Cyber-Weapons of the Weak: Understanding the Pursuit of Offensive Cyber-Capabilities by Smaller States

Cyber-weapons offer smaller countries significant strategic and tactical advantages across the international relations arena, yet not all smaller actors choose to prioritize cybersecurity and the development of offensive cyber-capabilities. This research project develops and tests a provisional theory about when and under what conditions smaller countries pursue offensive cyber-capabilities, arguing that smaller countries are more likely to develop offensive cyber-capabilities when threatened by a more powerful, cyber-armed rival, and when they demonstrate high-levels of military spending, a reliance on a high-tech military, or advanced national cyber-infrastructure.

In order to test my provisional theory, I created a cyber capabilities dataset and analyzed the security-resource theory variables in order to identify possible trends and correlations between proposed variables and each state’s level of cyber power. Based on the results of my analysis, I next ordered countries in a simple 2x2 matrix to identify the universe of cases. Finally, I examined variables inside the context of two in-depth case studies, Iran and Lithuania, and then across a series of five mini-cases. Together, the case study findings support my security-resource theory.