Can Working Memory Interference Explain Need for Cognitive Closure Effects in the Perception of Discrimination?

People often are faced with situations that seem as though they may be discriminatory (e.g., racist, sexist) but which are vague enough to provoke a variety of judgments. Prior research has shown that people take into account the characteristics of the executor of the ambiguous behavior, and also that certain personality traits of the perceivers as well as certain conditions of the environment influence these judgments. One particular construct that has been shown to moderate perceptions of discrimination is the need for cognitive closure (e.g., Bucchianeri & Corning, under review). This need is defined as the tendency to jump quickly to a conclusion Ì¢‰âÂ' right or wrong Ì¢‰âÂ' and stick tightly to it. Whereas there is empirical evidence to support the operation of this factor in the perception of discrimination (i.e., heightening one's tendency toward prototype use), there also is cause for criticism of this construct. In particular, the purpose of the studies presented here was to test whether a more basic and parsimonious explanation, situational interference with working memory, may account for previous studies' results regarding prototype use in the perception of discrimination. Results provided mixed support for this hypothesis. Contrary to expectations, Study 1 demonstrated that prototype use in the perception of discrimination was in fact related to higher levels of verbal working memory capacity. Study 2 did not support the hypothesized exacerbation of the prototype effect by interference with working memory, but provided preliminary evidence in support of this effect via a near-significant prototype main effect within the working memory interference condition.