The Nature of Well-Being: Towards a Defense of Aristotelian Perfectionism

<p>In my dissertation I seek to provide an account of well-being that is wider in scope than other contemporary accounts, and has the power to play a much more substantial and fruitful role in moral theory. I will argue that contemporary discussions of well-being have construed well-being too narrowly, thereby stripping it of its capacity to play a much more fruitful role in moral theory. Once we develop a better understanding of well-being, we will realize that it can play a much more significant role in our ethical theorizing. To do this I will: (a) show that well-being can be understood to be much more closely tied to moral goodness or virtue than previously thought, (b) develop an account of well-being that can harmonize both subjective and objective elements that all ethical theorists find appealing. </p> <p>A central claim that I defend is that well-being (or welfare) is not just one kind of value or consideration among others, but one that can be taken to unify other values that can be realized in a person's life, by providing their purpose and point. The reason why this has not been fully appreciated is that during their discussions of the very concept of well-being, philosophers have often assumed a particular substantive conception of well-being. (This is, I will argue, due to a deeper philosophical position that attempts to make a sharp division between morality and self-interest.) But well-being, as that in virtue of which a person's life goes better, when taken in its most general sense, is a very broad notion that leaves wide open what particular kinds of values constitute it. So while it is true that welfare or 'prudential' value is conceptually different from other kinds of value that can be realized in one's life' aesthetic, moral, or perfectionist' these values are constitutive of welfare; what is good for us will depend on the different ways in which these values enter our lives.</p> <p>Another important part of the dissertation will also be to address what is perhaps the most central issue concerning well-being' whether or not well-being is ultimately subjective or objective. My strategy will be to go through some of the standard accounts of well-being offered by both subjectivists and objectivists and argue that none of them are fully adequate. I will contend that both subjective and objective elements of well-being are constitutive of it. I will then attempt to develop a more plausible and satisfying account of well-being, a species of perfectionist or nature-fulfillment account, that integrates both subjective and objective components. Once we see that the life with highest well-being includes both subjective and objective components, we will have a picture of how an ideal human life would go. And once we keep this picture firmly on our minds, we will also be able to have a deeper appreciation for the kind of work that well-being can do within moral theory, by providing an intelligible aim as the formal object of practical reason.</p>