THE LOGICAL PROBLEM OF THE TRINITY

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Abstract

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The doctrine of the Trinity is central to mainstream Christianity. But insofar as it posits “three persons” (Father, Son and Holy Spirit), who are “one God,” it appears as inconsistent as the claim that 1+1+1=1.

Much of the literature on “The Logical Problem of the Trinity,” as this has been called, attacks or defends Trinitarianism with little regard to the fourth century theological controversies and the late Hellenistic and early Medieval philosophical background in which it took shape. I argue that this methodology, which I call “the Puzzle Approach,” produces obviously invalid arguments, and it is unclear how to repair it without collapsing into my preferred methodology, “the Historical Approach,” which sees history as essential to the debate. I also discuss “mysterianism,” arguing that, successful or not, it has a different goal from the other approaches. I further argue that any solution from the Historical Approach satisfies the concerns of the Puzzle Approach and mysterianism anyway.

I then examine the solution to the Logical Problem of the Trinity found in St. Gregory of Nyssa’s writings, both due to his place in the history of the doctrine, and his clarity in explicating what I call “the metaphysics of synergy.” I recast his solution in standard predicate logic and provide a formal proof of its consistency. I end by considering the possibilities for attacking the broader philosophical context of his defense and conclude that the prospects for doing so are dim. In any case, if
there should turn out to be any problem with the doctrine of the Trinity at all, it will not be one of mere logical inconsistency in saying that “These Three are One.”
To Kathleen Kaufman

for giving me permission to think for myself

I thank you on behalf of all of us. For you touched the lives of so many, and in so many ways, “...the which, if they should be written every one, I suppose that even the world itself could not contain the books that should be written.”
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INTRODUCTION

Why a Philosophical Evaluation of the Doctrine of the Trinity?

For decades after the rise of logical positivism, philosophers frequently took talk about God to be, not merely false, but without meaning altogether. If it was admitted that talk about God was more than meaningless, the next lines of argument from the skeptic were typically first the negative point that there was not sufficient evidence for God’s existence, and second the positive points that there were internal contradictions among God’s supposed attributes themselves, or external contradictions between the Divine attributes and manifest facts about the world, such as our own free will or the existence of evil.

As the positivists’ verificationist position on meaning crumbled, these next lines of argument began to be chipped away at as well. New developments in epistemology led some to take the position that belief in God could count among the “properly basic” beliefs an individual might hold. Others revived various strands of the tradition of natural theology. Likewise, new developments in modal logic helped to clarify arguments involving God’s attributes, the existence of evil, and free will. Soon there was an explosion in the philosophy of religion, as religious belief ceased to be an occasion for embarrassment among philosophers and came to be seen as rationally defensible. While theistic philosophers have by no means won the day, they have certainly made religious belief much more respectable. Where is the debate likely to go from here?

One can see the “New Atheists” of the current science and religion wars – Dawkins, Dennet, Gould, Harris, Hitchens, etc. – as continuing along the trajectory that ad-
dresses the evidence or lack thereof for traditional religious beliefs. Without necessarily relying on problematic assumptions in the foundations of epistemology, they take up the issue of the relation of religious belief to the findings of our best science (as well as adding to the mix the issue of how various religious beliefs might affect the believer’s behavior in ways that are unhealthy or even dangerous).

But while the alleged war of science and religion has received more press, there are equally serious issues to be addressed that lie along the other trajectory, the one that addresses the very consistency of religious beliefs.

Arguments about the compossibility of the traditional Divine Attributes, and their compatibility with obvious facts about the world, seek to discredit all traditional monotheistic religions on the basis of very general features they share in common. On the assumption that arguments based on such general features of all forms of monotheism have been or could be adequately addressed, the next reasonable step would seem to be to move to more specific features of particular versions of monotheism. (If one cannot defeat all forms of monotheism at once, one can try to do so piecemeal.) In the case of mainstream Christianity, no doctrine could be at the same time more centrally important, or more apparently incoherent, than the doctrine of the Trinity. Insofar as the doctrine posits three distinct “persons” (Father, Son and Holy Spirit), each of whom “is God,” and yet at the same time that there is only one God, the doctrine would appear to be as contradictory as the claim that 1+1+1=1 and thus an easy target for anti-Christian polemic. This problem has come to be called “the Logical Problem of the Trinity,” and given the brief history of recent philosophy of religion sketched above, it should come as no surprise that a great deal of attention has begun to be given to the doctrine of the Trinity by analytic philosophers of religion in recent decades. . .  

Or has it?

Why Another Philosophical Evaluation of the Doctrine of the Trinity?
There now exists a quite substantial philosophical literature on the Logical Problem of the Trinity. Philosophers have constructed, analyzed and evaluated a number of different accounts of the Trinity in an attempt to defend the logical coherence of the doctrine of the Trinity. This might seem puzzling since we have formal languages in which we can decide questions of logical consistency with mathematical precision. However, once we define the problem carefully, we can see that what is really being disputed is the very logical form of the doctrine itself, and that different proposed solutions correspond to different logical forms attributed to the doctrine of the Trinity. This raises a question as to how one could determine which logical form a doctrine truly has, or barring that, at least find some indirect way to determine its consistency, when the logical form of that doctrine is itself a matter of dispute.

Though there are infinitely many possible logical forms one could ascribe to the doctrine of the Trinity, I show that they can all be grouped together into a small number of related “Families” based on a few general logical features that correlate to some of the major criticisms of various proposed solutions in the literature. This shows that if the major proposed solutions are all flawed due to the features used to construct this taxonomy, then there can be no solution to the Logical Problem of the Trinity at all. One fact this taxonomy therefore reveals about the debate is that some Trinitarians have been overly critical of the on-offer solutions. That is, although they hold out hope that some solution can be found, they have not realized that their reasons for rejecting the on-offer solutions in fact rule out all possible solutions.

There then remains the project of determining, of all of the possible logical forms to ascribe to the doctrine, which one(s) would be correct. I note that, while some of the philosophers involved in this debate have done their fair share of research into the history of the doctrine, many have quite consciously attempted to carry out this project in relative isolation from the historical data. Some have even more or less explicitly committed to the view that historical inquiry is not strictly necessary for
completing it. Yet others, while not explicitly disavowing history, have presented arguments in defense of the doctrine with no mention of history, apparently tacitly presuming that grounding their account in history is not necessary.

I refer to this general methodological approach within Philosophical Theology, viewing the history of a doctrine as inessential, as “the Puzzle Approach” (and its followers “puzzlers”) as they seem to be modeling their methodology in the field of Philosophical Theology on an analogy to familiar metaphysical “puzzles.” I contrast this with my preferred methodology, which sees historical inquiry as essential to arguments in Philosophical Theology, and which I call “the Historical Approach” (and its followers “historicists”). I argue that, to the extent that the arguments in this literature fail to be appropriately grounded in the relevant history, they thereby fail to be valid arguments for or against the logical consistency of the doctrine of the Trinity.

The result is that the vast majority of what has been written in this literature consists of arguments (sets of premises) that have been left logically unconnected to their conclusions in a way that renders them either non-sequitur or obviously question-begging. I argue that it is unclear whether there is any way for the puzzler to patch up his methodology in a way that would make these arguments valid, but which would not either simply collapse into the Historical Approach or at least render the essence of the Puzzle Approach literature superfluous.

I also explore what has come to be called “mysterianism,” or as I will also call it “the Mysterian Approach.” There are deep questions about whether the Mysterian Approach is, or could be, successful in its aims. But I argue that, ultimately, it simply aims at a different goal from the Puzzle Approach and the Historical Approach alike, and so counts not so much as a rival methodology as simply a methodology for a different project.

I further argue that any solution to the Logical Problem of the Trinity to come
out of a successful application of the Historical Approach methodology will also count as a successful solution by the lights of Puzzle Approach, and that achieving the goal of the Historical Approach will also achieve the goals of the Mysterian Approach. So that we have nothing to lose, and much to gain, in seeking a solution to the Logical Problem of the Trinity through the Historical Approach.

At the same time, while I argue that most philosophical discussion of the doctrine of the Trinity has not paid enough attention to history, inquiry into this doctrine on the part of historians and historical theologians has typically failed to be done in a way rigorous enough to satisfy the analytic philosopher. Often this is simply because the historian and the theologian have not been operating with precisely the same set of concerns as the analytic philosopher. The result of these tendencies in philosophy and theology is that there has so far been relatively little inquiry specifically into the Logical Problem of the Trinity that is at once philosophically rigorous and also historically sensitive.

It would be unfair for the philosopher to blame this situation on the historian. The historian, as such, is not trained in the methodology of the analytic philosopher. And if the historian’s concerns are not the concerns of the philosopher, it is no shortcoming on the historian’s part if the results of his investigation do not adequately address the philosopher’s concerns. To the extent that inquiry into and evaluation of the relevant history is necessary for the philosopher’s ends, and to the extent that the historian’s work has not already satisfied those ends, it falls to the philosopher to complete what is lacking.

To that end, I have chosen to examine the solution to the Logical Problem of the Trinity found in the writings of St. Gregory of Nyssa. I have chosen Gregory, first because he is uncontroversially acknowledged to be at the heart of the development of the orthodox doctrine of the Trinity, and second because, among the more significant figures in that development, he is one of the most careful and precise in his
statements of certain views of central importance in evaluating the logical coherence of the doctrine. In particular, he is to my mind the clearest about what I will call “the metaphysics of synergy,” which lies at the heart of his defense of the doctrine of the Trinity against the Logical Problem of the Trinity, and which I believe was common within what has come to be called the “pro-Nicene consensus.” I examine his writings, mapping out the logic of his views on the Trinity precisely, and give a formal proof of the consistency of the doctrine of the Trinity as found in St. Gregory’s writings.

An Outline of the Dissertation

The dissertation thus proceeds in five parts. In Part I, I give a precise definition for the Logical Problem of the Trinity and what would count as a solution to the problem. I next construct a taxonomy of all possible answers to the Logical Problem of the Trinity, showing that any non-heretical solution to the Logical Problem of the Trinity will exhibit the same (allegedly) problematic formal features as those of the familiar Social Trinitarian and Relative Identity types of accounts.

In Part II, I exhibit the invalid nature of Puzzle Approach Methodology discussed above. I also discuss the Mysterian Approach. The questions about whether mysterianism can be successful are deeper than can be decided in this dissertation. But I argue that, whether successful or not, it does not actually constitute a rival methodology to either the Puzzle Approach or Historical Approach, even if it initially appears to.

In Part III, I turn to history, examining St. Gregory of Nyssa’s proposed solution to the Logical Problem of the Trinity. I argue, among other things, that a failure to adequately appreciate his purposes has led to a misunderstanding of his actual views. Further, I point out an important but under-appreciated distinction in his metaphysics of action and event individuation. Once we understand this, we can
understand what I call his “metaphysics of synergy.”

In Part IV, I organize the results of Part III more systematically and formulate Gregory’s account of the Trinity more precisely in predicate logic, providing a formal proof of the consistency of his account, completing the project taken on in Part I.

Finally, in Part V, I step outside the primary scope of the dissertation (the alleged logical problem with the doctrine of the Trinity) to the overall philosophical framework in which Gregory situates his solution. I present some general considerations to show that it would be difficult to fault his view on the grounds of implausibility of his metaphysical and semantic assumptions. In any case, not in any way that would still count as the simple, “logical” problem alleged by anti-Trinitarians.
PART I

DEFINING THE PROBLEM
CHAPTER 1

DEFINITIONS

In the case of divine dogma, the indiscriminate use of words is no longer free from danger. For in these subjects, that which is of small account is no longer a small matter.
–St. Gregory of Nyssa

1.1 What is the Logical Problem of the Trinity?

Consider the claims made by the following set \( S \) of natural language sentences:

\( (S1) \) The Father is God
\( (S2) \) The Son is God
\( (S3) \) The Holy Spirit is God
\( (S4) \) The Father is not the Son
\( (S5) \) The Father is not the Holy Spirit
\( (S6) \) The Son is not the Holy Spirit
\( (S7) \) There is exactly one God

Let us call the set of propositions that the sentences of \( S \) express \( P \) and let us call each of the propositions each \( S-n \) expresses \( P-n \). Of course, \( P \) is not the entirety of the doctrine of the Trinity.\(^1\) But it is at least a very important subset of, or is otherwise logically entailed by, the doctrine of the Trinity.\(^2\) Intuitively, what is called

\(^1\) See below, 1.2, p. 20.

\(^2\) (Cartwright 1987) seems to be the first to have formulated it this way in the current debate, and most follow him.
“the logical problem of the Trinity” (LPT) is just the question how, or whether, all the members of P can be true at the same time, for they seem inconsistent.

But what does it mean for them to be inconsistent? Following Plantinga, let us distinguish between three different senses in which a set of propositions can be consistent or inconsistent:

1. A set of propositions is explicitly inconsistent if and only if (at least) one member of the set just is the denial or negation of (at least) one member of the set.

2. A set of propositions is formally inconsistent if and only if a(n explicit) contradiction can be derived from its members using only “the rules of ordinary logic.”

3. A set of propositions is implicitly inconsistent if and only if adding some necessarily true proposition(s) to it yields a formally inconsistent set.

(And if, in one of these senses, a set of propositions is not inconsistent, it is, in that sense, consistent.)

Notice the three form increasingly large supersets of propositions. Any set that is explicitly inconsistent is formally inconsistent, though not vice-versa. And any set that is formally inconsistent is implicitly inconsistent, though not vice-versa.

They also correspond to decreasingly bad problems for a view. There are decreasing levels of cognitive deficiency one would have to exhibit to hold such an inconsistency in one’s belief system, and there are decreasingly good reasons for us to chastise a person for having such an alleged cognitive defect. Explicit inconsistencies are obviously false, and it is a serious problem if we embrace one. Formal inconsistencies run the gamut from almost as obviously false as explicit contradictions, to points so subtle they trip up a great many students in formal logic classes. Finally, the obviousness of the falsehood of an implicit inconsistency depends both on the obviousness of the necessity of the truth of the auxiliary proposition we have to add to the set to yield a formal inconsistency and on the obviousness of the logical

relations between the auxiliary proposition and the rest of the set. Even though, once we’re clear on the logical forms of the relevant propositions, one can’t very well question a proof of their consistency or inconsistency, one can often reasonably question the modal intuitions behind the claim that the auxiliary proposition is not only true but necessary.4

Explicit inconsistencies, of course, are rarely embraced by anyone, and nobody accuses the doctrine of the Trinity of being one. But the situation is nearly as bad, as the problem raised in the literature about the doctrine of the Trinity seems to be the allegation that the doctrine of the Trinity is not even formally consistent. This seems to be what is meant by calling it the logical problem of the Trinity.5

On the other hand, we could call the accusation that the doctrine of the Trinity is merely implicitly inconsistent “the metaphysical problem of the Trinity” (MPT). Since the accusation made by anti-Trinitarians seems to be that the doctrine of the Trinity is not even formally consistent, my focus will be on the logical problem of the Trinity. However, current responses to the LPT often make an elision between the LPT and the MPT. Therefore, since I want to address the methodology of the current literature, it will not always be possible to narrow the discussion down to the logical problem alone.

For now, we should keep in mind two things. First, on the one hand, at a certain level the anti-Trinitarian only wants to prove that the doctrine of the Trinity is impossible. And the anti-Trinitarian wins on that point if the doctrine of the Trinity is even implicitly inconsistent, even if it is still formally consistent. Thus, while the Trinitarian certainly wants some way to dissolve the LPT, it may seem not to be enough in the grand scheme of things. A solution to the LPT is not necessarily a solution to the MPT.

4. See (van Inwagen 1998) for a good discussion of this issue.

5. See, for example, (Yandell 1994).
But second, on the other hand, it would still be a major embarrassment to the anti-Trinitarian if the logical argument against the doctrine of the Trinity were to fail. In that case, the debate between Trinitarians and anti-Trinitarians would be less like a debate between people who can’t count and people who can – as the anti-Trinitarian wants to portray it – and more like a debate between, say, endurantists and perdurantists in the metaphysics of time. The anti-Trinitarian portrays his argument as a knock-down – a matter of simple logic – not as just another of the many uncertain arguments found in metaphysics and in philosophy generally. We will return to this issue in our final evaluation in Part 4.

I believe that the doctrine of the Trinity (or at least the particularly “problematic” part of it, P) can be shown to be consistent using the “rules of ordinary logic.” That result alone is significant in that it decisively shifts the debate from the level of formal consistency (the LPT) to the level of implicit consistency (the MPT).

Since P will have been shown to be formally consistent, the burden of proof for the anti-Trinitarian will be to either:

1. find some additional proposition that is plausibly “part of,” or entailed by, the doctrine of the Trinity, that when added to P, yields a formally inconsistent set, or

2. find some necessarily true auxiliary proposition that, when added to P, yields a formally inconsistent set (or some combination of such propositions).

But this of course is a distinct question from the LPT. I will not attempt to prove that no such additional proposition exists that could show the doctrine of the Trinity to be implicitly inconsistent in one of the above ways. But in Part 4 I do discuss these broader questions, and give some considerations to show that the prospects for attacking the doctrine of the Trinity in this way are dim.
1.1.1 Formal Consistency and the “Rules of Ordinary Logic”

If the LPT is about formal consistency, and formal consistency is determined by the “rules of ordinary logic,” what exactly are the “rules of ordinary logic”? And how would one show whether or not a set of propositions entails an explicit contradiction using them?

Logic as practiced today does not deal directly with propositions, or even with their expressions in sentences of ordinary, natural human languages. Rather, the modern logician constructs artificial languages with (so far) less expressive power than natural languages, but with no possibility for ambiguity in the logical forms of its sentences. With no such ambiguity possible in these artificial languages, precise rules and methods can be given for determining the consistency or inconsistency of a set $\Phi$ of sentences of these languages.

There are two senses in which we might say that a set of sentences $\Phi$ in a formal language $L$ is inconsistent. It may be that, given the rules of inference that are valid in $L$, $\Phi$ entails a contradiction, entails its own negation, or for whatever reason the inference rules for that language say that the conjunction of the members of $\Phi$ must be false. If this is so, $\Phi$ is “syntactically inconsistent in $L$." If there is no such valid proof in $L$, $\Phi$ is “syntactically consistent” in $L$. This is the strict meaning of “consistency,” and pertains, obviously, to syntax.

On the other hand, it may be that there is no interpretation $I$ of the non-logical constants of $L$ such that all of the members of $\Phi$ are true in $L$ on $I$ (i.e. there is no “model” for $\Phi$ in $L$). If this is so, $\Phi$ is not “satisfiable” with respect to the class of possible interpretations of the non-logical constants of $L$. If there is such an interpretation (a model) for $\Phi$ in $L$, $\Phi$ is satisfiable in $L$. This is not strictly consistency. It pertains not to syntax but to semantics. But it is just as important a consideration, and in a formal language with the features of soundness and completeness, the
syntactic feature of consistency and the semantic feature of satisfyability go hand in hand.

Since the “rules of ordinary logic” should encompass both syntax and semantics, it would seem that the phrase “formally inconsistent” should cover both strict, syntactic inconsistency, and the semantic notion of unsatisfiability. That is, it would seem we should say that a set \( \Phi \) of formulae of \( L \) is “formally inconsistent in \( L \)” if and only if it is either inconsistent in \( L \) or unsatisfiable in \( L \). \( \Phi \) is “formally consistent” in \( L \) if and only if it is both consistent in \( L \) and satisfiable in \( L \).

In any formal language \( L \) worth studying, any language with the property logicians call “soundness,” if \( \Phi \) is inconsistent in \( L \), then it will be unsatisfiable in \( L \) as well. (Otherwise there could be “valid” proofs from true premises to false conclusions, and what good is a language like that?)\(^6\) So, although these are not the only ways to do so, a usually good strategy for showing “formal inconsistency” is to give a proof of the negation of the conjunction of the members of \( \Phi \) (because the syntactic feature of inconsistency will show the semantic feature of unsatisfiability as well), and a usually good strategy for showing “formal consistency” is to give a model for all of the members of \( \Phi \) (because the semantic feature of satisfiability will show the syntactic feature of consistency as well).

But since the modern logician’s methods of determining consistency and inconsistency only apply within the artificial languages they construct, how does one determine whether a set of propositions \( P \) is consistent or inconsistent?

In order to make any use of the tools developed by the logician, the set \( P \) of propositions must be given some regimentation \( \Phi \) in some formal language \( L \) such that the logical forms of the sentences in \( \Phi \) accurately represent the logical forms of the propositions in \( P \). Within this artificial language, questions of consistency can be

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6. On the other hand, we know that there are interesting languages where a formula can be semantically unsatisfiable, but still syntactically consistent — languages that are incomplete.
determined (if at all) with mathematical precision. Thus, if a regimentation, \( \Phi \) in \( L \), of \( P \) can be found such that all parties to the debate can agree that:

1. the formal language \( L \) is suitably expressive that there are possible sentences (well-formed formulae, “wffs”) of \( L \) that could capture the logical forms (or at least all of the relevant aspects of the logical forms) of the propositions in \( P \) (for short “\( L \) is a formally adequate language for \( P \)”), and

2. the logical forms of the sentences of \( \Phi \) in \( L \) do reflect the logical forms (or at least the relevant aspects of the logical forms) of the propositions in \( P \) (for short “\( \Phi \) is a formally adequate regimentation of \( P \)"

then the question of the formal consistency of the propositions in \( P \) can be decided on the basis of the formal consistency of the sentences \( \Phi \) in \( L \).

Could there be different formally adequate regimentations, \( \Phi_1 \) in \( L \), and \( \Phi_2 \) in \( L \), of a set of propositions \( P \) such that \( \Phi_1 \) is formally consistent in \( L \), but \( \Phi_2 \) is not? Similarly, could there be different formally adequate languages, \( L_1 \) and \( L_2 \), such that a regimentation \( \Phi \) is, in \( L_1 \), both formally adequate for \( P \) and consistent, while in \( L_2 \) it is formally adequate for \( P \) but inconsistent?

Presumably in the first case either the sentences of \( \Phi_1 \) or the sentences of \( \Phi_2 \) (or both) do not “reflect the logical forms of the propositions in \( P \) in all relevant ways,” i.e. either \( \Phi_1 \) in \( L \) or \( \Phi_2 \) in \( L \) (or both) must not be “a formally adequate regimentation of \( P \)”.

Likewise, in the second case, presumably either:

1. one or the other of \( L_1 \) or \( L_2 \) (or both) are not expressive enough that their sentences can capture the relevant aspects of the logical forms of the propositions in \( P \), or

2. \( \Phi \) has an importantly different logical form as interpreted according to the grammar of \( L_1 \) as compared to its form as interpreted according to the grammar of \( L_2 \). And either \( \Phi \) in \( L_1 \) or \( \Phi \) in \( L_2 \) (or both) is (are) not “a formally adequate regimentation of \( P \)”.

Thus, either every pair of formally adequate language plus formally adequate regimentation for \( P \) is formally consistent, or none is.
So, in any debate over the formal consistency of a set of propositions $P$, the real work, and matter for debate, ironically does not lie so much in proving the formal consistency or inconsistency of any set of sentences, but in finding a suitable artificial language $L$ and a suitable regimentation $\Phi$, such that it can be shown that:

1. $L$ is a formally adequate language for $P$, and
2. $\Phi$ in $L$ is a formally adequate regimentation for $P$.

(With one important exception, most philosophers involved in this debate would probably agree that some standard version of predicate logic with (classical, absolute, non-relative) identity ("PLI" for short) would be a formally adequate language for $P$. What will be called "pure" Relative Identity Trinitarianism seems to be the only camp in the debate that demands the use of an importantly different formal language in which to address the issue. Since rejecting PLI is controversial in itself, we will adopt a certain mild "prejudice" toward PLI throughout the dissertation. Specifically, as long as a view can be given a formally adequate regimentation in PLI, we will regiment it in PLI. In other words, if it is possible to represent a certain logical form via formulae of PLI, we will use formulae of PLI as the means by which we will represent that logical form.)

So, why does the anti-Trinitarian think that the logical form of $P$ is inconsistent?

Suppose we take "Father," "Son," and "Holy Spirit" univocally as names for individuals wherever they appear in $P$. Suppose we take "God" in S1 through S3 univocally as the name of an individual. Suppose we take "is" univocally as the "is" of (classical) identity in S1 through S6. And suppose we analyze the counting statement expressed by S7 in the standard way, and understand "is God" as it occurs there in the same way we did in our interpretation of S1 through S3. The logical form of the claims expressed by $S$ on this interpretation of it can be represented in PLI as:

\[ \Phi_{LPT-1} : \]
\[(1_{\text{LPT-1}}) \quad f = g\]
\[(2_{\text{LPT-1}}) \quad s = g\]
\[(3_{\text{LPT-1}}) \quad h = g\]
\[(4_{\text{LPT-1}}) \quad f \neq s\]
\[(5_{\text{LPT-1}}) \quad f \neq h\]
\[(6_{\text{LPT-1}}) \quad s \neq h\]
\[(7_{\text{LPT-1}}) \quad (\exists x)(\forall y)(x = g \land (y = g \rightarrow y = x))\]

\[\Phi_{\text{LPT-1}}\] is inconsistent in PLI.\(^7\) ((7\(_{\text{LPT-1}}\)) is not strictly necessary to derive a contradiction here, but I include it for completeness’s sake.)

On the other hand, suppose we instead take “is God” in S1 through S3 univocally and take “God” to be a predicate and “is” to be the “is” of predication. Suppose we analyze the counting statement expressed by S7 in the standard way, and understand “is God” as it occurs there in the same way we did in our interpretation of S1 through S3. And suppose we otherwise leave our regimentation unchanged. The logical form of the claims expressed by S on this interpretation of it can be represented in PLI as:

\[\Phi_{\text{LPT-2}}:\]
\[(1_{\text{LPT-2}}) \quad Gf\]
\[(2_{\text{LPT-2}}) \quad Gs\]
\[(3_{\text{LPT-2}}) \quad Gh\]
\[(4_{\text{LPT-2}}) \quad f \neq s\]
\[(5_{\text{LPT-2}}) \quad f \neq h\]
\[(6_{\text{LPT-2}}) \quad s \neq h\]
\[(7_{\text{LPT-2}}) \quad (\exists x)(\forall y)(Gx \land (Gy \rightarrow y = x))\]

\[\Phi_{\text{LPT-2}}\] is also inconsistent in PLI.\(^8\)

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7. Proof is trivial.
8. Proof is trivial.
Since both of the logical forms we have in mind here can be represented in PLI, we will use PLI. So, a more precise way to put the anti-Trinitarian argument would be as follows:

1. PLI is a formally adequate language for P, and
2. at least one of $\Phi_{LPT-1}$ in PLI or $\Phi_{LPT-2}$ in PLI is a formally adequate regimentation of P, and
3. both $\Phi_{LPT-1}$ and $\Phi_{LPT-2}$ are (syntactically) inconsistent in PLI.

As mentioned above, since at least one formally adequate regimentation of P in a formally adequate language for P is inconsistent, all are. So, by definition of “formally adequate language” and “formally adequate regimentation,” P is formally inconsistent. So, since the doctrine of the Trinity contains or entails P, the doctrine of the Trinity itself is inconsistent.

But, if this is the “problem”... what exactly would count as a solution?

1.2 What Would Be a Solution?

In the previous section, we saw that the logical problem of the Trinity could be seen intuitively as the question how, or whether, all of P1 through P7 could be true at the same time. We saw that the LPT could be seen more precisely as the question what, if anything, is wrong with the following anti-Trinitarian argument:

1. PLI is a formally adequate language for P, and
2. at least one of $\Phi_{LPT-1}$ in PLI or $\Phi_{LPT-2}$ in PLI is a formally adequate regimentation of P, and
3. both $\Phi_{LPT-1}$ and $\Phi_{LPT-2}$ are formally inconsistent in PLI,
4. therefore, P is formally inconsistent.

But if that is the “problem,” what would count as a solution or answer to it?
If the anti-Trinitarian is right that PLI is a formally adequate language for P, and that one or the other of $\Phi_{LPT-1}$ in PLI or $\Phi_{LPT-2}$ in PLI is a formally adequate regimentation of P, then that just is the answer. There is no "solution." So the Trinitarian must maintain that neither regimentation, in PLI, is formally adequate for P (or else that PLI itself is not formally adequate for P).

Let us say that a "proposed answer" to the LPT is a set that includes:

1. Exactly one formal language L in which to regiment P, and
2. Exactly one set $\Phi$ of sentences of L with which to regiment P, and
3. A proof of the formal consistency or inconsistency of $\Phi$ in L.

Let us say that a "formally adequate answer" to the LPT is a proposed answer to the logical problem of the Trinity such that:

1. L is a formally adequate language for P, and
2. $\Phi$ in L is a formally adequate regimentation of P

(3. and the proof of formal consistency or inconsistency of $\Phi$ in L is correct.)

A "proposed solution" to the LPT is a proposed answer to the logical problem of the Trinity that proves that $\Phi$ is formally consistent in L.

A "proposed non-solution" to the LPT is a proposed answer to the logical problem of the Trinity that proves that $\Phi$ is formally inconsistent in L.

A "formally adequate solution" to the LPT is a formally adequate answer that is a proposed solution (i.e., a formally adequate answer to the LPT that proves that $\Phi$ is formally consistent in L).

9. We will relax this requirement in an obvious and non-problematic way in the case of a couple of dilemmas, where 2 different possible regimentations are offered, and the claim made is only that at least one of them is formally adequate. Specifically, the anti-Trinitarian LPT$_1$ and LPT$_2$, and the Naïve Modalist NM$_1$ and NM$_2$. 

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A “formally adequate non-solution” to the LPT is a formally adequate answer that is a proposed non-solution (i.e., a formally adequate answer to the LPT that proves that $\Phi$ is formally inconsistent in $L$).

(Since, as mentioned above, either every pair of formally adequate language for $P$ plus formally adequate regimentation of $P$ is formally consistent, or none is, either every formally adequate answer to the logical problem of the Trinity will be a (formally adequate) solution to the LPT, or every formally adequate answer to the LPT will be a (formally adequate) non-solution to the logical problem of the Trinity.)

Thus, the anti-Trinitarian argument above can be seen as a constructive dilemma. One of two proposed non-solutions to the LPT (call those $\text{LPT}_1$ and $\text{LPT}_2$) is formally adequate. Thus, there is some formally adequate non-solution to the LPT. (Thus, all formally adequate answers to the logical problem of the Trinity are non-solutions.) So, by definition of “formally adequate language” and “formally adequate regimentation,” $P$ is formally inconsistent.

We focus on $P$ here because, in order for the anti-Trinitarian to show the doctrine of the Trinity is inconsistent, he need not regiment the doctrine of the Trinity in its entirety. It is enough to argue that the doctrine of the Trinity contains or entails all the propositions in $P$, and that $P$ is inconsistent.

There are undoubtedly other propositions that count as elements of the doctrine of the Trinity. For example, the propositions that the Father is unoriginate, that the Son is the only-begotten, and that the Holy Spirit proceeds from (at least) the Father, are all parts of the doctrine of the Trinity, along with other propositions. And additional propositions can never yield a consistent set from an inconsistent set. But they can yield an inconsistent set from a consistent one. So, the fact that there is more to the doctrine of the Trinity than just $P$ can only help the anti-Trinitarian and can only harm the Trinitarian.
So, showing that P is formally consistent is not strictly enough for the Trinitarian to show that the doctrine of the Trinity is formally consistent. Nonetheless, most of the literature seems to take the question whether the doctrine of the Trinity is formally consistent to still be nearly equivalent (close enough for practical purposes) to the question whether P is formally consistent, i.e., whether the LPT as I have defined it here has a formally adequate solution or a formally adequate non-solution. That is, they seem to assume that:

1. if there is a formally adequate non-solution to the LPT, then the doctrine of the Trinity is certainly (formally) inconsistent, since the doctrine of the Trinity does in fact include or entail all of the propositions in P. (That is true, and should be uncontroversial), and
2. if there is a formally adequate solution to the LPT, then the doctrine of the Trinity is at least probably formally consistent.

How so?

Philosophers on both sides of the argument would probably agree to the following. It is true that there are other aspects of the doctrine of the Trinity, and that adding additional propositions to P, such as that the Son is the only-begotten, that the persons are consubstantial, etc., could in theory produce an inconsistent set, even though P itself is consistent. Nevertheless, no such alleged inconsistency has so far been raised. Further, it is hard to see how such additional elements could cause a bigger problem than what we’ve already seen. So, arguably, the Trinitarian may safely ignore that possibility – unless and until the anti-Trinitarian actually proposes some such auxiliary proposition as a problem for the doctrine of the Trinity. But no such auxiliary propositions have been pointed out by the anti-Trinitarian. And the LPT, as we’ve defined it, will probably be the most difficult problem facing the doctrine of the Trinity. So, if the Trinitarian can show that there is a formally adequate solution to the LPT, i.e. show the formal consistency of P, then, although there is no guarantee that there will not be other problems for the doctrine of the Trinity, there
probably are not, and if it turns out that there are, they would probably not be as difficult to deal with as the LPT. Finally, even if such a proposition were found, it is not clear that the resulting problem would deserve to be called by the same name as the LPT. It seems it would most usefully be counted as some distinct argument. It is in this sense that finding a formally adequate solution to the LPT is “nearly” equivalent to showing that the doctrine of the Trinity is (formally) consistent.

As things stand, however, anti-Trinitarians have presented their proposed non-solutions to the LPT (LPT\(_1\) and LPT\(_2\)), which one must admit at least prima facie seem like the most plausible, straight-forward ways of understanding P. Thus, to defend P, the Trinitarian must argue at least that it might (for all we know) be the case that neither LPT\(_1\) nor LPT\(_2\) is a formally adequate answer to the LPT, that is, either:

1. PLI is not a formally adequate language for P, or
2. Neither \(\Phi_{LPT-1}\) in PLI nor \(\Phi_{LPT-2}\) in PLI is a formally adequate regimentation of P.

(Or both.)

In principle, this very weak response (“for all we know,” either the language is inadequate or the regimentations are) would be a sufficient defence of Trinitarian beliefs. But most philosophers in the literature have wanted to do more. They have wanted to argue that it can be shown that P really is consistent (not just that it’s not unreasonable for us to believe that it is).\(^{10}\) But it might seem hard to see how one would argue that PLI is not formally adequate for P, except by arguing that some other language L is formally adequate for P, and that L is importantly different from PLI in some relevant way. Likewise, assuming that PLI is formally adequate for P, it might seem hard to see how one would argue that neither \(\Phi_{LPT-1}\) in PLI nor \(\Phi_{LPT-2}\) in PLI is a formally adequate regimentation for P, except by arguing that some other

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10. I discuss this issue in much greater detail below in Chapter 3.2 p. 105 ff.
regimentation $\Phi$ in PLI is a formally adequate regimentation for P, and that $\Phi$’s being a formally adequate regimentation of P in PLI is somehow incompatible both with $\Phi_{\text{LPT-1}}$ in PLI being a formally adequate regimentation of P and with $\Phi_{\text{LPT-2}}$ in PLI being a formally adequate regimentation of P (as will be the case if the alternative proposed answer has an importantly different logical form, which of course must be the case if it is a proposed solution). And so, the majority of the literature has centered around the search for alternative proposed answers to the LPT to supplant LPT\textsubscript{1} and LPT\textsubscript{2}.

But if one wants to replace LPT\textsubscript{1} and LPT\textsubscript{2}... what alternative answers could one propose?

1.3 Proposed Solutions

In the previous section, we saw what form an answer to the logical problem of the Trinity must take. But how could that outline be filled in in such a way as to avoid both of the non-solutions proposed by the anti-Trinitarian: LPT\textsubscript{1} and LPT\textsubscript{2}?

Of course, contemporary philosophers are not the first to have addressed the issue of the logical consistency of the doctrine of the Trinity. Thinking on the subject goes back to ancient times, to the earliest centuries of the church. And not just any way of understanding the “three-ness” and “one-ness” of God has been received as within the bounds of orthodoxy. Certain views, consistent though they may have been, were rejected as heretical during the course of the Trinitarian controversies of roughly the 3\textsuperscript{rd} through the 5\textsuperscript{th} centuries AD. I will refer to these as the “Classical Trinitarian Heresies” (CTHs). Most philosophers seem to count avoiding being some form of a CTH as a constraint on what Dale Tuggy has called “Trinitarian theorizing.”\textsuperscript{11} That is, contemporary philosophers attempt to construct accounts of the Trinity that avoid

\textsuperscript{11. (TUGGY 2003).}
both (1) inconsistency, and (2) being just another form of one of the CTHs.

So, for completeness’ sake, we will discuss the CTH’s in some detail. However, I think contemporary views will be easier for most of my readers to understand, will certainly require less textual interpretation, and will be easier to regiment in a standard way. Also, some of that discussion will help to shed light on the CTHs. And so, we will begin with contemporary proposed solutions to the LPT.

Our purpose at the moment is to collect various proposed solutions to the LPT. And what concerns us most at the moment is the matter of formal consistency. So we will not try to give an exhaustively detailed discussion of any of these views, but only so much as to give us a clear enough idea of its logical form that we can represent it in a formal language and determine its consistency or inconsistency.

1.3.1 Contemporary Proposed Solutions

1.3.1.1 Social Trinitarianism (ST)

Probably the easiest contemporary proposal to understand is Social Trinitarianism (ST). Paradigmatic versions of ST hold that Father, Son and Holy Spirit are straightforwardly numerically distinct persons – in the fullest sense of the term “person” – each of whom is fully divine, omniscient, omnipotent, etc. Instances of the phrase “is God” in reference to the persons individually are read as predications (“is divine” or “is god” with a little “g”) rather than as identifications to an individual called “God.” But it is the Trinity as a whole – the collective or “community” or “society” they compose – to which the term “God” is properly applied when we speak of “one God” (either as a name for the collective or as a predicate that is not, at least not precisely, univocal with “is God” as applied to the persons).

One might suspect the equivocation on “is god” as a predicate applied to the persons and “is God” as either a name or equivocal predicate applied to the one God of being merely an ad hoc logical escape route invented by Social Trinitarians. But
in fact there is some biblical warrant for it. In Greek, there is a distinction between using “οὐκ” without a definite article, which looks like a predication (“is divine,” or “is a god”) and “ὁ θεός” with the definite article, which looks more like a proper name or definite description (“God,” or “the divine thing”). And the Bible itself seems to make this distinction. For example, John 1:1, usually translated as “...the Word was with God and the Word was God,” is “...ο λόγος τον θεόν και θεός γν ο λόγος,” which looks like the Logos bears a relation (literally “was towards”) to an individual called “God,” and also has a certain property (“is divine”).

Also, the Cappadocians made use of analogies between the persons of the Trinity and human persons such as Paul, Silas and Timothy (clearly numerically distinct individuals) to describe the distinctness of the persons, and support for ST often relies heavily on the authority of the Cappadocians.

This kind of view can potentially raise questions regarding mereology and the metaphysics of composition (if composition is the relation an ST-er posits between the persons and God, or the Trinity, which the persons... compose?), the ontological status of “communities” (if that is the sort of thing God is supposed to be), etc. At its least palatable, ST would have the unwelcome consequence that God was just an abstract object, a particular set (among many other sets), or that “God” was just a word, useful in abbreviating some otherwise complicated talk about divine persons (“arranged God-wise,” perhaps?), but denoting nothing of a sufficiently ontologically

12. We’ll see an example of this in St. Gregory of Nyssa’s Ad Ablabium below.


14. This seems legitimate enough as far as concerns the distinctness of the persons. Indeed, see my discussion of modalism below; I am in need of no persuading that they had a consensus on the very strong, numerical distinctness of the persons. However, as we will see, that is not the logical feature that saves ST from inconsistency. It is rather the equivocation on “is God” or “is god.” Thus, to find patristic support for ST, one would need to find patristic support for this equivocation, not for a strong distinction between the persons. Furthermore, I think that, understood in context, the Cappadocians provide little support for Social Trinitarianism, if not outright opposition to it. See 4.2.1, p. 168 ff., and 4.2.2, esp. p. 175, footnote 47 below for more.
“beefy” status. (Think of how certain libertarians and anarchists would claim that talk about “the state” is just abbreviated talk about uses, and threats of use, of force by various individuals against various other individuals.) However, as we will be focusing on the logical form of the doctrine, such objections need not detain us.

Both proponents and critics of ST tend to focus on its taking the divine “persons” to be fully “persons” in our modern, post-Cartesian sense – fully aware centers of consciousness, reason, will, etc. This is thought to be its distinctive feature. But again, from the point of view merely of logical form, the issue is irrelevant. The “persons” could be beans as far as the LPT is concerned. But if there are three of them, and each is a bean, yet there is only one bean, LPT₂ would provide a formally adequate regimentation of the view, and ST would not.

So what features of ST are relevant to our concerns?

First, it is clear that Social Trinitarians insist on making a very strong, real distinction between the persons. But classical non-identity (≠) is the weakest (real) distinction one can make. (If it doesn’t entail x≠y, then in what sense is it a “real” distinction between x and y? If it is a “real” distinction between x and y, surely it (at least) entails x≠y.)

It’s clear then that Social Trinitarians will agree with LPT₁ and LPT₂ on their regimentation of P4 through P6. (Indeed, Social Trinitarians often want to go even further in distinguishing the persons, but they must at least admit the non-identity of the persons.) And in so doing they will (they may as well) take PLI to be a formally adequate language for P. In keeping with this emphasis on the distinctness of the persons, it is also clear that Social Trinitarians will want to treat “is god” in P1 through P3 not as identity claims to some individual, but as predications. (Perhaps these will mean “is divine,” perhaps something related. Again, the content here need not concern us at present.) Thus, Social Trinitarians will deny the formal adequacy of 1_LPT₁ through 3_LPT₁ in PLI.
It is also clear that Social Trinitarians make no distinctions *between* the persons as to their divinity, omniscience, etc. That is, each person is divine, is omniscient, is a person, etc., in exactly the same sense as either of the other two persons. So, whatever “is God” might mean (again, it could mean “is divine” or even “is a bean” as far as we are concerned right now), it will mean the same thing with respect to each person. There will be no equivocation. Thus, while Social Trinitarians will deny the formal adequacy of $1_{\text{LPT-1}}$ through $3_{\text{LPT-1}}$ in PLI, they will admit to the formal adequacy of $1_{\text{LPT-2}}$ through $3_{\text{LPT-2}}$ in PLI (or something relevantly similar, in a sense that will become clear later.)

ST, then, so far agrees with LPT$_2$. If ST is to count as a *solution*, then, it must regiment P7 differently. But there is no indication in ST literature that Social Trinitarians have any problem with standard logical regimentations of counting statements, either with the general schema that logicians usually employ, or with the classical identity relation (=) in particular. (Indeed, one of the motivations for adopting ST is precisely to avoid having to give up on classical identity. See the discussion of Relative Identity Trinitarianism below for more.) The only way, then, that ST could possibly avoid contradiction would be to equivocate on “is god,” not among its applications to the persons themselves, individually (in P1 through P3) but between its application there on the one hand and in P7 on the other. And it is this purely *formal* feature that lies at the heart of a major criticism of ST. Brian Leftow writes:

But even if Trinity monotheism avoids talk of degrees of deity, it faces a problem. Either the Trinity is a fourth case of the divine nature, in addition to the persons, or it is not. If it is, we have too many cases of deity for orthodoxy. If it is not, and yet is divine, there are two ways to be divine – by being a case of deity, and by being a Trinity of such cases. If there is more than one way to be divine, Trinity monotheism becomes Plantingian Arianism. But if there is in fact only one way to be divine, then there are two alternatives. One is that only the Trinity is God, and God is composed of non-divine persons. The other is that the sum of all
divine persons is somehow not divine. To accept this last claim would be to give up Trinity monotheism altogether.

I do not see an acceptable alternative here. So I think Trinity monotheism is not a promising strategy for ST.¹⁵

Leftow here uses “Trinity monotheism” for what he takes to be just one version of ST. But as we’ve seen, if all versions of ST admit the non-identity of the persons, and if all versions of ST treat “is god” as univocal across P1 and P3, and if no versions of ST take issue with standard logical regimentations of counting statements, then all versions of ST will have to confront the problem Leftow raises. (At least, they will have to confront the purely formal problem Leftow’s argument relies on.) Namely, first, that ST must equivocate on “is god” in P1 through P3 on the one hand and “is God” in P7 on the other hand (otherwise we end up with four gods instead of one). But then it follows that either (1) there is more than one “way” of legitimately being divine or being “a god” (a position Leftow calls “Plantingian Arianism”), or else (2) the persons are not legitimately divine or “god,” or else (3) the one God (the Trinity) is not legitimately divine or “god.”

So, although, again, both proponents and critics tend to characterize ST in terms of its taking the divine “persons” to be distinct centers of consciousness and so forth (a particular aspect of its content), for our purposes it will be more useful to characterize it in terms of the formal feature Leftow’s criticism relies on. For even if “x is god” means that x is a bean, we can run essentially the same argument to the effect that one will have to equivocate on “is god.” If the persons (for whatever reason) satisfy that predicate (whatever it means), and they are all non-identical, yet there is only one thing that (for whatever reason) satisfies that predicate (whatever it means), then LPT₂ is formally adequate.

So, if ST is to count as a solution (i.e., not be inconsistent), it must reject the

¹⁵. (Leftow 1999), p. 221.
formal adequacy of $LPT_{-2}$ and replace it with an equivocation on “is god.” Thus, we can pin down a formal regimentation for ST and give an ST proposed solution to the LPT as follows:

1. PLI is a formally adequate language for P.
2. $\Phi_{ST}$ in PLI is a formally adequate regimentation of P:
   
   $\Phi_{ST}$:
   
   
   
   
   
   
   

3. $\Phi_{ST}$ is formally consistent in PLI.  

1.3.1.2 (“Pure”) Relative Identity Trinitarianism (Pure RI)

The major strand of Relative Identity Trinitarianism (RI) in contemporary philosophy of religion, called “pure” RI by Mike Rea, began with Peter Geach’s discussions of relative identity, and his application of it to the doctrine of the Trinity. A. P. Martinich also endorsed an RI view a few decades ago, as did James Cain. But

16. It might be objected that this treats “is god” in P7 as another predication, whereas Social Trinitarians might claims it should be treated as a name in P7, thus: $(7_{ST})'(\exists x)(\forall y)(x=g & (y=g \rightarrow x=y))$. However, that is still an equivocation, and so, when we give a more general characterization of a “Family” of views into which ST will fall, such a version of ST will be included in our “Family” anyway.

17. It should be obvious that there is a model for $\Phi_{ST}$, and the proof is left as an exercise for the reader.


19. See (Geach 1968), pp. 43-48 and 69-70; (Geach 1967) and (Feldman and Geach 1969), both reprinted in (Geach 1972); and his chapter, (Geach 1973).

20. (Martinich 1978) and (Martinich 1979).

probably the clearest, fullest and most influential statements of the view are van Inwagen’s. In his earlier statement of the view, van Inwagen does not answer the question whether classical identity exists or not. But in his later statement, he explicitly rejects the existence of classical identity.

Pure RI may be, in some sense, the most difficult proposed solution to the LPT to wrap one’s head around, given that it rejects the existence of classical identity altogether, and given how intuitive classical identity seems to most of us. But in another sense (happily, the sense that will matter for us), it is among the easiest. This is especially so as it appears in van Inwagen’s work, which, also happily, is what we might call the canonical version of Pure RI. As I noted above, many in this debate have an unfortunate tendency to slide from the purely formal, logical problem of the Trinity, to the metaphysical problem of the Trinity, to biblical hermeneutics, etc. in illegitimate ways. Van Inwagen (wisely in my view) keeps the discussion always at the level of logic. So, distilling merely the formal aspects of his view is no trick.

First, Pure RI very explicitly rejects the very existence, or intelligibility, of classical identity, and so explicitly rejects PLI as a formally adequate language for P (PLI being “predicate logic with identity”). Van Inwagen has given his own preferred formal

22. (van Inwagen 1988), and (van Inwagen 2003) in (M. C. Rea 2009), pp. 61-75.

23. In (van Inwagen 1988), p. 241, van Inwagen considers three arguments concerning classical identity and its relation to relative identity, and says “I regard these arguments as inconclusive. In the sequel, therefore, I shall assume neither that classical identity exists nor that it does not exist.” Thus, strictly speaking, in this paper, van Inwagen counted as an adherent of “impure” Relative Identity theory, to be discussed below.

24. In (van Inwagen 2003), p. 70, he says, “I deny that there is one all-encompassing relation of identity. . . there is no relation that is both universally reflexive and forces indiscernibility.”

25. (Chapter 1.1, p. 11).

26. My reasons for taking these distinctions to be important should become clear in my concluding evaluation in Chapter 6, p. 360 ff.
language for this purpose, Relative Identity Logic, which he shortens to “RI-logic,”\textsuperscript{27} and which I will shorten even further to “RIL.” So, first we can say that Pure RI will not accept PLI as a formally adequate language for $P$, but will claim that RIL is a formally adequate language for $P$.

Second, Pure RI replaces the classical (non-)identity predicate “$\neq$” in the regimentations of $P_1$ through $P_6$ with various relative (non-)identity predicates, the two relevant for our purposes being: “is the same being as” in its equivalents of $P_1$ through $P_3$, and “is (not) the same person as” in its equivalent of $P_4$ through $P_6$.\textsuperscript{28} It can then use the “is the same being as” predicate in its equivalent of $P_7$ without generating inconsistency. Although van Inwagen uses the English “is the same being as” and “is (not) the same person as,” I will shorten these to “$=_{B}$” and “$\neq_{P}$,” respectively.

One might think we could now state a Pure RI proposed solution to the LPT as:

1. RIL is a formally adequate language for $P$.

2. $\Phi_{\text{Pure-RI}*}$ in RIL is a formally adequate regimentation of $P$:
   
   $\Phi_{\text{Pure-RI}*}$:
   
   $(1_{\text{Pure-RI}*})$ $f =_{B} g$
   $(2_{\text{Pure-RI}*})$ $s =_{B} g$
   $(3_{\text{Pure-RI}*})$ $h =_{B} g$
   $(4_{\text{Pure-RI}*})$ $f \neq_{P} s$
   $(5_{\text{Pure-RI}*})$ $f \neq_{P} h$
   $(6_{\text{Pure-RI}*})$ $s \neq_{P} h$
   $(7_{\text{Pure-RI}*})$ $(\exists x)(\forall y) \left( x =_{B} g \& (y =_{B} g) \rightarrow (y =_{B} x) \right)$

3. $\Phi_{\text{Pure-RI}*}$ is formally consistent in RIL.

However, this would not be accurate. At least, not without some qualifications about the uses of “$f$,” “$s$,” and “$h$” in RIL. As van Inwagen points out,

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{27} (van Inwagen 1988), p. 231.
  \item \textsuperscript{28} It will become clear why I say its “equivalents” shortly.
\end{itemize}
The philosopher who eschews classical, absolute identity must also eschew singular terms, for the idea of a singular term is – at least in currently orthodox semantical theory – inseparably bound to the classical semantical notion of reference or denotation; and this notion, in its turn, is inseparably bound to the idea of classical identity. It is a part of the orthodox semantical concept of reference that reference is a many-one relation. And it is a part of the idea of a many-one relation – or of a one-one relation, for that matter – that if \( x \) bears such a relation to \( y \) and bears it to \( z \), then \( y \) and \( z \) are absolutely identical.\(^{29}\)

To cut a long story short, RIL must replace singular reference with relative singular reference, and this boils down to certain kinds of general or quantified statements employing relative identity relations. Thus, a Pure RI proposed solution to the LPT would instead come to something like this:

1. RIL is a formally adequate language for \( P \).
2. \( \Phi_{\text{Pure-RI}} \) in RIL is a formally adequate regimentation of \( P \):
   \[
   \Phi_{\text{Pure-RI}}: \quad \\
   (\exists x) (\exists y) (\exists z)
   \]
   \[
   (Gx & Gy & Gz \& \quad \text{(cf. P1 to P3)}
   \\
   x \neq_p y & x \neq_p z \& y \neq_p z \& \quad \text{(cf. P4 to P6)}
   \\
   (\forall v) (\forall w) ((Gv \& Gw) \rightarrow (v \equiv_w w))) \quad \text{(cf. P7)}
   
   \]
3. \( \Phi_{\text{Pure-RI}} \) is formally consistent in RIL.\(^{30}\)

\( \Phi_{\text{Pure-RI}} \) is just one long formula. I have split it onto different lines for ease of reading. Obviously the first line is just the initial three quantifiers, which we must use in the place of singular terms. With that in place, the second line corresponds in a way to P1 through P3. The third line corresponds in a way to P4 through P6. And the fourth line corresponds in a way to P7. Thus, the different parts of \( \Phi_{\text{Pure-RI}} \) are in some sense the “equivalents” of different parts of \( P \). (One can usefully compare

\(^{29}\) (van Inwagen 1988), p. 244.

\(^{30}\) I will give no proof of this. It is easy enough to see that this will be consistent, but for more, one can see (van Inwagen 1988) pp. 249-250.
$\Phi_{\text{Pure-RI}}$ to other proposed answers by taking the conjunction of their regimentations of P1 through P7 in order, and then “Ramsifying” away the names of the persons.)

1.3.1.3 “Impure” Relative Identity Trinitarianism (Impure RI)

The final contemporary proposal we will look at has been defended by Mike Rea (and his sometimes partner in philosophical crime, Jeff Brower). In the Rea-Brower account of the Trinity, the persons stand in a “constitution” relation to one another, and the word “God” is systematically ambiguous between the persons.\footnote{31} That relation does not entail classical identity, but the account does not deny the existence or intelligibility of classical identity as on the “pure” RI view. It simply holds, as does Pure RI, that our ordinary counting practices rely not on classical, or “strict,” identity, but on various relative identity relations. The constitution relation either is, or at least entails, a species of relative identity between the persons, such that we should count them as three persons but one god. (For the time being, we will follow Rea’s terminology in calling this “impure Relative Identity” (Impure RI) as distinguished from “pure” RI. We will see later why there may be a more useful term to cover both of these views.)

Since Impure RI accepts classical identity, it can (it may as well) accept PLI as a formally adequate language in which to regiment $P$. Furthermore, it can regiment P4 through P6 as classical non-identity claims just as in $\text{LPT}_1$ and $\text{LPT}_2$. However, like Pure RI, it rejects classical identity as the relation by which we count, and instead analyzes counting statements as operating by way of relative identity relations. So, it will regiment P7 differently.

To claim that we count by classical identity is to claim that we count one or two

\footnote{31. The view is explicated, defended, and developed in more detail over the course of a number of articles. See (M. Rea 2003), (J. E. Brower and M. C. Rea 2005), (J. Brower and M. Rea 2005), (M. Rea 2006), and (M. Rea 2009). See also Rea and Michael Murray’s discussion of the Trinity in (Murray and Rea 2012).}
(\ldots\text{or } n) \text{ Fs when there are one or two } (\ldots\text{or } n) \text{ terms } (t_1, t_2, \ldots t_n) \text{ of which “F” is true and the appropriate claims of classical non-identity involving those terms } (t_1 \neq t_2, \ldots) \text{ are all true, and any other term } t_{n+1} \text{ of which “F” is true is such that at least some claim of classical identity involving } t_{n+1} \text{ and one of the previous terms is true (thus, } t_{n+1} = t_1 \text{ or } t_{n+1} = t_2, \text{ or } \ldots t_{n+1} = t_n).$

To claim that we count by \textit{relative identity} is to claim that we count one or two \( (\ldots\text{or } n) \text{ Fs when there are one or two } (\ldots\text{or } n) \text{ terms } (t_1, t_2, \ldots t_n) \text{ of which “F” is true and the corresponding claims of \textit{relative} non-identity involving those terms and that predicate } (t_1 \neq_F t_2, \ldots) \text{ are all true, and any other term } t_{n+1} \text{ of which “F” is true is such that at least some claim of relative identity involving } t_{n+1} \text{ and one of the previous terms and the appropriate predicate is true (thus, } t_{n+1} =_{F} t_1 \text{ or } t_{n+1} =_{F} t_2, \text{ or } \ldots t_{n+1} =_{F} t_n).$

Thus, Impure RI’s regimentation of P7 will look much like Pure RI’s in a way, but stated in PLI instead of RIL. But how does Impure RI analyze P1 through P3?

Over the course of several papers, the Rea-Brower view becomes fairly complex, involving the sharing by the persons of a trope-like divine nature that “plays the role of matter” for the persons, each of which is constituted by the divine nature plus its own hypostatic property (Fatherhood, Sonship, Spiritude). But the deeper importance of that theoretical machinery lies in its licensing of a relative identity claim involving the term “God” (here used as a name or other singular term again) and each of the names of the persons. Namely, the claim that the “same god as” relation obtains. We can symbolize this relative identity relation as “\(\equiv_{\text{G}}\)” which allows us to regiment the view more simply, and give an Impure RI proposed solution to the LPT as follows:

1. PLI is a formally adequate language for P.
2. \(\Phi_{\text{Impure-RI}}\) in PLI is a formally adequate regimentation of P:

\[\Phi_{\text{Impure-RI}}: \]
\[(1_{\text{Impure-RI}}) \ f =_G g \]
\[(2_{\text{Impure-RI}}) \ s =_G g \]
\[(3_{\text{Impure-RI}}) \ h =_G g \]
\[(4_{\text{Impure-RI}}) \ f \neq s \]
\[(5_{\text{Impure-RI}}) \ f \neq h \]
\[(6_{\text{Impure-RI}}) \ s \neq h \]
\[(7_{\text{Impure-RI}}) \ (\exists x)(\forall y)(x =_G g \land (y =_G g \rightarrow y =_G x)) \]

3. \(\Phi_{\text{Impure-RI}}\) is formally consistent in PLI.\(^{32}\)

Is it really OK to just ignore whatever more intricate logical structure might, given Rea and Brower’s fuller account, be entailed by the “\(=_G\)” relation, such as a reference to the divine nature and the constitution relation? Yes. How so?

Whatever the “same god as” relation might entail, as long as “x is the same god as y”:

1. is not in itself formally inconsistent, and
2. does not entail (classical) identity between x and some other term \(t_i\),\(^{33}\)

then \((1_{\text{Impure-RI}})\) through \((7_{\text{Impure-RI}})\) is still consistent.

On the other hand, if “x is the same god as y” does entail a (classical) identity between x and some other term \(t_i\), then \((1_{\text{Impure-RI}})\) through \((6_{\text{Impure-RI}})\) will be inconsistent without even appealing to \((7_{\text{Impure-RI}})\). But not for any reasons interestingly related to Impure RI. It will be inconsistent for the same reasons \((1_{\text{LPT-1}})\) through \((6_{\text{LPT-1}})\) were.

More precisely, for any formula \(\phi\), where \(\phi^{t_1,t_2}_{x,y}\) is the result of replacing every occurrence of the variables \(x\) and \(y\) in \(\phi\) with the terms \(t_1\) and \(t_2\), respectively, if:

\[\phi^{t_1,t_2}_{x,y} \models t_1 = t_i \text{ for some } t_i \neq t_1\]

32. It should be obvious that there is a model for \(\Phi_{\text{Impure-RI}}\), and the proof is left as an exercise for the reader.

33. I include 1 merely to aid comprehension. Given 2, 1 is in fact redundant.
then

\[ \phi^{f,g}_{x,y} \& \phi^{s,g}_{x,y} \& \phi^{h,g}_{x,y} \& f \neq s \& f \neq h \& s \neq h \]

is inconsistent anyway, but if:

\[ \phi^{t_{1},t_{2}}_{x,y} \not\subseteq t_{1} = t_{i} \text{ for any } t_{i} \neq t_{1} \]

then

\[ \phi^{f,g}_{x,y} \& \phi^{s,g}_{x,y} \& \phi^{h,g}_{x,y} \& f \neq s \& f \neq h \& s \neq h \& \]
\[ (\exists x)(\forall y)(\phi^{y,g}_{y} \& (\phi^{y,s}_{x,y} \rightarrow \phi^{y,x}_{x,y})) \]

is consistent.

So, as long as “x is the same god as y” doesn’t entail a classical identity claim between x and some other term, we are safe. And it doesn’t seem that it would on the Rea-Brower account. The only other term that might be involved would be “the divine nature.” But on the Rea-Brower account, the divine nature is definitely not classically identical to any of the persons. So, we needn’t go into more detail on the precise logical structure, or further semantic content, of the “same god as” relation. The above will do.

1.3.2 Classical Trinitarian Heresies

1.3.2.1 Arianism

Although not the first chronologically, the CTH of all CTHs was Arianism. It was Arianism that occasioned the First (and Second) Ecumenical Council(s) and the heated controversies of the 4th century and beyond. Historically, Arianism was not motivated by the search for a solution to the LPT. Nor was its rejection by the orthodox motivated by concerns about the LPT. Still, the logical problem of the
Trinity did have a role in the debate, albeit a more minor one, more as an afterthought or “back-up” argument tacked onto what seemed like more serious issues in the debate.

The more central concerns of that debate were in some sense ultimately Christological. Was the Logos a creature, or uncreated? Did it have the same nature as the Father, or a different one (that is, were the Father and Son *homoousios*, “con-substantial” or “co-essential,” or merely *homoiousios*, “similar in essence”)? Or were they outright *anomoios* or *heteroousios*, “not of the same essence” or “of a different essence”)? These were the important questions, and especially as they in turn led to soteriological consequences. (If we want to hold the traditional, Irenaean soteriological claim that “God became man, that man might become god,” then must the pre-incarnate Logos be “god,” or “divine” in the fullest sense, as the orthodox held, or not necessarily, as the Arians held?)

But how do these issues bear on a solution to the LPT?

Some Arians clearly thought that the LPT was a problem for orthodox Trinitarians, but not for Arians, for they raised the LPT as an objection to orthodox Trinitarianism. Arians clearly thought that the LPT was a problem for orthodox Trinitarians, but not for Arians, for they raised the LPT as an objection to orthodox Trinitarianism. Gregory Nazianzen in his *Fifth Theological Oration* (On the Holy Spirit) discusses this Arian argument:

34. Are these Arians best described as raising the purely formal, logical problem of the Trinity, or the broader, metaphysical problem of the Trinity?

The fact that no formal languages existed at the time does not settle the issue. The distinction between the two problems does not turn on whether we rely on recasting the argument in a modern, formal language to *determine* the formal (in)consistency of the relevant propositions, rather than expressing those claims in a natural language like Greek. Rather, the distinction between the two problems is whether (a) a certain set of propositions is by itself formally inconsistent, or whether (b) there exists some allegedly necessarily true *auxiliary proposition* that, when added to the original set, would produce a formally inconsistent set.

The Arians here seem to be saying that the orthodox Trinitarian understanding of P1 through P7 is formally inconsistent all by itself, not that there are additional propositions that, when added to the orthodox understanding of P, would produce an inconsistency. So, at least in this particular instance, Arians and orthodox in the original debate seemed to be focusing on the logical, not the metaphysical, problem of the Trinity.

35. Note that for all Greek text in this dissertation, I have relied on the text available online at the *Thesaurus Linguae Graecae*, and so in certain cases cannot give page numbers, in which case I
“If,” they say, “there is God, and God, and God, how are there not three gods? Or how is that which is glorified not a poly-archy?”

But why did those Arians not think the LPT was a problem for them? What was their proposed solution to the LPT?

For the first part of the answer, we have to go back to Gregory’s Third Theological Oration (On the Son). Arians took the position that Father and Son have different natures (that they were not “consubstantial”). Second, they took the position that “is god” as applied to the Father expresses the divine nature. (Both of these views, we shall see, were rejected by Gregory of Nyssa, and for that matter all of the Cappadocians and most “Eastern” Trinitarians in general). It follows directly from these two views that applying “is god” to the Son could only be done equivocally (regardless of concerns about the LPT).

And this is a consequence they themselves acknowledged. We read in Gregory’s Third Theological Oration:

"Otan δὲ ἀνθυποφέρομεν αὐτοῖς: τί οὖν οὐ χαρίως θεός ὁ υἱός, ὅσπερ οὐδὲ ζῶν τὸ γεγραμμένον"

And when we advance this objection against them, “What do you mean to say then? That the Son is not properly God, just as a picture of an animal is not properly an animal?

supply whatever section numbers or other information is available on the TLG.


37. Translation mine.

38. On the point that the Cappadocians, and specifically Gregory of Nyssa, rejected the claim that “is god” expresses the divine nature, see below, Chapter 4.2.3.1, p. 179. On the point that this was a fairly widespread assumption in the pro-Nicene tradition, see below, Chapter 4.2.3.2, p. 195.
So there is step one in the Arian solution to the LPT: equivocate on “is god.” Not between P7 on the one hand and P1 through P3 on the other, as in ST, but among P1 through P3 themselves.

Step two is that they paired the characteristically Arian equivocation on “is god” with a related view about counting statements involving ambiguous count nouns. Gregory continues a little later in the *Fifth Theological Oration*:

As for the arguments with which you would overthrow the Union which we support, I know not whether we should say you are jesting or in earnest.

For what is this argument? “Things of one essence,” you say, “are counted together,”

---

39. In Greek, ζώον means either an animal or a painting.


41. Translation from (ST. CYRIL OF JERUSALEM and ST. GREGORY NAZIANZEN 1894), p. 306.
and by this “counted together,” you mean that they are collected into one number.

“But things which are not of one essence are not thus counted;

so that you [=orthodox Trinitarians] cannot avoid speaking of three gods, according to this account,

while we [=Arians] do not run any risk at all of it,
inasmuch as we assert that they are not consubstantial.”

So the accusation made against Trinitarians by Arians is something like this. When we count by a count-noun $F$, for example “dog,” that noun must express some essence or nature, in this case dog-hood. And the number of $Fs$ will be the number of things instantiating this essence or nature. So, if there are three things that all instantiated dog-hood, then there are three dogs.

Applied to the Trinity, the Arian argues as follows. The orthodox Trinitarian holds precisely this sort of view with respect to the persons of the Trinity. That is, the orthodox Trinitarian holds that each of the persons instantiates god-hood (or “the Godhead,” as the old-fashioned like to call it). So, given the Arian view of counting, the orthodox Trinitarian will have to say that there are three gods.

On the other hand, if we have a count-noun that is ambiguous between two essences or natures, then we have to precisify (whether explicitly, or tacitly, given a certain context), and only given that precisification can we answer the question how many $Fs$ there are. For example, if “dog” is ambiguous between a kind of mammal and a kind of fish, and there is one land-dog and one dog-fish in the vicinity, and

42. (St. Gregory Nazianzen 1963), Fifth Theologian Oration (31), On the Holy Spirit, section 17.
43. Translation from (St. Cyril of Jerusalem and St. Gregory Nazianzen 1894), p. 323.
we ask “how many dogs are there?” the Arian will say that we have to precisify. In this context, there are two admissible precisifications. On one, the question comes to, “how many land-dogs are there?” and the answer is “one.” On the other, the question comes to, “how many dog-fish are there?” and the answer is “one.” So, on every admissible precisification in this context, the answer is “one.” And on no admissible precisification in this context is the answer anything other than “one.” So, it is right to answer “one” in a context like that.

Applied to the Trinity, the Arian argues as follows. The Arian doctrine of the Trinity holds precisely that the three persons do not exemplify a single essence or nature, expressed by the count-noun “god.” Rather, there are three different essences or natures – one for each of the persons. So, in this context, there are three admissible precisifications of the predicate “is god.” On any admissible precisification of the question “how many gods are there?” in this context, the answer will be “one.” And on no admissible precisification of the question in this context is the answer anything other than “one.” So, it is right (for the Arian) in a context like this to answer “one” to the question “how many gods are there” (likewise for, “how many gods do you believe in, or worship?” etc.)

Gregory goes on in the *Fifth Theological Oration* to argue against both sides of the Arian biconditional about counting, proposing counter-examples to each. But these need not detain us at present. For, although I think Gregory is right in his criticisms, Arianism need not be true, or even formally adequate for P, to be logically consistent. And for the time being that is all that concerns us. So, for our current purposes, we can understand well enough the logical form that Arians attribute to P and how it is consistent, and can thus end our inquiry into Arianism, and state a proposed Arian solution to the LPT as follows:

1. PLI is a formally adequate language for P.44

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44. One might object that it is anachronistic to put into the mouths of Arians the statement that
2. $\Phi_{AR}$ in PLI is a formally adequate regimentation for $P$:

\[
\Phi_{AR}:
\begin{align*}
(1_{AR}) & \ G_f \\
(2_{AR}) & \ G_s \\
(3_{AR}) & \ \ G_h \\
(4_{AR}) & \ f \neq s \\
(5_{AR}) & \ f \neq h \\
(6_{AR}) & \ s \neq h \\
(7_{AR}) & \ (\exists x)(\forall y)(G_i x \& (G_j y \rightarrow x = y)) \\
\end{align*}
\]

(for every admissible precisification of $G_i$ in this context)

3. $\Phi_{AR}$ is formally consistent in PLI.\(^{45}\)

\(^{45}\) Proof is left as an exercise for the reader.
1.3.2.2 (Naïve) Modalism

Modalism, variously known as monarchianism, patripassianism or Sabellianism (after one of its more famous proponents, Sabellius) was an early Trinitarian heresy, or family of heresies, that in some way denied the distinctness of the divine “persons” or “hypostases.”

We are in a more difficult position to determine precisely the content of Modalist doctrine, as compared to Arianism or orthodox Trinitarianism, due to lack of evidence. No complete modalist writings survive; what we have are fragments quoted by the church fathers and descriptions of their views by the church fathers. And the Fathers may not always have shared our concern for charitably interpreting one’s opponents. Perhaps because of this, or perhaps for some other reasons, a certain interpretation of modalism has been quite popular. I have misgivings about the historical accuracy of that account, but since we will be able to do well enough with the standard account, I will not explore the issue, but will simply label the standard account of modalism “Naïve Modalism” and merely note that, in my opinion, there were probably at least some versions of modalism that were more sophisticated.

Now, what seems to me the less charitable interpretation (or perhaps a perfectly good interpretation of a much less plausible version of modalism) can be seen in passages such as this one from St. Basil:

σφάλλονται γάρ, ὡς ὅτι ὁ πατήρ αὐτός ἐστιν ὁ υἱός, καὶ ὡς ὅτι ὁ υἱός αὐτός ἐστιν ὁ πατήρ, ὃσαῦτως καὶ τὸ ἄγνον πνεῦμα, ὃστε εἶναι ἐν πρόσωπον, τρία δὲ ονόματα.\(^{46}\)

For they get tripped up [thinking] that the Father is the same as the Son, and that the Son is the same as the Father, and similarly also the Holy Spirit, so that there is one person, but three names.\(^{47}\)

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46. (St. Basil the Great 1897), pp. 308-310.
47. Translation mine.
Similar statements can be found in other patristic descriptions of Sabellianism (as well as the related heresies of Praxaeus, Noetius, etc.)

Perhaps it has seemed reasonable to some philosophers and theologians to reason in something like the following way. If we today were to say that “Samuel Clemens” and “Mark Twain” are two names for the same person, then we would express that in PLI by making, say “s” in PLI have the same semantic value as “Samuel Clemens” in English, “m” in PLI have the same semantic value as “Mark Twain” in English, and asserting “s=m” in PLI. (At least, those of us who accept classical identity probably would.) So, if “Father,” “Son,” and “Holy Spirit” (in English, or their equivalents in Greek) are just three names for the same person, then, the persons of the Trinity are related in the way we would express using the “=” sign in PLI. So, it would be appropriate to think of modalism as asserting the classical identity of the persons of the Trinity. And a formally adequate way to regiment that view in PLI would be “f=s,” “f=h,” and “s=h.” I will call this view “Naïve Modalism” (NM).

So, if a Naïve Modalist accepts PLI (and he could), the NM view might be regimented as either of:

\[ \Phi_{\text{NM-1}}: \]
\[ (1_{\text{NM-1}}) \ f=g \]
\[ (2_{\text{NM-1}}) \ s=g \]
\[ (3_{\text{NM-1}}) \ h=g \]
\[ (4_{\text{NM-1}}) \ f=s \]
\[ (5_{\text{NM-1}}) \ f=h \]
\[ (6_{\text{NM-1}}) \ s=h \]
\[ (7_{\text{NM-1}}) \ (\exists x)(\forall y)(x=g \ \& \ (y=g \ \rightarrow \ y=x)) \]

or

\[ \Phi_{\text{NM-2}}: \]
\[ (1_{\text{NM-2}}) \ Gf \]
(2_{NM-2}) Gs
(3_{NM-2}) Gh
(4_{NM-2}) f=s
(5_{NM-2}) f=h
(6_{NM-2}) s=h
(7_{NM-2}) (\exists x)(\forall y)(Gx \& (Gy \rightarrow y=x))

And we can give a proposed NM solution to the LPT as:

1. PLI is a formally adequate language for P.
2. At least one of \( \Phi_{NM-1} \) in PLI or \( \Phi_{NM-2} \) in PLI is a formally adequate regimentation for P.
3. Both \( \Phi_{NM-1} \) and \( \Phi_{NM-2} \) are formally consistent in PLI.\(^{48}\)

(Similar considerations to those discussed in reference to Impure RI show that it doesn’t matter what further logical content might be packed into the Naïve Modalist understanding of “is god” in a regimentation of P1 through P3 as long as “x is god” doesn’t entail \( x \neq f, x \neq s, \) or \( x \neq h \). More precisely, if:

\[ \phi^I_x \models t_1 \neq f \lor t_1 \neq s \lor t_1 \neq h \]

then

\[ \phi^f_x \& \phi^s_x \& \phi^h_x \]

is inconsistent anyway. On the other hand, if:

\[ \phi^I_x \not\models t_1 \neq f \lor t_1 \neq s \lor t_1 \neq h \]

then

\(^{48}\) It should be obvious that there is a model for \( \Phi_{NM-1} \) as well as a model for \( \Phi_{NM-2} \), and each proof is left as an exercise for the reader.
\[\phi_x^f & \phi_x^s & \phi_x^h & f=s & f=h & s=h & (\exists x)(\forall y)(\phi x & (\phi y \rightarrow y=x))\]

is consistent.)

But although both of these regimentations are consistent (given the caveat in the preceding paragraph), neither is much in the way of a regimentation of P, because however P4 through P6 ought to be analyzed, this isn’t it. NM avoids the inconsistency of LPT\(_1\) and LPT\(_2\), not by so much by offering legitimate alternative regimentations of P4 through P6, but by simply denying them. NM is certainly heretical by the lights of historical orthodoxy, and entails what I think the orthodox saw as problematic in SM anyway. So for our current purposes, this will complete our discussion of alternative answers to the LPT that have actually been proposed, both in ancient times and in our own.

But one wonders... are these the only ways one could possibly solve the LPT? And if not, what other options could there be for the Trinitarian? If there are no other options, how could we know that?

Some philosophers seem to hope that further “Trinitarian theorizing” may bring forth creative new solutions to the LPT.

But is that even possible?
They find fault with those who keep silent
They find fault with those who speak much
They find fault with those who speak moderately
In this world, there is no one they do not find at fault
– The Dhammapada, verse 227

In the last section, we saw several alternative proposed answers to the LPT. But are these the only possible answers to the LPT? Or could we invent new ones?

Some philosophers find fault with all of the on-offer solutions to the LPT, but hold out hope for new avenues in “Trinitarian theorizing.” They hold that the “business of Trinitarian theorizing” is simply “unfinished,” and that there may be fresh, new ways of creatively answering (and hopefully solving) the LPT. For example, Dale Tuggy in “The Unfinished Business of Trinitarian Theorizing,” asks us to consider an analogue of what I have called P. He writes:

Consider the following six Trinitarian claims:

(1) God is divine.
(2) The Father of Jesus Christ is divine.
(3) The Son, Jesus Christ, is divine.
(4) The Holy Spirit is divine.
(5) The Father is not the Son is not the Holy Spirit is not God. That is, these four – Father, Son, Holy Spirit, God – are numerically distinct individuals.

This last claim can be broken into two parts:
(5a) These three are numerically distinct: Father, Son, and Holy Spirit.
(5b) God is numerically distinct from any of these: Father, Son, Holy Spirit.
(6) Whatever is divine is identical to at least one of these: the Father, the Son, or the Holy Spirit.¹

And in an endnote, he gives a regimentation of these claims in PLI:

In contemporary logical symbolism:

(1) \(Dg\)
(2) \(Df\)
(3) \(Ds\)
(4) \(Dh\)
(5) \(f \neq s \neq h \neq g\) (That is, \(f \neq s \& s \neq h \& f \neq h \& f \neq g \& s \neq g \& h \neq g\).)

(5a) \(f \neq s \& s \neq h \& f \neq h\)
(5b) \(f \neq g \& s \neq g \& h \neq g\)
(6) \((x) (Dx \rightarrow (x = f \lor x = s \lor x = h))\)

(5) is compatible with \(g=(f, s, h)\), the claim that God is identical to the mereological sum of Father, Son, and Holy Spirit.²

Tuggy claims that (5b) is the only claim that is “not a datum of the New Testament.”³ He explores a few of what he seems to think of as different “versions” of the doctrine of the Trinity,⁴ and finds fault with all of them. However, at least at the time of writing, he still held out hope. “We Christian theologians and philosophers came up with the doctrine of the Trinity; perhaps with God’s help we will come up with

¹. (Tuggy 2003), p. 166. It should be noted that Tuggy has since abandoned altogether the project of “Trinitarian theorizing” and now simply adheres to what he calls “humanitarian unitarianism,” more commonly called by its proponents, “biblical unitarianism.”

². (Tuggy 2003), p. 181.


⁴. See Chapter 3.1, p. 83, for criticism of such talk of “versions” of the doctrine of the Trinity.
a better version of it.”\textsuperscript{5} I think the sentiment is not atypical of many philosophers in the field. In this paper, Tuggy claims that, if we reject (5b), “There are materials left ((1)–(4), (6)) for a different kind of Trinitarian theory, whatever we replace (5) with. . . Whatever we come up with won’t be a version of either LT [i.e., RI] or ST.”

But could there really be any importantly different solution to the LPT? Something that is neither a form of RI nor of ST? Is there hope that further “Trinitarian theorizing” may someday pay off in a creative, new way of understanding the Trinity, heretofore undreamt of, and that avoids the anti-Trinitarian’s criticisms in some previously unimagined way? Is “the business of Trinitarian theorizing” really “unfinished” in this sense?

No.

This can be proven in the following way. First, we will note the key logical features of the already proposed answers to the LPT. Second, we will use these features to create a jointly exhaustive (though not mutually exclusive) taxonomy of sets, or “Families,” of answers to the LPT.

2.1 Method, Briefly

Of course, there are infinitely many possible languages in which to regiment P, and within many of those languages, infinitely many sets of sentences with which to regiment P. But for the purposes of showing there to be a formally adequate solution to the LPT, it would be “overkill” to map out all of them.

For example, once we see how Pure RI avoids inconsistency by eschewing classical identity and positing alternative, relative identity relations in its place, it doesn’t matter whether we go on to equivocate on “is god” among P1 through P3 or not. Once we see what minimal set of logical features of Pure RI allows it to avoid formal

\textsuperscript{5} (Tuggy 2003), p. 179.
inconsistency, we can group together all proposed answers to the LPT that share those features into one set, or “family,” of answers to the LPT. Then we can go on to consider only other proposed answers that do not share those features.

We will proceed in 7 steps, plus three initial caveats.

2.1.1 Three Caveats

First, aside from the Pure RI-er, everyone involved in the debate seems to accept some version of PLI as a formally adequate language for P. Or in any case, they may as well. Therefore, we will continue with our “prejudice” towards PLI. Specifically, we will assume (or pretend) that: PLI is a formally adequate language for P if and only if there is such a thing as classical identity. And if we accept that PLI is a formally adequate language for P, PLI is what we will use to regiment P.

Second, nobody involved in the debate takes it to be legitimate to equivocate on the terms “the Father,” “the Son,” or “the Holy Spirit.” Nor does anyone take them to be anything other than singular terms, if there are such things as singular terms. So, we will also adopt the policy that, so long as we are working within a language in which there are such things as singular terms, we will insist on treating “the Father,” “the Son,” and “the Holy Spirit” as singular terms, and on regimenting them univocally wherever they appear.

6. There is an exception to every rule. See (Baber 2008).

7. In what follows, we shall always let those singular terms be, respectively, “f,” “s,” and “h,” when we are using PLI. Strictly speaking, then, we are leaving out regimentations that use other terms, other logical names, in PLI, such as “a,” “b,” and “c,” to refer to the persons. To be more logically precise, we should instead use meta-linguistic variables such as “α,” “β,” and “γ” to range over all possible terms in the language, with the stipulation that \( \alpha \neq \beta \neq \gamma \) (i.e., that the values of these meta-linguistic variables, the terms or “logical names,” be distinct, not necessarily that their bearers be distinct, which would be the substance of P4 through P6 in all non-NM regimentations). But while this latter course is the more logically precise, it would introduce needless complexity, in this context, in what will already be a complex taxonomy. So, we will simply choose always to use “f,” “s,” and “h,” in PLI as the terms for the persons.
analyzing what appear to be singular terms in natural languages that gets around
the too-cozy relation between singular terms and classical identity.

Third, while both Pure and Impure RI-ers count by a relation other than classical
identity, neither they nor anybody else rejects the general schema with which logicians
typically analyze counting statements. In other words, nobody denies that, a formally
adequate regimentation of “There is exactly one God” would have the schema:

\[(\exists x)(\forall y)(\phi x \& (\phi y \rightarrow y R x))\]

(where R is a meta-linguistic variable to be filled in with a predicate standing for
whatever relation we count by).

Further, it’s hard to see what other schema one could count by. So, we will only
consider answers to the logical problem of the Trinity where P7 is regimented as some
instance of \((7_\text{SCHEMA})\), whether those instances give R the value of classical identity,
some relative identity relation, or whatever.

(It should be noted that, even if one were to disagree with all three of these
provisos, it would by no means wreck the attempt to create a complete taxonomy of
possible answers to the LPT. It would only mean that there would be, at most, an
additional three Families of answers to the LPT – one Family of answers that does
not treat “Father,” “Son” and “Holy Spirit” as singular terms (despite accepting the
formal adequacy of a language that includes singular terms) and/or equivocates on
those terms, one Family that acknowledges classical identity but that for some reason
does not find PLI formally adequate, and one Family that regiments P7 according to
some schema other than the usual one. I don’t find any of those suggestions plausible
enough to warrant attention, and I think few in the debate would. But again, even
if I am wrong, we could still give a complete taxonomy of all possible answers to
the LPT. In other words, we can group all answers to the LPT that have any of
these three features into “the Bastard Step-Child Family,” which we will then simply
As we did in Section 1, suppose that in P1 through P3 we take “is God” to be univocal, treat “God” as the name of an individual, and treat “is” as the “is” of (classical) identity. Then suppose we take “is not” in P4 through P6 as univocal claims of (classical) non-identity. In this case, there is such a thing as classical identity, so we take PLI to be a formally adequate language for P, and we use it. The result is, or at least entails, LPT₁, or something just like LPT₁ except for 7_{LPT-1}.

But since 7_{LPT-1} is not necessary in order to derive a contradiction, we will group together any proposed answers to the LPT that share the problematic features of its regimentation of P1 through P6. What exactly are those problematic features?

It might seem that the most salient feature of LPT₁ is that it treats “God” as a logical name instead of a predicate. But of course, a contradiction would arise even if there were another name being used besides “God.” And a contradiction would arise even if we treated P1 through P3 not as identity claims, but in a way that entailed a certain kind of identity claim.

For example, suppose I regiment “x is God” as a predication meaning “x is divine,” but then analyze “x is divine” as meaning “x is identical to Lucifer.” I will still have a contradiction, and for essentially the same reasons, logically speaking, as LPT₁. Indeed, if there is any term tᵢ such that tᵢ ≠ x and my analysis of “x is God” entails “x = tᵢ” I will end up with a contradiction. That is because “The Father is God” will now entail “The Father = tᵢ” and “The Son is God” will entail “The Son = tᵢ.”

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8. In conversation, Donald Smith has expressed, not quite endorsement, but enthusiastic curiosity and willingness to explore, a view in which “Father,” “Son,” and “Holy Spirit” would be something like mass terms, and “God” a count noun, designating a thing constituted out of three different kinds of stuff. I hasten to emphasize, then, that I would count only such a view as falling within a category I have merely stipulatively tagged with the label of “Bastard Stepchild.” I would not of course count adherents of such views as having the nature of a bastard stepchild.
those will entail “The Father = the Son,” and that will contradict $4_{\text{LPT-1}}$, or anything that entails $4_{\text{LPT-1}}$. So, we can group together any answers to the LPT that:

(1) use PLI, and

(2) give some univocal regimentation $\phi$ to “is God” in P1 through P3, such that

(3) $\phi\alpha \models \alpha = t_i$ for some term $t_i$ such that $t_i \neq \alpha$, and

(4) either regiment “is not” in P4 through P6 univocally as $\neq$, or for any other reason entails $4_{\text{LPT-1}}$, $5_{\text{LPT-1}}$, and $6_{\text{LPT-1}}$

into the “LPT$_1$ Family.” Any member of the LPT$_1$ Family will be a non-solution to the LPT.

So, from here on, we will only consider proposed answers to the LPT that do at least one (or more) of the following:

(1) use a language other than PLI (and so reject the existence of classical identity), or

(2) fail to give a univocal regimentation $\phi$ to “is god” in P1 through P3, or

(3) give a univocal regimentation $\phi$ to “is god” in P1 through P3 such that $\phi\alpha \not\models \alpha = t_i$ for any term $t_i$ such that $t_i \neq \alpha$, or

(4) regiment “is not” in any of P4 through P6 in some way other than $\neq$, and do not for any other reason entail $4_{\text{LPT-1}}$, $5_{\text{LPT-1}}$, or $6_{\text{LPT-1}}$.

2.3 The Non-PLI (Pure RI) Family

We’ve seen how Pure RI escapes inconsistency by rejecting classical identity, and with it PLI (option (1) above). By doing so, Pure RI obviously need not treat “is god” in P1 through P3 as being (or entailing any) classical identity claims at all. Nor need it treat “is not” in P4 through P6 as being (or entailing any) classical non-identity claims. Nor need it treat “one god” in P7 as involving classical identity.

9. 1 is strictly speaking redundant, given 3 and our “prejudice” that, as long as there is such a thing as classical identity, PLI is a formally adequate language for P, and the language we will use to regiment P.
Since we are assuming (or pretending) that PLI is a formally adequate language for P if and only if there is such a thing as classical identity, we will group together all answers to the LPT that reject classical identity, and with it PLI, into the “Non-PLI Family” of answers – the family of answers all of which choose option (1) above. Since we have already seen at least one member of the Non-PLI Family that has a logically consistent regimentation of P (our Pure RI proposed solution), we know that the Non-PLI Family contains solutions to the LPT.\textsuperscript{10}

So, from here on, we will only consider proposed answers to the LPT that accept the existence of classical identity and that (therefore, given our “prejudice” towards PLI) use PLI as the language in which to regiment P.

2.4 The Naïve Modalist Family (and Cousins)

We’ve seen how NM escapes inconsistency by analyzing P4 through P6 in such a way as to essentially reject them.

A related move would be to regiment P4 through P6 in a a non-committal way that simply does not entail any of the relevant classical identity claims, i.e. 4\textsubscript{LPT-1}, 5\textsubscript{LPT-1}, or 6\textsubscript{LPT-1}, despite accepting that there is such a thing as classical identity, thus falling into option (4) above.

We’ve seen that orthodox Trinitarians intended to draw a strong, real distinction between the persons. And, assuming classical non-identity exists, it is the weakest real distinction that can be drawn. But P4 through P6 seem to be intended to draw that distinction between the persons.

So, if the orthodox Trinitarian accepts the existence of classical (non-)identity, he himself will insist on regimenting P4 through P6 as classical non-identity claims (4\textsubscript{LPT-1}, 5\textsubscript{LPT-1}, and 6\textsubscript{LPT-1}). Or in any case, he would certainly accept, and not deny, ...
what such a regimentation expresses. Indeed, he would insist on it. If the orthodox Trinitarian wanted to analyze P4 through P6 as drawing an *even stronger* distinction than classical non-identity, he would still at least *accept* $4_{LPT-1}$, $5_{LPT-1}$, and $6_{LPT-1}$.

Indeed, if his preferred analysis involved a “stronger” relation, he would no doubt insist that, in some way or another, his preferred analysis *entailed* $4_{LPT-1}$, $5_{LPT-1}$, and $6_{LPT-1}$.

Thus, we will group together all proposed answers to the LPT that (a) accept the existence of classical (non-)identity, but (b) do *not* entail all of $4_{LPT-1}$, $5_{LPT-1}$, and $6_{LPT-1}$, into the “Naïve Modalist Family” (“NM Family”) of answers.11 Since we have already seen at least one member of the NM Family that has a logically consistent regimentation of P, we know that the NM Family contains solutions to the LPT.12

Note that defining the NM Family this way means there will be certain “cousins” of Naïve Modalism included in the NM Family that will regiment, for example, “the Father is not the Son” simply as some “ho-hum” relation, “f Rs,” that neither commits us to the classical identity of the persons (characteristic of NM), *nor* the classical non-identity of the persons (characteristic of orthodox Trinitarianism). Is it right to include such non-committal answers in the NM Family?

I think so. Again, the intent of the orthodox Trinitarian in saying that “the Father is not the Son,” is to draw a strong, real distinction between the two, and, at least

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11. A bit of logical housekeeping is in order. What about an answer to the LPT that, say, entails $4_{LPT-1}$, but fails to entail either $5_{LPT-1}$ or $6_{LPT-1}$? Thus, the Father and Son would be identical, but the Holy Spirit would be distinct from the Son/Father, a possibility St. Photios calls “a semi-Sabellian monster” in his arguments against the *filioque*. (PHOTIUS 1983, p. 73.)

As we’ve defined the NM Family (any regimentation that does not entail $4_{LPT-1}$, $5_{LPT-1}$, and $6_{LPT-1}$ – all three), it includes such “semi-Sabellian monstrosities.” And this seems like a reasonable grouping. Clearly the orthodox Trinitarian wants to understand P4 through P6 univocally. Any kind of semi-Sabellian view is just about as bad, from the point of view of orthodoxy, as all-out Sabellianism.

Of course, this will mean that some members of the NM Family will still be inconsistent, and for just the same reasons (at least some subset of the same reasons) as LPT1 is. But that is fine. All I am claiming here is that *some* members of the NM Family are consistent.

12. It also contains non-solutions, but that will not matter for present concerns.
within a framework that accepts classical non-identity in the first place, classical non-identity will be the weakest real distinction there is. Thus, any regimentation of “is not” that does not even entail classical non-identity (within a framework that admits the existence of classical non-identity) clearly subverts the intent of the claim. Or in any case, it clearly fails to say what the orthodox Trinitarian wants to be saying when he says “the Father is not the Son.” On the other hand, regimentations of “is not” in P4 through P6 that are not classical non-identity statements but that do entail them will still be inconsistent with anything that \(4_{\text{LPT-1}}, 5_{\text{LPT-1}}, \) and \(6_{\text{LPT-1}}\) are inconsistent with anyway (since they will entail \(4_{\text{LPT-1}}, 5_{\text{LPT-1}}, \) and \(6_{\text{LPT-1}}\)).

So, from here on, we will only consider proposed answers to the LPT that do not reject P4 through P6 and that either do regiment them univocally as classical non-identity claims between the persons, or else as some formula \(\chi\) that in some other way at least entails those classical non-identity claims.

That means that at this point we can “lock in” our regimentation of P4 through P6 as:

\[
\begin{align*}
(4_{\text{LPT-2-FAMILY}}) & \ \chi_1 \text{ such that } \chi_1 \models f \neq s \\
(5_{\text{LPT-2-FAMILY}}) & \ \chi_2 \text{ such that } \chi_2 \models f \neq h \\
(6_{\text{LPT-2-FAMILY}}) & \ \chi_3 \text{ such that } \chi_3 \models s \neq h
\end{align*}
\]

2.5 The Equivocation\textsubscript{1} Family (Arian)

We’ve seen how Arianism escapes inconsistency by equivocating on “is god” among P1 through P3 (option (2) above). So, we will group together all such answers to the LPT into the “Equivocation\textsubscript{1} Family” of answers. Since we have already seen at least one member of the Equivocation\textsubscript{1} Family that has a logically consistent regimentation for P, we know that the Equivocation\textsubscript{1} Family contains solutions to the LPT.\textsuperscript{13}

\textsuperscript{13} It also contains non-solutions, but that will not matter for present concerns.
So, from here on, we will only consider proposed answers to the LPT that do not equivocate on “is god” among P1 through P3.

Thus, we can now “lock in” at least the univocality of our regimentation of P1 through P3 as follows:

(1LPT-2-FAMILY) φ of such that φα \not= α = t_i for any term t_i such that t_i \neq α

(2LPT-2-FAMILY) φs such that φα \not= α = t_i for any term t_i such that t_i \neq α

(3LPT-2-FAMILY) φh such that φα \not= α = t_i for any term t_i such that t_i \neq α

Why will φ be such that φα \not= α = t_i for any term t_i such that t_i \neq α? After Step 1 we decided to only consider answers to the LPT that do one of the following:

(1) use a language other than PLI (and so reject the existence of classical identity), or

(2) fail to give a univocal regimentation φ to “is god” in P1 through P3, or

(3) give a univocal regimentation φ to “is god” in P1 through P3 such that φα \not= α = t_i for any term t_i such that t_i \neq α, or

(4) regiment “is not” in any of P4 through P6 in some way other than \not=, and do not for any other reason entail 4LPT-1, 5LPT-1, or 6LPT-1.

After Step 2 we decided only to consider proposed answers to the LPT that do use PLI (so, option (1) is no longer open). After Step 3 we decided only to consider proposed answers to the logical problem of the Trinity that do regiment “is not” in P4 through P6 as \not= (or at least for some other reason entail 4LPT-1, 5LPT-1, and 6LPT-1) (so, option (4) is no longer open). After Step 4, we decided to no longer consider answers to the LPT that equivocate on their regimentation of “is god” among P1 through P3 (so, option (2) is no longer open).

But since we are only considering answers to the LPT that choose at least one of the above four options, we can now only consider answers that take option (3), that is, that give a univocal regimentation φ to “is God” in P1 through P3, but such that φα \not= α = t_i, for any term t_i such that t_i \neq α.
Since $\phi \alpha \not\equiv \alpha = t_i$, for any term $t_i$ such that $t_i \neq \alpha$, it will not contradict any of:

(4LPT-2-FAMILY) $\chi_1$ such that $\chi_1 \models f \neq s$

(5LPT-2-FAMILY) $\chi_2$ such that $\chi_2 \models f \neq h$

(6LPT-2-FAMILY) $\chi_3$ such that $\chi_3 \models s \neq h$

simply on the basis of the non-identity claims. That is, whatever other logical form may be buried within $\chi_1$, $\chi_2$, and $\chi_3$, could still generate a contradiction, but the non-identity claims themselves will not.

So, from here on out, we know we are dealing with families of answers to the LPT such that their regimentations of P1 through P6 will be consistent barring any problematic logical features that might be tucked away in the regimentation of “is not” beyond mere non-identity. Their regimentations of P1 through P6 will certainly be consistent if “is not” in P4 through P6 is simply analyzed univocally as classical non-identity.

So, our focus now will be on the regimentation of P7.

2.6 The Equivocation2 Family

(Social Trinitarian)

We’ve seen how Social Trinitarianism escapes inconsistency by equivocating on “is god” between P7 on the one hand, and P1 through P3 on the other. Thus, different versions of ST will give regimentations of the form:

(1LPT-2-FAMILY) $\phi f$ such that $\phi \alpha \not\equiv \alpha = t_i$ for any term $t_i$ such that $t_i \neq \alpha$

(2LPT-2-FAMILY) $\phi s$ such that $\phi \alpha \not\equiv \alpha = t_i$ for any term $t_i$ such that $t_i \neq \alpha$

(3LPT-2-FAMILY) $\phi h$ such that $\phi \alpha \not\equiv \alpha = t_i$ for any term $t_i$ such that $t_i \neq \alpha$

(4LPT-2-FAMILY) $\chi_1$ such that $\chi_1 \models f \neq s$

(5LPT-2-FAMILY) $\chi_2$ such that $\chi_2 \models f \neq h$

(6LPT-2-FAMILY) $\chi_3$ such that $\chi_3 \models s \neq h$
That is, the regimentation $\phi$ of “is god” for P1 through P3 will be different from the regimentation $\psi$ of “is god” in P7. As we said earlier, not all such answers to the LPT will involve anything particularly “social.” This is simply the salient logical feature of ST that allows it to escape contradiction. So we will group together all such answers to the LPT into the “Equivocation$_2$ Family” of answers.$^{14}$ Since we have already seen at least one member of the Equivocation$_2$ Family that has a logically consistent regimentation, we know that the Equivocation$_2$ Family contains solutions to LPT.$^{15}$

So, from here on, we will only consider proposed answers to the LPT that do not equivocate on “is god” between P7 on the one hand, and P1 through P3 on the other.

We have already “locked in” regimentations of P1 through P6. We are no longer considering answers to the logical problem of the Trinity that equivocate on “is god” between P7 on the one hand, and P1 through P3 on the other. So, however we regiment “is god” in P1 through P3, it will have to be the same as it appears in P7. Since we are assuming that counting can only work according to the usual schema (only the precise relation may be disputed), we can now “lock in” regimentations of all of P1 through P7 as:

$$(1_{\text{LPT-2-FAMILY}}) \phi$ such that $\phi_\alpha \not= \alpha = t_i$ for any term $t_i$ such that $t_i \not= \alpha$$

$$(2_{\text{LPT-2-FAMILY}}) \phi$ such that $\phi_\alpha \not= \alpha = t_i$ for any term $t_i$ such that $t_i \not= \alpha$$

$^{14}$ Note that, as we are defining the Equivocation$_2$ Family, it is necessary that a member of the Equivocation$_2$ Family family equivocate on “is god,” but it is not necessary that it employ classical identity. A view that both equivocates in this way and employs a relation other than classical identity here would still fall into the Equivocation$_2$ Family as we are defining it. Of course, if one finds it more useful, one could have a separate “hybrid” family, the members of which would both equivocate on “is god” and count by a relation other than classical identity, then have a “pure” Equivocation$_2$ Family, the members of which equivocate on “is god” and do count by classical identity. For now, I will find it more convenient simply to group these all together into one Equivocation$_2$ Family, albeit a family, like Joseph’s, that is “splittable” into the half-tribes of “Pure Equivocation$_2$ Family” and “Hybrid Equivocation$_2$ Family.”

$^{15}$ It also contains non-solutions, but that will not matter for present concerns.
(3\text{LPT-2-FAMILY}) \ \phi h \text{ such that } \phi \alpha \not\equiv \alpha = t_i \text{ for any term } t_i \text{ such that } t_i \neq \alpha

(4\text{LPT-2-FAMILY}) \ \chi_1 \text{ such that } \chi_1 \models f \neq s

(5\text{LPT-2-FAMILY}) \ \chi_2 \text{ such that } \chi_2 \models f \neq h

(6\text{LPT-2-FAMILY}) \ \chi_3 \text{ such that } \chi_3 \models s \neq h

(7\text{SCHEMA-}}_{\phi}) \quad (\exists x)(\forall y)(\phi x \land (\phi y \rightarrow y \mathbin{R} x))

(such that \phi \alpha \not\equiv \alpha = t_i \text{ for any term } t_i \text{ such that } t_i \neq \alpha)

leaving open only the question of precisely what relation “\( \mathbin{R} \)” will represent in (7\text{SCHEMA-}}_{\phi}).

2.7 The Non-Classical-Identity-Counting Family

We’ve seen how Impure RI escapes inconsistency by claiming that our counting practices (at least sometimes) employ some relation(s) other than classical identity. We are assuming that the logical form of “is god” is not itself formally contradictory and that it does not entail a classical identity claim to some single individual.\(^{16}\) Thus, as long as the relation we give for \( \mathbin{R} \) in (7\text{SCHEMA-}}_{\phi}) is not classical identity and as long as \( y \mathbin{R} x \) does not entail \( y = x \), no contradiction will be derivable.

So, we will group together all answers to the LPT that analyze counting statements \textit{via} a relation other than classical identity, and that do not entail classical identity, into the “Non-Classical-Identity-Counting Family” (“NCIC Family”) of answers.\(^{17}\) Since we have already seen at least one member of the NCIC Family that has a logically consistent regimentation of \( P \), we know that the NCIC Family contains

\(^{16}\) Again, the assumption that the logical form of “is god” is not in itself contradictory is redundant, given the assumption that it doesn’t entail a certain kind of identity claim. A contradiction entails anything.

\(^{17}\) Note that this means that Pure RI will fall into both the Non-PLI Family and the NCIC Family. That is fine, since this is only intended to be a jointly exhaustive, not mutually exclusive, taxonomy of answers to the LPT. I will have more to say about this below under the heading “Consolidating our Taxonomy of Proposed Answers.”
solutions to the LPT.\textsuperscript{18}

So, from here on, we will only consider proposed answers to the LPT that do count by classical identity. Since we are assuming that we must use the usual schema for counting, and since we are not equivocating on “is god” between P7 on the one hand, and P1 through P3 on the other, if we use classical identity as the relation to count by in P7, we fill in the variable $R$ in:

$$(7_{\text{SCHEMA-$\phi$}})(\exists x)(\forall y)(\phi x \land (\phi y \to y \mathbin{R} x))$$

with “$=$” and have:

$$(7_{\text{LPT-2-FAMILY}})(\exists x)(\forall y)(\phi x \land (\phi y \to y = x))$$

(And if we used any other relation $R$ such that $R$ entails classical identity, then our regimentation of P7, whatever it might be, would still at least entail $(7_{\text{LPT-2-FAMILY}})$.)

Thus, we are now out of formally consistent alternatives to LPT\textsubscript{1}. We can now “lock in” our entire regimentation of P1 through P7 as:

### 2.8 The LPT\textsubscript{2} Family

$$(1_{\text{LPT-2-FAMILY}}) \phi f \text{ such that } \phi \alpha \not= \alpha = t_i \text{ for any term } t_i \text{ such that } t_i \not= \alpha$$

$$(2_{\text{LPT-2-FAMILY}}) \phi s \text{ such that } \phi \alpha \not= \alpha = t_i \text{ for any term } t_i \text{ such that } t_i \not= \alpha$$

$$(3_{\text{LPT-2-FAMILY}}) \phi h \text{ such that } \phi \alpha \not= \alpha = t_i \text{ for any term } t_i \text{ such that } t_i \not= \alpha$$

$$(4_{\text{LPT-2-FAMILY}}) \chi_1 \text{ such that } \chi_1 \models f \not= s$$

$$(5_{\text{LPT-2-FAMILY}}) \chi_2 \text{ such that } \chi_2 \models f \not= h$$

$$(6_{\text{LPT-2-FAMILY}}) \chi_3 \text{ such that } \chi_3 \models s \not= h$$

$$(7_{\text{LPT-2-FAMILY-Schema}})(\exists x)(\forall y)(\phi x \land (\phi y \to y x))$$

(such that $\phi \alpha \not= \alpha = t_i$ for any term $t_i$ such that $t_i \not= \alpha$)

(such that $y x \models y = x$)

\textsuperscript{18} It also contains non-solutions, but that will not matter for present concerns.
All proposed answers to the LPT that fall into the LPT₂ Family will be non-solutions.

2.9 Consolidating our Taxonomy of Proposed Answers

We can now usefully reduce the number of options by grouping together some of these families of answers.

First, anti-Trinitarians need not be picky about whether it is some member(s) of the LPT₁ Family or of the LPT₂ Family that is(are) formally adequate. So we can group these together and talk simply of the “LPT Family.” This leaves only 6 families of answers to the LPT.

Second, orthodox Trinitarians will want to reject all of the answers in the Equivocation₁ Family and all of the answers in the NM Family as heretical. Thus, we can usefully group all of these answers together into the “CTH Family.” (And since we are including the Equivocation₁ Family into the CTH Family, we will also now allow ourselves to refer to the Equivocation₂ Family simply as “the Equivocation Family.”)

Of course, this is not to say that other regimentations contained in other families of answers might not in some way involve us in some kind of heresy. So, while we will call the set of answers to the LPT that includes both the Equivocation₁ Family and the NM Family the “CTH Family,” we will do so with the caveat that while only heretical views on the Trinity will have regimentations that fall into the CTH Family, not all heretical views about the Trinity will have regimentations that fall into the CTH Family. (One can usefully think of the “CTH Family” as the “Purely Heretical Family,” while regimentations of P found in other families of answers to the logical problem of the Trinity could still be used to express heretical views about the Trinity, once the content is filled in.)¹⁹ This leaves only 5 families of answers to the LPT.

¹⁹. “God is good” and “God is evil” have the same logical form. Clearly, there is more to heresy
Third, by rejecting classical identity altogether, Pure RI perforce counts by a relation other than classical identity. But that is the characteristic feature of Impure RI that allows it to escape contradiction. So, from the point of view of formal consistency, it is really irrelevant whether one then goes on to accept or reject the existence of classical identity and the formal adequacy of PLI. That is, as long as a Pure RI answer agrees with an Impure RI answer in its regimentation of P7 (or its equivalent of P7) as involving a relation other than classical identity, and which doesn’t entail classical identity (and Pure RI must agree with Impure RI about that), and as long as whatever formula φ it uses in its regimentations of P1 through P3 (or its equivalent of P1 through P3) is such that φα ≠ α = ti for any term ti such that ti ≠ α (and Pure RI must agree with Impure RI about that as well), then it is irrelevant whether we say that there is such a thing as classical identity or not. And it is irrelevant whether we regiment P4 through P6 (or the Pure RI equivalent of P4 through P6) as involving classical non-identity, as in:

(4_{Impure-RI}) f ≠ s
(5_{Impure-RI}) f ≠ h
(6_{Impure-RI}) s ≠ h

or as involving only some relative non-identity relation, as in:

(Φ_{Pure-RI}): ... x ≠_p y & x ≠_p z & y ≠_p z ...

(cf. P4 to P6)

(Either can yield consistent regimentations, as has already been proven.)

And since we grouped together all answers to the LPT that claim that counting works by some relation other than classical identity, and that does not entail classical identity, into the NCIC Family of answers, Pure RI is already included in it anyway.\(^{20}\)

\(^{20}\) This is one example of why the categories of our taxonomy are jointly exhaustive, but not mutually exclusive.
We can see that the appearance of Pure RI being importantly distinct from Impure RI (in a sense relevant simply to the question of formal consistency at least) is an illusion. Pure RI may have *rhetorical* (or other) advantages (if there is no such thing as classical identity, then we *must* count by a relation other than classical identity). But any advantages it may have are not *formal*.

The rejection of PLI is in itself controversial. And no proposed answers to the LPT have been presented that fall into the Non-PLI Family that do not also fall into the NCIC Family. And it is hard to imagine what such an answer might look like, and what might motivate such a view.

Thus, it seems to me we may as well ignore any members of the Non-PLI Family that are not also members of the NCIC family, relegating them to the “Bastard Stepchild Family,” while their NCIC brothers will remain in the NCIC Family.

That leaves only 4 families of answers to the LPT,\(^21\) namely:

1. the Equivocation Family,
2. the NCIC Family,
3. the CTH Family, and
4. the LPT Family.

All answers in the LPT Family are non-solutions. All answers in the CTH Family will be unacceptable to the orthodox Trinitarian. So, if the orthodox Trinitarian wants to give an answer to the LPT that is both (a) non-heretical and (b) a *solution* to the LPT, it must fall into either:

(a) the Equivocation Family, which equivocates on “is god” between P7 and P1 through P3, or

(b) the NCIC Family, which counts by a relation other than classical identity.\(^22\)

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\(^{21}\) Aside from the Bastard Stepchild Family, of course, which we are, appropriately enough, ignoring.

\(^{22}\) It could fall into both, since, again, these categories are jointly exhaustive but *not* mutually
Thus, anyone who takes the “business of Trinitarian theorizing” to be “unfinished,” who is holding out hope for some fresh, new way of understanding the doctrine of the Trinity (or at least P), is out of luck. Every answer to the LPT must fall into one (or more) of the categories we have discussed. Only two of these categories contain any solutions to the LPT that are non-heretical. These two categories do indeed roughly correspond to the usual divide between Social Trinitarianism and Relative Identity Trinitarianism (or “Latin Trinitarianism” as it is sometimes, but unfortunately, called).  

Anyone who rejects ST on the basis of its characteristic equivocation must reject all answers in the Equivocation Family. And anyone who rejects RI on the basis of its analysis of counting must reject all answers in the NCIC Family. As for any new twist that a philosopher’s Trinitarian theory might incorporate, it may help with the metaphysical problem of the Trinity, or have some rhetorical benefit or other nice features, but from a purely formal point of view, they will be just another member of one of the families of answers to the LPT we have defined in this section.

So, we know what the LPT is. We know what form a proposed answer to the exclusive. If one prefers a mutually exclusive taxonomy here, one could stipulate that the NCIC Family not equivocate on “is god,” then split the Equivocation Family into the “pure” and “hybrid” ST families, and relabel them as the “pure NCIC Family,” “pure ST family” and “hybrid family,” respectively.

23. Although we have seen that it is the feature of equivocation and not the “social” aspect of ST that matters to the question of consistency. Also that the family corresponding to Latin or Relative Identity Trinitarian views is perhaps broader than one might have thought. There is, however, still a rough correspondence, at least.

24. What, then, was wrong with Tuggy’s way of formulating the LPT? It clearly leaves something out of the equation. If we look at his formalization of the problem, we can see that it is not, in fact, equivalent to P. One could escape the inconsistency he points to just by admitting that while all three persons are “divine,” the word “God,” when used as a proper name, refers to the Father (f=g), but not to the Son or Spirit. Indeed, this is eventually the position taken by Tuggy. Despite Tuggy’s idiosyncratic definitions of "Trinitarian" and "Unitarian," this view seems “Trinitarian” enough, and doesn’t even seem particularly unorthodox, and it would avoid the contradiction he points out. But it doesn’t solve the LPT at all. Thus, Tuggy’s formulation of the logical problem of the Trinity is inadequate. That is the source of the false hope it gives.
LPT must take. We also have a useful taxonomy of “families” into which all proposed answers to the LPT must fall.

But none of this tells us which proposed solution(s) or non-solution(s) to the LPT is (are) right (viz. formally adequate). How would we tell a formally adequate answer if we saw it? And here is where we will see that there is a parting of ways in the methodology of the literature.

Those I will call “puzzlers” hold that the question is something like a metaphysical “puzzle” to be solved. More Trinitarian theorizing is what we need.

Those I will call “historicists” hold that the question is best seen as a historical one, as an inquiry into what beliefs certain people in the past actually held. Historical inquiry is what we need...

...Which is the right way to proceed with our inquiry?
PART II

METHODOLOGY
I wanted to [...] warn him, while there was still time, against such English hypothesis-mongering into the blue. It is quite clear which color is a hundred times more important for a genealogist than blue: namely grey, which is to say, that which can be documented, which can actually be confirmed and has actually existed...

But it is unfortunately a fact that historical spirit itself is lacking in them... As is now established philosophical practice, they all think in a way that is essentially unhistorical...

– Nietzsche, The Genealogy of Morals

Business Plan:
Phase 1: Collect Underpants
Phase 2: ?
Phase 3: Profit

– South Park, Season 2, episode 17 – “Gnomes”

We ended the last section with the question, of all of the possible logical forms we might ascribe to P, which one is right. (Or, if more than one is right, which ones?)

Not much has been written explicitly about the methodology of this question, but the literature reveals that most authors dealing with the LPT seem to approach it with a similar set of methodological assumptions on which the LPT can be treated as something like a philosophical “puzzle.” I call their methodological approach “the Puzzle Approach” and its followers “puzzlers.” This methodology centers around giving accounts of the Trinity that have the virtue of being logically consistent, and in most cases some other theoretical virtues as well. But I will argue that, if their
conclusion is supposed to be that the doctrine of the Trinity (or at least P) is logically consistent, then, like the methodological approach of the Underpants Gnomes, theirs is missing a critical link. And this lacuna renders their arguments either invalid or question-begging in the context of the LPT. Furthermore, I will argue it is not clear how they could shore up the methodology without simply collapsing into the methodology I will advocate, which I call “the Historical Approach” (and its followers “historicists”).

Next, I will consider another identifiable methodological approach I will “the Mysterian Approach,” or (following Dale Tuggy’s nomenclature) “mysterianism” (and its followers “mysterians”). The mysterian eschews giving any definite answer to the LPT, but still maintains that the doctrine of the Trinity is consistent, and that it can be reasonable to believe in the doctrine of the Trinity despite its being apparently contradictory. We will look at a bit of the debate about mysterianism, though we will not have the space to adjudicate it. However, I will add one novel criticism to the mix – namely that mysterianism likely seems attractive to its defenders only because they have been working in ignorance of the extent of what solutions are possible – an issue which is clarified by our taxonomy. But I will argue that, once the taxonomy is in place, we can see that what is required in order to make sense out of a mysterian position is at odds with what is likely the deeper motivation for the position. Finally, we will show that, while the Mysterian Approach may initially appear to represent a rival methodology to the Puzzle Approach and the Historical Approach, it in fact turns out to be compatible, in principle, with either. Upon examination, it turns out that mysterians do not have a rival methodology for achieving the same goals as those of historicists and puzzlers; rather, mysterians simply have a different goal they are trying to achieve.

1. I do, however, accept that the methodology of the Puzzle Approach is appropriate in the context of the metaphysical and other philosophical “puzzles” from which the methodology seems to be drawn.
Finally, I will discuss my preferred methodology, the Historical Approach, briefly explaining it and then defending it from a few potential objections by puzzlers, mysterians and anti-Trinitarians. I conclude by noting that any solution to the LPT that meets the standards of the Historical Approach will also meet those of the Puzzle Approach, and that achieving the goals of the Historical Approach also achieves the goals of the Mysterian Approach. So that, even if puzzlers and mysterians want to argue the Historical Approach is “overkill,” they have no reason to object to any solution to the LPT that happens to arise out of the Historical Approach.

I want to emphasize that I do not claim that the considerations I will put forward against these other approaches are “knock-down” arguments. But I do think the criticisms I will present in this section, particularly of the Puzzle Approach are serious concerns that need to be addressed.2

2. I should also perhaps emphasize that this division is not intended to be exhaustive either. It only gives what seem to me the most common approaches in the literature.

In particular, van Inwagen’s papers on the Trinity are hard to place, and do not fit neatly into any of the categories I’ll discuss. Although van Inwagen’s methodology is probably closest to the Mysterian Approach, he does more than to merely say that there is “some” kind of solution or, in James Anderson’s terms some “unarticulated equivocation,” leaving it at that (even though, at one point, he might seem to say exactly that). Rather, on examination, he seems very much committed to that equivocation being specifically about the identity relation, and not the predicate “is God” (as Arians and Social Trinitarians would say). Additionally, in multiple casual conversations he has mentioned his apparently quite earnest wish that Social Trinitarianism had existed in the fourth century so that it could have been officially declared a heresy at that time. Presumably, then, he is firmly committed to the view that the correct answer to the LPT falls within the NCIC Family and not the Equivocation Family.

Thus, although he may take the content of P to be a mystery, and does not actually offer any specific metaphysical account of the workings of the Trinity (departing there from the Puzzle Approach), there seems to be no mystery as to what he takes the logical form of P to be, at least in a general way (departing somewhat from mysterians like Anderson.) Thus, his work does not fall neatly into either the Puzzle Approach or the Mysterian Approach. Finally, as we will see, he very clearly acknowledges the main thrust of the historicist argument – that merely giving a consistent account of the Trinity is not sufficient, by itself, to defend the doctrine of the Trinity, and that what is necessary in addition has to do with historical facts about the doctrine of the Trinity itself. We will thus discuss his view in a somewhat scatter-shot manner throughout this chapter.
3.1 The Puzzle Approach

The essence of the Puzzle Approach is that it attempts to show the consistency of the doctrine of the Trinity through what I will call an “account” of the Trinity in a way that is fundamentally ahistorical. We can characterize the Puzzle Approach as seeking to prove P to be consistent by:

1. providing some fairly explicit “account” A of the Trinity,
2. showing that A is consistent (and, optionally, that it has various other theoretical virtues),

and, the critical distinction from the Historical Approach,

3. *supporting* A on the basis of its consistency (and/or other theoretical virtues),
   rather than historical considerations.

What I am calling “accounts” are called by various names by different authors, but they seem to all be recognizably the same sort of thing. An account of the Trinity is just some more or less clear story about how the Trinity “works.” Much like a philosophical paraphrase, an account will in some sense go beyond P, but primarily it seems to be intended to preserve the important content of P while somehow explaining or clarifying that content so as to show how it is consistent. Thus, an account is supposed to (at least implicitly) provide a proposed answer to the LPT. The proposed answer to the LPT that is implicitly being given by A is just the one that attributes to P the same logical form A has. The proponent of a given account then argues in favor of accepting his particular account on the basis of its consistency and other theoretical virtues.
Accounts run a wide gamut. Some are clearly meant to be taken merely as analogies. E.g. Brian Leftow’s time-traveling Rockette(s).\(^3\),\(^4\) Others seem to be very in-depth philosophical explanations of the metaphysics involved in the Trinity along with discussions of the semantic links between these explanations and the corresponding linguistic expressions in S. E.g., Moreland and Craig’s version of Social Trinitarianism seems to be intended as the literal truth about the metaphysical workings of the Trinity, along with some discussion of the semantics of analogous predication to obviate objections to equivocating on “is God.”\(^5\) Finally, some accounts seem to be intended to fall somewhere in-between mere analogy and literal explanation. E.g., Mike Rea and Jeff Brower’s “Material Constitution” account, in which the divine nature can be thought of as “playing the role of matter” and what we will later call the idiomata can be regarded as playing the role of form, in three non-identical, but accidentally numerically one, persons who bear constitution relations to one another.\(^6\)

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3. Originally put forward in (Leftow 2004). Leftow further elaborates and defends his view of the Trinity in (Leftow 2007), (Leftow 2010), (Leftow 2012a) and (Leftow 2012b). Much of this in response to Hasker. See esp. (Hasker 2009) and (Hasker 2012).

4. Presumably these are supposed to be analogies in which we can somehow see that the analogue would be logically consistent and logically isomorphic to P. See p. 76 ff.

5. See (Moreland and Craig 2003). Craig also defends his version of Social Trinitarianism against criticisms in (Howard-Snyder 2003) in (Craig 2006) with, among other things, photographs of various two-headed animals, quite hilariously used to defeat Howard-Snyder’s assertion that such a thing is metaphysically impossible.

6. I say it falls somewhere in-between, since, on the one hand, it provides a much more philosophically rich understanding of how P could possibly be true than a mere analogy like Leftow’s Rockette(s). Yet, on the other hand, Rea and Brower don’t appear to want to commit to whether they have found “the sober metaphysical truth” about the Trinity.

In (J. E. Brower and M. C. Rea 2005) (p. 68), Brower and Rea state:

Thus, we can think of the divine essence as playing the role of matter; and we can regard the properties being a Father, being a Son, and being a Spirit as distinct forms instantiated by the divine essence, each giving rise to a distinct Person. As in the case of matter, moreover, we can regard the divine essence not as an individual thing in its own right but rather as that which, together with the requisite “form”, constitutes a Person. Each Person will then be a compound structure whose matter is the divine essence and whose form is one of the three distinctive Trinitarian properties. On this way of thinking, the Persons of the Trinity are directly analogous to particulars that stand in the familiar relation of material constitution.
Once some account A of the Trinity is explained in some detail, the methodology of the Puzzle Approach is to show that A is consistent, and, for many puzzlers, that it also has various other theoretical virtues the author may identify as desiderata. This is taken to be somehow definitive of the “success” of an account. Importantly, the other major defining feature of the Puzzle Approach is what the puzzler then does not do: seriously discuss the historical credibility of his account, more on which below (3.3, p. 125, ff.).

A good example of the sorts of criteria puzzlers give for a successful account of the Trinity, as well as the way in which they believe it possible, even desirable, to set aside the sorts of historical concerns I will argue shouldn’t be set aside, can be found in, “The Unfinished Business of Trinitarian Theorizing,” by Dale Tuggy, in which he writes:

The doctrine of the Trinity has a long and interesting history... In this paper I will avoid as much of this post-biblical tradition as I can, along with its Latin and Greek terminology. I do this not out of disrespect, lack of interest, or a mistaken belief that folks from the distant past have nothing relevant to say, but only because I want to focus on the most difficult philosophical problems facing various versions of the doctrine, problems which are often obscured by historical concerns...7

Of course, there are also some obvious disanalogies... (Emphasis mine.)

So the idea, I believe, is something like the following. This metaphysics, or something very much like it, may be how the Trinity works, or at least it may be very similar to how the Trinity works. Similar enough, and in the right sorts of ways, that it at least shows that there are ways in which P could be true, because things very analogous to P (to the right degrees and in the right ways) could be true.

Finally, although I put them in the puzzler camp during this paper, Rea’s work has become ever more and more historically grounded over time. (See, in particular, his chapter on the Trinity in (M. Rea 2009), in which he goes into just the sorts of historical issues the historicist would advocate. Whether or not he regards that sort of discussion as essential in the way historicists would, I don’t know. Also, we will see later that the view I am here attributing to Rea and Brower in (J. E. Brower and M. C. Rea 2005) would also have much in common with the Mysterian Approach, and at the end of the section on mysterianism, I will give a friendly suggestion as to how puzzlers might modify or clarify their arguments in service of a slightly different, more mysterian, conclusion.

Tuggy does well in noting that he avoids the relevant history “not out of disrespect, lack of interest, or a mistaken belief that folks from the distant past have nothing relevant to say.” Yet he still obviously considers it possible to avoid discussing the history of the doctrine of the Trinity to a great extent, and yet still provide a satisfying discussion of it. Indeed, he seems to think it not only possible, but apparently even preferable. In his view, the relevant philosophical problems are “often obscured by historical concerns . . .” rather than being illuminated by them, and he clearly doesn’t see history as essential in the way I will argue it is.

So then, with his account A of the Trinity described and explained, the puzzler believes that if he can demonstrate the consistency of A (plus perhaps his favorite other theoretical virtues – intelligibility, biblicality, etc.), this by itself (no serious discussion of history necessary) will be – somehow – sufficient to show the coherence of the doctrine of the Trinity itself (or at least of P).

A clear, and possibly the most entertaining, example of this sort of view is found in “Divine Fission: A New Way of Moderating Social Trinitarianism,” by Peter Forrest, which uses the term “speculation,” or some inflection thereof, to refer to his and others’ accounts of the Trinity a total of 34 times in barely over 16 pages. Indeed, he explicitly describes his project in the paper as providing a “speculation” about the Trinity that relies heavily on what he describes as Swinburne’s “important speculation” about the Trinity, and in the course of arguing that his speculation is coherent, makes it very explicit that he regards this as all that is required. (But required for what? He never fully explains.)

In the abstract of the paper, Forrest states:

... I follow Swinburne... in the important speculation that the Trinity arose from a primordial ‘unitarian’ God. In this paper I explain why I disagree with Swinburne’s account of how the Trinity came into being and

8. (Forrest 1998).
I propose an alternative...  

Then in the first paragraph, we read, “The topic of this paper is a way of speculating about the Trinity...”

As is typical of this kind of approach, Forrest spends almost the entirety of his paper explaining his speculation about (i.e., account of) the Trinity, arguing for its coherence and showing how it satisfies various other desiderata. Only briefly does he touch upon methodology, saying:

I grant that the above argument is just the sort of thing that brings metaphysics into disrepute. How could anyone know, readers might protest, about such matters? ... I grant that all this is speculative. But in order to defend a moderate Social Trinitarianism it suffices to provide a speculative metaphysics which is no worse than its rivals...  

Defend it from what, or in what sense? He never says. Likewise, concerning what, if any, relation his own, personal “speculation” about the Trinity might bear to the actual, historical, orthodox doctrine of the Trinity itself, again he says nary a word. And while one must praise Forrest for his honesty in describing his account of the Trinity as nothing more than a “speculation,” one must fault him for his logic.

For one imagines that the conclusion he wants to establish is that “the doctrine of the Trinity (or at least P) is consistent.” But without saying anything about the relation between his speculation about the Trinity and the doctrine of the Trinity itself, “providing a speculative metaphysics which is no worse than its rivals” (even if that is meant to include showing it to be consistent) certainly does not suffice to show the the doctrine of the Trinity itself (or even only P) is consistent. One would have to also show that one’s account is, say, identical to, or entails, or is logically

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isomorphic to, or is in some other manner logically related in the right way to, the
document of the Trinity (or at least P).

Otherwise, the anti-Trinitarian could of course admit that Forrest’s speculation is
consistent, while still maintaining that the doctrine of the Trinity itself is incoherent,
since they may be logically unrelated – or, for all we know, even logically incompatible.
For example, both modalism and Arianism are accounts of the Trinity (descriptions
of how the Trinity “works”), but neither could count as a defense of doctrine of the
Trinity itself. Indeed, atheism would technically be one account of the Trinity – and
a logically consistent one at that. It is the account of the Trinity that says there is no
Trinity (or binity, or . . . ). But that clearly isn’t a defense of the doctrine of the Trinity.
So why shouldn’t the Anti-Trinitarian agree with everything Forrest has to say about
his speculation, and simply conclude that Forrest’s (apparently perfectly consistent)
speculation about the Trinity is simply better than the (apparently inconsistent)
document of the Trinity itself. In the best case scenario, we can only validly conclude
that Peter Forrest’s own, personal speculation about the Trinity is coherent – not
that the doctrine of the Trinity itself is coherent.

And that is the historicist’s objection to the Puzzle Approach in a nutshell. That
it is simply a large body of invalid arguments. Or, perhaps collections of premises in
search of a conclusion (we will suggest an alternative conclusion for puzzlers at the
end of 3.2.3, p. 122).

But what’s worse is that it isn’t at all obvious what could be done to get the
argument into a valid form. Not in a way that both:

1. would allow for the the puzzler to give us good reasons for thinking his premises
   are all true, and

2. would not, in doing so, simply collapse into the Historical Approach, or at least
   render superfluous the whole business of constructing some speculative account of
   the Trinity.
For, to make the argument valid, the puzzler must demonstrate that there is a very particular sort of relation between his account A of the Trinity, and the doctrine of the Trinity itself (or at least P. And since the LPT focuses on P, to cut down on verbiage, I'll stick to talking just about P from here on out.)

Specifically, it needs to be some relation R, such that, if A bears R to P, then if A is consistent, P is also consistent. Let us call any such a relation a “consistency transferring relation.”

More precisely, we can give the following definitions (more intuitive characterizations immediately afterwards):

For any relation R, for any propositions P and Q,
R is a consistency transferring relation from P to Q iffDef:
If P bears R to Q, and if P is consistent,
then Q is consistent.

For any relation R, for any proposition P,
R is a consistency transferring relation from P iffDef:
For any proposition Q,
if P bears R to Q and P is consistent,
then Q is consistent.

For any relation R, for any proposition Q,
R is a consistency transferring relation to Q iffDef:
For any proposition P,
if P bears R to Q and P is consistent,
then Q is consistent.

For any relation R,
R is a general consistency transferring relation iffDef:

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For any propositions $P$ and $Q$,

if $P$ bears $R$ to $Q$, and if $P$ is consistent,

then $Q$ is consistent.

Intuitively, to say that $R$ is a consistency transferring relation from $P$ to $Q$ means that $R$ “transfers consistency” from $P$ to $Q$ – but that does not imply that it transfers consistency between any other two propositions.

Intuitively, to say that $R$ is a consistency transferring relation from $P$ means that $R$ “transfers consistency” from $P$ to any given proposition – but that does not imply that it transfers consistency “from” any other proposition besides $P$.

Intuitively, to say that $R$ is a consistency transferring relation to $Q$ means that $R$ “transfers consistency” from any given proposition to $Q$ – but that does not imply that it transfers consistency “to” any other proposition besides $Q$.

Intuitively, to say that $R$ is a general consistency transferring relation means that $R$ “transfers consistency” between any two propositions whatsoever.

For example, identity, logical entailment, and logical isomorphism are all general consistency transferring relations.

Strictly speaking, then, to use his account $A$ to show the consistency of $P$, the puzzler only needs to show, for his particular account $A$ of the Trinity, that:

1. $A$ is consistent, and
2. there exists some relation $R$ such that
   1. $R$ is a consistency transferring relation from $A$ to $P$, and such that
   2. $A$ bears $R$ to $P$.

From those two premises, together with the definition of a consistency transferring relation from $A$ to $P$, it would indeed follow validly that:

3. $P$ is consistent.
Call this argument (although really a general argument schema) “the Puzzler Argument.”

Puzzlers, of course, have provided lengthy explanations of the content of their preferred accounts of the Trinity, and arguments that these accounts are consistent. (Or even “broadly logically possible,” a step above the “narrowly logical” consistency we are discussing in the LPT. The same considerations I’ll present here will apply to being broadly logically possible, given parallel definitions of “possibility transferring relations” or indeed to any other theoretical virtue, given parallel definitions of various “virtue-transferring relations.”)

So, let us simply grant, for argument’s sake, that all puzzlers are always successful in supporting step 1 of the Puzzler Argument, that any given puzzler’s account A will be consistent (indeed, that it will have whatever other theoretical virtues the puzzler likes as well).

As with the business plan put forward by the Underpants Gnomes, the problem comes in step 2. In particular, there seem to be some tensions involved in supporting both parts of step 2 at the same time. Here’s why I think so.

First, it’s of course easy to find all sorts of relations A bears to P (the “I mentioned X at T1, just before I mentioned Y at T2” relation, for example), taking care of 2b. Pick one such relation R, and grant that A bears R to P. But, although for 2a it is only necessary to show R to be a consistency transferring relation from A to P (or a consistency transferring relation from A, or to P), how would one show that R is a consistency transferring relation from A to P (or from A, or to P) unless one simply picks some general consistency transferring relation (like identity or logical entailment)? But then, pick some known general consistency transferring relation R.

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12. Perhaps it would be better to use “the Puzzler Argument,” to refer to the above argument minus premise 2, since that is essentially what I am accusing puzzlers of offering. But the point is to think about what it might look like if the puzzler were to attempt to offer an argument that was at least valid.
Now how would one *show* that A bears this relation to P? How, without doing so much history that essentially one has given up the Puzzle Approach altogether, and fallen into the Historical Approach after all? Or, if some other way can be found, then at least making all the business of giving an account of the Trinity superfluous? Let me now explain this further worry in a bit more detail.

Take again the trivial, “I mentioned X at T₁, just before I mentioned Y at T₂” relation as an example. It’s easy to show A bears that to P (check off 2b). But what about showing that it’s a consistency transferring relation from A to P (what about 2a)? We can show that it’s a consistency transferring relation from A to “it’s raining or not raining,” because we can show that every relation is a consistency transferring relation to “it’s raining or not raining,” because we can show that (we have an *independent way* to show that) “it’s raining or not raining” is consistent. (Likewise, we can show that any relation is a consistency transferring relation *from* “it’s raining and not raining” or *to* “it’s raining or not raining,” because we have an independent way to show that “it’s raining and not raining” is inconsistent and an independent way to show that “it’s raining or not raining” is consistent.) But, unless some relation R is just a general consistency transferring relation, how would we show it to be a consistency transferring relation from A to P (or from A, or to P), unless we had some independent way to show that P was consistent? But first, how would we have some independent way of showing P to be consistent except by just examining it “directly”? And what would it mean to examine it “directly,” except to do some kind of historical inquiry into what it is? Second, even if the puzzler has some response to the first question that doesn’t involve historical inquiry, if we had *any* independent way to determine that P was consistent, then the whole business

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13. Independent of account A, that is.
14. Or or showing that A is *inconsistent*. But that would obviously not help the puzzler at all.
15. Independent of account A, that is.
of providing an “account” of the Trinity and going through the Puzzler Argument would be superfluous.

So, even though, theoretically, the Puzzler Argument could be done with one of the more limited consistency transferring relations we’ve defined, it seems likely that the puzzler will ultimately need to deal with general consistency transferring relations (like identity, entailment, isomorphism, etc.) to make his case.

But in that case, let us begin, not with a relation we know A bears to P, but with a relation we already know is a general consistency transferring relation, like logical entailment. In this case, in contrast to the trivial relation we picked above, it’s easy to show that logical entailment is a general consistency transferring relation (check off 2a). But now what about showing that A actually bears R to P (what about 2b)? We can show that A bears the logical entailment relation to “it’s raining or not raining,” because we can show that everything does, because “it’s raining or not raining” is a tautology. And we can similarly show that a contradiction entails anything. But could we show that P is a tautology? Not likely. Alternatively, the puzzler could show his own account A to be inconsistent. But that would wreck his project in the end (premise 1 of the Puzzler Argument would no longer be true). How then would we show that a non-contradictory account A entails a non-tautological P? How unless we explicate both the logical forms of A and of P, along with the overlap of their content,\(^{16}\) in enough detail that we could have just determined P to be logically consistent anyway,\(^ {17}\) once again rendering the whole business of providing

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16. What I mean by “overlap of content” is this. For example, “P → Q” and “Q → R” entail “P → R,” not merely in virtue of their logical forms (not just any two conditionals entail just any third conditional), but in virtue of their logical forms plus the further fact that the first premise shares the same antecedent as the conclusion and the second premise shares the same consequent as the conclusion. Any two propositions with the logical forms of conditionals such that one has the same content in its antecedent as and the other has the same content in its consequent as a third conditional, entail that third conditional. This is what I mean by saying that, to show that A entails P, one would have to both explicate the logical forms of A and P and show certain relevant “shared” or “overlapping” content.

17. Obviously this holds all the more so for identity or logical isomorphism than for entailment.
an “account” of the Trinity superfluous?\textsuperscript{18}

Furthermore, once again, how would the puzzler come to a sufficient understanding of the relevant content shared by A and P in the first place without doing the sort of historical work he intends to avoid?\textsuperscript{19} Wouldn’t he need to know what the authors of various Trinitarian creeds intended by those creeds (or at least what they intended by S in particular)? Or what the words used in the original (in this case Greek) expressions of the doctrine of the Trinity (or at least S), meant, given the linguistic practices of the linguistics communities of which the originators of the doctrine of the Trinity were a part (i.e., Greek-speaking, fourth-century theologians with a particular philosophical and theological technical vocabulary, stemming from a particular historical tradition)? In short, how would the puzzler explicate enough of the content of P without doing just the sort of historical work the puzzler wants to avoid but that the historicist claims is necessary? How would the Puzzle Approach not simply collapse into the Historical Approach?

Here is another way to see the point.

Imagine a debate between a puzzler and an anti-Trinitarian. While they disagree about the consistency of P, they would surely agree to one thing: that the following is an inconsistent set.

1. A is consistent.
2. There is some relation R such that
   1. R is a consistency transferring relation from A to P, and such that
   2. A bears R to P.
3. Yet P is inconsistent.

\textsuperscript{18} Of course, one could show that A entails P in an indirect way, by showing that A entails B, B entails C, C entails... P. But eventually we will come to some proposition such that we will have to show that it entails P, and we will face the same problem.

\textsuperscript{19} See footnote 16 just above on what I mean by “shared content.”
Although the puzzler ultimately wants to say that P is consistent, surely the puzzler grants that the anti-Trinitarian is right in thinking that, *prima facie*, P at least *appears* to be inconsistent. (If the puzzler thought P didn’t even *appear* to be inconsistent, why bother writing a more-than-Gettier-sized paper about it?)

So, the anti-Trinitarian will simply say that, since 3 is *prima facie* true, the more the puzzler does to back up 1, in the absence of saying anything about 2, the more reason he has to deny 2.

And that, in turn, means that, the more the puzzler does to back up 2a, in the absence of backing up 2b, (or vice-versa), the more reason he has to deny 2b (or 2a). And that means that the puzzler must find some way to argue for both parts of 2.

But puzzlers have typically simply *assumed* that 2 is true, or, as in Peter Forrest’s case, explicitly disavowed the need for it altogether(!) This is untenable. In order both to have a valid argument in the first place, and not to simply beg the question against the anti-Trinitarian, the puzzler must back up 2.

Yet, so far, puzzlers have not so much as even made the attempt to do so. Indeed, most puzzlers either spend little to no time even explaining what relation they believe their account bears to the doctrine of the Trinity, or, like Forrest, go so far as to explicitly deny they need to say anything at all about what relation their accounts might bear to the doctrine of the Trinity.

True, many puzzlers make passing uses of phrases like “model of,” “version of,” “form of,” etc., saying that their accounts bear one or more of these relations the doctrine of the Trinity. But so far none, to my knowledge, have ever stopped to explain *the nature* of these relations in any detail, and certainly not in enough detail to ensure us that they both (A) are consistency transferring relations, and (B) actually hold between their accounts of the Trinity and the doctrine of the Trinity itself.

So, as it stands, all the anti-Trinitarian needs to say is, “I don’t know precisely what the ‘model of’ relation is, but if it is some kind of consistency transferring
relation, then it appears that A doesn’t bear it to P (because it appears that no consistent proposition does, because it appears that P isn’t consistent).” Or “I don’t know precisely what the ‘form of’ relation is, but if A bears it to P, then it appears that it must not be a consistency transferring relation (because it appears that no relation any consistent proposition bears to P is a consistency transferring relation, because it appears that P isn’t consistent).” In other words, the anti-Trinitarian, quite reasonably, will simply challenge the puzzler to explain what exactly R is, in such a way that it’s clear both that A bears R to P and that R is a consistency transferring relation (at least from A to P).

On the other hand, suppose that, rather than appealing to undefined relations like “form of,” the puzzler chooses a well-defined relation that is clearly a consistency transferring relation, for example, identity or logical entailment. Or, suppose he gives a definition of “version of” such that a “version” of a doctrine is a superset of the doctrine or in any case it can be shown that when P is a version of Q, P logically entails Q or bears some other well-defined logical relation to Q. Certainly the anti-Trinitarian will then have to agree that we are dealing with a consistency transferring relation. But of course, now he will just say that, in the absence of any support for the claim that A really is identical to P, or that A really does logically entail P, or that A really is a version of P (in this more well-defined sense), it would appear that A in fact does not bear this relation to P. So once again the Puzzler Argument relies on an unsupported premise that, admittedly, it ought to appear, at least prima facie, must be false.

Finally, suppose the puzzler wants to take up the challenge of actually defending the claim that A bears some well-defined logical relation R, like identity, entailment or isomorphism to P. Then to show A actually bears R to P it clearly isn’t sufficient merely to say, “I speculate that A is, or could be, the case” or “My speculation has X, Y and Z theoretical virtues,” and conclude that, “Therefore, it bears logical relation
R to P.” For the anti-Trinitarian – quite correctly – will respond, “I agree that A could be the case. But it appears that P couldn’t be. Therefore, it appears that A does not bear any consistency transferring relation to P.”

So how could the puzzler argue that A does in fact bear R to P? Just as before, it would seem that the puzzler would need to explicate both the logical form of A and that of P, and the content on which they overlap. But in doing so, he likely will end up showing enough of the logical form of P that he could have just determined that it was logically consistent without reference to A. In which case, the whole business of providing an “account” of the Trinity and going through the Puzzler Argument was superfluous.

And likewise, once again, if he relies on identity or entailment, how would he explicate enough of the content shared by A and P to show they are identical, or that A entails P, without doing just the sort of historical work the historicist would advocate and that the puzzler seeks to avoid? How would the Puzzle Approach not simply collapse into the Historical Approach?

Note also that if we want to introduce other theoretical virtues besides consistency – “Biblical fit,” “intelligibility,” and so on – we will need to sort through the same sorts of considerations for “Biblicality transferring relations,” “intelligibility transferring relations,” and so on. Identity would seem to work as a “transferring relation” for any theoretical virtue that doesn’t somehow involve intensional contexts, and it may be that logical entailment would as well. But as we’ve seen, it’s difficult to see how either of those relations wouldn’t ultimately collapse the Puzzle Approach into the Historical Approach or at least render the giving of accounts in the Puzzle Approach superfluous. (And it is these accounts that are really the heart of the Puzzle Approach.)

(Before leaving this point I will simply note that, in some unpublished material I have chosen not to incorporate due to limitations of space, I argue that there may

20. See footnote 16, p. 81 above.
be a further problem on the assumption that “version of” and other puzzler relations are something like logical entailment, or at least that versions of doctrines logically entail those doctrines. For most puzzlers seem to want to say not only that their own accounts of the Trinity are versions of the doctrine of the Trinity. They want to admit that rival accounts in the literature are as well. E.g., most Social Trinitarians want to admit that Relative Identity accounts are “versions of” the doctrine of the Trinity, and and most Relative Identity Trinitarians want to admit that Social Trinitarian accounts are “versions of” the doctrine of the Trinity. They only want to claim their own versions are superior. Yet, since logical entailment is monotonic, when P entails Q the information “contained in” Q must be a subset of that in P. Thus, if the relation the puzzler posits between A and P just is logical entailment (or if A’s bearing it to P entails that A entails P), then this spirit of tolerance is fitting only if the doctrine of the Trinity is, or is a subset of, the intersection of the information contained in all of the competing puzzler accounts. But, arguably, there are accounts of the Trinity on-offer that have no overlap at all, in which case the doctrine of the Trinity must be the empty set of information, i.e., a tautology. Even if my arguments on that point are wrong, there are certainly puzzler accounts $A_1, A_2 \ldots A_n$ such that it is by no means obvious that the small amount of information that might be contained in $A_1 \cap A_2 \ldots \cap A_n$ (if it is not indeed the empty set after all) would be enough information to plausibly count as the orthodox doctrine of the Trinity. Unfortunately, however, I won’t have space to develop that argument here.)

3.1.1 A Note on van Inwagen

As noted above, it’s hard to place van Inwagen’s methodological approach neatly. But, although on a cursory reading he may seem to fall into the Puzzle Approach camp, upon examination it seems that he accepts something like the main thrust
of the historicist’s position. Especially in his second paper on the subject, “Three Persons in One Being: On Attempts to Show that the Doctrine of the Trinity is Self-Contradictory.”

In the abstract of the paper, he says:

Enemies of the Church have frequently contended that the doctrine of the Holy Trinity is not only false, but violates various elementary logical principles. In this essay, I show that, on one understanding of the doctrine, this charge is unfounded.21

The talk of “one understanding of” the doctrine might initially bring to mind something like the puzzler’s accounts, and their un- (or under-)defined relation. Furthermore, he goes on with what might initially appear to be a Puzzle Approach methodology:

I shall proceed as follows. I shall try to imagine a way of stating the doctrine of the Trinity that has the following feature: when the doctrine is stated in this way, it can be shown not to be self-contradictory.22

Again, talk about merely “imagining” a “way of stating” the doctrine might call to mind Peter Forrest’s “speculating.” So, one might initially think that he falls squarely within the Puzzle Approach. This diagnosis might even seem to be confirmed by the fact that the vast majority of both of his papers on the Trinity are taken up with discussions of logic and relative identity, with almost nothing said about the views of any church fathers or how his discussion relates to those views.

But that appearance, I think, is ultimately misleading. For he immediately follows with:

I shall leave the following question to theologians (for I am a philosopher, not a theologian): Is what I describe as ‘a way of stating the doctrine of the Trinity’ properly so described – or should it be called a way of

21. (van INWAGEN 2003), p. 83
misstating the doctrine of the Trinity? I claim only this: a strong case can be made for the thesis that the formulation of the doctrine of the Trinity I shall propose does succeed in being a statement of what has historically been called ‘the doctrine of the Trinity’; and an even stronger case can be made for the thesis that this formulation is consistent with historical orthodoxy. Even if these theses are false, they are, in my view, plausible enough to be worthy of a considered refutation.\textsuperscript{23}

Thus, van Inwagen seems to acknowledge that *merely* providing a consistent account of the Trinity is not sufficient to show the doctrine of the Trinity itself to be consistent. He seems to acknowledge that some further premise is necessary, and that what is necessary is to show a certain kind of logical relation between one’s account of the Trinity and the doctrine of the Trinity itself. That any given attempt at a restatement of the doctrine of the Trinity might simply end up being a misstatement of the doctrine of the Trinity. Furthermore, he seems to admit that whether one’s account of the Trinity bears the appropriate relation to the doctrine of the Trinity itself is a matter of *historical facts* about what the doctrine of the Trinity actually is. He goes on:

Whether my attempt at apologetic in fact distorts Christian belief is a point on which I humbly (and sensibly) defer to trained theologians. In matters of speculative theology – and particularly when the question at issue is whether certain theological speculations are in accord with historical orthodoxy – theologians must sit in judgment over mere philosophers. (Just as, in my view, bishops and councils must sit in judgment over theologians.) I claim only one kind of authority that is denied to theologians: I am the ultimate arbiter of what my own words mean. If a theologian tells me that my proposed way of stating the doctrine of the Trinity is wrong (that is, that what I have proposed as a way of stating “the doctrine of the Trinity” has implications inconsistent with what the Church has always understood by “the doctrine of the Trinity”\textsuperscript{24}), I allow myself only one defense: “If I had said what you think I’ve said, you’d be right; but I didn’t say what you think I said.”

Last but not least, the fact that he does not go into any substantial discussion

\textsuperscript{23} (van Inwagen 2003), p. 83.

\textsuperscript{24} (van Inwagen 2003), pp. 83-84.
of history might lead one to think he is only paying lip service to history. But that again, I think, would be a mistake. For besides discussing an essentially historical methodological principle in the abstract, he seems to make substantive use of some such principle in evaluating Swinburne’s account of the Trinity:

But there is a modern attempt at a demonstrably consistent statement of the doctrine of the Trinity – at least I should be willing to say that its consistency was demonstrable – according to which there are three Gods, and its author’s defense of its historical orthodoxy is well thought out and not simply to be dismissed. (I have in mind Professor Swinburne’s important essay on the Trinity, “Could There Be More Than One God?”) But whether Professor Swinburne’s account of the Trinity is, or is consistent with, historical orthodoxy is a subtle question, and one that is not in the end, to be answered by a philosopher.  

Here again, he seems to claim that he is only competent to rule on whether Swinburne’s account is consistent, but acknowledges that it must also bear the appropriate relation to the doctrine of the Trinity itself. One might object that he nowhere attempts to discredit the views of other philosophers on the basis of historical arguments. But as he states, the historical question is “not... to be answered by a philosopher,” but by “trained theologians.” That is, while it is true that van Inwagen says almost nothing substantive about the history of the doctrine of the Trinity, it does not seem as though he avoids historical questions because he thinks they are inessential (as puzzlers such as Tuggy and Forrest seem to think), but because he simply doesn’t claim to be competent in the field. In short, he seems to have the good sense (as the historicist sees things) to at least assert his belief that his account is appropriately related to the historical doctrine of the Trinity itself, showing, it seems to me, that he agrees with the historicist that such a premise is


26. (van INWAGEN 2003), p. 88

27. (van INWAGEN 2003), p. 84
required. He merely doesn’t attempt to defend that premise, leaving the question to others whom he regards as more competent than himself to determine whether this one particular premise is actually true.

Thus although, as we’ll see, van Inwagen doesn’t neatly fall into the historicist camp, nor does he even fall neatly into the mysterian camp, it seems we can certainly place him safely outside the puzzler camp. Even if he doesn’t want to enter into debate about the relation between his account and the historical doctrine of the Trinity, he, like the historicist, and unlike the puzzler, at least acknowledges that the relation must be there.

3.1.2 An Objection Based on An Analogy to Metaphysical Puzzles

Here is an objection the puzzler might reasonably bring up. The LPT looks and feels, so to speak, very much like a lot of puzzles dealt with by metaphysicians – we have an apparently inconsistent set of propositions that one wants to argue isn’t really inconsistent after all. And it seems as though the puzzler is just doing the same sort of thing that metaphysicians normally do in such cases – offering various competing ways of restating things in an attempt to show how the propositions in that set could all turn out to be true after all. So, unless the historicist is prepared to argue that the methodology metaphysicians ordinarily employ in these puzzles is flawed (invalidating an enormous amount of literature in metaphysics), why shouldn’t the puzzler be able to use the same sort of methodology for the same sort of problem or puzzle?

Let us work with a specific example of a standard metaphysical “puzzle” or “problem” of this very recognizable type, one that might seem parallel to the “puzzle” or “problem” with the doctrine of the Trinity. Namely, the Problem of Temporary
Intrinsics (PTI).\textsuperscript{28}

Here is a very simple way of putting PTI.\textsuperscript{29} Consider the set of propositions (P-TI) expressed by the following set of sentences (S-TI):

S-TI-1. Mr. Stick at \( t_1 \) is bent.
S-TI-2. Mr. Stick at \( t_2 \) is not bent.
S-TI-3. Mr. Stick at \( t_1 \) is the same stick as Mr. Stick at \( t_2 \).

Here is one formalization of TI, call it \( \Phi \)-TI:

\begin{align*}
\Phi \text{-TI-1. } & \quad B_{s_{t_1}} \\
\Phi \text{-TI-2. } & \quad \neg B_{s_{t_2}} \\
\Phi \text{-TI-3. } & \quad s_{t_1} = s_{t_2}
\end{align*}

The anti-change-itarian says that \( \Phi \)-TI is the most straight-forward way of reading the logical forms of P-TI. But \( \Phi \)-TI is inconsistent. So, if \( \Phi \)-TI is a formally adequate regimentation of P-TI, then P-TI is inconsistent.

But of course, to conclude that P-TI is inconsistent would be absurd. And so metaphysicians offer various philosophical paraphrases of claims about change, paraphrases with very different (and consistent) logical forms. And if one of those paraphrases seems to preserve the relevant content of the original claims, then this would show the set of claims to be consistent after all.

We could say, then, that just as the LPT is the question how, if at all, P could be consistent, the “Problem of Temporary Intrinsics” (PTI) is the question how, if at all, P-TI could be consistent.

\textsuperscript{28} (D. Lewis 1986), pp. 203-204 and ff. for one of the most important contemporary discussions of the problem.

\textsuperscript{29} Overly simple if one wanted to discuss it for its own sake. But sufficient for the purpose of analogy.
And in cases of metaphysical puzzles such as these, metaphysicians carry on in much the same way puzzlers do. When offering paraphrases for P-TI, most metaphysicians would agree that, as Forrest says about his Trinitarian account, “it suffices to provide a speculative metaphysics which is no worse than its rivals...” 30

In the case of PTI, there are various accounts of the metaphysics of change, and various corresponding proposed solutions to PTI.

On one account, Mr. Stick is really a four-dimensional object with some “temporal parts” that are bent and some that are not. So, in much the same way that Social Trinitarians say there is a single God and that the three hypostases are not identical to God, but that they are all “parts” of the one God, four-dimensionalists say that there is a single, four-dimensional Mr. Stick, and that Mr. Stick at t₁ and Mr. Stick at t₂ are not identical to Mr. Stick, but that they are both temporal “parts” of Mr. Stick.

Thus, the logical forms of P-PTI are implicitly being claimed to be:

4D-TI-1. Bsₜ₁
4D-TI-2. ¬Bsₜ₂
4D-TI-3. sₜ₁ R sₜ₂

where “R” is some relation that does not entail classical identity (specifically, it is the “is a temporal part of the same four-dimensional object as” relation, or what Quine would call “being stick-kindred”). 31

Another proposed solution is that properties are “time-indexed,” so that, while the stick we refer to at t₁ is in fact classically identical to the stick we refer to at t₂ (both are just Mr. Stick itself), the properties we are affirming and denying of Mr. Stick are not the same.

Thus, the logical forms of P-PTI are implicitly being claimed to be:

TIP-TI-1. $B_{t_1}s$
TIP-TI-2. $\neg B_{t_2}s$
TIP-TI-3. $s_{(t_1)} = s_{(t_2)}$

And of course there are other proposed solutions. But one gets the gist. With various proposed solutions on-offer, the game is more or less to argue that one account is superior to its rivals, and whichever is superior to (or at least no worse than) its rivals, wins. (What counts as a superior-making property of an account? Things like not conflicting with common sense, not conflicting with science, being simpler, not positing too many entities or too many types of entities, and so on.)

I am of course presenting the methodology summarily. One could argue that I’m presenting the methodology in too simplistic a light. And one might be right, if my task were to argue either for or against it. But my task here is neither to praise nor to bury this kind of methodology, at least as it is employed by metaphysicians dealing with metaphysical puzzles. Rather, my task is simply to show how such metaphysical puzzles are *importantly disanalogous* to allegedly parallel “theological puzzles” such as the LPT. So that, even given the appropriateness of this kind of methodology in the realm of metaphysics, it is still not appropriate in philosophical theology. (And for the record, I do accept that this sort of approach makes sense within the context of metaphysics, but again, I am not here either defending or attacking a Puzzle Approach in metaphysics.)

Φ-TI, of course, parallels LPT₁ and LPT₂, the regimentations the anti-Trinitarian offers of P. And the metaphysics of four-dimensional objects with temporal parts or of time-indexed properties parallel proposed solutions to the LPT such as Social Trinitarianism and Relative Identity Trinitarianism. The metaphysics of four-dimensional objects with temporal parts seems very parallel to Social Trinitarianism and Relative Identity Trinitarianism. And so this may seem to par-

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32. In fact, four-dimensional objects with temporal parts seem very parallel to Social Trinitarian-
allel the way in which the Trinitarian puzzler offers different accounts, with different logical forms, of the propositions in P.

What, then, is the difference between taking a Puzzle Approach in metaphysics and a Puzzle Approach in theology?

Although there is a certain parallel in their logical structures, PTI and LPT have importantly different epistemic structures. For it is a Moorean fact that P-TI is consistent. But it is certainly not a Moorean fact that the doctrine of the Trinity (P) is consistent. Indeed, in general, any set of apparently contradictory propositions dealt with in the puzzles of metaphysics (and philosophy more generally) will be such that it is a Moorean fact that it is consistent, while the same cannot be said for those dealt with in philosophical theology. And this is the crucial difference, as I see it, between the application of this methodology in philosophy versus philosophical theology.

What then creates a “puzzle” is that we sometimes find that the most straightforward reading of the logical forms of each of the propositions individually is such that they would turn out not to form a consistent set. This creates a scenario in which it really is the case that almost any alternative reading of their logical forms would do.

ism, while time-indexed properties seem more parallel to Arianism. But one sees the point

33. Anyone who has read John Keller’s dissertation on paraphrase, (Keller 2010), will see how very much influenced I have been by it. What I will present here as my view on how the Puzzle Approach methodology applies to philosophical puzzles is essentially just Keller’s view about how philosophical paraphrase works. Thus, I don’t take any credit for originality here. Nor will I try to defend it, as I have nothing to say to improve on Keller’s own defense of this view. I merely present it as what I take to be the most plausible explanation of how this sort of methodology works in philosophy generally, along with my explanation of why it wouldn’t apply in philosophical theology. The puzzler, of course, is free to substitute his own alternative explanation of how this methodology works, to evade my criticisms. But that must be left to the puzzler himself to do.

I should note that, although I have essentially lifted wholesale the story about how philosophical paraphrase works, and the assertion that this is what is going on in metaphysical puzzles, from Keller, I believe from conversations about the topic that he entirely disagrees with me about most of my methodological views in the realm of philosophical theology. Any shortcomings one might attribute to my own views should not be attributed to him.
One might think it counter-intuitive that, strictly speaking, a stick is not a three-dimensional object, but a four-dimensional object, and that when I say Mr. stick is bent, I really am only saying that a certain *temporal part* of Mr. Stick is bent, and when I say the stick from $t_1$ is the same stick as the stick from $t_2$, I really am only saying that they are “stick kindred,” i.e., that both are temporal parts of the same four-dimensional Mr. Stick. But even as counter-intuitive as it may be, it’s not nearly so counter-intuitive as saying that change is logically impossible. Though my four-dimensional account of Mr. Stick may be merely a “speculation,” unless and until some better theory is proposed, the theory of temporal parts gains at least a modicum of credibility due to the fact that the alternative is simply intolerable. Thus, one can truly say that, in a case like this, “it suffices to provide a speculative metaphysics which is no worse than its rivals...”\textsuperscript{34}

But then if yet another alternative to the anti-change-itarian reading can be given that is less counter-intuitive than four-dimensionalism, say time-indexed properties (supposing for argument’s sake that time-indexed properties are less counter-intuitive than temporal parts), then it would seem that this new theory must inherit at least all the benefits of the first (namely, that it allows us to avoid saying that change is impossible – which was intolerable) but with less of the costs (in terms of being inherently counter-intuitive), and thus becomes the new winner.

Thus, what drives the Puzzle Approach methodology in metaphysics, as it seems to me, is a certain *epistemic structure*. There is a premise (whether explicit or implicit) that the set of propositions we are attempting to paraphrase has some kind of significant *prima facie* warrant such that giving up the game and admitting that it is inconsistent should only be a last resort.

But the same epistemic structure is simply not there in the LPT, nor generally

\textsuperscript{34} (Forrest 1998), p. 293.
in philosophical theology.

Indeed, not only is it not a Moorean fact that the doctrine of the Trinity is logically consistent – an intellectually honest Trinitarian must admit that, at least *prima facie*, the doctrine of the Trinity *appears* to be inconsistent. While *anti-change-itarianism* is so intolerable that any decent alternative really would do, it simply is not the case that *anti-Trinitarianism* is so intolerable that just any decent alternative will do. (At least, not in the same sense.)

If the *anti-change-itarian* asks us why a four-dimensionalist or time-indexed-property reading of P-TI is preferable to the *anti-change-itarian* reading, we can honestly say it is because that reading has a result that is downright crazy. So, *almost any* reading would be better than his.

But if the *anti-Trinitarian* asks us why a Social Trinitarian or a Relative Identity Trinitarian reading of P is preferable to the the *anti-Trinitarian* reading, we can’t honestly say it is because that reading has a result that is downright crazy. So the question still remains, why should he accept our alternative account of the Trinity over just thinking the doctrine of the Trinity is inconsistent?

We can make a bit more clear how the argument that generates the puzzle (call it “the PTI Puzzle Argument”) works by reconstructing it as follows:

1. *Φ-TI* in PLI is a formally adequate regimentation of P-TI.
2. *Φ-TI* in PLI is logically inconsistent.
3. Therefore (by the definition of “formally adequate”) P-TI is logically inconsistent.

The change-itarian of course denies the conclusion, and so denies the soundness of the argument. But the argument is clearly valid, and the second premise is clearly true. So for the change-itarian to deny the conclusion, he must deny the first premise, the formal adequacy of *Φ-TI* in PLI. And, given that *Φ-TI* in PLI is not a formally adequate regimentation of P-TI (and similarly for any regimentation of P-TI on which
P-TI is logically inconsistent), if we want to know what the logical form of P-TI really is, we only have to argue about which of various consistent alternatives of P-TI seems the most plausible.

And since the validity of the PTI Puzzle Argument and the truth of premise 2 are not in question, the debate becomes a straight-forward tug-of-war between the alleged truth of premise 1 and the alleged falsehood of the conclusion. Anything that counts as warrant for one counts as warrant against the other, and vice-versa.

Yet premise 1 simply says that \( \Phi \cdot \text{TI} \) in PLI is a formally adequate regimentation of P-TI.\(^{35}\) And indeed, \( \Phi \cdot \text{TI} \) in PLI attributes a logical form to P-TI that is in some sense a “default.” It is the most straight-forward way of reading P-TI, reading the logical form of P-TI off of the grammatical form of the sentences we ordinarily use to express it (S-TI). So, it seems to be incumbent upon those of us who reject the PTI Puzzle Argument to at least say something about the logical form of P-TI.

The proponent of the PTI Puzzle Argument is within his rights to ask, “If \( \Phi \cdot \text{TI} \) in PLI is not formally adequate for P-TI, then why not? And what is the logical form of P-TI, if not what \( \Phi \cdot \text{TI} \) in PLI attributes to it?

That is, for any given alternative, consistent regimentation, \( \Phi \cdot \text{TI}^* \), of P-TI for the plausibility that:

1*. \( \Phi \cdot \text{TI}^* \) in PLI is a formally adequate regimentation of P-TI.

to be greater than or equal to the plausibility that:

1. \( \Phi \cdot \text{TI} \) in PLI is a formally adequate regimentation of P-TI.

the plausibility of 1* only has to be greater than or equal to the plausibility that:

3. P-TI is logically inconsistent.

But since 3 is so massively implausible, it’s incredibly easy for 1* to be as or more

\( \text{35. Or, a “logically perspicuous” regimentation.} \)
plausible than 3. So, (almost) any alternative regimentation will do.\textsuperscript{36} Indeed, even if, say, belief in time-indexed properties were the only possible way to get around the problem of temporary intrinsics, and even if a belief in time-indexed properties was massively implausible, that would be preferable to simply accepting the logical impossibility of change of intrinsic properties.

Once one decent proposed solution has been given, our view of the “problem” will likely shift. Further disagreement will no longer center on \textit{whether} there exists any solution to the problem, but simply on \textit{which} proposed solution is the best, or right, solution. And this will (quite rightly) involve just the sorts of theoretical virtues that followers of the Puzzle Approach tend to focus on in philosophical discussions. Since the occurrence of change is a Moorean fact, any paraphrase of P-TI that is formally adequate should be consistent, and any paraphrase that expresses the same content should be plausible, metaphysically possible, etc.

So, if the view I’ve taken about metaphysical puzzles here is roughly correct,\textsuperscript{37} a proposed solution to a philosophical puzzle is essentially a proposed philosophical paraphrase, another way of stating the same content, but one that is more logically perspicuous, and which shows us how the original claim could be logically consistent after all, despite the perhaps misleading way it was originally expressed.

The puzzle will seem puzzling precisely because each proposition of the set, taken individually, initially seems to have been given a formally adequate analysis (its most straight-forward reading, based on the grammatical form of the sentences in which it was expressed). That is, there is a certain amount of warrant behind each of the

\textsuperscript{36} I say \textit{almost}. Why? Suppose I regiment S-TI-1 as a biconditional between a singular proposition and an existential quantification, S-TI-2 as a universally quantified conjunction, and S-TI-3 as the predication of a 5-place relation involving 3 different terms. That is so bizarre a way to read the logical forms of these claims that its absurdity at least rivals the absurdity of the claim that change is logically impossible, if it doesn’t beat it. So, there may be \textit{some} consistent alternatives that still wouldn’t do.

\textsuperscript{37} Again, correct, but not original. See (Keller 2010).
individual analyses of each element of the set. Yet, collectively, the set seems not to have been given a formally adequate analysis. That is, there is a massive amount of warrant for rejecting the conjunction of the analyses of logical form taken together. This epistemic structure is why almost any alternative reading will do, even if it is just something made up (a “speculative metaphysics”) – because any consistent analysis automatically begins with a certain level of plausibility or warrant, as compared to the puzzle-generating analysis, simply in virtue of the fact that it allows us to maintain the consistency of what, _prima facie_, seems to be a consistent set of propositions.

But if what I am saying here about standard philosophical puzzles is correct, then to maintain that the same epistemic structure exists in the LPT would be to assume at the very outset that there is a massive amount of warrant for rejecting the view that P is logically inconsistent. That is, the very adoption of a Puzzle Approach methodology itself constitutes a begging of the question against the anti-Trinitarian.

As an analogy, consider what I’ll call the “problem” of Socrateic Immortality (PSI).

Consider the set P-SI of propositions expressed by the following natural language sentences (S-SI):

S-SI-1. All humans are mortal.
S-SI-2. Socrates is a human.
S-SI-3. Socrates is immortal.

Here is one regimentation, Φ-SI in PLI, of P-SI:

Φ-SI-1. (∀x) (Hx → Mx)
Φ-SI-2. Hs
Φ-SI-3. ¬Ms

But Φ-SI is inconsistent. So, if Φ-SI in PLI is a formally adequate regimentation of P-SI, then P-SI is inconsistent. Again, the argument goes like this:
1. Φ-SI in PLI is a formally adequate regimentation of P-SI.

2. Φ-SI in PLI is logically inconsistent.

3. Therefore (by the definition of “formally adequate”) P-SI is logically inconsistent.

   It doesn’t seem tempting to think of this as a “puzzle” at all. Suppose I want to defend, for some reason, the view that P-SI is consistent. I propose the following alternative regimentation of P-SI, Φ-SI*:

   \( \Phi\text{-SI*} \cdot 1. (\forall x)(Hx \rightarrow Mx) \)
   \( \Phi\text{-SI*} \cdot 2. Hs \)
   \( \Phi\text{-SI*} \cdot 3. Is \)

   That is, I propose to take the predicate “immortal” as basic, not definable by negating the predicate “mortal,” and I deny any conditional linking the two, so that I can consistently maintain all of the propositions in P-SI. Voila! “Problem” solved!

   This does not seem like a “solution” to a “problem.” It does not even seem legitimate at all. And that is because the epistemic structure, the structure of warrant, *prima facie* plausibility, and so on, is just the reverse of the situation in the case of PTI. There, the very fact that a given alternative analysis Φ-TI* is consistent just constitutes reason to think it is more logically perspicuous than Φ-TI. But in the case of PSI, it is so *prima facie* implausible to think that P-SI is not inconsistent, that the very fact that a given alternative analysis Φ-SI* is consistent now constitutes reason to think it is not as logically perspicuous as Φ-SI.

   Obviously, the question the anti-Trinitarian will want to raise is whether solutions to the LPT are more like solutions to PTI or more like “solutions” to PSI. In the case of time and change, Parmenides himself would admit that the result that P-TI is inconsistent is *prima facie* implausible. (That’s why he distinguishes in his poem between “the way of appearance” and “the way of truth.” His ideas appear to be nuts – and he knows it.) But in the case of Socrateic Immortality, everybody would admit
that it is the result that P-SI is consistent that is prima facie implausible. (Indeed, it not only seems wrong “at first glance,” but even “in the final analysis.”)

The problem with treating an account of the Trinity as a “solution” to a “philosophical puzzle” (if, as I claim, a solution to a philosophical puzzle is in essence a philosophical paraphrase for a puzzling set of claims like P-TI) is that not just any apparently inconsistent set of propositions counts as a “puzzle.” It’s only a philosophical puzzle if it is hard to believe that the set should turn out to be inconsistent, and yet hard to believe that the inconsistent analysis of it should turn out to be wrong. But the anti-Trinitarian, quite rightly, will point out that it’s not at all hard to believe that the doctrine of the Trinity should turn out to be inconsistent. Indeed, he might point out that in abandoning the doctrine we would be making things easier on ourselves.

To relate this to the earlier point about consistency transferring relations, with a metaphysical puzzle like the Problem of Temporary Intrinsics, nobody is claiming that there is any consistency transferring relation between their speculative metaphysics about the nature of time and change and a description of an object changing over time. Rather, as I’ve argued, in standard philosophical puzzles, it is simply assumed that the target doctrine (set of propositions) is consistent. Thus, if I am right about how Puzzle Approach methodology works in the context of metaphysical and other philosophical puzzles, then the very assumption that the Puzzle Approach methodology is appropriate in the first place simply begs the question against the anti-Trinitarian.

Before concluding, as a side note, even if we did have excellent reason to simply assume at the outset that P must be consistent, an argument of the Puzzle Approach type would not automatically give us reason to suppose that any particular puzzler’s account is more likely than any other to have the same content as P, substantially similar content to P, etc. Nor would it automatically give us reason to suppose that
any particular puzzler’s account of the Trinity even shares the same, or a substantially similar, logical form as P.

For all we can validly deduce from the assumption that P is consistent and a demonstration that A is consistent is that, barring any other information, A at least epistemically could be the same or substantially similar (in content, or in form) to P, while any interpretation of S that is not consistent certainly could not be. Thus, a consistent account A is more likely to be, or be substantially similar to, P than any account in the LPT Family (since the probability that any such account has things right is, by hypothesis, zero). But the same can be said for any proposed account of the Trinity that is not inconsistent.

Typically, of course, puzzlers want to argue in favor of their own account over those of others on the basis of various theoretical virtues that their account has. Some of these are just general theoretical virtues (like being “consistent” and “intelligible” – e.g., (Tuggy 2003), p. 166); others are the sorts of things that would be nice for a bit of specifically Christian theology to have (like being “scripturally kosher” – also at (Tuggy 2003), p. 166.)

But none of these qualities automatically makes a particular account A of the Trinity any more likely to be the same as or substantially similar to P than any other account. Unless, of course, one simply assumes at the outset that the doctrine of the Trinity (or at least P) also has all of these theoretical virtues, and has them to the highest, or at least a very high, degree (for any virtue that comes in degrees).

Indeed, unless we assume that the doctrine of the Trinity, or at least P, has a given theoretical virtue that admits of degrees to the highest (or at least a very high) degree (rather than, say, only to a mediocre degree) – then showing that one’s account has more of that virtue than another account could actually show one’s account to be less likely to be the same as or substantially similar to the doctrine of the Trinity, or to P. Thus, to make sense of the Puzzle Approach in such an instance, we really
need to assume that the doctrine of the Trinity, or at least P, is not only consistent, but has whatever other theoretical virtues we are judging accounts by, and that it has any of those virtues that come in degrees to the highest (or at least a very high) degree.

The question of course is, is it right (and is it not begging the question against the anti-Trinitarian) to assume \textit{a priori} that the doctrine of the Trinity, or at least P, must not only turn out to be consistent, but to have all of the relevant theoretical virtues and have them to a very high degree?

Of course, one might argue that \textit{the truth} is more likely to have these theoretical virtues, and to a high degree, and thus that these all follow from the assumption that the doctrine of the Trinity, or at least P, is true. But then the question is, is it right – and is it not begging the question against the anti-Trinitarian – to assume \textit{a priori} that the doctrine of the Trinity, or at least P, \textit{is the truth}?

There are no doubt cases in which similar assumptions are fine, epistemically speaking. I, for example, don’t know as much as one probably should about the history of the holocaust. But I do think that, were I to do a study of it, there would be nothing wrong in more or less ignoring the possibility that it never happened. And, whatever theoretical worries might be brought up in an epistemology classroom, I probably wouldn’t worry myself too much about the possibility that the holocaust wasn’t real.

However, it’s one thing to say that, in doing history \textit{for myself}, I don’t need to worry too much about conspiracy theories and crazy scenarios that deny the reality of the holocaust. But it’s another thing altogether to say that this \textit{counts as a defense} of the point of view that the holocaust happened. It of course is not a defense. It is precisely the \textit{denial that there needs to be any defense}. (We’ll see in the next section the similarities between this kind of position and mysterianism.)

To conclude, then, one might disagree with me on my assumptions about how and
why a Puzzle Approach methodology works for standard philosophical puzzles. But without saying anything more about how one thinks it does work, we are just back to the problem of answering what the relation is, then, between a puzzler’s speculative account of the Trinity and the doctrine of the Trinity itself. Without saying more, we seem to either have an invalid argument in defense of the doctrine of the Trinity, or one that begs the question against the anti-Trinitarian.

Furthermore, I strongly suspect that the foregoing two general ways of fleshing out the Puzzle Approach (i.e., one that involves some kind of consistency transferring relation, and one that is question-begging) are exhaustive. For the definition of “consistency transferring relation” is essentially just whatever relation would make the Puzzler Argument valid. So, suppose the puzzler’s methodology neither assumes a priori that the doctrine of the Trinity is consistent and “works backwards,” as it were, from there to his account, nor involves a valid argument “going forward,” so to speak, from his account of the Trinity to the doctrine of the Trinity itself. In that case, what kind of reasoning process could we have that would somehow essentially involve (1) an account of the Trinity, (2) the doctrine of the Trinity itself, and (3) the property of logical consistency?

Those, then, are the considerations I bring against the Puzzle Approach. Again, I don’t claim to have given a “knock-down” argument. After all, it might in theory be possible for a puzzler to specify some consistency transferring relation that holds between his proposed account of the Trinity and the doctrine of the Trinity itself (or P), allowing him to avoid the charge of invalidity. Or again, a puzzler could argue that Puzzle Approach methodology, as it operates in metaphysics and other areas of philosophy, in fact works differently than I have assumed, and that the way it in fact works is, after all, analogous to how it would work in philosophical theology in some such way as not to be question-begging after all. However, as it stands, unless some puzzler can come forward and say more about how his methodology works, we
would seem to be left with quite a large amount of literature that consists either of invalid arguments, or question-begging arguments. The next move, then, belongs to the puzzler. Unless and until the puzzler can answer these questions about his methodology, we must pursue our inquiry through other means.

3.2 The Mysterian Approach

In the current literature, the discussion of mysterianism mainly takes place between the once-but-no-longer-Trinitarian Dale Tuggy, and mysterian Trinitarian James Anderson, although both are elaborating in detail on some points made much more briefly by van Inwagen, who in turn takes a cue from some suggestions of John Polkinghorne. While, as we saw, the Puzzle Approach centers on giving an account of the Trinity (thus, implicitly, a proposed solution to the LPT corresponding to the logical form of his account) to show P to be consistent, the Mysterian Approach attempts to defend as rational the belief in P, despite its being an apparent contradiction, without giving any proposed solution or alternative account of the Trinity at all. Yet, the mysterian does not advocate believing in contradictions or willfully ignoring arguments against one’s views. How then can he maintain belief in P despite admitting it is an apparent contradiction, and without proposing any alternative?

Simply put, the mysterian claims that, from the fact that something is an apparent contradiction, we cannot always conclude that it is a real contradiction. Even when P and Q appear to constitute a formal contradiction, we can believe instead that P and Q form a “merely apparent contradiction” or “MAC,” as James Anderson abbreviates it.38 In particular, Anderson holds that the doctrine of the Trinity is a “merely apparent contradiction resulting from an unarticulated equivocation,” or

MACRUE.39

In other words, the mysterian claims that some formally adequate solution to the LPT does exist, but he does not base this belief on his actually accepting any particular account of the Trinity or any particular proposed solution to the LPT. Indeed, according to Anderson it may be that the solution to the LPT involves conceptual distinctions we are not even cognitively equipped to grasp.40 Thus, methodologically, while I have argued that the puzzler’s accounts, by themselves, are not sufficient to show the doctrine of the Trinity to be consistent, the mysterian argues they are unnecessary anyway. He may find none of the accounts on-offer to be satisfactory, but no matter. For the mysterian’s project – and this is the key issue for our purposes – is not to show the doctrine of the Trinity to be consistent. Rather, it is to maintain the rationality and/or warrant of one’s belief in the doctrine of the Trinity anyway – even though it really appears to be contradictory.

Let us begin our exposition of Mysterianism with van Inwagen. In “And Yet They Are Not Three Gods But One God,”41 van Inwagen gives an analogy between the doctrine of the Trinity and quantum physics in support of a position that looks like mysterianism.

Have we ever been promised by God that we shall understand everything he tells us well enough to resolve all the intellectual difficulties it raises? God’s concern with us – just at present, at any rate – is not the concern of a tutor who fears that we shall fail to grasp some nice point: God fears that we shall lose the end for which we were made. His concern with us is entirely practical... As to alleged demonstrations of contradiction – well, our faith is: There is some way to answer these demonstrations, whether or not we can understand it.

The world, of course, has a handy word for this sort of thing: ‘obscurationism.’ I would remind the world of certain cases that have arisen in

41. (van Inwagen 1988), Philosophy and the Christian Faith (Morris, ed.): pp. 241-278.
twentieth-century physics. An electron, we are told, is both a wave and a particle. One can ask pointed questions about this thesis. A wave is a spreading, periodic disturbance; a particle is a lump of stuff; How can something be both? I think that there are two equally respectable answers to this question: (1) No one knows; (2) Quantum field theory explains how something can be both a wave and a particle. Let us suppose that the second of these answers is correct, and that some people, those who are at home in quantum field theory, know how something can be both a wave and a particle. Still, there was an interval during which physicists went about saying that electrons were both waves and particles, and had no satisfactory reply to the childishly simple question, “How can something be both a disturbance and a lump of stuff?” . . . And I do not think that anyone should blame the physicists for this. I do not think that anyone should have blamed them even if quantum field theory had somehow never been discovered. There were certain undeniable but absolutely astounding experimental data (a “revelation” from nature, as it were); there was a theory that explained those data (a human invention, to be sure, and an extraordinarily brilliant one at that, but not a human invention in the way a motet or an abstract painting is – the theory purported to represent physical reality); and that theory implied that an electron had both a mass and a wavelength.

Might it not be that the Christian who accepts the doctrine of the Trinity, even though he is unable to answer certain pointed questions about it, is in a position analogous to that of quantum physicists before the advent of quantum field theory? The world, of course, will reply that the Christian “revelation” is a fantasy, while the revelation disclosed by nature in the double-slit experiment or in the phenomenon of electron diffraction comprises hard facts of observation. But may we not ask the world to consider the question hypothetically? Suppose the Christian revelation were not a fantasy. If the Holy Spirit really existed and had led the mind of the Church to the doctrine of the Trinity, then might not the Trinitarian be in a position analogous to that of the physicist to whom nature had revealed the doctrine of the Duality? The world may abuse us for believing in God and revelation if it will, but I think the world should admit that once we have accepted something as a revelation, it is reasonable for us to retain it even if we cannot answer all the intellectual difficulties it raises; or at least the world should admit this if the subject matter of the putative revelation is one that it is plausible a priori to suppose we should find it very difficult to understand.42

Thus, one can see how van Inwagen brings into the discussion a deeper, epistemo-

42. (van Inwagen 1988), pp. 243-244.
logical contour. He raises the question, does the Trinitarian even need to offer any solution to the LPT? Need he be able to actually demonstrate the logical consistency of P? Is it ever OK to believe in an apparent contradiction, even if we can’t dispel that apparent contradiction?

In “The unfinished business of Trinitarian theorizing,” after rejecting all of the Trinitarian accounts currently on-offer in the literature (including van Inwagen’s relative identity proposal), Dale Tuggy discusses van Inwagen’s analogy above and takes up the epistemological question, saying:

...Can one reasonably believe an apparent contradiction?

It seems to me that one can, if two somewhat hard-to-specify conditions are met. First, one must have very strong grounds for believing the claim or claims in question. Second, one must have some reason to suspect that the contradiction is only apparent. Unless these two conditions are met, one ought not believe any apparent contradiction[.]

But Tuggy claims that neither condition holds. He gives a rough analogue of P as follows:

(1) God is divine.
(2) The Father of Jesus Christ is divine.
(3) The Son, Jesus Christ, is divine.
(4) The Holy Spirit is divine.
(5) The Father is not the Son is not the Holy Spirit is not God. That is, these four – Father, Son, Holy Spirit, God – are numerically distinct individuals.

43. (TUGGY 2003).

44. I use “proposal” here, since the things van Inwagen says about the Trinity do not constitute an “account” in the specific sense in which we are using that term. (See 3.1, p. 71 ff.) Van Inwagen offers a proposed solution (a logical form), but consciously avoids filling it in with specific content about the metaphysical workings of the Trinity.


46. Why only rough? See footnote 55, p. 110.
This last claim can be broken into two parts:

(5a) These three are numerically distinct: Father, Son, and Holy Spirit.

(5b) God is numerically distinct from any of these: Father, Son, Holy Spirit.

(6) Whatever is divine is identical to at least one of these: the Father, the Son, or the Holy Spirit.  

Then in reference to these claims, he states:

With our claims (1)–(6) above, or the inconsistent triad (1), (5), (6), the second of these conditions is not met, for the contradiction is crystal clear. Even if one denies that, it is doubtful that we have strong enough grounds for (1)–(6) to swallow the apparent contradiction. The only way we could have strong grounds for (1)–(6) or any version of the doctrine would be if we very reasonably believed it had been revealed by God. 

No doubt van Inwagen would claim that he does “very reasonably believe” the doctrine of the Trinity has been revealed by God. But, after making the claim that the doctrine of the Trinity is not explicitly found in scripture, Tuggy continues:

But whether one grounds the doctrine in the Bible or in council documents, one will be hard pressed to show that we are so justified in believing that God revealed doctrine X that we should believe X, even though it seems as contradictory as the claim that there is a square circle. This is why so much energy has recently been spent by those in the ST and LT camps on coming up with a clearly consistent (or at least, a not clearly inconsistent) version of Trinitarian doctrine. 

That is, even if we have a great deal of warrant for accepting P, Tuggy simply denies that this belief is highly warranted enough that it can outweigh P’s apparent

47. p. 166
49. See Chapter 6.4, p. 398 ff., and esp. p. 418 on theological objections, for my deep misgivings about this sort of claim.
50. (TUGGY 2003), p. 177.
inconsistency. This question of how much antecedent warrant there might be for the doctrine of the Trinity seems to be one of the key issues for Tuggy.

Tuggy concludes:

... when we discover a contradictory, impossible, or unintelligible claim in Trinitarian theorizing, we should consider it the product of misguided or confused human theorizing, and not something which dropped into our laps from above. We Christian theologians and philosophers came up with the doctrine of the Trinity; perhaps with God’s help we will come up with a better version of it.51,52

Next into the fray comes James Anderson, with a 2005 paper,53 and later a 2007 book on the subject.54

At the time of “Unfinished Business,” Tuggy was still a Trinitarian who would seem to have been in the puzzler camp, and he gives some hints that the LPT could be solved by identifying God with the Father alone.55 So Anderson first (and rightly, in my view) argues that the doctrine of the Trinity is more paradoxical than Tuggy’s discussion reveals, and that all parts of the paradox are pretty firmly rooted in scripture. To Tuggy’s (1)–(6), Anderson adds the “biblical data” that:

(7) The Father of Jesus Christ is identical to God.

and

51. (Tuggy 2003), pp. 178-179

52. Note what seems to be a puzzler presupposition – that we need to “come up with” a better “version of” the doctrine of the Trinity, rather than simply discover what it is.

53. (Anderson 2005).

54. (Anderson 2007).

55. Note that Tuggy’s (1)–(6) is consistent with this kind of unitarianism, which Tuggy later adopts, whereas our P is not consistent with Tuggy’s unitarianism. This is why I call them only “rough” analogues. In my view, Tuggy’s unitarianism is misguided. Within a certain community, the singular expression, “the philosopher,” referred specifically to Aristotle. This did not mean that the predicate “philosopher” could not be applied to anyone else, yielding the conclusion that there is more than one philosopher. Anderson’s criticism of Tuggy’s formulation seems to be another way of getting at much the same issue.
(8) The Son, Jesus Christ, is identical to God.\textsuperscript{56}

He also suggests that there is reasonable biblical support for:

(9) The Holy Spirit is identical to God.\textsuperscript{57}

Finally he suggests that the following is probably a biblical datum as well:

(10) There is one divine being.\textsuperscript{58}

With these in place, he says:

\ldots the biblical data which Trinitarian theorists need to accommodate turn out to be rather more extensive (and awkward) than Tuggy’s assessment would suggest. His contention that a version of the doctrine which satisfies the triple constraints of consistency, intelligibility, and good fit with the Bible can be achieved by rejecting (5b) – as well as, one assumes, (8)–(10) – is subject to considerable doubt. Yet the logical problem that motivates Tuggy’s proposal is not yet resolved, for, even leaving aside (5b), a seeming contradiction arises simply from adding (8) to the mix. Tuggy’s arguments against ST and LT are persuasive; I concur with his conclusion that they fail to deliver in their promises. So what is a rational, biblical Trinitarian to do?\textsuperscript{59,60}

Before giving his positive proposal, he considers the option of just accepting a contradiction, and agrees with Tuggy that simply accepting a contradiction will not do. “Now, I quite agree with Tuggy that it will not do to say that the Trinity is really

\footnotesize
60. I note, in passing, Tuggy and Anderson’s apparent shared assumption of the appropriateness of a puzzle approach methodology – the search for “a version of the doctrine which satisfies the triple constraints of consistency, intelligibility, and good fit with the Bible…” with no discussion of how to determine whether any given account of the Trinity that satisfies those theoretical constraints genuinely counts as a “version of” the doctrine of the Trinity. As it seems to me, mysterianism per se is free either to agree or disagree with puzzle approach methodology, as the mysterian simply has a different goal from the puzzler. In this particular case, Anderson seems not to challenge the general thrust of the puzzle approach. More on which below. (3.2.2, esp. p. 122.)
contradictory. . . We should avoid, if at all possible, falling back on the idea that the law of non-contradiction does not apply when theorizing about God. 61

Instead, Anderson proposes that the doctrine of the Trinity may appear to be contradictory due to being a “Merely Apparent Contradiction Resulting from an Unarticulated Equivocation” or MACRUE.

. . . [A]n intelligible distinction may be made between apparent contradiction and real contradiction; thus an intelligible distinction may be made between apparent-and-real contradiction and apparent-but-not-real contradiction. Let us refer to an instance of the latter as a merely apparent contradiction (MAC). Having dismissed as untenable the idea that the Trinity is genuinely contradictory, we are left with the possibility that the theological claims suggested by the biblical data constitute a MAC.

. . . [K]nowing that the relevant distinctions could in principle be articulated and explicated is sufficient grounds for distinguishing a MAC from a genuine contradiction. MACs of this kind are thus accounted for by the presence of unarticulated equivocation among key terms involved in the claims. For the sake of brevity, I will hereafter refer to an instance of this phenomenon as a MACRUE (Merely Apparent Contradiction Resulting from Unarticulated Equivocation). 62

A few pages later, Anderson rehearses some of the ways in which the doctrine of the Trinity might turn out to rest on equivocations and how those could be articulated:

. . . [A] formally consistent expression of Trinitarian doctrine can be constructed simply by explicitly articulating distinctions between the relevant terms: distinguishing ‘is₁’ and ‘is₂’, say, or ‘divine₁’ and ‘divine₂’. Alternatively, problematic terms can be appropriately qualified so as to eliminate formal inconsistency; for example, the term ‘one’ can be redefined to accommodate the enumerative oddities raised by the metaphysics of divine personhood (while still applying in the usual way to non-divine persons and other mundane entities). Whatever route is taken, however, the essential point is this: given that we are dealing with a MACRUE, the vocabulary used to express the doctrine can in principle be adapted


so as to eliminate any formal contradiction.\(^63\)

With his account of a MACRUE in place, Anderson goes on to address the question whether it is reasonable to believe a paradoxical doctrine. In reference to Tuggy’s two conditions of having very strong grounds for believing the paradoxical claim or claims in question and having some reason to suspect that the contradiction is only apparent, Anderson says:

Now it seems to me that the second of these conditions will normally be met, at least in part, by way of the first being met. After all, if I have ‘very strong grounds’ for believing a set of claims that seem contradictory, don’t I thereby have good reason to suspect that the inconsistency is merely apparent? This principle is certainly supported by the examples of MACRUEs offered earlier. Furthermore, it is plausible to hold that Christians can have very strong grounds for believing those claims typically taken to constitute the orthodox doctrine of the Trinity, namely, the fact that each of those claims is implied by an array of scriptural data. If the Bible is indeed inspired by God, and if the Holy Spirit can induce in a person’s mind a firm conviction that this is so, then Christians can be warranted in believing both direct biblical claims and also whatever follows from those claims ‘by good and necessary consequence’ (as the Westminster Confession puts it). In favourable circumstances, those beliefs may be warranted to a high degree.\(^64\)

Thus, Anderson seems to be basing his argument on a presupposition that Trinitarians are (or might be) highly warranted in their belief in the doctrine of the Trinity. He ties this into the warrant Christians have for believing in the divine inspiration of the Bible:

There is excellent scriptural support for the individual components of the doctrine of the Trinity, as any good systematic theology text will document. And if the belief that the Bible is divinely inspired (or at least that the relevant biblical data are of divine origin) can be warranted to a high degree, as Plantinga and others have argued, then so can the derivative Trinitarian beliefs. This in itself can provide reasonable grounds for

\(^63\) (Anderson 2005), p. 151.

\(^64\) (Anderson 2005), p. 154.
resisting the inference from apparent contradiction to genuine contradiction.\textsuperscript{65}

In Tuggy’s response to Anderson,\textsuperscript{66} Tuggy admits that there are scenarios in which we are warranted in believing P and warranted in believing Q, and warranted in believing I: that P and Q are inconsistent, but in which the rational thing to do is maintain belief in P and Q. But this can occur, on Tuggy’s view, only when the warrant for I is less than the warrant for P and Q.\textsuperscript{67} In this case, although we are warranted in believing I (even, potentially, highly warranted, possibly even so warranted it would count as knowledge, if it were true and we believed it), it is still permissible to reject it.\textsuperscript{68} He further argues that, while belief in an apparently contradictory pair of propositions “may be reasonable for some people at some times,” it “is unstable or fragile, in that new information rather easily knocks one out of one’s reasonable belief in an apparent contradiction.”\textsuperscript{69}

This is because in his view, first of all, the warrant we have for religious beliefs will never be maximal, since firmness of belief is a necessary condition on warrant, and “religious claims themselves will never seem true […] at the maximal level.”\textsuperscript{70} Furthermore, the warrant for believing I can be increased “through the study of metaphysics, logic, and/or precise (philosophical) theology.”\textsuperscript{71} And finally the strength of our beliefs in P and Q (again, a necessary condition on warrant in his and Anderson’s views, both following Plantinga’s epistemology) can be decreased “through the study

\textsuperscript{65} (Anderson 2005), pp. 156-157.
\textsuperscript{66} (Tuggy 2011).
\textsuperscript{67} (Tuggy 2011), pp. 19-20 of online version.
\textsuperscript{68} (Tuggy 2011), p. 19 of online version.
\textsuperscript{69} (Tuggy 2011), p. 15 of online version.
\textsuperscript{70} (Tuggy 2011), p. 16 of online version.
\textsuperscript{71} (Tuggy 2011), p. 18 of online version.
of the Bible, biblical exegesis, and historical and recent systematic theology.”

Anderson, on the other hand, rejects both the claim that the only rational course of action when warrant for I is equal to or greater than that for P or for Q is to reject P or reject Q (by either denying or withholding)\(^73\) and the claim that warrant for I is likely to be increased and/or the warrant for P or for Q likely to be decreased (and argues that it is, after all, *probability* here that is the question, rather than mere *possibility*).\(^74\)

As I said, we will not have space for a full explication and adjudication of the dispute, and hopefully it is clear why now. However, without settling all of the epistemological questions raised in the Tuggy-Anderson debate, we can, first, add a novel problem for the mysterian to grapple with, and second, clarify why mysterianism is not so much an alternative methodology to the Puzzle Approach or the Historical Approach, as a methodology with an alternative goal (or set of related goals). Finally, we will explore the friendly suggestion for the puzzler we mentioned earlier – a way of combining the Puzzle Approach methodology with the goals of the mysterian.

### 3.2.1 A Challenge for Mysterianism

First then, I believe the taxonomy we presented in the first chapter creates a certain challenge concerning the *motivation* for mysterianism.

Of course there might be many reasons one would be a mysterian, but it appears that one strong motivation working in the background for mysterians like Anderson is a certain dissatisfaction with all of the on-offer proposed solutions to the LPT.

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\(^72\) (Tuggy 2011), p. 18 of online version.

\(^73\) (Anderson 2011), pp. 21-23 of online version.

\(^74\) (Anderson 2011), pp. 18-20 of online version.
Anderson seems to want to be able to reject all of the proposed solutions currently on offer, but still believe that there exists some solution. (Indeed, at the time of “Unfinished Business,” Tuggy seemed to share much in common with this position, in the sense that he rejected all of the on-offer solutions to the LPT, but still held out hope that that the “business of Trinitarian theorizing” was simply “unfinished.” That “perhaps with God’s help we will come up with a better version of [the doctrine of the Trinity].”\textsuperscript{75} But of course, he already disagreed with the epistemological stand of the mysterian.)

It’s no mystery why this desire to be free to reject all on-offer accounts of the Trinity would motivate one to take the Mysterian Approach. Both the Puzzle Approach and the Historical approach require one to say in essence, “The doctrine of the Trinity is consistent... and here’s an explanation of how it is or could be.” On the Mysterian Approach, one also maintains that the doctrine of the Trinity is consistent. The difference is just that the mysterian doesn’t have to tell us how that could be. To put it in other terms, the mysterian is only seeking to give an undercutting defeater-defeater in response to the LPT (an alleged defeater for Trinitarian belief). While the puzzler and the historicist seek to give a rebutting defeater-defeater. (See below, Chapter 3.2.2, p. 119.) Thus, the mysterian won’t be pushed toward giving an account of the Trinity or proposed solution to the LPT in the way that the puzzler or historicist would be.

But then why would one be attracted to mysterianism, unless one found fault with, and wanted to reject, all of the accounts or proposed solutions presented in the literature?

And yet, it seems that the mysterian will actually not be able to reject any of the proposed solutions in the Equivocation Family or the NCIC Family – at least, not on the basis of certain arguments one might have assumed would have been his

\textsuperscript{75} (Tuggy 2003), pp. 178-179.
motivation.

Specifically, he will not be able to reject any of the proposed solutions in those Families based on two of the most prominent reasons usually given – namely, that they employ an unpalatable equivocation on “is God” or an appeal to non-classical-identity counting. This is because, as we saw in the previous chapter, our taxonomy shows that if we rule out proposed solutions to the LPT based on those purely syntactic features, we thereby rule out the entirety of the Equivocation Family and the entirety of the NCIC Family, and therefore all possible, non-heretical solutions to the LPT.

Anderson hints at his motives when he states: “Tuggy contends that neither Social Trinitarianism nor Latin Trinitarianism can offer us an interpretation of the doctrine of the Trinity that is both logically consistent and biblically faithful. I concur.”

Unfortunately, Anderson himself does not give his specific reasons for rejecting Social Trinitarianism and Latin Trinitarianism, though he does state, “Tuggy’s arguments against ST and LT are persuasive,” perhaps indicating that he agrees with Tuggy’s arguments (which do seem to commit Tuggy to rejecting all possible, non-heretical solutions to the LPT). In any case, it seems unlikely to me that Anderson,

76. He could, for example, remain agnostic about whether there are any successful Equivocation Family solutions to the LPT but still reject all currently on-offer Social Trinitarian solutions piecemeal. Say, by rejecting one particular version of Social Trinitarianism on the grounds that one makes God out to be a set, another a community, another a whole, etc. (i.e., on the basis of some objectionable aspect of the content of the view.) But it seems more likely he would want to reject the entire Equivocation Family due to its saying that God “is God” in a different sense than the sense in which the Father, Son and Holy Spirit are. Likewise, he could remain agnostic about whether there are any successful NCIC Family solutions to the LPT but still reject all current such solutions by rejecting each particular version of Relative Identity Trinitarianism on the grounds of the specific relation it involves – the constitution relation, the synergy relation we will see later, etc. (i.e., again, because of some objectionable aspect of the content of the view). But it seems more likely he would reject the entire NCIC Family due to its counting gods by a relation other than classical identity.

77. Since van Inwagen actually puts forward a Relative Identity account of the Trinity, clearly he does not wish to reject such accounts. Thus, the issue I raise for motivation clearly does not apply to his views.


or other mysterians, would only want to reject specific accounts of the Trinity on a case-by-case basis or other piecemeal fashion, rather than rejecting all Equivocation Family accounts, and all NCIC accounts, precisely in virtue of the logical features that define those Families of solutions. But if that is so then our taxonomy shows that Anderson would ultimately be committed to rejecting all possible, non-heretical solutions to the LPT.  

To put the point in a very summary way, then, one might distinguish mysterianism into two types. One type would say, in essence, “I don’t know what the logical form of $P$ is, because none of the on-offer accounts of the Trinity strike me as plausible (due to the formal features we’ve noted.)” Another type would say, very roughly, “I don’t know what the logical form of $P$ is, because multiple on-offer accounts of the Trinity seem plausible enough.” It seems likely that only the latter type would be workable, but that only the former type would satisfy the mysterian’s real motivations.

3.2.2 Mysterianism’s Goal

Next, I want to argue that mysterianism is in an important sense not in competition with the the Historical or Puzzle approaches. To see this, recall that in our analysis of the Puzzle Approach, we faulted the puzzler for simply begging the question against the anti-Trinitarian, at least on a certain way of fleshing out the Puzzle Approach, by presupposing a great deal of warrant for belief in the doctrine of the Trinity. Since it seems that the mysterian presupposes a great deal of warrant for his belief in the doctrine of the Trinity, can one argue that the mysterian is guilty of the same sort of question begging?

80. The same, of course, holds for Tuggy and anyone else who rejects all of the now-standard Trinitarian accounts on the basis of the syntactic features we’ve used to taxonomize them. Although now that Tuggy has abandoned Trinitarianism altogether, he no doubt would welcome this result.
This turns out, I think, to be a much subtler question than may initially appear. Again, this is the question that occupies a central role in the Tuggy-Anderson debate, and unfortunately a complete analysis would simply take us too far afield. However, we can certainly say the following. One reason it is much more difficult to say whether the mysterian begs the question against the anti-Trinitarian is that, as I said at the outset, and as we can now see much more clearly, the mysterian simply has a different aim from either the historicist or the puzzler. That is, he is arguing for a very different conclusion.

If we view the anti-Trinitarian’s argument as an attempt to give a rebutting defeater for belief in the doctrine of the Trinity, it seems the puzzler and the historicist alike want to give a rebutting defeater-defeater, whereas the mysterian’s project is only to give an undercutting defeater-defeater. That is, both the puzzler and the historicist want to demonstrate that P is logically consistent, showing the anti-Trinitarian’s conclusion to be false. But the mysterian isn’t trying to do this. He only wants to show that one of the anti-Trinitarian’s premises is either false, or simply not sufficiently well supported. He wants to maintain that it’s possible for the Trinitarian to have a warranted belief in the doctrine of the Trinity (or that it’s rational to believe in the doctrine of the Trinity, or some such related conclusion), despite the anti-Trinitarian’s argument. As Anderson points out, his arguments “... can still serve as a defeater-defeater (or defeater-insulator) with respect to theological paradox (i.e., as an undercutting defeater for the inference from D appears to be logically inconsistent to D is false).”\textsuperscript{81} The puzzler and historicist, then, are engaged in a project analogous to theodicy in the problem of evil, whereas the mysterian’s project is analogous to a defense.\textsuperscript{82,83}

\textsuperscript{81} (Anderson 2011), p. 12 of online version.

\textsuperscript{82} (Anderson 2011), pp. 12-13 of the online version.

\textsuperscript{83} I will briefly discuss below the prospects for a Puzzle Approach that would also adopt a more
If the mysterian’s project really just aims at a different conclusion, what precisely is that conclusion? It seems to me that there are a number of related, but importantly different, conclusions the mysterian might be aiming at. And whether or not the mysterian project is successful depends both on precisely what that project is (i.e., precisely what property the mysterian wants to ascribe to his Trinitarian beliefs) and a number of factors about one’s overarching epistemological theory.

Anderson seems to want to argue that the Trinitarian’s belief either is or might be warranted. Warranted enough to count as knowledge, if true. Again, I don’t want to pronounce on the question whether that project can be made to work (in the absence of the kind of defense attempted by historicists and puzzlers). But Anderson does (rightly) point out that Tuggy’s criticisms of his position at many points seem to rest on underlying internalist epistemological assumptions, while Anderson’s epistemology, following Plantinga’s, is externalist.\(^{84}\) If the conclusion a mysterian wanted to arrive at had to do with internalist justification of Trinitarian beliefs, the position might be more clearly problematic. Given Anderson’s externalism, it’s more difficult to say.

However, in my view a clearer path is the one that appears to be taken by van Inwagen.\(^{85}\) Without going into great detail, his remarks indicate that the conclusion he wants to draw is not even as strong as saying that Trinitarian belief is, or even that it might be, highly warranted. Recall this:

> The world, of course, will reply that the Christian “revelation” is a fantasy, while the revelation disclosed by nature in the double-slit experiment or in the phenomenon of electron diffraction comprises hard facts of observation. But may we not ask the world to consider the question hypothetically? Suppose the Christian revelation were not a fantasy. If the Holy Spirit really existed and had led the mind of the Church to the doctrine

\(^{84}\) (Anderson 2011), p. 18.

\(^{85}\) To the extent that van Inwagen fits into the mysterian camp, which as we’ve seen is not totally.
of the Trinity, *then* might not the Trinitarian be in a position analogous to that of the physicist to whom nature had revealed the doctrine of the Duality? The world may abuse us for believing in God and revelation if it will, but I think the world should admit that *once we have* accepted something as a revelation, it is *reasonable* for us to retain it even if we cannot answer all the intellectual difficulties it raises...  

The repeated use of hypothetical terms – “hypothetically,” “suppose,” “if” – suggests that his intended conclusion is of a merely hypothetical character. *If* a Trinitarian’s beliefs *were* highly warranted, would the anti-Trinitarian argument count as a defeater, or would mysterian considerations count as adequate defeater-defeaters? That is, while Anderson’s book extends Plantinga’s Aquinas / Calvin model of warranted Christian belief to encompass the doctrine of the Trinity to argue that Trinitarian belief *really could be* warranted, it seems van Inwagen only wants to argue that *if* Trinitarian belief *were* warranted, anti-Trinitarian arguments would not defeat it (without even committing on whether they are or might be warranted). 

Furthermore, reading a bit more deeply into the final sentence of the quote from van Inwagen above, it may also be that van Inwagen is not only arguing for a hypothetical conclusion that would have a consequent involving an externalist, Plantingian-Andersonian concept of warrant, but one involving a perhaps related but distinct concept of *reasonableness*. This might be a more deontic notion, like being “within one’s epistemic rights.” (Note van Inwagen’s use of the term “blame” in his analogy, “I do not think that anyone should blame the physicists for this. I do not think that anyone should have blamed them even if quantum field theory had somehow never been discovered.”) Not that, if Trinitarian belief were warranted, anti-Trinitarian arguments would not defeat it. But that, if Trinitarian belief were at

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87. See esp. Chapter 6 of (Anderson 2007).

least *reasonable* (un-blameworthy), then anti-Trinitarian arguments would not render it *unreasonable* (blameworthy). Trinitarians would still be within their epistemic rights in maintaining their belief in the doctrine of the Trinity.

This latter interpretation, in my view, might be even more easily defended, though as always in philosophy, one might argue that the progressively more defensible alternatives we have briefly touched upon are also progressively less exciting. But be that as it may, the features of what seems to be van Inwagen’s position just discussed certainly render it more easily defensible. And this is why it turns out to be much less than clear that the mysterian is begging the question against the anti-Trinitarian in the way the puzzler (on one fleshing out of his view) was.

But happily, all of this also makes a refutation of the Mysterian Approach unnecessary for the historicist. For as should now be clear, the Mysterian Approach turns out to be, not so much another methodology in competition with the Historical Approach and the Puzzle Approach, but a methodology with a different goal, compatible, in principle, with either. The mysterian is only seeking to show something about the epistemic status of *his own beliefs* (that they are *reasonable*, or that they are *warranted*, or that hypothetically they could *remain undefeated*, or *remain reasonable*, in the face of the LPT, or something along these lines). The historicist and the puzzler, on the other hand, are trying to show something about *the doctrine of the Trinity itself* – that it is *consistent*.

### 3.2.3 A Suggestion for the Puzzler

This in turn raises an additional important question about the Puzzle Approach. Namely, if it should turn out that the puzzler’s methodology is insufficient to achieve its goal (or that the mysterian’s methodology is insufficient to achieve its goal), would one be able to construct a sort of hybrid methodology, taking the goal of the Mysterian
Approach but employing the accounts of the Puzzle Approach? This would be an attempt to use a speculative Trinitarian account to show, not that P is consistent (a rebutting defeater-defeater), but that the argument for its inconsistency is flawed (an undercutting defeater-defeater). The accounts, then, would not be intended to reveal the actual logical form of P, but only to demonstrate that there are logical forms that P epistemically might (for all we know) have that would be consistent. Perhaps the theoretical virtues an account has could be used to show it to be more charitable or for some other reason a more plausible reading than the anti-Trinitarian’s reading(s) of P.

I think there would still be a few issues with such an approach.

First, again, without doing some historical work, the puzzler still has to admit that, for all he knows, his account may not actually turn out to be a version of the doctrine of the Trinity at all. Indeed, without saying anything more, puzzlers must admit that all of their accounts may just be logically consistent heresies, since, without saying anything more, for all we know, his account may not even be logically consistent with the doctrine of the Trinity. Thus, without saying anything more, the Trinitarian puzzler shouldn’t actually advocate accepting his account as true – or even likely to be true – even if he does advocate accepting the doctrine of the Trinity itself as true (indeed, precisely because he advocates accepting the doctrine of the Trinity itself as true, and because, without delving into the history, for all we know, his account might entail the falsehood of the doctrine of the Trinity). So, on this proposal, without going back and answering the questions we posed in section 1, a puzzler’s speculative account of the Trinity should at best be put forward only as a defeater-defeater, not as a way of understanding or conceptualizing the Trinity that it would be actually acceptable for Christians to believe. The existence of a possible interpretation of S that is consistent may defeat the prima facie warrant for thinking P is inconsistent. But that doesn’t mean it constitutes a “version of” P itself (nor
indeed that it is even logically compatible with P).

Second, without providing any reason to think that one’s account bears any actual logical relation to the doctrine of the Trinity itself, it’s still not clear how strong a puzzler account would be even as a defeater-defeater. Returning to the Problem of Socrateic Immortality, suppose I believe that all men are mortal, that Socrates is a man, but that Socrates is immortal. One can easily give me a defeater for that conjunction, showing that the logical form that seems prima facie reasonable to attribute to it is inconsistent. On the other hand, we know that it’s possible to give an account on which that conjunction is consistent. But without showing that it’s reasonable to think the logical form of my account really does reflect the logical form of that conjunction, it’s not clear that I’ve succeeding in defeating the defeater.

In other words, it’s still not immediately obvious whether this approach would work, without the additional premise that the puzzler’s account either is identical to P or logically entails P or is logically isomorphic to P, etc. And just as before, it isn’t clear how one would show that without explicating the logical form of P in enough detail that one might have just determined its logical consistency altogether (giving a rebutting defeater-defeater), without even making reference to the speculative account, making the speculative account, again, superfluous.

3.2.4 Conclusion on the Puzzle Approach and the Mysterian Approach

In conclusion, then, while there is much more to say about methodology, two points should be clear.

The first is that the Mysterian Approach, regardless of whether it turns out to be successful in its goal or not, is simply directed at a different goal from that of the historicist or the puzzler.

89. See p. 99 ff.
The second is that, to date, puzzlers have not been clear as to what precisely their arguments are supposed to show, so that it is unclear what role their speculative accounts of the Trinity are supposed to be playing in these arguments. In order to evaluate puzzlers’ arguments fully, we would need to know, at a minimum, their conclusion. (Presumably the same as the historicist’s, though perhaps it would turn out that some would prefer to adopt a more mysterian conclusion, were they to state their conclusion explicitly.) Next, whatever the conclusion turns out to be, we need to know precisely what the premises of the argument in support of it are. Once the project of stating those elements has been completed, then, the bigger question will be, “What role (if any) does the puzzlers’ speculative account of the Trinity play in this argument?” (Whatever exactly the argument turns out to be.) But until the puzzler completes the project of stating his argument explicitly, it is at best unclear whether his accounts will ultimately play any essential role in that argument after all, or whether the project will not ultimately just collapse into the Historical Approach.

For the reasons given in section 1, it seems unlikely to me that puzzlers will get very far in trying to put their accounts to use in proving the conclusion that P is consistent (rebutting the anti-Trinitarian argument). It seems much more likely that they could use their accounts to make some kind of point about about the epistemic situation of the Trinitarian, a la the Mysterian Approach (undercutting the anti-Trinitarian argument). But even there it isn’t immediately obvious precisely how their argument will go, whether it would be successful, or whether their accounts will actually end up playing any essential role in those arguments after all.

3.3 The Historical Approach

I’ve argued that the Puzzle Approach is insufficient for answering the question, “of all of the possible logical forms we might ascribe to P, which one is right? (Or, if more than one is right, which ones?)” And the Mysterian Approach is not even
directly concerned with that question in the first place. How, then, does the Historical Approach recommend we answer the question?

We’ve already seen hints of this view in van Inwagen. We can also grasp the view that some historical relation between one’s account and the doctrine of the Trinity itself is essential simply by looking at the way in which authors like Swinburne or Cross proceed with their discussions.90

Although complicated in its implementation, the Historical Approach is fairly simple in its essence. Put simply, the historicist claims that the correct answer to the LPT will be whatever answer (solution or non-solution) to the LPT is implicitly given by the accounts of the Trinity historically held by the authors of the (orthodox) doctrine of the Trinity itself.

That is, the historicist does not attempt to find a solution to the LPT a priori. On the Historical Approach, whether the answer to the LPT is a solution or non-solution is to be determined by examining the doctrine of the Trinity itself, or particular historical versions of it. Thus, the historicist admits that, without begging the question, it cannot be determined a priori whether that answer will be a solution or a non-solution. The historicist only claims that his answer to the LPT will be correct, not necessarily that it will be a solution.

That is a brief statement of the methodology. But let us examine some potential objections from puzzlers, mysterians, and anti-Trinitarians, which will at the same time give us occasion to elaborate a bit on the view as well.

3.3.1 Objection 1: The Puzzler’s Tu Quoque

I said that one can carry out the Historical Approach by examining the orthodox doctrine of the Trinity itself, or particular historical versions of the orthodox doctrine

90. E.g., Swinburne’s discussions of the historicity of his account in (SWINBURNE 1988) and (SWINBURNE 1994), or Cross’s discussions of patristic accounts of the Trinity in response to Brian Leftow in (CROSS 2012).
of the Trinity. Does the Historical Approach, then, not fall prey to the same problem as the Puzzle Approach—namely that it will have to navigate between the Scylla of showing that the “version of” relation is a consistency transferring relation and the Charybdis of showing that some historical account of the Trinity actually is a(n orthodox) version of the doctrine?

No. This is because the accounts that the historicist advocates examining are just those that are definitive of the Trinitarian tradition itself, rather than ones deliberately constructed so as to be logically consistent or otherwise theoretically virtuous. To be sure, the historicist must say something about any account he examines being part of the Trinitarian tradition. And I will address that fact, albeit only briefly, at the end of the chapter. But, however one thinks about traditions and schools of thought, it seems that in practice we have perfectly good, practical ways of figuring out who lies in a certain intellectual tradition and who doesn’t, and likewise what propositions are more central or less central to a given school of thought. One might wonder why, then, the puzzler couldn’t avail himself of the same sorts of arguments and considerations, and simply give the same sorts of historical arguments to show that his theory was, in fact, within the same tradition. And of course, he could. Indeed, I would argue he should. Nothing wrong with it. But of course, to do so would be to no longer treat the project merely as a puzzle, divorced, or at least largely divorced, from historical concerns. It would be to collapse into the Historical Approach.

Think of Tuggy’s statement, “The doctrine of the Trinity has a long and interesting history... In this paper I will avoid as much of this post-biblical tradition as I can...” or Forrest saying, “I grant that all this is speculative. But in order to defend a moderate Social Trinitarianism it suffices to provide a speculative metaphysics which is no worse than its rivals...”91 Puzzlers could indeed go back and try to back up the

91. (Forrest 1998) p. 293 – emphasis mine.
claim that their accounts are orthodox version of the doctrine of the Trinity by using historical arguments. But in doing so, they would no longer “avoid... post-biblical tradition” or rely on nothing more than mere “speculation.”

Now I said that the accounts that the historicist advocates examining are just those that are definitive of the Trinitarian tradition itself. What if one supposes that there are no such accounts?

In the introduction to *Analytic Theology: New Essays in the Philosophy of Theology*, Mike Rea gives several “prescriptions” characteristic of analytic philosophers’ approach to theology, along with what he takes to be the major criticisms of these features. He relates my Historical Approach to his first prescription, labelled “P1”:

...P1 recommends that we operate under the assumption that positions and conclusions can be formulated in sentences that can be formalized and logically manipulated. One might object, however, that this prescription misconstrues the nature of philosophical and theological positions. Consider empiricism, for example. This position is notoriously problematic when thought of simply as a thesis about sources of knowledge. It is significantly less so when thought of as somehow involving attitudes, preferences, dispositions, and so on. Though no one that I know of has said exactly this, one might easily imagine someone claiming that empiricism simply cannot be understood apart from extensive familiarity with the writings of various historical empiricists. Any attempt to distill the position down to a thesis would inevitably fail; any attempt to express it propositionally and reject it on the basis of its alleged “logical consequences” would be wholly misguided. And the problem would be that all such attempts are objectionably “ahistorical”. They leave out the historical circumstances (whatever they might be—facts about particular authors and their intellectual climates, facts about what the position at various times is being defined in contrast with, and so on) that help constitute the position as whatever it is, and so they set up a mere caricature as an object of discussion or target for attack. Nobody that I am aware of has actually accused critics of empiricism of being ‘ahistorical’ in just this way; but the charge has been leveled against (for example) analytic philosophers who treat fundamental doctrines of Christianity in the way prescribed by P1. Such philosophers are often mystified by the criticism, in no small part because many of us often comment on (and thus show awareness of) the history of the relevant doctrines in the course of our philosophical treatments of them. But the objection lingers, I think,
precisely because we do not regard the history as in any meaningful sense determinative of the doctrines.\textsuperscript{92}

In a footnote to the final sentence, Rea states, “The first clear expression of this idea that I encountered was in Beau Branson’s dissertation proposal (unpublished). I do not know whether he would endorse it exactly as I have articulated it here, however.”\textsuperscript{93}

If “this idea” means that “history is ... determinative of the content of doctrines,” then I do endorse it. But not in any such way that “the first clear expression of this idea” Rea ever encountered could possibly have been in my dissertation proposal. For the idea I want to endorse is simply what anyone with at least roughly Kripkean views about naming would normally assume about any doctrine that has a name (e.g., empiricism, Stoicism, the doctrine of the Trinity, the doctrine of arbitrary undetached parts, etc.). Specifically, that it is historical facts about a name that determines its referent (in this case, a particular bit of content). And that is not in any obvious conflict with the idea that “positions and conclusions can be formulated in sentences that can be formalized and logically manipulated,” nor would it be obvious why the historicist would be committed to the claim that formulating positions and conclusions in logically manipulatable sentences would (necessarily) “misconstrue the nature of philosophical and theological positions.” So, let us explore the issue a bit further.

Rea rightly notes that “empiricism ... is notoriously problematic when thought of simply as a thesis about sources of knowledge. It is significantly less so when thought of as somehow involving attitudes, preferences, dispositions, and so on.” But this is not the point of the Historical Approach or the criticism of the Puzzle Approach; it is simply an unfortunate feature of empiricism in particular. Let’s substitute Stoicism

\textsuperscript{92} (CRISP and REA 2011), pp. 30-31.
\textsuperscript{93} (CRISP and REA 2011), p. 31, footnote 34.
instead. (Perhaps someone out there believes there are aspects of Stoicism that are
similarly problematic, but I don’t see why that should be, and in any case, for the
sake of argument, let’s suppose it isn’t. Let’s suppose the claim that “Any attempt
to distill [Stoicism] down to a thesis would inevitably fail” is false.)

Still, consider the claim that “[Stoicism] simply cannot be understood apart from
extensive familiarity with the writings of various historical [Stoics]” and that to try to
do so would “set up a mere caricature as an object of discussion or target for attack.”
Are these claims true? In a sense, clearly not. And in a sense, clearly so.

Of course, it would be theoretically possible to come to understand the content
of the body of propositions that is in fact Stoicism if, say, a billion monkeys banged on
a billion typewriters for a billion years and eventually happened to produce a clear
and concise explanation of the body of propositions in question. Neither I nor the
monkeys would then need any familiarity at all with the writings of any Stoics at all.
Indeed, I could grasp the content of these propositions without knowing that they
constituted Stoicism, indeed without having any concept of Stoicism or the Stoics in
the first place.

But it is hard to see how I would realistically come to know (much less prove)
that this is Stoicism, unless I already had a sufficient (which might be less than
“extensive”) familiarity with the writings of the Stoics, and could then compare those
Stoic writings with the product of our philosophical monkeys. (Or, instead of reading
the Stoics myself, I might rely on reputable secondary sources. But those secondary
sources had better have read the Stoics, or in their turn be relying on others who
had, or . . . etc.)

The problem, then, is not so much that there is no possible world in which one
might somehow end up understanding the content of Stoic doctrine without doing the
relevant historical inquiry. Perhaps some puzzler will even come up with some way
to prove that a certain set of propositions is Stoic, or bears a consistency transferring
relation to Stoicism, without having to engage in any serious historical discussion of the Stoic tradition (or of any authors who themselves discuss the Stoic tradition, etc.). After all, philosophers are tricky. The point is that the standard way one would attempt to get clear about the content of some difficult-to-understand Stoic doctrine would be precisely through “familiarity with the writings of various historical [Stoics]” (or familiarity with authors who themselves were familiar with the Stoics, etc.) In other words, the standard way to resolve disputes about difficult-to-understand doctrines is just through the methodological approach known as reading the primary sources.

And this is precisely because the history of a doctrine is what determines its content. (Or, more precisely, the history of a name – the name of the doctrine – is what determines the referent of that name.) And while I would love to claim credit for being the first person to think of the idea of reading primary sources, or for being the first person to express the idea clearly, this methodology has in fact been around for as long as there has been writing.

Rea writes, “[T]he objection lingers, I think, precisely because we do not regard the history as in any meaningful sense determinative of the doctrines.” ((CRISP and REA 2011), p. 31.) But if the historical views of the Stoics themselves are not in any meaningful sense determinative of the doctrines of Stoicism, what exactly would be?

It is difficult to take very seriously the idea that history really is not “in any meaningful sense” determinative of the content of a doctrine. (What else would be?) But I suspect it would be uncharitable to take Rea’s comment here as really intended to rule out history altogether. I suspect that what is really going on is not that Rea has some fundamentally different view about how the content of a doctrine (essentially, the referent of the name for the doctrine) is defined or determined. My suspicion is that he likely shares the same intuitions as I about how the content of a doctrine is determined, but simply locates the particular determinative history of this particu-
lar doctrine at a different point in history than I do. Specifically, I suspect that he conceives of statements relevant to the Trinity that are found in the Bible as definitive of the doctrine of the Trinity, rather than similarly relevant statements found in the church fathers who constituted the pro-Nicene consensus (which I conceive of as being the determinative history of the doctrine). If that suspicion is correct, then Rea would quite reasonably see the Bible as containing or describing the determinative history of the doctrine, and the pro-Nicene consensus as merely a part of the subsequent history of the doctrine. (Subsequent to the determinative history.)

Now if it were the case that the content of what in English is called “the doctrine of the Trinity” (in other words, the referent of the phrase, “the doctrine of the Trinity”) were determined by the authors of the Bible, rather than the pro-Nicenes, then of course I would share Rea’s lack of comprehension as to why anyone would fixate so much on the pro-Nicenes (merely another part of the subsequent history of the doctrine). It is for just this reason that I, for example, pay relatively less attention to St. Augustine (who comes to the party, in my view, just a bit too late). And, though valuable, the views of folks like Aquinas and Scotus, as I see it, are not even remotely determinative of the content of the doctrine of the Trinity. Aquinas really is on a par with Rea or anyone else in today’s literature (at least in the sense of being only part of the subsequent, not the determinative, history of the doctrine.) And if “the doctrine of the Trinity” just meant (or if we knew that its reference had been fixed to) “what the Bible has to say about the Trinity,” then what the pro-Nicenes had to say would be on the same level as Aquinas and Rea as well.

However, I don’t think that this is standard English usage. If it were, then it would be a priori that the doctrine of the Trinity is biblical. But that is not at all a

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94. At least, I suspect this is his view, on the basis of various remarks of his in conversation and over email; I could be entirely mistaken as to whether he would actually endorse the claim.
priori. As I discuss below in the concluding evaluation,95 one of the major criticisms of the doctrine of the Trinity is precisely that it isn’t biblical. As deeply misguided as I argue those criticisms are, they are not criticisms that can simply be ruled out a priori. The doctrine of the Trinity could turn out to be unbiblical, because the church fathers could have been wrong about how they interpreted the Bible (which is just the argument made by those who argue the doctrine of the Trinity is unbiblical.)

In any case, if we wanted to, we could just disambiguate and define “the doctrine of the Trinity Bíblica” and “the doctrine of the Trinity Pro-Nicene.” Now it is a priori that the doctrine of the Trinity Bíblica is biblical. But it is not obvious, even to someone who knows quite a bit about the history of the Trinitarian controversy, that the doctrine of the Trinity Bíblica should be incompatible with modalism or Arianism. It is not even obvious, even to someone who knows quite a bit about the history of the Trinitarian controversy, that the doctrine of the Trinity Bíblica might not be identical to modalism. (The modalists must have believed this. And the Arians certainly believed that the doctrine of the Trinity Bíblica was identical to Arianism. And even if one thinks, as I do, that the heretics were wrong on all of this, it is not a priori or just obvious that they were wrong.)

On the other hand, it is not at all a priori that the doctrine of the Trinity Pro-Nicene is biblical. But it is obvious to anyone who knows anything about the history of the Trinitarian controversy that the doctrine of the Trinity Pro-Nicene is not compatible with modalism or Arianism. Likewise, if the pro-Nicenes believed that the hypostases are numerically three and yet homousios with one another, then the doctrine of the Trinity Pro-Nicene entails that.

The question is which of these two disambiguations the unqualified use of “the doctrine of the Trinity” in standard English usage more likely corresponds to. It seems to me obvious that it is the latter. That is, it seems to me that it is not at all

95. Chapter 6.4, esp., p. 400, ff.
a priori that the doctrine of the Trinity is biblical. But it is obvious to anyone who
knows anything about the history of the Trinitarian controversy that the doctrine
of the Trinity is not compatible with modalism or Arianism. Likewise, if the pro-
Nicenes believed that the hypostases are numerically three and yet homoousios with
one another, then the doctrine of the Trinity entails that.

But what if we took the other option? Is it really plausible to say that it is a
priori that the doctrine of the Trinity is biblical? That it is not obvious, even to
someone who knows quite a bit about the history of the Trinitarian controversy, that
the doctrine of the Trinity should be incompatible with modalism or Arianism? That
it is not even obvious, even to someone who knows quite a bit about the history of
the Trinitarian controversy, that the doctrine of the Trinity might not be identical
to modalism. (Or Arianism?) That certainly doesn’t seem like standard English usage
to me.

But suppose I am wrong about that. Then wherever I write “the doctrine of
the Trinity,” read instead “the doctrine of the TrinityPro-Nicene.” That is what I am
concerned with in this dissertation. (I simply view it as a separate project to defend
the view that the doctrine of the TrinityPro-Nicene is biblical, i.e, is, or is a version of,
the doctrine of the TrinityBiblical.)

3.3.2 Objection 2: The Mysterian’s Conundrum

In conversation, van Inwagen has more than once asked me the question: “In
what sense, then, is the doctrine of the Trinity a ‘mystery’?” I take the import of the
question to be this. If indeed there is some fairly explicit and coherent account of the
Trinity to be found in the church fathers, and if this is definitive of the doctrine of the
Trinity, then it seems there is nothing particularly “mysterious” about it. What we’re
doing here is not obviously different from, say, scholarship on the Stoics or the British
Empiricists. Not exactly what one would call a “mystery.” But isn’t the doctrine of
the Trinity supposed to be, in some sense, a mystery? (And on van Inwagen’s theory, it’s easy to see how the doctrine of the Trinity is “mysterious” in a very deep sense. We can see, perhaps, its logical form, but may understand very little of its content.)

Indeed, van Inwagen is right to think that, on the Historical Approach, there isn’t any serious difference between investigating the doctrine of the Trinity and investigating, say, Stoicism or Empiricism. Thus, van Inwagen’s question needs to be answered. And doing so will help make more clear how the historicist approaches the question of the logical form of P and why.

Let’s return to van Inwagen’s analogy between the wave-particle duality in quantum physics and the doctrine of the Trinity. Our best theories of quantum physics seem contradictory, particularly with respect to how we understand the nature of light. But it’s also the case that each individual part seems well justified. It seems, then, that while the exact nature of light is a mystery, our theories about light are adequate (non- or extremely mildly-misleading, for most practical purposes) descriptions of the behavior of light.

I think the analogy is a good one in many ways, but problematic in a few ways.

First, we have to be clear about the kind of mystery light is (or the sense which light is a mystery – what Tuggy dubs “positive” vs. “negative” mysteries, explained below). Secondly, we have to be clear about the distinction between light itself and our theories about light. Last but not least, we have to distinguish between the theories themselves and summaries of those theories that might be created under certain logical perspicuity-destroying constraints.

Let’s take these in order.

First, the nature of light is certainly in some sense “mysterious.” But it is mysterious in what Tuggy dubs a “positive” sense, rather than the “negative” sense in which the pro-Nicene tradition says God, or the Trinity, is a mystery.

96. For more on the distinction between misleading and non-misleading, see below, p. 142 ff.
To say that something is what Tuggy calls a “negative” mystery is to say, so to speak, that there is *too little* information there. It is a “something, I know not what.” There is no contradiction, indeed not even an apparent contradiction, in saying that something exists but that it isn’t similar enough to anything else we’re acquainted with to be able to categorize it. For example, suppose Mr. Healthy, who is normally in good health and seldom gets sick, suddenly becomes ill. We might conclude that something made him sick. But whether it is a bacteria, or a virus, or some kind of poisonous or nauseous substance, or some strange auto-immune response to something, or merely psychosomatic for that matter, we wouldn’t know. This doesn’t create the appearance of a contradiction. It is a *negative* mystery, a mystery in the sense that it is something clearly real, but about which we lack certain information.  

On the other hand, to say that something is what Tuggy calls a “positive” mystery is to say, so to speak, that there is *too much* information there. It is not a “something, I know not what.” It is a “something which seems to be both P and not-P.” Thus, there seems to be a contradiction (or at least a tension) when we describe it. For example, I know that the phenomenon of light is real, but it seems to fit into one category – particle – and seems to also fit into another category – wave – and these categories seem to be mutually exclusive. This does create the appearance of contradiction. It’s a mystery in the sense that it is clearly real, yet apparently fits into multiple, *and mutually exclusive*, categories.

Tuggy rightly notes that the tradition of the early church treats God as a “mystery” in the negative sense. There is much about God that we do not (and perhaps cannot) know. (In particular, what God is – His essence or nature, or as the fathers

97. (Tuggy 2011).

98. He says, “I have found mostly negative mysterianism among the catholic church fathers and the medieval traditions beholden to them.” (Tuggy 2011), p. 5 of online version.
sometimes put it in Aristotelian terms, His “ti esti?”). But this in itself doesn’t create any appearance of contradiction.

Second, while light itself is a mystery, the content of our own theories about light is no mystery at all. And this is my answer to van Inwagen. For while the church fathers frequently claim that God in Himself (or the Trinity in itself) is a mystery, they never claim that the content of their own beliefs about God or the doctrine of the Trinity itself is mysterious. Indeed, to say so would be non-sensical. A “doctrine” (doctrina in Latin, dogma in Greek) is, “that which is taught,” and so, by definition, no dogma can, itself, be so mysterious as to be unteachable. Of course, that is not to say that there can’t be perfectly teachable, and non-mysterious dogmata about mysterious and unteachable things (e.g., the proposition that God’s essence is mysterious is not, itself, any more mysterious than the proposition that Mr. Healthy’s illness was mysterious, and thus could be a dogma).

To continue the analogy, suppose you were teaching a course on quantum physics and assigned several texts to the students regarding wave-particle duality and other aspects of quantum physics, explaining to them that the nature of light is a mystery, and that there is much about the physics of things at a quantum level that nobody really understands, but that, nevertheless we are going to study some of our best theories about these things. On the test, you give several short-answer questions asking the students what Einstein’s reaction was to the idea that probability might play an ineliminable role in describing the movements of fundamental particles. You ask what Heisenberg said about determining the position and velocity of photons. You ask what the thought experiment of Schrödinger’s Cat was, and what it was supposed to show, and about the implications of Bell’s Theorem.

Suppose one student returns his test with all of these short-answer blanks filled in with statements to the effect that “nobody really understands this precisely,” and “quantum physics is a mystery,” and so forth.
Perhaps justifiably annoyed, you return the exam with a low grade and comments to the effect that, as a matter of simple, historical fact, the student’s answers are wrong.

Now suppose the student comes to your office hours and demands a better grade. “After all,” he says, “you yourself stated at the very beginning of class that quantum physics is a mystery. If there really are definite right and wrong answers to all of these questions, then in what sense is quantum physics a ‘mystery’?”

Surely one would not say, “Good point,” and change his grade. Rather, one would point out that the student was simply confused. It is not the theories about quantum physics, or in other words historical facts about what people have actually believed and written, that is “mysterious.” Rather, it is light itself, the phenomenon the theories are about, that is mysterious. The question of what light itself actually is is difficult, perhaps impossible, for anyone to answer. The question what so-and-so believed about light is not.

Similarly, the Trinity itself is mysterious (although as we noted above, in a negative, as opposed to positive sense). Still, what the church fathers believed and wrote about the Trinity is not mysterious.

Last but definitely not least, we would do well to expand van Inwagen’s analogy by including not only well-developed theories about light, but summaries of those theories – summaries made under certain severe constraints. For whatever reason, most philosophers working in this field show a predilection for choosing to deal with creedal statements and Trinitarian slogans that were originally intended as summaries of doctrines for the benefit of an audience mostly of illiterates and slaves, rather than with the fuller explications of those doctrines found

99. To be clear, my response to van Inwagen’s question has ended. What follows is no longer a response to that question, but a useful clarification of the Historical Approach that can be given in light of his analogy – if we expand that analogy in the way I will say that we should.
in the catechetical lectures, sermons or other writings of the authors of those creeds.

Besides the constraint that these summaries were intended for a largely illiterate audience, in the early centuries of Christianity, it was forbidden to write a creed down.\textsuperscript{100} Thus, a creed also needed to be brief enough that it could be memorized. To get an idea of just some of the constraints the authors of a creed would be working under, consider St. Cyril of Jerusalem’s introduction to his creed in his \textit{Catechetical Lecture V.12} (c. 350 AD):

\begin{quote}
'Επειδὴ γὰρ ὁ πάντες ὁλύνανται τὰς γραφὰς ἀναγινώσκειν, ἄλλα τοὺς μὲν ἰδιωτεία, τοὺς δὲ ἱσχυρὰ τις ἐμποδίζει πρὸς τὴν γνῶσιν ὑπὲρ τοῦ, μὴ τὴν ψυχὴν ἔξ ἀμαθίας ἀπολέσθαι, ἐν ἀλλογος τοῖς στίχοις τὸ πάν δόγμα τῆς πίστεως περιλαμβάνομεν.
\end{quote}

\begin{quote}
'Ὁπερ καὶ ἐπ’ αὐτῆς τῆς λέξεως μνημονεύσα τῷ μας βούλομαι καὶ παρ’ ἀυτοῖς μετὰ πάσης σπουδῆς ἀπαγγέλλω, οὕτω εἰς χάρτας ἀπογραφομένους, ἀλλ’ ἐν καρδίᾳ τῇ μνήμῃ στήλη-γραφοῦντας: φυλαττομένους ἐν τῷ μελετάν, μὴ ποῦ τις Κατηχούμενος ἐπανομῇ τῶν παραδεδομένων...
\end{quote}

\begin{quote}
Καὶ τέως μὲν ἐπ’ αὐτῆς τῆς λέξεως ὁχοῦν, μνημονεύσων τῆς Πίστεως, ἐκδέχου δὲ κατὰ τὸν δόγμα καθον τὴν ἀπὸ τῶν θέων γραφῶν περὶ ἐκάστου τῶν ἐγκεκριμένων σύμπασιν.
\end{quote}

\begin{quote}
Οὐ γὰρ ὡς ἔδοξεν ἄνθρωπος συνετέθη τὰ τῆς Πίστεως· ἀλλ’
\end{quote}

For since not all are able to learn the scriptures, but lack of education hinders some from knowledge, and lack of free time others; so that the soul may not be destroyed from ignorance, we include the whole doctrine of the Faith in a few lines.

Which I want you both to commit to memory and to rehearse it with all diligence among yourselves when I recite it, not writing it out on paper, but engraving it into your heart through memory; taking care in the recitation that some Catechumen not somehow overhear the things which have been delivered to you...

So for the present listen while I simply say the Creed, and commit it to memory; but at the proper season expect the confirmation out of Holy Scripture of each part of the contents.

For not as seemed good to men were the parts of the

\textsuperscript{100} On forbidding the writing of a creed, and more generally the requirement of keeping a creed secret, see (Schaff 1919), p. 18, as well as the quote from St. Cyril below.
Faith composed; but out of all the scriptures the most important points were collected – one complete teaching of the Faith.

And just as the mustard seed in one small grain contains many branches, so also this Faith, in a few words, has embraced all the knowledge of godliness in the Old and New Testaments.

Take heed then, brethren, and hold fast the traditions which you now receive, and write them on the tablet of your heart...  

We can see that St. Cyril (as anyone of his time period would) sees the creed (the “Faith”) as a summary of Christian dogma, constructed in such a way that it can be memorized by those who lack either the education (illiterates) or the time (slaves) to be able to study the scriptures directly. We do well here to remember also that, although in the West we call it a “creed” after the first word in Latin, credo (“I believe”), and although it was sometimes called in Greek simply ἡ πίστις (“the Faith”), its full title in Greek was τὸ σύμβολον τῆς πίστεως, “the symbol of the faith.” Not “the exhaustive explanation of the faith” or “the fully logically perspicuous representation of the faith.” For much the same reasons it would be absurd to take the pledge of allegiance to be an exhaustive explanation of US civics, it would be absurd to take any creed to be an exhaustive explanation of Christian theology, or even any particular aspect of theology.

So, let us expand our analogy.

101. (St. Cyril of Jerusalem 1967), Catecheses ad Illuminandos, V.12.

102. (St. Cyril of Jerusalem and St. Gregory Nazianzen 1894), p. 32.
Suppose we were charged with the task of creating a brief summary of quantum physics for an audience of laymen, with, at a minimum, the following considerations in mind:

1. Much of our audience is illiterate.
2. Many are also slaves, and have little or no free time.
3. For whatever reason, we want to keep the summary secret from outsiders.

What sorts of constraints would this put on us?

A great many, it would seem. And quite serious.

Since it must be kept secret, it should not be written down or put into any form that might become public. And anyway, a written creed would put literate and illiterate audience members on a different footing, so we would likely want to avoid that.

Thus, it likely will have to be memorizable via oral repetition.

Thus, it can only be so long and so detailed.

Thus, in all likelihood, we will only be able to discuss the most important facts about quantum physics, not necessarily all that it embraces. (Important for what? It turns out that our purpose will be crucial.)

Nor will we be able to give full, detailed explanations even of the things we do discuss.

Likewise, since we will be trying to encode as much information as possible in as few words as possible, brevity will often trump both clarity and precision.

Thus, it is not likely to be logically perspicuous.

Time constraints would likely prevent us from giving definitions of technical terms. (That would be more appropriate in an introductory class on quantum physics – the equivalent of a catechism.) So we would likely want to avoid technical terminology as much as possible.
That would further limit us to either only expressing propositions that can be stated briefly in layman’s terms, or perhaps, if there is no other option on some absolutely critical point, in technical terms that we would have to leave undefined in the summary itself. But of course, there would be no point for us to include such terms unless we did have some sort of definition for them in mind, even if we left the explanation to the context of a catechism.

This would put constraints on just what propositions we could even discuss. Some things we might simply have to leave unsaid in the summary, even though they are important issues in quantum physics (though, perhaps not critical for our purposes in making the summary).

For example, there would likely be no concise way to explain, in non-technical terms, and in a way that would not invite confusion, the idea that quantum states can be represented as vectors in an infinitely-dimensional Hilbert space in which the relation between the quantum state vector and any given eigenvector gives us the probability that the quantum system will “collapse” to the state represented by the eigenvector upon observation. (Notice that, even there, I couldn’t resist using a bit of metaphor, as well as a number of technical terms that I did not define and that would be meaningless to most illiterates – indeed, even to literate and educated people who happen not to have studied quantum mechanics.)

Next, besides making it a practical impossibility to discuss certain propositions, time constraints would also prevent us from going into detail even on a great many of those propositions we might be able to adequately get across, if we had time. We may be forced to express certain ideas in summary ways that would be, strictly speaking, false, since what would be more important would be to give the expression that was least misleading given our intended audience and purpose, rather than what was most literally accurate.

To explain what I mean here by misleading, let me give a different analogy. In
the context of the popular Atkins diet, it is technically true that “it is possible to gorge oneself on bacon and fried chicken, covered in cheese, to drink coffee with butter instead of cream, and still to lose weight.” However, while technically true, without adding the further caveat that one must not eat any carbohydrates (or only very few), the statement could be devastatingly misleading. People might alter their current diet in no other way than by adding in heaps of calorie-dense foods of the types mentioned, which would lead to the exact opposite results of those intended.

On the other hand, a false but non-misleading summary of the principles of the Paleo diet would be that it advocates eliminating any food from one’s diet that wouldn’t have been eaten in the paleolithic era. This is not strictly true. Most people in the “paleo” community drink coffee and praise its health benefits, for example, despite coffee being unavailable in the paleolithic era. Likewise, there is some controversy about dairy, potatoes and other foods. Still, although the simplistic summary of the Paleo diet is not strictly speaking true, it is much less misleading than the proposition about the Atkins diet which is strictly speaking true.

When constructing a summary of any view, it is often more important to go with statements that are less misleading than ones that are more accurate. As St. Cyril states, the purpose of the creed is “that the soul not be destroyed.” Thus, when creating a summary, the primary goal will be to lead the hearer into taking the right course(s) of action, and to not mislead the hearer into taking any soul-destroying course of action. And there is no reason to suppose this will be likely to lead to precise and logically perspicuous expressions of propositions that are all strictly true, rather than to statements that are simply the least misleading in terms of the hearer’s salvation.103

103. To foreshadow, the distinction being made here between the pairs true / false and misleading / non-misleading (really, more misleading vs. less misleading) will arise again when discussing Gregory of Nyssa’s response to the LPT in the next section. Some misunderstanding of Gregory’s view in Ad Ablabium has resulted from failing to understand when he is attempting to say something true as opposed to something merely less misleading.
The point is that constraints of the sort we are imagining will almost inevitably create substantial distortions when we have a different interest from the authors of the summary (logical perspicuity as opposed to salvation). But this isn’t really problematic – unless you forget the fact that what you are dealing with is only a summary, and a summary created for a very different purpose.

The deeper point, of course, is that it would be absurd to try to evaluate the body of beliefs known as “quantum physics” by discussing nothing other than our summary of it. This is equally true whether one is attacking or defending quantum physics.

Would it make sense for the anti-quantum-physicist to think he could discredit quantum physics by doing nothing more than discrediting our summary of it? And that based on what seems to be the most “straight-forward” way of understanding it – without regard to whether the “straight-forward” way of understanding the summary was as expressing what the author(s) of the summary intended it to summarize? (Again, the constraints involved in creating the summary make it highly unlikely that it would turn out to be entirely logically perspicuous – logical perspicuity would almost inevitably have had to be sacrificed in favor of other concerns.)

And if they did, would it make sense for a defender of quantum physics to let them get away with such a thing, and even follow suit? Would it make sense for a defender of quantum physics to think he could defend it by taking the summary alone as definitive of, or containing all that is essential to, these theories, then coming up with his own, speculative account of the workings of quantum particles, claiming that the consistency of one’s own speculative account suffices to defend quantum physics itself, and treating the writings of Planck, Poincaré, Heisenberg, Born, Dirac, Schrödinger, Bell and so forth as on a par with one’s own speculations – just so many different “versions of,” “models of,” “interpretations of” or “ways of understanding” the summary? Almost as though the summary had come first – before the very views it was intended to summarize?
The Historical Approach says no to these questions. According to the Historical Approach, regardless of whether one wants to attack or defend quantum physics, what must be done is to go further back than the summary, to the actual body of beliefs called “quantum physics,” which the summary is supposed to be a summary of.

The **right** logical forms to ascribe to the beliefs being summarized in the summary will not (necessarily) be reflected by the grammatical forms of the sentences used in the summary, nor will they (necessarily) be those attributed to the statements in the summary by the most “straight-forward” way of understanding those statements. Nor will they (necessarily) be the logical forms found in some “speculation” based on the summary, even if that speculation displays various theoretical virtues and would seem to be a not unreasonable way of making sense of the summary. Rather, the **right** logical forms to ascribe to the beliefs being summarized in the summary will be the logical forms *actually had* by the beliefs that the authors of the summary were *actually* summarizing (whatever those turn out to be).

Likewise, according to the Historical Approach, the **right** logical form to ascribe to the beliefs summarized in a creed will not (necessarily) be reflected by the grammatical forms of the sentences used in the creed, nor will they (necessarily) be those attributed to the statements in that creed by the most “straight-forward” way of understanding those statements. Nor will they (necessarily) be the logical forms found in some “speculation” based on that creed, even if that speculation displays various theoretical virtues and would seem to be a not unreasonable way of making sense of the creed in question. Rather, the **right** logical forms to ascribe to the beliefs summarized in a creed will be the logical forms *actually had* by the beliefs that the authors of that creed were *actually* summarizing (whatever those turn out to be).

And in light of the fact that the statements in S are drawn from creeds authored by figures from what has come to be called the “pro-Nicene consensus,” this means that,
on the Historical Approach, the right logical form to ascribe to P (the propositions expressed by S) will be the logical form actually had by the content that the pro-
Nicenes historically were actually summarizing in these creeds.

Thus, the methods and reasoning processes we will use will be no different from those we would ordinarily use in attempting to determine the content of any body of propositions defined by the beliefs of some group of individuals, e.g., the bodies of beliefs called “Stoicism,” or “Empiricism,” or “Quantum Physics.” And, like proverbial pornography, while it would certainly be hard to spell out the nature of this process in an abstract, general theory, it is fairly easy to recognize and duplicate it in practice.

Central to the pro-Nicene consensus were the Cappadocians – St. Basil the Great, Basil’s friend, St. Gregory Nazianzen, and Basil’s younger brother, St. Gregory of Nyssa. And both Gregory’s were important figures in the second ecumenical council, which produced the Nicene-Constantinopolitan Creed. (Gregory Nazianzen acted as president of the council for some time, and Gregory of Nyssa was soon afterwards mentioned by name in Roman law as someone whom it was necessary to be in agree-
ment with in order to count officially as a catholic church.)

In what follows, I will focus on the account of the Trinity found in the writings of St. Gregory of Nyssa – and examine it in some detail. Of course, we could do the same with St. Basil, St. Gregory Nazianzen, or any of a number of other figures from the pro-Nicene consensus, such as St. Athanasius, St. Jerome, St. Hilary, or others. But I think Gregory is simply more clear in his writings about a particular point that I think is critical to understanding the way the pro-Nicene consensus responds to the LPT, and that is still misunderstood – namely, the metaphysics of synergy – which will make my task easier.

104. See p. 369.
3.3.3 Objection 3: The Anti-Trinitarian’s Challenge

Finally, suppose an anti-Trinitarian adopts a hyper-critical approach here, challenging us to demonstrate that Gregory’s (or whatever particular church father’s) view is orthodox or that he lies in the tradition definitive of Trinitarian belief.

If he has any interest in attacking the doctrine of the Trinity, presumably the anti-Trinitarian must have some grasp on what the doctrine of the Trinity is. Presumably the Trinitarian accounts of the figures who constituted the pro-Nicene consensus in the fourth century count as versions of the orthodox doctrine of the Trinity. Now perhaps one would argue that our standards of what counts as orthodox here should be loose enough to count certain other, importantly different accounts as well. But if he is willing to say that the Trinitarian theories of the figures who constituted the pro-Nicene consensus – indeed the Trinitarian theories of the very authors of the Nicene-Constantinopolitan creed itself – might not count as versions of the orthodox doctrine of the Trinity, then it would seem to be incumbent on the anti-Trinitarian to say what would count. For, to return to a question I asked of the puzzler, if the Trinitarian theories of these men don’t count as orthodox, whose would?

Without any answer to that question, we face the question, “why should we any longer think that the doctrine of the Trinity even includes any of the propositions in P in the first place?” Because they are expressed by the statements in S, and those are contained in or implied by a certain creed or creeds? But why we should be concerned about the statements contained in what is intended to be a summary of a larger theory held by a group of persons (a creed), while not being concerned about the actual theory (or related theories) of any of those actual persons?

In short, the anti-Trinitarian would have to argue that we can somehow know that P – the set of propositions expressed by S – is a subset of the doctrine of the Trinity (so that if we show it to be inconsistent, we show the doctrine of the Trinity itself to be inconsistent), while we cannot know that any particular Trinitarian account of
any of the church fathers involved in authoring the creeds from which S is drawn, is a superset of the doctrine of the Trinity (so that even if we show one of their Trinitarian accounts to be consistent, we haven’t shown the doctrine of the Trinity itself to be consistent). But if one says that we have no reason to take the Trinitarian accounts of the very authors of the Nicene-Constantinopolitan creed themselves as versions of the orthodox doctrine of the Trinity, then what reason would we have to take any creed that they composed as summarizing the doctrine of the Trinity?

To be sure, we should allow anyone to present a case as to why a certain view should or shouldn’t be considered an orthodox version of the doctrine of the Trinity. But any such arguments will have to be dealt with on a case-by-case basis. And it seems that at least some people will simply obviously fall within the pale of orthodoxy. In particular, the very authors of the creeds or other writings from which the anti-Trinitarian draws the sets of claims he is attacking. And if Gregory of Nyssa’s Trinitarian theory does not count as a version of the orthodox doctrine of the Trinity, then I no longer have any idea what the doctrine of the Trinity even is, nor do I any longer see why it would be important.105

3.4 Conclusion

We’ve seen that, regardless of what difficulties there may or may not be for the Mysterian Approach, it simply has a different goal from the Historical Approach. And whether it is ultimately a sound methodology for its more epistemological goals or not, it certainly will not be for our goals. The Puzzle Approach, on the other hand, may have the same goal as the Historical Approach, but if it does, it faces serious questions as to how it could achieve that goal. And although, again, the

105. For more on this, see below, Chapter 6.1, on the formal adequacy of Gregory’s account, p. 362 ff.
problems I raise for the Puzzle Approach might be answerable, I, in any case, don’t have any good answers to the questions I have raised, so until puzzlers themselves answer them, I can see no other way of proceeding than by taking the Historical Approach.

But what’s more, if the mysterian’s goal is just to provide a defeater-defeater to the anti-Trinitarian’s alleged defeater, it seems that a successful carrying out of the Historical Approach would also accomplish the mysterian’s goal, insofar as proving P to be consistent provides a defeater-defeater as well. On the other hand, accomplishing the goal of the Mysterian Approach does not necessarily accomplish the goal of the Historical Approach as just providing any defeater-defeater would not necessarily show P to be consistent. So, there is no reason the mysterian should complain if the historicist attempts to prove the consistency of P, even if the mysterian considers it “overkill.”

Additionally, it seems that if a satisfactory solution to the LPT can be found on the basis of the Historical Approach, that solution would satisfy the concerns of the Puzzle Approach as well, whereas the reverse is not necessarily so. That is, even if a puzzler comes up with a thoroughly satisfying account of the Trinity, according to the historicist it won’t automatically be clear that this should count as a defense of the doctrine of the Trinity itself.

On the other hand, if a historicist finds, through a historical investigation, that the church fathers who used certain creedal formulae to summarize their beliefs, in fact had a consistent account of the Trinity (or, say, a family of related accounts, at least some of which are consistent), then any such account that is consistent (and has whatever other theoretical virtues the puzzler wants) ought to count as a successful

106 Nor, for that matter, is it automatically clear that the anti-Trinitarian’s attack on the logical form of P counts as any reason to think that P is inconsistent. Just as there is no reason to assume that a puzzler’s account of the Trinity is logically related to P in the right way to defend it, there is no reason to assume that S itself is a logically perspicuous expression of the content summarized by P. Indeed, as we’ve seen, there is ample reason to doubt that it would be. (See p. 138 ff.)
defense of P by the puzzler’s lights as well. That is, if the puzzler can answer the
questions I’ve raised for his methodology, at best he will show that the arguments
of the Puzzle Approach are sufficient for proving the consistency of P, not that the
arguments of the Historical Approach are insufficient. (An account of the Trinity
should not be judged worse by the puzzler for the fact that it was actually held by
someone instrumental in the development of his favorite creed!)

And again, I take it that, by anyone’s account, whatever the (orthodox) doctrine
of the Trinity is, and whatever the “version of” relation is, Gregory of Nyssa’s account
of the Trinity either is identical to the (orthodox) doctrine of the Trinity, or else is
a “version of” the (orthodox) doctrine of the Trinity. Thus, if Gregory’s account of
the Trinity can be shown to be logically consistent, then it would seem to follow, on
both the Historical Approach and the Puzzle Approach alike, that the doctrine of
the Trinity is consistent.

But if any solution to the Logical Problem of the Trinity to come out of a successful
application of the Historical Approach methodology will also count as a successful
solution by the lights of the Puzzle Approach, and achieving the goal of the Historical
Approach will also achieve the goal of the Mysterian Approach, then we have nothing
to lose, and much to gain, in seeking a solution to the Logical Problem of the Trinity
through the Historical Approach. And I have given my reasons for preferring to focus
on St. Gregory of Nyssa’s account of the Trinity in particular.

So then, what was St. Gregory of Nyssa’s account of the Trinity?
PART III

HISTORY
We have frequently said, however, that the operations of the Trinity are inseparable; but the Persons needed to be set forth one by one, that . . . we may have a right understanding both of Their Unity and Trinity.

—St. Augustine, Commentary on the Gospel of John, Tractate 95.1

We ended the last section with the question, “What is Gregory of Nyssa’s account of the Trinity?”

In that section, we saw that there are deep questions as to whether the Puzzle Approach could yield a valid argument concluding in a formally adequate answer to the LPT, and that the Mysterian Approach does not even attempt to answer the LPT in the first place. But we saw that the Historical Approach can provide at least a valid argument concluding with a formally adequate answer to the LPT, and that it is capable of satisfying the concerns of the Puzzle Approach and the Mysterian Approach anyway.

We chose to focus on the views of St. Gregory of Nyssa as one version of the orthodox doctrine of the Trinity.¹

¹ I would be prepared to argue that almost all of the features of Gregory’s account of the Trinity that are actually essential to his solution to the LPT were common throughout the entire pro-Nicene consensus. One glaring exception is the question whether “is God” predicates the divine nature (ousia), or whether instead it predicates engagement in a certain type of activity (energeia). Here there was indeed something of a divide (though not complete or consistent) between East and West. As a rough generalization (that has a number of exceptions), “Western” fathers tended to say only that “God” either signifies the divine nature or an energeia (Lat. operatio), whereas “Eastern” fathers tended to come down decisively on the side of “God” signifying an energeia and not the divine nature or ousia – as we will see St. Gregory does (4.2.3.1, p. 179 ff. below). St. Augustine is
The conclusion of our discussion on methodology was that, since Gregory’s Trinitarian theology clearly counts as being a version of the orthodox doctrine of the Trinity on anyone’s view, then if Gregory’s Trinitarian account is consistent, the Doctrine of the Trinity itself (or at least P) is consistent. Since nobody seriously denies that Gregory’s Trinitarian theology at least counts as a “version” of the Doctrine of the Trinity or a “form of” orthodox Trinitarianism, all that remains to be seen is whether the answer to the LPT provided by Gregory’s account of the Trinity is a solution or non-solution to the LPT. That is, whether Gregory’s account of the Trinity is consistent. Let’s turn, then, to his view.

4.1  *Ad Ablabium*: Its Structure and Purpose

Of course we neither need to, nor would have the time to, explore every aspect of Gregory’s Trinitarian theology. We will focus only on those aspects of his view that are relevant to the LPT. The *locus classicus* for this is his letter *To Ablabius – On Not Thinking to Say “Three Gods,”* (hereafter *Ad Ablabium*) which deals specifically with the issue of whether his account of the Trinity commits him to saying that, at least in some sense, there are “three gods.” We will therefore focus on this short work, bringing in other writings for additional background information when needed.

4.1.1 One Question, Three Answers

In *Ad Ablabium*, Gregory has been asked to respond to the question why it would be *forbidden* to say there are “three gods,” given that there are three hypostases (Father, Son and Holy Spirit) with the same nature or *ousia,* and given that, in the (apparently) parallel case of Peter, James and John, it is not forbidden to call them the only church father of the time period I know of who says *decisively* of the word “God” that it is predicated according to the category of substance. As we will see, St. Gregory not only doubted it, but vehemently denied it, and for very good reasons. See p. 179 below.
“three men.” He writes the following in response:

The argument which you state is something like this:

Peter, James and John, being in one human nature, are called three men; and there is no absurdity in describing those who are united in nature, if they are more than one, by the plural number of the name derived from their nature.

If, then, in the above case, custom admits this, and no one forbids us to speak of those who are two as two, or those who are more than two as three, how is it that in the case of our statements of the mysteries of the Faith, though confessing the Three Persons, and acknowledging no difference of nature between them, we are in some sense at variance with our confession, when we say that the Godhead of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Ghost is one, and yet forbid men to say “there are three Gods”?

2. This of course raises a problem for Social Trinitarians, insofar as Social Trinitarian accounts fall into the Equivocation Family of solutions to the LPT. All accounts of the Trinity within the Equivocation Family face the problem that, even if there is some sense in which it is true to say that “there is one God,” it will still be the case that there is some sense in which it is true to say that “there are three Gods.” And this doesn’t seem to be enough for Christians. As Ablabius points out in his question, we not only want it to be allowed to say that “there is one God,” we want it to be forbidden to say “there are three Gods.” But as the subtitle of the epistle to Ablabius suggests, Christians shouldn’t even think about saying “there are three Gods.” And as we will see, Gregory’s response explains not only why it is in some sense the case that there is one God, but why it is not in any sense the case that there are three Gods. But Equivocation Family accounts obviously will have difficulties in this regard.


What may strike the reader of *Ad Ablabium* as strange, is that Gregory gives, on my reading, three different answers to the question, the first of which (what I will call the “Simple-Minded Argument,” or “the SMA”) he himself immediately and explicitly rejects as inadequate, and the other two of which (what I will call the “Unity of Nature Argument,” or “the UNA,” and the “Unity of Action Argument,” or the “UAA”) each employ premises that are obviously inconsistent with those of the other. It may be tempting to accuse Gregory of sophistry for putting forward an argument he himself rejects, and of inconsistency or confusion for putting forward two arguments that could not both have true premises. As we will see, both of these criticisms would be misguided.

In one of the more recent explorations of the structure of *Ad Ablabium*, Lewis Ayres counts two arguments, which he simply labels “A” and “B,” where his “A” is what I am calling the UNA and his “B” is what I am calling the UAA (he essentially ignores the SMA).\(^5\)

Ayres is correct in distinguishing the two arguments as “fundamentally distinct.”\(^6\) Also in thinking that Gregory assigns more weight to the second (Ayres’ B, my UAA), which he says (rightly), “we should treat as fundamental in his Trinitarian theology.”\(^7\) I think he is unclear, though, on precisely what the role of the UNA is for Gregory, seeing the two arguments as more closely related than they actually are. That, or simply not understanding the logic of Gregory’s arguments. We will see that, in a different way, Richard Cross also seems to want to see the two arguments as one, or at least as more closely related than they in fact are. Indeed, this seems to be a common confusion.

\(^5\) I will be referring to the version that appears as (Ayres 2003) in (Coakley 2003). The same essay originally appeared as (Ayres 2002), and essentially the same material appears as Chapter 14 of (Ayres 2004).

\(^6\) (Ayres 2003), p. 23.

\(^7\) (Ayres 2003) p. 23.
In Ayres, I think the confusion may stem from (as I understand Ayres), a failure to distinguish between what I will call *energeia* types and *energeia* tokens below. (See 4.4.2, p. 240 ff., and 4.4.4, p. 248 ff. on this distinction.) In Cross, a desire to see the UNA and UAA as forming a single, more or less cohesive argument or viewpoint. (Perhaps also as seeing St. Gregory and St. Augustine as having more in common than, perhaps, they actually do.)

In Ayres’ case, this leads to an attempt to tie the UAA into Gregory’s discussion of the *individuation of natures* in a confused way. For example, on pp. 22-23, he says that Gregory in B / the UAA is arguing that “Natures... are known by the operations of those powers, and the divine operation is always observed to be one. Therefore the divine power and nature is indivisibly one.” As we will see below, this way of trying to understand Gregory confuses *energeia* types and tokens as well as confusing the two different arguments themselves.

Oddly, Ayres later makes a perfectly good statement of the identity of the divine *energeia* tokens: p. 31 “his account... present[s] the three not as possessing distinct actions towards a common goal, but as together constituting just one distinct action...” but then he goes on to seem not to understand the role that this view of Gregory’s plays in his argument, due, again, to wanting to conflate *energeia* types and tokens, a distinction I’ll explain in more detail below (p. 240 ff.)

I think clarity on Gregory’s views can be achieved when we take into account Gregory’s purpose and audience(s). But before we can get clear on the UNA and the UAA, we need to ask ourselves what the point of the SMA is, and this, as we shall see, provides the clue to unlock the structure of Gregory’s thought here. I will argue throughout the remainder of the chapter that the distinction I mentioned between *energeia* types and tokens is the under-appreciated key to understanding Gregory’s

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8. Although contrast Augustine’s Unity of Nature Argument in the earlier *De Trinitate* with the quote at the beginning of this chapter, from the later *Commentary on the Gospel of John.*
solution to the LPT. But to understand that distinction and how it is operating in the context of Gregory’s two arguments here, and thus to understand why I think the UNA and the UAA are even more distinct than Ayres and others have supposed, we’ll need to go through the Ad Ablabium in some detail, bringing in further detail from other related texts when necessary.

Let us start, as Gregory does, with the Simple-Minded Argument (SMA).

4.1.2 The “Simple-Minded” Argument (SMA)

Gregory’s first response, the SMA is brief enough to quote in full:

Perhaps one might seem to touch the point if he were to say (speaking offhand [or “simple-minded”] people), that the definition refused to reckon Gods in any number to avoid any resemblance to the polytheism of the heathen, lest, if we too were to enumerate the Deity, not in the singular, but in the plural, as they are accustomed to do, there might be supposed to be also some community of doctrine.

This answer, I say, if made to people of a more guileless spirit, might seem to be of some weight: but in the case of the others who require that one of the alternatives they propose should be established (either that we should not acknowledge the Godhead in Three Persons, or that, if we do, we should speak of those who share in the same Godhead as three), this answer is
Gregory frankly admits that this response merely “seems” to be adequate, but acknowledges that it is, in reality, not an adequate response at all. More precisely, he admits that it would only even seem to be adequate to “simple-minded people,” but that to others it “is not such as to furnish any solution of the difficulty.”

But this raises an interpretive question that is by no means insignificant. Why bother telling someone who has given a solid enough formulation of the Logical Problem of the Trinity, or something close to it, and who has asked for the solution to it, in essence, “Here’s something one might say that doesn’t really answer the question”? And why go on to point out to an apparently intelligent enough man that, in essence, “It’s something that might satisfy you – *if you aren’t very intelligent*”?

One might suppose this is “just rhetoric.” That the point is for Gregory to show that he’s no dummy, that he gets that it’s a problem. Or perhaps the point is to build up the opposing argument before knocking it down – all the more impressive. Or perhaps it is a bit of flattery to Ablabius, “The simple folk might be content with this sophistry, but astute men of learning like us – we’re above all that.” Dale Tuggy describes it simply as a “flippant” answer.11

But none of these explanations for Gregory’s brief discussion of the SMA are satisfactory. I doubt Gregory was trying to show off. He usually presents himself as

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simply explicating things that St. Basil has already said, and doesn’t like to draw
attention to his own unique insights (even when he certainly had them) nor to point
out that he in some ways alters or corrects St. Basil. One gets the impression from
reading St. Gregory that, so far from bragging or seeking praise, he would have
more likely been uncomfortable with it. And anyway, even if he did like showing off,
spotting the fact that the SMA is flawed is not that impressive of a feat. Gregory
surely could have picked something better, if that had been his aim.

Further, the quote above does not really do anything to build up the apparent
force of the LPT. The LPT is already an apparently strong arguments. And Gregory’s
comments here aren’t even directly about the LPT; they’re only about a particularly
bad answer to the LPT.

As for flattery, Gregory does not put the distinction in terms of “us and them”
(we get that this doesn’t make sense – but those idiots won’t) or even of “you and
them” (of course you’re smarter than this – but you can fool those idiots with it).
Rather, he puts it in terms of a part of “them” and a different part of “them” (some
people will accept this argument, but other people won’t).

Finally, it’s unlikely that Gregory was simply being “flippant,” if for no other
reason than the fact that the means of writing was more expensive and scarce in that
world than in ours.

But I think there is a deeper, or at least better, explanation for what is going on
with the SMA that also gives us a clue as to how to interpret the rest of the letter.

I spoke in the chapter on methodology (Chapter 3.3.2, p. 142 ff.) about the
distinction between true and false vs. misleading and non-misleading. We saw one
example in which this distinction is important – specifically, in constructing a sum-
mary (the creed) that must be suitable for a very wide audience. I gave the example
of the Atkins diet, and how it would be true but misleading to say one can eat as
much fried chicken as one wants and still lose weight, while it would be false but
non-misleading to describe the Paleo diet as being a diet in which one eats only those foods that would have been eaten in the paleolithic era. And we saw that a statement can be misleading or non-misleading depending both on who one’s *audience* is, and what one’s *purpose* is.

Gregory gives his own examples of this distinction in his *Contra Eunomium* when responding to the fact that Eunomius calls Gregory’s older brother, St. Basil, “a liar” because “he called me a Galatian, though I am a Cappadocian.” After drawing attention to the pettiness of the statement, Gregory makes a few interesting further points:

Paul telling a falsehood and purifying himself after the manner of the Jews to meet the needs of those whom he usefully deceived did not sin the same as Judas for the requirement of his treachery putting on a kind and affable look. By a falsehood Joseph in love to his brethren deceived them; and that too while swearing “by the life of Pharaoh;” but his brethren had really lied to him, in their envy plotting his death and then his enslavement. There are many such cases: Sarah lied, because she was ashamed of laughing: the serpent lied, tempting man to disobey and change to a divine existence.

Falsehoods differ widely according to their motives. Accordingly, we accept that general statement about man which the Holy Spirit uttered by the Prophet, “Every man is a liar.”
We all say false things from time to time. But there is a difference between saying something false with an intent to harm someone through deception (like Judas, Joseph’s brothers, or the serpent itself), and saying something false with an intent to benefit someone through the deception (like St. Paul or Joseph), or at least with no intent to harm anyone (like Sarah), or perhaps with no intent to deceive at all (like St. Basil).

What I want to suggest is that in Ad Ablabium the distinction between true v. false and misleading v. non-misleading may also come into play, and that we need to ask ourselves the questions, “What is Gregory’s purpose?” and “Who is Gregory’s audience?”

And this man of God [St. Basil], too, has not kept clear of falsehood, having chanced to give a place the name of a neighbouring district, through oversight or ignorance of its real name.

But Eunomius also has told a falsehood, and what is it?

Nothing less than a mis-statement of Truth itself.

He asserts that One who always is once was not...

Is the difference between falsehoods so very trifling, that one can think it matters nothing whether the falsehood is palpable in this way or in that?

We all say false things from time to time. But there is a difference between saying something false with an intent to harm someone through deception (like Judas, Joseph’s brothers, or the serpent itself), and saying something false with an intent to benefit someone through the deception (like St. Paul or Joseph), or at least with no intent to harm anyone (like Sarah), or perhaps with no intent to deceive at all (like St. Basil).

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12. (St. Gregory of Nyssa 1960), Book I, Chapter 10, sections 108-110.

13. Translation from (St. Gregory of Nyssa 1893), p. 46.
As to the first question, I suggest that Gregory, as a pastor, does not have the same purpose as we, as philosophers. Although he is in some sense always concerned with the truth, he is primarily concerned with people’s salvation. Recall van Inwagen:

God’s concern with us – just at present, at any rate – is not the concern of a tutor who fears that we shall fail to grasp some nice point: God fears that we shall lose the end for which we were made. His concern with us is entirely practical.14

I suggest that Gregory’s concern here is the same. And this is why he does not confine himself to what is strictly true or accurate, but to what is the least misleading response he can give to a particular audience. And that brings us to the question who his audience is – or who his audiences are.

And as for the second question, I suggest that Gregory gives three different arguments because he has in mind three importantly different audiences:

1. The illiterate, uneducated or philosophically unsophisticated (the “simple-minded”)
2. Educated pagans (and certain heretics)
3. Educated (orthodox) Christians

And the three arguments he gives – the SMA, UNA and UAA – are the least misleading responses he can give to each of these three groups, respectively, given that his concern is primarily for their salvation.

One can see a similar distinction between audiences, and an attempt to direct communication to multiple audiences, in some of St. Basil’s sermons. For example, in Basil’s 9th homily, “That God is Not the Cause of Evils.” Here Basil wants to give a philosophically sophisticated and rigorous response to the problem of evil, but he clearly wants the illiterate, uneducated masses to be able to understand it as well. The sermon has a structure in which nearly every other sentence is stated in a philosophically precise way, and nearly every other sentence is a restatement of

the preceding sentence in layman’s terms. For example, Basil explores the sense in which evil “exists” and points out that this cannot be visible, *hypostatic* existence (or “subsistence”). He follows by saying “For evil is not subsistent (ὑφεστάσθαι), as though it were an animal.” The uneducated masses may not understand the more philosophically precise denial of evil’s hypostatic existence. But they can surely understand that there isn’t literally a little animal named “evil” that runs around the world making mischief.

It seems to me that Gregory, as so often, follows in his brother’s footsteps here. But this time he not only makes a distinction between the educated and uneducated. He makes a distinction between educated (orthodox) Christians (with whom he will have more common ground, who will be more willing to accept his basic premises) and educated pagans and heretics (who have no reason to grant Gregory certain controversial assumptions). His initial response, directed at the uneducated, is not flippant. It is simply the best answer that an illiterate audience without any background in logic, metaphysics, and so on, would be able to understand. “We refuse to say there are ‘three Gods’, because we don’t want people to confuse our doctrine with pagan doctrine.” It’s true, after all, at least on Gregory’s view, that Trinitarianism is not like pagan polytheism. This response doesn’t adequately explain why that is, but on Gregory’s view it’s probably the best you can do for anyone without the relevant education. (It should be clear by the end of the chapter why. See esp. 3.3.2, p. 142 ff.)

We’ll see also that the response he gives for educated pagans, and some heretics, is not one that he actually accepts, but it’s also the best Gregory thinks he can do for people who don’t accept certain key assumptions of his – assumptions that are only presented in the UAA, for the benefit of other orthodox Christians who share Gregory’s basic presuppositions.

Let us look, then, at the responses he gives for the educated.

4.2 The Unity of Nature Argument (UNA)

Next Gregory gives the “Unity of Nature Argument” (UNA). The UNA is the only argument presented in Gregory’s only other work directly about the LPT, namely “To the Greeks, From Common Concepts,” (hereafter, Ad Graecos) where it is presented in much more detail (and where Gregory – critically – only has a single audience in mind: educated pagans, or “the Greeks” as he calls them). But here in the Ad Ablabium, Gregory gives only an extremely abbreviated version. He begins:

Φαμέν τοίνυν πρώτον μὲν κατάχρησιν τινα συννηθείας εἶναι τὸ τοὺς μὴ διηγημένους τῇ φύσει κατ’ αὐτὸ τὸ τῆς φύσεως ὄνομα πληθυντικῶς ὀνομάζειν καὶ λέγειν ὅτι πολλοὶ ἀνθρώποι, ὅπερ ὀμοίων ἐστὶ τῷ λέγειν ὅτι πολλαὶ φύσεις ἀνθρώπων.  

Now, we first claim that it is a certain misuse of convention to name men, who are not distinguished by nature, in the plural according to the very name of the nature, and to say that there are many men, which is like saying that there are many human natures.

This is the crux of the UNA, the claim that, strictly speaking, we should only say that Peter, James and John are “one man.”

He argues:

καὶ ὃτι ταῦτα σύνως ἦσα, δῆλον ἂν ἡμῖν ἐνετειπεν γένοιτο προσκαλούμενοι γὰρ τινα, οὕτως

That this is so may become clear to us from the following: when we summon someone, we

16. By this time, Ἐλληνες has acquired the meaning “pagan.” See, e.g., (Kahlos 2007), p. 20, “Another term, the Greek Hellenes, became commonly used as the synonym for non-Christians. Christian apologists applied the term in the sense of pagan . . . Hellenes became the standard overall term for pagans — it replaced the word ethne by the beginning of the fourth century . . .” and ff. Gregory would have thought of himself and other Christians as “Romans” (Ῥωμαίοι).


18. Translation from (St. Gregory of Nyssa 2008a), p. 3.
This may seem obvious. We call people by their proper names (Bob, Frank), rather than by one of their common names (man, animal). We use a word peculiar to the particular subject we are addressing.

Up to this point, we have not seen much technical vocabulary. We have the term “nature” in Ablabius’ original question, and no additional technical terms are added by Gregory in the SMA (for obvious reasons). Now in the UNA we’ve seen “commonality” (κοινότης), “individualizing” (ιδιαίζοντι), and “appellation” (προσηγορία).

Next, Gregory suddenly gives us an onslaught of technical philosophical verbiage from the time period, including: “participation” (μετεσχημότατα), “the singular” (καθ’ ἔκχωστον), “the common” (τοῦ κοινοῦ), “definition” (λόγος), “hypostasis” (ὑποστάσεως), “particularization” (διαμερισμόν), “peculiarity” (ιδιότητας), “synthesis” (σύνθεσις), “in number” (ἐν ἄριθμῷ), “itself to itself” (αὐτὴ πρὸς ἑαυτὴν), “strictly indivisible monad” (ἀδιάτμητος ὁμοιότις μονὰς), “not increased through addition, not decreased through subtraction” (οὐχ ἀὔξανομένη διὰ προσθήκης, οὐ μειομένη δι’


"indivisible" (ἀσχιστος), "continuous" (συνεχής), "whole" (ὅλως), "not divided together with those particulars participating in it" (τοῖς μετέχουσιν αὐτῆς τοῖς καθ’ έκαστον οὐ συνδιαιρομένη) and talk of being "in" a nature (ἐν τῇ φύσει) and a nature being "in" its instances when he says "the man in all is one" (ἐνα δὲ ἐν πάσι τὸν ἀνθρωπον).

Clearly, there is far too much technical terminology here to go into detail on every term. But we can at least take a look at the passage and try to get a basic idea of what is going on. Gregory gives his argument thus:

Thus it is that the many, having participated in (μετεχχάτος) the nature, come to be called “disciples,” or “apostles,” or “martyrs,” but the man in all is one; since, as was said, “man” is not [predicated] of the singular, but of the common nature;

For Luke is a man, or Stephen is, but it is not the case that if someone is a man, he is also wholly Luke or Stephen.

But the logos of the hypostases admits the particularization through the peculiarities seen in them and is considered according to the synthesis in number;

yet the nature is one, having been united itself to itself, and a strictly indivisible monad, not increased through addition, not decreased through subtraction, but essentially being one and remaining one, even when it manifests in a plurality, indivisible and continuous and whole and not di-
This argument has received a fair bit of criticism for its conclusion – Richard Cartwright, for example, describes Gregory as “desperately suggesting” that there is only one man; Christopher Stead says Gregory’s argument, “resembles an accomplished conjuring trick more nearly than a valid theological demonstration” – but criticism is not usually based on a serious examination of its premises.


22. Translation mine.

23. (Cartwright 1987), p. 171, “It seems to have been left to Gregory of Nyssa, Basil’s younger brother, to notice that, thus understood, consubstantiality of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit appears to license saying that there are three Gods. Gregory himself rather desperately suggested that strictly speaking there is only one man.”


25. Cartwright, for example, ((Cartwright 1987)) doesn’t examine the argument at all. Stead, of course, does, but in my estimation not well. It will become clear why I think so in the course of this chapter. Stead himself admits that “It is tantalizingly difficult to determine what Gregory has in mind.” ((C. Stead 1990), p. 152.) Hopefully my comments in this chapter will shed some light.
Perhaps this is partly because the argument is so highly condensed in Ad Ablabium, and makes use of so much technical terminology. But despite the counter-intuitive conclusion, it is not obvious to me that Gregory’s actual argument is as problematic as its critics have assumed. It seems to me that Gregory is simply trying to draw out the logical consequences of a number of related semantic and metaphysical theses widely presupposed in the philosophical milieu of his time.

Again, the argument is too dense to explore fully, and as we will see, I hold that Gregory himself doesn’t actually accept it as fully adequate anyway. But it will be helpful as background to the UAA, and we can certainly get, I think, a good enough grasp to make some sense out of it.

4.2.1 Ousiai and Hypostases

In “Gregory of Nyssa on Universals,” Richard Cross argues, persuasively in my view, that St. Gregory and St. Basil both use the term ousia synonymously with physis (nature), and they conceive of this as a universal. But Basil makes a critical shift in his thinking on universals, which Gregory follows, a shift that allows him to move from hom-oi-ousianism (the view that the three hypostases of the Trinity are merely exactly similar in ousia) to hom-o-ousianism (the view that the three hypostases of the Trinity are the same in ousia). Basil starts off assuming a then-popular Neo-Platonic account of in re “universals” as simply collections, or mereological sums, of particulars, and therefore, quite literally, divisible into the part-iculers that compose them (hence the etymology of “particular”), as opposed to the monadic – but extrinsic or ante rem – Platonic Forms. But he eventually shifts to a realist view (possibly original) of in re universals as themselves simple, indivisible and wholly present in

26. (Cross 2002).

27. To the extent that one can speak of a “universal,” on an essentially nominalistic theory such as theirs.
their instances.\textsuperscript{28}

The reason that this shift allowed Basil to move from homoiousianism to homoousianism, is that on the earlier view of \textit{ousiai} as collections (but not the later view of \textit{ousiai} as monads) the \textit{homoousion} (the proposition that the hypostases are \textit{homoousios}) would entail that God is \textit{divisible into parts} – a proposition which Basil \textit{consistently} denies throughout his career.\textsuperscript{29, 30}

Note that in the passage above Gregory borrows a number of technical terms applied by Neo-Platonists to \textit{the Platonic Forms} ("strictly indivisible monad," "not increased through addition or decreased through subtraction," and so forth) and applies the same terms to \textit{in re universals}, which looks like a very deliberate and forceful rejection of their nominalism about \textit{in re} universals.

But Cross also mentions Gregory’s sudden shift in the passage above from talking about these simple, wholly present, and indivisible universals \textit{back} to talk about \textit{mere collections} – a shift that leads Zachhuber to postulate two \textit{different} theories of universals going on in parallel in Gregory’s thought – \textit{ousia} being Gregory’s term for a monadic universal, and \textit{physis} for, essentially, the Neo-Platonic collective “universals.”

But Cross notes an important distinction:

As I noted above, there is a passage in \textit{Ad Ablabium} where Gregory apparently likens a nature to a collection of particulars. And on the face of it this is a problem for my reading. It is precisely because of the apparent equivocation here that Zachhuber believes the \textit{Ad Ablabium} account to be philosophically inferior to the earlier accounts. But this is a misread-

\textsuperscript{28} (Cross 2002), pp. 381-386

\textsuperscript{29} See esp. (Cross 2002), pp. 383-385. As an example, consider Basil’s remarks in Epistle 236 ((St. Basil the Great 1930) pp. 381-383), “Does he mean that we know His substance in part, just as we know parts of His substance? But that is absurd, for God is indivisible into parts.” Incidentally, this seems to pose a difficulty for using Basil or Gregory to support Social Trinitarianism as well. See 47, p. 175.

\textsuperscript{30} Cross also argues for dating the \textit{Ad Petrum} around 370, roughly the same time as Basil’s Epistles 214 and 236. If the work is Basil’s, Gregory comes to accept the view. But if Gregory’s, either it marks his acceptance of Basil’s new view or perhaps represents Gregory’s own input which Basil shortly thereafter comes to accept.
ing of Gregory. The collections Gregory mentions are notable for their
dissimilarity from the Neoplatonists’ collections: every man is a man, but
no citizen a community, or soldier an army. Boethius, for example (prob-
ably repeating Porphyry), uses ‘flock, people, [and] army’ as examples of
discontinuous wholes that are not universals (in his collective sense). In
other words, if Gregory is using these examples to support a collective
theory of universals, he is being even more careless than commentators
suppose, since the examples are not even appropriate or germane. The
use of these analogies is much simpler. Gregory’s collective wholes here
are indivisible into parts of the same kind as their whole, and the analo-
gies are intended to show how it can be that the existence of something
indivisible (into parts of the same sort) is consistent with its being in
numerically many hypostases.31

I follow Cross here again, and want to add to his points in the next section (4.2.2)
with some semantic considerations.

But first, I note that Magee takes Boethius to have a confused classification of
wholes,32 first as:

1. continuous (Boethius gives the examples of “body, line, or anything of that sort.”)
2. discontinuous (examples: “flock,” “population,” or “army.”)
3. universal (examples: “man,” “horse.”)
4. composed of faculties (examples: the soul – which has the potentiae of under-
standing, sensing, and growth as “parts.”)

then later to subsume universal and “potential” under the heading of “discontinuous.”

Thus:

1. continuous
2. discontinuous
   1. universal
   2. potential

I’m not convinced that’s actually what Boethius does. He may of course be dichotomizing between (1) continuous and (2) discontinuous wholes. And it is certainly true that he takes universals to be a species of discontinuous whole. But I think he clearly still thinks there is a species of merely discontinuous whole that is neither a universal nor “composed of faculties.” He says later, “Those wholes that are not continuous and those that are universal are to be divided in one and the same way…”\footnote{Boethius 1998, p. 144. Emphasis mine.}

It would be hard to make sense out of phrasing this as a conjunctive claim if the former is just a genus and the latter one of its species, rather than taking the former to be, implicitly, “merely” discontinuous. It sounds as though Cross interprets Boethius in the way I do as well.

4.2.2 Gregory’s Semantics of Collective Nouns

Cross has explained the metaphysics involved in the UNA, but to understand how the UNA actually functions as a solution to the LPT, we also need to consider Gregory’s semantics.\footnote{See Chapter 5.1, p. 266 ff. for more on my approach here.} Gregory talks about collective nouns like, “a people,” that “are said singularly … yet … are understood in plurality” (λέγεται … μοναχῶς … ἐν πλῆθει νοεῖται), and here he echoes what in his time were the two greatest grammarians, Apollonius Dyscolus and Dionysius Thrax.

In the Syntax of Apollonius Dyscolus, Apollonius mentions the phenomenon of collective nouns several times briefly here and there, such as:

\begin{quote}
όλλ’ ἐπειδὴ καὶ τινα ἔστι δι’ ἐνικοῦ χαρακτήρος πλήθος ἐμφαίνοντα…
\end{quote}

\begin{quote}
“There are some words that imply quantity, even though they are singular in form…”\footnote{Apollonius Dyscolus 1910, Part 2, Volume 2, p. 31.}
\end{quote}

\begin{quote}

34. See Chapter 5.1, p. 266 ff. for more on my approach here.


But perhaps most striking is the explanation in a passage in which he explains why Philip greeted “the senate and the people of the Athenians.” In this passage, he describes collective nouns in nearly the same words as Gregory later will. Also just as Gregory later will, Apollonius uses the example of “a people” (deme) as a “collective noun.”

“Philip, King of the Macedonians, to the senate and the people of the Athenians, greetings.”

To paraphrase the reference, this is equivalent to “Greetings to the Athenians.” And since the same attributes didn’t apply to all equally (for some of the Athenians were “citizens” and the rest were “senators”), and this epistolary construction requires a distinguishing adjective, Philip divided into the senators, for whom he used the word boule “senate” and the citizens, for whom he used the word demos “people,” so that the whole expression (“the senate and the people of the Athenians”) is equivalent to “the senators and the citizens”. (And it is clear that collective nouns have this collective function — nouns, that is, which are said singularly but understood plurally (ἔνικῶς . . . λέγεται, πληθυντικῶς . . . νοεῖται).)

The same concept is also apparent in Dionysius Thrax’s Τέχνη Γραμματική (The

Art of Grammar), which also uses “deme” (people) as an example of collective noun:

There are three numbers — singular, dual, plural... And there are some singular characters also said of plural [subjects], such as “deme,” “chorus,” “crowd,” and [there are some] plural [characters said] of singular and dual [subjects]. Of singular, such as “Athens,” “Thebes.” Of dual such as “both” (amphoteroi).

Just a bit later on, Dionysius mentions collective nouns again, using the same examples:

And a collective [noun] is one which, in the singular number, signifies a plurality, such as “deme,” “chorus,” “crowd.”

Now clearly Gregory wants to say that “God” (and for that matter “man,” and really any common noun that express a nature) is just the sort of noun Dionysius and Apollonius point out. A noun that would be syntactically singular but semantically plural, as we might say.

But the question is why Gregory would think that “God” (or “man” or “horse”) would have to be collective nouns like “a people” or “an army,” so that “strictly

40. Translation mine.
42. Translation mine.
43. Although, as I will argue below, Gregory accepts the use of “God” to express the divine nature only hypothetically, since he takes it to be “the common view.”
"speaking" we should always put “God,” “man,” or “horse” in the singular? After all, it seems like collective nouns are the exception rather than the rule, and anyway common usage clearly is that we put “men” in the plural (the point of Ablabius’ argument). So when Gregory says “in just the same way that” collective nouns are “said singularly… yet… conceived to be in plurality,” what exactly is “the same way” in his mind? The grammarians themselves only note the existence of the phenomenon of collective nouns. They don’t tell us the conditions in which a noun signifying a plurality should be used in the singular, rather than the plural. So we have to ask, what might Gregory be thinking the conditions are under which a noun is “said singularly, but understood plurally?”

I suggest the answer lies precisely in Cross’s analysis above. Recall:

The collections Gregory mentions are notable for their dissimilarity from the Neoplatonists’ collections: every man is a man, but no citizen a community, or soldier an army. Boethius, for example (probably repeating Porphyry), uses ‘flock, people, [and] army’ as examples of discontinuous wholes that are not universals (in his collective sense)... Gregory’s collective wholes here are indivisible into parts of the same kind as their whole...44

A clue here lies in the examples Gregory mentions. All of them are at the same time collective nouns of the sort discussed by the grammarians and nouns that signify discontinuous wholes that do not constitute universals, as Cross discusses. So it seems reasonable to conjecture that Gregory is simply drawing the obvious connection between the metaphysics of discontinuous, non-universal wholes, and the semantics of collective nouns.

Thus, what I want to suggest is that the semantic picture which Gregory may have had in mind here (and which may have been, or he may have assumed to have been, a commonly accepted view at the time) is that common nouns are properly used in the plural just in case there are proper parts of the significandum that can be called

44. (Cross 2002), pp. 402-403.
by the same noun as each other and as the significandum itself.\textsuperscript{45} They are properly used in the singular just in case there are no proper parts of their significandum that can be called by the same noun as each other and as the significandum itself. This seems to fit well with the overall discussion, and I think makes the most sense out of Gregory.

If this is right, then we can describe what Gregory takes to be the commonly accepted viewpoint of the day as something roughly like the following:

1. Common nouns “signify” natures, which are universals.

2. These universals are merely collections of particulars, which compose them, and which they have as literal parts.

3. Common nouns are to be used in the singular just in case there are no proper parts of their significandum that can be called by the same noun as each other and as the significandum itself; they are to be used in the plural just in case there are proper parts of the significandum that can be called by the same noun as each other and as the significandum itself.

For example (according to this view),\textsuperscript{46} if the only three men there are, are Cicero, Cato and Vergil, then each can be called “man,” and together they compose the universal nature, man, which is a collection or sum of the three, and which can also be called “man.” In this sort of scenario, Cicero, Cato and Vergil can (together) be called “three men,” because they are three, as we might say, man-ish parts of the one, universal man.\textsuperscript{47}

\textsuperscript{45} I am assuming here, as I think Gregory does, that the significandum is the universal.

\textsuperscript{46} I do not want to commit to this view myself!

\textsuperscript{47} Compare this to the part-whole Social Trinitarianism of, e.g., Moreland and Craig in (\textsc{Moreland} and \textsc{Craig} 2003). As Cross notes, it seems to be precisely this sort of “collective” view of the Trinity that Basil wanted to avoid. See also Mike Rea’s criticism of Craig along these lines in (M. \textsc{Rea} 2009), esp. pp. 708-710 and pp. 718-721. Gregory wants to avoid saying “God” is a collective. He is here saying precisely that “the one God” is \textit{not} a collection of the Father, Son and Holy Spirit, but something \textit{simple and indivisible}. Thus, not only does Gregory not count as patristic support for Social Trinitarianism, he seems to count as patristic opposition to it. Also note that this anomaly with singular nouns that express a plurality only occurs when the same noun \textit{cannot} be applied both to the parts and to the whole they compose, whereas Social Trinitarians, and anyone whose account falls into the Equivocation Family, want to do just that – apply the same noun both to the
On the other hand, if the only man who existed was Cato, then the collective man, the sum of all the men, would have no proper parts called by the same name,\textsuperscript{48} and so we would say there is “one man” (or that “man is one”) because there are no man-ish (proper) parts of the one, universal man.

Finally, if Cicero, Cato and Vergil form an army, then that is also a collection, but while each of Cicero, Cato and Vergil can be called “man,” they cannot each be called “army.” So while they are three men, they are only one army, precisely because the army cannot be divided into the relevant sorts of parts.

But now suppose it turns out, as Gregory argues, that a nature is not a collection after all, but an indivisible monad. It follows automatically that any and all nouns that signify natures must only be used in the singular, because a monad will never have proper parts that can be called by the same noun as itself, because a monad will simply never have proper parts at all.

In other words, what it seems to me that Gregory is doing is leaving points 1 and 3 of this perhaps then-common picture in place, and merely rejecting 2 – the collective theory of universals – and replacing it, as Cross has argued, with a theory of an in re universal that is monadic (not divisible into “parts”) and which is “wholly present” in each of its particulars. Then he simply draws the obvious conclusion that all nouns signifying natures (including “man”) are always to be used in the singular (just as “army” would be in the example above).

Read in this light, Gregory’s argument seems to make much more sense. In the first sentence below, he finishes making his metaphysical point about whether universals are indivisible monads or divisible collections. In the second sentence, he goes on to point out the linguistic fact that there are collective nouns such that,

\textsuperscript{48} The only proper parts would be hands, feet, and so on.
semantically they indicate a collection of individuals, but their correct syntactic form is nevertheless singular. (Note that he uses the Neo-Platonists’ technical vocabulary against them when making the initial, metaphysical point, but then switches over to language reminiscent of Apollonius Dyscolus when making his second, linguistic point):

Yet the nature is one, having been united itself to itself, and a strictly indivisible monad, not increased through addition, not decreased through subtraction, but essentially being one and remaining one, even when it manifests in a plurality, indivisible and continuous and whole and not divided together with those particulars participating in it.

And in just the way that “a people,” or “a deme,” or “an army,” or “a church” is said in the singular in every case, yet each of these is understood in plurality, so according to the more precise account (λόγος), “man” would be said strictly [speaking], to be one, despite those displayed in the same nature being a plurality.

Thus, on my reading, what Cartwright describes as Gregory “desperately suggesting” that strictly speaking there is only one man turns out not to be nearly so dramatic. It turns out to be Gregory simply drawing out the obvious logical consequences of accepting what he takes to be a superior metaphysical theory of


50. Translation mine.
universal natures, while leaving the typical semantic assumptions of his interlocutors unchanged.

That, in my view, is how the UNA works. It has been seen as sophistry (Stead), or as Gregory simply biting the bullet (Cartwright) and shamefully accepting the ridiculous view that there is only one man, since he is unwilling to deny the analogy between Peter, James and John, on the one hand and the Father, Son and Holy Spirit on the other, given the rest of his views. But in fact, on my reading, Gregory is essentially just showing good form in offering a defeater-defeater. He gives a response primarily on his opponents’ own terms (from “Common Concepts” as Ad Graecos is subtitled). That is, he has responded by leaving intact the common semantic picture for the time period, and only insisting on his own metaphysics (a bit of metaphysics that is, after all, probably essential to making any sense at all out of his theology in the first place).

4.2.3 Did Gregory Really Believe in the UNA?

We can now see how the UNA is supposed to work. But although it has utility for Gregory as a defeater for the anti-Trinitarian argument presented by Ablabius (and others), I don’t think he actually accepts the picture he presents. And here is where I have to part ways with Cross.

51. Compare also his statement concerning the UNA in the Ad Graecos ((St. Gregory of Nyssa 1958), p. 29; translation from (St. Gregory of Nyssa 1994), unpublished):

\[
\text{αλλὰ τὰύτα μὲν, ως εἴπομεν, ἐκείνοι λέγουσιν: ἡμεῖς δὲ δείξαμεν σώρισμα τὸ πᾶν εἶναι καὶ οὐδὲν ἄτρομον τὸ λεξέγιμον, οὐδαμῶς ἄλλος περιγνωμόνως ἄλλος ἤ σοι ὁτίς εἰς ἐννομοὺς κεχρημένοι καὶ δεικνύντες μὴ δεῖν τὸν τούσδε θεόν καὶ τούσδε θεόν ἢ τούσδε ἄνθρωπον καὶ τούσδε λέγειν.}
\]

This, as we have said, is what our partners in the discussion argue; but we will show that all of what they are saying is sophistry and nothing else, and we will prevail by no other means than by using the statements made themselves and showing that one ought not speak of “such-and-such a God” and “such-and-such a human being” at all . . .
For Cross continues:

Gregory’s teaching, then, is that substance-sortals, such as ‘God’ and ‘man’, properly refer to natures: it is the unity of nature that entails that there is just one God, and just one man.\footnote{Cross 2002, p. 404.}

4.2.3.1 Does “Is God” Really Predicate the Divine Nature?

I take issue with Cross here, because, while Gregory of course does not take “God” to signify a particular hypostasis, critically Gregory \textit{does not} take “God” to signify a nature, or \textit{ousia}, either. Thus, \textit{unlike} “man,” the word “God” is \textit{not} a substance-sortal at all.

While Gregory may \textit{seem} to make that connection, both in \textit{Ad Graecos} and in \textit{Ad Petrum}, and again in this argument in \textit{Ad Ablabium} (the UNA), this is definitely a case in which appearances are deceiving.

Consider that, in \textit{Ad Eustathium}, Gregory goes to some pains to argue that “God” is not any sort of special predicate expressing the divine nature itself, but only another predicate among many expressing another attribute among many that we apply to the hypostases – not in principle different from “good” or “mighty” or “righteous” or any other predicates that are applicable even to non-divine beings. (Indeed, some of these other predicates are actually \textit{more} appropriate to God than “God!”)

\begin{verbatim}
Τεχμήριον δὲ ὅτι τούτῳ μὲν τῷ ὄνοματι πολλὰ καὶ τῶν κατα-
δεστέρων ἐπωνυμάζεται, μάλ-
lον δὲ οὐ φείδεται ἡ θεία Γραφή
tῆς ὀμοιωμάτως ταύτης οὐδὲ ἐπὶ
tῶν ἀπεμφοριόντων πραγμάτων,
ὅταν τὰ εἰδώλα τῇ τοῦ Θεοῦ
προσηγορίᾳ κατωνυμάζῃ.
\end{verbatim}

And a proof of this [that “God” does not signify the divine nature] is that many even of the inferior existences are called by this very name [“God”]. Further, the Divine Scripture is not sparing in this use of the name even in the case of things incongruous, as when it names idols by the appellation of “God.”

\footnote{Cross 2002, p. 404.}
For it says, “Let the gods that have not made the heavens and the earth perish, and be cast down beneath the earth”;

and, “all the gods of the heathen are devils”;

and the witch in her incantations, when she brings up for Saul the spirits that he sought for, says that she saw gods. (1 Samuel 28:13)

And again Balaam, being an augur and a seer, and engaging in divination, and having obtained for himself the instruction of devils and magical augury, is said in Scripture to receive counsel from God. (Numbers 22)

One may show by collecting many instances of the same kind from the Divine Scripture, that this attribute has no supremacy over the other attributes which are proper to God, seeing that, as has been said, we find it predicated, in an equivocal sense, even of things incongruous;

but we are nowhere taught in Scripture that the names of the Holy, the Incorruptible, the Righteous, the Good, are made common to things unworthy.

If, then, they do not deny that the Holy Spirit has community with the Father and the Son in those attributes which, in their sense of special excellence, are piously predicated only of the Divine nature, what reason is there to pretend that He is excluded.
from community in this only, wherein it was shown that, by an equivocal use, even devils and idols share.\footnote{St. Gregory of Nyssa 1893, p. 328.}

Thus, Gregory makes it quite clear here that, in his view, “God” is in no way a special term for predicating the divine ousia, since it can be applied to obviously non-divine beings. Rather, this is a claim he attributes to his opponents. He goes on:

But they [his opponents] say that this appellation (προσηγορίαν ταύτην, ἀκοινώνησιν δὲ εἶναι πρὸς Πατέρα καὶ ὸῳν τὴν τοῦ Πνεύματος φύσιν, καὶ δὲ τούτο μηδὲ τῆς κατὰ τὸ ὄνομα τούτο κοινονίας μετέχειν.\footnote{St. Gregory of Nyssa 1958, p. 10.}

Critically, Gregory does not go on to admit that “God” signifies the nature (φύσις) here. Rather, he simply brings in at this point an argument that natures, or ousiai, are individuated by energeiai and that the Spirit shares all the same energeiai as the Father and Son, so that He must have the same nature anyway (more on which below, 4.4.4.2, p. 251). Thus, even if “God” did signify the divine nature (which it doesn’t), it would still follow that “God” can be predicated of the Holy Spirit (the main question under discussion in Ad Eustathium).

...κἂν φύσιν σημανθῇ τὸ τῆς θεότητος ὄνομα, κυρίως καὶ ... even if the name of Godhead does indicate nature,
tò ‘Aγίω Πνεύματι τὴν προσηγορίαν ἐφαρμόζεσθαι ταύτην ἢ τῆς οὐσίας κοινότης συντίθεται. 57

We’ll explore this claim about the individuation of ousiai below (p. 248 ff.), as well as what I will call “the Cappadocian Assertion” – that the hypostases share all the same energeiai (p. 252 ff.). The point for now is that Gregory does not accept the semantic claim that “God” signifies the nature. In fact, he goes on to argue vehemently against the claim that “God” signifies the divine nature, but only considers what would follow, hypothetically, on his opponents’ assumption. In Gregory’s own view, it signifies a certain kind of activity (energeia). And Gregory, at least, seems to believe that this has been his consistent teaching:

'Αλλὰ οὐχ οἷα τῶς ἐπὶ τὴν τῆς φύσεως ἐνδεικνύει τὴν προσηγορίαν τῆς θεότητος φέρουσιν οἱ πάντα κατασκευάζοντες, ὡσπερ οὐχ ἄκηρσοτες παρὰ τῆς θείας γραφῆς ὅτι χειροτονητὴ φύσις οὐ γίνεται.

Μωυσῆς δὲ τῶν Ἀιγυπτίων ἐχειροτονήθη θεός, οὗτος πρὸς αὐτόν εἰπόντος τοῦ χρηματίζοντος ὅτι Θεόν σε δέκωχα τῷ Φαραώ.

οὐκοῦν ἐξουσίας τινὸς εἶτε ἐποτικής εἶτε ἐνέργητικῆς ἐνδείξειν ἢ προσηγορία φέρει.


But I know not how these makers-up of all sorts of arguments bring the appellation of Godhead to be an indication of nature, as though they had not heard from the Scripture that it is a matter of appointment, in which way nature does not arise.

For Moses was appointed as a god of the Egyptians, since He Who gave him the oracles, etc., spoke thus to him, “I have given you as a god to Pharaoh.” (Exodus 7:1)

Thus the force of the appellation [this προσηγορία, i.e., “God”] is the indication of some power, either of oversight or of
But the Divine nature itself, as it is, remains unexpressed by all the names that are conceived for it, as our doctrine declares.

For in learning that He is beneficent, and a judge, good, and just, and all else of the same kind, we learn diversities of His operations \([\text{energeiai}]\). but we are none the more able to learn by our knowledge of His operations \([\text{energeiai}]\) the nature of Him Who works \([\text{"energizes"}]\).

For when one gives a definition of any one of these attributes, and of the nature to which the names are applied, he will not give the same definition of both:

and of things of which the definition is different, the nature also is distinct.

Indeed the substance \([\text{oùsia}]\) is one thing which no definition has been found to express, and the significance of the names employed concerning it varies, as the names are given from some operation \([\text{energeia}, \text{ěnérgheia}]\) or accident.\(^{60}\)

Thus, not only does “God” not signify the divine nature in particular, as Gregory argued above (because it is applicable even to things of a non-divine nature, like demons), here Gregory argues that “God” cannot signify any nature at all (because natures can’t be had accidentally or “by institution and appointment,” and Moses

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60. (St. Gregory of Nyssa 1893), p. 329.
was exactly that – a god accidentally, by being made a god over Pharaoh.)

Gregory makes quite clear that his own view as to why the Holy Spirit counts as “God” is that “God” signifies a certain types of *energeia*:

\[ \text{Οὐχούν ἐξουσίας τινὸς εἶτε ἐποπτευκῆς εἶτε ἐνέργητικῆς ἐν-} \]
\[ \text{δείξεως ἢ προσηγορία φέρει.}^{61} \]

Thus the force of the appellation [this προσηγορία, i.e., “God”] is the indication of some power, either of oversight or of operation [*energeia, ἐνέργεια*].\(^{62}\)

He only gives the argument about the individuation of natures for the sake of having a “back-up” argument, since, he believes, *most people believe* the semantic claim that “God” signifies the divine nature:

\[ \text{εἶτε ὅταν ἐνέργειας ὄνομα ἢ} \]
\[ \text{θεότης, ὡς μίαν ἐνέργειαν πα-} \]
\[ \text{τρός καὶ ὕστερο καὶ ἀγίου πνεύμα-} \]
\[ \text{τος, οὕτω μίαν φασμέν εἶναι τὴν} \]
\[ \text{θεότητα.}^{62} \]

\[ \text{εἶτε κατὰ τὰς τῶν πολλῶν} \]
\[ \text{δόξας ψύσεως ἐνδεικτικῶν ἐστὶ} \]
\[ \text{τὸ τῆς θεότητος ὄνομα, διὰ τὸ} \]
\[ \text{μηδεμίων εὑρίσκειν ἐν τῇ ψύ-} \]
\[ \text{σει παραλλαγὴν ἐκ τῆς τῶν ἐν-} \]
\[ \text{εργειῶν ταυτότητας ωὐχ ἄπεικότως} \]
\[ \text{μας θεότητος τὴν ἁγίαν τριάδα} \]
\[ \text{διοριζόμεθα.}^{63} \]

\[ \text{If, then, “Godhead” is a name derived from operation} \]
\[ \text{[*energeia, ἐνέργεια*], as we say} \]
\[ \text{that the operation [*energeia, ἐνέργεια*] of the Father, and the} \]
\[ \text{Son, and the Holy Spirit is one,} \]
\[ \text{so we say that the Godhead is one:} \]
\[ \text{or if, according to the view} \]
\[ \text{of the majority, “Godhead” is} \]
\[ \text{indicative of nature, since we} \]
\[ \text{cannot find any diversity in} \]
\[ \text{their nature, we not unreason-} \]
\[ \text{ably define the Holy Trinity to} \]
\[ \text{be of one Godhead.}^{64} \]

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62. ([St. Gregory of Nyssa 1893](#), p. 329).

63. ([St. Gregory of Nyssa 1958](#), p. 15).

64. ([St. Gregory of Nyssa 1893](#), p. 329).
He then goes on to mention yet another commonly held semantic view, one which he again rejects, but provides a counter-argument for anyway:

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 ei dė tis ἁξίας ἐνδεικτικῆς εἶναι τὴν προσηγορίαν ταύτην ὁρίζοντο, ὡς οίδα μὲν τὶν λόγον πρὸς τὴν τοιαύτην σημασίαν ἔλκει τὸ ὄνομα·
 τόλη ἐπείδὴ πολλῶν ἐστὶ τὸ τοιοῦτον λεγόντων ἄνωτέρων, ὡς ἂν μηδαμὸν χώραν κατὰ τῆς ὑληθείας ἢ τῶν ἀντικειμένων εὐφράσκων σπουδῆς, καὶ πρὸς τὴν
toιαύτην ὑπόληψιν συμπεριεγκεκάθεντες τοῖς ὑπὸ δοξάζουσι φαμέν ὅτι, κἂν ἁξίαν σημαίνῃ τὸ ὄνομα, καὶ κατὰ τοῦτο κυρίως τῷ ἁγίῳ
πνεύματι ἢ προσηγορία ἑναρ-μοσιθησται.65
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But if any one were to call this appellation [προσηγορία] indicative of dignity, I cannot tell by what reasoning he drags the word to this significance.

Since however one may hear many saying things of this kind, in order that the zeal of its opponents may not find a ground for attacking the truth, we go out of our way with those who take this view, to consider such an opinion, and say that, even if the name does denote dignity, in this case too the appellation will properly befit the Holy Spirit.66

Similar statements can be found in his anti-Eunomian writings as well.67

It should be clear, then, that while Gregory spends time to consider the view that “God” signifies the divine nature (a view which he takes to be the majority opinion),

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67. E.g., his Refutatio Confessionis Eunomii (pp. 518-519 in (St. Gregory of Nyssa 1893)):

He is named, by those who call upon Him, not what He is essentially (for the nature of Him Who alone is unspeakable), but He receives His appellations from what are believed to be His operations [energeiai] in regard to our life. To take an instance ready to our hand; when we speak of Him as God, we so call Him from regarding Him as overlooking and surveying all things, and seeing through the things that are hidden...

And that this is so, we are clearly taught by Holy Scripture, by the mouth of great David, when, as by certain peculiar and appropriate names, derived from his contemplation of the works of God, he thus speaks of the Divine nature: “The Lord is full of compassion and mercy, long-suffering, and of great goodness.” Now what do these words tell us? Do they indicate His operations [energeiai], or His nature? No one will say that they indicate aught but His operations [energeiai].
he does not endorse the claim himself. For Gregory himself, “God” does not have the divine nature as its semantic value. He only considers it so as to respond to his interlocutors on their own terms.

4.2.3.2 The Real Role of the UNA in Gregory’s Response

The confusion about Gregory’s real view about the semantics of the word “God” naturally arises when we don’t see that Gregory is offering distinct arguments (SMA, UNA, UAA) directed at distinct audiences (the uneducated, educated pagans and certain heretics, educated orthodox Christians), for a purpose other than philosophical accuracy and logical perspicuity (namely, salvation). Not making that distinction, although we can easily separate out the SMA, we naturally want to run the UNA and the UAA together and try to reconcile them in some way (even though, as we’ll see, Gregory explicitly disavows the UNA in the *Ad Ablabium*, immediately after giving it).

Cross himself – quite correctly – notes, “Gregory in effect claims that the abstract noun ‘deity’ names the unified divine activity…”68 which is indeed precisely what Gregory says in the latter part of *Ad Ablabium*, as well as in *Ad Eustathium*. (Both of which, of course, are directed to fellow orthodox Christians.) But Cross then immediately returns, incorrectly in my view, to the claim that “God” signifies the ousia:

The point, however, is that, just as in the case of created natures, what underlies our use of the singular concrete noun (‘God’, ‘man’, etc.) is the unity of substance/nature in each case. . .69

We will see below (4.4, pp. 234 ff.) why I take it that what underlies the use of “God” in the singular for Gregory is not the unity of nature at all, but the unity


69. (Cross 2002)
of activity, and why these two kinds of unity turn out to be importantly different for the purposes of defending the doctrine of the Trinity today. For now, though, we’ve seen that for Gregory “God” is not a kind term, but an agent noun. Thus, although Gregory can and does enter into debates that assume “God” is a kind term like “man,” his actual view is that it is more like “rhetorician” or “shoemaker” (on Gregory’s view, as we will see, p. 235, it probably means something like the “beholder” of hidden things). Cross continues, “the (additional) unity of activity in the case of God means that it is never legitimate to refer to many Gods.”

Where Cross speaks of being “legitimate” or illegitimate here, I am claiming what we have is being misleading or non-misleading (see above, p. 142 ff.). And as we will see below (p. 258), for Gregory it is indeed the unity of activity (not of nature) that makes it importantly misleading (and in fact, on his view, false) to speak of “three Gods,” in a way such that it would at least not be misleading to speak of “three men” or three “three shoemakers,” and indeed possibly even true to say there are “three shoemakers” in the relevant cases. This is also what allows Gregory, in fact, to admit that the metaphysics of the Trinity is not strictly analogous to the metaphysics of humans and other creatures after all – contrary to how he has typically been read. That is, as we will see, while men do have the same kind of unity of nature as the Trinity, it would simply be impossible for there to be three men who have the sort of unity of activity the Trinity has, though if per impossibile such a state of affairs came about, it would be, on Gregory’s view, false, and as I will argue also certainly misleading, to speak of the three men as three shoemakers instead of one shoemaker. (See p. 258 below). As Gregory states:

*ἀλλ’ ἐπειδὴ ἀμήχανος τῆς συνηθείας ἢ ἑπανάρθυσας (πῶς γὰρ ἂν τις πεισθῇ μὴ πολ- But since the correction of the habit is impracticable (for how could you persuade any

70. (Cross 2002)
In other words, in the case of humans (or really any created things), Gregory is arguing that it is strictly speaking false (given the semantic picture sketched above, p. 171), but not misleading, to talk about “many men” (or many of whatever species of created thing).

So when it comes to God, Gregory holds that it is not only false, but no longer non-misleading, to speak of “many gods.”

But Cross seems to want to run the UNA and UAA together into a single, coherent argument – incorrectly on my reading.

He says:

But Gregory is prepared to concede that we can, improperly, refer to men, whereas we cannot, even improperly, refer to Gods in the context of the

71. (St. Gregory of Nyssa 1958), pp. 41-42.

72. (St. Gregory of Nyssa 1893), p. 332, emphasis mine.

73. (St. Gregory of Nyssa 1958), p. 42.

74. (St. Gregory of Nyssa 1893), p. 332.
Trinity. The reason for the impossibility of referring to three Gods, as the main bulk of *Ad Ablabium* makes clear, is that the divine persons share in unified activity in a way that different men do not. For Gregory, then, the *homoousion* does not in itself show how the case of the Trinity is relevantly different from the case of human beings.\(^{75}\)

He goes on:

> analogies to three human beings are perfectly serious: the type of universal is the same in the case of both divine and human hypostases. (It is worth noting too that the reason why ‘God’ properly names activity is that the essence is unknowable and therefore unnameable; unity of activity is a further point over and above this.)\(^{76}\)

I don’t think this is quite right. Although of course I agree with all of the metaphysical points: The analogy to three human being is “perfectly serious,” and the type of universal is the same, and thus “the *homoousion* does not in itself show how the case of the Trinity is relevantly different from the case of human beings” (that is, for Gregory, human beings are *homoousios* in just the same way that the divine hypostases are). But it sounds as though Cross wants to see Gregory as actually *endorsing* the semantic view that “God” signifies the divine nature, and that the unity of activity is only a sort of additional point *within the same argument*, that somehow shows why it would be illegitimate to speak of “gods,” even loosely. As should be obvious, my reading is not that the unity of activity is an additional point within the same argument, but that it is a separate argument altogether – and the only one that Gregory actually endorses.

One thing that does confuse matters is the sheer amount of time Gregory takes up talking about the UNA. It takes up the entirety of *Ad Graecos* (directed entirely towards a pagan audience), and the first part of *Ad Ablabium* (which I am arguing is again for the benefit of educated pagans, and some heretics). That naturally leads

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75. (Cross 2002), p. 404.
76. (Cross 2002), p. 405.
one to think it is in some sense more significant. And, in some sense, it is. Namely, in the sense that it is the argument directed at what Gregory clearly takes to be a wider audience than the one that would accept his semantic claims. Nevertheless, he makes it quite clear that he only gives this response for the sake of those who accept this common, but in Gregory’s view false, semantic assumption (i.e., most pagans and some heretics).

Still, the issue of Gregory’s treatment of the name “God” in *Ad Graecos* might seem to pose a problem for my interpretation. For in this work, Gregory really does look very much as though he accepts the view that “God” signifies the nature.

Cross points this out:

The opening of *Ad Graecos* likewise makes clear that ‘God’ is a name of an *ousia*, and not of a person, and that it is for this reason that we worship one God. ‘God’ thus names not the collection of divine persons, but the immanent universal exemplified by each person: viz. the divine substance. Equally, although each divine person is (a) God, there is only one God since there is only one substance. Three Gods would entail three substances. The crucial indivisibility claim is again made explicitly:

The substance is not divided (διαιροµένης) into each of the persons, such that there are three substances for the respective persons. It is evident that the term ‘God’ is not so divided, since it signifies the substance; such a distinction would result in three Gods.

‘God’ signifies the divine substance; the divine substance is not divisible; there is thus only one God. Note again that the substance is not divided into persons—and this is precisely the opposite of the Neoplatonic claim that a universal whole is divided in particulars. As I noted above, on those occasions where *Ad Ablabium* uses the term *ousia*, it is clearly synonymous with *phusis*. I take it that *ousia* in *Ad Graecos* is likewise synonymous with the *phusis* of *Ad Ablabium*, and that neither should be given a collective account.77

The passage Cross refers to from *Ad Graecos* is:

77. (Cross 2002), p. 405.
If the word “God” refers to a person, when we say “three persons” we necessarily would be saying “three Gods”;
but if the word “God” signifies an ousia, then in confessing one ousia of the holy Trinity we can properly be understood as teaching one God, since there is one name for that one ousia: God.

So it follows that in ousia and in name God is one and not three.\(^{79}\)

It must be admitted that, all throughout \textit{Ad Graecos}, Gregory makes statements to the effect that “God” signifies the divine nature or ousia. One might wonder, then, even if Gregory is fairly clear in \textit{Ad Eustathium} and \textit{Ad Ablabium} (as well as his anti-Eunomian works) that he doesn’t endorse this claim, but only considers it by way of responding to an objection, why Gregory sounds, in the \textit{Ad Graecos}, as though he \textit{does} accept it after all.

There are a couple of ways to respond to this. First, probably the easiest way, and I suppose the way “of the many,” would be to simply say that Gregory’s views developed over time. Second, one can respond based on my proposal that Gregory gives different arguments for different audiences.

Let’s consider first the easy way out.

It’s notoriously difficult to pin down very firm dates for Gregory’s writings. It’s clear that \textit{Ad Ablabium} was written very late, in Gregory’s old age, but in that work, he’s also quite clear about the semantics of “God.” As for the other triadological works we would want to take into consideration, we’re left with \textit{Ad Eustathium}, \textit{Ad Petrum} and \textit{Ad Graecos}, as well as his anti-Eunomian writings.


79. (St. Gregory of Nyssa 1994). I have simply substituted “ousia” for Daley’s “substance.”
The uncertainty of the dates of these works, and the fact that by all accounts they were likely written in at least roughly the same time period, makes it at least easier than usual to challenge the usually suggested dates. One could argue that, if Gregory ends up saying that “God” signifies an *energeia* in *Ad Ablabium*, but in the *Ad Graecos* says “God” signifies the *ousia*, then that’s reason to put *Ad Graecos* earlier. If *Ad Petrum* seems to say the same thing, one can argue it should be dated earlier as well (Cross dates it in the late 370’s anyway). So, if we date *Ad Eustathium* to some time after that (later in the 370’s or early 380’s, say) along with *Contra Eunomium*, then we can easily tell a story about development. In *Ad Petrum*, Gregory (or Basil) is just working out this new theory of universals, allowing him to accept the *homoousion* without having to admit that God is “divisible” or a “collection.” In *Ad Graecos*, Gregory connects “God” with *ousia* so as to use it in a response to what amounts to the Logical Problem of the Trinity, but perhaps has a few misgivings, based on his view of the mysteriousness of the divine nature. Later, in *Contra Eunomium* and *Ad Eustathium*, Gregory thoroughly disavows the use of “God” to signify the *ousia*. Then in *Ad Ablabium*, he mentions the view again only because it is a majority opinion.

So, at least, is the story that one might tell. And if there was no other way to explain the statements in *Ad Graecos*, that would be the story I in fact would tell.

But I’m not actually convinced that such a story has to be told, or should be.

First of all, if we can date any of these works first, it would likely be the *Ad Petrum*. And it certainly looks initially as though *Ad Petrum* would support the reading of Gregory as using “God” to signify the *ousia*. After all, he barely talks about *energeia* in *Ad Petrum* (he uses the term, or inflections of it, only 5 times, never in any very technical use, and never to say it is the signification of “God.”)

But it’s interesting to note that, *even in Ad Petrum*, although Gregory discusses the *metaphysical* distinction between *ousia* and hypostasis, and his theology of three divine hypostases and one divine *ousia*, *he never once asserts the semantic claim*
that the word “God” signifies the divine ousia. The example he gives for a noun that signifies an ousia is not “God,” but “man.”

Of all nouns, the sense of some, which are predicated of subjects plural and numerically various, is more general; as for instance “man.”

So, in fact, although Ad Petrum makes it quite clear what Gregory thinks the metaphysics of ousia and hypostasis is, the evidence from Ad Petrum is simply inconclusive as to what Gregory thinks the semantics of “God” is.

Obviously the suggestion I want to make is that Gregory is simply fitting his argument to different audiences. And not in a disingenuous way. He is simply taking into account the presuppositions of his interlocutors. It’s true that, given my interpretation, even in Ad Graecos one might expect him to keep talk about “God” signifying the nature always in the hypothetical, and yet that we don’t find him doing that. (He seems to simply say that “God” does in fact signify the nature). But for one thing, it may simply be that Gregory doesn’t mind affirming a non-misleading falsehood here. Or that putting a large number of the sentences of this work into a subjunctive mood would simply read too awkwardly for Gregory’s inner rhetorician to feel good about. More importantly, though, consider this passage from the Ad Graecos itself:

And if the Holy Trinity comprise a monad with respect to ousia, it is clear that this is also true with respect to the name “God”.

80. (St. Basil the Great 1957-1966), vol. 1, epistle 38, section 2.

81. (St. Basil the Great 1895), p. 137.
For this [the name “God”] signifies the *ousia*, not in that it represents what the *ousia* *is* (that is obvious, since the “what” of the divine *ousia* is beyond our understanding and mental grasp), but in that it hints at the appropriate *idioma* by which we can lay hold of it - just as being able to neigh or to laugh, being what we all “natural *idiomata,*” signify the natures of which they are *idiomata.*

Now it is an *idioma* of the eternal *ousia* to which Father and Son and Holy Spirit belong to survey and understand and know all things: not just what takes place in action (*ta ergo *ginomena*), but even what is grasped in the mind. This [activity] is proper to that *ousia* alone, since it is the cause of all things, has made all things, and reigns over all things as its own productions, presiding over all human affairs by some appropriate but ineffable word of command.

Understood on this basis, the noun “God” signifies, properly speaking, that *ousia* which truly rules all things as creator of all.

Since, therefore, the *ousia* to which Father, Son and Holy Spirit belong is one, and since the name that expresses it is one (i.e., the name “God”), God will be one in the proper sense, according to the structure of his *ousia*; no rationale
Note that what Gregory calls “the natural idiomata” – being able to neigh or laugh – are energeiai (or dynameis). And that, in the case of the divine nature, the relevant idioma of the nature is the energeia of “beholding” or “knowing all things.” (More on this energeia just below; more on idiomata below, section 4.4.1, p. 235 ff.).

So, even here, although he goes along with the idea that “God” signifies the ousia, he allows that it does so only by way of signifying that ousia’s “natural idioma” – the energeia of “beholding” – and in turn the energeia itself “signifies” the ousia. Now, whatever the nature of this “signification” going on between an energeia and an ousia (presumably something like the way in which smoke – naturally – “means” fire), it seems clear that, even in Ad Graecos, Gregory takes it that the primary signification of “God” is actually the energeia of “beholding.”

And this is really what we ought to antecedently expect anyway, as it turns out to be a very clear trend in the tradition leading up to Gregory. The following are just a few examples from the ante-Nicene fathers, to illustrate that these views are taken from an earlier tradition.

St. Justin Martyr (c. 150 AD), Apologia Secunda:

But to the Father of all, being unbegotten, there is no name given. For by whatever name He be called, He has as His elder the one who gives Him the name.

82. (St. Gregory of Nyssa 1958), pp. 21-22.

83. (St. Gregory of Nyssa 1994). I have substituted “ousia” for Daley’s “substance” and “idioma” for Daley’s “characteristic.”
But “Father,” and “God,” and “Creator,” and “Lord,” and “master,” are not names (ονόματα), but attributions (προσφήσεις) derived from His well-doing and works (ἐργα).  

Theophilus of Antioch (c. 180 AD), *Ad Autolycum:*

And he is called God (θεός) on account of His having placed (τεθεικέναι, from τέθημι) all things on security afforded by Himself; and on account of θέειν (from θέω). For θέειν is running, and moving, and energizing, and nourishing, and foreseeing, and governing, and making all things alive.

Origen (c. 215 AD), *De Principiis*

Whatever, therefore, we have predicated of the wisdom of God, will be appropriately applied and understood of the Son of God, in virtue of His being the Life, and the Word, and the Truth and the Resurrection:

For all these titles are derived from His power and op-

84. (St. Justin Martyr 1915), pp. 78-89
86. (St. Justin Martyr et al. 1885), p. 190. Emphasis mine.
87. (Theophilus of Antioch 1970).
88. (Theophilus of Antioch et al. 1905), p. 90.
Other examples can be given from within the pro-Nicene consensus itself. I will give just a couple of examples from St. Ambrose’s *De Fide (Ad Gratianum)* here.

Ambrose, *De Fide Ad Gratianum Augustum Libri Quinque*:

Deus enim et Dominus nomen magnificientiae, nomen est potestatis, sicut ipse dicit: Dominus nomen est mihi. Et sicut alibi Propheta asserit: Dominus omnipotens nomen est ei [Esai. xlii, 8]. Dominus ergo et Deus vel quod dominetur omnibus, vel quod spectet omnibus, et timeatur a cunctis... 91

Et hic ergo cum dicitur: Pluit Dominus a Domino, unitatem divinitatis agnosce. Operationis enim unitas non facit pluralem divinitatem, sicut ipse Dominus ostendit, dicens: Credite mihi, quia ego in Patre, et Pater in me: alioquin vel propter opera ipsa credite [Ioan. x, 38]. Et hic adversum quod unitatem divinitatis per unitatem operum designaverit. 93

For ‘God’ and ‘Lord’ is a name of majesty, a name of power, even as God Himself saith: ‘The Lord is My name,’ and as in another place the prophet declareth: ‘The Lord Almighty is His name.’ [Isaiah 42:8] God is He, therefore, and Lord, either because His rule is over all, or because He beholdeth all things, and is feared by all, without difference... 92

So again, when you read, ‘The Lord rained from the Lord,’ acknowledge the unity of Godhead, for *unity in operation* [operatio, = energeia] doth not allow of more than one individual God, even as the Lord Himself has shown, saying: ‘Believe Me, that I am in the Father, and the Father in Me: or believe Me for the very works’ sake.’ [John 10:38]

Here, too, we see that *unity of Godhead is signified by unity in operation* [operatio, = energeia]. 94

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89. (Origen 1836), p. 110.

90. (Tertullian et al. 1885), p. 247.
Thus, we really should come to read Gregory expecting to find him holding the view that “God” signifies, not the divine nature, but some kind of divine activity, i.e., *energeia* (Lat. *operatio*). And that if he has any specific view on what that *energeia* is, it will probably be “ beholding.” So, I wouldn’t actually subscribe to a developmental story on this particular question. I find it more likely that Gregory’s view on this semantic issue probably really *was* consistent over time, just as he claims in Ad Eustathium.

Thus, although *Ad Graecos* may be a bit of a rough patch in my interpretation, I think that, on the whole, it looks more like Gregory had a consistent view that “God” signifies an *energeia*. Only that he also adapts his arguments to a particular audience’s presuppositions (to the extent that he can), rather than resting his argument on more controversial premises than he needs to (which seems like just good common sense – and in a certain sense, just good manners).

And in either case, whether we accept the view that Gregory is simply accommodating the presuppositions of different audiences, or we tell some kind of developmental story, in either case, certainly within the *Ad Ablabium* (almost certainly the latest of his triadological writings), it seems clear enough that Gregory does not actually accept the presupposition of the UNA, that “God” signifies the *ousia*, but he rather holds that “God” signifies an *energeia* (specifically, “ beholding.”)

Thus (happily) when Gregory claims that it would be strictly speaking false, even if not misleading, to claim that there are “many men,” due to their monadic nature, it turns out that deciding the question of whether this claim of Gregory’s is correct or not is unnecessary for our purposes. That is, although he does seem to think that,

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91. PL 16, p. 530.
93. PL 16, p. 534.
94. (St. Ambrose of Milan 1896), p. 205.
strictly speaking, there is only one man, because there is only one human nature, this
(nowadays controversial) view turns out to be inessential to the response to Ablabius’
argument that Gregory himself actually accepts.

If one needs any further evidence of this, let us return to the *Ad Ablabium* and
consider Gregory’s conclusion to the section on the UNA, which may seem perplexing
on a first reading:

Therefore we must confess
one God, according to the tes-
timony of Scripture, “Hear, O
Israel, the Lord thy God is one
Lord,” even though the name
of Godhead extends through
the Holy Trinity.

This I say according to the
account we have given in the
case of human nature, in which
we have learnt that it is im-
proper to extend the name of
the nature by the mark of plu-
ularity.

We must, however, more
carefully examine the name of
“Godhead,” in order to obtain,
by means of the significance in-
volved in the word, some help
towards clearing up the ques-
tion before us.96

If Gregory actually accepted the UNA, he ought to have ended with the first
sentence above. He has given a response to the LPT: pluralizing the “name” (noun)
derived from a nature on the basis of there being a plurality of individuals with that
nature is merely a common abuse of language, even in the case of created things
such as men. Now, whether or not one agrees with Gregory that this is true, surely

96. (St. Gregory of Nyssa 1893), p. 332.
Gregory thinks it is. And if Gregory thinks it is true, we must ask why Gregory does not think his task is finished. Why would Gregory think there was still a need for obtaining any “help towards clearing up the question” if he thought the UNA, which he has just presented, is already an adequate answer to that question? Clearly, the fact is that Gregory does not in fact think the UNA is an adequate answer to the LPT.

And as expected in light of our discussion to this point, in examining “the name of ‘Godhead’…” and “the significance involved in the word,” Gregory points out that the UNA presupposes that “God” is the name of the divine nature, in just the same way as “man” is the name of the human nature, and he points out his denial of that view, again pointing out that he focuses on it only because he takes it to be the common viewpoint (not his own). Notice that, much as he did in Ad Eustathium (above, pp. 181–186.), he couches the UNA within the following two crucial “even if” clauses.

First, Gregory argues, even if “God” did not signify an energēia (beholding), it still could not denote the divine essence (as his opponents claim), because the divine essence is “above all names,” and “God” is a name. He says:

\[
\text{μάχεσθαι δὲ πρὸς τοὺς ἀν-
τιλέγοντας μὴ δεῖν ἐνέργειαν νοεῖν τὴν θεότητα οὐ πάντων τῶν ἀναγκαίων μοι δοκεῖ, ώς πρὸς τὴν παροῦσαν τοῦ λόγου κατασκευήν.}
\]

It does not seem to me absolutely necessary, with a view to the present proof of our argument, to contend against those who oppose us with the assertion that we are not to conceive “Godhead” as an operation [energeia]. For we, believing the Divine nature to be unlimited and incomprehensible, conceive no comprehension of it, but declare that the nature is to be conceived in all respects as infinite: and that which is
Æpeiron ou' ti na me'n orizetai, tina de ouyhi alla kata pantia logon ekphugiei ton oron he apeiria. oukou tou ektois orou oude onomati pantos orizetai.

Absolutely infinite is not limited in one respect while it is left unlimited in another, but infinity is free from limitation altogether. That therefore which is without limit is surely not limited even by name.

In order then to mark the constancy of our conception of infinity in the case of the Divine nature, we say that the Deity, is above every name: and "Godhead" is a name. Now it cannot be that the same thing should at once be a name and be accounted as above every name... 97

Thus, Gregory argues that, if he is wrong about "God" signifying an energeia, it does not automatically follow that "God" signifies the divine nature. In fact, it must signify neither an energeia, nor the divine nature, but something else entirely.

The second "even if" clause is that, even if he is wrong about the first "even if" clause, and "God" did signify the divine nature after all, there would still only be one God on his view, because there is only one divine nature. That is, because the UNA would be there as a "back-up" argument. He says:

Plh

But if it pleases our adversaries to say that the significance of the term ['Godhead'] is not [energeia], but [is] nature, we shall fall back upon our original argument [the UNA]. 100


98. (St. Gregory of Nyssa 1893), p. 335.


100. (St. Gregory of Nyssa 1893), p. 335.
This was exactly the same move Gregory made in *Ad Eustathium* (See above, pp. 181–186). Thus, although UNA is the first substantive response given by Gregory in “To Albabius,” he cannot actually accept it as a sound argument, as he denies one of its premises.

So we see that it is not the UNA, but the UAA, that is the only response Gregory actually regards as adequate. That is, SMA does not even give us the resources to determine any answer Ablabius’ question at all, and UNA gives us a solution, but one that Gregory himself regards as relying on false semantic premises. He only gives the UNA for the sake of those who accept this common, but in Gregory’s view false, semantic assumption (i.e., most pagans and some heretics). Just as the SMA is the least misleading response it is possible for the uneducated to comprehend, UNA is the least misleading response one could give to the educated who labor under this false, but apparently widespread, semantic presupposition.

We’ve seen that Gregory himself does not regard the UNA as adequate. And the semantics of collective nouns it relies on seems implausible today. So the UNA has little to recommend it. But if this is so, the question is, *what is the solution to the LPT provided by the UAA?*

4.3 *Idioma*

Now we’ve already seen what the concepts of *ousia* and hypostasis amount to above, or at least what they amount to on my reading, following Cross. Namely, that *ousia* and hypostasis are, respectively, a kind of universal or common quality (specifically, a nature, conceived of as a monadic *in re* universal, wholly present in its instances) and a particular or individual (*minus* the connotations of being a literal “part” of something, or the result of a process of “division”). But before I can explain exactly what I think is going on in the UAA, we need to understand one final concept
that of the *idioma*,\(^\text{101}\) which will turn out to be important for understanding an under appreciated feature of Gregory’s thinking about *energeiai*.

I will argue that Gregory takes the *idiomata* to be what individuates the hypostases, although there is some ambiguity in Gregory’s account of *idiomata*, so that we will have to consider both a “strong” and a “weak” version of the identity conditions for hypostases. We will later see that the *idiomata* are in a certain sense inessential for our own purposes in formulating a formal account of Gregory’s views. However, the fact that Gregory attributes *idiomata* not only to hypostases, but later to *energeiai* (as well as the fact that *energeiai* are said to be the “*idiomata* of *ousiai*”) turns out to have a critical implication about Gregory’s understanding of the metaphysics of *energeiai* that is useful in *understanding* his solution to the LPT (even if not critical to *stating* it later, after we understand what it is).

First, I want to look at some of the background to Gregory’s theory of universals that Cross mentions. Specifically, a passage from Basil’s Epistle 214 and another from his Epistle 236, since Basil’s thinking on this matter is clearly influential on Gregory (or at least reflective of Gregory’s views, if the influence went the other way around). Then we’ll look at Gregory’s *Ad Petrum* for a fuller discussion.

### 4.3.1 Basil’s Epistles 214 and 236

In Epistle 214, Basil says:

\[
\ldots \ \text{ὅν ἔχει λόγον ὁ κοινὸς πρὸς τὸ ὤσιν, τούτων ἔχει ὡς ὁ ὤσια πρὸς τὴν ὑπόστασιν. Ἐκάστως γὰρ ἡμῶν καὶ τῶν κοινῶν τῆς ὥσιας λόγῳ τοῦ εἶναι μετέχει καὶ τοῖς περὶ αὐτῶν ἰδιώμασιν ὁ δείνα ἔστι καὶ ὁ δεύνα. Οὕτω καὶ καὶ ὁ μὲν τῆς ὥσιας λό-}
\]

\[
\ldots \ \text{[O]usia has the same relation to hypostasis as the common has to the peculiar (*idion*). For each of us both participates in existence by the common *logos* of the *ousia*, and, by the *idiomata* around him, is so-and-so and so-and-}
\]

101. Although, in the passage I will point to in *Ad Ablabium*, the term used is “*idiotropon*,” but the meaning is the same.
Cross notes that τὸ κοινὸν, which I’ve translated “common,” is the normal word for a universal in these texts. So, Basil here claims that ousia is a universal and hypostasis a particular.

But note also the role of idiomata here. We are told that each of us individuals “participates in existence by the common logos of the ousia,” i.e., we exist only in virtue of instantiating our essence or nature. Thus, on Basil’s view, and Gregory would certainly follow him here, there cannot be any hypostasis that does not have an ousia or nature. But of course, while the instantiation of a nature is sufficient for the existence of some-or-another hypostasis (that man-hood is instantiated entails that there exists some man), for the existence of a certain, definite hypostasis, this is only a necessary, but not sufficient condition (the existence of Mark Twain entails that man-hood is instantiated, but that man-hood is instantiated does not entail the existence of Mark Twain in particular). He goes on to discuss the particularity of each individual as involving what he calls an idiomata. “[each of us . . .] by the idiomata


103. Translation mine.

104. (Cross 2002), p. 386, “the preferred term for universal is ‘common’ (κοινὸν) though ‘universal’ (κοινὸ) crops up occasionally. (Note, however, that there is no philosophical precedent for distinguishing the senses of ‘common’ and ‘universal’, so in the lack of any counterevidence we can reasonably accept their synonymity in the theological context too.)”

105. Or as I’ve rendered it here, somewhat better, even if more awkward, “peculiar,” that is τὸ ὀν. Not particular in the sense of μερικὴ ὁσία.
around him is so-and-so and so-and-so... the hypostasis is contemplated in the *idioma*...” Thus, it is a “peculiar quality” or qualities (*idioma* or *idiomata*) in virtue of which we count as this or that particular individual, and it is the instantiation of those *idiomata* (or co-instantiation of them with a nature) in virtue of which a given definite individual exists. Thus, just as a hypostasis could not exist without an *ousia* or nature, it could also not exist without an *idioma*.

In Epistle 236, Basil makes the same points:

> Οὐσία δὲ καὶ ὑπόστασις ταύτην ἔχει τὴν διαφορὰν ἢν ἔχει τὸ κοινὸν πρὸς τὸ καθ’ ἐκαστὸν, οἷον ὡς ἔχει τὸ ζῷον πρὸς τὸν δεῖνα ἀνθρώπον.

> Διὰ τούτῳ οὐσίαν μὲν μίαν ἐπὶ τῆς θεότητος ὁμολογοῦμεν, ἡστὲ τὸν τοῦ ἐξωθήμενον μὴ διαφόρως ἀποδιδόμεναι: ὑπόστασιν δὲ ἰδιάζουσαν, ἵν’ ἄσυγχυτος ἦμιν καὶ τετρανομένη ἡ περὶ Πατρός καὶ Υἱοῦ καὶ Ἁγίου Πνεύματος ἐννοία ἐνυπάρχῃ.

> Μὴ γὰρ νοοῦντων ἡμῶν τοὺς ἁρμονισμένους περὶ ἐκαστον γραφήτερας, οἷον πατρότητα καὶ υἱότητα καὶ ἁγίασμα, ὅλλ’ ἐκ τῆς κοινῆς ἐννοίας τοῦ ἐξωθημένου ὁμολογοῦμεν Θεόν, ἀμήχανον ὑμῖν τὸν λόγον τῆς πίστεως ἀποδίδοσαι.

> Χρὴ οὖν τῷ κοινῷ τὸ ἰδιάζων προστιθέντας, οὕτω τὴν πίστιν ὁμολογεῖν·

> κοινὸν ἢ θεότητα, ἢδον ἢ πατρότητα·

> συνάπτοντας λέγειν πίστευος εἰς Θεόν Πατέρα.

> Καὶ πάλιν ἐν τῇ τοῦ Υἱοῦ

Ouσία and ὑπόστασις have the same difference which the common has to the particular (*kath hekaston*); such as animal has to a certain man.

Wherefore, in the case of the Godhead, we confess one *ousia* so as not to give a variant *logos* of existence, but we confess a particular hypostasis, in order that our conception of Father, Son and Holy Spirit may be without confusion and clear.

If we have no distinct perception of the separate characters (*charakters*, *χαρακτήρα*), namely, fatherhood, sonship, and sanctification, but form our conception of God from the general idea of existence, we cannot possibly give a sound account of our faith.

We must, therefore, confess the faith by adding the particular to the common.

Godhood is common; fatherhood particular (*idion*, ἰδιόν).

We must therefore combine the two and say, “I believe in God the Father.”

The like course must be
Here he uses the phrase $καθ' \ έκαστον$ instead of $το \ ίδιον$ to describe the hypostases as what we would call particulars or individuals (minus the nominalist connotations of those terms in his time), and initially uses χαρακτήρ instead of ιδιώμα to speak of fatherhood, sonship and sanctification (“the power of sanctifying” in Epistle 214), but clearly the use is synonymous, or closely related. That is, he uses “character” (charaktera, χαρακτήρ) to describe “fatherhood, sonship and sanctification,” which are also the idiomata. Thus, either the concepts of χαρακτήρ and ιδιώμα are simply identical, or closely enough related as to be used interchangeably in this context. (I’ll discuss a possible objection from DelCogliano on this point below, p. 227.)

4.3.2 Ad Petrum

For the locus classicus of Gregory’s view on the distinction between hypostasis and ousia – also the locus classicus for this distinction in the entire Trinitarian controversy


107. Translation adapted from (St. Basil the Great 1895), p. 278.
– we turn to his *Ad Petrum*. This is essentially the same work as what has come down to us traditionally as St. Basil’s Epistle 38, addressed to St. Gregory of Nyssa, but it appears also among Gregory of Nyssa’s works as an epistle to his brother Peter of Sebaste. Although there is still some scholarly debate as to which is the correct attribution, the majority opinion is now that this was in fact written by Gregory of Nyssa to Peter of Sebaste. Thus, given the current general consensus of Gregorian authorship, it has come to be known as the “*Ad Petrum,*” on the assumption that it is actually to Peter of Sebaste. I will also assume Gregorian authorship here, but even if written by St. Basil, there is no doubt that Gregory accepts the ideas expressed in it, regardless of whether it was he or Basil that authored it.

In the *Ad Petrum*, we will see that hypostases are semantically connected to proper nouns, and *ousiai* are semantically connected to common nouns.\(^{108}\) This is important, since the entire discussion is reminiscent of Stoic discussions of proper and common nouns, and the Stoics defined proper nouns in terms of *idiomata*. The views of the Stoics were taken up later by the ancient grammarians, some of whom (like Dionysius Thrax) rejected the Stoic view, but some of whom (like Apollonius Dyscolus) accepted it. If the Stoics, either directly or mediated through the grammarians, are the source for Gregory’s discussion here, then we could reasonably expect his theory of *idiomata* to reflect theirs as well. On the other hand, we will see that there are parallels to Neo-Platonism in Gregory’s discussion of *idiomata* as well. And this will make a difference as to how we understand Gregory, since there is a case to be made that the Stoic theory of *idiomata* is in a certain sense much stronger than the Neo-Platonist. But first, Gregory.

After an introduction on the theological importance of the distinction between hypostasis and *ousia*, Gregory says:

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\(^{108}\) It will become clear why I hesitate to say more than “semantically connected” in the course of the discussion.
The meaning of the words, to put it shortly, is as follows:

Of all nouns, some, which are predicated of subjects plural and numerically distinct, have a certain more general signification; such as “man.”

When we so say, we indicate the common nature through the noun, and do not determine by the word a certain man, who is peculiarly known by that name.

Peter, for instance is no more man than Andrew, John, or James.

The signification therefore being common, and extending to all the individuals ranked under the same name, has need of a distinction through which we may understand, not the universal man, but Peter or John.

Other nouns, on the other hand, have a more peculiar denotation, through the signification of which is contemplated not the commonality of the nature, but the outline of a certain thing, having no commonality, according to that which peculiarizes, with what is of the same kind, such as “Paul” or “Timothy.”

For, in a word of this kind there is no extension to what is common in the nature; there is a separation of certain outlined conceptions from the general idea, and expression of them by means of their names.
Suppose then that two or more are set together, as, for instance, Paul, Silvanus, and Timothy, and that an enquiry is made into the ousia of the men; no one will give one logos of the ousia in the case of Paul, a different one in that of Silvanus, and another in the case of Timothy; but the words through which the ousia of Paul was made known, these same also will fit the others, and they are homoousios with one another, those described by the same logos of the ousia.

And when the enquirer has learned what is common, and turns his attention to the peculiarizing properties through which one is separated from another, the definition by which each is known will no longer tally in all particulars with the definition of another, even though in some points it be found to agree.

My statement, then, is this. That which is spoken of peculiarly is indicated (δηλούμενα) by the name of the hypostasis.

Suppose we say “man.” The indefinite meaning of the word strikes a certain vague sense upon the ears. The nature is indicated, but what subsists and is specially and peculiarly indicated by the name is not made plain.

But suppose we say “Paul.” We set forth, by what is indicated by the name, the nature subsisting.

This then is the hyposta-
sia, or "standing under;" not the indefinite conception of the *ousia*, which, because what is signified is general, finds no "standing," but the conception which by means of the expressed *idiomata* gives standing and circumscription to the common and uncircumscribed. It is customary in Scripture to make a distinction of this kind, as well in many other passages as in the History of Job.

When purposing to narrate the events of his life, Job first mentions the common, and says "a man;" then he straightway particularizes by adding "a certain."

For when it was about to narrate the affairs about him, after first mentioning the common property and having said "man," it immediately distinguishes it by the specific property in the addition of "a certain." It silenced the description of the *ousia*, because this brings no benefit to the present aim of the definition. Rather, it characterizes the "certain" person through the *gnorismata*, since it states both location and the *gnorismata* of the character and all the external contingencies that would distinguish and set him apart from the common signification. As a result, the description of that which is narrated becomes clear in all ways: from the name, from the location, from the *idiomata* of the soul, from the external contin-
A few things are obvious here. First, Gregory makes a distinction between common and proper nouns and connects common nouns (or at least some of them) to *ousiai*, while he connects proper nouns to hypostases.

Second, *ousiai* either are, or have, a *logos* or definition, which will be the same for various individuals of the same *ousia* (those who are *homoousios*).

But third, individuals themselves have a *logos* or definition as well. Gregory later says a hypostasis is “a bundle of *idiomata* about each thing” – ἢ συνάδρομη τῶν περὶ ἕκαστον ἰδιωμάτων.

Finally, where individuals differ in their individual definitions, Gregory speaks of their differing with respect to *idiomata*, which seem to be either qualities or bundles of qualities that individuate an individual (more on this ambiguity below).


110. This translation is an adaption of both (St. Basil the Great 1895), pp. 137-138 and (St. Gregory of Nyssa 2008b), pp. 1-3, along with my own modifications.
Now we said that the Stoics defined proper nouns by way of *idiomata*. For the Stoics, a common noun “signifies” a common quality, and a proper noun “indicates,” not, as we might expect, an individual, but a peculiar quality (ιδία ποιότης). In Diogenes Laertius’ *Lives and Opinions of Eminent Philosophers* (7.57-58), he discusses the Stoic view, possibly even quoting a Stoic without attribution:

> Έστι δὲ προσηγορία μὲν κατὰ τὸν Διογένην μέρος λόγου σημαίνον κοινὴν ποιότητα, οἷον Ἀνήρωπος, Ἰππός.

> ὄνομα δὲ ἐστὶ μέρος λόγου δῆλον ιδίαν ποιότητα, οἷον Διογένης, Σωκράτης.\(^{111}\)

And an appellation (προσηγορία) is, according to Diogenes, a part of speech signifying (σημαίνον) a common quality (κοινὴ ποιότης), such as “Man,” “Horse.”

But a [proper] noun (ὅνομα) is a part of speech indicating (δῆλον) a unique quality (ιδία ποιότης), such as “Diogenes,” “Socrates.”\(^{112}\)

The ancient Greek grammarians took over Stoic philosophy of language, modifying it here and there. Some rejected the Stoic definition of the proper noun, but others retained it. Of the two greatest grammarians in antiquity, Dionysius Thrax seems to have rejected the view, replacing the definitions as follows:

> κύριον μὲν οὖν ἐστὶ τὸ τὴν ιδίαν οὐσίαν σημαίνον, οἷον Ὅμηρος Σωκράτης.

> προσηγορικὼν δὲ ἐστὶ τὸ τὴν κοινὴν οὐσίαν σημαίνον, οἷον Ἀνήρωπος Ἰππός.\(^{113}\)

And so, on the one hand there is the proper [noun] (κύριον) signifying (σημαίνον) a peculiar *ousia* (ιδίαν οὐσίαν), such as “Homer,” “Socrates.”

And on the other hand, there is the appellative [noun] (προσηγορικὼν) signifying (σημαίνον) a common *ousia* (κοινὴν οὐσίαν),

\(^{111}\) (Diogenes Laertius, 1964 (repr. 1966)), 7.57-58.

\(^{112}\) Translation mine.
Notice that in the discussion of the Stoic theory above, there was a distinction made (common among the Stoics) between “signifying” (σημάζων) (the preferred term for the semantic relation between common nouns and common qualities), and “indicating” (διηλούν) (the preferred term for the semantic relation between proper nouns and peculiar qualities). But Dionysius here switches to using the same term (σημάζων) for both cases. Apollonius Dyscolus, on the other hand, uses both terms, but uses them interchangeably (as does Gregory). But Apollonius also goes back to the Stoic theory of idiomata in his definition of proper nouns. There are several examples of this. We will give just a few:

Nouns (names) were devised for the indication of certain qualities, general or particular, as anthropos (“man” – indicates the quality of being a man), Platon (“Plato” – indicates the quality of being Plato).  

The pronoun conveys the force of a proper name – I don’t mean the name considered as a phonological shape, but its meaning, that is the unique character (ἡ ἴδια ποιότης) of the referent (τοῦ ὑποκειμένου).  

‘And that man is Ajax the gigantic’ … the deixis is required because of Ajax’s being seen, but the name Ajax is required because of the indi-
The “peculiar quality” (*idioma*) is a feature of Stoic metaphysics that does quite a bit of work for them – metaphysical, epistemological, and even ethical (insofar as Stoic ethics postulates at least the possibility of a Stoic sage, who needs to have infallible knowledge so as never to mistakenly perform the wrong actions). What is important for our purposes is that *idiomata* are part of the Stoic criterion of individuation for particulars. There is some scholarly debate as to whether the Stoic *idiomata* are simple, non-shareable qualities (like Socrateity), or whether they are only unique combinations of in-principle shareable qualities (like the combination of whiteness, snub-nosedness, and so forth, that is only exhibited by Socrates, even though any of these qualities taken by itself might be exhibited by other individuals). (Sorabji, for example, maintains the stronger view, that for the Stoics each distinguishing mark is unique to the individual.) I will not enter into the details of that debate here. I only want to note that there is a case to be made that the Stoics take this stronger

116. Translation from (Householder 1981), II.VII.22., p. 93.
118. Translation from (Householder 1981), II.IX.41., p. 99.
119. (Apollonius Dyscolus 1910), part 2, volume 2, p. 159.
122. Translation from (Householder 1981), III.XXIII.96, p. 189.
123. (Sorabji 2005), pp. 164-203, but particularly pp. 169-173.
view of *idiomata*. And to the extent that Gregory’s discussion seems influenced by
the Stoics, or by the grammarians (particularly Apollonius, in my opinion), we might
reasonably conjecture that he would hold this stronger view.

On the other hand, his description of hypostases as “bundles” of qualities is remi-
niscent of the bundle theory we find in the Neo-Platonism of the time, perhaps most
well known from a passage in Porphyry’s Isagoge:

Such things are therefore called “individuals,” because each consists (συνέστηκεν)
of peculiarities (ιδιότητων) of which the combination (τὸ ἄθροισμα)
can never be the same in any other, for the peculiarities of
Socrates can never be the same
in any other particular person;
the peculiarities of man indeed
(I mean of the universal) may
be the same in many, or rather
in all particular men, so far as
they are men.125

We’ve already seen that Gregory uses quite a bit of Neo-Platonic technical ter-
minology, and Cross argues that Gregory is specifically responding to Porphyry in
certain cases. Thus, it’s easy to suppose that this might have been Gregory’s source
for his bundle theory (or Basil’s, if Gregory is just following Basil here).

What’s more, DelCigliano notes that Porphyry’s usage of “*idioma*” is inconsistent
in just a certain way in which Gregory’s is as well:

Though Porphyry adopts both the Platonic term ‘assemblage’ and the
Carneadean term ‘concurrence’, and uses them with the term ‘distinctive
feature’ (ι디οτης), his terminology is inconsistent. In the shorter com-
mentary, he implies that the “concurrence of qualities” is the “distinctive


feature” whereby individuals in the same species are differentiated. In the Isagoge, it is the “assemblage” of the “distinctive features” that constitute each individual which accounts for the individual’s uniqueness. The term ‘distinctive feature’ is used for both the resultant concurrence of properties and the properties that constitute the assemblage. 126

We will see that Gregory’s usage is also inconsistent in about the same way, which further corroborates Porphyry as a source.

On the other hand, DelCologna argues that Basil’s proximate source for his philosophy of language is a uniquely homoiousian philosophy of language already largely developed, but which St. Basil soaks up during his homoiousian phase, and refines and further develops for application to his newfound homoousianism. 127 This leaves us with a big question as to how to understand Gregory’s talk about idiomata...

4.3.3 How “Peculiar” is an Idioma?

Does Gregory have a theory of idiomata as simple, unshareable properties, as unique bundles of in-principle shareable qualities, or as the shareable qualities that constitute unique bundles?

I want to take a bit of space to explore this issue for two reasons. First, the precise role of the idiomata here has significant implications for the filioque controversy. It seems to me that at the bottom of much of St. Photios’ argument against the filioque, is the assumption that the idiomata are absolutely unshareable. 128 Second, although much less consequential, the issue also has some implications for precisely how we will formulate Gregory’s views formally in the next chapter (5.2.5.1, p. 280). So we

128. See for example, (PHOTIUS 1983), p. 73, “If the Spirit, Who proceeds from the Father, proceeds also from the Son ... the idioma which characterizes Him [the Father] would now be common [with the Son], and the two hypostases [sic, the Greek is “δύο ... τευχή καὶ ὁποστάσεως,” “two of the divine hypostases”] of the God-head would coalesce into one person. And thus Sabellios, or rather some other semi-Sabellian monster, would again sprout up among us.”
will look into it a bit further, if only to note that, and why, all we can do in the end is give two competing formulations and not come to a definitive conclusion for or against either of them.

As we saw above, this question comes up within Gregory’s discussion of the semantics of proper and common nouns. DelCogliano notes that Basil’s usage of technical terms like ὄνομα (“noun” or “name”) and προσηγορία (“appellation”) doesn’t correspond either to Stoic or grammarian usage. For considerations of space, I won’t go into detail, but the same holds true for Gregory as well. In Ad Ablabium, he uses προσηγορία 6 times, 5 times for common names, as one would expect from either the Stoics or the grammarians, but once clearly for a proper name. Onoma and related terms (e.g. onomazein) are used 31 times in Ad Ablabium, either for common or proper nouns, indiscriminately. (Stoics tended to use onoma only for proper nouns and prosegoria for common nouns, with no generic term for nouns. Some grammarians used onoma as a generic term for noun, specifying the proper noun as the kyrion onoma. So Gregory’s usage of onoma doesn’t correspond to either tradition.) Thus, since his usage doesn’t seem to correspond closely either to the Stoics’ or the grammarians’, it’s hard to make any assumptions as to how closely his theory of idiomata follows the Stoics just on the basis of his discussing common and proper nouns, despite some obvious similarities in what he says to Stoic and grammarian discussions of the same issues.

On the other hand, in Ad Petrum, Gregory says quite explicitly that the idiomata of the Trinity are neither shareable nor even compossible (i.e., not co-instantiable), so that the relation between hypostases and idiomata is neither one-to-many nor many-to-one, but one-to-one. This seems similar to Stoicism. For the Stoics, for an idiomata to be shared by two material substrata would simply be for numerically one qualified individual to subsist in two different material substrata at the same time, i.e., to be

bi-located – which they regarded as absurd. Conversely, for two distinct idiomata to be instantiated in the same material substratum would just be for two distinct qualified individuals to be co-located – also an absurdity in the Stoics’ view.\(^{130}\) This might be taken as good evidence that Gregory has in mind the stronger view of idiomata after all. The problem is that he makes this explicit claim about idiomata immediately after giving a number of examples that are hard to reconcile with the explicit statement. He states:

> Επειδή τούν τὸ Ἅγιον Πνεῦμα, ἃρ’ οὐ πᾶσα ἐπὶ τὴν κτίσιν ἢ τῶν ἁγαθῶν χορηγία πηγάζει, τοῦ Υἱοῦ μὲν ἤρθησεν ὡς ἀδιαστάτως συγκαταλαμβάνεται, τῆς δὲ τοῦ Πατρὸς (25) αἰτίας εξημένον ἔχει τὸ εἶναι, ὅθεν καὶ ἐκπορεύεται, τούτῳ γνωριστικῷ τῆς κατὰ τὴν ὑπόστασιν ἰδιότητος σημείον ἔχει, τὸ μετὰ τὸν Υἱὸν καὶ σὺν αὐτῷ γνωρίζεται καὶ τὸ ἐκ τοῦ Πατρὸς ὑφεστάναι.

> Ο δὲ Υἱὸς ὁ τὸ ἐκ τοῦ Πατρὸς ἐκπορευόμενον Πνεῦμα δὲ ἐσετοῦ καὶ μετ’ ἐσετοῦ γνωρίζων, μόνος μονογενῶς ἐκ τοῦ ἁγιεύματος φωτὸς ἐκλάμψας, οὐδεμίαν κατὰ τὸ ἰδιάζον τῶν γνωρισμάτων τὴν κοινωνίαν ἔχει πρὸς τὸν Πατέρα ἢ πρὸς τὸ Πνεῦμα τὸ Ἅγιον, ἀλλὰ τοῖς εἰρήμενοις σημείοις μόνος γνωρίζεται.

> Ο δὲ ἐπὶ πάντων Θεοῦ ἐξαιρετῶν τις γνώρισμα τῆς ἐσετοῦ ὑποστάσεως τὸ Πατήρ εἶναι καὶ ἐκ μηδεμίας αἰτίας ὑποστήρι...\(^{130}\) (E. Lewis 1995), p. 91.

Since, then, the Holy Spirit, from Whom all the supply of good things for creation has its source, is attached to the Son, and with Him is insep-arrably apprehended, and has His being attached to the Father, as cause, from Whom also He proceeds; He has this note of His peculiarity according to hypostasis, that He is known after the Son and together with the Son, and that He has His subsistence of the Father.

The Son, who through Himself and with Himself reveals the Spirit proceeding from the Father, who alone shines forth only-begottenly from the unbegotten light, has no commonality according to the individuating gnorismata either to the Father or to the Holy Spirit, but alone is known by these mentioned signs.

And the God over all [the Father] alone has a certain singular gnorisma of His own hypostasis, to be the Father, and
Gregory here first speaks in the singular of what one would think to be two distinct features of the Holy Spirit, saying He has “this recognizable sign” (τοῦτο γνωριστικὸν σημεῖον) of His “peculiarity according to hypostasis,” (τῆς κατὰ τὴν ὑπόστασιν ἰδιότητος) and “this” sign gets described as:

(1) that He is known after the Son and together with the Son, and

(2) that He hypostasizes from the Father.

which certainly sounds like, not one, but two very different features.

Then he immediately turns around and speaks in the plural of the signs (σημεῖα) by which the Son is known. And these are:

(1) His revealing the Holy Spirit through Himself and with Himself, and

(2) “shining forth” only-begottenly from the unbegotten light (i.e., the Father).

These again sound like two quite distinct features, and Gregory speaks of them in the


132. Adapted from (St. Basil the Great 1895), pp. 138-139.
plural. So it sounds like we have two co-instantiated (and thus compossible) *idiomata* after all. Gregory here explicitly states that the Son “has nothing in common” with the other two hypostases as far as the *idiomata* go. Of course, failing to share *idiomata* with the other two does not conflict with apparently having two distinct co-instantiated *idiomata* in one hypostasis. The problem comes later.

Finally, he turns around and once again speaks *in the singular*, of the Father having “a certain singular *gnorisma*,” which he elaborates as:

(1) being the Father, and

(2) hypostasizing from no cause,

which again sound like quite distinct features (one relation and one lack of relation). And yet Gregory uses the singular here, as though these were a single *idioma*.

Last of all, Gregory makes it quite explicit that, with respect to the *idiomata*, the Father, Son and Holy Spirit *share nothing at all in common*, and indeed that their *idiomata* are both unshareable (ἐκοινώνητα) and non-compossible (ἐσ’με’χτα). And while nothing in his discussion of the *idiomata* here counts against his saying that they are unshareable, it’s hard to see how the Father and the Holy Spirit each have only a single *idioma*, rather than two each (in which case, within each pair of *idiomata*, the one must be compossible with the other). And even if the Father and Holy Spirit do somehow have only a single *idioma* each, the non-compossibility claim is still hard to reconcile with the Son’s explicitly having, apparently, a plurality of (i.e., two) *idiomata*.

One point of interest here is Gregory’s usage of terms like “participation” and “communion.” Now when we think of the Platonic notion of “participation” today, we often have in mind primarily the fact that it is supposed to be the metaphysical correlate of the linguistic predication relation. And Gregory frequently adverts to this relation for just this purpose, either using its Platonic name “μέθοδεξίς” (usu-
ally translated “participation”) or the more churchy-sounding “χοινωνία” (sometimes translated as “communion” or “fellowship”).

However, both the Platonic concept of participation (μέθεξις) and the Christian concept of communion (χοινωνία) imply a sense of “sharing” on the part of those involved.133 Μέθεξις has some roots in Greek theater (and ritual) in which multiple agents are “participating” in a larger theatrical (or ritualistic) event (from which we derive the term “methetics” in theater). And χοινωνία has the connotations in a Christian context of multiple persons having some kind of fellowship or a sharing of something. For example, the early Christians selling all of their property and holding everything in common.134, 135 Or sharing a meal distributed from a single cup of wine and a single loaf of bread.136 More relevant, of course, for our concerns,

133. In my own translations, I am often simply rendering χοινωνία as “sharing.”

134. E.g., Acts 2:44.

πάντες δὲ οἱ πιστεύοντες ἦσαν ἐπὶ τὸ χύτο καὶ ἔχον ἄπαντα χοινά. ((NESTLE et al. 2006))

And all those believing were at the same place, and had all things common (κοινά).

(Translation mine.)


Τοῦ δὲ πλήθους τῶν πιστευόντων ἢν καρδία καὶ ψυχή μία, καὶ οὐδὲ εἰς τι τῶν ὑπαρχόντων αὐτῷ ἔλεγεν ὰδιον εἶναι, ἄλλ’ ἢν αὐτοῖς ἄπαντα χοινά. ((NESTLE et al. 2006))

And of the plurality of those who believed, the heart and the soul was single. And not one was saying that anything of the things existing for him was his own (갖조), but to them all things were in common (κοινά).

(Translation mine.)

136. E.g., 1 Corinthians 10:16-17, where Paul uses both “communion” and then “participation,” making apparent reference to issue of “the One and the Many” here:

τὸ ποτήριον τῆς εὐλογίας δὲ εὐλογομένη, οὐχὶ χοινωνία ἐστίν τοῦ αἵματος τοῦ Χριστοῦ; τὸν ἄρτον δὲ κλώμεν, οὐχὶ χοινωνία τοῦ σώματος τοῦ Χριστοῦ ἐστίν; δι’ εἰς ἄρτος, ἐν σώμα ὡς πάντες ἔσμεν, οἱ γὰρ πάντες ἐκ τοῦ έν Άρτος μετέχομεν.

The cup of blessing which we bless – is it not the communion (χοινωνία) of the blood of Christ? The loaf which we break – is it not the communion (χοινωνία) of the body of Christ? Because it is one loaf, we, the many, are one body, because we
is the connotation in a philosophical context of qualities or features that are had “in common.” Whatever the specifics, there is some implication of a “one” somehow related to a “many.” Thus, by definition, participation, or communion, is a “many-to-one” relation.

Interestingly, not only does Gregory explicitly state in the Ad Petrum that the idiomata are unshareable (ἁχωνώνητα), but while he describes the hypostases as “participating in” and “sharing” the divine ousia, he never describes any of the hypostases as “participating in” or “sharing” any of the idiomata.¹³⁷

4.3.4 Two Views of the Individuation of Hypostases

So Gregory explicitly states that the idiomata are unshareable. And he eschews speaking of the hypostases as “participating” or having “communion” in the idiomata. So it might seem we could easily rule out the view that idiomata are shareable (even if it’s hard to understand how they are non-compossible). But in fact these considerations aren’t quite enough to decide whether for Gregory idiomata are shareable or not, or whether hypostases are individuated by simple, unshareable qualities, or by unique combinations of in-principle shareable qualities, because his usage doesn’t seem consistent, and that makes it hard to say even whether his theory is consistent. Consider how Gregory speaks elsewhere in the Ad Petrum:

Χάρη ύπόστασιν ἀποδεδώκαμεν εἶναι τὴν συνθρόμον τῶν περὶ ἐκαστὸν ἰδιωμάτων, ὁμολογεῖται δὲ ὡσπερ ἐπὶ τούτου, ἐφ’ ἰδιαίτερον τινί καὶ τῷ ἀδιαφόρου.

(Translation mine.)

¹³⁷ I have verified this “manually” in all of the minor triadological works I discuss in the dissertation. For his anti-Eunomian works, I performed TLG searches for various forms and cognates of μέθεξες and χοιρώνια within a few lines of proximity to Gregory’s terms for the idiomata.

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Εἰ γὰρ ἡ ύπόστασις τὸ ἰδιάζων τῆς ἐκάστου ύπάρξεως σημείων ἐστι, τοῦ δὲ Πατρὸς ἴδιον τὸ ἀγεννήτως εἶναι ὁμολογεῖται, μεμόρφωτα δὲ ὁ Υἱὸς τοῖς τοῦ Πατρὸς ἰδιώμασιν, ἂρα ὁμόχει διαμένει τῷ Πατρὶ κατ᾽ ἐξαιρέτων ἐπὶ αὐτοῦ μόνου τὸ ἀγέννητον λέγεσθαι, εἴπερ τῷ ἰδιάζοντι τοῦ Πατρὸς καὶ ἡ τοῦ Μονογενοῦς χαρακτηρίζεται ὑπαρξία.138

Here he first describes a hypostasis as a bundle (συνδρομὴ). But it is a bundle of idiomata. So it sounds like an idiom is only one (presumably shareable) item within an unshareable bundle called a “hypostasis.” So it looks as though what is doing the individuating is the bundle, but rather than calling the bundle an idiom, he is calling the parts of the bundle the idiomata.

Then in the very next paragraph he defines hypostasis as “the peculiarizing (in-


139. Adapted from (St. Basil the Great 1895), p. 140.
dividuating) sign of each reality” and goes on to give the Father’s individuating sign as an apparently simple property, “being unbegotten.” So here it doesn’t sound like the hypostasis is being identified with an individuating bundle of shareable qualities, but with a simple, individuating (and thus unshareable) property.

So it sounds as though he is either saying inconsistent things, or using *idioma* in an inconsistent way.

We saw that Porphyry has a consistent theory – that individuals are just bundles of (and therefore individuated by) in-principle shareable qualities – but that he sometimes uses *idioma* to mean the bundle and sometimes to mean the shareable qualities. So while the first of Gregory’s statements we looked at seem more reminiscent of the Stoics, these passages seem to count as evidence that Gregory is influenced by Porphyry. Of course, it’s also possible he was influenced by all of the above, and either didn’t see that their theories were incompatible, or didn’t care. He may not have cared, in this context, since if the hypostases of the Trinity only have a single *idioma* each, then the distinction between a simple property and a bundle doesn’t come into play. If the “bundle” is, in this case, a “bundle” of one, then if the bundle is unshareable, the simple property that constitutes it must be too.

Gregory’s statements, then, are difficult to reconcile, and raise a couple of questions, namely:

1. Is an *idioma* an element of a bundle, so that the bundle really is a bundle of *idiomata*, or is an *idioma* itself a bundle of qualities?

2. Is a hypostasis literally individuated by an *idioma*, or is it only individuated by a bundle of idiomata?\(^{140}\)

The answers to these questions yield different theories, none of which does a very good job of explaining all of Gregory’s statements about hypostases and *idiomata*. Specifically:

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\(^{140}\) Obviously if we take literally the claim that a hypostasis *is* a bundle of *idiomata*, then a hypostasis will at least be *individuated by* a bundle of *idiomata* – the bundle of *idiomata* that it *is*. 224
1. An *idioma* is an element of a bundle, and *each idioma* in the bundle is, by itself, sufficient to individuate a hypostasis.

2. An *idioma* is an element of a bundle, but *only the bundle as a whole* is sufficient to individuate a hypostasis. (*Idiomata* themselves, individually, are actually in-principle shareable qualities.)

3. An *idioma just is* a bundle, and *each idioma (=bundle)* is, by itself, sufficient to individuate a hypostasis.

4. An *idioma just is* a bundle, but *only the bundle as a whole* is sufficient to individuate a hypostasis. (*Idiomata* themselves, individually, are actually in-principle shareable qualities.)

Since (4) is obviously contradictory, to interpret Gregory at all charitably we need only concern ourselves with the first three theories. But note that (2) and (3) are essentially the same view, only labelled differently, and correspond to Porphyry’s equivocal way of expressing his theory. That is, in both (2) and (3), what we have is a hypostasis being individuated by a unique bundle of in-principle shareable qualities. Only in (2) we are using “*idioma*” to refer to an in-principle shareable quality within the bundle, and in (3) we are using “*idioma*” to refer to the bundle itself. Only (1) is importantly different, with a “strong” view about *idiomata* that would be closer to that of the Stoics (on one interpretation of the Stoics).

Thus, we are left with (1) a “strong” view of the individuation of hypostases, on which a hypostasis may have more than one *idioma*, but no two hypostases could share any *idiomata* at all, and (2) a “weak” view of the individuation of hypostases, on which two hypostases can share *idiomata* (if we use that term for the shareable qualities), but cannot share all of their *idiomata*.

(1) does fine with the view that a hypostasis is, or is at least individuated by, “a bundle of *idiomata*,” but it’s difficult to reconcile with the examples Gregory gives in the case of Job, and also with his claim that the *idiomata* of the Trinity are (not just unshareable, but) non-compossible. Gregory says that the Bible picks out Job by way of “name, place, *idiomata* of the soul, and outside circumstances,” all of which seem
accidental, other than perhaps idiomata of the soul, so that this is problematic for
the view that each particular idioma is sufficient to individuate a hypostasis. It could
be, of course, that Gregory makes a distinction between idiomata, which would play
a metaphysical role and be strongly individuating as in the Stoics, versus gnorismata,
which would only be playing an epistemological role and a role in determining the
reference of names, in some such way that gnorismata would only need to pick out a
unique referent in the actual world and could be accidental, shareable and so forth.
But this view still has problems with the fact that Gregory describes the idiomata
as non-compossible.

(2) also does well with the view that a hypostasis is, or is at least individuated by,
“a bundle of idiomata,” as well as with the examples of Job’s gnorismata, but on this
view idiomata don’t literally individuate hypostases, and it seems difficult to reconcile
with Gregory’s explicit claim that the idiomata are “unshareable” (ἀκοινώνιτά).141

Finally, (3) makes better sense than (2) out of why Gregory would think an
idioma to be unshareable, and possibly even why he might think idiomata to be
non-compossible, but it doesn’t sit very well with the description of a hypostasis as
“a bundle of idiomata,” since in fact there are no bundles of idiomata, the idiomata
are themselves the bundles.142

All of these interpretations of Gregory have their problems, and for this reason, in
the next chapter, I will consider both a “strong” and “weak” formulation of the identity
conditions of hypostases, corresponding to (1) and (2)/(3), respectively. (And for the

141. Of course, since some of Job’s gnorismata are clearly accidental, any theory will either have a
problem making sense of those example gnorismata or else have a problem with the claim that the
idiomata are unshareable. Unless, that is, one either equivocates on idioma in the way Porphyry
does, or one thinks there is a distinction in Gregory’s mind between idiomata, which individuate a
thing and are therefore unshareable, and gnorismata, which are only “that by which a thing can be
known,” and only need to be accidental qualities by which one can pick an item out from among
others in the actual world.

142. Unless one supposes that a hypostasis is a bundle of bundles of qualities, so that we start with
shareable qualities, bundle them into idiomata, then bundle the idiomata into a hypostasis. But
that seems too much of a stretch.
“weak” version, it will be more convenient to follow the usage of (2).

4.3.5 Do *Idiomata* Really Individuate?

DelCogliano seems to think that, at least for St. Basil, the *idiomata* serve a *merely identifying* and *not constitutive* role. That is, insofar as a property corresponds to a description, the *idiomata* correspond to what happen to be (but perhaps only accidentally) unique descriptions of things, so that they are the sorts of things Basil can put to use in his description theory of proper names, but a thing is not literally *constituted by* these properties. In this case, the *idiomata* play a role in securing the reference of proper names, and can play an epistemological role in our being able to recognize and have knowledge about individuals, but they needn’t be the sorts of things that would identify those individuals across time or possible worlds. DelCogliano also casts doubt on Basil taking either the Stoics or the ancient grammarians directly as sources for his theory of proper names.

Therefore, the Platonist and Stoic traditions viewed individuals as assemblages of distinctive features, though there were significant differences among them. These distinctive features were sometimes thought to be constitutive of the individual, sometimes identificatory, sometimes both. Basil is indebted to the tradition of viewing the bundled distinctive characteristics of individuals as identificatory, not constitutive... Accordingly, I suggest that he has more in common with the Platonists than with the Stoics, and at the same time more in common with the Platonist tradition of viewing individuals as bundles of distinctive characteristics that are solely identificatory and not in any way constitutive.

Basil is clear that a bundle of distinguishing marks does not constitute an individual but only serves an identificatory purpose. None of the distinguishing marks that he lists for Peter and Paul define what they are essentially or who they are as individual persons, but allow one to distinguish them from each other and from other human beings, and recognize them for who they are as individuals.143

143. (DelCogliano 2010), p. 201.
Given Basil’s massive influence on Gregory, this might seem to count against my interpretation that Gregory takes the *idiomata* even to be playing a role in the individuation of hypostases at all.

But first, consider the fact that, on DelCogliano’s own account, Basil is taking his views about philosophy of language over from the *homoiousians*. But the *homoiousians* don’t really have the *need* to rely on the distinguishing features of the hypostases to individuate them in the way that *homoousians* do, given that, on the *homoiousian* view, the persons of the Trinity have distinct natures anyway, and so there is no mystery about how they might be individuated. Thus, there is no reason to expect a discussion of the reference of proper names to include any talk about the individuation of the hypostases, if the material for that discussion is coming primarily from the *homoiousians*. But in the context of the *homoousian* view, which says there is only one *ousia*, and which wants to maintain at least *some* kind of doctrine of divine simplicity (even if not an extreme one), and especially in the context of Basil’s denial that the *ousia* is something that can be “divided” into particulars, a need will eventually arise to explain how or in what sense the hypostases can even be distinct in the first place. So, although it might not occur immediately, it would seem like a fairly natural and obvious development, to put the *idiomata* into service for that purpose. So, if DelCogliano’s thesis about the proximate sources of Basil’s theory of proper names is correct (and I don’t doubt that), what we should expect to find is that discussions of the *idiomata* in earlier works (like Basil’s *Contra Eunomium* – probably not later than 364) or in passages primarily about reference (e.g., again, the passages in *Contra Eunomium* DelCogliano focuses on) will tend to focus on the sorts of semantic issues DelCogliano discusses, but that the *idiomata* will start to be put to metaphysical use in later works by Basil (e.g., Epistle 214 above – probably about 375), or in Gregory’s later works where he is defending or explicating Basil’s
views (e.g., *Ad Petrum* – usually dated 370, though Cross argues for 375,\textsuperscript{144} and *Ad Ablabium* – usually dated around 387), and in contexts in which issues of individuation are the primary focus (e.g., parts of *Ad Petrum*, and, as we will see, certainly parts of *Ad Ablabium*).\textsuperscript{145}

Second, we seem to see just what I’ve described. Despite Basil’s emphasis on semantic and epistemological issues in his early arguments against Eunomius (which is the topic under discussion in the passages DelCogliano focuses on), in the later Epistle 214 Basil himself certainly *sounds* as if he employs the *idiomata* in a metaphysical way. They are not merely that by which we are *known* or *recognized* as the individuals we are, nor merely that by which *reference* to us is secured – they are that *by which we are* so-and-so and so-and-so, i.e., it is in virtue of the *idiomata* that we *are* the particular individuals that we are.

Third, these points about the emphasis and focus of Basil don’t seem to me to be similarly true of Gregory (whose relevant works are later as well). DelCogliano himself shies away from attributing his claims about Basil here to Gregory. What’s more, in a footnote, he says:

> G. Christopher Stead . . . makes the comment that Basil (and Gregory of Nyssa) failed to distinguish between “how individuals are recognized and what being an individual involves.” Though this may be the case for Gregory, who is taken to be representative of the “Cappadocian” view on the issue, I see Basil’s remarks concerned solely with the identification, not the definition, of individuals.\textsuperscript{146}

I think DelCogliano makes this qualification for good reason. Gregory seems perfectly comfortable talking about the *idiomata* as “individuating” the hypostases, a claim seen frequently in the *Ad Petrum*. What’s more, as we will soon see (4.4.2, p. 242),

\textsuperscript{144} (Cross 2002), p. 387.

\textsuperscript{145} See below 4.4.2, p. 240 ff. on the individuation of token energeiai.

\textsuperscript{146} (DelCogliano 2010), p. 201, fn. 4. The paper he cites is (G. C. Stead 1981), p. 172.
he deploys the *idiomata* again in the *Ad Ablabium* in reference to the *energeiai* precisely for the purpose of giving them a separate criterion of individuation from the hypostases that perform them, which is critical to articulating his solution to the LPT.

I conclude that it’s not unlikely that Basil himself comes, eventually, to use the *idiomata* for the role of individuating the hypostases, and that even if he didn’t, it still seems that Gregory does, and that this is a fairly natural result of the trajectory along which the views of Basil had been developing anyway.

4.3.6 Do *Idiomata* Really Exist?

Finally, I will say something about a possible objection stemming from Richard Cross’s views on the ontological status of the *idiomata* in Gregory.

Cross holds that Gregory is essentially a nominalist about the *idiomata*. To put his case briefly, in *Contra Eunomium*, Gregory says that the *idiomata* are *epinoiai*, and Cross argues that for Gregory *epinoiai* are mere concepts. Thus, Gregory is a nominalist (conceptualist) about the divine *idiomata*. (Although, as we’ve seen, Cross holds Gregory is a realist about the divine *ousia*).

Cross describes a nominalist view about relations in general by reference to Leftow:

Leftow goes on to make the point that the Latin view involves accepting that the only real constituent of a divine person is the divine essence, though he does so in a way that does not bring out the distinctive claim, made by the Western theologians, that what underlies this is the fact that relations, which somehow explain the distinctions between the persons, are not themselves things with some kind of extramental existence. The point is made explicitly, later, by Aquinas, but something like it can be found in Augustine too – if not so clearly – if we link together various relevant texts.148

147. (Cross 2012).

After a quote from Augustine on the point, he says:

And it turns out that these relations are merely ways in which we can talk about the three persons – and not, I take it, items somehow distinct from the divine essence.\(^{149}\)

Cross goes on to claim that Gregory holds essentially the same view:

I take it that all of this provides us with a strong account of divine simplicity in the context of the Trinity. I shall argue that Gregory explicitly takes exactly this line, at least in *Contra Eunomium* 2, which I take to be a clear exposition of Trinitarian doctrine espoused by Gregory at least in his most refined anti-Eunomian argument (whatever he may be committed to elsewhere).\(^{150}\)

He goes on to contrast his thesis with Radde-Gallwitz’s view that Gregory wants a sort of via media between a nominalist and “hyper-realist” view of relations:

Basically, it seems to me that Gregory explicitly defends what Radde-Gallwitz labels the nominalist account of the *epinoiai*, and hence of divine *propria*. And it should be clear enough from what I have already said that this nominalist account would be a close cousin – perhaps even a sibling or twin – of Augustine’s account of the divine attributes.\(^{151}\)

This might seem problematic, since, in the next chapter, I will put the *idiomata* into Gregory’s ontology (his domain of discourse) as things that can be quantified over, be the subjects of predication, and be put into various relations with other items in Gregory’s ontology. But I will give three considerations as to why this is appropriate.

First, I simply note that the debate about *epinoiai* between Eunomius and Basil, and later between Eunomius and Gregory, is notoriously difficult, and Cross’ view here is by no means uncontroversial. Now, I am extremely optimistic about the

\(^{149}\) (Cross 2012), p. 55.

\(^{150}\) (Cross 2012), p. 56.

\(^{151}\) (Cross 2012), p. 57.
project of finding common ground between the so-called “Eastern” and “Western” fathers. However, I’m quite skeptical in particular about a few key issues, and the semantics of various predications concerning God in different of the church fathers is one of them. However, I do not want to take the time to enter into that debate here, as it takes us too far afield from the LPT itself.

The second, and more important consideration, is that even if it turns out that Cross’s interpretation here is correct, I would argue that it’s still appropriate to translate Gregory’s view into predicate logic in the way that I do.

Consider as an analogy how the Stoics make an essentially Meinongian distinction between things that “exist” (only physical bodies, or “corporeals,” for the Stoics) and just “somethings.” That is, there are things such that they “are something,” but don’t exist (or “subsist,” if one prefers to use that term instead). In particular, the “incorporeals” of place, time, void, and lekta (“things said”), lekta being more or less equivalent to propositions. (They are the meanings of sentences – what are “said,” or asserted, by sentences. Although, on the Stoic view, their truth-values can change over time.)

But consider the Stoic treatment of lekta. The Stoics claim that “there are” lekta. And that there are multiple lekta. And that it is true that lekta are incorporeals. And that they can be possible or impossible, necessary or non-necessary. And that they can be true or false, in virtue of their relations to things that do exist. And that they can bear or fail to bear various logical relations to one another. It seems, then, that lekta are the sort of thing that can be quantified over, that can be individuated, that can have various predicates be true of them, and that can enter into relations with one another and even with things that actually “exist” (or “subsist”).

Thus, it sounds very much as though the Stoic realm of the “something” is just the domain of quantification for the Stoics. And that corporeals and incorporeals simply form two proper subsets of the domain of quantification. Only the corporeal
subset is said to “exist” (or “subsist.”)

So, it seems perfectly appropriate, if one were to reconstruct Stoicism in predicate logic, to include lekta and other non-existent somethings in the domain of discourse over which one would quantify, and to treat them in the same way as any other item in one’s ontology.

After all, the Stoics had not read Quine.\textsuperscript{152} They did not take the rules of the game to be that, “to be is to be the value of a bound variable,” or, to translate it into Stoic terms, “to exist (subsist) just is to be ‘a something’.” Indeed, \textit{that is precisely what they deny.}

Now, whether making this kind of distinction is a sensible thing to do or not is a separate question entirely. Likely, the difficulty in deciding how to recast this kind of view in predicate logic is just a symptom of a deeper problem with trying to deal with any Meinongian view within standard predicate logic. And in my view, that is just a symptom of a deeper problem with trying to deal with any Meinongian view period.

My point is simply that, even if someone wants \textit{in some sense} to be a nominalist about X, or to deny the existence of X, even though they seem to make reference to X in their theory, it isn’t \textit{automatically} clear that it will be illegitimate to put X into their domain of discourse when reconstructing their theory in a formal language. But I am not so much arguing that Quine was wrong, as that it is possible for people to be confused.

Third and finally, although I think the \textit{idiomata} are very much an important contextual element in \textit{coming to understand} Gregory’s view of the metaphysics of the Trinity, they will turn out in the end to be dispensable, at least for our rather limited, formal purposes.\textsuperscript{153} That is, while we need to get a certain amount of clarity

\textsuperscript{152} See “GNT\textsubscript{Lite}” 5.6.1, p. 353 ff. for more.
on how the *idiomata* work so as to understand other aspects of Gregory’s solution to
the LPT, 154 his solution to the strictly formal issue we have in mind can be stated
without reference to them. 155

4.4 The Unity of Action Argument (UAA)

Finally, then, let’s look at the argument Gregory himself actually endorses – the
“Unity of Action Argument” (UAA).

4.4.1 Gregory’s Semantics for “is God”

In this response, St. Gregory follows a very long tradition (as we saw above)
holding that “God” does not signify the divine essence, and that, in fact, there simply
isn’t any word for the divine essence. Rather, he argues, all our words for God
(including the word “God”) signify, not the divine essence, but some action or activity
(*energeia*) engaged in by God (or perhaps the power or *dynamis* to engage in one
of those *energeiai*). So, Gregory actually thinks that, whereas “man” can be defined
in terms of human nature, “God” is defined not in terms of the divine nature, but
as a doer of a certain kind of *energeia*. In other words, “God,” like “shoemaker” or
“rhetorician,” is an agent noun.

He states:

\[ \text{ταύτα} \kappaατά \; \text{τὸν} \; \text{άποδοθέντα} \; ημὲν \; \epsilonπὶ \; \tauῆς \; \text{ἀν-} \; \text{θρωπίνης} \; \phiύσεως \; \lambdaόγον, \; \epsilonν \; \hat{o} \; \muει\text{μαθήκαμεν} \; \muη \; \text{δὲιν} \; \text{πλ-} \; \text{ηθυντικῷ} \; \chiαροκτήθη \; \tauὴν \; \text{προσφ-} \]

154. Specifically, as will become clear below, it sheds some light on the distinction he will make
between the way in which the Trinity share *energeiai* and the way in which creatures could “share” *energeia*.

155. See “GNTLite” 5.6.1, p. 353 ff. for more.

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the name of the nature by the mark of plurality.

We must, however, more carefully examine the name of “Godhead,” in order to obtain, by means of the significance involved in the word, some help towards clearing up the question before us.

The word “Godhead” seems to the many to be given peculiarly according to nature: and just as the heaven, or the sun, or some other of the elements of the cosmos are marked by peculiar words significant of the subjects, so they say also in the case of the supreme and divine nature the word “Godhead” is fitly adapted to that which it represents, as if it were some proper name.

We, on the other hand, following the suggestions of Scripture, have learnt that that nature is unnameable and unspeakable,

and we say that every term either invented by the custom of men, or handed down to us by the Scriptures, is indeed explanatory of our conceptions of the divine nature, but does not include the signification of that nature itself. 157

Gregory argues in detail for the point that “God” cannot name the divine nature.

But naturally this raises the question, what does “God” signify. His answer, a certain kind of energeia. Namely, our good friend “ beholding”:


Since, then, as we perceive the varied energeiai of the power above us, we fashion our appellations from the several energeiai that are known to us, and as we recognize as one of these that energeia of surveying and inspection, or, as one might call it, beholding, whereby He surveys all things and overlooks them all, discerning our thoughts, and even entering by His power of contemplation into those things which are not visible, we suppose that Godhead (θεότης) is so called from θέα, or beholding, and that He who is our θεατής or beholder, by customary use and by the instruction of the Scriptures, is called θεός, or God.

Now if any one admits that to behold and to discern are the same thing, and that the God Who superintends all things, both is and is called the superintender of the universe, let him consider this energeia, and judge whether it belongs to one of the Persons whom we believe in the Holy Trinity, or whether the power extends throughout the Three Persons.

For if our interpretation of the term Godhead (θεότης) is a true one, and the things which are seen are said to be beheld (θεατά), and that which beholds them is called θεός or God, no one of the Persons in the Trinity could reasonably be excluded from such an appellation on the ground of the
sense involved in the word.

For Scripture attributes the act of seeing equally to Father, Son, and Holy Spirit.

David says, “Behold, O God our defender”:

and from this we learn that sight is a proper energeia of the idea of God, so far as God is conceived, since he says, “Behold, O God.”

But Jesus also beholds the thoughts of those who condemn Him, and questions why by His own power He pardons the sins of men?

for it says, “Jesus, beholding their thoughts.”

And of the Holy Spirit also, Peter says to Ananias, “Why hath Satan filled thine heart, to lie to the Holy Spirit?” showing that the Holy Spirit was a true witness, aware of what Ananias had dared to do in secret, and by Whom the manifestation of the secret was made to Peter.

For Ananias became a thief of his own goods, secretly, as he thought, from all men, and concealing his sin:

but the Holy Spirit at the same moment was in Peter, and detected his intent, dragged down as it was to avarice, and gave to Peter from Himself the power of seeing the secret, while it is clear that He could not have done this had He not been able to behold hid-
Thus, on Gregory’s actual view, “God” is not a kind-term like “man” or “horse,” but an agent noun like “philosopher” or “rhetorician.” (Specifically, in Gregory’s view, to be a god is to have the power to “behold” hidden things.) But now the question is whether a response to the anti-Trinitarian argument here along the same lines as the UNA would still work, given Gregory’s actual view about the semantics of “is God.”

Gregory admits that it would not. He writes:

But some one will say that the proof of our argument does not yet regard the question.

For if the name of “Godhead” were granted to be common of the nature, it would be established that we should not speak of “Gods”:

but by these arguments [these now being given, in the UAA], on the contrary, we are compelled to speak of “Gods”.¹⁶⁰

for we find in the custom of mankind that not only those who are partakers in the same nature, but even any who may be of the same business, are not, when they are many, spoken of in the singular; as we speak of “many orators,” or “surveyors,” or “farmers,” or “shoemakers,” and so in all other cases.

If, indeed, Godhead were an appellation of nature, it would be more proper, accord-

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¹⁵⁹. (St. Gregory of Nyssa 1893), p. 333, adapted.
Gregory is here rehearsing what an opponent would say. Namely, that it would
have been better for him to stop at the UNA, since there he had an answer to why we put “God” in the singular. But now that he has claimed “God” is not really a kind-term at all, but an agent noun, it follows that the points made in the UNA regarding collective nouns no longer apply, since they presupposed that “God” was a kind-term. And once more, common usage is to put agent nouns in the plural when there is more than one hypostasis engaged in the same kind of activity.

4.4.2 Gregory’s Metaphysics of Energeia

Gregory now explicitly admits that the semantic points about collective nouns made in the UNA (4.2.2, p. 171 ff.) no longer apply, given his actual view about the semantics of “is God,” precisely because the metaphysical point about natures being indivisible monads above, does not have any parallel in the case of energeiai. That is, there is no simple, monadic universal uniting particular energeiai “of the same name.” Rather, it would appear that, for Gregory, energeiai just form something like the Neo-Platonic collective universals he has denied in the case of hypostases and ousiai after all. He re-introduces the technical term “divided” here, saying that the energeiai of men are in fact “divided” (Διαχωρισμένη) into particular energeiai after all. Thus it follows that, although it is not strictly speaking true to say there are “many men,” he admits that it is strictly speaking true that there are “many philosophers,” or “many rhetoricians,” etc.:
the plural, but that the divine is stated in the singular as one God and one God-
hood, even if the three hypostases should not be distinguished by the significance
manifest in the divinity, because men, even if several are of one energeia, each by him-
self exclusively energizes what lies before him, since he shares nothing in the particular en-
ergeia with those pursuing an equivalent [energeia].

Indeed, if the orators should be several, while the pursuit, being one, *has the same name among the several*, those who pursue it each by himself *energize individually*, since the one speaks powerfully and the other simply.

So, among men, since the *energeia* of each in the same occupations is divided (*diakrisi*
the idiotropon of the *energeia*).

Thus, Gregory draws a distinction between *particular, individual energeiai*, and
"the one energeia" which they constitute as a Neo-Platonic collective universal. Gre-
gory himself doesn’t seem to have any very good vocabulary to make this distinction
succinctly, or if he does he doesn’t use it, and isn’t always explicit as to when he is
talking about the one or the other. So I will introduce the words “type” and “token,”

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163. ([St. Gregory of Nyssa 1958], p. 47).

164. Adapted from ([St. Gregory of Nyssa 2008a], pp. 8-9).
to mark this distinction, with the caveat that I mean to use these terms only as a convenient way to mark the distinction Gregory wants to make here, and not to import any connotations extraneous to his thought. With that said, a few things should be fairly clear.

First, the token \(\chiαδ'\ ξωρτόν\) \textit{energeiai} of different rhetoricians are distinct and \textit{not shared} by the different rhetoricians.

Second, the rhetoricians are still said to be “of one \textit{energeia}” (despite having \textit{multiple} token \textit{energeiai}) because the token \textit{energeiai} are all “equivalent” (ἴσος). That is, since the “one \textit{energeia}” (or \textit{energeia} type as I am calling it) is “divisible” into the token \textit{energeiai}, it seems to be simply a collection of token \textit{energeiai} that form some sort of equivalence class, i.e., a Neo-Platonic collective universal.

But third, and most crucially, the token \textit{energeiai} of distinct rhetoricians seem to be individuated, \textit{not} by their relations to the individual rhetoricians that perform them, but \textit{by their own idiomata} (here ἰδιότροπον). – \textit{This in fact is the critical aspect of Gregory’s solution to the LPT}. – What individuates the token \textit{energeiai} in Gregory’s example is \textit{not} simply that they belong to distinct hypostases. Rather, he constructs his example so that what individuate the token acts of orating are \textit{qualities intrinsic to the particular acts themselves} (namely, that they exhibit \textit{different rhetorical styles}).\textsuperscript{165,166}

The picture that emerges, then, looks roughly like a Davidsonian view of events (actions) and their individuation.\textsuperscript{167} These \textit{energeiai} are particular, individual events,

\textsuperscript{165} The so-called “powerful” versus “simple,” rhetorical styles – see (St. Gregory of Nyssa 2008a), p. 9, footnotes 35 and 36, in which he references Demetrius’ \textit{De Elocutione} 240, on the “powerful” style.

\textsuperscript{166} This is not to say that token \textit{energeiai} can \textit{only} be individuated by intrinsic qualities, instead of relations (like spatio-temporal relations). Only that they \textit{can} be individuated by intrinsic features, and are \textit{not} individuated merely by being performed by distinct hypostases.

\textsuperscript{167} For Davidson’s views on the individuation of actions and events, see (Davidson 1963), (Davidson 1966), (Davidson 1969b), and (Davidson 1970) all reprinted in (Davidson 2001), as well as (Davidson 1969a).
with their own criterion or criteria for individuation. The rhetoricians have their own
idiomata, and the acts of orating have their own idiomata. But of course, in the case
of the three rhetoricians, despite the hypostases and their (token) energeiai being
individuated by different factors, they will all ultimately be individuated.

This is why the semantics of collective nouns no longer applies, and the previous
problem comes back again. If, unlike natures, energeiai (types) are “divided” into
their particulars (token energeiai), and the energeia “has the same name among the
several” (the token energeiai have the same name as each other and as the collective,
or energeia type, they compose) then not only is it the case that the token energeiai in
fact form precisely the kind of discontinuous whole that is a Neo-Platonic universal –
they also form precisely the kind of collection that, given the semantic view sketched
above,\(^{168}\) is not named with a (singular) collective noun, but is named in the plural
after all. We can see, then, that this is not some sort of additional point added
onto the UNA, as though it were still strictly speaking false to say there are “many
rhetoricians,” but somehow a legitimate misuse of language. Rather, this is an entirely
separate argument from the UNA (and incompatible with it), on which it now is
strictly speaking true after all that there are three rhetoricians.

So, if this is the case, if it is strictly speaking true that there are three rhetoricians
in Gregory’s analogy, why is it not strictly speaking true to say that there are three
gods?

4.4.3 Gregory’s Theology of Synergy

Gregory’s answer is that, unlike the case with men, the energeiai of the Trinity
are not divided. This does not mean that, somehow, necessary metaphysical truths
simply work differently for the Trinity, so that when we are talking about God we
will have a theory of energeiai types (universals) as indivisible monads, but when

\(^{168}\) 4.2.2, p. 171 ff.
talking about men we will switch over to a collective theory of *energeia* types. Nor does it mean that theological language is somehow different, so that when we speak about God our words follow a different set of rules. It is rather that in the case of men there are factors which actually do individuate the token actions, but in the case of the Trinity, while the hypostases are individuated by the *idiomata* of paternity, filiation and spiration, there simply are *no idiomata* that could individuate their token *energeiai*.

But in the case of the divine nature we did not learn thus that the Father does something by himself, that the Son does not engage in with him, or again that the Son energizes something separate from the Spirit, but every *energeia* that has extended from God to the creation and is named according to various conceptions, emerges from Father, proceeds through the Son and is perfected by the Holy Spirit.

Because of this, the noun for the *energeia* is not divided into the plurality of *energizers*, because the effort concerning anything is not separated by each one and individuated.

But whatever comes to be, whether of the things that first occur in forethought for us or for the management and support of the totality, comes to be through the three, but surely it is not three [things] that come to be.\(^ {170}\)


170. Adapted from (St. Gregory of Nyssa 2008a), p. 9.
Gregory gives the example of the life that has been given to each of us by the Trinity. I have been given life by the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit. But I have not been given three numerically distinct lives. (Nor, presumably, would Gregory want to say that only a “part” of my life has been given by the Father, a part by the Son and a part by the Holy Spirit.) Gregory takes this to show that there is, then, only one token act of life-giving, and it is the same token act of life-giving that is performed by all three hypostases simultaneously. (If there had been three distinct token acts of life-giving, all of which were completed, and if these were not merely the givings of parts of a life, then it would seem to follow that I should end up with three whole, distinct, token lives, which is unfortunately not the case. Thus, on Gregory’s view, we can only make sense of attributing a token act or activity of life-giving to all three hypostases by saying it is the same token life-giving that is performed by all three hypostases.)

I will call the phenomenon of multiple distinct hypostases performing numerically one token energeia “synergy” and say that when two distinct hypostases x and y perform a single token energeia e, they “synergize on” the token energeia e, and when e is of type e*, that x and y “synergize on” energeia type e*. Later on, Gregory gives another example, the energeia of salvation, to stave off objections to the possibility of synergy:

Kaï ὠσπερ εἰς ὁ πατὴρ σωτὴρ πάντων ἀνθρώπων μάλιστα πιστῶν ὑπὸ τοῦ ἀποστόλου ὄνομαστα καὶ οὐδὲς ἐκ τῆς φωνῆς τούτης ἢ τὸν υἱὸν λέγει μὴ σῴζειν τοὺς πιστεύοντας ἢ δίχα τοῦ πνεύματος τὴν σωτηρίαν τοὺς μετέχοις γίνεσθαι, ἀλλὰ γίνε- ται πάντων σωτὴρ οὗ ἐπὶ πάν- των θεὸς ἐνεργοῦντος τοῦ υἱοῦ τὴν σωτηρίαν ἐν τῇ τοῦ πνεύ- ματος χάριτι καὶ οὐδὲν μᾶλ-

Just as the one Father has been named “Savior of all men, and especially of those who believe” by the apostle [1 Tim. 4:10], and no one says, based on this statement, either that the Son does not save the faithful or that salvation belongs to the participants apart from the Spirit, but the God over all [=the Father] becomes the savior of all because the Son ener-
Here Gregory is giving a biblical argument to stave off objections to his metaphysics of synergy (i.e., the possibility of synergy). For although it does not logically follow from Gregory’s metaphysics of action individuation that token *energeiai* must be individuated by, or along with, the hypostases that perform them, someone might simply want to assume that they would, as an independently plausible metaphysical principle. But since Gregory’s audience, at this point, is other orthodox Christian, he points out that such an exclusionary principle would rule out synergistic attributions that are apparently committed to by the Bible.  

For example, that the Father, Son and Holy Spirit all engage in the *energeia* of salvation. The assumption that:

> for any hypostases, x and y, if x ≠ y, and if x does token *energeia* e of type e*, then y does not do e

would entail that, if the Father saves me, either the Son and the Holy Spirit do not save me *at all*, or that, if either of them do, then I am being saved multiple times in multiple token acts of salvation – neither of which seems consistent with what the Bible says or how the Bible says it.

Finally, Gregory generalizes from the example of life-giving, and claims that the hypostases of the Trinity synergize on *every* token *energeia* they perform. (I will call this “The Universal Synergy Claim” or “US.”)


172. Adapted from (St. Gregory of Nyssa 2008a), p. 12.

173. See 6.4, p. 407 ff. below for other cases in which *synergy* may be useful for understanding similar claims made in the Bible.
Since then the Holy Trinity fulfills *every energeia* in a manner similar to that of which I have spoken, not energizing dividedly, according to the number of the hypostases, but a single motion and disposition of the good will comes to be, communicated from the Father, through the Son, to the Spirit, for as we do not call “three givers of life” those who energize a single life, neither do we call “three good ones” those contemplated in the same goodness, nor do we express any of the others plurally, so neither can we call “three” those conjointly and inseparably energizing the same divine and superintending power and *energeia* to us and to all of creation. . .

And again just a bit later:

For He says, “If I by the Spirit of God cast out devils”; where He includes every form of doing good in a partial description, by reason of the unity of *energeia*: for the name derived from the *energeia* cannot be divided among many where [only] one thing is energized mutually.
Gregory concludes this part of *Ad Ablabium* with a longer argument and additional considerations to the effect that the hypostases synergize on every token *energeia* they perform. This is the heart of the UAA, and is the only response to the LPT that Gregory indicates he actually accepts. There is one God because there is only one token power and there is only one token action (*energeia*) shared among the Triad.

What emerges, then, from a close reading of the *Ad Ablabium*, is that Gregory takes the metaphysical position that it is possible for one and the same token *energeia* to be performed or engaged in by more than one hypostasis. This is what I have called his “metaphysics of synergy,” and is the under-appreciated key to his solution to the LPT. It might be thought a peculiar metaphysics, but it is neither unintelligible, nor obviously false, nor – certainly – is it simply *formally* contradictory.178

4.4.4 The Individuation of *Ousiai*

I think the above evidence from within the *Ad Ablabium* makes it clear enough that Gregory does in fact distinguish between *energeia* types and tokens. But we can also see the need for Gregory to make such a distinction between *energeia* types and *energeia* tokens when we note Gregory’s view that *ousiai* are individuated by *energeiai*.

This claim should hardly be controversial to anyone familiar with the Cappadocians. The closely related point that *ousiai* are individuated by *dynameis* (powers) has been examined in great detail by Michel Rene Barnes,179 noting the origins of the thesis in pre-Socratic medical authors, the influence of those writings on Plato, and the trajectory of the view up into the pro-Nicene consensus and its use by Gregory of Nyssa in his debates with the Eunomians. And insofar as there would seem to be a one-to-one correspondence between *dynameis* and *energeiai*, it should be obvious

178. I explore the plausibility just a bit more in Chapter 6.3, p. 391, and 6.4, p. 407.
179. (Barnes 2001).
enough that Gregory would also accept the thesis that *ousiai* are individuated by *energeiai*. However, I’ll quote a few important texts in which we can see Gregory himself present the view that *energeiai* individuate *ousiai*, as well as the further premise I will call “The Cappadocian Assertion,” (or “CA”) which says that the hypostases of the Trinity engage in all the same *energeiai*. Together, these claims constitute probably Gregory’s most powerful argument for the *homoousion*, and so are central to his triadology. As we will see, the Cappadocian Assertion cannot be understood as saying the same thing as the Universal Synergy Claim. And this is further evidence that Gregory distinguishes between two different concepts of “*energeia*” (although he does not always mark when he is speaking of one or the other). But first, what Gregory says about the individuation of *ousiai*. We’ll start with *Ad Xenodorum*, then look at *Ad Eustathium* again.

4.4.4.1 The Individuation of *Ousiai* in *Ad Xenodorum*

Only a small fragment remains from Gregory’s epistle to Xenodorus, a fragment preserved by St. Maximus the Confessor in a florilegium from Gregory about the concept of *energeiai*.

> Ένεργειαν γάρ ἡμεῖς εἶναι φομεν τὴν φυσικὴν ἐκάστης οὐσίας δύναμιν τε καὶ καίνησιν, ἢς χωρίς οὔτε ἐστὶν οὔτε γινώσκεται φύσις.

For we say that *energeia* is the natural (φυσικὸς) power (*dynamis*) and movement of each *ousia* without which a nature (φύσις) neither exists nor is known.

> νοερῶν γάρ ἐστὶ νόησις, αἰσθητικῶν ἀισθήσεις (καθ’ ἴνα ἀνταλλαγμένα των ἐκτὸς ἐφάπτονται

For intelligence is [the *energeia*] of intellectual beings, sensation of sensate beings —

180. See (St. Gregory of Nyssa 2007), pp. 245-246.
by which the same lay hold of things outside them and are subject to things outside them—flight of that which flies, swimming of that which swims, crawling of that which crawls, walking of that which walks, sprouting of that which sprouts.

To speak comprehensively, the idioma significant (σημαντικῶν) of each nature we call its natural energeia; of which only that which does not exist is deprived.

For that which participates in a certain ousia will also participate naturally and completely in the power (dynamis) manifesting it. For the true Logos presides over the natural limits of ousia.\textsuperscript{182}

First, we can already see here that Gregory takes energeia to individuate ousiai (although that will be even more clear in Ad Eustathium). He says, “that which shares in any ousia, will also share . . . in the power that manifests it.

We can also see that energeiai are that by which an ousia “is known,” but that Gregory then goes on to describe the natural energeia as the idioma of the nature. And I have argued that idioma for Gregory means something which individuates. Thus, there is a certain parallel here to Sydney Shoemaker’s “Causal Theory of Properties,” moving from the epistemological and semantic claims that dynameis (powers) and energeiai (activities) are that by which a nature “is known” to the metaphysical claim that they are that by which a nature is individuated.\textsuperscript{183}


\textsuperscript{182} Translation from (St. Gregory of Nyssa 2007), pp. 246-247. Adapted.

\textsuperscript{183} Although of course not just any property counts as an ousia. Still, Shoemaker’s view (or
Finally, we also see here the view that no *ousia* can exist without some natural *energeia*. *Energeia* is something “without which a nature neither exists nor is known,” and “only that which does not exist is deprived” of natural *energeia*.

### 4.4.4.2 The Individuation of *Ousia* in *Ad Eustathium*

*Ad Eustathium* contains further elaboration on the role of *energeia* as individuating *ousia*. Gregory writes:

> Άλλα λέγουσι φύσεως ἐν- δεικτικὴν εἶναι τὴν προσηγορίαν ταύτην, ἡκοινώνητον δὲ εἶναι πρὸς Πατέρα καὶ Υἱὸν τὴν τοῦ Πνεύματος φύσιν, καὶ διὰ τούτου μηδὲ τῆς κατὰ τὸ ὄνομα τούτου κοινωνίας μετέχειν.

> Οὐχοῦν δειξάτωσαν διὰ τῶν το τῆς φύσεως παραλλαγμένον ἐπέγνωσαν.

> Εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἢν δυνατὸν αὐτὴν ἐφ’ ἑαυτῇ τὴν θείαν φύσιν διεργαθῆναι καὶ τὸ τε οἰκείος ἔχον καὶ τῷ ἄλλοτει διὰ τῶν φαινομένων εὐρεῖν, οὐκ ἂν πάντως ἐδείχθην ιόγον ή τεκμηρίων ἐτέρων πρὸς τὴν τοῦ ζητουμένου κατάληψιν.

> Επεί δὲ ἢ μὲν ψηλοτέρα τῆς τῶν ζητομένων ἐστὶ κατανοήσεως, ἐκ δὲ τεκμηρίων τινὸς περὶ τῶν διαφευγόντων τὴν γνώσιν ἡμῶν λογιζόμεθα, ἀνάγχης πάσα διὰ something like it) would seem to entail Gregory’s view here (or something like it). For details of Shoemaker’s view, see esp. (SHOEMAKER 1980a), and also (SHOEMAKER 1979), (SHOEMAKER 1980b), (SHOEMAKER 1984), (SHOEMAKER 1998), (SHOEMAKER 2003), and (SHOEMAKER 2011).
Our knowledge, it is absolutely necessary for us to be guided to the investigation of the Divine nature by its energeiai.

If, then, we see that the energeiai which are wrought by the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit differ one from the other, we shall conjecture from the different character of the energeiai that the natures which energize are also different.

For it cannot be that things which differ in their very nature should agree in the form (εἴδος) of their energeiai: fire does not chill, nor ice give warmth, but their energeiai are distinguished together with the difference between their natures.

If, on the other hand, we understand that the energeia of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit is one, differing or varying in nothing, the one-ness of their nature must needs be inferred from the identity of their energeiai.185

Here Gregory makes it quite clear that natures are individuated by energeiai. In the next quote from Ad Eustathium, Gregory makes the claim that the hypostases all engage in the same energeiai, i.e., what I call “the Cappadocian Assertion.” From the Cappadocian Assertion and the criteria of individuation for natures, it follows, Gregory argues, that the persons of the Trinity have a single ousia.

185. (St. Gregory of Nyssa 1893), p. 328, adapted.
The Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit alike give sanctification, and life, and light, and comfort, and all similar graces.

And let no one attribute the *energeia* of sanctification in a special sense to the Spirit, when he hears the Saviour in the Gospel saying to the Father concerning His disciples, Father, sanctify them in Your name.

So too all the other gifts are *energized* in those who are worthy alike by the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit:

Thus the identity of *energeia* in Father, Son, and Holy Spirit shows plainly the undistinguishable character of their nature.

So that *even if* the name of Godhead does indicate nature, the community of *ousia* shows that this appellation is properly applied also to the Holy Spirit.187

I will let this quote suffice to show that Gregory holds the view that the hypostases have all the same *energeiai*. It is well known, and not controversial, that he did. We see here the same point as before, that Gregory does not accept the view that “God” expresses a nature. But now we can see how he argues that, *even if it did*, the Holy Spirit *would still* properly be called “God” anyway, since the identity of *energeia* between the Father, Son and Spirit entails the identity of their nature. (Although

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as we’ve seen, Gregory’s own view is that the Holy Spirit is properly called “God” because He participates in the appropriate energieia.)

Now I’ve said that the Cappadocian Assertion and the Universal Synergy Claim must be understood as two distinct claims. Of course, Gregory takes it to be the case that the hypostases of the Trinity not only engage in the same types of energieiai, but all the same tokens as well. Now if we grant that, then it won’t make any difference to Gregory’s argument in the case of the Trinity whether he takes ousiai to be individuated by token energieia or energieiai types. However, since as we saw above, Gregory claims that all the token energieiai of men are distinct, if Gregory took ousiai to be individuated by energieia tokens, it would lead to the conclusion that human beings don’t (indeed couldn’t) have the same ousia after all – whereas Gregory clearly thinks they do.\textsuperscript{188}

The obvious solution here, of course, is that when Gregory speak of natures being individuated by energieiai, he means that it is the energieia type, or as he sometimes puts it, the “form” (eidos) of energieiai that individuates ousiai.\textsuperscript{189}

\begin{quote}
Οὐδὲ γάρ ἐνδέχεται τὰ δι- 
εστῶτα κατὰ τὸν τῆς φύσεως 
λόγον πρὸς τὸ τῶν ἐνεργειῶν 
eidos ἄλληλοις συνενεχθῆναι:\textsuperscript{190}
\end{quote}

For it cannot be that things which differ in their very nature should agree in the form (eidos) of their energieiai;\textsuperscript{191}

Given that we have to understand his claim about the individuation of ousiai in

\textsuperscript{188} Of course, it would be hard to overstate the absurdity of the idea that natures would somehow be individuated by token actions, or even to catalogue all the ways in which it would lead to absurdity.

\textsuperscript{189} Radde-Gallwitz touches on the same distinction I am making in (RADDE-GALLWITZ 2009), p. 133, in noting the distinction between “peculiar features that distinguish individual members of a common species individuate” and “features peculiar to a common nature that distinguish that nature or shared substance from others.” What I am pointing out is that the latter, at least in \textit{Ad Xenodorum just are energieiai} (types), but that the former are had, not only by hypostases, but by energieiai (tokens).

\textsuperscript{190} (ST. GREGORY OF NYSSA 1958), p. 11.

\textsuperscript{191} (ST. GREGORY OF NYSSA 1893), p. 328.
terms of *energeia types*, instead of tokens, it’s best to understand the Cappadocian Assertion as the weaker claim that the hypostases of the Trinity merely engage in (some or another tokens of) all the same *energeia types*, rather than the stronger claim that they engage in all the same *energeia tokens* (i.e., the Universal Synergy Claim). The weaker claim (CA, as I read it), together with his view on the individuation of *ousiai*, is sufficient to get him the *homoousion*. US of course entails CA, but US would be a much more controversial assumption than CA. On the other hand, while CA does not entail US, what would entail US would be the conjunction of CA, plus Gregory’s views about the individuation of *energeia tokens*, plus the assumption that no *idiomata* individuate the token *energeiai* of the hypostases of the Trinity.

4.4.5 Conclusion

To round out our discussion of *Ad Ablabium*, Gregory concludes by considering two possible objections – first to the UAA, then to the UNA. First, he considers an objection to the controversial *semantic* presupposition of the UAA – that “God” signifies an *energeia*. We already discussed this above and saw that he ultimately will fall back on the UNA as a back-up argument. Second, he considers an objection to the controversial *metaphysical* presupposition of the UNA – that universals are indivisible monads. The objection here is that, if true, it would seem to entail that all the hypostases of a given nature would be identical. Gregory reiterates that hypostases are individuated by their *idiomata*.

Interestingly, as I see it, Gregory’s actual view (the UAA) is much more plausible than his supposedly more defensible argument constructed for the benefit of interlocutors who deny his semantics of “is God” (the UNA). Although I think that when we place Gregory in the framework of the common philosophical viewpoints of the time, we can see that his argument that there is “strictly speaking only one man” is not nearly so bizarre as it might initially strike us today.
Nevertheless, it is one thing to say that Gregory’s response was plausible *for the time*; it is another thing to say that it is useful for us *today*. Most of us would not accept the semantics of counting in which we number the X’s by the number of parts of the whole they compose, when the whole and all of the parts have a common predicate. One might have thought the UNA would be amenable to Social Trinitarianism, but I think that would be a mistake on multiple levels. First, at the level of semantics, the peculiar semantic / syntactic disconnect of collective nouns only comes into play, it would seem, when we have a whole that is *not* called by the same name as its parts, whereas any account within the Equivocation Family will work by saying just the opposite. Second, at the level of metaphysics, Gregory, like Basil before him, wants to say that God is *not* just the *collection* of Father, Son and Holy Spirit, which is at least roughly what Social Trinitarian accounts do in fact say. And so it would seem that, on closer examination, there are few or no resources in the UNA, or indeed in Gregory’s Trinitarian theology generally, for Social Trinitarians to take advantage of. Indeed, there is probably not much to be salvaged from the UNA for *anyone* today, relying as it does on a semantics for counting that nobody today would accept.

On the other hand, a nice feature of the UAA is precisely the fact that, on this response, there *is* a significant metaphysical difference between the hypostases of the Trinity and three rhetoricians. And this opens up the possibility of incorporating the metaphysics and theology of the UAA into some kind of semantics of counting that might be more acceptable as well.

That is, although Gregory still couches his discussion in terms of a semantics that seems to center on counting parts of a whole, it would be easy enough to transpose his Trinitarian account into a semantics for counting that is more amenable to us today. Gregory’s fundamental idea here seems to be just that E-ers are to be numbered by counting *token actions* of the same (E-ish) form, performed by some individual(s), as
opposed to counting "individuals" performing token actions of the same (E-ish) form. Thus, in the case of, say, Peter, James and John orating, they would be counted as three rhetoricians – *not because* they are three individuals, each such that he performs some token act of the orating type, but rather because there are three numerically distinct *token acts of orating*, each being performed by some individual.

We will go into more detail on how to represent the view formally in Chapter 5, and we will explore possible criticisms of this idea more in Chapter 6. But for now, here are a few considerations.

First, here is an argument in favor of Gregory’s view. Let’s switch from orating to an *energeia* that has a tangible result – shoemaking. Now suppose we say that three shoemakers all do that which only a shoemaker can do. Suppose all three shoemakers *perfect*, or bring to a completion, their doing of their act. We would expect there to be three shoes as a result. On Gregory’s view (the view that “three shoemakers” means *three token acts of shoemaking* being done) this is, necessarily, the case, while on the competing view (that “three shoemakers” means only three individuals doing some or another act of shoemaking), it is not. (This ties into the fact, discussed just below, that speaking of “three gods” would be misleading, even if technically true.)

On the other hand, here is an argument against Gregory’s view: Suppose I am typing up one book with my left hand and typing up another book with my right hand. Given Gregory’s view, it would seem that, not only am I an author – I am *two* authors. (Which seems false.)

But here is a response Gregory could give to the above that would salvage his response to the LPT without, I think, doing any violence to the spirit of his triadology: Perhaps we count E-ers *both* by the number of token E-ings *and* by the number of hypostases E-ing. That is, if one hypostasis does one E-ing, we count one E-er, and if one hypostasis does two E-ings, we also count one E-er (so I am only one author in the above example); *only if* two hypostases do two E-ings do we count two E-ers (and
any time there are two created hypostases doing any E-ings, there will automatically be at least two E-ings, because the same spatio-temporal relations that individuate the hypostases will also happen to individuate all of their actions). That is, as we normally speak, both the hypostases and their E-ings must be individuated for us to move the count up another number. But it is only in the case of the Trinity that we find more than one hypostasis doing a single E-ing, and in such a case, we ought to count only one E-er, since it is not the case that both the hypostases and the energieiai are distinct.

Finally, if any and all considerations in favor of Gregory’s counting principle seem ultimately unpersuasive, so long as there are no decisive considerations against it, one could simply argue that, since our ordinary linguistic practices are suited to mundane scenarios, that is, to counting creatures and creaturely phenomena, and since (one can argue) in the case of created hypostases and their actions, the actions and the hypostases are always individuated together (since both the hypostases and their token energieiai will always be individuated by the same spatio-temporal relations), there’s no reason to suspect that our ordinary linguistic practices would determine an answer as to whether we should describe the Trinity as one creator or three creators, one Lord or three Lords, and so on for any other agent noun we use – including, on Gregory’s view, “God.” That is, there may simply be no fact of the matter as to whether the Trinity count as one God or three. Not in the sense that there are no extra-mental facts as to what things exist and how they are individuated and so forth, but in the sense that our ordinary counting practices simply don’t determine any particular answer to certain questions. (As an analogy, there is no answer to the question what some number divided by zero is – not because of some metaphysical fact that reality itself is somehow indeterminate in certain scenarios, but because of the semantic fact that we have only a partial definition for the division function.)

Now suppose even that consideration is found wanting. Suppose that we even find
conclusive reasons to reject Gregory’s semantics here and to accept some semantics on which there are strictly speaking three Gods. I think Gregory could admit (though of course he doesn’t, and wouldn’t want to, but he could admit) that it is strictly speaking true to say there are “three Gods” but could still very easily argue that, even if so the truth in this case would be more misleading than the alleged falsehood of saying there is “one God.” Consider the following analogy.

Gregory would likely not accept the view that distinct men could be co-located. They would have to be spatially separated, and thus their actions would have to be spatially separated as well. But suppose per impossibile that three men were co-located. Suppose further, though, that there is nothing to individuate their (also co-located) actions, so that they and their actions would indeed be perfectly analogous to the Trinity and the Trinity’s actions on Gregory’s view. Let’s suppose these men are painters, that I am a general contractor whom they work for, and that you are in need of “three painters.” You want to hire a team of three painters, because you have three different areas in your house that need painted, each one of which will take about 8 man-hours of work (all day), and you will have to remove a lot of furniture in order to have them painted, then move the furniture back after the painting is done. You don’t want to be inconvenienced three days in a row, and anyway you only have (two day) weekends during which to move furniture in and out of the rooms. You explain the situation to me and say you therefore want to move all of the furniture out the night before, have “three painters” come in the next morning, and get all of the painting done in a single day, so that you can move the furniture back in that night and be done with the project in a day. I tell you – quite truthfully, mind you – that I have exactly “three painters” I can send out, and that we charge $50 per man-hour of work, a man-hour being, of course, determined by the number of men (which is to say, the number of painters) painting and the number of hours each painter (viz. man) works. You calculate that, since the job should require about 24
man-hours of work, you will be charged about $1,200 – just about what you have budgeted. So you agree to the deal, whereupon, instead of sending an ordinary team of three painters, I send out my Trinitarian team of “three” (co-located) painters.

Of course, your plans are now ruined. The whole point of hiring “three painters” was to be able to squeeze 24 man-hours of work into an 8-hour day. And this can only be accomplished when the “three” painters are engaged, at any given time, in three distinct token acts of painting (individuated by the fact that they are going on in different, spatially separated areas of the house simultaneously). My Trinitarian painting crew, however, being co-located, can only be engaged in a single token act of painting at any given time. Thus, instead of being done with the project in a single 8-hour day, they have to return over the course of three days after all – precisely the scenario you had specifically explained you wanted to avoid.

But what’s worse, after coming to terms with being inconvenienced in this way, you receive your bill. I have charged you, not $1,200, but $3,600 – three times what you had budgeted for! Irate, you call to complain about the bill, whereupon I calmly explain to you that you agreed to pay $50 per man-hour of work. I then go through the math with you, explaining that there were, after all, three men, and thus three painters, each one of which really did engage in a total of 24 hours of work. And 3 men (3 painters), times 24 hours, times $50 = $3,600. I say that, of course, I realize the situation is highly unusual, but I really did do my best to represent to you only that which is true in the most strict and literal sense possible, and that, on my view of things, there were, strictly speaking, three painters, and they did all work for 24 hours, and you are, after all, a man of your word, aren’t you?

Now suppose we grant, for the sake of argument, that in the above scenario it really is, strictly and literally, true that there were three painters. Even if true, is it not nevertheless misleading (if not downright deceptive) for me to describe them to you as such? One normally assumes that distinct E-ers can engage in distinct acts of
E-ing. But Trinitarian-ly distinct E-ers cannot. And for certain purposes, that fact matters very much. So, unless one can explain the metaphysics of synergy to one’s audience, it seems entirely misleading to refer to three hypostases that synergize on an act of E-ing as “three E-ers.”

Now if one has a Trinitarian painting crew, and one is asked “how many painters” one can send, and if one does not have the time to explain the metaphysics of synergy first, or if one is speaking to someone who is not well-educated enough, or simply not smart enough, to understand the metaphysics of synergy at all (the “simple-minded”), then one’s options are simply to say “one painter” or “three painters.” Gregory clearly thinks that, strictly speaking, it really is the case that there is only one painter here. But even if he is wrong about that, it clearly is more misleading to say that there are three painters and less misleading to say there is only one painter.

And surely Gregory would claim that it would be just as misleading – if not far more so! – to say that there were three Gods. This would imply, for example, at least the conceivability of their disagreeing or using their powers (plural) in conflicting ways, something that is inconceivable on Gregory’s view.¹⁹²

So, although Gregory couches his discussion in terms of a semantics that seems to center on counting parts of a whole, it’s easy enough to see what Gregory’s metaphysical and theological commitments entail when we substitute a semantics of counting that is more amenable to us, but that retains the fundamental idea that E-ers are to be numbered according to token E-ings being engaged in by some hypostasis, rather than according to hypostases engaged in some token E-ing (or that E-ers are to be numbered according to the number of distinct pairs of hypostasis-plus-token-

¹⁹² Swinburne’s account of the Trinity, therefore, is very close here (See (SWINBURNE 1994), pp. 170-191), but he fails to appreciate that the hypostases are not only cooperating – performing the same types of actions for the same purposes and so on – but synergizing – literally performing the same token actions. Even though on Swinburne’s view it is not possible for the hypostases to fail to co-operate, there is still on Swinburne’s account a certain kind of sense to be made out of the idea of them not co-operating that isn’t there on Gregory’s view.
energeia). And this is precisely what we will do in the next chapter.

With the gist of Gregory’s Trinitarian theory in place, we can now construct a Nyssen Trinitarian account, and a corresponding solution to the LPT, in a more formal and organized way, allowing us to answer the questions ... Is Gregory of Nyssa’s account of the Trinity consistent or inconsistent? Does it provide us with a solution to the LPT, or a non-solution to the LPT?
PART IV

LOGIC
“... and to those who say that the church fathers did not define all things clearly, but that they left the greater part mysterious, unclear, and untaught ... ANATHEMA.”

– The Synodicon On the Holy Spirit

We ended the previous chapter with the question, “Is Gregory of Nyssa’s account of the Trinity consistent or inconsistent? Does it provide us with a solution to the LPT, or a non-solution to the LPT?” Now, having gotten the idea of the content of the relevant elements of Gregory’s account of the Trinity in the previous chapter, we are now in a position to organize and state those elements more precisely in order to answer that question.

To reiterate, and to orient our discussion, what we have is a set of propositions (P) expressed by a set of natural language sentences (S), where the logical forms of these propositions are under dispute, different parties attributing different logical forms to the propositions. But the logical form of a proposition supervenes on its content. Thus, the way we are approaching the question of what logical form Gregory (implicitly) attributes to P is as follows: First, we specify the relevant content of Gregory’s view as clearly as possible (the project of the preceding chapter, though

1. Of course, as Keller notes, there are different kinds of content one might want to preserve when re-stating a given claim: propositional content, cognitive content, factual content, scientific content, inferential roles, truth conditions, assertability conditions, and so forth. (See (Keller 2010), p. 7, footnote 13 and passim. for discussion.) I take it that the current discussion centers around a set of related metaphysical issues such as number, counting, identity, etc. and that the relevant kind of content here is the truth conditions of the propositions involved.
here we will arrange things more systematically). Second, we make explicit the semantic principles by which Gregory maps this content onto the natural language sentences with which he is concerned (and which we can use to map that content onto the translations from his Greek sentences to our English sentences, $S$). Third, we give explicit semantic principles that allow us to map this content onto the expressions of a formal language in order to show the logical forms of these propositions precisely and unambiguously.

This means that, assuming that the logical form Gregory implicitly attributes to $P$ is consistent, an anti-Trinitarian opponent might respond to Gregory’s defense of the doctrine of the Trinity either by criticizing (1) the actual content of his view (or its presuppositions or entailments or other propositions it in some way commits one to), or (2) the semantic mapping of that content onto a language. In my view, though, an objection would not count as a “logical problem” unless the content itself is not just false but formally contradictory. We will return later (Chapter 6) to a more precise discussion of what would be required to refute Gregory’s position. But on the other hand, one might object, not (necessarily) to Gregory’s position itself, but to my reconstruction of his position. That is, one might say, at the end of it all, that they have no idea whether Gregory’s view is consistent or not, because I’ve misrepresented it (although I don’t think I have, or will). Thus, I’ll introduce the name “GNT$_F$” here to denote my formal reconstruction of (certain salient parts of) Gregory of Nyssa’s Trinitarian theory. We can use “GNT” to denote the actual views of Gregory’s that correspond to GNT$_F$. If I have done my history correctly, then GNT$_F = $ GNT. If not, not.

With that said, let me explain the above outline of the current chapter’s project

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2. Thus, GNT is not the entirety of the body of Gregory’s beliefs that relate to the Trinity, but a certain salient subset. One might consider, for example, that Gregory’s beliefs about epinoiai or dynameis to fall within what should be called “Gregory of Nyssa’s Trinitarian theory.” But they are not part of GNT, because they are not part of GNT$_F$. See footnote 7 below for more.
in slightly more detail before carrying it out.

5.1 Metaphysics, Theology, and Semantics

In what follows concerning the content of Gregory’s view, I want to make a distinction between two senses of the terms “ontology” and “metaphysics” – or two different things people might call “ontology” or might call “metaphysics.” The distinction is not particularly critical to the logic of my argument, but will serve as a useful way to organize the elements of Gregory’s account, as well as the possible objections to his account we will explore in Chapter 6.

First, there is what I would call “pure” or “abstract” ontology or metaphysics, or what I would call ontology or metaphysics “in the strict sense” or “in the narrow sense,” and which I would prefer to reserve the unqualified term “metaphysics” for. This concerns, among other things, such questions as (1) what types of objects one postulates can (or must) exist,3 (2) what (types of) relations can (or must) hold between token objects of these types, (3) which types of objects are such that their tokens can (or must) enter into which of these (types of) relations with tokens of which other types of objects, and (4) the principles (if any) by which token objects of the postulated types would be individuated (if any actually exist).4

Second, there is what might be called a “substantive ontology,” or what I would prefer to call a “substantive theory.” In this context, I will call it Gregory’s “theology” (his substantive theory about God) or by its more traditional name, “triadology” (a substantive theory about “the Triad” or Trinity). Substantive theories concern, among other things, such questions as (1) what token objects one postulates actually

3. I use the term “object” here as a most general count noun.
4. I say “the principles (if any),” because of course one might (indeed at some point, on pain of infinite regress, must) hold that certain objects need nothing to individuate them. They simply “come from the factory” that way – individually wrapped, as it were, for your ontological convenience.
do exist, (2) what relations one postulates actually hold between the token objects one postulates, and (3) whether, and in virtue of what, the postulated token objects actually are individuated from one another.\footnote{Two points. First, of course, for tokens of a type of object that need no individuation, there will be nothing “in virtue of which” they are distinct from one another. Or, as one might say, they are distinct in virtue of nothing. Second, for token objects to which some criterion of individuation does apply, whether they are distinct from other token objects will be a logical consequence, not merely of assumptions about what all token objects exist and what relations they bear to one another, but also of the principles of individuation involved. Thus, one’s metaphysics can constrain parts of one’s substantive theory (in this case, theology, though the same applies to physics or any other substantive theory). On the other hand one’s substantive theory may force one to accept or reject certain metaphysical principles to accommodate the theory. However, one man’s modus ponens is another man’s modus tollens, and there is no reason in principle why one must start with metaphysics or start with substantive theory.}

Finally, what I am calling “semantics” here concerns the systematic mapping of tokens and types of objects and relations to the expressions of a language. In the context of our discussion, we are dealing with two different languages – a natural language and a formal language – since we want to do the following two things.\footnote{Technically two types of language – natural and formal – but three different token languages – Greek, English (both natural languages) and Predicate Logic (formal). For simplicity’s sake, we will ignore the distinction between Greek and English, and pretend that translation between Greek and English is unproblematic.} First, we want to explicate both the metaphysics and the substantive theory as clearly and precisely as we can. Together with this, we want to map that content onto the natural language sentences in S to show how the more clearly and precisely expressed content is indeed being expressed by the natural language sentences in question. We can call this mapping of content onto natural language sentences the “N-semantics.” Second, we are giving a more precise representation of the logical form of that content in the language of predicate logic. Here we need semantic principles that map the relevant content onto the expressions of a formal language in order to be able to evaluate it with the logical tools available to us in the context of that formal language. We can call this mapping of content onto formal language sentences the “F-semantics.”

So, to specify GNT (the relevant content of Gregory’s Trinitarian theory) precisely,
we will first specify (the relevant aspects of) his “pure” ontology or metaphysics, and second (the relevant aspects of) his substantive theory or theology. Third, to evaluate his theory as an answer to the LPT (that is, to determine whether it yields a solution or a non-solution to the LPT) we will specify his semantics. Of course, expressing the content of Gregory’s view in a formal language will help us in making it precise. So, we will be explicating the content all along in predicate logic, and thus the F-semantics will be given alongside his metaphysics and theology throughout. We will give the N-semantics separately, after stating the content (metaphysics and theology) precisely. All of these taken together – Gregory’s metaphysics, theology and semantics – we will see yield a solution to the LPT. Since this is so, and since, if anybody’s Trinitarian theory counts as “a(n orthodox) version of” the doctrine of the Trinity, Gregory’s does, it follows that there is a(n orthodox) solution to the LPT. Since this is so, I will argue there is no strictly logical problem with the doctrine of the Trinity. Any legitimate objection to the doctrine of the Trinity will have to take the form of an objection to (1) its metaphysical content (in the strict or abstract sense of “metaphysics”), (2) its theological content (the “substantive” ontology), or (3) its semantics. Again, we will discuss those options in more detail in Chapter 6. First, we will proceed to carry out the project just proposed.

7. I say “relevant” and “relevant aspects of,” because, of course, there is more to Gregory’s overall metaphysics and triadology. For one, perhaps glaring, example, we could add “dynamis” as an additional object type and put in at least one dynamis per energieia in his substantive theory (see footnote 11 below). But since we can elucidate Gregory’s solution to the LPT without discussing dunameis, we will avoid the unnecessary complication (see footnote 11 below).

8. At least not of the sort or for the reasons the anti-Trinitarian typically claims. See Chapter 1.2, p. 20 above.
5.2 Gregory’s Metaphysics

5.2.1 A Note on Strict Identity

In my view, Gregory gives no indication that he would *take issue* with what we would call “classical” or “strict” identity. In addition, he freely makes use of Greek expressions like τὸ ὀνόμα and τὰ ὀνόματα that at least *apparently* express strict identity in Greek, if anything does. And he makes no attempt to explain or alter their meanings. So I think it is safe to assume that he accepts classical identity and that his views can be formulated in standard predicate logic with identity (and again, we have adopted a “prejudice” in favor of standard predicate logic with identity, such that if we can use it, we will).

I should note, however, that Richard Cross suggests that essentially nobody from Aristotle up through the medieval period has a concept of identity as we understand it today, or at least that it isn’t clear that they do. If he is right about that, then of course that could pose a problem for formalizing Gregory’s views in terms of strict identity.

I’m a bit skeptical of the thesis that Gregory lacked the concept of strict identity. To be convinced of it, I would want to see relative identity interpretations of phrases of Gregory’s like τὸ ὀνόμα ὁμός (“the same name”)\(^9\) and κατὰ τὸ ὀνόμα ὡν (“being in the same place”)\(^10\) and various uses of “himself,” “itself,” and so forth, and be assured that no violence is done to the validity of his arguments when these phrases are understood according to some relative identity interpretation, rather than strict identity. That’s not to say I have any proof that such a project *couldn’t* be done. But I would want to *see* it done (at least partially, sketched out well enough so one

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10. See 4.3.2, p. 209.
could see how to extend the general strategy throughout Gregory’s corpus). And
anyway, it seems more natural to me to take Gregory as employing the concept of
strict identity in such places.

But however that discussion would go, I don’t think we need to settle it here and
now. And that is because we have already seen, in van Inwagen’s response to the LPT,
how a solution to the LPT can be provided within a framework that rejects strict
identity. In other words, granting the existence of classical identity, and accepting
PLI as the language within which a response to the LPT must be formulated, is really
a concession to the anti-Trinitarian. If Gregory has no concept of strict identity, or
simply rejects the concept, then it is obvious that he would have a solution to the
LPT, and roughly what it would be like. If that is so, then my further discussion
here could all be read as within the scope of a hypothetical: “even if Gregory did
admit, or was forced to admit, that there was such a thing as strict identity, he would
still have a solution to the LPT as follows…” However, again, I do think Gregory
has a concept of strict identity (the hypostases are not strictly identical, their token
energeiai are), but settling that issue must be done at another time and another
place. And with that said, we can turn to the project of putting Gregory’s account
of the Trinity into PLI.

5.2.2 Possible Object Types

The results of the previous chapter indicate that the following possible object
types are relevant to Gregory’s response(s) to the LPT: hypostases, idiomata, ousiai,
erergeia types, and energeia tokens.11 We will abbreviate predications of token

11. Besides the concept of an energeia, the concept of a dynamis – the causal power or ability
to engage in a certain energeia – is clearly central to Gregory’s thought. A reader might have
been surprised to see that I make no mention of dynamis throughout my presentation of Gregory’s
thought. This is by no means because the concept is unimportant to Gregory or patristic theology
generally – far from it! Rather, it is that there would seem to be a straight-forward one-to-one
 correspondence between dynamis and energeia. That is, there is exactly one dynamis for every
energeia, namely, the dynamis (ability) to engage in that energeia. Thus, in a discussion centered
objects as falling into these object types with the following one-place predicates in PLI.\textsuperscript{12}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Predicate Description</th>
<th>Symbol</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>“is a hypostasis”</td>
<td>“H”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“is an idioma”</td>
<td>“I”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“is an ousia”</td>
<td>“O”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“is an energeia type”</td>
<td>“E*”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“is an energeiai token”</td>
<td>“E”</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5.2.3 Possible Relations Between Tokens of the Object Types

5.2.3.1 “Metaphysical Predication” or “Having”

The most important relation, or rather group of relations, that possibly holds between the tokens of these object types is any kind of metaphysical correlate to predication, which for present purposes I will simply lump together as one and call “metaphysical predication,” or more simply yet, “having.”

In many cases, the metaphysical correlate of predication in Gregory’s thought is “participation,” the familiar relation from Platonic (and Neo-Platonic) metaphysics. But we saw in the previous chapter (4.3.3, p. 220) that, while Gregory frequently makes use of this relation, either under its Platonic name “μεταφυσική” or the biblical term “τοιχόνωσις,” it doesn’t seem that Gregory always takes this to be the metaphysical correlate to the predication relation, since he never speaks of hypostases “sharing” or “participating in” their idiomata (however precisely he understands the relation between hypostases and idiomata). Therefore, I will simply speak of “metaphysical

\textsuperscript{12}See 5.2.3, pp. 271 ff. on the choice to represent universals with lower-case letters as well.
predication” or “having,” and let that subsume both participation / communion and whatever the relation between hypostases and their idioma(ta) is (if it is a different relation).

Now we face a choice as to how to represent “metaphysical predication” or “having.” This is because, typically in predicate logic, lower-case letters are correlated with individuals (they are “logical names” for individuals) and upper-case letters are correlated with sets of individuals (the set of all individuals that satisfy that predicate). And of course, there is an obvious sort of correlation between universals and the sets of individuals that exhibit those universals.

Thus, to say the Father “participates in” the divine nature, we might be tempted to give the Father the name “f” and predicate the divine nature of the Father with the upper-case letter “D,” thus: “Df,” where “D” is read “is divine” and the semantic value of “D” is the set of all things that are divine. (This is Tuggy’s way of formulating his rough analogue of P in (Tuggy 2003), p. 181.) Given a certain way of thinking about second-order logic (namely, taking “D” as referring to a universal – called “divinity” – rather than to a set of divine things, and generally taking upper-case letters to refer to universals rather than sets), we could even say of the divine nature that it is an ousia as follows: “OD.” (Using “O” with a line under it as a second-order predicate meaning “is an ousia.”) In this way, we would very closely link participation with predication. We could, if we wanted, even read “DF” as “the Father participates in divinity” and “OD” as “divinity participates in being an ousia.” We could then represent the homoousion as “\(\exists X (Xf & \_OX) = \exists X (Xs & \_OX) = \exists X (Xh & \_OX)\),” i.e., “the X such that X is the ousia of the Father, is identical to the X such that X is the ousia of the Son, is identical to the X such that X is the ousia of the Holy Spirit.”

13. If, indeed, sets are not simply a kind of universal – a debate into which I opt not to enter here.
14. And if the relation between hypostases and idiomata is not participation, substitute “has.”
15. As always, immense complications are introduced by the Incarnation and the supposition that
And we could similarly give a second-order treatment of *idiomata*.

On the other hand, we could instead stay within the confines of first-order logic by representing universals (and *idiomata*, if *idiomata* are not shareable) as lower-case letters, and participation claims (or any claims involving x bearing a “metaphysical predication” relation to y, i.e. x “having” y) with a two-place predicate like “P.” For instance, we could name the Father “f” and the divine *ousia* “o” and represent the claim that the Father “participates in” the divine *ousia* (or, more generally, that the Father bears some metaphysical predication relation to the divine *ousia*) as “Pfo.”

We will take the latter course, and represent participation and other kinds of “having” with a two-place predicate. So long as there is no need for second-order logic (and, strictly speaking, there is never a need for second-order logic if one allows sets or set-like objects into one’s ontology), we may as well stay within the confines of a more well-behaved system.

Furthermore, in Gregory’s theology, there is some kind of significant relation that undergirds certain predications, such that this relation holds, not just between individuals (e.g., hypostases) and universals (e.g., the divine *ousia*), but between individuals and *other individuals* – specifically between hypostases and *token energeiai*. And this cannot be represented in standard logic using merely two names for individuals (lower-case letters) back-to-back (like “fe,” or “ef,” which would be ungrammatical in the language of predicate logic). We could, of course, simply introduce a separate relation of “doing” to hold between hypostases and *token energeiai*. But it seems most convenient to me to stay within the confines of first-order logic and represent all of the objects in Gregory’s theology, whether universals or particulars, with lower-case letters, and to simply lump together all metaphysical predication relations with a two-place predicate, “P.” Thus, we will abbreviate claims of the form *x bears some*
metaphysical predication relation to y with expressions of the form \( P_{xy} \). We can also shorten the cumbersome English phrase “x bears some metaphysical predication relation to y” to “x has y.” Thus, whether x “participates in” y, or y is an idioma of x, or y is a token energeia performed by x or x is a token of type y (or x bears any other sort of metaphysical predication relation to y, if there are any other such relations), x “has” y and “P_{xy}” is true.

5.2.3.2 The “Natural To” Relation

Next, we saw that Gregory speaks of the “natural” energeiai of an ousia (4.4.4.1, p. 249). These are energeia types that are in some sense attached to the ousia or nature, and that individuate it. This relation seems to be definable in terms of metaphysical predication, but it will be useful to have a separate predicate to use as shorthand.

First, though, I note that I will be marking each of Gregory’s basic, substantive assumptions with a “+” and marking propositions he affirms, but which are either stipulatively defined, or assignments of names to arbitrarily selected individuals, or the logical consequences of his basic, substantive assumptions, with a “0,” and in the case of logical consequences, a footnote stating which other assumptions or previously noted consequences it follows from.

This notation is not meant to indicate that Gregory actually saw all of these logical entailments, or believed the entailed propositions only based on his belief in the basic assumptions that entail them. In some cases it is clear that he did, but in other cases he may or may not have. But the issue of how much of Gregory’s account counts as assumption and how much simply follows from his assumptions seems important not so much for historical reasons, but for philosophical and theological reasons.
For one thing, when one sees just how much of Gregory’s account is just the logical consequence of just how little substantive assumption, one can see that it’s much more difficult to fault Gregory’s account of the Trinity than it might seem. (More on this in Chapter 6.). It may also be of interest to theologians once one sees how it relates to the filioque controversy, as the weaker view of the individuation of hypostases requires Gregory to make more assumptions in the realm of substantive theology, while the stronger view requires fewer assumptions.

Now we will abbreviate claims of the form some energeia (type) x is natural to some ousia y with expressions of the form $N_{xy}$, and define N as follows:

$$0^{16} \text{ NDef: } (\forall x)(\forall y)\{(N_{xy} \leftrightarrow \Box(\forall z)[P_{zy} \rightarrow (\exists w)(Ew \& P_{wx} \& P_{zw})]) \}$$

i.e., for any x (an energeia type) and any y (an ousia), x (the energeia type) is “natural to” y (the ousia) iff, necessarily, for any z (a hypostasis) that has y (the ousia), z has some energeia token w of (energeia type) x.

(The parentheticals in this explanation are for clarity’s sake alone. For the sake of simplicity in constructing proofs, I am not building these restrictions into the very definition of the “N” relation, except for w’s being an energeia token. And this one restriction is for no other reason than to make the construction of certain proofs more convenient. It could be dispensed with, only at the cost of simplicity and convenience.)

To state it in a more understandable way, to say that an energeia type x is “natural to” an ousia y, is to say that any hypostasis z of that ousia y must always exhibit some token w of that energeia type y. This does not entail that there is any particular token energeia w such that hypostasis x must have that token energeia (w). Nor does it entail that there are any necessarily existent hypostases or necessarily existent token energeiai. It does not, as we’ve stated it here, even entail that the

16. Stipulative definition.
ousia had by the hypostasis is essential to that hypostasis (regardless of whether Gregory would endorse that claim – see footnote 21 below.) All it says is that if x is a natural energeia of y, then there couldn’t be a hypostasis z of y that wasn’t doing some token (w) of x.

To use a patristic example, the energeiai (types) of “heating” and “illuminating” are natural to fire. This means that any particular fiery thing, say this particular flame, must necessarily be engaged in some particular (token) act(s) of emitting light and heat. To put it the other way around, if some particular thing (hypostasis) isn’t emitting any light or isn’t emitting any heat, it doesn’t really have the nature of fire.17

One important corollary (really, just a restatement) of this definition, which Gregory makes use of in his dispute with Eunomius is the following:

\[ N_{Corol-Eun} : \forall x \forall y \{ \neg Nxy \leftrightarrow \diamond \exists z \left[ P_{zy} \land \neg \left( \exists w \left( E_w \land P_{wx} \land P_{zw} \right) \right) \right] \}
\]

i.e., a given energeia type is not natural to an ousia, if and only if it is possible for there to be some hypostasis of that ousia that does not have any tokens of the energeia type. Together with his criterion for the individuation of ousiai, this forms the basis of Gregory’s challenge to Eunomius: If the Father and Son are of different natures, then, given that natures are individuated by natural energeiai, it would be possible that the Son fails to do something that the Father does by nature, or vice-versa. The challenge he presents, then, is: point out something that the Father does that the Son does not do, or vice-versa. (In other words, prove the Cappadocian Assertion wrong.) (See 5.3.3.3, p. 318 ff.)

17. In the case of a natural dynamis, of course it might be that a hypostasis is not always engaged in the exercise of that dynamis, but it will necessarily always have the dynamis. But again, we will leave dynamis out of our discussion to avoid needless complication.

18. From N_{Def}. Proof is trivial.
With these relations in place, we will now say what they can (and sometimes
must) hold between, in Gregory’s metaphysics.

5.2.4 Relations Possible for the Objects

5.2.4.1 Relations Possible for Hypostases

First, hypostases can have *idiomata*. Thus, it is possible for a proposition of the
form $P_{xy}$ to be true where $x$ is a hypostasis and $y$ is an *idioma*.

Furthermore, a hypostasis *must* have some (at least one) *idioma*. Thus:

\[ + \text{NHI: } \Box(\forall x)[Hx \rightarrow (\exists y)(Iy \land P_{xy})] \]

19. See Chapter 4.3.1, p. 203.

20. See again Chapter 4.3.1, p. 203.

21. Note that I am choosing to formulate this, and all of Gregory’s basic assumptions about what
relations *must* obtain between certain types of objects simply with a box operator taking primary
scope. Of course, Gregory seems to take these to be truths of metaphysics, and so it would be odd for
him to say any of them were *contingent*. Thus, the box operator out front should be uncontroversial.

But one might wonder whether Gregory wouldn’t endorse a stronger claim, like:

\[ \Box(\forall x)[Hx \rightarrow (\exists y)(Iy \land \Box P_{xy})] \]

This would say, not only that in order for something $x$ to be a
hypostasis, it must have some *idioma* (as our original formulation says. But rather, that in order
for something $x$ to be a hypostasis, there must be some particular *idioma* $y$, such that
that particular *idioma* $y$ is *essential* to $x$. And similar questions can be asked about the other relation
requirements. Does Gregory merely think that a hypostasis must have *some* *ousia*, or does he think that
the particular *ousia* that a hypostasis has is essential to it? Must an *ousia* only have *some*
energeia(i), or must it have the *same* natural energeia(i) that it has in this world in every world in
which it exists? Further, one might wonder whether Gregory would assume the principle that if $x$
is a hypostasis then $x$ is *essentially* a hypostasis, and likewise for all of our object types.

Except in the case of $N_{Def}$ (where it turns out to make quite a bit of difference to Gregory’s argument
for the *homoousion* how we formulate things) I am choosing to simply avoid these questions. This is not because I think they are unimportant (particularly with reference to the Incarnation and
to the *filioque* controversy). Rather, these are deep issues that would require much further investiga-
tion and discussion. And any of these stronger theses would entail any of the weaker formulations
I rely on in what follows. Thus, if Gregory asserts any stronger claims, he will at least be *committed
to* the claims we will be dealing with, and thus to all of the logical consequences I will point out. Thus, GNTF will at least not be unorthodox.

Of course, eliding over this further detail in Gregory’s view could again be an occasion for the
anti-Trinitarian to try to find some flaw buried more deeply in Gregory’s metaphysics. Perhaps
it could be argued that Gregory really does endorse some stronger set of claims, and that those
stronger claims entail some sort of contradiction. But as noted in 1.2, p. 20 ff., no such problems
have so far been noted by anti-Trinitarians, and it isn’t clear that, if such a problem should exist,
Second, hypostases can have ousiai.\footnote{22} Thus, it is possible for a proposition of the form $Pxy$ to be true where $x$ is a hypostasis and $y$ is an ousia.

Furthermore, a hypostasis \textit{must} have an ousia.\footnote{23} Thus:

\begin{equation}
+NHO: \quad \Box(\forall x)[Hx \to (\exists y)(Oy \& Pxy)]
\end{equation}

Third, hypostases can have token energieia.\footnote{24} Thus, it is possible for a proposition of the form $Pxy$ to be true where $x$ is a hypostasis and $y$ is a token energeia.

Although we will not make use of the principle, it also follows from $N_{Def}$ that a hypostasis \textit{must} have some token of every energeia type that is natural to any ousia which the hypostasis has, thus:

\begin{equation}
0^{25} \quad NHE: \quad \Box(\forall x)(\forall y)(\forall z)[(Pxy \& Nzy) \to (\exists w)(Pwz \& Pxw)]
\end{equation}

I.e., if $x$ (a hypostasis) has $y$ (an ousia), and $z$ (an energeia type) is natural to $y$ (the ousia), then there exists a $w$ (a token energeia) of type $z$ had by hypostasis $x$.

\subsection*{5.2.4.2 Relations Possible for Idiomata}

First, as we said just above, idiomata can be had by hypostases. Thus, it is possible for a proposition of the form $Pxy$ to be true where $x$ is a hypostasis and $y$ is an idiomata.

\footnote{22. See again, Chapter 4.3.1, p. 203.}
\footnote{23. See again, Chapter 4.3.1, p. 203.}
\footnote{24. See Chapter 4.4.2, p. 242.}
\footnote{25. From $N_{Def}$. Since we do not make use of the principle, we will give no proof for it.}
Second, *idiomata* can be had by *energeia* tokens. Thus, it is possible for a proposition of the form \( P_{xy} \) to be true where \( x \) is an *energeia* token and \( y \) is an *idioma*.

### 5.2.4.3 Relations Possible for *Ousiai*

First, as we said above, *ousiai* can be had by hypostases. Thus, it is possible for a proposition of the form \( P_{xy} \) to be true where \( x \) is a hypostasis and \( y \) is an *ousia*.

Second, *ousiai* can have *energeia* types be “natural to” them. Thus, it is possible for a proposition of the form \( N_{xy} \) to be true where \( x \) is an *energeia* type and \( y \) is an *ousia*.

Furthermore, Gregory rejects the idea that there could be an *ousia* with no natural *energeiai*. That is, every *ousia* must have some natural *energeia* type or types. Thus:

\[
+ \text{NOE}^*: \quad \Box(\forall x)[O_x \rightarrow (\exists y)(E^*y \& N_{yx})]
\]

### 5.2.4.4 Relations Possible for *Energeia* Types

First, as we said above, *energeia* types can be natural to *ousiai*. Thus, it is possible for a proposition of the form \( N_{xy} \) to be true where \( x \) is an *energeia* type and \( y \) is an *ousia*.

Second, *energeia* types can be had by *energeia* tokens. Thus, it is possible for

26. See again, Chapter 4.4.2, p. 242.
27. See Chapter 4.4.4.1, p. 249.
28. See again, Chapter 4.4.4.1, p. 249.
29. See again Chapter 4.4.2, p. 242.
a proposition of the form $Pxy$ to be true where $x$ is an $energeia$ token and $y$ is an $energeia$ type.

5.2.4.5 Relations Possible for $Energeia$ Tokens

First, as we said above, $energeia$ tokens can have $energeia$ types. Thus, it is possible for a proposition of the form $Pxy$ to be true where $x$ is an $energeia$ token and $y$ is an $energeia$ type.

Second, as we said above, $energeia$ tokens can have $idiomata$. Thus, it is possible for a proposition of the form $Pxy$ to be true where $x$ is an $energeia$ token and $y$ is an $idioma$.

Third, as we said above, $energeia$ tokens can be had by hypostases. Thus, it is possible for a proposition of the form $Pxy$ to be true where $x$ is a hypostasis and $y$ is an $energeia$ token.

5.2.5 Identity Conditions for the Types of Objects

We have seen in the previous chapter the conditions for identity or individuation of the various types of objects, and we list them here more precisely in predicate logic.

5.2.5.1 Identity Conditions for Hypostases

Hypostases, as I understand Gregory, are indviduated by their $idiomata$. And we have seen in the previous chapter (Chapter 4.3.4, p. 222 ff.) that there are two ways to interpret Gregory with respect to what exactly $idiomata$ are and how they individuate hypostases. First is the strong view, namely that $idiomata$ are

\footnote{30. See 4.3.5, p. 227 ff.}
simple, non-shareable properties. Second is the weak view, namely that hypostases are individuated by unique combinations of in-principle shareable qualities. On the latter view, we might use “idioma” to refer to the unique bundle, or to one of the in-principle shareable qualities that constitute it. For convenience, I will eschew using idioma to talk about an unshareable bundle of qualities, and use the term either for a simple, unshareable quality (as in the strong theory), or for a shareable constituent of an unshareable bundle (as in the weak theory).

Thus, we can formulate the strong version of the identity conditions for hypostases as:

\[+\text{IDH}_{\text{Strong}}: \Box(\forall x)(\forall y) [\{Hx & Hy\} \rightarrow [x=y \iff (\exists z)(Iz & [Pxz & Pyz])]]\]

i.e., necessarily, for any hypostases, x and y, x and y are identical if and only if x and y (both) bear a metaphysical predication relation to any (single) idioma.

On the other hand, we might formulate the weak version of the identity conditions for hypostases as:

\[+\text{IDH}_{\text{Weak}}: \Box(\forall x)(\forall y) [\{Hx & Hy\} \rightarrow [x=y \iff (\forall z)(Iz \rightarrow [Pxz \leftrightarrow Pyz])]]\]

i.e., necessarily, for any hypostases, x and y, x and y are identical if and only if x and y bear metaphysical predication relations to all and only the same idiomata.\(^{31}\)

5.2.5.2 Identity Conditions for Idiomata

Whether idioma are simple, unshareable properties, or in-principle shareable qualities that constitute unique bundles, they are presumably the sorts of things that

\(^{31}\) Besides their idiomata, are hypostases also individuated by ousiai? Saying that they are would raise a number of complications, or at least a high degree of complexity, when dealing with the Incarnation. But since, prior to creation (see below, 5.3, p. 285, for an explanation of the phrase “prior to creation”), there are only three hypostases of one ousia, it will be irrelevant whether hypostases can, in principle, be individuated merely by having distinct ousiai. We therefore do not include any reference to ousiai in our principle of individuation for hypostases, for simplicity’s sake.
are simply distinct by hypothesis, not individuated by further objects. So we give no identity conditions for them.

5.2.5.3 Identity Conditions for Ousiai

As we saw, ousiai are individuated by the energeia types natural to them.\(^{32}\) Thus:

\[
\text{IDO: } \Box(\forall x)(\forall y)((\text{Ox} \land \text{Oy}) \rightarrow (x=y \iff (\forall z)(\text{E}^*z \rightarrow (\text{Nzx} \iff \text{Nzy}))))
\]

i.e., necessarily, for any ousiai, x and y, x and y are identical if and only if x and y have all and only the same natural energeiai types.

5.2.5.4 Identity Conditions for Energeia Types

Energeia types would seem to be intrinsically distinct for Gregory as well, thus we give no identity conditions for them.\(^{33}\)

\(^{32}\) See 4.4.4.1, p. 249 ff. and 4.4.4.2, p. 251 ff.

\(^{33}\) In fact, I know of no real evidence for this, except for the very fact that I know of no evidence for it. That is, the fact that, as far as I know, Gregory does not discuss the matter. This leads me to believe that he simply assumes it is obvious that energeia types are inherently distinct and does not discuss their identity conditions because there is nothing there to discuss.

But nothing much seems to ride on the question for the purpose of resolving our question about the LPT. The main issue it would raise would be the following: Suppose energeia types are somehow individuated by (and only by) their relations to other objects of whatever type. Now suppose that, prior to creation (see below, 5.3, p. 285, for an explanation of the phrase “prior to creation”), the only other objects that exist are the ousia, the three hypostases, energeia tokens, and the idiomata, all of which idiomata are intra-trinitarian relations. Suppose also that neither the intra-trinitarian relations nor the ousia nor the hypostases nor the token energeiai individuate any energeia types. In that case, there could be only a single divine energeia type. Whether that would be theologically problematic or not may be debatable, but I think it’s more plausible to suppose (and that Gregory likely supposed) that energeia types are intrinsically distinct. But even if not, it’s hard to see how it would make much of a difference to the LPT. Thus, to simplify the presentation, in what follows we will simply assume that energeia types are supposed to be intrinsically distinct.
5.2.5.5 Identity Conditions for *Energeia* Tokens

*Energeia* tokens are individuated by their own *idiomata* (and probably by *energeia* types as well). But what is actually most important to note here for our purposes is not so much what individuates *energeia* tokens as what does *not* individuate them – namely, the hypostases that perform them.

*This bit of metaphysics is the critical aspect of Gregory’s response to the LPT, and is what I think has not been fully appreciated to this point.*

That is, given hypostases x and y, even if x and y are themselves distinct, x’s e-ing and y’s e-ing are distinct *only if* x’s e-ing and y’s e-ing are either of different types, or they have different *idiomata*. If x’s e-ing and y’s e-ing are of the same type, and they have the same *idiomata* (they occur, for example, at the same location in space at the same time, etc.), then x’s e-ing is strictly (classically) numerically identical to y’s e-ing – *even if x and y are themselves (strictly, classically) numerically distinct.*

I will refer to this phenomenon as “synergy.” I will say that distinct hypostases x and y “synergize on” *energeia* token z, if and only if x and y are distinct, and both

34. I have said that Gregory takes *energeia* tokens to be individuated by *idiomata* and that he *probably* takes them to be individuated by *energeia* types as well. But in order to give a precise formulation, we will have to make a decision here as to whether to include *energeia* types as things that individuate *energeia* tokens. I am choosing to formulate Gregory’s view as having *energeia* tokens individuated *both* by their *idiomata* and by the *energeia* types they have. This is not because Gregory explicitly says so. (We saw above that he makes it explicit that an *energeia* token is individuated by its own *idiomata* – the “*ιδιότροπον τῆς ἐνεργείας*,” i.e., “the peculiar property of the *energeia*” – but not that it would be individuated by its *energeia* types or types). Rather, I take this approach because not doing so would have logical consequences I believe Gregory would most likely not want to embrace. See the section on the individuation of *energeia* tokens below (5.3.3, p. 314 ff., and esp. p. 321 ff.) for a fuller discussion.

35. If *energeia* types individuate *energeia* tokens. See footnote 34 just above, and 5.3.3.5, p. 321 below for more.

36. Gregory, in *Ad Ablabium* uses the verb “*συνεφάπτομαι*,” “to lay hold of jointly,” or “engage in with,” to describe what I am calling “synergy.” He says, “ἐπὶ δὲ τῆς θεικῆς φύσεως οὐχ οὔτως ἔμαθομεν ὅτι ὁ πατὴρ ποιεῖ τι καθ’ ἑαυτόν, ὡς ἡ συνεφάπτεται ὁ υἱός.” “But in the case of the divine nature we did not learn thus that the Father does something by himself, that the Son does not engage in with him.”
x and y have z. That is:

\[ \forall x \forall y \forall z \{ \Sigma_{xyz} \leftrightarrow \text{[Hx & Hy & Ez & } x \neq y \& Pxz & Pyz] \} \]

And I will say that distinct hypostases x and y “synergize on” *energeia* type z, if and only if x and y are distinct, and there exists a token *energeia* w of type z such that x and y both have w (thus, synergize on w). That is:

\[ \forall x \forall y \forall z \{ \Sigma_{xyz} \leftrightarrow \text{[Hx & Hy & E*z & } x \neq y \& (\exists w)(\text{Ew & Pwz & Pxw & Pyw})] \} \]

That is, x and y synergize on *energeia* type e* if and only if x and y synergize on some *energeia* token e of type e*. As we will see, the phenomenon of synergy is the key that allows Gregory to solve the LPT, but it has not been sufficiently appreciated or articulated in the literature. We will of course return to it later. For now, we can formulate Gregory’s view on the individuation of *energeia* tokens as follows:

\begin{align*}
+ & \text{IDE: } \Box (\forall x)(\forall y) \{[\text{Ex & Ey}] \rightarrow [x=y \leftrightarrow (\forall z)(Iz \lor E*z) \rightarrow [Pxz \leftrightarrow Pyz])] \}
\end{align*}

i.e., for any token *energeiai*, x and y, x and y are identical if and only if x and y have all and only the same *idiomata* and *energeiai* types.39

37. Stipulatively defined.

38. Stipulatively defined.

39. This is the course is a “weak” version of the individuation of *energeia* tokens. Probably the best way to formulate a “strong” version of the individuation of *energeia* tokens would be:

\begin{align*}
+ & \text{IDE}_{\text{Strong}:} \ (\forall x)(\forall y) \{[\text{Ex & Ey}] \rightarrow [x=y \leftrightarrow (\exists z)(Iz \lor [Pxz \& Pyz])] \}
\end{align*}

but there is little consequence to which criterion we use in this case, so to cut down on length and complexity, I will only deal explicitly with the weak criterion.
5.3 Gregory’s Theology

What I am calling Gregory’s “theology” or “triadology” involves, again, the token objects postulated and the relations that actually hold between the postulated token objects. In what follows, I will be using the phrase “prior to creation” quite a bit. This might seem like a phrase that should raise deep questions about the nature of time and the relation of God to creation. But in fact, I mean nothing very fancy by it. Simply, given our very limited concerns about the individuation of certain uncreated objects, and the details of Gregory’s views about how those objects are in fact individuated (or not individuated), created objects will not be relevant to our concerns. If one is uncomfortable with my use of the phrase “prior to creation,” one could substitute “abstracting away from all created objects,” or “bracketing off created objects,” or “ignoring the complications of created objects for simplicity’s sake” or some similar phrase. I will stick to the shorter phrase, “prior to creation.” With that said, we can give the substantive theological propositions that are relevant to Gregory’s answer to the LPT as follows.

5.3.1 Postulated Token Objects

5.3.1.1 Hypostases

There are on Gregory’s view exactly three divine (uncreated) hypostases: Father, Son and Holy Spirit. Although, of course, modalists denied that there were three

40. Of course, anyone who holds that the Son and Holy Spirit are themselves created would hold that this bracketing off of creation ipso facto brackets off the Son and Holy Spirit, bringing in a potential disagreement as to precisely what all to bracket off. Naturally, since I am here concerned with explaining Gregory’s view, I mean to exclude from my discussion those objects that he holds to be created (angels, humans, animals and so forth), and to include in my discussion those objects that he holds to be uncreated (in particular, as I interpret Gregory, at least the three hypostases, their idiomata, their shared essence, and their energeiai, both types and tokens). Thus, I am not employing the phrase in such a way as to beg any questions. If one prefers, one can substitute the phrase “abstracting away from all of those things, which, on Gregory’s view, would be created.”
distinct hypostases, they did not deny the existence (nor the divinity) of the Father or of the Son or of the Holy Spirit, only their distinction. Nor, obviously did any variety of Arian deny their existence.\(^{41}\) So this is all uncontroversial in Gregory’s context. To these hypostases, we will give the logical names:

“f,”

“s,” and

“h.”\(^{42}\)

They are hypostases, thus:

\[+ \ H(i): \ Hf\]

\[+ \ H(ii): \ Hs\]

41. And although, of course, the Trinitarian controversy was largely about the status of these hypostases in terms of simplicity and uncreatedness, even Eunomians would allow the application of the predicate “is divine” to all three hypostases as well – they would simply adopt a different semantics for “is divine,” arguing that the predicate “is divine” is equivocal and made true by distinct ousiai, some of which are created and hylomorphically non-simple and so forth. We will examine below how Gregory argues that the divine hypostases all have a single ousia (5.3.3.3, p. 318).

42. Of course, one might object to using mere logical names (“f,” “s,” and “h”) to replace the natural language terms “Father,” “Son,” and “Holy Spirit” as the natural language terms are not without significant semantic content, and some important arguments in the Trinitarian controversy turn on questions involving the existence of a “Father” necessitating the existence of a “Son,” whether the relation of begetting that holds between Father and Son could hold between things of different natures, and so forth.

For these reasons, one might reasonably point out that representing the Father as something like \(\exists x[(\exists y)(Bxy)]\) (the x that begets some y), and representing the Son as something like \(\exists x[(\exists y)(Byx)]\) (the x that is begotten by some y), would more perspicuously show the logical relationship between the existence of the Father (qua Father) and the existence of the Son (qua Son).

While these ways of representing things might add a certain amount of clarity in the overall context of the fourth century Trinitarian controversy, or in the context of the filioque controversy, I believe they would introduce needless complexity for our limited purposes of showing Gregory’s theology to be consistent. So we will simply represent the names for the persons, as well as their idiomata below, with simple logical names. To be sure, an anti-Trinitarian could claim that, perhaps, buried within that additional logical complexity, are the makings of some contradiction or absurdity. However, as mentioned in Chapter 1 (1.2, p. 21), it seems unlikely that any such hidden contradiction (if there be any) would be worthy of being included as part of the “Logical Problem of the Trinity,” which is supposed to hinge merely on the fact that the same predicate (“is God”) is being applied to three things (Father, Son and Holy Spirit) which are non-identical, and yet it is being claimed that there is only one God.
Perhaps not all of H(i)–H(iii) need to be counted as substantive theological assumptions. This is because, as we will see below, given a certain understanding of the relational properties that serve as *idiomata* for the Trinity, and a certain view about how reference to the Father is secured, the existence of, at least, the Son (and perhaps the Spirit) logically follows from the existence of the Father.\(^{43}\) However, to avoid certain complications we will discuss below,\(^{44}\) we will simply count these all as substantive assumptions.

### 5.3.1.2 Idiomata

As we saw in the previous chapter (4.3.3, p. 216), there are, at least three (if not four or more) *idiomata* that individuate the divine hypostases, and these are the intra-trinitarian relations. We might be tempted, on a modern view of relations to represent the intra-trinitarian relations as something like “B” for “begets” and “S” for “spirates.” And since the Father is the only one who begets, and the Son is the only one who is begotten, rather than representing them as “f” and “s,” we might represent them respectively as:

\[\forall x[(\exists y)(Bxy)]\]

and

\[\forall y[(\exists x)(Bxy)]\]

\(^{43}\) See note 42 above, p. 286 and the discussion just below on representing the *idiomata.*

\(^{44}\) See the discussion below on having to pick between “begetting the Son” and just “begetting something,” etc., p. 290 ff.
that is, “the x such that x begets some y” and “the y such that y is begotten by some x.” This more clearly shows why “the Father” (qua Father) could not exist without a “Son.” If there is no Son – no y such that y is begotten by some x – then there can be no Father – no x such that x begets some y. And vice-versa. Thus, it would be clear that it is logically necessary that some father exists if and only if some son exists. And that is as it should be.

Likewise, we could represent the Holy Spirit as:

\[ \forall z \exists x (Sxz) \]

that is, “the z such that z is spirated by some x.” Of course, we now face the issue of how to represent the Father as spirating the Spirit, whether to represent the Son in the same way (if one accepts the *filioque*) and how those descriptions relate to one another. But we face more pressing problems.

First, while we now have a more perspicuous way to refer to the persons, we face the question of how many relations there are. Given the formalism above, we might be tempted to count two relations, or “polyadic” properties – begetting and spirating. Yet, ancients and medievals seem to count the relations as either three or four.

So, it would not be as perspicuous to represent the relations with sentences of the form \( Bxy \) and \( Sxy \), which makes it look as though there are just two relations. Nor would it be most perspicuously represented as something like \( P^*xyb \), where \( P^* \) is some kind of three-place metaphysical predication relation, showing the Father and Son both entering into the begetting relation at the appropriate argument places (which again makes it look as though begetting is a single “polyadic property,” into which two distinct relata “enter” at different “places,” rather than that begetting is a single, monadic property that in some sense makes reference to a begotten, while being begotten is a distinct monadic property that in some sense makes reference to a begetter).
The reason for this discrepancy is that, from Aristotle through the medieval period, there was a widespread view that there was no such thing as a polyadic property.\(^{45}\) Medievals sometimes used an analogy between a dyadic relation and a road between two cities, and routinely rejected the idea that any such thing existed in reality. Rather, relational predicates were analyzed in various ways such that they were, ultimately, monadic properties of individuals (or supervenient on the monadic properties of individuals), but monadic properties that in some way point towards or make reference to other individuals. In fact, a classic example from Aristotle onwards is the relation of being a father, which would be seen as a feature of the father, but one that implies the existence of a son, and likewise being a son is a feature of the son, but one that implies the existence of a father.\(^{46}\)

So one might think that, to better reflect this kind of thinking, we could represent the Father’s “begetting the Son” as a one-place (monadic) property that makes reference to the Son. To that end, we could borrow notation from Bealer,\(^{47}\) and introduce an operation to form terms from predicates so that the property of “being an x such that x begets some y” could be represented as a singular term, thus:

\[ [(\exists y)(Bxy)]_x.\]

And we could then represent the Father’s idiom in just that way, so that, the Father’s having that property would be expressed as:

\[ P \text{x}[(\exists y)(Bxy)]_x[(\exists y)(Bxy)]_x \]

(i.e., “the x such that x begets something” has “being an x such that x begets something”).

\(^{45}\) See all of (Brower 2014), but esp. section 3.1.

\(^{46}\) This is all on the assumption that a given thinker even believes in relations at all, rather than simply relatives – the father and son themselves.

\(^{47}\) (Bealer 1982), pp. 43 ff.
This would certainly make it more clear why, assuming that the hypostases and their *idiomata* exist in the first place, the Father would have “begetting” as His *idioma* and the Son would have “being begotten” as His *idioma*, and likewise why the very existence of the Father (qua father) entails the existence of a Son (qua son) and vice-versa. (Less would be gained in clarifying the relation of the Holy Spirit to the other two hypostases, or whether, how, or in what sense, the properties of begetting the Son, spirating the Spirit, and being “anarchos” or “unoriginate” count as a single *idioma* – if they do.)

I have been saying “we could” represent things in the ways above (using Bealer’s notation). However, I will be choosing not to represent them so.

As mentioned above (footnote 42, p. 286), it might be nice, in the wider context of fourth-century theological debates, and perhaps also in the context of the later *filioque* controversy, to have a greater degree of logical detail here. But we face a few problems. First is the fact that it would needlessly complicate our discussion and proofs, as these particular details are not directly relevant to the discussion of the LPT. But second, and more importantly, the greater precision of Bealer’s notation would require us to resolve certain ambiguities that it is not clear how to resolve. Specifically, it may be that the Father’s *idioma* is simply the property of “begetting” (something):

\[ [(\exists y)(Bxy)]_x \]

But perhaps it is specifically, “begetting the Son,” which would be:

\[ [Bxs]_x \]

Or, if we represent the Son as “\( \forall y[(\exists x)(Bxy)] \)”:  
\[ [B \times \forall y(\exists w)(Bwy)]_x \]
("being an x such that x begets the y such that y is begotten by some w")

Or again, perhaps the Father’s idiomata is “begetting the Only-Begotten,” which would be:

\[ [B \land \forall y((\exists w)(Bwy) \land (\forall z)((\exists w)(Bwz) \rightarrow z=y))]_x \]

("being an x such that x begets the y such that y is begotten by some w and is the only thing that is begotten by anything.")

One can see how there will be similar ambiguities for the idiomata of the Son and the Holy Spirit. (“Being begotten,” “being begotten by the Father,” or “being the only-begotten of the Father?” And if the latter, in the sense of “being the only thing that is begotten (at all), and being begotten of the Father” or in the sense of “being the only thing that is begotten by the Father?” Likewise, for the Holy Spirit, is the idiomata “being spirated” or “being spirated by the Father”? And for those who affirm the filioque, “being spirated by the Son” as a distinct relational property (raising again the question whether idiomata are really non-compossible after all)? Or is there a single property of “being spirated by the Father-and-the-Son”? And so on.) One can also see how adding this level of detail causes the formalism to become (needlessly, it would seem) cumbersome.

Furthermore, it is not at all clear to me from my reading of Gregory (or Basil, or anyone else for that matter) how exactly to resolve these ambiguities about the idiomata, or indeed whether Gregory or any of his peers even considered these ambiguities at all.

But it is also not clear to me that it makes much difference. At least not in the context of the LPT, and probably not even in the wider context of the fourth century Trinitarian controversy (though I am more open to the possibility it may make a difference in the filioque debate). So, we will choose instead to suppress whatever the
deeper logical structure of the *idiomata* might be, and represent the Father’s *idioma* of begetting (or begetting the Son, or begetting the Only-Begotten or whatever it is) simply as:

\[ b, \]

And we will represent the Son’s *idioma* of being begotten (or being begotten by the Father, or whatever it is) simply as:

\[ b^*, \]

Likewise, we will represent the Father’s *idioma* of spirating (or spirating the Holy Spirit, or whatever it is) as:

\[ p,^{48} \]

And we will represent the Holy Spirit’s *idioma* of proceeding (or proceeding from the Father, or whatever it is) as:

\[ p^*. \]

Finally, since \( b, b^*, p \) and \( p^* \) are all supposed to be *idiomata*, we can say:

\[ + \ I(i): \ Ib \]
\[ + \ I(ii): \ Ip \]
\[ + \ I(iii): \ Ib^* \]

and

---

48. This may seem confusing, but since we are already using a lower-case “s” for the Son, we are switching to “p” for “proceeding,” although it will really be “\( p^* \)” that means “proceeding.” Still, this seems easier to remember than any alternative.
As with H(i)–H(iii), perhaps not all of I(i)-I(iv) need to be counted as substantive theological assumptions. Just as we said about using “f,” “s,” and “h” to represent the hypostases (footnote 42 above, p. 286), “begetting,” “proceeding” and their converses have significant semantic content, and given the discussion just above, at the very least, the existence of begetting logically follows from the existence of being begotten and vice-versa (and likewise the fact that something instantiates one logically follows from the fact that something instantiates the other). Similarly for spirating and being spirated (i.e. proceeding).

We could almost certainly get away with making only the following small set of assumptions. (1) that there exists a Son (which is, by definition, something begotten), from which we derive the existence of the Father (along with His instantiation of begetting). Then (2) that there exists “another comforter (John 14:16) . . . who proceeds from the Father (John 15:26)” (i.e., (2a) that there exists something that is distinct from – “another” than – the Son and such that (2b) it proceeds from the Father). And to individuate the Father and the “Other Comforter” (i.e., the Holy Spirit), we would either assume the metaphysical principle (3) that the proceeding relation is irreflexive, or simply the theological assumption (3τ) that the Father does not, in fact, proceed (perhaps because He is “anarchos” or for whatever reason). Thus (depending on how one individuates assumptions) we would really have only 3 or 4 theological assumptions – or 2 or 3 theological assumptions and a metaphysical assumption – rather than 7 distinct theological assumptions.

Of course, if begetting the Son and spirating the Spirit and being “anarchos” (i.e., unbegotten and unspirated) really are somehow identical, then we only need a single assumption – the existence of the Father qua Father, i.e., the existence of an x that instantiates this single, but in some sense multi-faceted, property. I would point out
that there are such relational properties – or at least prima facie it would seem so. For example, the property of being a judge cannot be exemplified unless there are two other beings (presumably distinct both from each other and from the judge), one of which is a plaintiff and the other of which is a defendant, each one of whom bears a relation to the judge that is very similar to – yet importantly different from – that which the other bears to the judge. Thus, the very existence of a judge, qua judge, would seem to entail the existence of a total of three distinct beings, and the instantiation of all of their various defining relations. Further, if there is such a property as being a “supreme” judge (a judge such that there does not exist any “higher” judge – that is, a judge x such that there does not exist any judge y such that y is distinct from x and y could be a judge of x), then, if being a supreme judge is a simple property, it would seem to give us a scenario quite analogous to what the Father’s idioma would be on the view that begetting the Son and spirating the Spirit and being “anarchos” (neither begotten nor spirated) is all somehow one simple property.

But again, although building the further logical details of the idiomata and the descriptions of the hypostases into our representations of them would be more logically perspicuous and might allow us to show how Gregory relies on even fewer assumptions, we will simply refer to all 7 of these objects with the simple logical names we’ve specified, and treat these as 7 distinct theological assumptions.

5.3.1.3 Ousiai

Next, since every hypostasis must have an ousia, the existence of the three divine (uncreated) hypostases necessitates the existence of at least one divine ousia. What is a “divine ousia”? That is a difficult question to answer without prejudice to the heteroousian (who believes the ousiai of the three hypostases are different) or even
the *homoiousian* (who believes the *ousiai* of the three hypostases are as similar as possible, but still non-identical).

One could define a divine *ousia* as any *ousia* participated in by *all* of the three divine hypostases (Father, Son and Holy Spirit), but this would have the result that *heteroousianism* would be inconsistent with there being *any* divine *ousia* at all (since there is, on that view, no single *ousia* participated in by all three of the hypostases).

Whereas in reality *heteroousians* and *homoiousians* want to say that there are *three* divine *ousiai*, not zero. The same problem would arise if we defined a divine *ousia* as any *ousia* had by the Father (or as any *ousia* had by the Son, or as any *ousia* had by the Holy Spirit), since this would again have the result that there is only a single divine *ousia*.

On the other hand, one could define a divine *ousia* as any *ousia* participated in by *any* of the three hypostases (Father, Son or Holy Spirit). But this would entail that the human nature is divine on the assumption that the second hypostasis (the Son) participates in humanity.

It would likely be closer to the meaning of “divine *ousia*” to define it in terms of being *uncreated*, or necessary, or even hylomorphically *simple*. But a thorough discussion of any of these suggestions would introduce needless complexity for our current, limited purposes. So, since we will later argue that the three divine hypostases all share the same *ousia* anyway (whatever precisely its character), we will not try to give any precise definition as to what a divine *ousia* is, and we will simply try not to worry too much about this question. We will represent the *ousia(i)* of the three hypostases with the logical names “o,” “n” and “m.” More precisely, from the metaphysical assumption:

\[ + \text{NHO: } \Box(\forall x)[Hx \rightarrow (\exists y)(Oy \& Pxy)] \]

it follows that:
\((\forall x)[Hx \rightarrow (\exists y)(Oy \& Pxy)]\)

and from this and the theological assumptions:

\[+ \quad H(i): \quad Hf\]
\[+ \quad H(ii): \quad Hs\]
\[+ \quad H(iii): \quad Hh\]

above, and

\((\exists y)(Oy \& Pfy)\)

\((\exists y)(Oy \& Psy)\)

and

\((\exists y)(Oy \& Phy)\).

And by \(\exists\) Elimination, we simply replace the “\(y\)”s with names, thus:

\(Oo \& Pfo\)

\(On \& Psn\)

49. From NHO, by the T axiom.

Note that, throughout, I treat the T axiom, AKA “M,” as though it were an inference rule. Strictly speaking, the T axiom just says any instance of \(\square \phi \rightarrow \phi\) is true. So that, in this case, by the T axiom, we have that \(\square(\forall x)[Hx \rightarrow (\exists y)(Oy \& Pxy)] \rightarrow (\forall x)[Hx \rightarrow (\exists y)(Oy \& Pxy)].\) Then, from this and NHO \((\square(\forall x)[Hx \rightarrow (\exists y)(Oy \& Pxy)])\), by Modus Ponens, it follows that \((\forall x)[Hx \rightarrow (\exists y)(Oy \& Pxy)].\) However, since this type of inference will always be valid, that is, since any time we have a formula of the form \(\square \phi\), we can always use the T axiom followed by Modus Ponens to derive \(\phi\), for the sake of convenience. I treat the T axiom throughout as though it were a rule of inference that says, “From \(\square \phi\), infer \(\phi\).”

50. From \((\forall x)[Hx \rightarrow (\exists y)(Oy \& Pxy)]\) and \(H(i)\), by Universal Modus Ponens (hereafter, \(\forall MP\)).

51. From \((\forall x)[Hx \rightarrow (\exists y)(Oy \& Pxy)]\) and \(H(ii)\), by \(\forall MP\).

52. From \((\forall x)[Hx \rightarrow (\exists y)(Oy \& Pxy)]\) and \(H(iii)\), by \(\forall MP\).

53. From \((\exists y) \ (Oy \& Pfy)\), by \(\exists\) Elimination o/y.

54. From \((\exists y) \ (Oy \& Psy)\), by \(\exists\) Elimination n/y.
and

35. Om & Phm

which we decompose into

36. O(i): Oo
37. RH(i): Pfo
38. O(ii): On
39. RH(ii): Psn
40. O(iii): Om

and

41. RH(iii): Phm

Of course, it does not follow immediately from NHO and H(i) through H(iii) alone that the hypostases share just one ousia, that is that o=n=m. We will return (5.3.3.3, p. 318) to the question of whether the three hypostases have a single ousia (whether they are homoousios), and thus whether:

43. \( O_{\text{homoousion}} : o=n=m \)

55. From (\( \exists y \) (Oy & Phy)), by \( \exists \) Elimination m/y.
56. From Oo & Pfo, by & Elimination.
57. From Oo & Pfo, by & Elimination.
58. From On & Psn, by & Elimination.
59. From On & Psn, by & Elimination.
60. From Om & Phm, by & Elimination.
61. From Om & Phm, by & Elimination.
62. By which, of course, I mean: (o=n) & (o=m) & (n=m).
63. From O(i)–O(iii), IDO and CA. See 5.3.3.3, p. 318 below, as well as Appendix A.1, p. 425.
5.3.1.4  

Energeia Types

There are whatever *energeia* types are natural to the divine *ousia(i)* and individuate it (or them). We will call these “divine *energeia* types,” of which there must be at least one. This is a consequence of Gregory’s metaphysical view that there are no *ousiai* without natural *energeiai*, plus the existence of (at least one) divine *ousia*. That is:

\[ 0^{64} \quad O(i): \quad Oo \]

and

\[ + \quad NOE^*: \quad \Box(\forall x)[Ox \rightarrow (\exists y)(E^*y \& Nyx)] \]

entail:

\[ 0^{65} \quad (\exists y)(E^*y \& Nyo) \]

i.e., that there exists at least one divine *energeia* type.\(^{66}\)

We cannot say what the precise number and nature of the divine *energeia* types are, because no upper limit is given by Gregory and no particular limit is entailed by his other metaphysical or theological assumptions. But since there is at least one divine *energeia* type, and since Gregory believes that the predicate “is (a) God” predicates engagement in some *energeia* (specifically, in some token *energeia* of a particular divine *energeia* type), we can arbitrarily select one divine *energeia* (type)

\[ 64. \text{See footnote 56. From Oo \& Pfo, by \& Elimination.} \]

\[ 65. \text{Despite it being redundant, I note this follows from NOE* and O(i), by the T Axiom (See footnote 49 for my use of this axiom as an inference rule), followed by } \forall \text{MP.} \]

\[ 66. \text{Of course, we could say the same for } n \text{ and } m, \text{ but since we will later prove that } n = o \text{ and } m = o, \text{ we will only show our work for } o. \]
to call “god-ding,” or, in predicate logic, “g*.”  

More precisely, from:

\[ (\exists y)(E^*y \& Nyo) \]

above, it follows, by \( \exists \) Elimination, that:

\[ E^*g^* \& Ng^*o \]

(We simply name the energeia-type “g*.”) And by \& Elimination, we have:

\[ E^*(i) : E^*g^* \]

and

\[ RE^*(i) : Ng^*o \]

5.3.1.5 Energeia Tokens

There is also at least one divine energeia token (I will call “token divine energeiai” or “divine energeia tokens” all those token energeiai that “have” or are “of” some divine energeia type.)

It follows from the definition of “natural to” that for any energeia type \( x \) that is natural to some ousia \( y \), if some hypostasis \( z \) has ousia \( y \), then there must be

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67. Whatever the nature of this activity actually is – “beholding” or whatever it might be (See Chapter 4.4.1, p. 235 for more on that). The precise nature of this energeia is not relevant for our purposes, so we will simply call it “god-ding” and not worry about what exactly it amounts to.

68. See footnote 65. From NOE* and O(i), by the T Axiom (See footnote 49 for my use of this axiom as an inference rule), followed by \( \forall MP \).

69. From \( (\exists y)(E^*y \& Nyo) \), by \( \exists \) Elimination \( g^*/y \).

70. From \( E^*g^* \& Ng^*o \), by \& Elimination.

71. Again, from \( E^*g^* \& Ng^*o \), by \& Elimination.
some token *energeia* w such that w has *energeia* type x, and such that w is had by hypostasis z.

I.e., from:

\[\text{N}_{\text{Def}}: (\forall x)(\forall y)\{N_{xy} \leftrightarrow \Box(\forall z)(P_{zy} \rightarrow (\exists w)(E_w & P_{wx} & P_{zw}))\}\]

It follows that:

\[\text{NE}^*\text{E}: (\forall x)(\forall y)\{(E^*x & O_y & N_{xy}) \rightarrow (\forall z)[(H_z & P_{zy}) \rightarrow (\exists w)(E_w & P_{wx} & P_{zw})]\}\]

And so, assuming (as we have already derived) that the divine *ousia* (1) is an *ousia*, and (2) is had by some hypostasis, it follows that any *energeia* type natural to the divine *ousia* will be had by at least one token *energeia*. That is, from:

\[\text{NE}^*\text{E}: (\forall x)(\forall y)\{(E^*x & O_y & N_{xy}) \rightarrow (\forall z)[(H_z & P_{zy}) \rightarrow (\exists w)(E_w & P_{wx} & P_{zw})]\}\]

\[\text{O}(i): O_o\]

\[+ \quad \text{H}(i): H_f\]

and

\[\text{RH}(i): P_f\]

---

72. Stipulative definition.

73. Proof in Appendix A.2, p. 427. Note that I omit any modal operators from NE*E to avoid certain unnecessary complications, and because, for our purposes, we will only need a non-modal version of it.

74. See footnote 73. Proof in Appendix A.2, p. 427. Note that I omit any modal operators from NE*E to avoid certain unnecessary complications, and because, for our purposes, we will only need a non-modal version of it.

75. See footnote 56. From Oo & Pfo, by & Elimination.

76. See footnote 57. From Oo & Pfo, by & Elimination.
it follows that:

\[ E^*_{\text{Lemma}}: (\forall x)[(E^*x \& Nxo) \rightarrow (\exists y)(Ey \& Pyx)] \]

And since, by hypothesis, god-ding (g*) is a divine *energeia* type (an *energeia* type natural to the divine *ousia*), there must be at least one token of that type. That is, from \( E^*_{\text{Lemma}} \) and:

\[ E^*g^* \& Ng^*o \]

above, it follows that:

\[ (\exists y)(Ey \& Pyg^*) \]

We will discuss the precise number of divine *energeia* tokens below. But at this point, we do not know the precise number of them. So, just as we did with the divine *energeia* type god-ding, we will simply arbitrarily select some token *energeia* that has *energeia* type g* and name it: “g.” In other words, from:

\[ (\exists y)(Ey \& Pyg^*) \]

it follows that:

\[ Eg \& Pgg^* \]

\[ E(i): Eg \]

---

77. From NE*E, O(i), H(i) and RH(i). Proof in Appendix A.3, p. 429.
78. See footnote 69. From \((\exists y)(E^*y \& Nyo)\), by \( \exists \) Elimination \( g^*/y \).
79. From: \( E^*_{\text{Lemma}} \) and \( E^*g^* \& Ng^*o \), by \( \forall \)MP.
80. See footnote 79. From: \( E^*_{\text{Lemma}} \) and \( E^*g^* \& Ng^*o \), by \( \forall \)MP.
81. From \((\exists y)(Ey \& Pyg^*)\) above, by \( \exists \) Elimination \( (g/y) \).
82. From \( Eg \& Pgg^* \), by \& Elimination.
and:

\[ \text{0}^{83} \text{ RE(i): Pgg}^* \]

We will see later that, not only must there be at least one divine \textit{energeia} type and at least one divine \textit{energeia} token that has that type, but that, depending on whether an \textit{energeia} token can belong to multiple \textit{energeia} types, the number of divine \textit{energeia} tokens that exist prior to creation is either exactly equal to the number of divine \textit{energeia} types or is equal to some whole number from one up to the cardinality of the power set of the divine \textit{energeia} types minus one. I think, however, it is almost certain that Gregory would take the view that there is exactly one divine \textit{energeia} token of each divine \textit{energeia} type, for reasons we will discuss later (5.3.3.5, p. 321 ff.).

Assuming, then, that there are no other hypostases, \textit{ousiai}, or \textit{idiomata} prior to creation, and ignoring whatever additional \textit{energeia} types and tokens besides \textit{g}\(^*\) and \textit{g} there might be, the ten objects (or nine, or even six, depending on one’s view about the \textit{idiomata})\(^{84}\) discussed above (\textit{o, f, s, h, b, b\(^*\), p, p\(^*\), g\(^*\), and g})\(^{85}\) are the only objects Gregory postulates to exist “prior to creation,” and are all we will need to concern ourselves with.\(^{86}\) Although we have mentioned in passing some of the

\(^{83}\) Again, from Eg & Pgg\(^*\), by & Elimination.

\(^{84}\) That is, depending on whether we take Gregory to hold that there are just three \textit{idiomata}, so that the Father really does have only a single \textit{idioma}, in which case, \textit{b}=\textit{p}, so there would really be only 9 distinct objects “prior to creation.” Further, if we take quite literally the claim that a hypostasis \textit{just is} a bundle of \textit{idiomata} (or just is the “individuating sign”), then \textit{f}=\textit{b}=\textit{p}; \textit{s}=\textit{b}\(^*\); and \textit{h}=\textit{p}\(^*\). In that case, there would really be only 6 distinct objects “prior to creation.” I include this remark for the sake of thoroughness, and as it may be of interest to metaphysicians, but it does not seem to me that much hangs on it for the purposes of establishing the logical consistency of the doctrine.

\(^{85}\) Since we will later show that the \textit{ousiai} of the three hypostases are all identical (see 5.3.3.3, p. 318), I am already counting \textit{m, n} and \textit{o} as a single object.

\(^{86}\) Strictly speaking, the only objects Gregory \textit{postulates} are the hypostases and the \textit{idiomata} (and perhaps only one or two of the hypostases and only one or two of the \textit{idiomata}). The existence
relations between some of these objects, in the next section we will look at all such relations that are relevant to our purposes.

5.3.2 Relations Posited Between the Token Objects

5.3.2.1 Relations Had by the Hypostases

First, the three hypostases have the intra-trinitarian relations as their *idiomata*, as follows.

The Father has “begetting the Son” (or simply, “begetting.”)

\[+/0^{87}\quad \text{RH(vi): Pfb}\]

The Father has “spirating the Spirit” (or simply, “spirating.”)

\[+/0^{88}\quad \text{RH(vii): Pfp}\]

Since the Father is “anarchos,” He does not have “being begotten by the Father” (or being begotten by anything at all).

\[+\quad \text{RH(viii): } \neg \text{Pfb*}\]

of all the others follow from those, their metaphysical predication relations, and his metaphysics. But the existence of these ten uncreated objects are what Gregory is committed to.

87. Of course, due to the way we’ve represented the relation between hypostases and *idiomata*, this does not follow as a strictly logical consequence of RH(xii) (Psbb*). However, it is certainly part of the understanding of relatives or relative properties that Gregory was working with, that the existence of a relative necessitates the existence of the correlative. Aristotle does note some exceptions, but these seem to deal with issues of modality. (For example, the existence of the perceptible does not necessitate the existence of a perceiver.) However, “father” and “son” are paradigm cases of correlatives either of whose existence would necessitate that of the other.

88. See footnote 87 above. Due to the way we’ve represented the relation between hypostases and *idiomata*, this does not follow as a strictly logical consequence of RH(xvii) (Pbpp*). However, it is certainly part of the understanding of relatives or relative properties that Gregory was working with, that the existence of a relative necessitates the existence of the correlative. It’s less clear, of course, that the Holy Spirit’s simply proceeding would entail that the Father, in particular, spirates. On the other hand, if p* is proceeding from the Father, then it’s obvious why this would entail that the Father spirates the Spirit (which is what Pfp would say if we interpret p as spirating the Spirit.
Since the Father is “anarchos,” He does not have “being spirated by the Father” (or being spirated by anything at all).

\[ \text{RH(ix): } \neg \text{Pfp}\]

The Son does not have “begetting the Son” (or begetting anything at all).

\[+/0 \text{ RH(x): } \neg \text{Ps}b\]

Whether or not the Son has “spirating the Spirit” (or simply “spirating”) is at the heart of the *filioque* controversy, and is obviously a matter of great contention. We won’t attempt to settle the issue here, though we can note that, on IDH\textsubscript{Weak}, Psp is compatible with \(f \neq s\) (given RH(viii) and RH(xii) – that the Father is unbegotten while the Son is begotten), but simply an additional, logically contingent, assumption.\(^{90}\) On the other hand, on IDH\textsubscript{Strong}, Psp is incompatible with RH(vii) (that the Father spirates) and \(f \neq s\) (thus, incompatible with RH(vii), RH(viii) and RH(xii)). See 5.3.3.1, p. 317 ff. for more.

\[+/0 \text{ RH(xi): } \text{Psp? / } \neg \text{Psp?}\]

The Son has “being begotten of the Father” (or simply, “being begotten.”)

\(^{89}\) On IDH\textsubscript{Weak}, this would be an additional theological assumption or follow from an additional metaphysical assumption that the begetting relation is irreflexive. (Assuming the *idioma* here is specifically begetting the Son. If the *idioma* is simply begetting *something*, then it would probably be best simply to add the fact that the Son is the Only-Begotten, i.e., \(\text{Ps}\ast \& (\forall x)(\text{Pxb}\ast \rightarrow x=s)\).

On IDH\textsubscript{Strong}, RH(x) simply follows from RH(viii), RH(xii) and RH(vi). That is, the fact that the Father is unbegotten while the Son is begotten individuates them, and on IDH\textsubscript{Strong} they cannot share any other *idiomata*, so the fact that the Father begets and the Father and Son are distinct, on IDH\textsubscript{Strong}, entails that the Son does not beget.

\(^{90}\) Of course, I don’t mean contingent in the “broadly” logical sense – that there are possible worlds where the Spirit proceeds from the Son and possible worlds where He doesn’t. I mean, in the “narrowly” logical sense, that neither Psp nor \(\neg \text{Psp}\) is logically entailed by any combination of the other propositions in GNT\textsubscript{F}, if GNT\textsubscript{F} includes only IDH\textsubscript{Weak} and not IDH\textsubscript{Strong}.

\(^{91}\) On IDH\textsubscript{Weak}, Psp is possible, but an additional assumption. On IDH\textsubscript{Strong}, \(\neg \text{Psp}\) follows from RH(vii) and \(f \neq s\) (thus, from RH(vii), RH(viii) and RH(xii)). See 5.3.3.1, p. 317 ff. for more.

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+ RH(xii): Psb*

The Son does not have “being spirated by the Father” (or being spirated by anything at all).

+/0\textsuperscript{92} RH(xiii): ¬Psp*

The Spirit does not have “begetting the Son” (or begetting anything at all).

+/0\textsuperscript{93} RH(xiv): ¬Phb

The Spirit does not have “spirating the Spirit” (or spirating anything at all).

+/0\textsuperscript{94} RH(xv): ¬Php

The Spirit does not have being begotten by the Father (or being begotten by anything at all).

+\textsuperscript{95} RH(xvi): ¬Phb*

92. On IDH\textsubscript{Weak}, both this and its negation would be consistent with our other assumptions about the \textit{idiomata}, and either one would have to be counted as an additional theological assumption. On IDH\textsubscript{Strong}, this follows from RH(xii) (Psb*), RH(xvi) (¬Phb*) (which together entail s≠h) and RH(xvii) (Php*).

93. On IDH\textsubscript{Weak}, this is an additional theological assumption. On IDH\textsubscript{Strong}, it follows from RH(ix) (¬Pfp*), RH(xvii) (Php*) (which together entail f≠h) and RH(vi) (Pfb).

94. On IDH\textsubscript{Weak}, this is an additional theological assumption (or follows from an additional metaphysical assumption that the spirating relation is irreflexive, if p is spirating \textit{the Spirit} in particular. If p is simply \textit{spirating}, then it must be an additional assumption.) On IDH\textsubscript{Strong}, it follows from RH(ix) (¬Pfp*), RH(xvii) (Php*) (which together entail f≠h) and RH(vii) (Pfp).

95. I count this as an additional theological assumption necessary to individuate the Son and Spirit. Of course, one traditional argument in favor of the \textit{filioque} is that it is necessary in order to individuate the Son and Spirit (along with, either the additional theological assumption that the Spirit does not spirate, or if we take p to mean \textit{spirate the Spirit}, the additional metaphysical assumption that spiration is irreflexive). But, ironically, the \textit{filioque} in fact entails the opposite on IDH\textsubscript{Strong} and is simply irrelevant on IDH\textsubscript{Weak}.

Of course, on IDH\textsubscript{Strong}, the \textit{filioque} entails that the Father and Son are identical, and since the Father and Spirit are distinct, it follows that the Son and the Spirit are distinct (since the Son is the Father). But it also entails that the Son and Spirit are identical, since the fact that the Father is unbegotten (RH(viii)) and the Son is begotten (RH(x)) and that they are identical is a
The Spirit has “being spirated by the Father” (or simply, “being spirated.”)

RH(xvii): Php*

We said above that the three hypostases each have an ousia, which we’ve represented as:

0\(^{96}\) RH(i): Pfo
0\(^{97}\) RH(ii): Psn
0\(^{98}\) RH(iii): Phm

Of course, the Cappadocians’ argument with the Eunomians centered around whether these were a single ousia or multiple ousiai, and we saw that the UNA centers on these being a single ousia. That is:

contradiction. Thus, on IDHStrong, Psp simply yields a contradiction, which entails everything – including that the Son and Spirit are identical (despite also being distinct). But such is the way with contradictions.

More importantly, consider the case of IDH\(_{\text{Weak}}\) (the only scenario in which the filioque is really interesting, since the only scenario in which it is really possible). First, suppose we simply assume (take it as a premise), as I suggest we do, that the Spirit is not begotten. Then, since the Son is begotten, they two are individuated anyway, so whether the Son spirates the Spirit or not is irrelevant to the question whether they are distinct.

Second, suppose that the Son and Spirit are individuated in any other way at all (whether because they differ with respect to spiration, or anything else at all). So h\(\neq s\). But the Son is the Only-Begotten. I.e., Psb\(*\) & (\(\forall x\))(Pxb\(*\) \(\rightarrow x=s\)). But those two propositions directly entail (by Universal Modus Tollens) \(\neg\)Phb\(*\). So any other strategy for individuating the Son and Holy Spirit will entail that the Spirit is not begotten anyway, making any other strategy for individuating the Son and the Spirit (whether the filioque or anything else) superfluous.

Of course, all of this assumes that the relations of begetting and proceeding are distinct relations, which is also controversial in the context of the filioque dispute. But it shouldn’t be. Again, any strategy for individuating the Son and Spirit will entail that the Spirit is not begotten (since the Son is the Only-Begotten). But anyone will admit that the Spirit does proceed. So, since by anyone’s admission, the Spirit proceeds (Psp\(*\)) but is not begotten (\(\neg\)Psb\(*\)), proceeding and being begotten cannot be the same relation (p\(*\neq b\(*\).

Thus, as I said, the filioque is, ironically, irrelevant to the individuation of the Son and the Holy Spirit, and we may as well simply count \(\neg\)Phb\(*\) as a theological assumption which individuates the Son and Spirit.

96. See footnote 57. From Oo & Pfo, by \& Elimination.


98. See footnote 61. From Om & Phm, by \& Elimination.
As we saw in the previous chapter, Gregory argues for the *homoousion* (O\textsubscript{homoousion}) on the basis of what I have called “the Cappadocian Assertion” (CA).\textsuperscript{100} We will discuss this argument and give a proof of O\textsubscript{homoousion} from O(i)–O(iii), IDO and CA below (See 5.3.3.3, p. 318, as well as Appendix A.1, p. 425.). For the moment, it is sufficient to note that from:

RH(ii): Psn
RH(iii): Phm

and

O\textsubscript{homoousion}: o = n = m

it follows, respectively, that:

RH(iv): Pso

and

RH(v): Pho

Discussions of Gregory’s theology, and the theology of the Cappadocians more generally, often focus on the *homoousion* and the Cappadocian Assertion. But although debate about the *homoousion* took center stage in the 4\textsuperscript{th}-century controversy,

\textsuperscript{99} From O(i)–O(iii), IDO and CA. See 5.3.3.3, p. 318 below, as well as Appendix A.1, p. 425.

\textsuperscript{100} We saw this especially in *Ad Eustathium*. See Chapter 4.4.4.2, p. 252.

\textsuperscript{101} See footnote 59. From On & Psn, by & Elimination.

\textsuperscript{102} See footnote 61. From Om & Phm, by & Elimination.

\textsuperscript{103} From O(i)–O(iii), IDO and CA. See 5.3.3.3, p. 318 below, as well as Appendix A.1, p. 425.

\textsuperscript{104} From RH(ii) and O\textsubscript{homoousion}, by substitutivity of identity (hereafter, “by =”) n/o.

\textsuperscript{105} From RH(iii) and O\textsubscript{homoousion}, by = m/o.
the key to Gregory’s solution to the LPT lies not in the three divine hypostases’ sharing all their natural *energeia types* (which is how I’ve interpreted the Cappadocian Assertion, 4.4.4.2, p. 252), but in their actually sharing *token* divine *energeiai*. We will discuss the individuation of the token divine *energeiai* below (5.3.3.5, p. 321 ff.). For now, we note that from:

0 N<sub>Def</sub>: \((\forall x)(\forall y)\{Nxy \leftrightarrow \Box(\forall z)[Pzy \rightarrow (\exists w)(Ew & Pwx & Pzw)]\}\}

making the substitutions \(g^*/x\) and \(o/y\) in \(N<sub>Def</sub>\) yields:

0<sup>106</sup> \(Ng^*/o \leftrightarrow \Box(\forall z)[Pzo \rightarrow (\exists w)(Ew & Pwg^* & Pzw)]\)

which together with:

0<sup>107</sup> RE*(i): \(Ng^*/o\)

entails:

0<sup>108</sup> \(\Box(\forall z)[Pzo \rightarrow (\exists w)(Ew & Pwg^* & Pzw)]\), and thus:

0<sup>109</sup> \((\forall z)[Pzo \rightarrow (\exists w)(Ew & Pwg^* & Pzw)]\)

and making the substitutions, \(f/z\), and \(s/z\), and \(h/z\), respectively, yield:

0<sup>110</sup> Pfo \(\rightarrow (\exists w)(Ew & Pwg^* & Pfw)\)
0<sup>111</sup> Pso \(\rightarrow (\exists w)(Ew & Pwg^* & Psw)\)

106. From \(N<sub>Def</sub>\), by \(\forall\) Elimination, \(g^*/x, o/y\).
107. See footnote 71. From E*\(g^*\) & \(Ng^*/o\), by \& Elimination.
108. From \(Ng^*/o \leftrightarrow \Box(\forall z)[Pzo \rightarrow (\exists w)(Pwg^* & Pzw)]\), and RE*(i): \(Ng^*/o\), above, by \(\leftrightarrow\) Elimination.
109. From \(\Box(\forall z)[Pzo \rightarrow (\exists w)(Pwg^* & Pzw)]\), above, by the T Axiom (See footnote 49 for my use of this axiom as an inference rule).
110. From \((\forall z)[Pzo \rightarrow (\exists w)(Pwg^* & Pzw)]\), above, by \(\forall\) Elimination, \(f/z\).
111. From \((\forall z)[Pzo \rightarrow (\exists w)(Pwg^* & Pzw)]\), above, by \(\forall\) Elimination, \(s/z\).
$0^{112}$ Pho $\to (\exists w)(Ew \& Pwg^* \& Phw)$

which together with

$0^{113}$ RH(i): Pfo

$0^{114}$ RH(iv): Pso

and

$0^{115}$ RH(v): Pho

entail, respectively:

$0^{116}$ P1$_{GNT-F}$. $(\exists w)(Ew \& Pwg^* \& Pfw)$

$0^{117}$ P2$_{GNT-F}$. $(\exists w)(Ew \& Pwg^* \& Psw)$

$0^{118}$ P3$_{GNT-F}$. $(\exists w)(Ew \& Pwg^* \& Phw)$

which, by three applications of $\exists$ Elimination ($g'/w$, $g''/w$, then $g'''/w$), yield, respectively:

$0^{119}$ Eg'$ & Pg'^* & Pfg'$

$0^{120}$ Eg'' & Pg''^* & Psg''

112. From $(\forall z)[Pzo \to (\exists w)(Pwg^* \& Pzw)]$, above, by $\forall$ Elimination, h/z.

113. See footnote 57. From Oo & Pfo, by $\&$ Elimination.

114. See footnote 104. From RH(ii) and $O_{homoousion}$, by $= o/n$.

115. See footnote 105. From RH(iii) and $O_{homoousion}$, by $= o/m$.

116. From RH(i) (Pfo), and Pfo $\to (\exists w)(Ew\&Pwg^*\&Pfw)$, above, MP.

117. From RH(iv) (Pso), and Pso $\to (\exists w)(Ew\&Pwg^*\&Psw)$, above, MP.

118. From RH(v) (Pho), and Pho $\to (\exists w)(Ew\&Pwg^*\&Phw)$, above, MP.

119. From P1$_{GNT-F}$, by $\exists$ Elimination, $g'/w$

120. From P2$_{GNT-F}$, by $\exists$ Elimination, $g''/w$. 

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and thus:

\[ \text{Lemma: } \text{Eg} & \text{Pg} \]

and

\[ \text{RH(xviii): } \text{Pfg} \]
\[ \text{RH(xix): } \text{Psg} \]
\[ \text{RH(xx): } \text{Phg} \]

And in 5.3.3.5, pp. 321–332, below, we will show that:

\[ \Sigma_{g^*}: \quad g = g' = g'' = g''' \]

which, together with RH(xviii)–RH(xx), will entail:

\[ \text{RH(xxi): } \text{Pfg} \]
\[ \text{RH(xxii): } \text{Psg} \]

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121. From P3\text{GNT-F}, by \exists Elimination, \text{g}^w/w.
122. From Eg' & Pg'g* & Pfg', above, by & Elimination.
123. From Eg'' & Pg''g* & Psg'', above, by & Elimination.
124. From Eg''' & Pg'''g* & Phg''', above, by & Elimination.
125. From Eg' & Pg'g* & Pfg', above, by & Elimination.
126. From Eg'' & Pg''g* & Psg'', above, by & Elimination.
127. From Eg''' & Pg'''g* & Phg''', above, by & Elimination.
128. See footnote 186, p. 327.
129. From RH(xviii) (Pfg') and \Sigma_{g^*}, by = g/g'.
130. From RH(xix) (Psg'') and \Sigma_{g^*}, by = g/g''.
5.3.2.2 Relations Had by the Idiomata

The idiomata are had by the three hypostases in the ways described in the section on hypostases above (RH(vi) – RH(xviii)), and we will not repeat that discussion here.

Additionally, although within Gregory’s metaphysics they are the sorts of things that would be candidates to be, the idiomata are not had by any of the divine energeia tokens. Thus, prior to creation:

+ ¬EI: ¬(∃x)(∃y)(Ex & Iy & Pxy)

5.3.2.3 Relations Had by the Ousia

The divine ousia is had by all the hypostases, as discussed above (RH(i), RH(iv) and RH(v), p. 307 ff.), a discussion we will complete below (5.3.3.3, p. 318 ff. and Appendix A.1, p. 425.). It is not itself had by anything else, nor does it itself bear metaphysical predication relations to (“have”) anything at all. Nor is it natural to anything. Certain energeia types are natural to it, as described in the following subsection.

5.3.2.4 Relations Had by the Divine Energiea Types

As mentioned above, certain energeia types (“divine energeia types”) are natural to the divine ousia, thus:

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131. From RH(xx) (Phg\(\mu\)) and \(\Sigma_{g^+}\), by = \(g/g^m\).
Again, we will not here settle the question of how many divine *energeia* types there are. But we have arbitrarily selected one such *energeia* type and named it “g*,” thus:

\[ \exists y \left( E^*y \& Nyo \right) \]

Although on Gregory’s view it is clear that there must be at least one divine *energeia* type that is natural to the divine *ousia*, some interesting questions remain as to whether a divine *energeia* type could also be natural to a created *ousia*. That is, if *ousiai* are individuated “weakly,” whether some *energeia* type could be natural both to the divine *ousia* and to one or more non-divine *ousiai*.

Likewise, regardless of the answer to that question, there is nothing in Gregory’s metaphysics to say that a non-divine hypostasis could not have a token of some divine *energeia* type, indeed, there is nothing in Gregory’s metaphysics (at least this subset of his metaphysics – the metaphysics contained in GNT) to say that a non-divine hypostasis could not synergize with a divine hypostasis on some token *energeia*. But we will not further pursue those matters here.

### 5.3.2.5 Relations Had by the Divine *Energeia* Tokens

The divine *energeia* tokens are had by the three hypostases in the ways described in the section on hypostases above (RH(xviii) – RH(xxii)). To repeat:

\[ \text{RH(xviii): } \text{Pfg} \]

---

132. See footnote 65. From NOE* and O(i), by the T Axiom (See footnote 49 for my use of this axiom as an inference rule), followed by \( \forall \text{MP} \).

133. See footnote 71. From \( E^*g^* \& Ng^*o \), by \& Elimination.

134. See footnote 125. From \( Egt \& Pfg^* \& Pfg \), above, by \& Elimination.
And again, in 5.3.3.5, pp. 321–332, below, we will show that:

\[ \Sigma_{g^*} : \quad g = g' = g'' = g''' \]

which, together with RH(xviii)–RH(xx), will entail:

\[ \text{RH(xxi): Pfg} \]
\[ \text{RH(xxii): Psg} \]
\[ \text{RH(xxiii): Phg} \]

Additionally, \( g / g' / g'' / g''' \) is a token of \( g^* \), thus:

\[ \text{RE(i): Pgg^*} \]

Finally, although within Gregory’s metaphysics they are the sorts of things that would be candidates to, the divine energeia tokens do not have any of the idiomata. (None of the divine energeiai tokens beget or spirate anything, nor are they begotten or spirated by anything.) Thus, prior to creation:

\[ + \neg EI : \neg (\exists x)(\exists y)(Ex \& Iy \& Pxy) \]

---

135. See footnote 126. From Eg\( ^n \) & Pgm* & Psn, above, by & Elimination.
136. See footnote 127. From Eg\( ^m \) & Pgm* & Phm, above, by & Elimination.
137. See footnote 186, p. 327.
138. See footnote 129. From RH(xviii) (Pfg\( ^l \)) and \( \Sigma_{g^*} \), by \( g / g' \).
139. See footnote 130. From RH(xix) (Psg\( ^m \)) and \( \Sigma_{g^*} \), by \( g / g'' \).
140. See footnote 131. From RH(xx) (Phg\( ^n \)) and \( \Sigma_{g^*} \), by \( g / g''' \).
141. See footnote 83. From Eg & Pgg*, by & Elimination.
5.3.3 Individuation of the Token Objects

5.3.3.1 The Individuation of the Hypostases

The three hypostases of the Trinity are all numerically distinct, being individuated by their *idiomata*. Recall that Gregory’s principle of individuation for hypostases is either:

+ **IDHWeak**: \( \Box(\forall x)(\forall y)\{[Hx \land Hy] \rightarrow [x=y \iff (\forall z)(Iz \rightarrow [Pxz \leftrightarrow Pyz])]\}\)

i.e., necessarily, for any hypostases, x and y, x and y are identical if and only if x and y have *all and only* the same *idiomata*,\(^{142}\) or:

+ **IDHStrong**: \( \Box(\forall x)(\forall y)\{[Hx \land Hy] \rightarrow [x=y \iff (\exists z)(Iz \land [Pxz \land Pyz])]\}\)

i.e., necessarily, for any hypostases, x and y, x and y are identical if and only if x and y have *any idiomata* in common.\(^{143}\)

First let us consider the individuation of the hypostases on **IDHWeak**.

The Father and the Son are individuated by \(b^*\). That is, making the substitutions \(f/x\) and \(s/y\) in **IDHWeak**, yields:

\[0^{144} [Hf \land Hs] \rightarrow [f=s \iff (\forall z)(Iz \rightarrow [Pfz \leftrightarrow Psz])]\]

Since on Gregory’s theology the Father and the Son are both hypostases, it follows that:

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\(^{142}\) See footnote 31, p. 281 for a discussion of why I do not include *ousiai* as objects that would individuate hypostases.

\(^{143}\) See footnote 31, p. 281 for a discussion of why I do not include *ousiai* as objects that would individuate hypostases.

\(^{144}\) From **IDHWeak**, by the T Axiom, followed by \(\forall\) Elimination, \(f/x\) and \(s/y\).
I.e., the Father and the Son are identical if and only if it is the case that they have all the same *idiomata*.

So, suppose that the Father and Son were identical:

\[ f = s \]

It would follow that they have all the same *idiomata*:

\[ (\forall z)(Iz \rightarrow [Pfz \leftrightarrow Psz]) \]

But on Gregory’s theology, being begotten (or being begotten by the Father) is an *idioma* that the Son has, but that the Father lacks:

\[ I^b* & (\neg Pb^* & Psb^*) \]

Which contradicts the previous statement (that they have all the same idiomata). Therefore, by reduc**tio**, the Father and Son are not identical:

\[ P_{GNT-F}: f \neq s \]

Although we will not give the proofs in details, the Father and Son would be

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145. From \( H(i) \) (Hf) and \( H(ii) \) (Hs), it follows that \( (Hf \& Hs) \), by \& Introduction.
Then from \( (Hf \& Hs) \) and \( [Hf \& Hs] \rightarrow [f=s \leftrightarrow (\forall z)(Iz \rightarrow [Pfz \leftrightarrow Psz])] \), just above, \( f=s \leftrightarrow (\forall z)(Iz \rightarrow [Pfz \leftrightarrow Psz]) \) follows by MP.

146. Assumption for reduc**tio**.

147. From \( f=s \) and \( f=s \leftrightarrow (\forall z)(Iz \rightarrow [Pfz \leftrightarrow Psz]) \), just above, by \& Elimination.

148. From \( I(iii) \), RH(viii) and RH(xii)

149. Proof is left as an exercise for the reader.

150. From \( f=s \leftrightarrow (\forall z)(Iz \rightarrow [Pfz \leftrightarrow Psz]) \) and \( I^b* \& \neg Pb^* \& Psb^* \), by reduc**tio**. Proof is trivial, and left as an exercise for the reader. In terms of substantive assumptions, then:

\( P_{GNT-F} \) follows from \( IDH_{Weak}, H(i), H(ii), I(iii), RH(viii) \) and RH(xii).
individuated by b as well.\textsuperscript{151} Whether they are individuated by p is at the heart of the \textit{filioque} controversy.\textsuperscript{152} They are of course not individuated by \( p^* \).\textsuperscript{153}

It is obvious that parallel proofs can be given for the individuation of the Father and the Holy Spirit, and for the individuation of the Son and the Holy Spirit as well. So we will not give the proofs, but only note the following.

First, with respect to:

\textbf{0}\textsuperscript{154} \( P_{5\text{GNT-F}} \): \( f \neq h \)

the Father and the Holy Spirit are individuated by \( p^* \).\textsuperscript{155} They are individuated by p as well.\textsuperscript{156} They are also individuated by b.\textsuperscript{157} They are not individuated by \( b^* \).\textsuperscript{158}

Finally, with respect to:

\textbf{0}\textsuperscript{159} \( P_{6\text{GNT-F}} \): \( s \neq h \)

the Son and the Holy Spirit are individuated by \( b^* \).\textsuperscript{160} The two are also individuated by \( p^* \).\textsuperscript{161} Whether they are individuated by p is at the heart of the \textit{filioque}

\textsuperscript{151} I.e., \( P_{4\text{GNT-F}} \) follows from IDH\textsubscript{Weak}, H(i), H(ii), I(i), RH(vi) and RH(x), assuming we have RH(vi) and RH(x) as additional theological assumptions to appeal to.

\textsuperscript{152} I.e., \( P_{4\text{GNT-F}} \) would follow from IDH\textsubscript{Weak}, H(i), H(ii), I(ii), RH(vii) and \( \neg P_{sp} \), if we made that assumption.

\( P_{4\text{GNT-F}} \) obviously does not follow from IDH\textsubscript{Weak}, H(i), H(ii), I(ii), RH(vii) and \( P_{sp} \).

\textsuperscript{153} I.e., \( P_{4\text{GNT-F}} \) does not follow from IDH\textsubscript{Weak}, H(i), H(ii), I(iv), RH(ix) and RH(xiii).

\textsuperscript{154} From IDH\textsubscript{Weak}, H(i), H(ii), I(ii), RH(vii) and RH(xv). Proof omitted.

\textsuperscript{155} I.e., \( P_{5\text{GNT-F}} \) follows from IDH\textsubscript{Weak}, H(i), H(iii), I(iv), RH(ix) and RH(xvii).

\textsuperscript{156} I.e., \( P_{5\text{GNT-F}} \) follows from IDH\textsubscript{Weak}, H(i), H(iii), I(ii), RH(vii) and RH(xv).

\textsuperscript{157} I.e., \( P_{5\text{GNT-F}} \) follows from IDH\textsubscript{Weak}, H(i), H(iii), I(i), RH(vi) and RH(xiv).

\textsuperscript{158} I.e., \( P_{5\text{GNT-F}} \) does not follow from IDH\textsubscript{Weak}, H(i), H(iii), I(iii), RH(viii) and RH(xvi).

\textsuperscript{159} From IDH\textsubscript{Weak}, H(ii), H(iii), I(iii), RH(xii) and RH(xvi). Proof omitted.

\textsuperscript{160} I.e., \( P_{6\text{GNT-F}} \) follows from IDH\textsubscript{Weak}, H(ii), H(iii), I(iii), RH(xii) and RH(xvi).

\textsuperscript{161} I.e., \( P_{6\text{GNT-F}} \) follows from IDH\textsubscript{Weak}, H(ii), H(iii), I(iv), RH(xiii) and RH(xvii).
controversy. They are not individuated by b.

Since IDH_{Strong} requires that the hypostases differ with respect to all of the idiomata, the proofs become so lengthy it seems unreasonable to include them explicitly. But it should be obvious how they would go, given that, on the assumption that the filioque (Psp) is false, we have:

\[
\begin{align*}
P_{fb} & \land \neg P_{sb} \\
P_{fp} & \land \neg P_{sp} \\
\neg P_{fb}^* & \land P_{sb}^* \\
\neg P_{fp}^* & \land \neg P_{sp}^* \\
P_{fb} & \land \neg P_{hb} \\
P_{fp} & \land \neg P_{hp} \\
\neg P_{fb}^* & \land \neg P_{hb}^* \\
\neg P_{fp}^* & \land P_{sp}^* \\
\neg P_{sb} & \land \neg P_{hb} \\
\neg P_{sp} & \land \neg P_{hp}
\end{align*}
\]

162. I.e., P_{6 GNT-F} follows from IDH_{Weak}, H(ii), H(iii), I(ii), RH(xv) and Psp. P_{6 GNT-F} does not follow from IDH_{Weak}, H(ii), H(iii), I(ii), RH(xv) and \neg Psp.

163. I.e., P_{6 GNT-F} does not follow from IDH_{Weak}, H(ii), H(iii), I(i), RH(x) and RH(xiv).

164. Otherwise the Father and Son will be identical, since \{IDH_{Strong}, P_{fp}, Psp\} \vdash f=s.

165. Technically speaking, Psp may not be the right way – certainly it is not the only way – to interpret the filioque. It may be that one ought to interpret the word “filioque” in an equivocal way. The Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father in the sense of deriving His hypostasis, or concrete existence, from the Father. Whereas he proceeds from the Son only in the “economic” sense of being sent into the world by the Son. Psp is simply the most straight-forward way of reading the filioque in a metaphysically serious sort of way. Thus, the problem of the filioque arises out of a combination of (1) assuming that IDH_{Strong} gives the correct identity conditions for hypostases, and (2) interpreting the word “filioque” in a metaphysically serious way. The problem does not arise from (1) by itself.
\[ \text{Psb* \& \neg \text{Phb*}} \]
\[ \neg \text{Psp*} \& \text{Psp*} \]

And thus (assuming the falsehood of Psp), none of the hypostases shares any *idiomata* with any of the others.

5.3.3.2 The Individuation of the *Idiomata*

We are assuming that there are either three or four *idiomata* (b, p, b* and p*), and, although it is unclear whether b=p or b\neq p, it seems they are all otherwise supposed to be distinct, and any *idiomata* that are distinct, are *intrinsically* distinct (5.2.5.2, p. 281).

5.3.3.3 The Individuation of the *Ousia*

There is a single divine *ousia*, individuated by its natural *energeiai*.

Recall our principle of individuation for *ousiai* is:

\[ \text{+ IDO: } \Box (\forall x)(\forall y)[(\text{Ox} \& \text{Oy}) \rightarrow (x=y \leftrightarrow (\forall z)[\text{E}^* z \rightarrow (\text{Nzx} \leftrightarrow \text{Nzy})])] \]

Also recall that the Cappadocian Assertion (CA) was the claim that the hypostases (or more precisely, their *ousiai*) share all the same natural *energeiai*. I.e., Gregory asserts that:

\[ \text{+ CA: } (\forall x)[\text{E}^* x \rightarrow (\text{Nxo} \leftrightarrow \text{Nxn} \leftrightarrow \text{Nxm})] \]

From IDO, CA and O(i)–O(iii), it follows that:
O\textsubscript{homoozion} \; o=n=m

which was what was in fact at the heart of the fourth century Trinitarian controversy.

He also issues what I will call “the Cappadocian Challenge” to Eunomius (or really to any heteroousians – i.e., those who deny the homoousion). That is, in order to disprove the Cappadocian Assertion that:

\begin{align*}
\text{+ CA: } (\forall x)\{E^*x \rightarrow (Nxo \leftrightarrow Nxn \leftrightarrow Nxm)\}
\end{align*}

one must show that:

\begin{align*}
\neg \text{CA: } (\exists x)\{E^*x \& \neg(Nxo \leftrightarrow Nxn \leftrightarrow Nxm)\}
\end{align*}

and to show that some \textit{energeia} type is not natural to some \textit{ousia}, one must show that it is possible for there to be a hypostasis of that \textit{ousia} that does not bear a metaphysical predication relation to any token of that \textit{energeia} type.

Of course, there are some deep questions here as to how precisely to formulate IDO and N\textsubscript{Def}. As I’ve formulated them, it would be open to the Eunomians to simply assert that, although the hypostases all \textit{in fact} exhibit tokens of all the same \textit{energeiai} types, some of those \textit{energeia} types might be natural to the \textit{ousia} of one hypostasis while another hypostasis has some token of that \textit{energeia} type only accidentally. (Gregory, after all, admits that it is not only possible, but \textit{actual} that other hypostases, including demons and humans, have tokens of various divine \textit{energeiai} types – including “god-ding” itself, whatever exactly that is.)\footnote{167. See above, 4.2.3.1, p. 179.}

And as I’ve formulated Gregory’s position in GNT\textsubscript{F}, this would at least be logically possible. We then would have to interpret Gregory as simply challenging the Eunomians to \textit{prove} the

\footnote{166. From IDO, CA & O(i)–O(iii). Proof in Appendix A.1, p. 425.}
distinction of *ousiai* between the hypostases by showing that there is actually some *energeia* type that is not shared by all three hypostases. In other words, he would be challenging them to show:

\[(\text{ChEun}): (\exists x) \{ E^*x \& Nx \& \neg(\exists y) (Ey \& Pyx \& Psy) \}\]

to prove that the Son is not *homoousios* with the Father by noting some divine *energeia* type, no token of which is engaged in by the Son.\(^{168}\)

On the other hand, one might interpret Gregory as holding a stronger view about the individuation of *ousiai* by *energeia* types such that it would be impossible to “accidentally” engage in all the natural *energeiai* of some *ousia* without being of that *ousia*. (“If it walks like a duck, and it quacks like a duck, it’s a duck.”) Gregory does seem to speak this way at times. All I will say here is that, if he does take this stronger view, then his argument is logically tighter than if not, although he relies on a stronger and perhaps more controversial assumption. However, here again, I will simply go with the weaker assumption, since either way, Gregory is certainly committed to the formulations we will be working with (even if he would also accept stronger ones) and the weaker ones are all we need to make our points.

5.3.3.4 The Individuation of the Divine *Energeia* Types

As discussed above (5.2.5.4, p. 282), *energeia* types are presumably intrinsically distinct. From the available evidence, we can show that Gregory is committed to there being at least one divine energeia type, but we can’t say precisely how many there are.\(^{169}\)

\(^{168}\) Likewise, with respect to the Pneumatomachians – those who affirmed the consubstantiality of the Father and Son, but denied the Holy Spirit’s consubstantiality with either of the former, thus “*pneumatomachoi*” or “fighters against the Spirit. Gregory would be challenging them to show:

\[(\text{ChPnM}): (\exists x) \{ E^*x \& Nx \& \neg(\exists y) (Ey \& Pyx \& Phy) \}\]

\(^{169}\) See 5.3.1.4, p. 298 ff.
5.3.3.5 The Individuation of the Divine \textit{Energieia} Tokens

While we can’t say how many divine \textit{energeia} types there are (See just above), nor how many divine \textit{energeia} tokens there are, we can show that there exists exactly one divine \textit{energeia} token for every divine \textit{energeia} type. That is, we can show that:

\[ 0^{170} \quad \text{EUnique: } (\forall x)[(E^*x \& Nxo) \rightarrow (\exists!y)(Ey \& Pyx)] \]

This, however, does not follow directly from the principle of individuation for \textit{energeia} tokens we attributed to Gregory, or even from that principle and the fact that, prior to creation, the divine \textit{energeia} tokens have no \textit{idiomata}.

Recall that principle of individuation for \textit{energeia} tokens is:

\[ + \ IDE: \quad \square(\forall x)(\forall y)[(Ex \& Ey] \rightarrow [x=y \leftrightarrow (\forall z)((Iz \vee E^*z) \rightarrow [Pxz \leftrightarrow Pyz])]] \]

From this and the fact that, prior to creation, the divine \textit{energeia} tokens have no \textit{idiomata} to individuate them, i.e.:

\[ + \ \neg EI: \quad \neg (\exists x)(\exists y)(Ex \& Iy \& Pxy) \]

it only follows that:

\[ 0^{171} \quad (\forall x)(\forall y)[(Ex \& Ey] \rightarrow [x=y \leftrightarrow (\forall z)(E^*z \rightarrow [Pxz \leftrightarrow Pyz])]] \]

i.e., prior to creation, \textit{energeiai} tokens x and y are identical if and only if x and y have all and only the same \textit{energeia} types.

However, I said earlier (5.2.5.5, p. 283, footnote 34) that we face a choice as to how to formulate Gregory’s view on the individuation of token \textit{energeiai}, and that I suspect he would want to say that they are individuated not only by their \textit{idiomata},

\[ 170. \text{See footnote 177 below. From IDE, } \neg EI, \ E^*_{Lemma} \text{ and } EE^*_x \text{ just below. Proof in Appendix A.4, p. 431.} \]

\[ 171. \text{From IDE and } \neg EI. \text{ We will not make use of this inference, so no proof will be given.} \]
but by their *energeia* types as well. I said this was due to the logical consequences of their not being individuated by *energeia* types. Now is the time to explain why. Again, as far as I know, Gregory does not explicitly discuss the issue. But there are good reasons to think he would want to take the view that *energeiai* tokens cannot have multiple types. There are two logical possibilities to consider here.

First, it may be that a given token *energeia* can have *at most one* *energeia* type:

\[ + \ EE^*_{\leq 1}: \square(\forall x)(\forall y)(\forall z)[(\exists x \land E^*y \land Pxy \land E^*z \land Pxz) \rightarrow y = z] \]

Second, it may be that, in principle, a given token *energeia* could have *more than one* *energeia* type:

\[ + \ EE^*+: \Diamond(\exists x)(\exists y)(\exists z)[(\exists x \land E^*y \land Pxy \land E^*z \land Pxz) \land y \neq z] \]

In the first scenario, there would be a one-to-one correspondence between divine *energeia* types and tokens. But in the latter, there could be as few as one divine *energeia* token, and as many as the cardinality of the power set of the divine *energeia* types (i.e., where \( n \) is the number of divine *energeia* types, the number of divine *energeia* tokens could be as high as \( 2^n \)), or that minus one.\(^{172}\)

Although these latter options following on EE\(^*+\) are logically possible, I believe Gregory would be happier with our initial assumption – that a given token *energeia* must have at most one *energeia* type, and thus that there is a one-to-one correspondence between divine *energeia* types and tokens. And this is not merely because it seems simpler or more intuitive from a metaphysical point of view (although it

\(^{172}\) The first extreme would occur if there were only a single divine *energeia* token having all of the divine *energeia* types at once. The latter would occur if we took every possible combination of *energeia* types (which would correspond to the power set of the set of *energeia* types, with the possible exception of the empty set – assuming we adopt an assumption that an *energeia* token must have at least one *energeia* type) and postulated one *energeia* token having each such possible combination.
does), but for theological reasons.\textsuperscript{173} Gregory wants to say that the three divine hypostases all have numerically the same token act of god-ding. But as we saw in the \textit{Ad Ablabium},\textsuperscript{174} he also wants to say the same is true for all of their activities (modulo complications from the incarnation).\textsuperscript{175}

Now, as we said, on the assumption that a given divine \textit{energeia} token can have at most one divine \textit{energeia} type, this theological result simply follows as a necessary consequence from his metaphysics and his other theological postulates. But suppose instead that a divine \textit{energeia} token can have multiple types. Although it would still be possible for the hypostases to have all the same token \textit{energeiai}, it would then be logically contingent (in the “narrowly” logical sense) and thus would have to be postulated as a substantive theological assumption.

For example, suppose there are three divine \textit{energeia} types: 1*, 2* and 3*. If \textit{energeia} tokens can have multiple \textit{energeiai} types, there could be divine \textit{energeiai} tokens 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6 that have these types in the following way:

\begin{align*}
P(1,1^*) \\
P(2,2^*) \\
P(3,3^*) \\
P(4,2^*) \\
P(4,3^*) \\
P(5,1^*)
\end{align*}

\textsuperscript{173} And what follows is a good example of how theological concerns can constrain one’s metaphysics or vice-versa.

\textsuperscript{174} See 4.4.3, esp. p. 246.

\textsuperscript{175} This feature of Gregory’s view allows him to fully generalize his solution to the LPT. That is, since, for Gregory, all of the things we want to call God – Lord, Creator, Savior, Provider, All-Knower, All-Ruler, and so on – all ultimately derive from some power or activity, and since he holds that the hypostases share all of their powers and activities, his Unity of Action Argument generalizes to any of the titles we want to apply to God. There will be, on Gregory’s view, only one Lord, only one Creator, only one Savior, and so on.
P(5,3*)  
P(6,1*)  

and

P(6,2*)

And then the three hypostases could each have some token of each of the divine energeia types without any of them having any common divine energeia tokens as follows:

P(f,1)  
P(f,4)  
P(s,2)  
P(s,5)  
P(h,3)  

and

P(h,6)

The Father’s having token 1 means He has a token of type 1*, while His having token 4 means he has a token of type 2* and a token of type 3*. The Son’s having token 2 means He has a token of type 2*, while His having token 5 means He has a token of type 1* and a token of type 3*. And the Holy Spirit’s having token 3 means He has a token of type 3*, while His having token 6 means He has a token of type 1* and a token of type 2*.

Thus, each hypostasis has some token of type 1*, some token of type 2* and some token of type 3*. Yet there is no token x such that each hypostasis has x. Thus, there is no synergy among the hypostases.

Gregory would not be very happy with such a possibility.
Suppose the *energeia* types in the example above were “god-ding,” “creating,” and “lording,” respectively. As we will see, given Gregory’s semantics below, the above scenario would entail that the Father, Son and Holy Spirit are each “God,” “Creator,” and “Lord,” but that there are exactly three gods, three creators, and three Lords. For 1, 5 and 6 are all god-dings; 2, 4 and 6 are all creatings, and 3, 4 and 5 are all lordings.

Again, on EE*+, it would still be logically possible for the hypostases to synergize as well. But it would also be logically possible for some such scenario as the case of three god-dings, creatings and lordings above to be the case. Thus, it would turn out to be a substantive theological assumption to say that the hypostases share all of their *energeiai* and *dynameis*.

But Gregory does not write as though he considers this sort of thing to be even theoretically possible. He does not seem to think that the matter is contingent and that he is simply making an assumption. (He does not, for example, give any kind of scriptural or other theological argument for his view that the hypostases synergize on all of their actions.) He seems rather to think that it would not be possible, even in theory, for the three hypostases not to share their *energeiai* in common in the way he believes they do.

So, it seems more likely to me that Gregory would want to say that the hypostases’ sharing *energeia* tokens is just a necessary consequence of the rest of his metaphysics and theology. In other words, I believe he would want to say that it is simply a truth of metaphysics that a given *energeia* token must bear a metaphysical predication relation to at most one *energeia* type. Thus:

\[ + \text{EE}^*_1: \Box (\forall x)(\forall y)(\forall z)[(Ex \& E^*y \& Pxy \& E^*z \& Pxz) \rightarrow y = z] \]

And together with:

\[ + \text{IDE: } \Box (\forall x)(\forall y)[[Ex \& Ey] \rightarrow [x = y \leftrightarrow (\forall z)([Iz \vee E^*z] \rightarrow [Pxz \leftrightarrow Pyz])]] \]
+ \neg EI: \neg(\exists x)(\exists y)(Ex & Iy & Pxy)

and

0^{176} \ E^*_{Lemma}: (\forall x)[(E^*x & Nxo) \rightarrow (\exists y)(Ey & Pyx)]

it follows that:

0^{177} \ E_{Unique}: (\forall x)[(E^*x & Nxo) \rightarrow (\exists! y)(Ey & Pyx)]

i.e., for any divine energeia type, there is exactly one token energeia of that type.

Of course, it follows from E_{Unique} (along with N_{Def} and \Sigma^*_{Def}) that the divine hypostases synergize on every divine energeia type. That is:

0^{178} \ \Sigma^*_{\forall}: (\forall x)[[(E^*x & Nxo) \rightarrow (\forall y)(\forall z)[(Hy&Hz&z\neq y&Pyo&Pzo) \rightarrow \Sigma^*yzx]]

i.e., for any divine energeia type x, all divine hypostases synergize on x. In other words, what we called in the previous chapter the "Universal Synergy Claim."

Now, let us turn specifically to the case of "g*". \Sigma^*_{\forall} entails that the divine hypostases will synergize on g*. What’s more, making the substitution g*/x in E_{Unique}, yields:

0^{179} \ (E^*g* & Ng*o) \rightarrow (\exists! y)(Ey & Pyg*)

and from that and:

0^{180} \ E^*g* & Ng*o

176. See footnote 77. From NE^*E, O(i), H(i) and RH(i). Proof in Appendix A.3, p. 429.
177. From IDE, \neg EI, E^*_{Lemma} and EE^*_{\leq 1}. Proof in Appendix A.4, p. 431.
178. From E_{Unique}, N_{Def} and \Sigma^*_{Def}. Proof in Appendix A.5, p. 435.
179. From E_{Unique}, by \forall Elimination, g*/x.
180. See footnote 69. From (\exists y)(E^*y & Nyo), by \exists Elimination g*/y.
above, it follows that:

\[ P7_{\text{Lemma}}: (\exists y)(E_y & P_y^g^*) \]

and since:

\[ Eg & P_g^g^* \]

\[ g^f_{\text{Lemma}}: Eg^f & P_g^g^* \]

\[ g^h_{\text{Lemma}}: Eg^h & P_g^g^* \]

and

\[ g^{iii}_{\text{Lemma}}: Eg^{iii} & P_g^{g^*} \]

it follows that:

\[ \Sigma^*_{g^*} g = g^f = g^h = g^{iii} \]

And since:

\[ RH(\text{xviii}): Pfg \]

NOTE: This may seem suspect, as \( \exists \) Elimination must always use a new term in place of a variable, whereas just above we instantiated a universally quantified sentence with \( g^* \). But in fact, this step – \( E^*g^* & N_g^*o \) – was derived already, in footnote 69. Thus, the order was actually that we first used \( \exists \) Elimination to get \( g^* \), back at foot note 69, when as yet \( g^* \) had not been used. We later use \( \forall \) Elimination to derive \( (E^*g^* & N_g^*o) \rightarrow (\exists y)(E_y & P_y^g^*) \). And \( \forall \) Elimination does not require the use of a previously unused term.

181. From \((E^*g^* & N_g^*o) \rightarrow (\exists y)(E_y & P_y^g^*)\) and \(E^*g^* & N_g^*o\) above, MP.

182. See footnote 81. From \((\exists y)(E_y & P_y^g^*)\), by \( \exists \) Elimination \((g/y)\).

183. See footnote 122. From \(Eg^f & P_g^g^* \& Pfg\), above, by \& Elimination.

184. See footnote 123. From \(Eg^h & P_g^g^* \& Psg^h\), above, by \& Elimination.

185. See footnote 124. From \(Eg^{iii} & P_g^{g^*} \& Phg^{iii}\), above, by \& Elimination.

186. From \(P7_{\text{Lemma}}, Eg \& P_g^g^*, g^f_{\text{Lemma}}, g^h_{\text{Lemma}},\) and \(g^{iii}_{\text{Lemma}}\). Proof is left as an exercise for the reader.

187. See footnote 125. From \(Eg^f \& P_g^g^* \& Pfg\), above, by \& Elimination.
0^{188} \text{RH(xix)}: \quad \text{Psg}''

and

0^{189} \text{RH(xx)}: \quad \text{Phg}'''

it follows that

0^{190} \text{RH(xxi)}: \quad \text{Pfg}
0^{191} \text{RH(xxii)}: \quad \text{Psg}

and

0^{192} \text{RH(xxiii)}: \quad \text{Phg}

which we had promised to show at the end of the section on relations had by the hypostases (5.3.2.1, p. 310).

And for our last trick, we note that from any one of

0^{193} \text{RH(xxi)}: \quad \text{Pfg}
0^{194} \text{RH(xxii)}: \quad \text{Psg}

or

---

188. See footnote 126. From \( \text{Eg}'' \& \text{Pg}''' \& \text{Psg}'' \), above, by \& Elimination.
189. See footnote 127. From \( \text{Eg}''' \& \text{Pg}''' \& \text{Phg}''' \), above, by \& Elimination.
190. See footnote 129. From \( \text{RH(xviii)} \) (Pfg'') and \( \Sigma_{g^*} \), by \( g' \rightarrow g'' \).
191. See footnote 130. From \( \text{RH(xix)} \) (Psg'') and \( \Sigma_{g^*} \), by \( g'' \rightarrow g''' \).
192. See footnote 131. From \( \text{RH(xx)} \) (Phg''') and \( \Sigma_{g^*} \), by \( g'' \rightarrow g''' \).
193. See footnote 129. From \( \text{RH(xviii)} \) (Pfg') and \( \Sigma_{g^*} \), by \( g' \rightarrow g'' \).
194. See footnote 130. From \( \text{RH(xix)} \) (Psg'') and \( \Sigma_{g^*} \), by \( g'' \rightarrow g''' \).
we can derive:

\[ \text{P7}_{\text{GNT-EQ.}} \quad (\exists x)(\forall y)\{[\text{Ex}\&\text{Px} \& (\exists z)(\text{Pzx})] \& [(\text{Ey}\&\text{Py} \& (\exists w)[\text{Pwy}]) \rightarrow y = x]\} \]

which, naturally, we will discuss more in the next section (5.4.3, pp. 335 ff.).

Finally, before we leave this section, recall that in the section on the identity conditions for *energeia* tokens, we simply assumed that *energeia* tokens can be individuated by *energeia* types in addition to their own *idiomata* (which turn out to be irrelevant in the case of the Trinity’s natural *energeiai*).

We have also seen there are reasons to suppose Gregory would want to add that every *energeia* token must have exactly one *energeia* type (EE*≤1*).

Suppose, for example, an event of lighting and heating occur at the same time and place. Say they both emanate from the sun at exactly the same time. On the assumptions we have been working with, these would be two distinct, but co-located, token *energeiai, each participating in its own unique *energeia* type.

195. See footnote 131. From RH(xx) (Phg/m) and Σg∗, by = g/gm.
196. See footnote 181. From (E∗g∗ & Ng∗o) → (∃y)(Ey & Pyg∗) and E∗g∗ & Ng∗o above, MP.
197. From E(i) and RE(i) above (see footnotes 82 and 83), by & Int.
198. From RH(xxi) or RH(xxii) or RH(xxiii) plus P7Lemma and E(i) & RE(i). Proof in Appendix A.6, p. 438.
Now let us consider the possibility that it is only idiomata that individuate energeia tokens, and that energeia types don’t individuate energeia tokens. (Thus, for example, “co-located” lightings and heatings would in fact count as a single token energeia).

Since there are no idiomata to individuate divine energeia tokens, it would follow that, prior to creation, there would be only one, single token energeia.

In that case, suppose we still assumed that there is at most one energeia type per energeia token (EE*₁). Then, prior to creation, there could be only one, single divine energeia type.

On the other hand, suppose we allowed that one energeia token could have more than one energeia type EE*₊. Since we are now assuming that tokens are not individuated by types, we would not have the problem discussed above in which there could be three god-dings, three creatings and three lordings. Instead, it would follow that there could be as many energeia types as we like, but they would all have to be realized in a single energeia token, which would be had by all three hypostases.

I doubt Gregory would be happy with either of those results, though it wouldn’t ultimately affect Gregory’s response to the LPT.

Gregory indicates that there are multiple distinct energeiai. (4.2.3.1, p. 183. “We have . . . been taught differences of energeiai . . . .” Similar claims are made elsewhere.) Of course, if one takes him to mean that there are multiple divine energeia tokens, it follows immediately that he wouldn’t be happy with either of the views we are now considering.

On the other hand, if we take him to mean only that there are multiple divine energeia types, he could accept the second of the views we are considering (multiples divine energeia types, all realized by a single divine energeia token), but not the first (a single divine energeia type with a single divine energeia token).
Such a view might appeal to one who wants to claim that God’s foreknowing is in fact the same as His creating, and so forth. And this might also seem more congenial to a certain kind of theory of divine simplicity. I don’t think Gregory or the other Cappadocians held such a strong view of divine simplicity, and I doubt very much that he would have been happy with this either, but I won’t argue for that point here as, fortunately, deciding this issue will not be necessary for our purposes, since, in any case $E_{\text{Unique}}$ will be true, as will $\Sigma^*_\gamma$. Either because:

(1) there is only a single divine $\textit{energeia}$ type with a single token (had by all the hypostases), or because

(2) there are $n > 1$ types with exactly one token instantiating all $n$ types (that one token being had by all the hypostases), or because

(3) there are $n > 1$ types and exactly $n$ tokens with a one-to-one correspondence between types and tokens, and each hypostasis has every token (as I think Gregory would actually want to say).

But in all of these scenarios, $E_{\text{Unique}}$ would be true, as would $\Sigma^*_\gamma$. And so, I will proceed on the assumption that Gregory would prefer the formulation we have been assuming (that (3) there are $n > 1$ types and exactly $n$ tokens, with a one-to-one correspondence between types and tokens), only noting that taking one of the other routes just discussed, though I suspect it would probably be less true to Gregory’s actual thought, would make no difference with respect to Gregory’s solution to the LPT.

$E_{\text{Unique}}$ and $\Sigma^*_\gamma$ are the keys to Gregory’s solution to the LPT (and the keys to the generality of his position with respect to all of our predicates and descriptions of God – not merely the predicate “God,” but “Creator,” “Savior,” “Lord,” etc.), since Gregory holds that counting by agent nouns hinges not on (or at least not only on) distinctions between hypostases engaged in $\textit{energeiai}$, but between token $\textit{energeiai}$ being engaged in by hypostases. Because of $E_{\text{Unique}}$ and $\Sigma^*_\gamma$, prior to creation, the hypostases will count as one $E^*$-er for any $\textit{energeia}$ type $E^*$ (and similarly for any
5.4 Gregory’s Semantics

Now that we have stated all of the relevant aspects both of Gregory’s metaphysics and of his substantive theology, we will explain the principles by which he believes this content maps onto the linguistic expressions we are concerned with. Again, we have done this implicitly all along the way for our formal language (PLI), since it has been a useful way to make the content of Gregory’s view more precise. Now we will make his N-semantics explicit. Then we will be in a position to give a model for the (relevant)\(^{199}\) content of Gregory’s view (via the F-semantics for P1 through P7),\(^{200}\) and to see how that content is supposed to be expressed by the natural language sentences S1 through S7, used to express P1 through P7 (via the N-semantics for the various expressions that make up those sentences).

5.4.1 Gregory’s Semantics for S4 through S6

First, as it seems to me, Gregory quite clearly sees a very strong distinction between the three hypostases.\(^{201}\) And as we have said before, \(\neq\) is the weakest real distinction there is. So Gregory is committed to analyzing P4 through P6 as having

\(^{199}\) In fact, the model we will construct below, \(M_{P\text{-GNT-F}}\), will be a model of all of Gregory’s metaphysics and theology that we’ve discussed in this chapter. But we will only \textit{show} that it is a model for his interpretations of P1–P7. The rest is left as an exercise for the reader.

\(^{200}\) In the actual, model-theoretic sense of “model,” as opposed to the looser sense of the term “model” typically employed in defenses of the doctrine of the Trinity.

\(^{201}\) At least, interpreting him in what I see as the most straight-forward way. See p. 269 for my response to the concern that Gregory may have had no concept of strict identity.
the logical forms of:

0\textsuperscript{202} \quad \text{P}4_{\text{GNT-F. }} f \neq s

0\textsuperscript{203} \quad \text{P}5_{\text{GNT-F. }} f \neq h

0\textsuperscript{204} \quad \text{P}6_{\text{GNT-F. }} s \neq h

(or in any case, he affirms some propositions $\chi_1$–$\chi_3$ with logical forms:\textsuperscript{205}

P4. $\chi_1$ such that $\chi_1 \models f \neq s$

P5. $\chi_2$ such that $\chi_2 \models f \neq h$

P6. $\chi_3$ such that $\chi_3 \models s \neq h$

but for simplicity's sake, we will suppose he would simply analyze P4 through P6 as simple non-identity claims).

As a result, Gregory's view will not fall into the Naïve Modalism Family, since these truth conditions are not compatible with the essential feature of Naïve Modalism.

So, it would seem that Gregory would accept the following N-semantics for S4–S6:

S4: “The Father is not the Son” is true, if and only if “$f \neq s$” is true, if and only if the hypostasis we have named “$f$” in PLI or “the Father” in English (“ὁ πατὴρ” in Greek) is not identical to the hypostasis named “$s$” in PLI or “the Son” in English (“ὁ ζωός” in Greek).

S5: “The Father is not the Holy Spirit” is true, if and only if “$f \neq h$” is true, if and only if the hypostasis we have named “$f$” in PLI or “the Father” in English (“ὁ πατὴρ” in Greek) is not identical to the hypostasis named “$h$” in PLI or “the Holy Spirit” in English (“τὸ ἅγιον πνεῦμα” in Greek).

S6: “The Son is not the Holy Spirit” is true, if and only if “$s \neq h$” is true, if and only if the hypostasis we have named “$s$” in PLI or “the Son” in English (“ὁ ζωός” in

\textsuperscript{202} See footnote 150.

\textsuperscript{203} See footnote 154.

\textsuperscript{204} See footnote 159.

\textsuperscript{205} See 5.3.3.1, pp. 314 – 318.
Greek) is not identical to the hypostasis named “h” in PLI or “the Holy Spirit” in English (“τὸ ἅγιον πνεῦμα” in Greek).

Given Gregory’s metaphysics and theology, these truth conditions all hold (see 5.3.3.1, p. 314 ff.), so S4 through S6 will express true propositions, if Gregory’s metaphysics, theology, and semantics are true.

5.4.2 Gregory’s Semantics for S1 through S3

Next, as we’ve seen, Gregory takes statements of the form, \( x \text{ is God} \), to be predications, not of an identity relation to some individual named “God,” but predication of engagement in some token action (\( \text{energeia} \)) of a certain type we have named “\( g^{*} \)” (“beholding” or, as we are calling it, “god-ding”). So it would seem that Gregory is committed to analyzing P1 through P3, not as having the logical forms of:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{P1}_{\text{LPT-1}} & : f = g \\
\text{P2}_{\text{LPT-1}} & : s = g \\
\text{P3}_{\text{LPT-1}} & : h = g
\end{align*}
\]

but as having the logical forms of:

\[
\begin{align*}
0^{207} \text{P1}_{\text{GNT-F}} & : (\exists x)(\text{Ex} \& P_{xg^{*}} \& P_{fx}) \\
0^{208} \text{P2}_{\text{GNT-F}} & : (\exists x)(\text{Ex} \& P_{xg^{*}} \& P_{sx}) \\
0^{209} \text{P3}_{\text{GNT-F}} & : (\exists x)(\text{Ex} \& P_{xg^{*}} \& P_{hx})
\end{align*}
\]

As a result, Gregory’s view will not fall into the LPT\(_1\) Family, since these truth conditions are not compatible with the essential feature of all LPT\(_1\) Family accounts.

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206. Nor predications of a certain natural kind, though that is not to the point just now.

207. See footnote 116.

208. See footnote 117.

209. See footnote 118.
That is, the logical forms of $P_{1 \text{GNT-F}}$ through $P_{3 \text{GNT-F}}$ do not fit the more general descriptions of:

P1. $\phi f$ such that $\phi \alpha \models \alpha = t_i$ for any term $t_i$ such that $t_i \neq \alpha$

P2. $\phi s$ such that $\phi \alpha \models \alpha = t_i$ for any term $t_i$ such that $t_i \neq \alpha$

P3. $\phi h$ such that $\phi \alpha \models \alpha = t_i$ for any term $t_i$ such that $t_i \neq \alpha$

So, it would seem that Gregory would accept the following N-semantics for S1–S3:

S1: “The Father is (a) God” is true, if and only if “$(\exists x) (\text{Ex} \land P_{xg^*} \land P_{fx})$” is true, if and only if the hypostasis named “f” in PLI or “the Father” in English (“$\tilde{\pi}t\tau\iota\rho$” in Greek) has some token of the divine $\text{energeia}$ type we have named “g*” in PLI (“godding,” or “beholding,” or whatever it is).

S2: “The Son is (a) God” is true, if and only if “$(\exists x) (\text{Ex} \land P_{xg^*} \land P_{sx})$” is true, if and only if the hypostasis named “s” in PLI or “the Son” in English (“$\tilde{o} \upsilon\tau\sigma\zeta$” in Greek) has some token of the divine $\text{energeia}$ type we have named “g*” in PLI (“godding,” or “beholding,” or whatever it is).

S3: “The Holy Spirit is (a) God” is true, if and only if “$(\exists x) (\text{Ex} \land P_{xg^*} \land P_{hx})$” is true, if and only if the hypostasis named “h” in PLI or “the Holy Spirit” in English (“$\tau\delta \chi\gamma\omicron\nu \pi\nu\epsilon\omicron\nu\omicron$” in Greek) has some token of the divine $\text{energeia}$ type we have named “g*” in PLI (“godding,” or “beholding,” or whatever it is).

Given Gregory’s metaphysics and theology, these truth conditions all hold (see 5.3.2.1, p. 309), so S1 through S3 will express true propositions, if Gregory’s metaphysics, theology, and semantics are true.

Since we saw above that Gregory’s view does not fall into the Naïve Modalist Family, and see here that it does not fall into the Arian Family or the LPT$_1$ Family, it must fall into either the Equivocation Family or the NCIC Family, if it is to avoid falling into the LPT$_2$ Family. Both of these hinge on one’s analysis of S7. And so let us examine the final aspect of Gregory’s view, his semantics for S7.

5.4.3 Gregory’s Semantics for S7

Finally, as we’ve seen, Gregory holds that we count E*-ers, not by counting the number of distinct hypostases engaged in some token of E*, but by counting the
number of distinct tokens of E* being engaged in by some hypostasis. That is, he seems to take it that sentences of the form there are n E*-ers, where “E*-er” is an agent noun, to be true when the number of token E-ings is equal to n. So Gregory is committed to analyzing S7 not as having the logical form of:

\[ 7_{\text{LPT-2-FAMILY-Schema}}. \quad (\exists x)(\forall y)(\phi x \land (\phi y \rightarrow y \equiv x)) \]

(Such that \( y \equiv x \)).

fleshed out (for \( \phi \) here to be univocal with P1–P3 on Gregory’s account) as:

\[ 7_{\text{LPT-2-GNT-F}}. \quad (\exists x)(\forall y)\{(\exists z)(Ez \land Pzg \land Pxz) \land [(\exists z)(Ez \land Pzg \land Pyz) \land y \equiv x]\} \]

(Such that \( y \equiv x \)).

(i.e., there is exactly one thing that has a token god-ding), but, perhaps, as:

\[ P_{7_{\text{GNT-EQ}}}. \quad (\exists x)(\forall y)\{[Ex \land P\#(\exists z)(Pzx)] \land [(Ey \land P\#(\exists w)[Pwy]) \land y \equiv x]\} \]

(i.e., there is exactly one token god-ding that is had by anything).

I say “perhaps” because, while it is not hard to say, in a concrete way, what Gregory’s view about counting amounts to, specifying its logical form precisely and placing it within our taxonomy does bring up an interesting dilemma. This is because there are distinct, though logically equivalent, ways of stating Gregory’s view, and which we choose will determine whether the solution falls into the Equivocation Family or the NCIC Family. This may seem confusing or surprising. I’ll try to dispel that confusion below. But first let’s look at two ways of formalizing Gregory’s view of S7, one that fits into the Equivocation Family, and one that fits the NCIC Family. Then we will discuss what moral we should take away from the fact, which may at first seem puzzling, that the view can be put into either family.

210. Or perhaps when both the number of hypostases engaged in some token act of E-ing is at least \( n \), and the number of token acts of E-ing being engaged in by some hypostasis is at least \( n \). See p. 257.
5.4.3.1 Formalizing Gregory’s View as an Equivocation Account

The simplest way to express the logical form of P7 on Gregory’s view is, as we saw just above:

\[ P^\text{GNT-EQ}_7 \equiv (\exists x)(\forall y)\{[\exists x \& P^*x \& (\exists z)(Pzx)] \& [(\exists y \& P^*y \& (\exists w)(Pwy)) \rightarrow y = x]\} \]

(i.e., there is exactly one token god-ding that is had by anything).

On this reading of Gregory, he would presumably want to give the following N-semantics for S7:

S7: “There is exactly one God” is true, if and only if

“\((\exists x)(\forall y)\{[\exists x \& P^*x \& (\exists z)(Pzx)] \& [(\exists y \& P^*y \& (\exists w)(Pwy)) \rightarrow y = x]\}\)” is true, if and only if there is some token energeia \(x\) of the energeia type we have named “\(g^*\)” in PLI (“goddng” or “beholding” or whatever we call it in English – “\(\theta\varepsilon\omega\varphi\varepsilon\nu\),” or “\(\partial\varepsilon\varepsilon\nu\),” or whatever we call it in Greek) such that \(x\) is had by some \(z\), and if there is any token energeia \(y\) of the energeia type we have named “\(g^*\)” in PLI (“goddng” or “beholding” or whatever we call it in English – “\(\theta\varepsilon\omega\varphi\varepsilon\nu\),” or “\(\partial\varepsilon\varepsilon\nu\),” or whatever we call it in Greek) such that \(y\) is had by some \(w\), then \(x\) and \(y\) are identical.

Given Gregory’s metaphysics and theology, these truth conditions hold (see 198, p. 329 ff.), so S7 will express a true proposition, if Gregory’s metaphysics and theology and this N-semantics are true.

Putting this together with the logical forms that Gregory’s view implicitly attributes to P1 through P6, gives us:

\[
\begin{align*}
P^\text{GNT-F}_1 &\equiv (\exists x) \ (\exists x \& P^*x \& Pfx) \\
P^\text{GNT-F}_2 &\equiv (\exists x) \ (\exists x \& P^*x \& Psx) \\
P^\text{GNT-F}_3 &\equiv (\exists x) \ (\exists x \& P^*x \& Phx) \\
P^\text{GNT-F}_4 &\equiv f \neq s \\
P^\text{GNT-F}_5 &\equiv f \neq h \\
P^\text{GNT-F}_6 &\equiv s \neq h
\end{align*}
\]
This would have the result that:

1. we count gods by the classical identity relation, but
2. in P1–P3 “x is (a) God” means “x has a token god-ding,” whereas
3. in P7 “x is (a) God” means “x is a token god-ding that is had.”

Thus, this would fall into the Equivocation Family as we’ve defined it, and not the NCIC Family.

5.4.3.2 Formalizing Gregory’s View as an NCIC Account

On the other hand, with much more complexity, we could represent the logical form of P7 on Gregory’s view within the NCIC Family as follows. Recall that in this family, we count by the schema:

\[(7_{SCHEMA}) (\exists x)(\forall y)(\phi x \& (\phi y \to y R x) )\]

(where \(x R y \neq x=y\.)

and that \(\phi\alpha\) is supposed to be univocal not only among P1–P3, but between P1–P3 on the one hand and P7 on the other. Thus, since in P1–P3 \(\phi\alpha\) is fleshed out with formulae of the form:

\((\exists z) (Ez \& Pzg^* \& P\alpha z)\)

yielding:

\[P1_{GNT-F}. (\exists x) (Ex \& Pgx^* \& Pf x)\]
\[P2_{GNT-F}. (\exists x) (Ex \& Pgx^* \& Ps x)\]
\[P3_{GNT-F}. (\exists x) (Ex \& Pgx^* \& Ph x)\]
in P7 this would yield:

\[
P7_{GNTSCHEMA} \cdot (\exists u)(\forall v) \{ (\exists w) (Ew \& Pwg^* \& Puw) \& \\
                (\exists x) (Ex \& Pxs^* \& Pvx) \rightarrow u \not R v \} 
\]

i.e., there is a u that has some token act of god-ding, and any v that has a token act of god-ding is such that u bears R to v. In the case of Gregory’s view, we could then flesh out u R v as:

0211 \[ R_{Def}: (\forall u)(\forall v) \{ u \not R v \leftrightarrow (\exists ! y) [ Ey \& Pyg^* \& (Puy v Pvy) ] \} \]

or more fully:

0212 \[ R_{Def}: (\forall u)(\forall v) \{ u \not R v \leftrightarrow (\exists ! y)(\forall z)[(Ey \& Pyg^* \& [Puy v Pvy] ) \& \\
                                               ([Ez \& Pzg^* \& (Puz v Pvy)] \rightarrow y = z)] \} \]

i.e., u and v bear the relation to one another that there is exactly one token act of godding that either one has. They are, as we might put it, “single-tokened with respect to god-ding.”

Thus, to put it all together:

\[
P7_{GNT-NCIC} \cdot (\exists u)(\forall v)\{(\exists w)[Ew \& Pwg^* \& Puw] \& \\
               (\exists x)[Ex \& Pxs^* \& Pvx] \rightarrow \\
               (\exists ! y)[Ey \& Pyg^* \& (Puy v Pvy)] \} 
\]

211. Stipulative Definition.

212. Stipulative Definition.

213. Note that, by itself, u R v just says that u and v have exactly one god-ding between them – thus, not that there is only one god-ding, but that u and v in particular have only one god-ding between them. But of course, I think that is as Gregory would want it. See the discussion at p. 179 ff. What will get the result that there is only one God below is assuming that anything that gods is single-tokened with respect to god-ding with anything else that gods. In fact, as we’ve seen, Gregory would not take this to be strictly speaking true. But he would affirm it if we restrict our domain of quantification to those things that exist “prior to creation,” or probably even just to those things that have “god-ding” by nature, rather than accidentally.
or more fully:

$$
P_{7_{GNT-NCIC}}. \ (\exists u) (\forall v) \{ (\exists w) [ Ew & Pwg^* & Puw ] & \\
( (\exists x) [ Ex & Pgx^* & Pvx ] \rightarrow \\
(\exists y)(\forall z) [(Ey & Pyg^* & [Puy v Pvy] ) & \\
([Ez & Pzg^* & (Puz v Pvz) ] \rightarrow y = z) ] \}
$$

i.e., there is a \( u \) that has some token act of god-ting, and, if any \( v \) has any token act of god-ting, then there is exactly one token act of god-ting that either \( u \) or \( v \) has.

To put it another way, there is a \( u \) that gods, and any \( v \) that gods is such that \( u \) and \( v \) are “single-tokened” with respect to “god-ting.”

So, on this reading of Gregory, he would want to give the following N-semantics for \( S_7 \):

\( S_7 \): “There is exactly one God” is true, if and only if \( P_{7_{GNT-NCIC}} \) is true, if and only if there is a \( u \) that has some token \( \text{energeia} \) of the \( \text{energeia} \) type we have named “\( g^* \)” in PLI (“godding” or “beholding” or whatever we call it in English – “\( \text{dæωρɛɪn} \)” or “\( \text{dɛɛɪn} \)” or whatever we call it in Greek) and if any \( v \) has any token \( \text{energeia} \) of the \( \text{energeia} \) type \( g^* \), then \( u \) and \( v \) are single-tokened with respect to \( g^* \).

Given Gregory’s metaphysics and theology, these truth conditions hold (see 198, p. 329 ff. along with refTwoFormulations, p. 341 ff. for an explanation), so \( S_7 \) will express a true proposition, if Gregory’s metaphysics and theology and this N-semantics are true.

Putting this together with the logical forms that Gregory’s view implicitly attributes to \( P_1 \) through \( P_6 \), gives us:

\( P_{1_{GNT-F}}. \ (\exists x) \ (Ex & Pgx^* & Pfx) \)
\( P_{2_{GNT-F}}. \ (\exists x) \ (Ex & Pgx^* & Psx) \)
\( P_{3_{GNT-F}}. \ (\exists x) \ (Ex & Pgx^* & Phx) \)
\( P_{4_{GNT-F}}. \ f \neq s \)
\( P_{5_{GNT-F}}. \ f \neq h \)
P6_{\text{GNT-F}}. s \neq h

P7_{\text{GNT-NCIC}}. (\exists u)(\forall v)\{(\exists w)| Ew & Pwg^* & Puw | \&
\quad ( (\exists x)| Ex & Pxg^* & Pvx | \rightarrow
\quad (\exists y)(\forall z)|(Ey & Pyg^* & |Puy v Pvy| ) \&
\quad (| Ez & Pzg^* & (Puz v Puv) | \rightarrow y = z)|}\}

This would have the result that:

1. we count gods by the relation of “being singled-tokened with respect to ‘god-ding’,”
   not classical identity,\textsuperscript{214} but
2. in P1–P3 “x is (a) God” means “x has a god-ding,” and
3. in P7 “x is (a) God” means “x has a god-ding” as well.

Thus, this would fall into the NCIC Family as we’ve defined it, and not the Equivocation Family.

5.4.3.3 A Note on the Two Formulations

As I said, one might find it puzzling that we could formalize Gregory’s view in two very different ways, with the result that his view could be put into either one of two different Families that attribute two very different logical forms to P7. First, one might think that it shouldn’t be possible, since a single proposition can’t have more than one logical form. Or again, one might think it just means that the difference between the two formulations is nil, so that we should be indifferent between them. I don’t think either of these reactions is right.

First, recall that our taxonomy is exhaustive, but not exclusive, so it is possible for certain solutions to the LPT to fall into both the Equivocation Family and the NCIC Family.

\textsuperscript{214} Of course, this is just because, in general, when counting by agent nouns, we count X-ers by the relation of “being single-tokened with respect to ‘X-ing’.”

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Next, note that the two formulations are logically equivalent.

Suppose it is the case that something bears some relation R (like “having”) to some object of type A (like token acts of “god-ding”).

Now suppose that any things that bear R to any A, bear R to at most a single A between them all. (This is essentially what \( P_{GNT-NCIC} \) says.) Clearly it will also be the case that there is only one A to which anything bears R. (This is essentially what \( P_{GNT-EQ} \) says.)

And likewise, suppose it is the case that there is only one A to which anything bears R. Clearly it will also be the case that any things that bear R to any A, bear R to at most a single A between them all.

So, the worry that this should not have been possible is misguided, because, for any given account A, there can easily be distinct, but logically equivalent ways of putting all of the relevant content of A. And our taxonomy was not created for the purpose of grouping all logically equivalent accounts together, with no overlap between Families, but for the purpose of showing that all answers to the LPT will have to have one (or more!) of a certain set of logical properties, all of which have seemed objectionable to some philosophers. (Thus, that there can be no new answers to the LPT that have a novel logical form that would escape all of those criticisms.) Of course, that’s not to say one couldn’t create a taxonomy of answers to the LPT that would group logically equivalent accounts together into Families that were mutually exclusive. That simply wasn’t the purpose of the taxonomy provided. So it shouldn’t come as a surprise that some accounts could be members of two different Families.

On the other hand, one might think this means that there is thus no important difference between the two ways of formulating P7, so that we should be indifferent between them. Either one essentially says the same thing.

I think this is also mistaken. All it means for these formulations to be logically equivalent is merely that any time the one is true the other will be and vice-versa (any
model for one is a model for the other). But the *semantic principles* (F-semantics) that we use to map Gregory’s metaphysics and substantive theology *onto* these two different formal representations are quite different. As are the parallel semantics principles (N-semantics) by which we would map his view onto S7.

Now there is a certain sense in which I will say that semantics doesn’t matter much (see Chapter 6.2, p. 371 ff. below). Namely, when *all that one is concerned about* is (the truth of, or consistency of) one’s substantive theory. However, given that the substantive theory one is trying to defend is consistent, there are certainly cases in which one semantics is preferable to another.

Putting aside any purely philosophical concerns, we have in this case an issue that concerns the very title of the work we focused on in the previous chapter – “On Not Thinking to Say ‘Three Gods’.” A problem with *any* solution to the LPT within the Equivocation Family is that, whether or not it has the resources to *allow* Trinitarians to straight-facedly claim that “there is exactly one God,” it will always face a difficulty when it comes to finding the resources to *forbid* Trinitarians to say that “there are exactly three gods.” For if the two senses in which something can be said to be a god, or divine, are *equally good*, then, even if there is some perfectly good sense in which there is one God, there is an *equally good* sense in which there are three gods. And however one tries to sort out that issue on any *other* Equivocation Family account, it’s difficult to see, if we formulate GNT as an Equivocation account, how Gregory would argue that a *token action* is somehow *primarily* what we mean by “God.”

On the other hand, on the NCIC formulation, there is no sense in which there are three gods, because there is only one sense of “is God” and only one way to count gods.

There are some textual reasons to prefer the NCIC formulation as well. For example, in *Contra Eunomium*, after discussing various biblical passages in which the
same *energeiai* are attributed to all three hypostases in different passages, Gregory says, “Those who keep repeating against us the phrase ‘three Gods,’ because we hold these views, have perhaps not yet learnt how to count.”215 Some similar statements can be found elsewhere in Gregory, as well as in Gregory Nazianzen.

But, although I would be prepared to argue that the NCIC formulation is preferable, since the two are logically equivalent, the model we will construct in the next section will be a model for either of these formulations. Therefore, both formulations count as solutions to the LPT. Therefore, so long as *at least one* of them is formally adequate, the LPT will have a formally adequate solution. So, although I do think $P_{7GNT-NCIC}$ is the philosophically preferable way to understand Gregory, for purposes of constructing a model, I will use “$P_{GNT-F}$” to denote the set \{${P_{1GNT-F}, P_{6GNT-F}, P_{7GNT-EQ}, P_{7GNT-NCIC}}$\}. And I will refer to this model as “$M_{P-GNT-F}$.” We turn to the model next.

5.5 A Model for $P_{\text{GNT-F}}$

Here, then, is a model for $P_{\text{GNT-F}}$ (which, again, models either of the two formulations of P7 we discussed in the previous section). We will call the model, “$M_{P\text{-GNT-F}}$.” We will name the proof I give that $M_{P\text{-GNT-F}}$ is a model for $P_{\text{GNT-F}}$, “O.E.Δ.”

$M_{P\text{-GNT-F}}$

Domain: \{0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9\}

\begin{align*}
o &= 0 \\
f &= 1 \\
s &= 2 \\
h &= 3 \\
g &= 4 \\
g^* &= 5 \\
b &= 6 \\
b^* &= 7 \\
p &= 8 \\
p^* &= 9
\end{align*}

H: \{1, 2, 3\}
I: \{6, 7, 8, 9\}
O: \{0\}
E: \{4\}
E*: \{5\}
P: \{<1,0> ,
    <2,0> ,
    <3,0> ,
    <1,6> ,
    <1,8> ,
    <2,7> ,
    <3,9> ,
    <1,4> ,
    <2,4> ,
    <3,4> ,
    <4,5> \} 

N: \{<5,0> \} 

\textbf{M}_P\text{-GNT-F} \text{ is a model for } P_{GNT-F}:^\text{216} 

P_{1\text{GNT-F}}. (\exists x) (Ex & Pxg^* \& Pfx) 

P_{2\text{GNT-F}}. (\exists x) (Ex & Pxg^* \& Psx) 

P_{3\text{GNT-F}}. (\exists x) (Ex & Pxg^* \& Phx) 

P_{4\text{GNT-F}}. f \neq s 

P_{5\text{GNT-F}}. f \neq h 

P_{6\text{GNT-F}}. s \neq h 

P_{7\text{GNT-EQ}}. (\exists x)(\forall y)\{[Ex & Pxg^* \&(\exists z)(Pzx)] \& [(Ey & Pyg^* \& (\exists w)[Pwy]) \rightarrow y=x]\} 

P_{7\text{GNT-NCIC}}. (\exists u)(\forall v)\{ (\exists w)[ Ew & Pwg^* \& Puw ] \& \\
( (\exists x)[ Ex & Pxg^* \& Pvx ] \rightarrow 

216. \textbf{M}_P\text{-GNT-F} \text{ is also a model for the entirety of GNT}_F. \text{ Showing that this is so is left as an exercise for the reader.}
\[(\exists y)(\forall z)[(Ez \land Pz^* \land (Puz \lor Pvz)] \land [(Ey \land Py^* \land (Puy \lor Pvy))] \land [(Ez \land Pz^* \land (Puz \lor Pvz)] \rightarrow y = z)\}\]

To make this easier to see, replace the names “o, f, s, h, g, g*, b, b*, p, and p*” with “0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9,” respectively. Thus:

\[P1_{\text{NUM}}. \ (\exists x)(Ex \land Px^5 \land P1x)\]

\[P2_{\text{NUM}}. \ (\exists x)(Ex \land Px^5 \land P2x)\]

\[P3_{\text{NUM}}. \ (\exists x)(Ex \land Px^5 \land P3x)\]

\[P4_{\text{NUM}}. \ 1 \neq 2\]

\[P5_{\text{NUM}}. \ 1 \neq 3\]

\[P6_{\text{NUM}}. \ 2 \neq 3\]

\[P7_{\text{NUM-EQ}}. \ (\exists x)(\forall y)[(Ex \land Px^5 \land (\exists z)(Pzx)] \land [(Ey \land Py^5 \land (\exists w)(Pwy))] \rightarrow y = x]\]

\[P7_{\text{NUM-NCIC}}. \ (\exists u)(\forall v)[(\exists w)(Ew \land Pw^5 \land Puw)] \land \]

\[\ ( (\exists x)[Ex \land Px^5 \land Pvx] \rightarrow \]

\[\ (\exists y)(\forall z)[(Ey \land Py^5 \land (Puy \lor Pvy)] \land \]

\[\ ( [Ez \land Pz^5 \land (Puz \lor Pvz)] \rightarrow y = z)\}\]

**Proof:**

\[P1 \ (\exists x)(Ex \land Px^5 \land P1x)\]

is true on \(M_{P,GNT-F}\) if and only if there is some number \(x\) such that \(x \in E\), and \(<x,5> \in P\) and \(<1,x> \in P\).

And in fact there is, since \(4 \in E\), and \(<4,5> \in P\) and \(<1,4> \in P\).

Thus, \(P1\) is true on \(M_{P,GNT-F}\).

\[P2 \ (\exists x)(Ex \land Px^5 \land P2x)\]

217. Below I use the sentences with logical names replaced by numerals for the numbers the logical names denote in the model. But note that the proofs given actually count as proofs for the elements of \(P_{GNT-F}\) themselves.
is true on $\text{M}_{\text{P-GNT-F}}$ if and only if there is some number $x$ such that $x \in E$, and $<x,5> \in P$ and $<2,x> \in P$.

And in fact there is, since $4 \in E$, and $<4,5> \in P$ and $<2,4> \in P$.

Thus, $P_2$ is true on $\text{M}_{\text{P-GNT-F}}$.

$P_3 \ (\exists x) \ (Ex \ & \ Px5 \ & \ P3x)$

is true on $\text{M}_{\text{P-GNT-F}}$ if and only if there is some number $x$ such that $x \in E$, and $<x,5> \in P$ and $<3,x> \in P$.

And in fact there is, since $4 \in E$, and $<4,5> \in P$ and $<3,4> \in P$.

Thus, $P_3$ is true on $\text{M}_{\text{P-GNT-F}}$.

$P_4 \ 1 \neq 2$

is true on $\text{M}_{\text{P-GNT-F}}$ if and only if $1$ is not identical to $2$.

And in fact $1$ is not identical to $2$.

Thus, $P_4$ is true on $\text{M}_{\text{P-GNT-F}}$.

$P_5 \ 1 \neq 3$

is true on $\text{M}_{\text{P-GNT-F}}$ if and only if $1$ is not identical to $3$.

And in fact $1$ is not identical to $3$.

Thus, $P_5$ is true on $\text{M}_{\text{P-GNT-F}}$.

$P_6 \ 2 \neq 3$

is true on $\text{M}_{\text{P-GNT-F}}$ if and only if $2$ is not identical to $3$.

And in fact $2$ is not identical to $3$.

Thus, $P_6$ is true on $\text{M}_{\text{P-GNT-F}}$.

$P_7 \ (\exists x)(\forall y)\{(Ex\&Px5\&(\exists z)(Pzx)) \ \& \ [(Ey\&Py5\&(\exists w)(Pwy)) \ \rightarrow \ y=x]\}$

is true on $\text{M}_{\text{P-GNT-F}}$ if and only if there is a number $x$ such that for every number $y, x \in E$ and $<x,5> \in P$ and there is some number $z$ such that $<z,x> \in P$, and if $y \in$ 

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E and \(<y,5> \in P\) and there is a number \(w\) such that \(<w,y> \in P\), then \(y\) is identical to \(x\).

And in fact, there is a number \(x\) such that for every number \(y\), \(x \in E\) and \(<x,5> \in P\) and there is some number \(z\) such that \(<z,x> \in P\), and if \(y \in E\) and \(<y,5> \in P\) and there is a number \(w\) such that \(<w,y> \in P\), then \(y\) is identical to \(x\).

This is because \(4\) is such that for every number \(y\), \(4 \in E\) and \(<4,5> \in P\) and there is some number \(z\) such that \(<z,4> \in P\), and if \(y \in E\) and \(<y,5> \in P\) and there is a number \(w\) such that \(<w,y> \in P\), then \(y\) is identical to \(4\).

Proof: arbitrarily select a number \(y\).

\(4 \in E\), and \(<4,5> \in P\), and \(<1,4> \in P\).

So \(4 \in E\), and \(<4,5> \in P\), and there is some number \(z\) such that \(<z,4> \in P\).

Now suppose: \(y \in E\), and \(<y,5> \in P\) and there is some number \(z\) such that \(<z,y> \in P\).

So, \(<y,5> \in P\).

But the only number \(y\) such that \(<y,5> \in P\) is \(4\).

So \(y\) is identical to \(4\).

So, if \(y \in E\), and \(<y,5> \in P\) and there is some number \(z\) such that \(<z,y> \in P\),
then \(y\) is identical to \(4\).

So, \(4 \in E\), and \(<4,5> \in P\), and there is some number \(z\) such that \(<z,4> \in P\) and if \(y \in E\), and \(<y,5> \in P\) and there is some number \(z\) such that \(<z,y> \in P\), then \(y\) is identical to \(4\).

So, since \(y\) was arbitrarily selected, for any \(y\), \(4 \in E\), and \(<4,5> \in P\), and there is some number \(z\) such that \(<z,4> \in P\) and if \(y \in E\), and \(<y,5> \in P\) and there is some number \(z\) such that \(<z,y> \in P\), then \(y\) is identical to \(4\).

So there is a number \(x\) (namely, \(4\)) such that for any \(y\), \(x \in E\), and \(<x,5> \in P\),
and there is some number \(z\) such that \(<z,x> \in P\) and if \(y \in E\), and \(<y,5> \in P\) and there is some number \(z\) such that \(<z,y> \in P\), then \(y\) is identical to \(x\).
Thus, $P7_{\text{GNT-EQ}}$ is true on $M_{\text{P-GNT-F}}$.

$$P7 \ (\exists u)(\forall v)\{(\exists w)| \ Ew \ & \ Pw5 \ & \ Puw \ | \ & \\
( (\exists x)| \ Ex \ & \ Px5 \ & \ Pvx | \to \\
(\exists y)(\forall z)|(Ey \ & \ Py5 \ & \ [Puy v Pvy] ) \ & \\
([Ez \ & \ Pz5 \ & \ (Puz v Pvz) | \to y = z])\}$$

is true on $M_{\text{P-GNT-F}}$ if and only if there is a number $u$ such that for any number $v$, there is a number $w$ such that $w \in E$ and $<w,5> \in P$ and $<u,w> \in P$ and if there is a number $x$ such that $x \in E$ and $<x,5> \in P$ and $<v,x> \in P$, then there is a number $y$ such that for any number $z$, $y \in E$ and $<y,5> \in P$ and either $<u,y> \in P$ or $<v,y> \in P$, and if $z \in E$ and $<z,5> \in P$ and either $<u,z> \in P$ or $<v,z> \in P$, then $y$ is identical to $z$.

And in fact there is a number $u$ such that for any number $v$, there is a number $w$ such that $w \in E$ and $<w,5> \in P$ and $<u,w> \in P$ and if there is a number $x$ such that $x \in E$ and $<x,5> \in P$ and $<v,x> \in P$, then there is a number $y$ such that for any number $z$, $y \in E$ and $<y,5> \in P$ and either $<u,y> \in P$ or $<v,y> \in P$, and if $z \in E$ and $<z,5> \in P$ and either $<u,z> \in P$ or $<v,z> \in P$, then $y$ is identical to $z$.

This is because 1 is such that for any number $v$, there is a number $w$ such that $w \in E$ and $<w,5> \in P$ and $<1,w> \in P$ and if there is a number $x$ such that $x \in E$ and $<x,5> \in P$ and $<v,x> \in P$, then there is a number $y$ such that for any number $z$, $y \in E$ and $<y,5> \in P$ and either $<1,y> \in P$ or $<v,y> \in P$, and if $z \in E$ and $<z,5> \in P$ and either $<1,z> \in P$ or $<v,z> \in P$, then $y$ is identical to $z$.

Proof: Arbitrarily select a number $v$.

$4 \in E$ and $<4,5> \in P$, and $<1,4> \in P$.

So there is a number $w$ (namely 4), such that $w \in E$ and $<w,5> \in P$, and $<1,w> \in P$. 

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Now suppose there is a number \( x \) such that \( x \in E \) and \( \langle x,5 \rangle \in P \) and \( \langle v,x \rangle \in P \).

In this case, there is a number \( y \) such that for any number \( z \), \( y \in E \) and \( \langle y,5 \rangle \in P \) and either \( \langle 1,y \rangle \in P \) or \( \langle v,y \rangle \in P \), and if \( z \in E \) and \( \langle z,5 \rangle \in P \) and either \( \langle 1,z \rangle \in P \) or \( \langle v,z \rangle \in P \), then \( y \) is identical to \( z \).

This is because 4 is such that for any number \( z \), \( 4 \in E \) and \( \langle 4,5 \rangle \in P \) and either \( \langle 1,4 \rangle \in P \) or \( \langle v,4 \rangle \in P \), and if \( z \in E \) and \( \langle z,5 \rangle \in P \) and either \( \langle 1,z \rangle \in P \) or \( \langle v,z \rangle \in P \), then 4 is identical to \( z \).

Proof: Arbitrarily select a number \( z \).

\( 4 \in E \) and \( \langle 4,5 \rangle \in P \) and \( \langle 1,4 \rangle \in P \).

So, \( 4 \in E \) and \( \langle 4,5 \rangle \in P \) and either \( \langle 1,4 \rangle \in P \) or \( \langle v,4 \rangle \in P \).

Now suppose \( z \in E \) and \( \langle z,5 \rangle \in P \) and either \( \langle 1,z \rangle \in P \) or \( \langle v,z \rangle \in P \).

So \( \langle z,5 \rangle \in P \).

But the only \( z \) such that \( \langle z,5 \rangle \in P \) is 4.

So \( z \) is identical to 4. So 4 is identical to \( z \).

So, if \( z \in E \) and \( \langle z,5 \rangle \in P \) and either \( \langle 1,z \rangle \in P \) or \( \langle v,z \rangle \in P \), then 4 is identical to \( z \).

So, \( 4 \in E \) and \( \langle 4,5 \rangle \in P \) and either \( \langle 1,4 \rangle \in P \) or \( \langle v,4 \rangle \in P \) and if \( z \in E \) and \( \langle z,5 \rangle \in P \) and either \( \langle 1,z \rangle \in P \) or \( \langle v,z \rangle \in P \), then 4 is identical to \( z \).

So, since \( z \) was arbitrarily selected, for any number \( z \), \( 4 \in E \) and \( \langle 4,5 \rangle \in P \) and either \( \langle 1,4 \rangle \in P \) or \( \langle v,4 \rangle \in P \) and if \( z \in E \) and \( \langle z,5 \rangle \in P \) and either \( \langle 1,z \rangle \in P \) or \( \langle v,z \rangle \in P \), then 4 is identical to \( z \).

So, 4 is such that for any number \( z \), \( 4 \in E \) and \( \langle 4,5 \rangle \in P \) and either \( \langle 1,4 \rangle \in P \) or \( \langle v,4 \rangle \in P \) and if \( z \in E \) and \( \langle z,5 \rangle \in P \) and either \( \langle 1,z \rangle \in P \) or \( \langle v,z \rangle \in P \), then 4 is identical to \( z \).

So, there is a number \( y \) (namely 4) such that for any number \( z \), \( y \in E \) and \( \langle y,5 \rangle \in P \) and either \( \langle 1,y \rangle \in P \) or \( \langle v,y \rangle \in P \) and if \( z \in E \) and \( \langle z,5 \rangle \in P \) and either
$<1, z> \in P$ or $<v, z> \in P$, then $y$ is identical to $z$.

So, if there is a number $x$ such that $x \in E$ and $<x, 5> \in P$ and $<v, x> \in P$, then there is a number $y$ (namely 4) such that for any number $z$, $y \in E$ and $<y, 5> \in P$ and either $<1, y> \in P$ or $<v, y> \in P$ and if $z \in E$ and $<z, 5> \in P$ and either $<1, z> \in P$ or $<v, z> \in P$, then $y$ is identical to $z$.

And as we said above, $4 \in E$ and $<4, 5> \in P$, and $<1, 4> \in P$.

So there is a number $w$ (namely 4), such that $w \in E$ and $<w, 5> \in P$, and $<1, w> \in P$.

So there is a number $w$ such that $w \in E$ and $<w, 5> \in P$, and $<1, w> \in P$ and if there is a number $x$ such that $x \in E$ and $<x, 5> \in P$ and $<v, x> \in P$, then there is a number $y$ (namely 4) such that for any number $z$, $y \in E$ and $<y, 5> \in P$ and either $<1, y> \in P$ or $<v, y> \in P$ and if $z \in E$ and $<z, 5> \in P$ and either $<1, z> \in P$ or $<v, z> \in P$, then $y$ is identical to $z$.

So, since $v$ was arbitrarily selected, for any number $v$, there is a number $w$ such that $w \in E$ and $<w, 5> \in P$, and $<1, w> \in P$ and if there is a number $x$ such that $x \in E$ and $<x, 5> \in P$ and $<v, x> \in P$, then there is a number $y$ (namely 4) such that for any number $z$, $y \in E$ and $<y, 5> \in P$ and either $<1, y> \in P$ or $<v, y> \in P$ and if $z \in E$ and $<z, 5> \in P$ and either $<1, z> \in P$ or $<v, z> \in P$, then $y$ is identical to $z$.

So, there is a number $u$ (namely 1), such that, for any number $v$, there is a number $w$ such that $w \in E$ and $<w, 5> \in P$, and $<u, w> \in P$ and if there is a number $x$ such that $x \in E$ and $<x, 5> \in P$ and $<v, x> \in P$, then there is a number $y$ (namely 4) such that for any number $z$, $y \in E$ and $<y, 5> \in P$ and either $<u, y> \in P$ or $<v, y> \in P$ and if $z \in E$ and $<z, 5> \in P$ and either $<u, z> \in P$ or $<v, z> \in P$, then $y$ is identical to $z$.

Thus, $P7_{GNT-NCIC}$ is also true on $M_{P-GNT-F}$.

O.E.$\Delta$.  

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5.6 GNT “Lite”

5.6.1 \( M_{\text{P-GNT-Lite}} \)

Note that in our proofs above, we made no reference to 0, 6, 7, 8, or 9. Nor did we make use of the predicates “H,” “I,” “O,” or “E*,” or the relation “N.” Thus, we could give an even smaller model for \( P_{\text{GNT-F}} \) – call it “\( M_{\text{P-GNT-Lite}} \).” And O.E.\( \Delta \). can also be used to show that \( M_{\text{P-GNT-Lite}} \) is a model for \( P_{\text{GNT-F}} \).\(^{218}\)

\( M_{\text{P-GNT-Lite}} \)

Domain: \( \{1, 2, 3, 4, 5\} \)

\[
\begin{align*}
f & = 1 \\s & = 2 \\h & = 3 \\g & = 4 \\g^* & = 5
\end{align*}
\]

\( E: \{4\} \)

\( P: \{<1,4>, <2,4>, <3,4>, <4,5>\} \)

If one preferred, one could even eliminate 5, eliminating all occurrences of “g*” from \( P_{\text{GNT-F}} \), and simply introduce a primitive predicate (\( G: \{4\} \)), replacing sentences

\(^{218}\) Though \( M_{\text{P-GNT-Lite}} \) is not a model for the entirety of GNT\( _F \).
of the form $P_{g^*}$ with sentences of the form $G_x$, and dispensing with sentences of the form $E_x$ entirely.

Given only the concerns of the logician, one could construct even smaller models of $P_{\text{GNT-F}}$ than $M_{P_{\text{GNT-Lite}}}$ – for example, by eliminating not only 5 but 4, and making both “$g$” and “$g^*$” refer to 1 – but these would not be in the spirit of Gregory’s overall Trinitarian theory, since he certainly would want to affirm that $f \neq g$ and $g \neq g^*$, as well as $\neg P_{ff}$, $\neg P_{sf}$ and $\neg P_{hf}$.

In any case, if the anti-Trinitarian wants to argue that the doctrine of the Trinity – or the “version” of it that appears in St. Gregory’s works – is literally a formal contradiction, he is out of luck. Our precise explication ($\text{GNT}_F$) of Gregory of Nyssa’s Trinitarian theory ($\text{GNT}$) in the idiom of predicate logic provides us with a formally adequate solution ($\{\text{PLI}, P_{\text{GNT-F}}, O.E.\Delta.\}$) to the LPT. And since either all formally adequate answers to the LPT are solutions (consistent) or all are non-solutions (inconsistent), it follows that all formally adequate answers to the LPT are solutions (consistent).

Thus, we have achieved the goal we set for ourselves at the beginning of this dissertation (Chapter 1.2, p. 22). The doctrine of the Trinity – or at least the subset of the doctrine of the Trinity we have called $P$ – is logically consistent. But if the anti-Trinitarian can no longer claim that the doctrine of the Trinity, or at least $P$, is inconsistent, what else, if anything, could he say against it? Where should debate and discussion go from here?

Before answering that question, we should note that $M_{P_{\text{GNT-Lite}}}$ reveals that we have discussed much more of Gregory’s metaphysics and theology than absolutely necessary merely to provide a solution to the LPT. Whether or not these other elements of Gregory’s metaphysics, theology and semantics are useful in understanding

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219. This isn’t to say that every other church father would want to say $\neg P_{ff}$, $\neg P_{sf}$ or $\neg P_{hf}$, or that such views are necessarily unorthodox. Only that these aren’t views that Gregory holds.
his view, and whether or not they are even essential to the orthodox doctrine of the Trinity or to Christian orthodoxy more generally, they are not essential to his solution to the LPT specifically. So, if the anti-Trinitarian wishes to continue his argument specifically that P is, for some reason, problematic (though not on the basis of an alleged logical inconsistency), it will be instructive to ask, “What is the ‘Smallest’ Gregorian Solution to LPT?” That is, what is the simplest account of the Trinity that Gregory would need to defend in order to defend the consistency of P along the lines we have been exploring?

Consider, then, the following “pared down” Nyssen Account of the Trinity.
5.6.2 GNT_{F-Lite}

5.6.2.1 “Lite” Metaphysics

Possible Object Types

1. Hypostases
   (We will not need any predicate for hypostases.)

2. 	extit{Energeia} Types
   (We will not need any predicate for 	extit{energeia} tokens.)

3. 	extit{Energeia} Tokens
   We will represent the predicate “is an 	extit{energeia} token” with “E.”

Possible Relations

1. Performing or Being “of” a Type
   We will represent the predicate “performs or is a token of type” with the two-place predicate “P.”
   The first relation (performing) can hold between hypostases and 	extit{energeia} tokens. Thus, sentences of the form $Pxy$ can be true where $x$ is a hypostasis and $y$ is an 	extit{energeia} token.
   The second relation (being of a type) can hold between 	extit{energeia} tokens and 	extit{energeia} types. Thus, sentences of the form $Pxy$ can be true where $x$ is an 	extit{energeia} token and $y$ is an 	extit{energeia} type.

5.6.2.2 “Lite” Theology

Token Objects:

Hypostases:

1. The Father (f)
2. The Son (s)
3. The Holy Spirit (h)
Energeia Types:

1. God-ding (type) \((g^*)\)

Energeia Tokens:

1. God-ding (token) \((g)\)

\(E(i): \quad Eg\)

Relations Posited Between Token Objects:

\[\begin{align*}
P_1_{\text{Lite}} & : (\exists x)(Ex & Pxg^* & Pfx) \\
P_2_{\text{Lite}} & : (\exists x)(Ex & Pxg^* & Psx) \\
P_3_{\text{Lite}} & : (\exists x)(Ex & Pxg^* & Phx) \\
P_4_{\text{Lite}} & : f\neq s \\
P_5_{\text{Lite}} & : f\neq h \\
P_6_{\text{Lite}} & : s\neq h \\
RE(i)_{\text{Lite}} & : Pgg^* \\
E_{\text{Unique-Lite}} & : (\forall x)[(E^*x & Nx_0) \rightarrow (\exists y)(Ey & Pyx)]
\end{align*}\]

5.6.2.3 “Lite” Semantics

1. S1–S3: Statements of the form \(x \text{ is (a) God}\) are true if and only if \(x\) does some token action of the God-ding type, i.e., \((\exists y)(Ey & Pyg^* & Pxy)\).

2. S4–S6: Statements of the form \(x \text{ is not } y\) are true if and only if \(x\) is not identical to \(y\) \((x\neq y)\).

3. S7: Statements of the form \(there \ is \ exactly \ one \ x-er\) are true if and only if there is exactly one token action of type \(x\) that is done

i.e., \((\exists y)[Ey & Pyx & (\exists z)(Pzy)]\).

Call this account of the Trinity \(GNT_{F-Lite}\) and those aspects of Gregory’s Trinitarian theory that it expresses \(GNT_{Lite}\). It is obvious that \(GNT_{F-Lite}\) yields exactly
the same answer to the LPT as GNT\textsubscript{F} (namely: \{PLI, P\textsubscript{GNT-F}, O.E.A.\}). Thus, if GNT\textsubscript{F} provides a formally adequate solution to the LPT, so does GNT\textsubscript{F-Lite}. Thus, if Gregory has a formally adequate solution to the LPT, then whether any aspect of GNT that is not contained in GNT\textsubscript{Lite} is in some sense essential to the doctrine of the Trinity, or to orthodox Christianity, it is \textit{not} essential to Gregory’s response to the LPT. Thus, any further philosophical criticism \textit{specifically} of Gregory’s answer to the LPT should focus \textit{specifically} on GNT\textsubscript{Lite}, and, assuming I have done my history correctly, on GNT\textsubscript{F-Lite}.

But if that further philosophical criticism can no longer be that P is \textit{logically inconsistent}, what else, if anything, could the anti-Trinitarian say against Gregory’s solution to the LPT? Where should debate and discussion go from here?
PART V

EVALUATION
It looked not so much as if Christianity was bad enough to include any vices, but rather as if any stick was good enough to beat Christianity with. – G. K. Chesterton

In the last section, we met the challenge we accepted at the beginning of this dissertation,¹ and showed that there is a formally adequate solution to the LPT. The doctrine of the Trinity – or at least the subset of the doctrine of the Trinity we have called P – is formally consistent. We showed this by taking an account of the Trinity already known to be a version of the orthodox doctrine of the Trinity (namely, St. Gregory of Nyssa’s Trinitarian theory, or GNT), examining it to see what logical form it implicitly attributes to P, then showing the consistency of P on that particular attribution of logical form. We ended the last section with the question, if the anti-Trinitarian can no longer claim that the doctrine of the Trinity, or at least P, is inconsistent, what else, if anything, could he say against it? Where should debate and discussion go from here?

Before giving this final evaluation and suggestions for further discussion, I want to reiterate what the (much more narrow) scope of the dissertation is: to show that there is a (formally adequate) solution to the LPT. And that has been done.

What follows is thus not intended to be a complete list of every possible further objection that could be made to Gregory’s solution or to the doctrine of the Trinity or

1. Chapter 1.2, p. 22.
to Gregory’s broader theological and philosophical commitments. It is merely what seem to me to be the most obvious ways in which one might take the discussion from here. Nor again do I intend my responses in this section to be taken as the final word on a particular subject. They are merely my impressions of the *prima facie* value of the objections I’ll consider. But with that said, what are the most obvious ways the anti-Trinitarian could object to Gregory’s solution to the LPT, or to Gregory’s broader philosophical framework, or to the doctrine of the Trinity more generally?

In the first section below (6.1, p. 362 ff.), I will briefly address the possibility that GNT\textsubscript{F-Lite} (and thus GNT\textsubscript{F}) is not formally adequate for P after all.

Next, if GNT\textsubscript{F-Lite} is formally adequate for P, and if it is all that is actually necessary to show that there is a solution to the LPT, why did we discuss other elements of GNT that are not essential to Gregory’s solution to the LPT?

We provided these other elements of GNT to show the broader theory within which Gregory’s solution to the LPT is situated. We did this first so that it is easier to understand. Secondly, so it can be seen just how much of Gregory’s theology simply follows as the logical consequences of just how few basic principles. And finally, so that it can be made clear what precisely those premises are, and that they may not be what one would assume.

But having explicated the broader philosophical framework within which Gregory situates his response to the LPT, we are now in a position to discuss how plausible this broader theory itself is, and what aspects of it may or may not be essential to Trinitarian belief. An interesting phenomenon, though, is that when we strip Gregory’s solution to the LPT down to its barest essentials, we can see that there are surprisingly few basic assumptions to attack. In particular, as far as what philosophers, as such, would be concerned with (metaphysics and semantics), only three things jump out at me as obviously essential to his solution to the LPT and potentially objectionable. One is his metaphysics of synergy, discussed in the section
on metaphysical objections below (6.3, p. 391 ff.). The other two are aspects of his semantics—first, treating “is God” as predicking an *energeia* or act(ivity) rather than an *ousia* or nature; second, counting doers by the number of token *energeia* done, rather than the number of hypostases doing (both discussed in the section on semantic objections below, 6.2, p. 371 ff.).

Since there is so very little to object to here, though, the next step in the debate must be to move away both from purely logical and even from more generally philosophical objections to the doctrine and raise purely theological objections to the doctrine, directly. In the section on theological objects below (6.4, p. 398 ff.), I explain why I think that any attempt to do so would be massively problematic.

Finally, I briefly consider the possibility of combining various concerns from these different areas, only noting that it would be incumbent on the anti-Trinitarian to articulate any such objections before the Trinitarian needs to respond to them.

6.1 The Formal Adequacy of Gregory’s Account

One could attempt to argue that, of the accounts of the Trinity I discussed in the previous chapter (GNT\(_F\) and GNT\(_F\)-Lite), neither yields a formally adequate solution to the LPT.

To fail to be a “formally adequate solution to the LPT” as I’ve defined that phrase is either:

(a) for the regimentation of \(P\) given in the solution to fail to be formally adequate for \(P\), or

(b) for the regimentation of \(P\) given in the solution to fail to be logically consistent.

But both (GNT\(_F\) and GNT\(_F\)-Lite) yield the same solution to the LPT, namely {PLI, \(P_{\text{GNT-F}}\), O.E.\(\Delta\)}.

One cannot argue that \(P_{\text{GNT-F}}\) is formally inconsistent, because we’ve given a model for it.
So it would seem the only way to challenge my argument would be to say that $P_{\text{GNT-F}}$ is not formally adequate for $P$. This could be for either of two reasons:

First, one might claim that, although the logical form of Gregory’s over Trinitarian theory itself (GNT) may yield a formally adequate answer to the LPT (some subset or entailment of GNT may adequately reflect the logical forms of the propositions in $P$), my formalization of Gregory’s Theory ($\text{GNT}_F$) is not a formally adequate representation of his actual theory (GNT). And my regimentation ($P_{\text{GNT-F}}$) of the logical form he implicitly attributes to $P$ does not in fact adequately represent the logical forms that he implicitly attributes to $P$. That is, I have done my history wrong. Indeed, I have misunderstood the content of Gregory’s view so much that I have attributed to his view a logical form that is so much different from the logical form his view actually has, that my attribution does not even “reflect the relevant aspects of the logical forms of” his view. This would be to say that there is in fact some very serious flaw in my historical investigation.

Second, one might claim that, although my formalization ($\text{GNT}_F$) of Gregory’s Theory may be formally adequate to his actual theory (GNT) (may adequately reflect the logical forms of the propositions in GNT), Gregory’s Trinitarian Theory (GNT) itself yields a reading of $P$ ($P_{\text{GNT}} = P_{\text{GNT-F}}$) that is not formally adequate for $P$. That is, although I have done my history correctly, Gregory’s view is so unorthodox that the reading of $P$ that it yields has a logical form that does not even “reflect the relevant aspects of the logical form of” $P$. It would be to say that, not only is Gregory’s view not partly definitive of the orthodox doctrine of the Trinity (as I have claimed), it is not even an orthodox form of Trinitarian doctrine at all.

(Or, of course, one might think both that Gregory’s view is not orthodox and that my understanding of him is mistaken.)

To the first objection, I would simply respond by inviting a correction to be given. Historical investigation, by its nature, deals in probability, and must therefore always
in principle be open to revision in light of further evidence and argument. Although I would be surprised to find that any of the historical conclusions I've argued for are so wrong as to make my reconstruction of Gregory's view not even formally adequate, I must obviously remain open to the possibility. However, to press this point, it would seem to be incumbent on the anti-Trinitarian to do his own historical homework and provide reasons for thinking that Gregory's view is in some relevant way different from how I understand it.

As for the second objection, although I can comprehend the individual words that are being said, I find this objection so far-fetched as to verge on unintelligibility.² I have already said in the section on methodology that, if Gregory's view does not count as a version of the orthodox doctrine of the Trinity, then I would not any longer know what the doctrine of the Trinity was, or why it was important.³ If an anti-Trinitarian seriously made this objection, at the very least we can certainly say it would be incumbent on him to say whose views would count as versions of the orthodox doctrine of the Trinity, and why Gregory's don't.

I do admit, though, that the thesis is (barely) intelligible. One could try to argue for it by showing that there was some broad consensus about P among the pro-Nicenes that Gregory's views lie outside of. To make an underatement, this would be a surprising result.⁴ Of course, in theory, one must again remain open to the possibility. But surely it would be incumbent on anyone claiming that Gregory's views do not count as orthodox Trinitarianism to show that, and not the other way around.

². I am reminded of the old Miracle Ear™ hearing-aid commercials, recommended “if you can hear people talk, but can't understand all the words.” Sadly, there is no philosophical version of Miracle Ear™.

³. Chapter 3.3.3, p. 147.

⁴. See p. 369 ff. below for just one of many reasons why such a discovery would be not only amazing, but scarcely intelligible.
Furthermore, especially when we focus in on GNT\textsubscript{Lite}, we can see that there are really only three aspects of the logical form of GNT that seem directly relevant to the LPT, and that might at all raise questions as to the orthodoxy of Gregory’s view.

First, that he takes “is God” to express participation in a token \textit{energeia} (rather than the divine nature). We saw above (Chapter 4.2.3.2, p. 195 ff.) some evidence that Gregory was by no means alone in this view, and we will not repeat that evidence here.

Second, he holds that the Father, Son and Holy Spirit all engage, not only in the same \textit{types} of \textit{energeiai}, but in \textit{the same token \textit{energeiai}}. Part of the reason I chose Gregory to focus on is precisely that he is the clearest of the church fathers that I know of on that point (even if one does have to look closely to see the point). So, I can’t present as detailed an argument that this is precisely the view taken by a significant group of his pro-Nicene peers. However, I do think that, once we have grasped that distinction, and understand the role it is playing in Gregory’s view, when we go back to other pro-Nicenes and look at similar statements, it lends at least some credence to interpretations of their statements on which they are making the same claim. And I think that will come out in some of the quotes I offer below with respect to the final aspect of the logical form of GNT the orthodoxy of which one might question.

Third, he takes it that the the logical form of the claim that there is one God is such that the previous point (that the hypostases synergize on a single token of god-ding) makes it true to say there is one God.

These three features together are the reason why, although the hypostases are numerically three,\footnote{It certainly wouldn’t seem that the anti-Trinitarian would want to object to taking “Father,” “Son” and “Holy Spirit” to be singular terms, or to object to taking P4 through P6 to be non-identity claims, since these are what make the LPT “work” in the first place. So, what else is even left in the logical forms of P\textsubscript{GNT} for the anti-Trinitarian to object to?} they count as a single God. But we’ve already seen that Gregory
is by no means alone on the first claim (4.2.3.2, p. 195 ff.). The following, then, are just a few examples as evidence that he is also by no means alone in taking it to be the case that the hypostases count as one in virtue of sharing a single dynamis (power) or energeia (or in Latin, operatio. And I think that a few of them lend credence to the view that these authors understand this sharing of energeia in the way that Gregory does as well, though more could certainly be said on the point. We can start with St. Athanasius.

Athanasius (c. 318 AD) Contra Gentes:

Or who that sees the earth, heaviest of all things by nature, fixed upon the waters, and remaining unmoved upon what is by nature mobile, will fail to understand that there is One that has made and ordered it, even God?

Who ... can resist the inference that there is one Power which orders and administers them, ordaining things well as it thinks fit?  

Too many passages from St. Ambrose could be given on these points for me to possibly do justice to. Indeed, De Fide (Ad Gratianum) contains so much material on the point, it would be hard to pick out a single passage and not simply quote the work in its entirety. We have already seen some of what Ambrose says about the semantics of “is God” and the phenomenon of synergy above (see 4.2.3.2, p. 197). Here I have selected just three quotations from De Spiritu Sancto, out of a much larger, essentially unmanageable, list of possible passages from Ambrose to quote.

6. (St. Athanasius 1971), section 36.
7. (St. Athanasius 1892), p. 23.
Denique ne vel in tempore, vel in ordine aliquam inter Patrem et Filium putares operis esse distantiam, sed eiusdem operationis crederes unitatem:

Et opera, inquit, quae ego facio, ipse facit. (Joan v, 17)

Et rursus ne discretionem aliquam in operis distinctione sentires, sed idem velle, idem facere, idem posse Patrem et Filium indiques, dicit tibi Sapientia de Patre:

Quaecumque enim ille fecerit, eadem et Filius facit similiter (Ibid., 19).

Non ergo alicui prior vel secundus est actus, sed idem unius operationis effectus.

Et ideo nihil a se posse facere Filius dicitur; quia a Patre non potest eius operatio separari.

Similiter et Spiritus sancti operatio non secernitur.

Unde etiam ea quae loquitur, audire a Patre dicitur.8

Lastly, that one may not think that there is any difference of work either in time or in order between the Father and the Son, but may believe the oneness of the same operation, He says:

“The works which I do, He doeth.” [John 5:17]

And again, that one may not think that there is any difference in the distinction of the works, but may judge that the will, the working, and the power of the Father and the Son are the same, Wisdom says concerning the Father:

“For whatsoever things He doeth, the Son doeth the same likewise.” [John 5:19]

So that the action of neither Person is before or after that of the Other, but the same result of one operation.

And for this reason the Son says that He can do nothing “of Himself,” because His operation cannot be separated from that of the Father.

In like manner the operation of the Holy Spirit is not separated.

Whence also the things which He speaks, He is said to  “hear” from the Father.9

8. PL 16, pp. 771-772.

Si ergo homo amicum ita definivit, ut alterum se esse diceret, per unitatem videlicet amoris et gratiae; quanto magis in Patre et Filio et Spiritu sancto unitatem maiestatis aestimare debemus,

cum per eandum operationem ac divinitatem vel unitas, vel certe id quod amplius est, ταυτότης sicut Graece dicitur, exprimatur?

ταυτό enim idem significat; eo quod idem habeat et Pater et Filius et Spiritus sanctus; ut idem velle, et idem posse non ex affectione sit voluntatis, sed in substantia Trinitatis.  

–Book II, Ch. 13.

Etenim secundum nostram sententiam quia unus Deus, una divinitas, et unitas intelligitur potestatis.

Sicut unum Deum dicimus, et Patrem vero deitatis nomine confitentes, nec Filium dene-

If, then, a man so defined a friend as to say, he was “a second self,” that is to say, through a oneness of love and good-will, how much more ought we to esteem the oneness of Majesty, in the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit,

when by the same operation and divine power, either the unity, or certainly that which is more [than unity], the ταυτότης, as it is called in Greek, is expressed.

for “ταυτό” signifies “the same,” so that the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit have the same; so that to have the same will and the same power does not arise from the affection of the will, but inheres in the substance of the Trinity.

According to our opinion, because there is one God, one Godhead and oneness of power is understood.

For as we say that there is one God, confessing the Father, and not denying the Son

10. Incidentally, this seems to show that Ambrose, at least, is working with a distinction between “oneness” (“unitas”) and “sameness,” the former of which is clearly “looser” than classical identity, but the latter of which I take just to be classical identity.


gantes; ita etiam Spiritum sanctum a deitatis non excludimus unitate, et tres deos non asserimus, sed negamus;
quia pluralitatem non unitas facit, sed divisio potestatis.\textsuperscript{13}because it is not unity [of power] but a division of power which makes plurality.\textsuperscript{14}

–Book III, Ch. 13.

We can even see hints of this theology in Roman law passed as a result of the Second Ecumenical Council.

\textit{Codex Theodosianus} XVI.1.3 (July 30, 381 AD):

\textit{Idem aaaa. ad Auxonium proconsulem Asiae.}
\textit{Episcopis tradit omnes ecclesias mox iubemus, qui unius maiestatis adque virtutis patrem et filium et spiritum sanctum confitentur eiusdem gloriarum, claritatis unius.\ldots}

\textit{quos constabit communioni \ldots Gregorio episc(opo) Nysseno \ldots}

\textit{Hos ad optinendas catholicae ecclesiae ex communione et consortio probabilium sacerdo-

\textsuperscript{13} PL 16, p. 799.

\textsuperscript{14} (St. Ambrose of Milan 1896), p. 148.
tum oportebit admitti:

omnes autem, qui ab eorum, quos commemoratio specialis expressit, fidei communione dissentient, ut manifestos hareticos ab ecclesiis expelli . . .

DAT. III KAL. AVG. HERACL(EAE) EVCHERIO ET SYAGRIO CONSS. 15

Humfress notes that, “taken in conjunction with the Edict of Thessalonica, this law is considered by modern scholars to have settled the legal definition of orthodox belief.” 17 I note that the edict contains no mention of unity of essence, nature or substance at all – only of “majesty . . . power . . . glory, 18 and . . . splendor.”

And the view seems to have continued in the subsequent orthodox Trinitarian tradition, for example:

Pope St. Leo the Great (mid-400’s AD) Sermon LXXV:

For we confess this blessed Trinity to be One God for this reason, because in these three Persons there is no diversity either of substance, or of power,

15. CT 16.1.3. Latin text from (Mommsen and Meyer 1905), p. 834.


18. On the equivalence of “glory” and energeia, see (Bradshaw 2006), esp. pp. 291-292.
I conclude, then, that what is really essential to Gregory’s solution to the LPT—
that “God” expresses an *energeia*, that the hypostases synergize on that *energeia*, and
that synergizing on this *energeia* is the fact in virtue of which the hypostases count
as “one,” was clearly part of the orthodox (pro-Nicene) consensus. I would even be
prepared to argue that it derives from a tradition earlier than that, which goes back
at least to the second century, if not to the New Testament writings themselves (on
which, see p. 402 ff.), although that is not necessary to show for our present concerns.

Again, historical arguments are always open to potential revision, whether we
are speaking of the link between my formalization and Gregory’s actual view, or
that between Gregory’s view and the pro-Nicene consensus itself. But since I have
presented my historical arguments, it would be incumbent upon the anti-Trinitarian
to attack them if he wishes to show $P_{GNT}$ not to be formally adequate for $P$.

6.2 Semantic Objections

Probably the single aspect of Gregory’s solution to the LPT that one could most
easily attack, and that, although not strictly logical, would come closest to counting
as a “logical” problem, would be his semantics for counting by agent nouns. Also,
while it would clearly not count as a “logical” problem, one could take issue with his
view that “is God” predicates an *energeia* (activity) rather than an *ousia* (a nature
or kind). We’ll take these in reverse order.

The main concern I have about the second issue is that it seems, so to speak,
too “private.” Externalist concerns notwithstanding, it seems like Gregory and other


20. (Pope St. Leo the Great and St. Gregory the Great 1895), p. 191.
church fathers should be able to mean whatever they want to mean by “is God.” (And see just above as well as 4.2.3.2, p. 195 ff. for evidence that this particular bit of semantics was common among pro-Nicenes and earlier Christians as well.)

On the other hand, if one wants to hold him to the standard of the Bible, then one will have to respond to his arguments about how the Bible itself uses the predicate “is God” (Chapter 4.2.3.1, p. 179 ff.).

But even if one could make the case that “god” in the Bible does in fact express the divine nature rather than, as Gregory claims, an activity, it’s not clear how devastating this objection would be in the end, because it isn’t clear how important the semantics really is to Gregory. Or rather, it’s pretty clear that, at least in a certain sense, it isn’t very important to him.

The objection seems very much analogous to a somewhat common, deeply problematic objection one sometimes hears from undergraduates studying the Ontological Argument. From time to time I have students object that, “Perhaps God really isn’t that than which nothing greater can be conceived. Perhaps there is some conceivable being that would be even greater than God.” But of course, it is up to Anselm what he wants to use the word “God” to mean. So I often say something like this:

Suppose we gave Anselm a computer and a copy of Microsoft Word. Suppose he types up his Ontological Argument as a Word document. Suppose further that you argue with Anselm that God really isn’t that than which nothing greater can be conceived after all, or that for whatever reason he shouldn’t use “God” to mean that than which nothing greater can be conceived.

Now suppose Anselm says, “Very well. I give in. Henceforth, I vow never again to use the word ‘God’ to mean that than which nothing greater can be conceived.” Then he opens his file in Microsoft Word and clicks on “Find and Replace.” In the “Find” field, he enters the string “God.” In the “Replace With” field, he enters the string “that than which nothing greater can be conceived.” Then he clicks on “Replace All,” whereupon all instances of “God” in the Ontological Argument are changed to “that than which nothing greater can be conceived.” Now the argument doesn’t even mention God at all — only that than which nothing greater can be conceived.
Then Anselm turns to you and says, “Now. I take it that, although you rejected my definition that God is that than which nothing greater can be conceived, you will admit that that than which nothing greater can be conceived is that than which nothing greater can be conceived. And so on for the rest of my premises. And now the conclusion will simply be that “that than which nothing greater can be conceived, cannot be conceived not to exist.” So, although you reject the claim that God cannot be conceived not to exist, unless you have further, more substantive objections, you will still have to admit that that than which nothing greater can be conceived cannot be conceived not to exist. We won’t call it “God,” of course, but this being (whatever it is to be called) must have every great-making property conceivable, and to the highest conceivable degree. It must be omniscient, omnipotent, omni-benevolent, immortal, and so on. And we must believe that it exists, not only in the mind, but in reality.

That is, he seems to get all the same substantive theological results, but simply can’t utter the sentence “God exists” due to his newly-adopted semantics.

Would Anselm (should Anselm) really be very upset about this outcome? You may have kept him from being able to assert the sentence “God exists.” But hasn’t he gotten every bit of the substance of what he wanted to prove? He can still believe in the existence of a being of exactly the sort he believed in before. He’ll just have to call it something other than “God.”

Likewise, suppose we allow Gregory the result that there are three uncreated hypostases that all synergize on all of their activities, including “beholding.” But we insist that he can’t call them “God,” or else that, if he did, then he would have to admit there are “three” Gods, because “God” predicates a kind, and that is how we count by kind terms.

Would Gregory (should Gregory) really be very upset about this outcome? We may have kept him from being able to assert the sentence “there is exactly one God.” But hasn’t he gotten every bit of the substance of what he wanted to prove? He can still believe all of the substantive theology he believed before. He’ll just have to eschew using the word “God” and replace it with something like “Lord” (or “Beholder,” or “Creator,” or some other agent noun, or a noun expressing some kind of power, so
that he can again say there is only “one” of it.)

So, it seems to me that merely attacking Gregory’s understanding of the predicate “is God” here (without also attacking his counting principle, which of course would then make the current objection superfluous) is not much different from attacking Anselm’s definition of “is God” in the Ontological Argument.

If Anselm still gets to hold onto the same picture with respect to his metaphysics and substantive theology, who cares if he doesn’t get to use the word “God” when describing his view?

Likewise, if Gregory gets to hold onto the same picture with respect to his metaphysics and substantive theology, who cares if he doesn’t get to use the word “God” when describing his view?

So, not only does this not count as a strictly logical problem with Trinitarian theology – it doesn’t seem to count as much of a problem at all. At most, it might play a role in a larger argument that Trinitarian theology is not biblical. But see below in the section on theological objections why such attempts all share an important, and in my view probably insurmountable, difficulty (6.4 400).

Returning, then, to the first issue (Gregory’s semantics for counting by agent nouns), the main concern I have is that, while in this case the semantics seems “public” enough that it makes more sense to criticize it, it isn’t quite as obviously a problem with the logical form of the doctrine of the Trinity itself as one might initially think.

First, as I mentioned above,21 at least the most obvious facts about our ordinary linguistic practices on this point don’t seem capable of settling the matter, as we always use agent nouns to count by pairs of hypostasis-plus-energeia.

That is, when we count “one shoemaker,” we count one pair of hypostasis-plus-

21. Chapter 4.4.5, p. 258.
token-shoemaking-energeia. And when we count “two shoemakers,” we count two distinct (non-overlapping) pairs of hypostasis-plus-token-shoemaking-energeia. And, outside of the Trinity, there are no instances of multiple hypostases sharing a single, token energeia. Thus, there simply are no ordinary counting practices there to make reference to that provide a straight-forward analogy to the case of the Trinity.

Thus, there simply are no facts of this sort about our ordinary linguistic practices that settle the question of how many shoemakers to count should there be multiple hypostases participating in a single token shoemaking energeia. This is not to rule out the possibility that there might be other facts about our ordinary linguistic practices that could settle the question. (Indeed, Gregory, at least, believes other such facts rule in his favor.) I only flag that the issue is not such a simple one to settle.

But even if turned out one could show that Gregory was wrong about his semantics for counting by agent nouns, it isn’t clear that the way in which he would be wrong would count as a “logical” problem.

Here is an analogy:

Suppose someone says, “it’s raining and it’s not raining,” and agreed to the standard truth table definitions for “and” and “not” and that he wasn’t equivocating on “it’s raining.” That would certainly be a logical problem. That is, it would certainly mean that what this person was asserting was formally, logically inconsistent.

But suppose someone says, “it’s raining and it’s not raining,” and agreed to the standard truth table definition for “not” and that he wasn’t equivocating on “it’s raining,” but then said that, in his view, the semantics for “and” is much more complicated than we usually think. In most cases it will match up to the standard truth table definition we have for it, but in certain rare circumstances, given this more complicated semantics, it ends up computing an importantly different function.

Then it doesn’t seem he has so blatantly contradicted himself. It seems, rather,
to be a much deeper disagreement, a disagreement more like those in the philosophy of logic. Not a disagreement about our pictures of the world, but about the meanings of certain logical operators.

Here is an even better analogy:

Suppose A says that, “If John is in London, then he is in England” and “If John is in Paris, then he is in France” entail “either if John is in London, then he is in France, or if John is in Paris, then he is in England,” because he believes that the logical connective “if... then,” as it appears in these sentences, is definable by the standard truth table for material conditionals. He argues that if B accepts the first two, he must not – on pain of contradiction! – deny the third.

Suppose B argues that this is absurd, and maintains that the first two statements are clearly true, while the third is false. Suppose he then proposes a more complicated semantics, not for any of the non-logical constants involved, but for the logical connective “if... then” itself. (Perhaps he proposes a Stalnakerian or Lewisian possible-worlds semantics, or something even more complicated than those).

A can accuse B of being wrong about his logic. And if A is right, then the propositions expressed by B’s statements, as interpreted according to standard English usage, may in fact be inconsistent. But at a deeper level, there is nothing particularly untoward about B’s picture of the world – his metaphysics and his substantive theory. He simply thinks that London is inside England but not inside France, and Paris is inside France but not inside England, and he believes certain things about the properties of relations like “inside of” and so forth. And since B understands the semantics of “if... then” differently, he thinks the disjunctive statement is false. And while, if he is wrong about that, so that the set of sentences he endorses express contradictory claims, it is only because they express something other than what B takes them to express, and other than what B actually believes about the world. So, while
one can call this a case of B endorsing a formally inconsistent set of propositions, it isn’t so in the same sense as we would normally think when hearing that sort of accusation.

Normally when we think of someone affirming a formally inconsistent set, we are thinking of a case where how we understand the uses of the natural language logical operators involved is agreed on or held constant. The notions of being “inconsistent” and “unsatisfiable” in a formal language are intimately tied to the idea of possible interpretations specifically for the non-logical constants, holding the logical operators themselves fixed in their definitions. And therefore the notions of being inconsistent or unsatisfiable are intimately tied to the assumption that there is no issue as to what the semantics for the logical operators themselves should be.

Thus, since Gregory of Nyssa quite clearly has a particular view about counting, it seems to me that if one attacks him on the point of his semantics in S7, one may (or may not) have some reasonable objection to make to his view, but it would be less analogous to a “logical problem” like saying, unequivocally, “it’s both raining and not raining” while agreeing to the truth tables for “and” and “not” (a formal contradiction), and more like the sorts of “logical problems” involved in debates over the philosophy of logic.

In other words, while the anti-Trinitarian has promised to show the doctrine of the Trinity to be a blatant contradiction (like saying, unequivocally, “it’s both raining and not raining,” while agreeing to the truth tables for “and” and “not”), he now would only be saying that the doctrine of the Trinity relies on a certain view about language or logic that (he alleges) isn’t how natural languages really work. That is, he seems to have begun by promising us a devastating objection to the truth of Trinitarian theology itself, but ended by saying only that, while the substantive theology involved may be consistent, Trinitarians have faulty views about how to use language, and that it would be more accurate for them to express themselves by
saying that there are three gods.

Now I admit that, if Gregory’s semantics could somehow be shown to be wrong on this point, it would be in some sense a problem or embarrassment for Trinitarians. Still, it doesn’t seem like the kind of problem we were promised.

What’s more, as we discussed above (Chapter 4.4.5, p. 258), even if one could show that the sober truth of the matter is that, given Gregory’s substantive theology, it is strictly and literally true that there are three gods, there is still an issue of whether the claim that there are three gods would not be more misleading than the technically false but non-misleading claim that there is only one God. Indeed, compare this to the example immediately above. Suppose it turns out that B is wrong in his semantics, and that, strictly speaking, it really is true that, either if John is in London then he is in France, or if John is in Paris then he is in England. Still, wouldn’t B be right to claim that it is, even if strictly speaking true, nevertheless highly misleading? And that, even if it is false to say that it is neither the case that if John is in London then he is in France nor that if John is in Paris then he is in England, it is nevertheless not nearly as misleading as its negation?

And finally, attacking Gregory’s semantics here (just as in the previous semantic objection) raises a deeper question. Namely, “which is more important: whether certain canonical sentences end up being true, or whether the theological states of affairs behind those sentences actually obtain?”

After all, two people could, in theory, have radically different metaphysics, and radically different theology, but end up agreeing on certain sentences being true or false, because they also have radically different semantics – they use the same words to mean different things.

On the other hand, two people could have precisely the same metaphysics and precisely the same theology, but end up disagreeing on what sentences are true or false, because, again, they have different semantics – they use different words to mean
the same things.

Historically, both of the above sorts of issues arose during the Trinitarian controversy. And in both cases, the church fathers seem to have come down clearly on the side of substantive theology being what was primarily important, not semantics.

On the first point, when arguing with the Arians, the introduction of the homoousion itself was motivated precisely by the fact that the Arians had a significantly different substantive theology, but were willing to agree on all the same credal sentences as the homoousians, by simply re-interpreting them (adopting a different semantics).

They used the same words, but meant a different thing. And the homoousians didn’t think that was enough. So they added the controversial term “homoousios” to the creed. It was only when that term was added that the orthodox could even use the creed to exclude Arian theology. St. Athanasius explains:

The Council wishing to do away with the irreligious phrases of the Arians, and to use instead the acknowledged words of the Scriptures, that the Son is not ‘from nothing’ but ‘from God,’ and is ‘Word’ and ‘Wisdom,’ and not creature or work, but a proper offspring from the Father, Eusebius and his fellows, led by their inveterate heterodoxy, understood the phrase ‘from God’ as belonging to us, as if in respect to it the Word of God differed nothing from us, and that because it is written,

‘There is one God, from whom, all things;’

and again, ‘Old things are passed away, behold, all things are become new, and all things are from God.’

But the Fathers, perceiv-
καὶ γράφει· ‘ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας τοῦ θεοῦ εἶναι τὸν υἱὸν’ ὑπὲρ τοῦ μὴ τὸ ἐκ τοῦ θεοῦ κοινὸν καὶ ἵσον τοῦ τε υἱοῦ καὶ τῶν γεννητῶν νομίζεσθαι, ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν ἄλλα πάντα κτίσμα, τὸν δὲ λόγον μόνον ἐκ τοῦ πατρός πιστεύεσθαι.

καὶ γὰρ ἐκ τοῦ θεοῦ τὰ πάντα λέγηται, ἀλλὰ ἄλλως ἢ ώς ἔστιν ὁ υἱὸς εἶρηται.

Τῶν δὲ ἐπισκόπων πάλιν λεγόντων δεῖν γραφῆναι δύναμιν ἀληθινὴν καὶ εἰκόνα τοῦ πατρός τὸν λόγον οὐκιον τε καὶ ἀπαράλληλον αὐτὸν κατὰ πάντα τῷ πατρὶ καὶ ἄτρεπτον καὶ οὐκ ἄλλως εἰσίν ἀδιαφέτως οὐδέποτε γὰρ ὅσι ἢν, ἀλλὰ ἢν ὁ λόγος ἢσιν ὑπάρχον ἀδιαφέρως παρὰ τῷ πατρὶ ὡς ἁπάυγασμα φωτός—οἱ περὶ Εὐσέβιον ἡγεῖόντο μὲν μὴ τολμῶντες ἀντιλέγειν διὰ τὴν αἰσχύνην, ἢν εἶχον ἑφ’ ὧς ἠλέγχησαν, κατελήφθησαν δὲ πᾶλιν πρὸς ἑαυτοὺς τονθορύζοντες καὶ διανεύοντες τοῖς ὁρὐσκαλοῖς, ὅτι καὶ τὸ οὐκοῦν καὶ τὸ οὐ καὶ τὸ τῆς δυνάμεως ὅνομα καὶ τὸ ἐν αὐτῷ κοινὰ πάλιν ἔστι πρὸς ἡμᾶς καὶ τὸν υἱὸν, καὶ οὐδὲν λυπεῖ τούτως ἡμᾶς συνιδέσθαι..<...
... were again compelled on their part to collect the sense of the Scriptures, and to re-say and re-write what they had said before, more distinctly still, namely, that the Son is ‘one in ousia’ with the Father: by way of signifying, that the Son was “from” the Father, and not merely like, but the same in likeness, and of shewing that the Son’s likeness and unalterableness was different from such copy of the same as is ascribed to us, which we acquire from virtue on the ground of observance of the commandments...  

Thus, according to Athanasius’ account, merely assenting to the same sentences or creedal formulae was not what was important to the fathers of Nicea, but accepting the same propositions they understood. One sometimes hears the claim that the results of the early councils were simply certain linguistic formulae that are essentially so open to interpretation as to be without any determinate meaning. I’m not convinced, though, that this was how the participants themselves saw what they were doing, as the passage above shows. Of course, one can say that, even if the fathers of Nicaea believed themselves to be, and intended to be, having a substantive theological discussion, they were simply mistaken about themselves, and they failed in their attempt. I’m not convinced of that either, although it is not essential to my point here. The point is that it seems to me that there was intelligible content in the Arian position that the fathers wished to deny, not merely that they disliked the way certain characteristically Arian noises sounded. But in any case, that is not the point

22. (St. Athanasius 1941), Ch. 19, Sec. 1 – Ch. 20, Sec. 3.

23. (St. Athanasius 1892), pp. 162-164.
to be argued here. What I am arguing is that Athanasius here at least claims, and thus commits himself to the view, that he is not interested in mere verbal agreement, that agreement on mere words is not sufficient, when one is using the same words to mean different things.

Now on the second point (using different words to mean the same thing), when certain groups at Antioch had ceased communion with each other, on suspicion of heresy, but in reality due to having a different semantics, Athanasius united them upon inquiring into their substantive theology. Because, just as in the above example, it was the substantive theology that seemed important to him, and to them all, not what sentences turned out to be true. I think it’s instructive to read a bit from the Tome of Antioch issued after the synod in question (AD 362):

O ΠΡΟΣ ΤΟΥΣ ΑΝΤΙΟΧΕΙΩΝ ΤΟΜΟΣ ΑΘΑΝΑΣΙΟΥ ΑΡΧΙΕΠΙΣΚΟΠΟΥ ΑΛΕΞΑΝΔΡΕΙΑΣ

... Πάντας τούν τοὺς βουλομένους εἰργενεύον πρὸς ἡμᾶς, καὶ μάλιστα τοὺς ἐν τῇ Παλαιᾷ συναγωγῇ, καὶ τοὺς ἀποτρέχοντας δὲ ἀπὸ τῶν Ἀρειανῶν προσκαλέσασθε παρ’ ἑαυτοῖς, καὶ ως μὲν πατέρες ὑμῶν προσλάβεσθε, ως δὲ διδάσκαλοι καὶ κηδεμόνες ἀποδέξασθε, καὶ συνάφαντες αὐτοὺς τοὺς ἀγαπητοὺς ἡμῶν τοῖς περὶ Παυλίνον, μὴ δὲν πλέον ἀπατήσητε παρ’ αὐτῶν ἢ ἀναθεματίζετε μὲν τὴν Ἀρειανῆν ἀφέσιν, ὁμολογεῖτε δὲ τὴν παρὰ τῶν ἄγιων Πατέρων ὁμολογηθέσαν εἰς Νικαία πίστιν, ἀναθεματίζειν δὲ καὶ τοὺς λέγοντας κτίσμα εἶναι τὸ Πνεῦμα τὸ ἁγιόν, καὶ διηρημένον ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας τοῦ Χριστοῦ. Τούτο

... As many then as desire peace with us, and specially those who assemble in the Old [Church] and those again who are seceding from the Arians, do ye call to yourselves, and receive them as parents their sons, and welcome them as tutors and guardians; and unite them to our beloved Paulinus and his people, without requiring more from them than to anathematize the Arian heresy and confess the faith confessed by the holy fathers at Nicaea, and to anathematize also those who say that the Holy Spirit is a Creature and separate from the ousia of Christ. For this is in truth a complete renunciation of the abominable heresy
of the Arians, to refuse to divide the Holy Trinity, or to say that any part of it is a creature. For those who, while pretending to cite the faith confessed at Nicaea, venture to blaspheme the Holy Spirit, do nothing more than in words deny the Arian heresy while they retain it in thought...

For as to those whom some were blaming for speaking of three hypostases, on the ground that the phrase is unscriptural and therefore suspicious, we thought it right indeed to require nothing beyond the confession of Nicaea, but on account of the contention we made enquiry of them, whether they meant, like the Arian madmen, hypostases foreign and strange, and alien in ousia from one another, and that each hypostasis was divided apart by itself, as is the case with creatures in general and in particular with those begotten of men, or like different ousiai, such as gold, silver, or brass;—or whether, like other heretics, they meant three Beginnings and three Gods, by speaking of three hypostases.

They assured us in reply that they neither meant this nor had ever held it. But upon our asking them ‘what then do you mean by it, or why do you use such expressions?’ they replied, Because they believed...
In a Holy Trinity, not a trinity in name only, but existing and subsisting in truth, ‘both a Father truly existing and subsisting, and a Son truly substantial and subsisting, and a Holy Spirit subsisting and really existing do we acknowledge,’ and that neither had they said there were three Gods or three beginnings, nor would they at all tolerate such as said or held so, but that they acknowledged a Holy Trinity but One Godhead, and one Beginning, and that the Son is homoousios with the Father, as the fathers said; while the Holy Spirit is not a creature, nor external, but proper to and inseparable from the ousia of the Father and the Son...

Having accepted then these men’s interpretation and defence of their language, we made enquiry of those blamed by them for speaking of One hypostasis, whether they use the expression in the sense of Sabellius, to the negation of the Son and the Holy Spirit, or as though the Son were non-substantial, or the Holy Spirit impersonal. But they in their turn assured us that they neither meant this nor had ever held it, but ‘we use the word hypostasis thinking it the same thing to say hypostasis or ousia;’ ‘But we hold that there is One, because the Son is of the ousia of the Father, and because of the identity of nature. For we believe that there is one
to the Father, and that it has one nature, and not that there is one nature of the Father, from which that of the Son and of the Holy Spirit are distinct.’

Well, thereupon they who had been blamed for saying there were three hypostases agreed with the others, while those who had spoken of one ousia, also confessed the doctrine of the former as interpreted by them...

These things then being thus confessed, we exhort you not hastily to condemn those who so confess, and so explain the phrases they use, nor to reject them, but rather to accept them as they desire peace and defend themselves, while you check and rebuke, as of suspicious views, those who refuse so to confess and to explain their language. But while you refuse toleration to the latter, counsel the others also who explain and hold aright, not to enquire further into each other’s opinions, nor to fight about words to no useful purpose, nor to go on contending with the above phrases, but to agree in the mind of piety... and value above all things peace of that kind, faith being sound. Perhaps God will have pity on us, and unite what is divided, and, there being once more one flock, we shall all have one leader, even our Lord Jesus Christ.”
Thus, merely disagreeing about sentences or creedal formulae was not what was important, but agreeing or disagreeing about substantive theological content. Thus, again, if an opponent insisted on making objections merely to Gregory’s semantics, it is simply unclear whether Gregory would (or should) have any reason to care, as it is unclear whether semantic disagreements of this sort are important to him or were to his peers in the intellectual milieu of fourth-century Trinitarian debates. Again, examples could be multiplied, but I will give a last example from Gregory himself, in his second Contra Eunomium lest there be any question as to whether Gregory shares the same views on semantics:

... For we understand no difference in the sense of these terms, but we signify one and the same thing by both, though the one may seem to convey the notion of affirmation, and the other of negation...

while the words seem by the formal change to be at variance with each other, the sense remains one and the same. For the object to be aimed at, in questions respecting God, is not to produce a dulcet and melodious harmony of words, but to work out an orthodox formula of thought, whereby a worthy conception of God may be ensured...

[If this opinion is established, what further contention

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24. PG 26, pp. 796-805.

25. (St. Athanasius 1892), pp. 483-485.
of words remains for men of sense and judgment, when every word whereby such a notion is conveyed to us has the same signification?

For ... all these words are, in a manner, of like force, and equivalent to one another, as far as the meaning of the things signified is concerned; and it is mere folly to contend for this or that vocal intonation, as if orthodoxy were a thing of sounds and syllables rather than of the mind.27

But perhaps the objector might disagree with the fathers here, insisting that, even if it wasn’t important to them, it is still for some objective reason important. But it would then be incumbent on the objector to tell us why.28 I myself can’t think of any very plausible line of attack that one could take in this regard, except to parlay the semantic objection into a theological one in something like the following way:

But the Bible is emphatic that there is exactly one God, and so, if one’s substantive theology is biblical, and one’s semantics is biblical, then it ought to turn out that the sentence “There is exactly one God” is true. So that if one could argue Gregory into admitting that, given his overall views, it turns out that the sentence “There is more than one God” is true, it would at least show that there is something unbiblical about his view – either in the realm of his substantive theology or in his semantics.

I’ll offer two responses. First of all, the claim that the Bible is emphatic that there is exactly one God is not so obviously true as is usually assumed. Famously, as we saw Gregory allude to, (Chapter 4.2.3.1, p. 179 ff.) parts of the Bible seem


28. I once heard it said, in an accent that made the phrase rhyme, “We ought to use Bible names for Bible things” – but it was never made clear why.
to be merely *monolatrous*, rather than monotheistic. Various statements made in Old Testament writings seem to imply that there are other gods, but simply that Abraham and others only worshipped one God.

The main proof texts usually pointed to in arguments like these are (1) the First Commandment and (2) the *Shema*.

(1) But the First Commandment in fact does not say there are no other gods, or anything that might even seem to *imply* that there are no other gods. It merely says not to put any other gods *before* the Lord. (And in fact, this at least *seems* to, or could not unreasonably be taken to, imply that *there are* other gods that one could put before the Lord.)

(2) And the *Shema* in fact does not say “there is exactly one God,” but “the Lord is your God; the Lord is one.” Famously, there are two words for “one” in Hebrew, *yachid* (יָחִיד), with a meaning closer to something like “single” or “only” (as in “only-begotten”) and *echad* (אֶחָד), with a meaning closer to something like “a unified whole” (as one might describe, to take an example from Gregory, “one people” or as in Genesis the man and the woman are “one flesh.”) And famously, the *Shema* uses the latter. Naturally, there is enormous debate over the *precise* meanings of those terms, as well as how, *precisely*, to interpret them in the context of the Shema. The point I am making is simply that it is, to understate, *less than clear* that the *Shema* can *only* be interpreted as meaning that there is a *single God* (which would, anyway, contradict other passages from the Hebrew Bible), much less that it must be taken to mean, more precisely, that there is a single hypostasis that is divine (which of course, on Gregory’s view, are two quite different claims).

Less famously, Hebrew also has the word *yesh* (יֵשׁ), which is just the existential quantifier, and *ayn* (אָיִן), which is just the negation of the existential quantifier. Thus, if one really wanted to say, very precisely, that there is exactly one God, one could

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29. See 4.2.3.1, p. 179 ff.
say, “There is one God and there is not a God other than (distinct from) it.” And if one wanted to say that there is exactly one thing that is divine, one could say there exists a *davar* (דבר) that is divine and there does not exist a *davar* such that that *davar* is divine and distinct from the first-mentioned divine *davar*. Of course, that would all be cumbersome. But there are other ways in Hebrew that one could put the point precisely, but less awkwardly. “There is a single God” (*yesh el yachid*) (יהי אלהי יחיד) for example. And for the more restrictive claim, “There is a single divine thing” (*yesh davar elohi yachid*) (יהי דבר אלוהי יחיד).

Thus, so far from being *emphatic* that there is exactly one God, the evidence even from these proof texts is, at best, inconclusive as to whether there are supposed to be other gods in the view of the author(s) of these passages.

Furthermore, as we noted Gregory points out numerous passages from the Hebrew Bible that in fact seem to *clearly admit* the existence of other gods, or at least created hypostases that *participate accidentally in* divinity (whatever exactly that is).

We saw that the Lord says to Moses, “See, I have made thee a god to Pharaoh.” (Exodus 7:1) Also, “The gods of the gentiles are demons.” (Psalm 96:5 LXX) To which many other passages could be added, “I have said ye are gods, all of you, sons of the Most High.” (Psalm 82:6) Likewise, “Among the gods there is none like unto thee, O Lord; neither are there any *erga* like unto thy *erga*.” (Psalm 86:8, LXX.) And, “For the Lord your God is God of gods, and Lord of lords, a great God, mighty, and terrible . . .” (Deut. 10:17) And so on.

Though there’s little about the Bible that is uncontroversial, at least many schol-

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30. See Chapter 4.2.3.1, p. 179.
31. See Chapter 4.2.3.1, p. 182.
32. Chapter 4.2.3.1, p. 182.
33. Chapter 4.2.3.1, p. 179.
ars today would also agree that the primitive Judaic or Abrahamic faith was not monotheistic but simply monolatrous. That is, it was acknowledged that other gods existed, only that they were not worthy of worship (or that, in any case, Israel had made a covenant with the Lord not to offer 
\textit{latreia} or \textit{service} to any other God but the Lord.)\textsuperscript{34}

One might be uncomfortable with this fact. Why only worship one god, if the Bible and later Christian tradition admit the existence of multiple gods? Are the demons that the gentiles worship \textit{on an equal footing} with the Lord? Are \textit{we}? (As the “sons of the Most High?”)

Gregory’s answers to these questions are obvious: Only the Holy Trinity participate in divinity \textit{by nature}. Other things that participate in the divine \textit{energeia} (or in some other token \textit{energeia} of the same type) do so \textit{only accidentally}.

But the second, and to my mind much more important, response I will give to the charge that the doctrine of the Trinity is unbiblical is given below, in the section on theological objections (Chapter 6.4, pp. 400 ff.).

In conclusion, the semantic objections we’ve considered seem to turn out to be dead ends. Objecting to Gregory’s semantics for the predicate “is God” was a non-starter. Further, objecting to his semantics for counting by agent-nouns might initially seem more plausible, and closer to a “logical” objection, but this turns out to be problematic on many levels. It’s not clear that our ordinary counting practices can even settle the question, or if they did whether they wouldn’t settle it in Gregory’s favor, and if they didn’t, whether it wouldn’t make the anti-Trinitarian argument less clearly an accusation of inconsistency in the usual sense, and more like just a disagreement in the realm of the philosophy of logic. Finally, even if it could

\textsuperscript{34} E.g., (Smith 2002), p. 13. “By the end of the monarchy much of the spectrum of religious practice had largely disappeared; monolatrous Yahwism was the norm in Israel, setting the stage for the emergence of Israelite monotheism. As chapters 2 through 5 illustrate, the period of the monarchy produced the conditions for the gradual development of monotheism.”
somehow be shown that the correct view of counting here is such that it would be strictly speaking true given Gregory’s theology that there are three gods, it seems that this would only be so in a very technical, but highly misleading sense. And given Gregory’s concerns, it isn’t ultimately clear why he should ignore the misleadingness of the statement that there are three gods and why he should be more invested in purely semantic concerns. Unless, that is, one wants to parlay the objection into a purely theological objection that his view is unbiblical. And for my response to that, see both immediately above, and below (Chapter 6.4 p. 400 ff.)

6.3 Metaphysical Objections

Suppose, then, that the anti-Trinitarian gives up on the attempt to press an allegedly purely “logical” argument against the doctrine of the Trinity, and even gives up on at least the semblance of a purely logical objection that the objection to Gregory’s semantics for counting considered just above would provide. He might, then, move on to what we can call the Metaphysical Problem of the Trinity (MPT), saying that P is not formally inconsistent, but that it is implicitly inconsistent (see Chapter 1.1, p. 10). That is, he could say that, although one can’t simply derive a contradiction from P via some logical axioms, P is in conflict with certain necessarily true propositions, so that when we add those propositions into the mix, we can then derive a formal contradiction.

Again, I flag that this would not count as the strictly “logical” problem we were promised (which seemed to be that P was simply a formal contradiction), but still it would be at least fairly closely related to the original worry, and might be a serious problem for Trinitarianism, even if not the problem we were promised. And while it may be that there are other orthodox accounts of the Trinity within the pro-Nicene consensus (or within the category of orthodox accounts of the Trinity, if that is a broader category than the pro-Nicene consensus), it seems fair enough if the anti-
Trinitarian wants to begin by criticizing P as understood on GNT.

But unfortunately for the anti-Trinitarian, there is surprisingly little to object to here. For although it’s nice that Gregory gives us a fully fleshed out Trinitarian Theory, it is not clear that *everything* Gregory says about the metaphysics and theology of the Trinity is essential to orthodox Trinitarianism, or indeed even to *his own* ultimate theological motivations. What’s more, we also saw that most of Gregory’s Trinitarian Theory actually just consists of the logical consequences of a handful of metaphysical and theological assumptions, most of which seem fairly tame, so that if one wants to raise any objection to the consequences of his basic assumptions, they ought, as a matter of philosophical etiquette, to try to trace the problem back to one of those basic assumptions. Even if one is unsure how to locate the problem in that way, the essential question here is whether the anti-Trinitarian could find some aspect of Gregory’s understanding of P that both:

(A) is essential to his response to the LPT, and
(B) is genuinely problematic (viz. false).

Without seeing such an argument fleshed out, although it’s easy to see aspects of Gregory’s view that might be argued to be one or the other, it’s difficult to see how one would argue that there is some aspect which is *both*.

For example, one might object to Gregory’s bundle-theoretic account of hypostases and to one or the other (or both) of the criteria of individuation of hypostases we might attribute to him (Chapter 4.3.4, p. 222 ff.). But it isn’t clear that any of that is actually *essential* to Gregory’s account, or to orthodox Trinitarianism in general. Suppose one argued that hypostases simply “come from the factory” already individuated. This might certainly have consequences for other theological questions (the *filioque* controversy, say, or issues about divine simplicity or the incarnation), but as far as the “threeness / oneness” problem of the Trinity, or really anything *specifically* about the Trinity in itself, it doesn’t seem like it would make
much difference. As long as the hypostases can be numerically distinct *somehow*, and as long as they can all bear all the same relations to all the same other objects as before (or at least can be *homoousios* and synergistic – even if they don’t have any *idiomata*) such an objection would seem to have little consequence.

We’ve seen that, in fact, all that is strictly essential to Gregory’s response to the LPT is GNT\textsubscript{Lite} (because, essentially, GNT\textsubscript{Lite} is all that results from analyzing $S$ according to Gregory’s N-semantics). And there is not much metaphysics going on in GNT\textsubscript{Lite} (though we will consider what little there is shortly). So, to press the MPT against Gregory, one would have to find some aspect of GNT\textsubscript{Lite} to object to. But as I said, there is surprisingly little to object to here.

First, the anti-Trinitarian will surely not want to object to the non-identity of the hypostases in P4\textsubscript{GNT}–P6\textsubscript{GNT}, since that is what makes the LPT “work” in the first place.

Second, as for P1\textsubscript{GNT}–P3\textsubscript{GNT}, to deny, not that these are what S1–S3 *mean*, or at least that they are the *truth conditions* for S1–S3 (as in the first semantic objection above), but simply to say that they *couldn’t possibly be true*, is really a *theological objection*. That is, to say this and nothing more, is to object to Gregory’s substantive theology (discussed below), not to his metaphysics. Within the context of GNT, it would be to say that atheism is necessarily true. Now that would certainly be a problem for Gregory’s view. But it’s hard to take seriously the idea that *that* is what the “threeness / oneness” problem amounts to. It would be better called, simply, “the oneness problem,” or the “there is no God in the first place” problem. And it’s difficult to see how one wouldn’t either just beg the question against Gregory here, or, if one argued for the thesis, argue for it on grounds that have essentially little or nothing to do with the considerations originally alleged by the anti-Trinitarian.

Finally, that leaves P7\textsubscript{GNT}, and various entailments of P\textsubscript{GNT} as a whole. As for claiming, again, not that Gregory’s *semantics* for S7 is false (discussed in the second
semantic objection above), but that P7 so explicated (P7_{GNT}) is necessarily false — that would be to say that (1) there cannot be any god (as just above), or that (2) there could not be more than one hypostasis that “gods,” or that (3) distinct hypostases cannot share a token god-thing. And it’s not obvious what else would be entailed by P_{GNT} as a whole that the anti-Trinitarian might object to.\(^{35}\)

As for (2), of course, the anti-Trinitarian doesn’t seem to want to take it to be a premise in his argument that there simply couldn’t be more than one divine hypostasis. He seems to want to take it to be entailed by the Trinitarian’s own premises. I can imagine, though, one trying to raise some kind of argument that there simply couldn’t be more than one divine hypostasis. But again, this doesn’t sound like a “threeness / oneness” problem, so much as a “more than oneness” problem. Indeed, not even a “more than oneness” problem, since on Gregory’s view there is still one God. It is a specifically “more than one hypostasis” problem. Although it’s slightly easier here to imagine finding some way not to just beg the question against Gregory, one would like to see what the argument would be. And whatever it might be, it again seems like the sort of thing that would have to be argued for on grounds that have essentially little or nothing to do with the considerations originally alleged by the anti-Trinitarian.

That brings us to (3). The anti-Trinitarian can deny that distinct hypostases can share a single token energeia between them, or what I have called Gregory’s metaphysics of synergy. This seems to me to be the only real bit of metaphysics that is genuinely essential to Gregory’s analysis of P and that might at all be objectionable. If the phenomenon of synergy were impossible, Gregory’s account of why the hypostases count as a single God would indeed be wrecked. We’ve seen that Gregory’s metaphysics of synergy falls out of his more fundamental view about the individuation of token energeiai. Therefore, let’s take a moment to consider objections to the

\(^{35}\) See Combination Objections below, p. 421.
related issues of synergy and the individuation of token energeiai.

First, it seems to me that the burden of proof at this point is on the anti-Trinitarian to show there is some problem with Gregory’s metaphysics of synergy. So, there seem to be two salient questions we might ask at this point:

1. Are there good philosophical reasons to think synergy is, not just practically, but metaphysically impossible? (That is, not merely that it is impossible for all spatio-temporal hypostases, due to the way in which they happen to be individuated, but that it is impossible tout court.)

2. Should the Christian for some other reason resist being committed to this bit of metaphysics? That is, if Gregory’s account of the Trinity commits one to synergy, is that itself a reason to rethink Gregory’s account, and to go back to the “business of Trinitarian theorizing,” as it were?

With respect to the first question, I only note that Davidson has defended a theory of the individuation of events (and therefore actions) roughly parallel to Gregory’s theory of the individuation of token energeiai, and which has the result that synergy is at least logically possible. That is, without adding in an additional assumption to the contrary, no formal contradiction arises merely from claiming that multiple agents perform the same actions. 37 There is not much that I could add to Davidson’s discussion of event individuation. I will only register the fact that I am persuaded by the considerations he offers. There seem to me to be excellent reasons for taking events to be individuals. So, it is the anti-Trinitarian’s burden to show why the Trinitarian shouldn’t accept a Davidsonian view on event individuation, and along with it the possibility of synergy.

36. For Davidson’s views on the individuation of actions and events, see (Davidson 1963), (Davidson 1966), (Davidson 1969b), and (Davidson 1970) all reprinted in (Davidson 2001), as well as (Davidson 1969a).

37. Though, of course, a contradiction would arise if those agents are individuated by various spatio-temporal relations, and that their actions are in turn individuated by the same spatio-temporal relations as the agents. This is precisely the reason why Gregory draws a real metaphysical distinction between the Trinity – whose token energeiai are not individuated “parallel to” the hypostases – and three shoemakers – whose token energeiai are.
That brings us to the second question, whether there are some sort of theological reasons to want to avoid a metaphysics that allows for synergy. Again, we would need to see the argument why. But I register my view that, *prima facie*, things seem quite the opposite to me. The notion of synergy is not only the metaphysical centerpiece of the orthodox doctrine of the Trinity – it would seem to be an incredibly fruitful concept in other areas of philosophical theology as well. For a wee bit of further discussion on that point, see the section on theological objections below (6.4, p. 407).

As far as I can see, the metaphysics of synergy is the only aspect of Gregory’s substantive theology and metaphysics that is both obviously essential to his response to the LPT (his analysis of P) and open to any serious philosophical objection. So since I don’t see any serious reason why synergy should be rejected, I can see no reason to reject Gregory’s response to the LPT, or his analysis of P, on purely metaphysical grounds.

But one might object that the *homoousion* is so central to Gregory’s thought, as well as to that of all of the Cappadocians and indeed to the pro-Nicene consensus more generally, that a certain amount of metaphysics surrounding *ousiai* is also essential to the doctrine of the Trinity, more broadly speaking. I hasten to reiterate that, surprising as it may be, the *homoousion* is not, in fact, essential to Gregory’s *solution to the LPT* specifically, nor indeed even directly to his understanding of P. And so I flag that this takes us yet further away from our original concern. Still, perhaps the anti-Trinitarian will want to move on from objecting merely to the allegedly problematic subset of the doctrine of the Trinity we’ve named “P,” either via the LPT or the MPT, and ascend to a yet higher or broader level, attacking the larger doctrine of which P was only a part.

I note again that this takes us yet another step further away from the problem we were originally promised. What we are considering now has left behind even the appearance of a merely “logical” problem with just a limited subset of the doctrine of
the Trinity. Still, I will admit that, if it were impossible for their to be three distinct hypostases with a single ousia, the homoousion would be untenable, and that would in some sense be the end of the world for the Gregory, the Cappadocians, and the pro-Nicene consensus in general.

But while it is certainly important to Gregory’s overall view that there be three distinct hypostases sharing a single ousia, it hardly seems problematic. Distinct hypostases in Gregory’s sense (individuals, like Peter, James and John, for example), share ousiai in Gregory’s sense (natures, like humanity in this case) all the time.

One might make a different objection, namely that ousiai are not individuated by energeiai, so that Gregory’s argument for the homoousion is flawed.

But first, even if true, this would not show that the homoousion must be false. It would only undercut one of Gregory’s arguments in favor of it.

Secondly, it seems true anyway. As Michel Barnes has shown in detail, the principle has a long pedigree in Greek philosophy beginning with pre-Socratic medical authors and continuing through Plato and up to the time of the Church Fathers who took it up.\(^\text{38}\) And as noted above, in recent times, Sydney Shoemaker has defended the thesis that properties are individuated by their causal powers, a thesis clearly analogous to Gregory’s.\(^\text{39}\) The metaphysical objection under consideration, then, would take one into these debates. (And if one wants to argue that the idea is not biblical, see my discussion of this point below in the section on theological objections (p. 408.).

In conclusion, then, besides there being no strictly logical problem with Gregory’s account of the Trinity, there seems to be no clear basis for making metaphysical objections to his account – neither to Gregory’s understanding of P specifically, nor

\(^{38}\) (Barnes 2001).

even to the broader metaphysical framework within which that understanding is situated.

6.4 Theological Objections

Finally, one might object neither to the logic proper, nor to the purely philosophical (semantic and metaphysical) framework involved in Gregory’s account of the Trinity, but simply to his substantive theological assumptions, directly.

But first, for non-Christians to object to specific bits of the theology involved seems question-begging, or at least out of place. Without arguing there is some kind of logical, metaphysical, or other problem with a bit of theology, on what basis would the non-Christian argue against it? More to the point, what kind of objection would the non-Christian make to Gregory’s theological assumptions that would count as specifically a problem with the Trinity, rather than simply a general problem with theism? (E.g., that the Father, Son and Holy Spirit simply don’t exist in the first place? A devastating criticism, if true. But really just the thesis of atheism, and not anything to do with the doctrine of the Trinity specifically.)

On the other hand, a Christian might try to object to a bit of theology (or a non-Christian might offer the same objection “in the voice of” a hypothetical Christian, as it were, as an “internal” criticism) on the basis of some other aspect of Christian theology.

In particular, a significant amount of criticism of the orthodox doctrine of the Trinity rests on the assertion that it is not biblical. Specifically, this usually takes the form of pointing to scriptural passages that seem to make Christ unequal to the Father, or to a lack of explicit scriptural support for taking the Holy Spirit to be equal to the Father (in some sense of “equal” and “unequal” that would be relevant to the homoousion and/or the synergy of the hypostases), or to the lack of the philosophical use of “ousia” in the Bible.
Indeed, the charge of un-biblicality seems to be, admittedly, one of Dale Tuggy’s biggest concerns. In an interview on his views about the Trinity, Tuggy admits that, “Not all versions of Trinity doctrines are contradictory. The more important question is, ‘are they well-founded in the scripture?’.”

James Anderson likewise argues convincingly that the debate between Tuggy and Himself ultimately centers not on purely philosophical disagreements, but on differences of biblical exegesis.

Without making it entirely explicit, Tuggy’s thought process here (along with most who raise the charge of “unbiblicality” against the doctrine of the Trinity) seems to be essentially a form of “Great Apostasy” mythology, and this argument from unbiblicality shares the same fundamental difficulty as all such arguments from Great Apostasy theorists.

The myth of the Great Apostasy takes many forms. What is essential to it is that it claims that, at some point, or through some gradual process (call it “the Great Apostasy”), mainstream Christianity lost its way, so that what came to be mainstream Christianity is in fact a perversion of what Christianity once was, or was supposed to be. (Some give this resulting perverted or heretical form of Christianity the charming biblical title of “the Whore of Babylon.”) Thus, the Great Apostasy theorist argues, we must go back through the history of the church and separate out the gold from the dross, the wheat from the chaff. Only then can we recover the original, pure Christianity (call it “primitive” Christianity) and either restore Christianity to its primitive form, or at least save ourselves from the Whore of Babylon that displaced primitive Christianity.

What is accidental to Great Apostasy mythologies are precisely what elements

40. With my apologies to Tuggy for holding him accountable for something said verbally in an interview posted on YouTube. It may be uncharitable to bring this kind of “unofficial” statement into the discussion. But I do think it is relevant, and that the view also comes through in some of his “official” statements (papers) on the subject. As of 02-21-2014, the video can be found at URL = http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mBzA-4vtToo and the quote occurs around 10:40.

of mainstream Christianity are claimed to have been part of primitive Christianity, what are claimed to be perverse accretions or distortions that resulted from the Great Apostasy, and when, how and why the Great Apostasy is supposed to have taken place.

Now I am not of course claiming that telling a full-blown story about a Great Apostasy is somehow a necessary condition on making the case that the doctrine of the Trinity is unbiblical. Rather, I am pointing out that the argument that the doctrine of the Trinity is unbiblical shares the same, fundamental problem as all arguments within the broader Great Apostasy family of arguments, as follows. In a nutshell, the strategy of the Great Apostasy theorist is to argue that:

1. Some particular aspect of the Christian tradition X (in this case the orthodox doctrine of the Trinity) is in some way in irreconcilable conflict with some other aspect of the Christian tradition Y (in this case the Bible).

2. Y (in this case the Bible) takes precedence over X (in this case the doctrine of the Trinity). Y is more clearly or obviously a part of primitive Christianity, or more likely to be, than X; or Y is more central to the primitive Christian web of belief, as it were, than X; or Y is a practice that is more essential to primitive Christianity than X, or what have you.

3. Therefore, Christians should reject X (in this case the doctrine of the Trinity) in favor of Y (in this case the Bible).

Now besides the difficulty in establishing the first premise, it is always left unclear what non-arbitrary criteria one could possibly employ that would make sense out of the second premise in arguments of this type.

Thus, there are two problems for this kind of argument, corresponding to the two premises. Let’s first look at what I regard as the less deeply problematic (though still incredibly problematic) issue – backing up the claim that the Bible and the doctrine of the Trinity are in conflict in the first place.

There is no shortage of passages anyone would consider “biblical”42 depicting

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42. For problems with the concept of what counts as “biblical,” see my second objection below,
Christ as pre-existent (e.g., John 1:1-2, 1:15, 1:30), explicitly referring to Him as “God” (e.g., ὃς ἦς at John 1:1 and, with the definite article, ὁ ἀπός at Hebrews 1:8), as participating in the creation of the universe (e.g., John 1:3, 1:10, Hebrews 1:2, etc.), and so on. And there is no shortage of contemporary scholarship legitimizing an orthodox Trinitarian understanding of these passages (e.g., Larry Hurtado’s work).  

But we will not enter into that debate here. I simply flag the fact that there would be a lot of work to do even to make this part of the argument stick.

But what’s worse on this score is that, although as we’ve seen, Christ’s being homoousios with the Father is in some sense essential to Cappadocian triadology broadly speak, it is not a basic theological assumption for Gregory. It is rather a consequence of other theological and metaphysical assumptions, so that if we reject this consequence, we need to examine the more basic premises from which it follows.

But Gregory’s purely theological assumptions are fairly few, and mostly uncontroversial. Aside from the uncontroversial (among Christians) assumptions that there are such things as the Father, Son and Holy Spirit, and the only mildly controversial assumption that these three are distinct, the only purely theological assumption he makes in the context of the LPT is that the hypostases engage in energeiai of the same type. And at least in the case of Christ and the Father this seems to be amply supported by the words of Christ Himself in the gospels. See all of the following discussion on this, but especially the quote from John 5:17-19 below, p. 403 (“the
Son doeth the same...”). One might actually interpret Christ here as meaning that He and the Father synergize on all of their actions, in which case Gregory has everything he wants. But even if Christ is only saying that He and the Father perform *energeiai* of all the same types (i.e., the Cappadocian Assertion), it then follows from Gregory’s *metaphysics* (not additional theological assumptions) that they have the same, uncreated, nature, and from the fact that there are no *idiomata* to individuate their *token energeiai*, it follows that they synergize anyway. Thus, to attack Gregory’s view here, we are led back to making metaphysical (not purely theological) objections after all.

Additionally, besides the fact that Gregory’s theological views that the hypostases are *homoousios* and synergistic are really just consequences of his metaphysics and some fairly uncontroversial theological assumptions, it doesn’t seem unreasonable to believe that the overall gist of this view – that is, the *basing* of the unity of the Father and the Son on their synergy, the view that the Father and Son *count as “one” because* of synergy – is simply taken into the tradition from the New Testament itself (though the New Testament uses the less technical word *ergon* rather than the more philosophically loaded term *energeia*).

Consider this passage from John 10:

10:24 The Jews then gathered around Him, and were saying to Him, “How long will You keep us in suspense? If You are the Christ, tell us plainly.”
25 Jesus answered them, “I told you, and you do not believe; the *erga* that I do in My Father’s name, these testify of Me... 30 I and the Father are one.”
31 The Jews picked up stones again to stone Him.
32 Jesus answered them, “I showed you many good *erga* from the Father; for which of them are you stoning Me?”
33 The Jews answered Him, “For a good *ergon* we do not stone You, but for blasphemy; and because You, being a man, make Yourself out to be God.”
34 Jesus answered them, “... 37 If I do not do the *erga* of My Father, do not believe Me; 38 but if I do them, though you do not believe Me, believe the *erga*, so that you may know and understand that the Father is in Me, and I in the Father.”

Thus, in 25-30, Jesus seems to connect the fact that he does certain *erga*
ergai) to the fact that He and the Father “are one.”

In 32, He claims that these erga are “from the Father.”

Finally, in 37-38, He connects doing the same erga with His being “in” the Father and the Father “in” Him. He also moves from the metaphysical claim that the unity of Him and the Father is grounded in their performing the same erga, to the epistemic claim that one should believe in Him if and only if He does “the erga of My [His] Father,” and that one can “know and understand” that the Father is “in” Him, and He “in” the Father, due to the fact that He does “the erga of My [His] Father.”

Later, in chapter 14, He again connects this concept of the Father being “in” Him and He “in” the Father to their unity in virtue of synergy and to Christian knowledge and belief:

14:8 Philip said to Him, “Lord, show us the Father, and it is enough for us.” 9 Jesus said to him, “Have I been so long with you, and yet you have not come to know Me, Philip? He who has seen Me has seen the Father; how can you say, ‘Show us the Father’? 10 Do you not believe that I am in the Father, and the Father is in Me? The words that I say to you I do not speak on My own initiative, but the Father who dwelleth in Me, He doeth the erga. 11 Believe Me that I am in the Father and the Father is in Me; otherwise believe because of the erga themselves.

This theme of synergy with the Father, and its being the basis on which Christ claims equality with God the Father, runs all through the gospel of John. After being accused of blasphemy for having healed the paralytic in the pool of Bethesda on the Sabbath, Christ says:

5:17 . . . “My Father works (ergazetai) until just now, and I work (ergazomai).” 18 Because of this, therefore the Jews sought even more to kill him, because not only had he broken the sabbath, but also said that God was his Father, making himself equal with God. 19 Then Jesus answered and said to them, “Amen, Amen, I say to you, The Son can do nothing of himself, but what he sees the Father do: for whatsoever things He doeth, the Son doeth the same thing, in the same way . . . ”

This again shows the author of John connected Christ’s being “equal to God” with
His doing all of “the same thing(s), in the same way,” as the Father, i.e., the concept of synergy.\textsuperscript{45}

We already saw how John connects the Father and Son’s synergy with their unity and with being “in” one another. He later also connects unity and being “in” one another with the relation of Christians to one another and to God, as well as to making known who are His true disciples. In the High Priestly Prayer of Christ, we read:

17:20 Neither pray I for these alone, but for them also which shall believe on me through their word; 21 That they all may be one; just as thou, Father, art in me, and I in thee, that they also may be one in us: that the world may believe that thou hast sent me. 22 And the glory which thou gavest me I have given them; so that they may be one, even as we are one: 23 I in them, and thou in me, so that they may be made perfect in one; and so that the world may know that thou hast sent me, and hast loved them, as thou hast loved me. 24 Father, I will that they also, whom thou hast given me, be with me where I am; that they may behold my glory, which thou hast given me: for thou lovedst me before the foundation of the world. 25 O righteous Father, the world hath not known thee: but I have known thee, and these have known that thou hast sent me. 26 And I have declared unto them thy name, and will declare it: that the love wherewith thou hast loved me may be in them, and I in them.

Here He speaks of the “glory” instead of the “\textit{erga}” (though one can argue they are the same thing, or at least that the \textit{Shekhinah} is \textit{one of} the divine \textit{energeiai}),\textsuperscript{46} but in any case He claims that Christians will be “one” in the same sense as that in which He and the Father are one, and that He will be “in” them and they will be “in” Him and “in” the Father. And we have already seen that John connects being “in” with synergy.

It is no wonder, then, that Paul constantly refers to his friends as “synergizers” of

\textsuperscript{45} Though one could interpret this as only asserting the CA. But we’ve seen how easily Gregory can get from the CA to the \textit{homoousion}, and from the \textit{homoousion} to Universal Synergy.

\textsuperscript{46} (Bradshaw 2006), pp. 291-292.
his, as well as to his synergy with Christ, (the author of the third epistle of John may well be making the same claim when he speaks of “being synergizers with the Truth,” “Truth” being a title of Christ).  

Paul also explicitly grounds the “oneness” he has with other Christians in his synergy with them. “I have planted, Apollos watered; but God gave the increase… Now he that planteth and he that watereth are one… For we are synergizers with God…”  

Although more pronounced in John, the theme of the Father and Son synergizing with one another, and of Christians synergizing with one another and with the persons of the Trinity, is present in the synoptic gospels as well. (E.g., Mark 16:20, “And they went forth, and preached every where, the Lord synergizing with them, and confirming the word with signs following. Amen.”)  

Indeed, once one knows to look for it, the term “synergy” (συνεργέω) and its inflections shows up all over the New Testament to describe the relationship between the Father and Son, and similarly the relationship between Christians with each other and with Christ, in ways that certainly sound as though this is the fact in virtue of which, and the sense in which, they count as “one.” (Compare the story of the Tower of Babel in Genesis 11 as well).  

Thus, not only does Gregory’s view here seem to lie comfortably at the heart of the pro-Nicene consensus, it seems not unlikely that he derived his views from an even earlier Christian tradition, and in turn there seems to be ample support for the


48. 2 Corinthians 6:1.  

49. 3 John 1:8  

50. 1 Cor. 3:6-9
view from the Bible itself on anyone’s understanding of what counts as “the Bible.”\textsuperscript{51}

I hasten to stress that I don’t imagine this brief foray into the Bible will be sufficient to persuade anyone to accept the interpretations I’m suggesting who doesn’t already accept Gregory’s views. Although I would be willing to defend the view in the detail that it deserves, my point at the present is not to show that Gregory interprets the Bible correctly. Although I obviously find the interpretation of the Bible I am suggesting plausible, I acknowledge that the Bible is a hard book to interpret and there is more to be said here.

The point of my remarks, however, is not to establish that Gregory’s view is biblical in the sense of being in accordance with a correct interpretation of the text (a point I would have to argue for separately, and at greater length). Rather, it is, as I said, to show that “it doesn’t seem unreasonable to think that the overall gist of this view – that the Father and Son count as ‘one’ because of synergy – is simply taken into the tradition from the New Testament itself.” That is to say, that it does not seem unreasonable to read the Bible in the way I have briefly outlined above, and so one can suppose, not unreasonably, that Gregory, not unreasonably (and not disingenuously), derived his views from an earlier Christian tradition in combination with the Bible itself. The burden of proof here seems to be on the anti-Trinitarian to show that Gregory’s theological assumptions are in some sense un-biblical, either in the sense that he doesn’t really believe that the various aspects of his triadology were really intended by the authors of the biblical passages we have in view (that he is “imposing them” on the text), or in the sense that his belief on that point was incorrect. The point I am trying to make clear is that Gregory’s most basic theological premises are not quite what one might assume they would be, and that when we see the very few theological assumptions he is actually making, there is hardly any reason at all to think that he couldn’t have been sincere in his belief that

\textsuperscript{51} Though see below, p. 408, for problems about what does count as “the Bible.”
these most basic theological premises were contained in the Bible. And, although a full defense of the point would be beyond my qualifications, there are at least some positive reasons to suppose that he was correct, and.

Of course, one might direct one’s charges of un-biblicality not at Gregory’s theological premises, but directly at his conclusions. But then, if one doesn’t object to his theological premises, one must go back and attack his metaphysics or semantics, specifically the metaphysical views that (1) synergy is possible, or (2) that ousiai are individuated by their natural energeiai, or the semantic views that (3) by calling something “God” or “divine” we predicate its engagement in a certain kind of energeia, or (4) that synergizing on a token energeia is that in virtue of which two hypostases count as “one” doer.

We’ve already seen some of the biblical reasons Gregory holds (3). (See 4.2.3.1, p. 179 ff.) And just now we’ve gotten at least a taste of how much the Bible talks about synergy (1), as well as the ways in which multiple New Testament authors conceive of synergy as that in virtue of which “two” count as “one” (4). One might argue that the Bible is only ever speaking of the human or creaturely sort of “synergy” – the kind of cooperation that is possible for beings separated by time and space. But nevertheless, there doesn’t seem to be any biblical reason to suppose that the beefier sort of synergy Gregory attributes to the Trinity is not possible for the Trinity. And anyway, even if one thinks that the Bible is talking here about some lesser kind of synergy – if two things can count as one in virtue of a lesser kind of synergy than what Gregory imagines, how much more so would the Trinity count as one. Indeed, if the biblical requirement for counting as one is only some lesser kind of synergy, then it wouldn’t matter even if synergy were metaphysically impossible – the Trinity could count as one anyway.

What’s more, the concept of synergy as Gregory understands it actually seems quite promising. Much of the mystery people seem to find in the issue of divine inspi-
ration seems to be dispelled by it, for example. (We need not accept any dichotomy between the Holy Spirit magically moving a man’s hands versus a mere mortal simply being “inspired” by God in the way one can be “inspired” by a painting when there is the possibility of dual agency in the same events.) There is a parallel problem with the agency of miracles, not as much noticed as the problem of inspiration, but equally difficult. The Bible sometimes attributes miracles to the Lord (e.g., the parting of the Red Sea and the drying up of the Jordan in Joshua 4:23). But sometimes to a prophet (e.g., Elisha’s raising the widow’s son from the dead, and his other miracles, in 2 Kings 8:1-5). Yet it seems we want to say both that Moses parted the Red Sea and that God did, and both that Elisha raised the widow’s son and that God did. Again, this can be a bit of a conundrum if we assume an exclusionary principle that two distinct individuals cannot both perform the same action. The conundrum is easy to dispel when we accept a metaphysics of synergy.

Finally, the claim that ousiai are individuated by their natural energeiai seems to me even more clearly biblical. It seems to me to be only a fancy way of saying, “By their fruits shall ye know them. Do men gather grapes from thorns, or figs from thistles?” (Matt. 7:16)

We come at last, then, to the second, and in my view much deeper and more problematic, issue I see for the kind of criticism we are considering. And that is that,

52. “For the LORD your God dried up the waters of Jordan from before you, until ye were passed over, as the LORD your God did to the Red sea, which he dried up from before us, until we were gone over.” (Joshua 4:23).

53. “8:1 Then spake Elisha unto the woman, whose son he had restored to life, saying, Arise, and go thou and thine household, and sojourn wheresoever thou canst sojourn: for the LORD hath called for a famine; and it shall also come upon the land seven years... 8:4 And the king talked with Gehazi the servant of the man of God, saying, Tell me, I pray thee, all the great things that Elisha hath done. 8:5 And it came to pass, as he was telling the king how he had restored a dead body to life, that, behold, the woman, whose son he had restored to life, cried to the king for her house and for her land. And Gehazi said, My Lord, O king, this is the woman, and this is her son, whom Elisha restored to life.” (2 Kings 8:1-5)
even if the Trinitarian were to simply *grant* that the doctrine of the Trinity were in conflict with the Bible, it wouldn’t be at all clear that it would be the doctrine of the Trinity, rather than the (or a) Bible, that should be the one to go.

Recall Tuggy says:

> When it comes to viewing the councils as instruments of revelation, many agree that the record of councils, even the major ones, is extremely spotty. One finds contradictory, morally objectionable, and unintelligible claims in their documents, as well as some which seem a poor fit with scripture. As to the way these proceedings occurred, one finds a lot more than the hand of God there! Still, one could try to make a case that, in these proceedings, God revealed the truth of the Trinity to His people. But whether one grounds the doctrine in the Bible or in council documents, one will be hard pressed to show that we are so justified in believing that God revealed doctrine X that we should believe X, even though it seems as contradictory as the claim that there is a square circle.\(^{54}\)

Note how Tuggy simply *assumes* that the being “a poor fit with scripture” is a criterion by which to judge the councils and the doctrine of the Trinity, rather than the other way around.

And yet the doctrine of the Trinity is both *older than*, and – even to this day – *more widely accepted among Christians than*, any of the several canons of scripture that one might intend to refer to as “the” Bible.\(^{55}\) This might sound surprising. What do I mean?

At the simplest level, even when a given canon of scripture is shared by two Christians or two groups of Christians, and when it is agreed what passages constitute

\(^{54}\) (Tuggy 2003), p. 13.

\(^{55}\) It was apparently John Chrysostom who first used the term “τα βιβλία” to refer to the scriptures. Ironically, what he was referring to was probably closer to the *Peshitta* than to the Protestant Bible, or even the Roman Catholic or Eastern Orthodox Bibles.

“According to Suicer he [John Chrysostom] is the first writer who gave the Bible its present name τα βιβλία, The Books. Of approximately 11,000 quotations that Chrysostom makes from the New Testament, according to Baur there are none from 2 Peter, 2 and 3 John, Jude, or Revelation. In other words, his canon of the New Testament appears to be the same as that of the Peshitta, the Syriac version current at Antioch in his time.”

the books that in turn constitute the Bible, they might disagree about what particular
text type to identify as a given passage.

For example, Tuggy (presumably) and I both accept canons of scripture in which
the books of Samuel and the books of Chronicles count as part of the “Old Testament.”
But if Tuggy follows most Protestants in terms of the canon of scripture, then what
he refers to as “the books of Samuel” and “the books of Chronicles” are the Masoretic
texts known by those names (one particular Hebrew text type), while what I (an
Eastern Orthodox) mean are the Septuagint texts known by those names (a Greek
translation of a different, and probably older, Hebrew text type). Thus, Tuggy will
be committed to saying that 2 Samuel 8:4 reads:

“And David took from him 1,000 chariots, and 700 horsemen, and 20,000
footmen…”

while he is committed to saying that 1 Chronicles 18:4 says, concerning the same
battle:

“And David took from him 1,000 chariots, 7,000 horsemen, and 20,000
foot soldiers…”

On the other hand, what I, as an Orthodox Christian, refer to as “the Old Testament”
(the Septuagint) reads:

“And David took from him 1,000 chariots, 7,000 horsemen, and 20,000
foot soldiers…”

in both passages.

Which of these counts as “the” Bible Tuggy wants us to adhere to?

I note in passing that, when Tuggy says, “one will be hard pressed to show that
we are so justified in believing that God revealed doctrine X that we should believe
X, even though it seems as contradictory as the claim that there is a square circle”
and given the particular way in which he resists mysterianism, and given that the
claims that, in the exact same battle, David took 7,000 horsemen versus 700 horsemen
might “seem as contradictory as the claim that there is a square circle,” there is a
serious question as to whether Tuggy ought not abandon the Masoretic text of the
Old Testament in favor of the Septuagint

But of course, the more interesting point here is that there are a great number of
more important discrepancies between the Masoretic text and the Septuagint text,
and I claim that Tuggy should abandon the Masoretic text because it is “a poor
fit with scripture,” to use Tuggy’s words. And of course by “scripture” I mean “the
Septuagint.” Naturally this is begging the question against Tuggy. But by the same
token, he begs the question against me to argue the reverse. And that is the point.
Namely, that we now face the question: if we must judge other aspects of the Christian
tradition by “the” scripture, then which version of “scripture” counts as the standard
by which to judge?

What’s more, beyond mere disagreements over the precise wording of individual
passages, Christians disagree over the inclusion or exclusion of whole passages from
the Bible. Suppose we find a way to settle disagreements over text types. Perhaps
we agree to simply accept (de dicto) that “the original versions of these texts are
scripture,” assuming that critical scholarship can reveal what the original versions
are, or perhaps we simply set these discrepancies aside. A Protestant like Tuggy and
an Eastern Orthodox like myself might then seem to at least “agree” that, say, the
book of Psalms counts as part of the Bible. But I accept an entire additional psalm
(Psalm 151) as being part of the book of Psalms, while Tuggy presumably does not.
Similarly, I accept the Song of the Three Holy Children as counting as part of the
book of Daniel, while again Tuggy presumably does not. So we seem to disagree even
about what passages constitute the various books we “agree” are canonical.

Suppose, then, that we even find a way around those disagreements. Still, beyond
disagreement on what passages are to be included in what books, we even disagree over what *list of books* succeeds in enumerating all of the books of the Old and New Testaments. As an Eastern Orthodox, I accept the entire books of Wisdom, Sirach, Tobit, the Maccabees, and the other so-called “apocryphal” books as legitimate parts of the Old Testament, while Tuggy and other “biblical” unitarians presumably do not.

Finally, suppose we take, for example, one of the two (!) canons of scripture (both) accepted by the Orthodox Tewahedo church of Ethiopia. These give us yet larger Old Testaments even than that of any of the Eastern Orthodox churches. Besides the so-called Apocryphal books from the Septuagint, their Old Testament includes, for example, the only surviving version of the books of Enoch and Jubilees, as well as I, II, and III Meqabyan (entirely distinct from the Septuagint books of the Maccabees, despite having the same name) as well as yet additional passages in certain Old Testament books like Jeremiah, etc. Furthermore, in their “broader” New Testament canon, they have, besides those 27 books familiar to most of us, four books of Sinodos, two Books of the Covenant, Ethiopic Clement, and the Ethiopic Didascalia.56

There are similar variations between the canons of scripture accepted by numerous ancient churches, such as the Assyrian, Syriac, Coptic, Armenian, Roman Catholic, various Eastern Orthodox, and other churches.

However, one issue on which there is *no* variation among any of the churches named above, is on the issue of accepting the orthodox doctrine of the Trinity, as enshrined in the first and second ecumenical councils. Even non-Chalcedonian Christians like the Coptic or the Ethiopian Tewahedo church, despite rejecting the council of Chalcedon, still accept the councils of Nicaea and Constantinople.

The same cannot be said for any of the various Christian canons of scripture.

And that, of course, is because, among all of the canons ever issued by any of the ancient ecumenical councils, not one was a canon of scripture (this being left to local councils).57

One wonders, then – for what reason are we supposed to prefer “the” Bible (one particular canon of scripture) over the doctrine of the Trinity?

Perhaps Tuggy simply takes belief in (the Protestant) Bible as basic. But then, why could one not take belief in the doctrine of the Trinity as basic?

And even if, for some reason, it turns out that one’s belief in the Bible could be properly basic, but one’s belief in the doctrine of the Trinity could not be – why take as basic a belief in Dale Tuggy’s Bible in particular (a canon of scripture that, if, as I presume, he accepts the Protestant Bible, did not even exist until well over a thousand years after the councils that anathematized the classical Trinitarian heresies of Modalism and Arianism)?

The point here is not to bash the Protestant Bible. The point is to show the arbitrariness of accepting it over the doctrine of the Trinity. It’s true that one can make a case for the Protestant Bible. The question is how? How, if one wants, at the same time, to reject the doctrine of the Trinity? The most obvious way to argue for the Protestant Bible is to note that the list of books it takes to constitute the Bible first appears in history in AD 367, in the 39th Festal Epistle of none other than “Mr. Trinity” himself – St. Athanasius – probably the only person who could be argued to occupy an even more central role in the fourth-century Trinitarian controversy and the ultimate development of a pro-Nicene consensus than Gregory of Nyssa and the

57. There is in a certain sense a very odd exception to this. And that is that the so-called Quinisext Council or Council in Trullo ratified the canons of a number of previous, local councils, some of which contained canons of scripture, as well as a canon of scripture given by Gregory Nazianzen. However, these lists are not identical. The result is multiple conflicting canons of scripture all implicitly ratified by the Quinisext Council, so that there is still no single list of books that can claim an advantage over every other in this respect. See (Metzger 1997), p. 217.
other Cappadocians. And as for the Hebrew text-type, one can argue for it on the basis that it was preferred (even if later rejected) by St. Jerome.\textsuperscript{58} But then on the basis of what non-arbitrary criterion would one argue that, when St. Athanasius and St. Jerome recommend we accept the orthodox doctrine of the Trinity, we are free to reject their views, putting ourselves in judgment over them, yet when the self-same men recommend we accept a particular (and, we must admit, at the time, \textit{novel}) canon or text-type of scripture, we can no longer question them, but must reject \textit{older} canons and text-types of scripture in favor of theirs?

After all, if one accepts, say, an Arian theology as being “more primitive,” why not also accept \textit{the Arian canon of scripture}, which in some sense \textit{was} more primitive, and which seems to have (still) included \textit{The Shepherd of Hermas} for example?\textsuperscript{59} Or if one accepts an even lower Christology, alleging it to be “more primitive,” why not accept the canon of scripture accepted by whatever allegedly more primitive group one claims to find one’s view accepted by? For a biblical unitarian, this might mean going with the canon of scripture accepted by the early Ebionites, which seems to have rejected all of the gospels but Matthew,\textsuperscript{60} and on the other hand included some spurious \textit{Acts}, the \textit{Periodoi} of Peter, and the “Degrees of James,”\textsuperscript{61} Thus, a Bible not only somewhat different from the Protestant Bible, but radically unlike any Bible accepted by any Christians today. Again, the point is not that the Protestant Bible is crazy. The point is that it is entirely unclear how one would, \textit{at the same time}, argue

\textsuperscript{58} In a bygone day, one could argue that the Masoretic text, being Hebrew, was obviously the original, and that where the Septuagint (a translation into Greek) seemed to differ, it must simply have been a bad translation. But with the discovery of the Dead Sea scrolls, that avenue has been closed as it seems there were simply multiple Hebrew text types in antiquity, and that the Septuagint is not a particularly bad translation of the Masoretic, but probably just a reasonably good translation of a different Hebrew text type.

\textsuperscript{59} (St. Athanasius 1892), p. 162. “And in the Shepherd it is written (since they allege this book also, though it is not of the Canon) . . . ”

\textsuperscript{60} (Epiphanius of Salamis 1987), p. 122.

\textsuperscript{61} (Epiphanius of Salamis 1987), p. 131 ff.
in favor of the Protestant Bible, but against the doctrine of the Trinity. How without being pushed, on the question of the scriptural canon, in the direction of accepting such a foreign canon of scripture that referring to oneself as a “biblical” unitarian, or making the charge that the doctrine of the Trinity is “unbiblical” becomes simply laughable?⁶²

And in yet another great irony, Great Apostasy theorists frequently claim that the doctrine of the Trinity was in some sense “shoved down the throats” of the ecumenical councils by the “political” machinations of unscrupulous bishops or emperors. But whatever exactly these criticisms amount to, the question is, were the local, North African councils in which the New Testament most commonly accepted today was adopted, or indeed any of the councils sanctioning any other canon of scripture in use by any churches anywhere today, significantly different in this respect from any other church councils in history (like the first or second ecumenical councils)? What is it that makes these “good” councils that give us a canon of scripture somehow different from the “bad” ones that give us the doctrine of the Trinity (or whatever other aspect of the Christian tradition the Great Apostasy theorist wants to reject)? Again, what we want is a non-arbitrary criterion that somehow distinguishes between the two. To take the Great Apostasy theorist’s criticisms seriously, we would need to get some kind of clarity on just what the alleged problem with what the Great Apostasy theorist sees as the “bad” councils amounts to, such that it isn’t obviously shared by what he sees as the “good” councils. And it’s entirely unobvious what such a criterion could possibly be.

On top of that, of course, within whichever of those councils the Great Apostasy

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⁶² And of course, the considerations in this paragraph show that even if the Great Apostasy theorist were to abandon the peculiarities of the Protestant Bible, opting to accept the Roman Catholic or the Eastern Orthodox (or the Armenian, or Coptic, or the Peshitta, or what have you), a substantially similar case might still be made for any more traditional Bible.

⁶³ I.e., the Synod of Hippo Regius (AD 393), whose acts are now lost, but which were read and accepted at the Synod of Carthage (AD 397), see (METZGER 1997), p. 314.
theorist wants to appeal to in order to support some version of the Bible, we will most likely also need some non-arbitrary criterion that allows us to separate out the *canon of scripture in particular* from all of the other canons passed by the same council. For example, in addition to ratifying the favorite canon of scripture of most Protestants, the third council of Carthage also passed a canon requiring clerical celibacy. So, if the Great Apostasy theorist does not *himself* want to be obligated to have a purely celibate priesthood, yet still wants to obligate *others* to accept the council of Carthage’s canon of scripture, he will need a non-arbitrary criterion to sort through “bad” canons and “good” canons *within* the “good” councils. (Of course, he might employ multiple criteria to do all of the different jobs he needs done, or he might try to find a single criterion that will do all of them at once.)

And what’s more, he will need a criterion that will allow him to be pretty precise about which canon(s) of scripture make the cut and which don’t. For it will not do to say that just *any* of the canons of scripture traditionally in use by some ancient church or another that we would countenance as Christian counts as a legitimate version of the Bible. Otherwise, we would have to go back again to the question of whether the doctrine of the Trinity *is*, after all, “biblical,” in the fullest and most problematic sense of the term. Why so?

Although I do not have access to a copy of the Ethiopian *Book of the Covenant*, included in the Ethiopian Tewahedo Church’s “broader” New Testament canon (I am not aware that there exists any English translation, and I do not know Ge’ez), I do know that section 61 is supposed to be quite similar to the *Testamentum Domini* (*Testament of the Lord*),64 which is well known for its anti-Arian theology, and in which we read such gems as:

Let the church be thus: let it have three entrances as a type of the Trin-

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64. According to (METZGER 1997), p. 228.
ity. \textsuperscript{65}

We lay hands on the servant of God, who hath been chosen in the Spirit... for the delivering of true judgement and divine and holy revelations, and of divine gifts and faithful doctrines of the Trinity... \textsuperscript{66}

Let him offer on Saturday three loaves for a complete symbol of the Trinity... \textsuperscript{67}

[We confess] Him who is pre-existent, and was present, and is, and cometh; who suffered and was buried, and rose, and was glorified by the Father; ... who is not only Man but therewith also God; who ... descended \textit{in the Godhead} into Sheol... the indivisible Thought who is from the Father, and [is] of one will with Him... \textsuperscript{68}

It also seems that the Ethiopian \textit{Sinodos} contains a number of (pseudo-) canons from the council of Nicaea, a section titled “The discourse of the Nicene Fathers on the Holy Trinity,” and another titled “On the Essence of the Holy Trinity.”\textsuperscript{69} In addition, some manuscripts of it contain “The Creed of Africa,” which is just the Athanasian Creed in Ge’ez.\textsuperscript{70}

Of course, it is true that these books must have been written after the time of the council of Nicaea, and that versions containing “The Creed of Africa” must have only come about after the Athanasian Creed was written. But it is equally true that they were thought worthy to be included in what Ethiopians consider the (or at least a) biblical canon. And it is equally true that, though the broader Ethiopian canon may have been formed quite late, it was still formed over a thousand years before the canon of scripture Tuggy presumably subscribes to (the Protestant Bible), and not significantly later than any of the others commonly in use today (late 4\textsuperscript{th} to early 5\textsuperscript{th}

\textsuperscript{65} (Maclean 1902) ch. 19, p. 62.

\textsuperscript{66} (Maclean 1902) ch. 21, p. 65.

\textsuperscript{67} (Maclean 1902) ch. 23, p. 69.

\textsuperscript{68} (Maclean 1902) ch. 28, pp. 84-85.

\textsuperscript{69} (Wright 1877), pp. 269-270.

\textsuperscript{70} (Harden 1926), p. 62. See also, (Wright 1877), p. 274.
It seems, then, that there exists at least some credible version of “the” Bible that in fact explicitly asserts the doctrine of the Trinity. The Great Apostasy theorist, then, will need his criterion (whatever it turns out to be) to rule out the Ethiopian canon as somehow illegitimate. But again, how were the relevant Ethiopian councils (or whatever other factors in the determination of the Ethiopian canon) somehow different from any others? On what basis will Tuggy insist that this Bible is somehow defective and that it is rather his Bible, his version of scripture, that all other Christians must bow to? One can imagine an Ethiopian Orthodox Christian saying to Tuggy something like the following:

There are over 40 million of us Ethiopian Orthodox Christians, and very few (surely fewer than a million) of you “biblical” unitarians.

Our church has existed as the dominant religious force in our land since about the fourth century, and in at least some form ever since the apostle Philip himself preached Christ to our Kandake’s eunuch. (Acts 8:26-40). Your church has only come into existence in (relatively) recent times.

Our people have had just this Bible, in just this text type, since before your people so much as had a language called “English,” or were given an alphabet by certain of our fellow Trinitarians with which you would later translate their Bible into your language.

And this canon of scripture of ours has been in use for more than a thousand years before yours was ever even begun.

So how is it that your Bible sits in judgement over us and ours?

And it seems to me that the Ethiopian would deserve a response from Tuggy.

Now on the Ethiopian’s part, he would be willing to tolerate the fact that Tuggy works with a much smaller Bible. (The Ethiopian is in communion with the Coptic, who has a smaller Bible.) But one thing that the Ethiopian would not tolerate, is the fact that Tuggy does not accept the doctrine of the Trinity.

And the reason for this discrepancy in what he would be willing to tolerate is simple. Let us grant that the councils are “spotty,” whatever precisely that amounts to. Still, one thing that can be said for the doctrine of the Trinity is that it at least
has been accepted at a “spotty” ecumenical council and by Christians all over the world. The same cannot be said for any of the various Christian Bibles – neither the Ethiopian’s, nor Tuggy’s.

Again, all of this is just a specific playing out of the general, fundamental problem with all “Great Apostasy” mythologies. Namely, that the Great Apostasy theorist must give us some non-arbitrary criterion by which we are to carve up the history of the Christian tradition. So that, when pitting two aspects, X and Y, of the Christian tradition against one another, we end up preferring Y over X, instead of vice-versa.

Usually the criterion is chronological. Tuggy cites, for example, the book A.D. 381: Heretics, Pagans, and the Dawn of the Monotheistic State by Charles Freeman,\(^\text{71}\) the thesis of which should be obvious from the title. Suppose for argument’s sake we say that the doctrine of the Trinity is something Christians may reject, since it fails to meet the criterion of being an object of consensus among Christians prior to 381 AD. In that case, we may then reject any and all of the biblical canons currently in use as well. And that is not likely to be a welcome result for a “biblical” unitarian like Tuggy.

On the other hand, suppose that instead of a chronological criterion, we make the criterion that the aspect of Christian tradition to prefer (the one that is more primitive, or more likely to be primitive, or whatever the claim is) is the one sanctioned at the largest number of councils, or the biggest councils, or the most widely accepted councils, or the earliest councils, or by the most Christians or the most bishops, or the earliest bishops. All of these criteria would again give us the doctrine of the Trinity before any particular canon of scripture.

But then, what happens if we simply lower the bar? Low enough that the Bible – some Bible the Great Apostasy theorist would want to accept – now passes our test.

\(^\text{71. (Freeman 2009).}\)
Then the doctrine of the Trinity (along with, likely, a host of other nasty doctrines and practices) will be let in as well.\textsuperscript{72}

In summary, to make his argument work, the Great Apostasy theorist needs to give us some non-arbitrary criterion that would let the doctrines \textit{he likes} (e.g., his particular canon of scripture) pass, but that would not let the doctrines \textit{he doesn’t like} (e.g., the doctrine of the Trinity) pass. Although there is no way to rule out such a possibility \textit{in theory}, the fact that Great Apostasy mythology has been around now for a number of centuries, and still awaits such a criterion, suggests that there is none to be had.

Again, I emphasize that I am not arguing that objections that the doctrine of the Trinity are unbiblical necessarily \textit{entail} a full-blown Great Apostasy theory. I am only saying that any such objection shares the same, familiar, problematic features. Even if such an opposition between a particular Bible and the doctrine of the Trinity were simply \textit{granted}, we would need to be presented with some kind of non-arbitrary criterion with which we can distinguish between those aspects of the Christian tradition that are “primitive” and those that are corruptions, such that the Bible will count as primitive, but not the doctrine of the Trinity. And so far no such criterion has been presented, nor is it obvious how one could be. I conclude that it is unlikely for there to be any good argument for directly opposing the theology involved in the doctrine of the Trinity.

\textsuperscript{72} Essentially the same points I am making are made fairly briefly, and much more entertainingly, in David Bercot’s non-scholarly, but still very well-argued books, (\textsc{Bercot} 1992) and (\textsc{Bercot} 1989), which I highly recommend.
6.5 Combination Objections

Finally, I have mostly been considering objections to individual assumptions of Gregory’s, one at a time. One might take, dare I call it, a “synergistic” approach here, saying that, although perhaps unobjectionable in isolation, there is some reason why certain of Gregory’s assumptions are problematic taken together. Perhaps some aspect of his theology and some aspect of his metaphysics are for some reason not compossible, or have some other problematic feature when taken together.

But to stave off every possible objection to every possible combination of Gregory’s basic assumptions would be at best tedious, at worst impossible. In any case, it would be incumbent on the anti-Trinitarian to present such a case, and it is not obvious to me that there is any such case to be made. The next move there belongs to the anti-Trinitarian.

6.6 Final Conclusion

We’ve seen, then, in the course of this dissertation, that the LPT has a formally adequate solution in Gregory of Nyssa’s account of the Trinity. Thus, the doctrine of the Trinity is not logically inconsistent – or at least, if it were, it wouldn’t be for the reasons usually alleged.

What’s more, Gregory’s broader, general philosophical framework (metaphysics and semantics) relies, ultimately, on only a very few assumptions, most of which (save, perhaps, his view on counting by agent nouns, and the metaphysics of synergy) are, if not uncontentious, at least certainly not outrageous. Likewise, most of Gregory’s Trinitarian theory, we saw, turned out simply to consist of the logical consequences of those metaphysical principles and a small number of theological assumptions, all of which seem to have precedent in the Christian tradition prior to his time, and plausibly in the New Testament itself.
Assuming I have done my history rightly, assuming Gregory’s view is indeed roughly what I’ve presented it to be, there is no denying that the doctrine of the Trinity is, at a minimum, logically consistent. Furthermore, even stepping outside the primary scope of this dissertation into broader questions of whether there are any serious objections to be made to Gregory’s doctrine of the Trinity at all, it turned out that there were only two points to attack the doctrine that turn out to be at all plausible – his semantics for counting by agent nouns, and the metaphysics of synergy.

On the first issue (the semantics for counting by agent nouns), we saw, first, that it’s a good question whether any disagreement could ever be definitively resolved at all. Second, even if Gregory could be shown to be wrong about his semantics here, it seems more like an (alleged) mistake in the philosophy of logic, rather than like the formal contradiction the anti-Trinitarian originally promised. Next, even if it could be persuasively argued that Gregory’s semantics (or philosophy of logic) is wrong here, so long as there is nothing impossible about Gregory’s substantive theory, it’s not clear how worried Trinitarians should be about the semantic questions involved anyway. And finally, even if it could be shown that, at least in some technical sense, it would be true to say “there are three gods,” the case can still be made that saying so would simply be so misleading that it would actually be less misleading to assert the technically false, but non-misleading statement that “there is one God.”

On the second issue (the metaphysics of synergy), it would more obviously be a problem for the Trinitarian if the anti-Trinitarian can make it a problem. But it also is less obvious that the anti-Trinitarian can problematize it at all. Indeed, to my mind, the possibility of the phenomenon of synergy seems to constitute an exciting contribution that patristic thought can make to contemporary philosophical theology, and rather than shying away from it, Trinitarians should gladly embrace the possibilities it offers.
Any direct objections to Gregory’s theology that have anything to do specifically with the *Trinity*, whether from an external (non-Christian) or internal (“biblical”) perspective, seemed ultimately question-begging. And finally, for any objection directed at some combination of Gregory’s assumptions, it would be incumbent on the anti-Trinitarian to articulate those objections before the Trinitarian needs to respond. But however any of these further possible discussions might go, it is clear that the doctrine of the Trinity, properly understood, is not formally inconsistent. At least not for the reasons alleged in the LPT. And the prospects for attacking the broader philosophical framework of Gregory’s solution to the LPT seem limited, and dim.

We began this dissertation saying that the doctrine of the Trinity might seem to be an easy target for anti-Christian arguments. It is clearly central to the faith of mainstream Christians, and yet seemed obviously incoherent. But what seemed like an easy target turns out to be mostly a dead end. Upon examination, there is surprisingly little to object to, and none of the possible avenues of attack seem very promising. In any case, should there turn out to be any problem with the doctrine at all, it will clearly not be one of mere logical inconsistency in saying that “These Three are One.”
APPENDIX A

APPENDIX OF PROOFS

Rather than presenting them in the main text, I’ve relegated the more involved inferences from Chapter 5 to this appendix. In what follows, rather than defining a language, axioms and so forth, I simply follow a fairly standard version of predicate logic and make use of well-known inference rules that anyone familiar enough with predicate logic to understand the proofs at all will surely be familiar with.

I have taken shortcuts when it is entirely obvious that I am, and what the shortcut is, and that there is a valid inference there to be had. E.g., deriving P & Q & R & S from P & R & S and Q in one step of & Introduction, rather than decomposing the whole bunch and building it back up again. Likewise, in a few rare cases I’ve used abbreviations like o = n = m for (o = n) & (o = m) & (n = m), and derived o = m from o = n = m by one step of & Elimination.
A.1 \(O_{\text{homoousion}}\)

The following:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{IDO: } & \quad \Box (\forall x)(\forall y)((Ox & Oy) \rightarrow (x=y \leftrightarrow (\forall z)[E^z \rightarrow (Nzx \leftrightarrow Nzy)])) \\
\text{CA: } & \quad (\forall x)\{E^x \rightarrow (Nxo \leftrightarrow Nxn \leftrightarrow Nxm)\} \\
O(i): & \quad Oo \\
O(ii): & \quad On \\
O(iii): & \quad Om
\end{align*}
\]

entail:

\[
O_{\text{homoousion}}: \quad o = n = m
\]

Proof:

\[
\begin{align*}
1 & \quad (Oo & On) \rightarrow (o=m \leftrightarrow (\forall z)[E^z \rightarrow (Nzo \leftrightarrow Nzn)]) \uparrow \\
2 & \quad Oo & On & \quad O(i),O(ii) & \text{ & Int} \\
3 & \quad o=m \leftrightarrow (\forall z)[E^z \rightarrow (Nzo \leftrightarrow Nzn)] & \quad 1,2 \text{ MP} \\
4 & \quad \text{Select: } a & \quad \text{For } \forall & \text{ Int} \\
5 & \quad \text{Suppose: } E^a & \quad \text{For } \rightarrow & \text{ Int} \\
6 & \quad E^a \rightarrow (Nao \leftrightarrow Nan \leftrightarrow Nam) & \quad \text{CA } \forall & \text{ Elim a/x} \\
7 & \quad Nao \leftrightarrow Nan \leftrightarrow Nam & \quad 5,6 \text{ MP} \\
8 & \quad Nao \leftrightarrow Nan & \quad 7 & \text{ & Elim} \\
9 & \quad E^a \rightarrow (Nao \leftrightarrow Nan) & \quad 5-8 & \rightarrow \text{ Int} \\
10 & \quad (\forall z)[E^z \rightarrow (Nzo \leftrightarrow Nzn)] & \quad 4-9 \text{ } \forall & \text{ Int } z/a \\
11 & \quad o=n & \quad 3,10 & \leftrightarrow \text{ Elim}
\end{align*}
\]
12  \((\text{On} \& \text{ Om}) \rightarrow (n=m \leftrightarrow (\forall z)[E^*z \rightarrow (Nzn \leftrightarrow Nzm)])\) ††

13  \text{On} \& \text{ Om} \hspace{3cm} \text{O(ii), O(iii) \& Int}

14  n=m \leftrightarrow (\forall z)[E^*z \rightarrow (Nzn \leftrightarrow Nzm)] \hspace{3cm} 12,13 \text{ MP}

15  \text{Select: } b \hspace{3cm} \text{For } \forall \text{ Int}

16  \text{Suppose: } E^*b \hspace{3cm} \text{For } 

17  E^*b \rightarrow (Nbo \leftrightarrow Nbn \leftrightarrow Nbm) \hspace{3cm} \text{CA } \forall \text{ Elim } b/x

18  Nbo \leftrightarrow Nbn \leftrightarrow Nbm \hspace{3cm} 16,17 \text{ MP}

19  Nbn \leftrightarrow Nbm \hspace{3cm} 18 \& \text{ Elim}

20  E^*b \rightarrow (Nbn \leftrightarrow Nbm) \hspace{3cm} 16-19 \rightarrow \text{ Elim}

21  (\forall z)[E^*z \rightarrow (Nzn \leftrightarrow Nzm)] \hspace{3cm} 15-20 \forall \text{ Int } z/b

22  n=m \hspace{3cm} 14,21 \leftrightarrow \text{ Elim}

23  o=m \hspace{3cm} 11,22 = o/n

24  o=n=m \hspace{3cm} 11,22,23 \& \text{ Int}

†  \text{IDO T Axiom, followed by } \forall \text{ Elim } o/x \text{ n/y}

††  \text{IDO T Axiom, followed by } \forall \text{ Elim } n/x \text{ m/y}
A.2 NE*E

The following:

\[ N_{\text{Def}}: (\forall x)(\forall y)\{N_{xy} \iff \square(\forall z)[P_{zy} \to (\exists w)(Ew \& Pwx \& Pzw)]\} \]

events:

\[ \text{NE*E}: (\forall x)(\forall y)\{(E^*x \& Oy \& N_{xy}) \to (\forall z)[(Hz \& P_{zy}) \to (\exists w)(Ew \& Pwx \& Pzw)]\} \]

Proof:

1. Select: a For \( \forall \) Int.
2. Select: b For \( \forall \) Int.
3. Suppose: \( E^*a \& Ob \& Nab \) For \( \to \) Int.
4. Select: c For \( \forall \) Int.
5. Suppose \( Hc \& Pcb \) For \( \to \) Int.
6. \( Nab \leftrightarrow \square(\forall z)[P_{zb} \to (\exists w)(Ew \& Pwa \& Pzw)] \)
7. \( \square(\forall z)[P_{zb} \to (\exists w)(Ew \& Pwa \& Pzw)] \) 6,7 \( \leftrightarrow \) Elim
8. \( Pcb \to (\exists w)(Ew \& Pwa \& Pcw) \)
9. \( Pcb \) 5 \& Elim
10. \( (\exists w)(Ew \& Pwa \& Pcw) \) 9,10 MP
11. \( (Hz \& P_{zb}) \to (\exists w)(Ew \& Pwa \& Pcw) \) 5-11 \( \to \) Int.
12. \( (\forall z)[(Hz \& P_{zb}) \to (\exists w)(Ew \& Pwa \& Pcw)] \) 4-12 \( \forall \) Int \( z/c \)
13. \( (E^*a \& Ob \& Nab) \to (\forall z)[(Hz \& P_{zb}) \to (\exists w)(Ew \& Pwa \& Pzw)] \)
14. \( (\forall y)\{(E^*a \& Oy \& Nab) \to (\forall z)[(Hz \& P_{zy}) \to (\exists w)(Ew \& Pwa \& Pzw)]\} \)
15. \( (\forall y)\{(E^*x \& Oy \& N_{xy}) \to (\forall z)[(Hz \& P_{zy}) \to (\exists w)(Ew \& Pwx \& Pzw)]\} \)
16. \( (\forall x)(\forall y)\{(E^*x \& Oy \& N_{xy}) \to (\forall z)[(Hz \& P_{zy}) \to (\exists w)(Ew \& Pwx \& Pzw)]\} \)
† $\text{N}_{\text{Det}} \forall \text{Elim} \ a/x, b/y$

†† 8 T Axiom, followed by $\forall \text{Elim} \ c/z$

‡ 3-13 $\rightarrow$ Int

‡‡ 2-14 $\forall$ Int $y/b$

* 1-15 $\forall$ Int $x/a$
A.3 E* Lemma

The following:

\[
\text{NE*E: } (\forall x)(\forall y)\{(E^*x & Oy & Nxy) \rightarrow \\
(\forall z)[(Hz & Pzy) \rightarrow (\exists w)(Ew & Pwx & Pzw)]\}
\]

O(i): Oo
H(i): Hf
RH(i): Pfo

ettailing:

\[
\text{E*Lemma: } (\forall x)[(E^*x & Nxo) \rightarrow (\exists y)(Ey & Pyx)]
\]

Proof:

\begin{align*}
1 \quad \text{Select: } a \\
2 \quad \text{Suppose: } E^*a & \& Nao \\
3 \quad (E^*a & Oo & Nao) \rightarrow (\forall z)[(Hz & Pzo) \rightarrow (\exists w)(Ew & Pwa & Pzw)] \quad \dagger \\
4 \quad E^*a \quad 2 \text{ & Elim} \\
5 \quad Oo \quad O(i) \\
6 \quad Nao \quad 2 \text{ & Elim} \\
7 \quad E^*a & Oo & Nao \quad 4,5,6 \text{ & Int} \\
8 \quad (\forall z)[(Hz & Pzo) \rightarrow (\exists w)(Ew & Pwa & Pzw)] \quad 3,7 \text{ MP} \\
9 \quad (Hf & Pfo) \rightarrow (\exists w)(Ew & Pwa & Pfw) \quad 8 \forall \text{ Elim } f/z \\
10 \quad Hf \quad H(i) \\
11 \quad Pfo \quad RH(i) \\
12 \quad Hf & Pfo \quad 10,11 \text{ & Int} \\
13 \quad (\exists w)(Ew & Pwa & Pfw) \quad 9,12 \text{ MP}
\end{align*}
14    Ec&Pca&Pfc
15    Ec&Pca
16    (∃y)(Ey&Pya)
17    (E*a&Nao) → (∃y)(Ey&Pya)
18    (∀x)[(E*x&Nxo) → (∃y)(Ey&Pyx)]
†    NE*E ∀ Elim a/x, o/y

13  ∃ Elim c/w
14  & Elim
15  ∃ Int y/c
2-16 → Int
1-17 ∀ Int x/a
A.4 $E_{\text{Unique}}$

The following:

$E^\ast_{\text{Lemma}}$: $(\forall x)[(E^\ast x \& Nxo) \rightarrow (\exists y)(Ey \& Pyx)]$

$EE^\ast_{\leq 1}$: $\Box(\forall x)(\forall y)(\forall z)[(Ex \& E^\ast y \& Pxy \& E^\ast z \& Pxz) \rightarrow y = z]$

IDE: $\Box(\forall x)(\forall y)[[Ex \& Ey] \rightarrow [x = y \leftrightarrow (\forall z)([Iz v E^\ast z] \rightarrow [Pxz \leftrightarrow Pyz])]]$

$\neg EI$: $\neg(\exists x)(\exists y)(Ex \& Iy \& Pxy)$

entail:

$E_{\text{Unique}}$: $(\forall x)[(E^\ast x \& Nxo) \rightarrow (\exists! y)(Ey \& Pyx)]$

Proof:

1 Select: $a$ For $\forall$ Int
2 Suppose: $E^\ast a \& Nao$ For $\rightarrow$ Int
3 $(E^\ast a \& Nao) \rightarrow (Ey) (Ey \& Pya) \dagger$
4 $(Ey) (Ey \& Pya)$ 2,3, MP
5 $Eb \& Pba$ 4, $\exists$ Elim, b/y
6 $Eb$ 5, $\&$ Elim
7 Select: $c$ For $\forall$ Int
8 Suppose: $Ec \& Pca$ For $\rightarrow$ Int
9 $Ec$ 8, $\&$ Elim
10 $Eb \& Ec$ 6,9 & Int
11 $[Eb\&Ec] \rightarrow [b=c\leftrightarrow(\forall z)([IzvE^\ast z] \rightarrow [Pbz \leftrightarrow Pcz])] \dagger\dagger$
12 $b=c \leftrightarrow (\forall z)([Iz v E^\ast z] \rightarrow [Pbz \leftrightarrow Pcz])$ 10,11 MP
13 Suppose: $b \neq c$ For Reductio
14 $\neg(\forall z)([Iz v E^\ast z] \rightarrow [Pbz \leftrightarrow Pcz])$ 12,13 $\leftrightarrow$ Elim
15  $(\exists z)\neg((Iz \lor E^*z) \rightarrow [Pbz \leftrightarrow Pcz])$  
14  DeM Quant

16  $\neg((Id \lor E^*d) \rightarrow [Pbd \leftrightarrow Pcd])$  
15  $\exists$ Elim, d/z

17  $[Id \lor E^*d] \land \neg[Pbd \leftrightarrow Pcd]$  
16  $\neg \rightarrow$ Equiv.

18  $Id \lor E^*d$  
17  & Elim

19  $\neg[Pbd \leftrightarrow Pcd]$  
17  & Elim

20  $\neg([Pbd \land Pcd] \lor [\neg Pbd \land \neg Pcd])$  
19  $\leftrightarrow$ Equiv.

21  $\neg[Pbd \land Pcd] \land \neg[\neg Pbd \land \neg Pcd]$  
20  DeM

22  $[\neg Pbd \lor \neg Pcd] \land [Pbd \lor Pcd]$  
21  DeM

23  $Pbd \lor Pcd$  
22  & Elim

24  Suppose: $Pbd$  
For $\rightarrow$ Int

25  Suppose: $E^*d$  
For Reductio

26  $(Eb \& E^*a \& Pba \& E^*d \& Pbd) \rightarrow a=d \upharpoonright$

27  $Eb$  
6

28  $E^*a$  
2 & Elim

29  $Pba$  
5 & Elim

30  $Eb \& E^*a \& Pba \& E^*d \& Pbd$  
27-29,25,24 & Int

31  $a = d$  
26,30 MP

32  $\neg Pbd \lor \neg Pcd$  
22 & Elim

33  $\neg Pba \lor \neg Pca$  
31,32 = a/d

34  $\neg(Pba \land Pca)$  
33 DeM

35  $Pba$  
5 & Elim

36  $Pca$  
8 & Elim

37  $Pba \& Pca$  
35,36 & Int

38  $\neg E^*d$  
25,34,37 Reductio

39  $Id$  
18,38 Dis. Syl.

40  $Eb \& Id \& Pbd$  
27,39,24 & Int

41  $(\exists x)(\exists y)(Ex \& Iy \& Pxy)$  
40 $\exists$Int $x/b y/d$
Pbd $\rightarrow (\exists x)(\exists y)(E x \& I y \& Pxy)$

43 Suppose: Pcd

44 Suppose: E*d

45 $(Ec \& E^*a \& Pca \& E^*d \& Pcd) \rightarrow a = d \uparrow\uparrow$

46 Ec

47 E*a

48 Pca

49 Ec & E*a & Pca & E*d & Pcd

50 a = d

51 $\neg Pbd \lor \neg Pcd$

52 $\neg Pba \lor \neg Pca$

53 $\neg (Pba \& Pca)$

54 Pba

55 Pca

56 Pba & Pca

57 $\neg E^*d$

58 Id

59 Ec & Id & Pcd

60 $(\exists x)(\exists y)(E x \& I y \& Pxy)$

61 Pcd $\rightarrow (\exists x)(\exists y)(E x \& I y \& Pxy)$

62 $(\exists x)(\exists y)(E x \& I y \& Pxy)$

63 $\neg (\exists x)(\exists y)(E x \& I y \& Pxy)$ $\neg EI$

64 b = c

65 (Ec & Pca) $\rightarrow$ b = c

66 (Eb & Pba)

67 (Eb & Pba) & {(Ec & Pca) $\rightarrow$ b = c}

68 (Eb & Pba) & {(Ec & Pca) $\rightarrow$ b = c}

69 $(\forall z)[(Eb & Pba) & {(Ez & Pza) $\rightarrow$ b = z}]$ 7-68 $\forall$ Int z/c
70 \((\exists y)(\forall z)[(Ey & Pya) & [(Ez & Pza) \rightarrow y=z]]\) \hspace{1cm} 69 \exists \text{ Int } y/b

71 \((\exists y)(Ey & Pya)\) \hspace{1cm} 70 \exists! \text{ Equiv.}

72 \((E^*a & Nao) \rightarrow (\exists! y)(Ey & Pya)\) \hspace{1cm} 2-71 \rightarrow \text{ Int}

73 \((\forall x)[(E^*x & Nxo) \rightarrow (\exists! y)(Ey & Pyx)]\) \hspace{1cm} 1-72, \forall \text{ Int } x/a

† \ E^*\text{Lemma} \ \forall \text{ Elim } a/x

†† \ IDE \ T \text{ axiom, followed by } \forall \text{ Elim } b/x, c/y

‡ \ EE^* \leq_1 \ T \text{ axiom, followed by } \forall \text{ Elim } b/x, a/y, d/z

‡‡ \ EE^* \leq_1 \ T \text{ axiom, followed by } \forall \text{ Elim } c/x, a/y, d/z
A.5 $\Sigma^*_\forall$

The following:

\[
N_{\text{Def}}: \quad (\forall x)(\forall y)\{N_{xy} \leftrightarrow \Box(\forall z)[P_{zy} \rightarrow (\exists w)(Ew \& Pwx \& Pzw)]\}
\]

$\Sigma^*_{\text{Def}}: \quad (\forall x)(\forall y)(\forall z)\{\Sigma^{*}_{xyz} \leftrightarrow \\
[Hx \& Hy \& E^*z \& x\neq y \& (\exists w)(Ew \& Pzw \& Pwx \& Pyw)]\}
\]

$E_{\text{Unique}}: \quad (\forall x)[(E^*x \& N_{xo}) \rightarrow (\exists !y)(Ey \& Pyx)]$

entail:

\[
\Sigma^*_{\forall}: \quad (\forall x)\{[E^*x\&N_{xo}] \rightarrow (\forall y)(\forall z)\{(Hy\&Hz\&y\neq z\&Pyo\&Pzo) \rightarrow \Sigma^{*}_{yzx}\}\}
\]

Proof:

1. Select: a  
   For $\forall$ Int
2. Suppose: $E^*a\&N_{ao}$  
   For $\rightarrow$ Int
3. Select: b  
   For $\forall$ Int
4. Select: c  
   For $\forall$ Int
5. Suppose: $Hb\&Hc\&b\neq c\&Pbo\&Pco$  
   For $\rightarrow$ Int
6. $(E^*a\&N_{ao}) \rightarrow (\exists !y)(Ey\&Pya)$ †
7. $(\exists !y)(Ey\&Pya)$  
   2,6 MP
8. $N_{ao} \leftrightarrow \Box(\forall z)[P_{zo} \rightarrow (\exists w)(Ew\&Pwa\&Pzw)]$ ††
9. $N_{ao}$  
   2 & Elim
10. $\Box(\forall z)[P_{zo} \rightarrow (\exists w)(Ew\&Pwa\&Pzw)]$  
    8,9 $\leftrightarrow$ Elim
11. $Pco \rightarrow (\exists w)(Ew\&Pwa\&Pcw)$ ‡
12. $Pco$  
    5 & Elim
13. $(\exists w)(Ew\&Pwa\&Pcw)$  
   11,12 MP
14. $Ed\&Pda\&Pcd$  
   13 $\exists$ Elim d/w
Pbo → (∃w)(Ew&Pwa&Pbw) ††

Pbo

(∃w)(Ew&Pwa&Pbw)  15,16 MP

Ee&Pea&Pbe  17 ∃ Elim e/w

Ed&Pda  14 & Elim

Ee&Pea  18 & Elim

(∃y)(∀z)[(Ey&Pya)&[(EZ&Pza) → y=z | ] ]  7 Equiv.

(∀z)[(Ef&Pfa)&[(Ez&Pza) → f=z | ] ]  21 ∃ Elim f/y

(Ef&Pfa)&[(Ed&Pda) → f=d ]  22 ∀ Elim d/z

(Ef&Pfa)&[(Ee&Pea) → f=e ]  23 ∀ Elim e/z

(Ed&Pda) → f=d  23 & Elim

(Ee&Pea) → f=e  24 & Elim

f=d  19,25 MP

f=e  20,26 MP

d=e  27,28 = d/f

Pbe  18 & Elim

Pbd  30,29 = d/e

Ed&Pda&Pbd&Pcd  14,31 & Int

(∃w)(Ew&Pwa&Pbw&Pcw)  32 ∃ Int w/d

Hb&Hc&b≠c  5 & Elim

E*a  2 & Elim

Hb&Hc&E*a&b≠c  34,35 & Int

Hb&Hc&E*a&b≠c&(∃w)(Ew&Pwa&Pbw&Pcw) *

Σ*bca↔[Hb&Hc&E*a&b≠c&(∃w)(Ew&Pwa&Pbw&Pcw)] **

Σ*bca  37,38 ↔ Elim

(Hb&Hc&b≠c&Pbo&Pco) → Σ*bca  5-39 → Int

(∀z)[(Hb&Hz&b≠z&Pbo&Pzo) → Σ*bza]  4-40 ∀ Int z/c
\[(\forall y)(\forall z)[(Hy \& Hz \& y \neq z \& Pyo \& Pzo) \rightarrow \Sigma^*yza]\] 3-41 \(\forall\) Int \(y/b\)

\[E^*a \& Nao \rightarrow (\forall y)(\forall z)[(Hy \& Hz \& y \neq z \& Pyo \& Pzo) \rightarrow \Sigma^*yza] \quad *\]

\[(\forall x)\{[E^*x \& Nxo] \rightarrow (\forall y)(\forall z)[(Hy \& Hz \& y \neq z \& Pyo \& Pzo) \rightarrow \Sigma^*yzx}\} \quad **\]

† \(E_{Unique} \forall\) Elim \(a/x\)

†† \(N_{Def} \forall\) Elim \(a/x\) \(o/y\)

‡ 10 T Axiom, followed by \(\forall\) Elim \(c/z\)

‡‡ 10 T Axiom, followed by \(\forall\) Elim \(b/z\)

* 33,36 \& Int.

** \(\Sigma^*_{Def} \forall\) Elim \(b/x\) \(c/y\) \(a/z\)

* 2-42 \(\rightarrow\) Int

** 1-43 \(\forall\) Int \(x/a\)
A.6 \( \text{P7}_{\text{GNT-EQ}} \)

The following:

\[
\begin{align*}
P_7\text{Lemma}: & \quad (\exists! y)(E y \& P y g) \\
\text{RH(XXI)}: & \quad P f g \\
E(i) \& \text{RE}(i): & \quad E g \& P g g
\end{align*}
\]

entail:

\[
P_7_{\text{GNT-EQ}}. \ (\exists x)(\forall y)\{[E x \& P x g \& (\exists z)(P z x)] \& [(E y \& P y g \& (\exists w)[P w y]) \rightarrow y = x]\}
\]

Proof:

1. Select: \( a \) \hspace{1cm} \text{For } \forall \text{ Int.}
2. Suppose: \( E a \& P a g \& (\exists w)[P w a] \) \hspace{1cm} \text{For } \rightarrow \text{ Int}
3. \( E a \& P a g \) \hspace{1cm} 2 \& \text{Elim}
4. \( E g \& P g g \) \hspace{1cm} \text{E(i) } \& \text{RE(i)}
5. \( (\exists! y)(E y \& P y g) \) \hspace{1cm} P_7\text{Lemma}
6. \( (\exists x)(\forall y)\{[E x \& P x g \& (\exists z)(P z x)] \& [(E y \& P y g \& (\exists w)[P w y]) \rightarrow y = x]\} \) \hspace{1cm} 5 \text{ Equiv}
7. \( (\forall y)\{[E b \& P b g] \& [(E y \& P y g) \rightarrow y = b]\} \) \hspace{1cm} 6 \exists \text{ Elim } b/x
8. \( (E b \& P b g) \& [(E a \& P a g) \rightarrow a = b]\) \hspace{1cm} 7 \forall \text{ Elim } a/y
9. \( (E b \& P b g) \& [(E g \& P g g) \rightarrow g = b]\) \hspace{1cm} 7 \forall \text{ Elim } g/y
10. \( (E a \& P a g) \rightarrow a = b \) \hspace{1cm} 8 \& \text{Elim}
11. \( (E g \& P g g) \rightarrow g = b \) \hspace{1cm} 9 \& \text{Elim}
12. \( a = b \) \hspace{1cm} 10,3 \text{ MP}
13. \( g = b \) \hspace{1cm} 11,4 \text{ MP}
14. \( a = g \) \hspace{1cm} 12,13 = g/b
15. \( (E a \& P a g \& (\exists w)[P w a]) \rightarrow a = g \) \hspace{1cm} 2–14 \rightarrow \text{Int}
16    Pfg          RH(xxi)
17    (\exists z)(Pzg)          16 \exists \text{Int }z/f
18    \text{Eg }\& \text{ Pgg}^* \& (\exists z)(Pzg)          4,17 \& \text{Int}
19    \left[\text{Eg} \& \text{Pgg}^* \& (\exists z)(Pzg)\right] \& \left[\left(\text{Ea} \& \text{Pag}^* \& (\exists w)(Pwal)\right) \rightarrow a=g\right] \uparrow
20    \left(\forall y\right)\left[\left(\text{Eg} \& \text{Pgg}^* \& (\exists z)(Pzg)\right) \& \left(\left(\text{Ey} \& \text{Pyg}^* \& (\exists w)(Pwy)\right) \rightarrow y=g\right)\right] \uparrow\uparrow
21    (\exists x)(\forall y)\left[\left(\text{Ex} \& \text{Pxg}^* \& (\exists z)(Pzx)\right) \& \left(\left(\text{Ey} \& \text{Pyg}^* \& (\exists w)(Pwy)\right) \rightarrow y=x\right)\right] \downarrow
\uparrow    18,15 \& \text{Int}
\uparrow\uparrow    1-19 \forall \text{Int }y/a
\downarrow    20 \exists \text{Int }x/g
A.7  \( \phi_{\text{GNT}} \alpha \not\models \alpha = t_i \) for any \( t_i \) such that \( t_i \neq \alpha \)

\[ (\exists x)(\exists x & \exists x^* & \exists x^f) \]

does not fit the description:

\( \phi \alpha \) such that \( \phi \alpha \models \alpha = t_i \) for some term \( t_i \) such that \( t_i \neq \alpha \).

Suppose \( (\exists x)(\exists x & \exists x^* & \exists x^f) \models \alpha = t_i \) for some term \( t_i \) such that \( t_i \neq \alpha \).

Then \( \emptyset \models (\exists x)(\exists x & \exists x^* & \exists x^f) \rightarrow \alpha = t_i \) for some term \( t_i \) such that \( t_i \neq \alpha \).

So, \( \emptyset \models \neg[(\exists x)(\exists x & \exists x^* & \exists x^f) \& \alpha \neq t_i] \) for any term \( t_i \) such that \( t_i \neq \alpha \).

So there is no model for \( (\exists x)(\exists x & \exists x^* & \exists x^f) \& \alpha \neq t_i \) for any term \( t_i \) such that \( t_i \neq \alpha \).

So there is no model for \( (\exists x)(\exists x & \exists x^* & \exists x^f) \& f \neq s \) (since “f” is not the same term as “s”).

But \( M_{\text{GNT-F}} \) is a model for \( (\exists x)(\exists x & \exists x^* & \exists x^f) \& f \neq s \).

So, \( (\exists x)(\exists x & \exists x^* & \exists x^f) \not\models \alpha = t_i \) for any term \( t_i \) such that \( t_i \neq \alpha \).
APPENDIX B

SUMMARY OF GNT_F

Legend

0 = Stipulative definition, naming of an arbitrarily selected individual from a set known to be non-empty, or logical consequence of other proposition(s).

+= Substantive assumption

B.1 Gregory’s Metaphysics

B.1.1 Possible Object Types

“is a hypostasis” : “H”
“is an idioma” : “I”
“is an ousia” : “O”
“is an energeia type” : “E*”
“is an energeiai token” : “E”

B.1.2 Possible Relations Between Tokens of the Object Types

“Metaphysical Predication” or “Having”

“x has y” : “Pxy”
The “Natural To” Relation

0 $\text{N}_\text{Def}: \ (\forall x)(\forall y)\{N_{xy} \leftrightarrow \Box(\forall z)[P_{zy} \to (\exists w)(E_w & P_{wx} & P_{zw})]\}$

Synergy

0 $\Sigma_{\text{Def}}: \ (\forall x)(\forall y)(\forall z)\{\Sigma_{xyz} \leftrightarrow \\
[H_x & H_y & E_z & x \neq y & P_{xz} & P_{yz}]\}$

0 $\Sigma^*_{\text{Def}}: \ (\forall x)(\forall y)(\forall z)\{\Sigma^*_{xyz} \leftrightarrow \\
[H_x & H_y & E^*z & x \neq y & (\exists w)(E_w & P_{wz} & P_{xz} & P_{wy})]\}$

B.1.3 Relations Possible for the Objects

Statements of the form $P_{xy}$ can be true where:

- $x$ is a hypostasis and $y$ is an idioma
- $x$ is a hypostasis and $y$ is an ousia
- $x$ is a hypostasis and $y$ is a token energeia
- $x$ is a token energeia and $y$ is an idioma
- $x$ is a token energeia and $y$ is an energeia type

Statements of the form $N_{xy}$ can be true where:

- $x$ is an energeia type and $y$ is an ousia

B.1.4 Relation Requirements

+ $\text{NHI}: \ \Box(\forall x)[H_x \to (\exists y)(I_y & P_{xy})]$  
+ $\text{NHO}: \ \Box(\forall x)[H_x \to (\exists y)(O_y & P_{xy})]$
0 NHE: \( \Box(\forall x)(\forall y)(\forall z)((Pxy \land Nz\overline{y}) \rightarrow (\exists w)(Pwz \land Pxz)) \)

+ NOE*: \( \Box(\forall x)[Ox \rightarrow (\exists y)(E^*y \land Nyx)] \)

0 NE*E: \( (\forall x)(\forall y)((E^*x \land Oy \land Nz\overline{y}) \rightarrow (\forall z)[(Hz \land Pzy) \rightarrow (\exists w)(Ew \land Pwx \land Pzw)]) \)

+ EE*\( \leq 1 \): \( \Box(\forall x)(\forall y)(\forall z)[(Ex \land E^*y \land Pxy \land E^*z \land Pxz) \rightarrow y = z] \)

### B.1.5 Identity Conditions for the Types of Objects

**Identity Conditions for Hypostases**

+ IDH\textsubscript{Strong}: \( \Box(\forall x)(\forall y)[[Hx \land Hy] \rightarrow [x=y \leftrightarrow (\exists z)[Iz \land [Pxz \land Pyz]]]] \)

+ IDH\textsubscript{Weak}: \( \Box(\forall x)(\forall y)[[Hx \land Hy] \rightarrow [x=y \leftrightarrow (\forall z)[Iz \rightarrow [Pxz \leftrightarrow Pyz]]]] \)

**Identity Conditions for Idiomata**

Intrinsically distinct.

**Identity Conditions for Ousiai**

+ IDO: \( \Box(\forall x)(\forall x)[[(Ox \land Oy) \rightarrow (x=y \leftrightarrow (\forall z)[E^*z \rightarrow (Nzx \leftrightarrow Nzy)]]] \)

**Identity Conditions for Energeia Types**

Intrinsically distinct.

**Identity Conditions for Energeia Tokens**

+ IDE: \( \Box(\forall x)(\forall y)[[Ex \land Ey] \rightarrow [x=y \leftrightarrow (\forall z)[Iz \lor E^*z \rightarrow [Pxz \leftrightarrow Pyz]]]] \)
B.2 Gregory’s Theology

B.2.1 Postulated Token Objects

Hypostases

+ H(i): Hf
+ H(ii): Hs
+ H(iii): Hh

Idiomata

+ I(i): Ib
+ I(ii): Ip
+ I(iii): Ib*
+ I(iv): Ip*

Ousiai

0 O(i): Oo
0 O(ii): On
0 O(iii): Om

Energeia Types

0 E*(i): E*g*

Energeia Tokens

0 E(i): Eg
B.2.2 Relations Posited Between the Token Objects

Relations Had by the Hypostases

0 RH(i): Pfo
0 RH(ii): Psn
0 RH(iii): Phm
(0 O_{homoeusion}: o=n=m)
0 RH(iv): Pso
0 RH(v): Pho
+/0 RH(vi): Pfb
+/0 RH(vii): Pfp
+ RH(viii): ¬Pfb*
+ RH(ix): ¬Pfp*
+/0 RH(x): ¬Psb
+/0 RH(xi): Psp? / ¬Psp?
+ RH(xii): Psb*
+/0 RH(xiii): ¬Psp*
+/0 RH(xiv): ¬Phb
+/0 RH(xv): ¬Php
+ RH(xvi): ¬Phb*
+ RH(xvii): Php*
0 RH(xviii): Pfg
0 RH(xix): Psg
0 RH(xx): Phg
(0 Σ_{g^*}: g = g' = g'' = g''')
0 RH(xxi): Pfg
Relations Had by the *Idiomata*

See Relations Had by the Hypostases, RH(vi)–RH(xvii) above. Also:

\[ + \neg EI: \neg(\exists x)(\exists y)(Ex & Iy & Pxy) \]

Relations Had by the *Ousia*

See Relations Had by the Hypostases, RH(i)–RH(v) above, and Relations Had by the Divine *Energeia* Types, RE*(i) below. Also:

\[ O_{\text{homoousion}}: o=n=m \]

Relations Had by the Divine *Energeia* Types

0 RE*(i): Ng*o

Relations Had by the Divine *Energeia* Tokens

The divine *energeia* tokens are had by the three hypostases in the ways described in the section on hypostases above (RH(xviii) – RH(xxii) and \( \neg EI \)) in addition to RE(i):

0 RH(xviii): Pfg'

0 RH(xix): Psg''

0 RH(xx): Phg'''

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\[(0 \quad \Sigma_{g^*}: \quad g = g' = g'' = g''')\]

0  RH(xxi):  Pfg

0  RH(xxii):  Psg

0  RH(xxiii):  Phg

0  RE(i):  Pgg*

+  ¬EI:  ¬(∃x)(∃y)(Ex & Iy & Pxy)

B.2.3 Individuation of the Token Objects

The Individuation of the Hypostases

0  P4_{GNT-F}:  f \neq s

0  P5_{GNT-F}:  f \neq h

0  P6_{GNT-F}:  s \neq h

(Summary of the Idiomata:)

\begin{align*}
\text{Pfb} & \quad \& \quad \neg \text{Ps}b \\
\text{Pfp} & \quad \& \quad \neg \text{Psp}^f \\
\neg \text{Pfb}^* & \quad \& \quad \text{Ps}b^* \\
\neg \text{Pfp}^* & \quad \& \quad \neg \text{Psp}^*
\end{align*}

\begin{align*}
\text{Pfb} & \quad \& \quad \neg \text{Ph}b \\
\text{Pfp} & \quad \& \quad \neg \text{Php} \\
\neg \text{Pfb}^* & \quad \& \quad \neg \text{Ph}b^* \\
\neg \text{Pfp}^* & \quad \& \quad \text{Psp}^*
\end{align*}
\neg Psb \ \& \ \neg Phb \\
\neg Psp \uparrow \ \& \ \neg Php \\
Psb* \ \& \ \neg Phb* \\
\neg Psp* \ \& \ Psp*

The Individuation of the *Idiomata*

The *idiomata* are all intrinsically distinct. It is clear that:

\[ b \neq b^* , \]
\[ p \neq p^* , \text{ and} \]
\[ b^* \neq p^* \]

There is some unclarity as to whether:

\[ b = p . \]

The Individuation of the *Ousia*

0 \ 0 \ \text{\textit{O}homoo\textit{ou}son:} \ o=n=m

The Individuation of the Divine *Energeia* Types

*Energeia* types are intrinsically distinct. There must be at least one divine *energeia* types, which we have named \( g^* \).

The Individuation of the Divine *Energeia* Tokens

0 \ \text{\textit{E}Unique:} \ (\forall x)((E^*x \ \& \ Nxo) \ \rightarrow (\exists ! y)(Ey \ \& \ Pyx)] \\
0 \ \Sigma^*_y: \ (\forall x)((E^*x \ \& \ Nxo) \ \rightarrow (\forall y)(\forall z)((Hy \ \& \ Hz \ \& \ y \neq z \ \& \ Pyo \ \& \ Pzo) \ \rightarrow \Sigma^*yzx)] \\
0 \ \Sigma^*_g*: \ g = g' = g'' = g'''
B.3 Gregory’s Semantics

B.3.1 Gregory’s Semantics for S1 through S3

S1: “The Father is (a) God” is true, if and only if “(∃x) (Ex & Pxg* & Pfx)” is true, if and only if the hypostasis named “f” in PLI or “the Father” in English (“ὁ πατὴρ” in Greek) has some token of the divine *energeia* type we have named “g*” in PLI (“godding,” or “beholding,” or whatever it is).

S2: “The Son is (a) God” is true, if and only if “(∃x) (Ex & Pxg* & Psx)” is true, if and only if the hypostasis named “s” in PLI or “the Son” in English (“ὁ ζωός” in Greek) has some token of the divine *energeia* type we have named “g*” in PLI (“godding,” or “beholding,” or whatever it is).

S3: “The Holy Spirit is (a) God” is true, if and only if “(∃x) (Ex & Pxg* & Phx)” is true, if and only if the hypostasis named “h” in PLI or “the Holy Spirit” in English (“τὸ ἅγιον πνεύμα” in Greek) has some token of the divine *energeia* type we have named “g*” in PLI (“godding,” or “beholding,” or whatever it is).

B.3.2 Gregory’s Semantics for S4 through S6

S4: “The Father is not the Son” is true, if and only if “f≠s” is true, if and only if the hypostasis we have named “f” in PLI or “the Father” in English (“ὁ πατὴρ” in Greek) is not identical to the hypostasis named “s” in PLI or “the Son” in English (“ὁ ζωός” in Greek).

S5: “The Father is not the Holy Spirit” is true, if and only if “f≠h” is true, if and only if the hypostasis we have named “f” in PLI or “the Father” in English (“ὁ πατὴρ” in Greek) is not identical to the hypostasis named “h” in PLI or “the Holy Spirit” in English (“τὸ ἅγιον πνεύμα” in Greek).

S6: “The Son is not the Holy Spirit” is true, if and only if “s≠h” is true, if and only if the hypostasis we have named “s” in PLI or “the Son” in English (“ὁ ζωός” in Greek) is not identical to the hypostasis named “h” in PLI or “the Holy Spirit” in English (“τὸ ἅγιον πνεύμα” in Greek).

B.3.3 Gregory’s Semantics for S7

As an Equivocation Account
S7: “There is exactly one God” is true, if and only if

\[(\exists x)(\forall y)\{[Ex\&Pxg^{*}\&(\exists z)(Pzx)] \& [(Ey\&Pyg^{*}\&(\exists w)(Pwy))] \to y=x\}\] is true, if and only if there is some token \textit{energeia} \(x\) of the \textit{energeia} type we have named \(\textit{g}^{*}\) in PLI (“godding” or “beholding” or whatever we call it in English – “\(\vartheta\varepsilon\varphi\varepsilon\vartheta\nu\),” or “\(\vartheta\varepsilon\varepsilon\nu\),” or whatever we call it in Greek) such that \(x\) is had by some \(z\), and if there is any token \textit{energeia} \(y\) of the \textit{energeia} type we have named \(\textit{g}^{*}\) in PLI (“godding” or “beholding” or whatever we call it in English – “\(\vartheta\varepsilon\varphi\varepsilon\vartheta\nu\),” or “\(\vartheta\varepsilon\varepsilon\nu\),” or whatever we call it in Greek) such that \(y\) is had by some \(w\), then \(x\) and \(y\) are identical.

As an NCIC Account

S7: “There is exactly one God” is true, if and only if \(P_{\text{GNT-NCIC}}^{7}\) is true, if and only if there is a \(u\) that has some token \textit{energeia} of the \textit{energeia} type we have named \(\textit{g}^{*}\) in PLI (“godding” or “beholding” or whatever we call it in English – “\(\vartheta\varepsilon\varphi\varepsilon\vartheta\nu\),” or “\(\vartheta\varepsilon\varepsilon\nu\),” or whatever we call it in Greek) and if any \(v\) has any token \textit{energeia} of the \textit{energeia} type \(\textit{g}^{*}\), then \(u\) and \(v\) are single-tokened with respect to \(\textit{g}^{*}\).
B.4 $M_{P\text{-GNT-F}}$

Domain: $\{0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9\}$

\[
o = 0
\]
\[
f = 1
\]
\[
s = 2
\]
\[
h = 3
\]
\[
g = 4
\]
\[
g^* = 5
\]
\[
b = 6
\]
\[
b^* = 7
\]
\[
p = 8
\]
\[
p^* = 9
\]

\[
H: \{1, 2, 3\}
\]
\[
I: \{6, 7, 8, 9\}
\]
\[
O: \{0\}
\]
\[
E: \{4\}
\]
\[
E^*: \{5\}
\]

\[
P: \{<1,0>,
\]
\[
<2,0>,
\]
\[
<3,0>,
\]
\[
<1,6>,
\]
\[
<1,8>,
\]
\[
<2,7>,
\]
\[
<3,9>,
\]
\{\langle 1,4 \rangle, \\
\langle 2,4 \rangle, \\
\langle 3,4 \rangle, \\
\langle 4,5 \rangle \}\}

N: \{\langle 5,0 \rangle \}
B.5 \text{ M}_{\text{P-GNT-Lite}}

Domain: \{1, 2, 3, 4, 5\}

\begin{align*}
  f &= 1 \\
  s &= 2 \\
  h &= 3 \\
  g &= 4 \\
  g^* &= 5 \\
\end{align*}

E: \{4\}

P: \{<1,4>, <2,4>, <3,4>, <4,5>\}
B.6 GNT_{F-Lite}

“Lite” Metaphysics

B.6.0.1 *

Possible Object Types

Hypostases : (We will need no predicate for hypostases)

\textit{Energeia} types : (We will need no predicate for \textit{energeia} types)

\textit{Energeiai} tokens : E

B.6.0.2 Possible Relations

1. Performing or Being “of” a Type

We will represent the predicate “performs or is a token of type” with the two-place predicate “P.”

The first relation (performing) can hold between hypostases and \textit{energeia} tokens. Thus, sentences of the form \( Pxy \) can be true where \( x \) is a hypostasis and \( y \) is an \textit{energeia} token.

The second relation (being of a type) can hold between \textit{energeia} tokens and \textit{energeia} types. Thus, sentences of the form \( Pxy \) can be true where \( x \) is an \textit{energeia} token and \( y \) is an \textit{energeia} type.

“Lite” Theology

Token Objects

Hypostases
The Father : f
The Son : s
The Holy Spirit : h

Energeia Types

God-ding (type) : g*

Energeia Tokens

God-ding (token) : g
E(i): Eg

Relations Posited Between Token Objects

\[ P_{1_{\text{Lite}}} = (\exists x)(E \land Pxg^* \land Pfx) \]
\[ P_{2_{\text{Lite}}} = (\exists x)(E \land Pxg^* \land Psx) \]
\[ P_{3_{\text{Lite}}} = (\exists x)(E \land Pxg^* \land Phx) \]
\[ P_{4_{\text{Lite}}} = f \neq s \]
\[ P_{5_{\text{Lite}}} = f \neq h \]
\[ P_{6_{\text{Lite}}} = s \neq h \]
\[ RE(i)_{\text{Lite}} = P_{g^*} \]
\[ E_{\text{Unique-Lite}} = (\exists y)[Ey \land Pyx \land (\exists z)(P_{zy})] \]

“Lite” Semantics
1. S1–S3: Statements of the form *x is (a) God* are true if and only if x does some token action of the God-thing type, i.e., $(\exists y)(Ey & Pyg^* & Pxy)$.

2. S4–S6: Statements of the form *x is not y* are true if and only if x is not identical to y ($x \neq y$).

3. S7: “There is exactly one God” is true if and only if there is exactly one token action of type $g^*$ that is done,
   i.e., $(\exists !y)[Ey & Pyx & (\exists z)(Pzy)]$. 

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——. 2008a. *A Letter of Gregory, Bishop of Nyssa, to Ablabius, A Defense Against the Notion That We Profess Three Gods*. Translated by Brian Duvick. For use during the 11th International Colloquium on Gregory of Nyssa (17-20 Sept. 2008 Tuebingen/Freiburg) only. All rights reserved. (Used by permission of the author). Unpublished.

——. 2008b. *Letter 38: Gregory of Nyssa to His Brother Peter, On the Difference Between Substance and Subsistent Entity*. Translated by Brian Duvick. For use during the 11th International Colloquium on Gregory of Nyssa (17-20 Sept. 2008 Tuebingen/Freiburg) only. All rights reserved. (Used by permission of the author). Unpublished.


