Disability, Testimony, and Love

This is a dissertation about the metaphysical and epistemic grounding behind the mere difference view of disability. The case for the mere difference view rests on two key moves: First, given ableism, the plausibility of the mere difference view rests on the delineation of disability “in itself” from disability as it is currently experienced in the actual world. Chapter 1 is directed at this metaphysical task. I argue that metaphysic’s age-old concept of essence can be commandeered to do this work in social philosophy, and moreover, that its companion, potentiality, can also do valuable work in grounding the effects of disability in different contexts. Second, even with this distinction in hand, why question the intuitive assumption that disability is bad? The answer is disability-positive testimony from disabled people. This is the epistemic basis of the mere difference view. Chapter 2 is concerned with analyzing whether the lived experience of the Disability Rights movement indeed translates to authority that rationally compels others to believe the mere difference view. I examine disability-positive testimony in dialogue with debates on epistemic authority and argue that although lived experience does render personal testimony authoritative, it cannot directly compel acceptance of the mere difference view. Instead, I argue for distinguishing between different kinds of disability-positive testimony, the degrees of authority they have, and the role each kind ought to play. Finally, Chapter 3 is concerned with whether the testimony-based dialectic can be extended to the cognitively disabled who may be unable to speak for themselves. Although it is common for caregivers to speak on their behalf, their testimony is often dismissed because of worries that they are blinded by love. Against such dismissals, I argue that good caregivers are uniquely positioned to offer reliable and often insightful testimony because of the semi-transformative power of love.