The Unity of Identity and Difference as the Ontological Basis of Hegel's Social and Political Philosophy
In order to central problem presented by the structure of the will, I argue that we must first recognize the will as the highest instantiation of the more general structures that constitute the notion. On my interpretation, the term 'notion' designates Hegel's doctrine of substance. More specifically, this term presents his conception of substance in terms of categories normally associated with human subjectivity, in terms of representation and purposive action.
The will presents the highest or truest instantiation of the notion. Various notions can be ranked along a spectrum in accordance with their degree of success at resolving the basic problem facing all objects -- namely the problem of integrating or essentially relating identity and difference through self-constituting activity. The unification of identity and difference presents the central problem or paradox of Hegel's philosophy. It is a paradox that takes many forms. In this dissertation, I show how change, the structure of judgment, and the nature of the object all exhibit this paradox. I also show how Hegel's doctrine of the notion develops as a direct response to this paradox. Additionally, I argue that Hegel's account of the structure of the will -- as the unity of the universal and the particular, the unity of the infinite and the finite, and the unity of the indeterminate and the determinate -- presents the highest manifestation of the paradox that arises when we seek to explain the unity of identity and difference.
History
Date Modified
2017-06-02Defense Date
2008-04-09Research Director(s)
Karl AmeriksCommittee Members
Fred Rush Garry Gutting Stephen WatsonDegree
- Doctor of Philosophy
Degree Level
- Doctoral Dissertation
Language
- English
Alternate Identifier
etd-07172008-111348Publisher
University of Notre DameProgram Name
- Philosophy