Prolegomena to a Kantian Theory of Moral Judgment

In this dissertation, I draw insight about what constitutes a good theory of moral judgment from Aristotle and, in particular, from John McDowell's appropriation of him in 'Virtue and Reason.' Articulating a set of desiderata for a theory of moral judgment, I consider whether Kant has the resources from which we could construct a similar theory of moral judgment while also retaining what I take to be advantageous aspects of his moral theory more generally. I turn to an examination of recent work in Kant's theory of theoretical judgment--in particular, the work of Beatrice Longuenesse in Kant and the Capacity to Judge--in order to find out what, for Kant, guides and makes possible theoretical judgment. Finding that theoretical judgment has at its core a teleological impulse to judge, I then show how this insight both can and cannot be applied to the case of moral judgment.