THREAT, FAITH, AND COMMUNITY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF
AMERICAN MUSLIM POLITICAL IDENTITY IN 21ST CENTURY

AMERICA

A Dissertation
Submitted to the Graduate School
of the University of Notre Dame
in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements
for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

by

Patrick L. Schoettmer

________________________________

David E. Campbell, Director

Graduate Program in Political Science

Notre Dame, Indiana

July 2014
THREAT, FAITH, AND COMMUNITY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF
AMERICAN MUSLIM POLITICAL IDENTITY IN 21ST CENTURY

AMERICA

Abstract

by

Patrick L. Schoettmer

This dissertation examines the changes in political, civic, and social behavior among American Muslims following the attacks in New York City and Washington DC on September 11, 2001. In particular, the dissertation examines the evolution of Muslim self-image in light of the perception of increased hostility and rejection from non-Muslim elements of the American public and even the American government. By examining the transformation of a community from an ethnically fragmented and politically divided collective into an increasingly coherent political and civic actor, this dissertation both examines the interconnection between the concepts of race and religion and how these concepts
can become fused when the distinctions fade or are never recognized by majority populations. The transformation of the importance and meaning of Muslim identity among those outside the group has lead to both social and political realignments within the Muslim community. By focusing on this transformation and the predictors that explain it, this dissertation tests hypotheses that link the perception of external threat to the way people process political information and allow it to shape their political behavior and belief systems.

This dissertation relies both on national survey samples of Muslim-Americans as well as interviews, participant observation, and localized surveys administered to Muslims throughout the state of Indiana to test the relationship between the perception of threat and the salience of ethnic and religious identity. This dissertation finds that the perception of people that fall outside the in-group play an important role in shaping the salience of a given identity, and that the needs of in-group authenticity and the need for out-group political alliances compete to shape the value systems of individuals who opt in to the identity group. At the same time, the perception of threat simultaneously increases the level of political engagement while discouraging other forms of civic and social contact with the broader community.
For Katrina, who is probably more patient that she should be
TABLE OF CONTENTS

Figures ................................................................................................................................. v
Tables ................................................................................................................................. vii
Acknowledgements ............................................................................................................. viii

Chapter 1: Finding Islam in the Public Square ................................................................. 1
1.1. The Boundaries of Race and Religion ................................................................. 6
1.2. The Importance of "Us" ..................................................................................... 10
1.3. How Politics Shapes "Us" .................................................................................. 14
1.4. America's Muslims ........................................................................................... 23
1.5. The Emergence of "Us" ..................................................................................... 39
1.6. How "Us" Shapes Politics .................................................................................. 46
1.6.1. Political Engagement .................................................................................. 46
1.6.2. Political Partisanship ................................................................................... 48
1.6.3. Policy Preferences ....................................................................................... 51
1.7 The Next Step ....................................................................................................... 51

Chapter 2: From Communities of Muslims towards a Muslim Community .................. 56
2.1. Ethnicity and American Islam ........................................................................... 58
2.2. Religious Practice ............................................................................................... 64
2.3. Trust and Political Engagement ....................................................................... 71
2.4. Discussion and Conclusions ............................................................................. 83
2.5. A note on the data used for this chapter ............................................................ 88

Chapter 3: Identity and Solidarity ..................................................................................... 90
3.1. Sources of Muslim Identity ................................................................................ 92
3.2. Data and Methodology ...................................................................................... 101
3.3. Searching for a Muslim Political Identity ......................................................... 102
3.4. Muslim Identity: Impact and Significance ...................................................... 114
3.5. Discussion and Conclusions ............................................................................. 132

Chapter 4: Identity Politics and the American Ummah ............................................... 139
4.1. Theories of Partisan Identity ........................................................................... 143
4.2. Becoming a Democratic Group ....................................................................... 148
4.3. Religiosity ......................................................................................................... 161
4.4. Issue Preference .............................................................................................. 165
4.5. Group Affect .................................................................................................... 167
4.6. Discussion and Conclusions ................................................................. 177

Chapter 5: Class and Culture in Islamic Indianapolis ......................... 181
5.1. Religion and Public Engagement ...................................................... 183
5.2. The Mosques of Indianapolis ............................................................... 189
5.3. Ethnic and National Diversity in the Mosque Community ............. 191
5.4. Social Class and Hoosier Muslims ....................................................... 195
5.5. Civic Engagement, Politics, and non-Muslim Neighbors .......... 198
5.6. Congregations and Competition ........................................................ 204

Chapter 6: Muslims in the US: Moving into the Future ...................... 207

Appendix A: Variable Coding ................................................................. 219

Appendix B: Supplementary Tables and Figures ................................. 225

Appendix C: A note on the demographics of the IMPAS sample ...... 232

Appendix D: Glossary of key non-English Terms ............................... 236

Works Cited ............................................................................................ 238
FIGURES

Figure 1.1: Jackson (2011) model of political identity formation .......... 18
Figure 1.2: The transformation of social identity into political attitudes .. 20
Figure 1.3: Muslims comprise a very small part of the overall US religious landscape (Pew 2007) ................................................................. 25
Figure 1.4: US Muslims, by region of birth (Pew 2007) ...................... 26
Figure 1.5: Select American Muslim demographics (Pew 2007) .......... 27
Figure 1.6: Percent responding that violence is never an acceptable means to achieve political ends (Pew 2011) ........................................ 28
Figure 1.7: Hate crimes per million citizens (FBI Unified Crime Report, 1996-2010) ......................................................................................... 37
Figure 2.1: Educated black Muslims drop off in mosque attendance between 2001 and 2004 ....................................................................... 66
Figure 2.2: Importance of ethnic group activism fades by 2004 .......... 67
Figure 2.3: Mean civic engagement, by ethnicity ................................. 69
Figure 2.4: Mistrust of the US Government grows among Muslims between 2001 and 2004 in response to the question, "Is the government engaged in a war against terrorism or against Islam?" .................. 72
Figure 2.5: Drop-off in trust in government greatest among the most religious ................................................................................................. 73
Figure 3.1: Ethnic identity more salient for ethnic minorities .......... 106
Figure 3.2: Personal piety is strongly and negatively correlated with ethnic identity ......................................................................................... 108
Figure 4.1: Muslims become a solidly Democratic voting bloc after 2001 ................................................................................................. 141
Figure 4.2: Proposed model of political evaluation .............................. 146
Figure 4.3: Republican Muslims most secular; Independents most religious ................................................................................................. 162
Figure 4.4: Democrats favored by all segments of the Muslim community ................................................................................................. 168
Figure 4.5: Secular Republicans warmest Muslims towards Evangelical Christians ........................................................................................................... 171
Figure 4.6: Independents see neither party as friendly .............................. 173
Figure 4.7: GOP Muslims only segment of community more concerned about Islamic radicals ........................................................................................................... 174
Figure C1. Political Feeling Thermometer Ratings ................................. 234
TABLES

Table 2.1: Mean level of civic and political engagement, by belief in the intentions of the US government ................................................................. 75
Table 2.2: Black Muslims more motivated by piety, while Arab Muslims more motivated by ethnic identification .................................................. 77
Table 2.3: Private devotionalism shapes Arab and Black Muslim behavior differently ......................................................................................... 82
Table 3.1: More respondents categorized highest on religious dimensions, though many score low on both ......................................................... 104
Table 3.2: Close network affiliations best predict differences in lined fate orientation .......................................................................................... 112
Table 3.3: Frequenct of civic engagement acts for IMPAS respondents .. 118
Table 3.4: Feeling threatened is associated with greater social isolation among Muslims .......................................................................................... 119
Table 3.5: Threat negatively correlates with voting in Pew survey data ... 121
Table 3.6: Muslim identity oriented more towards "in-group" categories. 127
Table 3.7: Responses to item inventory in IMPAS survey .................... 130
Table 3.8: Religious Muslims only more engaged within the Muslim community ................................................................................................. 135
Table 4.1: Partisanship 2001-2004: Perceived threats shape Muslim partisan preferences ................................................................. 152
Table 4.2: Ideology 2001-2004: Muslims align ideologically for the same reasons other Americans do ................................................................. 155
Table 4.3: Partisanship 2007-2011: Greater Muslim homogeneity in responses ................................................................................................. 157
Table 4.4: Ideology 2007-2011: Foreign-born Muslims disinclined to identify with an ideology ................................................................. 160
Table 4.5: Religious Muslims more likely to pick "None of the Above" .. 164
Table 4.6: Identity and linked fate rarely influential in the same model .. 167
Table 4.7: Linked fate beliefs shape Muslim perceptions of religious
threat ................................................................................................................................. 176
Table B1. Network Homogeneity and Personal Piety Drives Muslim-First Identity over Ethnic-First Identity ........................................ 226
Table B2. Political Feeling Thermometers ................................................................. 227
Table B3. Ethnic/Religious Feeling Thermometers ......................................... 228
Table B4. Issue Preferences .............................................................................. 229
Table B5. Alternative Model Construction for Social Engagement Measure .......................................................................................... 230
Table B6. Question Wording for Issue Inventory ........................................ 231
Table C1. Identified Ethnicity of Respondents ............................................. 233
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Success, as they say, has many fathers. This is certainly true for a successful dissertation. As such, there are a great many to whom I owe thanks in helping me on this journey. Near the top of this list belong the member of my committee, particularly Dave Campbell. I came in to Notre Dame knowing what I wanted to write about, but I probably wouldn't have come to Notre Dame at all had Dave not sold me on all the school had to offer. From my first day to my last, his guidance, support, mentorship, and friendship left an indelible mark on this work and the scholar I am emerging into. Dianne Pinderhughes was also a fantastic mentor, a caring and friendly woman, and someone whose guidance has had a powerful influence on me. Geoff Layman's wit, humor, and keen insight improved vast swaths of this work, while Ricardo Ramirez's advice and guidance helped to bring in important angles to bear on this work that, in my opinion, improved it considerably. I had the great good luck of having many outstanding people to study under here at Notre Dame, and Darren Davis, Mike Desch, Sebastian Rosato, Ben Radcliff, Craig Beyerlein, and Rich Williams also deserve particular note for guidance and counsel they provided on my journey. My peers were also of great help, particularly Jeremy Castle, Greg Shufeldt, Michael Hartney, Claudia Anewaldt, Todd Adkins, Chris Weaver, and Andre Audette, all of whom commented at one point or another on parts of this project that
eventually joined the whole. Special thanks is also due to Abdulkader Sinno at Indiana University, who helped to convince me that academia would be the way for me to go and that American Muslims were who I should be looking at, and Paul Djupe, who provided considerable assistance in helping me develop my survey for this project.

I also benefitted from considerable support outside academia in this project. Shariq Sadiqqi and the Muslim Alliance of Indiana was a tremendous resource and partner is this project, and this project could fairly be said to be as much due to their dedication to seeing this project through as my own. I am forever indebted to them. The Horowitz Foundation for Social Policy provided valuable support at a critical juncture in this project, and their generous backing is likewise greatly appreciated as well. I am also grateful to my many friends who helped to support me financially as well as intellectually at the University of Notre Dame, including the Institute for Liberal Arts, the Department of Political Science, the Department of Africana Studies, and the Rooney Center for American Democracy. The Pew Research Center (and particularly Greg Smith with the Religion and Public Life Project) were immensely helpful, both in making data available as well as providing information that helped keep the project on track and on schedule. I am also thankful to the US State Department, for helping me in my efforts to learn Arabic and to better understand Arab society. Finally, I am thankful to the many people who took time out of their busy days to talk to me about their lives, their communities, their fears, and their hopes. Shukran jazilan.
Last, but certainly not least, thanks is owed to my family, and particularly to my travelling circus. My wife made my goals her goals, which I still don't understand but will be eternally grateful for. My three children were also wonderful companions on this journey, and it is my hope that having taken this journey with me will help them on their many journeys and adventures to come.
CHAPTER 1:
FINDING ISLAM IN THE PUBLIC SQUARE

Abstract: In this chapter, I will introduce the two foci of this project: an empirical analysis of the political transformation of American Muslims at the beginning of the 21st century and a theoretical analysis of the drivers of rapid partisan (and identity) changes. The central argument of this chapter is that political identity is a product of individual social identities, made salient both by out-group emphasis and in-group promotion.

In the late summer of 2006, the 5-year anniversary of the September 11th attacks were approaching in the midst of an ongoing war in Iraq, another in Afghanistan, and a rancorous mid-term election. Controversy swirled abroad due to the violent response to a Danish newspaper's printing of what were seen as disrespectful images of the Prophet Muhammed along with a US-backed Israeli incursion into southern Lebanon. The former controversy found its way into the broader American dialogue a second time when Viacom chose to prevent the Comedy Central television show "South Park" from depicting the Prophet on their show following the Danish incidents.

It was in this environment that many journalists began to look at American Muslims, in order to report on how the impending anniversary was being seen
within the community. The discussion emerging from the burst of interest inspired by the 9/11 anniversary produced an intriguing image of the state of American Islam. Some female Muslims openly discussed their debates about "passing" - either as Christian or as a "non-Muslim" ethnicity like Latino - while others talked about "coming out" to friends as Muslim and the way such revelations would change their relationships (Kuruvilla 2006). Others described a siege-mentality where Muslims openly wondered amongst themselves whether there would be a Japanese-style internment of their co-religionists in the US (Micheles2006).

Muslims in the US felt under attack, and the feeling was not entirely unjustified. A 2006 Gallup survey reports 39% of American respondents admitting to prejudice against Muslims, with 1 out of 5 saying they would not want Muslim neighbors and half of respondents saying that they do not believe Muslims are respectful towards women.

It was also during this time that Moustafa Bayoumi echoed the question asked by W.E.B. DuBois over one hundred years prior in *The Soul of Black Folk* when he asked Arab-Americans "How does it feel to be a problem?" This question puts words to precisely the position many American Muslims of all ethnic backgrounds felt themselves to be in following the September 11th attacks. Through events completely beyond the control of those in the community, American Muslims found themselves the focus of intense scrutiny amidst a shifting political landscape. The very meaning of the community's core defining feature - its faith - was a subject of political debate and contestation. It is important to understand how this shifting perception of American Muslims in turn
transformed Muslim self perception, but it is equally important to understand, "What does it mean to become a problem?" More specifically, what are the political and civic consequences of a radical transformation of the social status of a primary reference group, and does this rapid transformation cause individuals to move away from this identity or to embrace and identify with it all the more strongly?

In what follows, I will argue that individuals contain a multitude of competing- and sometimes contradictory- identities with which they define themselves. Different identities will, in different situations, provide the dominant frame through which situations will be evaluated. The strength of a given identity is important, in that it makes it more likely that one identity will be the preferential mode through which an individual understands the world, but this process is also necessarily bounded and limited by the inputs of an individual's social networks. In terms of political identity, the perception of group threat is a key social cue individuals employ in order to understand which identities are most salient for the political environment. An individual's social environment is generally highly stable, which produces a consistent framework through which the political environment is understood. However, when the social environment is destabilized, individuals re-evaluate the identity frame through which they understand the political system, which can produce rapid shifts in long-held positions if a new framework is chosen inconsistent with old patterns and behaviors. This will lead to a change in the political preferences of respondents,
as well as influencing their degree of civic and political engagement in the process.

The study that follows picks up on some important trends in the contemporary political science literature. Among the most important of these trends is research into the role ethnocentrism plays in American politics. This line of research is best embodied recently by the 2009 work by Donald Kinder and Cindy Kam, *Us Against Them*. In this work, Kinder and Kam lay out a persuasive argument for the influence of ethnocentric attitudes on public opinion, as well as laying out a theory of how such attitudes develop and solidify.¹ They identify the importance of in-group solidarity and out-group disparagement, but do not discuss how one identity becomes more salient than the other in the political arena. The situation of Muslims in the United States gives us an opportunity to get purchase on this process. Prior to 9/11, Muslims in America were generally described as a collection of groups that could loosely be tied under a religious banner (Saeed 2003). However, by 2004, Muslims had begun acting in a politically cohesive manner similar to other small ethno-religious groups. By examining Muslim political and civic behavior, both from the individual level and from an organizational level, this study intends to cast light on the process through which individuals place themselves into politically salient in-groups.

Converse (1964) noted the enduring stability of issues that touch on matters of race, and how issues that could be framed in a racial terms are generally more salient to voters. Mendelberg (2001) in turn argues that subtle and

¹ Specifically, Kinder and Kam argue that ethnocentrism contains a genetic component to it, but is also impacted by an individual's personality and education, among other factors.
implicit racial messages are readily picked up at an unconscious level by voters.\footnote{It should be noted that Mendelberg's theory is explicitly focused on white racial cue response. White (2007) argues that these same mechanics work differently among African-American (and presumably other minority) voters.} The ability for subtle cues to be successful relies on an immediately accessible racial frame through which issues can be viewed. The core of the racial view relies on creating an "other" rooted in a political and economic understanding of interests against which one can be defined (Omi & Winant 1986.) Race, while one of the central important dividing lines in American politics, is not the only line along which such groupings can occur. Any group, in theory, can be readily lumped into an "other" category if the group has readily identifiable features and whose interests can be understood as either in competition with or in opposition to one's own perceived group interests. Kinder and Kam (2009) cite Walter Dean Burnham's (1974) evaluation that the "ethnocultural antagonisms" of race, ethnicity, class, religion, and region as the most fundamental groupings in the American political framework (p 32.)

Traditionally, religious identities served to reinforce racial identities. The literature on religion and politics generally concedes the importance of distinguishing between black and non-black Protestants or Latino and non-Latino white Catholics (Green 2007.) At times, religious groups and organizations that have a diverse local congregation can work to break down religious tensions (c.f. Putnam & Campbell 2010; Emerson 2006; Dougherty & Huyser 2008.) At other times, religious affiliations can replace racial categorization, as happened with Mormons in the 19th century (c.f. Ertman 2010). These ethnoreligious groupings can function essentially as a racial group both within and without the identity...
boundary. Navigating when a racial frame will emerge within or even supplant another powerful organizational framework (such as a religious frame) is a question the Muslim Diaspora is uniquely positioned to help us understand.

This examination of the question will begin by laying out the broad outlines of debate around race and religion, looking at what we know about how these two pillars of identity interact. After that, we will move to sketching out a theory of how these identities shape one another, and particularly how one or the other becomes prominent in the political thinking of individuals. To highlight the theorized interaction, we will then briefly examine how Islam has operated in the US among various ethnic groups by drawing together disparate ethnographies of American Islam to demonstrate how the various Islamic groups have gradually converged on Muslim identity as a key political identity in the US. Finally, we will take the proposed theory and, drawing on the presented history of American Muslims, use the case to explore further in depth how this theorized interaction works.

**The Boundaries of Race and Religion**

The study of race in American politics is a venerable and well-established research program. The study of religion’s role in the political system, however, is relatively young (Wald & Wilcox 2006). While the nascent field of religion and politics has grown rapidly, there are many lacunae in the body of research that invite further exploration. The study of the interaction of racial and religious identities is one such areas. Religion and race are often discussed in the same
context, but most often pertaining to the way in which the former reinforces the latter. Black Protestantism is the prototypical example of this in the literature and has been since the 1950s (Marx 1967). Recent literature has looked at the ways in which religion can subsidize racial activity, such as by providing resources and networks to facilitate the organization and mobilization of co-ethnics for political purposes as well as providing psychological fortification for those that might otherwise feel put-upon by society (Harris 1999). However, religion is not seen as defining the boundaries or helping to create the understanding of the racial identity of the group- it is largely seen as a tool and a resource. While there is a tacit understanding that race matters in understanding how religion shapes behavior- which had led to the differentiation between black Protestants from whites and Latino Catholics from “Anglo” Catholics in recent work- there is little research into how religion or race define and limit the borders of the other.\footnote{There have been a few works that have sought to examine the role religion plays in shaping racial attitudes. Among the most notable of these works are Gordon's (1964) \textit{Assimilation in American Life} and Emerson and Smith's (2000) \textit{Divided by Faith}.}

We know that religion and race are both shaped by the political climate of the nation. White ethnics went through a process of assimilation following their arrival to the US. European immigrants from Ireland and the Mediterranean countries, as well as European Jewish immigrants, were initially seen as outside the Anglo-Saxon Protestant understanding of what it meant to be "white" in America. It is only later, as these immigrants saw their political influence grow, that they were incorporated into the conception of whiteness (Dahl 1961; Jacobson 1999). Arabs make an interesting example of this phenomenon. Arabs had no less than 9 different decisions from the Supreme Court from 1909 to 1945.
on their precise racial categorization, with the court eventually settling on the
decision to classify Arabs as a white ethnic group (Haney-Lopez 1996). This was
not simply a rhetorical exercise, however—given the immigration laws of the time,
classification as a white people allowed Arabs to immigrate free of the restrictions
placed on others coming from Asia or Africa. African-Americans, on the other
hand, are the prototypical group that has had the boundaries of their racial and
ethnic categories defined by law, first with slavery and then through various laws
and census formulations.

Eric McDaniel argues that the creation of these legal boundaries helped
generate the central role the black church plays in the modern African-American
community. As the sole institution allowed to blacks in the United States, the
black church became a central clearinghouse for the community as well as a
destination for ambitious, talented, and charismatic members of the community
who found other leadership roles forbidden to them (McDaniel 2008). Likewise,
Native Americans have had the “purity” of their lineage legislated, though in this
latter case it was to reduce the numbers of the ethnic group rather than to cordon
members off and keep the group from being assimilated into other categories
(Thornton, 1997). At the same time, Native American religious practices have
been the focus of a number of court battles, with the court finding that at least
some of the traditional religious practices of western Native tribes (such as the
consumption of peyote and other hallucinogenic substances) lack the protection of
the First Amendment in cases such as Employment Division v. Smith (1990).4 It is

4 Employment Division v. Smith, a case examining the ability of Natives to legally use
peyote in their religious rituals without retribution. It is arguably the most well-known Supreme
action by the government to reinforce perceived salient differences between individuals that, in effect, has sustained those differences. This phenomenon is by no means limited to the United States, either. One of the clearest examples of legal boundaries creating and reinforcing groupings that in turn become central to individual identities is the creation of Hutu and Tutsi identities in east-central Africa. There are few substantive linguistic, religious, or historical differences between the groups. Indeed, Hutus and Tutsis generally share a common language and religion. However, these groups—generally held to be a creation of German and Belgian colonizers who were seeking a means through which to create divisions among their colonized people—have become potent personal and political identities, often with tragic consequences (c.f. Waters 1995; Uvin 1997.)

Religious groups have likewise had their status legislated and ruled on throughout US history. While the First Amendment prohibited the establishment of a national religion, many states in the early republic had established and official religions. Massachusetts was the last state to abolish its state religion (the Congregational church, brought to its shores by the Puritans and the Pilgrims in the 17th century), but did not do so until 1833—almost 50 years after the ratification of the US Constitution (Hutson 2000). Many laws seeking either to legislate or otherwise shape the identity of Mormonism were passed in the 19th century. Indeed, the Republican Party was itself founded to destroy what it termed

---

Court case related to Native American religion. However, there have been many cases before the Court that have questioned the legitimacy of certain Native American religious practices. Bowen v. Roy (1986), another prominent free exercise case on Native American religious belief, ruled on the rights of Native Americans to receive benefits without applying for documents which violate their religious beliefs. Brown (1999) identifies a number of cases, most notably Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Association (1988), regarding the use of eminent domain or other laws to usurp or develop Native burial grounds and other sacred spaces for development or other public purposes.
“the twin relics of barbarism” of slavery and polygamy in its first presidential election party platform in 1856. It did so at a time where only one religious group in the US was known to practice plural marriage (Mason 2010). At one point in the late 1800s, “Hindu” was considered a viable racial categorization by the US government and constituted one of the racial categories utilized on the US census.

What lies at the root of both ethnocentric religion and governmental racial classifications is arguably a very understandable human drive- the drive to know who "us" is and who "them" should be. Humans have an inclination towards homophily, which helps to strengthen intra-group bonds but comes at the cost of a propensity for viewing those not sharing the homophilous traits which define group membership in a poor light (Borgatti & Foster 2003). Better understanding the core of this "us vs. them" thinking is essential to understanding the importance of both race and religion in the political sphere, and so it is to this topic that we now turn.

**The Importance of "Us"**

Group orientations have long been an important part of the equation in political science. Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and McPhee (1954) are credited with elevating the sociological approach to understanding how voting decisions are made. In their account, groups play an important role in shaping interests. In particular, groups provide the primary source of pressure to conform to a proscribed set of norms. The behavioralist approach of the Michigan school also spoke of group orientation as a central focus for political activity, though their
research on group influence is generally given less attention than other aspects of their research. Campbell, et al (1960) argued that a plurality of Americans was driven primarily by their group affiliation and considerations of how issues would affect either their in-group or out-groups towards which they held some attitude. Group salience could be driven by either the identity of candidates or by identifying policies dominating the political sphere that could affect the group in question. In this formulation, groups serve less as a source of influence than as a cognitive framework through which a voter can understand the world. In the psychological model, groups are mental short-cuts frequently used because group labels have an intense and readily accessible meaning.

Clearly, these two mechanisms (social influence and psychological short-cuts based on group stereotypes) are not inherently contradictory. What is needed is a coherent theory of how the two approaches interact. To do so, we first must consider the current trends in understanding how cognitive and social processes interact. Social identity theory is the theory of group consciousness most popular in political science (Huddy 2001), and a good place to begin such a discussion. Modern social identity theory is rooted in the work of Tajfel and Turner. In brief, Tajfel and Turner define social identity as, “those aspects of an individual’s self-image that derive from the social categories to which he perceives himself as belonging,” (Tajfel & Turner 1979, p. 40) The salience of these categories varies depending on the relative comparability of the identities to others’ identities. It was along these comparable lines of distinction that the concept of in-group, out-group, majority group, and minority group form. Tajfel defines a minority group
as, “…‘self-conscious units’ of people who have in common certain similarities and certain social disadvantages,” (Wagley & Harris 1958, cited in Tajfel 1978, p. 3.) Tajfel goes on to point out that individuals acquire many traits that could identify them as belonging to one minority group or the other, whether the group be left-handed people, fat people, or political scientists. What makes a particular self-awareness salient, and what makes its members part of a salient minority, depends upon, “… the perceived clarity of the boundaries separating in common the members of the group from others,” (ibid, p. 5)

Furthermore, it is only along comparable lines of identity that group conflict might occur. The perception of a given identity as more or less impermeable would impact the hostility and competitiveness across groups as well as the propensity for individuals to view members of the out-group as members of an opposed group rather than as individuals (Tajfel & Turner 1979.) This idea is often coupled with their theory of self-categorization. This theory argues that, once an individual identifies themselves as part of an in-group and acculturates to group norms, individuals tend to reinforce that identity by a process of depersonalization (Turner et al, 1987.)\(^5\) One of the most important minority identities over which conflict can occur, frequently used as a case throughout the literature, is that of an ethnic minority. This is because ethnicity is often one of the most easily identifiable characteristics of an individual.

---

\(^5\) Turner et al (1987) define depersonalization as, “…the process of ‘self-stereotyping’ whereby people come to perceive themselves more as interchangeable exemplars of the social category than as unique personalities defined by their individual differences from others.” (p. 50.) This theory seeks to identify the mechanism through which the more general theory might work, though one should note that Turner, et al did view the general Tajfelian frame as a special case of their more general theory.
While identity is an important core need for individuals, to ignore material interests does not comport with what we know about human behavior. “Realistic group conflict theory,” or RCT, stems from the work of Muzafer Sharif in particular. It postulates rather straightforwardly that intergroup conflict stems from the competition over scarce resources and that both positive in-group affect and disdain for the out-group stems from this competition. Competition can be for tangible goods, such as wealth redistribution, or for more intangible goods like security or social status. History plays a role in the formation of stereotypes, as prejudices that hold over long periods of time tend to be more robust.  

Sherif points to the civil rights struggles of the 1960s as a case study on how stereotypes evolve. He says, “These changes [to group stereotypes] are not an outgrowth of widespread reversals in the attitudes of White Americans, although such changes have been noted for many years… They owe quite as much to the pressures on official America to gain or keep a favorable image in a world with a large population with colored skin,” (Sherif 1966, p. 35.) Thus, in Sherif’s formulation, government attitudes towards groups are a central locus for stereotype formation. Stereotypes, in Sherif’s view, have stickiness to them that are difficult to overcome. This is in large part due to the perceptual screen group members tend to erect towards individuals of the out-group where they tend to perceive behaviors and interpret actions in a manner consistent with their established stereotypes.

---

6 Sherif (1966) uses the following definition of stereotype: “a group stereotype may be said to exist when a large proportion within a group agree, over a period of time, that a particular cluster of adjectives describes all or most members of a human classification.” (p. 33)
Kinder and Kam (2009) seek to combine Tajfel and Turner's social identity theory and Sherif's realistic group conflict theory with the literature on the heritability of cognitive orientations and the literature on the influence of personality on preference to develop a theory of general ethnocentrism. Their theory posits that ethnocentrism is a trait to be activated by stimuli, and that certain individuals are more prone to ethnocentric evaluations than are others. For Kinder and Kam, media stimuli are the important mechanism through which issues might be framed in an ethnocentric manner. While their work has very helpfully advanced our knowledge about the role such mechanisms play in political evaluations, what we are still lacking is an understanding of how these frames are sorted internally, and how we know which in-group loyalty is activated by media (or social, as will be later argued) stimuli. In short, we know from Kinder and Kam that group loyalties shape political and social behavior. One question that remains is which group loyalty will activate in a given situation- or, in other words, how politics might shape us.

**How Politics Shapes "Us"**

While there is some ability to select among social identities, Citrin et al (2001) do point out that, “…this choice frequently must be affirmed by others in the group that you do indeed possess the criteria for membership." This ratification of the salient identity generally comes from those around us. It is almost a cliché to echo the sentiments of McPherson et al (2001), among others, who said that birds of a feather flock together- that is, people with more group
labels in common tend to spend more time with each other and form stronger ties than those with fewer similar traits. However, some similarities count for more than others. McPherson and his coauthors note that race is the most important sorting mechanism generally used in the US, followed closely by age and religion. Abrams et al (2005) set forward a framework of inclusion and exclusion that gives primacy to the perception of threat as grounds upon which to exclude another group.

Omi and Winant (1986) discuss a number of ways in which we conventionally think about race. The dominant paradigm they identify is one of ethnicity, which draws upon origin and quasi-biological understandings of humanity, relies on phonotypical markers, and arguably this is the way many people think about it today. The black/white paradigm lies at the core of the American political system, and is one that few whites and blacks have little problem sorting themselves into (c.f. Lewis et al 2004.) However, Omi and Winant do not define race in this way. Rather, they focus on race as a social concept, and discuss the ways, "...by which social, economic, and political forces determine the content and importance of racial categories, and by which they are in turn shaped by racial meanings." (p. 61.) Threat is a key force in the shaping of racial boundaries. Race in the US is, in short, the fundamental division of "us" and "them" individuals employ to understand the broader social system. Thus, it is not surprising to find that racial attitudes have significant import in evaluating American politics.
As race is the most common basis for sorting, being frequently the most accessible and easily identifiable trait, it tends to be the first label acquaintances apply to an individual. This would help to explain the noted and distinctive tendency for racial groups from different religious traditions to behave distinctively from non-minorities. Furthermore, as Martin Luther King, Jr. frequently observed, "Sunday morning is the most segregated hour in Christian America," (Scheitle and Dougherty 2010). Dr. King's observation is important in identifying at least one way in which religion can reinforce an understanding of race. Americans place significant trust within religious structures. Religious organizations and identities are imbued with a normative power that ethnic identity lacks. The homogeneity of most religious institutions helps to reinforce dominant perceptions of the salience of race. However, religious institutions can help to erode these same groupings. If a white Catholic, for example, is shaking hands with black and brown Catholics during a Mass, it becomes harder to label those people an "other" (c.f. Putnam and Campbell 2010). It is due to this importance, as well as the importance religious elites can play in molding opinion, which helps us to understand the significant role religious experiences play in shaping racial attitudes within social networks.

Religious belief and religious participation clearly have an independent impact on political attitudes as well as political participation (c.f. Green 2007.) Indeed, among white Americans in particular, it could be said that the most salient political division is between those for whom religion is an important part of their life and those for whom religion plays little or no role in their daily lives (c.f.
Layman 2001). This has not always been the case. For many, ethno-religious tradition has played and continues to play the most important predictive role in understanding how religious identity influenced the political process. Indeed, as Green (2007) observes, "For many Americans, denominational affiliation has replaced ethnicity as a source of personal identity." (p. 22) However, while we understand that racial and religious identity is both important to an individual's self-conception as well as to the political discourse of the country, the mechanism through which these social identities become political identities requires further explanation.

Jackson (2011) has proposed an intriguing model of how social identity is transformed into a political identity. An outline of her model is presented in Figure 1.1. Her analysis, developed by studying the case of American Latino voters, is a useful advance in the road to better understanding the causal flow from identity to political attitudes. For her, the political context of an individual's social environment produced a number of social identities, which together jockeyed with material interests, personal values, and (importantly) partisanship and ideology to form a political identity. Her model is an admirable conceptualization of the process, and shows deference to both the usual stability of partisanship and issue preferences. However, applying her theory to a different case (Muslims, for instance) highlights at least one area in which the model could use further refinement. The literature drawn from above suggests that it's not so much the social environment producing the various identities an individual might
chose to view themselves through as it is the environment winnowing down the available choices based upon how others view the individual.

Figure 1.1: Jackson (2011) model of political identity formation

Figure 1.2 below outlines the basic model of how social networks influence the various cognitive models of individuals and help to shape the ultimate political identity utilized by voters. In essence, individuals develop a series of identities from many different sources, though the applicability of any given identity is filtered through the social environment they find themselves in. The social environment itself works to shape how the political environment is perceived. The political context of the social environment operates on two levels, namely the one-step (close) network and the two-step (acquaintance) network. The one-step (friend or peer) network sends cues about what opinions are
acceptable or unacceptable by group members as well as clear delineation about group interests. This immediate network helps an individual understand "what it means" to hold an identity. This network applies a pressure, sometimes overt but usually subtle, to help shape to shape what it means to carry around that attachment. In this way, the impact of the political context of the immediate network could be said to operate as Carsey and Layman (2006) argued, by suggesting orientations people who hold a given identity as important but hold weaker issue preferences can adopt. However, while Carsey and Layman identified a psychological mechanism (cognitive dissonance) as playing a critical role, the model below suggests that peer pressure and the desire to create more harmonious networks as identified by Mutz (2006) plays a significant role. That is not to say that cognitive dissonance is not involved- indeed, identity choice is an active rather than a passive endeavor, and the desire to hold beliefs that comport with an identity is important. However, this pressure stems not from peer-group interactions but rather forms from contact with out-group information sources.
Figure 1.2: The transformation of social identity into political attitudes.

The two-step network (friend-of-a-friend contact or other more removed inputs of data such as media being consumed within the social network) informs individuals which identities and networks are most salient for the political environment. It does so by primarily framing others' responses to individuals in the terms of what is perceived to be the most salient group affiliation or trait. Out-groups do this by selecting particular traits about individuals and interacting with them based on stereotypes and schema they have developed about individuals with the label attached to that cluster of traits. The selection of important out-groups comes from cues received within these external networks, and stem from perceptions of political or personal threat. These perceptions in turn are generally
received from influential political entrepreneurs, who help to shape and reshape the meaning of a given political identity. Repeated exposure to a given set of responses cueing off of a particular trait or set of traits reinforce the importance of said trait(s), thus increasing the likelihood that individuals will consider political matters with the norms and preferences of the social identity in mind. This two-fold process shapes the political identity, which in turn influences the individual's perception of political labels and interests as well as issues.

Based on the argument underlying the model proposed in figure 1.2, we would be led to a number of logical conclusions. First, we would expect to find that the salience of an individual's political identity would correlate with the degree of threat they feel directed to members of that group from out-group rivals and competitors. Thus, threat should be an important predictor of political identity. However, this sense of threat, stemming as it does from out-group signal senders, depends on attentiveness to political news sources and a diverse social network. Individuals in a homogenous social network with little interest in political news media may well cling closely to a given identity, but the identity itself will be only loosely tied to one's political preferences. However, we would expect an individual with a homogenous social network to be more sensitive to cues from their in-group network as to which issues they should be most attentive to.

It should be stressed that the social environments most individuals find themselves in are generally stable owing to homogeneity, rootedness, and the general tendency of long-term social networks towards stability (Barabasi 2003.)
However, occasional exogenous shocks can lead to sudden reevaluations of the primary political identity, which in turn helps to shift things like attitudes, interests, and even partisanship. While partisanship and ideas about politics begin to be inculcated at an early age and is an important and stable predictor of political behavior, political learning is an ongoing process that can provoke change in partisan preferences (c.f. Sears & Valentino 1997; Smidt 1982; Niemi & Jennings 1991.) when the political context shifts suddenly and dramatically, both in-group and out-group signals will indicate to an individual about new salient political identities. Respondents will then be forced to choose to adopt the new identity, or downplay the identity in favor of other salient identities.

In the case of Muslims, it is not always clear that they have viewed each other as relevant allies in their political and social struggles. Until the 2000s, Muslims in the US have traditionally been focused on issues that might be described as "ethnic", whether those are civil rights issues for African-Americans or homeland politics and foreign policy for the large number of immigrant Muslims (Saeed 2003.) However, Muslims as a group did not collectively come under significant scrutiny from the general public in the United States until the public began to identify Muslims as a hostile "other" whose interests may run contrary to the US's. While it is difficult to precisely pinpoint when this cognitive shift began, it would not be unreasonable to argue that the Iran Hostage Crisis was an important moment for framing how the American public thinks about Muslims as a group. To better understand how Muslim identity has emerged on the political stage, the first step is to understand the origins of Islam in the US. In
doing so, I will draw from a number of Muslim ethnographies. While these histories have been richly drawn out on their own, they are rarely put side-by-side.

**America's Muslims**

The history of American Muslims will help to illustrate some of the key theoretical claims of the following work. What follows traces the arrival and growth of the Muslim community in the US, focusing particularly on rapid growth of the community in the 20th century. By sketching out a very basic history of Islam in America, what emerges is an account that helps to clarify why it is plausible to theorize that Muslims have indeed transformed from a religious group with many ethnicities to an ethnoreligious group. In particular, the twinning of the rising salience of ethnoreligious ties with a rising perception of threat from the broader non-Muslim community that I will argue emerges over the course of the 20th century helps to illustrate how hypothesized transformations may occur.

Though the origins of the various ethnic components of the American-Muslim community have different starting points and pressures under which they emerged- as will be seen, the multiple entry points of Islam into American society

---

7 For the purposes of this study, ethnoreligious will be defined as a group whose ethnic identity derives in whole or in part from the religious affiliation of individuals. A traditional example of an ethnoreligious group are Irish Catholics, whose "Irish-ness" and "Catholic-ness" serve to mutually reinforce each other through the confluence of historical, cultural, and religious values. In the case of Muslims, their transformation into an ethnoreligious group would represent the forging of a new ethnic identity similar to Jewish-Americans. The shared cultural history of Islam originating from a diverse array of countries serves as a template upon which a common ethnic identity can be forged, though its forging out of a disparate ethnic and linguistic community does share elements of similarity with the creation of Latino and Asian racial identity.
placed a premium on racial and ethnic solidarity- putting together (or comparing) different ethnographies can help to show how the groups could plausibly be argued to have begun converging on a shared and primarily religious identity framework. The following history will focus on African-Americans and Arab-Americans. There are a number of reasons to focus on these two segments of the US Muslim population. These are both the well-researched Muslim groups in the US as well as being the oldest and among the largest Muslim groups. In later chapters, I will also demonstrate that these two groups are the most important shapers of Muslim identity in the US.

**Who are the American Muslims?**

The American Muslim community is in an interesting position within the US. It is a group of considerable interest to the majority of Americans, but also a group many know little about. It is a group recognized as a religious community by the majority of Americans, but treated as much as an ethnic group or a social group engaged in undesirable behaviors (similar to homosexuals) as they are a religious community (Kalkan et al 2009.) Indeed, even though Muslims make up only 0.5% of the US population (as can be seen in Figure 1.3, below), Muslims make up nearly 6% of the US prison population (Johnson and Williams 2011).
Muslims comprise a very small part of the overall US religious landscape (Pew 2007)

Muslims are arguably the most ethnically diverse religious community in the US, but that ethnic diversity goes almost entirely unnoticed by the broader US population. The Pew Research Center’s 2007 *Muslim American Survey* has found that Muslims have the greatest ethnic diversity of any sizeable faith group in the United States. No one ethnic group makes up an outright majority, though Arabs and African Americans probably each make up about a quarter to a third of the total size of the community. Arabs have an interesting history of ethnic and racial classification in the United States (see, for example, Cainker, 2008) but have traditionally sought classification as white in order to circumvent immigration restrictions. After Arabs and African Americans, Pakistanis, Persians, Indians, and other south Asians make the third big segment of the population, comprising
about 18% of the total American Muslim population according to Pew. Those of European descent (mostly converts) and people from other Asiatic regions comprise the last few percentage points of the overall community composition. It is a group comprised predominantly of immigrants, but also has many whose ancestors reached American shores generations ago. While the largest majority of native-born Muslims are African-American, there are also long-established and notable Arab Muslim populations in the US, most famously in and around the city of Detroit, MI.

Figure 1.4: US Muslims, by region of birth (Pew 2007)

Figure 1.5 presents other key demographics, and demonstrates that in other ways Muslims are not all that different from other groups in the US. On one hand, they do seem to have somewhat lower levels of income and education than
the general public (though, it should be noted, this varies considerably by ethnicity) but not significantly so. Likewise, Muslims tend to be much more young and male than the general public. This is the sort of profile we would expect to see from a predominantly immigrant community like the Muslim-Americans. Thus, although Muslim-Americans are distinctively diverse in their ethnic composition, they are otherwise much like many other American social groups with a large component of immigrants, such as Latinos, for whom we have a much more in-depth literature.

*Figure 1.5: Select American Muslim demographics (Pew 2007)*

The American-Muslims are a group whom Presidents and governors seek to incorporate into public functions in order to demonstrate their tolerance (Sabochik 2010), but whose own religious garb and religious centers face
considerable intolerance and opposition from local communities (Associated Press, 2010.) American Muslims are also popularly maligned in some segments of American society as being particularly prone to violence (Pew 2011) though, as can be seen in figure 1.6, below, American Muslims themselves have reported the strongest opposition to the use of violence as a means to a political end in at least one Pew study (Pew 2011). American Muslims are, in short, a group located in a unique social position- one that allows social science to examine how the various forces of American society and culture help to shape both the religious and racial identity of individuals, and how these two identities are intimately tied one to the other in the US.

\[\text{Figure 1.6} \] Percent responding that violence is never an acceptable means to achieve political ends (Pew 2011)
Where do the American Muslims Come From?

The first Muslims to reach the US shores came as slaves from Western Africa. A number of slaves brought across the Atlantic came from tribes such as the Fulani and the Hausa, which had significant numbers of Muslims among their tribe members as well as others who mixed Islamic and indigenous practices (Curtis 2009; Raboteau 2004.) While documentation on the precise number of Muslims is difficult to come by, historians generally agree that the number of Muslim slaves brought to the US by the trans-Atlantic slave trade number in the thousands (c.f. Gomez, 1998.) While some consensus exists that Muslims made up at least 10% of the total slave population (Austin 1984, cited in Leonard 2003), estimates are generally extrapolated from the regions from which American slaves originated. One estimate puts the number of Muslims among male slaves arriving on American shores to be in the range of 15-30% of the total slave population (Hill et al. 2005). Islamic practice on the plantations varied greatly owing both to the poor or non-existent ties between Islam-practicing slave populations and the varied tribal origins of the Muslim slaves. However, historians note that many of the practices we do know of drew upon mystical and magical traditions. In particular, Arabic script was seen as possessing magical qualities, and the ability to write in Arabic was a highly valued trait among many slaves (GhaneaBassiri 2010). Several prominent cases of Muslim slave conversion to Christianity were held up by proponents of slavery as a justification for the civilizing benefits of the practice. While cases exist where Islam was used as a rallying point by slaves to resist their enslavement, Islam eventually faded from the south (Curtis 2009).
Immigrants from predominantly Arab Muslim regions under the control of the Ottoman Empire did not begin arriving as free settlers until the latter part of the 19th century, and many of these immigrants came with larger numbers of Christian neighbors and relatives (Kayyali 2006).

The largest source of immigrants in the early period was Syria province (which is largely comprised of modern-day Syria and Lebanon), though smaller waves came from other parts of the Ottoman Empire. Immigration picked up in the early 20th century, as the instability in the region following the collapse of the Ottoman Empire coupled with the promise of good wages in the burgeoning American industrial economy proved to be a potent inducement (ibid). These early waves of immigration settled across the east coast and the upper Midwest. In particular, the spread of Muslim immigration seemed to follow the route of I-80 (Ba-Yunus and Kone 2006.)

As with many other immigrants, minority, and religious groups, precise estimates of the current numbers of Arabs in the US are elusive. Likewise, the number of Arabs in the US, and what percentage of this group or of African-Americans practice Islam is a number over which there is contentious debate.

In the case of Arabs, population estimates from the Census only go back to 1980. Drawing on such information, however, shows that in recent years Arabs have been growing quickly. Since 1980, Arabs have almost doubled the proportion of the population they constitute, though it still makes up less than 1% of the total population according to official demographic statistics. However, both Census reports and private polling has demonstrated that Arabs generally mark themselves as "White only", and groups such as the Arab American Institute argue that Arabs are dramatically under-counted. Using their own data, coming from polls conducted by Zogby International, the Arab American Institute estimates the population to be closer to 3.5 million (2007).

Unlike the Arab population of the Middle East, Arabs in the US are overwhelmingly Christian. While the precise enumeration of the proportion of Arabs in the US that practice Islam is a point of contention, one study (the Detroit Arab-American Study) placed the estimate in that community at about one-third. <There is a clause missing here> Dr. James Zogby, the estimated religious breakdown of Arab-Americans in 2002 would be 35% Catholic (all rites), 24% Muslim (including Druze and other sects), 18% Orthodox (all traditions), 10% Protestant, and 13% other or none. Or, to look at it the other way, two-thirds to three-fourths of Arab-Americans are Christian, and all the prominent former and current Arab-American elected officials (including individuals such as Darryl Issa, Spencer Abraham, Mitch Daniels, and John Sununu) are practicing Christians. The majority of Christian Arabs trace their lineage back to modern-day Lebanon and Syria, though many also come from Iraq, Egypt, or the Israel-Palestine region. Census data suggests that, while present in all regions of the country, Arabs are most heavily concentrated (in raw numbers) in California, Michigan, and New York, and constitute more than 1% of the total state population only in Michigan.
explanation advanced for this interesting quirk of history is that the I-80 route was the most direct route from New York, the point of entry for many immigrants in this period, and the industrial jobs flourishing in the upper Midwest. The thickest bands of settlement were around major cities, particularly around Boston, New York, Detroit, and Chicago (Abraham and Shyrock 2000). However, the majority of Arab immigrants continued to be Christians, and Muslim immigrants were largely content to follow the lead of their Christian co-nationals and seek a quiet path of integration and assimilation (Kayyali 2006).9

Given the disparate nature of the two communities at the time it is not surprising that Islam seemed to have served as an auxiliary to primarily ethnic concerns. The theory above suggests that the primarily ethnic settlement patterns of the time would have privileged ethnic identity, which evidence from the period suggests was the case. However, while Islam did not seem to build ties across ethnicities during this period, that it not to say that there was no cross-ethnic influence. This influx of Muslims did seem to have an impact upon African-American communities in the areas where they settled. Muslim revivalist movements among African-Americans had their roots in the pan-African teachings of Marcus Garvy (Lincoln 1994). Among the earliest African-American moves towards Islam, which was argued to be the natural religious expression of

9 While, as noted above, Arabs in the US are overwhelmingly Christian, this is not the case in the region from which Arabs hail. Fargues (1998) estimates that Christians comprise little more than 6% of all Arabs in the Middle East. He argues that this percentage, which grew under Ottoman rule, declined steadily over the course of the 20th century. There is considerable variation by country, however, and the countries from which most Arab-Americans trace their origin generally have larger Christian communities. Lebanon, the country from which a plurality of Arab-Americans traces their lineage, had a Christian majority according to a 1932 French census (Chamie 1980). Current estimates provided by the CIA put the modern population of Lebanese Christians at 39% of the total. Syria, the second most common place of historical origin, is estimated to be 16% Christian, while about 10% of Egyptians profess some form of Christianity.
African identity by its proponents, Noble Drew Ali’s Moorish Sciences Temple is regarded as the most successful (Marsh 1996). Following the death of Ali in 1929, the movement split into two. One faction remained in Chicago, which had become the center of African-American Islamism, while others followed a Syrian adherent named W.D. Fard to Detroit (Lincoln 1994). In Detroit, Fard founded the Nation of Islam. While his leadership lasted only three years, the organization he established survived his death and subsequently grew rapidly under the leadership of his successor, Elijah Muhammad (Marsh 1996). The Nation of Islam proved to be the most successful of the Islamic Nationalist movements in the Black community. Though initially exhibiting slow but steady growth throughout the early tenure of Elijah Muhammad’s rule, the Nation of Islam rose to preeminence in this segment of the black community following the conversion of the charismatic proselytizer and organizer Malcolm X (Lincoln 1994).

Immigration from predominantly Islamic countries slowed and even reversed after the 1920s, as immigration quotas greatly curtailed the numbers of people allowed into the country in a given year and newly-independent states drew back some immigrants who wanted to take part in the politics of their new nation-state (GhaneeBassiri 2010). While Arabs were eventually able to get their group classified as "white" in order to take advantage of more generous quotas for white immigrants (Haney-Lopez 1996), Arab immigration nonetheless slowed to a trickle until the 1960s. During this time, both Arab and black Muslims began to develop an American Islam oriented towards serving their particular needs. Lincoln (1994) argues that Islam among African-Americans quickly became
centrally about race and resistance to the Christianity of the white majority. As such, black Muslims began to emphasize their religious differences and sought to create separate and self-sufficient communities-within-communities. Arab Muslims, on the other hand, modified their Islam and sought to actively emulate their Christian and Jewish neighbors (Curtis 2009). In particular, Arab Muslims - who had fought in court to be considered white- sought to do as much as they could to blend into the fabric of American life and assimilate to what were seen as the norms of white American culture. One subject interviewed for this study recounted stories from earlier generations about mosque "sock-hops", the adoption of an Islamic Sunday school, and the emulation of local churches in the designing of mosques. These divergent visions for American Islam persisted largely in isolation from each other for 20 to 30 years, but eventually black Muslims began to desire to move their religion more towards orthodox Islamic practices and away from a particularistic and racialized Islamic theology (Marsh 1996). This move towards orthodoxy is best embodied by the life of the most prominent advocate of orthodoxy, Malcolm X, as told in his well-known autobiography (1965).  

The 1960s also saw a new influx of Muslim immigration. These immigrants were more affluent and educated than the labor migration waves, having come to the US to either escape political turmoil or in pursuit of higher

---

10 Marable's magisterial 2011 history of Malcolm X convincingly argues that The Autobiography of Malcolm X is as much a piece of political writing as it is an authentic retelling of the man's story. The Autobiography intentionally blurs, obfuscates, or exaggerates parts of the tale for literary or political effect. However, the work of Malcolm X and Alex Haley is and will likely remain the dominant understanding of the life of the Nation of Islam activist in the minds of many Americans. Marable's work, if anything, underscores the long scope of Malcolm X's move from black nationalism to Islamic orthodoxy, suggesting that the move began earlier than is suggested in The Autobiography.
education (GhaneaBassiri 2010.) These immigrants began forming their own organizations- including some of the largest Muslim organizations currently active. The Muslim Student Association of the US and Canada in the 1960s and the Islamic Society of North America in the 1980s are prime examples of the sorts of organizations founded in this new wave (Curtis 2009). These new Muslims brought a greater concern for having an Islam that is more authentically orthodox to the Islam of their homelands, but also accommodating enough to embrace the vicissitudes of American society (Haddad 2004). Following the death of Elijah Muhammad, his son and heir led the Nation of Islam towards Islamic Sunni orthodoxy. He rejected a racialized Islam, and sought to bring black Muslims into an ecumenical union with Muslims of other ethnic backgrounds (Marsh 1996). The majority of black Muslims followed him in this, though a discontented minority followed Louis Farrakhan into re-establishing the Nation of Islam (Lincoln 1994). Thus, while black Muslims seemed to continue to orient primarily towards the shared concerns of the black community and Arab Muslims oriented towards homeland political concerns, we begin to see the emergence of a common theological ground across which dialogue was beginning to occur. However, that there was not convergence at this time suggests that purely internal religious cues might not be enough to help elevate an identity to a widely-shared political orientation.

This concern with orthodoxy also happened concurrently with the Islamic Revolution in Iran. While the excesses of the revolution quickly tempered the sentiments of Muslims in the West, the movement nonetheless had a significant
impact on how Muslims in the US viewed themselves as part of an ummah (or, member of a world-wide communion of believers) as opposed to members of a nationally specific ethnic or racial group (Haddad 2004). Paradoxically, the Islamic Revolution also led to a large wave of Persian immigrants, who concentrated in and around the city of Los Angeles. This wave, unlike Muslims from other regions, was largely secular or even anti-Islamic in their sentiments, though they retained a vestigial self-understanding as Shi'a Muslim (Mobasher 2006). Waves also followed US intervention into the Middle East, with immigration from Iraq following the two invasions of that country over a 15-year span as well as from other countries wracked by civil war and instability (Haddad 2004.)

In the US, Muslim identity was becoming increasing politically salient to Muslims in the United States before 9/11. Nadine Naber identified a number of external and internal pressures (international Islamism and an increasingly ambiguous ethnic identity among them) that pushed young Muslim activists towards identifying first as Muslim and only secondly as a member of their ethnic group (Naber 2005). This developing identity in the United States was reinforced by a hostile external stereotype of Arabs and Muslims that developed domestically (Jamal 2008). Muslims as a group were increasingly politically active as a group during the 1990s, with the founding of multiple pan-ethnic Muslim lobbying groups during this period (Haddad 2004). Muslim groups made a concerted effort to vote as a bloc in the 2000 elections. Internal polling by the Islam advocacy group the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR)
suggests that they had some success in moving Muslims towards their endorsed
candidate (George W. Bush), though some question the quality of the polling
(Rose 2001). Whether this low-level external pressure would have exhibited a
sufficiently strong pull to help build a Muslim ethnoreligious community or
whether other forces could have similarly built a coherent identity group is hard to
say. Events which occurred in the early part of the 21st century significantly
impacted the trajectory of said developments.

This nascent effort to build a stronger and cohesive Muslim voting bloc
took on a different meaning after 2001. The 9/11 attacks crystallized a growing
conception of Muslims as a distinct group, both among the general public and
arguably among Muslims themselves. In the case of the American public, this
new awareness came to have attached to it a number of negative stereotypes to
this group. One particularly striking measure of this transformed sense of Muslim
threat can be found in FBI hate crime statistics, as presented in figure 1.7 below.
Before 2001, Muslims were rarely targets for hate crimes. The hate crime rate
against Muslims in the pre-9/11 period is about the same as the rate of hate crimes
targeting American Buddhists. There is a spike in 2001, and subsequently
Muslims begin to report hate crimes per capita at roughly the same rate as US
Blacks. This identification as an out-group further fuelled the internal
development of a Muslim identity among many in the Muslim community (Naber
2005). However, this identity was not entirely exclusive to Muslims; comedian
Dean Obeidallah's quip rings true for many when he says, "...on September 10th I
went to bed a white guy; September 11th, I woke up an Arab," (Martin 2007).
Perhaps paradoxically, 9/11 can be seen as having helped to create the stronger and more coherent Islamic identity among Muslims that Muslim activists were striving to create throughout the 1990s. In particular, the actions of the US government arguably made Muslim identity particularly salient post-9/11. While there was an initial outpouring of support for the Muslim community in the wake of the 2001 terrorist attacks from official sources, the subsequent policies of the Bush administration seem to convey mistrust or even hostility towards the community. In particular, programs such as the National Security Entry-Exit Registration System (NSEERS) and the PATRIOT Act emphasized a perception held by Muslim that their group had been singled out for particularly close scrutiny, at the least from the government. NSEERS was the government program
implemented by the US State Dept. in 2003 that required men from 23 predominantly Muslim countries (and North Korea!) to come into State Department centers for a special registration and interview process. This program has been considered by many to be one of the most overt efforts at ethnic profiling by the US federal government in the post-September 11th era, and seems to have signaled to segments of the Muslim community that they have been singled out by the federal government for special attention. Furthermore, suspicions among many in the American Muslim community about the motives behind the Iraq war led a broad swath of the community, which had supported the Bush campaign in 2000 on largely social conservative grounds, to reject his party in the 2004 election (Patterson, Gasim, & Choi, 2011).11

As the brief survey of American-Muslim history suggests, Islam in the US seems to have shifted from being a movement primarily about the ethnic groups and ethnic solidarity towards being a salient- perhaps even preeminent- lens through which to view the American political environment. This apparent transformation makes it at least feasible to use Muslim-Americans as a case in which one can study the environmental impacts on identity. How such transformations take place, and how the political environment ultimately shapes the political identities, will be the focus of the rest of this chapter.

11 It should be noted that the 2003 invasion of Iraq was not universally opposed in the American Muslim community. Shi'a Muslims, particularly Shi'a Muslims of Iraqi descent, generally supported an American intervention into Iraq in order to oust the Hussein regime from power. Imam Hassan al-Qazwini, the leader of the influential Mosque of America in Dearborn, MI, was a particularly vocal advocate for American intervention into his native Iraq, though he later became critical of the government's handling of the post-war environment.
The Emergence of "Us"

Homophily is a common trait one finds within network structures. Homophily is in many regards a self-reinforcing mechanism. Homogenous groups will exert pressure on members of said network to conform to the identified group norms, in order for each individual within the group to secure their position as a member. This conformity pressure creates the process of self-identification identified in social identity theory. This process helps to reinforce the in-group identification generated by the political process as well as help those within the in-group structure to identify out-groups- or to help clarify the choices available to people as to which of their identities are compatible and which might prove sources of tension. By giving black Muslims and Arab Muslims a common interest, the political environment created a motivation for interaction between Muslims of different ethnic backgrounds that did not exist before. By engaging, this reinforced the importance of the "Muslim" label.

The labels acquire a force not only because the in-group finds it the most salient line of identity formation, but also because the out-group will opt to employ it as the primary group reference. Individuals will choose to label members not immediately recognized as part of their in-group by the most negative out-group label possible so as to create a clear delineation between "us" and "them". For much of American history, "black" has served as the primary other against which white Americans have defined themselves, and it is thus the label of black has long been a particularly challenging one to overcome. This
social ranking discouraged other ethnic or economic groups from forming political or economic coalitions with African-Americans. In the first part of 21st century American politics, however, "Muslim" has arguably become the out-group du jour. It is because "Muslim" has conceivably replaced "black" as the most negative social label in the US that blacks have, in the words of Clifton Marsh, been transformed from black Muslims into Muslims who are black. Likewise, many Muslims, who do not themselves belong to mosques, necessarily define themselves in response to the attitudes of those around them. Among those without mosque affiliation, Muslim-first identity will grow simply because everyone around them "says so."

Davis (2007) demonstrates that, following the September 11th attacks, the US contracted a case of what was initially described in the UK by the Runnymede Commission's 1997 report as "Islamophobia." The effect of this sudden attention on Islam following the attack heightened a dormant anti-Muslim sentiment, but did not contain itself solely to Muslims. Kalkan, Layman, and Green (n.d.) present evidence that suggests many Americans do not distinguish between the concepts of "Arab" and "Muslim", even though many American Arabs are themselves Christians. Kalkan and his co-authors also find that Muslims are seen as both a social/religious group and as a racial group (Kalkan, Layman, and Uslaner 2009.) This "otherization" of Arabs and Muslims crosses current racial and ethnic boundaries- Schildkraut (2009) finds robust support for the use of ethnic profiling against Muslims even among African Americans in the wake of 9/11. At the same time, Jamal (2005) finds that black Muslims and Arab Muslims
increasingly see themselves as a cohesive group—particularly when worship occurs in multi-ethnic mosques. The explanation for this would be a coupling of the sudden shift in the salience of Muslim identity to the political environment, coupled with some prior erosion of racial salience due to the greater ethnic heterogeneity of many American mosques.¹²

"Muslim", as the previous studies suggests, is becoming an important political touchstone in American politics. This is not unlike how "Mormon", "black", or "Catholic" are or have been important labels around which believers and non-believers shape their understanding of political issues. As Converse (1964) argued, when issues touch on key identities, politics becomes much more salient. People, in short, tend to think politically in terms of groups. While the role of religion in American politics has increasingly shifted away from the salience of ethno-cultural religious “tribalism” and towards the so-called “God-gap”, religion and politics scholars generally agree that this ethnic and racial linkage between that identity and one’s religious identity has not vanished (Putnam & Campbell 2010). Indeed, recent research published by Putnam and Campbell has found that, for Catholics and mainline Protestants, those who find their religious identities to be more salient for their day-to-day lives are more likely to also describe their ethnic identity as important to them. This is likely due to the ethno-cultural norms many religious traditions have imbedded within them. There are others, such as

¹² Ishan Baghby recently released a study in 2011 of American mosques conducted on behalf of CAIR. He finds, "Mosques of America reflect the great diversity in the Muslim community, and compared to the 2000 study, mosques are becoming even more diverse. Only 3% of all mosques in 2011 have only one ethnic group that attends the mosque—compared to 7% in 2000. Only 16% of all mosques have one ethnic group that composes 90% or more of its attendees—compared to 24% of all mosques in 2000. More than 90% of all mosques have some Arab or South Asians as regular attendees; 81% of all mosques have some African Americans who attend." (p. 14)
black Protestants and the obvious example of Jews, for whom religion and race are either twinned or nearly so. At the same time, whites who embrace an evangelical Protestant identity are the group most likely to reject any ethnic identity and embrace “American” as their ethnic background.

Given the almost primordial embrace of America as the “City on the Hill” by evangelical and revivelist strains of Protestant Christianity since the time of John Winthrop, one can plausibly trace a line of thinking from that time to a modern evangelicalism that would twin itself to a native ethnic identity even with the many permutations and changes evangelical theology has undergone in that time period. However, this leads us to the question of why religion frequently links up so well with race and ethnicity, what this linkage or disjunction mean for people's understanding of what is "American", as well as what this linkage between the two means politically.

Arabs had, in the words of Gualtieri (2001), "claimed whiteness" - and were certainly defined so officially on the census- before 9/11. After the attacks Arabs could no longer be white because, as Omi and Winant discuss, "White is seen as a 'pure' category," (p. 60.) Arab Muslims were being associated with the 9/11 attack and found themselves socially demoted for this reason. Interestingly, this is not the first time a white religious group found its social status diminished for what the majority of Americans deemed suspicious behavior. Ertman (2010)

---

13 It should be stressed again that there was some discomfort with the label of "white" among Arab-Americans even before 9/11. Michael Omi, in a 1997 piece, discusses the construction of racial identity and the role of federal recognition in establishing these boundaries. In the piece, he discusses that a nascent movement among some Arabs and Middle Easterners to have their own census category. The distinction was desired, "...to aid in the fight against discrimination and to fill other special needs of Arab Americans..." (p. 12.)
discusses, for example, a similar process occurring in the 19th century to Mormons for embracing polygamy and being transformed into what the US Surgeon General labeled, "a peculiar race" for committing what she terms "race treason."\textsuperscript{14}

This is significant particularly in light of the ethnic split within the Muslim community, and the divergent political impulses shown by these different ethnicities. While the study of Muslim political behavior before 9/11 was hardly a central concern of political science, what evidence exists suggests that a political split existed within the community. Black Muslims largely followed the Democratic impulses of black Christians, while Arab Muslims leaned towards the Republican Party along with their Arab Christian counterparts. While no solid polling data exists to back this up, the qualitative work of Lincoln (1994) has argued that the black Muslim experience was solidly rooted in the experience of the African-American community. It was his position that the African-American Islamic experience had much to do with racial solidarity and little to do with religion. Likewise, Agha Saeed argues that the primary focus of non-black American Muslims before 9/11 was on international politics and the politics of their homelands. There was little contact and little of shared interest between these segments of the Muslim community. There was no great impetus for creating a greater "us" out of Islam.

\textsuperscript{14} Ertman (2010) cites numerous public records suggesting that Mormons were explicitly labeled non-white in newspapers, etc, specifically because of their practice of polygamy. Interestingly, the Mormons in the public record were commonly compared to Muslims and Africans in such critiques. While this sentiment faded in the late 19th century as the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints formally abandoned the practice, Ertman was able to find a number of references to the matter even in the early 20th century.
The perceptual shift of the majority of Americans, both black and white, towards Islam elevated the importance of Islam to Muslims of all stripes. At the same time, it created a disjunction between being "Muslim" and being "American" that Muslims had to actively reconcile, increasing both the salience of the identity and the sense of threat directed at the individual due to this label. This reconciliation comes at the cost of previously preferred ethnic politics. In essence, 9/11 made "Muslimness"—or using Islam as the primary referential identity through which individuals understand, assess, and behave in the political environment—more important than "blackness", "Arabness", or other ethnic identifiers for understanding the individual's role in the social and political landscape of America.\footnote{As noted previously, the line between "Arab" and "Muslim" is much thinner (or entirely non-existent) in the minds of many Americans as compared to the lines dividing "Muslim" and "black".} It did this through cue-sending and cue-taking within social networks, by individuals hearing that Muslims were "a threat" from acquaintances and that their group was "under attack" from those out-groups.

One interesting challenge to this hypothesis could be made by extending the work of Christina Beltrán. In The Trouble with Unity (2010), Beltrán argues that Latino identity is primarily a useful political convention developed by elites of certain communities meant to forge a stronger political coalition. Beltrán argues that Latino identity is largely a non-factor for the various nationalities that make up what comprises the Latino label. While comparisons could be made between the Latino community and American Muslims, there are some critical differences. Most important is that the Islamic label is one both brought by Muslims from their ancestral countries of origin and one that has significant
political salience in the land of origin. The same cannot be said for the Latino label, which is a label of American invention. Rice and Feldman (1997) have an interesting article arguing that the civic participation habits of white ethnics tend to resemble those of their native lands even several generations after immigration. It would not be much of a stretch to argue that the political salience of the Islamic label in the lands of origin would help to create resonance for the label in the American context.

More importantly, however, the Beltrán argument tends to discount the impact and weight of legal definitions. Latino or Hispanic is a label used by ethnic leaders to build a base of political support, but it is also an official label recognized by the state and even created by it. The government treats Latinos as a group for many important purposes, including recognizing the legal rights as members of a minority, targeting grants and other opportunities towards those that can fall into the category, and continually seeking to reinforce the label by asking on official documents whether an individual is a member of the category in question. Even if there is a tepid response to the label in individual day-to-day self-evaluations, the utility of the label in understanding political behavior suggests that the notion of a "Latino Politics" might not be as problematic as Beltrán argues it is.

---

16 The 1930 Census listed "Mexican" as a racial category, but dropped it in the subsequent census. The 1970 census sought to count people of "Spanish origin or descent." The label "Hispanic" did not emerge in the Census until the 1980 enumeration, and "Latino" did not enter the count until 2000.
How "Us" Shapes Politics

Muslims seem to have been transformed from a broad umbrella of ethnic groups into a coherent interest group over the course of the last decade. How this newfound cohesion manifests politically is an empirical question that demands consideration. The impact has three clear and distinct dimensions: political engagement, political partisanship, and political preferences. Each of these dimensions will be briefly addressed.

Political Engagement

Increasing political engagement has long been held to be something at which organized religion excels (c.f. Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995.) However, this theory was built on analysis of the Judeo-Christian model in the West. Muslim theologians, most notably the Swiss-Arab theologian Tariq Ramadan, have expressed concern about a traditional line of thinking that would discourage Muslims from political participation. The usual mechanism identified for religious engagement leading to civic engagement is Verba et al.'s Civic Skills model. However, there is some question about the ability of either theology or religious engagement to restrain or even deter political participation (c.f. Campbell, 2004.) On the other hand, Tam Cho et al (2006) find that the perception of threat plays a mobilizing force for those socialized in an environment where said threat is convincingly tied to the importance of political engagement.
As suggested in the "How Politics Shapes Us" section, we expect to find that Muslim political engagement is driven by two factors - in-group norms and out-group threats. The social impact of a traditionalist set of religious convictions embedded within an immigrant community should correlate, ceteris paribus, with lower engagement. This expectation runs counter to most of the accepted literature on the role of religious participation in the American context (which can briefly be described as more religious participation = more civic participation), but I hypothesize that the ethnoreligious nature of the tradition can have a significant impact on the behavior of adherents. Specifically, greater emphasis on a traditionally religious Muslim identity will promote a sense of separatism and family orientation among Muslims which will discourage civic participation. Of course, other researchers have found that religious participation can have a consistent positive correlation with certain behaviors and attitudes (such as charitable giving) regardless of the theological content of the message (c.f. Putnam & Campbell 2010), but Muslims present a distinctive case that could challenge this position. This will be counter-balanced by the perception of danger stemming from the policy threat specifically directed at the Muslim community.

---

17 It has been the position of many theologians that the content of the theology propagated has an impact on the political outcomes such theology produces, and that different theologies can produce different outcomes (c.f. Wimbush 2000; Ramadan 2004). This could, theoretically, be dismissed as the conceit of theologians. Indeed, there is one story told about Robert Putnam who, when faced with an audience of evangelical Protestant ministers confident that members of their denomination behaved differently because of the particular theological emphasis of their sect, proceeded to demonstrate with available data that the rank-and-file of their congregation in fact behaved no differently than any other group of Protestants (Putnam and Campbell 2010). However, there is also research out there that is suggestive of the importance of theology. Aside from the widely-recognized difference between white and black evangelical Protestants, Campbell (2004) finds that some sects can lead individuals to become less rather than more engaged, contra the Verba et al (1995) Civic Skills model prediction. Other studies (Schoettmer, 2013; Ayers & Hoffstetter 2008) have similarly found a tension between measures of public engagement (which seems to lead to greater involvement in civic life) and private religious devotion (which, in some cases, can lead to a withdrawal from civil society.)
by out-groups. As outlined above, the new strength of Muslim political identity necessarily needed an external impetus to coalesce. This could stem from threats associated with the state itself, from parties, or from influential members of party coalitions.

**Political Partisanship**

The most common narrative about American Muslims is that this was a Republican-leaning group that, following 9/11, became solidly Democratic. While certainly true in certain respects, this is an explanation that lacks nuance. Muslims seem to have divided along ethnic lines politically before 9/11, with black Muslims supporting Democrats along with black Christians, Arab Muslims leaning towards the GOP along with their Christian counterparts, and Asian Muslims' political loyalty up for grabs. Current surveys show that very few Republican Muslims exist today, with the large majority either declaring themselves Democratic or Independent. Work by Baretto and Bozonelos (2009) suggests that perceived hostility from Republicans and the lack of support from Democrats helps to drive the high degree of non-identification among Muslims. However, they do not delve into the source of this disparate perception. I argue that this discrepancy is largely due to religious socialization, with the nature of the social network within the mosques themselves relaying the relative importance and utility of holding partisan attachments. Native-born Muslims are more likely
to see greater utility in civic and political engagement, and so mosque nativity will be an important factor in understanding the utility of masjid mobilization.\(^{18}\)

This actually serves as a clarification and extension to the notion of retrospective voting (c.f. Fiorina 1978) as well as offering an extension of the social identity approach to partisan loyalties (c.f. Green, Palmquist, and Schickler 2002.) The retrospective voting argument holds that voters shift their voting preferences through the updating of evaluations of the parties. For Fiorina, this updating is rooted largely in economic performance. While difficult to see at the micro-level, where political loyalties are generally robust, this drift is visible at the macro-level. This individual-level process relies on a rational assessment of individual benefit, with the essential cognitive process resting on a cost-benefit analysis of continued support of one's current party versus the benefits of supporting the opposition (or, theoretically, a third) party. This assessment of individual-level calculus has been challenged by on methodological grounds (c.f. Schickler and Green 1995). Green, Palmquist and Schickler have offered an alternative model based around group fit.\(^{19}\) While the model presented by these

---

\(^{18}\) Throughout this dissertation, you will find the words "mosque" and "masjid" used interchangably, as they often are used in colloquial parlance among Muslims. To be precise, masjid is the Arabic word for a mosque, which itself is the primary English word used to describe an Islamic place of worship that meets the exacting requirements of the faith. Masjid comes from the Arabic word "sajada", which means "to prostrate in prayer" or "to worship". In its particular conjugation, masjid literally translates as "a place where one worships." A third term, musallah, could be used for some places of worship, as this is an Islamic term that refers to prayer halls that do not meet all the requirements needed to be considered a masjid. Additionally, some consciously refer to themselves as "Islamic Centers" rather than any of the afore-mentioned terms. Islamic center connotates facilities that likely contain a prayer space, but also contain a number of other facilities like schools ("madrasa" in Arabic), gymnasiums, or social halls.

\(^{19}\) Green, Palmquist, and Schickler (2002) take pains to distinguish themselves from a purely social identity approach to partisanship. On page 11, they say, "The latter [social identity theory] emphasizes an individual's drive to achieve positive self-esteem...This depiction is very different than ours. We focus on how people categorize themselves and remain agnostic about the
three men is very compelling, and indeed dovetails with the above model in several ways, they also argue that group-based change occurs over generations. That explanation clearly does not match with the Muslim-American experience. Shifts in group welfare are generally gradual in nature, as alignments and coalitions slowly shift until a critical tipping point is reached. However, the rapid transformation of the social position of Muslims in the US did not conform to this usual process and perhaps helps to highlight a process of retrospective group evaluations.

What the theory being presented does is label retrospective voting as a very important subset of a broader political evaluation based on threat. Economic downturns, job loss, or rising gas prices are likely the most persistent threat to the well-being of many American families, so it would be unsurprising that evaluations of persistent economic changes would be most likely to produce a shift in the relevant political identity of a group. Social threats from immigrant groups introducing new customs and languages can likewise be perceived as threatening to established groups. However, sociotropic or economic threats are trumped by perceived physical threat. The immediacy of a perceived threat to physical security is likely to be able to produce more significant and more rapid reevaluation of the political environment than other sorts of threats. Thus, while a largely affluent Arab Muslim community might still have an economic incentive to maintain support for the Republican Party, a perceived physical threat from this underlying psychological motives that impel people to form social identities such as party attachment. Indeed, it seems to us to be unlikely that the pursuit of self-esteem drives the formation and adjustment of party attachments." (emphasis mine.)
group could still trigger considerable partisan instability among individual Arab Muslims.

Policy Preferences

Political preferences will largely be shaped by the composition of the social network. Muslim individuals with more homogeneous social networks will emphasize traditional identities and values-based concerns, as they likely exist in environments where such issues are made socially salient and lack significant exposure to out-group pressures. On the other hand, Muslims who live in predominantly non-Muslim social networks will be more attuned to the public political discussions and will see their issue preferences align more closely to the preferences of their stated political party. This is in part because they receive fewer in-group cues to indicate what "Muslim" issues are. However, these Muslims are also the ones who are more likely to express a sense of group solidarity in their political evaluations, as the salience of a Muslim cultural identity is reinforced by out-group responses and behavior.

The Next Step

Going forward, the building of the argument will necessarily unfold over the next four chapters. Chapter 2 will demonstrate that, while ethnic differences in political behavior existed among Muslims at the beginning of the decade, these differences become more muted as the decade progressed and Muslims began to see their government as hostile to their faith. I will show that this convergence has
led to similarity in both the policy preferences and the political and civic behaviors of Muslims of varying ethnic backgrounds. Furthermore, this chapter will find that government hostility seemed to play a unifying and mobilizing role among Muslims, with ethnic variables losing significance over time and variables that measure religious engagement both strengthening and explaining more of the variance over the course of the decade. Finally, this chapter will demonstrate that there are indeed strains of religious traditionalism that drive down political engagement but that this strain of thought is concentrated among Arab Muslims. While this mentality is rejected by large majorities (over 80%, according to the 2007 Pew study), it is both the case that those who do accept this division are decisively less engaged in the political process, and that Islamic religious commitment among Arabs, but not among blacks, correlates with lower levels of political engagement.

Chapter 3 will refine the insights of the previous chapter, and seek to establish both that a salient and measurable Muslim identity exists and then establish the role it plays in Muslim political attitudes and behavior. By utilizing a survey of Muslims from the state of Indiana, this chapter will demonstrate that Muslim religious identity itself largely shapes a coherent set of in-group values, while the perception of threat from the broader community shapes the political behavior of American Muslims. The perception of threat has a tendency to deter engagement in the broader community, though this tendency can be offset and even be seen to modestly encourage greater community involvement if the sense of threat also inspires a deepened sense of linked fate between Muslims of various
ethnic stripes. This effect will be found to be further shaped by the nature of a Muslim's social network. Muslims who live in more exclusively Muslim social environments are also more withdrawn and disinclined to engage with society as a whole, while those with more religiously diverse social networks also find themselves more engaged with non-Muslims in a broader range of activities.

Chapter 4 delves more specifically into the partisan attitudes of Muslim Americans, and applies what we have learned about the forces that shape Muslim behavior to the ongoing debate over the factors that are most salient to shaping partisanship in the US. It will be in this chapter that we take the phenomenon established in chapters 2 and 3 to most directly test the theory outlined in this introductory chapter. We will find in this chapter that partisanship is largely shaped by threat perception which, I argue, is at the root of what drives rationalist retrospective and prospective voter models, while social pressures tends to better explain attitudinal and ideological preferences of respondents. In all cases, psychological short-cuts such as group labels play an important role in how the partisan environment is navigated, thus reinforcing the argument laid out above that my proposed model better captures the psychology underlying partisan attachment formation rather than any individual model and, in particular, helps to explain why stable partisan identities do change from time to time.

The final substantive chapter, chapter 5, will examine the perceptions of religious elites. I will do this in order to try and answer the perplexing non-finding of mosque efficacy in the previous chapters. Based on a series of interviews with a small number of religious leaders in the city of Indianapolis, IN, I will argue
that mosques have become a central social focus of Muslims, owing in large part to their mistrust of the broader community and suspicion of the government's intentions. The increased social importance of the mosque within the Muslim community has led to an intensification of the value of the mosque community. This, in turn, has increased the focus of mosques on competition between each other and has, on occasion, intensified conflicts within the mosque community over positions of leadership. Furthermore, the largely immigrant nature of many of the mosques and the comparative stability of American politics (as compared to the politics of the Muslims' homelands) leads to more social orientation within mosques towards homeland politics. In this, I will demonstrate that mosques are actually behaving as we might expect them to, and similarly to the political behavior we see from synagogues in the US.

American Muslims present a rare opportunity to both help elucidate the political behavior and preferences of a distinct and interesting subgroup of the broader American panorama while at the same time examining generally applicable theoretical propositions. The opportunity to better understand the confluence between psychological constructs and social pressure should afford us better purchase on both how broader racial categorizations shape and are shaped by the political process as well as giving us the opportunity to test dominant theories of the political behavior of the religious in a hard case for the theories to explain in order to test the robustness of these general findings. As there are many moving parts to be examined, it is best to try and look at only small sections in
isolation. Thus, we now turn to examine specifically the way Muslim
organizations have responded to the political environment since the 1990s.
CHAPTER 2:
FROM COMMUNITIES OF MUSLIMS TOWARDS A MUSLIM COMMUNITY

Abstract: In this chapter, I will look at Muslim political behavior during the early 2000s in order to see how Muslim behavior has changed over this formative period. I will find that ethnic differences begin to fade between 2001 and 2004, though they do not disappear entirely. Furthermore, I will find, contrary to the conventional expectation, that mosque attendance plays little role in mobilizing Muslims for political engagement while personal faith is moderated by ethnicity. On the other hand, I do find that the perception of threat increases political participation.

Formal institutions are an important cornerstone of the Muslim community, just as they are in any other religious or ethnic community. Mosque attendance among Muslims also varies across ethnic lines in a manner similar to that of Christians, with blacks attending Mosque more frequently than other ethnic backgrounds (Pew 2011; Taylor, Chatters, Jayakody, & Levin, 1996.) Jamal (2005) argues that mosque participation has helped to forge a joint Muslim identity among attendants, particularly in integrated as opposed to single-ethnicity mosques. In particular, Jamal observes that blacks and Arabs who attend the same
mosque tend to see themselves as belonging to the same in-group, in large part due to shared experiences and discrimination. That we see this among mosque-attending Muslims is not particularly surprising- Putnam and Campbell (2010) present considerable evidence that personal contact among religious people can breed more tolerance and acceptance. However, Djupe and Green (2007) present evidence that black Muslims are much more likely to attend mosques where the congregants are of a single-ethnicity than Muslims of other ethnic groups.

Furthermore, many Muslims in the US do not belong to or regularly attend a mosque. According to the 2011 Pew Muslim-American survey, 41% of American Muslims attend a mosque less frequently than once a month. Mosque attendance does not play the same role in Islam that it does in Christianity, and mosques are not common outside of large cities. Mosque attendance, even among Muslims who consider themselves to be devout, may not be the best measure of religious commitment for Muslims. However, the mosque does potentially play important skill-building and community-building roles that private devotional practice cannot replicate. Thus, two important components of a potentially engaged Islamic political identity among American Muslims hit upon two important stumbling-blocks- self-segregation and non-attendance.

The reality of the mosque experience in the US raises the question of whether the mosque is the locus where an American Muslim political identity is being forged. This chapter will begin to answer that question. Furthermore, in this chapter we will explore the questions of whether there are substantive differences between Muslims who do and do not regularly attend mosque as well as whether
there are salient differences across ethnic lines. It will do so by examining the impact of mosque attendance on both the degree of engagement (both civic and specifically political) with society and by exploring how the perception of threat or hostility varies across salient lines.

**Ethnicity and American Islam**

One of the central tensions in the long history of the United States has long been the line between black and white. Ethnic groups have traditionally fit themselves within this black/white paradigm, seeking to establish a position within a spectrum anchored by these two polar positions. The creation of racial hierarchies in the US has its roots in the essentialization of certain traits (most importantly, skin tone) to categorize individuals (c.f. Omi and Winant 1986). Arab Muslims, as noted in the brief history of Islam in America sketched out in a previous chapter, sought, and eventually won, recognition as a white ethnic group. While occasionally enjoying tense relations with some of their neighbors, Arab Muslims generally sought to assimilate into American society and disappear into the melting pot of American society (c.f. Elkholy 1966). Such an option was not available for black Muslims, and because of that the communities largely developed separately for most of the 20th century.\(^\text{20}\) Indeed, while Islam has played a significant role in the black community for about a century, Lincoln

\(^{20}\) Of course, there are arguably religious reasons for this divide as well. For much of the 20th century, the majority of black Muslims in the US belonged to the Nation of Islam, a religious tradition that fell outside the orthodox boundaries of Islam brought to the US by foreign-born Muslims. While members of the Nation certainly consider themselves to be Muslim, this sentiment is often not shared by Sunni Muslims of Arab or South Asian descent. While the majority of black Muslims are now relatively orthodox Sunnis now, this legacy remains a factor shaping the modern contours of the American Muslim community.
(1994) argues that Islam among African Americans is primarily about race. Because of this, black Muslims had little motivation to build bridges to Muslims of other ethnicities for most of that time period.

Of course, it is easy to say that 9/11 may have changed that equation. On one hand, the level of support among blacks for profiling Arabs (Schildkraut, 2009) as well as their hostility towards Islamists and Arabs is significantly lower than for other ethnic groups following the September 11th attacks (Davis, 2007; Kalkan, Layman, and Uslaner, 2009). However, while Davis (2007) does note that African Americans tend to be more favorably disposed towards Islamists and Arabs than other ethnic groups within the United States, it is still the case that these groups are rated lowest on the African American feeling thermometer scores reported by Davis, suggesting that Arabs and Islamists are still looked on with relative disfavor. Davis argues that the history of Islam within the black community and its historical association with ethnic pride and positive in-group affect may moderate African Americans’ attitudes towards Muslims. Thus it is possible that blacks could differentiate between Muslims along ethnic lines and view African-American Muslims as belonging to “their group” rather than an out-group that they might place other Muslims into. If this is the case, then there would be less pressure on African American Muslims to distinguish themselves from the Christian majority within their ethnic group, and the lower barrier towards cross-group socialization should promote greater Christian-Muslim ties and personal contacts within the African American community.
This would be in contrast to Arabs. Sides and Gross (2013) report that a majority of Americans do not seem to distinguish much between either Arabs or Muslims or between Arab-Americans and Middle Eastern Arabs. Furthermore, it is not clear whether white Americans would view a black Muslim as a Muslim or as an African-American, and if this would even make a difference in how they interact with said individual.\(^{21}\) While there are certain powerful cues (such as being a muhajabah- a woman who wears a headscarf or other culturally traditional mode of expressing modesty) that might incline an individual one way or the other, religious cues are generally more subtle than the overt labeling based on the hue of one's skin. Finally, while the sense of Muslim identity generated from mosque attendance could forge a sense of linked fate\(^{22}\) between Muslims of different ethnicities, many Muslims in the United States are un-mosqued (Haddad, 2004) or attend single-ethnicity mosques.

Blacks, who are far more likely to be native-born, have been subjected to less official discrimination due to their religious preferences than Arabs (though blacks have a long history of discrimination due to their ethnicity, and it is likewise clear that black Muslims were on the FBI's radar since at least the 1950s, and black Islamists such as Malcolm X were specifically targeted for scrutiny

\(^{21}\) Arguably, however, the experiences of President Obama suggest that there may well be a willingness among at least some segments of the American population to readily associate blacks with Islam.

\(^{22}\) Dawson (1994) defines linked fate as the belief that an individual’s, “…own self-interests are linked to the interests of the race.” (p. 77) This belief that individual welfare depends on the welfare of the ethnic group more broadly drives greater identification with the ethnic group. If one perceives identity as being relatively fixed, either by self-reinforcing stereotype emulation or because of raw social pressure, then the Dawson position is powerfully logical. This is usually the case for race or ethnicity. This is likely the case for those with an ethno-religious orientation as well.
Arabs, on the other hand, are an ethnic group that has been singled out for closer scrutiny. This veil of suspicion has fallen on Arabs of all ethnic persuasions, which at times has been a moment for unity across religious lines and at other times a point of division within the community. Better understanding how ethnic cleavages among American Muslims have been transformed in the first decade of the 21st century will give us a better handle on how events have transformed the meaning of both Islam and ethnicity within this community. Because of the above, the first hypothesis that we will test in this chapter is as follows:

**H1:** Arab Muslim civic engagement will be more significantly correlated to measures of individual ethnic ties than black Muslims, whose behavior will be better explained by religious devotion.

As black Muslims have higher rates of public religious engagement, it is reasonable to expect that those who call themselves Muslim opted into the tradition for what they got from the religion. That is not to suggest that the faith of Arab-Americans is somehow less sincere than the Islam practiced by African-American Muslims, but Arabs often have the label of Muslim foisted upon them by the general public whether or not they wish to be so labeled. Rather, it is to say that black Muslims likely have the choice to conceal their faith tradition much more easily than Muslims of other ethnic backgrounds, so can more readily "pass" as a black Christian in day-to-day life. Black Muslims who chose to prioritize
their faith identity are embracing a tradition that may, at time, cause tension within their ethnic community. In essence, it could be said that black Muslims who embrace a Muslim political identity have begun to behave less like "blacks who are Muslim" and more like "Muslims who are black."

At the same time, there remains the question of the role of the mosque beyond shaping the political identity of Muslims. Stated plainly, our second expectation would be as follows:

**H2:** Public religious engagement will be correlated with greater political engagement, while private religiosity will be correlated with lower levels of political engagement.

The first part of the hypothesis is a straightforward assumption drawn from the civic skills model (Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995), that participation in communal religious life affords believers the opportunity to develop the skills and capacity that facilitate public engagement as well as the opportunity to be recruited to employ such skills. This is likely further enhanced by the construction of linked fate beliefs. As noted above in the findings of Jamal (2005), mosques seem to contribute to the creation of a common identity. We know from the experiences of other minority groups that linked fate beliefs and be a powerful motivator for political action (Dawson 1994; Junn and Masuoka 2008; McClain et al 2006; Barreto and Bozonents 2009). If this is true, we would expect to see those engaged in public worship engaged for this reason as well.
A final third assumption underlies the first two assumptions, along with the course of the project as a whole. That assumption is that the perception of threat from the non-Muslim majority makes Muslim identity politically salient in the first place. People tend to hold stable conceptions of ethnic and racial identity, particularly in their adulthood (c.f. Phinney 1990). However, Phinney (1996) finds that ethnic identities are constructed out of three key dimensions: cultural norms and values; the strength, salience, and meaning of ethnic identity; and the experiences and attitudes associated with minority status. When the meaning attached to a minority status is changed in the general public and seen as being in competition with other social identities in new ways, the salience of said identity is increased (Sherif 1966; Duckitt 1994). Trust is an important component of civic engagement (Putnam 1995), and when this trust declines so does civic engagement. Thus, stated formally, I expect to find the following:

**H3: Increased perceived hostility towards Islam will lead to Muslim civic disengagement.**

To begin this analysis, we will utilize the Muslims in the American Public Square (MAPS) survey data. MAPS was sponsored by the Center for Christian-Muslim Understanding at Georgetown University and conducted by Zogby International. There are two survey waves, one conducted in November and December of 2001 and the second wave in August and September of 2004. Muslims who self-identified as black make up 22% of the 1781-person sample in
the 2001 wave and 15% of the 1846-person 2004 wave. The data was gathered through telephone surveys, where the available pool sample was generated by drawing all phone numbers listed to individuals with last names that might indicate an origin from a region with large Muslim populations. This telephone sample is supplemented with face to face interviews over a 3-day period in Detroit, MI, Atlanta, GA, Washington, D.C. and New York, NY in order to better draw samples from Muslims who would have been missed by the telephone sampling method due to the perceived ethnicity of their family name.23

**Religious Practice**

Measures of the importance of religion do not give us much purchase on the differences between black Muslims and Muslims from other ethnic backgrounds, as both groups report very high levels of religious commitment. The United States is an unusually religious country by Western standards (Inglehart and Norris, 2003), so this should not be unexpected. When comparing responses between the two waves of the MAPS survey, the number of black Muslims reporting that Islam is a very important component of their life is 88% in 2001 and 93% in 2004. The movement among other Muslims likewise falls within the margin of error, with 76% of all other respondents saying religion is very important to them in 2001 and a similar 78% reporting so in 2004. Mosque attendance, however, gives us a bit better purchase on how the post-9/11 environment has affected Muslims generally. Eighty-nine percent of black Muslims attend organized religious services once a week or more in the 2001

---

23 Zogby International did not provide a response rate for the data in question.
wave, as compared to 51% of other Muslims. We actually see mosque attendance drop off in the subsequent wave, with 72% of blacks and 48% of other Muslims reporting weekly (or more) attendance to group services. While the shift in non-black attendance is within the expected variation we would see from one wave to another, the black attendance rate is a rather dramatic 17 percentage point drop. We will look more at this shift in a moment, but first we should look at another measure of religiosity. A different measure, if one is looking for an equivalent measure to Christian church attendance, might be salah (the five daily prayers that Sunni Muslims are obliged to make.) If one looks at salah instead, 57% of black Muslims and 44% of other Muslims report saying daily prayers in the 2001 wave. However, unlike with mosque attendance, the differences between ethnic groups more-or-less holds constant with 61% blacks reporting praying daily and 46% of other Muslims doing likewise in the 2004 survey. Examining the numbers for females versus males, we see similar stability across waves, though women are more likely to observe daily prayers and men are more likely to attend religious services. This is likely influenced by the fact that, in Islam, Friday prayers are generally not held to be obligatory for women.

While attending the juma’a service on Friday has a different (and less important role) in Islam than does attending a Sunday service in Christian traditions, the rather dramatic drop in black mosque attendance requires a closer look. It is possibly indicative of problematic data, although the stability we find in the prayer measures across waves gives us some reassurance that this is not the case. Even if the data is not itself flawed on this count, an examination of the
matter can help to shed light on what is happening among American Muslims. As the issue is one that emerges in an examination of the descriptive statistics, we will turn briefly to a regression analysis of the drivers of religious attendance.

The above is a predicted probability for mosque attendance, by education, race, and year of survey. The model is tested using pooled data from the MAPS surveys. N=1781 for 2001 and N=1846 in 2004, for a total pooled N=3627.

**Figure 2.1:** Educated black Muslims drop off in mosque attendance between 2001 and 2004

Figure 2.1 above shows the predicted probability of mosque attendance for black and Arab Muslims from the immediate aftermath of the 9/11 attacks in 2001 to the broader War on Terror in 2004. Interestingly, we see that, while blacks are more likely to attend mosque services regularly than Arabs regardless of year, less-educated blacks are significantly more likely to attend in 2004 than either Arabs of either wave or, indeed, than the group was in 2001. While blacks are in both waves more likely to attend religious services at a high rate than are
Arabs, it is the case in 2004 that more educated blacks are less likely to do so than black Muslims with less formal education. This statistically-significant difference stands in contrast to both Arabs in either wave as well as blacks in 2001. It also stands in contrast to what we typically see among most religious communities in the US, where education correlates with higher levels of religious attendance (at least until one reaches the highest levels of academic achievement) (c.f. Putnam and Campbell 2010).

![Chart](chart.png)

The above is a predicted probability for mosque attendance, by ethnic group activity, race, and year of survey. The model is tested using pooled data from the MAPS surveys. N= 1781 for 2001 and N=1846 in 2004, for a total pooled N=3627.

**Figure 2.2: Importance of Ethnic Group Activism Fades by 2004**

If we drill deeper into the phenomenon, we also find that group activism in ethnic or racial organizations matters for black Muslims. For Arabs, mosque
attendance really only seems to correlate with other measures of religious engagement. Ethnic group affiliations do not seem to matter for Arabs in either wave, though it comes close to statistical significance in 2001. However, for blacks we see a somewhat more complex story emerge. While the same religious predictors that matter for Arabs also matter for blacks, it is true that those African-American Muslims who are more active in groups with an ethnic focus to their activities are also more likely to be found attending group prayers on Friday in 2001. This can be seen as support for the Lincoln hypothesis that race plays a more significant role in the theological world view of black Muslims than it does for other Muslims. However, by 2004, this distinction had faded into statistical insignificance. All black Muslims have a higher predicted probability of attending masjid regularly, but we no longer see the higher rates of attendance among those active in ethnic groups.

Finally, it could be noted that political conservatism, by 2004, no longer matters for mosque attendance. This is a highly unusual finding, as ideological conservatism is one of the most consistent predictors of religious attendance in the American politics literature (c.f. Putnam and Campbell 2010.) As will be shortly discussed, we see a dramatic shift in partisan identity among Muslims of all backgrounds, and this may well explain this change.
Figure 2.3. Mean civic engagement, by ethnicity

The figure above compares blacks with the other two largest ethnic groups within the sample, namely Arabs and Pakistanis, as well as others from the sample that do not fall into one of these three largest groups. What stands out is the variation in black Muslim associational patterns when compared to Muslims of all other ethnicities. Specifically, what we see is much greater black engagement with the wider community than that of other ethnic groups. Recognizing that black Muslims are more likely to be born in the US, simply comparing raw categories may not be an entirely justifiable comparison.

Blacks are predominantly born in the United States (69% of the total sample are born in the US), where the other segments of the Muslims community

Source: MAPS Survey, Waves 1 & 2
Note: Civic engagement is measured by the range of groups respondents report being active in, with a range of 0-10.
are predominantly immigrant (only 23% of non-black Muslims were born in the
United States). When one only includes US-born Muslims, the difference
becomes much more stark between the other two ethnic backgrounds that make
up the majority of US Muslims. This could well be because of the afore-
mentioned historic role Islam has played in the black community, and the fact that
Islam is simply better received in homogenous black areas of the country than in
more heterogeneous communities or majority-white areas, where the bulk of non-
black Muslims find themselves.

Indeed, this possibility is also suggested in Figure 2.2, as one can see that
participation in ethnic organizations is a significant predictor for black mosque
participation in both 2001 and 2004, while it is not in either wave for Arabs. A
number of other indicators hint that this may be a possible explanation for the
story of greater black Muslim engagement with the society around. If we look
inside the components that make up our measure of civic engagement and
compare the groups, the estimated probability when it comes to give time or
money to an ethnic group such as the NAACP is about 20 percentage points
higher for black Muslims than it is for non-blacks to give to their representative
ethnic groups. Estimates for black community or neighborhood engagement are
also about 15 percentage points higher, and black Muslims have about a 10
percentage point higher probability to volunteer time at their mosque or local

---

24 While the distinction between blacks (including recent immigrants from Africa) and
African Americans (which only includes those who are born in the United States and have lived
with the historical legacy of American slavery) is not a small one, for the purposes of our analysis
there is little actual effect. Dropping immigrant blacks from the black sample does not
substantively change the results in most cases, and does not change the analysis in any of the
cases. This might suggest that the real differences between the immigrant blacks and the native-
born blacks are small, or it could simply be due to the small number of immigrant blacks in the
sample. This distinction is not one that can be spoken to with any confidence with this data.
school than non-black Muslims. The relative level of engagement holds constant across waves for the most part. Even when small shifts occur, the absolute difference between the two averages almost always moves equally and in the same direction.

**Trust and Political Engagement**

As the social capital literature suggests, the relative level of civic participation is often a strong indicator of non-voting political activity (e.g. Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995; Putnam 2000). The level of civic engagement is closely tied to trust; if one has little faith in the good will of the whole, then one has little incentive to strengthen institutions that may later be used to threaten oneself. If one looks at political activism in comparison to civic participation, we see that the general pattern holds—just as blacks are more civically engaged, they are also more politically engaged in non-voting activities. Looking at the individual items that compose the participation scale, however, an interesting pattern emerges. Blacks are notably more likely to report in engaging in forms of political action (rallying, boycotting, or giving time to a campaign) while Arabs are somewhat more likely than blacks to engage in political communication (visit web sites or discuss politics.)
Figure 2.4: Mistrust of the US Government grows among Muslim between 2001 and 2004 in response to the question, "Is the government engaged in a war against terrorism or against Islam?"

The collapse in American Muslim confidence in the administration’s motivations for the War on Terror is striking. In 2001, the Muslim community was solidly behind the government and expressed confidence that the Administration was engaged in a defense of the country against external foes. However, by 2004, the community had become deeply divided over this very issue. Only about half as many Muslims in the subsequent survey express a belief that the US government is indeed targeting terrorism, and a plurality of respondents to the survey express their belief that the Administration was engaged in an anti-Muslim campaign rather than in what could be interpreted as legitimate defense.
The growth of mistrust is not evenly distributed throughout the Muslim community. Examining the correlation between the likelihood of expressing belief in the sincerity of the government's intentions with an indexed measure of religiosity, as shown in Figure 2.5 above, it becomes clear that there is a connection between "Muslimness" and trust in the government. While the modal (and mean) answer among the most secular segment of the sample is virtually the same between waves, we see considerable drop-off among those who even nominally engage with their religious tradition. The collapse in confidence among

---

25 The religiosity measure in figure 5 is a scale constructed from attendance and prayer frequency, The attendance measure is collapsed to the same range as the prayer measure.
the most religious is very striking. This segment of the sample, who expressed the highest degree of confidence in the US government in 2001, expressed the lowest levels in the 2004 sample.

It is intriguing, however, that this mistrust of the administration does not necessarily translate itself into a mistrust of the underpinning system. As we can see from the increased participation rates shown in table 2.1, a growing sense of persecution has led to an overall intensification of engagement with the political process. While we know that a sense of threat can correlate with a higher degree of political engagement (Tam Cho et al 2006), we also know this is not always the case. In particular, Jamal demonstrates in her comparative study of civic engagement in Arab countries that higher levels of perceived threat and civic engagement lowers political participation in states where confidence in government institutions and the rule of law is low (Jamal 2007).
TABLE 2.1

MEAN LEVEL OF CIVIC AND POLITICAL ENGAGEMENT, BY BELIEF IN THE INTENTIONS OF THE US GOVERNMENT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The US Government is waging a</th>
<th>War on Terror</th>
<th>War on Islam</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2001</td>
<td>2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civic Engagement</td>
<td>4.331</td>
<td>4.007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2.621)</td>
<td>(2.626)</td>
<td>(2.437)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Engagement</td>
<td>6.146</td>
<td>6.341</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2.589)</td>
<td>(2.501)</td>
<td>(2.456)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: MAPS Survey, Waves 1 & 2
Notes: Civic engagement is measured by the range of groups respondents report being active in, with a range of 0-10. Political engagement is measured as a range of types of political actions that the respondent reports in participating, with a range of 0-11.

Those who see their government waging a war against their religion are both more engaged in civil society and more politically active than those who report a belief that the government is only trying to put a stop to terrorism and is not targeting Islam. This is a curious finding, as those who are more educated, a traditionally powerful predictor of civic engagement tend to be more likely to say that the government is not waging a war on terror. On the other hand, nativity seems to matter— even controlling for race, those born in the US are more willing to express doubts about the good faith of the government effort than are those born abroad. Among non-black Muslims, 18% of US-born Muslims (as compared to 13% of foreign-born Muslims) expressed doubts about the intentions of the US government. By 2004, however, 44% of US-born non-black Muslims expressed doubts about the intentions of the US government.

---

26 In 2001, 60% of people who report believing that the US government is waging a war on terrorism had a college education or more, while only 50% of those who said that the government is waging a war of Islam had that same high degree of education. The gap closes considerably by 2004, when 63% of those who trusted the government (vs. 59% of those who were suspicious of the government) were in the category of having at least a bachelor's degree. Of course, some (c.f. Berinsky & Lenz, 2011) have argued that education itself does not independently predict engagement but rather proxies for other traits that drive participation, but even in that case the finding is puzzling.
(as compared to 32% of foreign-born Muslims) were willing to express skepticism that the government was indeed waging a war on terror. Comparing native-born black Muslims to immigrant black Muslims produces an even starker discrepancy, though native black Muslims display a greater willingness to express doubts about the true target of the government response even in the immediate wake of the 9/11 attacks.\(^27\)

\(^{27}\) 32\% of black Muslims responded that the US government was waging a war on Islam in 2001, and the percentage jumped to 54\% in 2004. In both waves, African-American Muslims are far more willing to make such a claim than Muslims of any other ethnic background.
### TABLE 2.2

**BLACK MUSLIMS MORE MOTIVATED BY PIETY, WHILE ARAB MUSLIMS MORE MOTIVATED BY ETHNIC IDENTIFICATION**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2001a</th>
<th>2004a</th>
<th>2001b</th>
<th>2004b</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Piety</td>
<td>-.023</td>
<td>-.088***</td>
<td>-.051</td>
<td>-.082**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.023)</td>
<td>(.022)</td>
<td>(.031)</td>
<td>(.030)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mosque Political Participation</td>
<td>.017</td>
<td>.061**</td>
<td>.016</td>
<td>.062**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.023)</td>
<td>(.019)</td>
<td>(.019)</td>
<td>(.019)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imam Political Participation</td>
<td>.078***</td>
<td>.081***</td>
<td>.080***</td>
<td>.080***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.018)</td>
<td>(.019)</td>
<td>(.018)</td>
<td>(.019)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslims should participate in politics</td>
<td>.220***</td>
<td>.129**</td>
<td>.226***</td>
<td>.131**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.037)</td>
<td>(.039)</td>
<td>(.037)</td>
<td>(.039)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Threat Perception</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government targeting Islam</td>
<td>.110***</td>
<td>.080***</td>
<td>.112***</td>
<td>.080***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.021)</td>
<td>(.019)</td>
<td>(.021)</td>
<td>(.019)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Experienced some form of discrimination</td>
<td>.030</td>
<td>.052***</td>
<td>.031</td>
<td>.053***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.020)</td>
<td>(.012)</td>
<td>(.019)</td>
<td>(.012)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnicity</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arab</td>
<td>.066***</td>
<td>.039**</td>
<td>.073*</td>
<td>.062*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.012)</td>
<td>(.012)</td>
<td>(.032)</td>
<td>(.030)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black</td>
<td>.018</td>
<td>-.003</td>
<td>-.106**</td>
<td>-.078</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.014)</td>
<td>(.019)</td>
<td>(.039)</td>
<td>(.063)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arab * Piety</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-.015</td>
<td>-.038</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.047)</td>
<td>(.045)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black * Piety</td>
<td>.174**</td>
<td>.093</td>
<td>.052</td>
<td>.078</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.052)</td>
<td>(.078)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$R^2$</td>
<td>.4712</td>
<td>.4337</td>
<td>.4757</td>
<td>.4347</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>1496</td>
<td>1578</td>
<td>1496</td>
<td>1578</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: MAPS Survey, Waves 1 & 2

Note: Top entries are standardized OLS coefficients. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Not shown are control coefficients for nativity, voter registration, education level, age, gender, civic engagement, and region of the country.

$***p<.001; **p<.01; *p<.05$

To delve further into what is driving the behavior, we need to examine the underlying correlations. To do that, we will employ that old workhorse of social science, OLS. Turning first to the leftmost two column of table 2.2, we find the base model for the 2001 and 2004 waves that examines in greater depth the relationship between religious beliefs, ethnicity, threat perception, and Muslim political engagement. Aside from the role of attitudes towards the political leadership of the clergy, discussed below, it is telling that actual religious practice
has a non-significant (in 2001) or negative (in 2004) impact on Muslim political engagement. As discussed above, this runs contrary to the expectations we would have coming out of the literature on politics and religious engagement. The first possibility to explore is whether ethnic differences exist in modes of political engagement, which speaks to the first hypothesis proposed. As a reminder, the first hypothesis expects to find religiosity to play a more important role in black Muslim engagement. Columns 3 and 4 explore this possibility, revealing that ethnicity does impact the way faith impacts engagement. The column labeled 2001b suggests that disengaged black Muslims were less likely to involve themselves in politics, but that religious black Muslims participated at rates roughly comparable to Arab Muslims. By 2004, however, these ethnic differences seem to have disappeared and, as in the models without interaction, religiosity correlates with disengagement with politics.

What may be happening is that religious engagement is but one aspect of Muslim identity. The surveys in question do not allow for us to examine whether the negative correlation between piety and political engagement in 2004 truly represents a unique difference between Islam and other religions in the US, or whether the finding represents undercurrents that one is not able to measure with this data. This question, specifically whether engagement may be connected to a nascent Muslim identity or sense of linked fate, will be explored in a later chapter. However, a second possibility is that the process of public religious engagement may be facilitating black engagement for cultural reasons similar to those seen in the black Christian church. It is possible to distinguish between private religious
commitment and public religious practice with the data at hand, so we will examine this possibility. Before turning to this, however, there are a few other aspects of the model that should be explored.

One useful aspect of the Zogby surveys is that the survey designers showed sensitivity towards the possible tension between traditionalist Islam and political participation. Because of this, there are a number of items that ask about religious activism in the political process as well as whether or not Muslims should be involved in politics in the first place in a non-Islamic state. This allows for a test of the second hypothesis, which expects orthodox, traditionalist beliefs to be negatively correlated with civic engagement. The impact of the Muslim participation question is strong, especially given that nearly 88% of respondents do express strong support for Muslim political participation. Likewise, the support for religious leadership in politics is interesting. The work of Djupe and Gilbert (2009) suggests that, in Christian churches, religious leaders have relatively little power of persuasion from the pulpit. Furthermore, Putnam and Campbell (2010) present evidence that clerical political advocacy is frowned upon and uncommon in most traditions in the US. However, it is interesting to note that, across all models, we see individuals who look to religious leadership to have a political voice being more engaged in the political process. In both waves, roughly 50% express opposition to Imam's voicing their political preferences, but 40% believe it appropriate and 10% claim to be undecided on the matter. If one only looks at blacks, the numbers actually reversed; pluralities among blacks support religious leadership on political matters in both waves. Islam became wedded to the
Caliphal state shortly after its founding, and has a long tradition of fusing religion and the state. As such, it is not surprising that Muslims would be more receptive to clerical leadership on political matters, and those willing to be mobilized by their clergy are subsequently more engaged.

Finally, we can test the third hypothesis, which expects to find threat correlating with lower political participation. Turning to the measures of threat perception among American Muslims, we can see that threat perception has a clear positive correlation with mobilizing Muslim political engagement. What may be surprising, particularly given the literature discussed above, is that it is primarily belief in government discrimination that correlates with greater political engagement, and does so consistently across waves. Reported civilian acts of discrimination seem to more weakly correlate with political engagement (and then, significantly only in 2004), but these forms of discrimination likewise prove to be significantly connected with greater engagement with the political process. While this data does not tease out the directionality of the causation (that is, it could be that threat is driving political engagement, or it could be that more engaged Muslims are simply more sensitive to perceived threats to their community), it makes more theoretical sense for the former to be the case. Indeed, it is difficult to identify a significant social force that has shifted as much as the perceived level of threat targeting Muslims that could explain both a rise in participation and consequently a rise in the perception of threat that would be implied by the causal arrow flowing in the other direction. Furthermore, this explanation is consonant with the findings of Tam Cho et al (2006)'s findings in
their study of Arab-Americans in the state of Florida, suggesting that civic trust may play less of a role in political mobilization than protecting one's group.

Disaggregating the piety measure allows for a more direct test of the impact of second hypothesis, which expects to find private devotionalism to correlate with less political engagement and mosque attendance to correlate with higher levels of political participation. These models will also allow us to get a better understanding of how religiosity is interacting with ethnicity. Once again, columns 1 and 2 present non-interactive models. Disentangling public and personal forms of devotion provides greater clarity for what is going on in the data. In the 2001a column we observe a curious lack of correlation between actual modes of religious practice and political participation beyond the impact of one's beliefs on whether Muslims should be involved at all in politics and whether the imam should guide this political engagement. More telling is the change we see in model 2004a. Here, it becomes clear that it is private devotion- a commitment to the faith, fastidiousness in observing daily prayer requirements, and religious salience to the daily life- which seems to be the primary demobilizer. This negative correlation we see from private devotionalism runs contrary to the expectations of the literature on religiosity and political engagement (c.f. Harris 1999). As the single-measure models suggest that different ethnic responses are likely an important part of the story, this is further explored in the second half of table 2.3.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE 2.3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PRIVATE DEVOTIONALISM SHAPES ARAB AND BLACK MUSLIM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BEHAVIOR DIFFERENTLY</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2001a</th>
<th>2004a</th>
<th>2001b</th>
<th>2004b</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Public Piety</td>
<td>.008</td>
<td>.005</td>
<td>-.033</td>
<td>-.023</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.021)</td>
<td>(.022)</td>
<td>(.031)</td>
<td>(.028)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private Piety</td>
<td>-.033</td>
<td>-.101***</td>
<td>-.014</td>
<td>-.059</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.026)</td>
<td>(.024)</td>
<td>(.038)</td>
<td>(.034)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mosque Political Participation</td>
<td>.017</td>
<td>.062**</td>
<td>.013</td>
<td>.063**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.020)</td>
<td>(.019)</td>
<td>(.020)</td>
<td>(.019)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imam Political Participation</td>
<td>.077***</td>
<td>.078***</td>
<td>.080***</td>
<td>.079***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.018)</td>
<td>(.019)</td>
<td>(.018)</td>
<td>(.019)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslim should participate in politics</td>
<td>.222***</td>
<td>.131**</td>
<td>.224***</td>
<td>.134**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.037)</td>
<td>(.039)</td>
<td>(.037)</td>
<td>(.039)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Threat Perception</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government targeting Islam</td>
<td>.110***</td>
<td>.080***</td>
<td>.112***</td>
<td>.079***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.021)</td>
<td>(.019)</td>
<td>(.021)</td>
<td>(.019)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Experienced some form of discrimination</td>
<td>.029</td>
<td>.053***</td>
<td>.035</td>
<td>.053***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.020)</td>
<td>(.012)</td>
<td>(.019)</td>
<td>(.012)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnicity</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arab</td>
<td>.068***</td>
<td>.043***</td>
<td>.107**</td>
<td>.095**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.012)</td>
<td>(.012)</td>
<td>(.036)</td>
<td>(.034)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black</td>
<td>.019</td>
<td>-.004</td>
<td>-.146**</td>
<td>-.080</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.014)</td>
<td>(.018)</td>
<td>(.045)</td>
<td>(.091)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arab*Public Piety</td>
<td>.088</td>
<td>.059</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.046)</td>
<td>(.042)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arab*Private Piety</td>
<td>-.109*</td>
<td>-.100*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.054)</td>
<td>(.055)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black*Public Piety</td>
<td>.036</td>
<td>.038</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.048)</td>
<td>(.059)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black*Private Piety</td>
<td>.171**</td>
<td>.056</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.063)</td>
<td>(.112)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R²</td>
<td>.4716</td>
<td>.4361</td>
<td>.4792</td>
<td>.4384</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>1496</td>
<td>1578</td>
<td>1496</td>
<td>1578</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: MAPS Survey, Waves 1 & 2
Note: Top entries are standardized OLS coefficients. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Not shown are control coefficients for nativity, voter registration, education level, age, gender, civic engagement, and region of the country.

* ***p<.001; **p<.01; *p<.05
Columns 3 and 4 present interactive models between the private and public religiosity measures and the dummy variables for the two main ethnic groups. The story that emerges from this interaction is striking. We see that, once again, public religious engagement has no predictive power for understanding Muslim engagement. Furthermore, interacting piety with the ethnicity dummy variables makes it clear that the fluctuation we see on the salience of piety is driven by changes among black Muslims. In 2001b, the data suggests that it is less religious Arabs and more personally devout blacks that engage in political activity more frequently. Thus, the model suggests that it is distinctive cultural interactions with the Islamic faith that drive Muslim behavior in the immediate aftermath of the 9/11 attacks. However, as other pieces of information presented suggest, this dynamic has changed by 2004. In particular, black Muslims seem to have lost their distinctiveness, and their political engagement is likely no different than other Muslim ethnic groups. Arab distinctiveness, on the other hand, remains completely unchanged.

**Discussion and Conclusion**

Analysis of the dataset has proven illuminating in how Muslims both converge and diverge with our expectations of how religion affects engagement. While American Muslims have provided us with an opportunity to test a number of theories that have emerged from the literature, and whose provisional verdict will be discussed below, they also provide us with a reminder both of the growing diversity of the American religious canopy and the fact that our existent theory-
grounded in the dominant Judeo-Christian tradition—may not fully capture the religio-political experience of newer American traditions.

The first hypothesis, as a reminder, reads: Arab Muslims will be motivated more by ethnic ties than black Muslims, who will be motivated more by religious devotion. It can be said that this hypothesis seems to have received some support from the data. In particular, we see ethnicity persisting for Arabs as an important influence on political engagement—indeed, Islam, in this case, seems to have a distinctly negative impact on Arab engagement. Blacks, on the other hand, while initially distinctive, seem to lose this distinctiveness by 2004. As discussed above, part of the story may lie in the fact that educated blacks seem much less engaged in their faith by 2004. It could be that, as hostility grew in the US towards Islam, blacks found themselves in a situation where the felt the need to chose between activism on behalf of their ethnic group or their religious group—with more educated black Muslims becoming more "black" and less educated black Muslims becoming more "Muslim." Another explanation could be that educated black Muslims were more aware of or concerned about possible mosque surveillance in the years following the 9/11 attacks and attended less in order to avoid official scrutiny.

The second hypothesis being tested was: Public religious engagement will be correlated with greater political engagement, while private religiosity will be correlated with lower levels of political engagement. The first part of this hypothesis, that public religiosity correlates with greater political engagement, is not supported by the findings. In general, it would seem that mosque participation
has little effect in and of itself, but that the ethnic context may mitigate this to some extent. Likewise, ethnicity seems to be very important in understanding how private piety relates to political engagement. While the story we see coming from Ramadan's writings arguably holds in the case of Arab Muslims, private piety among African-American Muslims seemed to spur greater engagement in their community and the body politic, at least in 2001. This finding is very surprising in light of the existing literature on religion and political engagement. Even those few studies that find religion having a demobilizing impact on political participation (c.f. Campbell 2004) find that religion demobilizes for reasons of time use. Campbell argues that attachment to an evangelical tradition can lead to demobilization among evangelical Christians simply by requiring considerable time from their congregants, which leaves them little time for non-religious activities. Likewise, Djupe and Gilbert (2009) find that religious attendance itself adds little to political participation, but explain this finding by pointing to the importance of small-group activities and recruitment opportunities. Indeed, some writers (such as Harris 1999) explicitly point to private religious belief as a political mobilizer specifically because they can provide both divine sanction for the activity and a sense of divine protection. It is beyond the scope of this study to explain why this difference exists, though below I speculate on possible explanations.

The third hypothesis reads: Increased perceived hostility from official sources towards Islam will lead to Muslim disengagement from the political process. This hypothesis is rejected by the findings in the Zogby data. We instead
find that personal discriminatory experiences are significantly correlated with political engagement. While, as mentioned earlier, it could theoretically be a situation where more engaged individuals simply are more sensitive to threat, the explanation that threat drives participation is more satisfying given the circumstances in which we see the shifts in political behavior. Of course, the theories from which this hypothesis were generated were done so in a non-American context. Thus, it could be that Muslim confidence in the rule of law in the American political system inspires some form of confidence than injustices may (eventually) receive redress even if the government is hostile to one's group. This confidence in the rule of law could explain why Muslims would engage in politics in America when faced with perceived official hostility while turning away in other states. This explanation will require further testing, but opens up interesting questions on the role of beliefs about the "quality" of justice play in the decision of whether or not to engage in politics in order to receive redress for grievances.

There are a number of reasons why religiosity may have a negative impact on political engagement among Muslims, but one strikes me as particularly compelling. As mentioned earlier in the chapter, the Muslim theologian Tariq Ramadan has argued that Muslims living in the West need to develop religious traditions separate from those in the Middle East. He argues that Western Muslims must remain true to the principles of the religion but adapted to the realities of life in liberal Western democracies. One stumbling block on the road to this goal is the dependence many Muslim institutions have on imams from
abroad. While small Muslim communities will rely on individuals from the congregation itself to lead them in prayer and deliver the Friday sermon (or khutbah) larger communities will often seek to bring in an imam raised and trained abroad. The imprimatur of one of the prestigious religious academies (al-Azhar for Sunni mosques and the religious schools in Qum for Shi’a communities) is likely considered desirable by many American Muslims. As such, those mosques that can afford to do so may often hire imams from abroad to come and lead their community. This could have the effect of reinforcing traditional conceptions of the inappropriateness of political engagement within non-Muslim societies, even though the great majority of Muslims express a belief that Muslims should be engaged with the political process.

The African-American Islamic experience, contrary to those of other ethnic groups, is rooted in an indigenous experience. As such, prominent Imams in predominantly black mosques tend to be native born, though some do study for a time abroad. The growth of the black Muslim population is also driven by conversion, and as such helps to reinforce the native character of the black Muslim experience. Indigenous black leadership, coupled with a propensity to meet in predominantly black mosques and focus their activity within the black community, could explain the finding of a differing initial impact of Islam on blacks. However, the scrutiny of the Islamic community following the 9/11 attacks could have cast as much a light internally as externally. It is possible that black imams sought to become more orthodox as attention was focused more on their community, which (given the relatively greater support Muslims seem to
show for clerical leadership on political issues) could have helped to bring black Islamic behavior more into conformity with other Muslims. Unfortunately, while hints of such an explanation can be seen in the data, more research is needed to explore the links between Muslim religious leadership and the political engagement of the community.

The links between the religious and the political, especially in countries such as the United States, are deep and expansive. However, as this case demonstrates, context will shape the meaning of that connection. Thus, in the next chapter, we will delve further into the connection between Islam and political (as well as civic) engagement in the US. We will do so by examining whether there is something we might call Muslim identity that perturbs the normal impact religious behavior has on civic and political engagement, and whether there is a sense of linked fate that emerged among Muslims that helps to explain why hostility seems to spur political engagement.

A note on the data used for this chapter

The full coding for all variables and controls is discussed in the appendix, but several of the most central variables warrant particular attention. The measure of piety is a polychoric factor scale index created from six questions that tap religious intensity, frequency of mosque attendance, involvement in the mosque beyond prayer services, and orthodox observance of prayer requirements, with a polychoric Eigenvalue of 4.0956. Piety is also divided into public and private measures. The public scale draws upon the questions that ask about general
attendance and small group attendance, while the private scale takes those items which look at religious salience and private prayer. Both scales are constructed as factor scales, with the public piety scale scoring a polychoric eigenvalue of 2.4263. The private piety scale has a polychoric eigenvalue of 2.5025.

The measure of political participation is also a polychoric factor scale. It is constructed from items such as visiting a campaign website, participating in a boycott or political rally, giving to a campaign, or contacting an elected official, as well as measures of how much respondents discuss and pay attention to politics. Only the campaign contribution measure is one that would be legally complicated by a lack of citizenship. This could be important, as over 68% of the sample is foreign-born, and those born in the US are overwhelmingly of one ethnicity (African-American). Fortunately, a large part of the sample is registered to vote, and only 10% of the sample are not citizens. There is a large degree of internal coherence to this scale as well. The polychoric Eigenvalue is 3.8723.
CHAPTER 3
IDENTITY AND SOLIDARITY

Abstract: The purpose of this chapter is to demonstrate that the concept of "Muslim identity" is a measurable and politically salient concept among US Muslims. The central finding of this chapter is that Muslim identity does indeed exist and has two distinct components (religious identity, which is shaped by network homogeneity; cultural identity, which is shaped primarily by linked fate beliefs.) These beliefs encourage different sorts of behavior, with religious identification correlating with separatism and cultural identification being connected to engagement.

The bombing of the 2013 Boston marathon helped to bring to light the difficulties that can emerge from both a sense of alienation and a sense of hostility. The primary suspects of the bombing were a pair of brothers, immigrants from Chechnya. While the details of the case are still unclear at the time of this writing, certain aspects of the case that have bubbled to the surface ring familiar. However, even more telling are the stories emerging about the broader US Muslim community. Almost as soon as the bombing occurred, Muslim-Americans almost seemed to hold their collective breath waiting for the identity of the perpetrators of the attack (Fisher 2013; Garrison 2013). Muslim organizations were notably quick to issue both individual and joint condemnations
of the bombings, renewing and intensifying such statements after the primary suspects were revealed to be Muslims (Eckstrom 2013). Meanwhile, some, particularly conservative, commentators began to criticize the religious community (Poor 2013) or draw clear lines towards what they saw as the most salient aspect of the suspects- their religious identity (Portnoy 2013.) All the while, a backlash targeted at the community erupted in certain segments of the US (Greenfield 2013.) Debates erupt online between Muslims, with some lamenting that they are "disappointed and disturbed by the gratuitous displays of nationalism in attempts to dissociate and deny the citizenry of a 'bad guy'," while others insist that, "...they are Muslim kids and we need to start accepting that we have issues in our community," (personal communication, April 19, 2013.) Through it all and regardless of the point of view of the writers, a sense pervaded the reporting and discussion of the case that there was a routine that such attacks were supposed to follow. The routine was so seemingly familiar that it became a ready joke for the satirical newspaper the Onion, which lamented that the" Majority of Americans were not informed enough to stereotype Chechens," but that, "once {Americans} were told Chechnya is a predominantly Muslim region, they were 'usually pretty good to go from there.'"

The event helped to illuminate the social forces encouraging unity among Muslim-Americans. Two Caucasian men who practiced Islam sent ripples through the entire US Muslim community, as the general public once again reminded Muslim-Americans of the primacy of that label in the collective mind of the general public regardless of whether they were denouncing or defending the
religious tradition. Regardless of whether or not Pakistani-Americans, Arab-Americans, or African-Americans felt any sense of kinship with two troubled young men originally from the Caucuses, Muslims of those ethnic backgrounds were expected to speak out against it for no other reason than the "Muslim" label trumped any other label that could be attached to the suspects in the minds of both the general public and the American-Muslim segment of that broader community.

Thus far, we have seen that Muslims have what could be an emerging consensus on shared political interests. This sense of collective interests has helped to shape the Muslim community into a group with a coherent set of political preferences. As can be seen in the case of the bombing, it seems that social pressure has helped to shape this collective sense of self. What is not clear is how this sense of social pressure is internalized and manifests itself within the community, and the political and social implications of this new identity. It is this question that this chapter will attempt to tease out. In particular, this chapter will attempt to answer three questions: 1) Is there a distinct Muslim identity that can be usefully measured among American Muslims? 2) Does this identity create a sense of linked fate among Muslims which helps to forge a cohesive political unit out of this diverse and dispersed religious community? 3) Does this identity really matter for the political preferences of Muslims?

**Sources of Muslim Identity**

As previously noted, Muslim political loyalties only really began to solidify after the onset of the Iraq war and the perceived threat to the community
from the Bush administration stemming from the administration's anti-terror policies. During most of this period, the federal government was under the unified control of the Republican party. As we know from the research of Sears and Valentino (1997), political realities during formative periods tend to shape the political understandings of children as they come of age and begin to develop their political identity. While the research in question was squarely focused on the development of individual political identities, we also know that events tend to broadly shape generational cohorts (c.f. Alwin and Krosnick 1991; Carlsson and Karlsson 1970; Zukin et al 2006.) Indeed, it is this very notion that makes the idea of a group response plausible. Distinct events shape those that experience them, and those with similar perspectives on the events are likely to share similar responses and to be similarly influenced by said events.

The perception of threat plays a powerful role in helping us to understand the scope and rapidity of the American Muslim political reorientation. The perception of threat has had a significant impact on ideological preferences and, as will be discussed in greater detail in the next chapter, partisanship. There was a tremendous shift in political loyalties towards the Democratic party among Muslims between late 2001 and late 2004. This was coupled with waning confidence in the intentions of the Federal government. However, shifting partisan loyalties are only the tip of the iceberg when it comes to the formation of social-political identities. Much more substantial are general civic engagement habits. The level of civic participation directly reflects the level of investment individuals have in their community. La Due Lake and Huckfeldt (1998) argue
that patterns of civic engagement (and the social capital built from these contacts) is largely a product of the discussion networks individuals find themselves in. Indeed, McClurg (2003) argues that it is political discussions that drive and explain the impact other, more conventional predictors have on the degree of political participation we expect from respondents. In particular, he argues that it is the content and composition of these networks that help us to really understand the importance of group identity.

Huckfeldt and McClurg were not the first to recognize the importance of group labels and the communication that goes on within these social groups. This recognition goes back to the earliest days of the study of political behavior. The so-called Columbia school based its analysis of political behavior on the influence of one's social context (Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and McPhee, 1954). Additionally, the seminal work of Sherif (1961) points to the importance of external pressures in creating the necessary pressures for a label to take hold and matter for political evaluations. The psychological model of the Michigan school equally acknowledged the importance of groups for voting and political preferences (Campbell, Converse, Miller, & Stokes, 1960), but emphasizes a different role for groups. The difference lay primarily in how the group influences the individual’s choices. For the Michigan researchers, groups merely made up a convenient short-cut and mental reference point. Group labels became an easy way for individuals to categorize and define politics. Issues became helpful for some groups and harmful for others, and policies were to be supported for "friendly" groups and opposed for "hostile" groups. However, this mechanism does not
necessarily contradict, and indeed complements, the discussion-based sociological model of the Columbia researchers.

When, then, is a group's social context important and when is it important mainly as a reference point? As McClurg and Huckfeldt have argued, discussion matters for helping motivate behavior. The type of people one talks with, then, surely matters. We know from the growing body of social network literature that individuals tend to congregate with and talk most openly with those they see as "like" (Newman 2003.) This suggests that conversations matter mainly for in-group effects. Thus, we would expect the psychological model's group-reference mechanism to matter more for evaluations of politics as it impacts out-group members. Or, to put it another way, sociological forces influence how we think about "us", while psychological factors impact how we evaluate "them". Of course, as Shalizi and Thomas (2011) argue, it is difficult to disentangle the causal arrows within social network influence. Homophily and social influence are generally confounded, and it can be difficult to tease out the difference between group-think (the group behaves similarly because they share similar values and preferences) and social contagion (people switching their views to better fit in with their in-group.)

In the case of the Muslim-Americans, we would expect the important political reference group label of "Muslim" to be largely shaped by those they speak with. However, the (particularly ethnic and nativist) cross-cutting ties within the Muslim community allow us to use observational data to more efficiently disentangle these influences than studies of other sub-groups might.
Two theories emerging from the above analysis are that a) group identities are largely a product of external pressures, and that the most salient ideas (specifically, that a group needs to get involved and compete with other groups for scarce resources) will stem from this external pressure; and b) that group norms will largely be a product of internal social pressures, created as an effort to downplay internal conflicts and create a more coherent and cohesive identity. In both cases, it is the perception of external threat that gives the identity additional salience. Given that, these theories can be further boiled down and reduced to a series of testable hypotheses, which will be the primary preoccupation of the rest of the chapter.

The first theory is that salient group identity will be the product of external pressure, and speaks to the first question posed- *Is there a salient Muslim identity that can be measured?* One factor is particularly relevant for whether external pressure is felt by an individual. That factor is whether the individual is readily identifiable as a member of the group in question. Because visual cues are most readily identifiable traits individuals exhibit in public, it would be expected that these sorts of signifiers would correlate with stronger responses. More specifically,

*H1. Non-Caucasian Muslims will exhibit higher levels of ethnic identification.*

*H2. Women will exhibit higher levels of Muslim identification than men.*
Both of these hypotheses are based on the importance of being identified as a member of a group. Many prominent African-Americans in the US practice Islam, but the historical importance of skin color in the US nonetheless caused many black Muslims to identify more with ethnic rather than religious institutions (Lincoln 1994). That said, we know that religious identity is often intimately bound up in notions of ethnic identity. The role Christianity plays in African-American identity (and the role Islam has played in that same identity for many black Muslims) is well-documented (McDaniel 2008). The role of Islam in shaping what it means to be, say, Pakistani is likely considerable as well, as religion has often been a pillar of ethnic identity among immigrant groups (Putnam and Campbell 2010; Dahl 1961). Conversely, cultural notions of modesty within predominantly Islamic countries created a readily-identifiable visual cue for Muslim women—the head scarf. Muhajiba (which means "a woman who wears the veil) are a powerful symbol of Islamic identity to non-Muslims, and thus readily identify the believer as Muslim to non-Muslims. ²⁸ This, in turn, makes women more easily identified as a target for anti-Muslim animus.

At the same time, in-group identity is importantly produced within the group. While repeated reinforcement that a label matters can raise the salience of an identity for political evaluations, those identities that are not as easily deduced by the out-group will be shaped more by in-group pressures to conform to the

²⁸ Of course, it is a well-known observation within the literature that women tend to exhibit higher levels of religious commitment than men. I expect to find religious commitment to correlate with a stronger sense of Muslim identity. However, I expect to find women more intensely adopting the Muslim identity, or rejecting the ethnic one, above and beyond the correlation between the variable and religiosity.
norms and expectations of said group. Thus, we would expect that the salience of their political frame would come more from internal pressures to conform. Therefore,

\[ H3. \text{ The strength of Muslim identity will correlate more with in-group homogeneity rather than out-group hostility.} \]

The second main question to be answered by this chapter is whether this identity produces a sense of linked fate. Recognizable traits are more likely to be made salient by external pressure. The salience will particularly correlate with the perception of hostility towards that aspect of individual identity. Likewise, a belief that the communal welfare of a group is bound together is likely to be made more salient if the general public seems to largely define oneself by that same label. We would thus expect respondents who are attentive to out-group hostility directed towards their group will be more likely to involve themselves, ceteris paribus, in responding to external hostility, as they are more likely to see it as focused towards a group and not personalized danger. I will formalize this as the following hypothesis:

\[ H4. \text{ Linked Fate beliefs are dependent on both perceived hostility and political interest.} \]
The third, and perhaps most important question to be addressed by this chapter is whether these senses of linked fate and group identity shape individuals' political behavior and preferences. Perhaps the single most important question on this topic is whether, as feared by Tariq Ramadan and other theologians, the closing of Muslim circles will lead to a withdrawal from civil society at large. Though Muslims largely reject this view when asked in surveys, there is still the concern that immigrant and orthodox religious Muslims will be less likely to be involved in political and civic life in the US. This concern finds echo in the social science literature. In particular, the findings of Campbell (2004) and Mutz (2006) help to underpin a theoretical expectation as to why Ramadan's fears are justified.

Campbell (2004) finds that religious organizations can serve as a buttress against greater civic engagement within the broader community by examining evangelical responses to the perceived sociotropic threat of a secular society to their preferred way of life. Specifically, he presented evidence that this likely perception of threat correlated with a shift towards the Republican party among Evangelical Christians. In making this argument, he cited Smith's (1998) book that argued the importance of a sense of threat to the maintenance of strong Evangelical identities among adherents. Smith's book is a seminal part of a well-established literature that speaks more broadly to religious salience, and specifically to the observation that religious salience grows as the cost for that attachment grows. What we see happening among the Muslims in this sample reflect this.
Mutz's (2006), on the other hand, speaks to the importance of the type of dialogue occurring within the social network in shaping the quantity of political activity. In particular, she points to the power contradictory discussion partners can have to demobilize interest in politics and political participation. In brief, Mutz argues and convincingly demonstrates that individuals generally seek harmony within their close social networks. When certain attitudes and issues become problematic in-group, individuals tend to de-emphasize these problem areas in order to maintain in-group harmony and cohesion. We see this behavior in political parties as well, particularly in the process Layman and Carsey call "conflict-extension" (2002, 2006; Layman et al 2010). If engagement with American politics is seen as either an un-Islamic or at least an emotionally unsettling preoccupation, then those who are more engaged within their mosque communities should feel pressured to de-emphasize their political interests and, ultimately, their political activity.

The hypothesis growing out of this line of thinking can be codified thusly:

*H5. Religious commitment will correlate with lower levels of civic and political engagement.*

To investigate whether this is how the mechanism actually works, we turn to survey data to test whether Muslim political behavior is more driven by internal pressures or external forces.
Data and Methodology

To investigate the theory, I conducted an initial survey of Muslims living in the state of Indiana. The survey relies on a convenience sample, drawing upon the mailing list of the Muslim Alliance of Indiana (MAI). The MAI is a civic engagement group that seeks to contact and encourage civil and political participation among Muslims living in the state of Indiana. The initial mailing list is comprised of 10,824 names of individuals in the state of Indiana identified by the organization as having a high probability of being Muslim. The list draws its names from a number of sources, though the largest source of names are drawn from voter registration rolls and identified as being "likely Muslims" and mosque registration rolls. Paper surveys were sent out to all names on the organization's mailing list, providing paper ballots and return envelopes as well as information for replying online. Subsequent analysis of the return mail suggests that roughly 1/3 of all letters received were from non-Muslims. The survey is a mixed-mode survey that couples a mail survey with on-line. The online list provided by the organization is redundant to, though significantly smaller than, the mailing list provided. It was also considerably more accurate in identifying practicing Muslims. The survey relied on on-line follow-ups to the postal mailing due to cost constraints. The data below is drawn solely from the 261 self-identified Muslims who responded to the survey request.

---

29 Indeed, the considerable hostility some recipients demonstrated at receiving the mailing was telling. Some respondents replied with telephone calls or letters denouncing the study, pleading for a conversion to Christianity, or denouncing terrorism, while others expressed anger or fear at being associated with Islam. Several non-Muslim respondents specifically mentioned fear of encountering travel difficulties if they were to be associated with Muslims. Others took more artistic approaches in expressing their opinions, including one respondent who opted to reply by stuffing the return envelope with pictures of pork products.
The survey was based upon a number of previous surveys of the Muslim community. In particular, the survey drew from elements of the Pew Muslim surveys of 2007 and 2011, the MAPOS survey conducted by Barreto and Dana, and the social network surveys of Djupe and Calfano (2012). The survey looks at three distinct aspects of respondent lives - political engagement and preferences, religious and communal engagement, and social network communication. Social network items contain both an egocentric inventory focused on political discussion and a description of the general composition of the close social network in both ethnic and religious terms (i.e. "How many of your close friends would you say are the same X as you?"). The following analysis will rely on this self-reported network diversity.

**Searching for a Muslim Political Identity**

The first and most important question to answer with this data is whether there is something that we could call a "Muslim identity" and whether it is something widely-held in the community. We have two ways we will examine this question with the data. First, we need to ask whether there are coherent measures of a Muslim political identity distinct from ethnic identity. Secondly, I will ask whether Muslims express a politically significant sense of linked fate with their fellow Muslims.

First, we need to establish the existence of a measurable Muslim identity that takes precedence when evaluating political questions. This survey asked several questions, interspersed throughout the instrument, asking whether
Muslims take their cues on political issues from their religious community as opposed to various other possible sources of influence (such as family, co-workers, political leaders or their ethnic group.) Similar items were asked of ethnic identity. Respondents were also asked to subjectively evaluate the importance of ethnic and religious identity (as well as their identity as an American) in isolation on a four-point scale. A comparative scale can be created, using only comparable items or items that include both items in order to compare the relative intensity of religious as opposed to ethnic identity. This can be done by utilizing respondent indications to the group evaluations along with recording those respondents that identified either religious or ethnic identity as being "Very Important" to their self-identity. Doing so produces the distribution we see in Figure 3.1, below.

Ethnicity was more frequently rated as being important in political evaluations, but religion was more frequently rated as the most important identity among those measured. Interesting, while there are some few respondents who hold a racialized framework without religion entering the equation, none of those who score highest on the Muslim identity measure report having an anemic ethnic framework. The samples for sub-groups are small but, if one examines the distribution along these lines, one sees that blacks are the most likely of any ethnic group to achieve the highest possible score in both identity measures. Arabs are least likely to say that ethnic identity matters, while south Asians tend to be the most evenly divided between those who most emphasize ethnic and religious identity. At the same time, about 44% of respondents scored a 0 in the
religious salience measure, 39% scored a 0 in the ethnic salience measure, and about a quarter of all respondents scored a 0 in both measures.

**TABLE 3.1**

MORE RESPONDENTS CATEGORIZED HIGHEST ON RELIGIOUS DIMENSION, THOUGH MANY SCORE LOW ON BOTH

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnic Identity</th>
<th>0</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Muslim Identity</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Indiana Muslim Political Action Survey.
Notes: *=p<.05, **=p<.01, ***=p<.001. Significant results are also in bold. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors.

To dig deeper into the competing strengths of ethnic as opposed to religious frames for political identity, we turn to structural equation modeling in order to test various models. Structural equation modeling allows us to better examine the strength of various identities in the context of competing identities by allowing us to model both equations simultaneously (c.f. Savalei and Bentler 2006). Analysis of prior survey research in the last chapter suggested that Muslims were developing a political consensus after 2001 indicative of a shared collective identity. The IMPAS survey allows us to test this by comparing our measures of ethnic and religious identity in the same equation. By developing a structural model that allows both equations to compete head-to-head, this allows us to better understand and compare the relative strength each ethnic label in
attaching itself to the two modes of political identity we are studying. In short, the simultaneous equation lets us more clearly understand how ethnic categories contribute to the development of relevant political frameworks.

Figure 3.1 shows the findings of a simultaneous model regressing reported ethnic and gender categories against both measures of political identity in the IMPAS survey. What emerges from the analysis are two clear findings. First, Muslims who are also easily identified as ethnic minorities continue to place more emphasis on ethnic identity than do Muslims labeled as "white". Secondly, Muslim women (who, if they are a muhajiba- or veil-wearing woman- are much more easily identified in the public as Muslim) are considerably less likely to emphasize their ethnic identity than are their male co-ethnics. This is well in line with the expectations of the theory- individuals will emphasize those traits which others most readily identify them by and see these identities as more politically salient. Skin tone and garments make for readily identified markers by which others can categorize them, so we would expect these factors to be important. However, ethnicity is not the only, or even necessarily the most important predictor of which political identity will be most prominent.
Source: IMPAS (2012)
Note: Full Table found in appendix. Above coefficients are linear maximum likelihood regression coefficients estimated through a simultaneous structural equation model.

Figure 3.1: Ethnic identity more salient for ethnic minorities
The maximum likelihood estimation that produced Figure 3.1 above is not a particularly well-specified model by the standards of structural equation modeling. SEMs value parsimony, and by comparing the chi-square of competing models and other measures of model fit, it is possible to perform an analysis of which independent variables are truly central to a model's predictions and which are secondary contributors. By comparing various model fits, we can pare off the extraneous controls and evaluate the simplified models in order to determine which independent variables best predict or explain the dependent variable in question (in this case, the strength of one identity over the other in evaluating political matters.) Below, figure 3.2 presents the reduced model that best predicts our variables of interest.
Figure 3.2: Personal piety is strongly and negatively correlated with ethnic identity
The reduced model tells an interesting story. In essence, religious commitment strengthens both ethnic and religious identity. That being more religious makes the religious understanding of yourself more important for political evaluations is perhaps unsurprising. As noted previously, Putnam and Campbell (2010) find that those who are more religious also tend to hold their ethnic identities as more important. Religion not only helps to emphasize traditional beliefs, but, in the words made famous by Dr. King, "...11 o’clock on Sunday morning when we stand to sing ‘In Christ there is no East or West,’ we stand in the most segregated hour of America," (King 1968). The quote by Dr. King refers to the ethnic homogeneity one found and continues to find frequently in Christian houses of worship. The same is true for many Muslim communities, with predominantly single-ethnicity mosques being fairly prevalent in Indiana as well. Even so, prayer frequency correlates significantly with weaker ethnic identities. Prayer frequency among Muslims is a much better measure of religious intensity than is mosque attendance. This is in contrast to the Christian groups frequently studied.

Muslim tradition holds the Friday afternoon communal prayer session as the most important. However, mosque attendance is generally seen by Muslims as less obligatory than Church attendance is by Christians even on this Friday gathering, though this does vary somewhat by sect and Islamic legal tradition.30

---

30 The role of Friday prayers is important in Islam, but not in the same way that it largely defines religious engagement in Christianity. This is the role of the five (or, for Shi’a, three) daily prayers, which are meant to regulate the day. Furthermore, there are differences as to whether attendance is even necessary. Some Sunni legal scholars held that Friday prayers were only obligatory for men, while in many Shi’a traditions was only obligatory if the Imam was in attendance. Since the imam of the most popular Shi’a tradition (Twelver Shi’ism) has been in
The structure of the American work week can also make it difficult for Muslims in the work force to attend lunch-time Friday. Islam additionally emphasizes universalism, and religiously intense Muslims likely take that teaching to heart. Malcolm X recounts his story of the hajj (or traditional pilgrimage to Mecca) in his autobiography, and emphasizes the role this religious experience had in modifying and transforming the racialized view of the world he previously held (1965.) Thus, intense faith may play a role in shaping how network impressions are sent, though this data cannot disentangle whether the correlation between personal piety and lower ethnic salience is more due to the higher importance of religious identity or a transformative impact the faith may have on views of race.

Linked fate is, as noted earlier, a belief or sense that the welfare and well-being of a group as a whole has a direct impact on the welfare and well-being of individual members of the group (Dawson 1994). A sense of linked fate is more likely when individuals feel that the aspect or characteristic is fundamental to who they are or is otherwise a categorization that they cannot easily shed. That is not to say that the label isn't concealable; "passing" as an out-group member has been a phenomenon for many American social groups that have been stigmatized by the general public, such as African-Americans (Haney-Lopez 2006) or homosexuals (Mohr & Daly 2008). In the Indiana survey, the item used to measure linked fate is the item conventionally used in surveys. The question asks, "Do you think what happens generally to people of your XXX in occultation for centuries (hidden, to return on the Day of Judgment), Friday prayers are effectively no longer obligatory for those of that tradition."
this country will have something to do with your life? Will it have a lot of impact or a little impact?" The item was asked separately for ethnicity and for religion.

There is considerable correlation between the measure of ethnic and religious linked fate.\textsuperscript{31} This is perhaps unsurprising. It makes a level of intuitive sense to expect that individuals who think that others' opinion of one group is likely to impact them are likely to believe that opinions towards a different group is also likely to impact them. Furthermore, as was demonstrated by Putnam and Campbell (2010), religion and ethnicity have a very tight inter-connection in the American public and, with but two notable exceptions\textsuperscript{32}, individuals who hold their religious identity as important also tend to hold their ethnic identity as important (and vice versa). Thus, for much of the study we will employ a measure of linked fate beliefs that relies on an average of the two scores. However, there are some small differences between the two impulses, and exploring this gap between the two linked fate orientations can be illuminating.

\textsuperscript{31} The correlation coefficient between these two items is .7573

\textsuperscript{32} The exceptions are for Mormons and evangelical Christians. Demographically, Mormons continue to identify an ethno-national heritage but place little salience on it. Evangelical Christians, on the other hand, increasingly identify ethnically as "American".
### TABLE 3.2
CLOSE NETWORK AFFILIATIONS BEST PREDICT DIFFERENCES IN LINKED FATE ORIENTATION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Religious Linked Fate</th>
<th>Ethnic Linked Fate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Discussion Network Ethnic Homogeneity</td>
<td>-0.668 (.561)</td>
<td>0.282 (.495)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Close Network Ethnic Homogeneity</td>
<td>-0.066 (.211)</td>
<td>-0.079 (.186)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discussion Network Religious Homogeneity</td>
<td>*<em>1.248</em> (.577)</td>
<td>0.385 (.485)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Close Network Religious Homogeneity</td>
<td>-0.113 (.227)</td>
<td>-0.087 (.203)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mistrust of Government</td>
<td>-0.302 (.275)</td>
<td>-0.096 (.246)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religiosity</td>
<td>*<em>0.450</em> (.182)</td>
<td>0.058 (.178)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>0.355 (.348)</td>
<td>0.214 (.349)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>0.008 (.140)</td>
<td>0.059 (.121)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income</td>
<td>-0.101 (.107)</td>
<td>-0.082 (.106)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interest in Politics</td>
<td>*<em>0.501</em> (.206)</td>
<td>*<em>0.430</em> (.166)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Native Born</td>
<td>-0.643 (.490)</td>
<td>*<em>-0.949</em> (.467)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>0.004 (.011)</td>
<td>0.007 (.010)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black</td>
<td>**0.432 (.652)</td>
<td><strong>1.876</strong> (.612)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Asian</td>
<td>0.772 (.396)</td>
<td><strong>1.273</strong> (.411)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Indiana Muslim Political Action Survey.
Notes: *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001. Significant results are also in bold. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors.
Above are Ordered Logit coefficients, utilizing multiple imputation for missing variables. N=261
If we turn to Table 3.2 above, we can see that the single stable predictor across both models of linked fate is the measure of political interest. Given that the linked fate measures themselves seek to tap a certain understanding of shared political fate, it should not be surprising that those who consider themselves more attentive to politics should also be more likely to make observations that group markers may be a salient frame through which to view political activity. More interesting are the variables that seem to correlate with the different linked fate impulses.

A measure of personal religiosity correlates with one holding a stronger Muslim-first political lens, just as it does with the measures of Muslim identity. The item measuring political discussion network compositions also correlates strongly with religious linked fate views, another similarity to the analysis of the identity measures. At the same time, the most significantly-correlated measure for ethnic linked fate beliefs is self-reported minority ethnicity. Taken together, both of these measures of Muslim identity provide strong support for the first three hypotheses, and for the broader underlying theory that external social pressure restricts and makes salient particular identities while in-group pressure (via social network ties) shapes in-group identity.

We can at this point note that neither measures of religious nor ethnic identity can claim a high degree of correlation with linked fate world views, though there are certainly common roots for both world views. It is important to note that religious identity and religious linked fate beliefs are both associated with the composition (specifically, the homogeneity) of an individual's social
network and, in particular, the characteristics of their reported political discussion network. One way to think about it is to say that when everyone you talk with about politics shares a trait with you, it is easier to personalize the impact of the identity upon others. However, the way in which one views themselves politically is more influenced by whether "everyone they know" is Muslim or if they instead inhabit a religiously pluralistic social environment.

**Muslim Identity: Impact and Significance**

We have established that there is something measurable that we can call "Muslim identity." This is all well and good, but there is little utility in measuring an underlying concept if said concept has no substantive impact on outcomes in which we have an interest. Left-handedness is a measurable concept, for example, but we have little reason to suspect it impacts political behavior in any substantive way. Thus, we now will turn to substantive analysis and see how these ideas of identity and linked fate correlate (or not) with measures of individual participation in and opinions on politics and the political process. Given the importance of civic engagement to the health of a body politic, I first address the question of whether Muslim identity and Muslim linked fate beliefs correlate with civic and political engagement. Given the importance bridging engagement with the broader community can play for avoiding alienation and anomie, it makes sense to turn here first (Putnam 2000; Theiss-Morse and Hibbing 2005).  

---

33 It is fair to note that the Theiss-Morse and Hibbing piece is actually critical of the role civic engagement can play in fostering a more engaged and cohesive society. However, I would argue this assessment comes from a very limited definitional view of civic engagement, restricting their assessment to the ability of various modes of communal participation to elicit
A battery of 15 engagement items was asked on the survey. I developed the battery with an eye towards forming three broad modes of civic and political engagement. Dividing the different modes of engagement into scales based upon the general category of activity falls within a well-established tradition of civic and political engagement research. In doing so, I follow in the path of works such as Verba and Nie's (1972) *Participation in America*. While Verba and Nie focus on acts that directly seek to influence the government (such as voting and contacting elected officials) over more expressive modes of engagement (such as attending a protest), others who have followed in this tradition have looked a broader range of modes of civic and political engagement. Verba, Schlozmann, and Brady (1995) look at voting as well as modes of engagement that rely either on income (such as donating to campaigns) or available time (such as volunteering for a campaign.) Zukin et al (2006) examine the relationship between volunteering for political and non-political activities, while Campbell (2006) demonstrates, among other things, the relationship between engagement in after-school activities in high school and adult political and civic engagement.

Three theoretical multi-item dimensions were what I term activist modes of engagement (consisting of participating in protests or boycotts, wearing particularly electoral political modes of engagement (such as running for office or voting.) While not arguing with their larger point, I assume that meaningful engagement outside explicitly electoral activity is nonetheless a mode of political participation as well. Thus, I distinguish between different modes of civic participation, and seek to understand an array of politically-linked (if not always explicitly political) modes of communal involvement. Furthermore, their central criticism is that group participation tends to occur in-group rather than cross-group. However, given the ethnic diversity of the Muslim community, viewing co-religionists of different ethnicities as an in-group is important given the central role race has historically played in the US. Thus, for Muslim Americans, they are almost always both bridging and bonding regardless of the choices they ultimately make.  

34 Eigenvalue for the activist scale is 2.1784.
buttons or displaying signs, and giving money to political causes), social modes of engagement\(^{35}\) (consisting of volunteering time for political campaigns, community organizations such as the PTA, or religious organizations, as well as claiming to "work with others to solve community problems") and virtual modes of engagement\(^{36}\) (consisting of writing letters or e-mails to newspaper editorial pages or government officials, posting in the comments section on politically-oriented web sites, or signing an on-line petition). Table 3.3 presents some basic descriptive statistics for the items that compose the scales.\(^{37}\)

Social engagement proves to be the most common form of the three modes of engagement, with volunteering or participating within the Muslim community itself being (along with "working with others to solve community problems") considerably more common than any of the other modes of political engagement. That these two elements likely capture an important component of in-group engagement, it is importantly suggestive of the relatively greater

\(^{35}\) Eigenvalue for the social scale is 2.3357.

\(^{36}\) Eigenvalue for the virtual scale is 2.0392.

\(^{37}\) The scales developed were deductively developed, though factor analysis also revealed that each of the measured activities loaded strongly on a similar scale. The core organizing principle for activist modes of engagement were measures of ways of expressing "voice" in the political process. Social engagement, on the other hand, were items that would involve peaceably participating in (or at least witnessing) discussion and dialogue. Virtual engagement included items that individuals generally engaged in on-line or over the internet, and generally required less time or commitment from the respondent as well as little physical or social contact with others. Boycott participation was difficult to place within this rubric, given that it does not clearly express to others a particular opinion vocally. However, I reasoned that striving to live by one's ideals is, or can be, a powerful method of both self-expression and ideology reinforcement, so grouped it with activist engagement. Volunteering time for a campaign, on the other hand, could have well gone in the activist category as well (and had a respectable loading onto that factor in factor analysis.) However, the importance of face-to-face engagement when one gives time ultimately persuaded me that it was fundamentally a social mode of engagement because it required one to put oneself into a social situation where one would be required to at least minimally interact with others (as opposed to attending a rally, where simply being a body in the crowd is all that is expected from those that attend.)
willingness to engage in in-group activities. Overall, 34% of respondents report engaging in no social activities, 45% report engaging in no virtual activities, and 54% report engaging in no political activities.

To dig into the connection between Muslim identity and civic engagement, I constructed maximum likelihood model within a structural equation model. Doing so is an effective way of detecting whether there is an underlying relationship as it permits for probing the question without needing to break down the sample into components too small to realistically provide a statistically-reliable finding. Utilizing a structural equation model allows for the direct as well as the indirect impact of variables of interest to be observed. In particular, given the significant influence discussion networks have in shaping Muslim identity, a structural equation model will help distinguish the direct as well as indirect impact of these social networks on the level and type of civic engagement. Models below were run with both factor score measures of the three engagement measures as well as with additive scales. As the findings were consistent across various approaches to scale formation, the following models employ additive scales to facilitate discussion of the strength of the correlations. To examine the results of the analysis, we will now turn to table 3.4, below.
### TABLE 3.3:

**FREQUENCY OF CIVIC ENGAGEMENT ACTS FOR IMPAS RESPONDENTS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activist</th>
<th>% Yes</th>
<th>Social</th>
<th>% Yes</th>
<th>Virtual</th>
<th>% Yes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Participate in a Boycott</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>Volunteer time for</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>Write/e-mail newspaper</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>campaign or cause</td>
<td></td>
<td>editor</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attend a Protest or Rally</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>Attend a community meeting</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>Write/e-mail elected official</td>
<td>29%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wear Button or Display Yard Sign</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>Volunteer for religious</td>
<td>61%</td>
<td>Discuss politics on on-line</td>
<td>35%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>community</td>
<td></td>
<td>forum or news site</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Give money to candidate or cause</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>Work with others to solve</td>
<td>52%</td>
<td>Sign a petition online</td>
<td>43%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>community problem</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Activist</td>
<td>Social</td>
<td>Virtual</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------------</td>
<td>----------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prayer</td>
<td>0.039</td>
<td>0.361***</td>
<td>0.181*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.094)</td>
<td>(.083)</td>
<td>(.090)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attendance</td>
<td>0.136</td>
<td>0.400***</td>
<td>0.126</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.101)</td>
<td>(.090)</td>
<td>(.098)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Network Homogeneity</td>
<td>-0.018</td>
<td>-0.010</td>
<td>-0.011</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.052)</td>
<td>(.048)</td>
<td>(.051)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslim Identity</td>
<td>0.059</td>
<td>-0.053</td>
<td>0.065</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.035)</td>
<td>(.030)</td>
<td>(.034)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic Identity</td>
<td>0.053</td>
<td>0.063*</td>
<td>0.064*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.030)</td>
<td>(.026)</td>
<td>(.029)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Linked Fate Belief</td>
<td>0.108*</td>
<td>0.035</td>
<td>0.094*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.048)</td>
<td>(.044)</td>
<td>(.047)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Threat Perception</td>
<td>-0.144**</td>
<td>-0.134**</td>
<td>-0.114**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.043)</td>
<td>(.040)</td>
<td>(.043)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mistrust of Public</td>
<td>-0.146***</td>
<td>-0.142***</td>
<td>-0.102***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.027)</td>
<td>(.024)</td>
<td>(.027)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mistrust of Government</td>
<td>-0.062</td>
<td>-0.078*</td>
<td>-0.013</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.040)</td>
<td>(.033)</td>
<td>(.036)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arab</td>
<td>0.089***</td>
<td>0.064***</td>
<td>0.076***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.020)</td>
<td>(.017)</td>
<td>(.019)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black</td>
<td>0.015</td>
<td>0.052**</td>
<td>0.028</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.019)</td>
<td>(.016)</td>
<td>(.018)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income</td>
<td>0.250*</td>
<td>0.388***</td>
<td>0.419***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.105)</td>
<td>(.096)</td>
<td>(.101)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>0.312**</td>
<td>0.440***</td>
<td>0.449***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.091)</td>
<td>(.081)</td>
<td>(.085)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Interest</td>
<td>0.296***</td>
<td>0.269***</td>
<td>0.329***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.056)</td>
<td>(.049)</td>
<td>(.052)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
To start, let us acknowledge a number of trends consistent across all three modes of engagement. Aside from the control variables used in the models (specifically income, education, and level of political interest) the perception of threat and mistrust of the public are both significantly and negatively correlated with all modes of engagement measured in this survey. The more one senses hostility being directed towards one’s community, the less one gets involved. This correlation between a sense of threat and disengagement is offset by a sense of collective responsibility. While one does not like being targeted, it seems that those who feel this targeting forge a common bond between Muslims who are less likely to be withdrawn from various forms of civic engagement than those who see themselves as more atomized. This observation, at least for the activist mode of engagement, stands in contrast to the findings of the previous chapter. In the 2001 and 2004 waves of the Zogby data, we found that perceptions of threat correlated with higher rather than lower levels of political engagement. What could explain this discrepancy?

Part of the explanation could lie with the inclusion of the measures of Muslim identity. Linked fate beliefs correlate with higher levels of political engagement, and this certainly may explain some of the activism we see among Muslims in the Zogby data. Linked fate activism represents an active response to threat perception. However, dropping any measure of Muslim identity from the model does not substantively change the directionality and intensity of the threat measures, so that cannot be our primary explanation. This brings into question the validity of the data. There is one other available source of data that can help us get
a hold on the matter. The Pew Research Center conducted a series of surveys of American Muslims in 2007 and again in 2011. While the Pew survey does not include any measure of civic or political engagement, they do ask whether respondents voted in the Presidential election prior to the survey.

**TABLE 3.5**

**THREAT NEGATIVELY CORRELATES WITH VOTING IN PEW SURVEY DATA**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Coefficient</th>
<th>Standard Error</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Prayer</td>
<td>-.083</td>
<td>(.068)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mosque Attendance</td>
<td>.094</td>
<td>(.052)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious Orthodoxy</td>
<td>-.177*</td>
<td>(.087)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government Threat</td>
<td>-.054*</td>
<td>(.026)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal Discrimination</td>
<td>.082</td>
<td>(.073)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Pew Muslim-American Survey, 2007 and 2011 Waves

Notes: Above fitted in a logistic regression. * = significant at p<.05 or less. Controls for race, nativity, registration, education, age, gender, region, and year of survey included but not displayed.

If you recall, in the last chapter it was hypothesized that threat perception would correlate with lower levels of political engagement. This hypothesis was rejected based on the observations from the 2001 and 2004 data. I advanced the hypothesis that confidence in the political process may be an explanation for the failure of the variable to perform in the way it has been observed to operate in Europe. While the Pew data is not an ideal point of comparison, given that we are
comparing the specific act of voting to a broader understanding of political engagement, the fact that we see the threat variable significantly and negatively correlate with the turnout measure suggests the finding in the IMPAS data may well be relevant. Indeed, the impact of threat and engagement could have changed over the course of the decade between the first and the final survey, serving initially as a rallying point for the Muslim community before in a way not entirely dissimilar to Mueller's (1970) "rally 'round the flag" effect. This could have initially produced a stronger sense of linked fate than observed in the IMPAS data, which could have faded over time as disagreement and cultural differences within the Muslim community emerged and demanded resolution. This is a topic I will explore more in the fifth chapter. Thus, what we see in the IMPAS model, while contrary to earlier findings, could represent the natural evolution of how threat impacts political behavior.

Additionally, the findings on the activist model are contrary to those found by Tam Cho et al's (2006) study of Arab voter registration in Florida. However, the Tam Cho piece that examined threat and registration focused specifically on Arabs. In the models above we find that Arab dummy variable correlates with higher civic engagement across a broad array of activities, especially when compared to the other ethnic measures. Furthermore, there is likely a difference between resisting the negativity towards a label (Muslim) that

---

38 In particular, Tam Cho et al (2006) examine the correlation between media reports on the Patriot Act and Arab registration. She finds that voter registration went up as the discussion of the Patriot Act increased, though it seems many of these Arabs may have been registering as Republicans or Independents.
one rejects or sees as contrary to one's actual identity and the response one might demonstrate if that same identity is a core identity in one's self-conception.

Social modes of engagement, as mentioned earlier, are arguably the most inward-looking of the three measures of engagement. In particular, one important component is volunteering for religious communities, and other measures tap similar activities that could easily be contained within the Muslim community. Given this, it is perhaps less surprising to see that this is the only category where there is a significant correlation between both the proxy for religious community involvement and personal religious commitment and engagement. Beyond that, social engagement seems to differ from other forms of engagement in two ways. First, it is the only of the three measures of engagement in which linked fate shows no level of correlation. Secondly, and more interestingly, it is the only mode of engagement that seems specifically correlated with attitudes towards government. In this case, greater fear of government correlates with greater social disengagement. Finally, having a more strongly-rated ethnic identity also correlates with getting involved within one's community. It is difficult to tease

39 As discussed in a previous chapter, religious attendance is less useful for measuring Muslim religious commitment than among Christians. Prayer frequency among Muslims more closely reflects attendance for Christians, and the rate of people reporting frequent prayer seems to more closely mirrors reported attendance among Christians than prayer from the same group.

40 In order to account for the importance of religious volunteering as well as the possibility that measures of campaign volunteering may distort the findings of the social engagement measure, alternative model constructions are included in the appendix (Table A5). As can be seen in these alternate model constructions, the predictors are relatively stable. The only notable shift in significance with alternative measurement constructions for social engagement is that ethnic identity loses its significance in models where religious volunteering are not included in the measurement index. This suggests that the ethnic identity's measured impact on the underlying construct is perhaps more about inward-lookingness than other independent variables of interest included in the model. This is not to diminish the importance holding a salient ethnic identity can be for spurring social engagement but, coupled with the finding above that ethnic identity is stronger among those with easily-identifiable ethnic markers, suggests that those who
out with this data whether it is greater contact between fellow co-ethnic Muslims that is generating a heightened sense of ethnic identity or if the inverse is true and greater commitment to the ethnic group encourages respondents to seek out more opportunities to be engaged. However, comparing structural models suggests that viewing ethnic identity as a driver for social engagement fits the data better than does a model assuming that social engagement drives ethnic identity.\textsuperscript{41}

At this point, it should be said that it is strange to find the mosque having no bearing on whether one gets involved in political affairs, which certainly undercuts arguments that the mosque is a breeding ground for political activism. We saw this same finding in the analysis of the MAPS data in a previous chapter. However, we do see religious commitment dovetailing into social engagement. This means that religious association is working (at least in this regard) in exactly the same manner that we expect to see it operate in other religious communities. This, in turn, suggests that Islamic religious practice is not fundamentally a horse of another color, but rather that the social context is likely impacting the expected correlation of religious commitment with political engagement.\textsuperscript{42}

\textsuperscript{41} The comparative fit indices for two identical models consistently show a better fit for the model predicting engagement via ethnic identity than the inverse. One representative comparative model examined the impact of religiosity, political interest, and the two variables in question. The CFI for the model predicting social identity was .792, while the CFI for the inverse was .270. Regardless of model construction or the choice of variables (whether one constructed a model more favorable to the predictors of social engagement or ethnic identity, as developed in above models), the ethnic identity leading to engagement model performed better. As noted above, this further supports the notion that an ethnic framework may drive people towards their religious community as effectively as a religious one, and certainly fits with the argument that external pressures of these sorts drive people to "circle the wagons".

\textsuperscript{42} Of course, there is also the aforementioned fear Ramadan (2004) expressed concerning whether conservative theological interpretations of Islam will limit engagement.
The most intriguing aspect of virtual engagement is the role it seems to play among immigrants in particular. Aside from the trends we detect across models, we see that virtual engagement also demonstrates a correlation with both measures of piety and with ethnic measures. Though not shown in the above table, south Asians (particularly those who hail from Pakistan) are the most likely groups to cite virtual engagement as their preferred mode of participation. While those born outside the US are less likely to engage in any mode of civic participation, the difference between virtual engagement among immigrants and the native born is smaller than the difference found in other modes of engagement. Thus, perhaps virtual engagement represents, in part, an effort to maintain a diaspora political identity or to remain connected to homeland politics. Interviews conducted to better understand mosque mobilization reinforce this intuition, as several interview subjects noted their greater interest in homeland politics over local politics.

While measures of ethnic identity and linked fate give us some purchase on understanding Muslim civic engagement, the measure of Muslim identity itself seems to play no role. However, this is not entirely surprising. Analysis of linked fate and ethnic identity suggests that what linked these dimensions of identity capture is a response to perceived threat from out-group members. Muslim identity seem to be more influenced by the attitudes of the in-group. Thus, we would likely expect to see religious identity to play a role more in conforming with a "Muslim" view rather than with responding to external

---

\(^{43}\) The one possible caveat would be social engagement, given the somewhat more inward looking measures tapped by the survey. However, the models do include many of the core predictors of Muslim political identity.
pressures- not least of which because those with stronger Muslim identities tend to live in more enclosed social spaces. Muslims who operate from a Muslim political world view have, in essence, already "circled the wagons." Thus, we would expect a Muslim identity to play more of a role in shaping attitudes rather than impacting the degree of civic participation.

Muslims operating out of a Muslim-first political world view show less inclination to get involved outside of their own community. They are also more likely to live in a religiously homogeneous social network, where both their discussion and close friend network members are co-religionists. There is a specific correlation between Muslim political identity and one of our measures of hostility perception that should be noted. Those who adopt an Islamic political world view are more likely to also express specific beliefs about the hostility of the US government towards Muslims, even if they tend to be more optimistic about the tolerance of their neighbors and their immediate community.
TABLE 3.6
MUSLIM IDENTITY ORIENTED MORE TOWARDS "IN-GROUP" CATEGORIES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Muslim Identity</th>
<th>Significant Negative Feeling Thermometer Score Correlation</th>
<th>Significant Positive Feeling Thermometer Score Correlation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Atheists, Catholics, Jews, Evangelical Christians, Mitch Daniels</td>
<td>Arabs, Muslims, ISNA</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


This tendency can be seen if one examines the predictors of feeling thermometer attitudes. Table 3.6, above, lists the dependent variables in models for which Muslim identity or linked fate beliefs were a statistically-significant predictor. What is striking is the near-clean divide between the two groups. Muslim ID correlates negatively with attitudes towards religious groups as well as opinions of former Governor Mitch Daniels and positively with opinions of Muslims, Arabs, or the Islamic Society of North America. On the other hand, linked fate measures correlated negatively with opinions of evangelical Christians, the GOP, the second President Bush, European-Americans, and the

---

44 Full tables of the regression models can be found in the appendix.
45 As mentioned in a previous chapter, the Islamic Society of North America (ISNA) is one of the largest, and arguably the most influential, Muslim umbrella group in the country. Headquartered in Plainfield, IN, the organization focuses on community building within the American umma and often works with mosques to help locate imams that may be willing to come and lead their communities. The most notable difference between this group and others such as CAIR is that ISNA tends to shy away from explicit political advocacy, seeking to present itself as a moderate group.
Tea Party, while positively with opinions on Congressman Andre Carson and the Occupy Wall Street movement.

With the possible exception of the correlation between Muslim Identity and attitudes towards Governor Daniels⁴⁶, a clear pattern emerges. Muslim identity seems to correlate with attitudes towards in-group organizations as well as direct (religious) competitors. Linked fate views, on the other hand, correlate most closely with perceived political threats and allies of the Muslim community. Interestingly, though, linked fate views do not positively correlate with Democratic party evaluations. Based on the previous literature, it is not surprising to find either that specific attachment to the Democratic party is somewhat weak (Barreto and Bozonelos 2009) or that evangelical Christians are considered aligned with the Republican party (Campbell et al, 2011). That the negative correlation between Muslim identity and evangelical Christians was one of the strongest is also not surprising. Evangelical Christians have often targeted gatherings where Muslims are expected to be present to attempt to proselytize to the group. One example of this is the frequent proselytism efforts often observed at the Arab-American Street Fair, held annually in Dearborn, MI. Evangelical groups often have one or more tables presenting their views as well as roving missionaries distributing bi-lingual (English/Arabic) copies of the New

⁴⁶ Former Governor Daniels is partly of Arab descent through his mother (who is Lebanese.) Indeed, in 2011, he was recognized for his public service with the Najeeb Halaby Award for Public Service, awarded by the Arab American Institute. The details of Gov. Daniels' ethnic background seemed to be a well-known fact among the individuals I spoke with. While Governor Daniels does not fit the general profile described in the paragraph above, it is possible that his ethnic heritage could cause some (particularly Arab) Muslims as to feel as though he should have more sympathy towards them than they believe him to have. Arabs, on average, do rate the Governor about 3 points higher than do members of other ethnic groups.
Testament. While Catholic groups will be present as well, they seem to engage primarily in outreach to existing Catholic populations.

Issues matter as well, and so we will conclude our analysis by examining the correlation between political attitudes and group pressures. As with the group sentiments we see measured by the feeling thermometers, we see political identity and linked fate beliefs having distinct impacts in different issue spheres. The IMPAS survey asked about eight issue areas, drawing wordings from existing surveys, as well as probing a few issues that were likely of particular interest to the Muslim community. In particular, the survey asked respondents to rate statements on the topics of abortion, gay marriage, business regulation, social services, ethnic profiling, affirmative action, support for an Israeli attack on Israel, and support for the policy of drone attacks abroad. The questions were rated on a 5-point scale, going from strong disagreement to strong agreement. The distribution of responses can be seen in table 3.7 below.\textsuperscript{47}

\textsuperscript{47} Exact wordings for each item can be found in the appendix as table A6.
TABLE 3.7
RESPONSES TO ITEM INVENTORY IN IMPAS SURVEY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Strong Disagreement</th>
<th>Disagreement</th>
<th>Neutral/No Opinion</th>
<th>Agreement</th>
<th>Strong Agreement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pro-Abortion Rights</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pro-Gay Marriage</td>
<td>49%</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pro-Welfare State</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pro-Business Regulation</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-Ethnic Profiling</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>44%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pro-Affirmative Action</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>29%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-Israeli Strike</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>66%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-Drone Strikes</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>28%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Percentages may not equal 100% due to rounding. All issues in the table above are coded so that Disagreement = Conservative issue preferences and Agreement = Liberal issue preferences.

For about half of the issues, there is a fairly even distribution with many respondents clustering around the center of the scale. However, for the other half, there is a definite tilt on one side of the scale or the other. No issue has more one-side support among Muslims in the sample than does the question of whether the US should back an Israeli strike against a potential Iranian nuclear site. 2/3 of respondents strongly oppose such a position. However, strong majorities also express opposition to ethnic profiling to prevent violent crime and gay marriage, as well as (to a lesser extent) support for further government action to help blacks achieve equality.
Much like with feeling thermometer ratings, Muslim identity and linked fate beliefs rarely prove significant in the same models\textsuperscript{48}. Linked fate beliefs correlate with more liberal attitudes towards ethnic profiling, affirmative action, gay marriage, the potential Israeli attack, and business regulation. Muslim identity matters, on the other hand, as a correlate of abortion attitudes, gay marriage, welfare state support, and business regulation. Furthermore, except for in the case of business regulations (where political Muslims do not support reducing them), the Muslim frame tends to align with what would be considered more conservative attitudes\textsuperscript{49}. This, of course, adheres to some of the observations made in the introduction pegging US Muslims as being much more divided between liberal and conservative politics (and, therefore, the Democratic and Republican party) prior to 2001.

We also see ethnic and religious identity closely paralleling each other in the issue preference models. In general, individuals who identify either ethnic or religious identity as a strongly influential factor in their political evaluations are both more likely to adopt conservative views, particularly on social issues. This sort of traditionalism associated with adherence to religious or ethnic identity should not be particularly surprising, given the documented importance between

\textsuperscript{48} Full models being discussed can be found in the appendix. They will also be discussed in more detail in the following chapter.

\textsuperscript{49} While perhaps not widely known among non-Muslims, the Qur’an (the central holy book of Islam) and particularly the Hadith (the non-Qur’anic stories about the life and sayings of the Prophet that make up the central commentary and extension of the teachings found within the holy book) pay considerable attention to commercial matters. This should not, perhaps, be surprising, as Muhammad himself was a merchant, and the Arabs that were present at the founding of the religion were dependent on trade as an important source of wealth. The attention paid to commercial affairs might help to explain Muslim comfort with business regulations that might be seen as being in contrast with an otherwise conservative issue profile.
religious and ethnic identity (Putnam and Campbell 2010) as well as the correlation previously noted between religious and ethnic identity among Muslims. However, the intimate connection between religious and ethnic identity is again reinforced by these observations.

**Discussion and Conclusion**

We were left with lingering questions at the end of the last chapter that required further examination. We understood that context mattered, but we were not sure exactly how it did. That led me to pose three salient questions at the beginning of this chapter. The first question was whether there is a salient Muslim political identity among Muslims in the US that we can measure. The answer seems to be yes, and we see emerging is a story that suggests the political orientation of Muslims within this sample is most shaped by their network. Those who live within social networks dominated by co-religionists are most likely see the world from a "Muslim" point of view. That is to say, if it seems that everyone someone knows is Muslim, then to view political matters "as a Muslim" becomes the preferred mode of psychological engagement. These in-group ties shape respondent perception of the broader environment. These respondents feel threatened by the state in particular, and are more likely to be withdrawn from the broader society. Whether or not the Muslim frame becomes the dominant political frame for members of the sample, those who claim at least some of the time that it matters to their political evaluations are more likely to think of their in-group
members more highly and more likely to have lower opinions of members of other religions.

The second question posed by this chapter was whether there was a sense of linked fate that was developed from these identities. We found that there was indeed a measurable sense of common destiny, and those who scored more highly in the measure were more engaged both civically and politically. These individuals report the most homogenous political discussion networks, though their reported friendship networks can be fairly diverse. This motivation to engage, and this sense of shared outcomes, likely stems more from personal experience rather than a broader sense of who "we" are. These in-group bonds help to personalize any sense of threat that may be leveled at the group identity, thus providing a more immediate motivation to defend the perceived shared interests. Unfortunately, the survey did not ask whether the respondent had been personally discriminated against, or knew someone who had, based on their religious or racial identity. This sense of threat to the group that motivates Muslims within the sample to engage in their broader community is an outside pressure reflected in those close to them while the normalizing of an Islamic politics is a product of the in-group focusing broadly a particular mode of evaluating political matters.

Not only with politics but with the social fabric more generally, a sense of linked fate emerging from more harmonious and homogeneous network perceptions is an important correlate with greater engagement. However, this sense of shared destiny was countered by the demobilizing pressure of perceived
hostility from without the Muslim community. For those who perceive a threatening environment but fail to develop a belief that the threat is group-focused rather than solely an individual threat, the social world outside the group must seem very intimidating. While relatively few studies have looked at this discrepancy between personal threat and group threat, these findings do resonate with the work of Schildkraut (2005) who found Latinos more likely to register and vote when perceiving generalized group threat but less inclined to do so when perceiving personal threat. Similarly, while not addressing political engagement per say, Branscombe, Schmitt and Harvey (1999) find that stronger group identification ameliorates some of the negative effects to well-being suffered by minorities perceiving personal discrimination while Davis (1995) finds that, for blacks in the US, higher levels of intolerance are a response to perceived personal threat.

What this suggests, then, is that not all types of engagement will necessarily help to create a more vibrant public sphere within a democratic society. In particular, threatened communities will work to keep members' energies inwardly focused, as suggested by the positive correlation between religious commitment and only the mode of civic engagement that included a number of in-group activities. Indeed, if we disaggregate the measure of social engagement into in-group social engagement (volunteering at the mosque; working with others to solve community problems) and activities where out-group members might be encountered (attending a play; attending PTA meetings), we
find that religious commitment has significant positive correlation only with in-group engagement.

**TABLE 3.8**

RELIGIOUS MUSLIMS ONLY MORE ENGAGED WITHIN THE MUSLIM COMMUNITY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>In-Group Social Activism (Religious, Community)</th>
<th>Broader Community Social Activism (Plays, PTA, Campaign Vol.)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Attendance</td>
<td>.803*** (.136)</td>
<td>.139 (.125)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prayer</td>
<td>.679*** (.126)</td>
<td>.154 (.116)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Above is the disaggregated findings for the Social Engagement model found in table 3.4. There were no substantive changes in other variables of interest in the disaggregated models.

This helps us get at our third question, which was whether these measurable items have any substantive impact on Muslim political and civic behavior. The findings in this chapter largely reflect the expectations we developed from Campbell (2004) and Mutz (2006). Campbell found that religious organizations can serve as a buttress against greater civic engagement within the broader community while Mutz speaks to the importance of the type of dialogue occurring within the social network in shaping the quantity of political activity. What this here helps us to understand is the mechanism behind the phenomenon. Campbell (2004), as a reminder, finds evidence that this likely perception of threat correlated with a shift towards the Republican party among Evangelical Christians. What we see happening among the Muslims in this sample reflect this,
in that the perception of threat seems to have a significant impact on Muslim political and civic behavior.

Where we push forward, however, is seeing the potential civic cost of developing such identities. Mutz (2006), as a reminder, points to the power contradictory discussion partners can have to demobilize interest in politics and political participation. We see this among the Muslims of the sample as well, though only indirectly. Those embedded within homogeneous discussion networks are more likely to feel linked to the group as a whole, and thus a homogeneous social network contributes to an environment where individuals feel more inclined to engage with society. However, this positive reinforcement seems to be supported by this small core being enmeshed within a broader, diverse network. Those who are more heavily involved within their religious community seem to be more likely to engage only in activities involving other members of their in-group. As their world-view becomes increasingly defined as "Muslim-first", engagement with that community arguably becomes more important than engagement with the out-group. Certainly, we have seen above that a Muslim-first world view is associated with a world view that is more inclined to viewing affairs in religious terms and feeling more favorably towards the in-group while feeling less warmly towards other religious groups. While this effect is likely not limited to Muslims, it can certainly be seen clearly in the segment of the community examined in this sample. This, in turn, can bring out the potential "dark side" of social capital that some scholars on the subject have warned about (Fiorina 1999)
Intensive in-group, or bonding, engagement is not necessarily in the best interest of the community as a whole. Research has demonstrated that at least some religious traditions (particularly evangelical Christianity) foster an inward-lookingness that can promote greater social alienation by seeking to remove part of the community into a parallel society (e.g. Beyerlein and Hipp 2005; Beyerlein and Hipp 2006.) By focusing on the community to the exclusion of others, social ills such as higher crime rates can emerge. That may not be as much of a concern for Muslim-Americans, whose population is tiny compared to the evangelical Christians that Beyerlein and Hipp focus on. However, concern has been raised, particularly in the context of European Muslims, that intensifying an inward focus and not creating the opportunity for ties to the broader community can promote a sense of alienation that can promote ills within the community as well (Fetzer and Soper 2005.) Of considerable concern to the state is the potential for violent radicalization which, while rare, can have particularly deleterious impacts on the broader community. However, the potential for increased drug, alcohol, or family abuse within a community that perceives itself as being discriminated against, segregated, and marginalized has been well-documented in groups such as European Muslims (Karlson and Nazroo 2002), native Americans (Whitbeck et al 2001), and African-Americans (Gibbons et al 2004).

We will conclude by noting one of the most important predictors of political behavior- partisanship- has not yet been discussed. That oversight will be remedied in the next chapter, where we will apply the insights drawn from this and all the previous chapters to help us address one of the most intriguing
questions concerning American Muslims over the past decade. Specifically, we will examine the rapid realignment of the Muslim community over the past decade from a moderate and unaligned or weakly-leanng ethno-religious group to an overwhelmingly solid and reliable Democratic voting bloc.
CHAPTER 4:
IDENTITY POLITICS AND THE AMERICAN UMMAH

Abstract: In this chapter, I will examine the dramatic shift in partisanship among Muslims that has been observed since 2002. While there are a number of factors that help to explain why Muslim partisanship has been in flux, the role of perceived threat in shaking them loose from existing loyalties plays a primary role. Furthermore, I will observe that the competing impulses of Muslim identity and linked fate beliefs work at crossed purposes, with Muslim identifiers having a preference for non-partisan world views while those with strong linked-fate beliefs holding strong partisan views.

Partisanship is the cornerstone of American voter behavior. No aspect of an individual's demographic makeup is more predictive of an individual's vote choice (Gerber and Green 1998), shaping all sorts of aspects of political life from the way information is processed (Huckfeldt 1995; Green Palmquist, and Schickler 2002; Chong and Druckman 2007) and more likely to vote (Bartels 2000; Lewis-Beck, Jacoby, Norpoth, and Weisberg 2008). A considerable amount of the research that has been done on American Muslims, particularly since 2001,
has looked at the dramatic shift in Muslim macro-partisanship (c.f. Jalalzai 2009; Barreto and Bozonelos 2009; Ayers 2007; Ayers and Hofstetter 2008). Over the course of the past 10 years, Muslims have transformed from a slightly Democratic-leaning, but definitely up-for-grabs, segment of the population into a solidly Democratic ethnoreligious group.

Since party identification (Party ID or PID from here on) explains much of how one behaves politically in the voting booth, it is important to understand what drives PID. A rich literature exists explaining the formation and durability of PID\textsuperscript{50}, but Muslims provide an interesting case study of the phenomenon. Not only did we observe a recent and dramatic shift of partisan alignments among Muslims over the last decade, but Muslims also represent a predominantly immigrant group whose political loyalties were not necessarily fixed during childhood. Thus, we might expect the forces that shape the partisan preferences among Muslims to be somewhat different than the typical American voter. At the same time, we know that there is an ever-increasing fusion between ideology and political identity in the contemporary US. Where partisanship describes the "team" an individual sees themselves as belonging to, ideology represents a world view that one embraces. Increased sorting within and among partisans has decreased the number of individuals with orthogonal identities (such as "liberal Republican" or "conservative Democrat"), but these are not incoherent concepts within our political lexicon.

\textsuperscript{50} The literature is broad. For a summary of relevant research, see Johnson 2006, among others.
Muslim political realignment is frequently noted as one of the most intriguing elements of the ethnoreligious community's political behavior following 2001. Figure 4.1, below, puts the shift in partisan affiliation into measurable numbers. Combining the responses to partisanship items in both the Zogby and Pew studies, we can see snap-shots of the Muslim community's shift taken at roughly three-year intervals.

![Figure 4.1. Muslims become a solidly Democratic voting bloc after 2001](image)

In earlier chapters, anecdotal reports from Muslim activist groups were mentioned that claimed many of their members leaned towards the Republican Party or supported George W. Bush in the 2000 elections. Several of the religious leaders interviewed at mosques in the state of Indiana made a similar comment
about previous efforts to rally support for Bush through the masjid. While we do not precisely see that claim showing through in the 2001 data, we do see a fair number of Muslims reporting a Republican identification. However, there is a precipitous drop-off in GOP support in all subsequent waves. There is a notable shift towards the Democrats in each subsequent wave, though interestingly the number of Muslims reporting no partisan identification (and does not report leaning towards any party) still numbers about 18% in the 2011 Pew survey. 18% is a significant number, nearly twice the number of non-Muslims reporting the same identification in similar US Pew surveys conducted around the same time, though interestingly also less than half the number reporting such an affiliation among Latinos and Asians (Hajnal and Lee 2011). The relatively rapid shifting in partisan alignment provides an opportunity to look at the macro level predictors of a group in transition, and can help us better understand both the drivers of realignment and non-affiliation in this distinctive ethnoreligious group.

What follows is an effort to understand how the fluidity of Muslim identity itself challenges our existing models of partisan identity. In this, it shares some of the goals of the recent work by Hajnal and Lee (2011). This work will be discussed in greater detail shortly but, in brief, is a work seeking to understand the

---

51 American Muslims were not a particular group of interest for most social scientists before 2001, and their small numbers mean that we lack sufficient numbers of Muslim respondents in most general population surveys to say with confidence how exactly they voted in the 2000 election. There is some reason to believe that Muslims voted more for Bush than for Gore, however. Rose (2001) discusses a series of CAIR polls showing a swing towards the Bush campaign, with their final poll reporting 72% of their members voting for Bush, with 19% voting for Nader and just 8% for Gore. Another analysis examines voting in Dearborn, MI, which showed a decisive swing away from their usual Democratic voting patterns in giving Bush a 52%-44% victory in the city. On the other hand, Zogby's survey asked respondents who they voted for in 2000, and a plurality of Muslim respondents in the Zogby poll reported voting for Gore as can be seen in figure 1. What seems clearer, regardless of how Muslims actually voted in 2000, is that the Islamist vote (that is, those Muslims operating out of a specifically Muslim political identity as opposed to an ethnic, professional, gender, or other identity) did go decidedly for Bush.
inability of the major parties to more effectively recruit and mobilize minority immigrant voters. To begin, the chapter will begin by discussing the current models of partisan identity and where they seem to fail to capture the Muslim experience. It will then proceed to lay out the challenges presented to these theories by the case of the Muslim minority. Finally, I propose and test a refinement of how we understand partisanship to operate among American voters.

**Theories of Partisan Identity**

This is not the first attempt to try to refine the dominant models of partisanship. Hajnal and Lee (2011) point out in their examination of partisanship models that conventional models do a good job of explaining the behavior of many, particularly those for whom the political science literature have long focused on- majority whites and minority blacks. The lacunae present in those theories arise when it comes to capturing the growing population that does not fall into the classic black-and-white paradigm that has shaped much of 20th century US political history. Hajnal and Lee point out that immigrants have traditionally been difficult to fit with these theories, which itself would help to situate the position of many American Muslims, but also forcefully argue that the existing partisan identity models fail to capture the cognitive process that helps many of these unaligned and independent citizens reach their (lack of a) partisan affiliation.

In short, the first of these to develop chronologically is the sociological approach, also sometimes called the Columbia model. This approach argues that
the social network an individual is imbedded into has a preeminent role in shaping political behaviors and preferences (Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and McPhee 1954; Green, Palmquist, and Schickler 2004.) For this approach, "who you know" is the most important aspect of predicting individual behavior. The second to develop is the psychological model (also called the Michigan Model), which posits that partisan identities are rubrics, or mental short-cuts, utilized by the brain to help evaluate the difficult and potentially time-consuming task of evaluating political matters (Campbell, Converse, Miller, and Stokes 1960). For scholars in this school, it can be said that "who you are" is the most important determiner for political behavior. The third main approach are the various descendants of economic approaches. One of the most prominent is the Downsian Model (sometimes also called the Rochester Model); a rational choice approach which argues that partisanship is less a mental short-cut used to sort through issues and more of a running tally of party performances (Fiorina 1981; Erikson, Mackuen, and Stimson 2002). For this third approach, "what you want" is thought as being the most important determiner of vote choice and party identification.

As discussed earlier in this dissertation, this sociological model shares certain logics with the Michigan school assumptions, namely that group labels become important tools for political calculations. However, whereas the psychological model posits that these group identities are structures built up from childhood and the labels are used primarily as cognitive shortcuts, the sociological model assumes that social group affectation and pressure is the mechanism through which group salience most clearly manifests. This argument shares
similarities with the one made by Hajnal and Lee (2011). Hajnal and Lee argue that the psychological and rational models are essentially complementary, where ideology and identity combine to shape the core political identity, and this identity is modified by what they describe as essentially Bayesian updating (p. 21). Furthermore, they argue that the decision to be political or apolitical is the first choice individuals make, and necessarily comes prior to the need to choose to identify with any political party in particular. Thus, they take issue with the conception of political identity as belonging on a linear scale.

However, as has been argued throughout this dissertation, ignoring the enduring social context within which these identities are formed does not properly reflect the way in which information is acquired and processed by the modal citizen. The filtering effects of social networks (Huckfeldt and Sprague 1987) and political identity (Green, Palmquist, and Schickler 2004) considerably limit the ability of new information to shape political behavior. I argue that a more complete model needs to fully capture the social way in which we usually learn about politics.

As is illustrated in figure 4.2 below, political evaluations are necessarily rooted in non-political identities. Political interests do not come to individuals a priori, but are rather shaped by the social and developmental factors that shape all of the various aspects of an individual's identities. External information, in the form of the political environment one finds oneself in, plays a significant role in dictating which individual identities are deemed political relevant. This social pressure helps to define which identities can serve as reasonable basis from which
to frame and evaluate the political situation. In this case, when I say "reasonable", what is meant is that there are only certain identities upon which viable political coalitions can be built.

![Figure 4.2](image)

**Figure 4.2.** Proposed model of political evaluation

The social pressure to work within acceptable political identities is enhanced by the perceived threats to various aspects of the individual. Threat, and the perception of threat, plays an elevating role. This perception of threat helps to highlight which among those identities generally seen as politically viable need to be defended, abandoned, or otherwise addressed. For the typical white American of European descent, economic or sociotropic threats play the most significant threats to individual well-being, and so it is for this reason that we have often ascribed considerable importance to economic evaluations in the formation of
political identity. However, it is not so much economics in particular but potential threats posed by shifting economic fortunes that elicit political re-evaluations. Economic threat is a serious motivator, but it is certainly not the only one. As argued by Davis (2007), sociotropic threat and economic threat are usually trumped by perceived physical threats, and threats to one's personal safety generally trump other concerns. It is for this reason that Davis (1995) found blacks more intolerant of their "least liked' groups in surveys than whites, for example- personal threats provoke a stronger reaction than other threats an individual may be exposed to.

The external environment plays a role in limiting the range of individual identities seen as politically viable and in elevating others as especially important. These political identities in turn shape an individual's political engagement. In-group information, information seen as flowing from the political identity, is far more important than external information in determining political behavior. It is because of this that the political identity plays an important formative role in determining both the partisan identity an individual adopts as well as the issues they perceive as relevant. This also helps to explain both the stability and the rapid mutability of party identification. As individuals generally inhabit a stable threat environment, the risks they are exposed to tend to be constant and predictable. Thus, the underlying identity that shapes political evaluations tends not to shift much over time. It is only in times of considerable change (either personal or societal) that the focus of perceived threat might shift. When it does, this would be expected to lead to a reevaluation of both priorities and loyalties.
What follows is an analysis of partisanship and ideological orientation in the Muslim community from 2001 through 2012. Through this analysis, we will examine the primary forces on partisanship and ideological orientation. Of primary interest will be an examination of social, psychological, and perceptual measures, to allow for an examination of the posited theories. Through this analysis, it will be demonstrated both that social forces place an important, if indirect, pull on individual political loyalties and that measures of political identity play a significant role in shaping both the loyalties (political identity) and interests (expressed ideology) of respondents.

**Becoming a Democratic Group**

As mentioned in a previous chapter, the evidence that does exist suggests that Muslims were very bifurcated by ethnicity in 2000 and before (Saeed 2003; Haddad 2004). In particular, Arabs were generally described as leaning towards the GOP and blacks leaned towards the Democratic Party. This aligned with the preferences and voting habits of their Christian co-ethnics. However, as we saw in Figure 4.1, this initial partisan alignment was not sticky- there is considerable macro-level movement among Muslims sampled across years. This is arguably what we would expect to see based on the rational model. As I argued previously, economic evaluations are among the most important retrospective calculations voters take (Fiorina 1981); but not always. Economic evaluations do generally play a decisive role in assessments of party success for the majority of Americans, but this is not due to the nature of economics qua economics. Rather, it is due to
the fact that economic instability is generally the greatest threat to household security in the US. However, other threats to individual security—particularly the perception of physical threat—can and do weigh as or more heavily in the evaluation of party performance. Thus, we must consider the role that the perception of hostility from official or public sources will influence partisan alignments as much as economic or sociotropic threats (such as secularism to a devout Muslim) to the well-being of respondents when striving to evaluate the importance of evaluative assessments in shaping the partisan commitments of the respondents in the sample in question.

In order to get at what might be driving these different partisan preferences the first place to start is to look at what best predicts either Republican or Democratic party identification. Unfortunately, there is no panel data that includes a large number of Muslims, which would be the ideal instrument to get at the causal impact of the various forces shaping Muslim partisan views. However, we can at least look at what seems to drive Muslim political preference during the earlier period. To do so, we can look at the Zogby data to see what is driving Muslim partisan alignments in the early phase. Below, I employ a multinomial logit to examine what matters more for Muslims when moving away from an Independent identification towards one of the two parties. If Muslims are largely behaving as ethnics, then we would expect to see the ethnic dummies included to have a significant impact. Likewise, if they are behaving simply as pocketbook voters, we would expect to see income impacting their voting preference. If, however, they are reacting to a perceived personal threat in
the period following the 9/11 attacks, then we might expect to see attitudes towards the government (in particular, their level of trust in the government) to be substantively significant for predicting respondent partisan loyalties.

What we see in 4.1 is that, at least early on, they all matter. In fact, we do not see anything particularly surprising going on among American Muslims. Religious commitment seems to push Muslims modestly away from the Democratic party, while ethnicity plays an important role in understanding how Muslims align themselves. Among self-described Arabs we see that they are indeed much more likely both to describe themselves as a Republican and to not describe themselves as a Democrat. South Asians demonstrate an even higher likelihood of not offering a Democratic identification, but lack the propensity to identify with the Republican Party shared by their Arab co-religionists. Likewise, black Muslims show a statistically significantly higher likelihood of rejecting the Republican label, though show no higher likelihood of identifying with the Democratic party. In short, ethnicity matters a lot for how Muslims approach politics. At the

52 Given the controls used, the primary comparison group for these ethnic labels will be those that identify as white. This group will include individuals of Arab origin that no longer have a particularly strong tie to that origin as well as eastern European Muslims and converts of western European stock. The other notable segment of the reference groups would be southeast or East Asian Muslims, particularly of Indonesian or Philippino heritage.

53 While black Muslim identification with the Democratic Party is relatively high in the sample (about 58%), it is lower than comparable numbers from the period. Pew estimates from this time period put the overall black Democratic identification rate at 69%. Black Muslim identification is also twice as high (10% vs. 5%) across the two datasets.

Black Muslims could be less likely to identify with the Democrats than their Christian co-religionists in 2001 owing in part owing to the legacy of the Nation of Islam (NoI) that lingers in the background of the Black Muslim community. One of the black Muslims interviewed for this study stressed the importance of the Nation's legacy even though he (or she) has abandoned the racial emphasis of the theology for a more orthodox universalism following their "conversion" from the NoI to orthodoxy. The individual in question repeatedly emphasized the word "convert" and "conversion" during the interview in regards to their expression of a more orthodox Sunni faith. The interviewee was conscious of the theological differences and, though expressed a preference for their masjid's current affiliation, none-the-less expressed admiration for the Nation's
same time, Muslims who express mistrust of the government move away from the
Republican party (likely, as we will see later, because they associate the
government with the party of the President, as is common in American politics).
Yet, many Muslims came here to pursue economic opportunities, and those who
have achieved material success (as measured by income and educational
attainment) are less likely to side with the Democrats.

efforts and a belief that the origins of Islam in the black community deserves respect and should
be acknowledged by the community.

The Nation of Islam historically expressed mistrust in mainstream organizations and
institutions. This mistrust manifested itself as separatism and apolitical civic engagement (Lincoln, 1994). NoI Muslims rejected the Christianity of the majority of their ethnic community as being
too compromised by the beliefs of the majority. Hand-in-hand with this went a rejection of the
Democratic Party that most of the black community was allied with. The Nation argued that
Democrats were too co-opted by the interests of groups they believed were inimical to their
community's interests.
### TABLE 4.1

2001-2004: PERCEIVED THREATS SHAPE MUSLIM PARTISAN PREFERENCES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>GOP</th>
<th>Democrat</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Attendance</td>
<td>.204 (.311)</td>
<td>.167 (.259)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prayer</td>
<td>-.148 (.333)</td>
<td>-.621* (.255)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government Mistrust</td>
<td>-.618* (.270)</td>
<td>.165 (.205)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic Group Participation</td>
<td>.315 (.178)</td>
<td>.067 (.144)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious Group Participation</td>
<td>.197 (.190)</td>
<td>.237 (.154)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mosque Leadership</td>
<td>-.396 (.234)</td>
<td>-.454* (.192)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imam Leadership</td>
<td>-.171 (.229)</td>
<td>-.054 (.182)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslim Engagement</td>
<td>-.402 (.543)</td>
<td>-.287 (.462)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Experienced Discrimination</td>
<td>.131 (.184)</td>
<td>.091 (.142)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arab</td>
<td>.377* (.176)</td>
<td>-.503*** (.144)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black</td>
<td>-.490* (.245)</td>
<td>-.040 (.164)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistani</td>
<td>.136 (.184)</td>
<td>-.648*** (.161)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>.252 (.152)</td>
<td>.535*** (.118)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income</td>
<td>.557 (.308)</td>
<td>-.684** (.228)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>.438 (.396)</td>
<td>-.646* (.304)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Born in the US</td>
<td>.256 (.177)</td>
<td>-.037 (.136)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civic Engagement</td>
<td>-1.395*** (.389)</td>
<td>-.545 (.320)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Midwest</td>
<td>-.240 (.173)</td>
<td>-.514*** (.133)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South</td>
<td>-.298 (.184)</td>
<td>-.489** (.146)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West</td>
<td>.519* (.200)</td>
<td>.037 (.172)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>-.625*** (.156)</td>
<td>.325* (.126)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-.904 (.744)</td>
<td>2.199*** (.583)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Pseudo R²: .0706

Notes: Multinomial Logit, Collapsed Values (Independent Base Outcome).
Source: Zogby/Georgetown MAPS survey (2001 & 2004 waves), pooled samples
Perhaps the most interesting finding of the model presented in table 4.1 is the correlation between higher levels of civic engagement and lower levels of support for the Republican Party. This item is one of the strongest negative predictors of Republican partisanship. While it is a noisy measure\(^{54}\), it likely represents our best bet to capture the relative social engagement in the Muslim (as well as the broader) community. This item also has a negative (if not quite statistically significant) correlation with Democratic alignment. The interest in this result lies in more than just this being an unexpected finding. It suggests that a social dimension may be in play for shaping the partisan preferences of the Muslim community. While it is difficult to say what could be driving it, most of the plausible explanations (positive in-group interactions; negative out-group interactions; greater awareness of the issues and interests at stake) align with the theory that social forces are shaping the political identity through which Muslims are viewing the process. If so, then this is a precursor to the impact we will see from notions of identity and linked fate in later surveys.

Ideology and partisanship are often thought of as working in tandem to reinforce a world view, though this connection between ideology and partisanship is known to be more concrete in homogenous environments where there are few other points of contention.\(^{55}\) In order to understand what is going on within the Muslim community, it would be sensible to examine the predictors of ideology as

---

\(^{54}\) As you may recall, the measure of civic engagement captures a number of apolitical activities, from participating in ethnic or religious interest groups, attending community functions like plays or PTA meetings, as well as political acts like volunteering for political campaigns.

\(^{55}\) Hajnal and Trounstine (2014) argue that race dominates urban political elections, and trumps any other consideration, including partisan and ideological affinity.
well. If there is considerable congruence between the drivers of partisanship and ideology, it may just be that what we are seeing is political learning and "business as normal" for a predominantly immigrant group in the United States.

We can see in Table 4.2 that ideological orientations among the American Muslim community pretty much line up with what we would expect based on our observations of the US general public. The first thing to note is that there is a significant religious and ethnic correlation in the model. In particular, we see that Arabs are less likely to identify as liberal, which fits with the story of a group that leans Republican overall, and blacks are more likely to describe themselves as conservative, which is similar to the way Christian blacks describe themselves when compared to white Democrats. Furthermore, Pakistanis show no distinctive tendencies. Every measure of religious commitment in the model shows a strong negative correlation with the likelihood of a respondent identifying as a liberal, while ethnic group participation decisively correlates with greater identification with political liberalism.

---

56 Religious engagement correlates with lower liberalism, which is what we observe in other religious traditions in the US (c.f. Putnam and Campbell 2010). Bartels (2008) demonstrates the conservative orientation generally more commonly found among those higher up the SES ladder while Gray (2012), among others, documents the greater conservatism generally found among citizens in the South.
## TABLE 4.2

IDEOLOGY 2001-2004: MUSLIMS ALIGN IDEOLOGICALLY FOR THE SAME REASON OTHER AMERICANS DO

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Conservative</th>
<th>Liberal</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Attendance</strong></td>
<td>.325</td>
<td>-.449*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.267)</td>
<td>(.222)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Prayer</strong></td>
<td>.005</td>
<td>-.551*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.272)</td>
<td>(.224)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Government Mistrust</strong></td>
<td>.521*</td>
<td>.427*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.207)</td>
<td>(.184)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ethnic Group Participation</strong></td>
<td>-.305*</td>
<td>.321**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.147)</td>
<td>(.105)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Religious Group Participation</strong></td>
<td>-.225</td>
<td>-.317**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.149)</td>
<td>(.121)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mosque Leadership</strong></td>
<td>.007</td>
<td>-.035</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.195)</td>
<td>(.171)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Imam Leadership</strong></td>
<td>.022</td>
<td>-.051</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.185)</td>
<td>(.167)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Muslim Engagement</strong></td>
<td>-.656</td>
<td>.030</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.412)</td>
<td>(.427)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Experienced Discrimination</strong></td>
<td>.171</td>
<td>.109</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.149)</td>
<td>(.130)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Arab</strong></td>
<td>.134</td>
<td>-.491***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.146)</td>
<td>(.128)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Black</strong></td>
<td>.439**</td>
<td>-.116</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.169)</td>
<td>(.157)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Pakistani</strong></td>
<td>-.058</td>
<td>-.054</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.164)</td>
<td>(.138)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Female</strong></td>
<td>-.057</td>
<td>-.027</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.117)</td>
<td>(.107)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Income</strong></td>
<td>.482*</td>
<td>-.883***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.235)</td>
<td>(.194)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Education</strong></td>
<td>-.675*</td>
<td>-.514</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.296)</td>
<td>(.268)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Born in the US</strong></td>
<td>-.037</td>
<td>-.086</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.139)</td>
<td>(.124)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Civic Engagement</strong></td>
<td>.140</td>
<td>.045</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.315)</td>
<td>(.300)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Midwest</strong></td>
<td>-.015</td>
<td>-.198</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.138)</td>
<td>(.122)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>South</strong></td>
<td>-.011</td>
<td>-.263*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.147)</td>
<td>(.133)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>West</strong></td>
<td>.077</td>
<td>-.270</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.164)</td>
<td>(.148)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2004</strong></td>
<td>-.368**</td>
<td>.041</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.125)</td>
<td>(.112)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Constant</strong></td>
<td>.486</td>
<td>1.799**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.592)</td>
<td>(.539)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Pseudo $R^2$                      | .0359

Notes: Multinomial Logit, Collapsed Values (Moderate Base Outcome).
Source: Zogby/Georgetown MAPS survey (2001 & 2004 waves), pooled samples
One last observation, true in both table 4.1 and table 4.2, is that the variable measuring time is statistically significant in both models. The strength and directionality tell us that, despite these underlying social forces working on shaping Muslim political behavior, there is an overall shift among Muslims away from the Republican party as well as the conservative ideology associated with the party. Unfortunately, Zogby did not run subsequent waves of their survey after 2004, but we can continue the observation of Muslim political behavior by turning to the Pew Research Center. The comparison between the two surveys is not perfect--in particular, Pew did not ask respondents if they identified as Arab--but it is close enough to allow us to examine the development of our primary variables of interest.

Among the more intriguing findings emerging from the later surveys, shown in Table 4.3, we see the emergence of the tension identified in the preceding chapter between the desire to withdraw on one hand and the desire to resist hostility on the other. Though the context in the former case was related to political and civic engagement, we see similar correlations when examining partisan affiliation. The prayer measure correlates with a lower likelihood of identifying with either party, as does mistrust of the government. Individuals in higher income brackets likewise seem inclined to not identify with either party. This latter finding hints at the same impulse the personal religiosity and mistrust measures hint at--that mistrust, or at least the failure to inspire confidence, in either party has helped to contribute to the relatively high number of Muslims who claim to be true political independents.
### TABLE 4.3
**PARTISANSHIP 2007-2011: GREATER MUSLIM HOMOGENEITY IN RESPONSES**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>GOP</th>
<th>Democrat</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Attendance</strong></td>
<td>-.021</td>
<td>.012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.065)</td>
<td>(.046)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Prayer</strong></td>
<td>-.314***</td>
<td>-.215***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.077)</td>
<td>(.058)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Government Mistrust</strong></td>
<td>-.190***</td>
<td>-.078***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.046)</td>
<td>(.020)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Experienced</strong></td>
<td>.227**</td>
<td>.143*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Discrimination</strong></td>
<td>(.082)</td>
<td>(.060)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Black</strong></td>
<td>-.445</td>
<td>.343*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.302)</td>
<td>(.174)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Asian</strong></td>
<td>.207</td>
<td>-.268</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.261)</td>
<td>(.179)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Female, Veil Wearing</strong></td>
<td>.018</td>
<td>.073</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.059)</td>
<td>(.040)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Income</strong></td>
<td>-.143***</td>
<td>-.118***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.038)</td>
<td>(.023)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Education</strong></td>
<td>.054</td>
<td>.159**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.081)</td>
<td>(.056)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Born in the US</strong></td>
<td>.319</td>
<td>.351*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.244)</td>
<td>(.161)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Shi’ite</strong></td>
<td>.287</td>
<td>.135</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.253)</td>
<td>(.182)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Midwest</strong></td>
<td>-.048</td>
<td>-.058</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.259)</td>
<td>(.171)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>South</strong></td>
<td>.019</td>
<td>-.231</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.230)</td>
<td>(.157)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>West</strong></td>
<td>.032</td>
<td>-.255</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.258)</td>
<td>(.175)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2011</strong></td>
<td>.023</td>
<td>.025</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.050)</td>
<td>(.033)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Age</strong></td>
<td>.084</td>
<td>.043</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.089)</td>
<td>(.059)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Constant</strong></td>
<td>-46.046</td>
<td>-.47527</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(100.830)</td>
<td>(67.061)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Pseudo $R^2$ = .0538

Notes: Multinomial Logit, Collapsed Values (Independent Base Outcome).
Source: Pew Muslims in America Surveys (2007 & 2011 waves), pooled samples

At the same time, personal experiences of discrimination seem to make Muslims more partisan. Indeed, if one has been discriminated against, one is more likely to identify as a Democrat OR as a Republican. While this may seem like an incongruous finding at first glance, one would be well served to recall that Barreto
and Bosonelos (2009) found that Democrats were not always perceived as warmly welcoming even when Republicans were seen as actively hostile. Further, the period from 2007 to 2011 saw considerable public focus on the Obama administration's use of aerial drones to conduct targeted assassinations against suspected Muslim radicals. Among those so targeted was Anwar al-Aulaqi, an American citizen and internet Islamic activist believed to be connected with a number of planned or completed terrorist attacks against American targets. While the Muslim community did not regard Aulaqi warmly, they were unsettled both by the notion that the President could unilaterally order the assassination of a citizen without due process and by the fact that President Obama chose to do so (insofar as is publically known) only against American Muslims.

While this is not in and of itself a measure of linked fate perceptions (demonstrated in the last chapter to have a significant and robust correlation with the general level of political engagement), it can be seen as a proxy for such a sentiment given the correlation shown in the last chapter between perceived discrimination and holding linked fate worldviews. Thus, moving further away from the initial measure of Muslim sentiments and allowing time for shifts to occur and take hold, we see the initial stickiness expected by the psychological model to fade. Of course, this model lacks strong proxies for many of the factors we have a particular interest in, but it does at least allow us to see that movement is continuing to occur, and suggesting that Muslims may be settling on an at least somewhat coherent political identity through which they may orient themselves to
the political environment (or, as seems to be the case for many in the sample, to choose not to immerse themselves in the system at all.)

Black Muslims show an increasing realignment towards the Democratic Party, above and beyond what seems to be the trend for other Muslims. At the same time, this same ethnic group remains distinctively conservative in their political ideology, as can be seen in table 4.4, below. When looking at the model of ideology, we also see religiosity to correlate with lower liberalism, income modestly correlating with greater moderation, education nudging Muslims away from conservatism, and nativity strongly correlating with identification with either ideology. Again, we are left with a mixed bag, but one at least suggestive of a group beginning to draw further within itself- except for those most invested in the American experience. This is again suggestive that those with the closest ties to the US may be in some way more linked to each other and to the US system.
### TABLE 4.4

IDEOLOGY 2007-2011: FOREIGN-BORN DISINCLINED TO IDENTIFY WITH AN IDEOLOGY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Conservative</th>
<th>Liberal</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Attendance</td>
<td>-.026</td>
<td>-.016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.044)</td>
<td>(.043)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prayer</td>
<td>-.026</td>
<td>-.185*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.044)</td>
<td>(.047)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government Mistrust</td>
<td>-.027</td>
<td>-.062**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.025)</td>
<td>(.023)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Experienced Discrimination</td>
<td>.180</td>
<td>.075</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.054)</td>
<td>(.053)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black</td>
<td>.493**</td>
<td>.367*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.163)</td>
<td>(.160)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian</td>
<td>-.298</td>
<td>.076</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.217)</td>
<td>(.174)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female, Veil Wearing</td>
<td>-.049</td>
<td>.023</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.042)</td>
<td>(.035)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income</td>
<td>-.055*</td>
<td>-.048*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.027)</td>
<td>(.024)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>-.124*</td>
<td>.131</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.056)</td>
<td>(.052)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Born in the US</td>
<td>.324*</td>
<td>.372**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.149)</td>
<td>(.141)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shi’ite</td>
<td>.024</td>
<td>.184</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.193)</td>
<td>(.156)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Midwest</td>
<td>.028</td>
<td>-.196</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.171)</td>
<td>(.159)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South</td>
<td>.116</td>
<td>-.048</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.157)</td>
<td>(.142)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West</td>
<td>.054</td>
<td>.065</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.186)</td>
<td>(.159)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>-.002</td>
<td>.003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.034)</td>
<td>(.031)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>2.995</td>
<td>-6.060</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.68694)</td>
<td>(62.246)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Pseudo R²: .0367

Notes: Multinomial Logit, Collapsed Values (Moderate Base Outcome).
Source: Pew Muslims in America Surveys (2007 & 2011 waves), pooled samples
Religiosity

In the words of Robert Putnam and David Campbell, "...as a broad generalization it is accurate to say that religiosity and support for the Republican party are bound together," (American Grace, p.370). However, that does not seem to be the case for Muslim Americans. Figure 4.3, below, presents the distribution of Muslims by partisanship for three equal-sized groups divided based on their religiosity. What we find is that it is only the least-religious third of Muslims that are more likely to identify as a Republican than Independent or Democratic. The other two-thirds of Muslims are most likely to identify themselves as Independent than anything else, with a slight (and statistically insignificant, in the case of moderately religious Muslims) edge for Democrats among partisan Muslims. Given the findings in the models above showing that religiosity correlates with a less partisan (or political) worldview, this can be considered to be the expected result. However, in the raw data from Pew we see that Muslim Democrats are the more religious of the two partisan groups.

The Pew data provides us clear evidence that Muslims are behaving contrary to conventional expectations. While these observations are suggestive of the social forces shaping identity, as postulated in figure 4.2 below, none of the above studies have ideal proxies for the affective, strategic, and conditioned factors are needed to optimally test the model. The IMPAS study, however, has measures that more closely tap these factors and thus allows us to delve further than the other two surveys into the correlates of political and ideological

\[57\] In the figure below, I use a standard measure of religiosity, which is a factor score produced from measures of religious attendance, prayer frequency, and reported religious saliency.
identification. In particular, the IMPAS survey allows us to more closely examine the interaction of ethnic identity (and identification) with these central political orientations.

Source: Pew Muslims in America Survey (2007 and 2011 waves)

*Figure 4.3:* Republican Muslims most secular, Independents most religious

Before we proceed with the rest of the chapter, I would make a few relevant comments on the IMPAS data. The Muslims in the Indiana sample lean decisively towards the Democratic Party when they acknowledge partisan leanings; a large portion also steadfastly refuse to acknowledge loyalty to either party. While this certainly is in line with the national surveys above, there are only a small number of Republicans in the dataset. The ideological distribution also reflects the distribution found in the national Muslim surveys. If anything, with 62% of respondents describing themselves as moderates, individuals in the
IMPAS survey are even more likely to describe themselves in such terms as compared to those in national surveys.

Based on the findings in the national surveys, we have been led to expect that Muslim identity and linked fate beliefs will play a different role in shaping the partisan and ideological orientations of Muslims in the sample. In particular, we are led to expect that Muslim politics, if one wishes to use that term, would lead to a more quiescent and inward-looking political orientation while traits associated with greater ties to the American system or American identity would serve an opposite role. And, as it turns out, that is close to what we find in the data.

In table 4.5, you will find the results for multinomial logits for both partisanship and ideology. Looking first at partisanship, we find religiosity has a strong negative correlation with Republican identification (and, if one uses the more relaxed .1 standard for significance, is also negatively correlated with Democratic identity.) Furthermore, we see a tension between Muslim identity on the one hand and the social influence of a more ethno-religiously homogeneous social network on the other. Embracing a Muslim identity, while playing little role in defining partisanship, does significantly correlate with a willingness to identify oneself as a conservative. On the other hand, those who report being enmeshed in more homogeneous ethno-religious social networks are the ones most likely to reject this same conservative label. Along with that, we see a sense of shared linked fate significantly correlating with Democratic political identity. Taken together, we can see a pattern suggesting two competing impulses within the Muslim
community. On one hand, we see a religiously-based approached to politics which seems to orient people away from strong political identification and encourages a traditionalist world view. On the other, we see an ethno-religious approach to politics in which open alignment with the Democratic party and a rejection of the conservative politics that might clash with that alignment is cultivated among Muslims in the sample.

**TABLE 4.5**

**RELIGIOUS MUSLIMS MORE LIKELY TO PICK "NONE OF THE ABOVE"**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Partisanship (Independent Base)</th>
<th>Ideology (Moderate Base)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>GOP</td>
<td>Democrat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslim Identity</td>
<td>-1.517 (1.012)</td>
<td>-.004 (.306)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic Identity</td>
<td>.515 (.758)</td>
<td>-.283 (.394)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religiosity</td>
<td>-1.003* (.424)</td>
<td>-.457 (.245)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Network Homogeneity</td>
<td>-.245 (.452)</td>
<td>-.029 (.270)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Linked Fate Belief</td>
<td>.296 (.481)</td>
<td>-.618* (.270)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Threat Perception Arab</td>
<td>-.676 (.562)</td>
<td>-.602* (.240)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black</td>
<td>1.120 (.1052)</td>
<td>.769 (.594)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>-.249 (.833)</td>
<td>.675 (.471)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income</td>
<td>-.461 (.408)</td>
<td>-.183 (.152)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>.102 (.364)</td>
<td>.364* (.179)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Interest</td>
<td>-.302 (.442)</td>
<td>.055 (.237)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>1.012 (.1603)</td>
<td>-1.834 (1.208)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo R²</td>
<td>.2128</td>
<td>.1175</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Multinomial Logit, Collapsed Values. Stars indicate significance with a probability less than .05. Italics indicate a variable with statistical significance with a probability less than .1.
We can probe the plausibility of the argument by turning to the IMPAS survey to compare how these different explanations help us understand Muslim preferences on various issues as well as their ability to predict attitudes towards different groups. IMPAS includes a comparatively extensive issue preference battery and feeling thermometer scores for a broad array of groups and individuals.

**Issue Preference**

The IMPAS battery of issue preferences generally, though not entirely, covers core partisan and ideological concerns in the US. The scope of issues covered ranges from social issues of gay marriage and abortion, to social justice items like support for the welfare state and affirmative action, as well as a few issues likely to be of particular concern to US Muslims such as support for an Israeli attack on potential Iranian nuclear facilities or support for the use of racial profiling in anti-terrorism investigations. This array of issues will help to give us an understanding of how different elements of individual identity shape political perceptions.

Table 4.6 presents the results of regression analysis of the predictors of issue preference, focusing in particular on the political and identity variables of interest. As mentioned in the previous chapter, linked fate is an important predictor for issues that can be thought of as protecting group interests—ethnic profiling, affirmative action, and war in the Middle East. Muslim identity is an important predictor for those issues that pertain to issues with a clear connection
to Muslim values- caring for the poor and regulating business as well as the two issues that touch on sexual morality. As seen above, we know that these variables are themselves predictors of partisan and ideological alignment, and it is interesting to see here that they play a more significant role than partisan identity and ideology across a whole range of issues. Where we do see partisanship matter is in the area of business regulation, one of the oldest and most fundamental issue difference between the two parties. That this is the one issue on which Republican identification proved statistically significant suggests this might be the main issue of concern for those Muslims still aligned with the GOP.
**TABLE 4.6**

IDENTITY AND LINKED FATE RARELY INFLUENTIAL IN THE SAME MODEL

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnic Issues</th>
<th>Economic Issues</th>
<th>Sexuality Issues</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic Profiling OK</td>
<td>Israeli Attack OK</td>
<td>Drone Strikes OK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of total expressing disagreement</td>
<td>72%</td>
<td>83%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republican</td>
<td>.028 (.016)</td>
<td>.007 (.018)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democrat</td>
<td>-.026 (.028)</td>
<td>-.017 (.033)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberalism</td>
<td>-.040 (.057)</td>
<td>-.091 (.067)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslim Identity</td>
<td>-.035 (.038)</td>
<td>-.015 (.046)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Linked Fate</td>
<td>-.176*** (.046)</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: *=p<.05, **=p<.01, ***=p<.001. Significant results are also in bold. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. Above are Ordered Logit coefficients, utilizing multiple imputation for missing variables. N=261. Models also include controls for religiosity, network homogeneity, education, income, threat perception, political interest, gender, and ethnicity.

**Group Affect**

Group images and group attachments play an important role for partisan attachment in both the psychological and the sociological models, and has been shown elsewhere for more general political evaluations such as candidate quality (c.f. Campbell, Green, and Layman 2011; Bonneau and Cann, forthcoming) and issue salience (Slothuus and De Vreese 2010; Highton and Kam 2011). It is therefore important to understand the affective orientations of the American Muslim community if we are to evaluate the ability of existing theory to effectively explain and predict the partisan orientations of Muslim-Americans.
Figure 4.4 below compares the mean feeling thermometer scores for Democrats and Republicans across a number of groups of the Muslims in the sample. As a reminder, thermometer scores are subjective evaluations made by the respondent about how warm (positive) or cold (negative) they feel about a group. A rating of 50 represents absolute neutrality or indifference. 100 stands for adoration, 0 stands for loathing, and scores in between those anchoring points help respondents to rank and rate groups.

While it is not surprising to find that Democrats are consistently viewed more warmly than Republicans, it is intriguing that even the Republicans in the sample have roughly the same opinion of Democrats on feeling thermometer
score for Democrats as they do for their own in-group Republicans. Indeed, it is only with two categories (Independents and Conservatives) that the Democratic score drops below the dislike threshold of 50. Republicans, on the other hand, only approach 50 with one group (and that group is Republicans).

It is an intriguing observation for sociological theories that, in this small sample at least, even Republican Muslims would flirt with have warmer regard for the rival party than they would for their own party. We would expect to see this most likely in situations where the Muslim Republican's social environment is saturated with positive representations of the rival party or hostile representations of their own, or otherwise their partisan in-group is seen by Muslim Republicans as being hostile to Muslims. It makes for a more plausible argument than one stemming from either the economic model or the psychological model. The former would be agnostic about actual emotional attachment, though one might expect based on this model warmth towards the party the individual identifies with given the sense of "they are doing more for me", while the psychological model would expect higher in-group assessments as an outgrowth of a positive self-image. However, we do not yet know why we might observe this. To better set these partisan affective orientations in context, it is best to next examine attitudes towards the Muslim in-group as well as the two religious groups closely

---

58 While the above chart shows Republicans having a higher opinion of Democrats than their fellow members of the GOP, it should be noted that the difference in the Republican means for their reported affection for the Democratic and Republican party is not statistically significant based on the results of a paired T-test.
identified with the parties: evangelical Christians (identified with the Republican Party) and Jews (identified with the Democrats).\textsuperscript{59}

Figure 4.5, below, shows the mean feeling thermometer score for the three religious groupings across an array of subgroups within the IMPAS sample. Republicans have a lower mean feeling thermometer score for Muslims than most other divisions within the community, though the difference between Republicans and most other Muslim subgroups is small and statistically insignificant.

Furthermore, Republicans are the warmest of any of the groupings towards Evangelical Christians. Along those same lines, Republicans (along with conservatives, blacks and Bosnians) have the coldest sentiments towards Jewish-Americans. Democrats, on the other hand, are among the warmest towards Jews and Muslims, and among the coolest towards Evangelicals. While it might seem obvious that Republicans might be distinctively warm towards a group generally associated with the Republican Party, we should also remember that Republican Muslims tend to be liberal and secular. One of the most well-supported theories of secularization in the US argues that it is importantly driven by hostility towards the Religious Right (Hout and Fischer 2002), of which an anti-Evangelical bias could well be seen as a natural by-product. The notion that the group most warm to Evangelicals is also the most secular is an intriguing observation, and an obvious challenge to the part of my theory that argues a sense of threat plays an important role in political identity formation. Given this challenge, it would make

\textsuperscript{59} For more on the perceptions of religious groups with certain political parties, see Campbell, Layman and Green (2011).
sense to next examine how partisan Muslims view the threat posed by the political environment.

Figure 4.5: Secular Republicans warmest Muslims towards Evangelical Christians

Economic models will depend particularly strongly on estimations of hostility and threat, at least if we assume that it is ultimately threat and security that retrospective and prospective evaluations are based upon. Figure 4.6, above, presents the mean level of hostility perceived as coming from several segments of American society by the IMPAS respondents. An examination of figure 4.6 above reveals that independents are not inclined to see either party as friendly to Muslims.60 This echoes, in some ways, the findings of Barretto and Bosonelos

---

60 Using a Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test to examine whether the differences between the three groups are statistically significant at the more relaxed .1 level reveals that the means for the partisan hostility are indeed significant across the three groups of Muslims, though the other ones are not. They are presented to show the distribution of hostility perceptions across the five
(2009), who argued that the comparatively large number of Muslims that identified as independent was due to the perception of Democratic hostility towards their religious group. In many ways, this also echoes the arguments of Tajnal and Lee (2011), who argue that the failure of the major parties to adequately incorporate the concerns of minorities in the US has helped to spur the growth of non-partisanship among minorities. With programs such as NSEERS during the Bush administration, along with some of the more inflammatory rhetoric stemming from some quarters of the conservative movement, it is easy to understand how an American Muslim could come to see the Republican Party as hostile. It is likewise possible to understand how Muslims could perceive the Democratic Party, with prominent leaders such as President Obama making robust uses of targeted assassinations via the use of remotely-piloted attack drones, as not particularly sympathetic to Muslim concerns.

---

groups, while presenting the statistically significant differences on partisan hostility. Wilcoxon signed rank sum tests do reveal that the pooled means between the five measures are statistically significant at the .001 level (except for the difference between the mean of government hostility and public hostility, which is significant at the .05 level.)
Figure 4.6: Independents see neither party as friendly

A second noteworthy take-away from figure 4.6 is that Republican Muslims believe that the Democrats are less hostile to their group than their own party. Unlike in the case of the feeling thermometer scores, a Wilcoxon signed-rank test reveals that the difference we see in the Republicans' views of Democratic and Republican hostility are statistically significant at the .05 level. Presumably, one would, ceteris paribus, be inclined to view one's own group as more supportive of oneself, but this does not seem to be the case for Republican Muslims. Much like what was hinted at with the feeling thermometer scores, while Republican Muslims do consider the GOP less hostile to US Muslims than their non-Republican co-religionists, they still see the Democratic party as the party more friendly to Muslims. If even Republican Muslims tend to believe that Republicans dislike their religious group, and these same Republicans are notably cooler towards their party and more positive assessment of the opposing party than are their partisan rivals, then surely Republican identification among
Muslims cannot rest on a positive affective assessment of the partisan identity. What, then, could help to explain the persistence of the sentiment? Why aren't all Muslims unaligned or Democratic?

One possible answer is, of course, that Republican Muslims remain Republican for financial reasons. Republican Muslims in the sample have strong feelings against business regulation, as noted above, although they are also evenly divided when it comes to questions of welfare expenditures. Furthermore, using education as a proxy for socio-economic status (given respondents' greater reluctance to answer the income item rather than the education item), Republican Muslims tend to come from a somewhat lower socioeconomic status. Republicans are also more likely to say that ethnic or racial identity is more important than religious identity for them. In fact, the majority of self-described Republican Muslims in the sample are Bosnians. So part of the explanation could well lie in a

Figure 4.7. GOP Muslims only segment of community more concerned about Islamic radicals
primary concern on issues and specific ethnic salience over a religious identity. However, figure 4.7 above suggests a second possible answer to this question. Figure 4.7 shows the mean evaluation of different segments of the Muslim population of the sample of the threat stemming from radicalized versions of Islam and Christianity. Every segment of the sample population save one reports more concern over Christian extremism than over Islamic extremism. In some segments of the population, the difference between the two is rather large. Republicans buck this trend, however. GOP Muslims are the only segment of the sample with a higher median score for Islamic radicalism rather than Christian radicalism.\textsuperscript{61} The difference is statistically insignificant, and Republicans are comparatively unconcerned about radicalism from either religious tradition (only self-described Conservatives have lower mean scores across both items). The notion that Muslim Republicans could be motivated, at least in part, by a perceived threat from their own in-group is an intriguing motivation for political partisanship. Thus, to conclude this analysis, we will take a moment to examine the predictors of beliefs about the threat posed by religious radicalism.

Table 4.7 presents five key independent variables from ordered logit models examining the correlates of respondent's expressed concerns about either Islamic radicalism or Christian radicalism in the US. What we find is that the distinction between Democratic partisans and Republican supporters is not their level of concern about Muslim extremism in the US, but rather how concerned they are about religious extremism among their Christian neighbors. In short,\textsuperscript{61}

\textsuperscript{61} Bosnian and Conservatives, along with Republicans, show a statistically insignificant difference between the mean scores on these two measures of group threat.
those who align with the Republican party are, ceteris paribus, notably less concerned about threat coming from their Christian neighbors than are those aligned with the Democratic party.

**TABLE 4.7**

**LINKED FATE BELIEFS SHAPE MUSLIM PERCEPTIONS OF RELIGIOUS THREAT**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Islamic Radicalism</th>
<th>Christian Radicalism</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Democrat</td>
<td>-.040 (.035)</td>
<td>.084** (.032)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republican</td>
<td>.018 (.022)</td>
<td>-.052** (.020)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslim Identity</td>
<td>-.030 (.054)</td>
<td>-.000 (.049)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic Identity</td>
<td>-.020 (.049)</td>
<td>.034 (.044)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Linked Fate</td>
<td>.155** (.056)</td>
<td>.197*** (.054)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: *=p<.05, **=p<.01, ***=p<.001. Significant results are also in bold. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors.

Above are Ordered Logit coefficients, utilizing multiple imputation for missing variables. N=261 Models also include controls for religiosity, network homogeneity, education, income, threat perception, political interest, gender, ethnicity, and political ideology.

However, it is also important to note that linked fate beliefs prove to more significantly correlate with respondent beliefs than either partisan orientation. We know from the previous chapter that individuals with strong linked fate beliefs tend to be more engaged, and we also know from earlier in this chapter that people with stronger linked fate beliefs tend to align with the Democratic party. Given the association of Christian religiosity with the Republican party (c.f. Campbell, Layman and Green 2011) and the previously-noted belief of the hostility of the Republicans towards the Muslim community,
we would expect that those that feel a shared sense of fate to express concern about the threat posed by radical Christianity. However, the correlation with greater concern for Islamic radicalism is an intriguing finding. While we can only speculate at the reason for this correlation, it is very plausible that linked-fate Muslims are concerned as much about Islamic radicals as Christian ones because they recognize the harm these radicals do to the social position of Muslims in the US. Thus, for these Muslims, the threat posed to the Muslim community by these radicals is as great a threat to the community, even though their acts are not targeted at their fellow Muslims, as are those Christians that might take direct action against the American Ummah.

**Discussion and Conclusions**

So, where does this leave us? As a reminder, the central argument of this chapter is that the model including social pressures as well as psychological heuristics and retrospective/prospective evaluations better explains the Muslim case of political and ideological identity than a model that does not include such social pressures. The model, though related to both the Jackson (2011) and the Hajnal and Lee (2011) model, advances a separate conception of how the various theories of political identity formation fit together. What comes through in the data available is that it is clear that social influence does seem to play an indirect role in partisan identity formation. The story that consistently emerges from both the models and the observational data is that threat perceptions seem to directly influence partisan sentiments by making politics more relevant, and that it also
impacts partisan attachments indirectly by shaping Muslim political identity. At the same time, social measures seem to play more of a role in shaping attitudinal measures and shaping the ideological preferences of the respondents. This best fits the expectations of the model proposed in this project, which would anticipate the external pressures of threat to shape and define the political identity of respondents, while the definition of what it means to bear this label in society grows from contact between those who share the label and must necessarily learn to navigate the social and political environment under the label so attached.

That all three main theories of partisanship proved to contribute something to our understanding of Muslim partisanship should not be surprising. Social and psychological theories of partisanship have old pedigrees within political science (though it would be fair to say that social theories have had periods of relative eclipse in the literature), while the younger rational theories have a strong following among contemporary political scientists. What is important is not to demonstrate that one theory is objectively better at helping us to understand the political world better. What is important is to better understand how the processes that undergird these theories interact and work together to create the political beings that lie at the heart of the research agenda of behavioral political science. The model I have advanced seems to be a step towards a better conceptualization of this process, and in particular helps to highlight the role threat plays in explaining rapid shifts in political identity.

However, it is also important to take note of the substantive findings along with the theoretical implications of the analysis. The core substantive
finding is that the perception of threat can indeed serve to stimulate a political change in individuals, but the response to this threat seems for many Muslims to be withdraw from and neutrality in the political process. The demobilizing effect that a sense of personal threat seems to create is be ameliorated by the cultivation of a collective identity capable of responding to the threat as a group. However, the threat finding is nonetheless a troubling finding.

There are many legitimate reasons for individuals to withdraw from the party system in the US, and to support either third parties or to approach political races as individual contests that should be decided on the merits of the candidates rather than the labels they bear. The potentially troubling result from a failure to engage in partisan behavior and/or to be unable to identify an ideological home is that such individuals are less likely to be engaged in the process, less likely to vote, and thus less likely to have their views considered by elected officials (c.f. Griffin and Newman 2005; Griffin and Newman 2007; Griffin and Flavin 2011). This, of course, creates the potential of a vicious circle, creating an ever-greater loop of noninterest in politics owing to disaffection due to a lack of representation in the process. Indeed, in the case of Muslims, religiosity could be playing an important formative factor, especially for the most religious. There seems to be a tension of some sort within the Muslims sampled, where more committed Muslims are more likely to see their individual well-being tied to the collective well-being and thus engage the process while the most devout turn away from this sort of engagement. Those who identify with the Republican party are generally
less threatened by the environment, and possibly more readily accepted by their co-partisans due to their lower levels of religiosity.

This leaves us, then, with a dilemma. The best solution to threat-based disengagement on the part of American Muslims seems to be the development of a more robust sense of collective identity. What does it mean for those who are among the most devoted members of this religious (or, perhaps increasingly, ethnoreligious) community, though? Certainly, none of the models show that in-person religious participation encourages partisanship. To answer that, we must turn to a more fine-grained approach. Thus, in the next chapter, we will examine the historical context of Muslim identity development as well as seek to better understand how the religious and social lives of a select handful of highly-committed Muslims shape their understanding of American politics.
CHAPTER 5
CLASS AND CULTURE IN ISLAMIC INDIANAPOLIS

Abstract: In this chapter, I investigate the repeatedly-observed lack of correlation between religious institutional participation and civic engagement among American Muslims. Relying on interviews conducted with religious leaders in the city of Indianapolis, IN, I observe that bond-building is still a significant activity in many mosques, which encourages more inward rather than outward engagement. Furthermore, the influence of immigrant members cultivates an interest in homeland politics, and competition between mosques for members inhibits some avenues for cooperation.

It is by now well-trod territory in the political science literature that church attendance correlates with higher levels of political and civic participation (Verba, Schlozman and Brady 1995; Putnam and Campbell 2010; Djupe and Gilbert 2009; Cnaan, Boddie and Yancey 2003; Green 2007; Wilcox and Robinson 2010; McDaniel 2008). However, one observation repeatedly made throughout this project was the curious lack of civic engagement along many modes of participation among those with high rates of mosque attendance. This is not without precedence in the literature, of course. Marx (1967) discussed the
potential for religious commitment to be a substitute (or "opiate") for public
engagement and Campbell (2004) discussed the tendency for evangelical
engagement to be episodic rather than sustained. However, that we see it among
Muslims raises concerns, particularly when coupled with the negative correlation
between religious commitment (as measured by salah (daily prayer) frequency)
and both civic engagement and political commitment. Is there, as feared by
Ramadan (2004) something distinctive about Islam that is keeping it from playing
the same role that so many other religious traditions do?

The purpose of this final chapter is to begin to unravel this last question
by examining Muslim behavior within the mosque itself. This case study of
Indianapolis provides a suggestion as to the explanation for this. The relative
newness of the community, coupled with in-group tensions and competition,
seems to pull the typical Muslim engaged with their religious community to look
inward rather than outward. Race is often raised as a potential dividing line given
Muslim ethnic heterogeneity, but I find that class is a more significant dividing
line among Muslims. While a high level of political interest is frequently reported
and observed, many in the immigrant community admit to more interest in the
politics of their homeland than in US politics. At the same time, discussions with
US-born Muslims of Indianapolis suggest that this might be, in the end, a
temporary effect. We should expect to see the typical positive correlation between
religious attendance and civic participation to emerge and grow within the
American Muslim community as the immigrant generation is gradually replaced
by their American-born children. Before discussing the particular case of the
Hoosier Muslims of Indianapolis, however, I will first set the stage by laying out the historic connection between religion and public engagement.

**Religion and Public Engagement**

Michael P. Young argues in his book *Bearing Witness against Sin* that most of the major movements of 19th century America were born out of a fundamental evangelical commitment to public engagement. He argues that the rise in the popularity of public confession within the tradition (and its attendant focus on personal reform and improvement) eventually lead believers to embrace the necessity of the reform of public institutions and engagement against manifestations of the public's sins as well. This, in turn, gave birth to the abolitionist and prohibitionist movements, among others. These were among the first significant socio-political movements to swept the US, and largely went hand-in-hand with the Second Great Awakening. Interestingly, even as American evangelical pietism engaged the northern public of the country with the necessity of purging America of its original sin, evangelicalism in the South work to reinforce the institution. The abolitionist argument was eventually settled through a war that took on the aura of a crusade for many participants,. Following the Civil War, a Third Great Awakening encouraged many within the evangelical movement worked towards other reforms of the public, in areas such as currency reform, direct democracy, corporate responsibility, and women's suffrage. (Wald and Calhoun-Brown 2007) However, this social impulse eventually brought the tradition into conflict with Modernist movements which, while agreeing with the
various strains of evangelicalism on the propriety of alcohol prohibition as well as some other concerns, in general saw events from a strikingly different world view.

This conflict came to a head in the trial of a teacher in Tennessee, accused of teaching evolution in defiance of state law. While the teacher lost the case, the fundamental evangelical impulse behind the law lost the battle of public relations over the case. This led to a loss of prestige for the fundamentalist evangelical tradition, and persuaded the movement to privatize their faith and withdraw from the public sphere (Hunter 1983). With the exception of anti-Communism and racial issues, evangelical fundamentalism was particularly in the South generally content to exist separate from the public sphere, providing a refuge from the modernist pressures sweeping much of the rest of the country. Both an otherworldly orientation theologically and the lower level of social, economic, and educational opportunities within the community conspired to demobilize southern evangelicals (Wald and Calhoun-Brown 2007). This community re-emerged onto the political scene in time, of course, most notably when ushering in the election of Ronald Reagan in 1980 (Neuhaus 1984). This return reignited fundamentalist passion for engagement on one hand but, influenced by premillennialist eschatological beliefs, also brought with them a deep pessimism about the ultimate efficacy of such engagement (Jelen and Wilcox 1990).

All of this is to say that, while religious institutions do provide individuals with the opportunities to develop the civic skills necessary for engagement with the public sphere (Verba, Schlozmann, and Brady 1995), the
social and theological context of the faith necessarily shapes the willingness of believers to use their acquired skills for public ends. This observation was behind Marx's (1967) study of black religiosity, when he sought to understand the role theology played in shaping black political engagement. His observation that religion could play either a quiescent role (as it did on the plantation) or a mobilizing role (as it did during the Civil Rights movement) depends both on the theological framework of the believers as well as the social context the religion persists in. While the work on the ability of religious traditions to build civic skills is important, it is similarly important to take seriously the theological and social beliefs of the religious tradition. Even if the theological distinctions do not filter down to the congregational level as clearly as they exist for religious leaders, the theology is still important to the religious leaders themselves.

Tariq Ramadan is concerned about this possibility of a theological impetus for non-engagement. In his 2004 book *Western Muslims and the Future of Islam*, he expressed concern about the conceptualization of the world into a bifurcated Dar al-Islam (the Abode of Islam, where the faith was the dominant tradition) and the Dar al-Harb (the Abode of Struggle, where Islam was a minority faith tradition). Ramadan explains that the paradigms originated in the Middle Ages, and exhorts Muslims in the latter domain (which would include all Western Muslims) to refrain from engaging in politics or civic life outside their community so long as they are allowed to practice their faith in peace. The idea behind this, of

---

62 We know, for example, from Putnam and Campbell (2010) that theology does not drive what they term "good neighborliness" among American religious people. Rather, the social context of the congregation is what shapes prosocial behavior.
course, was that disengagement would better allow the community to maintain and protect their values without the compromises that public engagement would necessitate. This is the same logic that led Elijah Muhammad to embrace internal black separatism for the Nation of Islam (Lincoln 1994). Ramadan noted a third potential world view coming from the al-Shafi‘i Islamic juridical tradition, termed Dar al-Ahd (the Land of Treaty), but rejected this approach as being too dependent on the "Islam-at-war-with-the-West" world view. Ultimately, Ramadan argues that Muslims have to abandon the distinction entirely, and develop a Western Islam compatible with the tenants of the faith but molded in the traditions and realities of the world that immigrant Muslims live in.

Ramadan's analysis suggests that there is a possible theological motivation for Muslims to avoid public engagement, which could help explain why mosques do not serve the same mobilizing role that religious institutions of other traditions in the US do. However, Kniss and Numrich (2007) also discuss a second motivation immigrant and non-Christian faiths might have to disengage from society. Much like the evangelicals in the example above, immigrants might decide to disengage from broader society due to social opprobrium of some of their practices or traditions (such as, in the case of Muslims, separating genders during communal prayer) or, conversely, disapproval of some broader practice within society. Moral tensions within the religious community and the broader world can serve as an impetus to disengage with society. Furthermore, for immigrants with a language barrier, there is an additional impetus to focus participation and engagement inwards rather than outwards, for communication
and interaction within the group would simply be easier than with out-group members. However, Kniss and Numrich note not only that language use can be a problem, but the vernacular itself can prove problematic. With different cultural and moral touchstones, expressions that have a clear meaning in-group can either fail to express the intended idea or, worse, communicate an opposed idea to out-group members.

A third possibility exists for Muslims, owing to their distinctive level of diversity: that Muslims are themselves not unified within their mosques. In a divided mosque, the recruitment and civic skills building that enables and empowers congregants within religious institutions may not be present, or at least be considerably weakened. Muslim political identity is only recently salient as a framework through which to view American politics for many within the community. Thus, Muslims might still be negotiating their religious identity with the others identities that are competing for their political attentions. Furthermore, within the network of mosques themselves, the diversity of mosques and mosque structures could be inhibiting outward engagement. Rather than focusing on bridging social ties to the greater community, in short, Muslim-Americans could still be working on building those bonding social ties that will, eventually, allow them to become more politically effective and engaged.

In order to address this question, I conducted ethnographic fieldwork as well as a series of interviews with leaders of Islamic religious centers in the city of Indianapolis, Indiana. This ethnographic approach is the ideal approach for investigating this question, as neither survey instruments nor experimental
research can fully capture the contextual elements of the social environment that shape and influence the behavior of the Muslim congregants. Furthermore, the interview process allowed members of the community to share their insights with me, and such insights proved valuable in helping to cast a light on aspects of the community that are not frequently discussed when deliberating on the political mobilization of American Muslims within the academic literature.

Thirteen Islamic centers were identified in the Greater Indianapolis area. All thirteen were contacted and asked to participate in this study. Five agreed to participate. At each site that agreed to participate, ethnographic fieldwork, archival and documentary research, and interviews were conducted in order to develop a fully-formed observation of the communities in question. Structured interviews were conducted with a member of the leadership of each of the five participating centers, and informal, casual conversations were had with other members as time allowed. Individual interviewees were promised anonymity during the interview process and, as such, will not be identified by name or position in the community. Furthermore, in order to protect the identity of individuals who agreed to participate in the interviews, the views of the various representatives are reported anonymously, given the small number of interview participants and the ease individuals within the community might have at identifying individual respondents.
The Mosques of Indianapolis

The Muslim community of Indianapolis is a young and rapidly-growing community. The oldest of the continuously-existing Muslim communities in the city of Indianapolis is the Nur Allah Islamic Center. Nur Allah was originally established as a mosque of the Nation of Islam in the 1950s, later converting to Sunni Islam along with many others behind the leadership of Wallace Deen Muhammad in the early 1980s. Nur Allah has undergone a number of name changes during its long history, adopting the community's current name in 1997. Masjid al-Fajr, founded in 1971, claims the distinction of being the oldest continuously-operating Sunni masjid in Indianapolis. Thirteen Islamic centers are currently distributed across the city of Indianapolis and its immediate suburbs, an area that is home to nearly 2 million people. One mosque is affiliated with the Nation of Islam, a black nationalist interpretation of Islam founded by W.D. Fard in 1930, and another identifies as a Shi'a Islamic community center. The other 11 Islamic centers in the Indianapolis area identify with the Sunni tradition.

Mosque communities tended to be young— one leader estimated no more than 25% of their congregation was "grey-haired" and noted the large number of children in the congregation. All of the communities at which I interviewed had some sort of youth religious education program, some of which were fairly extensive. In addition to these youth programs, a majority of the mosques at which I spoke with people either had an affiliated private school or had ambitions of building one. Indeed, these private schools were a major point of pride for the community, with a large and engaged parent base and high-performing students.
The students of one school in particular were noted for their high academic performance and had distinguished themselves a couple months before with a number of notable performances in state PTA competitions. One leader mentioned that their school also serves as a recruitment tool for some local hospitals when they seek to recruit Muslim doctors.

The mosques of Indianapolis are in a wide variety of facilities. Some are in converted houses; others are in store-fronts, while many are in dedicated buildings. Given the age of the community, it is not surprising to find that most mosques in Indianapolis are located in relatively newer buildings. However, this is not always the case, and many of the individuals discussed that the growth of the Muslim community of Indianapolis has begun to strain their local centers. One manifestation of this increasing growth was a complaint, heard frequently in interviews, about the inadequacy of parking facilities on site. Many communities who were settled into relatively new and spacious facilities nonetheless voiced complaints about the traffic situation around their mosque, and several leaders discussed this as being an acute problem that the community was striving to address. Conversely, at least one leader interviewed discussed how their community had begun to outgrow their current facilities but, while there was some interest in trying to raise funds for a new mosque, the relative ease of parking and traffic issues around the mosque made them somewhat reluctant to move away from the current location.

Location dictates more than just the flow of traffic and the size of the building, however. While a few of the mosques draw from across the city for
distinctive reasons, most members of a congregation are drawn from those
Muslims that live closest to the masjid in question. As such, this shapes the
class of the community, which will be discussed in more detail below. One
consequence of this is the sensitivity with which leaders demonstrated over the
question of whether or not to try to build a new facility. One leader I spoke to,
when discussing the desire of some of the congregants to move in order to build a
larger facility, said, "If we were to move, where would we go? If we moved [one
direction], we would be very close to [an established mosque]. If we moved [a
different direction], we would soon run into a different mosque. The suburbs all
have mosques too. And if we moved, where would the people near here go?".
Moving into an area that already has an established mosque could well increase
tensions within the Muslim community. The interviewee felt there was already
tension between mosques, and he did not think a move would be worth the added
tension such a move would create.

Ethnic and National Diversity in the Mosque Community

Like with many other Islamic communities across the US, there is
tremendous ethnic diversity across the thirteen Indianapolis Muslim communities,
though there is also considerable ethnic homogeneity within many of the the
individual community centers. Three mosques are predominantly African-
American, three identify their congregations as predominantly coming from the
Indian subcontinent, and one reports a congregation predominantly of Arab
extraction. The other six Muslim communities seem to have relatively ethnic
diversity in their congregations, although even most of those that identify a majority ethnicity within their congregation often also report significant ethnic minority presences within their mosques. In addition to racial and ethnic differences within and across the Muslim communities, national differences also exist. Most communities in Indianapolis identify their congregations as being predominantly immigrant.

While ethnic diversity within the Muslim community of Indianapolis is considerable, I did not observe any evidence of intra-masjid ethnic conflict among the members of the diverse centers. Interactions seemed warm and easy across ethnic lines, and there was clearly a level of familiar comfort within and among the mosque regulars regardless of race. Given the presence of a number of single-ethnicity mosques in the city, it could be a selection effect. It could well be a genuine camaraderie forged from common faith and a shared sense of threat from non-Muslims as well. However friendly individuals seem across ethnic lines, ethnicity remains a potential point of conflict for leaders of the community. Indeed, almost all the leaders I spoke with demonstrated an acute awareness of the potential racial and ethnic differences presented as a point of division within the community. Many communities strive to achieve a balance of ethnic and national interests within their shura councils, one even going so far as to maintain representation quotas for each potential faction within the community in order to assure that all voices are fairly and evenly heard.

Immigrant/native distinctions were somewhat more common within mosques. Interestingly one of the biggest issues for mosque elites was the
deference immigrants sometimes showed. I was told by more than one leader that
the immigrants tended to favor members of the community with superior or native
English language proficiency for leadership positions, and because of that some
leaders felt they had to take steps to make sure that immigrant Muslims had
sufficient voice and representation within the decision-making bodies of the
community. Concerns about the quality of an individual's English ability also led
some to focus more inward into the community rather than trying to engage
outsiders.

I did sometimes hear from native-born speakers that they felt immigrants
were too eager to impose customs that they thought didn't quite conform to the
American way of doing things. "You have to understand the context of the Qur'an
and the Hadith," one interviewee said, "We have to take everything back to the
Prophet (pbuh) and sort out what is Islam and what is just cultural baggage....We
need to build a community that is American, but also Muslim. We need to be
Americans with an Islamic flavor." One respondent even expressed their
disagreement over the wearing of head scarves. "Hijab means to be modest. It
means not drawing attention to yourself. But here, all the scarf does is draw
attention. I don't think the head scarf is hijab in America." However, I also heard
a contrasting opinion from some of the immigrant congregants.."I love the
freedom and equality [in America]," one interviewee said, "but the culture here is
somewhat disrespectful. It is like when the man shouted, 'You lie,' at the
President. Disrespectful. This is brought too often into the mosque. These young
people think they are equal to [the more knowledgable elders], but knowledge elevates a leader, and they should be shown respect."

While there was relative ethnic harmony within mosques, the same level of harmony was not always exhibited across mosques. Comments that seemed either subtly or overtly reflective of potential or actual competitiveness between mosques tended to be heard, when brought up at all, from members of mosques with a clear ethnic majority and directed towards other mosques that shared that ethnic background. One leader mentioned this explicitly when they noted that a few members had left their congregation for another when a foreign imam had been brought in, while others were drawn in for their community's focus on local concerns. Citing the well-known saying, "birds of a feather flock together," the interviewee expressed their opinion that nationality as well as whether or not someone was a convert mattered a lot when individuals new to the area were seeking a mosque. They said that they felt that recent converts often felt that they needed to copy or mimic styles of Islam that they saw coming from "cradle" Muslims, and only later were more comfortable finding their own way within the tradition.

This awareness of the potential for poaching other members is something other leaders expressed some awareness of as well. Indeed, many of the people interviewed for this study said that they had started at a different mosque than the one I was interviewing them in, and wound up leaving over issues of fit. "When I first came here, I started at [a different mosque], but I didn't like it there," one respondent said. "I had moved to live near the mosque, but I didn't like the
mosque. I didn't like the neighborhood. So, I tried visiting other mosques in the area. I tried two or three other mosques. Then I found [the present mosque]...and I fit right in. I really liked it here. So as soon as I could, I moved my family [near the new mosque] and we have been here ever since." When discussing why the interviewee found their current mosque comfortable, ultimately what helped them find their religious home was not one with a shared race or immigrant status-- though the respondent in question did settle into a community in which their ethnicity and immigration status was well-represented. Rather, the respondent's comfort seemed rooted in the similar social class of the congregation.

**Social Class and Hoosier Muslims**

There is considerable economic diversity across the Islamic community centers. As with ethnicity, there tends to be considerably socioeconomic homogeneity within individual mosques. If anything, mosques in the Indianapolis area tend to exhibit higher levels of economic homogeneity than they do ethnic homogeneity. There are also considerable differences across the communities. Some community leaders were financially secure, and spoke about both infrastructure goals as well as endowment goals in order to provide for their community's future. Leaders in other communities were less worried about their legacy and more about making sure they kept the lights on from month to month.

A not inconsiderable amount of this socioeconomic homogeneity is due to physical location of each mosque. In this, there is considerable similarity
between the mosques and the economic stratification that can be seen among their neighboring Christian churches (c.f. Ammerman 1996 for one example of economic stratification within an ethnically homogeneous community.) Mosques in Indianapolis seem to draw a sizable percentage of its congregation from those that live relatively proximate to the facility. When a mosque is located in a largely African-American section of Indianapolis, one finds a largely African-American congregation. When a mosque is located in one of the wealthier northern suburbs favored by the professional class of Indianapolis, it should not be surprising that the community subsequently draws in more individuals with a higher socioeconomic profile. Living close to the mosque community they chose was important for a number of people I spoke with, in part because of the frequency individuals attached to their community would drop in for communal prayer. It was simply more difficult for those who wanted to frequently be part of the group prayers to maintain that level of commitment and live far apart from their community center. However, the cost of living of a given community is a powerful socioeconomic sorting mechanism. When better-off Muslims began to congregate at a particular mosque, there seemed to be a snowball effect that would lead others of a similar class to seek to relocate in order to better build ties to those with which they viewed commonality. This tendency is exacerbated by some well-meaning non-Muslims in the area. One interviewee informed me that, "Hospitals in the area use our mosque as a recruiting tool when they interview Muslim doctors.."
Suburban facilities tended to be newer, larger, and often had amenities like Islamic schools that helped to attract new families to their communities. An individual familiar with the workings of an Islamic school affiliated with one of the community centers I visited told me that there was a considerable waiting list for their school, and that it was a significant draw for many of the young professionals with families. The more well-off communities also offer an array of services for their members. "We would offer more services," one leader informed me, "but there is simply no demand for them." Among the wealthier mosques, youth programming was popular and in demand, as were Arabic and English classes for adults. However, these newer suburban mosques also tended to be the ones with communal leadership rather than having an appointed or elected imam leading their community. Because of this, the congregation tends to take a more direct role in mosque administration. At one of the wealthier mosques I was told that they, "...hold a monthly pitch-in dinner where the executive committee shares information and gets input from the community." I endowment building or endowment planning was also mentioned as activities the leadership focused on at wealthier mosques.

On the other hand, an official at a different institution told me about how their community would love to have a school of their own to offer their children, but that finances were sometimes a struggle. The congregants were less engaged with their mosque in the poorer Islamic centers. "[Our community] isn't very involved with services. We get maybe 30 to 40 people to come to the Arabic classes. For the others? Maybe 5. For too many, Islam is just the mosque, it's not
the community. It is like another job for many." At this urban mosque, I was told that many congregants were, "...middle class and young. Lots of our people are in college or still in high school. Others work in warehouses or gas stations. Just meeting our monthly bills is hard."

These economic divisions across mosques seem to be a source of some resentment among mosque communities. One individual discussed the wealth to be found in some of the mosque communities and expressed disappointment that there were few if any organized efforts for these more well-off communities to help the ones struggling with their month-to-month financial commitments. It was this resentment led some to see tensions within the greater Muslim community of Indianapolis. One mosque leader told me that, "...during Ramadan, I tried to arrange a meeting between all of the imams in Indianapolis. I thought it would be good for us to talk together about the problems we are facing, but not everyone responded well to this call for unity. There is competition between mosques. Some of us have spent time in other mosques, and left over 'dirty linens'. There is also competition between some of us for members."

**Civic Engagement, Politics, and non-Muslim Neighbors**

Ultimately, the degree of political participation and community involvement depended on three factors, according to the interviewees I spoke with. The first factor was community resources. There did seem to be some correlation between the community's fiscal health and their community
involvement. The communities with a greater ability to fund core and peripheral needs were more capable of involving themselves in a broader range of community group activities. Individuals from wealthier mosques mentioned community food banks and other external ties much more frequently than did individuals from the poorer mosques, who more frequently mentioned helping their own congregants in their time of need. Respondents at wealthier mosques also mentioned spending more time at the mosque than did those at some of the poorer ones. Part of this was likely due to the mosque's culture, but the types of professions individuals found themselves in also likely plays an important role. The lack of flexibility blue-collar workers face in their jobs likely pushes more of the community work on a small group. One leader in a developing mosque said that their community had to, "...focus on the community getting involved at the mosque first. We need to be less reliant on [community leaders] as the sole 'doers' for our mosque. We just need people to step up." At another community center, I also heard that, "we only have a small core of people who are highly involved," but in that case the leader I spoke with said that, "it is easier that way. They get things done. The whole community will rally when it is important." Even the poorest of the communities I interviewed at mentioned at least some external civic engagement.

External perceptions played an important role in explaining the level of political and civic engagement stemming from mosques. At every community center where I conducted interviews, I heard concerns about community suspicion and mistrust being directed towards their community. Some of that was directed
at officials. One interviewee specifically mentioned how local politicians were eager to shake your hand and have their picture taken with you during mayoral or gubernatorial Iftar dinners\textsuperscript{63}, but they never seemed to have time for them at other times of the year. However, the more frequent complaint by far was complaints about "the ignorance of our neighbors" from people with which I had spoken.

"Lack of knowledge about Islam is a big problem-- misconceptions arise due to a lack of correct information," one respondent reported. Others agreed, with a second telling me that they, "...always felt like they were being watched." They went on to say that Muslims, "...are always guilty until proven innocent," in the minds of many of their non-Muslim neighbors. This sense of mistrust was an important reason for some as to why they didn't necessarily get more involved with the broader non-Muslim community of Indianapolis.

Yet, this sense of suspicion didn't necessarily stem from their neighborhood interactions. "A lot of us are addicted to news," one interviewee said. "We are news junkies. But the media isn't interested in us. They are interested in their stories. I've never really felt racism from the people I meet, but the media made me feel hated. I'm not afraid any more, though, because I don't watch the news any longer. I'm a lot happier now." Others said they approached the situation by keeping a low profile. "We don't have problems because a lot of people don't know we exist [here]," one respondent told me. Another pointed to neighboring Christian leaders who would sometimes stir up sentiments for their

\textsuperscript{63} The Iftar dinner is the ceremonial breaking of the fast at sunset every day during Ramadan. It is a community gathering generally, often broken at the Islamic centers. Iftar dinners have evolved into perhaps the most prominent annual opportunity for a politician to demonstrate their acceptance and support for the Muslim community, and are increasingly common across the US.
own religious or political ends. "Any time I hear an Arabic word with an English suffix like '-ism' stuck on it, I know there's going to be a problem," another observed. They went on to recount the challenge of trying to distribute literature at gatherings, and how individuals would be open to discussion until the interviewee identified themselves as a Muslim. However, while this sense of mistrust from the public was palpable for everyone I spoke with, many were also quick to point out that they also had many non-Muslim friends. "I don't personally feel racism," one individual told me, mentioning the lengths people at work go to make accommodations for them in particular. They acknowledged that prejudice was there, but many also said that it wasn't always a daily concern for them.

The third element of the community's engagement profile was the nature of the congregations themselves. A few of the older respondents mentioned that religious leaders used to claim that public engagement and political participation was 'haram', or forbidden. However, even the most traditionalist leaders did not make such claims after 2001. Instead, they were told to get involved in their communities. However, despite this reversal, most communities reported low levels of civic or especially political engagement outside their Islamic community, as well as a lack of community programs to encourage political mobilization or voter registration. "There is no demand for it," one interviewee told me regarding the level of political discussion within the community. "Things are good here [in the United States]. Why talk about it? Everything is broken over there," one foreign-born respondent told me. Another echoed those sentiments, saying that immigrants were mostly interested in homeland politics and not local
politics. Among the communities where immigrants predominated, this was the prevailing sentiment. "Members have political awareness," one respondent told me about their community, "but politics is rarely discussed [in the community]." Another told me that, "Politics is very important, but people don't talk about US politics. They understand how politics works at home. They don't understand the US system."

Leaders were quick to reinforce their personal support for the separation of church and politics, and expressed their belief in the necessity of an apolitical American Islamic leadership. "Imams need to stay out of politics," one respondent told me, "because it is divisive." Another spoke even more clearly to the issue, saying that talking about politics, "...doesn't help me [raise] money for religious issues." However, some were not so absolute about this sentiment. "They are not experts in politics," one respondent told me, "and taking sides will undermine their religious leadership." Yet, after a bit of reflection, the respondent added, "Not now. Maybe later."

However, there was a difference between the mosques that said they had a majority of foreign-born congregants and the mosques with a native-born majority. Particularly in communities with relatively more native-born members, an appetite for American politics was more apparent. "I think we need to be more involved," one interviewee told me. "I think it will have to be young people that do it." One leader told me that the mosque they spoke for is not political, but that their congregation was politically interested. "The community has to be apolitical," I was told, "but the community also needs to be involved... the Spirit
of Islam is to deal with social problems." They went on to say that their Islamic community "was open to all, but we are focused on the needs of [our community]. Our community likes [civic engagement]. They want it. But it needs to have a focus." For some of the native-born Muslims I spoke with, an issue of concern that they felt needed to have an Islamic voice was the (then recent) shooting of Trayvon Martin. Others felt that it was important to encourage their congregants to get involved in local, state, or even national politics. Some spoke with particular pride at some of the offices local Muslims had been able to attain, from party ward captains to judges and even members of the US House of Representatives. Even more than with income, the predominant nativity of respondents' Islamic communities seemed to define the scope and breadth of the community's civic engagement. While most mosques were quick to cite affiliations with the Islamic Society of North America or the Muslim Alliance of Indiana, the centers with more native-born Muslims were more likely to cite specific food banks they work with, or their community's participation in activities with organizations such as The Concerned Clergy of Indianapolis and even local labor unions.

---

64 Trayvon Martin was a black youth from the city of Sanford, Florida. Martin was killed by a volunteer neighborhood watch member for what many felt were racially-motivated reasons. For more on the Trayvon Martin killing, see Dahl, Julia. “Trayvon Martin shooting: What do we know?” CBS News (March 30, 2012), http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-504083_162-57407115-504083/trayvon-martin-shooting-what-do-we-know.

65 Andre Carson (D-IN) was, at the time of this interview, the representative of the 7th district of Indiana, which is largely comprised of the city of Indianapolis and Marion County. Carson was at that time one of only two practicing Muslims in the US House of Representatives, as well as affiliated with a local mosque.
Congregations and Competition

What I observed in the city of Indianapolis leads me to think that neither the theological explanation of Ramadan nor the otherworldly orientation described by Marx provide the best explanation for why mosques and civic engagement do not seem to go hand-in-hand. Rather, two more material factors seem to be most responsible for shaping the ability and willingness of the Muslim community of Indianapolis to become engaged within the broader community. Both of the factors are internal to the community. The first rests within the individual congregations, and it is their tolerance or willingness to support political engagement. Ethnicity mattered little compared to the nativity of the individual in question—young, native-born south Asians were as eager to engage in local politics as young, native born black Muslims. This suggests that nativity is an important factor in understanding the ability of a mosque to excite their congregations.

Foreign-born Muslims for the most part expressed their belief that homeland politics was both more interesting and more urgent. However, this does not mean that foreign-born Muslims never get involved in US politics. One foreign-born interviewee recounted the enthusiasm they witnessed within their Islamic community center around George W. Bush's campaign in 1999/2000, and around the Obama campaign in 2007/2008. But, in both of these cases, the enthusiasm for these candidates was not sustained. Disillusionment with both Bush and Obama seems to have dulled the enthusiasm felt in these two periods, and led to a reassertion of the lack of interest immigrant Muslims seem to have.

204
previously felt. Foreign-born Muslims do not seem to be hostile to the idea of political engagement. They simply seem disinterested and unmotivated. Domestic politics simply seems to lack salience for them compared to the rather more visceral and high-stakes political conflicts that are occurring in the lands of origin for many of the Muslim residents of Indianapolis, IN.

This interest is largely inverted among those born in the United States. Foreign conflicts seem distant and irrelevant to those born here in the US compared to the tangible prejudices and difficulties facing the Muslim community they live in. For US-born Muslims, political engagement seems to be an obvious and natural choice, while navigating the politics of the homeland of their parents’ land of origin (for those who are the children of immigrants) is difficult. However, even for those interested in American politics and seeing the Muslim community more politically engaged, there are other road-blocks.

While community disinterest seems to be the most significant inter-mosque factor explaining the relative lack of political mobilization among those attending religious services, the competitiveness and misgivings some leaders expressed in regards to the other Islamic leaders in the area is another difficulty. The intra-community sense of competition seems to be an inhibiting factor in mobilizing a broader Muslim coalition within the city. While there do seem to be ties between some of the communities, and most of the community centers did seem affiliated with the Islamic Society of North America, the awareness most of the leaders I spoke with of the competition between the community centers I spoke with over members was palpable. A few communities likely do not have
that sense of competition with others for distinctive reasons (theological or ethnic), but these communities also seemed to be outside the broader dialogue I heard coming from the religious leaders when they discussed the situation of Muslims in Indianapolis writ large. So long as these feelings of competition exist, mosques will be hesitant to help out communities that could be potential competitors with them for future members and the financial support they bring with them.

The communities of Indianapolis have considerable familiarity with each other. Many of the individuals I had spoken with had attended more than one mosque in the area regularly before joining the community they were, at the time of the interview, a member of. Muslims in Indianapolis demonstrated a democratic, consensual model of community governance. While this model seems to be one that most were happy with, some leaders also hinted at competition under the surface that had shaped the community. While these divisions exist, and will likely continue to exist for a while longer, the emergence of a native-born American population will likely help to transform the mosque from an institution that focuses the community towards their internal concerns into a powerful tool for providing members the opportunity to become more civicly and politically engaged.
CHAPTER 6
MUSLIM IN THE US: MOVING INTO THE FUTURE

Dearborn, Michigan is well-known as a center of American Muslim culture. While Dearborn is distinctive in many ways- it is predominantly a Lebanese Shi’a community with roots going back generations, something that falls outside the typical American Muslim narrative- it nonetheless plays the role of an important touchstone for many across the country. When anything connected to the Muslim community happens across the United States, reporters can predictably descend on the city to get a "Muslim view" on events that have happened. Yet, Dearborn also serves as a model of what might be coming in the future for Muslim Americans.

Football plays an important role in the lives of many Michiganders, just as it does in many other American communities. Concern about concussions and violence can be heard among the parents here as elsewhere, but Fordson High School also wrestles with other football questions distinctive to it. Questions like, "what do we do when the fasting season of Ramadan coincides with football season?" The documentary Fordson: Faith, Fasting and Football tells the story of
this football team's effort to discover a distinctively Islamic approach to chasing a state championship while at the same time discovering a distinctively American approach to their faith. Fordson is arguably the most distinctively Middle Eastern high school community in the United States, with a student body that is approximately 95% Arab (CNN 2003). While the large majority of Arabs in the greater Detroit Area are Catholics, Dearborn is where the Muslim Arabs tend to live. The young men of Fordson in this film are both fully accepting of their Middle Eastern identity and of their American identity and, while they certainly encounter challenges in approaching their pursuit of their American dream, they do not shy away from that challenge. Indeed, they embrace it, and make it their own. As a sign of solidarity, all the non-Muslim members of the Fordson football team fasted during Ramadan with their Muslim teammates. In order to get around the religious restrictions on consumption, the team also held its practices after sunset, in order to give their teammates time to eat and recover from fasting before hitting the gridiron. It is through this striving that they are able to find an identity of their own.

Fordson was able to come together and, through taking on a shared adversity, was able to forge a common identity in pursuit of a shared goal. As we saw throughout this project, this football team's experience reflects the experience of American Muslims more generally. In the first chapter, I presented a broad outline of the history of the emergence of the Islamic community of the United States from a disparate collection of ethnic enclaves into at least the beginning of a coherent and cohesive political group. Some came here as slaves, others as
refugees, and some as job-seekers or students. All had a different vision of what American's promise was for their group and, for the most part, had little to do with each other. It was only through the shared experience of 9/11, an exogenous shock that fundamentally realigned the salience of Islam to Americans of all backgrounds, which these disparate groups began to draw closer together. What this transformation of individuals' views revealed is one way that an individual’s political identity is formed. In particular, the role threat plays in shaping how an individual evaluates the political environment is fundamental for understanding situations where individuals rapidly shift their political attachments and loyalties.

In chapter two, we saw the emergence of a cohesive Muslim voting bloc. In particular, we saw the solidification of American Muslims from a modestly connected group of individuals tied together by a shared faith to what seems to be the beginnings of a coherent ethnoracial political identity. We see the role threat has played in shaping the identity, and that this sense of threat seems to be spurring greater political and civic engagement among American Muslims. In response to this perceived threat, we find that ethnic differences have diminished between various parts of the Muslim community. In particular, African-American Muslims have begun to lose some of their distinctiveness as compared to other Muslim ethnics. Part of this is certainly other Muslims moving to the positions long held by black Muslims, but part of this is just as certainly black Muslims accepting the Muslim identity more as their own. What is curious, however, is that this increased Muslim engagement seems disconnected from the mosque
itself, which has little connection to the rising level of mobilization within the community.

Chapter three delved further into the emergent identity of American Muslims, taking advantage of the IMPAS survey to understand what comprises Muslim identity. What we find is that Muslim identity both does exist and has two distinct elements to it. One aspect of Muslim identity is a religious identity that correlates with what we might classify as traditional Islamic values. Individuals who feel this religious aspect of the identity strongly express greater in-group warmth and sympathy. However, this sentiment is also connected to a sense of detachment from the general public, with individuals who measure strongly on this dimension being more likely to be disengaged both from political life and the apolitical civic life of their broader community. The second dimension of Muslim identity is a sense of linked fate. This dimension of the identity corresponds more with an ethnoreligious sentiment of group, and is less tied to the religious beliefs of Islam and more to an imposed commonality. Muslims who score highly in this dimension are both politically engaged and socially liberal. The two identities tend to be correlated, though the degree of correlation is relatively low leaving for many detached but pious Muslims as well as secular "cultural" Muslims within the community.

Chapter four looks specifically at the role these modes of identity play in shaping the political identity of American Muslims. In this chapter, I demonstrate that Muslims are indeed coalescing around a single political identity, largely aligned with the Democratic Party. However, the two dimensions of Muslim
identity again work at cross purposes. Just as the religious dimension of the identity correlates with lower levels of civic participation, it also correlates with both lower levels of political engagement and a considerably higher likelihood of partisan non-identification. While religiously-identifying Muslims are more likely to describe themselves as conservatives (and to favor broadly conservative social issues) they are also content to sit on the sidelines of the political arena. Likewise, cultural Muslims are politically energized and active, and express a set of loyalties and preferences that closely align with that of the Democratic Party. Just as in the previous chapter, those spurred on by a sense of threat and shared fate look out in the world and see allies with which Muslims can work, while those who lack this same sense of linked fate look out and see a world they want to absent themselves from.

Finally, chapter 5 concludes the empirical portion of the project by examining the case of the Muslim community of Indianapolis. From my time spent among the Hoosier Muslims of the state's capital, I learn that much of the disconnect seen in the survey data between mosque commitment on one hand and civic engagement on the other is due to the crossed purposes some mosques work. Some mosques actively encourage disengagement due to a lack of interest with local politics while others foster it out of an intense concern for the locality. In both cases, the predominant nativity of the overall community plays an important role. At the same time, while externally-perceived hostilities do play a role for many in their preference to not engage in the broader community, an equally important factor is the competition within and between mosques for resources and
status within the community. Without effectively-built social capital within the
Islamic institutions of greater Indianapolis, it will be difficult for mosques to take
advantage of their strengths. Overcoming the internal divisions within the
community is vital for Muslims of Indianapolis to be a more influential force on
local politics.

Throughout the writing of this project, two themes consistently emerge
from the data considered. The first is that something fundamental has changed
within the Muslim community. From the limited data that we do have on the
American Muslim community in the 20th century, we have a profile of a divided
community tenuously linked by a shared faith but just as frequently divided by
seemingly more pressing ethnic concerns. With the different histories driving the
various parts of the Muslim community pushing them forward in different
directions, the effort some were making to develop a coherent American Muslim
political identity seemed a distant goal, if at all attainable. However, in the
beginning of the 21st century, we have seen evidence that this development is
actually occurring. The reason for this leads us to our second theme of this
project: when rapid change occurs, it is most likely the product of a shift in the
perceived threat environment by a group.

Muslim organizers didn't suddenly become more savvy and
sophisticated. What it meant to be a Muslim in the United States changed in
meaning. It was transformed from a secondary (or even tertiary) identity for
individuals looking to make their place as immigrants in the US to the primary
mode of reference used by many members of the out-group to define individuals
of this faith. This change in salience for the out-group clearly stems from a re-evaluation of the threat posed to them by Muslims, based on the actions of a few extremist individuals. This change in the perception of Muslim threat to the US led the general public to become more hostile towards its own Muslim population. A change in the state of one part of equilibrium necessitated a response on the other end, and it was this sudden hostility towards Islam that US Muslims seem to have been responding to. Much like with the Fordson football players, facing a collective challenge with a similar set of restrictions seems to have helped American Muslims to develop a sense of being all together on the same team. Furthermore, for many, this also seems to have cultivated a sense of collective responsibility that encourages them to get more involved in American politics in order to look out for the interests of their community.

There are a number of forces and factors that shape the political identity of individuals. However, we typically view partisan identity transformation as a gradual process. What this study of Muslim in the US illustrates is both why this stability might exist as well as a key mechanism for understanding relatively rapid partisan realignment. In so doing, it seeks to make a contribution to the growing literature on the political identities of American minorities, as well as adding to the relatively shallow pool of collective knowledge we have on American Muslims themselves. However, the contributions this study makes to the literature are not the only contributions this study has to make. There are practical suggestions stemming from this work, both for policy makers and for activists
within the Muslim community that wish to help spur higher levels of civic engagement among their co-religionists.

For policymakers, the challenge is how to de-escalate the perceived threat Muslims feel stemming from the general public towards their community. To some extent, policymakers can only lay the groundwork for greater trust between the government and the Muslim community. Yet, this groundwork is essential for Muslims to feel a greater sense of welcome. In both the survey research and in the interviews I conducted, I sensed receptiveness from many segments of the Muslim community for greater cooperation and integration into broader society. The challenge is how to facilitate that integration. The challenges are found at both local and national levels and for each aspect of the government different strategies should be pursued.

For local governments and NGOs, the challenge is really providing a compelling reason for Muslim communities to find a preferred approach to civic engagement. Many of the communities I interviewed had at least some level of broader community participation, whether it is blood drives, support for the local food banks, or activism on issues of particular interest to the community. Yet, for many immigrants, they did not feel a genuine interest from local officials in working with the community to get more involved in local matters. Here, I get the sense that small gestures would carry considerable weight. In the case of the city of Indianapolis and surrounding areas, such as Carmel, working with local Muslim congregations to alleviate their Friday afternoon parking issues would be the sort of small issue that could signal the local government's receptiveness to
helping local Islamic centers address the concerns of their community. Given the unfamiliarity some immigrants demonstrated with the mechanics of American democracy (admittedly, an area many native-born Americans also demonstrate a lack of mastery), educational outreach also seems a valid option. Muslim families tend to be younger than average and also tend to have children. While there is a nascent and growing Islamic school system in Indianapolis, the simple fact of the matter is that the system cannot absorb all the families that want to be part of it. Furthermore, most mosques do not have the capacity or financial wherewithal to offer such a service. So, for many Muslim families, the public school system will be a way to reach out and connect them to the broader community. PTA moms in hijab would be a good step in that direction.

For the federal government, the challenge is more striking the balance between the need to investigate legitimate threats to national security and effect of using ethnic profiling and other shortcuts to such an end. By now, the suggestion that the government needs to work towards making the community feel like an ally rather than a perpetual suspect is well-worn. Yet, this seems to be the key to better integration and engagement among American Muslims. As noted previously, the US government enjoyed considerable trust and confidence from American Muslims earlier this century, only to see this faith in the state evaporate in the face of real and perceived hostility and suspicion targeted at their community. While this trust will not be rebuilt in a day, and will likely repair itself some naturally as the United States gets further away temporally from the Iraq War that served to raise doubts in the minds of American Muslims more than
anything else, direct action to heal this mistrust would be warranted. Working with Islamic political action groups to better train government transportation safety officials is one obvious solution but, in a real way, that is low-hanging fruit. More important is recognizing the real concerns the community has over being a target. To that end, the Census’s consideration of including a "Middle Eastern" ethnic category similar to the Hispanic/Latino category may be a step in the right direction. Recognizing that those of Middle Eastern descent are exposed to a heightened level of threat that they were not exposed to in 1999 can validate, in a certain sense, the perspectives of Muslims (and the many of Middle Eastern descent that do not practice Islam) as well as serve as a pledge that the government will be more proactive about dealing with complaints of discrimination moving forward.

This hostility seems to be particularly strong from the Republican party, at least if the political affinities of the Muslims we have examined are to be relied on as a measure of such sentiments, but this hostility towards the GOP is not necessarily the natural resting place for Muslims in the US. There is good evidence that many Muslims felt warmly towards the Republican Party at the end of the 20th century, and many rallied behind the candidacy of George W. Bush. While current political realities may prevent the GOP from moving towards American Muslims in an overly conciliatory manner, the party will eventually want to move to recapture some portion of this demographic that would, in normal situations, make up a natural constituency for the party.
Yet if Muslims are to be drawn more into the public sphere and provided space to engage, the largest portion of the burden for that mobilization lies at the feet of Muslim activists and leaders themselves. It is their efforts and energies that Muslims must rely on if they are to become a more active and engaged segment of American society. The most important recommendation emerging from this study for Muslim political and civic engagement groups is not to work on finding more opportunities to get Muslims involved in the broader community. This is undoubtedly important work, and will certainly help dispel misconceptions some hold about Muslims- which in turn would alleviate to some degree the pressures on the community. However, that is not where the critical issue lies. The real work for Muslim civic engagement groups is to work towards fostering a sense of communal spirit and shared destiny that most clearly aligns with an Islamic ethos of civic engagement in the US.

If Muslim community engagement groups want a more engaged Islamic community in the US, they must first work to foster that spirit within the community. Bonding, rather than bridging, social capital is what the community is in need of right now. Given the diverse historical trajectories American Muslims took to reach the situation today, it shouldn't be that surprising to find that Muslims yet hold onto significant disagreements among themselves. While these disagreements are often submerged in the public eye in light of a sense of shared threat, they still persist beneath the surface. While these disagreements will never entirely go away, as they are rooted in identity differences among the composite groups that make up the American ummah, working to build up a unifying sense
of shared faith is critical for forging the American Muslim community into a more coherent and engaged part of the American religious canopy.

American Muslims have traveled a hard road over the last decade. They have moved from obscurity to the spotlight and from being ignored to being vilified in the minds of many. The journey the American Muslim community is on is a long one, fraught with many challenges today and many likely challenges to come. Yet, it is also a quintessentially American journey, one undertaken by many other religious and ethnic groups throughout the history of the American experience. If anything can be taken away from that, the Muslim community should take away a sense of hope. Fordson didn't make it to the state championship the year they were the subject of a documentary, but they made it farther than a lot of people thought they would and they did it in a way that was authentically theirs. This is what other American Muslims need to strive for as well.
APPENDIX A

VARIABLE CODING

Indiana Muslim Political Activity Survey (IMPAS)

- Campaign: Campaign is an additive variable which counts the types of campaign-oriented activities respondents reported engaging in. Included in the variable is monetary campaign donations; volunteering time for a campaign; and displaying a campaign sign.
- Voice: Voice is an additive variable which counts the types of expressive political activities respondents reported engaging in. Included in the variable is attending a protest; signing a petition; participating in a boycott; writing a letter to a newspaper editor; writing an elected official; and discussing politics online.
- Community: Voice is an additive variable which counts the types of largely apolitical activities respondents reported engaging in. Included in the variable is volunteering at one's religious center; working with members of the community to solve problems; attending a PTA meeting; and attending a public community event like a play.
- Feeling Thermometer Scores (Evangelical, Catholics, Jews, Atheists, Muslims): Feeling thermometer scores were generated by asking respondents to score the emotional warmth they felt towards a group. They were instructed to regard a score of 0 as intense dislike, 50 as neutrality or indifference, and 100 as intense like.
- Religious Guidance: A four-point scale measuring respondent's self-reported view of the importance of their faith in making daily decisions. Higher scores indicate greater relevance to the decision-making process.
- Religious Attendance: A seven-point scale measuring respondent's self-reported frequency of attendance at communal prayers at a mosque or Islamic center. Higher scores indicate more frequent attendance.
- **Prayer**: A six-point scale measuring respondent's self-reported level of observation of the daily prayer requirements (salah) prescribed by the religious tradition. Higher scores indicate more frequent prayer observation.

- **Network Religious Homogeneity**: Five-point scale measuring respondent's self-reported degree of religious homogeneity within their friendship network. Higher scores indicate greater levels of perceived religious homogeneity.

- **Discussant Religious Homogeneity**: Whether discussants were of the same religion as the respondent. Variable measures percent of discussion network homogeneity. The 'Muslim Discussant' variable is simply a recoding of this variable to reflect whether or not the respondent was Muslim, whether or not they were of the same sect.

- **Government Hostility**: Five-point scale recording respondent's perceived level of hostility from the federal government towards their religious tradition. Higher scores indicate greater levels of hostility.

- **Neighborhood Hostility**: Five-point scale recording respondent's perceived level of hostility from the people in their neighborhood towards their religious tradition. Higher scores indicate greater levels of hostility.

- **Christian "Extremists"**: Four-point scale measuring respondent concern about the threat of Christian religious extremists in the US. Higher scores indicate greater levels of concern about Christian extremism.

- **Muslim Identity**: Five-point scale measuring respondent's perception of the influence of their identity as a Muslim on how they think about politics. Higher scores indicate relatively higher levels of importance in political evaluations.

- **American Identity**: Five-point scale measuring respondent's perception of the influence of their identity as an American on how they think about politics. Higher scores indicate relatively higher levels of importance in political evaluations.

- **Muslim Linked Fate**: Four-point scale measuring the respondent's perception of the degree to which their personal welfare is connected to the general welfare of others who share their religious affiliation. Higher scores indicate a greater degree of believed linked fate.

- **Ethnic identifiers (Arab, Black, Bosnian)**: Dichotomous variable measuring whether respondents reported self-identification with one of these ethnic or racial backgrounds.
• Generalized Trust: Dichotomous variable measuring whether respondents believe most people are trustworthy or not. Higher scores indicate general trust in the public.
• Trust in Government: Four-point scale measuring response to an item asking the respondent how frequently they feel they can trust the government to "do what is right." Higher scores indicate more trust in the government.
• Education: Six-point scale measuring the respondents' reported level of education. Higher scores indicate greater educational achievement.
• Income: Seven-point scale measuring the respondents' estimated household income range. Higher scores indicate higher reported household.
• Political Interest: Five-point scale measuring respondents' self-reported level of political interest. Higher scores indicate increasing attention to political news and reports.
• Born in the US: Dichotomous variable measuring whether the respondent reports having been born in the US or not.
• Female: Dichotomous variable measuring respondent sex.
• Age: Raw reported age of respondents.

Muslins in the American Public Square (MAPS)

• Political Participation: Factor scale, where each point on the scale represents the respondent affirming that they have engaged in one of the following behaviors: give time or money to a campaign; visit a political website; call or write the media or politician on an issue; attend a rally in support of a politician or cause; participate in a boycott; discuss politics with friends or family (1-4; 1= never 2= hardly ever, 3= sometimes, 4= frequently); and follow government in the news (1-4; 1= never 2= hardly ever, 3= sometimes, 4= frequently.) The polychoric eigenvalue is 3.8723.
• Civic Group Engagement: Additive scale, where each point indicates participating in some way (giving time, money, or playing a leadership role) in the following types of civic groups: youth or school group; arts or culture group; neighborhood, civic, or community group; organizations to help the poor, sick, elderly, or homeless; professional organization; mosque or other religious organization; trade or labor union; veteran’s or military service organization; ethnic organization; or Muslim political action or public affairs organization. The polychoric eigenvalue is 4.7056.
- Piety: Factor scale built off of the following question responses: whether the respondent attends Friday mosque services regularly; whether they attended mosque services on the most recent Friday preceding the survey; the level of observation of traditional daily prayers; the importance of religion in daily life; and the importance of Islam. The polychoric eigenvalue of the scale is 4.0956.
- Public Piety: Factor scale drawing upon questions that ask about general attendance and small group attendance. The public piety scale scores a polychoric eigenvalue of 2.4263.
- Private Piety: Factor scale composed of the piety items asking about religious salience and private prayer practice. The private piety scale has a polychoric eigenvalue of 2.5025.
- Muslims should not participate in politics: 5-point item, where higher values represent greater support for disengagement from the political process.
- Mosques should take the lead in political affairs: No- 1, Not Sure- 2, Yes- 3
- Imams should express their views on political issues: No- 1, Not Sure- 2, Yes- 3
- Government Targeting Islam: Response to the question whether the US government was fighting terrorism or Islam in the global War on Terror, where 1= Terrorism, 2= Not Sure, 3 = Islam
- General Public Discrimination: dichotomous variable, where the higher value represents reported experience or knowledge of anti-Muslim discrimination.
- Partisan Identity: dichotomous variable, where the higher value represents respondent identifying as either a Democrat or a Republican.
- Education: 1= <HS Grad; 2=HS Grad; 3=Some College; 4=College Grad+
- Age Group: 1=18-24; 2=25-34; 3=35-54; 4=55-69; 5=70+
- US born: Dichotomous variable where the higher number represents birth inside the US.
- Voter Registration: Dichotomous variable where the higher number represents being registered to vote.
- Midwest: Dichotomous dummy variable where the higher number represents the respondent living in the Great Lakes-Upper Midwest.
- South: Dichotomous variable where the higher number represents the respondent living in the states of the former Confederacy.
• West: Dichotomous variable where the higher number represents the respondent living in the western states of the US.

_Pew’s Survey of American Muslims_

• The prayer item utilizes a question asking about the frequency that respondents observe the obligatory daily prayers (called salah). The variable is coded from 1 to 5, with higher values representing more frequent observation of traditional prayer. The mean is 3.7, with a standard deviation of 1.3.
• The prayer attendance item utilizes a question asking about the frequency of respondent’s attendance at Friday prayer services (called juma’a.) The variable is coded from 1 to 6, with higher values representing more frequent attendance. The mean is 3.6, with a standard deviation of 1.7.
• Religious importance is a 4-point variable where a respondent is asked how important religion is in their life. The mean is 3.6, with a standard deviation of .8
• Muslim vs. American identity variable is coded on a 0-3 scale where increasing value places more emphasis on Muslim identity. A 0 indicates that the respondent said that neither identity mattered, a 1 indicates that the respondent indicated that they think of their American identity as the more important identity, a 2 indicates that the respondent answered that both are of equal importance, and 3 indicates that the respondent indicated that Muslim identity is the more important identity. The mean is 2 and the standard deviation is .9
• Muslim friend density comes from an item asking an individual to estimate the rough percentage of their friends that are Muslim. The item is a 4-point scale, where higher numbers indicate greater Muslim density within the respondent’s friend network. The mean is 2.5, and the standard deviation is .8.
• Partisanship is a simple dummy variable for whether or not the respondent considers themselves a member of a major (Democratic or Republican) party. The mean of this variable is .48
• Female is a simple dummy variable for respondent gender. The mean of this variable is .47
• Education is a 7-point item measuring education attainment, where higher values represent greater education. The variable has a mean of 5 and a standard deviation of 1.7
• Income is a 9-point item tapping respondent income ranges, where the lowest values represent household incomes of less than $10,000, the median value of 5 represents a household income in the $40-50,000/year
range, and the highest value represents incomes above $150,000. The mean is 5.4 with a standard deviation of 2.3.

- **Happiness** is a measure for general life satisfaction, where higher values indicate greater happiness. It is measured on a 3-point item, with a mean of 2.1 and a standard deviation of .7.
- **White** is a dummy variable for whether or not the respondent considers themselves white. The mean is .33.
- **Black** is a dummy variable for whether the respondent considers themselves black or African-American. The mean of this variable is .2.
- **Born in the US** is a dummy variable for whether or not the respondent was born in the US. The mean of this variable is .27.
- **Born in an Arab Country** is a dummy variable for whether or not the respondent was born in a country traditionally defined as an Arab country. The mean for this variable is .18.
APPENDIX B

SUPPLEMENTARY TABLES AND FIGURES
TABLE B.1

NETWORK HOMOGENEITY AND PERSONAL PIETY DRIVES MUSLIM-FIRST IDENTITY OVER ETHNIC-FIRST IDENTITY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>MLE Estimation</th>
<th>SEM Estimation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ethnic Identity</td>
<td>Muslim Identity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prayer</td>
<td>- .818* (.322)</td>
<td>- .420 (.248)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attendance</td>
<td>- .217 (.285)</td>
<td>- .149 (.227)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religiosity</td>
<td>.368** (.106)</td>
<td>.217* (.089)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Network Homogeneity</td>
<td>.069 (.115)</td>
<td>.329** (.096)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Linked Fate Belief</td>
<td>-.011 (.107)</td>
<td>.160 (.090)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Threat Perception</td>
<td>.016 (.038)</td>
<td>.047 (.033)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>-.146* (.064)</td>
<td>-.008 (.053)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>.266 (.211)</td>
<td>-.071 (.175)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income</td>
<td>-.059 (.241)</td>
<td>-.102 (.202)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Interest</td>
<td>.313* (.133)</td>
<td>-.138 (.113)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Born in the USA</td>
<td>-.028 (.063)</td>
<td>-.049 (.052)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>-.1.84 (.2.189)</td>
<td>2.187 (1.844)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black</td>
<td>.125** (.042)</td>
<td>.043 (.035)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Asian</td>
<td>.127** (.045)</td>
<td>.000 (.038)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arab</td>
<td>.076 (.047)</td>
<td>.012 (.041)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosnian</td>
<td>-.029 (.045)</td>
<td>.121 (.039)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Threat Perception Factors</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Generalized Mistrust</td>
<td>1 (Constrained)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mistrust of Government</td>
<td>2.004*** (.505)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perception of Public Hostility</td>
<td>1.923*** (.412)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religiosity Factors</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious Guidance</td>
<td>1 (Constrained)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attendance</td>
<td>2.248*** (.336)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prayer</td>
<td>2.928*** (.493)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>261</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>χ² (DF)</td>
<td>826.75 (151)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RMSEA</td>
<td>.131</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CFI</td>
<td>.301</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Data from IMPAS survey (2012). Measures fit with linear maximum likelihood structural equation model utilizing missing variable imputation. * p<.05, ** p<.01, ***p<.001
| TABLE B.2 |
|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|
| POLITICAL FEELING THERMOMETERS |
| Dems | GOP | ISNA | CAIR | Andre Carson | Mitch Daniels | GW Bush | Barack Obama | Tea Party | OWS |
| Muslim | 0.001 | -0.004 | 0.006* | 0.004 | 0.002 | -0.007* | 0.001 | 0.001 | 0.003 |
| Ethnic ID | 0.000 | -0.005* | 0.005* | 0.004* | 0.003 | -0.002 | 0.002 | 0.002 | 0.002 |
| Religious | -0.099 | -0.140* | 0.019* | 0.016* | 0.014* | -0.008 | -0.006 | -0.005 | -0.010* |
| Prayer | -0.008 | -0.136* | 0.022 | 0.002 | 0.010 | -0.003 | 0.005 | 0.008 | -0.010* |
| Network | 0.003 | -0.004 | 0.005 | 0.009* | 0.001 | -0.003 | -0.003 | -0.004 | 0.002 |
| Link Fate | 0.001 | -0.010* | 0.004 | 0.003 | 0.007* | -0.002 | -0.005* | 0.004 | 0.008* |
| Educ | -0.001 | -0.024* | 0.023* | 0.016* | 0.020* | 0.004 | 0.009 | -0.012* | 0.013* |
| Inc | 0.001 | -0.013 | 0.019* | 0.021* | 0.003 | 0.019* | 0.013* | -0.008 | -0.012* |
| Hostile Percep | 0.002 | 0.002 | 0.002 | 0.001 | -0.001 | -0.001 | 0.004 | 0.001 | 0.006* |
| Gen. Mistrust | 0.001 | 0.001 | -0.004* | -0.003* | 0.001 | 0.003 | 0.002 | 0.002 | 0.004* |
| Gov. Mistrust | -0.002 | 0.004 | 0.002 | 0.002 | -0.002 | 0.002 | 0.001 | 0.002 | 0.004* |
| Pol. Interest | -0.004 | -0.015* | 0.012* | 0.011* | 0.019* | -0.004 | 0.002 | -0.005 | -0.018* |
| Black | 0.001 | -0.002* | 0.000 | -0.000 | 0.005* | -0.006* | 0.001 | 0.002* | 0.002 |
| Arab | -0.001 | 0.003* | 0.002 | 0.000 | 0.001 | 0.001 | -0.002 | -0.002 | 0.001 |
| Fem | 0.003 | -0.001 | -0.000 | -0.001 | -0.001 | 0.000 | -0.001 | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| N | 261 | 261 | 261 | 261 | 261 | 261 | 261 | 261 | 261 |
| F (DF) | 568.92 (105) | 547.16 (105) | 523.87 (105) | 554.27 (105) | 570.70 (105) | 564.57 (105) | 571.07 (105) | 550.27 (105) | 227 |

Notes: Data from IMPAS survey (2012). Measures fit with linear maximum likelihood structural equation model utilizing missing variable imputation.

* p<.05, ** p<.01, ***p<.001
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Muslim ID</td>
<td>0.012*</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>-0.005</td>
<td>-0.005</td>
<td>-0.005*</td>
<td>-0.005</td>
<td>0.012*</td>
<td>-0.005*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic ID</td>
<td>0.007*</td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td>-0.002</td>
<td>-0.003</td>
<td>-0.003</td>
<td>-0.001</td>
<td>0.009*</td>
<td>-0.006*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relig. Attd</td>
<td>0.013</td>
<td>0.007</td>
<td>-0.012</td>
<td>-0.014*</td>
<td>-0.008</td>
<td>-0.003</td>
<td>0.026*</td>
<td>-0.009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prayer</td>
<td>0.006</td>
<td>0.007</td>
<td>-0.019*</td>
<td>0.004</td>
<td>-0.005</td>
<td>0.005</td>
<td>0.006</td>
<td>-0.005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netwrk Homo</td>
<td>0.011*</td>
<td>-0.000</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>-0.008*</td>
<td>-0.004</td>
<td>-0.003</td>
<td>0.010*</td>
<td>-0.002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Link Fate</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>-0.010*</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>-0.007*</td>
<td>0.005</td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td>0.002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Educ</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>-0.009</td>
<td>-0.005</td>
<td>0.016*</td>
<td>-0.018*</td>
<td>0.027*</td>
<td>-0.012*</td>
<td>0.006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inc</td>
<td>0.005</td>
<td>-0.006</td>
<td>0.012</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>-0.018*</td>
<td>0.019*</td>
<td>-0.006</td>
<td>0.007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hostil. Percep.</td>
<td>0.007*</td>
<td>0.004</td>
<td>0.004</td>
<td>-0.008*</td>
<td>-0.002</td>
<td>-0.012*</td>
<td>0.009*</td>
<td>-0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gen. Mistrust</td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>-0.005*</td>
<td>-0.002</td>
<td>-0.005*</td>
<td>0.005*</td>
<td>-0.002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gov. Mistrust</td>
<td>0.005*</td>
<td>0.006*</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>-0.004</td>
<td>-0.000</td>
<td>-0.007*</td>
<td>0.007</td>
<td>-0.004*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pol. Intrst</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>-0.002</td>
<td>-0.005</td>
<td>0.012*</td>
<td>-0.014*</td>
<td>0.015*</td>
<td>-0.009</td>
<td>0.006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.006*</td>
<td>-0.004*</td>
<td>-0.002</td>
<td>-0.000</td>
<td>-0.004*</td>
<td>0.004*</td>
<td>-0.002*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arab</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>-0.002</td>
<td>-0.001</td>
<td>0.004*</td>
<td>-0.002*</td>
<td>0.004*</td>
<td>-0.004*</td>
<td>0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fem</td>
<td>-0.005*</td>
<td>-0.005*</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.008*</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>-0.006*</td>
<td>0.002</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Data from IMPAS survey (2012). Measures fit with linear maximum likelihood structural equation model utilizing missing variable imputation.

* p<.05, ** p<.01, ***p<.001
### TABLE B.4

**ISSUE PREFERENCES**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Gay Marriage</th>
<th>Abortion</th>
<th>Help Poor</th>
<th>Business Reg.</th>
<th>Help Blacks</th>
<th>Ethnic Profile</th>
<th>Israel Attack</th>
<th>Drone Strike</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Muslim Identity</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-.072* (.032)</td>
<td>-.167*** (.030)</td>
<td>-.079* (.039)</td>
<td>-.092* (.042)</td>
<td>.012 (.043)</td>
<td>.036 (.038)</td>
<td>.005 (.046)</td>
<td>.001 (.039)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ethnic Identity</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-.060* (.028)</td>
<td>-.121*** (.027)</td>
<td>-.076* (.035)</td>
<td>.023 (.038)</td>
<td>.068 (.037)</td>
<td>.044 (.033)</td>
<td>.054 (.040)</td>
<td>.060 (.034)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Religious Attendance</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-.200* (.089)</td>
<td>-.534*** (.085)</td>
<td>-.134 (.110)</td>
<td>.127 (.117)</td>
<td>.148 (.116)</td>
<td>.253* (.101)</td>
<td>.163 (.124)</td>
<td>.251* (.102)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Prayer</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-.096 (.082)</td>
<td>-.200*** (.082)</td>
<td>.004 (.100)</td>
<td>.185 (.106)</td>
<td>.204 (.106)</td>
<td>.218* (.093)</td>
<td>.086 (.113)</td>
<td>.124 (.095)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Network Homo.</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-.052 (.047)</td>
<td>-.095 (.049)</td>
<td>-.082 (.058)</td>
<td>.122* (.061)</td>
<td>-.023 (.060)</td>
<td>.023 (.054)</td>
<td>.057 (.066)</td>
<td>-.046 (.054)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Linked Fate</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.062 (.043)</td>
<td>-.022 (.044)</td>
<td>.011 (.052)</td>
<td>.134* (.055)</td>
<td>.186** (.054)</td>
<td>.176*** (.046)</td>
<td>.223*** (.056)</td>
<td>.018 (.048)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Educ</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.157 (.082)</td>
<td>.117 (.085)</td>
<td>-.234* (.098)</td>
<td>.242* (.105)</td>
<td>.109 (.105)</td>
<td>.124 (.109)</td>
<td>.200 (.111)</td>
<td>.160 (.093)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Income</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.212* (.093)</td>
<td>.162 (.096)</td>
<td>-.135 (.114)</td>
<td>.141 (.123)</td>
<td>-.043 (.126)</td>
<td>-.004 (.111)</td>
<td>.156 (.135)</td>
<td>.173 (.109)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Perception of Hostility</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.026 (.040)</td>
<td>-.019 (.042)</td>
<td>.040 (.049)</td>
<td>.004 (.052)</td>
<td>.006 (.052)</td>
<td>.082 (.045)</td>
<td>.141* (.055)</td>
<td>.077 (.045)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mistrust of Public</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-.050* (.025)</td>
<td>-.026 (.027)</td>
<td>.023 (.031)</td>
<td>-.044 (.032)</td>
<td>-.023 (.033)</td>
<td>-.023 (.029)</td>
<td>-.020 (.034)</td>
<td>.012 (.029)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mistrust of Government</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-.004 (.032)</td>
<td>-.085* (.034)</td>
<td>-.030 (.040)</td>
<td>-.085* (.042)</td>
<td>.025 (.042)</td>
<td>-.001 (.037)</td>
<td>.010 (.045)</td>
<td>.094* (.037)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Political Interest</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.098 (.052)</td>
<td>-.016 (.055)</td>
<td>-.073 (.065)</td>
<td>.146* (.068)</td>
<td>.066 (.068)</td>
<td>.043 (.061)</td>
<td>.129 (.073)</td>
<td>.051 (.062)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Black</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-.009 (.017)</td>
<td>-.043** (.017)</td>
<td>.040 (.021)</td>
<td>.035 (.022)</td>
<td>.069** (.021)</td>
<td>.031 (.019)</td>
<td>.026 (.023)</td>
<td>.012 (.019)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Arab</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.009 (.018)</td>
<td>-.004 (.018)</td>
<td>-.043 (.022)</td>
<td>.002 (.024)</td>
<td>-.043 (.024)</td>
<td>.023 (.021)</td>
<td>.003 (.025)</td>
<td>-.013 (.021)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Female</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.019 (.025)</td>
<td>.094*** (.026)</td>
<td>.006 (.031)</td>
<td>-.053 (.033)</td>
<td>-.061 (.033)</td>
<td>-.056 (.029)</td>
<td>-.025 (.035)</td>
<td>-.006 (.029)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Constant</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.264** (.108)</td>
<td>3.307** (.100)</td>
<td>3.345** (.088)</td>
<td>2.201** (.083)</td>
<td>3.724** (.082)</td>
<td>2.857** (.094)</td>
<td>3.342** (.079)</td>
<td>3.505* (.094)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| N | 261 | 261 | 261 |

\( \chi^2 (DF) \) 334.47 (81) 318.68 (81)

Notes: Data from IMPAS survey (2012). Measures fit with linear maximum likelihood structural equation model utilizing missing variable imputation.

* p<.05, ** p<.01, ***p<.001
TABLE B.5
ALTERNATIVE MODEL CONSTRUCTIONS FOR SOCIAL ENGAGEMENT MEASURE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Prayer</td>
<td>.361*** (.083)</td>
<td>.214* (.087)</td>
<td>.329*** (.079)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attendance</td>
<td>.400*** (.090)</td>
<td>.199* (.094)</td>
<td>.373*** (.085)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Network Homogeneity</td>
<td>-.010 (.048)</td>
<td>-.047 (.049)</td>
<td>-.041 (.046)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslim Identity</td>
<td>-.053 (.030)</td>
<td>.020 (.031)</td>
<td>.049 (.029)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic Identity</td>
<td>.063* (.026)</td>
<td>.033 (.030)</td>
<td>.062* (.024)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Linked Fate Belief</td>
<td>.035 (.044)</td>
<td>.035 (.045)</td>
<td>.043 (.042)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Threat Perception</td>
<td>-.134** (.040)</td>
<td>-.085* (.037)</td>
<td>-.083* (.036)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mistrust of Public</td>
<td>-.142*** (.024)</td>
<td>-.141*** (.024)</td>
<td>-.130*** (.023)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mistrust of Government</td>
<td>-.078* (.033)</td>
<td>-.104** (.034)</td>
<td>-.077* (.032)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arab</td>
<td>.064*** (.017)</td>
<td>.067*** (.018)</td>
<td>.063*** (.016)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black</td>
<td>.052** (.016)</td>
<td>.033* (.016)</td>
<td>.042** (.015)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income</td>
<td>.388*** (.096)</td>
<td>.420*** (.096)</td>
<td>.345*** (.092)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>.440*** (.081)</td>
<td>.426*** (.082)</td>
<td>.427*** (.077)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Interest</td>
<td>.269*** (.049)</td>
<td>.276*** (.050)</td>
<td>.287*** (.047)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>261</td>
<td>261</td>
<td>261</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\chi^2$ (DF)</td>
<td>465.76 (91)</td>
<td>452.63 (91)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**TABLE B.6**

**QUESTION WORDING FOR ISSUE INVENTORY**

Please tell us how much you agree or disagree with the following statements:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statement</th>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Strongly Disagree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A woman should have the right to terminate her pregnancy in the first few months of her pregnancy</td>
<td>(SA)</td>
<td>(A)</td>
<td>(N)</td>
<td>(D)</td>
<td>(SD)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>It is acceptable to use ethnic or racial profiling to help prevent violent crime or terrorism</td>
<td>(SA)</td>
<td>(A)</td>
<td>(N)</td>
<td>(D)</td>
<td>(SD)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poor people today have hard lives because government benefits don't go far enough to help them live decently</td>
<td>(SA)</td>
<td>(A)</td>
<td>(N)</td>
<td>(D)</td>
<td>(SD)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The use of unmanned drones by the CIA to kill terror suspects abroad is illegal and should be stopped</td>
<td>(SA)</td>
<td>(A)</td>
<td>(N)</td>
<td>(D)</td>
<td>(SD)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Our country needs to continue making changes to give blacks equal rights with whites</td>
<td>(SA)</td>
<td>(A)</td>
<td>(N)</td>
<td>(D)</td>
<td>(SD)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government regulation of business usually does more harm than good</td>
<td>(SA)</td>
<td>(A)</td>
<td>(N)</td>
<td>(D)</td>
<td>(SD)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The United States should encourage Israel to launch an attack against possible Iranian nuclear weapon sites.</td>
<td>(SA)</td>
<td>(A)</td>
<td>(N)</td>
<td>(D)</td>
<td>(SD)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marriage should only be between one man and one woman</td>
<td>(SA)</td>
<td>(A)</td>
<td>(N)</td>
<td>(D)</td>
<td>(SD)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
APPENDIX C

A NOTE ON THE DEMOGRAPHICS OF THE IMPAS SAMPLE

The mailing list developed by the Muslim Alliance of Indiana was selected in part due to their efforts to use voter registration records to try and identify Muslims unaffiliated with a mosque or Islamic center. Furthermore, the mailing lists allowed for targeted follow-ups intended to allow the sample to achieve a balance of ethnic and immigration statuses in order to facilitate comparison across categories of interest within the Muslim community. In particular, the survey sought to achieve relative parity between Muslim ethnic groups that either do (Arabs and Bosnians) or do not (South Asians and Blacks) identify as white. It also sought to compare groups that have many native-born in the group (Arabs and Blacks) and those that are almost entirely immigrant (Bosnians and South Asians.) The ethnic break-down of the sample can be found in Table C1, below.
**TABLE C1**

**IDENTIFIED ETHNICITY OF RESPONDENTS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnicity</th>
<th>% of sample</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Arab</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Asian</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosnian</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other, or unclear</td>
<td>30%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Respondents were allowed to self-identify using traditional census categories. Additionally, they were provided with the choice of Arab (since the US Census labels individuals of Middle-Eastern extraction to be "white) or with an open-response write-in. Additionally, individuals not born in the US were also asked to identify their nation of origin. Respondents were allowed to select multiple responses. This allowed for a fairly high degree of ethnic background identification among sample members. However, there were many that either identified themselves as either hailing from a region not of the focus of this study (such as Indonesia or Turkey), identified themselves as white native born with no other ethnic identifiers, or simply failed to answer relevant ethnic questions.

As may be expected in a convenience sample such as this, respondents tend to be somewhat more educated than normal, though reported income is within the expected range one would have based on the Pew and Gallup surveys.
of the American Muslim population. The median (and modal) respondent holds a 4-year college degree and had a household income of between $40,000 and $60,000 a year. The median age of a respondent is about 30 years old. Given the relative youth of the US Muslim community in the US, as found by the Gallup and Pew national surveys, this is also consistent with expected distributions in the general public. Another observation that mirrors general population surveys of US Muslims is partisanship. More Muslims identify as an independent (54%) than a partisan. When one includes those independents that lean towards one party, Muslims express an overwhelming preference for the Democratic Party (58%) over the Republican Party (9%). This Democratic-leaning world-view is even clearer if we examine Figure C1, below.

Figure C1. Political Feeling Thermometer Ratings
The figure plots the mean feeling thermometer ratings for a battery of items.\textsuperscript{66} For the sake of convenience, the items have been arrayed left-to-right from least to most popular with the respondents. As can be seen from the plots, sentiments were significantly cooler for the GOP and those closely associated with the party (specifically, the Tea Party and former President George W. Bush.) Perhaps unsurprisingly, the Islamic Society of North America (ISNA) was the most popular organization. Given that ISNA, a hugely influential Sunni Muslim umbrella organization that serves as the primary organizational bulwark for moderate Islam in the US, is headquartered in Plainfield, IN, it is not terribly surprising that this organization received such wide-spread support. The Occupy Wall Street movement was viewed somewhat more coolly than were other Democratic-leaning items, while Governor Mitch Daniels was viewed more warmly than other Republican-aligned items. Daniels, who served as governor during the survey period, was a fairly popular governor in the state and received reasonably high approval numbers in state-wide surveys. Less well-known to the general public, Governor Daniels also has Arab ancestry through his mother, and was recognized for his public service by the Arab American Institute in 2011.

\textsuperscript{66} Respondents were instructed to indicate when they did not recognize the individual or group being asked about. The Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR) was the least well-known group, while Andre Carson had the fewest responses among the individuals asked about in the survey.
APPENDIX D

GLOSSARY OF KEY NON-ENGLISH TERMS

- **Dar al-Harb** - the Abode of Struggle, where Islam was a minority faith tradition
- **Dar al-Islam** - the Abode of Islam, where the faith was the dominant tradition
- **Hadith** - customs and sayings of the Prophet Muhammad. Together with the Qur'an, they make up the core of the Islamic religious tradition
- **Hajj** - Islamic pilgrimage to the holy cities of Mecca and Medina.
- **Hijab** - A traditional Islamic veil that covers the hair of Muslim women
- **Iftar** - the traditional breaking of the daily Ramadan fast
- **Imam** - Islamic religious leader
- **Masjid** - An Islamic prayer space. Comes from the word "sajada," meaning to prostrate or to worship
- **Mosque** - Muslim place of worship. See also masjid, musallah
- **Muhajiba** - a woman who wears the traditional Arab head covering, or hijab


- **Musallah** - A Muslim prayer space that does not conform to the Qur'anic standards of a mosque

- **Ramadan** - A month of the Islamic calendar marked by fasting and community, which commemorates the flight of the Prophet Muhammad and his companion Abu Bakr from the city of Mecca to the city of Medina. As the Islamic calendar is lunar, it is held at different times in the year from year to year in the Gregorian calendar

- **Qur'an** - The central holy text of Islam, which is a recording of the visions and prophecies received by the Prophet Muhammad

- **Salah** - Ritual prayer involving recitation of Qur'anic verses and prostration in the direction of Mecca. In the Sunni tradition, the prayer is repeated five times every day, while the same is usually performed only three times among the Shi'a

- **Shi'a** - One of the two major religious traditions within Islam. Shi'a Muslims are most commonly in the minority within the broader Islamic community, and place greater emphasis on clerical hierarchy.

- **Shura (or Shura Council)** - The administrative or governance body of an Islamic center

- **Sunni** - One of the two major religious traditions within Islam. The more common of the two traditions, Sunni Muslims tend to hold a more horizontal view of religious leadership.

- **Ummah** - An Arabic word meaning "community." Often used in reference to the Islamic community
REFERENCES


Barreto, Matt A. and Dino N. Bozonelos (2009) “Democrat, Republican, or None of the Above? The Role of Religiosity in Muslim American Party Identification” Politics and Religion 2: 200-229


. 2006. Why We Vote: How Schools and Communities Shape our Civic Life Princeton: Princeton University Press


Fisher, Max. " 'Please don't be a Muslim': Boston Marathon blasts draw condemnation and dread in Muslim world." *The Washington Post*. April 15, 2013


Kalkan, Kerem Ozan Geoffrey C. Layman and John C. Green. n.d. “A Muslim by Any Other Name?: An Experimental Assessment of Religious and


Lewis, Amanda E. Maria Krysan, and Nakisha Harris. 2004. "Introduction: Assessing Changes in the Meaning and Significance of Race and


247


Pew Research Center. 2007. “‘Muslim Americans: Middle Class and Mostly Mainstream.’”

________. 1996. "When we talk about American ethnic groups, what do we mean?" *American Psychologist* 51:918-927

Poor, Jeff. 2013. "Limbaugh: If Boston bomber a Muslim, 'media will circle the wagons.'" dailycaller.com. April 16, 2013


