INTERNATIONAL OPPORTUNITY AND DOMESTIC POLICY CONSENSUS:

THE CASE OF U.S. MISSILE DEFENSE

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This study examines U.S. policy toward missile defense (MD) focusing both on the international opportunities opened up for the U.S. after the Cold War and on the variation of domestic policy consensus at the governmental level that influenced the actual decision making regarding the deployment of the current MD system.

Based on the insights of offensive realism, this study argues that the U.S.’s pursuit of MD is related to U.S. strategic calculations motivated by systemic incentives and opportunities. This study also addresses how domestic policy consensus played an important role in determining the timing and nature of the decision toward the deployment of the current MD.

By comparing the U.S.’s different policy paths under the Clinton and the Bush administrations, and analyzing U.S. experiences with MD during the Cold War, this study
concludes that the U.S. is about to deploy an MD system because it has power and resources to pursue strategic advantages, not because a new threat enforces the deployment of the system on it. Facing no peer competitor who can directly challenge U.S. exploitation of international opportunities, the U.S. began the active deployment of the system only after the effective veto dissolved by way of the Republican full control over both executive and legislative branches.

In other words, international opportunities and domestic policy consensus have been the main determining factors shaping the policy outcomes regarding the current MD. While international opportunities gave the U.S. a strong incentive to pursue MD as an additional power component, policy consensus at the governmental level enabled the U.S. to mobilize domestic resources for the power pursuit.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

This study asks two related questions: First, why does the United States pursue missile defense (MD)? This study argues that the projected MD has to do with international opportunities for the U.S. and its strategic considerations to utilize those opportunities. Second, if the international opportunities influence development of MD, why has the U.S.’s pursuit of MD after the Cold War unfolded differently despite the unchanging conditions? This study argues that the actual decision process toward the deployment of MD has been heavily influenced by policy consensus at the governmental level, which represents a state’s capability for domestic resource mobilization.

1 The name of U.S. anti-ballistic missile defense systems has changed depending on the expressed importance of the systems’ strategic, technological, or domestic political contexts. For example, anti-ballistic missile (ABM), ballistic missile defense (BMD), national missile defense (NMD), and missile defense (MD)—even the strategic defense initiative (SDI)—may actually mean the same system. In the 1990s, NMD was normally used to distinguish it from theater missile defense (TMD). Now MD is a common name for such capabilities. I use MD to mean missile defense for U.S. territory in the entire study except for either differentiating it from TMD or quoting other studies and documents.
To answer these questions, this study, based on the insights of offensive realism, shows how the U.S.’s pursuit of MD relates to its broad strategic calculations motivated by systemic incentives and opportunities. It also addresses how domestic policy consensus played an important role in determining the timing and nature of the decision toward the deployment of the current MD system by comparing the U.S.’s different policy paths under the Clinton and the Bush administrations.

I conclude that the United States is about to deploy the system because it has power and resources to do so, not because a new threat enforces the deployment of the system on it. Facing no peer competitor who can directly challenge U.S. exploitation of international opportunities, the U.S. began the active deployment of the system only after the effective domestic veto dissolved by way of the Republican full control over both executive and legislative branches. In other words, international opportunities and domestic policy consensus have been the main determining factors shaping the policy outcome regarding the current MD.

The remainder of this introduction addresses the questions in more detail, discusses the literature and the existing explanations of the questions, and presents the method for and organization of the study.
1.1 Research Questions

U.S. MD is an issue of theoretical importance as well as of policy relevance. However, the issue has been under-examined. The existing international relations (IR) literature has not fully addressed the issue in a theoretical sense.\(^2\) Since it has been largely considered a policy issue dealing with a clear problem and a straightforward solution to the problem—that is, countering rogue states’ ballistic missiles—questions have been raised mainly regarding the feasibility, costs, benefits and risks of MD. Yet MD is one of the most significant strategic challenges for other great powers to respond to in the coming years, after the probable conclusion of the U.S.-led war on terrorism. Therefore, the issue deserves more attention from IR scholarship.\(^3\)

In addition to this strategic importance and lack of attention, U.S. MD has merit as a case study. Unlike many other big questions in political science, which lack enough


\(^3\) As Glaser and Fetter note, U.S. MD is not just a national security issue, but is inevitably related to strategic relationships between the U.S. and its competitors like Russia and China. See Glaser and Fetter (2001), p. 40.
cases to generalize on, the U.S. history of pursuing a series of MD systems makes some
ground for comparison across cases available. However, due to some limitation in
constructing a rigorous model to examine all the cases in a coherent way, I do not deal
with all the previous U.S. MD efforts with similar emphases and weights in this study.4
Instead, I use U.S. MD efforts during the Cold War as background information for my
study.5

As indicated above, throughout the nuclear age, the United States tried to evade
fear of a nuclear attack. MD has been understood as one of the security measures to
guarantee U.S. survival in the event of nuclear exchange. Now the Cold War is over, as is
the strategic nuclear threat embedded in the Cold War structure of the international
system. However, the United States still pursues missile defense. Why?

Existing explanations do not provide satisfactory accounts for the U.S.’s quest of
missile defense after the Cold War. Some of the explanations at the domestic level offer
relatively rich descriptions of the political processes toward MD but fail to address the
fact that international factors are the primary cause of a state’s military/security policy. In
contrast, the current Bush administration’s explanation insisting that new international
nuclear missile threats enforced the U.S.’s MD is empirically weak.

4 See the method discussion followed.

5 For details of case selection of the study, see discussions in the later section.
This study first addresses why the U.S. seeks missile defense based on the theoretical perspective of offensive realism and then compares different U.S. policy initiatives toward MD under the Clinton and Bush administrations. States, especially great powers, are compelled to maximize their power whenever possible to attain security. MD is one of the security measures that can give the U.S. a strategic advantage and thus maximize its power relative to others. Offensive realism best explains how those systemic opportunities lead to U.S. grand strategies that lay foundations for MD. However, as illustrated by the debate on the relevance of structural realism in explaining a state’s foreign policy, offensive realism could do well in producing more accurate explanations of states’ specific behaviors when supplemented by accounts of particular policy initiatives.6

In other words, the question should be rephrased as this: what are the conditions under which power maximization takes place? Looking at opportunities for the U.S. at both international and domestic levels will answer this question. International incentive in itself is not enough to shape a state’s specific policy; only when a state has a capacity to mobilize domestic resources for the policy, can the policy be implemented. To address the latter point, I ask why the Clinton administration deferred the decision to deploy MD and why the Bush administration made MD the bedrock of its national security policy,

6 This debate is introduced in chapter 2.
despite the similar (if not the same) systemic opportunities the two administrations witnessed. The main difference lies in the presence or absence of policy consensus for MD, and the policy consensus can be explained by the governmental structure and the relationship between the executive branch and Congress at the time.

1.2 Literature Review

In the research done on the MD issue, a range of explanations both at the domestic level and the international level already exist. First, regarding the motive of the U.S., the current Bush administration’s rationale for MD based on an international level explanation is one of the influential arguments, which provides the basis for further studies. Second, the “pros and cons” of MD has been the subject of various analyses in the U.S. policy community. This policy debate shares the same assumption about the international threats with the Bush administration’s rationale. However, it does not address the international threats themselves and offers a limited understanding of the dynamics of MD. Finally, most criticisms of the Bush administration’s rationale and alternative explanations of MD advance their arguments mainly based on the analyses at the domestic level.

The Bush administration’s rationale is that the present MD of the U.S. is a defense against new threats posed by nuclear missile developments in states of concern (SOCs)
and/or possible acquisition and use of missiles by other groups. In IR literature, more often than not, external threats are assumed to play an important role in bringing on states’ substantial policy choices, usually in the form of a military build-up or alliance commitment. Countering opposing power concentrations or threats is assumed to be a natural behavior of a state under international anarchy.

As such, the Bush administration has asserted that the U.S. must have a defense against long-range missiles for two reasons. First, there is a great likelihood that several states will attempt to attack the U.S. by long-range missiles. Second, the U.S. currently

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7 Although the administration does not talk about the theory behind this explanation, the assumption and the reasoning of it are very close to those of defensive realism discussed later, and I define this explanation as the threat argument.

8 Emphasizing states’ motives to respond to external factors has been common in IR theory, especially in neorealism. For example, for fear of others’ domination, states try to balance against others’ power by internal (own military build-up) or external (coalitions) means. For this, see Kenneth Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1979), chap. 8. Walt also suggests that states respond to security threats by making alliances. See Stephen M. Walt, *The Origins of Alliances* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987).

9 This was implicit before. For example, the *National Missile Defense Act of 1999*, which made MD the official policy of the U.S., asserts that an MD should defend the U.S. territory against limited ballistic missile attacks (whether accidental, unauthorized, or deliberate). It does not specify who the potential adversaries are. However, high officials in the current administration and the president himself have repeatedly remarked that a number of actors are the major concern because they are not deterred in a traditional way. For this, see Department of Defense, *Nuclear Posture Review of 2001*; White House, “Remarks by the President to Students and Faculty at National Defense University,” (May 1, 2001) (http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/05/20010501-10.html); and White House, *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America* (September 2002). For example, the speech of President
has no defense against such an attack. Actually, this threat comes from the conjecture that (even nuclear) deterrence does not work against the SOCs, considering their deviant characteristics. Since such states (actors) are not cost-sensitive like other normal states (actors), we cannot count on deterrence to avoid threats from them.\(^\text{10}\) Therefore, with

Bush emphasizes that, for those states, terror and blackmail are a way of life, so there is a great chance that they will use weapons of mass destruction against the U.S.

\(^{10}\) However, this “insensitivity” claim is not strong enough to support the whole argument about the irrelevance of nuclear deterrence. For example, Van Evera argues that Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) does not work under certain conditions, among others, if aggressor states are not cost-sensitive in terms of their citizens’ lives and property. For this, see Stephen Van Evera, *Causes of War: Power and the Roots of Conflict* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1999), pp. 247-249. He cites some examples of governments insensitive to their nations’ suffering, including the mass killing under Stalin and Pol Pot, and the war initiation by Hitler and Saddam Hussein, etc. However, whereas there is no reason to believe that they were sensitive to their peoples’ suffering in those cases—in other words, there was little consideration regarding domestic costs—it does not follow that the same would apply to nuclear deterrence case—in other words, there is little benefit for destructive actions in contrast. In fact, as Van Evera also admits, nuclear deterrence makes conquest nearly impossible and erases first-strike advantages and windows of opportunity. Therefore, regardless of whether or not leaders care about their domestic constituencies, there is little or no benefit to initiate a nuclear attack. In that regard, nuclear deterrence is still feasible. After all, in the arguments emphasizing the irrelevance of nuclear deterrence based on the characteristics of the SOCs, one thing is not clear. Why would those states strike the U.S. with ballistic missiles that are easily traceable, thus running the risk of the whole thing at a “very little or nothing” game? For this reason, Waltz argues that rulers in the SOCs are sensitive to costs just like other rulers; thus we cannot expect that those rulers would risk more danger (nuclear retaliation), which would destroy a country that they want to continue to rule. See Kenneth Waltz, *Peace, Stability, and Nuclear Weapons*, Policy Paper 15, University of California Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation (La Jolla, CA: IGCC, 1995), pp. 6-7.
their strong motivation to change the status quo, they may rely on nuclear threats or actually inflict a nuclear war.\textsuperscript{11}

This is a plausible argument, and it may be believed that SOCs’ threats actually affected the deployment of the current MD system.\textsuperscript{12} According to this reasoning, the system is simply a necessary defense for U.S. security in the changing world environment. It neither aims to change the status quo nor tries to expand U.S. power but is only a response to new threats. The argument seems to be supported by seemingly strong analyses and evidence: the Rumsfeld Report in 1998 discussed the U.S.’s concern and thus provided the basis for the argument; and North Korea’s Taepodong-1 test of the same year also appears to have buttressed the validity of the argument.\textsuperscript{13}

However, as will be discussed in detail later, a few critical holes—in terms of both theory and evidence—exist in this argument. First, the threats, especially capabilities

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{11} For this view, among others, see Robert Jervis, “The Political Effects of Nuclear Weapons: A Comment,” \textit{International Security}, Vol. 13, No. 2 (Fall 1988), pp. 80-90. He argues, “people who believe that a situation is intolerable feel strong psychological pressures to conclude that it can be changed.” See ibid., p. 89.

  \item \textsuperscript{12} Although I try to establish that U.S. primacy rather than countering international threats is the main motive behind U.S. MD, it is hard to exclude from the beginning a possibility of equifinality or multiple causality, which is common in many social phenomena. To check this, I examine the threat argument in detail in chapter 5. For a discussion of the issue of equifinality, see Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, \textit{Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences} (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2005), pp. 157-162.

  \item \textsuperscript{13} Details of these issues are discussed in length in chapter 5.
\end{itemize}
and intentions of actors who would possibly attack with long-range nuclear missiles, are asserted without scrutiny. Second, even after the above two incidents, actually there was no substantial change in the process toward MD until the Bush administration assertively began the deployment: the structure of the system, the basic plan, and the (estimated) budget level (for research and development and for overall system construction) remained the same,\(^{14}\) and only the deployment deadline was changed.\(^{15}\) Finally, the technology of the system under construction does not match the claimed threats. All these issues imply that the validity of international threats in explaining the current MD seriously weakens, and we need a better explanation other than one based only on the international threats.

Many policy analysts in the U.S. share the above assessment of SOCs’ unique characteristics and the danger associated with them. Therefore, there are few questions about the necessity of MD and much of the existing research and debate regarding MD


\(^{15}\) It was changed from “by 2003” to “as soon as is technologically possible”, and it is not clear which one means an earlier time. Although this change should be noted, it does not strongly support the threat argument because the notion of the deadline became vaguer after the incidents.
has narrowly focused on the issues of technical feasibility, domestic budgetary
implication, and the international community’s reactions to the system.\textsuperscript{16} For example, for opponents (or skeptics) of MD, the system is unwarranted, unworkable, and has negative effects on international peace and stability, thus eventually reducing U.S. security.\textsuperscript{17} For proponents, it is in the U.S.’s vital interest to deploy an MD as soon as possible to provide the U.S. full security (defense as well as deterrence) and foreign policy autonomy, avoiding coercion by the SOCs.\textsuperscript{18} Both sides in the debate make their


cases by dealing with MD as a solution to a well-defined policy problem. However, MD is an issue that cannot be confined to U.S. domestic policy considerations in terms of its importance and probable consequences. The narrow focus in the debate fails to address broader implications of U.S. MD in international relations, at best tells us an incomplete story, and may lead to an unanticipated policy outcome despite the wishful assessments in the policy debate. For example, in addition to possible arms races between the U.S. and its strategic adversaries (Russia and China), in theory, MD deployment may likely escalate regional conflicts to war during the course of action-reaction chains between the U.S. and its regional challengers.\(^{19}\) In other words, MD may be a counterproductive policy if its international implications are not fully considered.\(^{20}\) Therefore, taking international implications of MD seriously is not only a theoretical issue but also a significant policy issue.


\(^{20}\) Of course, this study neither argues that MD is a bad policy nor tries to prove it. The main point here is to describe why MD is inherently an international issue and how we can properly examine the dynamics behind MD based on this understanding.
This lack of attention to international factors is common in most criticisms of the Bush administration’s rationale for MD and alternative explanations of MD. Of course, a few studies try to incorporate technical aspects of MD into its strategic implications. For example, Cimbala argues that adding a defensive dimension to the already complex issues of nuclear crisis management, arms reductions, and force modernization simply complicates the issues. Since the relationship between the perceived or expected performance of MD and its actual capabilities is largely unknown, more subtle analyses of the friction between the two are required.\(^{21}\) Hentz also notes that since it is evident that U.S. MD is aimed at Chinese nuclear missiles, both a new arms race between the U.S. and China and the regional instability of North East Asia are likely. This situation does not contribute to carrying out U.S foreign policy interests in the region and throughout the world.\(^{22}\) However, these studies are limited in their scope and are not central to the debate, and most IR literature and policy analyses do not ponder these aspects of MD


seriously. Therefore, the mainstream explanations of MD are based on different domestic factors that can partially explain MD politics.\textsuperscript{23}

For example, Hartung and Ciarrocca explain the reemergence of MD as an influential security issue based on a military-industry complex model. Facing the cut in the military expenditure and the reduced governmental order for the military equipments after the Cold War, main military manufactures aggressively tried to expand their share. MD should be understood as a product of such efforts, they argue.\textsuperscript{24} Many others try to explain MD on the grounds of domestic politics.

Cirincione analyzes the MD debate based on partisan politics. During the 1990s, Republicans preempted the MD issue by making it the top priority in their national agenda, and MD politics was heavily influenced by a power struggle between the Republican Congress and the Democratic administration.\textsuperscript{25} Similarly, Nacht argues that the current MD debate was deeply affected by election politics in terms of the timing and


\textsuperscript{25} Cirincione (1997).
the nature of the debate.\textsuperscript{26} As implied by Cirincione and others, Republicans set MD as one of their main agendas before the 1994 election, and after Republicans won the election, MD took the center stage of national politics and security policy debate.\textsuperscript{27} Auerswald makes a case that congressional support has been crucial for the fate of MD systems in the past, emphasizing the importance of the relationship between the executive branch and Congress.\textsuperscript{28} Kubbig notes that MD politics should be understood as a result of the changing political climate in the U.S., in which conservative internationalism embraced MD and unilateral strategies as key national security policy, eventually dismantling the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty.\textsuperscript{29}

\textsuperscript{26} Michael Nacht, “The Politics: How Did We Get Here?” \textit{The Washington Quarterly}, Vol. 23, No. 3 (Summer 2000), pp. 87-94.

\textsuperscript{27} In fact, a Republican election agenda called “Contract with America 1994” proposed 8 major reforms for the U.S., requiring them to be immediately passed by the new Republican majority on the first day of the 104\textsuperscript{th} Congress. Thereafter, within the first 100 days of the 104\textsuperscript{th} Congress, 10 acts including missile defense were brought to the House Floor. Eventually, on March 21, 1996, Senate majority leader Robert Dole and House speaker Newt Gingrich introduced the \textit{Defend America Act}, mandating deployment by 2003 of a nationwide system of satellites, radars, and missile interceptors. After that, MD became a theme for the media.

\textsuperscript{28} David P. Auerswald, “The President, the Congress and American Missile Defense Policy,” \textit{Defence Studies}, Vol. 1, No. 2 (Summer 2001), pp. 57-82.

Some argue that, in association with politics, confidence in technological advances and readiness has played an important role in reviving MD debate.\textsuperscript{30} In other words, elite groups have always acknowledged the importance and feasibility of MD. When presented with evidence of technology, they take active roles in reinstating MD debate. Therefore, the current MD can be understood as a result of such endeavors. Although this per se cannot be a strong argument explaining diverse aspects of MD politics, it is also true that in the past, policy makers who spoke for MD were always confident about technological feasibility of MD. They were mostly sure of the envisioned MD systems’ technological success.\textsuperscript{31}

These explanations based on domestic factors have their own merits. They provide relatively rich descriptions of several aspects of MD politics. Actually, foreign policy studies try to consider various causes of policy decision at the same time. Allison and Zelikow note that many factors, including domestic ones, may simultaneously affect


\textsuperscript{31} For example, a simple retrieval of newspaper articles would produce plenty of information indicating such confidence existed in the past. However, this technological factor should be considered one of the several factors influencing the process toward MD, not the main cause. In the previous experiences, only after substantial research and development and tests were conducted, appeared technological feasibility on the table of policy agenda. Until then, technology alone had no dynamic to initiate MD discussions.
foreign policy. As Kurth puts it, there is always a possibility that many explanations exist for one military/foreign policy. That is, nearly any military policy can be explained not only by factors at the international systemic level, but also by factors at the domestic level. Because foreign/military policy implementations inevitably require domestic resource mobilization and extraction, domestic actors and interests should always be involved during the implementation process. In that sense, domestic explanations can contribute to improving our understanding of U.S. MD.

Therefore, the above studies actually deal with critical issues that question the Bush administration’s rationale and decision-making for MD. Many of them are partially justifiable, but they are addressed in isolation, thus incomplete. They are limited in their

32 For a discussion regarding the merits of domestic explanations of foreign policy, see Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow, *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis, 2nd Edition* (New York: Longman, 1999). The authors argue that one model alone cannot address all the critical aspects of foreign policy issues. They note that when one considers a causal explanation, s/he should identify major factors, “but for which the outcome would not have occurred, or would have been materially different (emphasis authors’),” quote at p. 383.


34 Both Allison and Zelikow and Kurth are based on an assumption that those different explanations for a policy are competing against each other and thus telling a different story. However, there is no need to separate those explanations as competing. Put together, they may be complementary and can
ability to explain states’ basic motivation in taking security initiatives. They fail to address the fact that international factors are the primary cause of a state’s military/security policy. Therefore, they are misguided lack of proper attention to the international factors that constitute background conditions for the policy choice.

In sum, the existing explanations of MD have three shortfalls: first, overall they do not adequately address the theoretical meaning of U.S. MD and its international implications; second, international level explanations—the Bush administration’s explanation in particular—are empirically weak;\(^\text{35}\) and finally, despite their rich narrations, the explanations mainly based on domestic factors are isolated and provide partial accounts at best. For these reasons, this study aims at making a theoretically informed but empirically rich, and thus better, explanation of MD than the existing ones. Of course, in doing so, this study does not try to falsify all the existing explanations. However, since the Bush administration’s rationale is the strongest argument for MD that constitutes a basis of other policy analyses, it is juxtaposed with my explanation, and a more thorough discussion on the rationale is provided in the chapter 5 case study.

\(^{35}\) In chapter 5, I will address this issue in detail.
1.3 Method

To answer the questions I ask, I adopt several case studies methods. Since I expect to see different values on my research variables for two cases with semi-controlled conditions, and my main focus is to explain the relationship between the variables across the cases, case studies methods are appropriate.

First, by a method of controlled comparison, I examine similarities and differences in the relations among international incentives, domestic security policy consensus, and interests of the U.S. under the Clinton and Bush administrations. Second, however, it is methodologically unfeasible for a researcher to do a strict controlled comparison, which compares two or more instances of a well-specified phenomenon that are similar to each other in every aspect but one. Therefore, I also use another within-case analysis method, process tracing, to check whether the consistency I find for the


37 For the definition and limitation of a strictly controlled comparison, see George and Bennett (2005), pp. 151-153.
cases is spurious or causal. Finally, to test the threat argument I try to rebut, I use a kind of “before-after design.” A combination of a before-and-after design and process tracing can help focus on “whether the variable of interest was causally linked to any change in outcome.” This enables me to examine whether the threat was causally related to U.S. MD. The importance of “theory-oriented process tracing” exists here.

With the help of the process tracing method, offensive realism can better identify the causal process of the relationship between the international incentives for the U.S. and the outcome of the U.S.’s varied interests in MD.

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38 Process tracing is defined as a “procedure for identifying steps in a causal process leading to the outcome of a given dependent variable of a particular case in a particular historical context.” See ibid., p. 176. For the usefulness of process tracing, see ibid., p. 201.

39 George and Bennett suggest that the before-after research design is a quasi-experiment that enables researchers to “identify a ‘before-after’ configuration within the sequential development of a longitudinal case.” See ibid., p. 166.

40 Ibid., p. 221.

41 Ibid., p. 206.

42 Similar argument is addressed on the relevance of neorealism and its application as an analytical tool for German foreign policy by Rainer Baumann, Volker Rittberger, and Wolfgang Wagner, “Neorealist Foreign Policy Theory,” in Rittberger, ed., German Foreign Policy Since Unification: Theories and Case Studies (New York: Manchester University Press, 2001), chap. 3.
1.4 Organization

The organization of the study is as follows. In chapter 2, I will address the theoretical necessity of investigating factors at both international and domestic levels to examine U.S. MD. I propose a two-level approach and demonstrate how the approach confirms the neorealist theory of foreign policy.

In chapter 3, as background information, I will observe the history of U.S. MD that preceded the two cases of this study. This history reveals solid consistency in the relationship between my research variables. This consistency enables me to draw some patterns from the relationship. However, I do not claim this to be another study case for the entire argument for a theoretical reason. Ironically, the consistency of the two variables allows only little room for a controlled comparison. It is true that the U.S. constantly sought for international opportunities, and that the policy consensus institutionalized by way of the executive dominance in the early Cold War period did not experience any drastic shifts. As a result, there were continual attempts by the U.S. to attain MD capabilities. These conditions might support the main claim of the study that the U.S. attempt to have MD is supported by international incentives and domestic policy consensus. However, a few instances of lowered U.S. interest in MD involved the issue

43 Although there existed an intense competition over strategic advantages, the U.S. was never in a weak position vis-à-vis its adversaries during the Cold War. In addition, there were no domestic veto players effectively acting most of the time during the Cold War.
of technical feasibility, and this issue affected the fate of MD programs, eventually leading to the cancellation of some of the programs during the Cold War. In other words, while both international incentives and domestic policy consensus variables remained constant, technical feasibility as another variable had an impact on the policy outcome for MD during the Cold War. Since I do not employ technical feasibility as an independent variable for the other cases, this different dynamic keeps me from carrying out a meaningful controlled comparison.

Notwithstanding, the cases are worth reviewing because U.S. MD efforts during the Clinton and Bush administrations have many characteristics in common with U.S. MD pursuit during the Cold War. For this reason, I use the history of this period as an analogy, not another case study for comparison. Toward this end, I illustrate the early preparation of MD, including Nike-Zeus through the Reagan SDI program. Nike-Zeus was one of the first U.S. efforts whose objective was to develop long-range defenses against ballistic missiles. It was canceled in 1961 and replaced by Nike-X; Sentinel succeeded to Nike-X in 1967, and finally it was renamed Safeguard. The Reagan administration revitalized U.S. effort to obtain MD capabilities in the name of the SDI.

44 In contrast, as discussed below, technical feasibility has not been a salient issue beyond political rhetoric so far for the current MD debate. Although the Clinton administration included the issue of technical feasibility as one of the criteria to decide whether or not deploy an MD system, it simply represents normal policy consideration based on the cost-effective logic, not a specific and serious concern.
Most instances show consistent high interest in MD, but there was a few instances of lowered interest, too. The cancellation of the Safeguard system, the U.S.’s agreement on the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, and the termination of the SDI were largely associated with the issues of technical feasibility. From Nike-Zeus to Safeguard, U.S. MD attempts were characterized by a series of adjustments to technical problems faced. However, overall, before the U.S. signed the ABM Treaty in 1972, the U.S. demonstrated relatively high interest in MD capabilities. Regardless of the administrations and their party affiliation, there always existed strong interest in MD. Yet after Safeguard was completely closed in 1978, it was not until President Reagan’s surprising television address announcing the U.S.’s preparation of “Star Wars” that missile defenses became an issue again. The strong domestic support for the SDI declined when technological development was far slower than expected, and some of the main elements of the system

proved to be impossible to achieve. Therefore by 1987, most of the unpromising technologies of the SDI lost their budgetary support.46

In chapters 4 and 5, I conduct main case studies for the two cases. I intentionally select and construct the two cases in order to have controlled conditions for the research variable, U.S. interests in MD.47 To avoid possible confusion, it should be noted that this does not induce the famous “selection bias” problem by selecting on the dependent variable. At least, since I have variation in the dependent variable, a serious selection bias of that kind can be avoided.48 In other words, as Collier and Mahoney note, since truncation, which resulted from the selection of cases that have extreme values on the


47 According to George and Bennett, cases should be chosen “to provide the kind of control and variation required by research design.” See George and Bennett (2005), p. 83.

dependent variables, is not the issue for my study, my selection of cases is relatively free from the problem.\textsuperscript{49}

I compare the U.S.’s ambiguous groundwork for MD in the Clinton administration and the current Bush administration’s active pursuit of MD, each being a low interest case and a high interest case, in chapters 4 and 5, respectively. In the 1990s, the former president Clinton was reluctant to build a missile defense. However, facing a strong Republican push for an MD, the Clinton administration moved to diffuse political opposition by agreeing to increase the research and development funding for an MD. In the passage, Clinton once vetoed the \textit{National Missile Defense Act of 1997}, which Congress passed mandating deployment of an MD system by 2003, arguing that there was no threat justifying MD deployment. Although Clinton eventually signed the \textit{National Missile Defense Act of 1999}, which finally made MD the official U.S. policy, he deferred his decision for an actual deployment of the system. In contrast, backed by Congressional support, the current Bush administration made MD its essential security policy from the beginning.

In chapter 6, I conclude that this historical variance in the U.S.’s interests in MD systems deserves attention. My research shows that when U.S. interest in MD was high,  

\textsuperscript{49} Of course, in statistical analyses, truncation is the main issue to avoid and sometimes it is true for case studies. On this issue, see David Collier and James Mahoney, “Insights and Pitfalls: Selection Bias in Qualitative Research,” \textit{World Politics}, Vol. 49, No.1 (October 1997), pp. 56-91.
both domestic policy consensus and international incentives were present at the same
time. In other words, international incentives and domestic policy consensus have been
the two necessary conditions for U.S. MD. These two conditions enable us to roughly
predict the fate of the current MD. If international opportunities and incentives decline
for some reason, or domestic consensus for MD at the governmental level breaks down,
then U.S. policy toward MD will take a different path from the current one.\(^{50}\)

\(^{50}\) However, this is highly unlikely. First, internationally, the U.S.’s propitious position seems to
continue for a good while. Second, domestically, to change the status quo (currently, MD deployment), a
unanimous approval of all veto players (the administration and both Houses) is needed. Until the
Democratic Party takes full control of both branches, such a change in the status quo is impossible. A
landslide winning in both presidential and congressional elections has been very rare in U.S. politics.
In this chapter, the overall theoretical focus of the study is addressed. First, I will establish the theoretical necessity of investigating factors at both international and domestic levels to examine U.S. MD. I propose a two-level approach and demonstrate how this approach follows the tradition of neorealist theory of foreign policy, which I argue works best to study U.S. MD efforts. Second and relatedly, I argue that offensive realism as a theory that explains states’ imperatives to survive in international anarchy is best suited for capturing the international pressure for the U.S. and its motivation to pursue MD. Third, I will present domestic policy consensus as a theoretical as well as empirical construct in order to analyze the variations in U.S. policy toward MD at different times. I argue that combining offensive realism—as a main theoretical guide examining conditioning effects of international pressure—and domestic security policy consensus—as a variable to succinctly reveal domestic dynamics—can make a more complete description and comparison of U.S. policy toward MD possible.
2.1 Two-Level Approach

This study claims that the U.S. is about to deploy the MD system because international systemic incentives give the U.S. the opportunity for advantage, and at the same time the U.S. has the domestic resource mobilization capacity to utilize the opportunity. In more general terms, U.S. MD efforts are contingent upon the function of international advantages and domestic policy support for MD, instead of international threats or other purely domestic factors that are argued in other explanations.

I begin with offensive realism’s theoretical assumption that the desire to survive in anarchy encourages great powers to behave aggressively. Therefore, I establish that when the international balance of power favors the U.S., it has an incentive to acquire additional power to better ensure its security. MD is one component of how the U.S. enhances its security in the international system. However, the actual policy making for this choice is contingent upon how domestic consensus for the policy is obtained. Therefore, I also look at variance in domestic policy consensus as an indicator of U.S. domestic resource mobilization capacity.

Of course, this way of looking at both levels is not new. Many in the field of international relations and comparative politics have tried to investigate interactions between domestic and international factors in international relations and comparative politics. While there is still much room for improvement in this work to explain the
interactions in a systematic way—partly because of the complexity of the issues themselves or the breadth of factors to cover in explaining the issues at both levels—it is also true that many studies reflect this type of analysis. The subfield of foreign policy takes the center stage of the debate, and often we can draw a line between foreign policy studies based on their contrasting research foci. On the one hand, emphasis is given to the effects of domestic politics on the international relations of states. On the other hand, many have inquired into the impacts of international factors on domestic politics.

1 In this vein, efforts of a group of scholars deserve attention, although they are not the main focus of this study. They establish another level between the international and domestic levels not reducible to either of them. They note that after the Cold War, many of the U.S. foreign policy issues became “intermestic,” meaning that domestic interests are intermingled with international issues in analytically inseparable ways. In other words, Congress and other U.S. domestic actors became more involved in foreign policy making; their interests are not purely domestic; and power of agenda setting covers significant international and foreign policy issues. Due to this change, without understanding domestic politics of the U.S., we cannot properly observe U.S. external behavior, thus cannot properly understand international relations as an outcome of U.S. foreign policy. In a sense, they approach U.S. foreign policy in the opposite direction from neorealism. For a seminal work, see Bayless Manning, “The Congress, the Executive and Intermestic Affairs: Three Proposals,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 55, No. 2 (January 1977), pp. 306-324. For recent work, see, among others, Michael Minkenberg and Herbert Dittgen, eds., The American Impasse: U.S. Domestic and Foreign Policy After the Cold War (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1996), and James M. Scott, ed., After the End: Making U.S. Foreign Policy in the Post-Cold War World (Durham: Duke University Press, 1998). Some of the studies that employ this approach include Douglas C. Foyle, Counting the Public In: Presidents, Public Opinion, and Foreign Policy (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999), James M. Lindsay, Congress and the Politics of U.S. Foreign Policy (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994); and Warren B. Strobel, Late-Breaking Foreign Policy: The News Media’s Influence on Peace Operations (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Institute of Peace Press, 1997).

A methodological sophistication in this line was Putnam’s two-level games logic.\(^4\)

It acknowledges a certain role for national governments between the domestic and international interests, mediating between them in ways not reducible to one or the other.

Studies follow the same or similar logic, emphasizing that single-level analyses may not


work well. Others also suggest the necessity to study interactions between domestic and international factors in a more coherent manner.

It should be noted that these studies mostly consist of critics of realism and concentrate on the issues of international political economy. There are a couple of reasons for this development. On the one hand, neorealism has been blamed for excluding domestic factors in its theory building. On the other hand, the security studies field in particular, in which neorealism has been the dominant paradigm, often tends to follow the neorealist way of theorizing. It is true that neorealism’s first-order emphasis is given to international factors, and the emphasis is driven by its objective to gain theoretical parsimony and generalizability. However, in response to the challenges raised against its indeterministic predictions and explanations in return for the theoretical merits, neorealism has also contributed to the two-level approach debate in two ways.

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First, there is a discussion regarding the question of whether neorealism can be used to explain the foreign policy of a state, not international aggregate outcomes of states’ foreign policies. Some neorealists’ ambition to improve theoretical precision and causality in explaining real world politics motivated this questioning. Of course, Waltz insists that a theory of international politics and a theory of foreign policy be distinguished. As the founder of neorealism, he actually argues that neorealism is not relevant for explaining states’ foreign policy. For him, the theory of international politics explains “why states similarly placed behave similarly despite their internal differences,” and the theory of foreign policy explains “why states similarly placed in a system behave in different ways.” Taliaferro makes a similar distinction between theories of international politics (neorealism) and theories of foreign policy (neoclassical realism) based on the idea that they are different in their dependent variables. However, this

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exclusive characterization of neorealism seems to have been far from satisfactory in both practical and theoretical terms.

On the one hand, often IR theories should take into consideration (strong) states’ foreign policy and explain them because of the policy’s broad international implications. In a sense, it is more likely that many of the actual world events involve both individual states’ policies and the interactions between them in analytically inseparable manners.  

In addition, as Smith puts it, realism “has demonstrated a willingness to engage the controversial issues of contemporary foreign policy.” Due to the realism’s traditional engagement in controversial issues, challenges against neorealism tend to be directed at neorealism’s (in)effectiveness in explaining controversial contemporary foreign policy issues regardless of its probable theoretical suggestions and anticipated limitations.  

10 As Taliaferro also admits, the distinction between theory of international politics and theory of foreign policy in this way is more of a continuum rather than dichotomy. See ibid.


12 Adding to this challenge, there might be a tendency to believe that (neo)realism dictates states’ behavior regarding controversial issues. This is a plausible speculation in the sense that controversial issues are likely to unfold as realism predicts. For a discussion of such realism’s self-fulfilling prophecy, see Alexander Wendt, “Anarchy is What States Make of It: the Social Construction of Power Politics,” International Organization, Vol. 46, No. 2 (Spring 1992), pp. 391-425. However, this is a problematic understanding of neorealism as a theory. Although strong actors’ (or their aides) beliefs based on the realist perspective may have great impacts on how the issues are unfolded, this is not always the case. Realism as an analytical perspective recognizes the competition among states, but it does not necessarily approve the situation. Therefore, the above speculation may lead to an unnecessary misjudgment of realism. For this
this regard, the debate reflects the concern that when one attempts to employ neorealism as a theory of foreign policy, it often lacks precise operationalization “that permits case-specific rather than general probabilistic prediction of outcome for each of the cases examined.”

Second, coupled with this debate, some neorealist studies have tried to synthesize factors at both levels and establish a more accurate theory of foreign policy. They incorporate domestic politics as another key variable in their research by looking into the “black box” they hold constant for a good while. They share the expectation that a realist theory of state action that bridges domestic and international politics is possible.


13 George and Bennett (2005), p. 203.


15 Mastanduno, Lake, and Ikenberry (1989)
They believe that “those approaches that seek to integrate domestic political variables in order to generate consistent theories of foreign policy hold the greatest promise for further expansions of realism.” Of course, the progressivity of neorealism in this way is not without question. 

Notwithstanding, as the recent call for a middle range theory suggests, there is a need (for policymaking purposes or the effectiveness of a theory itself) for “well specified conditional generalizations of more limited scope.” International relations scholarship should engage to some extent in the refinement of theory in this direction in order to produce solid knowledge of real world problems. For example, a current


18 George and Bennett (2005), p. 266.

variant in the neorealist tradition, defensive realism, employs domestic variables—such as leaders’ perception or domestic power components—as another main explanatory construct in order to explain the link between systemic imperatives and states’ responses to them. Another recent variant, neoclassical realism, also tries to incorporate domestic factors in a systematic way. It looks at the ways in which states interpret international

and the importance of domestic factors is not theory in itself. That is, adding domestic complication does not improve our understanding of the world in theoretical terms; it only lets us know more about the specific case. Overall, these scholars prefer formal theorizing to empiricism. For a critical review of formal theory in security studies, see Stephen M. Walt, “Rigor or Rigor Mortis? Rational Choice and Security Studies,” International Security, Vol. 23, No. 4 (Spring 1999), pp. 5-48. Walt explicitly argues that the actual value of a theory is found in “its ability to explain real events in the real world.” See ibid, p. 31.


uncertainties and how systemic pressures are actually translated into decision-making. Although these two approaches differ in their assumptions about states’ general behavior with regard to security—for defensive realism, status quo states, and for neoclassical realism, opportunist states—between them a commonality of including domestic variables in their analyses exists.

This study takes a similar strategy. I build on the second-image reversed tradition to capture the primacy of international factors in making security policy. Employing offensive realism as a main theoretical guide, this study first examines

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23 Although there are some variants within the neorealist tradition as I use them here, and they have different emphases in their assumptions and predictions, the distinction among them is often murky. We may see various names such as defensive, offensive, neoclassical, contingent, specific, generalist, formal, and functional realism used sometimes with differentiation among them and other times in an interchangeable fashion. For a brief review of the studies under the different names, see Glenn H. Snyder, “Mearsheimer’s World: Offensive Realism and the Struggle for Security,” International Security, Vol. 27, No. 1 (Summer 2002), pp. 149-150, fn. 2-5. Finel also proposes a distinction between “formal” and “functional” realism. See Finel (2001/2), p. 189. Actually, some of the neoclassical realist studies are assumed to belong to offensive realism because of the similarity in their assumptions and predictions regarding states’ behavior with offensive realism. For example, many see Zakaria as an offensive realist, but according to Rose (1998), he is a representative neoclassical realist. Notwithstanding, for convenience, I categorize studies in the neorealist tradition into three groups: defensive realism, neoclassical realism, and offensive realism, the last being the primary theoretical basis for the study.

24 Keohane and Milner’s study is a good example in the sense that it emphasizes the profound effects of international factors on domestic politics, while acknowledging the forms that these effects take vary cross-nationally due to different institutional as well as domestic conditions. See Keohane and Milner (1996), p. 7.
conditioning effects of international incentives on the U.S. strategic choice. Second, domestic security policy consensus is taken as a single variable between international and domestic pressures succinctly signifying various domestic factors influencing U.S. policy toward MD.25

2.2 Offensive Realism and the Pursuit of Advantage

Offensive realism is the primary theory for this study.26 It says that states act opportunistically to seek more power internationally. Whenever possible—when they have the opportunities for more power and the benefits outweigh the costs for the power—they seek more power by acting aggressively toward other states. Basically this behavior depicts states’ imperatives (although in a pessimistic fashion) to survive in

25 For the reasons and justification of this variable, and the difference of this from defensive/neoclassical realism’s usage of domestic variables, see discussions in the following section.

international anarchy. Of course, this international pressure for states (or the primacy of international factors in security policy) has been consistently noted by realist scholars.\textsuperscript{27} Due to this external influence (although this influence may not be totally determinant), we cannot properly understand a state’s foreign policy decision without examining external conditions for the decision.\textsuperscript{28} Following this line of reasoning that emphasizes the primacy of international factors, offensive realism makes the case for power-maximizing behavior of states. This appropriately describes the basic motivation for the U.S. to pursue MD.

Offensive realism’s contention that states are enforced to maximize their power (mainly defined in terms of relative military capabilities) is based on five bedrock assumptions about important aspects of international politics.\textsuperscript{29} Because they fear each

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{28} Waltz notes, “each state arrives at policies and decides on actions according to its own internal processes, but its decisions are shaped by the very presence of other states as well as by interactions with them.” See Waltz (1979), p. 65
  \item \textsuperscript{29} The five assumptions, which working together create strong incentives for great powers to act aggressively, are (1) the international system is anarchic; (2) great powers inherently possess some
\end{itemize}
other in the self-help world and understand that “the best way to ensure their survival is to be the most powerful state in the system,” states look for opportunities to change the balance of power in their favor. This is done by “acquiring additional increments of power at the expense of potential rivals.” Since all states are driven by this same logic, power competition is inevitable. This aggressive intention to pursue more power stops “only when hegemony is achieved.”

However, it is nearly impossible for a state to be a global hegemon, and actually there has never been a case for global hegemony. Therefore, the best outcome for a great power is to be the world’s only regional hegemon: first, it should become a regional hegemon; then, it should prevent other powers in other regions from dominating the regions. According to Mearsheimer, this is the current situation for the U.S. It is the

offensive military capability; (3) states can never be certain about other states’ intentions; (4) survival is the primary goal of great powers; and (5) great powers are rational actors. See Mearsheimer (2001), pp. 30-31.

30 Ibid., p. 33.

31 Ibid., p. 34.

32 Mearsheimer, following the discussion by Gilpin and Wohlforth, defines a hegemon as a state that can dominate all the other states in the system. For the discussion, see Gilpin (1981), p. 29 and Wohlforth (1993), pp. 12-14.

33 Mearsheimer (2001), p. 41. Mearsheimer argues that the stopping power of oceans is the critical impediment to world domination.
Western Hemisphere hegemon and there is no other regional hegemon in the world.\textsuperscript{34} Basically, this means that now is the time for the U.S. to act assertively.\textsuperscript{35}

In addition, as long as the perceived costs of offensive actions are outweighed by the expected benefits of the actions, states take offensive actions. This situation remains the same even when a great power has an advantage over its rivals. That state behaves more aggressively because it has the capability and the incentive to do so.\textsuperscript{36} Although some uncertainties remain as to how and whether other (great) powers respond to the U.S. decision to acquire a missile defense capability, the propitious moment for the U.S. came with the end of the dissolution of the Soviet Union. In this case, even the remaining uncertainties are a positive thing for the U.S., and actually no other states have yet responded to U.S. MD with substantial actions. MD can improve the U.S. strategic position a great deal in this situation.

\textsuperscript{34} Ibid., p. 42.

\textsuperscript{35} The Cold War situation was not much different from this. The U.S. was the only remaining super power intact after World War II. The U.S. capability of power projection defined thereafter was never in danger, although the Soviet Union was an effective challenger to the U.S. during the Cold War. For an excellent discussion on this issue, see Layne (2002/3). The only difference is that there was a (would-be) regional hegemon—the Soviet Union—during the Cold War, and now there is not. However, the Soviet Union back then was partly involved in competition with China. This made the Soviet Union’s position less impressive than presumed. Even now China is ready to strongly claim its regional position. Therefore, the international implication of MD now is not much different from that of the Cold War.

\textsuperscript{36} Ibid., p. 37.
In other words, now the international situation gives the U.S. a strong (maybe stronger than during the Cold War) incentive to acquire additional power elements to better ensure its security at a reasonable cost. With the existing strategic offensive and deterrent capabilities, a MD-backed U.S has no reason to worry about a worst-case scenario when considering policy options to address regional issues. This is a point to which other analyses have paid relatively little attention because of their lack of proper theoretical guide to address this issue. In contrast, this study explicitly maintains that understanding the strategic logic and probable impacts of MD is the key to examining the U.S. decision toward MD, and offensive realism is suited for capturing this dynamic.

Yet there still can be a reservation on the relevance of neorealism (offensive realism in this study) as a theory of foreign policy. My answer to the reservation would be that there is no definite reason to believe that neorealism cannot explain states’ foreign policy. Elman points out several neorealist attempts to make foreign policy predictions. He strongly argues that “neorealist theories can be employed as theories of

37 Allison and Zelikow’s classic study of foreign policy supports this thought. They note that in order to explain state behavior and foreign policy decisions, the goals and objectives of a state or government should be considered. Their model 1, which is based on the neorealist rational actor assumption, predicts that decision-makers react to threats and opportunities on the international scene by formulating a number of options and submitting them to a cost-benefit analysis. See Allison and Zelikow (1999).

38 His list of leading examples of neorealist work of foreign policy includes Thomas J. Christensen and Jack Snyder, “Chain Gangs and Passed Bucks: Predicting Alliance Patterns in Multipolarity,”
foreign policy.” \(^{39}\) In other words, the question of whether or not neorealist theories can be theories of foreign policy is different from the question of whether or not they are good theories of foreign policy. \(^{40}\) Theories of foreign policy may have systemic level independent variables, and neorealist theory is better for international level factors than any other theories of foreign policy. \(^{41}\) I follow this line of approach with initial emphasis on the influence of international systemic level factors upon states’ behavior and a supplement by the domestic security policy consensus variable.

Regarding this issue, Mearsheimer argues, “offensive realism can be used to explain both the foreign policy of individual states and international outcomes.” \(^{42}\) Since his offensive realism explains the basic motives of great powers and their general behaviors based on simple but persuasive assumptions, it seems that he makes the case for the above statement. However, as he admits, although anarchy and its effects on  


\(^{40}\) Ibid., p. 11.


\(^{42}\) Mearsheimer (2001), p. 422, n. 60.
states’ behaviors can help produce stylized and expected patterns for great powers’ behaviors, they cannot explain variations in states’ responses to systemic imperatives. Anarchy has been constant, and a constant cannot explain change.\textsuperscript{43} For this reason, in order to explain variations in U.S. policy toward MD under the Clinton and the Bush administrations, this study employs domestic security policy consensus as a variable standing for domestic politics affecting the U.S. decision toward MD.

2.3 Power Balance in Two Terms

To examine the relationship between international incentives for the U.S. and U.S. MD efforts, I review the balance of power between the U.S. and its rival (mainly the Soviet Union) in strategic terms. Since I take on the assumption of offensive realism that states act aggressively and try to acquire additional power increments when they are able to do so, a strategic relationship between competing states should be addressed in a conceivable way.\textsuperscript{44} The balance of power between the two countries reveals their

\textsuperscript{43} Ibid., p. 43.

\textsuperscript{44} The ability of states in this regard is determined based upon the resources—available to them and their strategic opponents, respectively—and those states’ calculations of the resources. Therefore, we have to look at not only what resources available to a state in what amount, but also how the opponents of the state could have responded with what resources. In other words, the ability of a state should be measured in relation to opponents’ ability in terms of reducing vulnerability of the state defined below.
conscious efforts to reduce their strategic vulnerability. To analyze the balance, we need to evaluate the competition in actual terms.

However, measuring the strategic balance between the two is not straightforward. Despite various approaches, the ways to assess the strategic balance between the two countries have always been disputed. In fact, some argue that either simply counting the number of strategic weapons or tracing trends in the balance of strategic weapons is not a good measure of strategic balance and strength due to the

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46 Here I employ the more narrow definition of power—the ability to influence others—rather than the more general definition of power—the influence to get another actor to do what it would not otherwise do. For a discussion of the general definition of power as influence, see Robert A. Dahl, *Modern Political Analysis 4th Edition* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1984). For a realist discussion of power as capability based on specific assets, see Mearsheimer (2001), chaps. 3-4.

47 As discussed earlier, I mainly focus on the strategic elements of power of the two countries. Therefore, I intentionally leave out other elements of power such as the sizes, levels of income, overall armed forces, population, and so forth.
unimaginably destructive nature of nuclear weapons. For a similar reason, even Mearsheimer emphasizes the importance of incorporating both strategy and material assets when making net assessments of power balance between two sides.

Notwithstanding, we can still use some (although rough) indicators to examine the balance of power between states if they are supplemented by discussions on states’ strategies to utilize material capabilities. Here I focus on two indicators that reveal states’ intentions and possibly constitute states’ strategic power—military expenditures and the development (or changes) of offensive nuclear weapons. Then, I relate the second indicator with strategies guiding the use of those weapons, addressing the relevance of MD in the context.

2.3.1 Military Expenditures

I use military expenditures both to examine states’ intentions to improve their strategic positions and to look at their material basis for strategic capabilities to carry out

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For example, see Michael Salman, Kevin J. Sullivan, and Stephen Van Evera, “Analysis or Propaganda? Measuring American Strategic Nuclear Capabilities, 1969-88,” in Lynn Eden and Steven E. Miller, eds., Nuclear Arguments: Understanding the Strategic Nuclear Arms and Arms Control Debates (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989), pp. 172-263. They argue that because of the existence of nuclear weapons, military strength should be evaluated by measuring the capacity of forces to execute a country’s strategy, not by counting the numbers or tracing the trends.

that task. As the well-known notion of the “trade between guns and butter” suggests, a wealthy country may usually spend more money on its military than others except for some extreme cases such as North Korea. Although a state’s wealth does not automatically constitute its military power, wealth is indispensable for the state’s military strength. Wealth is the basic resource to build states’ powerful military forces, and

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50 This holds true when we compare states’ military spending to their size of the overall economy. In general, there seems to be no big difference between the shares of military spending in gross national product (GNP) for developed and developing countries. For example, in 1999, the average share of military spending in GNP for developed countries was 2.3%, and for developing countries it was 2.7% (for a comparison, those were 4.8% and 4.1%, respectively, in 1989). However, due to the difference in the size of the overall economy, the average military expenditures per capita in 1999 were $517 for developed countries and $51 for developing countries (in 1989, $884 and $53 for each in 1999 constant). In contrast, in 1999 for North Korea, the share of military spending in GNP was 18.8%, and the military expenditure per capita was $199, both of which are extremely high compared to others with a similar size of GNP per capita. For example, in 1999, GNP per capita for North Korea ($1,060), Ecuador ($1,020), and Iraq ($1,030) were almost equivalent. However, in the same year, Ecuador and Iraq spent 3.7% and 5.5% of the GNP on their military, respectively. These are still higher than the average, but these two countries’ military expenditures per capita are $38 and $57, respectively, and seem usual in terms of their economic status. Therefore, North Korea should be one of the most extreme cases in terms of the relationship between wealth and military power of a country. For the figures in the above discussion, see U.S. Department of State, *World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers (WMEAT) 1999-2000* (2003), table 1 (http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/18739.pdf).

51 For example, due to its unique historical experience and institutional limitation, Japan has not maintained a huge military despite its excellent economic performances. Japan’s military expenditures have been continuously remained 1.0% of its annual GNP. Its economy is larger than those of China, Russia, and most of Western countries, but it has spent only (and required) a small portion of its economy on the military. Of course, Japan’s military is considered one of the several strongest in the world, not counting the U.S.
wealthy states can continuously modernize their weapons systems and other equipment and maintain the readiness of their forces.\textsuperscript{52}

One way to measure a state’s wealth is to observe its gross national product (GNP). With populations, GNP can be used to gauge the capacity of a state to generate military might.\textsuperscript{53} However, GNP does not necessarily expose states’ will and capacity to uphold strong military forces.\textsuperscript{54} In a word, states use their wealth for the military at varying degrees, which are determined by their strategic considerations and choices. In addition, a practical problem is associated with GNP, and this might be a methodological problem, too. Interpretations of historical GNP data are often controversial due to some problems associated with accuracy and consistency. Especially, there is no generally accepted data (or estimation) on Soviet national income and the dollar amount of the Soviet GNP (or GDP) during most of the Cold War. Due to both intentional Soviet secrecy on its defense burden and methodological uncertainties, assumptions, and extrapolations that Western calculations employed to analyze Soviet economic and

\textsuperscript{52} For a discussion of the relationship between a state’s wealth and military power, see Mearsheimer (2001), chap. 3. Other important studies include Gilpin (1981); Paul M. Kennedy, \textit{The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000} (New York: Random House, 1987); and A.F.K. Organski and Jacek Kugler, \textit{The War Ledger} (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980).

\textsuperscript{53} Mearsheimer (2001), p. 61.

\textsuperscript{54} For this, see the discussion in ibid., pp. 75-82.
military strength, most analyses of the Soviet data remain debatable. For these reasons combined, military expenditures are better than GNP alone at capturing strategic choices of states under varying circumstances and times, thus representing the power reality better.

2.3.2 Strategic Nuclear Weapons and Nuclear Strategies

It is evident that strategic forces have been one of the most central elements in the super power competition, and several MD attempts during the Cold War and thereafter should be understood in this context. However, as noted earlier, measuring strategic capabilities balance and analyzing the context of that balance are demanding. Accordingly, there was no authoritative method to assess the capabilities and balance of the capabilities, and different analysts employed static measures of weapon attributes or


56 As discussed earlier, still we cannot simply equate military expenditures with states’ military strength. We need other indicators such as information of weapons systems (in this case, strategic weapons) and strategies that guide the use of the weapons. However, the relative size of military expenditures of a state to either its socio-economic spending or other states’ military expenditures can show at least how seriously the state considers its military strength.
dynamic, scenario-specific measures of force effectiveness at their convenience depending on their research focus.\(^5\)

The difficulty signifies two important issues. First, the advent of nuclear weapons gave us the problem. We can quantify the offensive capabilities of both sides by counting up the number of weapons and identifying the specifications of the weapons. However, we may still have problems in assessing their balance. For example, both sides (i.e. the U.S. and the Soviet Union during the Cold War and later Russia) have maintained much more nuclear weapons than required to annihilate each other several times. It is complicated and makes little sense to compare the weapons’ capabilities beyond the threshold of total destruction in order to assess the balance of power between the two.\(^6\)

In this regard, the utility of military power as capability is also limited. Strategic weapons are still one of the best available elements for great powers, but the number of strategic weapons is a rough indicator of power at best.\(^7\) In other words, we should be careful not


\(^7\) In contrast to Brodie’s full acknowledgement of nuclear weapons, Paul argues that while nuclear weapons clearly have deterrent power with the threats of massive destruction, they have never been converted into significant compellent power; therefore, they are limited just like other conventional weapons. For this, see T.V. Paul, “Power, Influence, and Nuclear Weapons: A Reassessment,” in T.V. Paul,
to overemphasize the utility of power as capability in analyzing actual military competitions.60

Second, the purposeful drive of states to take advantage over their rivals makes measuring the balance between them more difficult. Insofar as they have resources to sustain the competition, it is unimaginable that they would withdraw from the competition. The Cold War competition between the U.S. and the Soviet Union confirms this idea. The two countries continued to devote a certain amount of their resources to developing military technologies and new weapons. As technology progressed, strategic power components in the two countries varied. Therefore, although we can trace back the numbers of weapons at specific times, the power balance between the two is not always measurable in precise terms. The variety of weapons and technologies equipped with the weapons need to be incorporated to measure the balance. Even with this precise information, we may not be able to know in what ways either side could influence the other with these weapons. After all, we should analyze the purpose of different weapons


60 This is in large part due to various functions military power can serve for states’ different objectives. In specific, strategic weapons have mainly served as deterrent power except the two cases of U.S. strike against Japan during World War II. Other elements of military power can serve states for other purposes. For a discussion of functions of military power, see Robert J. Art, “To What Ends Military Power?” International Security, Vol. 4, No. 4 (Spring 1980), pp. 4-35.
systems and their possible effects on the other. This can be done with examining the strategies and policies of the two countries against each other.\textsuperscript{61}

Because of this complexity of the issue, I do not intend to assess the capabilities and balance in absolute terms. Instead, I briefly show trends in the competition of ICBM developments in the context of overall strategic nuclear weapons. Then, with discussions of U.S. strategic policies and postures following, what the U.S. wants (wanted) to do, what the U.S. can do (could have actually done) with those capabilities, and the meaning of MD for those capabilities are addressed.

2.4 Domestic Policy Consensus

I use the domestic policy consensus variable to explain the different approaches toward MD under the Clinton and the Bush administrations despite the unchanging international opportunities for the U.S.\textsuperscript{62} As discussed earlier, domestic policy consensus

\textsuperscript{61} In line with this understanding, MD should be understood in the context of the U.S.’s strategies and policies that support its development. For example, if we simply focus on the current capability of MD, either Russia’s or China’s concern regarding MD is negligible because the currently deployed MD can intercept at best no more than 10 (maybe only several) incoming missiles. However, this conclusion is too hasty. As Lieber and Press (2006b) argue, if either combined with the U.S.’s effective preemptive strikes or in case Russia or China does not launch a majority of its ICBMs at once—due either to fear of an all-out war or to just some strategic reason—the current MD can play a very critical role in strategic senses.

\textsuperscript{62} Of course, I use this variable to review domestic political processes toward MD developments during the Cold War, too.
is assumed to play an important role in determining the actual policy shape of MD development. Although two recent variants of neorealism—defensive realism and neoclassical realism—utilize domestic variables in their framework for analysis, I do not follow either of the theory. The reason is as follows.

First of all, defensive realism is built on different theoretical logic from mine. It assumes that states are prone to the status quo and there is no reason for states to seek extra power aggressively: if states want additional power, then they must be under external threats to which they should respond. Therefore, defensive realism is on the opposite side of my assumption about states’ behavior. Second, defensive realism uses domestic variables arbitrarily by inserting auxiliary assumptions occasionally, thus making a systematic analysis incorporating them unfeasible. How those variables can

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64 For this reason, defensive realism accommodates the Bush administration’s rational for MD better than my explanation.

65 For defensive realists, national leaders’ perceptions of relative capabilities and the “fine-grained” structure of power are integral links between systemic imperatives and states’ foreign policies. For the importance of perception, see Robert Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976). For an explanation of “fine-grained” structure of power, see Van Evera (1999). In addition to these variables, Glaser, for example, takes another two domestic variables that influence the magnitude of the security dilemma: the extent of an adversary’s greed and the extent of
be used across cases is another question for defensive realism. By emphasizing the (independent) role of perception, defensive realism sometimes overlooks the fact that perceptions of threat are shaped by states’ relative material power. As a result, defensive realism’s first-order systemic argument does not account for much of the states’ actual behavior; therefore, auxiliary variables have to be introduced ad hoc to explain what is left unexplained by the systemic argument.

On the other hand, neoclassical realism’s use of domestic intervening variables—decision-makers’ perceptions and states’ national resource mobilization capacities—has

an adversary’s unit-level knowledge about the state’s motives. See Glaser (1997), p. 189. All these can be applied to specific cases, but not without investigating the auxiliary conditions.

66 In particular, the perception variable entails an analytical issue. One of the difficulties with leaders’ perceptions is that without all the detailed narratives of the event of interest, we do not know how this mis/perception variable interacts with systemic factors. In addition, it is hard to identify under what conditions actors either approximate to rational actors or misperceive systemic incentives and others’ intentions. So many factors can influence actors’ perceptions and assessments of others’ intentions and capabilities. Investigations based on the relationship between mis/perception and its consequences can be a good contribution to an understanding of understudied part of events. However, without rigorous conceptualization, explanations in this line may not be more than a good narration of the event. Actually, many of the explanations regarding mis/perception are given on the basis of post hoc interpretation of actors’ intentions. Overall we may still have to explain how leaders’ perceptions lead to actual policies. Without precise and full information, this cannot be done. For some of the outstanding works trying to systemically examine key events in international relations based on perception analyses, see, among others, Yuen Foong Khong, *Analogies at War: Korea, Munich, Dien Bien Phu, and the Vietnam Decisions of 1965* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992); and Rose McDermott, *Risk-Taking in International Politics: Prospect Theory in American Foreign Policy* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2001).

been far from satisfactory, too. Few studies have conceptualized the role of leaders’ perception for security policy on generalizable grounds. The national resource mobilization capacity—national political power or state power in specific terms—is also complicated to process. Although these concepts can provide rich descriptions of the relationship between states’ apparatus and the surrounding society, they simply make analyses more complex. The intuition is that states’ external behavior cannot be properly understood without analyzing their internal situation and capabilities. However, by using domestic variables, neoclassical realism loses theoretical parsimony and gains some richness at the expense of analytical clarity and convenience. The problem comes with

68 Neoclassical realism also suffers from problems with the perception variable. Most neoclassical realist works argue that relative material capabilities and perceptions of them have been the main factors to shape historical events. See Christensen (1996), Schweller (1998), Wohlfarth (1993), and Zakaria (1998). However, their emphases were mainly given to explaining how leaders’ misperception of the international situations led to undesirable outcomes rational actors might not want to seek. Since this misperception logic is their theory’s integral part, the burden to explain the following is on them: why those misperceptions occurred; when and under what conditions states (or their leaders) do not misperceive external conditions; and whether or not there is crisis or conflict without the misperception.

69 National political power is defined as the ability of state leaders to mobilize their nation’s human and material resources behind security policy initiatives. See Christensen (1996), p. 11. State power is defined as “portion of national power the government can extract for its purposes and reflects the ease with which central decision makers can achieve their ends.” See Zakaria (1998), p. 9.

70 For example, the power Christensen or Zakaria uses are continuous variables and may change over time. Therefore, we have to understand and define these variables by other factors making changes on these variables. Eventually, these additional factors do not tell us much about actual state policy choices and decisions. As a result, the research focus may become blurred with these additional factors included. Although the authors do not claim to build a general theory of foreign policy, this kind of idiosyncrasy
difficulty in constructing the link between different units (individuals, states’ apparatus, and states) of analysis in a single study. Multiple units of analysis—especially if a unit at the individual level is included—can hardly cope with realist assumptions that emphasize the role of states as the single and most important unit of analysis.

I argue that in studying foreign policy of a state, using the state as a single unit of analysis is possible and even recommended for analytical clarity because of its unique position between the domestic and international politics. Many of the domestic factors affecting a state’s security decision account for the decision indirectly, mainly representing parochial interests of some groups or particular governmental agencies. In contrast, some others would directly explain the decision as a more or less inclusive and autonomous action (autonomous from domestic society) that responds to external factors.

should be filtered through a clearer framework. We need variables that directly relate to states’ critical decisions.

constraints and incentives. Those factors in the latter category are better grasped with the state as the unit of analysis.

Therefore, I adopt domestic policy consensus as the variable to illustrate such a unique position of the state between the domestic and international politics. This policy consensus variable accommodates the state as a single unit of analysis. In other words, domestic policy consensus is a measure of a state’s capacity to mobilize domestic resources to cope with international constraints and incentives. I argue that if a state has policy consensus, then the state can implement controversial policies (high in domestic mobilizing costs) it cannot otherwise. I define domestic policy consensus mainly in terms of governmental structure and the relationship between the executives and the legislative body: a unified government or executive dominant government is assumed to possess domestic policy consensus.

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72 For a discussion of this issue, see Mastanduno, Lake, and Ikenberry (1989), pp. 458-459.

73 Conversely, the state can stop the existing notorious policy based on policy consensus, too.

74 For research purposes, I emphasize a unified government as the main source for policy consensus to compare the different approaches toward MD during the Clinton and Bush administrations. However, the second form of policy consensus also existed during the Cold War mainly in terms of the monopolization of critical information pertaining to MD by the executive branch. In some instances, Congress was not informed of what the military was doing. For example, during the missile gap debate in the late 1950s and thereafter, Congress was not provided with enough information to make a reasonable judgment on the situation. Only a small number of members in the executive branch shared the information. For this, see Fred Kaplan, The Wizards of Armageddon (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1983), pp. 161-168.
The above specification of domestic policy consensus has two implications for this study of U.S. MD. First, political institutions define the framework within which politics takes place. Therefore, institutional settings for U.S. MD can give us a clue of how domestic policy consensus was or was not achieved. Theoretically, some institutionalists argue that a presidential system has an inherent dual democratic legitimacy problem when the president and the congressional majority are in opposition with regard to policy. In line with this understanding, Haggard and McCubbins argue that “a political system’s decisiveness (its ability to make policy decisions) and its resoluteness (its ability to commit to established policy decisions)” depend on the

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76 The institutionalist approach in this kind has an advantage. It emphasizes institutional settings at the middle range that explicitly examine intermediate variables. This enables researchers to integrate an understanding of general patterns of political history with an explanation of the contingent nature of political and economic development without going deep into societal analyses beyond the capacity of a single study. For this, see Kathleen Thelen and Sven Steinmo, “Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Politics,” in Sven Steinmo, Kathleen Thelen, and Frank Longstreth, eds., *Structuring Politics: Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Analysis* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), p. 28.

effective number of vetoes in decision making. Since institutional veto power is guaranteed by definition, a presidential democracy is assumed to have some variations in establishing domestic policy consensus across issues depending on the nature and intensity of interests involved. In other words, in democracies, to initiate a public policy like MD, policy decisiveness should be achieved beforehand, and the policy decisiveness is attained mainly by an established policy consensus through proper dealing with possible vetoes.

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79 Of course, this discussion can extend to non-democracies. For example, even in non-democracies, all the critical decisions are not made solely by a dictator or ruler. She or he should satisfy many members of “selectorate” group that is defined as the set of people in a country who have input in the selection of the governmental leadership. By definition, they may have some veto powers similar in representative democracies. For some exemplary roles for selectorate groups in non-democracies, see Philip G. Roeder, Red Sunset: The Failure of Soviet Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993), pp. 24-27; Susan L. Shirk, The Political Logic of Economic Reform in China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), pp. 71-72.

80 The structural logic in the democratic peace literature takes a similar view. The argument is that institutional constraints in democracies—regular elections, separation of powers, and checks and balances—make it very hard for their leaders to go into war. Without spending a significant amount of time and resources in persuasion, formal approval—meaning domestic policy consensus—cannot be obtained. Even after that, the risk of electoral loss still remains. For the democratic peace argument in general, see, among others, Zeev Maoz and Bruce Russett, “Normative and Structural Causes of Democratic Peace, 1946-1986,” American Political Science Review, Vol. 87, No. 3 (September 1993), pp. 624-638; Bruce Russett, “The Democratic Peace: ‘And Yet It Moves’,” International Security, Vol. 19, No. 4 (Spring 1995), pp. 164-175; Bruce Russett, Grasping the Democratic Peace: Principles for a Post Cold War World (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993). On the structural argument of the democratic peace in
Second, in addition to this theoretical issue of institutional setting, changes in the balance of power between the executive and legislative branches influence U.S. MD politics. As assumed by institutionalists, as a democracy, the U.S. has a constitution that guarantees political struggles between governmental branches. In U.S. politics, based on this constitutional framework, it is assumed that “the separation of powers” or “checks and balances” restricts the monopolization of power by one side, and this is held true for foreign policy decision-making.


However, the history of the balance between executive and legislative branches over foreign policy has not always followed the constitutional design. For example, before the 1990s, the separation of powers was not typical in U.S. security policy. During the period, the dominance of the executives over security policy was common. The presidents in this period made broader claims for “constitutionally based” prerogative powers in security policy. The so-called “constitutionally based”

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prerogative power of the president was prevalent during most of the Cold War, and now is revitalized.\textsuperscript{87}

On the contrary, after the Cold War, more specifically after the Republican Party seized both Houses in 1994, congressional power recovered from a passive position in security policy. Since then until the current President Bush entered office, there had not been much consensus in security policy because of the increased voice from Congress. Now, under the current domestic political structure, we can say that there is security policy consensus (decisiveness and resoluteness) at least at the elite level due to the unified government.\textsuperscript{88}

In sum, I assume that U.S. foreign policy making is based on a separation of powers defined in terms of “the extent to which different components of government have the ability to exert influence through the exercise of a veto on the formation of

\textsuperscript{87} The concept of “constitutionally based” prerogative power of the executives over security policy is based on the recognized advantage of centralized executive foreign policymaking (CEFP). There are three major arguments for CEFP: national representation arguments, expertise arguments, and structural efficiency arguments. On these issues, see George (1996), pp. 59-61. As expected, the CEFP claim is very skeptical about the capacity of legislatures of democratic governments to carry out effective foreign policy, recalling Tocqueville’s remark in \textit{Democracy in America} that “in the control of society’s foreign affairs democratic governments do appear decidedly inferior to other.” Quoted in ibid., p. 57.

\textsuperscript{88} Examples are plenty. Several controversial security legislations and presidential directives have been addressed without any serious challenges in terms of veto, especially after 9/11.
public policy." Then, U.S. foreign policy decisiveness is largely explained by relations between governmental branches based on institutionally-induced veto power. I suggest that when the U.S. has domestic policy consensus, and therefore has policy decisiveness, it can implement controversial policies like MD that may entail considerable domestic costs because the consensus has already been obtained and the costs can be both justifiable and defensible. In other words, domestic policy consensus is the necessary condition for executing MD policy in the sense that the status quo (not having MD) can change only by a unanimous decision of all veto players. Since this condition has varied over time regarding MD, I emphasize the role of domestic policy consensus in the path toward MD.

89 Haggard and McCubbins (2001), p. 2. Actually we might have to add another dimension to the relationship, agenda-setting power, because the probability of a status quo change partly increases with a capacity for agenda-setting. Normally, agenda setting lies with the legislative body, but for security policy the importance of executive decrees for agenda setting has been another characteristic. On this issue, see George Tsebelis, Veto Players: How Political Institutions Work (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002), pp. 112-113. In this sense, because two branches have the equivalent chance to set a new agenda, actual decision-making is largely shaped by a veto power of one of the two branches.

90 In the U.S. system, the president and the two Houses are the institutional veto players. It follows that to change a status quo, a unanimous decision of all veto players is required. For a discussion on this, see Tsebelis (2002), chaps 1 and 2.

91 Or the same thing applies to cases of ending existing contentious policies.
Based on the discussion so far, in the following chapters, after I review the Cold War situations, I will conduct case studies to demonstrate how international pressure and domestic policy consensus have shaped the dynamic toward the current U.S. MD.
CHAPTER 3

COLD WAR LEGACIES

This study argues that U.S. missile defense (MD) should be reexamined beyond the widely-shared analysis that justifies it as an inevitable defense. Behind this understanding is traditionally popular reasoning. Regarding the division between offense and defense—or offensive and defensive weapons—conventional wisdom acknowledges that offense is bad (or rarely justified) and defense is good. Therefore, for example, intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) are bad and anti-ballistic missiles are good.\(^1\) In this regard, there should be no reason to critically reexamine U.S. MD.

However, as the shifting contexts for MD advocacy during the Cold War suggests, MD was sought in the U.S. for deliberate strategic reasons, not simply for defense.\(^2\) In other words, changing international or domestic political dynamics affected the fate of MD programs. Therefore, we have certain grounds for doubting whether the


\(^2\) Ibid., pp. 8-9.
“common sense” understanding of MD should be accepted without reservation. U.S. experiences with MD show an interesting dynamic.

Specifically, on the one hand, the U.S. first complete MD program—NIKE-ZEUS—against Soviet ICBMs, SENTINEL against Chinese ICBMs, and the current Bush program of MD against rogue states’ ICBMs, all were initiated before the identified opponents’ missile capabilities materialized. The research and development of NIKE-ZEUS began in 1956, but the Soviet Union did not have an ICBM capability until 1960, and even this force had been very tiny until the mid 1960s. China did not deploy its first DF-5 ICBM until 1981, but the U.S. was preparing for the weapon from the late 1960s. Finally, the North Korean nuclear ICBM program is under way, but it remains uncertain that North Korea would eventually proceed to acquire such a capability.


4 Of course, this kind of early preparation seems natural because a lead-time (of at least several years) is required to fully develop a functioning defense system. However, my point here is that this lead-time concern was not always directed toward early preparations. In other words, whether to prepare MD in advance or not is a matter of strategic choice, not totally a matter of necessity.
In contrast, the U.S. did not take any significant action against Chinese ICBMs after China deployed its first ICBMs, although the U.S. could easily cancel out the merit of ICBMs for China by building an effective MD system against them.\(^5\) In addition, despite the Soviet expansion of ICBM capabilities during the 1970s, the U.S. did not try to work out a defense against the force.\(^6\)

These combined experiences suggest that a simple description of the threat-reaction model may not adequately capture the dynamics behind actual courses toward the development of U.S. MD programs. In other words, MD projects during the Cold War were not limited in their anticipated outcomes, and their purposes should not be defined as unnecessarily narrow. They were designed to advance U.S. strategic advantage over its rivals. In this regard, they were the products of U.S. active strategic considerations, not those of passive defensive measures.

In this chapter, I will first show how the U.S. security posture during the Cold War and a series of MD projects were related. To examine the relationship, I will review the balance of power between the U.S. and its rival (mainly the Soviet Union) in strategic terms during the Cold War. This strategic relationship was the main source of reference

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\(^5\) Since then, China has maintained only about 20 DF-5 ICBMs until recently.

\(^6\) Part of the reason was related to the issue of technical feasibility. However, again, if MD had been really a matter of necessity, the U.S. should have taken more consistent positions regarding these developments.
when the U.S. considered the option of MD during the Cold War. Then I will describe
how the U.S. set up and modified its strategies looking for an advantage over its rival.
U.S. nuclear strategies and employment plans during the Cold War reveal that MD was
not just a defensive shield, but an instrument to reduce strategic vulnerability. It was
largely aimed at increasing the accomplishment of U.S. strategic objectives largely
defined in terms of offensive strike capabilities.

Second, I will discuss whether policy consensus at the governmental level
supported those MD projects by looking at the governmental structure and the power
relationship between the executive and legislative branches. Whether or not a specific
system was pursued or canceled was contingent upon the variations in domestic policy
consensus. In other words, to initiate or to cancel a system launching, the main veto
players (the executive branch and Congress) needed to develop a policy consensus. I will
illustrate that administration changes and shifts in the U.S. governmental power structure
were closely related to the adoption or rejection of a specific MD project.

Finally, based on these analyses, I will suggest several implications (or patterns)
for the current MD policy. A series of MD systems were pursued for, and based on,
broader strategic reasons. Along with those strategic considerations, changes in domestic
policy consensus for MD played an important role in determining the fate of these
systems.
3.1 Power Balance and Security Posture for MD

Offensive realism argues that great powers consistently look for opportunities to change the status quo, and they usually take advantage of opportunities when they appear. During the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union continually engaged in tight arms races for supremacy, mostly in the form of strategic nuclear weapons competition. Of course, there is no doubt that since the beginning of the nuclear age, the U.S. has been the world’s most powerful nuclear state. However, its monopolization of nuclear capabilities lasted for a relatively short time. After its rival, the Soviet Union, acquired nuclear strike capabilities, the U.S. tried to determine how to insure its strategic nuclear advantage and to win nuclear war if necessary. MD programs

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during the Cold War were a component of U.S. nuclear strategy. Therefore, without taking U.S. strategic considerations into account, we cannot properly understand why the MD program was a recurring option for the U.S.

The U.S. nuclear strategy during the Cold War was based upon the guide of its grand strategy, and shaped the way in which its nuclear capabilities would be used. The U.S. grand strategy during the Cold War was: first to contain Soviet expansion, and second to fight and win war against the Soviet Union if necessary. Actually, for this purpose, the U.S. persistently tried to gain strategic superiority over the Soviet Union, and MD had to do with the latter part of U.S. grand strategy. It is evident that the main objective of U.S. MD was countering Soviet long-range nuclear missiles. What is not

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evident was that an MD system could be used either to save U.S. nuclear second-strike capabilities after a Soviet first-strike or to minimize U.S. damage by a Soviet retaliatory second strike after a U.S. first-strike.\(^\text{10}\)

In the following, I will review: first, the nature of the strategic balance between the U.S. and the Soviet Union during the Cold War; and second, how MD was a part of the U.S. grand strategy to improve the U.S.’s strategic position.

3.1.1 Prolonged Bipolarity

During the Cold War, there persisted a bipolarity in the international system, centering around the U.S. and the Soviet Union on each side.\(^\text{11}\) Of course, the bipolarity was never static, and often underwent some variations due to international dynamics as

\(^{10}\) This latter point that MD is associated with U.S. first-strike plans is hypothetically advanced in Lieber and Press (2006b), especially at p. 28. A first-strike capability generally refers to a state’s ability to hit its enemy by strategic weapons and thereby limit the enemy’s ability to retaliate to acceptable levels. A second-strike capability is a capacity of a state to absorb an enemy’s first-strike and inflict unacceptable damage on the enemy. Lieber and Press argue neither that the U.S. would actually launch a preemptive attack on Russia nor that the launch would succeed. Their point is that if the U.S. has an effective first-strike capability, even very limited MD can be powerful leverage over Russia. This is a plausible argument in that counterforce strike was the main pillar of U.S. nuclear strategy during the Cold War, and even after.

well as political, economic, and social changes within the two countries, although the bipolarity was preserved in structural terms during the period. Despite the variations, it is true that the U.S. and the Soviet Union were involved in an intense two-way competition to increase their relative power over each other for strategic advantage, thus maintaining the bipolar nature of the Cold War.

The main focus here is to discuss the two countries’ strategic competition that called for U.S. MD. However, as discussed in chapter 2, my objective in this chapter is limited. I mainly focus on showing that a consistency existed in the two states’ efforts to gain advantage over each other, by both increasing defense expenditures and developing and harnessing strategic nuclear weapons. This trend analysis—along with a discussion in the next part of U.S. strategies and nuclear weapons policies during the Cold War—leads to the point. First, a series of MD attempts during the Cold War were part of the U.S. broad objective to take strategic advantage over the Soviet Union, rather than being merely a defense shield in response to eminent missile threats from the opponent. Second, the current U.S. policy for MD should be understood by a similar reasoning, emphasizing

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12 For example, China’s opposition against the Soviet Union (and the U.S.) seemed to make the notion of bipolarity problematic at least temporarily, enabling a tripolarity argument. For aspects of tripolarity during the Cold War, see Ilpyong J. Kim, ed., Beyond the Strategic Triangle (New York: Paragon, 1992); Randall Schweller, Deadly Imbalances: Tripolarity and Hitler’s Strategy of World Conquest (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998); and Gerald Segal, The Great Power Triangle (New York: St. Martin’s, 1982)
the need for an understanding of the broad security posture and nuclear policies of the U.S.

3.1.2 Military Expenditures

What follows is a brief description of the changes in both U.S. and Soviet Union’s military expenditures during the Cold War. Those changes represent their conscious endeavors to cope with each other. For the first two decades of the Cold War, U.S. military spending took over half (53%) of total governmental expenditures on the annual average. The Soviet Union also spent an average of 6.9% of its net material product on the military from 1956 through 1974. And especially, from 1962 through 1975, the average annual Soviet military expenditure as a percentage of Soviet total national income was 16.8%. Overall, a unique trait of that competition was that the two superpowers remained by and large equal in the amount of money they spent on defense.

13 Of course, as the Cold War went by—in other words, the fear of an all-out war was normalized—the ratio of defense expenditure to total government spending dramatically decreased. For historical data on U.S. federal and defense expenditures, see Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), National Defense Budget Estimates for FY 2007 (March 2006) (http://www.dod.mil/comptroller/defbudget/fy2007/fy2007_greenbook.pdf).

Figure 3.1 below demonstrates that during the entire Cold War period, both the U.S. and the Soviet Union strove to take advantage over each other, spending a huge amount of money on their military. As seen in Figure 3.1, economic damages during World War II were far greater for the Soviet Union than the U.S. As a result, right after the war in 1946, the U.S. could spend five times more on its defense ($45 billion) than the Soviet Union could ($9 billion). However, the Soviet Union soon recovered from the damages and its economy grew rapidly to narrow the gap between the two superpowers’ economies.\textsuperscript{15} This economic recovery and continued growth allowed the Soviet Union to keep up with U.S. defense spending, even surpassing the U.S. in defense spending after the early 1970s. Although the Soviet GNP growth rates declined rapidly toward the end of the Cold War, the Soviet Union’s economic development was actually among the best in comparable cases.\textsuperscript{16}

\textsuperscript{15} Mearsheimer (2001), p. 73-74. For example, according to Mearsheimer’s estimations, of the total wealth of the two countries, the Soviet Union’s relative share in 1945 was 16 %, opposed to 84 % of the U.S.’s, and in 1965 it increased to 33 % vs. 67 %.

\textsuperscript{16} For factors pertaining to Soviet economic performances, see Gur Ofer, “Soviet Economic Growth: 1928-1985,” \textit{Journal of Economic Literature}, Vol. 25, No. 4 (December 1987), pp. 1767-1833. Between 1950-85, the Soviet average GNP growth rate was 4.3 %, and especially during 1950-60, it was 5.7 %. For a discussion of this trend, see ibid., p. 1777-1778. Ofer notes that along with international aspirations and fears, the urge to prove the superiority of socialism and the character of the leaders were among the main factors explaining Soviet high economic performances and patterns of behavior.
Two things should be noted here. On the one hand, although there were some rises and falls, the U.S. consistently allotted its economic resources to its military. During the entire Cold War period, the average ratio of defense expenditure to total government spending was almost 40%.

On the other hand, U.S. military expenditures remained at the same level from the Nixon administration through the Ford administration. During

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this period, there was no substantial increase in U.S. defense spending. Considering the fact that the U.S. was at war in Vietnam, this was quite unusual and is largely explained by domestic issues.\(^{18}\) As a result, since the early 1970s until the end of the Cold War, the Soviet’s annual defense spending was larger than that of the U.S. Especially, during the late 1970s, the Soviet Union was spending 50% more than the U.S. in annual defense expenditures.

However, this did not necessarily mean that the U.S. was weakening or neglecting the importance of the military and strategic forces during the period. As Figure 3.2 below shows, the military expenditure per person tells us a different story. In terms of this indicator, the gap between the U.S. and the Soviet Union steadily grew in favor of the U.S.\(^{19}\)

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\(^{19}\) Calculated from the *Correlates of War Dataset on Material Capabilities of States, 1816-2001, version 3.02*. 

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This implies that, since the 1970s, despite both the conventional wisdom regarding the failures of the U.S. administrations in keeping up with the Soviet Union in defense, and Soviet efforts to modernize its strategic weapons, the U.S. could actually secure enough money for its military. One of the factors explaining this development is that the number of U.S. military personnel was continuously reduced since the height of the Vietnam War in the late 1960s. In the meantime, the U.S. could use much more money for each of its military people than the Soviet Union could. For example, during
the 1970s, the U.S. annually spent $41,000 for each military person on the average, and
this was about $10,000 more than the Soviet Union’s spending.\textsuperscript{20}

This means that the U.S. military was better equipped and could have better
weapons during the period.\textsuperscript{21} As will be discussed in detail below, with this additional
money, the U.S. in fact doubled its deliverable strategic nuclear warheads.\textsuperscript{22} This increase
in strategic capabilities was guided by one of the U.S. military foci during the period,
which was to improve the survivability, endurance, responsiveness, and capacity of its
strategic forces.\textsuperscript{23} For example, the Nixon administration actually improved various
nuclear attack options by developing and launching MX missiles, Trident submarines and
missiles, B-1 bombers, short-range attack missile and cruise missiles.\textsuperscript{24} Along with these

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{20} Calculated from ibid. On the contrary, the Soviet Union had maintained its force numbers at the
  same level since the mid 1960s until the end of the Cold War. Therefore, the increased military budget
  level for the Soviet Union during the period was actually not very impressive.

  \item \textsuperscript{21} In terms of cumulative defense expenditures from 1945 on, the Soviet Union could catch up the
  U.S. total cumulative expenditure only in the early 1980s. For example, those figures in 1980 were $2,240
  billion for the U.S. and $2,230 billion (in current) for the Soviet Union, respectively. Thereafter, during the
  1980s, the Soviet cumulative defense expenditure remained larger than that of the U.S. For the source of
  this calculation, see ibid.

  \item \textsuperscript{22} In 1969, the number of total strategic nuclear warheads loaded was 5,962. In 1979, it increased
  to 11,088. See Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC), “U.S. Strategic Offensive Force Loadings”

  \item \textsuperscript{23} Desmond Ball, “United States Strategic Policy since 1945: Doctrine, Military-Technical

  \item \textsuperscript{24} Gray and Barlow (1985), p. 44.
\end{itemize}
weapons programs, the U.S. conducted more nuclear tests during this period than the
Soviet Union did.\textsuperscript{25} In addition, the U.S. maintained the same levels of expenditures for
nuclear weapons research, development, and testing as in the previous period.\textsuperscript{26}

As a result, cumulatively since 1945 through 1990, the U.S. spent $409 billion (in
constant 1996 dollars) on building nuclear bombs. And the U.S. spent an additional
$3,241 billion on constructing nuclear weapons delivery systems between 1945 and
1996.\textsuperscript{27} In contrast, during the same period, the U.S. spent about $100 billion (in constant
1996 dollars) on developing a series of MD programs.\textsuperscript{28} This contrast, in terms of the
money spent, does not necessarily mean that the MD programs were not important for the
U.S.

Instead, this signifies that MD programs and other strategic air defenses
(additional $371 billion) were not given top priority in U.S. strategic considerations. If

\textsuperscript{25} From 1969 until the end of the 1970s, the U.S. and the Soviet Union ran 274 and 246 nuclear
tests, respectively. See NRDC, “Known Nuclear Tests Worldwide: 1945-2002”
(http://www.nrdc.org/nuclear/nudb/datab15.asp)

\textsuperscript{26} For example, from 1962 through 1969, the average of annual expenditure for nuclear weapons
research, testing, and development under the direction of the department of defense was $326 million. This
figure remained at the same level during the entire 1970s, which was $332 million. See Stephen I.
Schwartz, ed., \textit{Atomic Audit: the Costs and Consequences of U.S. Nuclear Weapons since 1940}

\textsuperscript{27} Ibid., pp. 32 and 104.

\textsuperscript{28} Ibid., p. 270.
the defenses had been crucial for U.S. survival vis-à-vis the Soviet Union because the U.S. considered the Soviet Union’s missiles imminent threats, these types of defenses would have gotten more money from the government. After all, improving the U.S. strategic position over the Soviet Union by securing various strategic options and capabilities from which the U.S. could actually choose to use against the Soviet Union remained important during that period. MD programs could contribute to addressing those U.S. purposes, not anything else. In the next section, I will discuss how the U.S. strategic force structure development during the period supports this claim.

3.1.3 Strategic Weapons Competition

As the defense expenditures of both countries show, since the end of World War II, both countries tried to take a superior position over each other. Two things should be noted here. First, as noted earlier, strategic force has been one of the most vital elements in super power competition. Several MD attempts during the Cold War should be understood in this context. Second, due to the redundancy of devastating strategic weapons that both sides possessed during the Cold War, both measuring the strategic capabilities balance and analyzing the context are demanding. Accordingly, no agreed-upon, authoritative method existed to assess the capabilities and balance of those capabilities. Thus, different analysts employed either static measures of weapons’
attributes or dynamic and scenario-specific measures of force effectiveness, at their convenience depending on their research focus.\textsuperscript{29}

Because of the complexity of this issue, I do not intend to assess the capabilities and balance in precise terms. Instead, I will briefly discuss the significance of strategic capabilities for MD, comparing the number of ICBMs in specific and total strategic nuclear weapons in the context of the super power competition. Then, along with the following discussion of U.S. strategic policies and postures, I will focus on what the U.S. wanted to do, what the U.S. could actually have done with those capabilities, and what the U.S. could do with MD programs it tried to acquire.

Table 3.1 below summarizes the history of the nuclear competition between the U.S. and the Soviet Union, highlighting the changing context of strategic capabilities.\textsuperscript{30} Immediately after World War II, the Soviet Union had no atomic weapons, while the U.S. had already used two atomic bombs during the war. Therefore, despite its having the world’s largest land force, in terms of strategic (nuclear) capabilities, the Soviet Union had no ability to compete with the U.S.\textsuperscript{31} This situation did not change until 1949, when

\begin{table}
\centering
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|}
\hline
Year & Event  \\
\hline
1945 & United States dropped two atomic bombs on Japan  \\
1949 & Soviet Union tested its first atomic bomb  \\
1955 & U.S. unilaterally canceled its offensive weapons program  \\
1959 & U.S. and Soviet Union began deploying ICBMs  \\
1962 & Cuban Missile Crisis  \\
1972 & Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT)  \\
1980 & U.S. and Soviet Union begin Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT II)  \\
1985 & U.S. and Soviet Union reach an agreement that led to the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty  \\
1992 & U.S. and Soviet Union reach an agreement that led to the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START)  \\
1996 & Russia and the United States agree to extend the START treaty for another five years  \\
2002 & The START Treaty is extended indefinitely  \\
2007 & U.S. and Russia begin negotiations on a new START treaty  \\
2010 & U.S. and Russia agree to reduce their strategic nuclear arsenals  \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\end{table}

\textsuperscript{29} Gray and Barlow (1985), p. 39.

\textsuperscript{30} For a review of the history of the competition during the Cold War, see Freedman (1989); Glaser (1990); and Ball (1990).

the Soviet Union conducted its first nuclear test and succeeded in making a nuclear warhead.\textsuperscript{32} One thing should be noted here. Even though the U.S. had a monopoly on nuclear weapons during this period, it did not necessarily give the U.S. nuclear superiority over the Soviet Union because the U.S. lacked meaningful delivery systems, which would have enabled it to attack targets in the Soviet Union. Actually, until 1948, the U.S. had only 30 B-29 bombers, which were modified to drop huge and old-fashioned nuclear bombs requiring 39 people over two days to assemble.\textsuperscript{33}

\begin{table}
\centering
\begin{tabular}{lll}
\hline
U.S. monopoly & Soviet disability & 1945-1949 \\
\hline
U.S. supremacy & Soviet infancy & 1950-1955 \\
\hline
U.S. dominance & Soviet inferiority & 1956-mid 1960s \\
\hline
Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) &  & Mid 1960s-the end of the Cold War \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\caption{NUCLEAR COMPETITION DURING THE COLD WAR}
\end{table}

\textsuperscript{32} Mearsheimer (2001), p. 130.

However, it is also true that only the U.S. had the capability to strike its opponent with nuclear weapons until 1949. Even the Soviet first nuclear warhead did not have a strategic capability, which means that it could not inflict a significant damage on the U.S.\textsuperscript{34} Of course Soviet leaders, especially Stalin, did recognize the importance of atomic weapons before the end of World War II. However, mainly due to the underdevelopment of Soviet defense industries, the accomplishment of Soviet offensive nuclear weapons was delayed.\textsuperscript{35}

The Korean War—along with other Cold War advancements around the world including incidents in Czechoslovakia, Berlin, and China—helped boost the U.S. defense budget. With this increased expenditures the U.S. accumulated a large stockpile of nuclear warheads without any significant challenges from the Soviet Union until 1955. The U.S. increased its number of total strategic warheads and their offensive loadings by about eight times during the period.\textsuperscript{36} Until 1955, the Soviet Union was not able to secure


\textsuperscript{35} Zaloga (2002), pp. 3-4.

\textsuperscript{36} NRDC, “U.S. Nuclear Warheads: 1945-2002” (http://www.nrdc.org/nuclear/nudb/datab9.asp), and “U.S. Strategic Offensive Force Loadings.” In 1949, the numbers of U.S. strategic nuclear warheads and offensive loadings were 235 and 200, respectively. In 1955 the numbers increased to 2,200 and 1,755, respectively.
the strategic capability to attack the U.S. with only 200 non-strategic nuclear warheads.\textsuperscript{37} Therefore, although the Soviet Union succeeded in testing a hydrogen bomb in 1953 following the U.S. test in 1952, the gap in strategic capability between the two countries remained significant.

From 1956, a significant change developed in the strategic relationship between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union finally started to deploy its strategic offensive force. In 1956, Soviet bombers were equipped with strategic nuclear warheads. It operationalized 6 Submarine-launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBMs) in 1958 and 2 ICBMs in 1960—following the shocking Sputnik launch in 1957.\textsuperscript{38} Therefore, in this period, the Soviet Union finally achieved a strategic capability and showed the potential to build enough weapons to attack and destroy U.S. heavy bombers and land-based ICBMs.

However, until the mid 1960s, American dominance remained intact because the U.S. maintained a clear quantitative advantage in all classes of strategic offensive capabilities. For example, in 1966, the number of U.S. nuclear warheads attached to

\textsuperscript{37} NRDC, “USSR/Russian Nuclear Warheads: 1949-2002.”

\textsuperscript{38} NRDC, “USSR/Russian Strategic Offensive Force Loadings” (http://www.nrdc.org/nuclear/nudb/datab2.asp).

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ICBMs, SLBMs, and bombers were 1,004, 1,264, and 3,476, respectively while those numbers for the Soviet Union were 416, 75, and 546, respectively.  

The steady growth of Soviet defense spending and the continuous expansion of Soviet nuclear warhead stockpiles since the mid 1960s resulted in another development in the strategic relationship between the two countries. From this period until the end of the Cold War, both countries were essentially equivalent in terms of strategic nuclear capabilities. Especially by the 1970s, the Soviet Union had completed its nuclear triad with sufficient numbers of nuclear warheads and even surpassed the U.S. in number of ICBMs. The result was a situation in which neither side could attack the other without fearing enormous damage from the opponent’s retaliation. Each side obtained a second-strike capability, which shaped a new state of mutual assured destruction (MAD).

Within this context, Table 3.2 below sums up the history of ICBM development in the U.S. and the Soviet Union that signified U.S. interests in MD capabilities throughout the Cold War.

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39 NRDC, “U.S. Strategic Offensive Force Loadings,” and “USSR/Russian Strategic Offensive Force Loadings.”

40 As a result, in 1979, the Soviet Union possessed 1,395 ICBMs, 993 SLBMs, and 157 strategic bombers, while the U.S. deployed 1,054 ICBMs, 656 SLBMs, and 376 strategic bombers. See NRDC, ibid.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>U.S.</th>
<th>U.S.S.R.¹</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1959</td>
<td>ATLAS D (64)²</td>
<td>SS-6 Sapwood (68)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>ATLAS E (65)</td>
<td>SS-7 Saddler (78)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>ATLAS F (65)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>TITAN I (65)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MINUTEMAN I (75)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>TITAN II (87)</td>
<td>SS-8 Sasin (78)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td></td>
<td>SS-11 Sego (91)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>MINUTEMAN II (91)</td>
<td>SS-9 Scarp (80)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td></td>
<td>SS-13 Savage (91)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>MINUTEMAN III</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td></td>
<td>SS-17 Spanker (91)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>SS-18 Satan (present)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td></td>
<td>SS-19 Stiletto (present)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>MX (2005)</td>
<td>SS-25 Sickle (present)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td></td>
<td>SS-24 Scalpel (01)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SOURCE: Drawn from Archive of Nuclear Data from NRDC’s Nuclear Program (http://www.nrdc.org/nuclear/nudb/datainx.asp)

NOTE: 1. Soviet missiles’ names here were given by Western intelligence agencies for identifying purposes. According to the rules adopted by the U.S. intelligence agencies, SS designates a missiles’ role, which means surface-to-surface, and the numerical suffixes were issued in sequence. Along with these designations, NATO allocated unique names beginning in S. For a review of the rules and variations, see Zaloga (2002), Appendix 3, pp. 249-256. 2. Numbers in parentheses are the year in which ICBM was removed from alert.
Since the main focus here is to understand the context of strategic competition in which MD was required, looking further at the trend in ICBMs development and acquisition on both sides is a necessary step. The U.S. operationalized its first ICBM ATLAS D in 1959. Since then, both the U.S. and the Soviet Union have continuously improved and expanded their ICBM capabilities. After the ATLAS ICBMs, the U.S. deployed the TITAN ICBMs from 1962. The third generation MINUTEMAN ICBMs also went on alert from 1962. The first MINUTEMAN III, which employs Multiple Independently-targetable Reentry Vehicles (MIRVs), was deployed in 1970.

The Soviet Union also started engineering and testing of the SS-6 and the SS-7 ICBMs from the mid 1950s, and deployed them in 1960 and 1961, respectively. The Soviet Union finished the development of the SS-9 missiles and the SS-11 missiles by 1966, and rapidly increased its ICBM capabilities with this generation.

On the one hand, this weapons development suggests that the U.S. (and the Soviet Union) tried hard not to allow the opponent to take strategic advantage with superior ICBMs, and it was never on the defensive dealing with the Soviet’s increase in offensive capabilities. On the other hand, after the initial rapid expansion of its ICBMs, the U.S.

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41 All figures for this discussion come from various data included in NRDC, *Archive of Nuclear Data from NRDC’s Nuclear Program* (http://www.nrde.org/nuclear/nudb/datainx.asp).

had maintained the number of ICBM launchers at the level of around 1,000 from 1966 until the end of the Cold War.\textsuperscript{43} Therefore, although the U.S. took the initiative in ICBM capabilities, the Soviet Union soon followed suit. Figure 3.3 below demonstrates the quantitative competition in ICBM development between the U.S. and the Soviet Union.

From 1969, the Soviet Union was able to keep more ICBM launchers than the U.S. maintained.\textsuperscript{44} As a result, in 1989, the number of U.S. ICBM launchers was 1,000 with 2,440 deployed nuclear warheads, and the Soviet Union had 1,379 ICBM launchers with 6,671 nuclear warheads. However, this expansion in the Soviet Union’s ICBM capabilities did not guarantee Soviet superiority in the nuclear competition between the two super powers. Considering the intense competition, the stabilization of U.S. ICBM force during the period suggests that the U.S. was not interested in increasing the force.

\textsuperscript{43} By the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) I agreement signed in 1972, the U.S. was allowed 1,054 ICBMs, while the Soviet Union was allowed 1,618 ICBMs. See Paul H. Nitze with Ann M. Smith and Steven L. Rearden, \textit{From Hiroshima to Glasnost: At the Center of Decision—A Memoir} (New York: Grove Weidenfeld, 1989), pp. 330-331.

\textsuperscript{44} However, as noted below, because the U.S. installed the MIRVed MINUTEMAN III, until 1975 the number of ICBM-deployed nuclear warheads for both sides remained basically equivalent. Since then, the Soviet Union started to fully utilize the MIRV technology with the SS-19 ICBMs and significantly increased the number of ICBM nuclear warheads.
This implies that the U.S. might have achieved an optimization of its ICBM forces with MIRV technology.\footnote{By 1975, the MINUTEMAN ICBM force consisted of 450 MINUTEMAN IIs and 550 MINUTEMAN IIIIs. After 1975, the U.S. did not increase the number of deployed ICBM launchers and nuclear warheads attached to them. Actually, the SALT I agreement did not set any limitations for MIRVing.}
In addition, the U.S. could have alternatives other than ICBMs for strategic offensive force. This inference is based on the fact that the level of U.S. ICBM force remained basically unchanged, even after the U.S. designated 25,000 Soviet targets, which should be destroyed in war, through the Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP)-5 in 1976.\(^4^6\)

Since SIOP-5, which emphasized the concept of “escalation control,” introduced even non-military targets in the Soviet Union, increasing the number of deployed ICBMs might have been necessary. However, with other delivery options such as SLBMs and strategic bombers, as well as enough nuclear warheads stockpiled for the weapons (total over 25,000 nuclear warheads in 1976) to accomplish the mission defined in the SIOP-5, it was not necessary for the U.S. to increase the number of ICBMs further. In other words, in the midst of nuclear competition with the Soviet Union, the U.S. had already established a variety of offensive options.

Figure 3.4 below illustrates how the U.S. achieved such competence, not increasing its ICBM capabilities to the extreme. Instead, the U.S. kept a huge amount of nuclear warheads deliverable by other means such as strategic bombers or SLBMs.\(^4^7\)

\(^4^6\) Ball and Toth (1990), p. 67.

\(^4^7\) Before the 2001 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) by the Bush administration, ICBMs, bombers, and submarines constituted the U.S. strategic triad. In the 2001 NPR, the new triad is defined as consisting
Actually, as discussed earlier, the U.S. tried to maintain ICBM capabilities as small as possible due to some inherent vulnerability of ICBMs to the opponent’s attack.\footnote{A series of agreements between the U.S. and the Soviet Union (and Russia) to reduce the number of ICBMs (and nuclear warheads)—such as SALT and partly the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) later—were possible due to such concern about the vulnerability for the U.S. side.}

of conventional weapons such as precision-guided munitions (PGMs), missile and civil defenses, and the traditional nuclear forces including all three components.
In contrast, the Soviet Union had to keep its ICBM force maximal. First of all, due to logistic and geo-strategic reasons, strategic bombers were not as reliable for the Soviet Union as for the U.S. In addition, Soviet SLBM projects were ill-funded until the mid 1970s, due to the Soviet limitation in both missile and submarine technologies.

For example, the short operational range of SLBMs and their deficiency of sound dampeners were the main technical issues. In addition, Soviet submarines were vulnerable to NATO naval forces. In the event of a surprise attack, the Soviet submarines could be destroyed in port. The Soviet military recognized these problems of the submarine force, so it had to rely on the ICBM force more than the U.S. did.

The implications from the discussion so far on strategic weapons of the two superpowers are twofold. First, although it is hard to define the balance in an absolute and precise term, the strategic balance between the two did not experience a drastic shift after the early shaping period of the Cold War. This was, for the most part, a result of the competition in which both sides could willingly devote their resources to developing strategic weapons to take a superior position vis-à-vis each other. Second, the meaning of U.S. MD as a part of U.S. overall nuclear strategy can be found in relation with this

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49 While the U.S. could have used air bases in Europe and other regions for attacking the Soviet Union by bombers, the Soviet Union did not have such supports. Therefore, the utility of bombers was limited for the Soviet Union.

50 For the limitation of the Soviet submarine forces, see Zaloga (2002), pp. 115-118, and 153-159.
context. In other words, what the U.S. tried to achieve with MD should be examined along with this understanding. This latter point will be discussed in detail below.

3.1.4 MD and U.S. Nuclear Strategy

In the above, I discussed the strategic competition between the U.S. and the Soviet Union in material terms. In this part, I will discuss the developments of U.S. nuclear strategy and actual nuclear employment policy against the Soviet Union during the Cold War, and relate them to U.S. MD attempts. As Mearsheimer puts it, states’ strategies affect much of the outcomes of the relationship between rival countries.\(^{51}\) Since MD was part of the U.S.’s purposeful efforts to make the best of its resources and capabilities vis-à-vis its rival, analyses of U.S. strategies and policies embodied in them spell out how the U.S. tried to achieve what with MD.

Some argue that the role of strategic concepts and doctrine in U.S. strategic force development should not be overemphasized because they were at best dependent variables.\(^{52}\) In light of this understanding, trying to find a coherent relationship between

\(^{51}\) Mearsheimer (2001), p. 60.

U.S. nuclear strategies and weapons developments can be futile or misleading.\textsuperscript{53} Instead, both technological changes that created new strategic challenges and options and bureaucratic politics that pushed the expansion of nuclear weapons certainly contributed to the development of U.S. nuclear forces.\textsuperscript{54}

However, as Kaplan shows, it is true that U.S. nuclear strategies were largely affected by the calculations of how to prevent and fight a nuclear war, addressed by various strategic ideas as well.\textsuperscript{55} It is problematic to assume that such an important national security issue was dealt in the absence of broader guidelines. Instead, as in the example of the Reagan strategic modernization program, usually, once strategic objectives were defined, “an acquisition policy which leads to the attainment of the required capabilities” would follow.\textsuperscript{56} Therefore, MD should be understood with the context of broader U.S. nuclear strategies and employment plans.

As noted earlier, U.S. nuclear monopoly was short, and U.S. strategic considerations were required to cope with the changed situation. Of course, even before

\textsuperscript{53} In specific, Ball argues that development of U.S. defensive systems advanced without a conceptual linkage to the offensive weapons systems’ development. See Ball (1987), p. 10.

\textsuperscript{54} Rosenberg (1983), pp. 10-11; and Halperin (1972).

\textsuperscript{55} Kaplan (1983).

\textsuperscript{56} Richelson (1983), pp. 131-133.
the Soviet Union became a nuclear state, an initial concept of nuclear strategy already existed.\textsuperscript{57} This original idea focused on deterrence while avoiding the risk of inevitable catastrophic destruction that nuclear war would have caused. However, as Herman Kahn’s notable thought indicates, nuclear war has never been off the heart of U.S. nuclear strategy.\textsuperscript{58}

Therefore, during the Cold War, U.S. nuclear strategic thinking had oscillated on the continuum of deterrence and winning a nuclear war with varied emphases depending on both international and domestic political developments. The dilemma facing the U.S. was that although nuclear deterrence was not a bad option in the nuclear age, it was forced to increase its nuclear attack capabilities.\textsuperscript{59}

There were two main reasons for this. First of all, the U.S. ought to prepare for the failure of nuclear deterrence. Deterrence is based on the threats of retaliation. Therefore, if, for any reason, an opponent is ready to risk such threats, then deterrence will likely fail. Although nuclear weapons have credible deterring effects due to their massive destructiveness, those weapons have not fundamentally changed how states calculate

\textsuperscript{57} For example, see Brodie (1946).

\textsuperscript{58} Herman Kahn, \textit{Thinking about the Unthinkable} (New York: Horizon Press, 1962).

\textsuperscript{59} Mearsheimer describes this as evidence that shows why and how great powers try to expand their offensive capabilities to take advantage over the other side in a situation that does not require more offensive weapons. See Mearsheimer (2001), pp. 224-233.
their costs and benefits based on those weapons’ usage. For example, nuclear weapons were originally developed by the U.S. to win a war not deter it. Then, there is no reason for its opponent not to think about winning nuclear war. The U.S. had to consider this.

Second and relatedly, in order to make nuclear deterrence effective, the U.S. had to continuously build up massive nuclear strike capabilities. After the Soviet Union’s acquisition of nuclear strike capability, the U.S. required sufficient nuclear weapons that could survive a Soviet possible first-strike. The problem was that as the Soviet Union’s nuclear capabilities expanded, the U.S. needed more weapons to guarantee the survival of part of its nuclear weapons. After all, no absolute measure could decide how much was enough to deter the Soviet Union. As discussed earlier, the result was a continuous build-up of nuclear weapons on both sides, and this is a classic example of arms race based on security dilemma.

Of course, during the period of U.S. nuclear monopoly, the U.S. did not need a nuclear strategy. Most of the sensible arguments for a nuclear employment plan were


61 Despite various efforts and approaches by analysts to objectively define this, the satisfactory level of nuclear weapons has mostly been directed by political and strategic guidance. See Enthoven and Smith (2005). Questions about the utility of nuclear weapons beyond the level of total destruction of U.S. opponents were largely ignored.

based on the tradition of strategic bombardment, which was seen as having significantly contributed to winning World War II.\textsuperscript{63} Therefore, although the U.S. began to review the role of its nuclear weapons before 1950, NSC 30, the sole general U.S. guidance on atomic warfare until the late 1950s, simply concluded without any detailed suggestions that the U.S. must be ready to use nuclear weapons in the event of hostilities, and the decision as to the employment of nuclear weapons should be made by the president.\textsuperscript{64}

This thinking was transferred to the “massive retaliation” strategy during the most part of the 1950s.\textsuperscript{65} In 1950, President Truman directed a reexamination of U.S. objectives and plans with regard to nuclear weapons. As a result, NSC 68 laid out the rationale for the U.S. strategy during the Cold War; however, it was still not complete enough to guide the overall U.S. nuclear employment plan, only allowing the rapid build-up of U.S. nuclear offensive forces.\textsuperscript{66} In 1956, NSC 5602/1 confirmed that nuclear

\textsuperscript{63} Ball (1990), Freedman (2003), Kaplan (1983), Rosenberg (1983), and Sagan (1987).


\textsuperscript{65} Earlier war plans by the U.S., such as PINCHER (1946), FLEETWOOD (1948), DROPSHOT (1949), all focused on damaging Soviet urban-industrial targets. See Richelson (1983), pp. 126-127.

\textsuperscript{66} Desmond Ball, “U.S. Strategic Concepts and Programs,” in Samuel F. Wells, Jr. and Robert S. Litwak, eds., \textit{Strategic Defenses and Soviet-American Relations} (Cambridge: Ballinger Publishing Company, 1987), pp. 9-10. NSC 68 anticipated that U.S. nuclear weapons could have a formidable deterrent effect on the Soviet Union’s strategic consideration. However, it did not provide specific
weapons would be used in general war and military operations by the authorization of the president. It emphasized the importance of containing limited conflicts but still did not present the way to achieve it by using nuclear weapons. Therefore, the ways in which U.S. nuclear weapons were to be used remained underspecified until later administrations drafted more precise employment plans.

There were several factors that affected the continuation of non-discriminative use of nuclear weapons during the early nuclear years. First of all, the U.S. did not have enough nuclear weapons to selectively strike various Soviet targets, and even they were

67 Paragraph 11 of NSC 5602/1 read: “It is the policy of the United States to integrate nuclear weapons with other weapons in the arsenal of the United States. Nuclear weapons will be used in general war and in military operations short of general war as authorized by the President. Such authorization as may be given in advance will be determined by the President.” See “NSC 5602/1, Basic National Security Policy,” (March 15, 1956), U.S. Department of State, FRUS, 1955-57, Vol. XIX (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1990), p. 246.

68 Rosenberg (1983), p. 42. For example, paragraph 14 of NSC 5602/1 vaguely states “In carrying out the central aim of deterring general war, the United States must develop and maintain as part of its military forces its effective nuclear retaliatory power, and must keep that power secure from neutralization of from a Soviet knockout blow, even by surprise.” See “NSC 5602/1, Basic National Security Policy,” p. 246.

too large to be effectively delivered. See Rosenberg (1983), p. 16. For changes in the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile, see the discussion in the previous section.


72 Ibid., pp. 126-127.

73 In 2003, the name of the SIOP was changed to Operations Plan (OPLAN) 8044. SIOP-03 was incorporated into “a more flexible, situation specific, ‘family of plans’ with an increasing emphasis on adaptive planning.” Thereafter, OPLAN 8044 Revision FY (Fiscal Year in effect) represents the official U.S. nuclear employment plan. For the background of this change, see USSTRATCOM (U.S. strategic command) Action Processing Form, Subject: CINCSTRAT Memo to CJCS regarding Renaming the SIOP, August 3, 1992, J000, at http://www.nukestrat.com/us/stratcom/97-64h_STRATCOM080392.pdf. For a discussion of this name change, see Hans M. Kristensen, “U.S. Changes Name of Nuclear War Plan” (http://www.nukestrat.com/us/stratcom/siopname.htm).
war, “programs for the assignment of all U.S. strategic weapons systems to various targets,” and options for the use of the weapons against designated targets.\(^{74}\)

In preparing nuclear employment plans, counterforce strike and MD were under continual consideration from administration to administration, and became the backbone of U.S. nuclear strategy because of the several factors as follows.\(^{75}\) First of all, both counterforce and MD seemed to provide grounds for reducing the damages a nuclear exchange with the Soviet Union would have caused in the U.S.\(^{76}\) Since they complement each other on the offensive and defensive sides, respectively, seeking both capabilities was more than reasonable.

Second, constructing a reliable decent counterforce capability provided another advantage to the U.S. An option of a U.S. counterforce strike guaranteed more U.S.

\(^{74}\) See Ball and Toth (1990), fn 1. For various discussions of the SIOP, see references included in the footnote.

\(^{75}\) Counterforce capability means a state’s nuclear war fighting forces that specifically target the other state’s strategic forces, while countervalue capability is targeting other states’ cities and general populations.

\(^{76}\) However, ironically, counterforce capability does have a unique problem. A counterforce strike is expected to be very accurate and powerful or massive in order to successfully destroy the other’s nuclear weapons. Then counterforce weapons should be very effective first-strike weapons, while threatening to the other and increasing preemption possibilities in a crisis by the opponent. In other words, U.S. counterforce build-up not only instigated a two-way nuclear arms race but also increased the possibility of nuclear war at least in theory. For this, see R. Harrison Wagner, “Nuclear Deterrence, Counterforce Strategies, and the Incentive to Strike First,” *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 85, No. 3 (September 1991), pp. 727-750.
credibility to NATO allies than a countervalue strike; therefore, it could decrease the necessity for independent nuclear armament of its European allies and avoid any unnecessary regional escalation of arms race.\textsuperscript{77} In addition, since a counterforce strike also appeared to limit damages to the enemy’s population a countervalue strike might otherwise incur,\textsuperscript{78} it seemed morally and publicly more justifiable than a countervalue strike.\textsuperscript{79}

Finally, MD could embolden U.S. deterrence because it could increase the possibility of survival of U.S. nuclear weapons, thus assuring a U.S. retaliatory second-


\textsuperscript{78} For a discussion of moral aspects of using nuclear weapons, see Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations (New York: Basic Books, 2000), chap. 17; and John Finnis, Joseph Boyle, and Germain Grisez, Nuclear Deterrence, Morality and Realism (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987).

\textsuperscript{79} However, there is another aspect to consider regarding the moral aspect of nuclear weapons usage. As Kaplan notes, a judgment regarding the use of nuclear weapons is very challenging. A countervalue strike seems worse than a counterforce strike because of the former’s purposeful civilian mass killing. However, because of this unattractive nature of countervalue strike, it has been more of a concept in the abstract with a remote possibility of real occurrence. In contrast, a seemingly more rational counterforce strike basically implies a first strike in reality, which opens a door to nuclear war. For this aspect of assessment, see Kaplan (1983), p. 299.
Due to these merits, despite varied declaratory nuclear policies, counterforce and MD remained at the center of U.S. nuclear employment considerations.

Table 3.3 below summarizes the history of U.S. MD, U.S. declaratory nuclear policy that at large framed the context for MD, and the nuclear employment plans that revealed distinct preparations of the U.S. for nuclear war.

### TABLE 3.3

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MD</th>
<th>Expected protection</th>
<th>Opponent ICBM</th>
<th>Nuclear policy</th>
<th>Employment guidance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NIKE-ZEUS (1958)</td>
<td>Strategic air bases against Soviet missiles</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Massive retaliation</td>
<td>NSC 5602/1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NIKE-X (1963)</td>
<td>Against Soviet missiles</td>
<td>99 (USSR)</td>
<td>Flexible response</td>
<td>SIOP-63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SENTINEL (1967)</td>
<td>Against Soviet missiles and Nth country's missiles</td>
<td>818 (USSR)</td>
<td>Assured destruction</td>
<td>SIOP-4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAFEGUARD (1969)</td>
<td>ICBM silos against Soviet attacks and population defense against Nth country</td>
<td>1,274 (USSR)</td>
<td>Assured destruction</td>
<td>SIOP-4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDI (1983)</td>
<td>Soviet missiles targeting 3,500 sites</td>
<td>6,660 (USSR), 20 (China)</td>
<td>Prevailing in a protracted nuclear war</td>
<td>SIOP-6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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80 Ball (1987), pp. 7-8.
The U.S. tried for MD five times during the Cold War, and each of the attempts had a unique strategic connotation for the U.S. national security.\textsuperscript{81} For each MD attempt, I will briefly examine why the system was proposed by describing how it coped with the U.S. strategy and nuclear employment plan at the time.

As discussed earlier, before the Soviet Union operationalized its ICBMs, the U.S. was planning a defense against ICBMs while trying to field its own ICBMs. In January 1958, then defense secretary Neil H. McElroy decided to proceed with developing an MD system under the supervision of the army.\textsuperscript{82} This was an immediate response to the Soviet Union’s 1957 Sputnik test.\textsuperscript{83} For example, a special report by the Security Resources Panel of the Science Advisory Committee of the Office of Defense Mobilization (the Gaither Committee), which was handed to President Eisenhower on November 7, 1957, suggested that the Soviet Union would be able to launch an ICBM attack in two years and could increase the vulnerability of U.S. strategic forces.\textsuperscript{84} This was unacceptable for the


\textsuperscript{82} Baucom (1992), p. 11.

\textsuperscript{83} Of course, the feasibility study for the NIKE-ZEUS system was completed in 1956 before the Soviet Union’s Sputnik test. See Adams (1971), p. 24.

\textsuperscript{84} Kaplan (1983), pp. 141-142.
U.S. To carry out the national security policy of “massive retaliation,” protecting U.S. bombers, which were then the backbone of U.S. strategic forces, was necessary, and an MD system was the key toward that end.\textsuperscript{85}

In line with this strategic consideration, the NIKE-ZEUS system was expected to provide defense shields for U.S. strategic air command (SAC) bases rather than for the U.S. general population, based on the recommendation of the Gaither Report.\textsuperscript{86} In other words, NIKE-ZEUS began as a measure to improve the strategic readiness of the U.S. vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. This U.S. strategic consideration for NIKE-ZEUS did not substantially change for NIKE-X, and the same consideration continued to dictate the argument for MDs until SAFEGUARD was launched.

Entering office, President Kennedy began a major review of U.S. defense policy in January 1961.\textsuperscript{87} Since Kennedy emphasized the importance of protecting U.S. striking power from the time of his presidential election campaign, it was not surprising that the

\textsuperscript{85} Baucom (1992), p. 9; Adams (1991), p. 34. In contrast, Rosenberg argues that Eisenhower tried to ensure that the bombers would be in the air at the time of a Soviet surprise attack by increasing tactical warning time and rapid response, not by increasing their survivability on the ground. See Rosenberg (1983), p. 48.


review included ballistic missile defenses.\textsuperscript{88} Due to the limitations of NIKE-ZEUS, the Kennedy administration decided to restructure the system by adopting a more advanced system, NIKE-X.\textsuperscript{89} By this time, the U.S. general nuclear policy changed to “flexible response” from the previous “massive retaliation.” While the massive retaliation policy called for an all-out preemptive first-strike against the Soviet Union in response to Soviet invasion to Western Europe, the policy of “flexible response” and SIOP-63 as the actual nuclear employment plan, in specific, detailed the order of Soviet targets being attacked, thus making the use of nuclear weapons more practical.\textsuperscript{90}

SIOP-63 basically emphasized a counterforce attack against the Soviet Union to limit the damage a nuclear war would inflict on the U.S. (and the Soviet Union, too). Actually, counterforce damage limiting was more than a concept.\textsuperscript{91} By the end of 1962,

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{88} Kaplan (1983), pp. 248-250.
\item \textsuperscript{89} Baucom (1992), pp. 18-19. Problems with NIKE-ZEUS were three-fold: it was not able to discriminate decoys from actual warheads, the effect of the detonation of its nuclear-tipped kill vehicle was unknown, and the system could not cope with a heavy attack.
\item \textsuperscript{90} Kaplan (1983), pp. 263-285. SIOP-63 specified that the Soviet strategic forces—air bases, missile sites, and submarine pens—were the primary and initial targets of U.S. nuclear strike. If the war escalated beyond that level, other targets such as air-defense sites and eventually Soviet cities could be attacked.
\item \textsuperscript{91} This damage limitation concept was addressed by RAND analysts during the 1950s, and eventually began to be incorporated to U.S. nuclear policy when the first SIOP was prepared in 1960. See Rosenberg (1983), p. 58-62.
\end{itemize}
the Soviet Union had only 36 operational ICBMs with real strategic attack capability. In 1963, it had 99 operational ICBMs, while the U.S. owned 597 operational ICBMs, 160 SLBMs, and 1,055 bombers. In other words, a U.S. counterforce strike could have fully destroyed Soviet second-strike capabilities. Therefore, along with counterforce preemptive capability, MD would be an effective alternative for damage limiting. A counterforce strike would limit damage by destroying Soviet weapons, and MD would perform a similar function by destroying Soviet nuclear weapons before they landed. In the meanwhile, although the Johnson administration lacked much confidence in the system’s civil defense capabilities, China’s first nuclear test in October 1964 and the Soviet development of “GALOSH” MD system around Moscow in 1966 formed a momentum for the continuation of NIKE-X.

From 1964, however, the U.S. general nuclear policy began to shift to cope with changing strategic conditions and was reformulated as a policy of “assured destruction,” which means that the U.S. would be able to destroy an aggressor as a viable society, even

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92 NRDC, “U.S. Strategic Offensive Force Loadings.”

93 Ball (1986), p. 66.


after a well-planned and executed surprise attack on the U.S. As discussed earlier, the Soviet nuclear inferiority in quantity was rapidly resolved by the Soviet aggressive efforts to enhance its ICBM capability. After the Cuban Missile Crisis, the Soviet Union recognized obvious U.S. nuclear superiority. Therefore, it strove to amass formidable ICBMs. As a result, for example, in 1967, the Soviet Union had a total of 818 operational ICBMs, including 514 SS-11, which was believed to be the Soviet counterpart of the U.S. MINUTEMAN system.

Increasing Soviet strategic capabilities prompted the writing of the Draft Presidential Memorandum (DPM), which was presented to President Johnson in 1963 and emphasized the deterrence, rather than the fighting, of nuclear war. In the 1964 DPM, doubts against the U.S. ability to limit domestic damage were more strongly expressed. Therefore, as then Secretary of Defense McNamara emphasized in 1965, the U.S. should have an offensive force enough to assure the destruction of the Soviet

96 Ball (1990), p. 91.

97 See tables 3.1 and 3.2, and figure 3.3 in this chapter.


99 NRDC, “USSR/Russian Strategic Offensive Force Loadings.”


101 Ibid., pp. 325-327.
Union (about a half of Soviet industry and a quarter of the population).\textsuperscript{102} To secure this capability, the U.S. significantly reduced its strategic bombers (about half from the 1963 level), expanded SLBM force to 656 operational warheads, and deployed 1,054 hardened and dispersed ICBMs by 1967.\textsuperscript{103}

The U.S. did not totally abandon damage limitation as a task for strategic offensive forces, although the emphasis on counterforce preemption was much lowered. SIOP-4, prepared in 1966 and continued thereafter until SIOP-5 in 1976, was a direct continuation of SIOP-63, which specified counterforce orders for flexible response.\textsuperscript{104} The only difference in the two policy postures was that more emphasis was placed on “second-strike counterforce” in the latter. Then the goal of U.S. nuclear policy became to secure its second-strike force, and another MD system called SENTINEL was announced to begin on 4 November 1967.\textsuperscript{105} Unlike NIKE-X, which was mainly to protect U.S. cities against Soviet ICBMs, SENTINEL was expected to provide protection of U.S.

\textsuperscript{102} Baucom (1992), p. 23.

\textsuperscript{103} NRDC, “U.S. Strategic Offensive Force Loadings.”


\textsuperscript{105} Baucom (1992), p. 36.
MINUTEMAN ICBM sites against a Soviet attack. By protecting U.S. ICBMs, it could provide the U.S. with the ability to penetrate Soviet defenses, and possibly deny the Soviet Union a decisive first strike. It could also serve as a defense against a small force of unsophisticated ICBMs under development in China.

In 1969, as President Nixon was entering office, the new administration began another major review of U.S. defense policy. On March 14, the administration announced that a new SAFEGUARD MD system would be launched. This announcement was made after reviewing other alternatives and based on the conclusion that the U.S. should have a carefully phased but deployed MD system. The purpose of the system—the protection of U.S. ICBMs against a Soviet Union’s attack, protection of the U.S.

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106 Although SENTINEL had the option for ICBM force defense, it was primarily configured to protect major U.S. cities. Actually, 10 of the 15 probable deployment sites were located in or near most of the U.S. metropolitan areas. Adams (1971), p. 177.

107 Ibid., p. 166-167.

108 Baucom (1992), p. 37. Actually, due to concern with on-going arms control talks with the Soviet Union, the U.S. did not want to prompt any negative Soviet reactions to SENTINEL. Therefore, the U.S. tried to emphasize the emerging Chinese threat when announcing the decision for SENTINEL. See McNamara (1967), pp. 443-451.

population against a Chinese attack, and protection against an accidental attack—was not greatly different from that of SENTINEL.\textsuperscript{110}

This decision to reorient SENTINEL to SAFEGUARD represented three U.S. strategic deliberations at that time. First, as the unchanged U.S. general nuclear policy and employment plan during the Nixon administration (assured destruction and SIOP-4) suggest, the U.S. should have enough strategic force structure to deny others’ ability to threaten the U.S. and its allies.\textsuperscript{111} Second, realizing that effective protection against a full-scale Soviet ICBM attack was not likely based on the degree of U.S. technological development, the U.S. should not unnecessarily trigger a spiral offensive force build-up by the Soviet Union.\textsuperscript{112} An MD system to defend missiles, not cities, would be regarded by the Soviet Union as an attempt to protect U.S. retaliatory force from a Soviet first strike, not to protect the U.S. population from a weak Soviet second strike after a U.S.

\textsuperscript{110} Ibid., pp. 198-199. Three alternatives presented to President Nixon were the following: a deployment of a more comprehensive system against the Soviet Union; a continuation of SENTINEL; and an indefinite postponement of deployment. Because a comprehensive system seemed unfeasible and halting all work would entail too many risks, Nixon rejected the three options.

\textsuperscript{111} Baucom (1992), p. 41; Yanarella (1977), pp. 174-175.

\textsuperscript{112} The Soviet Union possessed 1,274 ICBMs in 1969.
first strike against the Soviet Union.\textsuperscript{113} Finally, this moderate MD system would have increased U.S. leverage against the Soviet Union from a position of strength when negotiating with the Soviet Union regarding the arms reduction talks in process.\textsuperscript{114}

However, due to the limitations imposed by the ABM treaty and the July 1974 protocol, SAFEGUARD could not basically provide a nation-wide defense against an expanded Soviet ICBM attack. In addition, it could not technically be converted to an effective point defense for ICBM sites because it was optimized for an area defense against light ICBM attack.\textsuperscript{115} Therefore, SAFEGUARD was totally canceled in 1976, and from the cancellation of SAFEGUARD until the SDI, MD existed as a research-only program, not as a policy agenda.\textsuperscript{116}

In 1983, President Reagan announced that the U.S. would deploy a new MD system designated as the SDI. This announcement was based on the ongoing U.S. strategic forces modernization plan initiated in 1981 after Reagan entered office. According to the plan, the U.S. would expand its strategic forces by reviving the B-1

\textsuperscript{113} Baucom (1992), p. 42. Actually whereas SENTINEL would be seen as a protection of cities, SAFEGUARD would be mainly initiated to protect two MINUTEMAN sites, and the only city that could be defended was Washington, D.C. See Adams (1971), p. 200.

\textsuperscript{114} Baucom (1992), pp. 53-54.

\textsuperscript{115} Ibid., pp. 91-95.

\textsuperscript{116} Ibid., pp. 99-100.
strategic bomber and deploying MX missiles in 6 years. First laid out by the Reagan’s National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) 13, which underscored the concept of “prevailing” in a protracted nuclear war, this modernization plan put emphasis on the U.S. ability to destroy the Soviet command and control system at any given point in a strategic nuclear exchange with the Soviet Union.

In 1983, the Soviet Union possessed 6,660 ICBMs, including about 2,000 MIRVed missiles such as SS-18 and SS-19. Therefore, a counterforce capability simply could not be feasible. In that regard, the Reagan administration actually contemplated a second-strike counterforce capability, which means the capability to disarm the Soviet Union after taking a Soviet first strike. Toward this end, a space-based MD system could be a solution to the problem of U.S. ICBM vulnerability.

Again, the SDI under the Reagan administration did not mean that the U.S. fully embraced a benign defensive posture. The defense was not a simple one. It was to protect U.S. offensive strategic forces, and it was accompanied by one of the biggest offensive

118 Ball and Toth (1990), pp. 68-69.
121 Baucom (1992), p. 177.
military build-ups in U.S. history to boost U.S. strategic leverage over the Soviet Union.\textsuperscript{122} Actually, Regan himself recognized the complex nature of such strategic defense programs by saying that defensive systems “if paired with offensive systems, they can be viewed as fostering an aggressive policy.”\textsuperscript{123} Notwithstanding, the U.S. went on to develop the SDI because it wanted to prevail over the Soviet Union in all circumstances possible.

In this section, I have discussed a series of U.S. MD attempts in relation to overall U.S. strategic considerations at the time MD programs were projected. The discussion so far confirms that U.S. MD attempts made sense only when they were related to U.S. broad nuclear strategies and employment plans. It is clear that sometimes no adversary ICBMs existed, and other times there were too many ICBMs to defend against so that an effective defense against them was impossible. A stand-alone analysis, which simply treats MD as a narrow defensive shield, does not fully address this inconsistency. Only by incorporating MD into U.S. general strategic nuclear policy, can we observe the broad implications of U.S. MD.

Since Soviet strategic offensive capabilities were very thin during the NIKE-ZEUS period, the U.S. could envision a very positive situation in which the U.S. had both

\textsuperscript{122} Posen and Van Evera (1983), p. 3.

\textsuperscript{123} Quoted in Ball (1987), p. 30.
defensive and offensive advantages. After the Soviet Union deployed substantial strategic offensive forces, the U.S. tried to develop strategic defense capabilities. NIKE-X, SENTINEL, SAFEGUARD, and the SDI all focused on increasing the survivability of U.S. strategic offensive forces. In most cases, with an effective MD system, the U.S. could achieve a quasi-first-strike capability or secure robust second-strike retaliatory forces. Actually, a series of U.S. nuclear employment plans strongly suggest that the U.S. contemplated a preemptive first-strike option. Otherwise, U.S. ICBMs targeted on Soviet strategic forces to reduce Soviet capabilities would likely detonate on empty silos and sites. In this regard, the U.S. has maintained much more than a “second-strike” capability, and U.S. strategic missions (massive retaliation, flexible response, damage-limitation, assured destruction, and prevailing in a protracted nuclear war) would be more effectively addressed when accompanied by MD systems. This is why MD was necessary for the U.S. despite the exposed deficits of MD programs in defending U.S. territory and the general population.

In the next section, how domestic policy consensus affected the advent and fate of those MD programs will be briefly discussed.

3.2 Policy Consensus for MD Projects

International and strategic considerations alone did not decide the fate of U.S. MD programs during the Cold War. In this section, I will examine how each of the MD attempts was supported by domestic policy consensus at the governmental level by looking at the institutional structure of U.S. politics and the power relationship between the executive and the legislative branches. I argue: first, due to executive dominance during the Cold War, congressional oversight and initiative over MD projects were limited and incoherent; and second, this inability of Congress to address consistent policy options regarding MD made effective veto players over U.S. MD policies non-extant and laid the foundation of continual domestic policy consensus for MD programs. Therefore, most important decisions regarding MD programs during the Cold War were made mainly by the executive branch despite intense perennial debates over the programs.

3.2.1 Executive Dominance and No Effective Veto against MD

As discussed in chapter 2, the dominance of the executive branch over security policy was common during the Cold War. Several factors contributed to this executive dominance. First, the institutional strength of the presidency and the executive branch vis-à-vis Congress in foreign policy has been a theoretically prevalent idea despite the
constitutional design for the separation of powers,\textsuperscript{125} thus contributing to the establishment of executive dominance without serious reservation in the first place.\textsuperscript{126}

Second, the Cold War military competition and the advent of nuclear weapons introduced a situation in which the role of the commander-in-chief became vital, and the importance of the “advice and consent” of the Senate in foreign policy waned, thus increasing the president’s freedom to act unilaterally.\textsuperscript{127} This executive primacy in security affairs did not change much even after the Iran-Contra incident, which underscored the necessity of a more active role for Congress in national security matters.\textsuperscript{128} Finally, the incentive for congressional oversight over security policy by getting through this institutional

\textsuperscript{125} Many take for granted the limitation of Congress regarding foreign/security policy such as diverse interests, parochialism, and a lack of authority, information, hard data, and expertise. For example, see John Lehman, \textit{Making War: the 200-year-old Battle between the President and Congress over How America Goes to War} (New York: Scribner’s, 1992), pp. 69-70.


disadvantage was inherently low. Voters might assume that the president and the executive branch are responsible for national security matters. Recognizing this, therefore, even most active “national security” legislators tend to defer to the president regarding national security matters.

This executive dominance was further strengthened by weak veto power for Congress. While the executive branch acted as a single player, Congress would have to persuade the 535 members (actually a majority of them) with diverse voice but equal voting power to make its veto work. In addition, more often than not, executive-legislative conflict has not been a good description of the relationship between the executive and legislative branches in U.S. politics. When policies led by the president become congressional agendas, Congress mostly endorses them.

Of course, different military service branches (for example, the Army and the Air Force) competed for a greater role over MD programs, and governmental departments,

\[129\] In contrast to this electoral explanation of low incentives for legislators as vote-maximizers to address substantial foreign policy issues, Lindsay argues that powerful non-electoral incentives exist for legislators regarding foreign policy issues. See James M. Lindsay, *Congress and the Politics of U.S. Foreign Policy* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994), chapter 2.

\[130\] Zegart (1999), pp. 31-32.

\[131\] Ibid., p. 29.

such as the Department of Defense and the Department of State, had different strategic preferences regarding the development of MD programs. In other words, a competition within the executive branch was observable in security affairs. However, the actors had the same goal (taking leadership of MD programs, securing a greater share of defense expenditure, and strengthening U.S. national security) and their disagreement did not significantly affect the executive push for MD programs. As Ball put it, in terms of bureaucratic politics, the different military services came up with compromises and supported MD programs anyway. Therefore, the executive-led MD programs during the Cold War benefited from this situation, and policy consensus for the MD programs was mostly achieved in spite of occasional objections from Congress. I will discuss in detail the continuation of policy consensus for MD programs during the Cold War below.

3.2.2 Policy Consensus for MD during the Cold War

In the above, I argued that weak congressional oversight and veto were the two main factors that contributed to policy consensus for U.S. MD systems during the Cold War. Unlike the MD debate during the 1990s and thereafter that has shown a rather

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133 Adams (1968); and Halperin (1972).

134 Zegart (1999); and Lindsay (1994).

unambiguous divide between Republican proponents of MD and Democratic skeptics of MD, MD politics during the Cold War can be defined as a weak division between the executive and the legislative branches.\textsuperscript{136}

Table 3.4 below shows that only three out of the five MD programs were initiated by the Republican administration. Democrats took control of Congress nearly most of the time when the administrations put forward those initiatives, but Congress was unable to form a veto, which could deny policy consensus for MD programs. From this, we can infer that the party identification of the executive branch was not the main determinant of its position regarding MD programs.

Republican and Democratic administrations alike proposed to have MD systems for strategic reasons discussed in the previous section. Although Congress sometimes tried to redirect the path of MD programs, most of the time it was not able to halt them entirely.

TABLE 3.4
MD AND U.S. POLICY CONSENSUS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MD</th>
<th>Administration</th>
<th>Senate Majority</th>
<th>House Majority</th>
<th>Result for MD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NIKE-X (1963)</td>
<td>Kennedy (Dem.)</td>
<td>Dem.</td>
<td>Dem.</td>
<td>Replaced with SENTINEL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SENTINEL (1967)</td>
<td>Johnson (Dem.)</td>
<td>Dem.</td>
<td>Dem.</td>
<td>Renamed to SAFEGUARD</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SOURCE: Information for House majority is drawn from “Majority and Minority Leader, 1899 to Present” (http://clerk.house.gov/histHigh/Congressional_History/leaders.html); and information for Senate majority is drawn from “Party Division in the Senate, 1789-Present” (http://www.senate.gov/pagelayout/history/one_item_and_teasers/partydiv.htm).


For example, when the Republican Eisenhower administration announced the development of the first U.S. MD system, NIKE-ZEUS, congressional involvement was nearly unobservable. Therefore, the administration was able to make decision regarding NIKE-ZEUS without difficulty. This opened a path toward MD programs promoted by successive administrations. In other words, weak congressional veto power enabled the administrations to commit and maintain the established consensus for MD programs. In
order for Congress to reject executive-led MD programs, it should have formed a unified veto against the programs. However, congressional consensus against the MD programs was not possible to achieve despite heated debates after the mid 1960s. Congress could only have impact on occasional partial redirection of the MD programs when it generally agreed with the administrations on the deployment of the programs.

In the developmental stage of NIKE-ZEUS, Congress was not active and found itself in the traditional consultation role. The Department of Defense testimonies in 1958 before the Senate committees (the Subcommittee on Preparedness and the Defense Appropriations committee) revealed no serious objection to NIKE-ZEUS from Congress, and Congress was more concerned about the successful development of NIKE-ZEUS by mitigating the Army-Air Force rivalry. In addition, Secretary McElroy’s decision for NIKE-ZEUS was not seriously challenged in the House Armed Services Committee hearings immediately after his announcement of NIKE-ZEUS in January 1958. As discussed earlier, this minimal objection to NIKE-ZEUS from Congress was due to the Sputnik shock in the U.S., which created a national emergency mentality. One of the congressional recommendations for NIKE-ZEUS was to “put more effort into developing

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138 Baucom (1992), pp. 11-12.

139 Ibid., pp. 13-14.
anti-missile missiles," not the other way around.\textsuperscript{140} Actually, after the Eisenhower administration’s decision for NIKE-ZEUS, several members of Congress actively promoted the system, including major senators of both parties.\textsuperscript{141}

This foundation of policy consensus did not change for NIKE-X. In the process of canceling NIKE-ZEUS and developing its replacement NIKE-X, the executive branch—mainly figured by Defense Secretary McNamara—took the lead. McNamara admitted in the 1963 testimony before the House Armed Services Committee that the decision regarding the restructuring of NIKE-ZEUS into NIKE-X was already made in 1962, but was not publicly revealed until 1963.\textsuperscript{142} In the congressional hearings, the main debate revolved around when an effective system should be deployed, not whether the U.S. should have a system of that kind.\textsuperscript{143} In other words, the debate at the policy-making level for NIKE-X, following McNamara’s analyses, concentrated on how to achieve a cost-effective system in the foreseeable future, not on debating whether the U.S. should

\textsuperscript{140} U.S. Senate, Preparedness Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services, \textit{Inquiry into Satellite and Missile Programs}, Part 2, 1958, 85\textsuperscript{th} Congress, 2\textsuperscript{nd} Session, p. 2315. Quoted in Adams (1971), p. 29.

\textsuperscript{141} Adams (1971), p. 47.

\textsuperscript{142} Ibid., pp. 63-66.

\textsuperscript{143} Ibid., pp. 66-74.
deploy such a system.\textsuperscript{144} However, opposition to MD began to grow from late 1963.\textsuperscript{145} By 1966, a number of legislators formed a minority group against MD, and in some instances they tried to cancel funds for MD programs.\textsuperscript{146} For example, an amendment to delete funds for NIKE-X was proposed in 1966 by Senator Joseph Clark. However, it was defeated in the Senate by 14 to 73.\textsuperscript{147} Other than that, objections to NIKE-X in the House Armed Services Committee were not voted on in committee.\textsuperscript{148} Eventually, the funding for NIKE-X was strongly approved by a majority in both houses.\textsuperscript{149}

In the meantime, by the end of 1966, several international developments—including Chinese tests of nuclear explosions and missiles and the Soviet’s fielding of an MD system—furthered the favorable domestic situation for MD.\textsuperscript{150} Because of the

\textsuperscript{144} Baucom (1992), pp. 23-24.

\textsuperscript{145} Adams (1971), pp. 92-106. For example, civil organizations, including the Federation of American Scientists (FAS), the Committee on Arms Control and Disarmament of the National Citizen’s Commission on International Cooperation, and the Council for Christian Social Action of the United Church of Christ, actively tried to propagate rationales for opposing MD programs. By 1967, total 17 arguments against MD were put forward. See ibid., p. 101.

\textsuperscript{146} Ibid., p. 130.

\textsuperscript{147} Ibid., pp. 72, 133-135.

\textsuperscript{148} Ibid., pp. 131-132.

\textsuperscript{149} Baucom (1992), p. 27.

\textsuperscript{150} Ibid.
coming election in 1968, MD became one of the hot issues symbolizing defense preparedness. Therefore, broad bases of consensus for SENTINEL were not hard to form. The Johnson administration’s decision to replace NIKE-X with SENTINEL was not seriously challenged in Congress after Defense Secretary McNamara’s capable justification of that change.\(^{151}\) Overall, executive-led policy consensus for NIKE-X and SENTINEL was rather easily achieved due to unified governmental structure coupled with the sentiment of security urgency. Congressional weak veto was another factor for the continuation of the policy consensus. By the end of 1968, domestic opposition to SENTINEL began to develop both in Congress and in the public mainly because most system sites would be located near major cities.\(^{152}\) However, several Senate amendment bills to delete funding for SENTINEL were all defeated. The situation was the same for House Appropriation amendment bills to delete funds for SENTINEL.\(^{153}\)

Since the Nixon administration and Congress shared reservation with SENTINEL by early 1969, the next step was to halt it.\(^{154}\) The administration decided to have SAFEGUARD, another MD system, mainly to protect MINUTEMAN ICBM sites. Then,


\(^{152}\) Ibid., p. 181; and Baucom (1992), p. 39.

\(^{153}\) Adams (1971), pp. 182-186. There were 6 Senate amendments in that kind. See ibid., pp. 70-73.

\(^{154}\) Ibid., pp. 190-194.
the argument and efforts against SENTINEL were transferred to SAFEGUARD because both had similar system components, thus similar domestic and strategic implications. In 1969, most active opposition came from the Senate, although nation-wide discussion of SAFEGUARD intensified. When the defense authorization bill was presented, Senator Margaret Smith introduced an amendment to delete all funds for SAFEGUARD, but it was defeated by 11 to 89. Another later amendment, the Cooper-Hart bill, which would stop the deployment of SAFEGUARD, was voted on and defeated by 50 to 51. As a result, Congress passed the 1970 budget including $1.5 billion for SAFEGUARD. This incident suggests that the congressional objection to SAFEGUARD simply was no more than reassuring the power of the purse given by the U.S. Constitution by exercising congressional control over defense spending. Other than that, there was no substantial congressional challenge to the executive-led MD program.

In the same year when SAFEGUARD decision was made by the Nixon administration, the U.S. began the first round of SALT I talks with the Soviet Union. These talks got through several rounds, and eventually the SALT I agreements were

155 Ibid., pp. 200-203; and Baucom (1972), pp. 42-44. For detailed information regarding the process of the debate in Senate, see Johnson (2006), pp. 147-158.


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signed in 1972, making MAD institutionalized by allowing only one MD site to each side.  

As part of the SALT I agreements, the ABM Treaty was easily ratified in the U.S. Senate, although it required approval of two-thirds of the vote. Along with this institutional constraint on SAFEGUARD that allowed only limited protection, its known weaknesses, including the vulnerability of the system itself to missile attacks, were made available to Congress. The House voted to cancel the system in October 1975, and the Senate followed in November 1975 to vote against operation of SAFEGUARD. The Department of Defense was preparing to deactivate the system, and Congress had the same opinion. The system facilities were finally closed in February 1976.  

From then until the Reagan administration, the Army conducted research-oriented programs with limited funds made available by Congress, and eventually accumulated the technological understanding that shaped the foundations of the SDI, including improved computers, optical sensors, new interceptor concepts, and directed energy weapons.  

In early 1981, MD became one of the top national security issues again. The Reagan administration’s basic strategic idea was to prevail in a protracted nuclear war,  

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159 Ibid., p. 73.  
160 Ibid., pp. 95-97.  
and this included plans for MD. When the administration proposed its strategic modernization plans, the reasons for MD were not greatly different from the previous administrations’ rationales. The U.S. should counter the vulnerability of ICBM forces (in this case, MX missiles). At the same time, MD could provide a population defense.\textsuperscript{162} By 1982, the growing number of Soviet SS-18 and SS-19 MIRVed ICBMs awakened the longstanding concern about the vulnerability of U.S. ICBMs, and this required a proper U.S. response.\textsuperscript{163} The nuclear freeze movement prevalent in the fall of 1982 gave more momentum for MD.\textsuperscript{164} In early 1983, a new concept of deterrence with emphasis on strategic defense was elaborated on and presented to Reagan by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the president announced his decision for the SDI on 23 March 1983.\textsuperscript{165} Following the President’s announcement, three official advisory panels (the Fletcher, Hoffman, and Miller panels) began actively supporting the idea.\textsuperscript{166} However, no immediate response to

\textsuperscript{162} Ibid., p. 177.

\textsuperscript{163} Alternatively, the Regain administration tried to find an appropriate basing mode of MX missiles to deploy extended MX forces.


\textsuperscript{165} For the development of space-based MD program ideas, see Baucom (1992), pp. 141-170. Actually, the name SDI became official when NSDD-119 was signed in January 1984.

the announcement was made in Congress. While the administration and SDI contractors actively propagated scientific evidence in favor of the SDI to Congress, Congress itself was rather inactive. Since election was coming, many representatives did not want to be seen as “soft on defense” by opposing an MD program that held psychological appeal for the public (i.e. perfect defense). When the administration’s first SDI budget request reached Congress in 1984, a series of amendments to cut the SDI budget were defeated in the Senate and the House. Despite individual members’ opposition, Congress appropriated most of the budget request for the SDI. As a result, Congress allowed more than $44 billion from 1983 through 1993 for the SDI. This demonstrates that as in the previous cases, Congress was not able to effectively veto the executive-led MD initiative due to its limitations in institutional structure, procedures, expertise, and election considerations.

167 Larry Pressler, *Star Wars: the Strategic Defense Initiative Debates in Congress* (New York: Praeger, 1986), p. 67. For example, despite the significance of the issue, only the People Protection Act, which intended to help the president’s initiative, was introduced in 1983.

168 Reiss (1992), chap. 8.

169 Ibid., p. 55.

170 For detailed information, see Pressler (1986), chap. 7.


Overall, U.S. MD programs during the Cold War benefited from weak congressional veto to remain at the top of national security agenda whenever the executive branch sought ways to improve the U.S. strategic position. In other words, as Haggard and McCubbins note, the U.S. had both policy decisiveness (ability to make policy decisions) and resoluteness (ability to commit to established policy decisions) for MD programs due to weak veto in the decision-making on the congress side.¹⁷³

With strategic considerations to gain advantage over the Soviet Union, succeeding U.S. administrations continually put forward policy initiatives for MD programs during the Cold War. In the meanwhile, due to the factors discussed above, congressional oversight of the MD programs was limited, if existent, in the beginning. Later, congressional objections and efforts to divert executive decisions regarding MD programs were attempted in vain because of congressional ineffectiveness to arrange a majority to form a veto. In doing so, most congressional efforts were made in the traditional reactive forms such as trying to amend defense appropriation bills to delete funds for MD programs.

3.3 Implications

In this chapter I have shown that how the U.S. security posture during the Cold War and a series of MD projects were related by reviewing the balance of power between the U.S. and its rival (mainly the Soviet Union) in strategic terms. This strategic relationship was the main source of reference when the U.S. considered the option of MD during the Cold War. In addition, U.S. nuclear strategies and employment plans during the Cold War reveal that MD was not just a defensive shield but an instrument to reduce U.S. strategic vulnerability. It was largely aimed at increasing the accomplishment of U.S. strategic objectives largely defined in terms of offensive strike capabilities.

In addition, I have discussed how policy consensus at the governmental level supported those MD projects, mainly by looking at the congressional responses toward executive-led MD projects. Whenever trying to initiate or cancel a system launching, the main veto players (the executive branch and Congress) needed to develop a policy consensus. Most of the time, Congress was not able to mobilize an effective veto to divert the MD policy agenda presented by the executive branch. Despite occasional heated debates in Congress in the process of authorization of MD budget requests, Congress generally failed to perform its power of the purse effectively. This weakness of Congress enabled various administrations to obtain policy consensus necessary for the continual promotion of MD programs throughout the Cold War. In a word, after MD was
decisively introduced as a central U.S. national security agenda for NIKE-ZUES, policy resoluteness for MD maintained throughout the Cold War.

Based on these observations, some patterns for MD policy process can be inferred. First, during the Cold War, MD initiatives were not directly related to the development of offensive missile capabilities of U.S. adversaries. Instead, MD was pursued for U.S. opportunities and strategic advantages. Second, accordingly, the termination of MD programs was unrelated to the reduction of the offensive missile capabilities of opponents. The third and final implication is that policy consensus for MD was a main factor in determining the fate of the programs. Since the U.S. had to consider any possible strategic options vis-à-vis the Soviet Union, the U.S. appeared to have continued strategic motivation for defending against enemy ICBMs. Therefore, observations about the existence or lack of domestic policy consensus can help explain different processes, if any, for implementing MD policy initiatives.

In the next two chapters, I will discuss how U.S. policy toward MD under the Clinton and the Bush administrations differed using the similar approach as in this chapter: reviewing the strategic balance of power and the strategic considerations of the administrations, and showing how policy consensus has affected the policy process toward the development of the current MD system.
CHAPTER 4

MD DURING THE CLINTON ADMINISTRATION

U.S. experiences during the Cold War uncover some implications for the main claim of this study. In chapter 3, I established that while a series of MD were considered during the Cold War for U.S. strategic advantages over its rivals, the fate of any individual MD system was contingent upon the existence of domestic policy consensus to sustain or change specific initiatives for MD. This policy consensus was mostly obtained by way of both the institutional strength of the executive branch and the ineffectiveness of Congress to form a veto. In this chapter, based on this observation, I will examine U.S. MD policy during the Clinton administration.

First, I will briefly discuss the strategic balance between the U.S. and Russia to show that the U.S. might have had a strong incentive to increase its power. During the Clinton administration, the strategic balance between the two powers began to favor the U.S. Second, I will examine Clinton administration’s nuclear strategy and policy in relation to the shifting balance of power to address why the administration did not fully accept the idea of MD. Third, I will argue that because of the reluctance of this
administration, domestic policy consensus for MD did not exist, and this resulted in the deferment of the deployment of MD.

The analysis in this chapter confirms the finding of the previous discussion that the implementation of MD as a policy for strategic advantage is contingent upon the existence of international incentive and domestic policy consensus. Although the Clinton administration permitted the so-called “3+3” plan in 1996 and the National Missile Defense program in 1999, the programs were basically focused on research and development.¹ The Clinton administration never fully acknowledged MD. As a result, the U.S. could not proceed with MD despite the increasing international opportunity and strong domestic push for MD.

4.1 Strategic Balance and International Incentive for the U.S.

It is conventional wisdom that the balance of power between the U.S. and its main opponent Russia changed in favor of the U.S. after the Cold War.² Based on the

¹ For a brief review of the “3+3” and other MD programs the Clinton administration considered, see Congressional Budget Office, Estimated Costs and Technical Characteristics of Selected National Missile Defense Systems (January 2002).

² After the Cold War, nobody can deny the U.S. preponderance in international relations, although it is debatable whether the U.S. now is the world hegemon or just a superpower. For a collection of debate about the U.S. world position after the Cold War, see G. John Ikenberry, ed., America Unrivaled: the Future of the Balance of Power (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2002).
assumption of offensive realism, the U.S. should have had a stronger incentive to pursue MD than during the Cold War. As discussed earlier, the Cold War period was characterized as a competition. However, while the U.S. had never been in a disadvantageous position, it consistently sought for MD capability during the competition. Therefore, with the weaker rival, the incentive for U.S. power pursuit might have increased. To examine the plausibility of this argument, I will evaluate the material power balance between the two parties by comparing their military expenditures (with GNP indicators) and strategic nuclear capabilities.3

4.1.1 Economic Balance of Power: Military Expenditures and GNP

As discussed in the previous chapters, military expenditures are the useful demonstration of states’ will and capacity to compete against their opponents. Table 4.1 shows that how the economic balance of power drastically shifted in favor of the U.S. after the Cold War. The change was rather straightforward, and it means that the U.S. had a great opportunity to take advantage over Russia in terms of military competition.4

3 For the justification of this measurement of power, see the discussion in chapter 2.

4 Actually, since this after-Cold-War opportunity for the U.S. was too evident, no country would ever try to challenge the U.S. This moment yielded the unprecedented situation in which the absence of counterbalancing against the U.S. is equilibrium. For this, see William C. Wohlforth, “U.S. Strategy in a Unipolar World,” in Ikenberry (2002), pp. 103-105.
### TABLE 4.1

**BALANCE OF ECONOMIC POWER**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>US Gross National Product (Change %)</th>
<th>US Military Expenditure (Change %)</th>
<th>US ME Share %</th>
<th>USSR/Russia Gross National Product (Change %)</th>
<th>USSR/Russia Military Expenditure (Change %)</th>
<th>USSR/Russia ME Share %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>6,920,000 (1.9)</td>
<td>382,000 (-3.1)</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>3,320,000 (-3.0)</td>
<td>381,000 (-7.3)</td>
<td>11.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>7,050,000 (-0.6)</td>
<td>370,000 (-11.6)</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>3,220,000 (-8.4)</td>
<td>353,000 (-14.2)</td>
<td>10.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>7,010,000 (-0.6)</td>
<td>327,000 (-6.4)</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>2,950,000 (-8.8)</td>
<td>303,000 (-17.5)</td>
<td>8.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>7,220,000 (-0.6)</td>
<td>348,000 (-6.4)</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>907,000 (-0.6)</td>
<td>72,900 (-12.9)</td>
<td>7.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>7,420,000 (2.8)</td>
<td>331,000 (-4.9)</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>830,000 (-6.5)</td>
<td>62,200 (-14.7)</td>
<td>7.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>7,700,000 (3.8)</td>
<td>314,000 (-5.1)</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>725,000 (-12.7)</td>
<td>60,100 (-14.7)</td>
<td>7.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>7,910,000 (2.7)</td>
<td>297,000 (-5.4)</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>693,000 (-0.4)</td>
<td>40,200 (-33.1)</td>
<td>6.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>8,190,000 (3.5)</td>
<td>284,000 (-4.4)</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>667,000 (-0.8)</td>
<td>36,300 (-9.7)</td>
<td>5.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>8,550,000 (4.4)</td>
<td>284,000 (-1)</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>670,000 (2.8)</td>
<td>40,400 (11.2)</td>
<td>6.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>8,900,000 (4.1)</td>
<td>278,000 (-2.1)</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>624,000 (-0.9)</td>
<td>28,800 (-28.7)</td>
<td>4.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>9,260,000 (4.0)</td>
<td>281,000 (1.1)</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>625,000 (2)</td>
<td>35,000 (21.5)</td>
<td>5.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


* All dollar amounts are constant 1999 million dollars.

* Soviet/Russia figures are rough estimation. For detailed information, see explanations of the original source.

First, the implication of the overall trend of U.S. and Russian Gross National Product (GNP) sizes, usually the basis of military expenditure, is very simple. The U.S. had a big edge over Russia. For example, in 1989, the size of the U.S. economy was just more than double the Soviet Union’s in terms of GNP. After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the overall size of the Russian economy could not compete with the U.S. In 1999, the U.S. GNP was more than ten times that of Russia. During this period, the U.S. GNP continuously increased, while the GNP of Russia constantly deteriorated.
Second, military expenditures of both countries accordingly reflected this growing gap in overall economic potentials to some extent. In 1989, the size of the military expenditure in both countries was very similar. However, the military expenditures of Russia as a succeeding state of the former Soviet Union dramatically reduced. In 1999, Russia could spend only 9% of the money it did in 1989 on its military. In contrast, the 1999 U.S. expenditure remained 74% of the level of the U.S. military expenditure in 1989. Although Russia’s share of military spending in GNP was still two times the world’s average, Russia’s shrunken economy had a devastating impact on its national power.

With a considerable amount of money needed to maintain the integrity of strategic forces, let alone resources necessary to maintain conventional forces, this situation was absolutely unacceptable to Russia. Yet it had to take this disadvantage because Russia had no resources to alter it. In a real sense, the Russian economy could barely afford nuclear deterrence, but the mission alone became very burdensome toward the end of the 20th century.

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5 Author’s own calculation based on the data.

6 For information of the average share of military spending in GNP for countries, see the discussion in fn. 50 in chapter 2.

7 For example, the Russian government, especially the Ministry of Defense, had no money at its disposal. The Ministry was left with very limited procurement budget. For this, see Bruce Blair and
4.1.2 Balance of Power in Strategic Weapons

Unlike the economic balance examined above, the strategic force balance during this period was not as clear-cut as expected. This disparity between the economic and strategic force balance mainly comes from the fact that Russia retained most of the nuclear weapons the Soviet Union had possessed despite the dissolution of the Union. Table 4.2 illustrates this rather complex situation of the balance in terms of strategic weapons. First, it is clear that both countries maintained a huge number of operational nuclear warheads after the Cold War, although the number for both countries gradually declined. Second, Russia enjoyed a short period of quantitative advantage over the U.S. in terms of strategic warheads after the decades of pursuit, but the period soon came to an end.\(^8\) Since then until the late 1990s, both countries had maintained similar quantities of nuclear weapons with a slight edge of the U.S. over Russia.

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\(^8\) This fluctuation mainly came from the U.S. strategic weapons modernization performance, which was ongoing between 1990 and 1993. During the period, U.S. nuclear submarine forces and the strategic bombers were substantially reduced in preparation for the full-scale deployment of next generation weapons systems. For example, Poseidon submarines that carried about 2,500 W68 and W76 nuclear warheads and FB-11A bombers with 1,100 AGM-69A warheads were taken off during the period. This additional cutback of U.S. nuclear weapons to the START reduction discussed below explains why U.S. nuclear weapons reduction was bigger than that of Russia in the early 1990s. For detailed information about the weapons taken off alert, see Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC), “U.S. Ballistic Missile Submarine Forces” (http://www.nrdc.org/nuclear/nudb/datab7.asp) and “U.S. Strategic Bomber Force” (http://www.nrdc.org/nuclear/nudb/datab7.asp).
### TABLE 4.2

OPERATIONAL STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>US Strategic Warheads</th>
<th>US ICBM Warheads</th>
<th>US ICBM Share %</th>
<th>USSR/Russia Strategic Warheads</th>
<th>USSR/Russia ICBM Warheads</th>
<th>USSR/Russia ICBM Share %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>12,780</td>
<td>2,440</td>
<td>19.1</td>
<td>11,529</td>
<td>7,031</td>
<td>61.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>12,343</td>
<td>2,440</td>
<td>19.8</td>
<td>11,159</td>
<td>6,857</td>
<td>61.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>9,300</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>21.5</td>
<td>9,202</td>
<td>6,034</td>
<td>66.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>8,280</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>24.2</td>
<td>8,560</td>
<td>5,680</td>
<td>66.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>7,582</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>26.4</td>
<td>8,287</td>
<td>5,117</td>
<td>61.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>7,780</td>
<td>2,090</td>
<td>26.9</td>
<td>7,396</td>
<td>4,278</td>
<td>57.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>7,323</td>
<td>2,075</td>
<td>28.3</td>
<td>6,773</td>
<td>3,691</td>
<td>54.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>7,371</td>
<td>2,075</td>
<td>28.2</td>
<td>6,652</td>
<td>3,580</td>
<td>53.8</td>
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<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>6,720</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>29.8</td>
<td>6,204</td>
<td>3,580</td>
<td>57.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>6,720</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>29.8</td>
<td>5,966</td>
<td>3,590</td>
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<td>1999</td>
<td>6,832</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>29.3</td>
<td>5,906</td>
<td>3,540</td>
<td>59.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: *Archive of Nuclear Data from NRDC’s Nuclear Program* (http://www.nrdc.org/nuclear/nudb/datainx.asp).

* Strategic Warheads exclude non-strategic nuclear warheads. Therefore, they count only strategic nuclear warheads carried on ICBMs, SLBMs, and Bombers.

Another dynamic defined by the arms reduction talks held between the two countries was involved in this constructed stability. The U.S. and the Soviet Union signed the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) on 31 July 1991. The objective of the treaty was to reduce the strategic nuclear weapons of both countries by about 30% of the 1990 level. The treaty’s memorandum of understanding (MOU) data acknowledged: the U.S. had 2,246 SNDVs (1,000 ICBM launchers, 672 SLBM launchers, and 574 strategic

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9 The text of the treaty and related materials can be seen at http://fas.org/nuke/control/start1/text/index.html.
bombers), 10,563 accountable warheads (8,210 ICBM and SLBM warheads and 2,353 warheads on heavy bombers); and the Soviet Union had 2,500 SNDVs (1,398 ICBM launchers, 940 SLBM launchers, and 162 strategic bombers), 10,271 accountable warheads (9,416 ICBM and SLBM warheads and 855 warheads on heavy bombers). Based on the data, the following central limits were imposed on both countries: 1,600 strategic nuclear delivery vehicles (SNDVs), 6,000 accountable warheads, 4,900 total warheads deployed on ICBMs and SLBMs, and 1,540 warheads on 154 Soviet heavy ICBMs (the U.S. had no heavy ICBM deployed then). The two countries eventually ratified the treaty in 1994, and they continually reduced the number of warheads to the level of the treaty’s limits within a seven-year period the treaty specified. Therefore, it

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12 As a result, in 2001, the U.S. had 6,196 (1,700 ICBM, 3,120 SLBM, and 1,376 bomber) strategic nuclear warheads, and Russia had 5,263 (3,011 ICBM, 1,384 SLBM, and 868 bomber) strategic nuclear warheads. The other 3 countries that had inherited strategic nuclear weapons from the Soviet Union, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine, have fully removed those nuclear warheads from their territory. Figures here are drawn from NRDC, “U.S. Strategic Offensive Force Loadings” (http://www.nrdc.org/nuclear/nudb/datab1.asp) and “USSR/Russian Strategic Offensive Force Loadings” (http://www.nrdc.org/nuclear/nudb/datab2.asp).
seems that both countries carefully controlled their strategic forces so as not to shift the existing balance between the two.\textsuperscript{13}

However, several trends signify U.S. advantages that may constitute international incentives for the U.S. First, although the gap in the number of strategic weapons should be understood as nominal, it broadened between 1991 and 1999 (from 98 to 926).\textsuperscript{14} Assuming the balance (1.01:1, the U.S. first) in 1991 as the status quo, it seems to have changed slightly (1.16:1).\textsuperscript{15} In other words, the relative size of Russia’s strategic nuclear warheads to the U.S. declined from 99\% to 86\%, and this decline was not far from the level that power transition theorists generally consider a transition to occur.\textsuperscript{16} Russia still possesses a credible deterrence capability, but it should be less confident than in the past.

\textsuperscript{13} The U.S. and Russia signed the START II treaty that requires the elimination of MIRVed ICBMs and further reductions in the number of strategic warheads of both countries to the level of 3,000 by 2003. In 1997, the deadline for the elimination of SNDVs was extended to December 2007, and the treaty became effective in 2000.

\textsuperscript{14} Because this large amount of strategic warheads is great enough to guarantee the capacity to overkill for both sides, a simple margin in the numbers does not matter much.

\textsuperscript{15} Author’s own calculation based on the data in table 4.2.

Second, a comparison of ICBM forces of both countries tells an interesting story. Russia was much more dependent on its ICBM forces than the U.S. was. The U.S. had already achieved its ICBM force stabilization in 1991 with the retirement of MINUTEMAN II ICBMs, while Russia had to rely on its ICBMs for maintaining strategic balance with the U.S. On the average from 1991 to 1999, the ICBM warheads’ share of total strategic warheads for the U.S. was 27.1%, and it was 59.7% for Russia.\(^{17}\)

As discussed in chapter 3, during the Cold War, the U.S. flexibility in strategic offensive options enabled the U.S. to keep its ICBM forces minimal but sufficient to inflict unacceptable damage to Russia. This advantage for the U.S. continued after the Cold War. The U.S. had no reason to focus on ICBMs due to its possession of other means of effective delivery.\(^{18}\) In contrast, Russia’s strategic offensive (or deterrence) options had been heavily dependent on ICBM forces.\(^{19}\) As a result of this disparity in the relative dependency on ICBM forces, the Russian nuclear warhead reduction concentrated on

\(^{17}\) Author’s calculation based on the data in table 4.2.

\(^{18}\) Trident II (or C5) SLBMs, which began to be deployed from 1990, have provided the U.S. hard target kill capability and short flight time with quick launch sequence. Therefore, these missiles are very threatening to Russia. For the implications of this missile, see Robert S. Norris, “Counterforce at Sea: The Trident Missile,” *Arms Control Today*, Vol. 15, No. 7 (September 1985), pp. 5-12. In addition, the U.S. began to deploy B1 stealth strategic bombers from 1986 and B2 stealth strategic bombers from 1993. Both types of bombers can perform an intercontinental bombing without refueling.

\(^{19}\) The modernization of Russia’s SLBM and strategic bombers forces was so slow that Russia could not follow suit in this area.
ICBM forces was disadvantageous to Russia, although both countries agreed upon such reductions. Actually, during the period, the U.S. had maintained almost double the number of strategic nuclear warheads attached to alternative means of delivery systems that Russia had.\(^\text{20}\) This discussion illustrates that in this period, the U.S. had more effective and less vulnerable (to opponent’s first strike) nuclear forces, although the exact meaning of the effectiveness and invulnerability should be examined further.\(^\text{21}\) At least, the U.S. obtained relative gains in strategic nuclear power relations in the period.\(^\text{22}\) One thing is clear: the relative strength of U.S. strategic capability vis-à-vis Russia increased during the period.

\(^{20}\) For example, in 1991, the number of strategic warheads carried on SLBMs and heavy bombers was 7,300 for the U.S. and 3,168 for Russia. In 1999, those numbers were 4,832 and 2,366, respectively. Author’s calculation based on the data in table 4.2.


In sum, these favorable conditions in both power resources provided the U.S. with room to consider various strategic initiatives, including missile defense systems. In other words, following offensive realism’s proposition, it can be argued that the situation enabled the U.S. to deliberate upon expanding its power by adding additional increments of capability to the existing ones. Actually, this proposition is plausible because the U.S. had the same experiences during the Cold War when the competition was more serious—therefore, a risk of a worse-off situation was greater—than in this period.

In fact, active discourses for MD reemerged during this period. However, while the Clinton administration contemplated a possibility of an MD, there was no broad consensus on whether MD was necessary for U.S. security and whether it would properly represent U.S. interest in the international arena. The reluctance of the Clinton administration regarding MD, which I argue played a critical role in producing a lack of policy decisiveness, will be addressed in the next section.

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23 For a possibility, the Clinton administration restructured the missile defense agency in the department of defense from the Strategic Defense Initiative Organization (SDIO) to the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (BMDO), and provided the basic architecture of the current missile defense system of the Bush administration.
4.2 U.S. Nuclear Strategy and Policy under the Clinton Administration

Even after the demise of the Soviet Union, the basic concept of U.S. nuclear strategy and employment plans changed little from that of the Cold War. In spite of substantial reductions in the strategic nuclear forces, the START talks and treaties, and the U.S.-Russian cooperation in those practices, U.S. plans for large scale nuclear war against Russia essentially remained the same as in the Cold War.24 As discussed in chapter 3, U.S. nuclear strategy and employment plans were reflected in a series of SIOPs during the Cold War. These SIOPs during the Cold War sometimes signified important changes and other times slight modifications in U.S. strategic war planning. However, the introduction of annually revised SIOP became a routine during the 1990s.25

President Clinton issued Presidential Decision Directive-60 (PDD-60) as a new guidance for nuclear targeting and war planning in 1997.26 The directive would set the broad national policy regarding employment concept to achieve U.S. strategic objectives. Until then, U.S. nuclear war planning (or nuclear weapons employment plan) was based

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25 Ibid., p. 10. Under the Clinton administration, each revised SIOP became effective with the beginning of a new fiscal year (October 1).

26 This directive was the first revision of such guidance in over 15 years.
on the SIOP previously acknowledged during the Cold War. The basic concept of SIOP-6 was to win a protracted nuclear war. It maintained 14,000 targets in 1987, even after the several revisions and dropping of thousands of Soviet industrial and minor military targets from the list. Therefore, although the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) approved by President Clinton in 1994 concluded that nuclear weapons were “playing a smaller role in U.S. security than any other time in the nuclear age,” and the U.S. did not need to have a bigger nuclear arsenal under the changed circumstances, the Cold War requirements for nuclear weapons continued. In other words, the NPR 1994 would not alter U.S. nuclear operational policies, including the policy of first use, and making prompt counterforce strike remained the primary principle of U.S. nuclear strategy.

27 SIOP-6, which came into effect in 1982, was the last SIOP in this kind. For the implication of SIOP-6 and its revision SIOP-6F, see Desmond Ball and Robert C. Toth, “Revising the SIOP: Taking War-Fighting to Dangerous Extremes,” International Security, Vol. 14, No. 4 (Spring 1990), pp. 65-92. Since 1983 the Secretary of Defense annually issued the Nuclear Weapons Employment Plan (NUWEP), which was based on presidential directives and set out the general basis of the SIOP. Based on each NUWEP, the SIOP underwent an annual revision each year until 1991. See ibid., p. 69. After 1991, the fiscal year numbering began to be used for the SIOP. For this, see McKinzie et al. (2001), fn. 20.

28 Ball and Toth (1990), pp 71-2.


When President Clinton issued PDD-60, it required changes in strategy on nuclear weapons. It basically dropped any planning for a long nuclear war.\textsuperscript{31} The directive reaffirmed that the U.S. should have a triad of strategic deterrent forces both to complicate an adversary's attack and defense planning and to inflict “unacceptable damage” against those assets a potential enemy values most.\textsuperscript{32} It also acknowledged that the U.S. would not rely on “launch on warning,” but instead would focus on maintaining the capability to respond promptly to any attack.\textsuperscript{33}

Overall, Clinton administration’s nuclear strategy and policy demonstrates a clear element of continuation from the Cold War nuclear posture of the U.S. One of the priorities was given to maintaining credibility of counterforce (deterrence) capability. However, unlike the practices of the previous administrations, the Clinton administration did not include the necessity of MD for improving the security of U.S. counterforce capability in its broad nuclear strategy consideration.


\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{32} Presidential directives are signed or authorized by the president and issued by the National Security Council. Usually recent presidential directives are classified. In specific, this PDD is classified “Top Secret/Extremely Sensitive Information.” Therefore, the original text of the document is not available.}

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{33} “PDD/NSC 60: Nuclear Weapons Employment Policy Guidelines” (http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/pdd60.htm).}
This approach of the Clinton administration to MD was distinctive in the sense that during the Clinton administration, U.S. incentive to pursue MD capability seemed greater than during the Cold War. As discussed in the above, after the demise of the Soviet Union, Russia could barely maintain its existing deterrence forces due to its damaged economy. It was obvious that the waning Russian economy could hardly provide Russia with any capacity to compete with the U.S. in a strategic weapons development battle. There was no reason for the U.S. not to pursue MD if it wanted to enhance strategic advantage over its potential enemy.

However, this practice of the Clinton administration was logical considering the fact that MD has been nothing but a means to improve U.S. strategic advantage, as I argue in this study. Several strategic deliberations together might have led to the Clinton administration’s lack of interest in MD. First, although the total number of Russia’s ICBMs was continuously declining, almost half of the Russian ICBMs during the period were MIRVed.34 These MIRVed ICBMs would make any MD systems with the technology available at the moment less effective because the costs of maintaining a workable MD against MIRVed ICBMs would greatly multiply.

34 For example, in 1992, 635 out of 905 Russian ICBMs deployed were MIRVed with 5,420 warheads. In 1999, 376 out of 756 ICBM were MIRVed with 3,160 warheads. See NRDC, “USSR/Russian Strategic Offensive Force Loadings.”
Second, counterforce mission, which is still given the top priority of U.S. nuclear war plan, would be successfully executed without the help of MD because of the existence of the powerful U.S. Trident submarine forces. For example, in 1993 the U.S. already had 13 Trident submarines. Each of these submarines can carry up to 192 W76 (100kt) or W88 (475kt) nuclear warheads. Those warheads are carried on MIRVed SLBMs. Those Trident forces have formidable deterrence capability since a single Trident submarine can destroy a third of the Russian population. In addition to this countervalue implication of the Trident, the Trident II missiles have high capability to destroy hardened missile silos. This hard target counterforce capability of Trident II might have decreased U.S. interest in pursuing MD that might inflict high financial and strategic costs.

35 In addition, the U.S. had reserved 50 MIRVed PEACEKEEPER ICBMs with 500 W87-0 (300 kt) during the entire 1990s despite the START II agreement that would eliminate all MIRVed ICBMs on the U.S. and Russia by 2003. The last PEACEKEEPER missile was decommissioned in September 2005. It was intended that these missiles would employ a “rail garrison system,” which could greatly enhance the survivability of them in a nuclear exchange, but was never operationalized. Notwithstanding, since this missile had outstanding accuracy, survivability, and a flexibility, it is true that the U.S. counterforce capability was much more improved than during the Cold War. See NRDC, “U.S. ICBM Forces” (http://www.nrdc.org/nuclear/nudb/datab3.asp).

36 NRDC, “U.S. Ballistic Missile Submarine Forces.”

37 See McKinzie, et.al. (2001), pp. 118-121.

Finally, although the Russian ICBM forces remained robust during the Clinton administration, the administration might have considered that the possibility of Russian first strike by ICBM forces diminished, and that a further reduction of the possibility could be achieved by the ongoing cooperation with Russia regarding the START talks. In fact, in the 1990s, both the U.S. and Russia were accomplishing an unprecedented level of agreement to eliminate nuclear weapons they deployed. In that situation, a U.S. MD system could have prompted a negative response by Russia that could lead to another unnecessary arms race. A U.S. with a smaller nuclear arsenal without MD could be more secure than a U.S. with a larger nuclear arsenal with ineffective MD.

In short, the Clinton administration made little significant change in U.S. nuclear policy and employment plan, while paying no great attention to MD to meet such strategic objectives. In other words, MD as a means to reduce U.S. strategic vulnerabilities (by protecting ICBM forces) was less attractive to the Clinton administration in the post-Cold War environment than to other administrations during the Cold War. This unique implication of MD for the Clinton administration provided the source of discord with Congress, which began to assert more active roles in foreign policy. In the next section, I will review the domestic politics of MD during the Clinton administration by discussing several incidents of strong push for MD from Congress and the administration’s reluctance to embrace such congressional initiatives.
4.3 Two Domestic Dynamics: Executive Dominance and Resurrected Congress

The U.S. Congress influences security policy. However, as discussed in chapter 3, the role of Congress in U.S. security policy was rather limited during the Cold War. The end of the Cold War, along with globalization and the increased link between domestic interests and international events, opened a way for congressional activism in foreign/security policy to play an important role in U.S. decision-making.\(^{39}\) This renewed congressional activism made a domestic political environment for MD controversial.

During the Cold War, a divided government was not the main factor in determining the fate of MD. Since all the administrations shared certain strategic necessity of MD, and the power relationship between the executive and legislative branches was skewed in favor of the former, domestic policy consensus for MD was achieved without big difficulties at the executive discretion. However, with the transformed congressional activism and the Clinton administration’s lack of interest in MD, the divided government characterized the politics of MD to a great extent, although the executive dominance in security policy decision-making was still able to determine the fate of MD proposed by several congressional initiatives.\(^{40}\)

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\(^{40}\) To be specific, for the first two years of the Clinton administration, a unified government had existed. In 1994 midterm elections, a 54-seat swing in membership from Democrats to Republicans made
Before President Clinton entered office, domestic pushes for MD already existed. For example, the former Bush administration was pursuing an MD capability.\(^41\) In addition, Congress passed a Missile Defense Act in 1991 requiring the deployment of an MD system by FY 1996.\(^42\) However, from the beginning, the Clinton administration emphasized that MD would not be necessary under the existing strategic circumstances.

One of the first actions taken by the Clinton administration was to cut the funding for MD from the former Bush administration’s FY 94 budget request.\(^43\) Eventually in May 1993, the Clinton administration abandoned the former Bush administration’s

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\(^41\) Former President Bush ordered, January 29, 1991, to refocus the SDI, which was in fact already terminated several years ago, with an emphasis on limited protection instead of a nation-wide protection, which is called “Global Protection Against Limited Strikes” (GPALS). See President George Bush, “Address before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union” (January 29, 1991) (http://bushlibrary.tamu.edu/papers/1991/91012902.html).

\(^42\) One thing should be clarified regarding this act. This act as part of the FY 92 Defense Authorization Act was not intended to deploy a full-scale MD system. Instead, the act required that the U.S. deploy a cost-effect against limited ballistic missile threats system fully compliant with the ABM treaty and effective theater missile defense (TMD) systems. It was a compromise between the two parties following the incidents by Iraqi Scud missile attacks during Operation Desert Storm. Therefore, it was supported by a bipartisan majority in both houses. The text of the act and major congressional actions regarding the bill can be found at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/dbquery/z?d102:h.r.02100:. Later Missile Defense Act of 1991 was amended significantly by cutting the SDI funding and extending the deployment date from 1996 to 2002. See Thad Cochran, *Stubborn Things: A Decade of Facts about Ballistic Missile Defense* (United State Senate, 2000), p. 6.

proposal to build a system to defend the U.S. against ballistic missiles.\textsuperscript{44} It was controversial because it was inconsistent with the ABM Treaty, which banned nationwide defense systems.\textsuperscript{45} As a result, MD was downgraded to a research and development program and TMD acquisition was given the top priority.\textsuperscript{46}

However, the Republican Congress continuously pushed hard for MD after the momentous congressional election win in 1994. Before the election, MD was one of the top issues utilized by the Republicans during the campaign. For example, the Republicans made the MD issue public and successfully mobilized the support for MD.\textsuperscript{47} From 1995, the Republicans did not stop promoting proposals requiring an MD system for the U.S.

Table 4.3 briefly summarizes such history of MD promotion by the Republicans.

\textsuperscript{44} “Chronology of Missile Defense” (http://www.missilethreat.com/overview/pageID.265/default.asp).

\textsuperscript{45} It was signed at Moscow May 26, 1972, ratified by the U.S. Senate August 3, 1972, and entered into force October 3, 1972. Later, the U.S. and the Soviet Union signed a protocol to the treaty, effective in 1976, which reduced the number of ABM sites to one, deployed either around each nation’s capital area or at a single ICBM deployment area. The Soviet Union deployed an ABM system around Moscow, but the U.S. did not. Actually, in 1976, the U.S. deactivated its Safeguard site at Grand Forks, North Dakota, around a Minuteman ICBM launcher because of technical problems and credibility of the system associated with the problems. For the text of the treaty and the protocol for the amendment to the treaty, see James M. Lindsay and Michael E. O’Hanlon, \textit{Defending America: The Case for Limited National Missile Defense} (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2001), Appendix A, pp. 169-180.


\textsuperscript{47} According to “Contract with America 1994”, 10 major acts, including MD, would be brought to the House Floor within the first 100 days of the 104\textsuperscript{th} Congress. See “Republican Contract with America” (http://www.house.gov/house/Contract/CONTRACT.html).
## TABLE 4.3

**MAJOR MD ACTS DURING THE 1990S**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Result and Content</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>National Defense Act</td>
<td>Passed and Bush signed the act in December: part of National Defense Authorization Act, required the DoD to aggressively seek the development of advanced TMD systems and an MD system against limited ballistic missile threats by 1996 or the earliest date allowed by the available technology.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>Contract with America</td>
<td>Defeated in the House: portion of Republican Contract with America, required to renew America’s commitment to an effective MD system</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>Missile Defense Act</td>
<td>Passed, vetoed by Clinton, failed of passage in House over veto; part of National Defense Authorization Act, required the deployment of an MD system at the earliest practical date.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>Defend America Act</td>
<td>Did not come to a vote; called for deployment by 2003 of a system to defend the U.S. against an attack by ballistic missiles.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>National Missile Defense Act</td>
<td>Passed and vetoed by Clinton; announced, “It is the policy of the United States to deploy by the end of 2003 a national missile defense.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>National Missile Defense Act</td>
<td>Passed and Clinton signed the act in July; declared it to be the policy of the U.S. to deploy a national missile defense, “as soon as is technologically possible.”</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Especially, the process of reviewing annual defense authorizations became a heated battlefield for MD debate. Since Congress passed its first MD legislation in 1991, which mandated the deployment of a limited MD system by 1996, a series of MD legislations were included in annual defense budget authorization bills. The *Missile Defense Act of 1995* was another example of such legislations. In addition, the Republican Congress introduced separate bills for MD. For example, the Republicans
introduced the *Defend America Act of 1996*, which called for an MD system that would be developed over time to provide a layered defense against larger ballistic missile threats.\(^{48}\) The *National Missile Defense Act of 1997* and the *National Missile Defense Act of 1999* were some of such legislations that demonstrated congressional activism for MD.

Facing these Republican requests for MD, the Clinton administration moved to diffuse political opposition from the Republican side by agreeing to increase funding for research and development of MD. In 1996, the administration, based on the Joint Chiefs’ advice,\(^ {49}\) announced the so-called “3+3” program because of the continuing congressional pressure. It was to develop an MD system capable of being deployed within three years after a deployment decision was made. It assumed that there would be at least three years’ warning of ICBM deployment by an emerging missile state, and for several years the program helped deflect continued Republican pressure to commit to a national missile defense.\(^ {50}\)

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\(^{49}\) In January 1996, the JCS advised Clinton to keep the funding level for both NMD and TMD minimum to allow a “balanced and proportional” program to meet war-fighting needs. Without clear threats and technological promise, diverting critical funds to NMD projects should be avoided, the JCS argued. See Joseph Cirincione, “Why the Right Lost the Missile Defense Debate,” *Foreign Policy*, No. 106 (Spring 1997), p. 48.

Clinton once vetoed the *National Missile Defense Act of 1997*, which Congress passed mandating deployment of a limited MD system by 2003, arguing that there was no threat justifying MD deployment. However, the Rumsfeld Report and the North Korean Taepodong-1 test in 1998 strengthened the position of the Republican Congress emphasizing the necessity of MD.

In 1997, Congress established a bipartisan commission, with Donald Rumsfeld as chairman, to reassess ICBM threats to the U.S.\(^{51}\) On July 15 of 1998, the commission released a report indicating that countries such as North Korea and Iran could develop a long-range missile with little or no warning, rejecting the 1995 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) that the U.S. would face no direct ballistic missile threat before 2010.\(^ {52}\) According to the report, the U.S. might have little or no warning before operational deployment of threatening ballistic missiles, and the threat to the U.S. posed by the


\(^{52}\) Within the executive branch, major threat assessment comes from National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs), documents produced by the National Intelligence Council (NIC), whose members are drawn from both the CIA and other intelligence agencies that make up the U.S. intelligence community. See Craig Eiseendrath, Melvin A. Goodman, and Gerald E. Marsh, *The Phantom Defense: America’s Pursuit of the Star Wars Illusion* (Westport: Praeger, 2001), p. 67. For the 1995 estimation, see NIC, “Emerging Missile Threats to North America during the Next 15 years,” NIE-95-19 (November 1995) (http://www.fas.org/spp/starwars/offdocs/nie9519.htm) or “Excerpts from the DCI National Intelligence Estimate” in Lindsay and O’Hanlon (2001), Appendix B.
emerging capabilities is broader, more mature and evolving more rapidly than has been reported in the previous estimates by the Intelligence Community.\textsuperscript{53} It concluded:

A new strategic environment now gives emerging ballistic missile powers the capacity, through a combination of domestic development and foreign assistance, to acquire the means to strike the U.S. within about five years of a decision to acquire such a capability (10 years in the case of Iraq). During several of those years, the U.S. might not be aware that such a decision had been made. Available alternative means of delivery can shorten the warning time of deployment nearly to zero.\textsuperscript{54}

In the meanwhile, on August 31 of the same year, North Korea tested a ballistic missile, Taepodong-1,\textsuperscript{55} which is believed to be able to reach Hawaii or Alaska with some modifications, and this incident made the commission’s case more trustworthy, although the test was not a complete success.\textsuperscript{56} William Cohen (then Secretary of Defense) responded to this incident:

The Taepodong-1 test was another strong indicator that the United States will, in fact, face a rogue nation missile threat to our homeland against which we will have to defend the American people. Our deployment readiness program has had two key criteria that had to be satisfied before we could make a decision to deploy


\textsuperscript{55} Taepodong-1 was a medium range ballistic missile (MRBM) with a range of 1,000-2,500 km.

\textsuperscript{56} Lindsay and O’Hanlon (2001), p. 60. North Korea confirmed that it had successfully launched a satellite, called Kwangmyongsong-1, into orbit. Whatever the test was, missile technology required for a satellite is enough to be used for an ICBM. This made the test significant.
a limited national missile defense system. There must be a threat to warrant the deployment and our NMD development must have proceeded sufficiently so that we are technologically able to proceed. What we are saying today is that we now expect the first criterion will soon be met, and technological readiness will be the primary remaining criterion.57

The assessments of threats exemplified by the two incidents in 1998 renewed the threat perception, making a good case for the development of MD. Actually, affected by the two incidents, the new 1999 NIE report concluded: “during the next 15 years the United States most likely will face ICBM threats from Russia, China, and North Korea, probably from Iran, and possibly from Iraq.”58 This revised assessment finished official debate at the government level on whether the rogue-state missile threat was sufficiently imminent to warrant the deployment of the limited MD, although the actual deployment decision was expected to be made considering some other factors such as technological feasibility, budgetary implication, international responses, etc.

President Clinton finally signed the National Missile Defense Act of 1999 to make it a public law after he had indicated that he would not veto such a bill only if arms reductions efforts and funding were included in the bill. Therefore, even after the act was


passed, there seems to have been no real consensus on how and why an MD should be deployed: the Clinton administration did not fully embrace the necessity of MD.

Overall, U.S. policy-making regarding MD during the 1990s was dominated by strong Republican initiatives. The Republican Congress tried very hard to push forward MD deployment. Clinton’s unwilling support for MD had its roots in the Republican takeover of Congress, although Republicans aggressively spoke for MD even before this power shift in Congress. However, since Congressional initiative in security policy making is institutionally limited, and the Clinton administration fully exercised the executive advantage in that matter, domestic policy consensus was never achieved during the Clinton administration. Therefore, the Clinton administration deferred its decision of whether the U.S. should deploy an MD.

4.4 Implications

Above I have discussed the following: that there was evidence that the international balance of power did begin to change in favor of the U.S. during the Clinton administration; that nonetheless, the Clinton administration did not seriously take MD into account in reassessing U.S. strategic postures; finally that because of this executive

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59 For example, President Clinton vetoed MD legislations two times, but Congress failed to reverse the decision because it could not get enough support (two thirds) in Congress.
reluctance regarding MD, policy consensus for MD was not available despite the vigorous congressional thrust for the deployment of MD. The political passage in the 1990s illustrates this point well. During this period, Republicans pushed very hard to deploy an MD through various routes and Democrats in the executive branch were reluctant to fully support such an initiative.

With regard to the main argument of the study, we can infer several implications from this discussion. First, despite growing international incentives for MD, the U.S. did not earnestly attempt to acquire MD capability. This seems contradictory to offensive realism’s argument that states seek more power whenever possible. Because the long-lasting rival was weakening, the U.S. should have sought MD more aggressively than during the Cold War. However, U.S. weak interest in MD was logical considering the fact that MD has been nothing but a means to improve U.S. strategic advantage. MD could not be the best strategic choice for the U.S. with a substantially shrunken defense budget since it was still pursuing a nuclear strategy focused on a combination of counterforce strike and deterrence capability.\textsuperscript{60}

Second, the ultimate decision-making power for MD was in the hands of the executive branch in the sense that the intense congressional push did not result in the

\textsuperscript{60} Reduced defense expenditures along with the efforts to restructure government popular during the 1990s might have affected this strategic choice based on cost-benefit and cost-effective analyses.
authorization of MD. Although push for MD deployment came from Congress—different from the Cold War experience—this should be understood as a continuation from the previous practices. During the Cold War, the executive branch continually managed to mobilize domestic policy consensus for MD at its discretion. The Clinton administration could resist the strong congressional pressure for MD. As a result, MD was not deployed during the Clinton administration because of the lack of policy consensus at the policy-making level, while MD had been sought for several times during the Cold War.

Finally, therefore, to understand different dynamics of U.S. MD in different times, we should consider both the international context of U.S. strategic calculation and domestic politics that may or may not lead to policy consensus for MD. This final point will be further scrutinized in the next chapter while discussing the U.S. approach to MD under the current Bush administration.
CHAPTER 5

BUSH ADMINISTRATION’S MD POLICY

I have discussed in chapter 4 that despite the evolving international incentive, the U.S. did not proceed with the deployment of MD because domestic policy consensus for MD did not exist. In this chapter, I will first briefly examine the balance of power between the U.S. and Russia, emphasizing that the balance becomes more favorable to the U.S. Second, I will discuss the current Bush administration’s nuclear strategy and employment plans to utilize this favorable strategic environment. Third, I will review the domestic policy consensus for the current MD system as achieved by the Republican control over both governmental branches. Fourth, I will revisit the Bush administration’s rationale for deploying the current MD system to compare with the relevance of this study’s overall argument. I will conclude that the deployment of the current MD system is not well accounted for by the Bush administration’s policy and its justification that emphasizes the growing international ICBM threats; instead, it is better explained by incorporating both analyses of international strategic incentives for the U.S. and domestic
policy consensus for the deployment of MD that supported the realization of those incentives.

5.1 Strategic Balance and International Incentive for the U.S.

U.S. dominance in international affairs has continued after the Clinton administration. The balance of power between the U.S. and its potential adversary has constantly shifted in favor of the U.S. In the following, I will review this shifting balance focusing on the two familiar material resources of strategic power: military expenditures and strategic weapons.

5.1.1 Economic Balance of Power: Military Expenditures

Table 5.1 summarizes the obvious imbalance in economic power measured by military expenditures of the U.S. and Russia. As discussed in chapter 4, the gap in

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1 The current U.S. predominance is well characterized by the preventive war doctrine of the Bush administration. For the Bush doctrine, see White House, *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America* (September 2002). Based on the belief in U.S. strength and the changing nature of international threats, President Bush asserted in his speech at West Point, “When the spread of chemical and biological and nuclear weapons, along with ballistic missile technology—when that occurs, even weak states and small groups could attain a catastrophic power to strike great nations. Our enemies have declared this very intention, and have been caught seeking these terrible weapons. They want the capability to blackmail us, or to harm us, or to harm our friends—and we will oppose them with all our power.” Quoted in ibid., p. 13. According to Jervis, “now the preventive war doctrine is based on strength, and the associated desire to ensure the maintenance of American dominance.” See Robert Jervis, “Understanding the Bush Doctrine,” *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 118, No. 3 (September 2003), p. 370.
economic power between the two countries was increasing during the 1990s. Since then, the trend has not been reversed.

### TABLE 5.1

**BALANCE OF ECONOMIC POWER**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>US Military Expenditure</th>
<th>US ME share of GDP (%)</th>
<th>Russia Military Expenditure</th>
<th>Russia ME share of GDP (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>322,309</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>14,100</td>
<td>3.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>324,908</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>15,700</td>
<td>4.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>364,819</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>17,400</td>
<td>4.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>415,223</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>18,500</td>
<td>4.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>452,223</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>19,300</td>
<td>3.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>478,177</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>21,000</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Note: Military expenditures are in 2003 constant U.S. $, and ME share of GDP for both countries is not available for year 2005.

During the early 2000s, Russia could only allocate less than 5% of U.S. military expenditure to its military. Russia is no longer the country that once could compete with the U.S. during the Cold War and can catch up with the U.S. military spending if it wants.\(^2\) One analysis shows that Russia is not even second to the U.S. in military spending. According to this analysis, Russia is the 4\(^{th}\) country in military expenditure in

\(^2\) As seen in table 5.1, the relative size of GDP for both countries is very similar to that of military expenditure. In other words, their military expenditures quite accurately reflect their economic potentials.
purchasing power parity terms and 9th in military spending in market exchange rate terms in 2005.\(^3\) Considering the fact that military expenditure reflects a country’s intention to improve its strategic positions and its material basis for strategic capabilities to carry out that task, Russia is not a country that can interrupt any probable U.S. interest in maximizing its power.

In contrast, U.S. military expenditure takes almost half of the world’s total military spending. For example, U.S. military expenditure in 2000 was 41.1% of the total military expenditure in the world combined, and in 2005 the former takes 47.8% of the latter.\(^4\) Of course, U.S. military expenditure has been inflated due to the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq after 9/11. However, this increased U.S. military expenditure only underscores U.S. capacity to mobilize domestic resources to perform its security missions. Therefore, the gap in economic power between the U.S. and Russia does not allow any meaningful comparison. This situation provides a great opportunity to the U.S. to do anything it wants unilaterally for its security.


5.1.2 Balance of Power in Strategic Weapons

The balance between the U.S. and Russia in strategic weapons is still debatable. Mainly for the same reason discussed in chapter 4 that Russia still possesses large quantities of strategic weapons that can inflict unacceptable damage to the U.S., a more subtle discussion of the balance should be necessary. Table 5.2 simply compares two countries’ strategic nuclear forces in quantity.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>US</th>
<th>USSR/Russia</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Strategic Warheads</td>
<td>ICBM Warheads</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>6,832</td>
<td>2,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>6,196</td>
<td>1,700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>6,196</td>
<td>1,700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>6,140</td>
<td>1,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>5,886</td>
<td>1,490</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>4,216</td>
<td>1,150</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Archive of Nuclear Data from NRDC’s Nuclear Program (http://www.nrdc.org/nuclear/nudb/datainx.asp) for years 2000-2002; the remaining data are drawn from NRDC, “Nuclear Notebook” in different issues of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists.
Due to the START II agreement and negotiation in START III talks, both countries have gradually reduced the number of strategic nuclear warheads. The U.S. still has an edge in quantities, but it is not clear how big the advantage is from table 5.2 above. However, as discussed in chapter 4, some changes in the strategic weapons signify a shifting balance.

First of all, Russian ICBM forces, which are the traditional backbone of its strategic forces, have continuously reduced. As far as the Russian ICBM share of total strategic forces remains large, the reduction of Russian ICBM forces should have a greater impact on its overall strategic power than the same kind of reduction may have on the overall U.S. strategic forces. Russia’s new strategic plan indicates that it will decrease its ICBM numbers. This waning Russian ICBM capability is a serious disadvantage for Russia considering the fact that the modernization of Russian submarine forces as another

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5 According to START II treaty, which was signed in 1993 but became effective in 2000, both countries must reduce their total deployed strategic nuclear warheads to 3,000-3,500 by December 31, 2007; all MIRVed ICBMs must be eliminated from each side’s deployed forces; no more than 1,700-1,750 deployed warheads may be on SLBMs, which may be MIRVed. For the text of the treaty and limitations, see the hypertext version of the START II treaty at the State Department website (http://www.state.gov/www/global/arms/starthtm/start2/st2intal.html). START III treaty, if agreed, will allow only 2,000-2,500 strategic warheads on both sides.
nuclear triad has long delayed, and the retirement of Russian strategic submarines has continued without replacements.⁶

Second, in addition to this shrinking number of submarine forces, the operational capability of the Russian strategic submarines is in doubt. Russia conducted only 8 nuclear submarine deterrent patrols from 2002 through 2005, while it did 61 patrols in 1990 alone. In comparison, the U.S. conducts more than 40 such patrols per year.⁷ Therefore, with the robust operational Trident SLBMs, it is reasonable to say that the U.S. has a strategic advantage.⁸

For these reasons, some studies suggest that now the era of U.S. nuclear primacy, which means a U.S. achievement of a first-strike capability, is beginning.⁹ According to these studies, most Russian strategic nuclear forces are not ready for use and vulnerable to a U.S. surprise attack, while the U.S. has modernized its strategic weapons by making

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them more accurate and powerful.\textsuperscript{10} The U.S. has strong MINUTEMAN III ICBM forces. In addition, although the U.S. completed the decommission of its MX MIRVed ICBMs in 2005, it will keep those missiles for possible use.\textsuperscript{11} Trident II submarine forces guarantee a high level of strategic destructive capability. Finally, U.S. strategic bombers such as B-2 have been upgraded to meet a new strategic requirement.\textsuperscript{12}

Based on the examination above, we can conclude that the strategic nuclear balance between the U.S. and Russia has shifted substantially to U.S. advantage, too. With the increased economic edge over Russia, it is likely that the U.S. would try to increase its security with additional power increments.

5.2 U.S. Nuclear Strategy and Policy under the Bush Administration

The current Bush administration’s nuclear strategy and policy exemplifies a strong case for offensive realism’s argument for states’ intention of power maximization. Official statements by the Bush administration underscore the importance of preemption and full-spectrum dominance to improve U.S. security.


\textsuperscript{11} Norris and Kristensen (2006a), p. 68.

For example, Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) of 2001 established the new triad of offensive strike systems, defenses (both active and passive), and a defense infrastructure that will provide new capabilities in a timely manner to meet emerging threats.\(^{13}\) This posture opens the possibility that the U.S. would use strategic weapons in preemption by both denying the traditional role of nuclear weapons for threat-based deterrence and emphasizing a capability-based approach to U.S. security.\(^{14}\) This emphasis on full-spectrum strength includes an ambitious plan for MD. In contrast to the Clinton administration’s approach, this NPR explicitly guides that MD should be able to intercept ballistic missiles of any range in all phases of their flight.\(^{15}\)

U.S. Doctrine for Joint Nuclear Operations published in 2005 further clarifies the need for the U.S. to have full-spectrum strength. The doctrine notes that increasing uncertainty requires integrating conventional and nuclear attacks and offensive and defensive forces to address immediate contingencies. If integrated, these measures will


\(^{15}\) Ibid., p. 25.
limit attack damage to U.S. war-fighting capabilities and populations, and improve U.S.
deterrence by increasing adversaries’ uncertainty of achieving attack objectives.\textsuperscript{16}

To meet this strategic need, the U.S. officially withdrew from the ABM treaty on June 13, 2002 after announcing that it would unilaterally withdraw from the treaty on December 13, 2001. In his announcement, President Bush noted that the treaty hindered U.S. ability to develop ways to protect its people from future missile threats.\textsuperscript{17} This decision is not surprising because as the NPR of 2001 indicates, the Bush administration had already chosen to proceed with MD.

Overall, as also stated in \textit{Quadrennial Defense Review of 2001}, the main objective of U.S. defense strategy during the Bush administration is to create substantial margins of advantage across key functional areas of military competition.\textsuperscript{18} For this purpose, MD has been an indispensable element of the Bush administration’s strategic posture.

5.3 Strong Domestic Policy Consensus for MD during the Bush Administration

In contrast to the division between the executive and legislative branches regarding MD deployment during the Clinton administration, policy consensus for MD


\textsuperscript{17} “Remarks by the president on National Missile Defense” (December 13, 2001) (http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/12/20011213-4.html).

was easily achieved by the Republican control of both branches. For example, since the Bush administration began its annual budget request in 2001, Congress often authorized more funding for MD than the administration’s request, let alone the fact that Congress has not introduced any bill to halt and divert the path toward the deployment of the current MD system.¹⁹

Backed by Congressional support, the current Bush administration made MD its essential security policy from the beginning. Now the fundamental goal of the planned MD system is not limited, but instead it is to make the system able to engage all classes and ranges of ballistic missile threats.²⁰ The “Block Approach” of the Bush administration for testing and fielding promising technologies actually provides an easy way to increase the system capabilities.²¹


²¹ A block is a two-year term increment of the Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) providing an integrated set of capabilities. Each successive block provides increasing capabilities to capture ranges and complexities of missile. See MDA, “The Ballistic Missile Defense System,” p. 1
The current MD system was originally framed during the Clinton administration. The administration projected a ground-based system that would eventually consist of two interceptor sites, designed to defend the U.S. from ten to twenty incoming ballistic missiles by intercepting them in the midcourse of their flights. If fully extended, it would deploy 250 interceptors. It was called a limited system because the plan focused on destroying a moderate number of incoming missiles with a ground-based midcourse system. The current Bush administration has conducted a wide range of research and development programs for a variety of missile defense systems beyond the maximum capacity in the Clinton plan. Those programs will explore systems that will intercept missiles in the boost and terminal phases of their flights as well as in the midcourse phase.

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22 Ballistic missiles have boost, midcourse, and terminal phases. In the boost phase within the first 60 to 300 seconds of flight, a missile flies until it stops accelerating under its own power. The midcourse phase, which is outside the atmosphere, allows the largest window of opportunity to intercept. This is the point where the missile stops thrusting and follows a more predictable glide path. A missile enters the terminal phase when the warhead falls back into the atmosphere. It lasts less than a minute. See Missile Defense Agency, “The Ballistic Missile Defense System,” MDA Fact Sheets (http://www.mda.mil/mdalink/pdf/approach.pdf).

23 A midcourse system means a system designed to destroy a missile in the midcourse flight, after the rockets stop firing but before its warheads reenter the atmosphere. Midcourse intercept focuses on the longest phase of a missile’s flight lasting about 20 minutes in the case of ICBM, and therefore gives an interceptor the greatest amount of time to locate and converge with its target. The missile’s location can be predicted from the information gathered from the boost phase, continued observations by radar and sensors, and the mechanics of a ballistic trajectory. For the details of the three-step Clinton plan and the configuration of the midcourse system examined, see Congressional Budget Office, Estimated Costs and Technical Characteristics of Selected National Missile Defense Systems (January 2002).
It is expected that the U.S. will have an initial system of missile defense capabilities soon, depending on the technological progress.\textsuperscript{24}

5.4 Revisiting the Bush Administration’s Rational for MD

In the above, based on the offensive realism’s assumption, I established that the U.S. is trying to reduce its vulnerability to uncertain future threats by preventing opponents from challenging it while availing global projection of its military force if necessary, thus maximizing its security and power of various functions.\textsuperscript{25} With the existing U.S. deterrence capabilities, added strategic defense capabilities position the U.S. well over other great powers. This may be the most desirable situation the U.S. has ever imagined. The U.S. now has the best opportunity to create this situation: there is no

\textsuperscript{24} It should have been already deployed. President Bush announced that the U.S. would deploy the system no later than 2005. See White House, “President Announces Progress in Missile Defense Capabilities” (December 12, 2002) (http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/12/20021217.html). However, several unsuccessful interception tests delayed the progress of the deployment. For a review of technical problems and difficulties associated with interception tests and the actual deployment of the system, see Lisbeth Gronlund, David Wright, and Stephen Young, “An Assessment of the Intercept Test Program of the Ground-based Midcourse National Missile Defense System,” \textit{Defense and Security Analysis}, Vol. 18, No. 3 (September 2002), pp. 239-260.

\textsuperscript{25} For an excellent discussion regarding the utility and different functions of military power, other than actual offense, see Robert J. Art, “To What Ends Military Power?” \textit{International Security}, Vol. 4, No. 4 (Spring 1980), pp. 3-35.
substantial international challenge, as evidenced by the fact that no (great) powers have responded to U.S. MD development with tangible policies.\textsuperscript{26}

Domestically, for the first six years during the Bush administration, the U.S. enjoyed security policy consensus at the governmental level due to the Republican control over both Congress and the executive branch. I argue that U.S. MD efforts since the end of the Cold War are explained in terms of both the increased international incentives and the current domestic security policy consensus. In other words, since the development of U.S. MD was contingent upon the dynamics of these two factors, we need to consider both of them concurrently. Below I will review in detail the Bush administration’s rationale for MD deployment to assess the relevance of the argument vis-à-vis the argument of this study.

As briefly addressed in chapter 1, MD proponents such as the current Bush administration argue that missile developments in some states of concern (SOC) are the main factor to make the move toward the development of the current MD system. This threat argument maintains that such a defense is in its nature not threatening others. It is designed neither to change the status quo nor to expand U.S. power, but is only a

\textsuperscript{26} As Lieber and Press note, Russia’s strategic weapons upgrade projects have been delayed, and Chinese strategic weapons modernization plans have been too slow to make any impact on the U.S. deployment of MD.
response to new threats. Such a rationale for the current MD provided by the Bush administration is well reflected in the following speech:

…More nations have nuclear weapons and still more have nuclear aspirations. …Some already have developed the ballistic missile technology that would allow them to deliver weapons of mass destruction at long distances and at incredible speeds. And a number of these countries are spreading these technologies around the world. Most troubling of all, the list of these countries includes some of the world's least-responsible states. …They seek weapons of mass destruction to intimidate their neighbors, and to keep the United States and other responsible nations from helping allies and friends in strategic parts of the world. …To maintain peace, to protect our own citizens and our own allies and friends, we must seek security based on more than the grim premise that we can destroy those who seek to destroy us. This is an important opportunity for the world to re-think the unthinkable, and to find new ways to keep the peace. …We need new concepts of deterrence that rely on both offensive and defensive forces. Deterrence can no longer be based solely on the threat of nuclear retaliation. …We need a new framework that allows us to build missile defenses to counter the different threats of today's world.27

In addition, the North Korean Taepodong-1 missile test and the conclusion of the Rumsfeld Report seem to have heightened immediate threats from the SOCs perceived by U.S. policy makers. However, before claiming the direct relationship between the perceived threats and U.S. MD, there are a few points to ponder. First, the threat argument is logically weak.28 Second, the U.S. decision process toward the current MD

27 White House, “Remarks by the Presidents” (May 1, 2001).


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and changing funding levels for MD development do not support the threat argument. Finally, the technology of the projected system does not fit the threat argument, either.

5.4.1 Under-examined Intentions and Capabilities of SOCs

As the Bush administration asserts, those SOCs (or other non-state actors) may be revisionist, but it does not automatically follow that they would actually attack the U.S. in a self-destructive way.\(^\text{29}\) We should analyze “the regime’s intentions and capabilities, its perceptions of external actors, the nature of its leadership, the possibilities for domestic political evolution, etc.” to claim the direct relationship between its characteristics and its high probability of attack on the U.S.\(^\text{30}\)

First of all, labeling SOCs as “rogue states” considerably exaggerates the danger associated with those actors.\(^\text{31}\) The term “rogue” was originally used to denote countries

\(^\text{29}\) I don’t claim that U.S. policymakers totally overstated the danger on purpose without any justifiable reason. Instead, my point here is that they are ignorant of the subtlety of the issue involved when considering the threats.


\(^\text{31}\) See John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen M. Walt, “An Unnecessary War,” *Foreign Policy*, Vol. 134 (Jan/Feb 2003), pp. 50-59, and Hentz (2003). In both articles, the authors establish that tyranny is not necessarily irrational, and therefore there is no reason that nuclear deterrence would not work against those states, especially given the condition that they do not have a second strike capability.
of domestic oppression. After several years’ usage of this term, the U.S. State Department officially dropped the term, but the Bush administration began to reuse the term referring to several states. This labeling is misleading in two senses. First, the U.S. had similar experiences of this kind. During the early Cold War years, the U.S. strongly feared that the Soviet Union might use its nuclear weapons. The same fear emerged when China was about to deploy its ICBMS. In this respect, the rogue threats should be measured against those threats during the Cold War. In addition, as Mueller puts it, by labeling them, special attention was given to SOCs as if they constituted a new problem in international relations. They existed in the past and posed threats to the U.S. Now North Korea, for example, is far less significant a threat than during the Cold War because of its deteriorated economy and loss of external supports from China and the USSR. Notwithstanding, North Korea is automatically assumed to be undeterrable, and its probable acquisition of weaponry is expected to reveal its offensive intention even


though such use would be suicidal. Therefore, a careful analysis should be performed before trying to argue SOC’s threats as a justification of MD.

Second, making nuclear ICBMs is so difficult that only a few highly developed countries possess the resources and technologies to make them work. ICBMs are very expensive to produce and maintain. Although they (will) have some nuclear offensive capabilities, SOC’s intentions to actually use the weapons are highly doubtful. If those actors really intend to inflict considerable damage on the U.S., they should find better (cheap and easy) ways to do so (cruise missiles, suitcase bombs, and dirty bombs, etc). Actually, as Waltz notes, ICBMs are the least likely way SOCs would choose to deliver warheads. Therefore, their main purpose in building such weapons may be to gain prestige, or to deter or coerce the U.S. In that case, SOC’s threats should be re-


36 Even officials in the Bush administration frequently state that the main issue regarding North Korea’s nuclear missile development is not the possibility of the usage of the probable weapons, but the possibility of their transfer to other actors.


examined. In fact, the same NIE report, which called attention to the nuclear missile threat after the 1998 events, assessed the intentions of SOCs this way, contrary to its emphasis on the threat: “North Korea, Iran, and Iraq would view their ICBMs more as strategic weapons of deterrence and coercive diplomacy than as weapons of war.”

5.4.2 Changes in the Approach: Threats versus Politics

As noted in chapter 4, U.S. approaches (or decision) toward the deployment of MD did not substantially change even after the two incidents in 1998 during the Clinton administration. This implies that the threats may have not been significant as publicly stated. Two arguments are in order for this speculation.

First, the basic plan of the system remained the same after 1998. The Clinton administration originally projected a ground-based midcourse system, the Expanded Capability 1 architecture plan, trying to adhere to the ABM Treaty, which limited both sides to one anti-ballistic missile interceptor site. It would consist of 100 ground-based interceptors deployed at a single site. At the same time, a Capability 3 system would

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40 Here I explain the meaning of the number of interceptors. Since each attempt of interception of an incoming missile is independent of any previous attempts, the probability of intercept remains the same
add a second interceptor site, 150 additional deployed missiles, more radars, and improved software for the system’s components, to increase the number of interceptible missiles. During the Clinton administration, there was no significant change in the basic structure of the system capability (basically remained the Capability 1). Since 100 interceptors might be enough, in theory, to defend against a few arsenals from SOCs or even from China, there was no reason to increase the number of interceptors, should the system have been designed solely against such missiles.

However, changes in the approach occurred under the Bush administration, and the administration is expanding the interceptor numbers as well as their range of coverage.

Throughout each attempt. Therefore, if $q$ is the probability of failure, the probability of a successful interception of the missile at least once in $n$ tries is $1 - q^n$. Technically a successful interception is determined by three factors: the probability of discrimination of an actual warhead from decoys, the reliability of the rocket portion of interceptor, and the probability for hitting the warhead. To successfully intercept a missile, these three necessary conditions should be fulfilled at the same time. For a detailed discussion, see Craig Eisendrath, Melvin A. Goodman, and Gerald E. Marsh, The Phantom Defense: America’s Pursuit of the Star Wars Illusion (Westport: Praeger, 2001). If we assume the three probabilities are 90% each, then the number of interceptors required for a 90% chance of stopping an attacking missile is 2, and for 80% each, 3-4 interceptors are needed. Although Eisendrath, Goodman, and Marsh address a very pessimistic view about obtaining the discriminating technology at such a high percentage level, it is reasonable to assume that it is the U.S. expectation and will be available in the near future. In addition, the rocket reliability and hitting technology can be guaranteed at a more advanced level. If we assume the three probabilities to be 50%, 90%, and 90%, respectively, 4-5 interceptors are needed to warrant 90% chance of interception. In this sense, 100 interceptors are enough to deploy an effective shield against small arsenals of SOCs or even China.

As discussed in footnote 40, other capabilities may not be necessary against a small SOC’s arsenal. However, other options were also envisioned even during the Clinton administration. For details of alternatives envisioned, see CBO, “Estimated Costs” (2002).
This fact goes against the threat argument. The threat (if any) might be unrelated to the currently deploying system. This deduction is strengthened by a budget analysis in the following.

Historical funding for the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) clearly illustrates how the threats had less to do with the system development than politics of inter-governmental branches.\footnote{The MDA was renamed from the BMDO, which succeeded to the SDIO.} Table 5.3 summarizes the funding levels for MD projects.\footnote{Since the end of WWII, the U.S. had spent $937 billion through 1996 on strategic defenses such as strategic air defense, missile defense, anti-satellite and submarine warfare, and civil defense. Among them, ballistic missile defenses used $100.0 billion in constant 1996 dollars; it took 10.7 % of the total spending until then. See John E. Pike, Bruce G. Blair, and Stephen I. Schwartz, “Defending against the Bomb,” in Stephen I. Schwartz, ed., Atomic Audit: The Costs and Consequences of U.S. Nuclear Weapons since 1940 (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 1998), p. 269. Also see figure 4-1 on p. 270 of the book for a graphic illustration. However, it is very hard to estimate the actual cost of the past MD development, since there is no authoritative source for estimation. For example, analysts do not all agree on exactly what to count for MD and how to count it once identified because, in fact, MD was not a separate program until fiscal year 97. Therefore, this table is just to roughly estimate the general trend of the funding, not to calculate the exact amount devoted to MD development.} Actually, Table 5.3 raises doubts about the direct relationship between MD and the stated threats.

First, the funding levels for MD remained relatively constant even after the North Korean missile test and the release of the Rumsfeld Report (see the differences between FY 99 and FY 00).
### TABLE 5.3

**HISTORICAL FUNDING FOR MDA FY 89-04**

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Fiscal Year</th>
<th>89</th>
<th>90</th>
<th>91</th>
<th>92</th>
<th>93</th>
<th>94</th>
<th>95</th>
<th>96</th>
<th>97</th>
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<th>03</th>
<th>04</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>President’s Request (incumbent)</td>
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<td>4.6</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>5.4</td>
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<td>3.2</td>
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<td>2.8</td>
<td>3.6</td>
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<td>(D)</td>
<td>(D)</td>
<td>(D)</td>
<td>(D)</td>
<td>(D)</td>
<td>(D)</td>
<td>(R)</td>
<td>(R)</td>
<td>(R)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>House Authorization (majority)</td>
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<td>2.3</td>
<td>3.5</td>
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Source: Budget, abridged from MDA, “Ballistic Missile Defense Historical Funding” (http://www.mda.mil/mdalink/pdf/histfunds.pdf); Information for House majority, drawn from “Majority and Minority Leader, 1899 to Present” (http://clerk.house.gov/histHigh/Congressional_History/leaders.html); Information for Senate majority, drawn from “Party Division in the Senate, 1789-Present” (http://www.senate.gov/pagelayout/history/one_item_and_teasers/partydiv.htm).

* Budget amounts in Fiscal Year (FY) $ in billions. They are Budget Authority (BA) figures.44

Although former President Clinton increased his budget request for the MDA in FY 00, the authorization from both Houses did not increase significantly. Even the amount of House authorization ($3.7 billion) remained the same as the level before the North Korean missile test.

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Second, House authorizations as well as the president’s request were noticeably increased from FY 02, in which the Republican Party began to exert control over both legislative and executive branches. Therefore, it appears that any budget increase for MDA was related to domestic factors, coupled with inter-party politics, rather than SOCs’ threats.\(^{45}\)

Combining the two considerations, we can come to a strong conclusion. If the threats evidenced by the two incidents had been significant, the U.S. would have quickly changed its approach to the system. However, the U.S. did not do so under the Clinton administration, and only after the Republican Party took control over both governmental branches, the U.S. changed the approach toward MD. This means, contrary to the expressed concern about international nuclear missile developments, the U.S. was not surprised by the incidents, and the threats might not be the cause of MD.

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\(^{45}\) The increased perception of threats—that is, a fear of attack after 9/11—may partly explain the budget increase for MDA. This psychological explanation is plausible in a sense, but it does not follow that absent of 9/11, the U.S. would have neither adopted different approaches nor increased budget for MDA. Considering the fact that President Bush made MD a centerpiece of his defense proposals throughout his first presidential election campaign, the utility of this psychological explanation should be limited. In addition, according to the *Budget and Accounting Act of 1921* of the U.S., the president must annually submit a budget to Congress by the first Monday in February. Therefore, we know that President Bush’s FY 02 budget request (84% increase from FY 01) was already made in early 2001, not after 9/11. There was no direct relationship between budget increase in FY 02 and 9/11.
5.4.3 Technological Issues

In a sense, the issue of diverse MD capabilities is at the center of the debate between the two arguments addressed here. If the U.S.’s goal for MD was really limited, then the system should be optimized against those threats from SOCs. On the contrary, if the U.S. objective was to seek broader strategic advantages through MD, then the system would end up with a more comprehensive one, without considering the status quo among nuclear powers.

Instead of continuing to pursue only a limited ground-based midcourse system, the Bush administration began planning a wide range of research and development programs for a variety of different missile defense systems beyond the Capability 3 in the Clinton plan. Those programs will explore systems that would intercept missiles in the boost and terminal phases of their flights as well as in the midcourse phases, aiming at making the system able to engage all classes and ranges of ballistic missile threats.  

One of the advantages of the midcourse system is that it can have the greatest amount of time to locate, track, and destroy the incoming missiles. However, the system or the hit-to-kill vehicle in the system is very susceptible to decoys. Therefore, many proponents of MD have been trying to complement the weakness of the midcourse system with a boost phase system.

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Actually, boost phase capture can be ideal for MD because it intercepts missiles much earlier during their flight. The heat the rocket emits when lifting a missile makes it easy to distinguish decoys from actual warheads, and the boost phase interception can even prevent decoys from being deployed. In addition, a missile’s direction and course are very predictable in this phase. The only challenge with this interception is that the phase ends in a relatively short period of time, less than 5 minutes. Therefore, although the coverage of a boost phase defense is theoretically broad, its technical constraint narrows its usage for a limited range. To be effective and applicable, a boost phase system requires forward deployment of some of the major components such as sensor systems including radars and interceptors to guarantee a rapid interception.

Ironically, this limitation of the boost phase system makes it more preferable. Since its boundary and coverage are very limited, it is unlikely to have a significant impact on the strategic deterrence capabilities of countries other than the target if it is deployed very close to the target countries. In other words, “they would not threaten the basic viability of either the Russian or the Chinese nuclear deterrents.” Therefore, a

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48 For example, such a system can hardly capture missiles launched in the inland of both Russia and China.

ground-based boost phase system with back-up midcourse interceptors (a limited amount) is most preferable and best serves the threat argument of MD.\(^{50}\) In other words, if the U.S. deploys this kind of system, we can say that it is almost perfectly optimized against a limited threat posed by SOCs. However, the Bush administration is preparing for a so-called layered system that would combine boost phase and multiple midcourse systems.\(^{51}\)

In addition, even under the ABM Treaty that the U.S. had already abandoned, the U.S. could have been allowed to possess a total of 200 interceptors. Considering the very limited ICBM capabilities of SOCs, more seem to have been unnecessary. Yet the Bush administration had already withdrawn from the treaty in order to have a more comprehensive defense, including various options such as ground, sea, air, and space interceptions, along with the increased number of interceptors and other means of destroying missiles.

Of course, forward deployment of a sophisticated x-band radar near Russia and China increases U.S. defense against both countries to some extent since the U.S. can acquire more rapid and accurate strategic information regarding their weapons.\(^{52}\) As a

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\(^{50}\) Lindsay and O’Hanlon call it a limited two-tier system. See ibid., pp. 144-152.


\(^{52}\) Considering the location of SOCs such as North Korea or Iran, this forward deployment seems inevitable if the U.S. wants only a very limited boost phase system. Then this issue would become a problem.
result, once a layered or two-tier system is employed, there is no way not hurting the
deterrence capabilities of Russia and China in both technical and strategic senses. That is,
the current program in progress under the Bush administration reveals a somewhat
apparent weakness of the threat argument.

This section so far has looked at the relevance of the argument of this study and
the threat argument widely acknowledged. In sum, the decision timing of the current MD
system is the main issue in need of reevaluation. The threat argument cannot explain why
the decision was not made until the current Bush administration. If the threat was so great
to cause MD deployment, the decision should have been made under the Clinton
administration. However, Clinton deferred his decision regarding the deployment of MD.
The reason for the putting off is well accounted for in the argument of this study. Due to
the differing goals and perspectives for national security among policy makers, especially
between the Republican Congress and the Democratic executive branch, there was no
policy consensus to actively seek for MD in the Clinton era.

In addition, the actual impact of the test of Taepodong-I for the U.S. is less clear
than generally assumed. The U.S. already knew of missile developments in North Korea
long before the test. For example, U.S. satellites detected North Korean missile
developments in February 1994, and since then, the U.S. has kept track of the
development of the program despite North Korean effective concealment. In doing so, the
U.S. anticipated that North Korea could test Taepodong-1 by the late 1990s. Then, how could the test constitute a new imminent threat for the U.S.? The test itself could hardly be a surprise because the U.S. had already discovered preparations before the test and even warned North Korea not to conduct the test.\(^53\) As a result of the test, North Korea faced international pressure (either intended or not), and it began negotiations with the U.S. on its moratorium on long-range missile tests and agreed to the moratorium in September 1999, in exchange for U.S. partial lifting of economic sanctions against North Korea.\(^54\) It is still very difficult to assess how much progress North Korea has made since then. North Korea had observed a deferment on its long-range missile test for the last few years before it conducted tests in July of 2006. And it is still not clear if the test of Taepodong-2, which is expected to be able to strike U.S. territory, was a success or a failure.

5.5 Implications

The issues discussed above together cast plausible doubt on the Bush administration’s rationale. While the deployment of the current MD system is better


\(^{54}\) Ibid., p. 78.

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explained by incorporating analyses of both international strategic incentives for the U.S. and domestic policy consensus for the deployment of MD that supported the realization of those incentives than by the threat argument only, both acknowledge that the U.S. is now preparing for some probable threats to enhance its security. In this regard, one of the differences between the two arguments is whether the threats are real. Of course, I do not pretend to have proven that the threats are weak enough to totally negate the threat argument, nor do I argue that U.S. deployment of MD is an inadequate policy choice, which would necessarily bring negative effects to the real world.

My argument in this study only points out that as long as international threats exist, policies like MD would be sought for by states with resources to do so. This happens because states want to be more secure if possible. MD provides a good example to review the relevance of offensive realism’s assumption regarding the basic motive of states. States want to maximize their power, but the fundamental goal behind this intention is security. MD is a defense in a sense, but it is a means of increasing U.S. power to assure its security. U.S. official statements regarding MD certainly emphasize the linkage between MD and other U.S. strategic forces and military capabilities.55

Without an understanding of this aspect of the MD issue, policy implications of MD can be misinterpreted.

In addition, domestic consensus for such policies plays a crucial role in determining the fate of the policies given the international incentives for such policies. The comparison of different MD approaches of the Clinton and Bush administrations exhibits the impact of domestic consensus on MD policy at the governmental level. Under similar conditions, both administrations’ policy paths were different due to the difference in the existence of policy consensus. Although congressional initiatives for MD were strongly introduced, the ultimate decision-making power resided in the hands of the executive branch. Therefore, with different interpretations of strategic circumstances, the two administrations managed to make different MD decisions.
CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSION

U.S. experiences during the Cold War uncover some implications for the main claim of the study. In that period, a series of MD projects were neither purely defensive measures nor limited in their effects. They were designed to advance U.S. strategic advantages over its rivals. With its ability to acquire additional power elements, the U.S. constantly pursued MD. Whether or not a specific system was pursued and canceled was rather contingent upon the variations in domestic policy consensus for it. In other words, to initiate or to end a system development (or deployment), the main veto players (the executive branch and Congress) needed to develop a policy consensus.

In chapters 4 and 5, I have discussed the different approaches of the Clinton administration and the Bush administration toward MD, and have found out that those two administrations’ approaches are consistent with the Cold War experiences. The current MD case shows that despite relatively increased international incentives during
the 1990s, the U.S. could not successfully proceed toward MD deployment until the Republican Party took control over both governmental branches after 2000.¹

In short, this study has so far established that the current U.S. MD should be understood in terms of the dynamic function of the international incentives variable and the domestic policy consensus variable. Although we cannot totally neglect the impact on the U.S. of the stated threat posed by new international missile developments, the threat cannot explain important issues engaged in the current MD politics. This study clearly shows that it was not until the Republican Party took control of both branches, establishing security policy consensus at the government level that the U.S. could actively proceed with MD deployment.

In more general terms, based upon the contingencies of the two variables and in the relationship between them, the development toward MD and the eventual deployment of the current system was determined. Building on this discussion, we can predict that, as

¹ Of course, technological problems may have thwarted earlier deployment. However, it was not the main factor for the delayed deployment. The Clinton administration could have supported more rigorous research and development (R&D) to quickly address any possible problems revealed, but it did not. In other words, if technological problems had been the main issue, we should have seen increased funding for R&D and a lot of debate on the issue. However, there was no such indication. Policy makers who spoke for MD were always confident about the technological feasibility of MD. They were generally sure of technological success of envisioned MD systems. For example, a simple retrieval of newspaper articles would produce evidence of such confidence. Therefore, technology was not the main factor in the U.S. decision toward MD. Only after substantial R&D and tests were conducted did technological feasibility appear on the table.
long as the U.S. enjoys both international incentives and domestic policy consensus that supports to materialize the incentives, the U.S. will proceed toward the deployment of the currently projected MD. To put it differently, given the current international situation, unless there is an event that impedes the existing domestic policy consensus and establishes a new policy consensus for abandoning MD, U.S. policy toward MD may remain the same.²

Offensive realism posits that states respond to international uncertainties by seeking more power and influence when they are able to do so, in preparation for possible future threats. The threat represents the uniqueness of international relations. Although there can be various ways to mitigate the effect of international anarchy, from the perspective of realism, security threats in international relations are inevitable and exist

² There are two possibilities that could change this domestic consensus. One is altering the domestic political structure. It would be a Democratic take-over of the administration. Although 2006 midterm elections resulted in a Democratic majority in both Houses, this alone cannot break the existing policy consensus or establish a new consensus for different policy choices. Another possibility may come from waning confidence in MD technology. If skepticism is broadly shared by elites or the American public, the situation may be different. The repeated failure in interception tests of the current system until now leaves room for such a change in the faith in the system. Actually, the strong domestic support for the SDI declined when some of the main elements of the system proved to be impossible to achieve at the time, and most of the unpromising technologies of the SDI lost their funding by 1987. See John E. Pike, Bruce G. Blair, and Stephen I. Schwartz, “Defending against the Bomb,” in Schwartz, ed., Atomic Audit: the Costs and Consequences of U.S. Nuclear Weapons since 1940 (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 1998), p. 291.
as a constant unless the international system itself changes. For this reason, it is reasonable to say that a threat itself does not yield a specific policy outcome. Instead, power resources available to a state determine how the state acts in response to international incentives or threats.

Many proponents of MD are relatively unconcerned about its impact on international relations. They believe MD is a domestic issue because it is designed to defend U.S. territory, not to offend any countries. However, regardless of its original purpose, it has been deeply involved in other countries’ security concern and national interests. Yet IR theories, too, have not paid much attention to the MD issue despite these implications. MD politics reveals how the shadow of security dilemma still exerts a significant influence in international relations. In addition, if we extend the discussion to a regional context, a functioning MD can easily reinforce a security dilemma existing in the region, as in Northeast Asia. In theory, MD deployment may likely escalate regional conflicts to war during the course of action-reaction chains between the U.S. and its

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regional challengers. In this regard, MD can be counterproductive to regional security. After all, in addition to its global strategic significance, the regional implication of MD should be dealt with as an important issue that needs more attention.

Having said the above, this study leaves more to be investigated and answered. First, for generalization across states, we need other cases to examine whether similar behavior in similar circumstances is observed. Second and relatedly, regarding the revisionist tendency of states assumed by offensive realism, two things should be clarified: the relative importance of international incentives and domestic consensus, and the impact of international system structure change (i.e., from bipolar to unipolar) on states’ revisionist motivations.

On the one hand, we should determine how a country would respond to international (or regional) incentives if there is no actual veto in security policy in the


5 Actually, this comparable case may be difficult to get because there have been only a few nuclear powers, and the context of their domestic political structure for policy consensus differ from country to country. Therefore, a vigorous comparison may not be possible.
country. In other words, the question is how much domestic regime characteristics explain the utilization of international incentives, other things being equal. For example, are democracies less revisionist than non-democracies, or are parliamentary systems more revisionist than presidential systems because they are more likely to have a consensus and decisiveness in policy making? On the other hand, are states more opportunistic in a certain system structure, or do different international system structures make no difference in states’ responses? For example, many scholars consider the U.S. at the moment a benign hegemon.\(^6\) Does this unique position of the U.S. entail different policy responses eventually, despite its dedication to the deployment of MD? In other words, does a less competitive international system structure provide states with modest incentives for expansion? With these questions, further study is in order.


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