The Progressive Era Regulationist Institutional Structure: A Case Study of the American Iron and Steel Industry
The industrial case study provides support for the hypothesis that regulated periods tend to increase the rates of profit, output growth, and capital accumulation relative to free market periods. The enhanced performance of the steel companies was achieved as a result of a price and wage stabilization program initiated by the United States Steel Corporation. The case study also shows how this part of the Steel Corporation's regulatory program led to increased fluctuations in employment and longer working hours for the steelworkers. In an effort to combat potential threats from the federal government, the American public, and organized labor to the market stabilization program and mechanization drive, the steel companies introduced a paternalistic welfare program, company unions, and limited hours reform. The ultimate goal of the steel companies in maintaining the progressive era regulatory environment in the iron and steel industry was the indefinite continuation of the period's enhanced profitability. The study thus provides a solution to the contradictory nature of the industry during the progressive era and offers a general model for radical political economists who seek to use SSA analysis to investigate microeconomic questions in addition to the macroeconomic questions for which the framework was originally devised.
History
Date Created
2004-04-02Date Modified
2018-10-04Defense Date
2004-03-29Research Director(s)
Martin H. WolfsonCommittee Members
Charles Craypo Kwan Kim William H. LeahyDegree
- Doctor of Philosophy
Degree Level
- Doctoral Dissertation
Language
- English
Alternate Identifier
etd-04022004-145635Publisher
University of Notre DameAdditional Groups
- Economics
Program Name
- Economics