Divine Providence and Human Libertarian Freedom: Reasons for Incompatibility and Theological Alternatives
I approach the central issue of divine providence indirectly, by first considering principles that would lead one to 'stronger' incompatibility claims: that libertarian freedom is incompatible with prior truth and with divine foreknowledge. As I proceed from the problem of logical determinism to that of the compatibility of libertarian freedom with divine foreknowledge and finally to its compatibility with divine providence, I expect that more readers will judge that the principles that lead to the particular incompatibility thesis being discussed have greater plausibility than the implications of maintaining compatibility. I believe that many readers will find that at least some of the principles to which I appeal are more plausible than the implications of accepting the most controversial compatibility thesis – that the traditional Christian view of divine providence is compatible with human libertarian freedom. Finally, I end my dissertation by considering the two most plausible theological alternatives open to those who reject the compatibility of the traditional Christian view of divine providence with human libertarian freedom: Thomism and Open Theism. The former gives up libertarian freedom to maintain the traditional view of providence; the latter maintains libertarian freedom at the expense of meticulous sovereignty.
History
Date Created
2004-03-04Date Modified
2018-10-08Defense Date
2003-12-11Research Director(s)
Michael ReaCommittee Members
Michael Rea Philip Quinn David BurrellDegree
- Doctor of Philosophy
Degree Level
- Doctoral Dissertation
Language
- English
Alternate Identifier
etd-03042004-211128Publisher
University of Notre DameProgram Name
- Philosophy