Powered Up: Substantial Unity and Upward Determination

<p>Hylomorphists coherently commit to intrinsically unified composites only if they affirm the existence of prime matter. Doing so frees them to concede that for a substance <i>y</i> composed of the <i>x</i>s,<i> </i>the causal powers of the <i>x</i>s upwardly determine <i>y</i>’s causal powers. Unlike some hylomorphic theories that endorse upward determination, however a theory that includes prime matter is not a version of non-reductive physicalism.</p><p> Chapter 1 introduces Robert Koons’s distinction between Staunch Hylomorphism (SH) and Faint-hearted Hylomorphism (FH). SH is committed to composite substances, but FH holds denies there are such. I argue that Koons’s answer to the question of how a substance <i>y</i>’s powers are related to those of the <i>x</i>s collapses into a version of FH on account of his view that <i>y</i>’s fundamental parts are the “enduring substrate of substantial change.”</p><p>Chapter 2 studies three hylomorphic theories that claim emergent causal powers distinguish composite substances from accidental unities. Both Patrick Toner and William Jaworski insist that emergent powers are <i>not </i>realized in the powers of the <i>x</i>s as the <i>x</i>s are configured in <i>y</i>. In contrast, Eleonore Stump claims that some of <i>y</i>’s powers are emergent in a weaker sense, such that they are realized in the powers of the <i>x</i>s. I argue that all three views are instances of FH. Each regards substantial forms as higher-level properties of a sort that do not forge intrinsic unity among a composite’s parts. </p><p>Chapter 3 argues that SH must characterize relations among a substance’s properties differently than Toner, Jaworski, or Stump. Unlike the proposals of Toner and Jaworski, SH must be compatible with the view that the properties of the <i>x</i>s upwardly determine all <i>y</i>’s properties. Unlike Stump’s theory, however, SH must not claim that <i>y</i>’s substantial form <i>F</i> is among the upwardly determined properties of <i>y</i>. On the contrary, the properties <i>y</i> bears as a member of its substantial kind<i> </i>are among <i>F</i>’s effects. </p><p>Chapter 4 argues that SH can fulfill these desiderata by appealing to prime matter. If <i>y</i>’s substantial form <i>F</i>actualizes a principle more basic than physical matter, i.e., some prime matter <i>M</i>, then <i>F </i>is not among <i>y</i>’s physical properties; rather, <i>F</i>’s is metaphysically prior to any such property. Moreover, <i>F </i>is the form not only of <i>y</i>, but also <i>y</i>’s physical parts, the <i>x</i>s. In that case, being part of <i>y </i>is of the essence of every <i>x</i>, and <i>y</i>’s intrinsic unity is secured. Now if <i>F </i>is the form of every <i>x</i>, then for every <i>x</i>, the properties <i>x</i> bears as a functional part of <i>y</i> are also posterior to <i>F</i>. <i>A fortiori</i>, the powers of <i>y </i>that are upwardly determined by the properties of <i>x</i>s are posterior to <i>F</i>. Therefore, SH is compatible with the upward determination of <i>y</i>’s<i> </i>causal powers.</p>