APPLYING THE NEW FEDERALISM OF 1996

GOVERNORS AND WELFARE REFORM

A Dissertation

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In 1996, when he signed the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act into law, President Bill Clinton made a promise to Americans to "end welfare as we know it." However, with the devolution of welfare authority from the national government to the states, the type of welfare system that Americans would come to know under TANF would not only look different compared to the national AFDC programs of the past but would vary significantly from one state to the next. A number of explanations have been offered to account for this variation, but few have focused on the impact of the state itself and the institutions and individuals that govern state action. In an attempt to fill this scholarly void, this project seeks to examine the relationship between measures of gubernatorial power and welfare policy outcomes across the fifty states from 1996-1999. Using a variety of measures of gubernatorial power, results of quantitative tests relating to a number of key policy choices, and the ability of states to achieve identified goals relating to these policy options, indicate that the state executive power does play a significant role in determining policy formulation and implementation in the states. Finally, the project concludes with recommendations for future institutional research into state-level public policy studies.
For my wife, Kristi, and my parents.

Your lives and work have inspired my own. Thank you.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

1.1. Overview

Does the most visible, most powerful elected official in state government and politics have a substantial impact on major public policies? Until now, this question has been left largely to the realm of speculation and anecdote. Little research has focused attention on the role of governors in determining public policy outcomes in a significant and systematic fashion (Barrilleaux and Berkman 2003; Fording, et al. 2001; Barrilleaux 1999; Brace and Jewett 1995; Gross 1989), and even less on the explanatory power of the relative success offered by formal and informal powers of executives to governors in the policy arena. This is largely due to the fact that the study of state politics is often overlooked in favor of national institutions, behavior, and policy (Fording, et al. 2001). However, this “federal focus” only reveals part of the overall political puzzle in the United States. Due to the nature of American federalism, as well as the reemergence of the states from the late 1970s to today, what happens at the state level is just as important to understanding politics as what happens nationally (Conlan 1998; Kaplan and O’Brien 1991; Derthick 1989).1

1 An additional reason why research into the effects of political institutions on policy outcomes remains largely under-studied and under-appreciated in study of state politics is because of research that suggested that political systems were unimportant for consideration in evaluating patterns of public policy (see Dawson and Robinson 1963; Dye 1966; Hofferbert 1966). Instead, policy variation
Unfortunately, because of the paucity of research in this area, little is known about the actual affect of this institution as it relates to public policy outcomes that touch the lives of all citizens across the 50 states. If we want to understand and make sense of the policy process, as well as how and why decisions about policy are made, a formal, systematic approach to this question is both necessary and important. Until the role of institutions like the governor’s office is understood, questions about the democratic process and politics in the United States will remain unanswered.

With the passage of The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) in 1996, America experienced an emergence of the “new federalist” policies that began during the presidency of Richard Nixon and blossomed under Ronald Regan (Conlan 1998; Nathan 1997; Gold 1996; Kaplan and O’Brien 1991; Rosenthal 1990). Defined primarily by its emphasis on “devolving” federal influence over social policies to the states, the new federalism of the mid-1990s gave state governments more freedom to decide how to manage and implement social programs while simultaneously increasing pressure on state officials to make those programs work (Catchen 2001; Rom 1999; Albelda and Tilly 1997). An obvious effect of this move in power was the pushing of states to the forefront of the debates surrounding social policies. Rather than continuing to sing backup to the federal government’s lead, the states now had a greater role in determining the course

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was seen as being determined almost entirely along socio-economic lines. Even though later research began to report findings that lead scholars to begin calling for a renewed consideration of political institutions in policy studies (Sharkansky and Hofferber 1969), the lack of scholarly consensus as to the importance of systemic variables in the determination of policy variation in the states hampered the development of research in this field.
of some of the most long-standing controversies in modern-American political history.  

The devolution of authority from the federal government to the states not only opened a door for state governments to have a greater say in policy choices, it also offered “students of politics a unique opportunity to pinpoint the determinants of state-level policy choices – a case in which the fifty states responded virtually simultaneously to a single policy mandate” (Soss, et al. 2001, p. 378). This rare occurrence in which the American states were opened up as a laboratory for policy analysis on the same set of policy choices within the same time period offers a chance to see not only the impact federal policy has across the states, but it enables a look into the specific political activities of state governments in determining policy outcomes.

The purpose of this dissertation is to examine what effect governmental institutions have on the outcomes of policy within the states. More specifically, I will seek to assess what impact – if any – state executive officers have on determining outcomes in policy adoption and implementation. By going beyond studies that are only concerned with the affects of policy, I hope to fill a significant gap in the literature surrounding welfare reform; what occurs between the devolution of responsibility of welfare policy from the federal government and the outcomes that

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2 Alan Rosenthal (1990) described new federalist moves in the 1970s and 1980s in terms of three Ds: “devolution, deregulation, and defunding.” Rosenthal goes on to describe how these moves throughout Nixon’s administration and on through Reagan’s placed a significant burden on state governments, but the resurgence of the states in important policy areas such as welfare, education, and the environment creates an even more significant need for scholars to understand the workings of state governments and how they affect policy.
result. Likewise, although there have been studies examining different determinants of welfare policy across the states, these studies do not take into account the role state executives play in shaping outcomes. For example, according to Soss, et al. (2001), state policy choices made following the 1996 welfare reform act were largely influenced by factors such as birth rates among unmarried couples, caseload-population ratios, government ideology, inter-party competition, low-income voter turnout, unemployment rates, change in incarceration rates, percentage of Latino population, percentage of the population that was African-American, and previous welfare innovation. This is but one example of how the existing literature has neglected the significant role that one might expect state executives to play in determining welfare policy. And without understanding how the political systems of the fifty states operate, the process of how inputs are translated into the adoption and implementation of policy cannot be properly understood.

1.2. Why the Governor?

The reasons I selected the governor’s office as the primary focus of this exploration are the increased power and importance of the governor’s office in the last several decades, the nature of the office itself, and the high visibility enjoyed by the executive office at the state level (Barrilleaux and Berman 2003; Beyle 1999; Gross 1991, 1989; Derthick 1989; Sabato 1983). These factors are due in large part

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3 The Urban Institute (2001) has compiled a multi-year study that analyzes the effects of “the devolution of responsibility for social programs from the federal government to the states.” Focused “primarily on health care, cash assistance, and other income benefits, family structure, child care, child welfare, immigration, and long-term care,” the Urban Institute project is concerned entirely with policy outcomes and their effects. This means that, although the study traces program changes and fiscal developments, it does not explain how these modifications come about.
to the primary role governors began to play in state politics during the latter years of the twentieth century.

In *The American Governorship*, Coleman Ransone (1982) describes this emergence of the governor as the primary state actor when he wrote:

During the last thirty years, the American governor has emerged as a policy leader of no mean proportions. He also is emerging gradually as a leader in terms of more recently gained powers in the field of state management. His office has become the primary center of public attention at the state level, and his actions and speeches have considerable influence in molding public opinion. This tendency toward a strong governor means the office has increased in importance; in most states the governor is one of the key people in the fascinating game of political chess (p. 3).\(^4\)

Eric Herzik and Brent Brown (1991) support this characterization by Ransone, and claim, “Governors are the most salient actors in state government” (p. ix). Likewise, Donald Gross (1991, 1989) and Larry Sabato (1983) have referred to the twentieth century as an “executive era,” citing the rise to prominence of governors in American politics as one elements of his characterization. Ultimately, Governors are politicians, managers, policy makers, and administrators who, in the words of Thad Beyle and Lynn Muchmore (1983), “are elected to ‘run state government’” (p. 5).

Certainly, the contemporary American governor has risen to the position of first among equals in relation to other political institutions within state government,\(^5\) and because they have risen to this position it is often governors who are thought to

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\(^4\) Ransone makes the same statement in his 1956 publication, with the only difference between the two assessments is the statement “During the last thirty years…” in the 1982 book, and “During the last fifty years…” in the book from 1956.

\(^5\) Although he prefers a model that is more oriented towards viewing state executives and legislators on more equal footing, Alan Rosenthal (1990) notes, “In the twentieth century, and particularly in the 1950s and 1960s, the executive succeeded in carving out a distinct advantage over the legislature” (p. 2). Likewise, in the realm of policy, Rosenthal admits that although he is often biased in favor of the legislature it is “impossible to deny the central role of the governor in [their] relationship” (p. 3).
be at the very center of programmatic implementation, budgeting, and change when
power was devolved back to the states in 1996 (Cathcen 2001; Rom 1999). How they
approached the tasks delegated by the federal government was believed to be a major
factor in setting the stage for the form and content, the resources and support, and the
success or failure of many social programs in the United States. With this view of the
executive office in mind, it might be expected the governors of the U.S. to be major
players when it comes to determining policy. But are commonly held conceptions
about politics and democracy correct? Does the most visible – and arguably most
powerful – person in state politics have the most influence in determining social
policy and its implementation? Or does it even matter who is elected to the highest
state office? If it does matter, then in what ways are governors important, and upon
which dimensions of policymaking do they have the most impact?

1.3. The State of Research on Gubernatorial Power and Public Policy

Although it is commonly held that the modern governor is the most salient
and important political actor in state politics, the level of scholarly attention focused
on the activities of state executives in formal research is negligible (Brace and Jewett
1995). Few studies have analyzed the exact impact the governor has on determining
policy outcomes (Barrilleaux and Berkman 2003). Even fewer have approached this
issue from a large-N comparative analysis, largely due to the lack of a substantive
policy issues that affected all the states within a similar span of time. As Soss, et al.
(2001) explain, “Most cross-sectional studies . . . analyze variation in welfare grants
for a single year, but the policy choices that set the grants for any given year were
actually made at different times in different states. As a result, the analysis includes a great deal of unobserved variation in the political forces . . . as [states] acted to set their grant levels” (p. 379). Because it is a policy that affected all states at the same time, analyzing the impact of the governor’s office on the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act can increase what we know about the role of the governor in determining policy outcomes. Likewise, the PRWORA can highlight what role institutions play as determinants of social policy at the state level.

The last major attempts at determining the influence of governors on policy included a symposium in the *Policy Studies Journal* of 1989, and an edited volume of scholarly essays detailing gubernatorial leadership and state policy by Eric Herzik and Brent Brown in 1991. Since that time – in spite of the major changes in the relationship between the federal and state governments – little attention has been paid to the role of state-level executives and policy outcomes. In 1991, for example, Marshall Kaplan and Sue O’Brien studied the role of governors in the period of devolution following the reforms of President Ronald Reagan in the 1980s. However, their study focused on the anecdotal results of a few case studies. There was no large-N focus or comparison done to provide assessments that could be extracted and applied to all states in a general sense.

The first of two notable exceptions to the lack of empirical, large-N research on the role of gubernatorial leadership and policy outcomes is a recent study by Margaret Ferguson (2003) in which she develops a model of gubernatorial

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6 An additional collection of works on gubernatorial activity was released by Thad Beyle in 1992. However, these essays, and others like them, looked at the governor’s office in a more generalized sense. They were more interested in the institutional composition and design of state executive offices rather than on the influence governors had on determining policy outcomes.
policymaking based on a myriad of institutional, personal, and external variables. However, as Ferguson notes in the conclusion of her article, her approach was limited to a one-year snapshot of executive action in the legislative arena, and as such her findings “may be time-bound and fail to capture fully the dynamism” of the forces she examines (p. 173). Secondarily, Ferguson’s study took into account legislation in a general sense, and covered 89,678 pieces of legislation. Examining the effects of gubernatorial power on one particular form of legislation that affected all states simultaneously, and by tracing those effects over time, should increase the ability for scholar’s to draw substantive conclusions through more direct comparison. By limiting the focus of this study to welfare reform, it helps maintain continuity among the actors, choices, and interests across states. Whereas different groups might be interested in health care or education policies, one can assume with some confidence that welfare policy affects similar groups in similar ways across state borders. Therefore, containing the study to welfare reform specifically enhances the level of confidence that the same types of agencies, groups, and actors are influencing policy outcomes throughout the fifty states.

The second exception to the general lack of systematic research into the effect of gubernatorial power on policy outcomes is that of Charles Barrilleaux and Michael Berkman (2003). Their research, exploring the question of whether governors matter in the budget process, finds that governors who enjoy greater budgetary authority are likely to use that power to confer statewide (rather than localized) benefits. They also find that governors who enjoy a greater amount of “electoral security” are more willing to support the localize projects being proffered by state legislators. While
important, and a marked advancement from research that ignores the role of state executives in the budget process, Barrilleaux and Berkman do not explore the role governors play in any element of state policy beyond the budget. Additionally, the authors assume that only the budgetary powers of the governor are important to consider as a possible determinant of state spending outcomes, and as such leave out other important powers that can directly affect budget choices (e.g., veto power). Therefore, a study that goes beyond the work being done by Ferguson and Barrilleaux and Berkman is important for understanding the role of gubernatorial power in the development and implementation of policy.

The paucity of research on governors and public policy is in part due to the lack of attention paid to institutions in state politics in general by the scholarly community. A field essay by Paul Brace and Aubrey Jewett compiled in 1995 took stock of all of the articles related to state politics printed in the top six professional political science journals from 1983-1993. Although the authors acknowledge a “notable progress in the study of state politics [from 1983-1993].” (p. 643) their breakdown of the types of studies reveals an interesting fact about the ways in which state politics is approached in the scholarly community. Of the roughly 384 articles related to state policy in the decade they examined, only less then one-fifth of those articles related to government institutions, with even fewer focused on policy studies. This roughly amounts to 6-8 articles a year across the six journals relating to state institutions or policy studies, the bulk of which focused on the activities of state legislatures. This lack of attention being paid to the governors office in attempting to understand policy outcomes in the states creates a haze of ignorance in regard to some
of the most important institutional processes at the state level, and lead to improper estimations about the nature of policymaking in the states.

In 2001, *State Politics and Policy Quarterly (SPPQ)* journal was founded with the purpose of addressing concerns about a lack of focus on state politics in a manner that is coherent and cohesive. However, as the journal is still in its infancy, it has not been able to compensate for the lack of scholarly exploration into gubernatorial leadership and policymaking over the past several decades. An edited special edition of *SPPQ* about the approval ratings of public officials contained five articles relating to how a governor is received within a state and some the implications that result from such approval, and six other articles from the three-year period are dedicated to understanding the state executive office. However only Ferguson’s article directly deals with gubernatorial leadership and policy outcomes. The other articles are primarily focused on elections and campaign spending, popularity and approval, and the dynamics – meaning the different types and resources available for – but not the specific impacts of gubernatorial power (Ferguson 2003; Turner 2003; Bardwell 2003; Neimi, Beyle, and Sigelman 2002; Orth 2001; Adams and Squire 2001). Understanding those impacts will help lend greater insight to the public policymaking process that affects the lives of all Americans.

1.4. Public Policymaking in the States

Public policy analysts have long envisioned policymaking as a system of stimulus and response (Hawkins 1971; Easton 1965). One of the first models to capture the relationship between welfare demands and policy outputs was developed
by Richard Dawson and James Robinson in the early 1960s (Dawson and Robinson 1963). The Dawson and Robinson model was used to explain differential levels of welfare spending across the American states. They described a process that began with the initial state environment, which lead to the development of political rules and institutions. These institutions then helped to shape the policies that were to govern the citizenry. Once in place, this system worked in a symbiotic manner in which the external environment would create demands on the political system. These demands were seen as the initial input that lead to the parties and governmental institutions to respond by trying to negotiate a desired outcome among each other. Dawson and Robinson labeled this as the political process phase; the phase where responses to the input stimuli began to take shape and actors clashed on specific goals, plans, and operations for meeting the demands of their external environment. Finally, after the political process worked to negotiate the details, it gave birth to public policy outputs. That policy would then have an impact in the form of feedback on the political process, the political system, and the external conditions creating changes that would reshape demands and the policymaking process of the future.

The Dawson and Robinson model, although one of the first ways of conceiving of the policymaking process was critiqued and reformulated over time. Perhaps the most common way of understanding how demand inputs translated into policy outputs was detailed by Thomas Dye (1966), who developed a model of policymaking so well received it became known as the “mainstream model” (Treadway 1985, p. 15). Dye envisioned the policy process in a much more complex and sophisticated manner than outlined by Dawson and Robinson. According to Dye,
policy outputs were more dependent upon the external variables creating demand (socioeconomic variables in Dye’s case) than they were on the political institutions and operations of the state. Dye’s analysis has subsequently been adapted to explain variations in redistributive spending (Treadway 1985) and fiscal and regulatory policy (Berry and Berry 1992; Gormley 1983), including variations in state welfare policy (Tweedie 1994).

**Figure 1.1. Dawson and Robinson Model of Public Policy Process**


Such an argument ran contrary to what previous scholars like V.O. Key (1984) had written about the importance of state institutional arrangements and interaction as being the primary determinants of policy outcomes. In his *Southern Politics in State and Nation*, Key explains how political institutions within southern
states are extensions of the desire for white elites to maintain dominance through the subordination of African-Americans in the “black belt” of the south. One might initially read this as being a precursor to Dye’s demand, output model, but when more carefully examined it is clear Key is making an argument about the significance of institutions themselves in generating the types of policy that are seen in states throughout the south. Due to institutional makeup like one-party rule – additional parties might enable blacks to find an access point into the system wherein they could exert influence for the types of policies they desired – Key demonstrated how institutional arrangements were the driving force behind the non-progressive nature of social policy in the south. His conclusions highlight the idea that, while they are the result of social forces, institutions are important determinants of policy outcomes in the states. Thus, while social forces are important, and external political variables effectual, institutions should not be left out of an understanding of the policy process. However, even Key’s study is of limited importance to questions about the role of state executives in determining policy outcomes, as his analysis is limited to mediating institutional forces (i.e., institutional design, party makeup, points of access to the system, etc.) rather than the direct, specific role formal governmental institutions play in shaping public policy.

Unfortunately, those seeking to understand public policymaking at the state level often overlook even the limited institutional arguments posited by the likes of Key. For example, Soss, et al. (2001) stress the importance of environmental factors in determining welfare policy outcomes in the states. Using a trichotomous measure to differentiate policy outcomes across the fifty states, the authors attempt to measure
the “get-tough policy choices in the states” (p. 380). They examine the tightening and strengthening of restrictions on welfare policies within states, Soss, et al. account for the “four key areas in which lawmakers sought to end permissiveness” (p. 380). The four areas they identify are: 1. imposing obligations in exchange for assistance; 2. ending of long-term program dependency; 3. reformation of social behaviors; and 4. development of stricter penalties to force compliance. According to their research, state policy choices made following the 1996 welfare reform act were largely influenced by factors such as birth rates among unmarried couples, caseload-population ratios, government ideology, inter-party competition, low-income voter turnout, unemployment rates, change in incarceration rates, percentage of Latino population, percentage of the population that was African-American, and previous welfare innovation.

One of the problems with the analysis provided by Soss, et al. is the fact that they overlook the middle phases in the Dawson and Robinson and Dye models, and as such there remains a “black-box” of unanswered questions in which public demands are filtered through a political sphere and come out as policy. By skipping over these stages in the model, Soss, et al. offer no insight as to what, if any, affect the governing institutions had on the final content and form of welfare policy in the states.

A second problem that is present in the analysis presented by Soss, et al. is the fact that they assume the activities of the state are mere reflections of societal forces rather than as an independent force directing policy outcomes. This is not always the case. The rules and policies of state governments have influence on the types of
policy outcomes are pursued by politicians and bureaucrats at the state level. Rather than being a simple reflection of demographics and social demand, the state is in part a result of negotiation over rules and the struggles of governmental institutions, which have significant effect over policy over the long term (Krasner 1984). In the words of Alford and Friedland (1985), describing the statist view of politics, “Organizational goals are strategic choices and do not reflect societal values” (p. 162).

However, Soss, et al. are not the only ones who use external stimulus models to explain policy outcomes. A variety of other works look to broad, demographic stimuli to explain policy variation in the American states. For some scholars, political culture is at the heart of institutional and policy variance across the states (Elazar 1984; Sharkansky 1969). For others, ideology and partisan identification are the main factors influencing differences in public policy outcomes (Erikson, Wright, and McIver 1993). Still others have focused on racial and ethnic diversity as primary determinants of policy (Hero 1998; Hero and Tolbert 1996). Finally, there are those who argue that population demographics and abstract cultural or ideological identifiers are not nearly important as other important variables, which are seen as driving policy across the states (Dawson and Robinson 1963). Each of these theories provides an excellent indication of the types of environment in which state governments exist and act, but all overlook the actual institutional processes that translate environmental demands into policy outcomes. Put simply, these theories might explain the “why” and the “what,” but they gloss over the important questions of “who” and “how.”
1.5. State Institutions and Public Policy Formation

A theory that relies on stimulus-response to explain policy outcomes overlooks the role that actors within governing institutions play in shaping opinions regarding what elite actors might see as problems demanding solutions. Likewise, relying solely on environmental explanations to examine policy outputs loses sight of how institutional changes within government can alter the direction of policy and state programs. This is not to reject the idea that external factors are important to understanding policy decisions. It is merely an attempt to show that political actors within government, and the institutional structures that make up government, play an equally (if not slightly more) important part in the policy process than these theories allow.

1.5.1. The Role of the Governor in the Policy Process

State executives are unique in comparison to the state legislatures in that the governor is a statewide representative as opposed to being district specific (Barrilleaux and Berkman 2003). The actions of the governors are likely to reflect their attempts at creating the largest possible voter base across the state, just as members of the legislature will most likely attempt to meet the demands of their constituency within their voting district. This sets governors apart from legislators in that they have a more diverse pool of voters that they can attempt to bring into their fold. Legislators have a much smaller support-target, and as such are more
constrained than governors in what groups of people they are seeking political support from.7

The difference in primary constituencies is important in understanding executive-legislative relations. In dealing with the legislature, governors often do not find themselves dealing with unified majority and opposition groups. Instead, governors deal primarily with trying to control, or negotiate their way through, factions (Ransone 1982). In the post-election phase, parties become less important identifiers of individual activity within the legislature, as representatives will continue to do what the party needs but also have a great deal of individual independence to do what they need to accomplish for reelection.8 Likewise, the American system lends itself to having diverse groups that might not have anything in common other than party identification. This leads to a variety of unrelated (and sometimes competing) groups that fall under the umbrella of the same party, even though they may not agree with one another’s position.9 These are all part of the reason that governors often find

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7 Barrilleaux and Berkman (2003) find evidence that suggests that governors who enjoy high approval ratings and are considered to be electorally safe are more likely to support the constituency-specific spending measures called for by individual legislators than those who are insecure in their possibility of reelection. However, their research indicates that, in general, governors are more likely to support budgetary measures that optimize statewide benefits rather than benefiting a limited number of people in a single district.

8 David Mayhew (1974) on parties in the legislature: “It should be obvious that if they wanted to, American congressmen could immediately and permanently array themselves in disciplined legions for the purpose of programmatic combat. They do not. Every now and then a member does emit a Wilsonian call for program and cohesion, but these exhortations fail to arouse much member interest. The fact is that the enactment of party programs is electorally not very important to members (although some may find it important to take positions on programs)” (pp. 98-99).

9 Theodore Lowi (1985) talks about the role of parties in creating coalitions of support when examining presidential-congressional relations during the New Deal period and beyond. Lowi’s logic is that FDR used the umbrella of the Democratic Party as an identifying point for different groups to rally under and support during the development of his New Deal programs. Groups that were not traditionally linked or associated with one another found commonality in their support for the program itself. This translated into more groups voting Democrat because the party worked as a vehicle for groups and individuals to work through in order to get the policy outcomes they desired with the New Deal.
themselves dealing with various factions in the legislature, rather than with unified party organizations.\textsuperscript{10}

Given the relationship between state executives and the vast majority of legislators, it can be assumed that governors will often use policy to create a stable base of support in the electorate as well as in the legislature (Ransone 1982). The ability of the governor to advance his policy causes in the hopes of gaining the largest possible voter-base is significantly affected by the institutional powers of the office. These institutionally rooted powers are known as \textit{formal powers}. They are the specific, legally granted powers that are held by individuals when they take office. For example the ability for a governor to appoint, his tenure in office, his budget-planning authority, veto capabilities, and more all create the formal, institutional powers of a governor (Beyle 1999; Ransone 1982; Morehouse 1981; Bernick 1979; Schlesinger 1965). These powers, although broadly similar, vary from state to state, which is why some governors are considered more powerful when they take office than others. A governor can draw on these formal powers to influence and direct policy, as well as work to create policy via the legislature with his governing authority, and as such these powers are often viewed as a necessary condition for strong gubernatorial leadership (Beyle 1999; Sigelman and Dometrius 1988; Dometrius 1987; Mueller 1985; Dye 1969).

Concomitantly, governors are also individuals who bring with them to office difference according to who they are as leaders. Applying Neustadtian logic about executive leadership, personal ability and skill are major factors in determining the

\textsuperscript{10} Keith Hamm and Gary Moncrief (1999) offer an excellent discussion of legislative constituencies and representation issues in their look into legislative politics in the United States.
strength or weakness of a governor (Neustadt 1990).\textsuperscript{11} State executives often times must draw upon informal powers – powers not specifically granted, but nevertheless used to gain political leverage – in order to direct policy and political activity. Their ability to do so enhances the possibility of attaining the outcomes they seek (Beyle 1999; Ransone 1982; Morehouse 1981; Bernick 1979; Schlesinger 1965). In fact, Ferguson (2003) argued in her study that the informal, personal powers of the governor were far more important than the formal, institutional.

To determine what role the executive institutions play in shaping policy outcomes, I posit the following hypothesis: the stronger the formal and informal powers that rest within the governor’s office, the more influence the governor will have on policy outcomes. This would be an important finding for the study of state politics, because it would demonstrate that institutions do in fact matter, something vastly understudied in sub-national politics. It is possible, however, that regardless of the powers held by the governor within a state the governor will not play an important role in determining policy outcomes. Such a finding would be equally important to the study of state politics, and have implications for American democracy as a whole, because it stands in opposition to basic assumptions about elections and government. If the highest elected official within a state does not play a central role in determining policy, what does that tell us about where power is vested within state government? And how would such results reshape our view of the health of democracy in the U.S.?

The findings based on this hypothesis will, therefore, further important study in state

\textsuperscript{11} Neustadt’s argument about personal leadership traits relates specifically to the American presidency. However, the logic equally applies to state-level executives, and the similarities between the two offices in relation to policy choices and political activity allow his theory to easily travel into the realm of gubernatorial leadership.
and national politics, and help an understanding of just how policies that affect all Americans in profound ways are decided across the United States.

1.5.2. Gubernatorial Power

The sources of power governors traditionally draw upon to achieve their policy goals include both formal (specifically, legally granted) and informal (not specifically granted, but nevertheless used to gain political leverage) (Beyle 1999; Ransone 1982; Morehouse 1981; Bernick 1979; Schlesinger 1965). E. Lee Bernick (1979), who employs a systematic ranking of the importance of gubernatorial powers, lists the top formal and informal roles of the governor in order of importance as: 1. budget formation, 2. popular support, 3. administrative control (appointment power, influence of the administrative bureaucracy, etc.), 4. veto, 5. mass media, 6. prestige of office, 7. personal contact with legislators, 8. party leader, 9. personal characteristics, 10. public relations, 11. patronage, 12. bargaining skills, 13. legislative message, and 14. administration of programs in district. Scholars like Joseph Schlesinger (1965) and Thad Beyle (1999) use these resources available to governors as the basis for formulating an index of institutional and personal power ratings of executives in all fifty states.

Along with these resources of power, the governor also faces a number of constraints within the political system. These constraints also arise from formal and

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12 The formal and informal powers available to state executives are often cited, but concrete analysis as to the specific roles each of these powers play is not readily available within a gubernatorial context. However, these powers are also often discussed in the presidential literature in which a number of rich texts describe the specific ways in which these powers enhance executive leadership. For further reading on the treatment of executive powers in the presidential literature, see: Arnold 1998; Skowronek 1997; Nelson 1995; Milkis 1993; Neustadt 1990; Kernell 1988; Ceaser 1979.
informal sources. Beyle (1999) details a number of constraints that arise in dealing with the legislature. Among the restraints he describes is the power of the legislature to adopt or reject a proposed budget, agreement or disagreement on policy directions, partisan composition and level of professionalization of the legislative houses, and confirmation of appointments. Likewise, tenure potential, the type of veto power given to the governor, political experience (or lack thereof), and the watchdog efforts of the media can all have an impact on a governor’s ability to perform executive functions.\footnote{As in the case of sources of executive power, the constraints that act upon executives at all levels can be found in the aforementioned texts on presidential leadership.}

There are a number of indices that attempt to quantify gubernatorial power. For example, one of the most commonly cited indexes was an ordinal measure created by Joseph Schlesinger (1965) that attempted to rate the formal, institutional powers vested within the governor’s office. This index was later modified by Nelson Dometrius (1979), and although Dometrius’ “Revised Measure of the Governor’s Administrative Powers” does not factor in the tenure potential of governor’s, like the Schlesinger model, it is preferable to the original measure because, even though “the concurrence between these two indices is moderately high, the revised measure is twice as powerful a predictor of gubernatorial power” (pp. 608-609). A summary table of the revised Dometrius index is provided in the Appendix.

Although there is merit to both the Schlesinger and Dometrius measures of gubernatorial power, the index that I will employ in this study will be that of the “Personal and Institutional Powers of Governors” compiled by Thad Beyle (1999). Beyle’s measure of gubernatorial power is preferable to the other indices because it
utilizes the same elements as the Schlesinger and Dometrius ratings, and includes some formal elements not examined. At the same time, Beyle adds a second index that evaluates the informal powers held by governors of the fifty states. These scores are then tallied into one measure of gubernatorial power. The coding for Beyle’s index can be found in the Appendix.

1.5.3. Executive Legislative Relations: Competing Models of Competing Institutions

No study of the role that governors play in determining policy would be complete without at least some attention being paid to state legislatures. As the purpose of this study is not to explore competing institutions, or their differing impacts on policy outcomes, I do not intend to devote much of this study to legislatures specifically. However, due to the symbiotic nature of these political institutions within the realm of checks and balances, it is important to note what role state legislatures play in enhancing or detracting from a governor’s ability to affect policy.

In his work examining the relationship between governors and legislatures, Alan Rosenthal (1990) describes two competing models for describing interaction between the two institutions. The first of which is the independence model in which the governor acts as the primary state actor, initiating policy programs and setting the political agenda. The role of the legislature in this model depends on how legislators respond to gubernatorial activity. In the independence model, the legislature accepts, rejects, or amends the governor’s policies. It is the governor’s responsibility to determine what aspects of policy to put forth, and to follow up on these policy
initiatives through to their conclusion (Jones 1983). This model concentrates primary attention to the governor as the “principal overseer of public interest,” and the legislature plays more of a supporting role rather than a lead (Rosenthal 1990).

Rosenthal does not dismiss the legitimacy of the independence model, but rather says he prefers a perspective of state political institutions in which the legislature is viewed as either equally, or more, important than the governor. He therefore places his support behind an *exchange model* wherein the two branches are viewed as “interdependent” and policy is determined through “considerable bargaining.” Rosenthal sees interdependence as a more appropriate way of viewing the state political process due to the amount of work, resources, and attention concentrated within the legislature, as well as the fact that “[legislatures] handle many more issues than does the governor, because of entrepreneurial members pushing their own pet bills, a myriad of organized groups lobbying legislators to advance special interests through legislation, and departments and agencies relying on the legislature for bills they need to further bureaucratic objectives” (p. 95).

Despite the number of issues taken on by legislatures, or the amount of attention that is given to this branch of state government by lobbyists or representatives of various agencies, the model that I feel best captures the role of governors and legislative representatives in this study is that of independence. Governors dominate the policymaking process at the state level in that they set the agenda, initiate policy, and work to push through their policies to conclusion. As Rosenthal writes, “In the policy-making process of the states, the spotlight is on governors and their priorities” (p. 96). Therefore, in terms of acting as a determinant
of welfare reform outcomes, the legislature will be viewed primarily in how it can work to enhance, or detract from, the governor’s ability to achieve their policy goals.

In order to determine just how state legislatures work for or against a governor’s legislative program, I will consider the following elements that could impact passage of executive initiated policies. First, does the state have a professional or citizen legislature? Second, what is the overall party make-up, and does it match the governor’s party or is it in opposition? Third, does the governor play a significant role in appointments and leadership selection within his or her state? Finally, if possible, I will attempt to determine the predisposition of the legislature to proposed gubernatorial reforms in relation to welfare policy in order to determine levels of congruence between the two branches prior to the passage of reform bills. Incorporating the answers to these four questions can help to increase an understanding of exactly how much a governor relies on certain elements within the legislative branch to achieve desired policy results. Likewise, combined with the gubernatorial power index, it will help to show whether or not those executive powers are important in achieving the policies governors are seeking, and if so how they might work to push passage through the legislature.

1.6. Alternative Sources of Policy Outcome Determination.

In addition to the gubernatorial power index, other determinants of welfare outcomes will be applied to examine what factors shape policy at the state level. As noted previously, these “external influences” outside the bounds of the governor’s office create the demands, needs, and motivations for gubernatorial action in regard to
policy concerns. It is important to include these concepts into our understanding of gubernatorial leadership and policy outcomes, because these forces help complete the picture about how much influence a governor may have to shape policy and how much policy is merely the result of social, economic, and political interplays outside the state executive office.

1.6.1. Political Culture

The first of these determinants to be considered is “political culture.” Culture in the US has long been viewed as being relatively uniform. From the time when Alexis de Tocqueville wrote *Democracy in America*, it has been commonly assumed that Americans share a common belief in egalitarianism, freedom, capitalism, and liberal-democracy. However, there are those that feel it is important to further unpack the concept of culture in order to better comprehend variance in action across the American states. Daniel Elazar, for example, is most commonly associated with the study of American subcultures (1984). His trichotimization of culture attempts to explain the long-standing political differences that continue to have an affect on politics even today. Elazar breaks the base American liberal-democratic ideology into *individualist*, *moralist*, and *traditionalist* subtypes. Each of these subcultures, rooted in historical immigration patterns in the United States, has a unique impact on the way in which citizens respond to government and politics.14

14 There are a number of debates surrounding Elazar’s classification of states based on these three cultural forms. According to Virginia Gray, there have been a number of empirical tests of Elazar’s political culture measure, and that these tests have revealed support for his conclusions. However, this does not leave Elazars findings without criticism. Some criticism is leveled at the terminology employed by Elazar, arguing that the individualist, moralist, and traditionalist labels are misleading. More substantively, Elazar’s measure has been criticized for not taking into account issues
1.6.2. Social Diversity

The next determinant to be included in my analysis of social policy outcomes is that of racial and ethnic diversity. Robert J. Samuelson (2001) writing for *Newsweek* highlights the increasingly important role that social diversity is having in America today. According to Samuelson, after the 2000 census figures were released, there was an increased awareness in the media about the impact that immigration and “assimilation” (or lack thereof) is having in the transformation of modern America.

Similarly, some significant scholarly attention has been paid to the effects of race on social policy. Rodney Hero and Caroline Tolbert (1996) established a breakdown of state diversity using not only minority populations, but also proportions of white ethnic groups given state boundaries. They use this as a foundation for showing that existing racial and ethnic patterns are just as (if not more) important than historical cultural patterns. Hero (1998) extends this analysis by classifying states based on patterns of diversity. First, there are the *homogenous* states. These are the state whose concentrations of whites (Northern and Western European) are high, and white ethnics (Southern and Eastern European) and minorities (Blacks, Latinos, and Asians) are both low. The second classification Hero gives are of *heterogeneous* states. These states are said to have moderate levels of whites, high levels of white ethnics, and moderate levels of minorities within their populations.

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of race, change over time, oversimplification, and its inability to move from an aggregate to an individual-level explanation of behavior. See: Gray 1999; Hero 1998; Lieske 1993.
Finally, there are the bifurcated states that, according to Hero, tend to have high white, low white ethnic, and high minority population.

1.6.3. Ideology

Along with political culture and diversity, ideology can play an important role in determining policy outcomes at the state level. Therefore, I will also include partisan and ideological identification measures developed by Erickson, Wright, and McIver (1993). These measures are the result of over 120-pooled surveys conducted by CBS News and the New York Times. The authors find that individual attitudes and perspectives in regard to party identification and ideological positions are largely a product of the state in which they live. Regardless of the basis for these views of citizens, Erickson, Wright, and McIver assert as a result of their findings that there is a strong “state effect” that influences political attitudes and views. Thus, an inclusion of these measures is important in seeing whether or not ideology and partisanship play a significant role in determining social policy outcomes.

Concomitant with these measures of culture, diversity, and ideology, I will also apply the independent variables used in the Soss et al. (2001) study of welfare policy choices after the devolution revolution. These variables include unmarried birth rate, caseload-population ratio, inter-party competition, low-income voter turnout, unemployment rate, change in incarceration rate, and welfare innovation.15 These variables capture a number of important social and economic forces that could impact the formation of welfare policy.

15 These authors also include government ideology and percent Latino, percent African-American into their study of welfare policy formation. However, these factors are covered in a more comprehensive manner in the Erickson, Wright, and McIver (1993) and Hero (1998) measures.
1.7. Exploring the Role of State Executives and Welfare Policy Outcomes: A Brief Overview

It is my belief that gubernatorial power, both formally and informally, will have a significant and substantial effect on the outcome of welfare policy in the states following the 1996 devolution in the PRWORA. In attempting to show what role specifically governors play in determining these outcomes; the rest of my exploration into this question is divided into the following chapters. Chapter 2 is a look at the historical dynamic between welfare policy and state executives leading up to the 1996 reforms. This will include a detailed look into the PRWORA, and the guidelines held therein as they apply to the states.

Chapter 3 introduces the data to be used in this study, as well as the model to be employed. In addition, I will report the findings gathered from tests utilizing this data and discuss the implications of the outcomes. Chapter 4 will be dedicated to a follow-up study of the effects of gubernatorial power on the implementation of welfare reform policies following their adoption in the states. The purpose of this chapter is to determine whether governors continue to play a role in the policy process following the initial development of those policies.

The final chapter will be dedicated to a discussion of the major findings and implications of this study with an eye toward advancing the state of state politics scholarship. Not only will this discussion help to add to what is known about state politics and government in the United States, it will also open up new questions and thoughts for future research. In the end, I hope to fully answer the question that
began this study: Does the most visible, most powerful office in the American states have a substantial impact on major public policies?
CHAPTER 2

PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITY AND WORK OPPORTUNITY
RECONCILIATION ACT OF 1996: HISTORY, THEMES, AND THE ROLE
OF STATE EXECUTIVES IN WELFARE REFORM

2.1. Overview, History, and Themes of Welfare in the United States

While accepting the 1932 Democratic Presidential nomination, Franklin Roosevelt made the infamous claim: “I pledge you, I pledge myself, to a new deal for the American people.” With that promise in mind, FDR worked to create a package of programs that would drastically change the face of American federalism. The New Deal, Roosevelt’s response to the harsh economic realities facing the United States in the 1930s, consisted of several relief programs that sought to address problems resulting from unemployment. Some of the more sweeping programmatic changes included the creation of the Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC), the Federal Emergency Relief Administration (FERA), the Civil Works Administration (CWA), and the Works Progress Administration (WPA). These programs were responsible

16 There were another of other programs developed and administered under the New Deal. For example, there was the Home Owners Loan Corporation (HOLC), which worked to help lending institutions and property owners financially during the economic hardships of the 1930s. Although different from the other programs that targeted unemployment and poverty directly, the HOLC and other New Deal programs are examples of the expansion of federal spending and growth that reshaped the nature of federalism in the U.S.
for providing millions who were out of work with jobs and helped to revitalize the staggering American economy.\(^{17}\)

In addition to the federal jobs programs created under the first years of the New Deal, the most notable aspect of Roosevelt’s relief package came in 1935 with the passage of the Social Security Act. The Act, designed to provide pensions for the retirees, the disabled, as well as survivors benefits and financial assistance for dependent children, created the modern American welfare state. Specifically, Title IV of the act established the Aid to Dependent Children (ADC) program that offered monetary assistance to needy children. After several revisions to the ADC, which included extending benefits to provide for parents of needy children to offering financial assistance to children in the last trimester of their mother’s pregnancy, the program was renamed in 1962 as Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) so as to reflect the extension of relief from just children to families in need.\(^{18}\)

Following its inception, a number of other programs designed to assist the poor were brought under the enforcement of AFDC provisions, which began changing the federal dynamic between the national and state governments in dealing with welfare. For example, in response to growing concerns about hunger in America, the Nixon Administration pushed for the enlargement of the federal food stamps program that began during the New Deal era. In 1974, Congress further expanded the food stamps program by making it a requirement for all states to participate. Later, in 1988, the federal government again expanded the scope of

\(^{17}\) Although much has been written about the presidency of FDR, the New Deal and its legacy, and the changing face of American politics during the 1930s and 1940s, a few suggested are: Barber (1996); Badger (1989); Eden (1989); Cohen (1986); Sitkoff (1985); Conkin (1975).

\(^{18}\) For a complete history of the development of AFDC and welfare assistance to the needy, see Handler and Hasenfeld (1997), Katz (1996), and Coll (1995).
assistance as a part of its Job Opportunities and Basic Skills (JOBS) program, requiring mandatory state participation in the provision of Medicaid to qualified individuals and their families. These are but two examples of the changing relationship between the federal and state governments in the development and application of welfare programs (Derthick 1996, 1970).

Although a vast majority of the focus on the study of the New Deal is at the federal level, some attention has been paid to the impact of its legacy on state and local politics. In looking at the New Deal as it affects the states, some scholars have concluded that the influence of FDR’s program was marginal at best. For example, James Patterson (1969), although seeing the New Deal as changing the nature of federalism in the U.S., described the effect of FDR’s programs across America as, “an overused piece of carbon paper whose imprint on the states was often faint and indistinct” (126). However, others viewed the New Deal as bringing about changes not only in the dynamics of federal-state relations, but also substantial changes in the nature of state politics as a whole. For example, David J. Maurer (1975) detailed how the New Deal helped to bail-out the state of Ohio, which was teetering on the brink of economic disaster in the early 1930s, and how the matching fund programs used for public welfare and works programs helped to grow the size and scope of its governmental functions. Similar results were seen in other states across the country, as the New Deal facilitated reform of not only the face of federalism, but of party-politics, and state and local governmental capacity and responsibility.19

19 John Braeman, Robert Bremmer, and David Brody (1975) assembled a collection of case studies detailing the effects of the New Deal on 13 American states and large urban centers. These cases, chosen for their diverse socio-demographic and regional backgrounds, comprise an anecdotal representation of how the New Deal affected the nature of state and local politics.
Since its implementation, welfare policy in the United States has been debated from all sides. Oddly enough, however, the narratives of these arguments rarely change. Instead, the welfare debates of the 1990s were similar to those of the 1960s, 70s, and 80s, as there continues to be disagreement as to whether the causes of poverty are due to personal or social and economic problems (Latham 2001; Handler and Hasenfeld 1997; Marmor, et al. 1992; Mead 1986; Bell 1965). There has been long standing continuity in the political clashes surrounding welfare that can be summarized in four identifiable themes: federalism (Derthick 1996; Thompson 1996; Peterson 1995; Kaplan and O’Brien 1991), dependency (Misra, et al. 2003; Mink 1998; Edin and Lein 1997; Holloway 1997; Kleniewski 1995), deservedness (Barker 1999; Handler and Hasenfeld 1997; Armstrong 1995; Berrick 1995; Gordon 1994; Omi and Winant 1994; Edin 1993; Burton 1992), and morality and behavior (Wolfe 1998; Handler and Hasenfeld 1997; Berrick 1995; Murray 1984). The reforms that result from these political contests are almost entirely directed at resolving these debates. Moreover, although the pendulum has seemingly swung from the more Liberal expansion of welfare under the Great Society of the 1960s to a more Conservative approach in the new federalist policies of Ronald Reagan in the 1980s and the Republican Revolution in the mid-1990s, the dialogue on both sides has remained almost uniform in how the state of welfare should be interpreted and dealt with (Handler and Hasenfeld 2002; Kaplan and O’Brien 1991).

20 Historian Gareth Davies’ description of the implementation and aftermath of The Great Society supports this notion of a pendulum swinging from “left to right.” Davies argues that, although more conservative that the 1960s, the politics of the 1970s did not begin as fundamentally conservative. Rather, the momentum of the Great Society carried over into some of the policy in the early 70s under Nixon, and began to slowly shift to the right through to the Reagan Administration. See Davies (2002).
The first half of this chapter will deal with the “themes of the welfare debate,” and will place them in the context of the 1996 welfare reforms. This section will explore the role that states played in bringing about welfare reform in the mid-1990s, as well as the logic behind this act of devolution. The second half of the chapter will focus on the actual legislation of the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act, offering an overview of the types of reforms being made and showing how those reforms impacted state gubernatorial flexibility in determining welfare policy.

2.2. Debating Welfare: How Do the States Fit In?

Before one can truly understand how gubernatorial power and action worked to determine welfare policy outcomes, it is important to understand how governors themselves fit into the dominant themes surrounding social welfare. By understanding and incorporating this logic into our discussion about policy, the impact of leadership efforts by governors before, during, and after the passage of reforms can be more fully understood.

2.2.1. Welfare Controversy #1: Federal-State Relations

The first theme driving the welfare debate has been the issue of national versus local control (Derthick 1996; Kaplan and O’Brien 1991).21 President Ronald

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21 Paul Peterson has traced out the development of modern federal-state relations in regards to welfare and the Republican “Contract With America” in terms of modernization of labor and the development of infrastructure. Peterson argues that the mobility of labor in contemporary America has placed state governments in competition with one another for the development of jobs and sustaining strong markets within their states. Peterson’s assessment holds that it is more functional for states to
Reagan exemplified one side of this long standing argument in his first inaugural address, in which he stated, “It is my intention to curb the size and influence of the Federal establishment and to demand recognition of the distinction between the powers granted to the Federal Government and those reserved to the States or to the people. All of us need to be reminded that the Federal Government did not create the States; the States created the Federal Government.” This statement goes to the very heart of the debate surrounding welfare tensions between those who want greater state, rather than federal, authority over such programs.

During the 1992 presidential campaign, then Democratic Governor of Arkansas William Jefferson Clinton made a promise to “end welfare as we know it.” These words echoed the sentiments of governors across the United States who were clamoring for increased control over the welfare programs and reforms they felt their states needed. Although little was done within the first two years of his administration to make these words a reality, Clinton’s promise came to fruition after the 1994 Republican sweep of Congress (as well as the majority of state executive offices), when conservative leaders across the country and in the House and Senate worked with President Clinton on developing the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996. Better known as the “welfare reform act,” PRWORA worked to devolve over 100 federal programs to the states in the form of block grants. The logic behind such a move is simple: States are closer to the people, take a greater role in regulating economic development, but that this role as come at the expense of the poor as state governments have overlooked social welfare policy in the face of economic competition. However, the 1994 Republican revolution in the US House and Senate pushed forward the notion that states were proven to be able to know what is best for their citizens, and as such should be given greater control and flexibility over social welfare programs as well. Although not specifically to the point, Peterson’s work is an excellent example of the types of arguments that have long dominated the national versus local debates on welfare (Peterson1995).
and therefore would be better equipped to meet the specific needs of their populations.

The move to devolve greater control over welfare from the federal government to the states came, therefore, in part do to the demands of state executives, who felt they could help resolve “problems” within the current welfare structure by tailoring policies to meet the specific needs of people within their state. A blanket welfare policy was seen as too restrictive on state officials, and generalized to the point of inefficiency. According to Wisconsin Governor Tommy Thompson, “flexibility is what the governors need and that’s what the governors will have” (House Education Committee 2002). As the pendulum continued to swing farther to the right, the more conservative logic of localism increased its momentum through the passage of the PRWORA in 1996, and continued to dominate discussions of reauthorization in 2000. Thus, state executives were able to insert themselves into one of the more prevalent themes of welfare – federalized versus localized control – and assert influence on national leaders to increase their authority over welfare policy.

2.2.2. Welfare Controversy #2: Cycle of Dependency

The second theme in the welfare debate is that of dependency. Much has been argued on both sides of the liberal-conservative divide about whether or not a guarantee of aid encourages long-term dependence on the part of welfare recipients. While some have asserted that the money given to those in need through programs like AFDC and WIC are barely enough to make ends meet, let alone enough to
encourage people to stay out of the labor force, still others contended that welfare was becoming a “way of life” for far too many people.\textsuperscript{22}

On the issue of dependency, states also were able to assert themselves into the forefront of legislative discussion at the national level. Governor Tommy Thompson issued one of the nation’s earliest and most comprehensive welfare reform packages for the state of Wisconsin. Known as “Wisconsin Works,” or W-2, Thompson’s welfare initiative not only proposed a number of programmatic and administrative changes in his state’s welfare system, but also struck a blow at one of the most controversial elements of welfare under AFDC – guaranteed entitlement to aid.\textsuperscript{23} Although the passage and implementation of W-2 did not fully replace AFDC in Wisconsin until September 1997, President Clinton was already offering his support for the program in May 1996. On June 6, 1996, the U.S. House of Representatives voted to support H.R. 3562, authorizing Wisconsin to implement its Works program on a statewide, trial basis. This program was to act as a demonstration of the ability of the states to develop and run their own welfare systems in ways that would better meet the needs of their citizens.

By emphasizing work programs as an alternative to guaranteed entitlement to aid, Governor Thompson was attempting to resolve the controversy surrounding welfare dependency. His efforts to innovate welfare in his state acted as both an example and a catalyst for federal reforms, and helped to thrust governors into a stronger role as program designers and implementers for social welfare policies in

\textsuperscript{22} For more on these debates, see Mink 1998; Edin and Lein1997; Holloway 1997.  
\textsuperscript{23} For a complete overview of how the W-2 program works, see Wisconsin Department of Workforce Development, Division of Workforce Solutions, “Wisconsin Works (W-2) Program Resource Page,” Found online at http://www.dwd. state.wi.us/dws/w2/default.htm, Last updated October 15, 2003.
their states. It was due to Thompson’s initiative and success that helped to propel governors into a more direct leadership position in regards to welfare reform, and his example was soon to be followed by governors across the country after the passage of TANF replaced the long standing guarantee of aid programs of AFDC.

2.2.3. Welfare Controversy #3: Defining the “Deserving Poor”

A third controversy surrounding social welfare policy in the United States has been an issue of defining who does and does not deserve assistance. It is within this debate that more dominant narratives of race and gender come into play. It has been long argued that public opinions toward welfare programs are linked with public attitudes toward race, in particular attitudes toward blacks (Barker 1999). Some have argued that the association between blacks and welfare can be traced to political priming on the issue from the likes of Ronald Reagan and Daniel Patrick Moynihan, who have implanted images of “undeserving minorities” (the mythological welfare queen as a black woman with numerous children who can still afford a big screen television) to raise public ire against social welfare spending (Misra, et al. 2003; Barker 1999; Omi and Winant 1994). Still others have argued that welfare is a racial issue because of a politics of difference that offers a bright-line to separate the deserving from undeserving poor (Handler and Hasenfeld 1997). And still others have promulgated the notion that sexual politics is what is driving the debates around who does and does not deserve the support of social welfare programs (Armstrong 1995; Berrick 1995; Gordon 1994; Edin 1993).
Whether or not one of these arguments is more or less correct than any of the others, the issue of deservedness is one that has long dominated discussions about welfare. Here is another area in which states were seen as better providers of welfare for their citizenry than the national government. By allowing for programmatic diversification, state governments could cater to the racial and sexual demographics of their particular populations in order to deal with the problems directly confronting them. This could help to refocus the images used across the country so that it brought welfare spending home. No longer would welfare be viewed as a nebulous program in which Idaho tax dollars were being used to support people in New York or California, but instead, it could be spun a homegrown program of neighbor helping neighbor. This helped to eliminate notions of difference and similarity, and by being given the flexibility to address different racial and gender populations differently, the states were now able to deal with poverty in a way more “palatable” to the patriarchal norms that defined their given populations.

2.2.4. Welfare Controversy #4: Modifying Morality and Behavior

Finally, the devolution of welfare authority to the states helped to resolve debates about the affect of social welfare on morality and behavior. In the 1980s, Charles Murray (1984) helped to popularize notions that welfare programs were destroying work ethic, tearing apart homes, and causing a moral decay throughout American society. These notions became commonplace among middle-class America who bought into the idea that welfare was promoting divorce, teenage pregnancy,
laziness, and a number of other social ills (Wolfe 1998; Handler and Hasenfeld 1997; Berrick 1995).

So how exactly does delegating an increased authority over welfare programs to the states help to resolve these issues? Similarly to the way that devolution would help to ameliorate some of the racial and sexual debates, granting more authority to state governments would help to localize the politics of welfare. According to Handler and Hasenfeld (1997):

Why delegation to the lowest levels of government? Because it is there that the conflicts between charity and ideology are most keenly felt. Local officials believe that they know best how to resolve the moral dilemmas, how to distinguish the deserving poor from the undeserving. At the same time, delegation serves the interests of upper-level politicians. They can claim to be taking the moral high ground, to be “solving” the welfare mess, while leaving the moral conflicts to be sorted out at the local level, out of sight (they hope) (20).

Here we see a fine description as to how devolution alone would help to resolve some of the debates surrounding welfare policy. By localizing the issues, it enables state officials to attack poverty in accordance to the moral and ideological value sets of their particular state’s population. Much has been written about the cultural and ideological differences across states, and as such it is obvious why a blanket federal policy became so entwined in “moral” controversy. What is agreed upon as acceptable in California may not be what is acceptable in Iowa, and vice-versa. Devolution once again was an attempt to give state officials what they were already demanding, flexibility and authority to deal with issues of concern to them.

The idea that “local is better” in terms of differences across states in need and demographics is not without merit. In 1997, Kathryn Edin and Laura Lein looked at
the different “survival strategies” used by women who were either receiving welfare or had were living on low-income employment. Although these studies were based on women in four urban cities, the results are at least suggestive of the notion that differences in location due to infrastructure, social composition, and family orientation and support, are both present and efficacious. Although not writing specifically to this point, Edin and Lein’s work helps to lend credence to the belief that different locales face different problems, and as such state officials who are closer to the problems at hand might be able to better identify and attack these problems.

2.3. United Governors, United Causes: The Role of the National Governor’s Association in the Development of Federal Welfare Reform

The devolution of welfare authority sought to put an end to a number of controversies surrounding programs like AFDC. However, the aforementioned reasoning is not the only way that states found themselves at the forefront of welfare reform. Many governors began to take an active role in lobbying and pushing for change under the united front of the National Governor’s Association. Formed in 1908, the National Governor’s Association (NGA) works as a “collective voice of the nation’s governors,” and has gained a reputation as one of the nation’s most powerful lobbying groups. Throughout the development, implementation, and reauthorization of the PRWORA, the NGA was active in attempting to shape and mold welfare policy so as to give state executives greater leverage over these controversial social programs.
The NGA first began really influencing the direction of the welfare reform debate in 1996 when the organization offered a unanimously agreed upon, bipartisan proposal to make sweeping changes in the welfare system. Almost immediately, House Speaker Newt Gingrich and Senate Majority Leader Robert Dole – who attempted to incorporate the suggestions offered into a version of welfare reform that would be agreeable to the states – championed the proposal submitted by the NGA (American Public Human Services Association 1999). Subcommittees in both the House and Senate began hearings on the proposal in late February. The proposal, however, met with opposition from the White House. Health and Human Services Secretary, Donna Shalala, argued that the President could not support the proposal as it was offered by the NGA because it was too restrictive and did not allow for proper assistance for children and immigrants (American Public Human Services Association 1999).

In May 1996, President Clinton offered his support to the W-2 program for the state of Wisconsin. At the same time, he began calling on states to tighten some of their welfare eligibility requirements while House Republicans once again began to draft a version of welfare reform based largely around the proposal submitted by the NGA (American Public Human Services Association). After months of debate, revision, and amendment, President Clinton finally lives up to his promise to “end welfare as we know it” by signing the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act into law on August 22, 1996.

Based largely on the proposal submitted by the NGA earlier that year, the PRWORA was greatly influenced by governors from across the country. However,
the role of the governors in welfare reform did not end there. The NGA continued to lobby for reform, testifying in front of Congress on a number of occasions, so that the governors of every state would be given the most flexibility with the greatest amount of resources possible. Even in periods of reauthorization, governors were called upon to testify in front of Congress on behalf of the Association. On April 10, 2002, Governors John Engler of Michigan and Howard Dean of Vermont offered testimony to the Senate Finance Committee on Welfare Reform Reauthorization. While calling for “the committee to make a commitment to once again reach a bipartisan consensus on how to reauthorize this law” by praising the six years of success that governors around the country, Engler and Dean offered NGA proposed policy changes to improve the state of welfare in the states (National Governor’s Association 2002). Once again, the united voice of the governors from around the U.S. proved influential in shaping policy, as a number of their suggestions were incorporated into, and helped to achieve, reauthorization.

2.4. Understanding the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act, 1996

Welfare reform was largely based on the notion that states could better solve problems they faced with poverty and unemployment than the federal government. This logic thrust the states to the forefront of welfare discussions on a number of the themes that dominate the welfare debate. Governors themselves were an active part in attaining authorization, and later reauthorization, for the PRWORA. Not only did Governor Tommy Thompson become a beacon for executive success on welfare
issues at the state level, but governors united behind NGA proposals that shaped the outcomes of reform at the federal level.

The actual PRWORA legislation contains thousands of elements comprising well over 100 pages (U.S. Congress 1996). However, the key elements of the reform package are as follows (Handler and Hasenfeld 1997; Health and Human Services 1996; U.S. Congress 1996):

- Abolishment of AFDC, JOBS, Emergency Assistance to Families with Children, and other welfare programs, replacing them with Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) and Child Care and Development (CCDG) block grants.

- Stricter requirements were placed on who was eligible for welfare support, including cutting off support for children born to welfare mothers, immigrants, persons convicted of drug related felonies, and unwed mothers under the age of 18. States could apply for waivers to opt-out of these (and other) requirements, with a deadline for application set at July 1, 1997.

- A two-year time limit was placed on non-working families that were receiving government, welfare assistance. After two years, funding would become dependent on employment or involvement in job training programs. Those individuals who were receiving aid but chose not to work or become involved in job training would be cut off of funding after two years had elapsed.

- By 1997, states were to have moved 25% of caseloads into jobs or training. By 2002, 50% of all families were to work, engaged in training, or off the state welfare rolls. Single parents were required to be working 20 hours per week for the first year, increasing to 30 hours per week by the year 2000. Two-parent households would be required to work 35 hours per week beginning in July 1997. Up to 20% of a state’s caseload could be exempted from this requirement. States failing to meet these requirements risked funding punishment by the federal government.

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The work requirements detailed by the federal government as being acceptable activities for recipients are participation in either subsidized or unsubsidized employment, on-the-job training programs, work experience, community service, one year of vocational training, or provision of childcare for other individuals participating in community service. Additional caps were placed on the amount of people who could be participating in vocational training, and some exceptions for the time limits were made for single parent households with a child or children less than one year of age.
A five-year, cumulative lifetime limit was placed on families receiving state assistance, with an exception for food stamps, public housing, and Medicaid. This means that families who have received cash assistance for a total of five years over a lifetime can receive only non-cash assistance and vouchers if states wish to provide such assistance. States have the option of exempting up to 20% of their caseload from the five-year restriction.

Childcare and family health care would be provided on a limited basis to help move people into jobs, with at least a year of “transitional Medicaid” being provided when people move off the state dole and into work.

Monies provided by the federal government would be capped for five years, and states were required to maintain welfare expenditures at 80% of the 1994 levels. States that could not afford to meet the needs of everyone could either place people on a waiting list, or merely deny them funding if alternative sources of revenue could not be generated. In essence, the guarantee of aid for those who needed it no longer exists, even though a small amount of discretionary funds by the federal government was set aside in case of an economic downturn.

National standards would be replaced by those established within the states. State governments would now have controls as to the types of welfare programs they would establish, as well as a large amount of discretion as to who might receive funds and at what levels.

An additional element of the 1996 welfare reform bill is an incentive program for states that move people into jobs as quickly as possible. A state’s progress would be evaluated by the federal government using a criteria developed by Health and Human Services (HHS), the National Governors Association (NGA), and the American Public Welfare Association (APWA). Evaluations were scheduled to take place between 1999-2003, and monetary awards (not to exceed the allotted $1bn total for all states) would be given to states making substantial progress in this area. Finally, the reform package included strengthening existing child support enforcement laws.25

25 The PRWORA was slated for reauthorization during the 107th Congress of the United States. However, the 107th adjourned before completing the process, and as such the debates over reauthorization continue in the 108th session. Federal funding for TANF will continue through March 31, 2003 because of a continuing resolution (National Governor’s Association 2002).
The implementation of the TANF block grants to the states placed governors in a similar position to the new federalism period of the 1980s. Much like federal reforms passed under the Reagan presidency, the welfare reform of 1996 gave state executives increased freedom to act while simultaneously reducing the amount of financial resources available to them. Governors, therefore, faced a choice of either meeting the federal standards as they were detailed in the PRWORA, or amending those requirements with the funding given to them to make welfare work in their states.

As a part of their continuing evaluation of the PRWORA, the NGA has released a statement in favor of reauthorization of the welfare reform act. According to a statement released by the committee as a whole, reauthorization of the act is needed so that state executives can “maintain flexibility,” “maintain investment,” and “move toward greater program alignment” (National Governor’s Association 2002). This testimony by the NGA demonstrates a desire on the part of America’s governors to maintain the programmatic influence they were granted over welfare policy, but also acknowledges the need for further reform to happen within the states. The assumption being, governors largely help to determine outcomes. However, the NGA does not provide specific analysis as to how or why this assumption is true.

2.5. Identifying the Major Aspects of Welfare Reform in the States

As might be expected, there were both positive and negative reactions to the 1996 welfare reform bill from a variety of factions within the states. From executives to legislators, citizens to interest groups, and analysts to bureaucrats, the PRWORA
ignited a response from a variety of participants within the state political arena who began competing for influence over the direction welfare reform would take in their state. The influence each of these factions was able to leverage would in turn have a significant effect upon the state as a whole, as both their clashes and cooperation would determine what welfare looked like in the new millennia.

In addition to the different groups vying for control of welfare policy in the American states, each state also had to reckon with its own set of social, cultural, political, and demographic realities. These factors could also have an affect on the direction welfare policy would take following the enactment of PRWORA. The study by Soss, et al. offers insight into the forces that help determine policy outcomes within the states. However, their analysis falls short in that the role of institutions is absent from their study. Given what is commonly argued about the role of governors in shaping social policy within states, leaving the executive office out of an analysis of what determines policy outcomes overlooks perhaps the primary institution that influences programmatic change. Therefore, by bringing an analysis of policy variation across the states that takes into account the role of governors would improve upon their model, and would help to more accurately portray the determinants of welfare outcomes.

Soss, et al. use a trichotomous measure to differentiate policy outcomes across the fifty states. Using data from studies of policy outcomes, the authors attempt to measure the “get-tough policy choices in the states” (Soss, et. al. 2001, 278). By examining the tightening and strengthening of restrictions on welfare policies within states, Soss, et al. account for the “four key areas in which lawmakers sought to end
permissiveness.” The four key areas they identify are: 1. imposing obligations in exchange for assistance; 2. ending of long-term program dependency; 3. reformation of social behaviors; and 4. development of stricter penalties to force compliance. These four key areas identify the main aspects of reform in the states in a very broad sense. However, each of these key elements should be “unpacked” for purposes of precision. Such changes take on the following forms:

- Tighten regulation on eligibility for who can and cannot receive welfare support.
- Redirection of federal monies toward job creation programs rather than on direct aid to the poor.
- Expansion (or contraction) of the state welfare bureaucracy, especially in light of the fact that old agencies not only have to perform the same job of routing welfare funds, but also have to become something akin to employment agencies.
- Applying for federal waivers to opt out of some of the federal requirements, especially related to time limits, increased work requirements (especially the more strict requirements for two-parent households), and “values-based” requirements.
- Implementation of a “sanction” and “inducement” program for people either participating in employment training or volunteer work. Such a program might offer monetary rewards for people seeking to improve their chances at employment in the future, while cutting some support to those who are not.
- Cutting recipients from state welfare funding.
- Reduction of the two-year federal requirement for employment before a person is removed from welfare support by the state in order to produce immediate and visible results.
- Redirection of federal monies given for welfare, and using them to create education programs, job training, and/or alcohol and drug rehabilitation centers.
• Redirection of federal monies given for welfare toward health care, day care, and/or low wage supplementation so as to reduce negative effects on working families.

• Raising taxes, or diverting existing state funds, in order to meet economic realities of maintaining full programmatic support with limited federal aid.

These ten items are the most commonly identified outcomes resulting from the PRWORA around the U.S.

The NGA compiled two studies to examine the types of efforts being made by states after the passage of welfare reform. The first of these studies examined the varying state TANF plans in 1997, two years after the passage of the PRWORA. The second study, released in 1999, was a follow-up to the first in which the NGA attempted to see if the efforts initially made by states had changed over time (National Governor’s Association 1999, 1997). These studies helped to note some of the major policy choices adopted by states, and gives a clearer idea about the variation of welfare programs from state-to-state. For example, in 1997, nineteen states passed welfare legislation that supported a family cap. By 1999, Indiana, Maryland, and Wisconsin had eliminated their family cap policy, while Oklahoma and South Carolina adopted their own. These are the types of reforms tracked by the NGA, and they help to give a clearer picture of the state of welfare in the states.

2.6. Conclusion

Since 1996, states have been aggressively trying to deal with welfare reform in a variety of ways. While some states have focused on eliminating dependency through education and job training, others have attempted to remove barriers to working by providing child and health care services. These are just a few of the ways
in which states are pursuing different paths to providing the welfare services they feel best meet the needs of their citizens and their policy goals. Although states have dealt with similar issues of devolution in the past, little is known about the ways in which state-level institutions impact the various kinds of policy outcomes that result from such practices.

Chapter three explores the affect the governor – the central figure in state politics – has on determining the various outcomes shown here. By focusing attention on what factors generate differing outcomes across the states, the role of institutions in determining these policies will become clearer, and the question of whether or not gubernatorial power affects policy variation will finally be answered. An extension of this analysis occurs in chapter four, where the role of the governor in implementing reforms is examined in terms of the ability of states to achieve identified policy goals following the passage of welfare reform.
CHAPTER 3

GUBERNATORIAL POWER AND WELFARE POLICY OUTCOMES

3.1. Overview

The preceding discussions of gubernatorial power and welfare reform offer a number of reasons to assume state executives play a significant role influencing policy outcomes. Moving beyond these foundational thoughts, it is possible to test the commonly held assumption that, *ceteris paribus*, those governors who have higher levels of institutional and personal powers will yield more policy influence than their weaker counterparts. In testing this hypothesis, I assembled data for all fifty states for the years 1996-1999. The rationale for selecting these years is based on the specific requirement within the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) mandating that all states submit an initial plan to the Secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS) detailing the options they chose to exercise by July 1, 1997 in order to receive Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) assistance (NGA 1997). This requirement means that all states responded simultaneously to the same set of policy choices. Additionally, because states were able to amend their welfare policy decisions at any time, the National Governor’s Association (NGA) compiled a second review of the policy options exercised by states between September and November of 1998 (NGA 1999). The results for both
of these reviews, as well as social, political, and economic data for all four years, were combined into a cumulative dataset that enabled the testing of a variety of independent forces on welfare policy outcomes. Ultimately, this study offers a view of policy choices in each of the fifty states over a span of four years.

The following is a description of theories behind policy preferences in the states, the data used, the methods employed, and a discussion of the statistical findings. These tests will help us to better understand the relationship between the powers of state executives and welfare policy choices adopted by the states.

3.2. Policy Preferences in the American States: Establishing a Theory of Policy Formation

There are a number of ways to interpret the interaction between governors and policy outcomes. Each of these theoretical models is rooted in traditional assumptions about politicians and the policy process. First is to attempt to identify a governor’s set of preferences and compare them to actual policy outcomes. Such an explanation, however, is difficult to support quantitatively given the diverse set of policy choices facing each state executive across the U.S. Attempting to codify gubernatorial preferences for each piece of legislation for welfare reform prior to its passage is simply not a feasible task, nor can it always be accurately managed. In an attempt to overcome this difficulty, one might turn to the studies performed by Dean Lacy and Philip Paolino showing that voters often select gubernatorial candidates based not on their personal characteristics but on their policy positions and expected policy choices once elected (Lacy and Paolino 2003). Voting based on policy
expectation leads one to conclude that policy outcomes can offer a form of “revealed preferences” (the direct observation of choices) for state executives. Put simply, one can assume that the policies adopted were more or less the policy options sought by state executives. Although not an ideal theory for capturing whether or not gubernatorial power translates into executive-preferred policy outcomes, such studies might enable researchers to make general claims about gubernatorial power and policy with at least a moderate degree of confidence that such a relationship exists from the outset. Unfortunately, such a system of preference identification is, by itself, tautological, and decreases the level of confidence with which claims about the direction of power and the achievement of desired goals can be made.

Perhaps a more accurate way of determining a governor’s preferences in terms of welfare policy options is develop a theory of partisanship. Using such a theory of preferences, one would expect that a governor would pursue policy programs that matched up most fundamentally with her party’s basic philosophies of governance. A number of studies provide general support for the theory of partisanship and policy preferences, especially in terms of economically driven policies (Iversen 1999; Boix 1997; Alesina and Rosenthal 1995; Hicks and Swank 1992; Alvarez, Garrett, and Lange 1991). John Bibby et al. provide some strong support for such a theory of partisanship in relation to the executive office, as they point out that gubernatorial campaigns are often more partisan in nature than their legislative counterparts (Bibby, et al. 1990). Therefore, there is strong theoretical support for the idea that gubernatorial policy preferences are dictated by partisan concerns. In combination with the theory that candidates are selected based on their policy positions, a theory
of partisan based preferences helps to add support to claims about the causal links between gubernatorial power and preferred policy outcomes.

One important caveat that must be applied to the theory of partisanship and policy preference is that such a theory is rooted in generality. That is to say that it simply is not enough to base knowledge of a person’s specific preferences for all elements of policy based on partisanship goals. Instead, such a theory must be focused on a more general understanding of preferences in which – on the whole – policy packages match-up with partisan identification. Generally speaking, however, one can assume that Republican governors will pursue conservative programs, while Democratic governors will pursue more liberal ones.

A statistical test of the relationship between a governor’s party and a state’s welfare policy package reveals support for the theory of partisanship and policy outcomes. A governor’s party affiliation shares a significant (.023), positive relationship with an overall measure of state welfare policy in terms of a conservative-liberal continuum of possible policy outcomes.26 Moreover, when controlling for southern states, the positive relationship slightly increases in significance (.018). Such a relationship is expected because higher party scores are assigned to Republican governors, just as higher scores on the welfare continuum indicate more conservative packages. These results lend support to the notion that we can identify a governor’s policy preferences based upon partisan identification.

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26 The conservative-liberal continuum is based on an overall score assigned to all aspects of a state’s welfare program. Policies were assigned a value of 1 if the state opted for a more conservative outcome, and a −1 if they selected a more liberal one. The scores were then added to give states an overall conservative-liberal welfare policy score.
An alternative set of theories for policy formation relies on non-institutional factors to explain policy outcomes. For example, political culture arguments make the claim that institutional preferences are secondary to the long-standing cultural preferences of a given state. However, a statistical test of this theory reveals no significant relationship between welfare policy in general and the political culture of states.\textsuperscript{27} Likewise, economic conditions are often considered important factors in determining policy outcomes. Much like measures of political culture, though, none of the economic variables under consideration proved to have any significant relationship with statewide welfare policy choices.\textsuperscript{28} Finally, racial composition within states was considered as a possible explanation for overall welfare policy choices adopted by states from 1996-1999. Again, no significant relationship could be established between race and the conservative-liberal policy continuum for welfare reform.\textsuperscript{29}

\textsuperscript{27} Simple OLS Regression to test the relationship between statewide welfare policy and Elazar’s measure of political culture reveal a significance score of .421, which means that such a relationship is not significant. The statewide welfare policy measure was created through the use of an additive measure of policy that created a scale of policy on a conservative-liberal continuum in which higher scores revealed more conservative policy programs within a state. Scores could range from a possible high of 9 (most conservative) to −9 (most liberal). Additionally, when regressed against individual policy outcomes, political culture proved to be insignificant in relation to 7 of the 9 policy choices, but did prove to be significant with the variables DRUGTANF (.009) and FAMPCAP (.004).

\textsuperscript{28} Three economic measures – personal income per capita, gross state product per capita, and unemployment rate – were employed. However, none proved to have a significant relationship with the welfare policy continuum: personal income per capita (.208), gross state product per capita (.131), unemployment rate (.333). Adding a regional control for southern states had no effect on the insignificance of outcomes. When regressing each of these variables against individual policy outcomes, none of the 9 policy outcomes proved to share a significant relationship with a state’s rate of unemployment. The variable GARCCARE did prove to be significant in relation to both personal income per capita (.024) and gross state product per capita (.028), and DRUGTANF did share a significant, negative relationship with personal income per capita, while WORKSANC proved to have a significant, negative relationship with gross state product per capita (.069).

\textsuperscript{29} A measure race was introduced to look at the effects of the percentage of a state’s population that was identified as African-American on welfare policy choices. However, such a relationship proved to be insignificant (.272). When a regional control variable for southern states is introduced, the significance level not only proves to have a negative relationship (t = -.198), but also has a significance score of .844. The percentage of the population that is African-American did prove to be significant in

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significant relationship with at least two or more individual policy outcomes suggesting that while these social and economic forces do not determine policy in general, they might have a significant effect on specific policies. For this reason they remain important controls for the consideration of determinants of welfare policy.

What do the tests of these theories tell us about the adoption of welfare policy at the state level? First, there is reason to believe that partisanship reveals the preferences of state executives at a basic level. That is to say, we would expect that Republican governors would pursue more conservative policy choices overall, and Democratic governors to pursue more liberal ones. The statistical tests of this theory lend support to this partisan view of policy preference. Likewise, these initial tests help to establish a direct link between who the governor is and statewide welfare policy choices. Unlike other theories of policy preferences based on political culture, economic concerns, and racial composition, there is empirical support guiding an institutional theory of policy selection. That is not to say these other concerns are not important, but does suggest that the partisan identification of governors has a significant relationship with welfare policy in general. Given that studies have shown the electorate tends to select governors for perceived policy preferences, we can assume that – if gubernatorial power proves to be significant as a determinant of welfare policy outcomes – the governors achieved desired results through the use of these powers.

3 of the 9 individual policy outcomes: DRUGTANF (.041), FAMCAP (.000), and WORKSANC (.088). These relationships were all positive in nature, meaning that as the percentage of the population that is black increased, so did the likelihood that a state adopted a more conservative, or restrictive, policy.
Establishing the link between partisan identification and general policy preferences is extremely important for the purposes of this study. Without it, claims about gubernatorial power and policy outcomes are diluted and weak. Due to the nearly impossible task of identifying the exact preferences for every governor for every piece of welfare legislation from 1996-1999, a reliance on a partisan theory of preferences establishes a directional link between a governor’s powers and the resulting policy outcomes. Because higher policy scores indicate a more conservative choice, then one would expect a significant, positive relationship between Republican governors and policy outcomes. Such an effect would indicate that as executive power increased for Republican governors, so does the likelihood that a state would adopt conservative welfare policies. Likewise, because lower policy scores indicate a more liberal choice, then one would expect a significant, negative relationship between Democratic governors and policy outcomes. A significant, negative relationship between gubernatorial power and policy while controlling for Democratically dominated executives means that as a Democratic governor’s power increased, so did the likelihood that a state would opt for more liberal welfare policy choices. Therefore, controlling for party (and using a theory of partisanship and preference) helps to identify just how gubernatorial power effects policy outcomes, and establishes the directional link necessary for making a claim that increased power vested in the state executive office actually helped a governor achieve her desired goals.
3.3. Determinants of Welfare Policy: Gubernatorial Power

For the purposes of this study, gubernatorial power was divided into three separate indicators. These variables are the institutional powers of the governor, the personal powers of the governor, and the overall measure of gubernatorial power. In terms of which elements of gubernatorial power are significant in determining policy, the level at which power is being discussed is important to consider. If one views

Figure 3.1. Levels of Gubernatorial Power.
gubernatorial power in terms of a pyramid, at the apex would be the overall power scoring for a governor. To talk about power at this level is to talk about the executive as a whole, the person and the office. It is at this level that the state executive office is most often considered. For many, the office and the individual are inseparable, and the activities of the governor are seen in terms of an individual, granted certain powers, acting in a manner that is best for achieving established political goals.

As one moves down to the middle of this three-tiered pyramid, the power of the governor is dichotomized into institutional and personal powers. Here power is seen as having two sources. The source for the institutional powers is state law; those codified powers granted to the executive to carry out the functions of governance. An additional source of power is from the individual holding the office, which is defined as the personal power that a governor holds as a person and not as an office. The separation of these powers into two distinct entities allows for the scrutiny of the office and the office holder separately, and enables one to decide whether or not similar outcomes might have resulted even if different individuals held the same office.

Finally, at the base of the pyramid are the components that serve as the foundation for all gubernatorial power. Looking at the powers of the governor from this level offers the chance to apply the powers one at a time, and in different combinations, to see which of the powers (if any) are effective in bringing about policy outcomes. This level is an important one to consider given the nature of gubernatorial power as it is classified in the other tiers. If one or two elements of power are important, but the rest are not, then a study that only looks at a broad or
mid-range perspective of gubernatorial power might overlook the nuances of authority and leadership that bring about differential outcomes. In sum, each level offers an understanding of gubernatorial power, and in turn results in the extraction of different lessons.

The variable measuring a governor’s institutional power was created through the use of a revised formula based on one developed by Thad Beyle (1999). The individual components of gubernatorial power – separately elected officials, tenure potential, appointment power, budgetary power, veto power – were all coded according to Beyle’s criteria, and were added together to create the overall institutional power score. The sum of these scores was divided by five in order to remain within a five-point scale. The same process was used to create the variable measuring a governor’s personal powers, with the subcomponents being the governor’s electoral mandate, position on the state’s political ambition ladder, personal future, job performance rating, and party control. The sum of these scores was divided by five in order to remain within a five-point scale. Finally, adding the scores for institutional and personal powers establishes a combined indicator of overall gubernatorial power.

Notice that the formulas used here are based on a revision of those used by Thad Beyle in his analysis of gubernatorial power. According to Beyle, when a governor and legislative majority share the same party it makes it easier for the governor to achieve his legislative agenda through the reduction of partisan conflicts.

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30 Much of the data, coding, and descriptions for other years can also be found online at http://www.unc.edu/~beyle/. Data that was unavailable through Thad Beyle was collected and coded using the same criteria Beyle employed in his own scoring. This data is available upon request from the author.
While I agree with this assessment, I disagree with Beyle’s assertion that such a power is “institutional” in nature. Instead, I have classified the variable “party control” as an element of the informal, personal power held by state executives. Given that levels of party cohesion are fluid, and are not prescribed in a formal manner, the inclusion of party control in an institutional definition of executive power seems to obfuscate the concept. Logically, since party is attached to the individual occupying office and not the office itself, it makes more sense to include party control as an element of a governor’s personal – not institutional – power.

Why use an additive scale to measure gubernatorial power? The answer to this question rests within the very nature of gubernatorial power concept. A basic understanding of any type of executive power shows that power as a whole is comprised of a variety of parts. A governor is not merely assigned an overall level of power by a state or its constitution. Rather, one looks to the different capacities and resources available to a governor in order to make claims about the strength or weakness of the individual officeholder. Determining the overall measure of state executive power is, therefore, an exercise in mereology; the study of “parts and wholes.” Turning to the theoretical explorations of the use of additive scales in the practice of mereology by Gary Hardegree, it is clear that “mereological summation” via the implementation of an additive scale is appropriate for this type of exploration into gubernatorial power.31 The use of an additive scale enables me to examine the specific parts of gubernatorial power, as well as providing a means of useful

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comparison of how those powers (assigned differently in relative strength and combination) vary across the executive offices of the fifty states.

There are a number of theoretical reasons to assume that each element of gubernatorial power would help governors achieve desired results in terms of policy. Apart from offering the governor a variety of leverage points in dealing with the legislature, as well as persuading the public to side with a particular issue, different powers work differently to provide the governor with institutional and personal authority in the pursuit of policy outcomes.

3.3.1. Bureaucratic Control

In a number of states across the country, executive officials are elected separately rather than as a part of a “governor’s ticket.” This results in what Beyle refers to as a plural executive (Beyle 1999). The result of a plural executive branch is a governor that has less influence in the administrative network needed to bring about desired policy results. To the contrary, when officials are elected in a slate along with the governor, it makes it easier to sell a unified vision of policy. Similarly, the governor’s ability to appoint state officials after an election can work to her advantage in directing the flow and nature of policy and its implementation.

Why would a governor’s power to appoint, and the nature of executive selection, have such a significant influence on so many policy outcomes across time? What is it about these powers that make such powerful tools in determining welfare outputs? The answer to both of these questions is a simple one: bureaucratic control. The formal ability to appoint heads of a number of agencies, including the head of
health and the head of welfare and other offices as defined by individual state
constitutions, gives the governor a strong ally in the quest for achieving desired
results in the welfare reform process. Although little has written about governors and
the bureaucracy specifically, several works on the presidency have addressed this
issue.32

In “The Politicized Presidency,” Terry Moe (1985), describes how modern
executives are able to insulate themselves in institutional bureaucracies that advance
their own leadership agendas. Moe asserts that the President can use administrative
toins and their expertise to more effectively govern, and to increase presidential
power vis a vis Congress. This means that bureaucratic control can help a chief
executive attain desired leadership goals. As Moe (1994) states in a later work, this
does not mean “presidents are somehow destined to take over,” but control over the
bureaucracy does offer advantages to executive power not held before.33 A similar
logic can be applied to state executives and their control over administrative agencies.
Increased control over the bureaucracy by a governor lends itself to having increased
control over the fruition of policy goals, and the power to appoint the heads of these
bureaucratic organizations plays a major part in that process.

There are a number of reasons why controlling the bureaucracy is an
important tool for state executives. First, once an appointment has been made and
confirmed, there is a conveyance of legitimacy upon the head of a particular

32 Raymond Cox (1991) does tangentially address the issue of appointment and administrative
control in “The Management Role of the Governor.” However, Cox looks more generally into the
administration and staff, and attempts to reconcile that relationship with the rest of the functions of the
governor in general. When issues of management and bureaucratic control are addressed, many of the
same lessons drawn from the presidential literature seem to apply to the governor’s office as well.
33 Similar arguments to those made by Moe about the importance that bureaucracy and
bureaucratic control play in increasing executive power, have been made by John Burke (1994) and
department for their given bureaucratic functions. As Woodrow Wilson (1887) wrote in describing how administrative organizations are viewed: “Institutions which one generation regards as only a makeshift approximation to the realization of a principle, the next generation honors as the nearest possible approximation to that principle, and the next worships as the principle itself” (8). Organizations are seen as inextricably linked to the very functions they serve, and as such political activity is seen in the light bureaucracy casts upon it. One presumes the education secretary understands the strengths, weaknesses, composition, needs, and status of public schools across the state. The same is true for those individuals appointed to head a state’s welfare department. They are the ones the state looks to for answers to questions, and solutions to problems, in regards to welfare and public assistance. Thus, when the governor is able to appoint someone who is in line with her stance on welfare to the head of that agency, she has increased her chances of persuading others to share her understanding and vision of the welfare system.

In addition to being able to persuade others through the power of expertise, the very activities performed under the leadership of the heads of bureaucratic organizations lend themselves to influencing policy outcomes when policy is to be decided. The formation of budgets, strategic planning, the establishment of statewide goals, and the carrying out of the daily functions required of the office make it a central part of the lifeblood of policy. Therefore, the power to appoint officials to major state organizations gives the governor a major inroad into the formation of policy when new policy is being created. When the PRWORA overhauled the American welfare system through the abolition of AFDC and the creation of TANF, it
paved the way for state welfare agencies to outline new goals and ways achieving those goals to the public. It also served to empower those governors who appointed the head of the state’s welfare agency to the same end. The governor and the bureaucracy may not always see eye-to-eye on everything, but there is a greater likelihood that their goals will be in sync when one gets to select who they will be working with, not to mention when one owes their job to the other.

3.3.2. Budgetary Authority

Strong gubernatorial power in the area of the budget can help set the policy agenda for the state. In an interview with former Montana Governor, and current head of the Republican National Committee, Marc Racicot (2004), he noted that it is important for the governor to set the agenda because “raising an issue publicly introduces an idea and sets expectations as well as enabling [the governor] to find people in the legislature who are sympathetic to the cause.” Likewise, Racicot described how it is both helpful and important for a governor to try to establish a bipartisan group from the start, as it is “better to wrestle the devil at the beginning than at the end.” He continued by noting that an executive’s budgetary powers are the most important tools they have for framing issues and setting an agenda. In a state like Montana, one which gives the governor strong budgetary authority, the governor can use the budget to set both limits for, and attitudes toward, government activity. Therefore, budgetary power can substantially affect the way an issue is viewed publicly, as well as set the agenda for the legislature to respond to and pursue.
It is for these reasons that budgetary powers are so important in attempting to measure the influence of gubernatorial power on policymaking.

When a governor has primary responsibility over setting forth the budget, fiscal responsibility becomes a top priority. In an interview on National Public Radio, Michigan Governor Jennifer Granholm (2004) describes how a governor’s budget reflects their preferences in terms of state policy. Likewise, according to analyst Robert Tanner (2002), in a period of economic decline, deficits can often times cause state executives to pursue different options to maintain some programs at the expenses of others. In sum, when formally charged with maintaining a state’s budget, governors tend to use those budgetary powers in ways that keep fiscal responsibility as a top priority when determining policy. Budgetary powers matter, and many welfare policy outcomes are a reflection of that idea.

3.3.3. Election and Reelection

The term “lame duck” is often used to describe officials who are at the end of their tenure without possibility of again holding that office. Like the clichéd image of a lion in winter, term limited governors who cannot seek reelection might have a powerful roar, but it does not inspire much action on the part of others who realize that soon they will be dealing with a new executive who will likely make different demands, while the old one can no longer offer tit-for-tat promises to reward and punish the behavior of others. For these reasons the formally prescribed tenure potential and personal future of a governor are deemed to be important elements of power.
Tenure potential and the personal future of the governor are both important elements to the understanding of the types of choices state executives will make in regards to policy. For those governors who are able to seek reelection, there is a greater likelihood that they will pursue policy choices that require high levels of sacrifice early in their terms. This enables them to pursue more publicly popular and generous programs in the years leading up to their reelection bid.34 Additionally, according to Beyle (1999), term-limited governors “move faster and act more decisively to achieve their goals and not be afraid of voters’ retribution at the ballot box when a necessary yet unpopular decision had to be made” (212). Unfortunately, Beyle notes that a term-limited governor at the end of their tenure loses the power to convince opponents (or even maintain previous alliances) when it comes to the development and implementation of policy. Therefore, like separate sides of the same coin, a governor’s tenure potential and personal future are necessary elements for consideration in determining the influence a governor will have on desired policy outcomes.

3.3.4. Veto Power

In Federalist No. 73, Alexander Hamilton argued for the power of executive veto. According to Hamilton, “[Veto power] not only serves as a shield to the executive, but it furnishes an additional security against the enaction of improper laws. It establishes a salutary check upon the legislative body, calculated to guard the community against the effects of faction, precipitancy, or of any impulse unfriendly

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34 Richard Pious (1996) originally applied this theory of executive leadership, in terms of policymaking and tenure, to the president.
to the public good, which may happen to influence a majority of that body” (411).

Most certainly, without the power of the veto, governors would not possess the ability to block the actions of even the simplest of legislative majorities. It is because of the powerful check that the veto gives the executive over the legislature that one might expect a governor’s veto power to greatly impact many dimensions of policy consistently across time.\(^{35}\)

The veto at the state level can take on a number of forms depending on how it is formally prescribed in state law. In addition to the “total-bill veto” that is held by the president, Ronald Moe (1988) describes how forty-three states have also granted the governor the constitutional authority to use a form of “item veto,” which often applies specifically to fiscal and monetary policy (taxing and spending).

There is some dispute about the importance of the veto in terms of its usefulness in terms of achieving policy goals. Governor Racicot (2004), for example, says that veto powers are “substantially overrated.” According to Racicot:

“The most useful tools available to governors are those that do not come down to the use of force. In my eight years [as Governor of Montana], I did not use [the veto] more than ten to fifteen times. My perspective was to seek to avoid those types of constitutional showdowns and get everyone – especially with the budget – on the same page. There were approximately 1,500 pieces of legislation per [legislative] session, and I served for four sessions and some special. In that time, between 500 and 700 pieces of legislation were passed, and I utilized the veto only 10 to 15 times. Just raising the possibility causes the legislature to reexamine their options.”

However, even though Governor Racicot and others might question the need for the utilization of the veto in executive-legislative relations, the presence of a strong veto

\(^{35}\) For more on the specific details on factors influencing the use of the veto by governors, see Thompson and Boyd (1994); Herzik and Wiggins (1989); and Gosling (1986).
power can give the governor leverage over policy choices, and therefore is an important determinant in the formation of policy at the sub-national level. 36

3.3.5. Popular Support

A very important resource that governors can draw from for political leverage, albeit informal, is the popular support they enjoy from the mass electorate. The electoral mandate received by a governor, as well as their continued performance ratings, symbolize the governor’s authority as a statewide representative of the people. As such, these levels of support can give the governor the ability to claim the mass public as the source and foundation for action, thereby trying to push policy as a reflection of the will of the people. Such claims begin with the percentage of the popular vote captured in an electoral victory, known as the governor’s “mandate.” The electoral mandate shapes the perceptions of other political actors in terms of how powerful they view their state’s executive (Beyle 1999). According to Luther Carter and Richard Young (2003), “Even those governors who have weak formal powers . . . can be successful if they have a strong electoral mandate and the ability to work with people. If a governor is elected by a wide margin of votes, this is a good indicator that a significant majority of the public looks favorably on some key aspect of his or her campaign platform, position or views.” The margin of electoral victory is, therefore, an important consideration in understanding how a governor might influence the outcome of public policy.

Similarly, a governor’s approval rating acts as either a reaffirmation or rejection of a governor’s mandate to represent the will of the people. Nelson

36 For more on the frequency and importance of the veto, see Herzik and Wiggins (1989).
Dometrius (2002) explores this concept empirically to find there is a significant connection between the level of a governor’s approval ratings and their influence on policy. According to Dometrius, the level of support a governor is able to maintain effects their ability to control both the bureaucracy and legislature in the passage and implementation of state policy. Therefore, the popular support of a governor has a significant impact on their ability to both govern and define the choices for state governments to pursue in terms of policy outcomes.37

3.3.6. Party Control

The issue of party control speaks directly to the degree of influence a governor has on the state legislature. Not only does the governor serve as the unofficial figurehead and mouthpiece of the party line in her state, but also the congruence between the goals of members of the same party is likely to be higher than if they were members of a different party. Having greater numbers of legislators of the same party serving with a governor is often viewed as a major factor in determining whether or not a governor is able to achieve their desired goals.

A measure of gubernatorial party control does not evaluate the degree of congruence between the governor and the legislature as a whole. Instead, it is a measure of the degree to which the governor’s party controls the legislature. It is often assumed that, because of theories of partisanship and policy preferences, those legislators of one party are more often likely to agree with a governor of the same party and disagree with governors of an opposition party. George Edwards et al. and

John Coleman performed two empirical studies of some note that confirm these assumptions about party control. In their study of the impact of divided government on policy, Edwards, et al. (1997) concluded that bills that have been identified as most salient are likely to fail in divided governments than in unified ones. This has particular relevance for social welfare policy, one of the most controversial and important issues faced by government in the modern era. Likewise, John Coleman (1999) studied the overall effectiveness of divided versus unified government. His studies showed that unified governments pass more legislation and move more quickly through issues than those governments that are divided. These studies, therefore, offer empirical support to the idea that governors with increased party control are more likely to achieve their desired policy goals than governors who face an opposition majority in the legislature.

3.3.7. Gubernatorial Ambition

As a person moves up the hierarchy of state government, they attain the knowledge of the key functions of individuals at different levels of the organization. Likewise, they learn routines and behaviors, points of access and leverage, and the difference between assumed and actual duties. Put simply, moving up the political ladder a rung at a time might help officials gain knowledge and experience vital to being more effective in their next position. This informal element of gubernatorial power is known as an individual’s progress up the “ambition ladder” of state politics. When an individual works their way up the hierarchy of state government, they learn essential skills and acquire important insights through the holding of various sub-state
positions. Serving in different offices, administrations, and agencies on the way to becoming governor can serve executives well when dealing with trying to leverage certain key components of the system in order to attain desired policy results. Put simply, a governor who has worked their way up the ladder will understand how the system works a lot more thoroughly than someone whose first elected office is that of state executive (Beyle 1999).

3.4. Determinants of Welfare Policy: Identifying the Control Variables

In addition to gubernatorial power, there are a number of factors that have an impact on state policy, and countless articles and books have been dedicated to studying these issues and their effects. In order to properly conceptualize the significance of gubernatorial power as it relates to welfare policy outcomes within the states, it is important to also consider at least some of these additional factors in this analysis. The variables I have decided to include are: political culture,\textsuperscript{38} gross state product per capita,\textsuperscript{39} percentage of the population that has received at least a high school diploma,\textsuperscript{40} percentage of the total population that is black,\textsuperscript{41} percentage of births to unmarried mothers,\textsuperscript{42} the percentage of a state’s population that is on welfare, and whether or not a state has a professional, citizen, or hybrid legislature.\textsuperscript{43} Although not perfect representations, the inclusion of these variables helps to control

\textsuperscript{38} See Elazar (1984).
\textsuperscript{39} See State Politics & Policy Quarterly (2003).
\textsuperscript{40} See State Politics & Policy Quarterly (2003).
\textsuperscript{41} Calculations done by author based on total state population number and total black population numbers available through the State Politics and Policy Data Resource (2003).
\textsuperscript{43} See Hamm and Moncrief (1999).
for the effects of culture, economics, education, diversity, and the legislature on welfare policy outcomes.\footnote{It should be noted that, in regard to legislative power and the politics of executive-legislative relations, legislative party composition and its relationship to the governor’s party is already factored into the governor’s institutional and overall power scores.}

3.5. Welfare Policy Outcomes: Identifying the Dependent Variables

As previously discussed, the dependent variables to be analyzed in this study come from a study by the NGA of data the states submitted to HHS detailing the welfare policy options they decided to exercise to receive TANF assistance, and from the updated matrix of policy choices compiled by the NGA in their second round of data collection on welfare reform in the states.\footnote{National Governor’s Association (1997, 1999)} Based on the data provided by the NGA, the policy choices adopted by states were coded as follows:

- **WORK24**: Does the state require welfare recipients to engage in work sooner than 24 months? If yes, 1 point was assigned. If no, 0 point was assigned.
- **DRUGTANF**: Does state deny TANF assistance to convicted drug felons? If yes, 1 point was assigned. If no, 0 point was assigned.
- **MEDI12**: Does state provide transitional Medicaid for longer than 12 months? If yes, 0 point was assigned. If no, 1 point was assigned.
- **IDA**: Does state allow for individual development accounts that allow recipients to accumulate funds for postsecondary education, purchase of a home, the starting of a business, etc.? If yes, 0 point was assigned. If no, 1 point was assigned.
- **FAMCAP**: Does the state have a family cap to deny extended benefits to those individuals that have children while already receiving TANF assistance? If yes, 1 point was assigned. If no, 0 point was assigned.
In an attempt to reveal possible themes within state welfare policy outcomes, it was important to first determine the level of inter-correlation for the dependent variables. The first thing I noticed after creating a correlation matrix was that three of the five variables in the matrix were significantly correlated (have a p-value less than .05) with at least two other variables.

The next step in this process was to run a reliability analysis using the dependent variables in order test their additivity in generating a new, combined variable. The Cronbach’s alpha for the dependent variables was approximately .0019. Given the consensus that suggests that the value of alpha should be no less than .7 or .8 to indicate that the variables are reasonably added together for form an aggregated measure, it does not seem to be reasonable to add together the five variables to generate a “get tough-leniency” measure (Nunnaly 1978). Therefore, despite the intercorrelation of a few of the variables, it is essential to examine the policy outcomes individually and not as a combined package.

3.6. Gubernatorial Power and Welfare Reform: Methods and Testing

To test whether or not gubernatorial power has a significant effect on welfare policy outputs, I employed linear regression, using a backward elimination method of variable selection to find which model was most appropriate for analyzing determinants of welfare policy outcomes. In doing so, a dummy variable was created

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46 Since the raw and the standardized alpha scores were roughly the same (both approximately .48), it does not provide any leverage to consider them separately. Therefore, any discussion about these scores refers to the raw alpha score. Due to the fact that WORK24, IDA, SUBEMP, and WORKSANC did not share a significant correlation with any other variable, they were removed from a second test of additivity to determine whether or not that would increase the alpha scores. However, even with these variables removed, the alpha score was only .46, which means that these policy choices lack the significant internal consistency needed to create an additive scale.
for each model in order to control for a governor’s partisan identification and see if the expected directional link exists between increased gubernatorial power and policy outcomes. This was done for each of the dependent variables. In determining the model of best fit, I first looked to which model had the lowest standard errors. If more than one model met this criterion, I then looked to which of these models had the highest R-squared score to select the model that had the lowest error while maintaining the highest explanation of variance possible. This method was repeated a number of times to test the various models and their effects on the dependent variables.

3.6.1. Macro-Level Analysis of Gubernatorial Power and Welfare Policy Outcomes

In first doing a macro-level analysis of overall gubernatorial power, the combined measure of a governor’s institutional and personal powers, along with the control variables, was regressed against the welfare policy outcomes adopted by states. The results were, in some cases, as expected, as overall measures of gubernatorial power did prove to be significant in determining welfare policy outcomes in three of the tests. The results of these tests can be seen in Table 3.1. As the table demonstrates, a combined measure of gubernatorial power proves to be a significant determinant for the variables DRUGTANF, MEDI12, and FAMPCAP.

When examining the first column, DRUGTANF, the results indicate that as a governor’s overall power increases, it significantly affects the outcome of policy. Likewise, the governor’s party proves to be significant. The positive sign here means that more conservative outcomes are tied to Republican partisanship in the
governor’s office. This is an expected result given the nature of partisanship and policy choices explained previously. In addition, a state’s political culture, gross state product per capita, and percentage of the population on welfare prove to be significant determinants of welfare policy choices in the states. The negative sign in front of the results for the effect of gross state product per capita on DRUGTANF outcomes is also expected. This relationship means that as gross state product per capita increases, a state is more likely to adopt more liberal policy outcomes. This

**TABLE 3.1. MACRO-LEVEL ANALYSIS OF OVERALL GUBERNATORIAL POWER AND EFFECT ON STATE TANF POLICY OUTCOMES.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent Variable</th>
<th>DRUGTANF</th>
<th>MEDI12</th>
<th>FAMCAP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Governor’s Party</td>
<td>2.210**</td>
<td>1.244</td>
<td>-0.404</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall Gubernatorial Power</td>
<td>2.159**</td>
<td>2.446**</td>
<td>-3.017***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Culture</td>
<td>3.593****</td>
<td>-1.074</td>
<td>2.131**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gross State Product Per Capita</td>
<td>-2.023**</td>
<td>-2.962****</td>
<td>1.876*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of the Population on Welfare</td>
<td>-1.815*</td>
<td>-2.365**</td>
<td>-1.119</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unmarried Birth Rate</td>
<td>1.094</td>
<td>2.352**</td>
<td>-1.796*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of the Population Black</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>2.235**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional Legislature</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>-2.145**</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Overall Model</th>
<th>R² = .184</th>
<th>R² = .117</th>
<th>R² = .242</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Adj. R² = .158</td>
<td>Adj. R² = .089</td>
<td>Adj. R² = .210</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>S.E. = .441</td>
<td>S.E. = .414</td>
<td>S.E. = .430</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sig. = .000</td>
<td>Sig. = .000</td>
<td>Sig. = .000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*p<0.10  **p<0.05  ***p<0.01  ****p<0.001
makes sense if we assume that the wealthier a state, the less likely it is to be forced to adopt more conservative spending choices. However, the negative interchange between DRUGTANF and unmarried birth rates is less obvious, and further studies would need to be done to explore this relationship in greater depth. Finally, a state’s political culture, gross state product per capita, and percentage of the population receiving welfare assistance all prove to significantly determine the outcomes of state restrictions on TANF assistance to convicted drug felons.

Turning to the second column – the relationship between gubernatorial power and the variable MEDI12 – once again the governor’s overall power proves to be significant in determining policy outcomes across the states. Although the governor’s party does not prove to be significant in determining policy outcomes along this dimension, the positive relationship helps to add support to the idea that when gubernatorial power is significant it is producing those outcomes desired by state executives. Additionally, the second column shows other economic, social, and demographic factors to be significant in determining whether or not a state adopted transitional Medicare assistance as a part of its welfare policy package. Here gross state product per capita, percentage of the population on welfare, and unmarried birth rates all prove to be significant factors influencing policy outcomes at the state level.

Finally, the third column addresses the relationship between gubernatorial power and a state’s option as to whether or not to adopt a family cap as a part of their welfare policy package. Interestingly enough, although gubernatorial power proves to be significant in this case, it shares an inverse relationship with the FAMCAP output. This means that as gubernatorial power increases, the likelihood that a state
would adopt a family cap decreases (or that as overall gubernatorial power decreases, the greater likelihood that a state will adopt a family cap). Likewise, although it does not prove to be significant, a governor’s partisan identification also shares a negative relationship with this dimension of welfare policy. This leads me to believe that, along this dimension of policy, governors were not able to achieve desired policy results. This would mean that the significance in the relationship between gubernatorial power and a state’s option to adopt (or not adopt) a family cap is one in which as gubernatorial power declines, the state is more likely to adopt a policy contrary to the will of the state executive. Here, other forces such as the unmarried birth rate, the level of legislative professionalization, political culture, gross state product per capita, and the percentage of the population that is black all prove to be significant in determining FAMCAP outcomes across the states. It is quite conceivable, then, to assume that governors simply lacked the overall power necessary to achieve desired policy outcomes because of other, more important, forces. This would certainly lend support to the hypothesis that as a governor’s power increases, so does his ability to influence policy outcomes, because here it seems to be the case that as a governor’s power declines states are more likely to adopt policies contrary to the desire of the state executive.

Table 3.1 provides illustrative support for the notion that gubernatorial power is significant in determining welfare policy outcomes. Although it did not prove to be a significant determinant for all five of the policies, an evaluation of aggregate gubernatorial power does prove to be important in furthering an understanding of policy formation, and variation, across the fifty American states.
As a means of further strengthening the confidence in these findings, a Random Effects, GLS-Regression was run on the relationship between the model and DRUGTANF outputs to compare whether or not these results are reliable or the product of randomness. In comparing the results for the DRUGTANF outcomes, little difference actually seems to occur between the different tests. The Random Effects test reveals gubernatorial power is significant at the 0.05-level, and political culture and percentage of the population on welfare are both significant at the 0.10-level. Such results increase my confidence in reporting these results as being reliable and not as being the product of random chance.

3.6.2. Mid-Level Analysis of Gubernatorial Power and Welfare Policy Outcomes

In attempting to see whether or not it makes a difference in evaluating gubernatorial power from an aggregate perspective or a dichotomized one (formal versus informal powers), the same tests were repeated, only this time instead of using a single, combined indicator, gubernatorial power was divided into institutional and personal power scores. Table 3.2 shows the results of these tests. In this mid-level analysis of the effect of institutional and personal powers on state TANF policy outcomes, the results once again add support to the notion that gubernatorial power is an important determinant to consider in evaluating state policy outcomes. A governor’s institutional powers prove to be a significant determinant for both the DRUGTANF and WORK24 variables. Likewise, a governor’s personal powers prove to be significant in determining outcomes for DRUGTANF and MEDI12

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47 I want to thank Benjamin Radcliff for his insights and contributions to this portion of statistical testing.
outcomes. These results indicate a number of interesting conclusions, and add further justification for analyzing gubernatorial power from different analytical perspectives; macro vs. mid-level, combined versus dichotomized.

**TABLE 3.2. MID-LEVEL ANALYSIS OF GUBERNATORIAL INSTITUTIONAL AND PERSONAL POWER AND EFFECT ON STATE TANF POLICY OUTCOMES.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent Variable</th>
<th>DRUGTANF</th>
<th>MEDI12</th>
<th>WORK24</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Governor’s Party</td>
<td>2.073**</td>
<td>1.035</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Governor’s Institutional Power</td>
<td>1.802*</td>
<td>1.570</td>
<td>1.932*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Governor’s Personal Power</td>
<td>1.913*</td>
<td>1.720*</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legislative Professionalization</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>-2.671***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Culture</td>
<td>3.671****</td>
<td>-1.148</td>
<td>1.293</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gross State Product Per Capita</td>
<td>-2.081**</td>
<td>-2.944***</td>
<td>-1.259</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of the Population Black</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>-2.078**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of the Population on Welfare</td>
<td>-1.868*</td>
<td>-2.409**</td>
<td>-2.871***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unmarried Birth Rate</td>
<td>1.173</td>
<td>2.357**</td>
<td>1.594</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Overall Model</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$R^2 = .191$</td>
<td></td>
<td>$R^2 = .113$</td>
<td>$R^2 = .139$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adj. $R^2 = .161$</td>
<td></td>
<td>Adj. $R^2 = .080$</td>
<td>Adj. $R^2 = .108$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S.E. = .441</td>
<td></td>
<td>S.E. = .416</td>
<td>S.E. = .474</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sig. = .000</td>
<td></td>
<td>Sig. = .002</td>
<td>Sig. = .000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*p<0.10  **p<0.05  ***p<0.01  ****p<0.001

First, the fact that gubernatorial power as a whole did not prove to be significant in determining WORK24 outcomes, but a governor’s institutional powers prove to be
significant when separated from a governor’s personal powers, suggests that using a combined indicator of power loses some of the nuance necessary for understanding whether or not gubernatorial power works as a significant determinant of policy outcomes. Table 3.2 indicates that when combined, the importance of a governor’s institutional powers are diluted by including them with a governor’s personal powers. One might assume that the governor was not a significant actor to consider in the understanding of policy formation along this dimension of welfare outcomes if only an aggregate indicator of power is used. By dichotomizing power into a mid-level analysis that distinguishes between institutional and personal powers, it becomes clear that the governor, through an application of institutional powers, was able to influence policy outcomes. Therefore, considering gubernatorial power from different perspectives can influence the conclusions one draws about the importance of the governor as policymaker.

Additionally, when comparing Table 3.1 and Table 3.2, the results seem to suggest that, along certain dimensions, combining gubernatorial powers into a single indicator increases the significance of the role of the governor as a determinant of policy outcomes than a dichotomized measure. For example, Table 3.2 shows that as a determinant of DRUGTANF outcomes, the governor’s personal and institutional powers are only significant at the 0.10-level. Likewise, in relation to MEDI12 outcomes, the governor’s personal powers prove to be significant at the 0.10-level, while a governor’s institutional powers do not prove to be significant at all. However, turning back to the results listed in Table 3.1 tells a much different story when the powers are combined and working together at the same level. The overall
level of gubernatorial power in relation to DRUGTANF and MEDI12 outcomes proves to be significant at the 0.05-level for each variable.

These results suggest two things. First, the data outcomes support the notion that it is important to examine gubernatorial power from various levels before making blanket claims about the importance (or lack thereof) of a governor in determining policy outcomes. The fact that gubernatorial power as a whole does not prove to be significant in determining WORK24 outcomes might lead some to inaccurately conclude that gubernatorial power does not matter in policymaking. Second, it shows how a governor’s institutional and personal powers work together to either give the governor the strength to achieve desired policy results, or how they can dilute each other so that gubernatorial power as a whole does not seem to influence outcomes at all, as indicated by the comparative results of a governor’s personal power proving to be a significant determinant of MEDI12, but overall gubernatorial power scores did not. Therefore, the level of analysis utilized is important to consider when analyzing gubernatorial power and policy outcomes.


If analyzing gubernatorial power from a macro- or mid-level perspective makes a difference in the conclusions that might be drawn, what effect would it have to further disaggregate gubernatorial power to each of its specific elements? The answer to this question can be shown in Table 3.3.

The results in Table 3.3 again show that gubernatorial power plays an important role in determining welfare policy outcomes following the implementation
of welfare reform in 1996. Concomitantly, the results further support the notion that the level of analysis applied (aggregate, dichotomized, or disaggregated) makes a difference in the conclusions one might draw about the relationship between executive powers and policy outcomes at the state level. Table 3.3 shows that as power increases along a number of dimensions of gubernatorial power, a governor is able to achieve desired policy results. However, as power decreases along those different dimensions (as exemplified in the results of the third column comparing gubernatorial power and the likelihood of a state adopting individual development accounts), it prevents a governor from achieving desired policy results. Additionally, Table 3.3 serves as a reminder that, although considered to be the most important official at the state level, the governor is but one of many factors to take into account in an attempt to understand policy outcomes. Other social, economic, and demographic forces play significant roles in influencing choices made by the states. So, while the results of each of these tables lend support to the hypothesis that gubernatorial power matters in determining policy outcomes, such assertions must be tempered by an understanding of how other forces converge as determinants of policy.
### TABLE 3.3. MICRO-LEVEL ANALYSIS OF INDIVIDUAL GUBERNATORIAL POWERS AND EFFECT ON STATE POLICY OUTCOMES.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent Variable</th>
<th>DRUGTANF</th>
<th>MEDI12</th>
<th>IDA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Governor’s Party</td>
<td>3.903****</td>
<td>1.194</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Separately Elected Officials</td>
<td>-2.040**</td>
<td>2.117**</td>
<td>1.503</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tenure Potential</td>
<td>1.487</td>
<td>1.215</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appointment Power</td>
<td>1.999**</td>
<td>-2.461**</td>
<td>-5.336****</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Budgetary Power</td>
<td>2.065**</td>
<td>3.220***</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Veto Power</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>-1.421</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electoral Mandate</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>1.413</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party Control</td>
<td>4.366****</td>
<td>-1.259</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ambition Ladder</td>
<td>1.327</td>
<td>4.497****</td>
<td>-2.271**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal Future</td>
<td>-0.824</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>-3.673****</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legislative Professionalization</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>-2.553**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Culture</td>
<td>5.505****</td>
<td>-1.967**</td>
<td>4.551****</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gross State Product Per Capita</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>-3.477****</td>
<td>2.025****</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of the Population on Welfare</td>
<td>-1.552</td>
<td>-3.455***</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unmarried Birth Rate</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>3.036***</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Overall Model:

- \( R^2 = .291 \)
- \( \text{Adj. } R^2 = .253 \)
- \( \text{S.E.} = .416 \)
- \( \text{Sig.} = .000 \)

- \( R^2 = .259 \)
- \( \text{Adj. } R^2 = .216 \)
- \( \text{S.E.} = .384 \)
- \( \text{Sig.} = .000 \)

- \( R^2 = .347 \)
- \( \text{Adj. } R^2 = .313 \)
- \( \text{S.E.} = .401 \)
- \( \text{Sig.} = .000 \)

*\( p<0.10 \)  **\( p<0.05 \)  ***\( p<0.01 \)  ****\( p<0.001 \)

### 3.7. Conclusion: Gubernatorial Power and Welfare Policy Outcomes

This chapter sought to provide statistical support for the often-purported claim that the strength or weakness of a state’s governor plays a role in determining policy...
outcomes. The central hypothesis was that the more power a governor held both personally and institutionally, the more significant she would prove to be in the policymaking process. The findings seem support this hypothesis. However, as is the case in all most all policy studies, the power of the governor is but one determinant of welfare outcomes. A number of social, economic, and cultural factors play a role in shaping policy outputs. The important lesson from these tests is that the common wisdom, holds true: governors are important in shaping policy, and when studying policy formation in the states, institutions matter.

One key lesson here, however, is that one should take care in basing an understanding of a state executive office solely on how powerful the governor is deemed to be overall. As is demonstrated throughout this study, strength in different areas might help a governor to influence the outcomes of some policies but not others. Therefore, when dealing with specific policies, a governor who has a high overall power rating may not achieve desired results because they are weak where it matters. Likewise, a governor who ranks low on the overall scale of power may achieve the outcomes they seek simply because they are strong in a few key areas. Put simply, the strength or weakness of a governor in an aggregate sense might help us to make very general claims about the role of the governor in policymaking, but such claims may not travel well across policy. As such, generalization may not always be the best way to consider the policymaking abilities of those persons occupying the executive office. It is, therefore, not always enough to state that a governor is powerful in a broad sense. Instead, one must determine in what areas the
governor is most powerful, and then decide whether or not these particular strengths are enough to yield desired outcomes.

As we move down one level on the power-pyramid, we see how the effects of gubernatorial power in determining policy differ slightly from those generalized claims. Table 2 shows that when gubernatorial power is divided into personal and institutional powers, one or both is a significant predictor of policy outcomes in three of the five welfare policy outcomes considered throughout the states. What do these results suggest? Initially, treating gubernatorial power as the result of two different sources or forms lends more support to the notion that governors do matter in the policymaking process than initially revealed in tests that focused solely on gubernatorial power as a whole. Moreover, not only does the office matter, but the person holding the office is also shown to be important when evaluating policies. In terms of gubernatorial power, the constitutionally ascribed powers that are institutionally held by a state executive are important in understanding a governor’s ability to successfully pursue desired policy options. Likewise, applying a Neustadtian understanding of the executive branches of the states, the power that the individual personally brings to the office is also important. Therefore, one must evaluate the office as well as the office holder in an attempt to more accurately understand the effect the executive will have on policy throughout the state.

Finally, a number of components of gubernatorial power proved to be significant when it was broken down to its singular elements, as shown in the examples in Table 3. One of the more consistent variables that proved to be a significant determinant on policy was that of a governor’s budgetary authority. This
is to be expected given that welfare programs are based on fiscal allocation and spending considerations. However, it is likely that in other, less economically driven policies (gay marriage, decriminalization of marijuana, support of physician assisted suicide, etc.), other powers would prove to be consistently more significant. In terms of welfare, budgetary authority remains incredibly important to an understanding of gubernatorial power and policy outcomes. An interesting result that stems from such a finding is that it helps to confirm the leadership theory that most governors identify as their position in government, that of a policy catalyst. Budget powers leading to policy outcomes are suggestive of the notion that governors pursue policy by setting a monetary agenda, framing the issues as they are presented to the legislature and the public, and attempting to guide policy from a proactive position. Such findings, therefore, help us to more clearly understand the leadership style of state executives, as well as supporting the initial hypothesis that gubernatorial power is a significant determinant of policy in the American states.
CHAPTER 4
GUBERNATORIAL POWER AND WELFARE POLICY
IMPLEMENTATION

4.1. Overview

The results detailed in the preceding chapter indicate that gubernatorial power played a significant role in determining welfare reform policy outcomes at the state level. These findings help add support for the hypothesis that gubernatorial power – both at institutional and personal levels – affects the ability of state executives to influence the policymaking process. However, the role of governor as “chief legislator” (or policymaker) is but one of the major roles that is commonly identified by scholars of state politics that is performed by state executives (Bowman and Kearney 2005; Saffell and Basehart 2005; Harrigan and Nice 2004; Beyle 1999; Rosenthal 1998, 1990). In addition to this role, governors are required to wear a number of other “hats” from the ceremonial duties of being chief of state, to the head of the state militia as commander-in-chief of the armed forces, as well as wielding a number of judicial powers in terms of pardoning and reprieve powers (Bowman and Kearney 2005; Saffell and Basehart 2005; Harrigan and Nice 2004). Figure 4.1 describes a number of the parts the governor plays in the state political system, and provides an overview of how gubernatorial leadership can mean a number of different things.
TABLE 4.1. THE VARIOUS LEADERSHIP ROLES OF THE GOVERNOR.

| Governor as Head of State: Ceremonial role of the governor as the spokesperson for the entire state and its people, as well as the central focal point for public opinion. | Governor as Chief Legislator: Executive capacities to either directly, or indirectly, exert influence on the policymaking process, and setting the public agenda. |
| Governor as Commander-in-Chief: Unless otherwise called into the service of the United States Federal Government, the governors of the American states have the capacity to call upon their states national guard in order to perform the faithful execution of public law, or to protect domestic tranquility. | Governor as Manager of State Administration: Executive responsibilities to appoint, govern, and mediate the heads of various state administrative agencies. May also include the ability of the governor to negotiate between private and public spheres of policy implementation. |
| The “Law and Order” Executive: Gubernatorial powers that influence the outcomes and process of the state legal system. Such powers include the ability to pardon or grant reprieves to those who have been convicted of crimes. | Governor as Manager of Crisis and Disaster Situations: The emergency powers granted to a governor to respond to natural and other disasters. Such powers range from calling in the national guard to raising disaster relief funds to help the state. |

While these other duties do not give us insight into the role that state executives played in determining welfare outcomes following welfare reform at the national level, a fourth role, that of the governor as “chief administrator,” does offer additional perspective (Saffell and Basehart 2005). This view of gubernatorial leadership is one that envisions the governor as being responsible for the oversight and management of executive agencies and departments, and for mediating between public and private interests in the execution of policies of state government. The governor’s place in this managerial position at the top of the state system offers another dimension on how the governor affects policy.

The office of the executive in almost every state shares a variety of characteristics in terms of having final responsibility for organizing and running state
administrative agencies and executive departments. With these responsibilities come a number of expectations of the chief executive. Some of the expectations include the ability for governors to achieve stated policy goals while executing the laws and programs of the state. Some have likened this role of gubernatorial administrative responsibilities to the duties and activities of a CEO of a major corporation, being forced to try and execute strategic planning in an attempt to meet or exceed stated goals (Weinberg 1977). From this perspective, the governor is the central administrator of the functioning of state government and its various agencies to provide for the most efficient and effective execution of policy.

The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (PRWORA) was designed with a number of goals and objectives in mind. Some of these goals were met *prima facie* in their design and implementation – to increase state control over and implementation of social welfare policy. However, there were several other goals that were argued as reasons for passing welfare reform. These included the transitioning of more people into work through the reduction of state welfare rolls, the containment and reduction of welfare spending, the reduction of births to unwed mothers through the promotion of marriage, and even the reduction of births to teenage mothers (Campbell 2004; Rector and Fagan 2003; Rom 1999).

If the purpose of the PRWORA is to enhance the ability of states to reach prescribed goals, then the attainment (or lack of thereof) of those goals is a critical aspect of policy formulation and implementation. Because the governor plays a critical administrative role in organizing government for the purposes of executing laws and mediating between public and private interests, then examining just how
gubernatorial power affects whether or not states reach identified policy goals is important in understanding the policy process, as is the initial creation of policy programs. Therefore, the purpose of this chapter is to test whether or not gubernatorial power plays a significant role in determining if a state is able to meet the underlying goals established through the adoption of welfare reform programs.

4.2. Governor as “Chief Administrator”: The Relationship Between Gubernatorial Power and the Achievement of Statewide Policy Goals

Sabato has argued that in the last few decades there has been an increase in the dynamic, managerial-style of leadership efforts being employed by state executives (Sabato 1983). Such a shift from the “good-time Charlies” of the past to the modern managerial role played by most governors has primarily been in response to the evolving and ever increasing expectations placed on state executives by the public (Harrigan and Nice 2004). Morehouse describes how increasing expectations of the performance of those leaders occupying the states’ executive office means that not only does the governor need to assist in the development of policy, but also the governor must organize government to provide the public a working, sustainable policy program (Morehouse 1977). These pre- and post-policymaking roles played by the governor demonstrate that the policy process goes beyond the writing and passage of legislation. Likewise, the leadership of the governor is not limited to the first stage of policy development. Even the most cursory examination of the various constitutions governing the fifty states demonstrate that the role of the governor is one that extends into the realm of ensuring the enactment and administration of state
programs and policy packages. Therefore, a fuller understanding of how
gubernatorial leadership affects at least one policy is needed.

But what role does power play in the governors’ ability to most efficiently and
effectively implement policy? That is, why does the relative strength or weakness of
the state executive matter following the initial development of state policies?
Understanding the obstacles that the governor faces in administering policy
throughout the state is necessary in answering this question. First and foremost, not
all governors have the ability to organize the top officials within the executive branch
as members of the same political ticket. Instead, several states have separately
elected officials who each enter their offices with different agendas and perspectives
on how government is to function (Beyle 1999).

**TABLE 4.2. ELECTED EXECUTIVE OFFICES ACROSS THE FIFTY
STATES.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Office</th>
<th>Number of States in Which Elective</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Governor</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lieutenant Governor</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attorney General</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Treasurer</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secretary of State</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Head of Department of Education</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Head of Department of Agriculture</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comptroller</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Auditor</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Harrington and Nice 2004, p. 223.

Table 4.2 illustrates the various ways that states elect each of their executive
officers. These numbers demonstrate the degree to which governors are formally
capable of selecting and organizing their executive branch. Such variation can have a substantial affect on the ability of states to achieve certain policy goals. If the governor is unable to select who is running the departments and administrative agencies, it may cause increased difficulty in developing a unified approach to the implementation of policy. This not only leads to more cumbersome administrative operations, but has the potential of reducing the effectiveness of the policy as it is translated from adoption to action (Harrigan and Nice 2004).

Additionally, in attempting to implement policy and attain stated objectives, governors are often constrained by statewide regulatory policy, conflicts between public and private spheres in the delivering goods and services throughout the state, and providing the necessary (primarily financial) resources, to make such efforts work (Bowman and Kearney 2005; Harrigan and Nice 2004; Beyle 1999; Conlan 1998). As such, Harrigan and Nice describe the evolution of the executive offices in a number of states in response to these constraints on the executive. These authors suggest that to increase the effectiveness of the governor in their administrative duties, gubernatorial powers were increased in a number of states to provide authority for the chief executive regarding budgetary, appointment, organization, and a number of other powers (Harrigan and Nice 2004). This supports previous arguments made about increasing executive powers in response to political constraints, in which gubernatorial power was seen as a mechanism to enhance the administrative responsibilities of the executive as well as other statewide duties (Bowman and Kearney 1986). Thus, much like the previous examination of the role of gubernatorial power in policy formulation, examining the relationship between a
governor’s powers and the effects of policy across the states offers further understanding of the part played not only in developing, but actually implementing policy seeking to meet identified policy objectives.

4.3. Welfare Policy Goals: Identifying the Dependent Variables

To examine to what extent if at all gubernatorial power affects the ability of state governments to achieve stated policy goals I have identified four major policy objectives motivating the welfare reform efforts of 1996. The first of these goals is the reduction of dependency on the part of recipients on the welfare system. The second is the reduction of spending on welfare programs by states, while the third and fourth pertain to modification of behavior by reducing pregnancy rates of teenage and unwed mothers (Sawhill 2001). Although it might be argued that there are additional goals that went along with the implementation of the PRWORA, the aforementioned objectives were among the top state priorities identified and are easily tested.

Regarding the reduction of dependency on the part of recipients, states focused on efforts to reduce the percentage of the overall population receiving welfare assistance. Using data from the US Census Bureau, I tracked the percentage of state populations receiving welfare from 1996-1999, and developed an overall

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48 The arguments in favor of developing policy that would reduce the number of so-called “illegitimate” births to teenage and unwed mothers were made by a number of conservative thinkers. Among them was Charles Murray who was instrumental in the development of the Wisconsin Works (W-2) program under the leadership of Governor Tommy Thompson. According to Murray, “Illegitimacy is the single most important social problem of our time – more important than crime, drugs, poverty, welfare, or homelessness, because it drives everything” (Bowman and Kerney 2005, p. 493). This line of reasoning prompted a number of states to adopt those policies they felt would both provide an economic incentive for marriage, and disincentives for teenage pregnancy in an attempt to modify the behavior of some welfare recipients (Bowman and Kearney 2005; Campbell 2004).
## TABLE 4.3. VARYING IMPACTS OF STATE WELFARE POLICIES IN TERMS OF FOUR KEY POLICY GOALS, 1996-1999.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>+/- of Welfare Recipients as Percentage of Overall State Population</th>
<th>+/- of Welfare Spending as Percentage of Overall State Budget</th>
<th>+/- of Birth Rate to Teenage Mothers</th>
<th>+/- of Birth Rate to Unwed Mothers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Alabama</td>
<td>-1.4</td>
<td>-1.3</td>
<td>-3.8</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alaska</td>
<td>-1.5</td>
<td>-4.6</td>
<td>-2.8</td>
<td>-2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arizona</td>
<td>-2.0</td>
<td>-2.3</td>
<td>-0.1</td>
<td>-1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arkansas</td>
<td>-1.2</td>
<td>-0.5</td>
<td>-4.8</td>
<td>-1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>California</td>
<td>-2.8</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>-6.6</td>
<td>-0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colorado</td>
<td>-1.6</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>-0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Connecticut</td>
<td>-2.3</td>
<td>-2.6</td>
<td>-2.8</td>
<td>3.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delaware</td>
<td>-1.1</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>-1.5</td>
<td>-2.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Florida</td>
<td>-2.5</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>-4.2</td>
<td>-1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>-2.9</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>-2.1</td>
<td>-1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hawaii</td>
<td>-1.8</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>-2.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Idaho</td>
<td>-1.7</td>
<td>-3.7</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>-0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Illinois</td>
<td>-2.4</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>-3.6</td>
<td>-0.7</td>
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gain-loss total for welfare recipient percentages for each state. This enabled me to measure the extent to which states were able to achieve the goal of reducing the numbers of individuals receiving state welfare assistance. A similar method was employed for factoring the percentage of a state’s overall budget allocated to welfare expenditures, teen pregnancy rates, and birth rates of children to unwed mothers. In this way, I was able to construct measures of how far states had come in attaining the goals established at the inception of welfare reform in 1996.

However, relative reductions in spending, the number of individuals receiving welfare assistance, and the rate of births to teenage and unwed mothers may not be the best indicator of how far a state has come in relation to the goals established by welfare reform. To begin with, these measures do not account for where a state stood in relation to these goals at the inception of welfare reform. For example, in 1996 the percentage of Alabama’s population receiving welfare assistance was approximately 2.52%, while Alaska’s was roughly 5.84%. In the period of time from 1996-1999, both Alabama and Alaska had approximately the same rate of reduction in the number of people receiving welfare assistance (as a percentage of the population, 1.4% versus 1.5%, respectively). However, the difference in the actual numbers of people receiving welfare assistance as a percentage of the state’s overall population

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Wisconsin</th>
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</table>


49 To determine whether or not there was a high intercorrelation between teen pregnancy rates and the birth rates of children to unwed mothers, I ran a bivariate correlation analysis. These tests revealed a Pearson’s correlation coefficient of -.228, and was insignificant in both one-tailed and two-tailed tests. Such results indicate that it is appropriate to treat these variables separately, and not as similar indicators revealing the same underlying trends.
was nearly four-times as much in Alaska what it was in Alabama. Therefore, measuring only the relative reductions in the numbers over the four-year period does not offer a clear indication of just how much a state has moved in meeting the objectives established by welfare reform.

One additional problem in running a test between gubernatorial power and the achievement of welfare policy goals is in establishing just how high a priority (if at all) the dependent variables are across the fifty states. That is, how can we be sure that the reduction in the number of welfare recipients was a major priority in each of the states, or that reducing relative levels of spending, teenage birth rates, or birth rates to unwed mothers were of main concern for state governments in the passage of welfare reform policies? While it is difficult to say with certainty that these goals were of primary importance to each of the states, there is substantial evidence that all of the states were concerned with achieving such goals. First, an issues brief released by the National Governor’s Association (NGA) in July 1997 indicates that, “Although every trend or issue does not apply to every state, they reflect the collective experience of multiple states.” (NGA 1997, p. 1). The brief, comprised of self-reported summaries of the experiences of twenty-three state executives, goes on to describe how among some of the top priorities were reducing the numbers of individuals receiving welfare assistance from the state and regulating behavior. Likewise, testimony provided by the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services on the NGA to the Senate Finance Committee identifies these goals (among others) as being some of the primary reasons for unanimous, bipartisan support from the organization for the reforms implemented in the PRWORA (Department of Health
and Human Services 1996). Finally, in 2002, the NGA urged Congress to reauthorize the landmark welfare reform legislation citing some of these same goals as reasons for continuing the program (NGA 2002). While this evidentiary material supports the notion that the governors of various states all desired to meet the identified goals, it does not identify which governors placed these four goals among their top priorities or how they ranked them. One thing is for certain, there is no evidence indicating that any of the various governors desired anything but reductions along the lines of the number of individuals receiving welfare assistance, welfare spending as a percentage of the state’s overall budget, teenage birth rates, or births to unwed mothers (Rom 1999).

A final problem with measuring states’ progress in terms of relative reductions is that by 1999 the federal work requirements began to kick in, automatically forcing some individuals to leave the welfare rolls. Thus, as indicated in Figure 4.3, every state in the US experienced at least some reduction in the number of people receiving welfare as a percentage of a state’s overall population. This means that states that had previously adopted more liberal stances on poverty that experienced some of a reduction based on federal funding standards would see significant reductions in their roles leading them to be mischaracterized as incredibly restrictive states. Likewise, comparing state-level welfare spending data from 1995 to those in 1999 show similar trends with spending prior to, and following, the adoption of welfare reform. Figure 4.4 demonstrates these spending levels. As shown in this figure, 39 out of 50 states saw a relative reduction in levels of welfare spending. Therefore, applying a different standard of how close a state is to a
complete elimination of individuals receiving state welfare assistance, and measuring how close or far removed a state is in terms of this goal, seems like a more accurate


<table>
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<th>Welfare Speding as % of Annual Expenditures, 1999</th>
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way of measuring the dependent variable. Both tests are, however, included because the insights both methods might offer concerning gubernatorial power and the efforts to maximize outcomes relative to statewide welfare policy goals.

4.4. Determinants of Welfare Policy Success and Failure Relative to Established Goals: Identifying the Independent Variables

The independent variables and the logic for their use for this analysis remain similar to those detailed in chapter three; thus, a comprehensive explanation for this data does not need to be repeated here. However, because there are differences in some of the variables employed, and because the logic of their importance varies given the dependent variables being measured, a brief discussion of these variables is needed. By means of a brief overview, the independent variables used are measures of gubernatorial power (overall, institutional and personal, and the individual components of power), gubernatorial partisanship, legislative professionalization, political culture, racial diversity, poverty rates, southern regional classification of states, bureaucratic quality, and levels of education attainment within the states. The goal was to assess whether the results would support the hypothesis that higher levels of gubernatorial power help states achieve identified policy goals. Because no

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50 The partisan congruence between the executive and legislative branches are factored into the “party control” component of gubernatorial power measures.
political actor functions in a vacuum, the additional variables were utilized as controls to maximize the explanatory power of the various models in this study.

The results from the tests performed in chapter three indicate that, while gubernatorial power is a significant indicator of policy variation across the states, some executive powers might matter in determining certain outcomes but not others. This means that while institutional powers might be important in determining one type of policy, they might not be the case for others. As the results in chapter three reveal, one must be careful as to what assumptions are made about gubernatorial power and its impact on the ability of a state to attain desired policy goals. It is not enough for governors to merely be strong institutionally or personally, for different powers seem to have different effects in relation to policy outcomes. Therefore, what is needed is a theory of what powers are important when and why.

Based on findings from chapter three, I concluded that overall levels of gubernatorial power (a combined measure of both institutional and personal powers) are a significant determinant of policy variation across the states. These findings support the central hypothesis that higher levels of power vested in the executive help governors to achieve policy goals. This means that one should expect that increased levels of gubernatorial power in an aggregate sense would have an affect on all types of policy outcomes. However, do these results carry over into other aspects of the governor's duties as chief executive? That is, can it be assumed that a combined measure of gubernatorial power would also affect a governor’s ability to achieve desired outcomes in the policy implementation phase as well?
4.4.1. Gubernatorial Power and “Performance-Oriented” Government

With the 1992 publication of Osborne and Gaebler’s *Reinventing Government*, contemporary studies of public administration are largely concerned with “performance-oriented” government. Concerns over the ability of government to perform adequately, or more accurately achieve desired results, in the arena of policy implementation increased greatly in recent years, with analyses of administrative performance taking on a business-like model of performance assessment (Barrett and Greene 1999; Radin 1998; Kravchuk and Schack 1996). In such models, the governor is often treated as the CEO of the “public industry” in charge of delivering public goods and services (Lynn 1998; Terry 1998).

The increased attention being paid by scholars, elected officials, the media, and common citizens on the performance models of “reinvented government” leads me to expand the theories of gubernatorial power beyond policymaking and into the realm of policy implementation. This shifts our focus from gubernatorial power as a tool of the state’s “chief legislator” into one being employed by the state’s “chief executive officer.” Such classifications of the governor are not novel to this study. Several authors have explored the theoretical link between the governor and CEOs major corporations (Beyle 1999; Sabato 1983; Moorehouse 1981; National Governor’s Association 1981). Beyle (1999) describes how the governor can use the same powers available to him in the policymaking phase in this implementation aspect of his policy duties. Put simply, as in the policymaking process, it can be assumed as well that the more powerful the governor the more likely they are to influence the results in the execution of policy within their state.
In an attempt to determine whether or not measures of gubernatorial power are significant in influencing policy results in the implementation phase, it is important to clarify the assumptions underlying this analysis. Similarly to aggregate measures of gubernatorial power, one can assume (based on previous findings) that general measures of institutional and personal powers of state executives are influential in determining results of policy implementation across the states. The results of the tests for determinants of policy variation in chapter three indicated that a governor’s institutional powers were significant in determining policy outcomes along two dimensions of state welfare policy.\textsuperscript{51} Much like institutional powers assist the governor to perform the duties of chief-legislator, institutional powers should also prove to be significant across the board in terms of performing the functions of chief-administrator. Not only do the institutional powers of the governor affect the state budget (and therefore, funding for bureaucratic agencies), but the institutional powers of the governor are also comprised of appointment powers and the election of an executive team. This influences the governor’s ability to organize and influence the funding of bureaucratic agencies, which in turn impacts the ability of the governor to induce desired results from policy implementation by statewide administrative agencies.

Although not often considered an administrative power, a governor’s tenure powers do offer leverage over the public bureaucracy. Studies performed by Gerald

\textsuperscript{51} Overall levels of gubernatorial power were significant in determining whether or not states adopted restrictions on providing benefits to those who convicted of drug related felonies (p < 0.10), as well as whether states opted for more stringent standards for the amount of time a person was able to receive welfare assistance before being transitioned into the workforce (p < 0.10). Likewise, although it did not prove to be significant on its own, aggregate measures of gubernatorial power were a part of the overall model for explaining variation across the states as to whether or not to adopt transitional Medicaid assistance for longer than twelve months.
Benjamin (1982) and Ronald Moe (1988) indicate that the ability of the governor to exercise the veto – especially when granted line-item veto authority – offers the chief executive additional controls over state administrative agencies by overseeing their budgets. The veto power enables governors to oversee cuts and raises in administrative funding. Likewise, the line-item veto offers the governor the ability to cut parts of an agency’s budget without rejecting an entire budget package, making it very difficult for enough legislative support to be garnered for an override (Thompson and Boyd 1994; Herzik and Wiggins 1989; Gosling 1986). Such powers, therefore, offer the governor a means for controlling administrative agencies in the implementation of public policy.

The personal powers of the governor also influenced the ability of executives to perform legislative functions in the pursuit of attaining desired policy outcomes. However, unlike the institutional powers of the governor, it cannot be logically assumed that the personal powers of executives will enable them to directly leverage desired outcomes in the implementation phase of state policy. There are several reasons to support this hypothesis. First, unlike members of the legislative branch of government whose jobs are dependent on and seek reelection (Mayhew 1974), American civil service stresses “objective merit” as the basis for almost all administrative employees (Elling 1999, p. 283). This means that civil servants are more likely to be insulated from turnover based on public support or popular

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52 The results of the tests performed in chapter three revealed that a governor’s personal powers were significant in determining outcomes of whether states adopted restrictions on providing benefits to those who convicted of drug related felonies (p < 0.10), and whether they decided to adopt transitional Medicaid assistance for longer than twelve months (p < 0.10).
sentiment. For example, although research performed by the Pew Research Center in 2000 revealed that only 9% of taxpayers and 2% of businesses reported a “very favorable” overall impression of workers at the Internal Revenue Service, and that 67% of taxpayers and 63% of businesses reported that the IRS could be trusted “only some of the time,” such a low level of support for the agency does not affect whether or not members of the IRS will keep their job from one year to the next (Pew 2000). Likewise, although a study performed by Charles Goodsell (1985) reported that more than 80 percent of Wisconsin residents describe their contact with parts of the state transportation bureaucracy as being at least “good” or better, such approval has little bearing on the retention of these street-level bureaucrats. Therefore, members of the public bureaucracy are not as likely to be swayed by public support figures for state executives (electoral mandate, job performance ratings) as are members of the legislature. Thus, the electoral mandate or job performance ratings of the governor do not easily translate into executive influence over the management and control over bureaucratic functions of the state.

A second reason that the personal powers of the governor are unlikely to yield much influence over the implementation of policy is because of the general difficulty top administrators who are more likely to be gubernatorial appointments have in controlling the behavior of lower-level bureaucrats. In fact, Brehm and Gates (1997) demonstrate that supervisors within pubic bureaucracy are extremely limited in their

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53 This does not mean that civil servants are entirely insulated from external influences, nor should it be taken to mean such. There are a number of important studies that detail the possible external forces that influence or shape bureaucratic behavior and decision-making (see Balla and Wright 2001; O’Toole and Meier 2001; Meier 2000; Lynn 1996; Brudney and Hebert 1987; Gromley and Hoadley 1983). However, an attempt to include each of these influences on a measure is conceptually improbable within a study such as this, especially in light of the relationship between the personal powers of the governors and state administrative bureaucracy.
ability to control the behavior of their subordinates. The authors go on to show through empirical testing that the “street-level” bureaucrats that deal with the day-to-day operations of the state are highly insulated in their decision-making processes and activities. According to the authors, primarily their own preferences and those of their colleagues shape the behaviors of professional bureaucrats. However, Brehm and Gates do note that these preferences are aligned with fulfilling the policy missions of the bureaucratic agency for which they work. Thus, bureaucrats are not entirely insulated from public considerations, but for the most part political considerations are not a factor in the day-to-day operation of state administration. Moreover, when it comes to the personal future of the governor and his position on the political ambition ladder, neither are likely to influence the maintenance and management of the day-to-day functions of the bureaucracy because the future of civil servants are not tied to the future of governors. This decreases the likelihood that a governor’s personal powers would factor into the ability of executives to manage the functions of bureaucrats.

Finally, of the four outcomes under consideration in this study, different results can be expected in terms of their relationship with the varying degrees of gubernatorial power held by the chief executives of the fifty states. These differences can be attributed not only to the different ways we might expect the various elements of gubernatorial power to effect change, but also to the length of time accounted for in this examination. This means that for some of the outcomes we can expect more immediate impacts from the passage of reform than others. For example, the attempt on the part of states to reduce the amount of spending on TANF programs can be
immediately effected by policy adoption and budgetary decisions (Gallagher, et al. 1998; NGA 1998). There is little preventing states from achieving immediate results in this identified policy goal. The same is true for the reduction of the numbers of people receiving welfare assistance. Because there is a state imposed limit of two years or less on the amount of time an individual can receive welfare assistance, one might expect little lag between the adoption of policies that impose limitations on available assistance and the reduction of people receiving state support (Gallagher, et al. 1998; NGA 1998). In these two areas, faster results can therefore be expected thereby increasing the probable significance between gubernatorial power and outcomes following the implementation of welfare reform.

In terms of what powers that can reasonably assumed to impact outcomes along these two dimensions of results, not all powers are necessarily equal in terms of how they might be expected to affect reductions in these categories. Because we are discussing results based on policy implementation, and not just the adoption of the legislation as discussed in the preceding chapter, some of the factors of power that were once considered important are not as likely to significantly impact the results of this study. While one can logically expect the powers that grant the governor leverage in controlling the administrative offices that are in charge of carrying out the actual implementation of TANF, other powers are unlikely to play a significant part in affecting said outcomes.\textsuperscript{54} For example, according to Sherman (1984) partisan congruence between the governor and state legislature (i.e., party control) offers the governor influence over the legislature in the policymaking phase of the process.

\textsuperscript{54} For a more thorough examination of the relationship between gubernatorial power and bureaucratic control, see the discussion of this issue in chapter three.
However, because the street-level bureaucrats of the public administration of the
states are primarily merit employees, the same power is less likely to offer the
executive much control following the adoption of various policy options. While
much of the nineteenth century bureaucracy in the American states was characterized
by pure political patronage for employment, civil service reformers of the early
twentieth century began promoting the already federally adopted concept of merit for
employment and retention (Elling 1999). The result of these reforms was to, in large-
part, create a “neutral civil service” (Elling 1999, p. 278). This neutrality of service
and employment and retention based on merit, helps to insulate (although, admittedly,
does not entirely shield) them from much politicization in terms of how programs are
run, which reduces the importance of factors like the governor’s electoral mandate
and performance ratings in determining the effectiveness of policy implementation
(Brehm and Gates 1997).

Unlike reductions in the number of people receiving welfare and the amount
of the state budget allocated to TANF programs, results for programs intended to
modify personal behavior throughout the state are unlikely to produce any immediate
results. A 2001 research brief by the Brookings Institute reveals that while increased
emphasis on child support enforcement “had a significant effect in deterring unwed
childbearing,” attempts to find a clear relationship between other policies in particular
and reductions in teenage and out-of-wedlock pregnancies are often unable to find a
precise link (Sawhill 2001, p. 2). This research suggests two things: One, that strong
public emphasis on welfare reform policies like time limits, work requirements, and
enforcement of child support obligations has helped to decrease the number of
pregnancies among teenagers and unwed mothers, and two, that these reductions have occurred slowly over time. These results indicate that, in terms of gubernatorial power being a significant force in affecting the behavior of teenagers and unmarried men and women, we can expect that the relationship between gubernatorial power and the reduction in births to teenage and unwed mothers will likely be weak given the small number of years being covered and the indirect link between power and these particular results. When it comes to such attempts at modifying behavior, these tests are likely to suffer from a lag between government action and behavioral response.

Second, as was described with the possible reduction in spending and in the number of people receiving state welfare assistance, it is likely that those powers designed to specifically give the governor leverage over other state executive agencies and the public will prove to be more significant than other powers available to him. This means that certain institutional powers designed to give the governor administrative control over the executive like those of appointment (Cox 1991), election of other executive officers as members of the same ticket (Beyle 1999), and budgetary authority (Granholm 2004; Tanner 2002) will likely share a more significant relationship with policy implementation results. Additionally, one can expect that a governor’s political experience will weigh heavily on his ability to achieve desired results from the implementation of policy, as experience itself offers “best and worst” lessons in terms of how to effectively govern the administration. Likewise, Dometrius (2002) emphasizes the importance of a governor’s electoral mandate and performance ratings, as he empirically demonstrates the link between
levels of executive support and success in controlling both the state legislature and bureaucracy. Finally, when it comes to executive tenure, limits and the potential for reelection can play significant factors in controlling the administration (Beyle 1999; Pious 1996). A governor who is term-limited is not able to produce the type of continuity necessary in adapting a program the way he might want to produce desired outcomes, and turn-over in the executive office may also throw the rest of the administrative agencies of the state into upheaval.

4.4.2. Environmental Factors Effecting Welfare Reform Policy Implementation

In conjunction with gubernatorial power, a variety of other independent variables were considered in the model to assess the relative success states have in relation to each other in achieving identified welfare policy goals: gubernatorial partisanship, legislative professionalization, political culture, racial diversity, poverty rates, southern regionalism, bureaucratic quality, and levels of educational attainment.55

As was the case in chapter three where it was shown how gubernatorial power acts as one variable among many in determining policy outcomes in the states, the party affiliation of the governor is important to consider as an independent factor influencing results in the outcomes in the four identified state goals of welfare reform. As previously indicated, one would expect Republican governors to place a greater

55 Two additional control variables used in chapter three were that of the percentage of births to unmarried women and the percentage of a state’s overall population that was receiving welfare assistance. Both variables, while important to consider in the initial formation of state policy, are now being evaluated in terms of how effective states are in reducing these numbers and as such are dropped from consideration as control variables in the implementation stage. Thus, variation in the method from chapter three to the study in this chapter is due to the nature of the question being asked, which is the difference between the policymaking and policy-implementation phases of state government.
emphasis on what would be considered to be more “conservative” goals (i.e., greater reductions in the amount of money spent on welfare programs, greater reductions in the number of people receiving state welfare assistance, and greater reductions in births to unwed and teenage mothers) than their Democratic counterparts (Iversen 1999; Boix 1997; Alesina and Rosenthal 1995; Hicks and Swank 1992; Alvarez, et al. 1991; Bibby, et al. 1990). This is not to say that Democrats do not seek these outcomes; they do. Instead, this variable is introduced as a way of controlling for common partisan emphasis in which Republicans are more likely to place greater emphasis in terms of making these reductions a critical element to their overall administrative goals. In terms of outcomes following implementation of welfare reform policies, it is this emphasis that may carry with it substantial effects in which greater emphasis yields greater reductions (Sawhill 2001). Thus, controlling for the party of the chief executive is important in evaluating overall determinants in policy outcome variation across the states following welfare reform.

One might expect that legislative professionalization does not play an important part of the implementation of policy, since policy execution is normally regarded as a function of the governor and the executive branch of state government. However, this is not necessarily the case. Due to the budgetary and other powers held by the legislative branch, state legislatures retain a very crucial power that offers them leverage over the way in which policy is implemented across the states – the power of legislative oversight (Banks 1989; Bendor, et al. 1987). Some argue that it is through a variety of techniques that extend even beyond just budgetary authority that state legislatures are able to ex ante supervise how the routine carrying out of legislation is
performed by the executive branch following the passage of legislation (Lupia and McCubbins 1994; Macey 1992; Aberbach 1990; Moe 1990; McCubbins, et al. 1987; Weingast and Moarn 1983). It is this power of oversight that makes legislative professionalization an important independent variable for consideration in this study, as more professional legislatures are likely to continually oversee and supervise policy than citizen legislatures that have very limited meetings and sessions (Huber, et al. 1998). Therefore, because of the importance of oversight, legislative professionalization is important to consider when attempting to discover determinants of variation in results across the states.

One important difference between the independent variables employed in chapter three and those used in this study is the inclusion of a measure of bureaucratic quality. In assessing the impact the governor has on the implementation of policy, a consideration of the quality of the employees of state bureaucracy are essential because it is these employees that perform the day-to-day operations of government. However, the quality of state bureaucracy is a difficult concept to quantifiably measure. In cross-national studies, the commonly accepted approach to quantifying bureaucratic quality is through the use of the Freedom House measure of bureaucratic corruption (Chang-En and Shang-Ji 2001; Olson, Sarna and Swamy 2000; Collier and Gunning 1999). However, such attempts at measuring bureaucratic quality in the American states are of little value. Instead a limited, and admittedly crude way of measuring bureaucratic quality is through the average salary provided for state governmental administrative employees.\(^{56}\)

\(^{56}\) Although some might argue that salary alone is not the only way of measuring compensation, and that other important benefits such as pensions, vacation, sick leave, and health care are important.
TABLE 4.5. AVERAGE MONTHLY SALARY OF STATE GOVERNMENT ADMINISTRATIVE EMPLOYEES, 1996.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Average Salary</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Alabama</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>$2,314</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alaska</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3,654</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arizona</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>2,284</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arkansas</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>2,163</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>California</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3,547</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colorado</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3,139</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Connecticut</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>3,096</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delaware</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>2,569</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Florida</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>2,383</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>2,247</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hawaii</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>2,562</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Idaho</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>2,511</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Illinois</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>2,018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indiana</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>2,214</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iowa</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>2,902</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kansas</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>2,371</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kentucky</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>2,259</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Louisiana</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>2,189</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maine</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>2,537</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maryland</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>2,663</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Massachusetts</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>3,022</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Michigan</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3,285</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minnesota</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3,153</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mississippi</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>2,143</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missouri</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>2,198</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Montana</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>2,345</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nebraska</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>2,270</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nevada</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>2,898</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Hampshire</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>2,695</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Jersey</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3,435</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Mexico</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>2,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New York</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3,382</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Carolina</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>2,368</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Dakota</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>2,259</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ohio</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>3,056</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oklahoma</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>1,885</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oregon</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>2,655</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Factors to consider when attempting to measure compensation. However, according to Richard Elling (1999), “states ranking high in regard to average monthly salary also rank high when the value of fringe benefits is considered” (p. 281). Although Elling notes that there are slight variations in the overall competitiveness of state compensation for administrative employees when these benefits are included, for the most part all but a few states retain the same ranking. Additionally, Gold and Ritchie (1992) indicate that, while controlling for cost-of-living from state-to-state alters a few of the state rankings, for the most part average monthly salary rankings remain consistent whether or not one controls for cost-of-living.
Pennsylvania & 17 & 2,798 \\
Rhode Island & 6 & 3,221 \\
South Carolina & 48 & 2,143 \\
South Dakota & 41 & 2,216 \\
Tennessee & 36 & 2,269 \\
Texas & 37 & 2,262 \\
Utah & 21 & 2,573 \\
Vermont & 27 & 2,385 \\
Virginia & 29 & 2,374 \\
Washington & 13 & 2,990 \\
West Virginia & 49 & 1,949 \\
Wisconsin & 14 & 2,916 \\
Wyoming & 46 & 2,158 \\

*Source: US Census Bureau, 1996

The ability of states to both attract and retain “good” employees is due, in large part, to compensation (Elling 1999). Studies show that states that paid their employees higher average salaries had decreased turnover due to employees quitting their jobs than states who offered less. In fact, Richard Elling demonstrates that between 40 and 60 percent of variation in the rates of public employees quitting their jobs could be accounted for by compensation alone. Although level of pay alone, regardless of its effects on turnover rates, does not entirely capture the quality and capacity of bureaucratic agencies across the states, such measures have been used by scholars of state politics to roughly quantify bureaucratic quality despite their limitations (Hero 1998). Therefore, the average monthly salary of state government administrative employees is used here to measure bureaucratic quality.

An often-overlooked aspect of political culture in the policy realm of American and state politics is the effect that it has on the organization and activities of public bureaucracies (Atkinson, et al. 2000). Political culture arguments are often invoked to explain variations in policy and the size and scope of state governments, but rarely do these arguments go beyond the initial passage of policy or development.

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57 Additional discussion regarding the measurement of bureaucratic quality can be found in chapter five.
of political institutions. However, what little research has been done regarding administrative agencies in the United States, and that research done on foreign governments in the international comparative politics literature, suggests that political culture influences the behavior of bureaucratic agencies in implementing law and regulations following the adoption of such legislation (Atkinson 2002; Atkinson, et al. 2000; Bielefield and Corbin 1996). According to Sarah Atkinson et al., “The social organization and political culture of the society in which an organization is embedded can have major effects on the way in which organizational policy is implemented and on how that organization functions (619).” These outcomes indicate that, to adequately control for the different ways in which the various components of welfare reform were enacted by the administrative agencies of the fifty states, political culture must be taken into account.

A racially diverse population often places conflicting demands on not only the policy development of, but also the way it is implemented by, state governments. In the area of TANF policies specifically, research indicates that racial composition of states affect the way in which welfare policies are implemented. Research done by Lael Keiser, Peter Mueser, and Seung-Whan Choi (2004) demonstrates that the overall rate of sanctions imposed by states increased as nonwhite populations increased. Additionally, the authors find that nonwhites are sanctioned at greater rates than nonwhites living in the same local areas. These results indicate the influence that racial composition can have on how welfare policy is implemented, and

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58 The authors also show that at a certain threshold, when nonwhite groups become a significant enough portion of the population to begin taking control of governmental office and substantial parts of the bureaucracy through democratic means, sanctions begin to decline. This also demonstrates the effect of racial diversity on policy implementation following welfare reform.
can help explain variation in outcomes across the states. Therefore, it is important to include racial diversity in the model.

Research suggests that one of the most important factors influencing the way in which welfare reform is implemented is controlling for poverty in general (Handler and Hasenfeld 1997). It stands to reason that poverty places increased demands on the welfare systems of those states with higher rates. This directly affects a state’s ability to meet the defined policy objectives detailed above. Thus, an independent variable measuring overall rates of poverty in the states was introduced.

As described in chapter one of this dissertation, V.O. Key (1984) argues that the structure and nature of bureaucracy in southern states were an extension of elites attempting to entrench white domination over blacks in America. This is not to argue that southern bureaucracies are today intentionally racist in the implementation of policy. Instead, this argument suggests that, in order to control for the possible difference between the nature of administration in southern states and the rest of the nation, a regional control variable should be introduced.

Educational achievement is at the heart of a number of other welfare related issues ranging from poverty to job availability. The more education a person has, especially at the threshold of receiving their high school diploma, the more earning power potential they hold and the less likely they are to be unemployed (Handler and Hasenfeld 1997). This means that more educated populations are less likely to rely on governmental welfare assistance. Concomitantly, educational achievement in general also affects the birth rates of children to teenage mothers. Studies indicate that higher rates of educational attainment are negatively correlated with teenage
pregnancies and birth rates (Ventura, et al. 2001; Singh and Darroch 2000). This means that the more education young people have, the less likely they are to become pregnant during their years of adolescence. For these reasons, controlling for educational attainment is essential for understanding variation in the relative rates of success states have had in attaining their welfare policy goals following adoption.

4.5. Gubernatorial Power and the Attainment of Welfare Policy Goals: Methods and Testing

To test whether gubernatorial power affects the ability of states to reach identified welfare policy goals, I employed the same methodology used in chapter three, using linear regression with a backward elimination method of variable selection to find which model was most appropriate for analyzing the effects of gubernatorial power on the attainment of welfare policy goals. Additionally, a dummy variable was created for each model to control for a governor’s partisan identification and see if the expected directional link exists between increased gubernatorial power and policy effects (such as the reduction of spending on welfare as a percentage of the overall state budget). To determine the model of best fit, I first looked to which model had the lowest standard errors. If more than one model met this criterion, I then looked to which of these models had the highest explanatory power (R-squared) to select the model that had the lowest error while maintaining the highest explanation of variance possible.

Similar to the tests in chapter three, the effects of gubernatorial power and the subsequent controls were tested for each of the dependent variables. However, as
indicated previously, because of the different ways of measuring (and subsequently testing) the dependent variables in this analysis, two sets of tests were run for each dependent variable for each level of gubernatorial power measurement.59


Looking first at gubernatorial power from a macro-level, aggregating all of the personal and institutional powers into a single indicator, Table 4.1 reveals that gubernatorial power only appears in two of the four tests (the percentage of state expenditures allocated to welfare and the birth rates of infants to teenage mothers). Additionally, although this aggregate measure of gubernatorial power appears in two of the models, neither times does it prove to be significant. This means that, although important to include to increase the explanatory power of these models, an aggregate measure of gubernatorial power does not prove to be a significant determinant of outcomes along the dimensions of these state policy goals.

4.6.1. Macro-Level Analysis

Although Table 4.6 reveals that aggregate measures of gubernatorial power do not prove to be significant, there are a number of important findings to explore and consider. Looking to the first column, the independent variables were tested against the dependent variable measuring the percentage of the overall population of a state receiving welfare assistance. The explanatory model that results from these tests

59 Gubernatorial power was, once again, tested on a macro-, mid-range, and micro-level in order to determine how different measures of power might affect the attainment of policy goals differently.
includes the dependent variables of gubernatorial partisanship, political culture, the southern regional control, the percentage of the population that is black, poverty rates, educational attainment, and quality of bureaucracy. Combined into a single model, these variables explain approximately 43% of the variance in the dependent variable ($R^2 = 0.426$).

**TABLE 4.6. MACRO-LEVEL ANALYSIS OF OVERALL GUBERNATORIAL POWER AND EFFECT ON STATE TANF POLICY GOALS, 1996-1999.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent Variable</th>
<th>% of Welfare Recipients as Part of Overall Population</th>
<th>Level of Welfare Spending as % of Public Expenditures</th>
<th>Teen Birth Rates</th>
<th>Birth Rates to Unwed Mothers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Governor’s Party</td>
<td>1.949*</td>
<td>-3.650****</td>
<td>-1.351</td>
<td>2.371**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall/Aggregate Gubernatorial Power</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>1.211</td>
<td>-1.532</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legislative Professionalization</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>4.636****</td>
<td>1.105</td>
<td>2.327**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Culture</td>
<td>1.961*</td>
<td>3.349****</td>
<td>6.628****</td>
<td>5.803****</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southern State</td>
<td>-1.817*</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>-2.368**</td>
<td>-6.386****</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of the Population Black</td>
<td>-1.102</td>
<td>1.530</td>
<td>2.172**</td>
<td>6.900****</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poverty Rate</td>
<td>5.588****</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>4.573****</td>
<td>5.626****</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Educational Attainment</td>
<td>-2.303**</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>-0.843</td>
<td>-3.290****</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quality of Bureaucracy</td>
<td>9.854****</td>
<td>8.303****</td>
<td>-0.764</td>
<td>2.824***</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Overall Model                       | $R^2 = .426$                                           | $R^2 = .368$                                          | $R^2 = .667$    | $R^2 = .674$                |
|                                      | Adj $R^2 = .406$                                       | Adj $R^2 = .349$                                      | Adj $R^2 = .652$| Adj $R^2 = .660$            |
|                                      | S.E. = .63935                                         | S.E. = .95352                                        | S.E. = 7.8598   | S.E. = 3.2069               |
|                                      | Sig. = .000                                           | Sig. = .000                                          | Sig. = .000    | Sig. = .000                |

*p<0.10  **p<0.05  ***p<0.01  ****p<0.001
Of the variables included in the model in the first column of Table 4.6, gubernatorial partisanship (p < 0.1), political culture (p < 0.1), the southern regional control (p < 0.1), poverty rates (p < 0.001), educational attainment (p < 0.01), and quality of bureaucracy (p < 0.001) all prove to be significant. Of these, the southern regional control variable (coded as 1 = southern state, 0 = non-southern state) and percentage of the population that have received their high school diploma share an inverse relationship with the dependent variable as indicated by the negative t-scores. This means that the percentage of the population receiving welfare assistance is likely to be lower in southern states where greater restrictions on welfare assistance were adopted, and that the lower the percentage of the population receiving at least a high school diploma the higher likelihood the percentage of the same population is to be receiving welfare assistance. Both outcomes are intuitive.

An additional outcome that needs little explanation is the relationship between poverty rates and the percentage of the population receiving welfare. Column one in Table 4.6 reveals that the poverty rates of the states share a highly significant (0.000), positive (t = 5.588) relationship with the percentage of the population receiving welfare assistance. This means that, as expected, higher rates of poverty in a state lead to a greater number of people receiving TANF assistance.

Unexpectedly, gubernatorial partisanship shares a positive relationship with the dependent variable of the percentage of the population receiving welfare assistance (t = 1.949). This means that the percentage of the population receiving welfare assistance is likely to be higher in states with a Republican governor than a
Democratic one. Such a result is slightly confusing given the nature of parties in America (Gerring 1998; Aldrich 1995; Milkis 1994; Shefter 1993). However, as was previously discussed (and demonstrated later in a discussion of Tables 4.9-4.11), what is being measured in these tests is the percentage of the population receiving welfare from year-to-year in 1996-1999. The tests do not account for the lag in the time it took a state to adopt time-limit restrictions, and the time necessary for those restrictions to take-effect, which means that it is possible that in the period of years being examined not enough time elapsed to allow Republican governors to forcibly transition people off of welfare and into work. It is likely that additional studies allowing for the consideration of a greater period of time – one that enables time-limit restrictions to go into effect in greater number – would reveal different results.60

The positive relationship of political culture61 with the dependent variable (t = 1.961) means that the percentage of the population receiving welfare assistance is likely to be higher in more “traditionalist” states than in ones classified as being more “moralist” or “individualist.” Such results are to be expected given the basis for which Elazar (1984) makes his classifications. Traditionalist societies are those that take a relatively unconcerned approach regarding the government’s role in promoting the welfare or market of a state. Instead, traditionalists embrace a structure and

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60 This assessment is strengthened by the fact that gubernatorial partisanship shares a negative relationship with the percentage of the population receiving welfare when looking at tests considering average indicators from 1996-1999 on levels in 1999 alone. See the discussion of Tables 4.4-4.6 for more on this issue and explanation.

61 The code for political culture is based on the writings of Todd Zoellnick (2000) on Elazar’s classifications. Zoellnick’s coding of these variables is as follows: Moralist = 1, Moral-Traditionals = 2, Moral-Individualists = 3, Individual-Moralists = 4, Individualists = 5, Individual-Traditionals = 6, Traditional-Individualists = 7, Traditional-Moralists = 8, Traditionals = 9. The culture of a hybrid state is dominated by the cultural type that begins the subtype. For example, a Moral-Traditionalist society is dominated by the Moralist cultural, and at a secondary level has strands of a traditionalist influence. For more on this, review the discussion of political culture in Chapter 1.
governmental order that seeks to preserve social and economic hierarchies. In such states, the emphasis for inter-party competition is not about raising the status of the poor or transitioning people into positions that enable the possibility of upward mobility. Instead, traditionalist societies are more likely to embrace policies that maintain status-quo class conditions – keeping the economic elites and the poor right where they are.

Finally, the independent variable measuring bureaucratic quality (as defined by average monthly salaries of state governmental administrative employees) shares a significant (0.000), positive (t = 9.854) relationship with the dependent variable defined by the percentage of the population receiving welfare. This means that states that have a higher quality of bureaucracy are also likely to have more people receiving welfare. On face, such a relationship is seemingly spurious as it is not clear why or how bureaucratic quality would impact the number of people receiving welfare assistance in a state. However, turning to empirical studies performed by Geoffrey Deverteuil (2003), data exists that suggests that significant strain was placed on administrative agencies in the wake of welfare reform due to new requirements for delivery of services, program monitoring, and the general reallocation of resources. Likewise, Deverteuil emphasizes the realignment that occurred between welfare agencies in the public bureaucracy and their traditional clientele. Such strains are likely to be magnified in areas that have greater numbers of people receiving welfare assistance, and thus the need for high bureaucratic quality in order to properly service these individuals is needed. While such a conclusion is, admittedly, speculative, it
remains within the realm of possibility given existing data and the results of this study.

In turning to the second column, the percentage of state expenditures allocated to welfare, the independent variables of gubernatorial partisanship, gubernatorial power, legislative professionalization, political culture, percentage of the population that is black, and quality of bureaucracy combine to create a model that is significant at the 0.000-level. Although neither gubernatorial power, nor the measure of state diversity (as defined by the percentage of the population that is black), proves to be significant, a governor’s partisan affiliation, legislative professionalization, political culture, and bureaucratic quality all prove to be significant at the 0.000-level. Combined, the model has an $R^2 = 0.368$, meaning that it explains approximately 37% of the variance.62

As shown in the second column of Table 4.6, the partisan identification of the governor shares an inverse relationship ($t = -3.650$) with the dependent variable of the percentage of state expenditures allocated to welfare. This is an expected relationship given the nature of likely partisan goals regarding welfare spending (Gerring 1998; Aldrich 1995; Milkis 1994; Shefter 1993). The coding of gubernatorial partisanship gives Democratic governors a score of 0 and Republican governors a score of 1. The results, therefore, mean that spending levels tend to increase in states with

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62 An additional set of tests was run to analyze the relationship between the independent variables and the yearly changes in the percentage of public expenditures allocated toward welfare. In these tests, the dependent variable was created by subtracting the percentage of state expenditures allocated to welfare from that of the previous year. Regression analysis following the same methodology as employed for each of the tests in chapters 3 and 4 was used. However, few variables proved to be significant (or even appear) in the models that resulted. Additionally, even though the models were themselves significant at the 0.05-level, the explanatory power of the models (based on R² scores) ranged between a mere 4-9%, which shows that the models are of little value in the effort to understand determinants of yearly changes.
Democratic governors, and decrease in states that have Republican governors. Because Democratic leaders place a greater emphasis on supporting policies favoring the poor, the fact that relative spending levels on TANF programs are higher in states with Democratic executives comes as no surprise.

The results for political culture and bureaucratic quality were, the same in terms of significance and relationship to the dependent variable as in the results for the percentage of people receiving welfare assistance. However, although one might expect the logic of the measure of bureaucratic quality to carry over from the results of tests determining the percentage of the population receiving welfare assistance, the positive relationship between spending and political culture is a bit confusing given Elazar’s (1984) classifications. One would expect a negative relationship, indicating that the more “moralist” a state, the more money it would be willing to allocate to welfare expenditures as a percentage of its overall spending. There are two possibilities to explain why this might not be the case here. First, given that moralist states are more willing to spend money on public programs in general, it is less likely that welfare would show up as a sizeable portion of those aggregately high spending levels. If, on the other hand, a state (i.e., those within the individualist and traditionalist categories that do not generally seek to promote large amounts of governmental interference into the commonwealth) does not spend much money in general, than monies allocated to welfare are likely to show up as being a more sizeable portion of overall expenditures. This might help account for the seemingly inaccurate relationship between political culture and spending seen in the Table.
A second reason why the relationship between political culture and spending may not be as expected is to do to the significant, positive relationship between levels of spending and bureaucratic quality. Moralist states, because of their views on strengthening and enhancing the public bureaucracy as a means of promoting governmental activity and performance in the commonwealth, spend more on their bureaucracies than those that fall in the individualist or traditionalist camps (Gray 1999). This would mean that the quality of bureaucracy is likely to be much higher in moralist states, which gives them a significant advantage in more easily adjusting to the strains welfare reform placed on administrative agencies (see Deverteuil 2003). Thus, it is likely that traditionalist and individualist states would have to spend more money in the initial phases of welfare reform in an effort to reorganize the bureaucracy, train caseworkers and other social services employees, and redesign programmatic rules than moralist states. Therefore, the relationship between political culture and spending demonstrated here is properly understood within the context of bureaucratic quality as an intervening factor.

An additional independent variable that shows up here, but did not show up in the model for percentage of the population receiving welfare is the measure of legislative professionalization (coded: -1 = professional-, 0 = hybrid-, 1 = citizen-legislature). In the model, legislative professionalization shares a significant (0.000), positive (t = 4.636) relationship with the dependent variable. Such an outcome means that the more professionalized the legislature, the more restrictive they are likely to be with the allocation of funds to welfare programs. These results are expected based on previous research on public attitudes and professional legislatures. According to
Jewell (1982) and Hibbing and Theiss-Morse (1995), professional legislatures are under more intense public scrutiny than citizen legislatures because of the length of time they are in session and number of meetings held. Research by these authors suggests that the longer a legislature is in session, the more aware the public becomes about controversies and issues being considered. This may increase the pressure a number of professional legislators felt to more quickly show results when it came to reducing spending following TANF reforms, especially given the attitudes of Americans towards welfare and welfare spending (Alesina, Glaeser, and Sacerdote 2001) and the literature suggesting that American’s engage in “pocketbook voting” (Campbell 2001; Hibbs 2000; Erikson 1989). For these reasons, it is more likely that incumbent legislators in professional legislatures will adopted more restrictive spending levels in an effort to garner greater constituent support than their citizen-legislature counterparts, which helps explain the relationship demonstrated between the two variables in Table 4.6.

Regarding determinants of teenage birth rates in the states following the passage of TANF reforms, column three in Table 4.6 reveals a model that includes gubernatorial partisanship, gubernatorial power, legislative professionalization, political culture, southern regional control, percentage of the population that is black, state poverty rates, educational attainment, and bureaucratic quality. Combined, the model is significant (0.000) and explains approximately 67% of the variance (R² = 0.667) of the dependent variable. However, only the variables of political culture (p < 0.001), the southern regional control (p < 0.01), percentage of the population that is black (p < 0.01), and the rate of poverty (p < 0.001) are significant in the model.
Again, as was the case the percentage of the population receiving welfare assistance and the percentage of state expenditures allocated to welfare, there is a positive relationship between political culture and the dependent variable. Likewise, as in the case of the percentage of the population receiving welfare assistance, there is a negative relationship between the southern regional control variable and outcomes along the dependent variable.

The impact of diversity in this model is best explained in tandem with the extremely significant ($p < 0.001$), positive ($t = 4.573$) relationship between teenage birth rates and poverty. Traditionally, Marxist approaches to the issue of race and class have been based on the assumption that the two forces are inextricably linked in America. Known Marxist, black social leader, journalist and scholar, Claude McKay, addressed this perspective as early as 1922 when he wrote, that while African-Americans were only allowed low-income employment, “[blacks are] only race-conscious and rebellious, not revolutionary and class-conscious” (p. 817). McKay goes on to argue that true liberation from racial discrimination would only come in the form of liberation of class-based oppression. However, it is not just Marxists that argue the relationship of racial classification as an outcome of class conditions. Milton Friedman (1962) argued that efficient and open markets would resolve all racial issues, thereby establishing race as a product of class. Likewise, Max Weber has argued that racial inequality can be linked to social opportunities and the relationships of groups to the means of resource allocation and distribution (Kalberg 2005). These arguments would, therefore, explain the relationship between diversity
and teenage birth rates as being a class issue instead of a racial one, and the results of this test certainly offer support to those theories.

There are a number of scholars, however, who do not subscribe to the theories that make race a category spawned only via economic inequality. Michael Omi and Howard Winant (1994), for example, argue that race is itself an important sphere of social concern, independent of class inequalities. They argue that economic inequalities reinforce racial discrimination, but race itself is more than just an outcome of economics. Agreeing with Omi and Winant, I believe that race is an important, independent category for consideration, but that class issues reinforce and magnify racial divisions. In the case of teenage birth rates, it is without logical or empirical support to claim that the color of a person’s skin causes them to have children at an earlier age. Instead, it is probable, and undoubtedly likely, that race proves to be significant only because of the intervening variables that go hand-in-hand with racial discrimination – poverty, inequality in educational opportunities, and other such byproducts of discrimination.

To conclude the examination of the results presented in Table 4.6, the fourth column illustrates the statistical relationship between a number of independent variables and birth rates to unmarried women. Not surprisingly, a number of the results are the same as those testing the relationship of the independent variables with

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63 Although it is not independently significant, the variable measuring educational attainment (as determined by the percentage of the population that have received at least a high school diploma) does appear in the overall model. What is of greatest significance here, especially in light of the discussion on race, is that educational attainment shares a negative relationship with teenage birth rates. This means that higher levels of educational attainment are likely to produce a corresponding decrease in teenage birth rates. While there might be a problem here with endogeneity (i.e., teens giving birth tend to drop out of high school at higher rates, therefore not achieving their high school diploma), the appearance of educational attainment in the model, and the fact that it shares a negative relationship with the dependent variable, supports the notion that economic and social conditions brought on by racial discrimination best explain why race proves to be a significant factor.
that of teenage birth rates in column three of the table. All eight of the independent variables in the model (gubernatorial partisanship, legislative professionalization, political culture, southern regional control, percentage of the population that is black, poverty rates, educational attainment, and quality of bureaucracy) were a part of the model of determinants of teenage birth rates. The only variable that drops out is that of the aggregate measure of gubernatorial power. Additionally, the relationship between the independent variables and birth rates to unmarried women are the same as those in the model for teenage birth rates except in the case of gubernatorial partisanship and bureaucratic quality. Table 4.6 demonstrates that while gubernatorial partisanship and bureaucratic quality share an inverse relationship with the dependent variable of teenage birth rates, these same variables share a positive relationship with birth rates to unmarried women. Additionally, these variables both prove to be significant at least at the 0.05-level in relation to birth rates to unmarried women, whereas neither variable is of significance as a determinate of birth rates to teenagers. Combined, the model is significant at the 0.000-level, and explains approximately 67% of the variance \((R^2 = 0.674)\).

4.6.2. Mid-Level Analysis

Turning to the results in Table 4.7, the role of gubernatorial power takes on a greater level of importance as a determinant of results of policy implementation when it is dichotomized into separate measures of institutional and personal powers. In fact, the measure of the institutional power of the governors appears in the overall models in three of the four tests. Likewise, a governor’s institutional powers prove to
be a significant indicator of results during welfare reform policy implementation in two of those three models. In reviewing the results from the tests examining the determinants of variation in the percentage of state expenditures allocated to welfare, for example, the institutional powers of the governor share a significant (p < 0.1), positive (t = 1.650) relationship with the dependent variable. This means that as the institutional power of the governors increase, the percentage of state expenditures allocated to welfare also increases. Moreover, this result is coupled with a significant (p < 0.001), negative (t = -4.004) relationship between gubernatorial partisanship and the dependent variable. Such a result is expected, as it indicates that states with Democratic governors (coded as with a “0” score) are more likely to have higher percentages of state expenditures allocated to welfare spending than ones with a Republican governor (coded with a “1” score). Thus, not only does institutional power prove to be significant, it appears that governors are able to use these formal powers to help them achieve (based on partisanship factors) “desired” results.64

When comparing these results to those in Table 4.6, it is revealed that the formal, institutional powers of the governor are significant only when decoupled from the personal powers of the governor. This means that while an aggregate measure of gubernatorial power are not significant as a determinant of results during the policy implementation phase of welfare reform, it does not mean that all aspects of

64 The institutional powers of the governor also proved to be significant (p < 0.1) in tests examining relative spending changes from one year to the next in the four-year period between 1996 and 1999. Likewise, the institutional powers shared an inverse relationship (t = -1.843) with the change in the percentage of state expenditures allocated to welfare programs, meaning that increases in gubernatorial power lead to corresponding spending cuts in welfare relative to aggregate levels of state expenditures. However, as was previously noted, the explanatory power of the entire model is a mere 6% (R² = .062).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent Variable</th>
<th>% of Welfare Recipients as Part of Overall Population</th>
<th>Level of Welfare Spending as % of Public Expenditures</th>
<th>Teen Birth Rates</th>
<th>Birth Rates to Unwed Mothers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Governor’s Party</td>
<td>1.949*</td>
<td>-4.004****</td>
<td>-0.991</td>
<td>2.408**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Governor’s Institutional Power</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>1.650*</td>
<td>-3.759****</td>
<td>-1.357</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Governor’s Personal Power</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legislative Professionalization</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>3.352****</td>
<td>1.348</td>
<td>2.019**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Culture</td>
<td>1.961*</td>
<td>2.786***</td>
<td>7.891****</td>
<td>5.766****</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southern State</td>
<td>-1.817*</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>-2.999***</td>
<td>-6.523****</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of the Population Black</td>
<td>-1.102</td>
<td>1.832*</td>
<td>1.867*</td>
<td>6.673****</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poverty Rate</td>
<td>5.588****</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>5.122****</td>
<td>5.647****</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Educational Attainment</td>
<td>-2.303**</td>
<td>8.241****</td>
<td>-0.0987</td>
<td>-3.321****</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quality of Bureaucracy</td>
<td>9.854****</td>
<td>-1.185</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>2.819***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall Model</td>
<td>$R^2 = .426$</td>
<td>$R^2 = .377$</td>
<td>$R^2 = .686$</td>
<td>$R^2 = .677$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Adj $R^2 = .406$</td>
<td>Adj $R^2 = .354$</td>
<td>Adj $R^2 = .67$</td>
<td>Adj $R^2 = .661$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>S.E. = 1.1567</td>
<td>S.E. = .94948</td>
<td>S.E. = 7.6125</td>
<td>S.E. = 3.1998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sig. = .000</td>
<td>Sig. = .000</td>
<td>Sig. = .000</td>
<td>Sig. = .000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$R^2 = .377$</td>
<td>$R^2 = .354$</td>
<td>$R^2 = .686$</td>
<td>$R^2 = .677$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Adj $R^2 = .354$</td>
<td>Adj $R^2 = .354$</td>
<td>Adj $R^2 = .67$</td>
<td>Adj $R^2 = .661$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>S.E. = .94948</td>
<td>S.E. = .94948</td>
<td>S.E. = 7.6125</td>
<td>S.E. = 3.1998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sig. = .000</td>
<td>Sig. = .000</td>
<td>Sig. = .000</td>
<td>Sig. = .000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* $p<0.10$  ** $p<0.05$  *** $p<0.01$  **** $p<0.001$

gubernatorial power is insignificant. Instead, these results show how only conceiving of gubernatorial power in a general, aggregate sense can be misleading in attempting to evaluate the role the governor plays as chief executive. In Table 4.6, the
importance of gubernatorial power was diluted through the inclusion of insignificant aspects of power in regard to this policy implementation phase. Thus, it is important to be careful about the assumptions one makes regarding gubernatorial power when the various facets of that power remain unexplored. As was demonstrated in chapter 3, it is not enough to say the governor is weak or strong; one must determine whether or not the governor is weak or strong along the appropriate dimensions of power. This is supported by the fact that, although the aggregate indicator of gubernatorial power did not prove to be significant, the institutional powers of the governor are significant at the 0.001-level in relation to teenage birth rates. Likewise, Table 4.7 reveals a negative relationship between the institutional powers of the governor and teenage birth rates. This means that as the institutional power of executives increases, there is a corresponding decrease in births to teenage mothers. Such a relationship is expected, and it helps add support to the conclusions offered in chapter 3, and to the hypothesis that more powerful governors are likely to have a significant effect on the achievement of state goals following during the policy implementation phase of welfare reform.

As was the case in Table 4.6, a number of independent variables proved to be significant in the tests performed using a dichotomized measure of gubernatorial power. However, given the in-depth analysis provided for these factors in detailing the results of Table 4.6, additional discussion is not needed here. Suffice it to say, however, that the institutional powers of the governor are but one in a mosaic of factors determining the variation of results following welfare reform implementation across the states.
4.6.3. Micro-Level Analysis

Table 4.8 illustrates the results of tests performed to analyze the possible significance of the micro-level, disaggregated measures of gubernatorial power (in addition to the other independent variables) and the relative success or failure of states to achieve desired goals following the adoption of welfare reforms in 1996. Again it is apparent that disaggregating the measures of gubernatorial power to its specific elements is important to truly capture the appropriate nuances of that power on policy outcomes. Although the overall indicator of gubernatorial power proved to be rather inconsequential as a determinant of result variation in regard to the stated welfare policy goals, when broken down to its individual components, several aspects of gubernatorial power prove to be significant. Likewise, several of those powers (whether or not there is a separate election of executive officials, the governor’s tenure potential, executive appointment, budgetary power, party control of the legislature, the governor’s position on the political ambition ladder, and gubernatorial performance ratings) appeared in the models of at least three of the four dependent variables tested. While not always significant on their own, the presence of these and other variables within the various models presented in Table 4.8 demonstrate that such factors are important in the explanation of various outcomes across the states.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent Variable</th>
<th>% of Welfare Recipients as Part of Overall Population</th>
<th>Level of Welfare Spending as % of Public Expenditures</th>
<th>Teen Birth Rates</th>
<th>Birth Rates to Unwed Mothers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Governor’s Party</td>
<td>2.438**</td>
<td>-3.299****</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>2.683***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Separately Elected Officials</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>-2.577**</td>
<td>-5.727***</td>
<td>-1.167</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tenure Potential</td>
<td>-1.905*</td>
<td>1.804*</td>
<td>5.021****</td>
<td>-1.719*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appointment Power</td>
<td>1.305</td>
<td>2.361**</td>
<td>3.073***</td>
<td>3.395****</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Budgetary Power</td>
<td>1.603</td>
<td>-1.566</td>
<td>-3.099***</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Veto Power</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>2.122**</td>
<td>-3.302****</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electoral Mandate</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party Control</td>
<td>-1.543</td>
<td>1.646*</td>
<td>-1.185</td>
<td>-3.037***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ambition Ladder</td>
<td>2.914**</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>2.149**</td>
<td>2.792***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal Future</td>
<td>1.578</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>-1.834*</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gubernatorial Performance Rating</td>
<td>-3.197***</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>-3.198***</td>
<td>-2.240**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legislative Professionalization</td>
<td>-0.906</td>
<td>4.863****</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>1.725*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Culture</td>
<td>1.247</td>
<td>3.550****</td>
<td>8.613****</td>
<td>5.144****</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southern State</td>
<td>-2.228**</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>-1.511</td>
<td>-7.113****</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of the Population Black</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>0.904</td>
<td>1.873*</td>
<td>7.643****</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poverty Rate</td>
<td>5.770****</td>
<td>-1.642</td>
<td>3.523****</td>
<td>5.143****</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Educational Attainment</td>
<td>-1.934*</td>
<td>6.869****</td>
<td>1.255</td>
<td>-2.799***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quality of Bureaucracy</td>
<td>5.952****</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>-2.081**</td>
<td>0.784</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Overall Model**

\[
\begin{align*}
R^2 &= .501 \\
\text{Adj } R^2 &= .464 \\
\text{S.E.} &= 1.0986 \\
\text{Sig.} &= .000 \\
\end{align*}
\]

\[
\begin{align*}
R^2 &= .455 \\
\text{Adj } R^2 &= .420 \\
\text{S.E.} &= .89991 \\
\text{Sig.} &= .000 \\
\end{align*}
\]

\[
\begin{align*}
R^2 &= .778 \\
\text{Adj } R^2 &= .760 \\
\text{S.E.} &= 6.5248 \\
\text{Sig.} &= .000 \\
\end{align*}
\]

\[
\begin{align*}
R^2 &= .721 \\
\text{Adj } R^2 &= .700 \\
\text{S.E.} &= 3.0138 \\
\text{Sig.} &= .000 \\
\end{align*}
\]

*p<0.10  **p<0.05  ***p<0.01  ****p<0.001
Disaggregating gubernatorial power to its individual elements performs an important explanatory role in each of the models presented in Table 4.8. When comparing these results to those presented in Tables 4.6-4.7, the R² value for each of the models increases with each step of disaggregation process. For example, the R² value for the model including a single measure of gubernatorial power in relation to the percentage of state expenditures allocated to welfare increases from 0.368 to 0.455 when that power is disaggregated into its various components. Similar results occur when comparing the models testing the rate of births to teenage mothers, as the explanatory power increases from 67% at the macro-level to approximately 78% at the micro-level. Finally, the R² value of the models explaining variation along the outcomes of the dependent variables of the percentage of the population receiving welfare and births to unmarried women increases approximately 7% when moving from an aggregate measure of gubernatorial power to one that is disaggregated.

What is perhaps most interesting about these results is the fact that some of the dimensions of gubernatorial power share a positive relationship with the dependent variables, while others share a negative one. At first this might seem problematic, but upon closer examination such outcomes are easily explained. First, it is important to realize that there are only three instances in which an individual component of gubernatorial power proves to be significant in more than one model and the signs are not consistent. These instances include the governor’s tenure potential, veto power, and partisan control of the legislature. In all other cases the relationship between the governor’s powers and the outcomes along the dependent variables are either consistent, or are at least consistent only where the powers prove
to be significant. This means that, although the budgetary power of the governor shares an inverse relationship with the dependent variables measuring welfare expenditures ($t = -1.566$) and teenage birth rates ($t = -3.099$), it shares a positive relationship with the percentage of the population on welfare ($t = 1.603$). However, the relationship between the governor’s budgetary power and the dependent variables in only significant in the model for teenage birth rates ($p < 0.01$). This helps reduce the problematic nature of the inconsistency of the relationships across the dependent variables.

Although the fact that in almost all cases the direction of the relationship between individual powers is either consistent (or at least consistent when there is a significant relationship), there still needs to be an explanation of why the relationship changes when a specific power is present in the independent models, even if that particular relationship is not significant. That is why a closer examination of each of these powers is necessary in order to explain why the apparent problems with the outcomes are actually quite expected when the separate relationships are explored.

To begin, the indicator measuring whether or not the governor and members of her executive department are elected separately or as a team appears in three of the four models in Table 4.8, and is significant in two. In the models testing the relationship between the independent variables and welfare expenditures as a percentage of overall state spending ($t = -2.557$), teenage birth rates ($t = -5.727$), and the rate of births to unmarried women ($t = -1.167$), the indicator of gubernatorial power as defined by the separate election of executive officials is present. Notice that all three relationships are inverse, meaning that as power for the governor increases
along this dimension the percentage of spending allocated to welfare, and the birth rates to teenagers and unmarried women decrease. Likewise, the relationships between the separate election of executive officials and outcomes for welfare spending and teenage birth rates are both significant at the 0.01-level.

Similar to the results of the measure of gubernatorial power as indicated by the election rules governing the election of the executive officers as either being separate or as members of the same team are the results for a governor’s public approval ratings. Gubernatorial performance ratings, as measured by public approval of the job the governor is doing in office, prove to be of significance in three of the four explanatory models testing variation across the states for the percentage of the population receiving welfare (t = -3.197, p < 0.01), the rate of birth to teenagers (t = -3.198, p < 0.01), and the rate of births to unmarried women (t = -2.240, p < 0.05). In each of the models, the relationship between these job approval ratings and the dependent variables remains consistent.

It should be noted that a governor’s electoral mandate does not prove to be significant, nor does it appear in any of the explanatory models. Such results are not surprising given that these tests covered the span of four years. Research into the effects of the electoral mandate on executive leadership has shown that the election “honeymoon” usually last for no more than a year (Pious 1996). This means that the effect of the executive electoral mandate wanes over time, and therefore is not likely to have a substantial effect over a four-year period. However, gubernatorial performance ratings do prove to be significant in three of the four models, which
seem to be a better indicator of popular support of the governor over time than the electoral mandate.

The problem with analyzing the results for the tests involving gubernatorial job performance ratings is in not having the ability to determine the direction of causality here. Does increased popularity for the governor really help the executive achieve policy goals? Or is it that successes along these dimensions of reform are what are causing the job performance ratings to go up? It is likely that the answer is yes to both. Perceived success by the governor in the arena of policy increases her popularity and job performance ratings, and in turn that approval offers strength and leverage over future activities (Fording, Woods, and Prince 2001; Beyle 1999). This is a case of the “winners-win” phenomenon of democratic politics, in which a “winner” receives greater support for perceived victories that increase the ease with which that official will have success with future activities.

The appointment power of the governor, and her position on the state’s ambition ladder, also share a consistent relationship with each of the dependent variables. However, unlike the separate election of officials and job performance ratings, these variables have a positive relationship with the outcomes along the dependent variables. Such results remain confusing, but possible explanations do exist. First, regarding the appointment powers of the executives, it is quite possible that the study does not allow for a long enough period of time to elapse to properly reflect the relationship between the governor, the bureaucracy, and policy outcomes. By only testing for a four-year period immediately following the passage of the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 not
enough time has elapsed for governors to appoint new officials responsible for overseeing the implementation of the new requirements welfare policies. It is most likely that if the length of time of the study were expanded to cover a greater number of years, the direction of the relationship would swing the other way and that the power of the governor to appoint administrative officials would help her achieve desired effects from policy implementation.

But why a positive relationship? While it might be true that over time the governor would be able to appoint the types of officials they want to help them meet desired policy objectives, why would there exist a positive relationship currently between a governor’s appointment powers and increases in all four of the dependent variables? The answer to this question likely lies in the changing nature and objectives of state welfare administrations following the massive overhaul of state programs beginning in 1996. The “ending of welfare as we know it” in 1996 placed significant strain on the public bureaucracy of states as their missions, responsibilities, resources, and overall objectives that had been entrenched for several decades were radically changed in an incredibly short time (Deverteuil 2003). In an effort to meet these new demands, governors would likely fill available departments with officials who would help reorganize and redirect the welfare bureaucracy to meet new TANF goals. Unfortunately, in the realm of institutional psychology and public administration, such a drastic overhaul would be met with extreme resistance from a bureaucracy that had for decades developed its own objectives, goals, and informal social relationships that are threatened by even minor change (Mayo 1945). In fact, a study of personnel change in city government by Curtis Copeland (1980)
reveals that new, reform-minded directors in public bureaucracy can meet with a very unfriendly staff of public employees who are negatively affected by the new demands of substantial reform. Thus, the ability of the governor to completely restaff the heads of administrative agencies may, in the short-term, actually work against overall successes in the realm of policy implementation. To make it ready to service TANF objectives in the way the governor and her appointees see as appropriate, the data seems to suggest it will take a much longer than four years to clean up and prepare the bureaucratic bathwater after the AFDC baby had been thrown out.

In regards to the position of governors on the state political ambition ladders, those who score higher along this dimension are the governors who have steadily progressed up the political ladder of their state. It is possible that they are not only politically more established but also that they view the governorship as the last stop for them on the political line, and that they are less concerned with producing immediate results than those who are new to the political game and are less secure with their place in the public-eye. Such a conclusion remains speculative, and further testing would need to be done to see if that is what is causing the existence of such a relationship here.

Regarding the budgetary authority of the governor, it is somewhat surprising that this power does not appear to be significant in more than one of the four models. However, even though it only proves to be significant in relation to the birth rates to teenage mothers (p < .01), the budgetary powers of the governor do appear in the models explaining variation in the outcomes for the percentage of overall state spending allocated to welfare and the percentage of the population receiving welfare
assistance. In both the models for expenditures (t = -1.566) and teenage birth rates (t = -3.099), the governor’s budgetary powers share the expected negative relationship. This means that as the governors budgetary power increases, it will likely lead to subsequent declines in the percentage of state expenditures allocated to welfare and teenage birth rates. The relationship between a governor’s budgetary authority and outcomes in the percentage of the population receiving welfare, on the other hand, is positive (t = 1.603). This is likely due, however, to a problem of reverse causation, meaning that as the percentage of the population receiving welfare increases so does the pressure on governors to use budgetary powers to meet those needs.

The results for the impact of tenure potential on the dependent variables in Table 4.8 are problematic as it is significant in each of the four tests, but has an inverse relationship in two and positive relationship in the other two. The problem, though, is likely due to the fact that 37 of the 50 states have imposed term-limits on their executives, which offers a sample that skews the ability to get an accurate reflection of the relationship between this independent variable and the dependents over time. Thus, the problem here is one of having a diverse enough sample to accurately test the relationship, which yields problematic results. This is not to say that there is no connection between the tenure potential of the governor and their ability to achieve desired results in the implementation of policy. There remain a number of strong theoretical arguments and anecdotal examples that highlight the possible importance of tenure potential (Beyle 1999), but such relationships are unable to be properly tested here.
The governor’s partisan control vis-à-vis the legislature appears in all four models, and shares the expected negative relationship with the percentage of the population receiving welfare assistance (t = -1.543), teenage birth rates (t = 1.185), and birth rates to unmarried women (t = -3.037). Of these, only the relationship between partisan control and unmarried birthrates is significant (p < 0.01). However, there is an inverse relationship between the governor’s partisan control of the legislature and the percentage of state spending being allocated to welfare (t = 1.646). Similarly, for a governor’s veto power, there is a negative relationship between teenage birth rates (t = -3.302), and a positive relationship with welfare expenditures (t = 2.122).65 Although the negative relationships are expected as they indicate an increase in power leading to decreases in the dependent variables (which remain the identified goal of these reforms), the results for expenditures need explanation. What is likely occurring here is best understood by introducing the results for the control variable measuring gubernatorial partisanship. Here exists an extremely significant (p < 0.001), negative (t = -3.299) relationship between the governor’s party and welfare expenditures. This outcome indicates that states with Democratic governors are likely to see greater rates of spending on welfare as a percentage of overall state expenditures than those with a Republican Governor. It is likely then that these positive relationships for party control and veto power are best understood through the lens of party. If Democratic governors control the legislature, it is more likely that they would be able to keep spending on welfare a higher priority, and they would be able to use their veto powers to protect welfare spending. Although additional

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65 Both relationships are significant at least at the 0.05-level.
testing would need to be performed to verify these results, it remains a likely explanation of the outcomes for these variables.

Finally, the personal future of the governor shares the expected negative (t = -1.834), significant (p < 0.1) relationship with teenage birth rates, but a positive (t = 1.578) relationship with the percentage of the population receiving welfare. However, this latter relationship does not prove to be significant independent of the overall model.

Ultimately, regardless of the positive or negative relationship shared between the individual components of gubernatorial power and the dependent variables, the results in Table 4.3 offer further support to previous tests indicating that gubernatorial power does matter in helping the governor in both the policy formulation (as indicated in the results of chapter 3) and implementation phases of welfare reform.

Again, as the interpretation of the results for the other independent variables have been discussed at length previously, a further analysis of their relationship to the same dependent variables in Table 4.3 is not necessary here. It remains important to emphasize, however, that these variables remain an essential component to any study on policy implementation across the states.

4.7. Cumulative Results for Gubernatorial Power and Policy Implementation on 1999 Levels

As previously mentioned in the beginning of this chapter, one of the problems with attempting to measure the impact of gubernatorial power on the relative achievements of states in trying to meet policy goals is the fact that these tests do not
account for where a state stood in relation to these objectives prior to the passage of welfare reform. For this reason, a second set of tests was developed in which the possible determinants of state outcomes were averaged from 1996-1999, and then tested using the linear-regression method described above on the percentage of the population receiving welfare, the percentage of state expenditures being allocated to welfare, and the birth rates to teenagers and unmarried women as stated in 1999 levels. The purpose of this testing was, as previously noted, to try and control for the possible effect that immediate and drastic changes to decades of pre-reform welfare policies might have on the results.

To begin, tables 4.9-4.11 reveal that the partisanship of state executives appears in 11 of the 12 models determining outcomes following the implementation of welfare reform in the states. Moreover, in eight of those models, the partisan identity of the governor proves to be significant at the 0.1-level or better. This means that, in a vast majority of tests, the partisan affiliation of the chief executive is important as a determinant of policy results following the implementation of TANF reforms. What is most telling in these models is the fact that the variable capturing gubernatorial partisanship all share the expected negative relationship. Such results demonstrate that states with Republican governors are more likely to see lower levels of spending on welfare programs, a lower percentage of welfare recipients as a percentage of the overall population, and lower rates of pregnancy to teenage and unmarried mothers than states with a Democratic executive. Given the ideological

The model of determinants of outcomes for the dependent variable of welfare spending as a percentage of overall state expenditures (Table 4.5) is the only one in which a governor’s partisanship does not appear.
grounds upon which American parties are based, these results come as no surprise (Gerring 1998).

**TABLE 4.9. MACRO-LEVEL ANALYSIS OF OVERALL GUBERNATORIAL POWER AND EFFECT ON STATE TANF POLICY GOALS AS DEFINED BY 1999 LEVELS.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent Variable</th>
<th>% of Welfare Recipients as Part of Overall Population</th>
<th>Level of Welfare Spending as % of Public Expenditures</th>
<th>Teen Birth Rates</th>
<th>Birth Rates to Unwed Mothers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Governor’s Party</td>
<td>-2.591**</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>-1.487</td>
<td>-1.731*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall/Aggregate Gubernatorial Power</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>-1.133</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legislative Professionalization</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Culture</td>
<td>1.026</td>
<td>-3.130***</td>
<td>3.230***</td>
<td>1.019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southern State</td>
<td>-1.747*</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>-1.968*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of the Population Black</td>
<td>-1.553</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>1.096</td>
<td>3.313***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poverty Rate</td>
<td>-1.931*</td>
<td>-1.898*</td>
<td>3.3659****</td>
<td>4.817****</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Educational Attainment</td>
<td>-1.931*</td>
<td>-4.482****</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quality of Bureaucracy</td>
<td>6.126****</td>
<td>-1.458</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall Model</td>
<td>R² = .564 Adj R² = .491 S.E. = .82880 Sig. = .000</td>
<td>R² = .387 Adj R² = .317 S.E. = 3.41570 Sig. = .000</td>
<td>R² = .669 Adj R² = .640 S.E. = 7.90322 Sig. = .000</td>
<td>R² = .602 Adj R² = .557 S.E. = 3.67967 Sig. = .000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*p<0.10  **p<0.05  ***p<0.01  ****p<0.001
TABLE 4.10. MID-LEVEL ANALYSIS OF INSTITUTIONAL AND PERSONAL POWERS OF GOVERNORS AND EFFECT ON STATE TANF POLICY GOALS AS DEFINED BY 1999 LEVELS.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent Variable</th>
<th>% of Welfare Recipients as Part of Overall Population</th>
<th>Level of Welfare Spending as % of Public Expenditures</th>
<th>Teen Birth Rates</th>
<th>Birth Rates to Unwed Mothers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Governor’s Party</td>
<td>-2.591**</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>-1.259</td>
<td>-1.731*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Governor’s Institutional Power</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>-1.379</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Governor’s Personal Power</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>-1.148</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legislative Professionalization</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Culture</td>
<td>1.026</td>
<td>-3.135***</td>
<td>3.307***</td>
<td>1.019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southern State</td>
<td>-1.747*</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>-1.008</td>
<td>-1.968*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of the Population Black</td>
<td>-1.553</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>3.313***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poverty Rate</td>
<td>-1.931*</td>
<td>-1.915*</td>
<td>3.573****</td>
<td>4.817****</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Educational Attainment</td>
<td>-1.931*</td>
<td>-4.887****</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quality of Bureaucracy</td>
<td>6.126****</td>
<td>-1.539</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall Model</td>
<td>R² = .564</td>
<td>R² = .387</td>
<td>R² = .687</td>
<td>R² = .602</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Adj R² = .491</td>
<td>Adj R² = .318</td>
<td>Adj R² = .644</td>
<td>Adj R² = .557</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>S.E. = .82880</td>
<td>S.E. = 3.41442</td>
<td>S.E. = 7.86266</td>
<td>S.E. = 3.67967</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sig. = .000</td>
<td>Sig. = .000</td>
<td>Sig. = .000</td>
<td>Sig. = .000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*p<0.10  **p<0.05  ***p<0.01  ****p<0.001
TABLE 4.11. MICRO-LEVEL ANALYSIS OF INDIVIDUAL COMPONENTS OF GUBERNATORIAL POWER AND EFFECT ON STATE TANF POLICY GOALS AS DEFINED BY 1999 LEVELS.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent Variable</th>
<th>% of Welfare Recipients as Part of Overall Population</th>
<th>Level of Welfare Spending as % of Public Expenditures</th>
<th>Teen Birth Rates</th>
<th>Birth Rates to Unwed Mothers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Governor’s Party</td>
<td>-3.168***</td>
<td>-1.905*</td>
<td>-1.991*</td>
<td>-2.125**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Separately Elected Officials</td>
<td>1.308</td>
<td>3.787****</td>
<td>-1.937*</td>
<td>1.176</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tenure Potential</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>3.103***</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appointment Power</td>
<td>1.419</td>
<td>-1.022</td>
<td>2.259**</td>
<td>2.554**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Budgetary Power</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>-2.515**</td>
<td>-1.676*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Veto Power</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>-1.106</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electoral Mandate</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>-1.046</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party Control</td>
<td>-1.816*</td>
<td>-3.004****</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>-2.824***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ambition Ladder</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>1.748</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal Future</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>1.195</td>
<td>-1.559</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gubernatorial Performance Rating</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>1.218</td>
<td>-1.179</td>
<td>-1.946*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legislative Professionalization</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Culture</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>-3.363***</td>
<td>2.862***</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southern State</td>
<td>-2.127**</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>-2.748**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of the Population Black</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>1.759*</td>
<td>5.760****</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poverty Rate</td>
<td>4.272****</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>2.696**</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Educational Attainment</td>
<td>-1.658</td>
<td>-5.631****</td>
<td>1.418</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quality of Bureaucracy</td>
<td>4.384****</td>
<td>-2.489**</td>
<td>-1.642</td>
<td>-1.860*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Overall Model</strong></td>
<td>R² = .608 Adj R² = .532 S.E. = .79503 Sig. = .000</td>
<td>R² = .631 Adj R² = .537 S.E. = 2.81285 Sig. = .000</td>
<td>R² = .811 Adj R² = .742 S.E. = 6.68860 Sig. = .000</td>
<td>R² = .722 Adj R² = .642 S.E. = 3.30931 Sig. = .000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*p<0.10  **p<0.05  ***p<0.01  ****p<0.001
It is important to note that these results do no necessarily indicate that Republican TANF programs have been more successful than Democratic efforts in decreasing poverty or the need for welfare assistance in the states. For instance, if we look at the three tests (the first column in Tables 4.9-4.11) for the percentage of the population receiving welfare in 1999, we find that the rate of poverty in a state share a positive, significant relationship at the 0.01-level or better with the dependent variable measuring the percentage of the overall population receiving welfare assistance. This means that as the rate of poverty decreases, the number of citizens as a percentage of the state’s population receiving welfare also decreases. Similarly, when rates of poverty increase, so do the numbers of people receiving welfare assistance. Such results are expected, but should not be taken to immediately mean that Republicans are more successful in resolving the problems of poverty within their states. A more likely explanation for these results is found in the nature of partisan identification in the United States, as upper-income Americans are likely to support the GOP at considerably higher rates than those of a lower income who tend to vote for the Democratic Party (Gerring 1998; Aldrich 1995; Shefter 1994; Milkis 1993). This means that states with a higher poverty rate, and therefore a greater number of people in need of welfare assistance, are more likely to vote in Democratic governors, which might account for these results.

Other than seeing an increase in the effect of partisanship, the results for the tests in Tables 4.9-4.11 remain almost entirely consistent with their corresponding results in Tables 4.6-4.8. For instance, a comparison of the results in the first column of Tables 4.6 and 4.9 reveals the same seven independent variables in the model, all
sharing the same positive or negative relationship discussed in the results of Table 4.6 previously. There is some slight variation in the levels of significance of the independent variables in terms of their relationship to the dependent variable, but overall the model remains roughly the same. It should be noted, however, that the explanatory power of the model measuring the cumulative effects of the independent variables from 1996-1999 ($R^2 = 0.564$) on 1999 levels of the percentage of the population receiving welfare is higher than the year-by-year analysis in Table 4.6 ($R^2 = 0.426$). This is an increase of approximately 13%. Likewise, the standard errors are lower in the results of the cumulative model (S.E. = 0.82880) than that of the year-by-year analysis (S.E. = 1.1567). These results are typical across the various Tables.

The results in Tables 4.9-4.11 help to add confirmation to the results demonstrated in Tables 4.6-4.8. The added degree of confidence this adds is important in ensuring that these results are an accurate reflection of what is occurring in the states. Coupled with the results in chapter 3, these results seem to allow a tentative conclusion that gubernatorial power does matter in relation to policy formulation and implementation of welfare reform in the states.

4.8. Conclusion: Comparing the “Governor as Chief Legislator” to the “Governor as Administrative Manager”

Chapter three’s findings of the study of the determinants of welfare reform policy outcomes across the states lead to the conclusion that gubernatorial power indeed plays a significant role in the policymaking process. This conclusion came
with the caveat that one does not overemphasize the role of the governor in the
development and passage of state welfare policy programs. Instead, not only do a
number of demographic, social, and economic factors significantly influence the
policy options selected by states, but the indicator with which one analyzes
gubernatorial power also influences what occurs at the state level. This means that
when considering the various indicators of policy variation and policy outcomes
across the fifty states, one not only needs to include a variety of socioeconomic
factors but must also decide whether to approach executive influences from a macro-,
mid-, or micro-level. Regardless of the level, or the type of understanding of
executive influence one is seeking, the findings in these studies are suggestive of the
notion that scholars can be “cautiously confident” about claiming that executive
power can, and does, influence policy outcomes.

But what do these most recent findings detailed previously tell us about the
role of governors following the policymaking process at the implementation stage?
How does gubernatorial power affect the variation in policy results across the fifty
states?

The findings seem to support the central hypothesis that the more power a
governor holds both personally and institutionally the more significant s/he will be in
the policy process. Tables 4.6-4.11 all suggest support for the notion that the relative
strength of the state’s chief executive affects their ability to produce successful results
in the implementation of policy. Like the previous findings in chapter three
concerning the governor as chief legislator, these tables also show that aggregate
indicators of gubernatorial power most effectively explain administrative results in
two key policy areas – reduction of state spending on welfare as a percentage of the overall budget and reduction of the number of welfare recipients as a percentage of the state’s overall population. However, this single, aggregate measure does not appear to affect the outcomes of specific behavioral modification policies. Comparing the findings of these two tests in relation to a single, combined indicator of gubernatorial power reveals similar results. This helps to confirm the findings in chapter three, and reminds us that although gubernatorial power is an important consideration in the study of policy and output variation, it is but one of several factors that influence the differences.

A notable difference in the effects of gubernatorial power is seen when comparing the results of the two different stages of public policy in chapters three and in chapter four. That is the difference in the effects of a governor’s institutional powers on the policy formulation and implementation processes. On the one hand, the effect of gubernatorial power on policymaking, the institutional powers of the governor proved to be significant in more than one instance – whether or not states adopted TANF restrictions on conflicted drug felons – and if states adopted a work requirement policy that was shorter than the federally mandated 24 months. Likewise, Table 4.7 reveals that the institutional powers of the governor are significant in two of the four measures of state goals related to welfare policy implementation. On the other hand, the results of the studies detailed in Table 4.10 illustrating the impact of gubernatorial power on the attainment of state policy goals as measured by levels in 1999, the institutional powers of the governor are not significant in any of the four indicators. These results cause me to tentatively
conclude that while the institutional powers of the governor are important in the initial phases of policy development, initiation, and adoption, they do not seem to play as significant a role in the administrative functions carried out by the executive. The personal powers of the governor prove to be significant in determining outcomes at the policymaking and administrative phases of gubernatorial leadership. Again these results remind us that while gubernatorial powers can and do play a role in influencing variation across the states, one must be cautious to note that different powers might have different effects. Thus, it is not enough to just make claims about the strength or weaknesses of the governor; it must be determined along what dimensions of gubernatorial power the governor is strong and how that affects their various roles and duties.

Finally, when the effects of disaggregated measures of gubernatorial power on the passage and execution of policy are compared, the results show some significant impacts of a few (albeit disparate) independent gubernatorial power variables. One of the limitations of both of these tests is the inability to make claims about the extent that individual elements of gubernatorial power might be bolstered with increases in other areas of strength. That is, these findings do not allow us to make claims about possible combinations of dimensions of gubernatorial power, nor do they offer a clear perspective for why some powers might matter at one time but not at another. For now, the only lessons I am comfortable drawing from these tests of disaggregated measures of gubernatorial power are that gubernatorial power is an important variable to consider in explaining state variations in social policy adoptions and policy outcomes, and that different gubernatorial powers may affect different aspects of
policy in various ways. Thus, the common wisdom that gubernatorial power matters as a determinant of what happens politically in a state holds true, but that wisdom is tempered by the findings in this and the previous chapters (i.e., chapters 3 and 4).
CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH

5.1. Summary of Research

This dissertation began with the following question: Does the most visible, most powerful elected official in state government and politics have a substantial impact on major public policies? Such a question has profound implications for the traditional views of democracy, executive leadership, and policymaking and implementation at the state level in America. Likewise, because of the vital role that states play in the politics of the United States in general, these findings have broader, national implications. Unfortunately, to this point the research on gubernatorial power and leadership, as well as that done on state politics and policy in general, left this question surprisingly unexplored (Barrilleaux 1999; Brace and Jewett 1995; Gross 1991, 1989). A number of assumptions are often made regarding the role that state executives play in the policymaking and policy implementation processes, but little systematic research has been done to explore the relationship between the powers of the governor and policy variation across the American states. Due to the dearth of such explorations, some of the most basic suppositions of the role of governors in the policymaking and implementation processes remain in the realm of theory with little empirical analysis to assess them. Therefore, this study sought to carefully explore the question of whether the levels of gubernatorial power across the
states shapes policy outcomes, the answer of which affects common perceptions of
government and politics at the sub-national level.

Measures of gubernatorial power provides a tool for examining the role of
executives in the social laboratories of the American states, and understanding the
function of gubernatorial power in determining state policy offers greater insight into
the often-analyzed collective patterns and general trends of state-level political
outcomes. The evidence in the preceding chapters indicates that gubernatorial power
can and does affect policy formulation and implementation. Likewise, these powers
can be interpreted along macro-, mid-, and micro-levels dimensions, which in turn
directly affects the extent of influence state executives seem to have on policy in the
various stages of the process. Furthermore, the analyses provide an often-overlooked,
under-appreciated institutional dimension to understanding policy variation across the
fifty states. Such understanding is critical to the enhancement of knowledge
pertaining to a variety of political questions ranging from policy formulation to
administrative implementation.

The devolution of authority from the national to sub-national levels of
government in the form of welfare reform offered a somewhat unique opportunity to
explore these essential relationships. Welfare reform was a point in time in which
each of the fifty states had to confront the same set of policy choices within the same
time period (Soss et al. 2001). Thus, by examining the effect of gubernatorial power
on state welfare policy following the passage of the 1996 Personal Responsibility and
Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA), this study explored the question
of whether gubernatorial power has a significant effect on policy variation among the
fifty states. This should help fill the gap that has existed for far too long in the study of state politics.

To accomplish this goal, I reviewed the literature on gubernatorial power as a determinant of state policy outcomes in chapter 1, and went on to explore the details of how it could be applied to the specifics of the 1996 Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act. Finally, a large amount of data was gathered, analyzed, and summarized in chapters 3 and 4 to empirically scrutinize the theoretical assumptions often attached to studies of executive power and leadership. Though a large amount of information was waded through and summarized in these studies, the main goal was to offer insight as to whether, and just how, gubernatorial power influences state policy adoptions and their subsequent implementation. In this way, these studies should not be viewed merely as an explanation of how executives played a role in the welfare reform process, but as a springboard for future research into state policy development and administration. State executives – through the application of both formal, institutional and informal, personal powers – play a significant role in the complex policy process, and studies that seek to explain differential outcomes and situations from state-to-state should account for this influence.

5.2. Revisiting Gubernatorial Power: Theories and Findings

Scholars of gubernatorial leadership often identify a number of different powers that help increase executive influence on policy and outcomes. Chapter 1 established that, although there is some variation as to which powers are important
and why, among the most commonly identified powers are veto power, appointment power, tenure potential, the election of other executive officials on the same ticket as the governor, budgetary powers, electoral mandate, personal future, party control, political experience, and performance ratings (Ferguson 2003; Beyle 1999; Herzik and Brown 1991; Gross 1991; Rosenthal 1990; Beyle and Muchmore 1983; Ransone 1982). Increases in these various dimensions of power are often assumed to strengthen the governor in the performance of executive duties. Governors that have high levels of power are presumed “strong,” meaning that they are more likely than “weak” governors – those lacking high levels of power within these categories – to accomplish identified political goals. Figures 5.1-5.4 graphically illustrate the different levels of power enjoyed by state executives spanning the years 1996-1999.

In addition to the different ways of categorizing executive power, gubernatorial activities are commonly classified among a variety of different stages in the political process (Bowman and Kearney 2005; Saffell and Basehart 2005; Harrigan and Nice 2004; Beyle 1999; Rosenthal 1998, 1990). For example, governors are seen as playing essential roles in the policy formation, policymaking, policy implementation, and policy enforcement processes in the states. In these various roles, the governor is perceived differently at different points. At some stages he is viewed as “chief legislator,” while at other times he is “chief executive” performing different functions. This means that, when it comes to understanding the role of state executives in the policy process, gubernatorial power can be measured along a variety of different dimensions and at different points. Thus, the preceding
analysis examined gubernatorial power on three levels (macro-, mid-, and micro-levels) and in two different phases of policy (adoption and implementation).

**Figure 5.1. Institutional and Personal Dimensions of Gubernatorial Power by State, 1996.**
Figure 5.2. Institutional and Personal Dimensions of Gubernatorial Power by State, 1997.
Figure 5.3. Institutional and Personal Dimensions of Gubernatorial Power by State, 1998.
Regarding the different ways of codifying and reporting gubernatorial power, this study employed a method of analyzing executive strength from macro-, mid-, and micro-level interpretations of power. This examination enabled me to draw conclusions about overall levels of gubernatorial power, as well as analyzing the impact of institutional and personal powers and the ways in which more specific powers affected various policy outcomes and results. It was important to approach gubernatorial power in such a fashion because of the nature of these strengths potentially giving executives leverage over policy. Although governors are typically
classified as either weak or strong in a general sense, there are a number of reasons to presume that each element of power would help governors achieve desired results in the different phases of policy. Apart from offering the governor a variety of leverage points in dealing with the legislature, as well as persuading the public to side with a particular issue, these different powers can work differently to provide the governor with institutional and personal authority in the pursuit of policy outcomes. Thus, to adequately capture the dynamic interplay between gubernatorial power and policy outcomes and results, it was important to deal with gubernatorial power along overall, dichotomized, and specific dimensions of power.

In terms of dichotomizing the activities of the governor into two phases of the policy process, the preceding studies examined the relationship between gubernatorial power in the policy development and implementation stages. This offers insights into the way in which gubernatorial power affects the role of the governor as “chief legislator” and “chief executive,” respectively, and enables additional claims to be made about the relative strength of state executives as they perform two of their more fundamental policy roles. The central hypothesis in both of these chapters was that, ceteris paribus, those governors who have higher levels of institutional and personal powers would have greater policy influence in both the formation and implementation phases. The results from these examinations offer support for this hypothesis.

5.2.1. Governor as Chief Legislator

Chapter three dealt with the role of the governor as chief legislator, examining the way in which gubernatorial power affected policy adoptions throughout the
American states. This study, therefore, engaged the policy adoption phase of the political process, seeking to determine whether gubernatorial power offers an explanation for policy variation at the sub-national level. This chapter explored gubernatorial power in three ways: as an aggregate measure in which a governor’s power was considered as a summative reflection of specific institutional and personal aspects; in a bifurcated sense as a reflection of institutional and personal power; and as separate, individual components.

In addition to examining gubernatorial power measures as determinants of policy outcomes, this study also accounted for socioeconomic and demographic factors including gross state product per capita, percentage of the population receiving welfare assistance, unmarried birth rate, the number of African-Americans as a percentage of the state’s overall population, and legislative professionalization. These variables help to analyze the significance of gubernatorial power, while controlling for variation in state context. Additionally, these factors can be seen as contributing an alternative interpretation to policy variation in the American states beyond the institutional perspective offered by the central hypothesis of the present study. Thus, the inclusion of these variables enables me to not only control for variation in context, but to examine the contributions institutional perspectives might offer the study of state politics and policy in light of other theoretical explanations.

The results presented in chapter three indicate that gubernatorial power is a significant determinant of policy outcomes. In a general sense, gubernatorial power proved to be significant along three of five dimensions of welfare policy options – offering TANF assistance to individuals who had been convicted drug related
offenses, offering transitional Medicaid assistance, and whether or not to impose a family cap. Additionally, a governor’s institutional powers proved to be significant as a determinant of both a state’s option to provide TANF assistance to convicted drug offenders and whether to adopt a work requirement that transitions welfare recipients into the workforce more quickly than the federally mandated 24 months. Likewise, a governor’s personal powers were found significant as to whether a state offered TANF assistance to individuals convicted of drug related offenses and to offer transitional Medicaid assistance. Finally, when examining gubernatorial power from the perspective of individual components, a variety of different powers were significant as separate influences on offering TANF to those convicted of drug related crimes, the offering of transitional Medicaid, and whether states chose to adopt individual development accounts. These results suggest that gubernatorial power does affect policy outcomes, and tentatively confirm the hypothesis that the more powerful the governor the more likely they are to influence policy at the state-level.

In conjunction with these differential measures of gubernatorial power, the various control variables all proved to be significant at different points in the study. While some variables, like gross state product per capita and the percentage of the overall population receiving welfare assistance, were significant in a majority of the cases, others only proved to be significant determinants of one or two of the policy outcomes. These results indicate a complex interplay of political, demographic, social, and economic forces on the policymaking process, and offer a reminder that care must be taken in making overly broad claims about what does and does not affect policy variation across the states.
5.2.2. Governor as Chief Executive

Chapter four moved the focus from the legislative role of the governor to the more administrative function a state’s chief executive performs. The data and findings summarized in this chapter reflect a desire to understand the connection between gubernatorial leadership and the ability – or inability – for states to achieve policy goals after adoption of legislation. The theory guiding this analysis is based on the notion that, as the formal head of a state’s administrative bureaucracy, the governor can apply a variety of institutional authority and personal influence in ways that help achieve desired results in the execution phase of policy implementation. Put simply, more powerful governors are likely to be more successful in navigating the administration, thus achieving more desirable results related to the policy goals.

Employing a similar method as utilized in chapter three, this look into the role of the governor as chief executive examined power along the three (macro, mid-range, and micro) levels previously described. In attempting to measure whether gubernatorial power significantly affects a state’s ability to achieve policy goals following the enactment of legislation, four primary goals of welfare reform were identified. These four goals included the reduction of welfare recipients, welfare spending, births to teenagers, and births to unwed mothers. However, the tests run in chapter four had to go beyond looking at just a single method of evaluating whether states were able to achieve progress along these identified policy goals. Instead, two separate tests were run for each of the dependent variables at each level of gubernatorial power. The first examined reductions in the four categories in the years
spanning 1996-1999. This was designed to account for varying levels of increase or decrease in the four categories that states experienced on a yearly basis following the adoption of welfare reform. The second test measured, cumulatively, how far states had come along these dimensions from 1996-1999. Such tests show how far along states had come relative to their goals following the 1996 PRWORA reforms in light of levels prior to the devolution of welfare authority. Both tests suggest a number of conclusions about the effect of gubernatorial power as a determinant of a state’s ability to achieve desired results.

As was the case in chapter three, a number of additional independent variables were considered in the models to control for socio-economic, political, and demographic variation across the states. Some variation as to the selection of these variables had to be employed – namely the elimination of a measure of unwed birth rates and the percentage of the state’s population receiving welfare assistance as independent variables in the model – due to the endogenous relationship with the dependent variables regarding the nature of these tests.

5.3. Lessons Learned

The results from chapters three and four indicate various lessons that shed light on the often overlooked connections between the power of the governors and the impact on state policymaking and administrative implementation of those policies. First and foremost, the results from tests assessing the impact of gubernatorial power in the policymaking and implementation phases serve as a reminder that institutions do matter. This means that, when attempting to uncover the determinants of policy
variation across the fifty states, scholars of American sub-national politics would do well to include institutions in their analyses. Moreover, the differential powers held by each of the executive offices from state-to-state add a further level of understanding to already established methods of approaching state policy variation, whether from cultural, racial, or socioeconomic perspectives. Bringing institutions back in to the study of state politics is important for a variety of reasons, as they help us evaluate the vitality of democracy at the state level, determine the effectiveness of political arrangements in the process of governance, and paint a more accurate picture of the forces explaining policy in the development and implementation phases. Thus, the primary lesson of the previous chapters is that – looked at broadly – institutions do matter and should be included in future research on state policy.

Additionally, the results presented in the preceding chapters show that not only do institutions matter, but also the people who occupy the offices of state government are important to consider in the quest to understand the policy process. When elected officials assume office, they are not only able to exercise the powers that are institutionally granted to them by law, but also personal powers enable them to achieve desired results without relying specifically on codified authority granted to them in state law. Such findings are important to consider when determining the way in which gubernatorial power is defined, and how to approach the inclusion of the executive office in state-level policy analysis.

Although power, as it is defined in an institutional, personal, and cumulative sense, proves to be significant, the results also suggest that much care must be taken before making comprehensive claims about state executives. It is not enough to
simply judge governors as being powerful or weak as is often the case; such simplicity does not offer the full picture of the policy process. The preceding analyses indicate that power has a differential affect on different policies in both the development and implementation phases. This does not mean that overall measures of gubernatorial power are insignificant or irrelevant. To the contrary, the results reveal that in a number of cases an aggregate measure of gubernatorial power does significantly affect welfare policy and the ability of states to achieve welfare reform goals. However, as one moves further down the pyramid from a cumulative measure of all powers, it is clear that different powers are significant in some cases and not in others. Likewise, some powers traditionally considered to be of importance do not appear to play a significant part in one or both of the phases of policy examined. Therefore, when looking to piece together an accurate portrayal of whether gubernatorial power has a significant effect on policy formation or implementation, it is important that studies not consider only a single indicator of power. Instead, the preceding chapters illustrate how conceiving of gubernatorial power from macro, mid-level, and micro perspectives contribute to a fuller understanding of the nuance of gubernatorial power often overlooked or assumed in other studies.

5.4. Limitations of Studies and Future Research

In spite of the numerous lessons that can be extracted from this research, there are a number of limitations that suggest the need for additional research.
5.4.1. Lengthening the Study

First, the research presented here would benefit from extending the number of years covered beyond 1999. Considering additional years enables more accurate claims to be made by not only offering more data points, but also a longer tracing of the effects of gubernatorial power over various outcomes and results of policy implementation. This is important for a variety of reasons. For starters, most state budgets have been experiencing pressures of a national economic decline that has been occurring since roughly 2001. Because of these declines, there is likely to be greater pressure on state welfare programs than experienced during the inception of welfare reform. This could fundamentally alter the approaches state governments take to meet new demands. Additionally, studies have shown that some of the “successes” under welfare reform have little to do with any of the actual reforms pursued by state governments. For example, some studies estimate that approximately two-thirds of all decline in the number of people receiving welfare assistance was due to strong economic factors and jobs creation not because of welfare reform (Fagan Ziliak and Figlio 2000; Ziliak et al. 1997). This means that shifts in the economic cycle might significantly affect states’ ability to achieve desired results over a longer period of time. Therefore, broadening the scope of the study to incorporate a number of years following the economic decline of 2001 could

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67 Reports released by the U.S. Census Bureau about the state of real money income in America revealed a number of declines in very critical areas of the economy from 2001-2002. In this time, family household income declined by 0.8% and non-family income declined approximately 2.4%. Additionally, per capita money income declined 1.8%, which was the first annual decline since 1991 (DeNavas et al. 2003). Likewise, data published by the U.S. Bureau of Labor and Statistics revealed a 1.5% increase in unemployment from 4.1% in January 2001 to 5.6% in March 2004 (BLS 2004).
offer greater insight into the actual effects of gubernatorial power on welfare policies and results.

5.4.2. Broadening the Scope

Second, future research should further apply gubernatorial power measures to a broader scope of study that considers other types of policies than those considered in this study. For example, the preceding analyses could be applied to state educational reforms following the passage of the No Child Left Behind Act of 2002. Such a study might focus on whether gubernatorial power affected the performance goals adopted across the states, or the types of programmatic spending choices executives influenced in trying to make federal policy a reality in their states. Currently, research on gubernatorial politics treats executive power as if it worked the same regardless of the type of policy under consideration (Beyle 1999; Mueller 1985; Schlesinger 1971). As Barrilleaux and Berkman (2003) note when describing problems with traditional approaches to gubernatorial power and budgeting, “Commonly used measures of gubernatorial power are not designed to discriminate when particular powers matter… Therefore, they can obscure the issue of influence and fail to measure power over the legislature.” (pp. 8-9). Thus, it is essential to the enhancement of traditional interpretations of gubernatorial power and policy to begin adapting measures to more accurately account for the types of policies under consideration.
5.4.3. Adjusting Coding of Gubernatorial Power to Match Policy Type

Third, gubernatorial power ratings need to be adapted to accurately account for variation in policy adoption and implementation in accordance to the specific policies being examined. For example, future studies of gubernatorial power on welfare policy should refine the coding for a governor’s appointment power to only include those agencies in the executive department that play some significant part in handling issues related to TANF. Such data would include specific, not merely generalized, power measures for each agency in terms of the governors ability to appoint, maintain executive oversight, and perhaps developing new measures of institutional autonomy granted to the various state executive agencies that enable them to act outside of the governor’s control.

5.4.4. Tracing National Trends in the States: Using Case Studies

Fourth, future research in this area would also benefit from exploring these national trends in more specific state-by-state case studies. That is to say that the next step in this research process would be to develop an in-depth analysis into the specific happenings of a few representative case studies in an attempt to more thoroughly develop a clear picture as to how gubernatorial power specifically enables a governor to achieve desired policy results. Such efforts would help, as one Brookings Institute research brief noted, “examine differences” as well as “identify best practices” following the passage of the 1996 PRWORA (Nivola, et al. 2004). This does not mean that previous research employing this type of method had not been performed.
To the contrary, there are a number of qualitative studies available that examine the relationship between governors and welfare policy in the states (Weissert 2000; Barnow et al. 2000; Liebschutz 2000; Thompson 1996).\footnote{Marshall Kaplan and Sue O’Brien (1991) have also performed a multi-state, case-study approach that focuses specifically on the governors and their role in implementing welfare reforms in the new federalist period of the 1980s.} However, while these cases do address the role of governors in the adoption and implementation of welfare reforms in general, they lack a comprehensive focus on the role of the institutional and personal powers of state executives on welfare outputs along these two dimensions. Instead, a qualitative study that builds off the evidence and theories presented here and examines the specific ways in which governors of several states employ their various powers in order to leverage control over the adoption and implementation of welfare policies would help trace out these national trends in a deeper, more detailed manner.

There are a number of interesting combinations that can be explored using a more qualitative, case-study approach. For instance, it would be beneficial to examine the different experiences of some of the most powerful governors during the years surrounding welfare reform (Bill Graves, KS; Terry Branstad, IA; George Voinovich, OH) with those who were classified among the weakest (J. Fife Symington, AZ; Lincoln Almond, RI; Kirk Fordice, MS). Similarly, because general evaluations of power only tell part of the story, selecting cases based on institutional strength and weakness, or on higher and lower levels of personal powers could also help produce insights into the nature of power and how it affects policy development and implementation. Adding this dimension of understanding to the findings
presented here would greatly enhance the level of knowledge available regarding the chief executive office in the American states.

Along with these three methodological approaches, there are two considerations that should be incorporated into future research into gubernatorial power: establishing an appropriate weighting for the individual components of gubernatorial power, and creating an appropriate measure of bureaucratic capacity. Both of these issues require much more sophisticated and rigorous follow-ups to the research presented in chapters three and four, and as such a deeper exploration of both is needed.

5.4.5. Weighting Individual Components of Gubernatorial Power

A significant limitation of the analyses of gubernatorial power in the preceding chapters is the lack of a truly nuanced scale that is able to appropriately account for differences in the importance of the various elements of gubernatorial power. In these explorations, and indeed in almost all examinations of state executive power, each dimension of power is treated as though it has equal bearing or influence on policymaking and implementation. That is, budgetary powers are treated as though they were just as important to the process as tenure potential and vice-versa. All powers are assigned scores ranging from one to five, and cumulative measures of gubernatorial power treats these scores as if they have equal bearing and influence on policy outcomes. But can it be assumed that all powers affect the various policy stages equally, or that these components are of similar importance to the governor in her roles as chief legislator or chief executive? Are some powers more important
than others? And does the level of importance vary systematically from policy to policy based on policy type?

When examining the results presented in chapter three, it is clear that some elements of gubernatorial power are significant in determining policy outcomes across the fifty states. For example, when examining how specific components of gubernatorial power affect whether or not states adopted a cap preventing TANF assistance to convicted drug felons, four of the ten elements of gubernatorial power – members of executive branch elected as members of the same ticket (p<0.05), governor’s appointment powers (p<0.05), gubernatorial control over the budget (p<0.05), and party control vis-à-vis the legislature – are all significant. Additionally, three additional variables (tenure potential, position on state’s ambition ladder, and personal future of the governor) appear in the model, although they are not significant. Such results indicate a variety of possibilities to consider. First, some powers prove to be more important than others in determining policy outputs. This would indicate that appropriate weighting of the independent variables needs to be accounted for when assessing the affects of aggregate measures of gubernatorial power. Additionally, the appearance of other, insignificant elements of power as contributing to the final model suggests that there might be some sort of interaction occurring between these significant and insignificant variables. That is to say that a governor’s partisan control of the legislature might only be significant to the degree they are in the model because of the interaction with the governor’s political experience (as indicated by the position on the state’s ambition ladder) or tenure potential. These results, therefore, indicate that different dimensions of power are of
varying importance, and need to not only be weighted accordingly, but that their importance may depend on some latent interaction between each other not accounted for in this study.

The notion that powers need to be weighted differently, and that interactions among variables must be explored, is not limited to the findings in chapter three. When turning to the results of tests run to determine if gubernatorial power significantly affects the outcomes of policy implementation, the findings presented in chapter four seem to indicate that not all powers are of equal importance. For example, results in Table 4.3 indicate that a governor’s tenure potential (p < 0.1), position on the political ambition ladder (p < 0.05), and job performance ratings (p < 0.01) are all significant determinants of variation along the dependent variable of the percentage of the population receiving welfare. Likewise, although not statistically significant, a governor’s appointment powers, budgetary authority, partisan control of the legislature, and personal future are all present in the model. These results indicate support to the notion that there should be an appropriate weight assigned to the individual variables when developing cumulative measures of power, and also suggest that there might be latent interactions among the variables that are not adequately accounted for in the currently simplistic measures of aggregate power employed in the study of state executive politics. Such findings are important to future research of gubernatorial power and the adoption and implementation of policy throughout the states. It is no longer enough to assume that a governor with a score of 2 for budgetary and 4 for tenure potential has the same amount of influence and authority as one that posses a 5 rating for budgetary powers and a 1 for tenure.
potential. Both governors may end up with a rating of 6 along these two dimensions, but the evidence in the preceding studies indicates that those 6’s are not necessarily equal. Thus, future studies need to account for the appropriate weighting of the various elements of power in studies that attempt to evaluate the effects of aggregate measures of power on policymaking and policy implementation.

To explore these ideas further, it is necessary to develop a theoretical foundation for why and how we might determine the varying import of some variables over others along different dimensions of policy. For example, for policies involving major issues of appropriation, a governor’s budgetary control, ability to line-item veto legislative actions, and partisan control vis-à-vis the legislature will likely be more important than the other elements traditionally considered in regards to measures of gubernatorial power. As such, these powers should be weighted more heavily in studying primarily fiscal policies than the other components.

There are a number of reasons to believe these three powers in particular are of greater importance to fiscal matters than the others. To begin with, Beyle’s (1999) codification of budgetary power of state executives ranges from the most powerful where the governor has full control over the budget and the legislature may not increase it, to the least powerful wherein the governor shares responsibilities for creating the executive budget with other officials and the legislature has the unrestrained ability to amend the budget however it sees fit. As indicated in chapter one, these two possibilities, along with three others, are codified on a five-point scale that measures the control of the executive over the budget. For the governor to be able to have virtually unlimited authority to develop the executive budget offers gives
them an extraordinary amount of power over fiscal issues. Therefore, it can be expected that, when it comes to fiscal issues, a governor’s budgetary powers would have a much more relevant influence, and as such should be weighted accordingly.

In addition to gubernatorial budgetary authority, when it comes to economic issues it can be expected that the veto authority of the governor will have an impact on the ability of state executives to control spending and fiscal allocations in the state budget. As far back as the early 1920s, political scientists recognized the important role that the item veto played in giving state executives significant leverage over state budgets. According to Roger Wells’ 1924 assessment of the item veto and state budgets, allowing the governor to reduce what he deems as unnecessary spending projects without rejecting the budget in its entirety gives state executives significant control over how revenue is allocated in the states. Subsequent studies confirm this idea put forward almost a century ago. For example, James Dearden and Thomas Husted (1993) found that “[When accounting for] the socioeconomic, institutional, timespecific and state-specific factors that determine the size of the state expenditure budget, the empirical results support the theory that the line-item veto enhances the governor's ability to obtain a more desirable budget" (p. 710).

The notion that governors are able to use the line-item veto to achieve “more desirable” budgetary goals does not necessarily mean an overall reduction in state spending. In fact, examinations of the link between the affect of the item veto and state expenditures have found little to support the notion that item veto power has led

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69 Those policies falling under the rubric of an “economic issue” in the American states include: 1. fiscal policy (taxation and public spending by governments); 2. monetary policy (those economic regulations that affect the amount of money in circulation); and 3. regulatory policies that substantially affect businesses, labor relations, the protection of consumers, and the flow of commerce in and out of the state.
to a reduction in state spending (Nice 2002, 1988; Holtz-Eakin 1988). Instead, a multi-state study of public budgeting found that state executives were likely to employ the item veto for partisan purposes vis-à-vis the legislature in which Republican governors would cut the spending projects of Democratic legislators and vice-versa (Abney and Lauth 1985). The results of this study were supported by James Gosling (1986) who performed a longitudinal analysis of the use of the item veto in the state of Wisconsin. Gosling found that over a twelve-year period governors used this authority to pursue their own policy goals but not to cut spending. Additionally, Gary Cox and Mathew McCubbins (1993) argue that the item veto was granted to executives by state legislatures as a means of regulating legislative collective action problems when it comes to allocating expenditures. Their logic is that when the governor cuts portions of the budget that benefit one or a few legislators without having to reject it completely, it becomes more difficult to get enough support in the legislature as a whole to override the veto. However, this does not mean the governor is reducing spending across the board. It simply means that the veto powers held by governors can have a significant impact on budgetary issues when it comes to setting budgetary priorities in accordance to what the governor finds desirable.

Although evidence suggests that the item veto has little effect on reducing overall levels of state spending, it is likely that such power has an affect on where that money is spent and on what. Put simply, the governor can use the item veto to control budgetary issues by substituting the priorities of specific legislators with his own. Thus, when analyzing welfare policy, which is primarily redistributive in nature
(fiscal policy), the ability of the governor to use something like the item veto should be weighted more heavily than other, less important powers.

Finally, compared to other available formal and informal powers, the partisan congruence of the legislature with the executive office is likely to offer the governor greater influence over state spending (Nice 2002, 1988; Holtz-Eakin 1988; Abney and Lauth 1985). At this level, even if the governor does not have the item veto, or have substantial budgetary authority vested in the office, if she enjoys a substantial legislative majority then as the head of the party the governor holds a great deal of influence over establishing fiscal priorities. Conversely, if the governor is facing an opposition party majority, or even if her party only retains a slim majority, it would likely have a significant impact on the influence the executive would have over spending patterns. Therefore, the partisan composition of the legislature compared with that of the executive would likely have a more substantial effect on how much influence the governor would have over economic activities of state government than other elements of executive power. These differential influences should be accounted for accordingly in future studies.

In light of these assessments of certain powers being more important than others given the differential nature of policies in the states, the next step is to determine just how much to weight the individual variables and how to appropriately aggregate the data to better establish in empirical reality general assessments of gubernatorial power. This is true from a mid-level analysis where power is dichotomized into institutional and personal powers, and when it is aggregated into a single indicator. Additional studies focusing on a wider range of policy issues – not
just welfare reform policies and their results – should be performed to appropriately tease out the correct weighting of the different elements of gubernatorial power regarding fiscal decisions at the state level. Analyses of budgets from state-to-state over several years would help to establish patterns of influence across a variety of budgetary concerns. These studies can, in turn, help account quantitatively for the differences in theoretical influence that some powers have over others concerning fiscal decisions.

5.4.6. Measuring Bureaucratic Capacity and Administrative Strength

When considering future research into the effect of gubernatorial power on policy choices and results, scholars should begin including more refined measures of bureaucratic strength. At the very least, a better measure of bureaucratic professionalization than employed in chapter 4 (measured by average monthly salary of state administrative employees) must be accounted for in order to assess the strength of state executives vis-à-vis the administrative organization similar to the measure of legislative professionalization offered in these studies. Such measurement is significant for a number of reasons, but primarily because “as the decentralization or devolution from the national government to the states proceeds, the ability of the states to effectively implement the devolved programs depends heavily on each state’s administrative capacities” (Bowling and Wright 1998, p. 53). There is much debate within the state politics literature concerning how such measurement can be accomplished and incorporated into research on subnational politics, which complicates the process and makes it difficult to establish a clear method as to how
measuring bureaucratic capacity might be best accomplished. However, there have been a number of efforts to capture this important institutional dimension of state government.

Two noted attempts are the Government Performance Project (GPP) and the American State Administrators Project (ASAP). Both of these projects were major undertakings that sought to quantify administrative capacity along a variety of dimensions ranging from financial management to resources of information technology (Burke and Wright 2002). Both assessments have limitations; however, as Patricia Ingraham and Amy Kneedler (2000) point out that neither the GPP nor the ASAP actually offer a measure of state administrative capacity. At best, these studies might be suggestive of the actual performance of state bureaucratic organizations when it comes to reorganization and reform, but do not offer a way to capture capacity or the quality of state administrations. What the GPP and ASAP studies ultimately offer is a deeper insight into the complexity of trying to measure bureaucratic strength. The GPP, for example, attempts to rank administrative performance based on over 1,000 interviews and a “telephone book” sized survey (Burke and Wright 2002; Barrett and Greene 1999). Likewise, the ASAP developed a multi-dimensional survey that it offered to the heads of over 3,000 state administrative bodies. But, Burke and Wright (2002) indicate that less than 37% responded to the first survey in 1994 and less than 35% responded to the follow-up study of 1998. Thus, even attempts to measure empirically the performance of state bureaucracies are difficult due to the complexity such assessments entail, not too mention an attempt to quantify capacity. Such conclusions are in agreement with
previous studies by Barrilleaux, Feiock, and Crew (1992) that argue that there are no simple, singular measures of bureaucratic capacity or administrative quality.

The complications involved in developing a more nuanced measure of state administration should not be taken to mean that such measurements are impossible. Nor should such difficulties be taken to mean efforts to codify administrative capacity are futile. However, such observations should help to remind scholars of state politics that a measure of bureaucratic capacity is one that requires a vast amount of data and continued thought as to the best approaches to calculate a meaningful computation. As Bowling and Wright (1998) state, “No short analysis can do justice to the variety, scope, complexity, originality, and significance of the changes in the administration of public policies in the states over the last five decades” (p. 54).

The aforementioned strategies and alternatives for future research (expanding the number of years under consideration; tailoring gubernatorial power measures to more accurately account for the types of policy under consideration; extending these studies to include consideration of other policies outside the scope of welfare reform; employing a qualitative, case-study approach to trace national-trends at a deeper level; developing the appropriate weighting of power scores for the types of policies being examined; and employing a more refined and nuanced measure of bureaucratic capacity and administrative strength) would offer greater insight into the role of gubernatorial power in policy adoption and implementation.
5.5. Conclusion

John Adair, Governor of the state of Kentucky from 1820-1824, once claimed, “The chief executive who knows his strengths and weaknesses as a leader is likely to be far more effective than one who remains blind to them.” Nearly two centuries later, these words can again be applied to an understanding of the governor’s office in the United States. As the preceding analyses demonstrate, it is not always enough for a governor to be deemed as merely weak or strong when it comes to assessing their possible influence on policymaking, but instead the nature of those strengths and weaknesses must be understood in light of the specific goals and policies being sought. While general levels of gubernatorial power offer some insight, it may not always be sufficient to judge the probability of gubernatorial effectiveness based on cumulative measures of power. Instead, the results of the previous analyses indicate that interpreting gubernatorial power on mid- and micro-levels can offer key insights into the role governors play in the development and implementation of policy across the fifty states.

No matter how one examines gubernatorial power, or on what level, the preceding chapters remind us that when it comes to understanding policy variation in the American states, we cannot disregard the importance of institutional arrangements. Nor can we simply overlook the important ways in which individuals who occupy public office can shape and effect policymaking and policy-implementation. Such findings are likely to be welcomed by institutionalists who have long argued that the nature and structure of the mechanisms of government are important in explaining political behaviors and outcomes. Similarly, these findings
are likely to please democratic advocates of all walks. The results suggest that voting does matter, as the person occupying elected office – in this case, the chief executive office of the states – makes a difference in understanding policy outcomes and the results following their implementation. Not only does the institutional capacity of the chief executive seem to matter in terms of policy and its implementation but, as Neustadt (1990) argues for understanding the presidency, the individual leadership qualities and resources the governor brings to office can be just as important in terms of influence and leadership as the office itself. Either way, the winner in a statewide election does, in fact, have a significant influence on policymaking and implementation both in terms of the power of the office and the personal powers the victor possesses. Thus, the analyses presented here – limitations and all – contribute to the ongoing efforts to understand state government, executive leadership, public policy, and the American democratic system of politics as a whole.
Figure 1.2. Domethrius’ Revised Measure of the Governor’s Administrative Power

Appointment Power

This score is obtained from the following formula:

\[
\text{Scale} = \frac{\text{Values of } P_1+P_2+P_3 \ldots P_{16}}{\text{Maximum values of } P_1+P_2+P_3 \ldots 16}
\]

Where \( P = 5 \) if governor appoints;
4 if governor appoints and one house of legislature approves;
3 if governor appoints and both houses of legislature approve;
2 if appointed by director with governor’s approval or by governor and council;
1 if appointed by department director, board, legislature, or civil service;
0 if popularly elected; and where the subscript indicates the chief administrator for each of sixteen functions or offices.* Using this formula, values are obtained ranging from 0.00 to 1.00. States with a value from 0.00 to 0.10 are assigned a point score of 1, from .11 to .20 a score of 2, etc., up to a score of 10 for values from .91 to 1.00.

Budget Power

1 point    If the governor has full responsibility for preparing the budget, or if he shares this responsibility with a civil service appointee or someone appointed by another appointed official.
0 points  If the governor shares this responsibility with the legislature, another elected official, or several others with independent sources of strength.

Veto Power

1 point    If the governor has an item veto and a majority or more of the legislators elected are needed to override.
0 points  If a majority or more of the legislators present are needed to override the governor’s item veto, or no item veto, or no veto at all.

Combined Measure

The scores on the above three components are combined to create a total index of the administrative power of the governor with values ranging from 1 to 12.

*The sixteen functions are administration and finance, agriculture, attorney general, auditor, budget officer, conservation, controller, education, health, highways, insurance, labor, secretary of state, tax commissioner, treasurer and welfare.

**Replicated from Domethrius’ “Chart 2: Revised Measure of the Governor’s Administrative Power,” in Domethrius, 1979, p. 609.
Figure 1.3. Governor’s Institutional Powers (Formal Powers)

- Separately elected executive branch officials (SEP): 5 = only governor or governor/lieutenant governor team elected; 4.5 = governor or governor/lieutenant governor team, with one other elected official; 4 = governor/lieutenant governor team with some process officials (attorney general, secretary of state, treasurer, auditor) elected; 3 = governor/lieutenant governor team with process officials, and some major and minor policy officials elected; 2.5 = governor (no team) with six or fewer officials elected, but none are major policy officials; 2 = governor (no team) with six or fewer officials elected, including one major policy official; 1.5 = governor (no team) with six or fewer officials elected, but two are major policy officials; 1 = governor (no team) with seven or more process and several major policy officials elected.

- Tenure potential (TP): 5 = four-year term, no restraint on reelection; 4.5 = four-year term, only three terms permitted; 4 = four-year term, only two terms permitted; 3 = four-year term, no consecutive reelection permitted; 2 = two-year term, no restraint on reelection; 1 = two-year term, only two terms permitted.

- Governor’s appointment powers in six major functional areas (AP): corrections, K-12 education, health, highways/transportation, public utilities regulation, and welfare. The six individual office scores are totaled then averaged and rounded to the nearest .5 or [1] for the state score. That average score is then rounded to the nearest .5 between 0 and 5. 5 = governor appoints, no other approval needed; 4 = governor appoints, a board, council, or legislature approves; 3 = someone else appoints, governor approves or shares appointment; 2 = someone else appoints, governor and others approve; 1 = someone else appoints, no approval or confirmation needed.

- Governor’s budgetary powers (BP): 5 = governor has full responsibility; legislature may not increase executive budget; 4 = governor has full responsibility; legislature can increase [by] special majority vote or subject to item veto; 3 = governor has full responsibility; legislature has unlimited power to change executive budget; 2 = governor shares responsibility; legislature has unlimited power to change executive budget; 1 = governor shares responsibility with other elected official; legislature has unlimited power to change executive budget.

- Governor’s veto power (VP): 5 = has the item veto and a special majority vote is needed to override a veto (three-fifths of legislators elected or two-thirds of legislators present); 4 = has item veto with a majority of legislators elected needed to override; 3 = has item veto with only a majority of
legislators present needed to override; 2 = no item veto, with a special legislative majority needed to override it; 1 = no item veto, with a simple legislative majority needed to override.

- Gubernatorial party control (PC): the governor’s party is: 5 = has a substantial majority (75 percent or more) in both houses of the legislature; 4 = has a simple majority in both houses (less than 75 percent), or a substantial majority in one house and a simple majority in the other; 3 = split party control in the legislature or a nonpartisan legislature; 2 = simple majority in both houses, or a simple minority (25 percent or less) in one and a substantial minority (more than 25 percent) in the other; 1 = substantial minority in both houses.

- Governor’s institutional power score (GIP): The sum of the scores SEP, TP, AP, BP, VP and PC divided by 6 to stay within the 5 point format. Overall power score rounded to the nearest tenth of a point.

* Reproduced from tables printed in Beyle, 1999, pp. 204-205.
Figure 1.4. Personal Powers of the Governors (Informal Powers)

- Governor’s electoral mandate (EM): 5 = landslide win of eleven or more points; 4 = comfortable majority of six to ten points; 3 = narrow majority of three to five points; 2 = tight win of zero to two points or a plurality win of under 50 percent; 1 = succeeded to office.

- Governor’s position on the state’s political ambition ladder (AL): 5 = steady progression; 4 = former governors; 3 = legislative leaders or members of Congress; 2 = substate position to governor; 1 = governorship is first elected office.

- The personal future of the governor (PF): 5 = early in term, can run again; 4 = late in term, can run again; 3 = early in term, term limited; 2 = succeeded to office, can run again; 1 = late in final term.

- Gubernatorial job performance rating in public opinion polls (GP): 5 = more than 60 percent positive job approval rating; 4 = 50 to 59 percent positive job approval rating; 3 = 40 to 49 percent positive job approval rating; 2 = 30 to 39 percent positive job approval rating; 1 = less than 30 percent positive job approval rating.

- Governor’s personal powers’ index score (GPP), the sum of the scores for EM, AL, PF, GP divided by 4 and rounded to nearest tenth of a point.

* Reproduced from tables printed in Beyle, 1999, pp. 211.
Table 1.1. SUMMARY OF BEYLE’S GUBERNATORIAL POWER RATINGS

INDEX BY STATE, SUMMER 1998.

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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Utah</td>
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<tr>
<td>Wisconsin</td>
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<td>7</td>
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<tr>
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*Average Score = 7.2
**TABLE 2.1. SUMMARY OF NATIONAL GOVERNOR’S ASSOCIATION 1997 STUDY OF STATE TANF PLANS.**

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<th>Feature</th>
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<td>Continue Waivers?</td>
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<td>RI (n/a)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Time Limit Shorter Than Sixty Months?</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Subsidized Employment?</td>
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<td>Continue Waivers?</td>
<td>AZ, CA, CT, DE, GA, HI, IN, KS, MA, MI, MN, MO, MT, NE, NH, NC, OH, OR, SC, SD, TN, TX, UT, VA, WI</td>
<td>AL, AR, CO, FL, ID, IL, IA, ME, MD, MS, NJ, NY, ND, OK, WA, WV, WI</td>
<td>AK (no waiver), KY (no waivers), LA (no waivers), NV (no waivers), PA (no waivers), RI (n/a)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Time Limit Shorter Than 60 months?</td>
<td>AR, CT, DE, FL, GA, ID, IN, LA, MA, MO, NE, NC, OH, OR, SC, TN, TX, UT, VA</td>
<td>AL, AK, AZ, CA, CO, HI, IL, IA, KS, KY, ME, MD, MI, MN, MS, MT, NE, NV, NH, NJ, NM, NY, ND, OK, PA, RI, SD, VT, WA, WV, WI, WY</td>
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<tr>
<td>Work Requirement Shorter Than 24 Months?</td>
<td>AL, AZ, AR, CA, CT, FL, GA, ID, IA, LA, MA, MI, MN, MT, NE, NH, NM, NC, ND, OH, OK, OR, SD, TN, UT, VA, WA, WI</td>
<td>AK, CO, DE, HI, IL, IN, KS, KY, ME, MD, MS, MO, NV, NJ, NY, PA, RI, SC, VT, WV, WY</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hours Of Work Required Per Week Same As Federal Law?</td>
<td>AL, AK, AR, CA, CO, CT, DE, FL, IL, IN, KS, KY, LA, ME, MD, MA, MI, MN, MS, MO, MT, NV, NH, NY, OK, SC, SD, TX, WA</td>
<td>AZ, GA, HI, ID, IA, MA, NE, NJ, NM, NC, ND, OH, OR, PA, RI, TN, UT, VT, VA, WV, WI, WY</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Different Treatment For New Residents?</td>
<td>FL, GA, MD, MN, NE, NH, NJ, NY, ND, PA, RI, VT, WA, WI</td>
<td>AL, AK, AZ, AR, CA, CO, CT, DE, HI, ID, IL, IN, IA, KS, KY, LA, ME, MA, MI, MS, MO, MT, NV, NM, NC, OH, OK, OR, SC, SD, TN, TX, UT, VA, WV, WY</td>
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<tr>
<td>Provide TANF For Legal Non-Citizens?</td>
<td>AK, AZ, CA, CO, CT, DE, FL, GA, ID, IL, IN, IA, KS, KY, LA, ME, MD, MA, MI, MN, MS, MO, MT, NE, NV, NH, NJ, NM, NY, NC, ND, OH, OK, OR, PA, RI, SC, SD, TN, TX, UT, VT, VA, WA, WV, WI</td>
<td>AL, AR, HI</td>
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<tr>
<td>Deny TANF For Drug Felons?</td>
<td>AL, AZ, AR, CA, DE, GA, ID, IL, IN, KS, KY, ME, MD, MA, MS, MO, MT, NE, NV, NJ, NM, NC, ND, OH, PA, SC, SD, TN, VA, WV, WY</td>
<td>AK, CO, CT, FL, HI, IA, LA, MI, MN, NH, NY, OK, OR, RI, TX, UT, VT, WA, WI</td>
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<tr>
<td>Guarantee Child Care For TANF Families?</td>
<td>AL, AK, AZ, AR, CA, DE, GA, IN, IA, KY, LA, ME, MD, MA, MI, MT, NE, NV, NH, NJ, NY, OH, OK, OR, SC, TN, UT, VT, VA</td>
<td>CT, FL, HI, ID, MN, MS, NM, NC, PA, SD, TX, WA, WV, WY</td>
<td>CO (n/a), IL (n/a), KS (n/a), MO (n/a), ND (n/a), RI (n/a), WI (n/a)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Question</td>
<td>States Provided</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
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<tr>
<td>Guarantee Child Care For Those Leaving TANF (TCC)?</td>
<td>AL, AK, AZ, AR, CA, CT, DE, FL, GA, HI, IN, IA, KY, ME, MD, MA, MN, NE, NV, NJ, NY, OH, OK, OR, SC, TN, TX, UT, VA</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ID, LA, MI, MS, MT, NM, NC, PA, SD, WA, WV, WY</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CO (n/a), IL (n/a), KS (n/a), MO (n/a), NH (n/a), ND (n/a), RI (n/a), VT (n/a), WI (n/a)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Transitional Medicaid Longer Than Twelve Months?</td>
<td>AZ, CA, CT, DE, HI, NE, NJ, RI, SC, TN, TX, UT, VT</td>
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<td>AL, AK, AR, CO, FL, GA, ID, IL, IN, IA, KS, KY, LA, ME, MD, MA, MI, MN, MS, MO, MT, NV, NH, NM, NY, NC, ND, OH, OK, OR, PA, SD, WA, WA, WV, WI, WY</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>AL, AK, AZ, AR, CA, CO, CT, DE, GA, HI, ID, IL, IN, IA, KS, KY, LA, ME, MD, MA, MI, MS, MO, MT, NE, NH, NJ, NM, ND, OK, OR, PA, RI, TX, WA, WV, WY</td>
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<tr>
<td>Family Violence Option (FVO)?</td>
<td>AL, AZ, CA, CO, DE, FL, GA, IN, IA, KY, LA, MD, MA, MI, MN, MO, NE, NV, NH, NJ, NY, NC, ND, PA, RI, TX, WA, WV, WY</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>AK, AR, HI, ID, IL, KS, ME, MS, MT, NM, OH, OK, OR, SC, SD, TN, UT, VT, VA, WA, WV, WY</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CT (pending)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Allow Individual Development Accounts?</td>
<td>AL, AR, CA, CO, GA, IL, IN, IA, KY, LA, ME, MI, MO, MT, NM, NY, NC, OH, OK, OR, PA, RI, SC, TN, TX, VT, VA, WA</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>AL, AK, CT, DE, FL, HI, ID, KS, MD, MA, MN, MS, NE, NV, NH, NJ, ND, SD, UT, WV, WI, WY</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Family Cap?</td>
<td>AL, AK, CA, CT, DE, FL, GA, IL, MA, MS, NE, NJ, NC, ND, OK, SC, TN, VA</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>AL, AK, CO, HI, ID, IN, IA, KS, KY, LA, ME, MD, MI, MN, MO, MT, NV, NH, NM, NY, OH, OR, PA, RI, SD, TX, UT, VT, WA, WV, WI, WY</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Diversion Payments?</td>
<td>AK, AR, CA, CO, CT, FL, ID, IN, IA, KY, ME, MD, MN, MT, NV, NJ, NM, NY, NC, OH, OR, PA, RI, SC, TX, UT, VA, WA, WV, WI</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>AL, AZ, DE, GA, HI, IL, KS, LA, MA, MI, MS, MO, NE, NH, ND, OK, PA, SC, TN, VT, WY</td>
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<tr>
<td>Subsidized Employment?</td>
<td>AK, AR, CA, CO, DE, FL, GA, HI, KS, KY, ME, MD, MA, MN, MS, MO, MT, NH, NY, NC, ND, OH, OK, OR, PA, RI, SC, SD, TX, VT, WA, VA, WV, WI</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>AL, CT, ID, IL, IN, LA, NE, NV, NJ, NM, TN, UT, WY</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>IA (no, but under consideration), MI (some areas)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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</table>

TABLE 2.1. STATE-BY-STATE SUMMARY OF WORK SANCTIONS AND LENGTH FOR NONCOMPLIANCE, 1999.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Amount of Work Sanction</th>
<th>Length of Work Sanction for Noncompliance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Alabama</td>
<td>Partial</td>
<td>3 months</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alaska</td>
<td>Partial</td>
<td>Until Compliance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arizona</td>
<td>Partial</td>
<td>1 month</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arkansas</td>
<td>Full</td>
<td>Until Compliance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>California</td>
<td>Partial</td>
<td>Until Compliance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colorado</td>
<td>Partial</td>
<td>1-3 months</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Connecticut</td>
<td>Partial</td>
<td>3 months</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delaware</td>
<td>Partial</td>
<td>Until Compliance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Florida</td>
<td>Full</td>
<td>Until Compliance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>Partial</td>
<td>1-3 months</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hawaii</td>
<td>Partial</td>
<td>Until Compliance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Idaho</td>
<td>Full</td>
<td>1 month</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Illinois</td>
<td>Partial</td>
<td>Until Compliance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indiana</td>
<td>Partial</td>
<td>2 months</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iowa</td>
<td>Partial</td>
<td>3 months</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kansas</td>
<td>Full</td>
<td>Until Compliance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kentucky</td>
<td>Partial</td>
<td>Until Compliance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Louisiana</td>
<td>Partial</td>
<td>3 months</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maine</td>
<td>Partial</td>
<td>Until Compliance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maryland</td>
<td>Full</td>
<td>Until Compliance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Massachusetts</td>
<td>Partial</td>
<td>Until Compliance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Michigan</td>
<td>Full or Partial</td>
<td>Length Varies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minnesota</td>
<td>Partial</td>
<td>1 month</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mississippi</td>
<td>Full</td>
<td>2 months</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missouri</td>
<td>Partial</td>
<td>Until Compliance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Montana</td>
<td>Partial</td>
<td>1 month</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nebraska</td>
<td>Full</td>
<td>1 month</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nevada</td>
<td>Partial</td>
<td>2 months</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Hampshire</td>
<td>Partial</td>
<td>½ of a month</td>
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<tr>
<td>New Jersey</td>
<td>Partial</td>
<td>1 month</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Mexico</td>
<td>Partial</td>
<td>Until Compliance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New York</td>
<td>Partial</td>
<td>Until Compliance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Carolina</td>
<td>Partial</td>
<td>3 months</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Dakota</td>
<td>Partial</td>
<td>1 month</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ohio</td>
<td>Full</td>
<td>1 month</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oklahoma</td>
<td>Full</td>
<td>Until Compliance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oregon</td>
<td>Partial</td>
<td>Until Compliance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pennsylvania</td>
<td>Partial</td>
<td>1 month, or Until Compliance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rhode Island</td>
<td>Partial</td>
<td>Until Compliance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Carolina</td>
<td>Full</td>
<td>1 month after compliance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Dakota</td>
<td>Partial</td>
<td>1 month</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tennessee</td>
<td>Full</td>
<td>Until Compliance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Texas</td>
<td>Partial</td>
<td>1 month</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Utah</td>
<td>Partial</td>
<td>Until Compliance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vermont</td>
<td>Partial</td>
<td>Until Compliance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Virginia</td>
<td>Full</td>
<td>1 month, or Until Compliance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Washington</td>
<td>Partial</td>
<td>Until Compliance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Virginia</td>
<td>Partial</td>
<td>3 months</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wisconsin</td>
<td>Full or Partial</td>
<td>Until Compliance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wyoming</td>
<td>Full</td>
<td>Until Compliance</td>
</tr>
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</table>


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