Is The Trinity Constitutional? A Revision and Defense of Constitution Trinitarianism

In this thesis, I will defend a modified version of Jeffrey Brower and Michael Rea’s “constitution trinitarian” model of the trinity. Constitution trinitarianism is an attempt to resolve the so-called “problem of the trinity”; that is, the problem of how to reconcile the claim that God comprises three distinct divine persons with the claim that there is exactly one God. Brower and Rea attempt to reconcile these claims by applying to trinitarian metaphysics the relation of numerical sameness without identity. The trinitarian persons are non-identical with one another on the grounds that they possess distinct personal properties. But they comprise numerically one God on the grounds that they share between them a single quasi-material substrate–the divine nature–which comes together with the trinitarian properties to constitute the trinitarian persons. I argue that the core features of constitution trinitarianism furnish a successful solution to the problem of the trinity. I also argue, however, that constitution trinitarianism is not fully tenable in its original formulation and requires substantive modification. The major modification that I introduce concerns Brower and Rea’s understanding of the “substratum” held in common by the trinitarian persons. Brower and Rea originally conceive of this substratum as “immaterial stuff” that enters into composition with the trinitarian properties to form the divine persons. I will argue that this notion of “immaterial stuff” is of dubious coherence and propose instead that it is God Godself who enters into composition with the trinitarian properties. I call the theory that results from these amendments “modified constitution trinitarianism” (MCT). Accompanying this constructive task will be a secondary, methodological project: namely, to answer the question how theologians should treat the “sources” of trinitarian doctrine in constructing a theory of the trinity. Within analytic theology, it is often taken for granted that the major loci from which the church’s tradition of reflection on the trinity has derived should be treated as theological norms in the strong sense of standards to which any model of the trinity must conform. In contrast, I argue that these sources cannot be treated jointly as theological norms on equal footing with one another, and that the theologian must engage in the work of selection, privileging some texts over others as representing superior expressions of the normative development of trinitarian theology. I then propose some guiding parameters for this “work of selection.”