Landing Peace: Rural-Poor Mobilization and Land Redistribution in Civil War Political Transitions

<p>Dominant theories of political transitions and redistribution suggest that negotiated settlements involve a trade-off: elites concede political incorporation to opposition actors yet resist wealth redistribution—especially when wealth is tied to land. Contrary to these expectations, 40 of 79 peace settlements addressed land reform between 1991 and 2022. Under what conditions is land redistribution achieved in civil war political transitions? More specifically, why is land redistribution enshrined in peace settlements? Why is it implemented at varying degrees?<br><br>I develop a theory of unarmed rural movement agency to explain both the negotiation and implementation of land redistribution. I argue that Indigenous, Afro-descendant, and peasant movements shape redistribution when they deploy mobilization strength: the ability to engage in intense political contention—organizational capacity—and credibly assert autonomy from warring factions—distancing capacity. By projecting legitimacy and urgency, movements forge consensus across partisan and warring divides. Where insurgents set the agenda, movements bridge divides between warring parties through a revolutionary coalition anchored to insurgent-led negotiation. Where insurgents are weak, movements expand agreement across partisan divides via a constituent coalition with reformist elites. After settlements, land delivery hinges on whether movements pair mobilization strength with political incorporation—their recognition as legitimate actors entitled to rights and state access. Movements activate land claims and shape policy from within, triggering property rights allocation to dispossessed communities.<br><br>I test this argument through a comparative historical analysis of Colombia’s two major peace processes (1988–1991, 2012–2016). In the 1990s, Indigenous and Black movements expanded cross-partisan consensus to secure collective land ownership, later driving allocation via grassroots organizing and bureaucratic posts. In the 2010s, peasant movements narrowed the gap between signatories’ preferences to shape individual land ownership, yet delivery has remained uneven. To assess generalizability, I conduct a cross-national regression analysis and a paired-case comparison of El Salvador and Guatemala. I employ process-tracing, NLP, network analysis, and regression, drawing on archives, 136 interviews, participant observation, and original datasets collected from 16 months of fieldwork in Colombia and 1 month in Central America. These findings underscore the overlooked role of unarmed movements in reshaping property rights in transitioning contexts.</p>