RELIGIOUSLY FRIENDLY DEMOCRACY: FRAMING POLITICAL AND RELIGIOUS IDENTITIES IN CATHOLIC AND MUSLIM SOCIETIES

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RELIGIOUSLY FRIENDLY DEMOCRACY: FRAMING POLITICAL AND RELIGIOUS IDENTITIES IN CATHOLIC AND MUSLIM SOCIETIES

Abstract

by

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This research project explores the relationship between faith and nation, and the institutional entanglements of religion, state and democracy in Catholic and Muslim societies. It is specifically animated by the following research question: What are the effects of bringing religion into the public sphere in new democracies, especially those whose theological values are considered to be hostile to democratic precepts? My analysis presents a theory for modeling the dynamics which are created when states allow hostile religions more access to the political and public spheres during moments of democratization (or lesser forms of political liberalization) by a) allowing religious political parties to contest elections and b) biasing religion-state arrangements in favor of religion. Drawing from more than eighteen months of field research in Italy and Algeria, I test the mechanisms of my theory through in-depth case studies in both a Catholic and Islamic setting and then use cross-national data on religion-state arrangements by Grim and Finke (2006) and Fox (2008) to statistically explore the theory’s wider explanatory weight.
To all of my teachers

who told me to be patient with the wild within

and to listen
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INTRODUCTION

This dissertation explores the relationship between faith and nation, and the institutional entanglements of religion, state and democracy in the Mediterranean region. It is specifically animated by the following research question: What are the effects of bringing religion into the public sphere in new democracies, especially those, such as Islam and Catholicism, which have been considered to be hostile to democratic precepts?

I argue that a democratizing regime may win over the support of a hostile-to-democracy religion by guaranteeing that religion a voice in the public sphere. This dissertation explains this outcome as a function of the effects of religiously friendly governmental policies on both the goals of religious authorities and the political salience of the religious identities of religiously faithful individuals. These shifts in the political goals and identities of religious actors can help make democracy possible in a nation whose religious market is dominated by a society-wide religion, which I define as any major religion which can claim 70% or more of a population’s self-reported religious identity, with ambiguous or even hostile intentions toward democratic ideas and institutions. I also argue that by instituting or maintaining religiously friendly governmental policies the same strategy of inclusion ensures a public and political voice for religious authorities over the moral economy of the nation. The shifting political salience of religious identities, however, modifies the relationship of those religious
authorities to their faithful within the framework of democracy. Different theological starting points may affect the specific outcomes of this relationship, but the fundamental dynamics operating across religions are similar and can be characterized, therefore, by this dialectical model of mutual shaping between democratic elites, religious elites, and the national electorate.

This dissertation anchors these claims in case studies of Italy and Algeria, integrating both original qualitative evidence drawn from more than eighteen months of dissertation fieldwork, as well as statistical evidence on voters’ political and religious attitudes. The dissertation then examines the theory’s wider relevance through a large-N quantitative analysis employing new, cross-national databases on religion-state relationships created by Grim and Finke (2006) and Fox (2006).

Background and Theoretical Relevance

The past fifteen years have witnessed a spirited academic and policy debate over the relative paucity of democracy in the Middle East. The parameters of this debate have more often than not stuck to the idiosyncrasies of predominantly Muslim and Arab nations, focusing on the specific nature of their economic, regional and religious natures. Several scholars, thus, have explained the lack of democracy in the Middle East as the result of the oil economies which often prevail in predominantly Muslim and Arab nations (Luciani 1988, Ross 2001). Oil rents, which create most of these states’ national wealth, accrue directly to a handful of state leaders who use the extensive income to buy popular legitimacy through social services rather than civil liberties. Other scholars have directed the blame at the authoritarianism-inducing incentives inherent in the structure of
the “security-states” which many Middle East rulers have exploited to their advantage (Bellin 2004, Entelis 2005). In this decade’s war on terrorism, these scholars argue, Middle East leaders have taken advantage of Western anti-terrorism funding to build up their own security fortresses and use the threat of radical Islam to justify such actions among their constituencies. Other scholars, still, have argued that the lack of democracy in the Middle East might have something do with Arabic culture and the geographic specificities of the Middle East (Stepan and Robertson 2003) whose tribal histories and colonial experiences have led to a rejection of Western democracy (Salzman 2008).

Despite all of these reasonable explanations, the claim that incompatibilities between Islamic values and democratic ideas and institutions predispose predominantly Muslim countries against democratization (Huntington 1996) has been the most passionately contested argument of all.

Much of this debate over the compatibility of Islam as a religion and democracy as a political regime has focused on the democratic potential of Islamist political parties and the individuals who support them. In what has been coined the inclusion-moderation hypothesis (Schwedler 2006), several scholars have argued that the democratic hostility of Islamist parties derives more from their exclusion from electoral participation than from any immutable theological precepts (Burgat and Dowell 1997, Wickham 2004, Schwedler 2006, Masoud 2008). Islamist religious beliefs and political goals can change over time, these scholars argue, and including Islamist parties in the democratic process can help stimulate the democratic elements within their political programs, leading both them and their constituents to become more politically secular and democratic. Detractors from this hypothesis, however, argue that allowing Islamist parties to participate in
democratic elections and win political power would only feed Islamist attempts to hijack the state apparatus and institute a non-democratic Islamic republic, as authoritarian theocrats did in Iran in 1979 (Tibi 2008, Tlemcani 2003, Kramer 1997). These scholars worry about politically empowering what they understand to be the undemocratic tendencies within Islamic values, especially those theological claims which fuse religious and political power into one, repressive state authority.

It is difficult to resolve these debates about the compatibility of Islam and democracy because there are so few democracies in countries with predominantly Muslim populations. Islam, however, is not the only religion that has been supposed to be empirically and theoretically inimical to democracy. All predominant, society-wide religions, in fact, possess the power to de-legitimize a democratic government. When leaders of such religions collectively mobilize their faithful to refuse to pay taxes; go to war; register births, deaths, and marriages; or be educated; they can usurp the power of the state and erode the possibility that a democratic regime might win legitimacy, a condition for any successful democratic transition (Linz and Stepan 1996).

Despite these tensions between political and spiritual authority, democracy does not require that religion be entirely shut out of democratic institutions in order to work. Recent research, especially Madeley (2003), Grim and Finke (2006) and Fox’s (2006) projects on contemporary religion-state arrangements in the world, reveals that once basic, democratic requirements about mutual political and religious freedoms are reached, a wide variety of arrangements governing the relationship between religious institutions and states is possible within the context of societies that afford the highest levels of democratic rights and privileges. Integrating this finding, this dissertation argues that
institutions biased in favor of religion are not only democratically viable but may help facilitate successful transitions to a democratic regime.

In this respect, and in light of the current debate on Islam and democracy, the historical experience of Catholicism with democratic ideas and institutions provides important analytical insight into understanding how religious hostility to democracy can be transformed over time. Like Islam, Catholic Christianity before the middle of the 1960s was also considered to be a stumbling block for democracy, yet many Catholic countries eventually became democratic (Huntington 1991, Philpott 2004). What is more, many of these countries democratized thanks to the participation of Christian Democratic parties. The animating forces of these parties were intimately linked to a Catholic hierarchy with dubious democratic credentials and to Catholic electorates who initially paid more heed to the Church in political matters rather than party leaders. Despite the initial opposition of Church leaders and weak support among many religious faithful to early attempts at democracies, some Catholic countries successfully democratized only after democratic leaders struck friendlier institutional deals with the Church. Once in power, Christian Democratic parties, who benefitted from such privileges and from Church support, rapidly secularized their political goals. With the question of the Catholic Church’s future position in the nation removed, Christian Democratic leaders, together with their electorates, developed political programs which were independent of and sometimes contrary to those of the Vatican (Kalyvas 1996, Warner 2000, Kselman and Buttigieg 2003). These changes allowed Christian Democratic parties and their constituents more room to make deals with and recognize the legitimacy of non-Catholic political parties. This experience won over the hearts of important Catholic religious
leaders and theologians towards democracy and boosted the consolidation of democracy in the process (Panebianco 1988, Parisi 1979, Alberigo 2000). The story of democratization in these countries, therefore, is often told as the arrival of democracy despite the Catholic Church’s original, undemocratic intentions and, in certain respects, sounds rather similar to the expectations of the inclusion-moderation hypothesis introduced above.

The changing political salience of Catholic religious identities, together with the political secularization of Christian Democratic parties and the success of democracy, also had far-reaching consequences on religious life in Europe. These changes directly influenced the outcome of the theological reforms embraced by the Catholic Church with respect to the legitimacy of religious pluralism and the democratic liberty of conscience at the Second Vatican Council in the early 1960s. The changes also coincided with the religious secularization of Europe, in which the practice of societal religious beliefs dropped to what some scholars described as “subsistence levels” (Bruce 2002). Although these accounts of religious secularization have often been portrayed as the inevitable, constant decline of institutional religious practices in a (democratic) modern society, scholars have challenged such characterizations in recent years. They note, for example, the significant variation observed in the patterns of religious decline within Europe and the relatively high rates of national religious practice sustained by a substantial group of European Catholic countries such as Austria, Italy, Portugal and Ireland (Smith and Sawkins 2003). In his book entitled Public Religions in the Modern World, Casanova (1994), in particular, argues that within several of these countries, religion has been able to find a way to re-assert its influence in the public sphere. Despite forfeiting the direct
political powers they once enjoyed as the keepers of Christendom, in some European
countries religious leaders have learned to take advantage of their roots in civil society to
take up a contentious public voice for laws and decisions on “life” issues like abortion,
divorce, euthanasia and war. While Casanova does not offer an explanation of what
makes a religion more likely to take on the role of a public religion in any given country,
his insight makes a powerful case that religious institutions and leaders can continue to
exercise important political and public influence within modern democracies when those
institutions and leaders adapt to their new institutional settings.

I argue that a religiously friendly democratization process helps make such
adaption more likely by institutionally guaranteeing religious leaders a future role within
the nation while simultaneously empowering religious individuals. In a dialectical
fashion, therefore, inviting a democratically hostile religion into a democratization
process can actually help make such a religion more open to democratic principles and
ideas even while doing so assures some institutionally writ religious nature to the
democratic regime itself. In order to analyze the mechanisms at work which produce
these recursive effects, my model distinguishes between two overarching and interacting
sets of dynamics.

Thus, my model first considers the effects that an introduction of democratic
institutions and ideas has on religious actors who might be ambivalent or hostile to
democracy. I draw from a key insight of the identity politics literature, that by nature all
individuals have multiple and changing identities (including religion, ethnicity, language,
and class), which are nested within one another and are shaped over time by processes of
institutional framing. Religious leaders can help inflate the saliency of religious identity
in an average individual’s political calculus when they can make credible claims that that religious identity is under attack by the state. States, in turn, can undermine the credibility of such a claim if they show institutional favoritism to religion in the public life of the state. In this light, the activation of latent democracy-supporting cleavages in post-World War II Italy or post-1988 Algeria, I argue, could be thought of as the result of institutional changes between religion and state that changed the possibilities for individuals to be simultaneously spiritually and politically profitable.

States that offer institutionalized relevance to a hostile religion affect the goals and orientations toward democracy of both religious elites and the individuals comprising their religious base, but through two different mechanisms. At the elite level, a favorable governmental guarantee makes it easier for religious authorities to accept democracy and exhort their faithful to join the electoral process. This gives moderate religious elites a greater incentive to embrace democracy as a legitimate source of political authority. In addition, it also gives religious radicals incentive to try to achieve their radical ends by winning power in the electoral process. At the individual level, these institutional changes lessen the salience of religious identity on individual political action. By removing a threat to their religious identity, they pave the way for the legitimization of democracy by allowing for religious identities to not be exclusive and thus freeing many individuals to vote on the basis of political interests other than their religious ones.

My model then considers the effects that religiously friendly democratic institutions has on the religious life of the nation. By ensuring a public voice for religious authorities in the debate over its moral economy, a democratizing regime orient its values in favor of certain religious ones and institutionalizes a religious component to
that country’s democracy. Through subsidies which encourage religious belief, I argue, the state creates a more likely context for the (re)-emergence of a public religion. By creating a protective space for religion, these subsidies allow religious authorities some time to re-propose themselves as an organizing authority in the political and social life of a nation. Once incorporated into the political process, therefore, religious actors and ideas do not go away and can still regenerate the societal connection between a national identity and some set of religious values over time. At the same time, the political and social framework in which these actors operate is much-altered by the forces of democratization. By empowering every individual with a vote, democracy compels such an association between religion and nation to be loose, open to change and dependent on the extent to which religious authorities can continue to persuade their faithful individuals of their public and spiritual worth.

As democratic norms take hold, therefore, religious authorities must renegotiate their relationship with their national faithful. In order to maintain an effective public voice in politics, they must become adept at responding to the wider range of issue-areas created by any shifts in the political goals of their faithful and the greater access those individuals gain to non-religious ideas and activities. Religious leaders can either condemn this rising influence of their faithful, risking marginalization and, over time, a decoupling of the relationship between faith and nation, or they can adapt, by emphasizing those parts of their theological traditions which are in harmony with the changing political concerns of their faithful and taking advantage of their position within the democratic regime to diffuse them. Religious leaders are more likely to accept and support changes that ratify their faithful’s growing political independence and tolerate
religious pluralism if they are part of a tradeoff for governmental policies that sustain religious participation and the privileged role of religion in the state.

This theory does not assume that all democratizing countries that adopt favorable political cues to their seemingly hostile national religions will result in successful democracies. My theoretical expectations do imply, however, that theological incompatibilities will not become the determining factor in the failure of democratizing regimes. If national religious leaders can be persuaded by guarantees of public relevance to mobilize for elections, then a breakdown in democracy will most likely not have to do just with theology, but the many other factors affecting democratic consolidation, including, especially, levels of economic development (Przeworski et al. 2000). In a similar vein, even as the theory expects religiously friendly policies to affect the religious life of the nation, I also expect economic development (McCleary and Barro, 2006), in addition to the structure of the national religious market (Stark and Iannacone 1994, Fox 2008) to contribute to the determination of the quality and intensity of national religious participation.

Methodology and Case Selection

The primary aim of this dissertation is to present a theory which models democratization processes that are characterized by religiously friendly religion-state arrangements in those countries with a predominant, society-wide religion whose leaders and faithful possess an ambivalent attachment to democratic ideas and institutions. In order to do so, this theory draws on scholarly works on Islam and politics, democratization, identity politics, Christian democratic parties and the sociology of
religion. I build on this body of knowledge to derive hypotheses which specify how religiously-friendly religion-state arrangements affect the political goals and desires of political elites and religious actors during moments of democratization.

After presenting this model, I begin to test its predictions using two different methods. First, following the method of analytical or historical narratives, I process trace the predictions of my theory through two in-depth case studies of religiously friendly democratization processes: in the predominantly Roman Catholic country of Italy between 1946 and 1965 and in the predominantly Sunni-Malekite country of Algeria between 1991 and 2009. I use archival, bibliographical and historical evidence, as well as statistical data on voting patterns and voter preferences, to establish this narrative for the historical case of Italy. In addition to similar historical and statistical data, for the contemporary case of Algeria, I also use evidence from forty semi-structured elite interviews.

The function of the historical narrative method is to illustrate and explain how a theory works in the real world, rather than simply predict a series of results (Bates et al. 1998, Falletti 2006). As such, it is a method which is particularly well-suited to the complex, dialectic theory of this dissertation, whose predictions stretch across historical periods and major religious traditions in two regions of the world. As a dialectic model, the independent and dependent variables of interest change and affect one another at different points of analysis. Within the theory, for example, I predict that the democratization process affects the goals and preferences of religious elites and individuals; that the goals of religious actors affect the nature of the democratic politics which ensue; and that, within religious actors, the changing preferences of religious
individuals affect the changing goals of religious elites. The wealth of in-case detail and data which the production of a historical narrative offers allows us to sort out and illustrate how these complex relationships actually unfold in reality in these two cases as specified. In doing so we can begin to determine whether there is a systematic, regular relationship between the variables, here between religiously-friendly democratic processes and political and religious actors, as predicted by the theory (Büthe 2002).

Although I expect this theory to provide insight to other regions and religions of the world, for this dissertation I bound the theory to countries where either Islam or Catholicism have a monopoly over the national religious market. This permits us to assume a type of democratic hostility which both religious traditions share thanks to similar historical experiences and theological perspectives. Chapter two justifies this decision in greater depth. Sunni-Malekite Islam and Roman Catholicism, however, also represent two major world faith traditions with different ideals for interacting with politics and society. Process tracing this theory in both a Muslim and a Catholic country, thus, also helps us to begin to determine to what extent the dynamics produced by religiously friendly democratization work across religions despite these religious differences.

The historical narrative method, while important for this dissertation, is nonetheless limited by the specificities of these two cases and the results of the test cannot be generalized. As Büthe argues, the task of an historical narrative is essentially to provide a “plausibility probe” for a complex theory (2002: 489), not a final test of its theoretical worth. Once we have shown that the theory’s predictions are not only logical but are also plausible explanations for modeling reality in these two cases, therefore, the
next step in theory-testing is to examine the predictions on a wider range of other cases. While I consider other specific cases of religiously-friendly democratization processes from Southern Europe, Latin America, North Africa and the Middle East in the conclusion, in the body of the dissertation I conduct a large-N statistical analysis using new cross-national data on religion-state arrangements created by Grim and Finke (2006) and Fox (2006); national data on levels of democracy by *Freedom House*, *Polity* and other democracy databases; and data on voters’ preferences and attitudes from *World Values Surveys*. I first examine the democratic viability of religiously friendly governmental institutions on a cross-national sample. I then explore whether democratization attempts in contemporary Muslim countries are aided by religiously friendly institutions and test for the effects of such arrangements on the political preferences of religious voters. Finally, I analyze the effects of government favoritism of religion on religious attitudes and national levels of religious participation.

Preview of Cases

My evidence indicates that the cases of Italy and Algeria support my thesis in similar ways. In Italy, the constitution of 1948 created an especially favorable position for the Catholic Church in Italian national life, at a time when both the future of democracy in Italy and the Church’s support for it were far from certain. The Vatican, however, was not able to instrumentalize this position to bar its political rivals from the democratic game. Both the leaders of the Catholic political party, *Democrazia Cristiana* (DC), as well as the Catholic electorate quickly lost interest in the Vatican’s attempts to direct their political goals and became more open to collaborate with the socialist and communist left and recognize their legitimacy as opposition parties. The institutional
favoritism for the Catholic Church has helped it retain a central role in Italian public life, but the experience with democracy also altered the Church’s understanding of its role in politics, culminating in the significant shifts of the Second Vatican Council in the early 1960s. During the council Italian Bishops from northern regions, the locus of early experiments in political coalitions between socialist parties and the DC, persuaded enough other Italian Bishops to support the writing of new theological documents which recognized the legitimacy of political and religious pluralism and, thus, democracy for the first time.

In Algeria a similar story can be told with regards to the evolution of the Islamist political parties, the *Mouvement de la Société pour la Paix* (MSP) and *Islah*, and, to some extent, the *Front Islamique du Salut* (FIS), since Islamist parties were first allowed to compete in the electoral arena in 1990. The more these parties gained entrance onto the political playing field, the more likely they were to modulate their policy goals towards nationalist parties and to attempt to mobilize outside of their religious faithful to win parliamentary victories. These modulations have contributed to a depoliticization of Islam in Algeria, and they reflect similar shifts in voting patterns among the Algerian electorate. Strikingly, this decreasing interest in political Islam has coincided with a growth in national levels of religiosity, powered by a renewed youth interest in religion. Young Algerian voters, in turn, who make up Algeria’s largest demographic cohort, have been courted with considerable energy by both religious and secular political parties. Partly on account of this courtship, as expected from the model, the values animating new Algerian religious growth reflect youth inputs. The new face of Islam in Algeria, for now, is neither the dogmatic rigor which characterized the Islamist revival in the 1980s, nor the
of earlier Islamic practices, but a mix of both, blending into it the coolness of Islamic television preachers whom youth audiences have popularized and endorsed, with the hopes they have set in contemporary soccer, music and fashion.

Outline

Following this short introduction, chapter one explores the theoretical relationship between religion and democracy and introduces a framework for analyzing religion-state arrangements. Chapter two justifies the comparison of Islam and Catholicism. Chapter three presents my theoretical model for describing the dialectic dynamics created by a religiously friendly democratization process in a country whose religious market is dominated by ambivalently democratic religious actors. Chapters four and five then test the causal logics of the theory through case studies of the Italian and Algerian experiences with religiously friendly democratization processes. Chapter six presents a quantitative analysis of the effects of religion-state arrangements on democracy and national rates of religious participation. Finally, the dissertation ends by way of a conclusion which briefly looks to other cases of religiously friendly democratization processes in Southern Europe, Latin America, North Africa and the Middle East and discusses some of the limits of this theory as well as future avenues of research.
CHAPTER 1:
DEMOCRACY THEORY, SECULARIZATION STORIES, AND RELIGION-STATE ARRANGEMENTS

1.1 Introduction

The basic thesis which animates this dissertation is that a religiously friendly democratization process represents a plausible strategy for incorporating hostile religious actors and individuals into democracies. Such a strategy can generate important sources of stability for a young, fragile democratic regime even as it affects that regime’s long run nature. This thesis rests on the assumption that a religiously friendly democracy is possible. Such a possibility, however, is not commonly recognized as a general fact of knowledge, at least in the Western tradition. Before trying to answer the question of how a religiously friendly democratization might successfully incorporate democratically hostile religious actors, therefore, this chapter first tries to respond to the question of why a religiously friendly democracy is possible in the first place. In order to answer that question, the chapter proceeds as follows: In the first section, I explain and define what I mean in this dissertation by the concepts “democracy” and “democratization” and explore what theoretical room such definitions leave for the institutional influence of religion on democratic life.
In the second section I then explore why the idea of a religiously friendly democracy remains controversial by examining the relationship between secularization theories and liberal political philosophy. In this section I argue that contemporary scholars and policy-makers in the West remain skeptical of an institutionalized role for religion in democracies because of 1) the history of how the modern, liberal nation-state came into being and 2) the normative expectations generated about what such a state should look like.

The third section challenges this skepticism and draws on recent scholarship to present a revisionist account of the decline of institutional public religious influence in the West in order to chart the possibilities for religion’s continued institutional influence on modern democratic life.

The fourth and final section introduces a conceptual framework that helps capture this multi-dimensional relationship between religion-state arrangements and democracy and allows us to define what we mean by the concepts of “religious friendly democracy” and “religiously friendly democratization processes.”

1.2 Democracy, Democratization and Religions in Democracies

1.2.1 What is “Democracy”?

As David Held’s (2006) survey of “models of democracy” makes clear, there are many ways of defining and understanding what the term “democracy” means. In this dissertation, I adopt what could be termed as a “procedural” definition of democracy, following Schumpeter (1942), Rustow (1973), Dahl (1971), Huntington (1991), and
Przeworski et al (2000) among others. By their criteria, democracy requires the periodic election to office of representative leaders, coupled with the presence of institutional rights which guarantee those elections to be free, fair and responsive. Dahl (1971; 3) famously offers a list of eight institutional guarantees which he modestly entitles “Some Requirements for a Democracy among a Large Number of People” and which include, principally, the rights to associate and freely join organizations, the rights to a free press and free expression, and the rights of political leaders to compete for electoral support (Dahl 1971). These definitions and checklists of essential rights and guarantees form the standards by which most social scientists attempt to quantitatively and qualitatively measure and compare levels of democracy in the world.

We can contrast these procedural or minimal definitions of democracy with other substantive versions of democracy, which Held (2006; 92, 253) refers to as developmental or deliberative models of democracy, whose definitions include normative prescriptions about what is required of democratic institutions in order to help create an ideal liberal democratic society. Procedural models of democracy are most concerned that institutions guarantee a relatively free, fair and representative decision-making process which regularly elects leaders and keeps a check on state power; they are less concerned than more substantive theories of democracy with the ideal outcomes of those decisions. We will return to these substantive versions of democracy, developed from within the tradition of liberal political philosophy, later.
1.2.2 What is Democratization?

With regard to democratization, I follow the classic framework articulated by Linz and Stepan (1996). In order to capture the dynamics at work in a democratic transition, Linz and Stepan (1996) distinguish between three stages in the democratization process: an opening moment, in which opposition groups successfully challenge authoritarian rule, the transition to democracy itself and, finally, the consolidation of democracy. In order to gauge whether a regime has successfully transitioned to democracy, Linz and Stepan (1996) focus on the new government’s ability to command legitimacy as a regime. As they write (1996:3), a democratic regime has had a successful transition when a government has,

come to power that is the direct result of a free and popular vote, when this government *de facto* has the authority to generate new policies, and when the executive, legislative and judicial power generated by the new democracy does not have to share power with other bodies *de jure*.

The consolidation of democracy, then, is the widening and deepening of this legitimacy. A consolidated democracy is one that has become the “only game in town” as Linz and Stepan (1996) define it, where citizens behaviorally, attitudinally and constitutionally stop questioning the presence of democracy as the best regime for the state. Problems are solved within the norms of the democratic formula; no significant groups try to overthrow the regime; and in crises citizens look for policy change through elections rather than coups or other non-democratic forms of government.

When the citizens of a nation contain a plurality of identities which are in conflict with one another, the success of transitioning to and consolidating democracy depends on the degree to which the democratic regime can insure their citizens “broad inclusiveness”
in the political process. For free and fair elections to take place on a continual basis, citizens must recognize the legitimacy of the electoral process, and they must be willing to play the part of the loyal opposition (Linz 1978). Alternatively, if their party wins, citizens must be willing to tolerate the opposition (Dahl 1971). As Linz (1978) points out, this understanding of democracy is one that sees democracy’s fundamental virtue in the ability of its institutional framework to encourage a pluralistic society to solve its problems pragmatically, rather than in the substantive association of democracy with the development of equality, welfare or education. Good democratic leaders recognize this virtue of pragmatism and try to nurture the complementarity of their citizens’ multiple identities, instead of exploiting and polarizing them in the competitive electoral process.

In this dissertation I bound my analytic timeframe to the phases of democratic transition and consolidation. The “opening” phase of democracy, which creates the possibility of a democratic transition and has been described as a moment of great uncertainty (O’Donnell and Schmitter 1986), is of less interest to this dissertation. While they are important, the questions relevant to an analysis of this opening in a religiously friendly democratization – why would a state with a hostile religion decide to democratize in the first place, why would that state decide to institutionalize religiously friendly policies in order to do so, and why would democratically hostile religious actors agree to suspend their overt hostilities to enter the democratic game, – receive less attention here. I make this choice in order to focus on the question of what happens after states with a predominant, society-wide religion institute a religiously friendly democratization process – can a religiously friendly democratization help resolve the
hostility of religious actors towards democracy, deepen democratic legitimacy and thereby aid the success of a fledgling democracy’s consolidation? And how does it do so?

When we bound our timeframe of analysis in such a manner, we take on at least two empirically questionable assumptions in our study of religiously friendly democratization processes. First, we assume a general level of good faith on the part of the democratizing state and its democratizing actors. We do not assume that the state or its democratizing elites are benevolent, but simply that they are ready to give democracy a chance and to allow hostile religious actors to win some political power through elections in order to do so. If this assumption is violated and, for example, state leaders, despite holding elections, do not allow religious actors to assume any political power whatsoever, our theoretical expectations are no longer valid. Similarly, we assume a basic willingness on the part of hostile religious actors to suspend their overt hostilities towards democracy and, at least, nominally agree to participate in elections. This second assumption, as we will explore in greater detail below, leaves ample room for a wide range of degrees of hostility towards democracy on the part of religious actors and more and less explicit intentions to instrumentalize democratic institutions and ideas towards non-democratic ends. At the same time, the assumption, at a minimum, requires that hostile religious actors renounce violence and, at least rhetorically, agree to give democratic elections a chance.

Although no political event unfolds in a vacuum, to the extent that it is reasonably possible, I am also interested in answering these questions ceteris paribus. As we will examine in more detail later, social scientists study many economic, political and historical factors which help predispose a country more to regime failure (for example,
see Linz 1978), and other macro-factors which help ensure a regime’s survival (for example, see Przeworski et al 2000). Without downplaying the significant impact that these macro-economic, historical and international influences have on the probability of a regime to breakdown or survive, I am interested in understanding whether biasing religion-state institutions in favor of a religion which has a monopoly on the national spiritual realm and whose elites, faithful and doctrine are not considered to be friendly with respect to democracy makes democracy more of a viable long-term option. As we try to measure the independent effect of “religious friendliness” on democracy, however, it will be important to remember that the religious friendliness of a democratization processes is not the only factor affecting democratization’s chances of success.

What is more, as Whitehead (2002) stresses, a democratic transition is a “complex, long-term, dynamic and open-ended process.” In this optic, it is possible to imagine that a religiously friendly democratization process might help make a democratic transition more likely to succeed even as other factors ultimately lead to the democratic transition’s failure. Or, that after a period of success, the gains incurred by a religiously friendly democratization might be reversed or overturned. In these cases, which we could describe as lesser forms of liberalization processes which create a change in a democratizing direction in a non-democratic political regime but do not necessarily produce a full democratic outcome, we would still expect that the religious friendliness proposed in the transition process would have, nonetheless, contributed to that democracy’s chances of success.
1.2.3 What Can We Say Now about Religion and Democracy?

What do these procedural definitions of democracy tell us about the proper relationship between religion and state within a democratic regime? In his article, “Religion, Democracy and the Twin Toleration,” (2000) later expanded in a book chapter of the same title (2001), Stepan derives two essential conditions for the role of religion in a democratic regime from these definitions. The first condition flows from the minimal or procedural democratic requirement for free, fair and competitive elections for political office and is aimed at respecting the accountability-representative principle underlying this definition. In order to do so in a manner which insures, in Dahl’s terms, that citizens can formulate their preferences; signify them to their fellow citizens; and have them weighed equally in the conduct of government (Dahl 1971: 2), democratically elected officials require sufficient autonomy to make policy that is within the bounds of the constitution and which cannot be contested or overruled by non-elected religious leaders or institutions. The second condition flows from the basic political rights and civil liberties which democracies must guarantee their citizens to secure them their ability to “signify their preferences” and exercise their democratic rights to elect officials and hold them accountable. With respect to religion, the government cannot regulate or prohibit private religious belief and worship or prevent citizens from organizing politically and pursuing policy objectives which are in line with their religious values as long as they do not violate the constitution (Stepan 2001).

Stepan’s (2001) twin tolerations suggest that democracy does not require the total marginalization of religion to the private sphere; in theory, a perfectly democratic regime could co-exist with a religion-state arrangement where relevant religious elites still
exercised significant symbolic and moral authority over a national citizenry. In many successful democracies this is not the case, and religion has been relegated to the private realm where it enjoys little institutional influence on public policy and politics. Importantly, this characterization is especially true of the United States and France whose foundational experiences, which established separation of religion and state in the United States Constitution and, eventually, Laïcité in the French Constitution, have often been held up as an ideal. Taking issue, particularly, with Rawls’ concept of the proper political influence of religion in a just liberal society, Stepan claims, however, that democratically viable religious alternatives are available which do not hew to either the American model of separation of religion and state or the French model of laïcité so lionized in liberal political philosophy. Following the twin tolerations, we could imagine that in friendlier religion-state relationships, while still respecting democratic institutions and procedures, religions might have a more public face and be looked to more seriously for guidance on policy, morality and identity matters.

Since its publication, Stepan’s article, with its explicit implications for the Islamic world, has had wide resonance in the scholarly world. His thesis challenges a bias in much of political theory which assumes that the relationship between democracy and the influence of religion on politics is one of a continuum, where more separation of religion and state is associated with a more completely democratic regime. This bias, I argue, is rooted in the models and theories that enlightenment scholars and philosophers employed to understand the appearance of modern nation-states, modern economies, modern

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1 For different reasons (see Gill 2008) and with different effects. Kuru’s (2008) work distinguishing between the “passive” secularism of the United States and the “assertive” secularism of France, and its implications for the nature of either’s religious markets is important here.
democratic regimes and, eventually, economically modernized democratic nation-states. These models, which we now term secularization theories, attempted to describe the epochal political and economic change in the West from the world of Christendom, where religious values and logics ordered and infused most spheres of reality, to the world of constitutions, where secular values and rationales did. The story of this transition from Christendom to constitutions told of the decline of traditional religious authority in the West and the reduction of both 1) institutional religion’s public influence and 2) individual religious belief. The logic of these enlightenment versions of the secularization theory became deeply embedded in the reasoning processes of scholars and philosophers and greatly influenced their predictions as to the future role of religion after modernization ran its course, as well as their prescriptions about what the modern, liberal democratic state ought to look like. I now turn to unpacking these stories of secularization and liberal normative expectations in order to re-examine this epochal transition and chart out a revisionist possibility of the place of religion in modern democratic society.

1.3 Secularization Theories and Norms

1.3.1 Classic Secularization Stories

Classic theories of secularization generally make a claim that the various forces of modernization are associated with a general decline in religion. These forces are a complex bundle and include the rapid acceleration of urbanization, democratization, and education; the increase of per capita income, recreation and consumer goods; and the
rationalizing effects of science, bureaucracies and the welfare state. There are many versions about how the processes connected with modernity interact with the demand and supply of religion and what the general decline of religion that follows actually looks like (see Taylor 2007, Norris and Inglehart 2004, Fox 2008, and Philpott 2009 for recent reviews of this literature). For the purposes of this dissertation, I simply want to distinguish between two ideal accounts of the process of Western secularization, one which focuses on changes in societal demand for religion and the other which focuses on structural changes in the demarcation of the religious sphere of influence.

Functionalist scholars since Durkheim have emphasized the change in societal demand for traditional religious goods which occurs when a more diversified and specialized set of non-religious goods become available with processes of modernization. These scholars have pointed out that individuals in the modern world have realized, among other things, that movie theaters are more interesting places to gather on evenings than churches, mosques or synagogues, that hospitals are more reliable for curing people than miracles, and that advances in technology does more for farmers than prayers and fasting. Modern science and the rise of effective, reasoned explanations and prescriptions for dealing with the mysteries and pains of life meant that individuals and communities did not “need” religion to help them as much through life’s trials. Within political science, Norris and Inglehart’s recent work (2004), Sacred and Secular, tells this secularization story as a function of “existential security” and put particular emphasis on the connection between the social protections that rising levels of income and education afford and the resulting loss of individual religious belief. Many of these scholars over the years have wondered whether the increasing availability of these new goods meant
that institutional religion would have any useful function left to offer the modern individual (Bruce 2002, Norris and Inglehart 2004). Some thought it would not and predicted the eventual demise of institutionally-connected religious belief, not necessarily creating a world where everyone was inevitably atheist, but where the numbers of regular church-going, institutional believers dropped to “subsistence” levels (Bruce 2002: 151).

Other scholars, especially those working in the tradition of Weber, have focused on the structural changes caused by modernity which demarcated the proper sphere of religious influence in society. Most especially among these changes was the modern separation of religion and state relative to government which transferred governmental authority’s source of political legitimacy away from a divine source (popes and their anointed kings) to secular ones (constitutions and their elected ministers). This demarcation, or what is termed as the differentiation, of secular and religious spheres of authority implied a de-sacralization of society through the reduction of the sphere of religious influence. The differentiation of spheres of authority allowed nation-states to consolidate their monopoly over the use of force as Tilly (1990) and Giddens (1987) have argued, and its control over the interpretation and meaning of societal symbols and history (Bourdieu 1999; Hansen and Stepputat 2001; Loveman 2005; Gorski 1999).

While religious authorities would continue to stake out claims over the ultimate loyalty of citizens, through, for example, the rituals of baptism, marriage, teachings on just and unjust wars, hereditary rights, alms-giving, and forgiveness.
spiritual realm, religious institutions and leaders lost much of their public and coercive ability to convince citizens to participate in religious rituals of belief.

If secular state elites managed their power over symbols effectively, they inherited much of the conscious and unconscious loyalty of their citizens from religious authorities, tied them together into a national identity and directed their energies to defending and buttressing the state. As Anthony Marx’s title aptly captures, *Faith in Nation*, (2003) the power of nationalism enabled the state to generate a pseudo-religious leap of faith on the part of its citizens which made such an inheritance possible. In essence, by replacing the legitimacy-conferring power of religion with its own state-controlled ideology, the state became the new “surpra-religion” of the land (Juergensmeyer 1993), permitting it to justify and direct its own doctrines of “destiny and wars” (see also Cavanaugh 2005, 2009). This transfer of mystical power from religion to the nation-state, as Prodi writes (1999) in *The Sacrament of Power*, only happened to the degree that the state was capable of appropriating Christian religious traditions to “sacralize” its own political power and requiring citizens to make a binding profession of faith in it. Although the statebuilding goal of expanding its coercive and symbolic means of control led to tensions with the ideals of a democracy, the marginalization of religious

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3 Only nationalism and religion, both Juergensmeyer (1993) and Cavanaugh (2009) point out, confer the moral sanction to martyrdom and violence, a vast power which gives state and religion the capacity to inspire loyal masses to give their lives over, literally, on behalf of religion or state.

4 As Weber and Taylor describe, for example, turning church calendars into state calendars and ecclesial codes of law into secular ones (Weber 1978, Taylor 2007).

5 Prodi’s concept of a “political sacrament of power” mirrors Robert Bellah’s (or Rousseau before him) concept of the necessity of a nation to bind its citizens together through the creation of a civil religion, through what Cavanaugh (2005) has referred to as ritual liturgies of state.
authority and the creation of a strong state made it easier for democratic regimes to
govern efficiently. As in Weber’s account, therefore, nation-state building and the
rationalization of politics evolved simultaneously with the intellectual legitimization of
democratic politics and the articulation of legal lists of individual rights.

These two ideal versions of secularization theory, naturally, are not wholly
distinct, and both deal with different, but interlocking aspects of processes of political,
economic and scientific modernization in the West. Weber’s account of the
differentiation of spheres and the disentanglement of religious authority from
consitutional authority, for example, is intimately connected with a narrative of the
major changes in the relationship of European society and religion which heralded the
individualization of society and the relativism of knowledge and belief. As Weber
recounts, the desacralization of politics was made possible through the societal changes
created by the Protestant reformation in which the rational individual was placed at the
center of society and invested with the personal responsibility of interpreting human
beings’ role in the temporal order (Weber 1956). Forcing religious authorities out of state
institutions helped the state build up its own sovereignty, but that process was reinforced
by changing societal attitudes which no longer perceived the necessity of the Roman
Catholic Church as a mediating mechanism between the sacred and profane. Like
Durkheim, therefore, Weber’s understanding of the rise of liberal, capitalist and
bureaucratic politics over religious and kingly ones is grounded in the demystification of
temporal religious political power which greatly changed the perception of society of
their own need for any hierarchical religious authority.
Presenting these two versions of secularization theory, however, allows us to make an important distinction between two different secularizing effects, what I will refer to as political secularization, i.e. the removal and differentiation of religious influence from the political realm, as opposed to religious secularization, i.e. the societal decline of religious belief. The functionalist account is primarily concerned with the latter: a society-wide decline of religious belief occurs as the functions of religion are replaced by other realms of knowledge, especially through the rationalization of politics and science, and the security that an accumulation of wealth creates. The Weberian account, on the other hand, is primarily trained on the former: the rise of the liberal nation-state is connected to a removal of religion from the political sphere and that removal significantly reduces temporal religious power by taking away the ability of religious authorities to coerce religious belief. These structural-Weberian theories, as we will see in more detail below, are less certain about the total collapse of religion. Like functionalist accounts, however, they agree that modernization privatizes religion as a specialized provider of personalized spiritual goods rather than an omnipresent public provider of a self-containing and without-which-unthinkable set of nationally shared religious beliefs and moral imperatives (Hervieu-Leger 1992a). Once taken out of the public sphere as the underlying legitimator and guide of politics, these scholars are in agreement on some inevitable decline in the national participation in religious institutions and beliefs.

Making this distinction between political and religious secularization also helps us notice that classic accounts of secularization in the West are modernization-cum-democratization stories. I would like to loosely associate 1) the economic security and the
rationalization of human belief systems of modernization with the process of religious secularization and 2) the rise of constitutions and the separation of powers of democratization with the process of political secularization. While these two processes (modernization-to-religious-secularization and democratization-to-political-secularization) were generally interlocking and reinforcing in the history of Northern Europe, we could imagine that one might precede the other and that a change in sequence could create different outcomes of secularization. To preview an argument I will develop in greater detail later on, let me give two examples of what I am getting at with this distinction here: 1) *Democratization after economic modernization*: even if Iran, a relatively modernized country, fully democratized tomorrow, we would not necessarily expect that the political secularization associated with such democratization would have an immediate and detrimental effect on national levels of Iranian religiosity, partly because economic modernization in Iran happened throughout a political period in which religious identity was fiercely protected and sustained by the state. 2) *Economic modernization after democratization*: Likewise, we probably would not expect the consolidation of democracy in Mali, one of the poorest countries in Africa, to dramatically alter national levels of religious participation, partly, in this case, because the political secularization associated with democracy is not being reinforced by any intense process of economic modernization.

1.3.2 Liberal Philosphic Norms

While I have presented these compacted versions of secularization theory as analytical and descriptive accounts of the sweeping changes in the relationship between
state and society and religion that occurred as the result of modernization in the West, these theories also have a normative side to them. Not only did scholars use secularization theory to describe and predict the process by which the world was becoming less religious, they also prescribed that modern, liberal, democratic states function best when religious authority is separated, completely, from political authority (Philpott 2009).6

This is especially the case for liberal philosophers in the Anglo-Saxon and Continental traditions, such as Mill, Rousseau, Locke, and Kant, as well as, more recently, Rawls and Habermas. Partly because, as we will see, they had to fight so hard against the authority of traditional religion in order to institute basic democratic rights of expression and association, this philosophic tradition argued that the construction of a truly liberal, democratic society required that democratic decision-making did not make any recourse to religious reasoning or values. For Kant, Rawls, Habermas and others, the liberal state must act as an ideologically neutral arbiter in order to best facilitate the formation of collective opinions and translate those decisions into national law. In order to be fair and protect a plurality of individual beliefs, a democratic state cannot rely on religious-mystical logics to defend the legitimacy and reasonableness of the laws it enacts to guide societal interactions. Religious logic requires religious adherents to believe (as in the profession of a religious Credo) in order to understand their validity. Purely rational-discursive logic, however, does not require any statement of belief and, in theory, is a logic which any individual, regardless of their religious beliefs, can appeal to and accept.

6 And in some of its more robust versions, that democracy is ideally underpinned by a society where religious belief has little to no influence, even privately, over the lives of its citizens.
Institutionalizing standardized procedures in democratic politics for arriving at societal consensus, therefore, beckons as the most effective and fair way of protecting a plurality of individual beliefs. Held (2006: 239) refers to this concept as the principle of “impartialism,” which he sums up as follows:

Before the court, suggesting ‘I believe this is the case’, ‘I want it because I like it’, ‘it suits me’, ‘I think it’s fair’, ‘it belongs to male prerogatives’, ‘it is in the best interest of my country’, does not settle the issue at hand, for claims and principles must be defensible from a larger, social standpoint. The latter is an open-ended, critical argumentative device for focusing our thoughts on views, norms and rules that might reasonably command agreement. Impartialist reasoning is a frame of reference for specifying standpoints that can be universally shared; and, concomitantly, it rejects as unjust all those positions and practices anchored in principles not all could adopt (O’Neill 1991). At issue is the establishment of principles and rules that nobody, motivated to establish an uncoerced and informed agreement, could reasonably discard (see Barry, 1989; cf. Scalon, 1998).

A liberal democratic state which tries to create such an equality of discourse by discriminating against religious influence on the public realm represents a perfectly reasonable philosophic goal and political project. Yet, I argue, it is not a necessary project to pursue for the procedures of democracy to function well. Universalizing the liberal goal of total state neutrality as the only viable democratic model available muddles the point that while the historical process of state-building and democratization in the Western sense is one that is generally associated with the marginalization of religion to the private sphere, it is a process that is not necessarily required for the success of all future or past democratic regimes.
1.4 Revisiting Secularization Theories

1.4.1 Varieties in Patterns of Secularization

Empirically, in fact, even within what scholars would indisputably refer to as the modern democratic West, a closer analysis reveals a surprising variation in the resilience of both individual levels of religious belief and the institutional influence of religion on politics than one might have expected based on these descriptions of secularization theory and prescriptions of liberal philosophy (see, for example, Eisenstadt 2000, Casanova 1994, Fox 2008, Taylor 2007, Cavanaugh 2005, Stark 1999, Greeley 2003).

Fox’s analyses, for example, of cross-national separation of religion and state report that a full institutional separation of religion and state goes unheeded quite often, if not most of the time, in longstanding democracies, let alone fragile new ones. His most recent work (see 2008), in fact, shows that over the period from 1990 to 2002 government involvement in religion (GIR), measured on a variety of indicators, actually increased in a majority of countries, including many democracies. While acknowledging that it is difficult to measure the motivations behind this increased involvement, Fox’s conclusion is a strong indicator that institutional religion still has an important public role to play in many democracies, including Western European ones (see also Madeley 2003 and Grim and Finke 2006).

7 Fox also finds that a significant minority of governments decreased their GIR. The great variety of the ways different governments chose both to get more as well as less involved in religion leads him to emphasize the simultaneous processes of sacralization and secularization occurring in contemporary society (Fox 2008: 13).
Norris and Inglehart’s (2004) study of global levels of secularization reveal a similar diversity of national levels of religious participation and belief. While the differences between the thriving religious markets of the developing world and the more tempered ones of the West is most apparent, once again, even within the democratic West, there is unexpected variation. In countries like the United States, Australia, Italy, Ireland and Portugal, religious participation rates remain much higher than would be expected by those secularization theories which associate economic development with the decline of religious belief (Barro and McCleary 2006).

The persistent influence of institutional religion in the public realm coupled with the robustness of religious participation in some of these countries suggests that alternative pathways to democracy are available which do not entail the full marginalization of religion. In other words, as Stepan’s (2000) twin tolerations imply, it is possible for democracies to violate the principle of a strict ideological neutrality of state with respect to religion while still successfully instituting and protecting high levels of democratic rights and privileges.

The democratization experiences of several Catholic European countries are especially illustrative of these possibilities. Throughout early attempts at democratization in several Catholic countries of Europe, for example, as in Spain, Italy, Portugal, Belgium and even France, religious forces were relatively successful in mobilizing effective opposition against early democratic forces and secular state builders. Incapable of forcing a complete religious retreat from the political realm, democratic leaders often finished by compromising with these religious leaders over the content of their democratic republics in order to get them on the bandwagon, so to speak, and gain a majority approval over
some set of democratic institutions (Linz 1991; Kalyvas 1997; Gould 1999, Warner 2000). As Gould (1999) argues, some liberal movements were only able to succeed in their political projects after they forged coalitions with anti-liberal clerical forces and then, later, their followers as well. Liberal elites were able to form such coalitions by compromising on their political platforms and by framing projects of democratization as largely beneficial to the Catholic Church, as was the case in early stages of liberalization in Belgium and parts of Switzerland (Gould 1999). At least in the symbolic realm, therefore, rather than fully inheriting the loyalty of its citizens from religion, many nation-states arrived at modernity still sharing the affection of those loyalties with religious authorities.

In his recent book on the origins of religious liberty, Gill (2008) points out that similar processes also occurred in parts of Catholic Latin America. Using a rational choice perspective on religious markets, Gill reveals how the political necessity of political leaders often necessitated that they deal with and bestow certain institutional favors on the Catholic Church in order to win much needed popular legitimacy for their governments.8 While many of these new democracies in Latin America eventually instituted separation of religion and state, the Catholic Church was often able to negotiate particularly favorable institutional relationships with specific, national political regimes.9

8 Gill (2008) contrasts the Latin American experience with the very different political necessities facing politicians in the North American colonies, especially the costs of governing an ascendant pluralistic religious society, which led politicians in the North to institute religious liberty much earlier than their Latin counterparts.

9 The political authority of these and other churches in the developing world has also often been enhanced as the result of the instrumental political role many Catholic and Protestant religious organizations played in the transitions to democracy throughout the 1970s and 1980s (Huntington 1991, Anderson 2001, Philpott 2003).
The alternative pathways that some of these Catholic countries have travelled with respect to the continuing public influence of religious faith, as well as the unfolding encounter of modernity and religion in, especially, many countries in which Islam predominates, in addition to the experience of the Jewish democratic state of Israel, has led some scholars to even theorize about the existence of “multiple modernities” (Eisenstadt 2000, 2002). Different historical-cultural trajectories, Eisenstadt argues, have produced or are in the process of constructing modern, democratic nation-states so informed and explicitly guided by religious traditions as to constitute a distinct, non-liberal or Western form of democratic modernity.

The existence of these alternative pathways by which institutional religion has remained more and less woven into political and public spheres of society in the West does not invalidate many of the empirical and theoretical insights of either secularization theory or liberal political philosophy. The advent of modern democratic states did entail the institutional retreat of religious authorities from the strictly political realm and the new configuration of democratic political power, combined with the forces of economic modernization, did radically alter the relationship between religious authorities and individual religious belief in the West.

These two dynamics, however, left much more room than many enlightenment thinkers and secularization theorists perceived or expected for the possibility of modern religious belief and the potential institutional, political and public role religion may still serve within democratic states. José Casanova and Charles Taylor’s work is especially helpful in this respect for understanding these future possibilities for institutional religion and religious belief in modern democracies.
1.4.2 Modern Public Religions and Contemporary Religious Belief

In his book, *Public Religions in the Modern World*, Casanova begins by noting four global religious-political encounters in which religious institutions and actors unexpectedly seemed to thrust themselves back into the “public arena of moral and political contestation” in the waning decades of the twentieth century (1994:1): The Islamic Revolution in Iran; The Solidarity Movement in Poland; The Sandinista Revolution in Nicaragua; and Protestant Fundamentalism in the United States. While these events were unexpected by scholars in the West, Casanova argues that this (re)appearance of public religion in the modern world is not precluded by at least some versions of secularization theory. Secularization theories which focus on the differentiation and specialization of spheres of influence, he claims, leave ample room for a public role for religions in modern democracies through the standing of religion within the sphere of civil society.

The modern democratic state and economic modernization, as secularization theory observed and liberal philosophy prescribed, largely required a retreat of religious authorities from the heart of the political sphere and, most importantly, its direct powers of coercion. Casanova notes, however, that political coercion and regulation are not the only way to influence politics or individual behaviors in a democracy. Democratic policy making, in theory, reflects debates within the sphere of civil society. Religions can interact with and steer those debates through their standing within civil society and thereby continue to influence political policymaking and the shape of democratic life. Highlighting the experience of the Catholic Church, Casanova points out that after lugubriously suffering through the dissection of the totalizing world of Christendom, in
some Catholic countries, the Church figured out ways to flourish within their newly demarcated spheres of influence. In Casanova’s account, the Catholic Church was so successful because it was able to take advantage of its roots in the sphere of civil society. Casanova writes that the Church has used this influence to challenge, for example, the moral legitimacy of state policies regarding the justice and morality of capitalist market systems; of state arms races; or state protections with regards to life issues such as abortion, euthanasia and capital punishment (1994: 58). In doing so, he notes, in some modern democracies, the Catholic Church has powerfully renegotiated its moral voice and public authority by responding to the limits of a perfectly “ideologically neutral” democratic state to promote an ethical social-political order, but in a way that no longer contests the legitimacy of democratic rights, procedures and institutions themselves.

In making this argument, Casanova discounts those functionalist accounts of secularization which treat religious faith as a formerly useful but historically-bounded product of society that could be readily replaced. Instead, Casanova emphasizes the more essential teleological goals that all major religions share which empower them with a regenerative possibility of adaption and learning, even within a democratic context. These goals, which appeal to the transcendent and spiritual, materialize differently within various historical settings, but continue to remain salient over a longer breadth of human experience. As Habermas10 writes (De Vries and Sullivan 2006: 257) in a much followed

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10 Who, in recent years, has become more open to allowing religious discourse to have a large place in the public sphere (Nemoianu 2006).
public debate\textsuperscript{11} with the then Cardinal Joseph Ratzinger (now Benedict XVI) on the modern place of religion in the public sphere, the spiritual \textit{Telos} of religion has allowed, holy writings and religious traditions [to] articulate, subtly spell out, and hermeneutically keep alive over thousands of years intuitions about fall and redemption, about a saving exit from a life experienced as being without salvation. That is why something that has elsewhere been lost and cannot be restored using the professional knowledge of experts alone remains intact in the life of religious communities, so long as they avoid dogmatism and the moral constraint of a prescribing of conscience. By this something I mean sufficiently differentiated possibilities of expression and sensibilities for misspent life, for societal pathologies, for the failure of individual life plans and the deformation to be seen in distorted life contexts.

As religious traditions and institutions have adapted to modernity, individual religious belief has similarly evolved to reflect the character of a new historical setting. With the end of Christendom, religious belief did, as functionalist scholars observed, cease to be an unquestioned ontological fact which underpinned society’s perception of reality or its functional organization around a parish (see Hervieu-Leger 1992: 184ff). In the modern democratic state, traditional religious belief was no longer compulsory and competed with a host of other scientific, philosophic, political and (other) religious institutions and ideas which explain and give meaning to society. This impermissibility of coercion and competition for religious attention, however, does not mean that religious

\textsuperscript{11} This debate, which was entitled, “The Pre-political moral foundations in the construction of a free civil society,” it could be noted here, also took up the important question of the sources which a secular constitution possesses to renew or regenerate sufficient citizen loyalty to it without recourse to some of the implicit “pre-political” religious values which helped establish such shared citizen loyalty to it in the first place. One answer to this question, traditionally more dear to Habermas, is “yes,” the rational state can. Another, more dear to Benedict, is “not entirely”: the state should consider making those religious values explicitly available to citizens to fruitfully regenerate itself. Without expanding this footnote into an essay, I would also like to point out here that this above debate reflects important (and contested) elements of the communitarian critique of liberalism in the United States in the 1980s and 1990s and the need for a revived moral-spiritual-philosophical public discourse to guide democratic society.
belief cannot burgeon within democratic societies. As Charles Taylor argues, it is not the possibility of religious belief that has changed, but its conditions, from one in which, in the year 1500, “it was virtually impossible not to believe in God, to one in which faith, even for the staunchest believer, is one human possibility among others.” (2007: 3). In other words, in modern democratic states, individual religious belief represents a more or less individually reflected choice, not the publically shared attribute of a nation. As both Taylor and Casanova argue, however, while less so than when religious belief was an assumed corollary of human existence and, anywise, compulsory, there is little reason not to believe that many people might still freely choose to continue to hold religious beliefs. Taylor, for example, focuses on the reasonableness of modern religious belief as a spiritual means to what he defines as “human flourishing” in response to contemporary life’s psychological, moral and philosophical uncertainties (Taylor 2007:16).

As we will explore in more detail later on, although the non-coercion of religious belief coupled with a multiplication of religious choices creates the possibility of religious belief disconnected from the influence of religious institutions, we might expect that religious belief would remain especially high in those environments where religious institutions have most successfully adapted to the problems and yearnings of contemporary human existence. We will come back to this point about religion and its potential for adaptability later, but introduce it now to point out, with Casanova, that many religious actors have been capable of regenerating themselves and adapting to a modern, differentiated society and have used their authority within their own proper sphere of influence in civil society to re-exert public, national authority by contesting
political programs, orienting national debates, and shaping cultural identities and societal mores.

Casanova convincingly presents us with a revised account of modernization which highlights the variation in secularization paths trod by countries in the West and puts forth the possibility of sustainable public religions within modern democracies. Taylor is similarly convincing that religious belief may represent a reasonable choice on the part of an individual who lives in a democratic regime which does not require such a choice. It is not entirely clear from either Casanova or Taylor, however, what it is that makes a religious culture in one contemporary national setting more likely than another to resist the effects of modernization, reproduce themselves as a public religion and help sustain higher national rates of religious participation than another. Catholicism as a dominating societal force, for example, does not seem good enough to guarantee either religiously infused institutions or high religiosity: countries like France and Uruguay, both overwhelmingly Catholic at the cusp of modernity, are among the world’s most thoroughly secularized nations (both religiously and politically) today. In chapter three, I will argue that a religiously friendly democratization process, which respects Stepan’s twin tolerations while instituting a role of religion in public life, can help make it more likely that religious actors and institutions will be able to transition to modern democratic life; find a prominent role in civil society; take on the status of a public religion; and help generate relatively higher rates of religious participation. Before doing so, I now turn to introducing a framework which will allow us to better define and operationalize our concepts of “religiously friendly democracy” and “religiously friendly democratization processes.”
1.5 Religion-state Arrangements in Democracy: A General Framework

In order to capture our central insight about the relationship between religion-state arrangements and democracy, namely, that there exists a range of religious friendliness which a democratic state can viably institute without violating democratic principles, it is useful to break up our concept of religion-state arrangements into different dimensions. Rather than treating religion-state arrangements as if on a continuum with respect to democracy and assuming that all government involvement in religion is equally risky and harmful to democracy, a multi-dimensional conception of religion-state arrangements allows us to sort out which types of non-separation of religion and state are more compatible with democracy than others. In doing so, we can better specify what kinds of government involvement in religion are possible in a religiously friendly democracy and, thus, what a religiously friendly democratization process precisely looks like.

1.5.1 Government Regulation(s) of Religion (GRI)

Throughout our account of the place of religion in democracies, we have argued that the requirements of procedural democracy are normatively neutral about whether the state identifies itself with a religious tradition and whether citizens mobilize and enact laws based on religious values. However, we have also argued that a democratic state must guarantee that citizens can mobilize in the first place and elect representatives who are free to challenge and debate religious values and laws. As Stepan (2001) articulates, this means that the democratic state must protect the right of citizens to formulate and signify their preferences, religious or not, and that the political authority of
democratically-elected leaders must be autonomous of non-elected religious authorities. Even within a religiously friendly democracy, therefore, democratic institutions must mediate whatever religious values and authority are embedded in national laws and the constitution, and democratic citizens and their representatives must be able to challenge those values. As the secularization story of the transition from Christendom to constitutions emphasizes, in a world of democratic institutions, one religious tradition can no longer claim the absolute authority to order political life to a particular religious vision. From our procedural definitions of democracy, therefore, we could conclude that what is most intolerable with respect to the relationship between religion and state is when that relationship explicitly coerces citizens or their political representatives to adhere to a particular religious belief (or to no religious belief at all).

Following Durham (1996), Linz (2004) and Grim and Finke (2006), I refer to this dimension of the religion-state relationship as government regulation of religion (GRI) as it measures the extent to which the state regulates and restricts the “free exercise” of individual belief (Durham 1996). At very high levels of government regulation of religion, religious actors can either totally dominate and regulate political life, what Linz terms politicized religion, such as in theocracies like Iran, or politics can overwhelm and totally regulate religious life, even in the private sphere, what Linz calls political religion, such as in some communist regimes like Laos and North Korea. Alternatively, as in the model of Arab nationalism, the state could enact high levels of government regulation of religion in order to control religious institutions and enforce a certain version of

“religion” which is beneficial to their state-building projects. All of these examples, with different designs, attempt to force a conformity of private and public religious beliefs by politically empowering religious authority (Iran), controlling religious authority (Arab Nationalism), or eliminating religious authority (North Korea). Because they so openly violate the rights of citizens to “free exercise,” such high forms of government regulation of religion are not compatible with a fully democratic regime.

1.5.1.1 What is Coercion of Religious Belief?

Two general qualifications about government regulation of religion are in order. First, some types of “coercion” of religious belief are worse than others for democracy. On the one hand, it is reasonably clear that a democratic state cannot force its citizens to adhere to a specific set of religious beliefs. On the other hand, most democratic states can and do coerce some sort of moral-religious public ethic which they enforce by law. A few examples are helpful here. In the United States, the only country in Fox’s study to receive a perfect score for separation of religion and state, adults between the age of 18 and 20 cannot drink liquor and women are not allowed to bathe topless, regardless of their religious beliefs.¹³ In Algeria, no Algerian citizen is legally permitted to publically break the fast of Ramadan (although they may privately) and women, but not men, require a male witness in order to enter a marriage contract, also regardless of religious belief. In France, women cannot wear any sort of Islamic veil in public schools (and probably won’t be able to wear the Burka in public, under any circumstances, very soon) and in

¹³ While Americans might believe that these are laws based on the logic of pure reason, it is impossible to convince any continental European of their reasonableness without reference to some underlying society-wide puritan system of religious-ethical values.
Switzerland a clause banning the future construction of minarets has been voted into the Swiss constitution by democratic referendum.

To what extent do these laws coerce a certain religious or secular set of beliefs? While there are certain “core” human rights which seem to be globally agreed upon and which are essential to protecting citizen’s democratic rights, the United Nations document which enshrines those rights, the *Universal Declaration of Human Rights*, has been increasingly contested in the last decade by many nations as one which has been imposed by the West and is secularly biased. The framing of women’s rights in the constitutions of predominantly Muslim countries has been, rightly so, at the center of this debate. Pertinent to this study, however, so, too, has been the protection of “spiritual rights” in Western constitutions. In the aftermath of the Danish Cartoon controversy, for example, the United Nations Human Rights Council adopted a resolution against the defamation of religion which was highly supported by Islamic countries (and the Vatican) but opposed by European countries, Canada and the World Association of Newspapers (Klausen 2009: 54).

I cannot resolve the delicate and fiercely-contested debates which surround the examples above. However, in order to distinguish government regulation of religion from our second, less democratically harmful dimension of religion-state arrangements, we can calibrate our measure of government regulation of religion to this ideal of coercion. Despite levels of trickiness, we can define coercion, with Mazie, as any regulation of religious belief which leaves no exit options or protections for citizens of other, non-religious beliefs which would block them from associating freely and expressing discontent with the religious state of affairs in the country. This definition respects the
inherent flexibility which democratic institutions require to allow citizens to mobilize around new issues and alter national laws to reflect and channel the evolution of society. Although we will take this qualification up more below, any identification of a democratic state with one religious tradition must be coupled with the protection, (although not necessarily encouragement) of minority religious beliefs. This does not resolve the essential tensions and contested nature of protecting minority religious values against a majority-shared consensus on the religious character of a national identity, but it does give us an ideal: in order to not be coercive, the promotion of religious values (or civic ones) by a democratic state must be compatible with guarantees of the basic rights of all, non-religious citizens to express, associate and contest elections.

1.5.1.2 Regulation of Religious Belief versus Regulation of Religious Institutions

A second qualification, related to the first, is that we can further distinguish between two types of government regulation of religion. This distinction will become more important latter on when we discuss the forward effects of different kinds of religion-state arrangements on the religious and democratic life of a nation.

The first type of regulation, what I will refer to as type A government regulation of religion, is closer in keeping to our definition of coercion above and could be thought of as government regulation of religion relative to the enforcement of individuals’ religious behavior in society. Type A regulation can be employed on behalf of or against religion. Most consolidated Western democracies have very low levels of it. Except under limited and tricky circumstances as those alluded to above, type A regulation is nearly
impossible for modern democracies to tolerate, although it was quite present in earlier waves of democracy.

There is a second type of regulation, however, what I refer to as type B government regulation of religion, and has to do with the state’s direct regulation of a religion’s organization by the state. Although religious-market scholars within the sociology of religion tradition generally do not distinguish between these two types of regulation, as I will argue below, the logic underlying their theoretical expectations of a negative association between government regulation of religion and national rates of religious participation really only refer to type B government regulation of religion. In Western Europe, type B regulation could be most associated with the established churches of the Protestant Northern European states of Scandinavia and of Great Britain. In many states in the Muslim world, such as Saudi Arabia and Egypt, states employ both types of GRI, overseeing and directing the infrastructure of institutional Islam as well as publically enforcing religious morals.

While type A regulation of religion is in clear opposition to democratic principles, type B regulation also risks violating Stepan’s twin tolerations, although, as the example of Great Britain illustrates above, it is difficult to say that states with established religions are, necessarily, less democratic on account of such establishment. Linz’s ideals of politicized religion or political religion, referred to above, can aid us here. In the case of national or established religions where it is widely (and theologically) expected that religious clergy are to be functionaries of the state and that the state has an obligation to take care of that religion, the religion-state arrangements which govern
those relationships, I argue, must respect a separation of powers and a logic of independence to be democratically viable.

Following the rationale of the twin tolerations, on the one hand, we would expect that an established state religion be allowed to have powers over decisions in the sphere of that religion’s theological body of doctrine and organization, and thus over decisions which affect adherents of that religious belief. However, we would not expect national religions to have authority over the private religious beliefs of all citizens, nor would we expect national religions to possess direct authority over the final laws and legislative decisions made by bodies of elected representatives (congresses, parliaments, senates) or by constitutionally appointed judiciary or executive powers. If they do possess such authority, established religions violate Stepan’s twin tolerations and risk becoming *politicized religions* (Linz 2004). On the other hand, while we would expect that the government would have some say in the requirements, organization and appointment of the clerical body of an established national religion, once again, in order to respect Stepan’s twin tolerations, the more such government regulation marginalizes or manipulates the national religious belief of all citizens the more it risks becoming what Linz terms a *political religion*. Governmentally regulated national religions can do this by, for example, automatically registering all new citizens as members of the national faith; promulgating religious restrictions on voting or office-holding rights; identifying the national religious faith to a partisan policy or candidate; or using political
appointments to control the output of theology in favor of personal or party gain. As with an independent judiciary or an independent bank, the goal of an ideal established religion with respect to democracy is to insulate the promotion of a religious belief that has been deemed to be intrinsic to the national character from politically charged interference.

It is for this reason that some scholars and policy-makers within the Islamic world have proposed explicitly instituting the organization of Islam as a fourth pillar of democratic power, along with the judiciary, executive and the legislative. As Charfi (2000:191) writes,

The nature of Islam is such that, in a Muslim country, the state cannot extract itself from its religious obligations. Democracy does not imply the separation between Islam and the state, but, within the state, the separation between religious functions and political functions.

In order to create a tangible, autonomous mandate for this independent religious authority, Charfi suggests (2000: 193) that such an established Islamic institution would have power over the organization and formation of mosques and Imams and act as a deliberating judge on matters of morality. Crucially, however, this religious authority would have no power in the decision-making processes of the other branches of

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14 These examples illustrate Linz’s point well, that in such circumstances, it is oftentimes difficult to determine who’s manipulating whom: is it a political religion where religious leaders are controlling politicians? Or a politicized religion where politicians coerce religious leaders?

15 A Tunisian scholar-turned-policymaker-turned scholar who, in his capacities as Education Minister, Law Professor and President of the Tunisian Human Rights League, advised the Tunisian government on its institutional relationship with Islam.

16 As we will see later on, when we take a look at the history of Islam and State relations in Algeria, Charfi is not the first Muslim thinker to come up with this suggestion. Important early 20th century Algerian Imams such as Benbadis and Oqbi proposed similar religion-state arrangements at Algerian Independence. Like Charfi, both also suggested that the Imams, supported by the state, be elected by their mosque congregations and that the Imams elect their Muftis from among themselves.
government, and, equally important, would be free of govern interference in its moral judgments and organization.

1.5.2 Government Favoritism of Religion (GFI)

These boundaries of acceptability for an established religion (and its implied government regulation of religion) with respect to democracy begins to carve out a space for religion-state arrangements that can be positively acceptable within a democracy, and as we have argued, imply that a well-functioning democratic regime can co-exist with a religion-state arrangement which promotes the symbolic and moral authority of relevant religious elites over a citizenry in certain spheres of national life.

One way to think about this other face of the religion-state arrangement is to add a second dimension to the religion-state relationship which measures the degree of friendliness or “identification” (Durham, 1996) that exists between government and religious institutions. Once again following Durham (1996), Linz (2004) and Grim and Finke (2006), I refer to this dimension of the religion-state relationship as government favoritism of religion (GFI) as it measures the degree of friendliness of the state towards one or more religions in its country (Linz 2004) independent of whether or not the state chooses to regulate religious organization and belief. Government favoritism of religion could include, among other things, offering state salaries and tax exemptions for the clergy; allowing religious parties to compete in the electoral arena; highlighting or creating a special institutional mention for a predominant religion in the constitution;

creating legislation based on religious precepts; and synchronizing national holidays, calendars and celebrations to religious ones.

Gill (2008) makes a similar distinction to that proposed here between GRI and GFI by introducing the language of negative restrictions on religious liberty (as in government regulated coercion) as opposed to positive endorsements of religion (as in government identification with a particular system of religious values). This positive endorsement of religion is often also referred to by American scholars as a question of religious establishment in the sense above and one which is analytically distinct from the question of free religious exercise that GRI measures.\(^{18}\) Gill (2008) argues that while negative restrictions on religious liberty are explicitly detrimental to the protection of the civil liberties required of democracy, positive endorsements of religion (what we consider here to be government favoritism of religion) similarly restrict the equality of religious treatment in society and full religious liberty. Subsidizing a national religious monopoly may reduce the bandwidth of choice available to religious consumers, however, as long as a government does not actively restrict and regulate religious belief, this type of “positive” religious involvement in government does not violate Stepan’s twin tolerations. I argue, thus, that GFI is not necessarily harmful to democracy.

When the national establishment of a religion is effectively and institutionally non-partisan and independent, and does not engage in negative restrictions on religious

\(^{18}\) Often referring to the tradition of American constitutional law which has a rich history of debating the correct interpretation of the religious establishment clause in the U.S. Constitution (thanks to Ted Jelen for this suggestion). Gill (2008) points out that while, ironically, many of the early settlers to the American colonies fled there from England precisely because of the rigorously enforced religious establishment of the Anglican Church, many of the colonies forthwith created religious establishments of their own. He goes on to argue that the eventual acceptance of religious liberty, as evidenced in the writing of the establishment clause within the constitution, was more the result of the political necessity of dealing with religious pluralism than the lofty ideals of liberal philosophy.
liberty, I argue that it essentially represents a form of government favoritism of religion and poses no problem for democratic consolidation.\(^{19}\) While an established religion carries connotations of some form of state administration, e.g. the state appointment of Bishops, in its “purer,” subsidized form some states may choose to have an institutionally positive identification with one religion but avoid having any say as to how that religion operates, develops its theology or chooses its leaders. In many Catholic countries, instead of the term established, “confessional” is used to describe this identification of a state with religious belief. On account of its trans-national nature, the Catholic Church attempted to achieve high levels of government favoritism of religion in many countries without ceding any administration rights to the state, thus making it a confessional, but not exactly an established religion. During certain periods of time, in places like Italy, the Catholic Church won the right to freely appoint its own Bishops, university rectors and politicians, while in other countries, like Austria of yesteryear or China today, the state kept to an established model of national religion and asserted its right to appoint its own Bishops with or without the approval of the Vatican.

1.6 Two Hypotheses about Religion-State Arrangements and Democracy

To sum up, in order to satisfy Stepan’s (2001) conditions for the role of religion in democracies, regimes need to avoid establishing religions with no toleration of other religious beliefs or swinging the balance so much in favor of separation of religion and state that religious beliefs are persecuted. With respect to political rights, relatively high

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\(^{19}\) Fox (2008:87) argues something similar by creating a “near” separation of religion and state category to describe these kinds of established religions.
levels of government favoritism of religion do not exclude the protection of a pluralistic set of religious beliefs, but high levels of government regulation of religion do not offer this protection. Whether by repressing the public worship of certain sects, delegating the appointment of national clergy, or regulating religious and moral codes, government regulation of religion empowers the state to manage certain religious beliefs while prohibiting others. Government favoritism of religion, however, while actively identifying the state with, and thus encouraging some religious traditions over others, does not necessarily allow the state to manage the religious beliefs of those traditions.

While a potentially risky strategy, as Mazie (2004) writes is the case with the Jewish state of Israel, a democratic state may actively endorse one religious tradition of a majority of its citizens as essential to its national identity while simultaneously protecting the rights of minority groups to rally around their own traditions.

We can use these concepts of GRI and GFI to formulate two hypotheses about the relationship between religion-state arrangements and democracies and which kinds of religious interference with government or government interference with religion ought to be harmful for democracy and which are not, namely:

**Hypothesis 1:** States with higher levels of government regulation of religion (GRI), which discriminate and regulate either against religions and religious belief or on their behalf violate Stepan’s twin tolerations and are less likely to be democratic than those with lower levels of GRI.

However, we can also hypothesize that:

**Hypothesis 2:** To the extent that a government favors one religion without actively denying the liberties of any other, states do not violate Stepan’s twin tolerations. In other words, at reasonable levels of GRI, more or less government favoritism of religion (GFI) should have little effect on national levels of democracy.
These hypotheses also allow us to define what we mean by the terms “Religiously Friendly Democracy” and “Religiously Friendly Democratization Process:”

**Religiously Friendly Democracy:**

is defined by a democratic state which possesses relatively high levels of GFI and relatively low levels of GRI.

**Religiously Friendly Democratization Process:**

is a democratization process in which a state’s religion-state arrangements can be defined by a) levels of GFI which increase or remain relatively high and, simultaneously, b) levels of GRI which decrease or remain relatively low.

While any national religion-state arrangement could theoretically vary along either of these two dimensions as along a continuum (and as will be done later in the statistical analysis) a simple two-by-two table employing ideal categories helps illustrate these expectations with respect to GRI and GFI and democracy:
As the table suggests, the majority of the countries in the upper quadrants, with religion-state arrangements characterized by high levels of GRI, institutionalized either on behalf of religions (i.e. with high GFI) or against them (i.e. low GFI), are not democracies. While not all of the countries in the lower quadrants are democracies, on the other hand, many of them are. This includes the countries listed here in the lower righthand quadrant who possess relatively high levels of GFI and relatively low levels of GRI. The Catholic European countries highlighted in the previous section, whose religiously friendly democratization processes challenge many of the common assumptions about the role of religion in democracies, fall into this category of “religiously friendly democracies.” Several of these countries, prior to democratization,
could have been listed in the upper righthand quadrant, where many of the world’s predominantly Muslim countries lay today, and where religion-state arrangements can be typically characterized as possessing high levels of both GRI and GFI. The examples in the table make clear that religiously friendly democratizations do not represent the only possible path to democracy.\(^{20}\) However, the characteristics of countries in the lower righthand quadrant suggests that predominantly Muslim states with high levels of GFI and democratically hostile religious actors do not have to make it into the lower lefthand quadrant and successfully marginalize religious authorities and institutions in order to become democratic. Rather, as was the case with some of the Catholic countries in the lower righthand quadrant, a democratizing state might be able to enlist hostile religious leaders and their faithful to generate greater societal legitimacy for democracy through the institutionalization of religiously friendly democratic institutions.

The rest of this dissertation is devoted to modeling how religiously friendly democracies might generate such democratic legitimacy among hostile religious actors and what the societal effects of such religiously friendly institutions might look like in a democracy. Before doing so, however, the next chapter considers the limits of comparison between the hostility of Islam and Catholicism to democracy and how the different historical and institutional legacies of either’s varied historical traditions might shape the possibilities by which either’s hostility could be resolved in a democratic but religiously-friendly context.

\(^{20}\) The lower lefthand quadrant, with low levels of both GRI and GFI, not surprisingly, also includes many democratic regimes. These regimes host a wide variety of national religious markets, including religiously plural and robust religious markets like the United States and religiously monopolistic and weak religious markets like Uruguay and France. We will take a look at the relationship between religion-state arrangements and religious market structures and intensity a little more later on.
CHAPTER 2:

ISLAM AND CATHOLICISM: QUALIFYING DEMOCRATIC HOSTILITY

2.1 Introduction

Before attempting to answer the question of how a religiously friendly democratization process might resolve the hostilities of religious actors towards democracy, our last chapter took up the question of why a religiously friendly democracy is possible in the first place. In order to answer that question, we examined the biases against the role of religion in democracy which had become embedded over time in the models and normative expectations attached to theories about the transition of the Western political system from Christendom to constitutions. Theoretically, we argued that the procedural definitions of democracy did not require the total separation of religious and political institutions, as classical accounts of secularization and the traditions of liberal political philosophy came to assume. Empirically, we argued that many states in the West successfully democratized without such separation. In this respect, we highlighted the experience of several Catholic European states and noted how religious actors who had at first resisted democratic political arrangements later adapted to them following religiously friendly democratization processes. We ended the chapter by suggesting that instituting similarly religiously friendly governmental policies represents a viable strategy for diffusing the presupposed hostilities of Islam to democracy in some predominantly Muslim nations today.
This suggestion assumes that there is a reasonable level of comparability between 1) the nature of Islam and Catholicism as religions and 2) the nature of the hostility which actors in either tradition assume towards democracy. If Islam and Catholicism cannot be meaningfully compared as religions, or, even if they can, if the hostility of religious actors towards democracy in either tradition emanates from disparate sources, it is difficult to expect that a religiously friendly democratization process would have the same effects on religious actors in both a Catholic and Islamic setting. If, for example, Catholicism is an inherently more flexible religion than Islam is with respect to politics, or if Catholic hostility towards democracy is less theologically rooted than Muslim hostility, then we would have more reason to believe that Catholic actors, but not necessarily Muslim actors, could resolve their democratic hostilities in a religiously friendly democratization process. Or, even if a religiously friendly democratization did succeed in a predominantly Muslim setting, one might argue that its success had occurred for different and idiosyncratic reasons, not necessarily the same ones which produced success in a Catholic setting.

This chapter, therefore, considers these assumptions and qualifies the comparison between Islamic and Catholic experiences with democracy which the rest of the dissertation assumes. In order to do so, I will simultaneously mount two different claims about Islam and Catholicism and either’s relationship to democracy. First, I will argue that Islam and Catholicism share essential theological, historical and institutional characteristics as universalizing, transnational religions. Leaders in both traditions understood themselves to be the guardians of an ideal of an integral religious civilization for nearly 1000 years each, and similarly violent encounters between those religious
leaders and liberal political forces enabled similar kinds of theologically hostile responses on the part of religious actors to democratic ideas. Secondly, I will try to make clear that both Catholicism and Islam also possess a very large and complex set of theological and cultural resources which could be harnessed to support certain types of democratic reforms as well. In other words, even though either Catholic or Islamic hostility towards democracy could be understood as being shaped by their particular theological and historical traditions, those traditions are neither fixed nor determinative of one, ideal set of political institutions. While both Islamic and Catholic elites, at different times, have used theological arguments to justify hostility towards democracy, the origins of that hostility lay as much in the violent history of the way in which either encountered democratizing forces, as in their lack of theological affinities with democracy. Reframing this encounter between religion and democracy, I will argue in the next chapter, makes it more likely that affinities rather than tensions with democracy will be emphasized by religious leaders and adopted by the religiously faithful.

While arguing that the common origins and nature of this hostility reasonably justify the formulation of some general hypotheses about the effects of governmental favoritism towards hostile religions in new democracies, however, by exploring the differences between Islam and Catholicism, in this chapter, I also want to acknowledge how differences between either’s history and ideas and institutions affect the shape of that change, creating important variations within a general trend. As we argue at the end of the chapter, for example, the degree to which either religious tradition centralizes its structure of religious authority affects how much flexibility religious authorities have to adapt to new political contexts.
Many of the theoretical insights of the following chapter ought to help us understand the dynamics animating religiously friendly democratization processes in other, non-Muslim and non-Catholic countries who host democratically hostile, society-wide religions. Bounding our analysis to the experience of Islam and Catholicism with democracy, however, allows us to assume important combinations of theological, historical and institutional similarities which do not necessarily hold true in the experience of other democratically hostile religious traditions. It also allows us to focus on the experiences of the two largest religions of the world, each claiming around one billion adherents a piece.

Before moving on to discuss Islam and Catholicism’s comparability with respect to democracy, it is important to define in which ways I understand Islam and Catholicism to be religions, and which “Islam” and which “Catholicism” I am referring to here. The dissertation adopts Appleby’s (2000: 8) definition of religion, namely that,

Religion is the human response to a reality perceived as sacred...religion, as interpreter of the sacred, discloses and celebrates the transcendent source and significance of human existence...In a common formula: religion embraces a creed, a cult, a code of conduct, and a confessional community. A creed defines the standard of beliefs and values concerning the ultimate origin, meaning, and purpose of life. It develops from myths-symbol-laden narratives of sacred encounters- and finds official expression in doctrines and dogmas. Cult encompasses the prayers, devotions, spiritual disciplines, and patterns of communal worship that give richly suggestive ritual expression to the creed. A code of conduct defines the explicity moral norms governing the behavior of those who belong to the confessional community. Thus religion constitutes an integral culture, capable of forming personal and social identity and influencing subsequent experience and behavior in profound ways.

I also adopt Appleby’s (2000: 9) definition of religious actors as,

People who have been formed by a religious community and who are acting with the intent to uphold, extend, or defend its values and precepts.
It should be noted here that Catholicism could be considered as one autonomous variant of a larger creed, cult, code and community among many pertaining to the religion of Christianity, just as Islam as a religion contains many important codes and communities itself, including, importantly, various versions of Sunni or Shi’a Islam. What is more, within Sunni Islam or even the most hierarchical Roman Catholic Church, Appebly’s doctrines and dogmas, disciplines and worship traditions can vary widely from one national context to another and, within nations, from one local setting to another often in openly contradicting and competing ways. Despite this rich variety and internal pluralism within either religion, what is important for this dissertation is how a similarly shared ideal of a transnational, religious-political civilization in both traditions can be characterized as similarly shaping reactions of religious leaders to liberalism and the modern state. The dissertation does not assume that the reactions of these religious actors were the “theologically correct” reactions to democracy; nor that they represented the only religious reactions to democracy possible; nor that these reactions were uncontested by other religious leaders within either’s own tradition. The aim of this chapter is simply to establish the comparability of the religious-cultural backdrop which made it possible for Catholic and Muslim actors to take a hostile stance against democracy in a manner which resonated with either’s religious faithful because of the way it appealed to an historical, if idealized, narrative of a religious past. In what follows I hope to make clear in what ways I distinguish the set of religious beliefs and historical traditions attributed to Catholicism in Western Europe as different from those attributed to Protestantism in Europe with implications for either’s congruence with or hostility towards liberalism. With regards to Islam, I am primarily concerned here with the historical legacies linked
to the encounter of Sunni Islam with liberalism and democracy in the Middle East and North Africa and the type of hostility between them which followed. In many ways the dynamics of these historical legacies can be extended to the Shi’a Islamic world as well, although important institutional differences affect those dynamics. Where appropriate I will try to point out the consequences which follow from these theological-historical institutional differences from within Islam.

The rest of this chapter will proceed as follows: In the first section, I will examine the nature of the hostility towards democracy which has been generated in both Catholic and Islamic traditions. I consider the argument that the hostility of Islam and Islamic political actors and movements towards democracy is essentially different and harder, if not impossible, to resolve than the hostility towards democracy enabled by Catholicism and Catholic political actors and movements.

The second section discounts this argument. In order to do so, the section focuses on the characteristics which Islam and Catholicism share as religions and the similar ways in which Muslim and Catholic leaders, theologians and their faithful understood the proper public and political role of their religions throughout the long political periods which we could define as Christendom in Europe and Dar al-Islam\textsuperscript{21} in the Middle East and North Africa. The section then considers how such a shared ideal affected similar responses of religious actors within either religion to the challenge that liberalism and the modern nation-state implicitly and explicitly posed to such an ideal.

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\textsuperscript{21} Meaning, literally, the “house of Islam.”
Even as it justifies shared expectations about the ability of religiously friendly democratization processes to resolve democratic hostilities in Islam and Catholicism, the final section discusses how such an account leaves ample room for taking into consideration how either religion’s differences affect the shape of how, as opposed to whether, religious actors might be successfully incorporated into democratic institutions and influence the future of democratic life.

2.2 Defining Hostilities

2.2.1 Catholicism and Democratic Hostility

In the last chapter, we began to describe some of the key forces directing the monumental political, social and economic changes in the political transition of the West from the world of Christendom to constitutions. The temporal authority of the Catholic Church was challenged and upended in this transition, as political authorities shed themselves of any need for religious approval or sacramental anointment which had given the Church a seat at the fulcrum of Christendom in the first place. The chapter introduced two responses of the Catholic Church to this transition towards democratic politics: at first, explicit hostility and then, sometimes, for reasons will explore more in the next chapter, adaption.

As we noted in the first chapter, this transformation did not happen spontaneously, as state leaders and democratizing elites forcibly tried to depose the Catholic Church of its material powers and direct influence over society. The anticlericalism associated with liberal republicanism in the 19th and early 20th centuries had
close battle cries to that of the religious wars which had earlier ravaged Europe in the 16th and 17th centuries. Like independent Protestant kings had done then, anti-clerical liberals were fiercely focused on banishing the material, organizational and spiritual power of the Roman Popes. Anti-clerical partisans in places like France, Spain and Italy took over religiously supported regimes by force, with armies, and deposed Kings, clerical structures, religious associations, educational facilities, and much more in an attempt to establish the authority of the secular state and liberate it from the influence of the institutions of the Catholic Church.

This violent encounter between Catholicism and liberalism set Catholic pontiffs rigidly against liberal democratic politics for nearly a century and exaggerated the distance between the ideals of democratizing liberal forces and the ideals of Catholic Church leaders. As it struggled against the modern reorganization of politics and society in Europe, the Catholic Church refused to renounce its political ideal as the ultimate and exclusive moral keeper of truth within a state which recognized God and the moral, social and political authority of the Catholic Church. Even when Church leaders did begin to conditionally urge their faithful to participate in liberal politics and vote in democratic elections, in the late 1800s and early 1900s, the Catholic Church did not endorse the rights of freedom of conscience or religious pluralism. It defended the use of state power to buttress laws which required citizens to submit to the moral authority of the Catholic Church; to prevent evangelization attempts by non-Catholic religious leaders; and to block rival political forces and parties which challenged these privileges. As the Church began to compromise with liberal leaders, the deals they struck, for example, as in the case of Belgium, giving the Church the mandate to direct religious education in all public
schools, remained democratically suspect and seen as political losses for liberal
democratic forces (Gould 1999). Until the major theological reforms adopted by the
Catholic Church in the 1960s at the Second Vatican Council, which accepted religious
pluralism and freedom of conscience as desirable democratic rights, the goals of Catholic
political forces, thus, continued to be implicitly and, at times, explicitly, hostile to the
consolidation of liberal democratic institutions and the idea of an ideologically neutral
state free from the influence of unelected religious authorities. We could define this
hostility as a function of the religious exclusivity proposed at the heart of Catholic politics
of the time, which a) refused the legitimacy of non-religious political parties and
candidates and b) violated fundamental democratic rights which guarantee freedom for
plural religious belief, expression and association.

When the Catholic Church finally endorsed democratic politics fully, they had
access to important theological resources and historical experiences which made such
reconciliation possible. It could be argued, in fact, that the final undoing of religiously-
ordained authoritarian politics in Europe, through the rise of liberalism, came from within
Christianity itself, through the Protestant Reformation and its use of religious sources
which the Catholic Church could have claimed as their own. As we began to describe in
the first chapter, by deconstructing the spiritual authority of the hierarchy of the Catholic
Church, the Reformation helped create the individual sense of calling (Weber 1978) and
societal self-discipline (Gorski 2003) which would animate many of the political and
economic reforms of liberalism. It also laid the groundwork for the protection of an
individual’s personal freedom of conscience and set the entrepreneurial capacities of the
individual free of the oppressive nature of the authoritarian, centralized pyramid of
spiritual power over individuals which Rome had acquired through the centuries. As scholars from Weber (1958) to Banfield (1958), Almond and Gabriel (1963), and Putnam (1993) have argued, this strict hierarchy had encouraged a verticalization of Catholic societies which was anathema to the promotion of mutual trust, individual political choice, and freedoms of speech and association that helped “make democracy work” (see, especially, Putnam 1993, 2000).

Even as it set Protestantism on a course which would more favorably dispose Protestant societies to liberal political reforms, Luther’s protest of pontifical political power, however, was primarily an appeal to the Catholic Church to reform themselves through a more direct reading of the scriptures. In doing so, Luther criticized the Catholic Church’s institutional evolution towards political arrangements which had encouraged spiritual leaders to corrupt themselves in material power. The Catholic Church had done this by investing spiritual offices, like bishoprics, with political power and by directly associating worldly success with heavenly success, through, especially, the selling of indulgences for the remission of sins. In his challenge of the political corruption of the Catholic Church, Luther could turn to the early history of Christianity and a wealth of theological resources which reminded the Christian just how different he was from, and how wary he should remain of, earthy kingdoms. Before the Catholic Church became explicitly identified with a political regime through the Roman emperor Constantine, Christians had rejoiced in their rejection by the world’s political powers throughout the first 300 years of church history. Christians had welcomed this rejection as a mark of

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22 In 312, following a vision on the eve of battle in which he saw the phrase in hoc signo vinces appear above a cross, Constantine put the sign on his battle standards, conquered a rival army in the name of Christ and forced his subjects to convert to Christianity.
their belonging to the heavenly kingdom revealed to them in the life of Jesus of Nazareth who was himself rejected by the world and put to death by the Roman Empire. Jesus taught that Christians would have to lose their life to gain the heavenly kingdom,\textsuperscript{23} and he refused to use his power or popularity to establish any political order on this earth.\textsuperscript{24} Jesus also encouraged his followers to remember to keep their political responsibilities distinct from their spiritual ones, commanding them to, “Give to Caesar what is Caesar’s and to God what is God’s” (Mt 22:21\textsuperscript{25}). Giving to Caesar his due could be read as helping to favorably dispose Christianity towards differentiation, and to keeping the political and divine spheres as distinct as liberal democracy does. In this light, the monastic tradition and even the institutionalization of the Church’s clerical hierarchy could be interpreted as attempts to articulate the Church’s otherliness, and its separate nature from political authority, making it clearer that the Church’s first allegiance was to what Augustine had distinguished as the divine “city of God” opposed to the political “city of man.” In this respect, therefore, the Protestant Reformation could be understood as a lengthy corrective to an institutionalized relationship between religion and politics which had led to spiritual and political corruption. This reform finally reached the Catholic Church at the Second Vatican Council, in which the Catholic hierarchy voted to make itself more ideationally

\textsuperscript{23} See, for example, Lk 9:23-24, “If anyone desires to come after me, let him deny himself, and take up his cross daily, and follow me. For whoever desires to save his life will lose it, but whoever loses his life for my sake will save it.”

\textsuperscript{24} Saying to the Roman Procurate Pontius Pilate, “My Kingdom is not of this world. If my Kingdom were of this world, my servants would fight, so that I should not be delivered to the Jews; but now my kingdom is not from here.” (Jn 18:36, see also Mt 26:43).

\textsuperscript{25} Or, alternatively, Lk 20:25 or Mk 12:17.
and institutionally similar to Protestantism and, thus, by extension, to the early Christian Church.\textsuperscript{26}

2.2.2 Islam and Democratic Hostility.

As was the case with the experience of Catholicism with democracy, many religious leaders in the predominantly Muslim world have also resisted the institutionalization of democracy. Some scholars have argued that the theological incompatibilities and historical record behind Islamic hostility towards democracy have made it much more difficult, if not impossible, for Muslim-religious political leaders to adapt to and become mutually supportive of democratic ideals and institutions (Lewis 1990, Huntington 1996, Kramer 1997). Whether or not Islamic religious leaders claim to support democratic ideas and institutions, these arguments claim that political movements animated by the desire to institute more Islam in politics, as do Islamists today, will be fundamentally anti-democratic. Arguments of this type often focus on the way in which religious and political authority was infused together in the leadership of the prophet Muhammed, in addition to those Qur’anic verses and theological traditions which were used to defend the ideal of a unified religious-political community in Dar al-Islam (Huntington 1996: 177).

\textsuperscript{26} The Protestant-izing reforms of Vatican II, in turn, liberated Catholics all over the world to embrace democratic rights and institutions and, it has been argued, as a result, to protest authoritarian politics, making the Catholic Church one of the great agents of change behind the third wave of democracy throughout the 1970s and 1980s (Huntington 1991 and Philpott 2003).
Whereas the founder of Christianity and, tradition tells us, most of his original disciples were martyred for their spiritual claims, the Prophet Muhammad and his four companions who succeeded him as religious and patriarchic authorities of the Muslim community were successful conquerors and military leaders. Rather than giving to Caesar what is Caesar’s and to God what is God’s, as Huntington and others point out (Huntington 1996: 210, Lewis 1990:1), Muhammad’s establishment of a just, earthly city blur the lines between Caesar and God and makes it much harder to justify a political order whose legitimacy resides in a constitutional contract with “the people” rather than in an explicit submission to the sovereignty of God’s authority and his stewards on this earth. Perhaps one of the most famously referenced scriptural support for such a claim is 39:6 of the Qur’an which says:

He created you from a single cell,  
Then from it created its mate...  
He formed you in the mother’s womb,  
Formation after formation  
In three (veils of ) darkness.  
He is God your Lord.  
His is the kingdom.  
There is no god other than He.

Here, “kingdom,” Hakiyymah in the Arabic, is often translated as “sovereignty,” but not without controversy. These verses allow Islamic political leaders to claim that there is no legitimate political authority outside the authority of God and to justify a


28 Often cited is also verse 2:25 of the Qur’an: “He to whom belongs the kingdom of the heavens and the earth/ Who has neither begotten a son /Nor has He a partner in His kingdom/ (who) created every thing/ And determined its exact measure.”

29 Addi (1994), for example, argues that sovereignty was not yet an invented concept or word at the time the Qur’an was written down, and he uses that reflection to create a different meaning of Hakiyymah which is less politically restraining than “sovereignty.”
political project bent on uniting religious and state institutions and endowing unelected religious officials with ultimate political authority. An Islamic state would also call for the full application of Islamic Shari’a law, which would grant wide powers to non-elected religious authorities to marginalize the individual rights of secular and other (and less) religious citizens by criminalizing their non-Islamic conduct and reducing their rights to express and organize freely, fundamental rights needed to guarantee free and competitive elections in the first place (Kramer 1997). Rather than playing the part of a loyal opposition to elected, non-religious governments, Islamist parties of this inclination, it is argued, would attempt to mobilize enough religious faithful to vote in a confessional-authoritarian Islamic state.

The outward appearance of this hostility seems close to that adopted Catholicism towards democracy in the 19th and early 20th centuries in Europe: both religion’s hostility could be described as a function of their claims to religious exclusivity within the nation and either’s ideal of a political state which defended and protected such exclusivity. The theological underpinnings of Islamist rankling against democracy and their defense of a political order which institutes Shari’a law, however, has led many to wonder whether Islam as a whole could ever really reconcile with democracy, as the Catholic Church seems to have done. Whether they explicitly denounce democratic politics or not, therefore, many scholars, policy-makers and potential voters to suspect any Islamist who publically announces he is favorable towards democracy. For many, “democratic” Islamists are the worst Islamists of all and stand the greatest chance of blocking a nation from democratizing, because of the way they enter politics as wolves in sheep’s (electoral) clothing, just like fascists and Nazis did in early 20th century Europe (see
discussion, e.g. Wickham 2004). Or, as a prestigious Algerian academic who wishes to remain anonymous told me,

Islamists are liars, they are very good at lying, they have a special talent for lying. I would say they are genius liars.\(^\text{30}\)

What is more, it could be argued that this hostility is even further compounded in the Islamic tradition because, unlike in the case of Catholicism, liberalism and democratic politics came to Islam from \textit{without}, and in the form of conquest. While Catholic actors did not like the arrival of democracy and its challenge of the Church’s religious and political authority, at least that challenge was made by fellow Christians and countrymen who spoke a similar cultural and historical language. In the Middle East and North Africa, on the other hand, democracy could always be charged with the politically corrosive label of “foreign.” The region’s first introduction to liberal democratic statecraft came in the form of colonization by European countries whose liberal politicians marginalized, discriminated and repressed them. In a particularly striking example, as we will explore more below, the separation of religion and state instituted at home (i.e. France) in the French colonies was intentionally ignored in order to insure that Muslim religious authorities were directly managed by a non-Muslim, French colonial government. Thus, not only were Muslims in French (liberal) colonies treated as second class citizens, the administration they came to associate with French liberal politics was one that required the total submission of religious authority to a non-religious state. Not surprisingly, many of the early opponents of colonialization and the forerunners of Arab National movements were Muslim religious leaders.

\(^{30}\) Interview with author, Algiers, Algeria, March 11th, 2009.
With the advent of decolonization, the Arab Nationalist politicians who took over power in many Middle Eastern countries selectively appropriated much of the liberal and socialist discourses of the West for what they defined to be an Arabic, Islamic context. The same Arab Nationalist rulers who had greatly benefited from the support of religious leaders, however, systematically began to marginalize and manipulate them for their own political ends. These politicians often enshrined Islam in their founding national constitutions as the official religion of state, yet, as colonial governments had done before them, they used such an enshrinement as a pretext to control the religious economy of the country for their own ends, by ordering religious leaders to bless and legitimate their political projects and woes. As they had done with the French and the British before them, religious leaders were able to accuse their political leaders of marginalizing religion within Arab society. They were then able to link that marginalization to Western (democratic) institutions and ideas, in the form of the enormously potent charge of neo-colonialism. This accusation charged Arab Nationalists with being worse traitors to Arab society than the colonialists, by defiling the spoils of revolution and liberation and selling themselves out to the West. Sometimes this led religious leaders to totally denounce democracy in any form, but when they did not wholly reject democracy, as in the Iranian Revolution, they called for democracy’s purification through religion in the establishment of a truly Islamic republic which would endow religious leaders with wide political powers.
2.3 Similarities: Dar al-Islam, Christendom and Liberal Rupture

2.3.1 Religions and Multivocality

These alternate theological, historical and institutional experiences of Islam and Catholicism with respect to democracy describe differences that matter for understanding how faithful Muslims and Catholics perceive and pursue the ideal place of religion in society. Focusing solely on these differences, however, obscures just how meaningfully Islam and Catholicism can be compared and the characteristics that Islam and Catholicism share as religions which can be defined originally and ontologically, as in Appleby’s formulation, with respect to a set of beliefs and practices that refers to the transcendent and here, specifically, with God.

Islam and Catholicism are, thus, transnational, monotheistic, Abrahamic, religions. They are religions whose doctrines of faith aspire to universality and, as such, both Islam and Catholicism share a strong religious impetus to evangelize and spread to every culture of the earth. They are also religions of a “book,” who have received, in custody, a revelation of truth that was subsequently (or immediately in the case of Islam) written down in a canon of sacred scripture. However, in order to evangelize in a way that is accessible to so many cultures, their respective sacred books, the Bible and the Qur’an, have needed to be translated and ultimately interpreted in myriad different ways. This universal urge of both religions have led Islamic and Catholic leaders to adapt these narratives over time to local practices. As Laitin (1986) has written, most of the cache of

31 Notwithstanding the differences in how that transnationalism is institutionalized.
symbols given by any religion can be instrumentally employed with a variety of political regime types, and over the centuries Muslim and Catholic societies have produced variegated options for organizing the arrangement of religious and political power in specific societal arenas.

This shared status as historical, universalizing religions sets both Catholicism and Islam apart from other universalizing non-religious political ideologies, such as liberalism, fascism, and communism. While deeply concerned with the *hic et nunc*, the ultimate goal of both religions is with transcendant, spiritual reality. Their worldly and other-worldly visions do not sit in one-to-one correspondence with a singular political or institutional vision. As long as it is possible to achieve spiritual goals, religious actors are structurally flexible over time, as we began to note in the Habermas quote from chapter one, and they need to be characterized as being “multi-vocal” entities (Stepan 2001). Reducing religion to a political ideology whose function is to simply rule, coerce or organize power, as many scholars do, ignores the avowed spiritual goals and origins of religions as a set of beliefs about the supernatural (see discussion in Bellin 2008), and constrains our ability to understand the longevity of either Islam or Catholicism and their ability to survive the rise and fall of a number of political ideologies for organizing power over the centuries.

As expected by Laitin or Stepan, we could trace how the exact political formation and religious organization of both religions evolved throughout the centuries, as did trends in theology, culture and politics, building up, over time, a large repertoire of symbolic and ideational resources for either to mine. However, it is equally important to recognize that this political variation was always directed to a certain, more or less fixed,
core, celestial vision, premised on the written set of revealed truth, found in either the Bible or the Qur'an. Over the centuries, religious leaders in both religions have sought to preserve as well as translate the important values, ethics and beliefs which are central to the revealed truth of their religious faith.

Despite either’s multivocality, therefore, the universal urge to share this truth and to protect it also led religious leaders to use their moral and spiritual authority to seek out the hegemonic societal status they enjoyed in Christendom and Dar al-Islam by collaborating intimately and often corruptly with monarchical, authoritarian and sultanistic regimes in the name of morality and order (Esposito and Voll 1994, Appleby 2000). The morality and order religious leaders promoted and the divine anointing they accorded political leaders turned out to be very useful for authoritarian rulers as well, to conquer, unite, subdue and sustain vast geographic territories. From around 700 (but much earlier than that in Christianity) to about 1500 AD, this alliance of religion and politics consolidated into two distinct religious civilizations, that of the Christendom of Catholic Europe and the Dar al-Islam of the Islamic Middle East. As the animating forces of these civilizational projects, Islam and Catholicism were the unchallenged background ether which provided a logic and meaning to social morality and political reality; endorsed a specific ordering of the universe that was ultimately directed towards God; and mediated the powerful forces of darkness in the world.

These ideals of either civilization were also, crucially, pre-Westphalian, transnational ideals. The idea of either a United Christendom or a Dar al-Islam in which the living body of Christians defined as “the church” or the entire body of Muslims defined as “the Umma” lived their faith protected and unchallenged was not wedded to,
or certainly under the control of, one national, sovereign state. Even when wars, occupations and schisms hardened down the identification of political-religious projects of faith to specific nations and gave rise to the supremacy of the nation-state and political authority over religious authority, this transnational ideal remained for Islam and Catholicism. The Umma residing in Dar al-Islam or the idea of a Catholic Civilization on earth continued to exist in the collective Islamic and Catholic memory and successive political projects were welcome to tap into it for political mobilization.

2.3.2 Theological Hierarchies

These shared characteristics re-frame the theological differences between Islam and Catholicism which we began to consider above, especially with respect to their traditions regarding the separation of religion and state. On the one hand, Huntington et al are right: since the beginning of Christianity there has been a tradition distinguishing between two distinct spheres of reality, one divine and one secular. What these political scholars often miss, however, is that those two spheres were always intrinsically connected to one another and there was a clear order to the two. Augustine does articulate a city of God in contradistinction to a city of man, but the city of man was meant to draw on the city of God, imitate it, approach it and submit to its moral ordering as best it could in a fallen world of sin. Thus, we can talk about a political versus a spiritual sphere in Christendom, and some division of labor between them, but these two spheres were united under the authority of one sovereign God and directed towards his purposes.

32 And influenced by the Greeks before them.
Some verses from the New Testament, in fact, approach the Quranic verses referenced above in that they both place sovereignty squarely with God alone, bringing into question the strict separation of religion and politics Huntington (1996) and others attribute to Christianity’s scriptural DNA. These include Jesus’ response to the Roman procurator Pontius Pilate,

>You could have no power at all against me unless it had been given you from above (Jn 19:10).

And the Apostle Paul’s advice from Romans (13:1-2),

>Let every soul be subject to the governing authorities. For there is no authority except from God, and the authorities that exist are appointed by God. Therefore whoever resists the authority resists the ordinance of God and those who resist will bring judgment on themselves.

This political-social reality radically changes the context for understanding Matthew’s verse, one in which God and Caesar have neither equal nor independent roles. It can be read as advice for Christian individuals to resist immoral governments as well as for Christian rulers to remember that their authority has religious responsibilities attached to it. On the one hand, therefore, these verses can be interpreted as a justification of Christian hostility towards secular governments which do not respect the sovereignty of God. As Cavanaugh points out in his wittily entitled article, “If you give to God what is God’s is there anything leftover for Caesar?”(2009), the early Christian Church understood Matthew’s verse in this manner and resisted the state when it ordered them to act against the moral and social order of their community of religious faith. Thus, even though they did not explicitly attempt to establish a theological-political order, early Christians were not considered to be ideal citizens and were persecuted and killed for...
challenging the governmental order of the day when they refused to recognize the political supremacy of the state. Popular martyrs of the first and second century, for example, were executed for refusing to worship Caesar or his gods (Stephen and the apostles); refusing to fight as soldiers (Marcellus); or marry non-Christian Roman nobles (Agatha and Lucy). Paul ardently sought to institutionalize these traditions of religious authority and order within Christian communities. While he exhorts all the great Christian virtues of love, mercy, forgiveness, and gentleness, in order to establish this religious authority, Paul’s letters are also very explicit about the need to discipline, judge and even cast members out of the Christian community to protect the community from the dangers and temptations of immorality and untruth.33

On the other hand, however, the above verses can also be understood as an exhortation by Paul to encourage obedience to political rulers who do recognize that their authority derives from their function as God’s ministers on earth. Therefore, when Constantine proclaimed Christianity as the religion of the empire, and Caesar became the servant and defender of God’s revealed truth on earth, he resolved the political dilemma of the early Christian Church which had sometimes pitted them against state authorities. By assuming the duty to enforce the power of judgment over the Christian community (now also the political community) that Paul and the early church accorded to religious authorities, the Christian political ruler transfers the position of authority within the religious community to the political community. Thus, in the person of Constantine, whatever dichotomy was left in Matthew’s verse is lost and giving to Caesar also

33 See, for example, 1 Cor. 5:11, “Now I have written to you not to keep company with anyone named a brother, who is sexually immoral, or covetous, or an idolater, or a reviler, or a drunkard, or an extortioner- not even to eat with such a person.”
becomes giving to God, modulating Cavanaugh’s observation to, “If you want to give to God what is God’s give everything to Caesar.”

In the Islamic tradition, from the time of Dar al-Islam, we can discern a similar distinction between the recognition of various spheres of reality (and the proper competencies or specializations within those spheres) as opposed to a shared understanding of the hierarchy between those spheres, which, again, in theory, placed the divine above the material.

Lapidus describes this distinction in the Islamic tradition as a de facto separation of religion and state (1975). Even in the most idealized days of the Caliphate, the Caliph, who held the title as defender of the faith and ultimate authority of the land, did not make theological pronouncements and rarely ventured into the fields of theology or morality or ethics (Lapidus 1975). Even though they were institutionally de-centralized as an authority and often politically weak, this meant that the Ulema enjoyed high symbolic power as the guarantor on the divine mandate of the Caliph and the just order of his rule. Like in Christendom, rulers within Dar al-Islam were theoretically beholden to a higher divine power and their earthly rule was subject to certain obligations and responsibilities to God and his faithful believers. The Ulema’s power derived from their status as the interpreters or spokesmen for determining whether those obligations were being fulfilled. These responsibilities, including the need for ruling in a manner which consulted (shura) and found consensus (ijma) among the people by ruling justly, providing certain social rights and guaranteeing the protection of strangers and non-Muslims, \(^{34}\) provided some

\(^{34}\) Here the Quranic verse 2:256, “There is no compulsion in matters of faith,” and 88: 23 “Thou hast no authority to compel them” are often used to justify such protection. Charfi (2000: 162) also points
basis of a social contract between ruler and ruled, as well as some check on the ruler’s political power. While affirming the virtue of public order, these divinely mandated responsibilities also provided resources which many scholars have argued could be used to justify some democratic reforms (Esposito and Voll 1996, Addi 1994, Charfi 2000).

As in the case of Christendom, the Ulema often simply rubber-stamped political projects, but, Lapidus notes (1975, 2002), the ideal of the Ulema’s right to contest unjust political power remained and, especially in earlier times, was occasionally seized upon to protest or revolt against unpopular regimes. Ibn Khaldun’s famous theory of urban-rural cycles of reform, in which rural reformers animated by religious purity and justice periodically overthrow urban, cosmopolitan, elite rulers, who become corrupt, lazy and out of touch over time illustrates this tradition well. Khaldun’s theory acknowledges the expectation of religious authority to challenge unjust rule as well as the necessity for material power to remain subject to higher, spiritual laws in order to rule effectively, thus requiring the occasional purification (Eisenstadt 2002).

The potential of the Ulema to challenge political power was increased by their authority in society. As Eisenstadt (2002) notes, the Ulema, in their function as interpreters of Qur’anic law, had immense power over the interaction of relationships and mores in society and were turned to in all matters of everyday life for guidance and advice. Traditionally, the Sultan or Caliph allowed the Ulema this independence and profited from the ability of their religious authorities to keep the social peace. In Shi’a Islam where this authority is even more institutionalized, the clergy’s independence and

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to 10: 100, “And it thy Lord had enforced His will, surely, all who are on the earth would have believed together. Wilt thou, then, force men to become believers?”
potential for contestation was even greater (Kepel 1994). Eisenstadt goes as far as describing the Ulema as the keepers of the public sphere in Islamic societies, making them one of the only sources of authority independent of state rule (see also Kepel 1994 and Salvatore and Eickelman 2004). This created an alternative set of allegiances for citizens, increasing the potential of the Ulema to mobilize and challenge the authority of the state and insuring the primacy of the divine sphere over the material as well as the Ulema’s authority as guardians and interpreters of the revealed Truth of the former.

Therefore, while the tradition may have been less theologically articulated in Islam (Brown 2000) we can conclude with Lapidus (1980, as quoted in Esposito and Voll 1996: 45), that,

Though the modalities of “state” and “religion” in the Islamic world are quite different from those of “state” and “church” in the West, Islamic society, in fact, if not in its own theory, is one of those societies in which religious and political institutions are separate.

Yet, we can also conclude that in Dar al-Islam and Christendom that separation had a clear order to it in which religious authority (and not the state) represented the ideologically non-neutral, final arbiter over the moral economy and political discourse of the nation. As Fregosi writes (1994), despite their historical differences and despite the birth of Luther, in this respect, it is nearly impossible to compare Islam and Catholicism between 700 and 1500 and argue that one was more disposed than the other to generating democratic institutions and ideas. This should not make us forget the alternative resources either Islam or Catholicism had at its disposition to contest authoritarian politics- whether the early years of the Catholic Church and its institutional articulation of distinct spheres or Islamic traditions of consensus, consultation, non-compulsion and
equality. For both Catholicism and Islam, however, the introduction of substantive liberal versions of democracy represented a frontal assault, a tearing asunder, a radical break which attempted to root out a centuries-old way of life where the state ensured religious orthodoxy, promoted the regeneration of religious Truth and bowed to a moral ordering mandated by God and preserved by religious authorities. In the words of Marty and Appleby (1993), this led to striking “family resemblances” in the types of theological arguments that Catholic and Muslim leaders have selected from their traditions to support that hostility. At the same time, it seems reasonable to theorize that given the favorable circumstances Islamic and Catholic political leaders who are locked in contestation with a secular state could also sustainably exploit those affinities with democracy that already exist within Islam. We will examine more closely how some religious-political leaders are in the process of doing so in the contemporary case of Algeria.\footnote{As Charfi (2000: 188) writes in this respect, “Since the century of the Enlightenment, the combat for liberty was directed against the monarchy in its representation of authoritarian state and divine law, two notions which were intimately connected. Democracy could not truly install itself durably in Europe until after the affirmation and application of the neutrality of the state towards religion. The Church resisted such things as much as it could in this evolution until it then accepted them. At such a point, Christian thinkers found this old principle within their patrimony, that it was necessary to give to Caesar what was Caesar’s and to God what is God’s, a principle which was forgotten for many long years but today is quite welcome. Muslim theologians cannot find such a principle from within our patrimony because circumstances have not favored its emergence.”}

2.3.3 What about Protestants and Democracy?

To sum up where we have come so far, we could now argue that what sets Islam and Catholicism apart from Protestantism in their hostility towards democracy is not just Protestantism’s favorable institutional or theological dispositions towards democracy, elements of which both Islam (in its decentralized clerical organization and emphasis on
the discipline required for personal salvation) and Catholicism (in its shared heritage of
the early Christian church and articulation of distinct spheres inherited from Augustine)
share, but the combination of all of those elements with the pace and growth of liberal
thoughts and democratic institutions in the Protestant countries of Europe.

The Protestant Reformation did not immediately produce democratic and
economic flourishing. The original aim, in some sense, of Luther and other reformers was
to make religious faith more purely and wholly guiding of humans’ lives, not less, and
the reformation spawned Calvin’s 1500s caesaropapist\textsuperscript{36} regime of Geneva, which
inflicted severe punishments on any citizen who broke the moral code Calvin had
instituted, before it spawned the United States. However, the reformation created a
certain congruence\textsuperscript{37} between the goals of both religious and political authorities and their
desire to break up religious authority’s unhealthy association with political authority.
Such separation helped religious authorities to shift the focus of devotion from public
acts of religious conformity to the pursuit of personal salvation, and to insulate
themselves from the temptation to corruption and excess by which the Catholic Church
had forsaken its divine mandate for a political-material one. The same separation allowed
political authorities to break all political responsibilities with the Popes in Rome which
had hitherto blocked the consolidation of state power away from religious power.

Later, as liberal ideas and democratic institutions evolved in Protestant Europe,
this congruence meant that the separation of religion and state required to institute the
authority of elected officials over liberal political regimes was a matter of degree, not

\textsuperscript{36} Calvin’s Geneva serves as Linz’s classic example of caesaropapist authoritarianism (1975).

\textsuperscript{37} What Kuru (2008) terms ideational and institutional bridges.
fact, and did not entail a dis-establishment of religion, but, rather, a proper separation of those spheres. In Protestant countries, liberal reform did not imply the rooting out of a 1000 years of religious tradition, but the appropriate shaping of a new one. In the Catholic countries of Europe, on the other hand, the same reforms required the dislodging of the international power of the Catholic Church, making liberal projects synonymous with the dis-establishment of a national faith tradition. Likewise, in Muslim countries, the rise of liberal state politics, first through colonialization and then Arab National regimes, was also equated with the violent marginalization of the moral authority of Muslim religious leaders and the uprooting of centuries of religious-political tradition.

2.4 One Final Observation

So far we have argued that despite differences in theological doctrines, historical experiences and the timing of either Catholicism or Islam’s encounter with liberal democracy, the causes and nature of Islamic and Catholic hostility to democracy are strikingly similar because of overriding ontological similarities as universalizing religions and as the historical guardians of pre-Westphalian religious-political orders. It is,

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38 This does not imply that there was no anticlericalism in Protestant countries, see, among others, Lipset and Rokkan’s (1967) description of the political effects of church-state tensions in the Netherlands, but, for these reasons, I argue it was simply not the same order of scale as in Catholic countries. It is interesting to note here that the archetypal example of liberalism springing from the blood of revolution in Europe comes from the Catholic country of France and is associated with anti-clericalism. This can be opposed to the archtypal case of Protestant England where liberalism evolved over years in successive reforms.
therefore, reasonable to expect that attempts to affect that hostility through negotiation or force would have similar effects as well.

In the next chapters we will examine more closely how some of the institutional and historical differences between Islam and Catholicism and their encounter with democracy might combine with religiously friendly government politics to reinforce or weaken the chances of democracy’s success in any national setting, as the cases of Italy and Algeria will illustrate. In this respect, particular emphasis will be paid on 1) how the variation in economic fortunes and failures specific to the histories of Catholic and Muslim states will affect the chances that a religiously friendly democratization process will be successful, and 2) how the confessional nature of Catholicism’s clerical structure might affect the shape and intensity of religious authority in a religiously friendly democratic setting differently from the established nature of Islam’s clerical organization.

Before moving on to do so, however, and without veering too far from this dissertation’s avowed focus on what happens after religiously friendly democratization occurs, I would like to make one final note about how these clerical institutional differences may affect the ability of a predominantly Muslim state to initiate a religiously friendly democracy in the first place. Without questioning the premise that Islam has historical and theological affinities with democracy, some scholars have questioned whether these differences in clerical institutional arrangements has made it more difficult for state authorities to clearly negotiate and make compromises with Muslim actors, as states had been able to do with respect to Catholic actors.

In his study of religion, democracy and politics in Belgium and Algeria, for example, Kalyvas (2000) noted that one of the greatest problems which plagued the early
negotiations over democratization between religious and state leaders in Algeria stemmed from the decentralized nature of religious authority in Islam. Who has credible authority in Algerian Islam? Or, in any nation, who has the power to speak in the name of the entire Umma, and negotiate deals with state leaders and deliver on them? For Kalyvas there was an inherent, relative problem of credibility in Islam in Algeria with respect to Catholicism in Belgium. Due to the institutionalization of rank and authority in Catholicism, it was clear that once the liberal Belgian state had made a deal with the Pope, the Pope’s bishops and faithful in Belgium would most likely rally around that decision. The claim of the Kalyvas hypothesis, therefore, is that it is more difficult to negotiate credible compromises between democracy and religion in Muslim as opposed to Catholic countries. While it is incorrect to say that there is no hierarchy of religious authority in Islam, even in Sunni Islam, the body of authority which pushes forward the religious tradition of a country is more disperse in Islam than Catholicism, and even more disperse in Sunni as opposed to Shi’a Islam. 39

Despite this difference, Kalyvas’ observation is a sword which cuts both ways. Even while the decentralization of authority in Islam makes negotiations messier and more multifaceted, involving more personalities and ideas, the same decentralization of authority also makes it easier for Islamic leaders to negotiate with political leaders and to adapt and evolve to new political environments in the first place. Theoretically, the lack of centralized authority in Islam, as was true for Protestantism, makes it easier for Islamic societies to support a greater pluralism of ideas and allow new ideas to ascend in

39 For this reason, authors like Kepel (1994) argue that the Shi’a clerical structure makes clear and direct conflict between state and clergy more likely in predominantly Shi’a than Sunni nations.
importance more quickly. This also makes it theoretically easier for rulers in Muslim states to persuade some set of religious authorities of the worth of certain political projects while isolating another and imprisoning yet another set, making Islamic authority structures easier to deal with or manage in the short run (see, for example, Lust-Okar 2004).

The rigid centralization of authority in Catholicism, on the other hand, made it easier for one pontiff to remain personally obdurate to new political propositions over greater lengths of time and, even if his faithful did his bidding more quickly than in Islam, that obduracy also meant that the Catholic Church remained stubbornly opposed to democratic principles even after nominally accepting them. The rigid centralization of ecclesiastic authority might make it clearer who is at the negotiating table with political forces, therefore, but it can also make such authority structures more resilient to change and evolution. It is important to remember here, as we noted earlier, that the vertical societal relationships which Catholicism’s centralized system of authority encouraged also meant that there was less congruency between societal norms of interaction (or lack thereof) and democratic virtues of egalitarianism, mutual trust, and association (Putnam 1993). Once again, theoretically, the structures of authority in Islam, in this sense, would seem to more favorably dispose Islamic societies towards such virtues.

With respect to differences in the organization of religious authority, we might conclude by simply recognizing these cross-cutting currents and their ambiguous affects on the overall likelihood that state leaders might initiate a religiously friendly democratization process in either Muslim or Catholic societies. Once initiated, however, such ambiguities with respect to democracy also imply that these institutional differences
are not determinative, in themselves, of whether Catholic or Islamic societies will have
greater success in the consolidation of religiously friendly democracies.
CHAPTER 3:

ON THE CONSEQUENCES OF INSTITUTING FRIENDLINESS TOWARD RELIGION: TOWARDS A GENERAL THEORY OF RELIGIOUS-DEMOCRATIC CHANGE

3.1 Introduction

In the first chapter of this dissertation we argued, against the conventional wisdom, that religiously friendly democracies and religiously friendly democratization processes are possible. In the second chapter we argued that the hostility towards democracy adopted by many Muslim actors today, as well as many Catholic actors in the 19th and 20th centuries draws on similar historical experiences with democracy and similar theological intuitions in Islam and Catholicism about the ideal relationship between religion and politics. Despite this hostility, we also argued that both religions contain rich internal pluralism and possess powerful theological and historical sources which, under the right circumstances, could be understood to be supportive of democratic ideas and institutions. This chapter now returns to the original question of the dissertation, namely, what are the effects of bringing religion into the public sphere in new democracies, especially those, such as Islam and Catholicism, which have been considered to be hostile to democratic precepts? Given that a religiously friendly
democracy is possible and given that the hostility of Islam and Catholicism can be meaningfully compared, we can now reframe the question as follows: To what extent can the hostility of Muslim and Catholic actors be resolved in a religiously friendly democratic setting, and what would such a democracy look like?

In order to respond to these questions, this chapter presents a model which explains two, general, recursive sets of dynamics that are introduced by religiously friendly democratization processes in a state who hosts a predominant, society wide religion with hostile or ambiguous intentions towards democracy. These two sets of dynamics affect 1) the success of a nation’s democratic transition and consolidation and 2) the future trajectory of that nation’s religious and social life. With respect to the first set of dynamics, I will argue that the combination of religiously friendly institutions and electoral politics present in a religiously friendly democratization reduces the salience of religious identity on the political goals and desires of both religious elites and religious individuals by giving them a stake in the success of a new democratic regime. The reduction of the political salience of religious identity encourages religious elites to deflate the exclusivity of their religious appeals and sets religious voters free to pursue other, non-religious political interests. The development of non-religious political interests makes it more likely that religious political parties and individuals will enter into cross-cutting political alliances or at least recognize the legitimacy of other non-religious political appeals and, in the process of which, generate wider democratic legitimacy.

With respect to the second set of dynamics, I will argue that the same combination of religious friendliness and electoral politics ensures a future public and political voice for religious authorities in the nation, but that it also modifies the political
goals and social relationships of those religious authorities to their faithful. By subsidizing and encouraging religious belief I argue that the state creates a more likely context for that religion’s (re)-emergence as a public religion, and, at the same time, relatively higher levels of national religiosity, by creating a protective space which allows religious authorities some time to re-propose themselves in the political and social life of a nation. Democratization, however, simultaneously changes the conditions for contemporary religious belief in that nation by shifting political and social power away from institutional authorities and towards individual actors. Such a shift “loosens” the bond which ties religion and nation together by making that link more of a function of the success with which religious authorities can persuade individuals of their public and spiritual worth. Although we will examine their logic in greater detail below, figure one illustrates the two basic dynamics which are set in motion by a religiously friendly democratization process in states with democratically hostile society-wide religions:
Effects of Religiously Friendly Democratization on Hostile Religious Actors

Figure 3-1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dynamics</th>
<th>Affect:</th>
<th>Actors</th>
<th>Results of effects with respect to:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Religiously Friendly Institutions</td>
<td></td>
<td>a) Religious elites</td>
<td>1) Democratic Consolidation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>b) Religious individuals</td>
<td>a) Strategically support democracy</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>b) Participate in elections</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electoral Politics</td>
<td></td>
<td>a) Religious elites</td>
<td>2) National Religious Life</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>b) Religious individuals</td>
<td>a) Authority subsidized</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>b) Institutionalized contact with religious identity</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- a) Broaden political appeal, internalize demo. rules |
- b) Political salience of religious identity reduced, internalize democratic rules |

Overall Result: Generation of democratic legitimacy Generation of loose national religious identity
As we can recall from the introduction, recent studies of the effects of democratizing regimes that have created a favorable institutional space for a dominant religion have focused on the possibilities that these arrangements engender for the moderation of religious actors in a contemporary Islamic setting (Burgat and Dowell 1997, Hefner 2000, Lust-Okar 2004, Schwedler 2006, Masoud 2008) or the unintended and often secularizing consequences of religious elites’ strategic political choices in an historical Christian and, especially, Catholic setting (Panebianco 1988, Kalyvas 1996, Warner 2000, Gill 2008). These scholars explain well how and why religious political actors, often despite themselves, moderated and secularized their political goals and discourse with respect to democracy in response to the strategic logic of electoral competition. In doing so, under the right conditions, these religious political actors either became more democratic themselves or politically marginalized those religious voices who did not, and they helped legitimize and consolidate democracy in the process. In this account, thus, while religious beliefs had originally led religious actors to oppose democratic ideas and institutions, a new institutional setting led those same actors to first change their strategies towards democratic politics and then, sometimes, their beliefs about democracy as well.

The analysis of these scholarly works is generally focused on the evolution and success of religious political parties and the elites who steer them, and it often assumes that the evolution of these parties mirrors similar trends in society. In doing so, however, these scholars limit their analysis and miss the larger forces which are introduced in a religiously friendly democratization that also affect the beliefs and strategies of religious actors outside the religious political party. Inclusive electoral politics combined with
government policies which subsidize and institutionally identify the nation with one religious belief can and do affect the strategies and beliefs of religious political parties with respect to democracy. They affect the strategies and beliefs of many other religious actors, too, including the religious rank and file and religious authorities who might not be explicitly identified with the religious political party. Most scholars have generally failed to adequately theorize about the interaction of all of these actors in a religiously friendly democratization and how those interactions reshape the religious and political discourse of politics and society as a whole, not simply the narrow goals of the religious political party itself.

Rather than “religious political party,” therefore, this chapter considers how a religiously friendly democratization process affects shifts within the composition of a “religious political movement” as a whole. I define religious political movement to include all religious actors who help determine the general hostility of a religious political party with respect to democracy. These actors include religious party elites and members; religious authorities and theologians whose writing, preaching and community esteem affect religious attitudes towards democracy and who may or may not be directly connected to the party; religious individuals whose beliefs and actions religious elites attempt to court, channel and represent, both politically and religiously; and religious associations who organize and mediate between these religious actors.

My theoretical model illustrates how a religiously friendly democratization can affect the general direction of a religious political movement from one in which hostility towards democracy dominates the goals of religious political parties and their electorate to one in which support for democracy does. In what follows I will explain how what
might have begun as a strategic move on the part of hostile religious elites with respect to participating in democratic institutions can create new conditions in which both religious individuals and elites internalize and assume new democratic rules and values and how, in turn, these shifts can also affect the content and intensity of their religious beliefs.

The task of our two case studies, over subsequent chapters, will be to specify the composition of religious political movements in Italy and Algeria and determine a) whether democratically hostile attitudes dominated those movements; b) how religiously friendly democratization processes affected that hostility; and c) how religiously friendly democratization affected the religious life of the nation. In order to illustrate this process by which a religiously friendly democratization can affect a religious political movement as a whole, however, and to preview those chapters, the following tables chart the shifts among religious actors in Italy and Algeria with respect to democratic attitudes and levels of religious beliefs before and after a religiously friendly democratization process.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Italy</strong></th>
<th><strong>Attributes:</strong></th>
<th><strong>1944</strong></th>
<th><strong>1963</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Religious Institution:</strong> Vatican/Roman Curia</td>
<td>Democratic Support:</td>
<td>Intransigent</td>
<td>Less intransigent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Position of Power within Movement:</td>
<td>Dominant</td>
<td>Isolated</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Religious Political Party:</strong> Democrazia Cristiana</td>
<td>Democratic Support:</td>
<td>Democratic</td>
<td>Democratic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Position of Power within Movement:</td>
<td>Dependent on Vatican support</td>
<td>Independent of Vatican support</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Religious Associations:</strong> Azione Cattolica, Coldiretti, CISL</td>
<td>Democratic Support:</td>
<td>Ambivalent</td>
<td>Democratic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Position of Power within Movement:</td>
<td>Obedient to Vatican</td>
<td>Divided on Policy Positions</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Religious Individuals:</strong> Catholic Faithful</td>
<td>Democratic Support:</td>
<td>Ambivalent</td>
<td>Democratic</td>
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<tr>
<td>Position of Power within Movement:</td>
<td>Obedient</td>
<td>Independent</td>
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<tr>
<td>General Religiosity:</td>
<td>Tight</td>
<td>Loose</td>
<td>Religiosity</td>
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TABLE 3-2

COMPOSITION OF RELIGIOUS POLITICAL MOVEMENT BEFORE AND AFTER

RELIGIOUSLY FRIENDLY DEMOCRATIZATION IN ALGERIA

*Algeria*

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<thead>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1) Harakat Mujtama al-Islami (HAMAS)</td>
<td>Democratic Support:</td>
<td>Ambivalent/Hos tile</td>
<td>Democratic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2) Ennahda (MRN)/El Islah</td>
<td>Positions of Power within Movement:</td>
<td>Ascendant and Independent</td>
<td>Weakened</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ministry of Religious Affairs</td>
<td>Democratic Support:</td>
<td>Democratic</td>
<td>Democratic</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Position of Power within Movement:</td>
<td>Independent</td>
<td>Governmental</td>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Zawiyas, Association of Ulema, Islamic Student Unions</td>
<td>Democratic Support:</td>
<td>Ambivalent</td>
<td>Democratic</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Position of Power within Movement:</td>
<td>Divided on Policy Positions and Loyalties</td>
<td>Divided on Policy Positions and Loyalties</td>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Muslim Faithful</td>
<td>Democratic Support:</td>
<td>Ambivalent</td>
<td>Democratic</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Position of Power within Movement:</td>
<td>Obedient</td>
<td>Independent</td>
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<tr>
<td>General Religiosity:</td>
<td>Tight</td>
<td>Loose</td>
<td>Religiosity</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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The rest of this chapter is broken into two sections which present the mechanics and logic of change animating these two overarching sets of dynamics. In the first section I argue how I expect religious elites to react to friendly overtures by state elites, how those overtures affect the salience of religion on the political desires of an average religious individual and how these two together affect the probability of successful democratic transitions. In the second section I present how I expect the combined forces of religiously friendly policies and electoral politics to affect the relationship of religious authorities to their faithful, national levels of religious participation and future moral and theological trends.

3.2 Incorporation/Moderation in Democracy

When states allow hostile religions more access to the political and public spheres during moments of democratization, allow religious political parties to contest elections and bias religion-state arrangements in favor of religion, what dynamics does it set in motion? To what extent does such inclusion resolve religious hostility towards democracy, and how can we measure this? Before developing our model of change further, the following paragraphs review how the dissertation measures a) the generation of democratic legitimacy on the part of hostile religious actors and b) inclusive, religiously friendly democratic institutions.

In the last chapter we defined the essential hostility of religious actors with respect to democracy as a function of the religious exclusivity of those actors’ political goals and discourse. We can gauge whether or not the favorable inclusion of hostile
religious actors in an emerging democracy resolves their hostility by measuring the extent to which they reduce the exclusivity of their political goals and discourse. Our task, therefore, is to show change: that religious actors had previously said and did things which put in doubt their willingness to play by the democratic rules of the game and that, on account of inclusionary measures by the regime, these same parties put to rest those doubts. This will involve some measure of their behavior (whether or not they participate in elections and adhere to some minimum requirements of rights) as well as some measure of their ideological discourse (whether or not they acknowledge the legitimacy of opposition politics and democratically elected officials).

In some cases, when measures of liberalization do not entail full democratization, for example, by allowing significant powers of coercion to remain at the disposition of the executive, it becomes more difficult to interpret the meaning of the participation of religious actors in elections. Does the repeated participation of radical religious actors in elections mean that they have become more moderate or democratic? Or are they just waiting to build up enough political power to the point when they can democratically institute non-democratic ends? As long as there is some implied threat of repression, how can we distinguish between changes which are state-coerced and manipulated and those which are induced by the benefits of inclusion? Although evidence from participation in less-than-democratic regimes is not a perfect indicator of the democratic commitment of religious actors, as long as measures of state liberalization entail some substantive change in the direction of open competition, and as long as candidates and parties have the chance to win some real power, then we can still begin to explore whether important theoretical mechanisms function when radical religious actors participate in democratic
politics. If offers of inclusion create some “arenas of democracy” within a regime, the patterns of action and discourse that religious actors establish within these arenas give us some indication of any substantive evolution of their policy and goals with respect to democracy. Whether they use their limited levers to strengthen democratic institutions, build deeper alliances with non-religious parties and create more internal party democracy can all be understood as evidence that religious actors have begun assuming habits of democracy that will probably not be so quickly shed if fully free and fair elections were to be had and won by them in the immediate future (Langhor 2001, Wickham 2004).

In her excellent review and critique of the various versions of what has been termed the “moderation-inclusion hypothesis” within studies of Islam and politics, Schwedler (2006) argues that most scholars focus on the effects that 1) new institutional constraints and 2) the exposure to alternative views have on the strategic behavior and discourse of radical parties and candidates when they participate in elections and win political power. While incorporating some of this logic into my explanatory model, I want to emphasize how moderation can occur as a combination of the effects produced by the participation of religious actors, including religious individuals, in elections and the changes in the religion-state framework which may accompany that participation.

If we broaden our understanding of religious inclusion and treat the legalization of religious political parties as part of a larger category of religiously friendly government policies, it is easier to view those efforts as a strategy of negotiation between state and

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40 As cited in Wickham 2004: 215
religious elites over the institutionalized relationship between faith and nation. Through this negotiation, religious leaders and state elites attempt to resolve two competing worldviews of state, a lay-secular one in which religious leaders are marginalized from public power (in either its authoritarian or democratic versions), and a religious-clerical one, in which lay-secular leaders are. To recall from chapter one, states can pursue religiously friendly policies by, among other things, highlighting or creating a special institutional perch for a religion in the constitution; creating legislation based on religious precepts; and synchronizing national holidays and celebrations to religious ones. Inclusion understood in this broader sense as “religious friendliness” responds to the fundamental fears of religious elites and religious individuals about democracy, namely that it attacks their identity as religious persons, forces secularization and destroys the relationship between faith and nation. Government favoritism of religion promises the possibility that religious actors can influence politics and policy (the implication of allowing religious parties into power) and, by giving a religion some favored place in the regime, that the state will not make it its policy to marginalize that influence. I do not argue that this is the only path towards democratization for nations with predominantly religious populations whose leaders are hostile towards democracy, but simply that a larger sense of inclusion makes for a more credible mechanism of behavior-inducing change. Religious actors are more likely to champion the legitimacy of a democratic regime not simply as a result of participating in elections, but also on account of the assurances which that regime has made to them with respect to their religious beliefs and goals.
3.2.1 Religious Friendliness, Religious Elites and Elections

Before examining the mechanics set into motion by the combination of government favoritism of religion and democratization the following paragraphs briefly examine my assumption that democratically hostile, or ambivalent religious elites will respond to promises of inclusion by agreeing to sanction the initial electoral process and encourage their faithful to vote. The logic behind this assumption reveals a fundamental miscalculation about their potential electoral appeal and ability to manipulate elections that many religious actors make.

Through its formal and informal institutional posturing towards religion, a democratic state can guarantee the protection of the national religious faith and the freedom of religious leaders to compete in elections, and by doing so I argue that the state can nominally win over the support of that religion’s authorities. With the question of survival removed, the religion’s leaders and faithful can breathe easier and without fundamentally altering religious doctrine, these religious leaders will shift the sights of their political goals. Instead of collectively fighting for survival, pragmatic and politically moderate religious elites have a greater incentive to embrace democracy as a legitimate source of non-oppressive political authority. As table one’s preview of the composition of religious political movements in Italy and Algeria illustrate, some, if not many, religious actors, within the political party or clerical structure or both, may already have been well-disposed towards democracy, although religiously threatening political institutions made such good disposition difficult to dominate in the attitude towards democracy of the movement as a whole.
A religiously friendly institutional setting also changes the costs of electoral behavior for radical religious elites. The new religious identification of the regime and the promise of winning power make it relatively less costly for religious elites to accept participation in elections rather than continue in violent or otherwise explicitly hostile action in their struggle to institute a religiously exclusive state (see discussions in Wegner 2007 and Lust-Okar 2004). Through their participation in elections, religious leaders can bargain that they have earned the opportunity to increase the authority of religion in politics and build on whatever institutional favoritism the government has offered them to institute their political vision through elections, whether or not these leaders have democratic intentions in mind. Government favoritism of religion, therefore, helps make religious leaders more willing to take on the risks of participating in an electoral process which they do not necessarily view as legitimate in order to win and exercise power. As Warner (2000) argues was the case with Catholic Church support for confessional parties in Europe, the more convinced religious leaders are that they can control the state through a political party, the more likely it is that they will invest themselves in democratic elections, at least in the short run.

What makes this calculation even more reasonable for religious leaders is that unlike other politically relevant identities, such as class and region, in a predominantly Muslim or Catholic population religious identity represents an attribute that nearly all citizens share. Why, if given the chance, would these citizens not accord their religious authorities the same respect and obedience in political matters as in moral and ethical ones? Whether their motivation lays in purely spiritual or political goals, my theory predicts that on average a friendly posture on the part of democratic elites backed with
institutional guarantees can persuade a majority of religious elites to give democratic politics a chance and, at least, strategically sanction the initial electoral process and encourage their faithful to vote.

However, as Kalyvas (1996), Warner (2000) and others have argued, electoral competition and the need to win elections change the power dynamics among religious elites and between them and the electorate. As Przeworski and Sprague (1986) argued was the case with socialist political parties in northern Europe, elections create pressures on radical elites to mobilize outside of an exclusively ideological base in order to gain political power. Then, once some power has been won, those same elites also face pressures to exercise their power with efficiency if they want to win elections again in the future. The need to produce material-political results in order to maintain power can pressure religious leaders to emphasize less religiously exclusive political goals. As Panebianco (1988) classically argued was the case with any political party, founding zeal fades with time as politicians assume the tactics of compromise to hold onto political power. Results and survival become favored over the purity of ideology. We would especially expect Panebianco’s insights to hold true with respect to the exclusivity and zeal of religious ideology especially if the state has already responded to the founding demand of a religious party by allowing them to participate in elections and agreeing to protect the religious identity of the nation.

Religious parties can moderate, therefore, as pragmatic and technical politicians gain strategic importance over radicals and ideologues in order to win elections and govern efficiently (Langhor 2001, Fuller 2005, Berman 2008). The ascendance of these politicians in the influence over the political party can change the composition of
leadership and stimulate an evolution in the party’s platform and ideas away from exclusively religious ones by marginalizing the most radical demands of religious leaders (Panebianco 1988, Wickham 2004, Warner 2000, Kalyvas 1996).

In this respect, observers of Christian Democratic party trajectories have argued that electoral politics accentuated the difference in goals between Catholic politicians seeking to build up and expand the resources of their political parties and the purely religious leaders behind the party, i.e. the Vatican, who supported, mobilized and tried to control those goals and resources for survival purposes. Party leaders strategically embraced political secularization to obtain autonomy from religious authorities and attempted to expand their electoral base well beyond a strictly religious one (Kalyvas 1996). While retaining some religious identity to guarantee a religious voting base, Christian Democratic parties dropped the integral religious vision of the Vatican, leaving Catholic religious authorities to try to institute that vision by other means. Olivier Roy has made a similar argument through his use of the conception of “post-islamisme.” Roy contends that electoral politics has cultivated political secularization among religious party politicians in much of the Islamic world and that their political secularization has incited most of the religious ideologues within Islamist movements to abandon the project of Islamizing the state from above, through politics, in order to pursue a new strategy of Islamizing society from below (Roy 1998).

Even as some radical religious leaders are marginalized from the religious political movement, others may respond to the pressures of electoral politics and govern by becoming more moderate and democratic themselves. Classic arguments of exposure, in fact, argue that a strategic response to a change in the cost/benefit ratio of participation
can work hand-in-hand with mechanisms of learning to produce a substantive evolution of political goals. Putting radical politicians in charge of mundane political tasks, like fixing pot-holes (see Masoud 2008), forces them to expend their energies on issues affecting the common good, and, as a result, to re-evaluate their relationship with the whole of the electorate (Wickham 2004). The presence of a free and critical press intensifies this exposure and forces religious leaders to defend and reform their message before a larger, skeptical audience (Wittes 2008). As Fuller notes (2005), the need for practical results combined with a demanding press makes it much more difficult for religious leaders to defend a simplistic *Religion is the Solution* platform, creating incentives, instead, to consider adopting other, less religiously-exclusive but politically successful, policy positions.

3.2.2 Religious Identities and Individual Political Calculations

These theories often assume that religious leaders will be forced to mobilize outside of their electorate, and temper their goals, discourse and beliefs towards democracy as a result, because their own core constituencies do not represent a great enough fraction of the entire electorate to consistently win elections. Even though religious leaders may calculate otherwise, while all citizens may share a common religious identity, not all profess that faith and any accompanying obedience to religious authorities in the same way. For the purposes of this dissertation, while acknowledging a large range of types and rates of religious participation,41 I focus on two very general

41 There are many different indicators by which scientists measure average national rates of participation and many other ways for analyzing sub-national and local religiosity rates. These indicators
categories of religiosity: 1) the regular practicing religious (who freely choose to have regular contact with an institutional religion and express that choice by regular participation in religious services) and 2) the culturally religious (who, while not regular institutional religious participants, still self-identify with one religious institution or creed, either through their actual membership or their participation in its rites of religious passage and feast days). Over time, I argue that religious political movement leaders will only be able to assume the strict political allegiance of a very regularly practicing religious minority and that minority will probably not be enough to consistently win major elections.42

Religious leaders, furthermore, will also need to change their mobilization tactics because electoral competition in a religiously-friendly environment changes the political calculus of individual members within their constituency. If religious individuals are convinced by state actions of government favoritism of religion and are encouraged by their religious authorities to mobilize for elections, many of them will also be more likely to understand the democratic arena as a legitimate place to solve their political problems. With the existential threat to their religious identity removed, it is also likely that their
generally either count raw numbers on religious practice from hard data (i.e. how many members have registered in a given church; how many people subscribe to religious news services; how many cars are parked in a church parking lot on Sunday; how many official religious associations, charities and schools does a religion have; how many baptisms, marriages, funerals and ordinations are performed each year), or they calculate national percentages of various types of religious belief from survey data (how many respondents claim to be affiliated with a religious institution, believe in God, go to church on Sunday, go through rites of initiation, pray outside of church services, morally obey their tradition’s theological imperatives, or celebrate major church feasts). Each indicator tells a slightly different story about religious participation and are often only appropriate for one religious creed (i.e. counting church attendance) or denomination (i.e. counting priests) or country (i.e. counting membership registration).

42 Kurzman and Naqvi’s recent (2010) study of the electoral performance of Islamist parties leads them to conclude that, in its current state, on average, Islamist parties are not likely to win an electoral majority in most predominantly Muslim nations.
own religious identity will become less salient in their political desires, and, exposed to 
appeals by other (not-strictly-religious but religiously-friendly) political parties, that they 
will consider giving them their political vote or support. As Kalyvas, who also considers 
the effects of electoral politics on individual voting patterns in a Catholic European 
setting argues,

Participation in democratic politics impregnates the Catholic world of 
obedience and divinely rooted hierarchy with the secular democratic 
values of individual autonomy and equality … [and] leads Catholic 
activists to push for more autonomy of action and further participation in 
the political process because it gives them, for the first time, a sense of the 
potential that politics holds for the advancement of their cause (1996: 43).

This interaction between government posturing and individuals’ engagement with 
the electoral process can be best understood through a focus on the identities of religious 
voters. A key insight of the literature on identity politics is that all individuals, even 
faithful religious individuals, have multiple and changing identities (including religion, 
gender, ethnicity, and class) which can order or nest within one another. These “identity 
repertoires” are shaped over time by processes of framing. Posner (2005), Laitin (1999) 
and others have focused on the capacity of institutions to set the parameters for which 
identity of one’s identity repertoire is most “profitable” for political mobilization. The 
activation of latent democracy-supporting cleavages, I argue, could be thought of as the 
result of these institutional changes between state and religion which changed the 
possibilities for individuals to be both politically profitable and spiritually secure.

Whether or not these religious elites agree to elections with democratic intentions 
in mind, religious elites who encourage their faithful to enter the electoral process help 
expose their followers to non-religious political appeals by other political parties and 
entrepreneurs. I argue that it is through this mechanism that a change to a friendlier
religion-state arrangement can lessen the salience of religious identity on an individual’s calculus of political interest, in effect, re-arranging the order of which identity she chooses out of her identity repertoire as the most important in her political decisions. By political decisions I mean both the weight of an individual’s religious identity or faith on the calculus of her electoral decisions as well as the extent to which she pressures her representatives to pursue legislation and political alliances based on religious versus other concerns.

When there is mutual hostility between religion and state, the political salience of religious identity with respect to other identities, such as class, ethnicity and region, is aggravated, meaning that the effects of religious identity are weightier on the total probability of voting. Democratic state elites, however, can manipulate the political salience of religious identity by changing the context of the relationship between religion and state, and by reaching out to religious elites and their faithful. If a religion feels that it is under attack, religious identities’ political salience can become large and an individual’s religious identity matters a lot for their political actions. But if the religion and state are on good terms, the effect of the political salience of religious identity approaches zero and religious identity matters very little for an individual’s political decisions, particularly for those who only nominally identify themselves with the national religious tradition.

The potential this shift in framing creates for individuals to vote on the basis of other political interests, hitherto nested within their larger religious identity interests, gives democracy a needed boost of legitimacy by weaving a larger fabric of cross-cutting alliances made up of individuals who realize they have something to gain together from
the electoral process. The potential to be politically successful while retaining their religious identity can temper the hostility of religious individuals towards democracy over the long run. In order to continue to have a public voice in politics, religious authorities, in turn, must learn to respond to the wider range of issue-areas created by any electoral and programmatic shifts in the political goals of their faithful. Because of the changed institutional setting between religion and state, religious authorities can no longer play the “survival” or “protest” card to make successful political appeals to their faithful. The effect of electoral competition on religious voters thus reinforces the pressure on religious party leaders to make appeals outside of exclusively religious ones or to frame their religious goals to include other, less-religious voters. This makes it even more difficult for the voices of the most anti-democratic aspects of religious platforms to be projected electorally, namely those which claim that one religion alone has the rights to political and moral authority and who refuse the legitimacy of plural political contestation and opposition.

In sum, electoral competition and the exercise of power in an emerging democracy which has instituted some favoritism towards religion favors the secularization of the political goals of religious elites and their faithful. We could, therefore, hypothesize that when offers of religious inclusion by a democratizing state entail both a) giving religious leaders the chance to exercise some real political power within some arenas of democracy and b) creating a more favorable relationship between religion and state:

**Hypothesis 3:** The political salience of religious identity is reduced and religious candidates, parties and faithful respond by becoming more moderate in their behavior and discourse with respect to democracy, by decreasing the religious exclusivity of their political calculations.
And,

**Hypothesis 4**: The combined effects of the moderation of both religious individuals and leaders within a religious political movement increase the probability of a successful transition to and consolidation of democracy.

While Islamists and Catholics might be “genius liars” about their democratic intentions, once they have agreed to enter into the electoral process, in a favorably changed religion-state environment, and once they have encouraged their faithful to do the same, I have argued that new dynamics come into play which make it difficult for the most radical religious leaders to get their way. As Kalyvas (1996) has argued, there are unintended consequences in store for religious leaders who think they can use democratic elections to institute their way to a religious state.

This does not mean that religious leaders will never be able to do so. History is full of surprises and, what is more, theological hostility is not the only variable that might make a transition to democracy more or less successful in a predominantly Muslim or Catholic country. There are many other factors that can cause these transitions to be more or less fragile, compounding or reducing the hostility of religious elites and their constituents. Perhaps most importantly among those factors is the effect of economic development on democratic transitions and democratic consolidation (Moore 1966, Lipset 1960, Huntington 1991, Przeworski et al. 2000, Bunce 2000, Acemoglu and Robinson 2000). While there is still discussion in the field concerning whether economic development might cause a democratization process to occur, following Przeworski, Alvarez, Cheibub and Limongi’s authoritative study (2000), most scholars agree that democracies with high levels of economic well-being have a tremendously high rate of survival, much more so than poor democracies. We would expect, therefore, that the
economic success of a country would have an important effect on any democratic transition and, accordingly, that a religiously friendly democratization process in a country that is economically well-off would be more likely to consolidate over the long run than a religiously friendly democratization process in a country which is not economically well-off.

Democratic theorists have also identified many other factors more or less specific to certain cultural areas which also might make transitions to democracy or their consolidation more probable, including, strong as opposed to weak institutions, in general (Berman 2008); the presence of neighbors who have democratized (Brinks and Coppelde 2006); parliamentary as opposed to presidential institutions (Linz and Valenzuela 1994); multi-party proportional representation versus majoritarian voting schemes (Lijphart 1999); a culture of participation, protest and national conferences (Bratton and Van der Walle 1997); a constitutional monarchy rather than a presidential system (Moore 1966, Brumberg 2002); British versus Spanish colonial legacies (Bernhard, Reenock and Nordstom 2004); oil wealth (Ross 2001, Luciani 1988); and the unpredictability of human agency and leadership (Stepan 1978), among many other variables.

While all of these factors are certainly important, the point of this chapter has been to theoretically isolate an independent effect of religiously friendly democratization which, when instituted in tandem with democratic reforms, works as a moderating force on the hostility of religious actors. Partly because government favoritism of religion resolves that hostility and partly because of the dynamics set into motion by electoral politics, an important implication of this theory is that the religious hostility of Islamists
or other religious actors is not a good enough reason, on its own, to block them from the political process.

While a religiously friendly democratization process might favor the creation of some political secularization which is necessary for elected authorities to govern independently of unelected religious authorities, from our discussion of identity repertoires above, we can observe that this does not necessarily affect the place of religious identity in the average citizen’s identity set, just its salience for political decisions. In other words, the secularization of politics does not automatically lead to the religious secularization of society. I now turn to exploring this relationship in more detail below.

3.3 Religiously Friendly Democracies and Religious National Identities

A strategy of religious inclusion in a democratizing state can generate more adherence to the democratic rules of the game on the part of hostile religious actors. This moderation occurs as a function of some political secularization on the part of religious political parties who set aside the most exclusively religious aspects of their religious-political platforms and increasingly recognize the legitimacy of non-religious political appeals. We could describe a religiously friendly democratization process, therefore, as simultaneously helping resolve religious hostilities towards democracy as well as diminishing the salience of religious identity in the political goals and interests of religious political parties and religious individuals. In doing so a religiously friendly democratization creates the possibility for the adoption of new religious beliefs with respect to democracy on the part of religious political parties and religious individuals. The internalization of these new beliefs with respect to democracy, however, combined
with the reduction of the political salience of religious identity, also changes the general conditions in which individuals choose to adopt other religious beliefs in society. These changes affect 1) the relationship of religious authorities to their faithful and the religious ideas which they choose to promote among them as well as 2) the probability that a predominantly religious society will continue to remain religious. The resulting effect of a religiously friendly democratization process on a state’s religious market is the creation of a national religious identity which is more robust than it would otherwise have been in a secular democracy, yet less robust than it would have been in a religiously-identified authoritarian regime of the kind idealized in Christendom or Dar al-Islam.

As in the first section, I argue that these changes are the result of the combination of both the religiously friendly policies and the electoral politics introduced in a religiously friendly democratization process. However, while these two forces worked together in the same direction with respect to the creation of democratic legitimacy, here, with respect to the general shape and intensity of national religious belief, the two forces work somewhat against each other. On the one hand, the consolidation of democratic ideas and institutions increases the political choices available to an average citizen and reduces religious authority in society. On the other hand, religiously friendly policies continue to subsidize the structure and national identification of the nation’s religious market towards one religious institution and thereby keeps citizens closer to that religious identity than they would otherwise in a secular democratic setting. A religiously friendly democratization by itself, therefore, does not necessarily imply that a national society becomes less religious, as classic theories of secularization expected, but it does imply
that it becomes religious in a different way. The following subsections examines this process more carefully.

3.3.1 Democratization and the Decline of Regular-practicing Religiosity

As we saw in the first chapter of this dissertation, most secularization stories base their predictions of decline in levels of individual religious belief on the combination of the downward effects of both economic modernization and democratization. We argued, however, that the appearance of these two mega-bundles of forces might come in different sequences and with varying intensities. This subsection accepts secularization theory’s assumption that economic modernization has a negative effect on traditional religious belief systems and holds the effect constant in order to theoretically isolate the effects of religiously friendly democratization processes on average levels of individual religiosity.

Democratization, as we can recall from chapter one, is expected to depress individual levels of religious participation and belief because it increases individual political choice, reduces the possibility of religious coercion on the part of religious elites, and relativizes religious authority in politics. By empowering individuals with a vote, democracy increases religious individuals’ say in the formation of public policies. Those political policies, in turn, shape the system of values that governs society. While it is probable that religious citizens will inject religious values into their political goals, religious authorities can no longer assume that they will do so in a democratic setting. In a religiously friendly democracy which respects Stepan’s twin tolerations, religious authorities cannot justify laws which force citizens to profess certain religious beliefs and
otherwise submit to their religious authority as they might have in a religiously friendly authoritarian setting. Moreover, once religious leaders begin participating in political elections and encouraging their faithful to as well, it becomes more difficult for those leaders to justify the same militancy and obedience they enjoyed as the “threatened” leaders of the religion of the people. Religious elites must periodically persuade their faithful voters of their political and religious worthiness in order to sustain their privileged institutional position. As democratic norms take hold religious authorities must, therefore, renegotiate their relationship with their national faithful who are in the process of developing new political interests which are independent of their religious identity in order to diffuse religious values in a democratic society.

This shift in the relationship between religious authorities and religious individuals animates what we saw Taylor (2007) describe in chapter one as the “change in the conditions of contemporary belief” in modern democracies. The empowerment of individuals with political choice subverts the traditional authority of religion in society by increasing the independence of the faithful and thereby weakening the societal control of religious hierarchies (see also Nasr 2005, Kalyvas 1996:43ff and Warner 2000: 211). As they grow in their autonomy to choose their interests and belief, it is likely that not all citizens will choose to be regular-practicing religious individuals or continue to structure their lives tightly around the authority of a traditional religious institution.

In sum, in a democracy, religious individuals are less likely to automatically pursue religious goals in the political arena or continue to hold strong religious beliefs themselves; religious political parties are also less concerned with religious political goals; and religious authorities can neither coerce religious belief nor command religious
or political allegiance among individuals as the keepers of a national religious identity under threat. We could, therefore, hypothesize that,

**Hypothesis 5**: By empowering individuals with political choice, democratization reduces religious authority in politics and will have some downward effect on national levels of regular religious participation.

3.3.2 Religious Friendliness, Public Religion and National Religious Identity

While all of this is true, as we also saw in chapter one, the increase of individual choice and the reduction of the direct political authority of religious leaders and structures does not necessarily imply that individuals will not choose to be religious at all or that religious political parties will not mobilize around some religious political goals. And even as religious leaders relinquish claims to direct political authority in the realm of politics, we also noted in chapter one that there were other ways for religious authorities to exercise public influence in a democracy. As Casanova argued (1994, 2001), within a democratized society religious authorities can take on the status of a public religion by assuming a leading voice within civil society. In this respect, we could think about religious leaders as having a choice in how they respond to the reduction of their political authority: they can either condemn the rising influence of their faithful, risking marginalization and, over time, a decoupling of the relationship between faith and nation, or they can adapt. If the state continues to subsidize and encourage religious belief in the nation, I argue that religious leaders are more likely to attempt to adapt in the short run, even though the democratization process may rob them of some of their political relevance and prevent them from instituting their ideal vision of a religious political order.
If they choose to adapt, religious leaders have the opportunity to take advantage of a national religious framework which socializes its citizens into a common set of religious values. By adopting religious feastdays and celebrations as national holidays, allowing some religious legislative authority in religious matters and subsidizing religious education in public schools, religiously friendly policies insure that religious values remain institutionally woven into the underlying national, symbolic and social fabric. The symbolic identification of the state with a religion and the public-religious education of its citizens will help regenerate the memory of religious identity as a nationally shared cultural touchstone and, therefore, the numbers of citizens who continue to self-identify as religious persons. In religiously friendly national milieus it will be easier for the average citizen to identify herself as a religious believer than in those national milieus with less friendly religion-state arrangements and easier for religious authorities and institutions to have an impact on their lives. By favoring such a national milieu, I argue religiously friendly governmental policies mediate the downward effects of both democratization and economic modernization on individual religious beliefs. In those countries where democratization and economic modernization happened more or less simultaneously, this institutional embeddedness could be thought of as creating a stop-gap valve which helped slow the rate of religious decline and gave religious authorities some protective incubation time to embrace the transition to modern democracy. The protection of a religious national identity made it more likely that religious leaders would successfully reassert themselves as a public religion whose authority derived from their standing in civil society. In a reciprocal fashion, by becoming a public religion, religious authorities could then keep state subsidies on the
bond between faith and nation active and, in the least, maintain their symbolic relationship with society.

From this discussion we can make the following hypothesis regarding the effects of religiously friendly democratization processes on national rates of religiosity:

**Hypothesis 6:** Government favoritism of religion will have a positive effect on national rates of religious belief and the regeneration of a national religious identity.

This shared national religious identity does not invalidate the observations about the effects of electoral politics and individual choices on religious participation discussed above. Even while identifying themselves with a national religious tradition, the same individuals might not necessarily desire regular participation in religious activities or obligations. It is likely that many citizens will turn to alternative sources of authority in their moral and leisure decisions as they already have done in their political decisions. The tie between the national religious identity of a society and religious authority in a religiously friendly democratic setting, therefore, is a tenuous one, especially concerning the relationship between religious authorities and the “culturally religious.” In order to mine their dense networks of state-sponsored structural resources, (parishes, mosques, charities, universities, hospitals, banks) and guide public policy debates on moral and social issues, religious authorities must find an appropriate language with which to credibly address this culturally religious majority. To craft this language in an effective way which allows them to channel religious values into society, it is probable that they will emphasize those parts of their theological traditions which are in harmony with the changing political concerns of their faithful.
This toleration of the rising power of individuals within the community of believers can have far-reaching consequences on the ideas assimilated into religious traditions’ codes of conducts and patterns of worship. Such toleration can increase the internal pluralism of religious beliefs accepted within the national religious identity and open the possibility for the creation of more bottom-up influenced structures of religious authority within that religious tradition. A toleration for internal religious pluralism combined with the privileged status as a public religion might also make it easier for religious leaders to accept the legitimacy of the national presence of external religious pluralism as well and become advocates of their rights to religious liberties.

3.3.3 A Rival Hypothesis: Religious Market Theory

The hypothesis that government involvement in a religious market might have a positive effect on national rates of religiosity represents a challenge to a rival theory to secularization, namely religious market theory, or what is also variously referred to as a supply-side or rational choice theory of religion. Like the theory presented here, religious market theory is also more ambivalent than secularization theory about any general process of decline in society-wide religious participation in modern, industrialized democracies. Using the laws of supply and demand, religious market theory argues that the robustness of a national religious market might not be very tightly related to national levels of economic development. Roughly working from the assumptions of supply-side economic theory, these scholars assume some level of general religious demand in any
The *homo religiosus* who is the object of this demand functions much like economic theory’s version of *homo economicus*: he is a rational consumer of religious goods. The expression of religious demand, which could be thought of as the societal level of consumption of religious goods (how often individuals in society “buy” spiritual products by attending church services, consuming religious rites, praying, etc) is more or less determined by the market structure of that good’s supply.

Again, working from classic economic theory, these religious market theorists expect that a “freer” (i.e. less regulated) and “more competitive” (i.e. more pluralistic) religious market will provide better and more diverse religious products for the religious consumer, thereby increasing national levels of religion-consumption, i.e. religious participation and religiosity. When, on the other hand, one religious monopoly dominates any religious market, the resulting decrease in competition among religious firms for souls and the monotony of a less diversified religious line of products combine to create a less dynamic societal religious landscape and lower levels of religious participation. The classic, model-generating case for religious market theory is the United States, whose persistently high national rates of religiosity always seemed to pose a problem to secularization theory, but which could be explained by the insight of the massive, jostling religious market of the country. Northern European Protestant nations, especially Scandinavia and Great Britain, are often used as an illustration of the effects that established, government-regulated religions have in creating dull and moribund religious markets. Government regulation of religion and external religious pluralism are closely

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43 For the more standard and classical accounts of supply-side religious market theory, see Finke and Iannaccone (1993), Stark and Iannaccone (1994), and Gill (1998).
connected for religious market theorists as less regulation also increases the probability of more religious pluralism and the two together dynamize the market (see Gill 1998, 2008). In this dissertation I will mostly limit my discussion to the effects of government regulation of religion because in countries with predominant, society-wide religions, by definition, there is so little religious pluralism.44

The logic behind religious market theory, I argue, is essentially about the effects of what I termed Type B GRI in chapter one, which is to say, the direct governmental regulation of a religion’s organization by the state as in the established churches referenced above. A religious monopoly is especially poor at offering convincing religious products to individuals in modern democracies when that monopoly is the product of a national religion whose clergy are functionaries of the state and whose leaders are appointed by politicians, as in the established churches of the Protestant Northern European states of Scandinavia and Great Britain.45 Adding to the natural indolence-inducing effects of monopolistic markets, the establishment of a religion as a national religion also technically makes the religion a political entity which is directly or indirectly organized and regulated through political appointments, as we saw in chapter two. In addition, these established religions often automatically register their citizens as members of the national faith. This makes the clergy’s salary and status dependent not necessarily upon whether or not they attract new members or persuade their automatically

44 There is also a rather underdeveloped counter-thesis that pluralism might actually have the effect of undermining religious belief in societies with one predominant religion, by further contributing to relativize its authorities’ claims over religious truth (see Barro and McCleary 2003). Religious market theorists argue that even just a little bit of pluralism, i.e. the presence of an upstart, can help whip an established church into shape (see Introvigne and Stark 2003).

45 This concept parallels Chaves and Cann’s (1992) measurement of government regulation of religion which also registers whether or not the government appoints its church leaders.
registered ones to become faithful or fervent believers, but simply whether they continue to perform their codified functions. These functions are set by a religious hierarchy populated by religious leaders who have been picked because they have proven to be leaders who were in tune to the development of that state, and not those who actively fought it. 46 While not necessarily prohibiting other religious firms from operating, establishing the national faith skews the religious market so much in favor of this one religious monopoly that it becomes very difficult for any new religious firm to pretend equal competition, 47 all the while offering little incentive for those leading the predominant religious firm to not turn into complacent religious entrepreneurs over the long run.

Although the explanatory power of religious market theory holds a great deal of promise, it fails to distinguish between different types of religion-state arrangements and their potential to affect rates of religious participation differently. 46 Type A GRI, for example, which we defined as being relative to the enforcement and coercion of individuals’ religious behavior in society can create a different type of monopolistic religion-state arrangement than that characterized above, with potentially different effects. Type A GRI could, theoretically, be employed on behalf of or against religion and might or might not hasten secularization. For centuries in Europe and in some

46 Thus claims by some scholars of a secular clergy complicit in the decline of religion (Berger 1966).

47 If they ever attempt to sail for their shores.

countries elsewhere today, Type A GRI on behalf of a national religion helped ensure that all citizens (or subjects) proclaimed some religious belief or go to jail (or worse). If, on the other hand, it is employed by the state against religion, Type A regulation can significantly raise the costs of religious participation, either in the private or public realm, and fuel national declines in religiosity. As was the case in France in its early years as a Republic, Type A government regulation of religion can actually speed decline in the influence of religion even as it does so in the name of encouraging religious pluralism. By actively regulating against any public religious influence which challenges the secular authority of the state, France has often raised the costs for expression of religious belief over the last two centuries. Type A GRI, therefore, could be associated with either higher or lower national levels of national religious belief, depending on whether the state regulates religious behavior on behalf of or against a national religious tradition.

This discussion on the limits of religious market theory puts into relief the importance of considering the effects of regime type on national levels of religiosity when assessing the expectations of both religious market theory and secularization theories. With respect to religious market theory, the expectation of low religiosity being associated with government regulated religious monopolies holds especially true in democracies, where the coercive regulation of religious belief of Type A is not tolerated, but the institutional regulation of a religion’s organization, GRI of Type B, may be tolerated. With respect to secularization theories, regime type can help determine how sequenced processes of democratization and economic modernization affect national levels of religiosity. When an authoritarian regime has achieved a relatively high level of economic modernization during a period in which they simultaneously held high levels of
Type A GRI on behalf of a state religion, any future processes of democratization will have much less of a negative effect on national levels of religious belief than had democratization and economic modernization processes occurred simultaneously or if they had achieved economic modernization after they already democratized.

The importance of this distinction between types of government regulation of religion and their hypothesized effects on national levels of democracy is that it further helps to explain why the Catholic Church became a public religion in some countries, but not in others. It will also help us to form some expectations about the potential of Islam as a public religion in future democratic regimes.

Throughout negotiations between the Catholic Church and liberalizing states in the late 1800s and early 1900s, the Vatican avoided as best as it could to allow states to institutionalize any sort of regulation of type B over the internal institutional organization of the Church. Using our categories developed in chapters one and two, we could understand this drive as the result of the nature of the Catholic Church as a supra-national organization with a preference for a confessional as opposed to an established religion-state arrangement. Although in pre-liberal days they were both connected to the authoritarian political regimes of the day, the Catholic Church was more concerned than its Northern Protestant cousins with losing autonomy to national politicians, and the Church tried to minimize any sort of state control over Catholic organization, ideas or beliefs. At the same time, as a confessional church, the Catholic Church also did everything it could to insure that it won government favoritism from the state in addition to some regulation of type B by the state over the enforcement of religious practices within the nation.
The optimal Catholic institutional arrangement of a confessional state allowed the Church to dictate the national moral economy, but prevented the state from any interference in the Church’s organization. Under such an arrangement, Catholic Bishops and theologians were promoted by the Vatican, not a national state bureaucracy, and much more likely to resist any sort of strengthening of an autonomous political sphere which would weaken Church authority, decouple nation and faith or break the bond between Catholic individuals and the Catholic Magisterium. In its ideal scenario, therefore, the Church was at once protected and subsidized by the state, but also at liberty to organize itself in a way that maximized Church authority relative to state authority.

When their states democratized, the Church was successful in obtaining something nearer to a confessional state in some countries, like Italy, Belgium, Portugal and Spain, while in other Catholic nations, like France and Uruguay, it failed to do so. By avoiding vitality-stripping forms of government regulation, the government favoritism of religion instituted in these democratic Catholic countries turned religious belief into something of a public good which was promoted among citizens by the government, but not required of them. This promotion resulted in higher national rates of religiosity for these states than they would have had without such promotion.

Finally, these hypotheses also give us some indication of what to expect of Muslim countries who democratize and maintain or increase their levels of government favoritism of religion in the future. On the one hand, even as we expect government favoritism of religion to have some positive effect on post-democratization levels of religiosity, Islamic religious authorities will have to deal with their status as established religions. The more they allow themselves to be incorporated into the bureaucratic state
machine, the more they will risk facing the same tendencies towards monopolistic
indolence which Protestant Churches faced. The more they are able to keep their
independence from the state, however, over the long run they will have a greater
likelihood of retaining their vitality. On the other hand, this vitality will also greatly
depend on the nation’s level of economic modernization at the time of democracy and its
future growth. If, as is the case in some states of the Middle East and North Africa, such
as, especially, the Gulf states, economic modernization has been largely achieved during
a period when the state simultaneously maintained high levels of Type A GRI on behalf
of a national religion (such as, especially, the Gulf states), we might expect the
institutionalization of a religiously friendly democratic regime to actually increase if not
maintain levels of national religious practice, rather than simply slow down the rate of
democratization’s negative effects. If, however, after democratizing, some of these
countries undergo an accelerated period of economic modernization, we might expect
GFI to simply mediate those forces, as happened in Catholic Europe, and lessen rather
than block its downward pressures on the rate of decline of national religiosity.

The following chart summarizes the hypotheses of this section regarding the
effects of government involvement in religion, economic development, democratization
and external religious pluralism on national levels of religious participation. In order to
illustrate how these variables combine to affect contemporary religious markets, I list
eight examples of national patterns of religiosity and give short descriptions of each
below.
TABLE 3-3

INTERACTIVE HYPOTHESIS CHART OF VARIABLES AFFECTING RELIGIOSITY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent variables</th>
<th>Predicted Outcomes</th>
<th>Exemplars</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GRIA</td>
<td>GRI B</td>
<td>GFI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Med</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
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<td>Hi</td>
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</tbody>
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All of the first four exemplars, France, Italy, Sweden and the United States have similarly high levels of economic development and democratization and thus, according to classic secularization theories, ought to have similarly low levels of national religious participation. This is not the case across all four countries. Classic secularization theory, in part, does seem to explain the religious markets of France and Sweden, where high economic development, high levels of democratization and relatively low external religious pluralism appears to correspond with low levels of regularly practicing religious individuals. In France, thanks to historical government regulation of religion against
public religious identification and low levels of government favoritism of religion, relatively few individuals consider themselves culturally religious either. In Sweden, on the other hand, thanks to some historical identification of the state with a national religion, many individuals, while not regularly practicing, still identify themselves with the government regulated religion of state.

Secularization theory has much more trouble explaining the robustness of national religious markets in Italy and the United States. In Italy, whose religious market we will examine in much greater detail below, high levels of government favoritism for the Catholic Church coupled with the absence of either government regulation of the Church’s institutions or significant external religious pluralism have created a relatively vigorous religious market. Many Italians consider themselves to be both regularly practicing and culturally religious individuals. The religious market of the United States is similarly robust but for different reasons. Rather than government favoritism of religion, in the United States the presence of an extremely plural and unregulated religious market has created much more religious dynamism than expected by those theories which reduce such dynamism to a function of economic development.

All of the countries in the second set of examples share the common regime characteristic of authoritarianism. One of them, the United Arab Emirates, has achieved relatively elevated levels of economic development, yet, on account of very high levels of government favoritism of the predominant religion of state, Islam, and government regulation which works in Islam’s favor, the UAE has buoyed robust national participation and cultural identification with the religion of state. Similarly high levels of government regulation of and favoritism towards the religion of state, coupled with low
levels of economic development and low external religious pluralism, have also produced robust national religious participation and cultural identification in Afghanistan. In Kenya, on the other hand, a robust religious market is sustained not because of any government regulation or favoritism towards religion, but on account of a very competitive national religious market. This plural religious market is even more charged than the United States thanks, in part, to Kenya’s relatively low level of economic development. Laos, our final example, has relatively low levels of both cultural religious identification and regularly practicing religious individuals, despite a relatively low level of economic development. Thanks to Laos’ communist political regime, government regulation of religion against religion has raised the costs of individual religious participation and identification.

In the following chapters we will further explore these connections between government policies toward religion and the shape and intensity of a national religious market, first by looking at trend of religious participation in Italy and Algeria and then, secondly, by using cross-national data on religion-state arrangements and national levels of religiosity.
CHAPTER 4:
RELIGION AND DEMOCRACY IN ITALY

4.1 Introduction

Now that we have articulated the principal hypotheses about the dynamics introduced by a religiously friendly democratization process and specified the mechanisms which explain how these expected outcomes are produced, the goal of the next two chapters is to begin testing these mechanisms and hypotheses through the construction of an historical narrative of the relationship between religion, state, democracy and society in Italy and Algeria. The task of the historical narrative, as we noted in the introduction, is to determine what causal processes were set into motion by a religiously friendly democratization process in either country. In particular, we want to establish to what extent there is a systematic, regular relationship in the Italian and Algerian cases between religiously friendly democratization and 1) the support for democracy on the part of religious actors and individuals and 2) the nature of national religious life in Italian and Algerian society. By constructing a condensed timeline of the combination of events which led to democratization policies in Italy and Algeria and carefully evaluating how religiously friendly policies interacted with other political,
historical and economic conditions throughout the process, we will be in a better position to judge whether religiously friendly policies affected politics and society regardless of or in addition to, rather than dependent of or only because of other factors.

The rest of this chapter proceeds in three sections. The first section paints a backdrop of the relationship between Catholicism, state, nation and democracy in Italy in order to introduce the principal religious and political actors and ideas who would take center stage in Italy’s post-war democratization process. The section gives an account of the modern history of church-state relations in Italy and examines the resulting nature of the Italian Catholic Church’s hostility to liberalism.

The second section describes the religion-state institutional framework that took shape at the time of democratization and considers the effects of these religiously friendly policies on the transition to and consolidation of democracy in Italy. Given the circumstances, it evaluates to what extent religious candidates, parties and the faithful responded to government favoritism of religion by becoming more moderate in their behavior and discourse towards democracy. The section also asks whether that response was triggered by the way changes in the religion-state arrangement reframed the weight of religious identity on the political goals and desires of Christian Democratic Party (DC) leaders, Vatican authorities and Italian Catholics. Finally, it evaluates to what extent such religious moderation made the transition to and consolidation of democracy more likely in Italy.

49 As in *Democrazia Cristiana*.
The third and final section considers the effects of religiously friendly
democratization on the religious life of Italy. Specifically, it evaluates whether religiously
friendly public institutions helped stimulate the religious life of Italy even as the
secularizing effects of democratic institutions transformed the relationship between
Catholic religious authorities and Italian society, religiously empowering the latter.
4.2 Anti-clerical Democrats and Anti-modern Popes

*We have given God back to Italy and Italy back to God.*
- Pope Pius XII, February 13th, 1929

*We have not revived the temporal power of the Popes, we have buried it and left them with as much territory as would suffice for them to bury its corpse.*
- Benito Mussolini, May 13th, 1929

4.2.1 Pope Pius IX and the Risorgimento (1846-1878)

In the long history of church-state relations in the modern Italian era, the date of September 20th, 1870 stands out in sharp relief, capturing the tenor of hostility that would color Catholicism’s relationship with democracy for the next century. On that date, after cannon blasting the Aurelian Walls at Porta Pia, Italian troops marched into the city of Rome and definitively occupied the city which the newly unified Italian state had first declared as its capital in 1848. In response to the act, Pope Pius IX famously declared himself a “prisoner of the Vatican” and refused to recognize the jurisdiction of the Italian state over the city.

In chapter one, we argued that the hostility of Catholicism as a whole to democracy could be traced in part to the liberal regime’s nation-building quest of gaining and consolidating its political and devotional authority over the citizens within their territory. The success of that quest required that the liberal state disencumber itself of religious authorities, most notably the Catholic Church, who claimed that individuals ultimately owed them greater moral loyalty than the state. Reacting with hostility to the
liberal attempt to dismantle their claims of authority, religious authorities found natural common ground with conservative European monarchs and their political supporters. The liberal state’s insistence on a national constitution as the ultimate source of political sovereignty threatened nobles and royals whose claims to authority lay in bloodlines rather than electoral ballots. Neither the Catholic Church nor European monarchs were ready to accept relinquishing moral or political power to the bourgeoisie (let alone the common man) either through elections or by recognizing that individuals had a right to form moral and religious opinions independently of Church authority. In Catholic countries, therefore, conservative political forces defended the Church’s authority over the traditional moral and social structure of society and the Church defended the sacred right of monarchs to rule. The French revolution’s attempt to physically eradicate the Catholic Church from French politics and society alarmed the clergy about what the worst of liberal reform could look like and flamed the Church’s violent stance against democracy and liberalism.

The antagonism between the Catholic Church and liberal forces in Italy, thus, was not an isolated conflict. However, the special circumstances of Italian unification and the Popes’ physical location in Rome added fuel to the conflict. In Rome, the Pope not only governed the transnational structure of the Catholic Church, but he also held the temporal role as the ruling head of the Papal states, one of several historic, sovereign Italian states which stretched from Rome in the south to Bologna in the north and was the last city-state to formally unite with the state of Italy during the time of the Italian Risorgimento.

Liberals in Italy seeking to avoid the excesses of the French Revolution originally flirted with the idea of inviting the Pope to take on the role of figurehead of a future
Italian federation, or a Catholic “constitutional papacy” (Jemolo 1960). The continent-wide events of 1848, however, made such an arrangement impossible. In Italy, the popular and (moderately) violent revolution of 1848 led by liberal nationalists claimed Rome for the Italian State. In what would take on broad symbolic importance, Giuseppe Garibaldi and his band of Freedom Fighters heroically defended Rome from Papal forces, and despite being badly outnumbered, defeated a garrison of French troops on Rome’s Gianicolo hill. Pius IX’s predecessor, Pope Gregory XVI, had suppressed a similar attempt at revolution fifteen years earlier with Austrian troops who, like the French troops, had been stationed in Rome to guarantee the Pope’s temporal sovereignty. Both the French and Austrian forces were sent to Rome by Catholic emperors whose claims to their thrones and political legitimacy were, in turn, underwritten by the Catholic Church.

When the founding fathers of the first Italian State eventually took control of Rome, they sought to disestablish the traditional role of the Church in politics and create a liberal political regime that offered no special privileges to the Church. After attempts

50 Garibaldi’s men defeated the garrison but eventually had to abandon the city when French reinforcements arrived. Garibaldi’s gunslinging, pregnant Peruvian wife, Anita, died in the retreat that followed and, after the Italian state’s eventual victory in Rome, the state erected monuments to both on the Gianicolo hill. Garibaldi’s statue was originally pointed with arms raised towards the Vatican’s walls, but after the signing of the Lateran Pacts, Pope Pius XI was able to convince Mussolini to switch the orientation of the statue so that Garibaldi’s sculpted gaze turned to overlook the city of Rome rather than menace the Vatican.

51 It is interesting to note here the variation in the religion-state arrangements of modern France—variation which is often forgotten due to French laicite: The French Catholic Church lost all of its privileges in the French Revolution, gained some back under Napoleon I, but lost some again when he left. Napoleon III restored those privileges to the Church, but they were lost once more with the laws of laicite in 1905. The Vichy regime temporarily restored them for one last time before the IVth French Republic returned the state to a strict laicite.

52 It was only the pressing needs of the Franco-Prussian war which forced Napoleon, with much trepidation for the consequences of such actions, to abandon his defense of Rome in 1870 (Kertzer 2005).
to persuade the Vatican to peacefully accept the new arrangements failed, in 1870, the Italian state forcibly put into effect the *Law of Guarantees* to regulate the relations between the Catholic Church and the Italian state. Originally proposed by Italy’s first Prime Minister in 1861, Camillo Cavour, the law was essentially based on Cavour’s principle of a “free Church *in* a Free State” [italics by author]. Pius IX, however, understood this law as a mandated surrender of religious power and sovereignty to the Italian State, not the liberation from temporal duties which Cavour proposed for the Catholic religion. The preposition “in” seemed to assume that the state, and not the Church, was the higher of the two political and moral powers. Had he been asked to negotiate on the issue, which he was not, Pius IX might have suggested, as Scoppola points out, that the *Law of Guarantees* read a “Free Church *and* a Free State” (Scoppola 1967:4).

In this context, Pope Pius IX issued two important decrees that would guide precedent for Catholic thought on democracy until after World War II. In 1864, he wrote the infamous *Syllabus Errorum*, which encompassed 80 errors that attacked liberalism, modernism and pluralism, and reasserted the danger of the separation of Church and state and the need for an institutionalized state religion. Among other errors, he most famously stated that,

53 Cavour was insistently idealistic in his coherent and sincere attempt to democratize and modernize the Catholic Church (in addition to the Italian state) and thereby transform but not necessarily eliminate the role of religion in a modern liberal regime. Among other anti-clerical laws which will be discussed later, at this time Cavour also proposed legislation which would have required Bishops to be elected from among themselves (rather than appointed by the Pope) as well as giving the state a veto in such decisions (Jemolo 1960: 25). These propositions coated Pius IX’s hostility to Italian liberalism in thick layers of ice.
55. [it is an error to hold that] the Church ought to be separated from the State, and the State from the Church.

77. [It is an error to hold that] in the present day, it is no longer expedient that the Catholic religion shall be held as the only religion of the State, to the exclusion of all other modes of worship.

80. [It is an error to hold that] the Roman Pontiff can and ought to reconcile himself to, and agree with, progress, liberalism, and civilization as lately introduced (Helmreich 1979). 54

Then, immediately following the seizure of Rome, Pius IX issued the non-expedit, informing Catholics that it was a “grave” sin to vote or involve oneself in secular Italian politics and that doing so risked excommunication. In response Catholic lay leaders drafted a political manifesto of Intransigent Catholics in which they swore unconditional fidelity to the Pope, irreducible opposition to the liberal state, and systematic electoral abstentionism in national elections (Scoppola 1967:100). 55

4.2.2 Liberal Anti-clericals, Hostile Catholics and an Evolving Church (1878-1922)

From the papacy of Leo XIII (1878-1903), who followed Pius IX, through that of Pius XII (1938-1958) and the beginning of Catholic democracy in Italy, the Italian Church’s political activity was guided by two somewhat contradictory political and doctrinal goals. First, Popes and Italian Bishops continued the struggle against

54 The Syllabus was an especially political document. Although in the same year, Pope Pius IX conferred the First Vatican Council in order to formulate a doctrinal response to contemporary societal changes, the Syllabus of Errors was not presented as part of that Council (Helmreich 1979). It is interesting to note here that although the justification of its promulgation reached back to medieval traditions, Papal Infallibility was declared doctrinal at this council. In all of the 80 errors of the Syllabus, Jesus Christ is mentioned only twice; God is abstractly referred to three times; and no scripture verses are referenced. The bulk of the errors deal with official Vatican concordats, the role of Catholic education within the state, and encyclicals on the relationship between reason and faith.

55 Italian Catholics would continue, however, to be politically active in municipal governing institutions.
modernism and liberalism instituted by Pope Pius IX. Although the prospect of restoring the whole of the Papal territorial kingdom waned with time and Catholics became more restless to join in the democratic political process, Catholic elites still insisted on the need for some sovereign, temporal power. Catholic intransigents, therefore, continued their program of abstentionism.

Pope Leo XIII and then Pius X, Benedict XV, and Pius XI, however, continued to employ the *non expedit* more and more as a way of protesting the legitimacy of the liberal regime than as a maneuver to win back its historic sovereign territory. Pope Pius X, for instance, while generally holding to the *non expedit*, wrote that when there existed “reasons of paramously grave importance which touch on the supreme well-being of society, which at every cost must be saved,” it was possible for Catholics to vote for a candidate specified by the Vatican. These emergencies, in which the salvation of the public good was required “at every cost,” became more frequent and Catholic politicians in Catholic regions such as the Veneto sought and won important local political positions.

As anti-clerical laws were periodically passed, however, the Church found fodder to renew its belief that the liberal political system of government was intent on marginalizing the Catholic Church to the private realm and forcing secularization upon Italy. Some of the most notable of this legislation included the *Saccardi* laws of 1850 in the Piedmont which abolished the jurisdiction of ecclesiastical courts in civil and criminal cases affecting the clergy (Helmreich 1979); the 1865 law requiring civil marriages; the dissolution of ecclesiastical bodies and monasteries (some 25,000 by Helmreich’s (1979: 56)....

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36) count); the decision to require Clergy to do military service; and, most importantly, the state legislation supplanting the Church’s traditional role in education, including the 1848 Boncompagni law (Kalvyas 1996) requiring secular public schools; the 1873 law abolishing chairs of theology in Italian universities (Puglisi 1924); and the 1908 law forbidding religious material from being taught in public schools (Jemolo 1960).

Particularly baneful to the Church were liberal politicians’ unwavering claims on the primal importance of the individual’s autonomous judgment on religious matters over the direction of any Church authority, especially when it came to education, marriage and freedom of conscience. The Church argued it continued to represent the sole competent authority when it came to teaching Truth, forming society’s conscience, and correcting moral error, and the Catholic hierarchy remained insistent on the need for a negotiated concordat with the Italian state that could guarantee the authority and moral primacy of the Catholic Church in Italian society (Scoppola 1967).

Secondly, however, at the same time that they blasted liberal secularism’s encouragement of “freedom of conscience,” this string of Popes and their elite officers became more sensitive to the changing political consciousness of their faithful and more innovative in the ways they attempted to organize and channel it. While condemning liberal secularism, Leo XIII and his successors emphasized the Church’s position as first and foremost a spiritual empire. Both he and Benedict XV (1914-1922) declared that it was not the Church’s purpose to decide between conflicting systems of secular government (Binchy 1970). From Pope Leo XIII on, Catholic authorities encouraged the creation of an intensely active Catholic civil society outside of normal politics that mobilized the Catholic faithful into participative associations and formed a virtual
parallel society. In 1867 the *Società della Gioventú Cattolica* was founded, later evolving into *Catholic Action*, and it would create Catholic newspapers, cooperatives, rural banks, professional societies and youth clubs. In 1891, Leo XIII’s *Rerum Novarum* called attention to the plight of the working classes (Jemolo 1960, Sigmund 1987), and in 1904 the Church created a federation of Catholic workers’ unions through which many Catholics of working class backgrounds organized their needs.\(^{57}\) Even as it condemned modernism, therefore, the Church was actively engaging with modernity and while it rejected liberalism’s proposal for the institutional separation of church and state, the Church’s new approach to Catholic society found echoes in some liberal political goals. This was most clear in the attempt of the Church to represent and organize the needs of a growing Catholic working class. Although it tried to do so outside of party politics, the concern of the Church to create more just and humane conditions for workers and to promote civil society associations which workers themselves would help manage reflected liberal and socialist attempts to do the same. Doctrinally, therefore, it was not clear that the Church so much opposed the precepts of democracy theologically or institutionally as it was opposed politically to the type of liberalism and anti-clericalism embodied by democratic governments of the time.

This evolution of the Catholic Church was not a linear process and commonalities between democratic ideals and Church goals were often obscured because the Church felt that it faced a government that was bent on eroding Italy’s spiritual identity and replacing it with secular authority (Binchy 1970). This led inner contradictions to form under the

\(^{57}\) This federation of Catholic Unions came into being only after the dismemberment of its predecessor, the *Opera dei Congressi*, which was originally founded in 1874 but then dissolved in 1904 by Pius X when certain leaders within the organization began publicly participating in elections.
surface of the Italian Church’s projected unity and its relation to Italian electoral politics. In its fight against liberal democratic secularism, for example, the Catholic Church found itself tacitly and sometimes openly supporting the political parties of the conservative right who did not represent the political interests of many of the Catholic Church’s faithful working class base. In 1913 the year universal male suffrage was passed, in the hopes of gaining Catholic votes, a group of moderate conservative political candidates signed the *Patto Gentiloni*, committing themselves to resisting the further introduction of anti-clerical legislation by liberal or socialist parties.

In 1919, these contradictions were forced out into the open when Don Luigi Sturzo, a southern priest at the head of Catholic Action, formed *il Partito Popolare* (PPI). The PPI was a centrist party that aimed to activate the Catholic middle and working classes to participate in elections on a platform based on Catholic social doctrine and Church interests. The Church hierarchy did not openly condemn Sturzo for doing so, nor did it approve of his actions. In a Secretary of State memorandum on the elections of 1924, for example, the Vatican hierarchy argued that Mussolini’s Nationalist Party represented a more desirable political option than the PPI because it appeared more capable and willing to institutionally defend Catholic interests and morals.

Nevertheless, the Secretary of State recommended tacitly allowing Catholics to support the *Popolari*, calculating that it was impossible that Mussolini’s party would not win and, among lesser evils, it would be better for a coalition government to form

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58 Who had, in 1905, already written of the emerging presence of two tendencies in the Catholic movement in Italy: the “moderate-clericals,” which grouped together conservative Catholics, and the progressive Catholics, the “reformist-democrats.”
between Mussolini and the PPI than between Mussolini and the socialists. The PPI had some early but not overwhelming electoral success, and Sturzo soon fled into exile after Mussolini began to concentrate political power.

4.2.3 Fascist Governments and Friendly Institutions (1922-1944)

While Mussolini was wary of the political intentions of the Catholic hierarchy, he also realized that the creation of a strong Italian state capable of promoting order and authority required the assistance of the Catholic Church. Although in later years fascism would lose the support of the Vatican, Mussolini was initially able to gain great Catholic support by actively reaching out to the Catholic Church and faithful. Instead of foisting a treaty (or reform) on the Church as earlier liberal governments had attempted, Mussolini negotiated a set of institutional agreements between the Vatican and Italy with Pope Pius XI on the Pope’s own terms. This set of agreements, the Lateran Pacts, would later become a key tool that the new democratic government would use to secure the support of the Church for democracy in 1946. The Lateran Pacts, negotiated between Pius XI’s special legal advisor, the attorney Francesco Pacelli, and Mussolini’s delegate, the Honorable Domenico Barone, included two treaties in one. The first was a bilateral treaty between the Vatican and the Italian Government which established the existence and boundaries of the Vatican City as a sovereign territory governed by the Pope. The second was a concordat between the Catholic Church and the Italian State that regulated the


60 Francesco Pacelli was the older brother of Eugenio Pacelli, who was serving as the Papal Nuncio to Berlin at the time but would become the future Pope Pius XII.
specific relationship between the Italian state and the Vatican as well as the role of Catholicism within Italian society.

With the Lateran Pacts, Mussolini reversed most of the anti-clerical laws which had been passed in the 1860s and 1870s and ended the awkward position of the Pope as a self-declared prisoner of the Vatican. By restoring some temporal sovereignty to the Pope through the creation of the Vatican City, the Lateran Pacts finally resolved the “Roman Question” and led Pius XI to drop all claims to Italian territory and symbolic protest against Italian unity. Most importantly, the Pacts restored a strong institutional role for the Church in Italian society, making the “Catholic, Apostolic and Roman Religion” the “only religion of the State.” This clause, in the opening phrase of the Pacts, made Italy a confessional state by all effects and bound it to protecting the interests of the Church at the expense of other religions. The Pacts also returned to the Church its charge to educate Italian school children, once again made Catholic religious education in schools compulsory; relegated matters of marriage and annulment to governance by Church Canon law; awarded state-sponsored salaries to personnel in ecclesiastical institutions; restored many ecclesiastical communities; and recognized most Church calendar festivals as national holidays (Jemolo 1960, Rossi 1959). In return, the Church agreed to bless Mussolini and the Fascist state in all public masses and swear an oath of fidelity to the state. In addition, the Catholic Church agreed to inform the Fascist government of the names of future appointments of Bishops before the appointments were officially announced, and to allow Mussolini to vet and even disapprove of the lists.

The announcement of the Lateran Pacts came as a surprise to many in Europe as most of the negotiations occurred in secret and the media as well as the masses were
convinced that if Mussolini were to promote Catholicism as essential to Italian fascism, he would impose a deal on the Vatican by force.\textsuperscript{61} It is curious, then, that throughout the negotiations, Mussolini made major concessions to Vatican demands to restore its moral authority within Italian society. Mussolini intervened forcefully only to whittle down the size of the Pope’s hopes for Vatican territory, nearly breaking off negotiations permanently at one point, and to insist on instituting a guarded veto power over the appointment of Italian Bishops. Other than that, he largely gave the Pope whatever he wanted.\textsuperscript{62}

In parliamentary sessions Mussolini and others from his party defended the government’s action on two accounts. First, Fascists saw the Pacts as an opportunity for synergies to form between traditional Catholic education in Italy, which prized discipline and respect for authority, and the rigorous social training Fascism required for the creation of future cadres of Italian youth. Delegating education duties to the Catholic Church would help ensure that Italian schoolchildren would be formed with the appropriate moral fiber, vigor, discipline and loyalty which Fascism promoted as the base of renewal of society. As these children became men and women they would be primed to invest themselves in Fasci youth clubs and political parties, where their energies would

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\textsuperscript{61} As the French Catholic newspaper \textit{La Croix} (October 20th, 1927) reported, “For Fascist Italy, it is and will be out of discussion to re-establish, even in a much-reduced proportion, the temporal power [of the Pope] which ended in 1870,” (as collected in AVS: A.E.S. Stato italia: Convenzioni Lateranensi 1926-1929:702 (P.O.) Vol. IV: Fasc. XII). In Mussolini’s own statement in \textit{Il Popolo d’Italia}, (September 23rd, 1927), he makes it clear that any treaty with the Holy See is one that concerns the regulation of Italy’s rights over “its religion of state,” and that religion, if it wanted a normalized relationship with the Fascist state would need “to bend itself to the dictates of that State” (as collected in AVS: A.E.S. Stato italia: Convenzioni Lateranensi 1926-1929: 702 (PO) Vol.1, Fasc. 6.)

\textsuperscript{62} See especially the last round of revisions of the Lateran Pacts, penciled in by Pope Pius XI and Mussolini, 1927-1928(AVS: A.E.S. Stato italia; Convenzioni Lateranensi 1926-1929:702 (PO) Vol.s II-III)
be harnessed towards building the Fascist Italian state. Secondly, Mussolini understood the Pacts as removing the motivation for and, thus, permanently resolving clerical political resistance to the secular state. As he said in the days following the treaty,

With this Concordat...the principle of separation of Church and state as it was intended in the old liberal doctrine, and is still professed today by democratic anticlericalism, is abandoned... but the state has not renounced one ounce of its sovereignty.63

By appearing to give into most of the Catholic Church’s demands and making Italy a fully confessional state, Mussolini calculated he could weaken the political (and mobilizing) power of the Church and please an easy majority of Italians who, after all, identified themselves in the grand majority as Catholics. The Church would essentially have no reason to protest or intervene in politics and therefore have little reason or power to incite their faithful to resist the state either. The Fascist party saw this reconciliation with the Church as one of many political victories which had eluded Italian liberals who, for their part, had never mustered the power or will to negotiate with the Church and suffered serious problems of legitimacy on account of it.

When Pius XI, nearly beside himself with exuberance about the deal he had just made, declared that, “We have given back God to Italy and Italy to God,”64 Mussolini

63 From Mussolini’s discourse (Atti Parlamentari. Lesislatura XXVIII sessione 1929, Camera dei Deputati. seduta del 20 aprile 1929, anno VII. See, also, Atti Parlamentari. Legislatura XXVIII sessione 1, discussioni, tornata del 10 maggio 1929: intervento dal Hon. Martire: “This beautiful and holy fecundity of the Italian family is consecrated in the Concordat...but...a Catholic state does not mean a Clerical state.”

64 Pope Pius XI spoke this phrase to a crowd of professors and students at the Catholic University of the Sacred Heart in Milan on February 13th, 1929. The full text went: “We have succeeded in walking through the middle of an abyss in concluding a Concordat which, if it is not the best of those that we could do, it is certainly among the best that has been achieved until now; and so it is with deep pleasure that we believe that we have given back God to Italy and Italy to God.” (excerpted from parole pontificie sugli accordi del Laterno. tip. de l’osservatore romano, 1929).
retorted that “We have not revived the temporal power of the Popes, we have buried it and left them with as much territory as would suffice for them to bury its corpse.” Then, reiterating the coercive state regulation which the Lateran Pacts had established for the state over the Italian Church, Mussolini went on to say,

The Regime is vigilant, and nothing escapes it. Let no one think that the most insignificant rag circulating in the most remote parish does not at some time come beneath the eye of Mussolini.

The Church for its part did not act as if the Lateran Pacts had written its epitaph. The majority of Italian Catholics and the Catholic hierarchy gladly gave their symbolic legitimacy to the fascist regime and praised the staid vision of the fascist government to protect “Dio, Patria, Famiglia” (Jemolo 1960, Pasquino 1986). At the same time, the Catholic Church used the Lateran Pacts to expand its presence in society and profited from its new legal status as the confessional religion of state. Records from the Vatican Secret Archives documenting Church officials’ requests of the Fascist state following the Lateran Pacts show that the Catholic hierarchy regularly made use of its privileged status. They beseeched the fascist government for initiatives or legislation to provide for the morality of the beaches, root out the vice of cursing in the military, and rid Italian society of immoral cinema, “nudism,” and improper art. Although they were few in

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65 From a speech to the Italian Chamber on May 13th 1929, as quoted in Jemolo (1960: 233).

66 Which stated, (Art. 1 of the Concordat between the Holy See and Italy (Lateran Pacts)) “The Catholic, Roman and Apostolic Religion is the only Religion of State...[and the state will] grant ecclesiastical members for the benefit of their spiritual ministry, the defense of their authority. In consideration of the sacred character of the Eternal City [Rome], the Bishop’s seat of the Holy Pope, center of the Catholic world and destination of pilgrims, the Italian government will take care to prohibit in Rome all that could be in opposition to its character.”

67 See, for example AVS: Segretaria di Stato: Scedario, 1936-1939: 1937: Stati 69 “disposizioni per sradicare nell’ambiente militare il vizio della bestemmia,” 1938 and Stati 106 “Provvedimenti per la moralità delle spiagge.”
number, Protestants in Italy were also marginalized. While some long-established non-Catholic religious communities, such as the Waldesian Church, were given protection under the Lateran Pacts, they were also subject to tightened regulations. Pastors were bound by law to request permits to preach in public, to advise the government of religious gatherings, and to worship only in established churches. This last restriction created great hardship for many small groups of Protestants who met only in homes (Peyrot 1977, Viallet 1985). The Ministry for Religious Affairs was also instituted under the Italian Ministry of Justice which was subsumed under the Ministry of Internal Affairs by the Fascists. Although they did not systematically use their power to do so, Catholic ecclesiastical authorities could denounce pastors to the Ministry of Justice for slandering the religion of state and thereby block Protestant gatherings of prayer or the erection of new Protestant buildings (Rochat 1990). Worst off among Protestant groups of the time were the Jehovah’s Witnesses and Evangelicals, of whom many were jailed, sent to internment camps, or exiled abroad or to deserted towns in the south. The 1935 Buffarini Circolare malignly outlawed any Evangelical practice as “contrary to the social order and harmful to the physical and mental integrity of the race.”(Peyrot 1977:12).

In this respect, Mussolini underestimated the commitment of the Catholic Church to continue to participate actively in the organization of society and politics, and Catholic subgroups, including Catholic Unions, newspapers and youth organizations, wielded their position within Italian society to resist fascist leadership (Galli and Prandi 1970, Casula and Cucchiari 1977). Despite Mussolini’s attempts to regulate Catholic Action, its organizations continued to operate autonomously and often skirmished, violently, with Fascist Youth societies. Catholic journals and organizations were placed under strict
surveillance and censorship for their subversive attitudes towards Fascism; in 1931 these tensions came to a head when Mussolini ordered the dissolution of all Catholic youth organizations. In response, Pope Pius XI issued the encyclical *Non Abbiamo Bisogno*, in which he denounced Fascist violence against Catholic Action and criticized the idolization of the state which the *Fascist Oath* demanded of party members and public servants (Pollard 1985: 158). Although this crisis over Catholic Action was temporarily resolved with a negotiated agreement between Pius XI and Mussolini that left Catholic Action under the direct control of bishops but purged its leadership of opponents of Fascism, when Mussolini invaded Abyssinia, instituted race laws and then allied himself strictly with the Nazis, tensions between the Fascist state and the Vatican boiled over once again. Importantly, despite the fact that the Vatican proclaimed neutrality and continued to hold diplomatic ties with Germany and Italy, at the parish level, particularly in the north, Catholic Churches turned into critical centers for the Italian Resistance throughout the Second World War.

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68 For studies of this period see Pollard (1985) and Casula and Cucchiari (1988).

69 “We have no need of this”

70 In the treaty, entitled *l’Accordo per l’Azione Cattolica*, Pius XI and Mussolini agreed that Catholic Action would 1) remain under the direct control of the bishops but also 2) that “there cannot in future be chosen as directors men who belonged in the past to parties hostile to the regime,” and that the Fascist police would enforce such stipulations (Pollard 1985: 216). This phrase was especially directed at the numbers of ex-*popolari* present in Catholic Action ranks whom the Fascist government felt had turned the organization against Fascism.

4.3 Moderation and Inclusion: Friendly Democracy (1944-1966)

_Catholic Citizen! He who does not vote is a traitor to la Patria. He who does not vote Christian is a traitor to his Faith._

-1948 Christian Democracy Campaign Propaganda

4.3.1 Introduction

The Vatican’s rapprochement and subsequent rift with Mussolini’s government; continued popular support for the former leaders of the PPI and the Church’s social encyclicals; and the emergence of a viable socialist political alternative all set the stage for the institutionalization of religiously friendly democratization in post-war Italy. This section considers the shape that these religiously friendly democratic institutions took and analyzes their effect on the evolution of the goals and beliefs of the Italian Catholic political movement.

In order to do so, the section first defines the composition of the Catholic political movement in post-war Italy and its attitude as a whole towards democratic ideas and institutions. As will be seen, the Catholic political movement at the time of Italy’s post-war democratization continued to be dominated by a Vatican hierarchy with, in the end, ambivalent attitudes towards democracy. The section then outlines the nature of Italy’s religiously friendly democratic institutions and considers the reactions of the distinct groups of actors within the Italian Catholic political movement to those institutions. In order to do so, it first explores the Vatican’s energetic campaign to activate the Catholic Italian electorate to institute a less-than-democratic Catholic political regime in Italy. It then analyzes the growth of the Italian Christian Democrats and how the Vatican’s
intransigent platform ran out of steam and evolved to reflect the growing autonomy and political secularization of both the Italian Christian Democratic party and the Italian Catholic electorate.

With respect to the evolution of the Christian Democratic party, the section explores the significance, particularly, of the party’s decision to enter into a political coalition with the Italian Socialist party in 1963 and analyzes how elites responded to the objections of the Vatican to such a coalition. The section then considers survey evidence and electoral records which chart the political secularization of the Italian Catholic electorate. The data indicates that the shifting political salience of religious identities in Italy moved 1) a minority of Italian Catholics to abandon the Christian Democratic party and, thus, the political objectives of the Catholic hierarchy, and 2) a majority of Italian Catholics within the Christian Democratic party to drop religious goals from their sets of most pressing political aims and, in the process of which, also abandon the original objectives of the Catholic hierarchy. The section ends by evaluating rival hypotheses to this theory and articulating how this process of political secularization benefited the transition to and consolidation of democracy in Italy.

4.3.2 Christian Democrats, the Left and the Vatican: Implicit Hostilities

Table 4.1 reproduces our table presented in chapter three which outlined the principal actors in the Catholic political movement in Italy in 1944. The table characterizes each group of actors’ position of influence within the movement; their attitudes towards democracy; their religious character; and the evolution of all these attributes following Italy’s process of religiously friendly democratization. Within the
Italian Catholic political movement, the main actors of interest for this study are the Vatican hierarchy, the Christian Democratic party and the Catholic electorate who were, in turn, socially and politically organized into Catholic associations.

TABLE 4-1

COMPOSITION OF ITALIAN CATHOLIC POLITICAL MOVEMENT BEFORE AND AFTER RELIGIOUSLY FRIENDLY DEMOCRATIZATION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Actor:</th>
<th>Attributes:</th>
<th>1944</th>
<th>1963</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Religious Institution:</td>
<td>Vatican/Roman Curia</td>
<td>Democratic Support:</td>
<td>Intransient</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Position of Power within Movement:</td>
<td>Dominant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious Political Party:</td>
<td>Democrazia Cristiana</td>
<td>Democratic Support:</td>
<td>Democratic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Position of Power within Movement:</td>
<td>Dependent on Vatican support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious Associations:</td>
<td>Azione Cattolica, Coldiretti, CISL</td>
<td>Democratic Support:</td>
<td>Ambivalent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Position of Power within Movement:</td>
<td>Obedient to Vatican</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious Individuals:</td>
<td>Catholic Faithful</td>
<td>Democratic Support:</td>
<td>Ambivalent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Position of Power within Movement:</td>
<td>Obedient</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>General Religiosity:</td>
<td>Tight</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Religiosity</td>
<td>Religiosity</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The Christian Democrats (DC) rose from the ashes of Don Struzo’s PPI in the last years of WWII and formed as a moderate Catholic party of the center. The party was technically independent of Vatican control and steered by lay Catholic leaders like Alcide de Gasperi, Giuseppe Dossetti, and others who were politically rooted in the doctrines on social justice within the Church. These leaders had been long-time advocates of Catholic participation in plural democratic elections. However, the party itself entered the political scene as a relatively weak shadow of the massive, dense networks of the Italian Catholic subculture to which the DC would turn to win its electoral support (Galli 1966, Durand 1991a). This heterogeneous subculture of Italian Catholic individuals was represented most actively by Catholic Action. Catholic Action was an acutely centralized organization and took its directives foremost from the Vatican and the Catholic Curia. The Curia, in turn, found its political roots in the Church’s tradition of intransigence towards liberalism and was especially concerned with preserving the confessional aspect of the new Republic.

The DC was not, therefore, intrinsically hostile to Italian democracy. Rather, the undemocratic tendencies within the Catholic political movement were animated most vigorously by the set of religious authorities who underwrote the party, guided its electorate and attempted to direct its political goals (Warner 2000:125-6). Despite the

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These lay Catholic politicians also found some voice within the Vatican Hierarchy, most notably through De Gasperi’s friendship with Cardinal Montini who would eventually become Pope Paul VI. Montini began Pius XII’s pontificate as the Pope’s substitute Secretary of State, but was then named Archbishop of Milan in 1954, a move interpreted by many as an act of symbolic exile from Rome on account of his sympathies for the DC’s leadership choices.

As was true of individuals within the Vatican who supported the DC’s vision more or less wholeheartedly, there were also prominent members within the DC who supported the goals of the Curia more or less wholeheartedly, such as the lay president of Catholic Action, Luigi Gedda.
democratic, non-confessional leanings of the leaders of the DC, especially de Gasperi and Dossetti, their political decisions in the 1940s reflect their dependence on the Church hierarchy and illustrate the strength of “moderate-clerical” tendencies relative to “reformist-democrats”74 within the greater Catholic political movement. De Gasperi, who was bitter about the Church’s compromises with Fascism, weary of clerical political intentions, and suspicious of gathering ideologically diverse Catholics into one party, nevertheless was also aware that the DC had little organizational base or independent financial support (Scoppola 1977: 147). His political pragmatism won out over his political ideology and he raised the Catholic tone of the DC to persuade the Church to champion Catholic political unity through the party. To that end, as the Vatican had pressed them to do, DC party members lobbied for the inclusion of the Lateran pacts throughout the Constitutional debates. In 1946, as the DC contested elections for the first time, it also inserted the need for the state to protect marriage as one of the party’s policy goals (Scoppola 1977: 141), emphasized the need for Catholic public education over the “absurd and unrealizable” goal of lay public schools (Musselli 1990:55), and, critically, in 1947, forced the Communist Party out of the interim governing coalition which had been elected in 1946 and charged with the drafting of the new Italian constitution (Warner 2000: 109).

As we discussed was often the case in chapter two, it is important to note that this general hostility of the Catholic movement towards democracy in Italy, as animated by the Vatican, was an implicit, as opposed to an open hostility. By the end of the war, the

74 To return to Sturzo’s 1905 categorization.
Catholic Church had ceased its frontal attack on democracy as a legitimate political regime and signaled that it was open to supporting the return of some set of democratic institutions. Given its recent support for Fascism and the Church’s historical relationship with liberal democracy, this represented no small step towards democracy. The new openness of the Church towards democratic politics confirmed the mutual concern of both liberal democrats and Catholics for a common set of political goals which had been obscured by Church-state conflicts during Italy’s first experience with democracy. Throughout his addresses at the end of the war, for example, Pius XII praised the ideals of democracy to defend human rights and promote social and economic equality, goals the Church itself had promoted in Italy. The Catholic Church had also learned that religiously friendly authoritarian governments had a sinister underside which the Church was not capable of controlling. Although he had restored privileges to the Church, Mussolini had also attempted to coercively manage both the Church and Italian Catholics for his own political ends in ways that the Church had not foreseen. The trauma of World War II had revealed how destructive totalitarianism could be, leading the Church and Italian society as a whole to be more reluctant to support such a concentration of political power in an authoritarian regime again (Scoppola 1977). Through the institutional rotation of power, therefore, Pius XII recognized that some sort of democracy might help protect Italian citizens and the Catholic Church from future hostile, totalitarian governments (Acerbi 1991).

At the same time, it was not clear to what extent the Church had simply sanctioned elections with the intention of using them for their own, undemocratic ends, as many of the period accused and feared. The Catholic Church made no new proclamation
that democracy represented a better form of government or that it had somehow been purified or deemed worthy of full Catholic legitimization. Instead, Pius XII made it abundantly clear that the type of democracy that could be successful in Italy and embraced by the Catholic Church was a “protected” democracy (Riccardi 1983: 130), one that guaranteed the right and necessity for the Church to intervene in politics (Musselli 1990, Acerbi 1991:210, Warner 2000:81). Pius XII’s postwar political vision for both Italy and the world was one in which the Catholic Church played the role of global Defensor Civitatis.\footnote{“Defender of Civilization”} As Pius XII ended his oft-quoted Christmas Radio Message of 1944:

> If the future belongs to democracy, an essential part of its task must be played by the religion of Christ and the church, messenger of the world and redeemer and the keeper of his mission of salvation. This church, in fact, teaches and defends the truth, communicates the supernatural forces of grace to achieve the order of beings and ends established by God, the ultimate foundation and directive norm in any democracy (Acerbi 1991: 208).

While expressing openness to the basic democratic rules of the game, Pius XII’s rhetoric places an important restriction on democratic politics: it must conform to the Truth of the Church’s moral vision. It was ambiguous at the time to what political lengths the Church would go to ensure such conformity and whether it would tolerate less religious or secular parties who did not share this vision or, even more importantly, accept playing the role of a loyal opposition to them.

As late as 1943-45, it was not even clear how aware the Vatican was about the political intentions of the Christian Democrats or if it considered them to possess political potential or to be authentically Catholic enough in their political orientations. In
diplomatic exchanges with the American Embassy at the end of the war, for example, Vatican officials indicated that they were hoping for either the revival, in some form, of the pre-fascist conservative party, or else the creation of some sort of liberal-conservative coalition that would include the less corrupt elements of the Fascist party (Scoppola 1977:41). At that point, in fact, a semi-authoritarian Catholic alternative that would allow the Church to play a instrumental role in the creation of a new Italian political regime, keep its place of privilege, fend off the Communist challenge, and protect the faith, seemed viable. In 1943, King Emmanuel II dismissed and arrested Mussolini, appointing Mussolini’s officer, Marshall Pietro Badoglio, as interim Prime Minister. Badoglio initially announced the continuation of war against the allies but eventually signed an Armistice with them and won the favor of Churchill as a potential anti-communist, post-war governor (Pasquino 1986). To that end, Luigi Gedda, president of Catholic Action at the time, offered interim Prime Minister Badoglio the full mobilizing support of Catholic Action (Scoppola 1977:43). However, the popular success of a Resistance force led mostly by the Italian left, and the growing calls for a socialist revolution in Italy which accompanied the left’s popularity, made the peaceful transition to an authoritarian government seem less and less likely.

This fear of a civil war and return to violence led the Pope to resist those voices within the hierarchy who, together with General Franco, tried to persuade him to pursue a “Spanish solution” and pressure the formation of a nascent Italian government which would criminalize communist parties and outlaw them from the electoral process.

76 Mussolini escaped two months later and, under heavy pressure from Hitler, set up the two-year government of the Social Republic of Saló in the North of Italy.
(Riccardi 1983). The Pope’s decision was reinforced by his calculation that the Catholic Church had both the votes and the support of politicians required to build and defend a new Christian civilization, with the Church at its helm, within the context of democratic institutions. Although he accepted that such a democracy would entail separation between civil and religious spheres, Pius XII also thought that Italy had the numbers of practicing Catholics within the electorate, theoretically bound by religious obedience, to ensure that the Church remained the sole master of truth and morality within Italian society. In order to do so, like de Gasperi, Pius XII also knew that Italian Catholics would have to vote together as a single block to defeat the left. Despite their autonomous instincts, Pius XII realized that the DC’s democratic credentials, centrist message, and popular support made it the most likely party in which to pursue Catholic unity, and he went to work at cajoling DC leaders to follow the Vatican’s policy lines (Warner 2000:109). While nominally legitimizing democratization in Italy by flipping the Catholic electoral switch, therefore, as we will examine in more detail below, the rhetoric of the rest of Pope Pius XII’s papacy was hardly supportive of democratic consolidation. Rather, it focused on protecting the confessional nature of Italy.

4.3.3 Democratization and Religiously Friendly Policies

Pius XII’s calculations were strengthened by the form that post-war democratization negotiations took in Italy and the favored place in Italian society that new democratic institutions assured the Church. In 1944, party heads met in Salerno and found themselves at an impasse over what sort of post-war government to form. Palmiro Togliatti, the historic Italian communist leader-in-exile, broke the impasse by declaring
that Italian national unity had to come before the revolutionary social reform desired by many of those, particularly in the north, who had waged the war of resistance against Fascism. Also fearing the chaos of civil war, as was already occurring in Greece, or the possibility of a military-led coup, Togliatti was careful to cull the Catholic vote, as Mussolini had done, and signaled no hostile intention of breaking with the Lateran Pacts.\footnote{At the Fifth PCI Congress of 1945, Togliatti rebutted any revision of the Lateran Pacts, saying that the treaty “has closed and liquidated forever the problem of Church-State relations,” and De Gasperi made it publically clear that he had received the message (Musselli 1990: 44ff).} In the interim elections of 1946, the left out-pollled the DC with 21% of the electorate voting for the Socialist Party and 19% for the Communist Party (PCI), leaving 35% of the popular vote to the DC. An historic center-left coalition of socialists, communists and Christian Democrats were thus given a mandate, headed by De Gasperi, to write a new constitution. Together with most of the important surviving politicians of the pre-Mussolini period, they voted to write the Lateran Pacts in their entirety into the new Italian constitution. In the constitutional debates on the inclusion of the pacts, liberals, communists and socialists who had fought the Church for decades defended their change of position as the price to be paid for the religious peace necessary to build a legitimate Italian state. Togliatti, in particular, made the following, forceful argument,

This is the point from which we must part, at that moment which all questions previously raised by us have always been subordinated, to a fundamental exigency, that of not disturbing the religious peace of our country... We are in need of this religious peace, we can in no way consent that that peace be disturbed. Now, the opposite of the term for “peace” is “war.” (Scoppola 1967: 825).\footnote{Other politicians were less adamant about the necessity of adding the Lateran Pacts, but, in the end, recognized the utility of their inclusion nonetheless, such as Pietro Nenni of the Socialist Party who told the assembly that, “The smallest agricultural problem interests me more than the Concordat- even if it is useful,” (Musselli 1990: 98).}
While the wording of the Lateran Pacts remained the same in the constitution as it had been under Mussolini, the Pacts’ effects significantly changed in the new democratic setting. As a democratic political regime, the state claimed less regulation over the Church, making the overall relationship relatively more friendly. Most importantly, as had been the case under Mussolini, the Italian state no longer required the Church’s loyalty and blessing or attempted to regulate its organization, associations or doctrine to the benefit of the Italian Republic. Although this meant that the Church gained autonomy and liberty from government involvement in its organization, the regime change also meant that the Church would no longer be able to rely on such an openly coercive political apparatus to enforce or sustain its religious objectives. Nonetheless, that is precisely what the Church attempted, as the following subsection illustrates.

4.3.4 Inclusion, Mobilization and Moderation

As Warner (2000:76), Scoppola (1977) and others point out, the Lateran Pacts made it much easier for Catholic Church leaders to throw their weight behind democracy in Italy. Once it was clear that the Church had earned an institutionally special position within the new regime, the Church hierarchy employed the whole of its moral and institutional resources to mobilize Italian Catholics to vote for the DC as the most effective means to combat the looming communist-secularist threat to the Church. Beginning with the 1946 campaign but then greatly intensifying in the campaign of 1948, Pius XII launched a veritable crusade to combat the Catholic tradition of electoral abstentionism and get Catholics to vote for “Christian” candidates (Durand 1991a). Harper (1986), among others, has documented that massive amounts of American
financial aid also fueled the DC-Church mobilization of the Italian electorate against the left and magnified anti-communism fears among the electorate. This U.S. supported anti-communism, however, was particularly powerful in Italy because the Church successfully framed participating in elections as a religious duty and activated its thick parallel civil society associations towards that goal (Warner 2000:147ff). Publicly reversing Pius IX’s exhortations, Pius XII declared that Catholics had a duty to vote and that not doing so represented a “grave” and “mortal” sin (Prandi 1968).

In this battle for the political soul of Italian Catholics, the Catholic press took on particular importance alongside Catholic associations as a means of communicating the religious duty of voting, in the first place, and, in the second place, of voting correctly. As Durand (1991a, 1991b) demonstrates in his studies of the Catholic press in the years following World War II, bishops were instructed by the Curia to encourage their priests and parishioners to read Catholic journals and newspapers and privilege them as a means to “bring the light of faith to the doubtful, orient stray consciences, redress the distortions of false doctrines, [and] defend the morality of individuals and families,” as L’idea del Popolo of the diocese of Gorizia put it in 1944 (Durand 1991b: 32). Or, as the Archbishop of Salerno trumpeted at the launch of his new journal, “The Crusade,” in the same year,

The newspaper will respond to the necessity of the apostolate, especially in moments like this one, which has witnessed the comeback of the Masonic congregation, protean liberalism, socialism, communism and all the dark and subversive forces contrary to the Church which form the ancient, treacherous enemy: evil. (Durand 1991b: 68).

The DC’s campaign message and propaganda mirrored and drew from the Church’s crusade. It chose a shield with a Catholic cross on it as its emblem, and it
echoed the Church’s argument for the religious necessity of voting for the DC to protect the country against evil. A campaign slogan in 1948 claimed, “Catholic Citizen! He who does not vote is a traitor to la Patria. He who does not vote Christian is a traitor to his faith.” (Durand 1991a:350). In the 1948 elections, divisions in the left combined with this vigorous campaigning by the Church gave the Christian Democrats a margin of victory sufficient to form a center-right coalition, which excluded communist and socialist parties from power.

The calculations made by the Vatican hierarchy with regard to the DC’s electoral potential and societal support for a Catholic agenda, therefore, were partially right at the level of aggregate numbers. The overwhelming majority of Italians were, after all, baptized Catholics and the thick mass mobilization of Catholicism continued to be organized more around parish structures and confessional Catholic associations than around the political party itself. Table 4.2 illustrates just how dense Catholic civil society was and how much voice the Church retained in Italian society as the animators of Catholic organizations.
TABLE 4-2

ITALIAN PARTY AND CATHOLIC ACTION MEMBERSHIP: 1947-1958

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1947</th>
<th>1948</th>
<th>1953</th>
<th>1958</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Catholic Action</td>
<td>2,077,506</td>
<td>2,261,000</td>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>3,372,000*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DC Membership</td>
<td>800,400</td>
<td>1,127,200</td>
<td>762,000</td>
<td>1,140,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PCI Membership</td>
<td>1,817,000</td>
<td>1,522,000</td>
<td>1,818,000</td>
<td>2,134,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Furthermore, the Vatican continued to hold powerful sway within the leading ranks of the DC. The Pope and several of his close advisors were able to influence party goals and, thus, national political programs in its favor and away from democratic consolidation in Italy. In these immediate post-war years, through DC policies and its political rights as the religion of state, the Church attempted to buttress the confessional nature of the Italian state to the detriment of political pluralism and religious liberty in Italy. As Peyrot (1977), Jemolo (1960), Oppenheim (1948) and other observers of the time (who did not have the benefit of the hindsight afforded by a secularized perch thirty years later) wrote, the period seemed to be one of the full Catholic “restoration” of Italy. Jemolo (1960), for example, ends his authoritative history of church-state relations in Italy with a chapter outlining the dangers of confessionalism, including the tendency of the Church, with the approval of the DC, to disregard the constitution in its treatment of

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80 The number in this column for Catholic Action corresponds to the year 1959.
such non-Catholic minorities as Protestants and Communists (Jemolo 1960: 310ff). He adds a dire note in a post-script to the book, written in 1959, about the rise of Catholic authoritarianism or even Catholic Fascism in Italy following the resignation of the left-leaning DC Prime Minister Amintore Fanfani, the result of the Pope’s disapproval, not a parliamentary vote of no-confidence (Ibid: 339).

A closer study of these apparent numbers of Catholic voters and the influence of the Vatican within the DC, however, reveals a significant shift in the salience of religious goals among DC elites and the electorate. In the first two elections of the Republic, the Church was able to mobilize a great majority of regularly practicing Catholics from different socio-economic backgrounds, engaging the whole behemoth of Italian Catholic subculture to support the DC coalition and win it astronomical success. Yet, paradoxically, as Catholics fully assumed the reigns of political life in Italy this political power also jeopardized the Church’s political and spiritual authority over its faithful. In time, while a nominally Catholic party remained in power and the Church retained its institutionally protected position, intransigent Catholic leaders found it much harder to mobilize Italian Catholics for mono-religious causes or justify the necessity of an authoritarian clergy-lay model of association.

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81 We will examine the form such treatment took in the next section on the evolution of religious goals and belief.

82 This fear was reinforced by the election of de Gaulle in France.
4.3.4.1 Party Moderation and the “Apertura a Sinistra”

Once they had achieved electoral power, both DC party elites and many of the Catholic faithful became less interested in the need for defending their religious identities politically and more concerned with strategically pursuing other political and economic interests. As most scholars of Italian politics have observed, after largely capturing the Catholic vote, DC party elites quickly realized that pursuing the type of exclusively Catholic political program that clergy leaders advocated was not a long run, sustainable vote-winning strategy (Galli 1966, Parisi 1979, Durand 1991a). This shift in the goals of DC party elites away from the Vatican, in fact, is reported as a central theme in many accounts of early Italian “Christian Democracy.” Italian political scientists of the time described the shift as evidence of the general laicization of the party and the triumph of the reformed democrats over the moderate clericals within the Catholic political movement (Parisi 1979). As the party institutionalized, party elites became more concerned with capturing a wider electorate that could assure them a longer tenure in political power than with simply defending Catholic and Church principles. Laicized DC elites calculated that capturing this wider electorate meant that the party had to move to the left of the political spectrum. In order to do so, party leaders sought to increase their autonomy from Church leadership and enter into a political coalition with the Italian Socialist party. Although the Church continued to condemn both socialist and communist parties, the Italian Socialist party had fully supported democratic institutions for decades.

83 “An opening to the [political] left”

84 See, especially, the chapters by Ignazi and Panebianco in addition to Parisi.
It was the Socialist’s irreligious platform rather than their democratic credentials which pushed the Church to keep them out of power.

In many ways, this opening towards the left or *Apertura a Sinistra*, amounted to a referendum on the consolidation of democracy in Italy, within the DC, the Church and the electorate, as will be seen more clearly in our survey data below. The willingness of the DC to enter into a political coalition with the left, the willingness of the electorate to support such a coalition, and the willingness of the Church to allow such a coalition to form all indicated to what extent Italian parties, political actors and individuals had accepted democracy as the only game in town and were willing to share power with secular parties who did not uphold their core political goals or ideologies. In this sense, the laicization of the DC and its growing openness to the Italian left represent a reduction of the religious exclusivity of Catholic political goals and thus, as we defined in chapter one, a moderation of the Catholic political movement’s hostility towards democracy.

De Gasperi bowed out of politics in 1953 after having successfully blocked an attempt by the Vatican to force the DC into a political coalition with former Fascist, but Church-leaning political parties. Following de Gasperi, Fanfani and Aldo Moro assumed leadership positions within the DC and moved the party towards even greater independence from the Vatican and closer to entering a coalition with the left. Fanfani tried to stimulate such a shift away from the Vatican by forcing a professionalization of

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85 Morlino (1998), for example, dates the integration of the Socialists into Italian governing coalitions as the beginning of Italian democracy’s period of “inclusive” legitimacy among Italians, as opposed to the limited or nominal legitimacy democracy acquired in Italy in the 1950s.

86 In order to achieve such a move, the Vatican employed Luigi Sturzo in the so-called “Operation Sturzo,” in which the Church attempted to ensure a non-left leaning victory in local elections in Rome in 1952 (see Riccardi, 1988 for a history of the operation).
the DC, which promoted technocrats and progressives to high-level positions and centralized power within the party in his own hands.

Moro, on the other hand, was much more sensitive to the delicate evolution of democracy in Italy and to the role which the relationship of the DC to the Vatican played in that evolution.\(^\text{87}\) Employing arguments which drew on his faith as a Catholic and a Christian, Moro, went on the offensive to persuade bishops to support his project of party independence and political openness to the left. While Fanfani tried to steamroll these changes over Church objectives with mixed success, Moro attempted to present the shifts in policy to the Church leadership as a natural evolution of the relationship between the DC and the Vatican. Documentation of Moro’s correspondence from the *Archivi Luigi Sturzo* for the period show that he wrote to all the Italian Bishops between 1961 and 1962 about the Apertura a Sinistra and personally responded to their preoccupations in its regard. He argued that it was better for the Church and for Italian society if lay Catholic leaders led the DC independently of the Church hierarchy (Marchi 2006, de Angelo 2005). As he told the Bishop of Rossano, “the DC was always convinced of its roots in Christian social principles, but we must face the facts of our national relation...and engage a democratic evolution of the socialist party.”\(^\text{88}\) Moro tried to persuade Church leaders that in order to defend both democracy and morality in Italy, given the changing

\(^{87}\) Like many of the political elites within the DC Moro’s fundamental political education occurred as an active member of Catholic Action in the 1930s (see Moro 1979 for a study of the educational experience of DC elites in Catholic Action).

\(^{88}\) See Moro’s letters from 1961 and 1962 to Italian Bishops over the Apertura a Sinistra: Archivi Luigi Sturzo, Sec. 92. As/8-Moro/AD, Fasc.s 20-23, including his June 15th, 1961 letter to the Bishop of Rossano.
nature of Italian society, the DC had to politically engage the democratic socialist left. He said,

Opening to the socialists is not an expression of a stubborn will to associate Marxism and Christianity or Marxism and democracy. It springs from an observation of the forces animating our history and the necessity to engage them in a manner which serves democracy…The Catholic electorate has no motive other than to be profoundly interested and connected to economic and social development, the rising ascension of the people, the expansion of liberty, to democratic progress, but that electorate also has the right to ask for a certain tone, respect, language. Up to this moment, the DC has always understood how to find that tone and this language, giving the Catholic electorate all the guarantees of a moral order which that same electorate justly seeks (Marchi 2008:8).

Moro’s arguments were successful because they found echo in a parallel evolution with the Church hierarchy who, as predicted by our theory, realized that their relationship with Italian Catholics had changed in democracy and that their public authority depended on how they responded to those changes. While intransigent voices continued to hold important sway within that hierarchy, the advent of John XXIII’s papacy created more space for those within the clergy who disagreed with the intransigents. Pope John XXIII’s substitute Secretary of State, for example, Cardinal Dell’Acqua seconded Moro’s arguments of faith that it was best, in the contemporary democratic setting, for lay political leaders to fully assume the role of political protagonists in Italy, and that failing to do so risked a potentially devastating alienation of

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89 Among them were Cardinals Ottaviani, Tardini (then the Pope’s secretary of state) and Siri (head of the Italian Conference of Bishops), who went so far as to try to persuade Moro’s confessor to dissuade Moro of the acceptability of his decisions (Marchi 2006).

90 Dell’Acqua shared similar sympathies with Cardinals Montini of Milan and Lercaro of Bologna, in addition to the Bishops of Grosseto, Tortona, Livorno, and, to some extent, John XXIII himself.
the Catholic Church from Italian society and especially the working classes. As Dell’Acqua encouragingly wrote to Moro,

We express our wishes that your difficult position is not aggravated or, worse, made unsustainable, by the initiatives and behaviors of individuals or organs which, under the pretext of defending orthodoxy or religious interests, in reality undertake actions which seriously disorient public opinion, which tend to commit the Church and to create dangerous situations for the order and stability of democracy in Italy (Marchi 2008: 9).

Moro’s success with the clergy and the party, therefore, marks the beginning of a new model for the relationship between Church, party, society and politics in Italy. With the *apertura a sinistra* in 1963 the DC could no longer be considered a “Catholic Party” (*Partito Cattolico*) in the service of the narrow (and exclusive) ends of the Catholic Church, but a party of Italian Catholics (*Partito dei Cattolici*) inspired by Catholic values and ideals, which engaged in dialogue with other political parties and religious actors (Marchi 2006). As Moro promised, the DC, still appealed to Catholic identities for votes, as, for example, when it offered token support on the 1974 divorce referendum and the anti-abortion laws in 1979. However, this new framework meant that the DC’s nature as a political party was no longer exclusively Catholic and despite the party’s Catholic origins, the party could now legitimately claim to represent non-Catholics as well as pursue political goals at odds with the Catholic hierarchy’s religious goals.

4.3.4.2 Italian Catholics and Political Identities

Many classic accounts describing this change in the orientation of the Italian Christian Democratic Party toward the electorate and its electoral competitors present the evolution as a top-down process animated by DC party elites (see, for example, Barnes 170...
1968). But these changes were reinforced by similar shifts among the electorate, reflecting a new understanding of their political identities and relationship with the Vatican. Consistent with the theoretical frame advanced in this work, with the adoption of the Lateran Pacts by the founders of the post-War Republic Catholics understood that their spiritual identities were no longer in political danger and they were autonomous enough from that point forward to distinguish Church voices on doctrine from Church positions on public policy. Their growing security and political independence made them less likely to heed Catholic calls for intransigence toward other legitimate opposition parties and more ready to embrace fully democratic institutions as the arena within which to solve their political problems. This subsection examines the available electoral and survey data from the time period and makes use of statistical analyses to evaluate my claim about the evolving content of Catholic voters’ political desires.

A word of caution before proceeding on the survey data which follows in this section and the next: individual-level data from the critical time period under study is, unfortunately, sparse and inconsistent. There is a relative wealth of data on parameters aggregated at the provincial or “comune” levels but those data limit how much we can infer about the weights of religious as opposed to other socio-economic identities on any one individual’s political decisions. The first of a series of standardized General Election Surveys begin to be administrated in Italy only in 1968.\footnote{The study was led by Professor Samuel Barnes from the University of Michigan.} This is not to imply that individual-level socio-political data does not exist before 1968,\footnote{This includes Almond and Verba’s 1963 groundbreaking Civic Culture survey.} but questions were generally administered at a single point in time, thus making comparisons across surveys
difficult. The data-collecting agency DOXA, established by Pierpaolo Luzzatto Fegiz\(^{93}\) in 1946 and designed to imitate the Gallup Poll model, is the closest approximation to across-time individual-level data that Italy has from the period. While DOXA was pioneering and rigorous, its surveys were not always consistent in the way in which it worded questions over time. Moreover, it would sometimes change survey methods from one round to the next, adding a certain degree of uncertainty to any data analysis which uses their surveys. Even more limiting is the fact that very few social scientists of the period asked Italians any question about their religiosity or religious identity, sometimes even explicitly omitting the question as a superfluous variable. As such, the data collected during the 1950s in Italy which I present here cannot add up to much more than a “highly suggestive” level of statistical probability. However, despite this cautionary tale, as I will now try to show, all the data available from the time period, from different sources, point their vectors in the same direction and are consistent and complimentary to both the model I propose and the historical evidence I have already presented.

In 1946, the electoral results of the first post-war elections (see Table 4.3) effectively destroyed the political dominance of the pre-fascist bloc of conservative liberal parties and moved the Italian electorate towards the center and the left, which is to say towards the DC and socialist and communist parties.

\[^{93}\text{A professor of statistics at the University of Trieste.}\]
TABLE 4-3
REGIONAL ELECTIONS RESULTS FROM 1919 AND 1946 (IN PERCENTAGES)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Voted for a...</th>
<th>1919 North</th>
<th>1919 South</th>
<th>1946 North</th>
<th>1946 South</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Right Party</td>
<td>27.8</td>
<td>74.6</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>27.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Center Right*</td>
<td>27.3</td>
<td>12.9</td>
<td>37.4</td>
<td>36.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Left Party</td>
<td>44.8</td>
<td>11.8</td>
<td>55.3</td>
<td>31.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* In 1919, the center right party was the Partito Popolare, a Catholic party representing lower and middle class Catholic votes, which existed for the 1919 elections only. In 1946, this party evolved into the Christian Democrats (DC).

More than the mere transfer of votes away from right-leaning conservative parties, these results represent the enfranchisement of whole new classes of voters\(^{94}\) who had not previously participated in electoral politics, either because they had abstained from voting or because, in the case of women, they did not yet have the right to vote. One indication of the success of the mass campaigning efforts on the part of the Catholic Church to engage these new voters in 1948 can be found in the geographical changes in abstention votes. In 1919 the regions of Italy with the highest percentage of abstention voters, Veneto (where 58.5% of the registered electorate voted), Sicily (47.9%) and

\(^{94}\) In most regions, in fact, at a purely aggregate level, right-leaning political parties received roughly the same number of votes in 1948 as they did in 1919.
Sardinia (56.6%), were also the regions with some of the highest concentrations of regularly practicing Catholics (Burgalassi 1968). In the elections of 1946 and 1948, respectively, when the Church told Catholics that it was their duty to vote for the DC, these same regions saw their electoral participation rates rocket to an average of 90% of registered voters. Subtracting the numbers of women voters in 1948 and those who were not of voting age in 1919 from the party profiles of 1948, we can estimate how successfully the DC was able to mobilize voters who had abstained in the pre-fascist period. On the islands of Sicily and Sardinia, the DC was able to gain new male voters in 1948 from the voting class of 1919 at a rate of 1.6 to 1 more than the communist and socialist parties did, and in Veneto, their gains in this category outmatched the left by 3.6 to 1.

After the height of the combined Catholic-DC electoral success in 1948, a large, stable lump of Catholic voters were happy to stay in a Catholic party of the center. However, as indicated above, the political relationship of these voters to the Church hierarchy changed greatly and their votes for the DC became less religiously driven, both for those Catholics who stated in the party and those who left. On the margins, when it became clear that the DC would focus on relatively moderate issues of the center, small

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95 Along with the south of Italy, Veneto and the Islands (and among them more so Sardinia than Sicily) were the three regions of Italy with the highest levels of religiosity at the end of the war, with more than 70% of respondents reporting weekly church attendance.

96 I use DOXA pre-election surveys from 1953 to estimate the 1948 percentages of women and youth voters for all political parties in each region.

97 At an aggregate level, in Sicily and Sardinia parties of the right received slightly more votes in 1948 than in 1919. In Veneto, their aggregate votes were cut in half. Subtracting the right’s losses in the Veneto from the numbers of new DC male recruits from the voting classes of 1919, the DC still out-mobilized the left parties in this category at a rate of 2.8 to 1.
but noteworthy percentages of Italian voters peeled off to the right and the left of the party. Even as the Church excommunicated communists, the PCI’s greatest expansion of the 1940s and early 1950s came in the traditionally Catholic zones of the south of Italy (see Table 4.4). Those Catholics within the DC who were most concerned with the social interests of the working class abandoned the party, as perhaps most notably Giuseppe Dossetti did in 1951. And in the north, after 1948, the locus of the largest, albeit very modest, growth of the left was in the “white” Catholic zones of the Veneto (see Table 4.5).

### TABLE 4-4
COMMUNIST PARTY RESULTS, 1946 – 1963
(PERCENTAGE OF NATIONAL VOTE)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year:</th>
<th>1946</th>
<th>1953</th>
<th>1958</th>
<th>1963</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Zone:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industrial Northwest</td>
<td>21.9</td>
<td>20.9</td>
<td>20.3</td>
<td>23.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catholic Northeast</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>12.2</td>
<td>11.5</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Center</td>
<td>33.5</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td>33.7</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Continental South</td>
<td>11.5</td>
<td>21.6</td>
<td>21.9</td>
<td>23.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sicily</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>21.8</td>
<td>21.9</td>
<td>23.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sardinia</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>21.2</td>
<td>19.7</td>
<td>22.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

98 While some voters also migrated to the ranks of the Monarchists, Liberals and Neo-Fascists, none of these parties of the right appeared capable of posing a threat to a DC-Catholic political hegemony despite Vatican threats that they could, and the Catholic Church did not generally attempt to discriminate against them.
TABLE 4-5

CUMULATIVE LEFT (SOCIALIST AND COMMUNIST) VOTES, 1946 – 1963

(PERCENTAGE OF NATIONAL VOTE)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Zone:</th>
<th>1946</th>
<th>1948</th>
<th>1953</th>
<th>1958</th>
<th>1963</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Industrial Northwest</td>
<td>55.1</td>
<td>46.8</td>
<td>47.5</td>
<td>46.5</td>
<td>48.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catholic Northeast</td>
<td>43.3</td>
<td>31.9</td>
<td>34.5</td>
<td>34.0</td>
<td>36.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Center</td>
<td>67.6</td>
<td>60.3</td>
<td>59.8</td>
<td>58.5</td>
<td>60.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Over time, therefore, more and more Catholics transferred their votes to the left (Parisi and Pasquino 1985). Although they represented a small minority of the left vote, by 1968, Barnes reported that 70% of regularly practicing Catholics with general union ties\(^{99}\) identified themselves as left partisans in addition to 56% of semi-practicing Catholics from the north.\(^{100}\)

While not changing their votes or party affiliation, the attitudes of the majority of regularly practicing Catholics who stayed within the DC also profoundly changed in a similar direction. This change is most manifest in the changing attitudes of many Catholic voters’ towards the left. As the political impact of their identities as industrial and agricultural workers grew in salience, many Italian Catholics were increasingly likely to regard opposition parties of the left, who also claimed to represent economically marginalized class sectors, as potentially legitimate ruling parties. DOXA surveys of the

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\(^{99}\) A category which represented a small minority, about 1% of those reporting left partisan identification (Barnes 1977).

\(^{100}\) Representing 16% of the left partisan identification (Barnes 1977).
time which asked the question, “Is it possible to be a good socialist and a good Catholic” begin to register this change in the attitudes of Italian Catholics towards the left.

TABLE 4-6

CHANGE IN NATIONAL PERCEPTIONS OF COMPATIBILITY BETWEEN SOCIALISM AND CATHOLICISM

(AS PERCENTAGE)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year:</th>
<th>1953</th>
<th>1961</th>
<th>1963</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Is it possible to be a good socialist and a good Catholic?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I don’t know</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N = 2,492</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

From 1953-1963, the majority of Italians went from answering this in the negative to the positive (Fegiz 1956, 1966). This change was driven in large part by changing perceptions among the rank-and-file of DC supporters\(^{101}\) who the Church hierarchy had singularly tried to persuade against voting socialist. As tables 4.7 and 4.8 document, by 1961 there were already more DC sympathizers who wanted to see the strengthening of a center-left coalition between the DC and socialists than not and by 1963, some 27% of DC members thought an individual could even be a good Catholic and a “militant” revolutionary communist (Fegiz 1966).

\(^{101}\) Whose rank and file voters remained 70% regularly practicing Catholic until the end of the 1960s (Barnes 1977).
### TABLE 4-7

NATIONAL PERCEPTIONS OF COMPATIBILITY BETWEEN SOCIALISM AND CATHOLICISM, BY POLITICAL PARTY MEMBERSHIP, 1953 (AS PERCENTAGE)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party:</th>
<th>PCI</th>
<th>PSI</th>
<th>PSDI</th>
<th>Socialism -mo</th>
<th>DC</th>
<th>PLI</th>
<th>PNM</th>
<th>MSI</th>
<th>other</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I don’t know</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NOTE: Parties to the right of the DC are considered to be right, conservative parties. Those to the left of the DC are considered to be left, socialist parties. The MSI is a neo-fascist, anti-system party; the PCI is the Italian communist party. Sample size = 2,492
TABLE 4-8

NATIONAL PERCEPTIONS OF COMPATIBILITY BETWEEN SOCIALISM AND CATHOLICISM, BY POLITICAL PARTY MEMBERSHIP, 1963

(AS PERCENTAGE)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party:</th>
<th>PCI</th>
<th>PSI</th>
<th>PSDI</th>
<th>DC</th>
<th>PLI</th>
<th>PDIUM, MSI</th>
<th>Other</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Is it possible to be a good socialist and a good Catholic?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I don’t know</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NOTE: Parties to the right of the DC are considered to be right, conservative parties. Those to the left of the DC are considered to be left, socialist parties. The MSI is a neo-fascist, anti-system party; the PCI is the Italian communist party. Sample size = 2,492.

The changing perceptions of this historic *Apertura a Sinistra* are also consistent with data on respondents’ views of the role of religion in politics from the late 1950s and early 1960s, and they indicate a consensus among the majority of Italians approving a secularized political sphere. Even if they had enthusiastically responded to the Catholic hierarchy’s explicitly religious political project in the electoral mobilization of the late 1940s, by 1958 a majority of the DC electorate was convinced that the Catholic hierarchy and clergy should not be involved in Italian politics (see Tables 4.9-4.12).

What distinguishes DC sympathizers from partisans of other political parties in these surveys is that they continued to be more likely to believe that the clergy still had the right and responsibility to intervene in the private life of Catholics. While there is evidence that Italians were already beginning to attend church services less frequently in
the 1950s, throughout the 1960s religious practice remains one of the best predictors of DC party membership (Barnes 1977) and DC supporters remained much more likely on average than those of other parties to hold the Catholic clergy in high esteem\textsuperscript{102} as well as attend Mass regularly. Both religiosity, therefore, and “religious affectation” remain important for DC supporters during this time period of study. It could be said, then, that following the post-war democratic elections in Italy, DC voters secularized politically more quickly than they secularized religiously. Like the party leaders themselves, the DC electorate continued to be politically concerned about national religious and moral questions, but these concerns were increasingly dwarfed by other political considerations. In a 1958 DOXA survey, for example, the percentages of DC voters who listed church-state issues as one of the top three national problems (21%) lagged far behind those who listed national unemployment (71%) or even the mundane problem of motorways improvement (26%).

\textsuperscript{102} In 1968 DC voters gave the clergy a 73% approval rating, nearly 20 points higher than the average Italian.
TABLE 4-9

NATIONAL PERCEPTIONS OF POLITICAL SECULARIZATION

(AS PERCENTAGE)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Clergy has the Duty to express its judgment</th>
<th>Clergy has the Right to express its judgment</th>
<th>The Clergy ought not to express itself</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Labor Union Questions</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domestic Politics</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil marriages</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private life of Catholics</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The content of films</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NOTE: In response to DOXA 1958 question: “Concerning which Political and Cultural problems ought the Catholic clergy occupy itself?”
TABLE 4-10
NATIONAL PERCEPTIONS OF POLITICAL SECULARIZATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES: CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATS
(AS PERCENTAGE)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Clergy has the Duty to express its judgment</th>
<th>Clergy has the Right to express its judgment</th>
<th>The Clergy ought not to express itself</th>
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</thead>
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<tr>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>The content of films</td>
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<td>20</td>
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</table>

NOTE: In response to DOXA 1958 question: “Concerning which Political and Cultural problems ought the Catholic clergy occupy itself?”
TABLE 4-11
NATIONAL PERCEPTIONS OF POLITICAL SECULARIZATION, BY POLITICAL PARTIES: COMMUNIST PARTY (AS PERCENTAGE)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th>Clergy has the Right to express its judgment</th>
<th>The Clergy ought not to express itself</th>
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<tr>
<td>The content of films</td>
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NOTE: In response to DOXA 1958 question: “Concerning which Political and Cultural problems ought the Catholic clergy occupy itself?”
TABLE 4-12
NATIONAL PERCEPTIONS OF POLITICAL SECULARIZATION, BY POLITICAL PARTIES: SOCIALIST PARTY (AS PERCENTAGE)

<table>
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<th>Clergy has the Right to express its judgment</th>
<th>The Clergy ought not to express itself</th>
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<td>Civil marriages</td>
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<tr>
<td>The content of films</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NOTE: In response to DOXA 1958 question: “Concerning which Political and Cultural problems ought the Catholic clergy occupy itself?”

4.3.5 Catholic Moderation and Democratic Consolidation

It is quite possible that democracy would have eventually taken root in Italy without the support of the Catholic Church and that international, economic and historical factors would have determined the course of Italian democratization anyway. As other authors writing on Italian democratization have argued, however, (Pasquino 1986, Galli and Prandi 1970, Jemolo 1960), while these macro-conditions might have strengthened the probability of democratic consolidation, they did so indirectly and could not have guaranteed the fate of Italian democracy at the end of the war. The presence of allied forces in Italy certainly provided a safety net and the urgency for peaceful negotiations among rival Italian political parties during the delicate years of 1945-1947, but they did
not necessarily ensure a fully democratic solution. The Church might have been able to tip the scales on the national referendum on the future of the Italian monarchy in the constitution or cobbled together a coalition of Catholic-friendly former fascists and used either as a pretext to push for the installment of a semi-authoritarian Catholic regime.\textsuperscript{103} There is little reason to suggest that the allies would not have supported such a government so long as it was anti-communist, just as the United States continued to support authoritarian governments in Spain, Portugal and Greece well into the 1970s. This scenario becomes even more likely if the Catholic Church had not found a reason to electorally mobilize so vigorously in 1946 and 1948.

The Italian left also might have attempted to install its own version of an authoritarian regime. Such a scenario was in fact plausible; American troops were withdrawn from Italy in 1947; Italy was a neighbor to the communist state of Yugoslavia; and the north was ideologically very close to the eastern socialist bloc. If Italian socialist and communist parties had worked together in 1948, they could have electorally defeated the DC, instituted some sort of Socialist Republic and inched the nation closer to an authoritarian regime of the left or, possibly, towards open war between communist and Catholic political forces.

As for economic determinism, the Italian post-war economy was operating at one-third capacity at the end of World War II, and Italy’s real economic boom only began ten years later. Intense economic and social modernization certainly helped to accelerate the mobility of the Italian electorate after democratization and the improvement in living

\textsuperscript{103} Without any campaigning on the referendum by the Church, two thirds of the south and one third of the north still voted for the continuation of the monarchy.
standards played an important role in the later consolidation of Italian democracy, as the
success of democracy bred its own legitimacy. Other factors could be likewise cited as
contributing to the success of Italian democracy, such as Italian institutional
parliamentarian arrangements which dampened the bitterness of ideological polarization
(Sani and Sartori 1983) or the harshness of Soviet interventions in Eastern Europe, which
made a rigorously communist political alternative less likely (Pasquino 1986).

However, without the initial support that the Church helped garner for democratic
elections, it is doubtful that Italian democracy would have survived the immediate post-
war period. The institutionalization of the religiously friendly Lateran Pacts by the
founding fathers of Italian democracy helped ensure that the Catholic Church put its
whole heart and soul into mobilizing Catholic voters to participate in political elections.
The same religiously friendly nature of the new regime ensured those masses would stay
in the democratic game. At the same time, these policies also helped change the dynamics
of the Italian electorate’s objectives, making it easier for both Catholic individuals and
their political representatives to set aside their most exclusive religious goals, persuade
their religious leaders to do the same, and thereby open a new space for Italian Catholics
to embrace the legitimacy of non-Catholic democratic parties. All of this helped anchor
and consolidate the legitimacy of democracy within Italian society. Biasing political
institutions in favor of the Catholic Church, however, also had important consequences
for the religious life of Italy. The next section turns to explore those consequences.
4.4 : New Theologies, New Religiosities

*It is entirely in accord with human nature...to provide all citizens with the genuine opportunity of taking a free and active share in establishing the juridical foundations of the political community, in determining the form of government and the functions and purposes of its various institutions, and in the election of the government. All citizens should therefore be mindful of their right and duty to use their free vote to further the common good.*

-Section Seventy-Five, *Gaudium et Spes*, 1965

4.4.1 Introduction

Many of the accounts of religious politics in Italy end with the conclusions of the last section: The *Apertura a Sinistra* is held up as a moment of democratic consolidation in Italy and the point when the DC’s political autonomy from the Vatican became irrevocably clear. This conclusion is sometimes relayed to a reference about how the political secularization which animated this moderation also mirrored the general religious secularization of Italian society (e.g. Parisi 1979). Our theory, however, leads us to expect that there is more to this story and that Italy’s religiously friendly institutions had important mediating effects on the religious secularization of Italian society, even as those policies contributed to its political secularization.

The last section hinted at this effect in citing, for example, the number of DC voters who continued to submit to the Church’s authority in private matters while altering their views on what the political role of the Church should be. The last section also pointed out the emergence of important voices within the Church hierarchy, such as Cardinal Dell’Acqua, who were also rethinking the relationship between Church and society in democratic Italy. This section explores the nature of post-World War II
religious secularization in Italy more carefully. It first considers the effects of the institutionalization of democratic norms and ideas on the evolution of religious authority in Italy and how that evolution affected the relationship of religious leaders to Italian society and to the spiritual beliefs and goals they promoted. It then considers the longer-term effects of religiously friendly public institutions on Italy’s trajectory of religious secularization and the new forms Italian religious belief have assumed over time.

4.4.2 GRI, GFI and democracy

As we began to observe in the last section, the most notable change in the religion-state arrangement from the Mussolini-era to the post-war democratic one in Italy was the deregulation of religion. The Italian state simultaneously dropped its claims to coercive control over the Church’s organization and beliefs, yet, also, consciously chose to re-institute all of the institutional privileges which Mussolini had promised to the Church. In doing so, the new Italian democratic state signaled two important messages to the Church. First, it communicated that this democracy embedded a different kind of political liberalism from that which their fathers knew: post-war Italian democracy did not aim to marginalize or steer the Church but to favor and cooperate with it. Secondly, the state communicated that the Church would be free of political interference and, at the same time, that Italian citizens would be legally free of the Church’s political authority. This dual promise of favoritism (for the Church) and freedom (for both Italian citizens and the Church) caused tensions as citizens, lawmakers and the Church tried to define the boundaries between the Catholic Church’s institutional rights as the religion of state and Italian citizens’ rights of freedom of conscience and choice (see Rossi 1959). In this
respect, although the Italian state had renounced its powers of regulation over the Church, through the Lateran Pacts, the Church retained levels of legal moral jurisdiction over Italian society and, together with intransigent Catholics within state institutions, tried to exploit their legal powers and government favoritism. Thus, while non-Catholic politicians like Togliatti (and Mussolini before him) had hoped that giving into the Church’s political demands could help silence the Church’s public voice, the Church fought to use its institutional position to retain its authority over Italian society.

Led by Pius XII, therefore, the Catholic hierarchy tried to make the Lateran Pacts the guiding political light of the new Italian Republic by consolidating the Church’s role in public education, its influence within the DC, and its juridical status as the confessional religion (Musselli 1990). Catholic officials, for example, continued to make use of Fascist-era police ordinances that prohibited offences against the “religion of state.”

The Italian state’s archives of police reports from the time are full of accounts of arrests and trials, often requested by Catholic priests, of socialists, Protestants, irreverent youth, workers or lay Catholics who politically or publicly criticized the Catholic Church

104 Including among others, the following articles from the Codice Penale Italiano: Art. 402: “Whoever shows public contempt for the Religion of State is to be punished with imprisonment of up to one year.” Art. 403: “Whoever publicly offends the Religion of State, showing contempt for those who profess it, is to be punished with imprisonment [up to two years]. Imprisonment is to be applied [from one to three years] to whomever offends the religion of State, by means of contempt for a minister of the Catholic cult.” Art. 404: “Whoever, in a place designated to the cult, or in a public place or place open to the public, offends the religion of state, publically defaming objects of the cult or things consecrated to the cult or specifically designated to the exercise of the cult, will be punished with imprisonment [from one to three years]. The same punishment extends to whoseover commits the misdeed during the occasion of religious functions held in a private place by a minister of the Catholic cult.” Art. 405: “Whoever publicly curses, with invective or outrageous words, against the divinity [or symbols or persons venerated in the religion of state] is to be punished with the monetary administrative fine of twenty-thousand to six-hundred-thousand lira. The same punishment applies to whoever performs any outrageous public manifestation towards the dead.” (see http://www.olir.it/ricerca/index.php?Form_Document=2346; accessed 11.3.2008.)
or the figure of the Pope. Although some of these denouncements sound comic\textsuperscript{105} to the ear of a twenty-first century reader, bringing lay Catholics, workers\textsuperscript{106} and communists\textsuperscript{107} before the court for religious offenses reveals the intensity with which the Church attempted to promote, enforce and socialize its project of a Catholic state within a democracy.

The Church also tried to keep other religions in Italy marginalized. As under Fascism, Protestant leaders continued to require permits to preach, and bible study groups continued to be periodically raided by police units (Rochat 1990, Peyrot 1977, Jemolo 1960). Perhaps most perniciously, while the reference to race was dropped in 1947, the Buffarini Circolare of 1935, which criminalized Evangelicals, was reiterated before Parliament in 1953 by the DC minister of Interior, Mario Scelba, and remained in effect until 1955.

\textsuperscript{105} Such as the following report of a Milanese comedian tried for delivering a joke of “bad taste” about the Virgin Mary: “On the evening of the 24th of this month in the local Cinema-Theater “Impero,” at the end of a variety show, the Milanese comic, FERRARIO Dario, told the public a joke which contained offensive content towards the Virgin. In fact, he told that the most Holy Virgin Mother, finding herself on earth again, gave news of herself in Heaven, periodically sending messages, and signing them first as “Most Holy Virgin Maria,” then “Most Holy Maria,” then “Maria” and, in the end, “Okay Mary.” The public welcomed these words of FERRARIO in silence which created in everyone a sense of evident disapproval. The functionary service P.s. of the local Questura immediately came to the aid to identify and hand in FERRARIO who sought to justify himself by declaring that he had told the joke only after hearing it just before his performance and without having reflected on its spirit. He was denounced to the local Procura for slander against the Religion of State in conformity with article 402 of the Penal Code.” Ministro dell’Interno (Archivi Centrali del Stato (ACS), Min. Int., D.G.P.S., Div. A.G.R., sez. I, Fasc.12, Varese 28.8.1947).

\textsuperscript{106} Such as the young construction worker from Livorno who received 10 months in prison for hissing at an image of Pope Pius XII during a public film (ACS, Min. Int., D.G.P.S., Div. A.G.R., sez. I, Fasc.12, Livorno: 21.11.1948).

\textsuperscript{107} Such as the PCI deputato Gina Mare who was sentenced to one year in prison after two DC Deputies accused him of uttering offensive phrases against the Pope (ACS, Min. Int., D.G.P.S., Div. A.G.R., sez. I, Fasc.17, Trapani, 28.3.1954.).
When Catholic lay leaders and the Catholic faithful began to pursue electoral issues outside the directives of the Church, the Pope turned his energies to combatting this autonomy and preempting the moral independence of the laity (Giovagnoli 1988, Campanini 1976). In 1944, for example, the Vatican ruled against the formation of Catholic socialist or communist parties, pressuring independent Catholic communists and socialists to disband and join the DC (Scoppola 1977, Vecchio 2001, Campanini 1976). In 1949, Pius XII proclaimed it a sin to vote for communist parties or leaders and excommunicated communists from the Church (Prandi 1968, Riccardi 1983). Then, in 1953 and 1954, Vatican officials dismissed Catholic Action leaders like Mario Rossi and Arturo Paoli from the organization for encouraging the independence of the laity and for being too open to socialist influences (Giovagnoli 1988). When the DC performed poorly in the 1953 elections, the Pope criticized them for putting, “too much emphasis on democratic values.” The Pope faulted the DC, for example, for not pushing through legislative reforms designed specifically to make electoral competition difficult for communist and socialist parties (Galli and Prandi 1970). As late as the 1958 elections, the Italian Bishop’s Conference continued to instruct the Catholic faithful to vote only for those politicians who opposed coalitions with socialists or communists (Galli and Prandi 1970), writing that,

“The electoral projects must affirm the full sufficiency of Catholic doctrine for the solution of social problems, excluding any invocation or acknowledged necessity for the integration on the part of Marxist doctrines or any doctrine removed from Christian thought...[and] the right and duty of the church to direct the activity of its faithful, at a moral level and towards its supernatural ends, whether public or private, whether individual or collective, whether social or political, without violating in this the autonomy of the laity in their technical and specific work.” (Scoppola 1986:10ff)
As we also saw in the last section, these efforts to bind the Italian electorate and Catholic political leaders to the Church’s political goals failed as the center of gravity of Catholic political power was in the process of shifting away from those concerned with exclusively religious aims. Even as faithfully practicing but politically secularized Catholics continued to turn to the Church for moral guidance, the Church hierarchy also began to sense the dwindling of those numbers, especially as more Italians stopped coming into Church every Sunday. After witnessing the incarnation of Catholic political power following a long century of absence, Pius XII and a core group within the hierarchy watched that power quickly slip away from their hands as it became clear that their power over DC policymaking was increasingly diminished. Without openly questioning the future of democracy in Italy, these intransigent Catholics recognized this political and religious secularization as a stamp of their failure to truly institute a Catholic confessional state (Prandi 1963, Scatena 2003).

4.4.3 New Freedoms, New Theological Directions

Although Pope Pius XII remained intransigent towards democracy through the end of his papacy in 1958, a growing number of clergy within the Church hierarchy saw new opportunities within the transformation of Italian politics and society. Convinced by Moro’s arguments, and those of de Gasperi, Dossetti and Sturzo before him, more clergy saw the growing autonomy of the DC as a chance to extricate the Church from the dynamics of partisan politics. The energy required to channel the Church’s organizational

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108 As Riccardi (1988:32) writes, imbuing the rhetoric of the last years of Pope Pius XII’s papacy with an increasingly apocalyptic tone.
strength into the DC had exhausted Catholic associations, especially Catholic Action (Giovagnoli 1988), and diverted their attention away from the heart of their original mission of educating and saving individuals’ souls. What is more, while the DC might have become more autonomous, the party still represented a Catholic political presence in Italian politics and the Church still retained its institutional privileges. More religious leaders, thus, took the new political framework as beneficial for the Church and shifted their energies toward repairing the Church’s relationship with Italian society and, to that end, taking up a more globally prophetic, as opposed to punitively partisan, public tone.

Pope John XXIII, in particular, who succeeded Pius XII as Pope in 1958, explicitly began his papacy with a focus on the changing global atmosphere and with less concern with forcing unity of Catholic political thought in the local context. To that end, in 1960 he declared the opening of a Second Vatican Council. The former DC vice-secretary, Giuseppe Dossetti, became one of the Council’s most important writers (Alberigo 1995); as a periti, or theological consultant, to Cardinal Giacomo Lercaro of Bologna, Dossetti brought his political experience to bear on his theological work. In addition to Dossetti, Vatican II also elevated other Catholic thinkers like Jacques Maritain and John Courtney Murray, who had theologically and philosophically reemphasized those parts of Catholic doctrine that could be interpreted as supportive of democracy (Appleby 2000). When John XXIII died in 1963, Cardinal Montini was

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109 Who, after dropping out of the DC, created his own religious order in the foothills of Bologna.

110 Lercaro had the distinction of being one of four appointed “moderators” of the Council.

111 Both of whom had been recently chastised by the Vatican, in 1955 and 1956, respectively, for going too far in their advocacy of laicization (Scatena 2003:10).
elected Pope Paul VI and institutionalized the spirit of John XXIII’s reforms. The key documents of Vatican II -- the declaration *Dignitatis Humanae* (1965) and the pastoral constitution *Gaudium et Spes* (1965) -- coupled with John XXIII’s encyclical *Pacem in Terris* (1963), all emphasized the inviolability of human rights, the need for the freedom of religion in a pluralistic society, and the right of all individuals to have a voice in the determination of their political governments. Section seventy-five of *Gaudium et Spes*, as quoted in the section introduction, reads,

> It is entirely in accord with human nature...to provide all citizens with the genuine opportunity of taking a free and active share in establishing the juridical foundations of the political community, in determining the form of government and the functions and purposes of its various institutions, and in the election of the government. All citizens should therefore be mindful of their right and duty to use their free vote to further the common good.” (As translated by Tanner, 1990:1122).

The debates surrounding these documents, especially those leading up to the vote on *Dignitatis Humanae* which endorsed religious freedom, reflected the evolution of the opinion of Catholic Bishops in Italy with regard to the ideal role of the Church in political society. Along with the delegation of Spanish bishops, a considerable number of Italian bishops\(^\text{112}\) opposed the original formulation of the Council’s declaration of religious freedom and the theological and political about-face that it appeared to imply for the Catholic Church in Italy. Cardinals Ruffini and Ottaviani,\(^\text{113}\) for example, pitched a fierce battle to block the document’s birth (Musselli 1990). Other bishops, however, were won over by John Courtney Murray’s argument that modern states required a coherent

\(^{112}\) Who continued to compose the majority of the Roman Curia (Alberigo 2006: 68).

\(^{113}\) Whose rigorous defense of a Catholic confessional state, *Potestas Indirecta in Temporalibus*, had been taught in Italian seminaries throughout the 1950s (Musselli 1990).
political framework within which to contribute to the common good of all human beings and that that was of a higher moral concern than the pursuit of institutional religious predominance for the Catholic Church within the state (Miccoli 2002). Such constitutional coherence demanded the congruent defense of political and religious rights and, therefore, that the Church’s embrace of the promotion of equality and human rights had to be coupled with the acceptance of the democratic norms of religious liberty and pluralism within state and society (Musselli 1990, Acerbi 1991, Scatena 2003). Thus, as the final wording of the second section of the document read,

This Vatican synod declares that the human person has a right to religious freedom. Such freedom consist in this, that all should have such immunity from coercion by individuals, or by groups, or by any human power, that no one should be forced to act against his conscience in religious matters, nor prevented from acting according to his conscience, whether in private or in public, whether alone or in association with others, within due limits. The synod further declares that the right to religious freedom is firmly based on the dignity of the human person as this is known from the revealed word of God and from reason itself. This right of the human person to religious freedom should have such recognition in the regulation of society by law as to become a civil right (As translated by Tanner 1990:1002).

Theologically, the declaration upholds religious liberty according to the overriding imperative of the dignity of the human person. The dignity of the person, in turn, takes precedence over any form of moral coercion which might have been politically justified to protect society from moral error in the past. Thus the declaration kept with John XXIII’s vision of reaching out to an evolving society, “to make more room for charity…with clarity of thought and greatness of heart”\textsuperscript{114} and to restore the credibility that the Church had lost in modern society by positioning itself so often

\textsuperscript{114} As John XXIII described the Council’s purpose in 1959 (Alberigo 2006: 9).
against the rights of personal freedoms (Alberigo 2006: 69). At the same time, however, a
decisive number of moderate Italian votes, Led by the moderate Italian Cardinal
Giovanni Urbani,\textsuperscript{115} were won over by the final wording of the declaration because it
framed the principle of religious liberty within a reiteration of the Church’s right as the
authentic guardian of Truth on this earth,\textsuperscript{116} as both Maritain and Murray themselves had
argued (Scatena 2003, Alberigo 2006:100). As the first section of the declaration thus
reads,

But all people are bound to seek for the truth, especially about God and his
church, and when they have found it to embrace and keep it. The synod
further proclaims that these obligations touch and bind the human
conscience, and that the truth imposes itself solely by the force of its own
truth, as it enters the mind at once gently and with power. Indeed, since
people’s demand for religious liberty in carrying out their duty to worship
God concerns freedom from compulsion in civil society, it leaves intact
the traditional catholic teaching on the moral obligation of individuals and
societies towards the true religion and the one church of Christ (As
translated by Tanner 1990: 1002).

\textit{Dignitatis Humanae’s} dual emphasis on the rights of individuals to religious
freedom and the Church’s rights as the authentic defender of Truth reflected a
compromise which allowed both moderate and progressive bishops to support the
document. As a compromise, as others have noted (Melloni and Ruggieri 2009), the
document caused tensions among theologians over how much this development implied a

\textsuperscript{115} Urbani had succeeded John XXIII as Patriarch of Venice which had been a politically Catholic
stronghold for decades and the locus of early Catholic electoral participation (Alberigo 2006:100).

\textsuperscript{116} As well as the continuation of special constitutional privileges and recognition (as in Italy) for
particular demographic or historical reasons, as long as the rights of other citiznes are upheld (as in
paragraph six of \textit{Dignitatis Humanae}).

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break with previous Church doctrine over the nature of the Church’s moral authority.\textsuperscript{117} Yet, even though theologians will continue to argue over its implications for the organization of religious authority within the Church, the document clearly marked the end of the Italian Church’s century-long defense\textsuperscript{118} of its exclusive political rights to religious privilege and the Vatican’s undemocratic tendency to marginalize non-Catholics from the polity. In other words, with \textit{Dignitatis Humanae}, we may claim that the Church dropped its ideal of the Catholic Church as the only legally recognized religion of state with coercive regulatory rights, in order to reclaim its essential public role as the communicator of Truth in an evolving, democratic, human society. As DC leaders had argued in the \textit{apertura a sinistra}, in doing so, the Church tried to engage the changing nature of individuals’ needs and desires in modernity and respond to the “growing numbers [who] demand that they should enjoy the use of their own responsible judgment and freedom, and decide on their actions on grounds of duty and conscience, without external pressure or coercion” (\textit{Dignitatis Humanae}, as translated by Tanner 1990:1001).

4.4.4 Religiosity in Contemporary Italy

The political secularization of the Italian electorate and the DC and the redefinition of the role and authority of the Catholic Church in Italian society coincided with an intensified period of decline of religious observance in Italy through the 1970s, most dramatically manifested in the numbers of Italians who continued to stop attending

\textsuperscript{117} This theological debate spawned two important theological journals that took up both sides of the argument: \textit{Concilium} (which has stressed the Council’s rupture with previous doctrine) and \textit{Comunio} (which has stressed the Council’s reforms within a framework of continuity with the past).

\textsuperscript{118} From Pius IX to Pius XII.
Mass regularly and the increasing number of Italians marrying outside of the Church (Segatti 1999). Following this important transition and transformation, however, in the mid-1980s, measures of religious participation in Italy stabilized at much higher rates than many other European countries, drawing the international attention of scholars (Introvigne and Stark 2005, Diotallevi 2001, Norris and Inglehart 2004, *Journal of Modern Italian Studies* 2007) This subsection examines the nature of this trajectory more closely and evaluates its relationship to the dynamics set into motion by Italy’s religiously friendly state institutions.

4.4.4.1 How many Italians are Catholic?

Based on World Values Survey (WVS) data on the number of self-reported regularly participating religious faithful and numbers of priestly ordinations, some scholars have argued that Italian religiosity has actually experienced a recent period of relative growth (Introvigne and Stark 2005, Diotallevi 2001) and, what is even more interesting, that the locus of that growth has been in the more industrialized, wealthy and secure northern regions of Italy (Diotallevi 1999). Other Italian scholars point out that many of those respondents who say they go to Mass every Sunday really do not (Castegnaro and Dalla Zuanna 2006), and other scholars drum the reminder that the great majority of Italians who claim that they are “Catholic” on surveys do not claim that they believe in or follow church principles (Cipriani 2003) In addition, survey data which is specific to Italy alone generally show slightly lower levels of self-reported, regular religious participation than do the WVS data (Pisati 1998). However, even when we examine the second set of data, self-reported regular Italian religious participation and
religious cultural identification with the Catholic Church are higher than what would be expected if compared with average European levels of religious participation, even when national indicators of modernization or religious pluralism are taken into account (McCleary and Barro 2006, Norris and Inglehart 2004). The following table charts twentieth century religiosity trends in Europe and illustrates the tendency of Italy and other Catholic countries to possess higher than average national levels of religious participation:

### TABLE 4-13

**EUROPEAN RELIGIOSITY LEVELS**

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Year</th>
<th>DEN</th>
<th>SWE</th>
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<th>FRA</th>
<th>GER</th>
<th>NTH</th>
<th>AVG</th>
<th>BEL</th>
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<th>SPA</th>
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NOTE: All cells represent percentage value of national population that reports attending religious services at least once per week.

SOURCE: World Values Surveys.

This table emphasizes the point that Italian religiosity cannot be considered “high” when compared to itself, but it can be when it is compared to the religiosity of other countries with similar demographic characteristics. Admittedly Italian religiosity at the end of the twentieth century was significantly lower than Italian religiosity at the beginning of the twentieth century, and Italy did not escape the dramatic effects of
processes of secularization. Nonetheless, although it suffered significant declines in national levels of religious participation during specific moments of the twentieth century, levels of religious observance are second only to Ireland.

The table also presages the point made forcefully by Norris and Inglehart (2004), Barro and McCleary (2006) and others that the decline of average levels of national religiosity in both Italy and the rest of Europe has kept pace with that of increases in education, income, urbanization and the consolidation of democracy. However, the same table suggests that religious secularization has had greater limitations in Italy than in the rest of Europe over the post-World War Two European period of economic growth. A comparison of indicators of religiosity with Italy’s Catholic neighbor France brings contemporary Italy’s relative robust religiosity into sharp relief:
Figure 4-1
Italian Religiosity
(on cultural and regularly practicing indicators)
Figure 4-2
French Religiosity
(on cultural and regularly practicing indicators)
These graphs show both the aggregate numbers of baptized Italian and French as a percentage of their total populations,¹¹⁹ as well as the percentages of Italians and French who continue to claim that mark of identity later in life.¹²⁰ While the aggregate numbers decline in both (at a faster rate in France than in Italy) many more Italians than French continue to identify themselves with that religious-identity heritage. Regardless of their intentions of “obeying” the Church, Italians are much less likely than their French counterparts to declare themselves atheist (17.1% of French and 2.7% of Italian respondents in the WVS 2005 sample) or simply as someone without any institutional church identity.¹²¹

As a fully industrialized, Western European country with a monopolistic religious market, Italy’s level of religiosity appears to be off the regression lines of both secularization and religious market models and seems to mirror the observation of a trend towards higher relative religiosity in Catholic, European countries (Smith and Sawkins 2004), as we noted in chapter one. Sociologists have attempted to explain Italy’s levels of religiosity by either dismissing the country as an outlier or by modulating the hypotheses or mechanisms of secularization or religious market theories. Secularization apologists have focused on the high initial cultural disposition towards Catholicism at the time of political and economic modernization in Italy. Religious market theorists have shifted their attention to the levels of internal religious pluralism within the Catholic religious

¹¹⁹ Using data registered by the Catholic Church’s *Annuarium Statisticum Ecclesiae*.

¹²⁰ As revealed in World Values Surveys.

¹²¹ As Figure 3.3 indicates, in 2005, for the first time in recorded survey history, more French designated themselves as having no religious affiliation than self-identified with some loose Catholic identity.
market in Italy. As we will see, neither of these modulations are quite satisfactory and fail to take into account how an unregulated institutional favoritism of a majority religion can help embed that religion into the public life of a nation and give religious leaders time to adapt and respond to changes in politics and society.

4.4.4.2 Catholic Heritages and Religious Pluralisms

One attempt to explain this relative difference in Italian religiosity from within the framework of secularization theory is with the use of the concept of “cultural residuals,” as Norris and Inglehart (2004) have coined it. Modernization, they point out, reaches each national history at various religious starting points. Italy, it could be argued, had a higher cultural store of religious identity than other European countries did when modernization occurred. Italy’s national levels of religious participation might have declined from a much higher starting point or declined much more slowly because of the cultural and structural embeddedness of Catholicism in the Italian social fabric. Garelli’s (1991, 2007) and Cartocci’s (1990, 1994) analyses of exceptionalism in Italian religious participation lean on such a structural explanation. Garelli (1991) points out that Italy has always been the land of thousands of Church steeples, or *mille campinili*, and even with modernity it is difficult to erase the path dependent effects of that sort of architectonical presence so easily.\(^2\) Similarly, the effects of militaries of religious orders, Catholic political movements, and Catholic boy scouts, which set up shop in Italy and thrived atop that structure for centuries, could also not easily be erased. Structural-secularization

\(^2\) It would be very interesting to pursue this logic of architectural path dependency and its effects on religiosity in places like Germany or Japan where allied bombing campaigns did, in a short span of time, wipe out that physical religious structure.
explanations for why Italian religiosity was relatively more successful in resisting secularization also usually point out that the Pope’s residence is in Italy, creating a non-negligible residual-cultural effect. Rome is the global headquarters of Catholicism, and Italians literally ran the Catholic Church’s bureaucracy (the Roman Curia) and named themselves the Church’s supreme ruler (the Pope) for centuries. It would be strange if all this combined Catholic physical presence did not have some effect on Italian religiosity.

While the argument is not without merit, I contend that this sort of structural thesis does not take sufficient account of Italian history and fails to put the Italian experience in an appropriate comparative context. As we saw in the first section of this chapter, historic Catholic emperors from much older Catholic nations such as France, Austria and Spain had more powerfully identified their political identity to the pope than had the city-states of Italy before the Risorgimento. The French Catholic Church, in particular, had always understood herself to be the firstborn (daughter) of the Catholic Church, la fille ainée, and with good reason. In the 1600s and 1700s, when France was the most powerful and populous nation of Europe, French monarchic rule was sanctified by the Pope’s blessing, and, as we saw in the last section, French kings and emperors provided military aid and troops to the pope when he was in difficulty. Gabriel LeBras’ (1956) monumental study of 8,000 parish registries across France reports that 90% of French citizens could be considered to be regular-practicing Catholics until at

123 Throughout a period when Italy’s collective population was only one half the size of France’s.

124 It should also be remembered that France is the only other nation besides Italy whose territory happened to physically house the Roman Popes, who officially resided in Avignon from 1305-1378 (and where rival French popes continued to reside until 1423).
While the century following the French revolution saw the beginning of a long struggle between anti-clerical and clerical forces who vied over the proper political arrangement between Church and state, that struggle was mirrored in Italy, and the two countries entered the 20th century at relatively similar structural starting points of religion. In the 1931 census, a year in which Italy’s population, for the first time, reached par with that of France (each nation had forty million citizens), both countries had similar levels of diocesan priests (45-50,000) and an active, publicly influential Catholic lay organization, and France could still claim 10,000 more parishes (and campinili) than Italy. Nor does housing the seat of Catholicism sufficiently explain Italy’s exceptional European religiosity or guarantee a bottomless store of cultural resistance. The physical seat of the Church of England, for example, despite being housed in London for the last five hundred years and representing the spiritual guide to the World’s second largest Christian congregation, has done little to maintain England’s levels of religious participation. England’s non-religiosity, in fact, rivals that of France, with less than five percent of its population claiming to go to church every Sunday (Norris and Inglehart 2004: 72). It is difficult to claim how the simple presence of Italian cultural Catholicism could prove to be so much more resistant than English cultural Anglicanism or French cultural Catholicism without making some argument about how that identity was regenerated and re-proposed over time in these countries.

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125 As measured according to the register of French citizens who, as state law required them, annually participated in the paschal feast, confessed themselves before a priest and received Holy Communion during the Easter Triduum.

126 France, incidentally, has also understood herself to be the land of church steeples, perhaps even more so than Italy. At Easter time Church bells and not bunny rabbits herald the return of sweets and feasts, and as Hervieu-Leger (1992a) points out, the church steeple continues to remain a prominent political symbol of French tradition and civic organization.
Some Italian authors working within a religious market approach have focused their attention on the growth of external and internal religious pluralism within Italy as a possible explanatory factor for Catholic religiosity that is more or less disconnected from historical, structural or institutional forces. Many Italian scholars, for example, have noted that the Italian Catholic Church has faced a growing amount of external religious competition in recent years (Introvigne and Stark 2005, Garelli et al. 2003, Pisati 1998). Consistent with some institutional deregulation of the national religious market in 1984, six non-Catholic religious entities officially established concordats with the Italian state for the first time, including the Waldesian Church, the Seventh Day Adventists, the Assemblies of God, The Union of Jewish Communities, the Baptists and the Lutherans. Other religious entities, such as the Testimonies of Jehovah and some bodies representing unions of Islamic communities, are moving in a similar direction. This modest growth of officially operating religions in Italy, however, does not capture the perceived scale of the very notable and new waves of recent immigration to Italy. The majority of these immigrants are either from the East, of Orthodox religious origin, or the South, of Islamic or Christian origin, and their collective presence has been adding thousands of non-Catholic (and potentially evangelistic) faithful, as well as their churches, mosques and ministers, into Italy each year. Some scholar’s claim that this competition for their faithful’s souls, money, and building space, has forced the leaders of the Catholic Church to improve and diversify their services as well as their publicity of them in order to protect their market share.

Non-Catholic competition, however, still remains a marginal, if important, phenomenon in Italy, representing less than ten percent of its population. Thanks,
especially, to predominantly Muslim immigration from former colonies, religious markets in other European powers, such as Germany, England and France, have been more diverse and for much longer than Italy. What is more, the religious pluralism in these countries, as in Italy, also continues to grow, without, however, the increased competition adding robustness to the religious market (Introvigne and Stark 2005).

Similar to the work of other scholars on the “Catholic effect” elsewhere (Smith and Sawkins 2003) some Italian researchers, therefore, have theorized about the possible effects of an internal competition within a religious monopoly (Pisati 1998, Diotallevi 1999, 2001 and Introvigne and Stark 2005). Their argument posits that the Catholic Church is a world unto itself, with its own internal religious market, so to speak, which supports all sorts of religious participation and expression (including the most extreme forms of the completely secularized, ethno-national Catholic). Coupled with the de-regulatory measures of the Second Vatican Council of the Catholic Church, which encouraged the creation of a larger variety of Catholic lay communities, the 1960s-1980s saw an upsurge in the numbers of Italians participating in various new Catholic organizations. These organizations are theorized to have created a more diversified religious project which has catered to the spiritual needs of a new generation of Italian Catholics. As Diotallevi (2001) and others have pointed out, Catholic religious consumers can move freely within this internal market, making this sort of intra-denominational pluralism more effective and satisfying than the normal inter-denominational pluralism studied by religious market theorists. Consumers get all the
religious benefits of religious product diversification and competition among religious firms, but avoid paying any of the costs associated with conversion.\textsuperscript{127}

While the new religious movements which flourished in the aftermath of World War Two have certainly seemed to breathe energy into the Italian Church, it is not obvious that Italy has more internal pluralism than other Catholic nations or that these intra-Catholic religious “firms” are necessarily even in competition with each other. As Pace (2007) writes, while a competitive spirit may have certainly characterized the outreach efforts of Catholic communities in the 1960s, as new movements tried to establish themselves, the Church hierarchy has been vigilant about the shape these internal factions assume or the authority they exert within the hierarchy. In the 1980s, for example, the Vatican gathered lay community leaders to Rome and ordered them to work together with one another under the direction of Church authority. This forceful centralization of Catholic authority and guidance strikes at the sort of competitive activism market theorists have described animating the activity of pluralistic inter-denominational religious markets.

In this respect, it should be remembered that the whole of the Catholic world was also deeply affected by the reforms of Vatican II including such historically Catholic but religiously secularized nations today as France, Uruguay and Paraguay.\textsuperscript{127} Although their

\textsuperscript{127}While it is relatively easy to switch Catholic parishes or transition from being a boy scout to a Franciscan tertiary, there are, of course, limits to this postulation. Many Catholic associations have entrance costs and exit barriers much higher than those associated with the “conversion fees” for entering or exiting many non-Catholic churches. It takes years to be a Jesuit, for example, and once in, if a Jesuit wants out, it takes year to do that, too. Even many of the new Catholic lay communities require rather restrictive covenants, life commitments, or even vows of their lay members.
exact numbers elude us,\textsuperscript{128} surveys of French Catholic movements and associations, for example, do not wildly diverge from those of Italy in their levels of internal pluralism within the national Catholic market. Moreover, explanations which refer to the deregulatory measures of Vatican II do not tell us why those reforms ought to have been more effective in stirring an active internal pluralism in Italy in the first place. As we argued in chapter two, therefore, it is hard to make the claim that either external or internal religious pluralism alone could be the driver of the differences between Italian levels of religious participation and other European countries without referring to the underlying conditions that makes the religious pluralism of one country more dynamic than another.

4.4.4.3 Institutional Mediations

In contrast to these explanations, this dissertation contends that the combination of government friendliness shown to the Catholic Church with its autonomy from state bureaucracies and interference created particularly favorable conditions for the survival of religious life in contemporary Italy. The state’s promotion of the Catholic Church in Italy was not a sufficiently powerful measure to stop the forces of secularization and prevent the large numbers of Italian citizens who stopped spending their leisure time at the parish and took on a secular ethical approach to their sexual morals and other life decisions. Through the Lateran Pacts, however, the Catholic Church remained

\textsuperscript{128} For new Catholic movements, see, among others, Cholvy and Hilaire (2005) for France and Diotallevi (2006) for Italy. For older Catholic associations, similarly reported Catholic Almanacs from the middle of last century (1951 in Italy, 1964 in France) counted 93 masculine religious orders which had either originated or held their general superior’s home in Italy and 62 for France. The same count for feminine religious orders, however, put 186 in Italy, but over 400 in France.
institutionally woven into the underlying national, symbolic and social fabric. At the same time, as an autonomous, confessional religion rather than a dependent, established one, the Catholic Church was at once protected and subsidized by the state, but also at liberty to organize itself in a way that maximized Church authority relative to state authority. Catholic Bishops and theologians were promoted by the Vatican, not a national state bureaucracy, and much more likely to resist any sort of marginalization to the private sphere by the state which would weaken Church authority, decouple nation and faith or break the bond between Catholic individuals and the Catholic Magisterium. As a result, while the secularizing effects of modernization had dramatic consequences on national religious life in Italy, they were not as deleterious as they were in much of the rest of Europe.

Institutionally, therefore, we could say that the Italian state helped break the fall for the Catholic Church from the post-war forces of modernization, creating a safety valve which slowed the Italian rate of religious decline. The combination of Church promotion by the state and independence from it gave the Catholic Church some protective incubation from the effects of modernization on mass attachment to the institutional Church, as well as the flexibility to respond to them, as the Church tried to do at Vatican II. Thanks to state subsidies which encouraged the identification of the Italian citizen with the Catholic Church, by the time the Church had re-invented herself as a provider of modern spiritual goods to which a new generation of Catholics could adhere, it still had a congregation to sell itself to in Italy.

In this respect, in addition to national religious holidays, religious state ceremonies, and state subsidized Church infrastructure, the Church’s state-mandated time
of access to the public education of all Italian children has particularly helped the Church sustain a regeneration of Catholic identity and memory as a nationally shared cultural touchstone over time. The Italian Catholic Church continues to decide the curriculum and promote the teachers who staff the religious education classes offered in all Italian public schools for Italian students. The effects of this are especially evident in the remarkable resilience of the numbers of Italian Catholics who, without desiring regular participation in Catholic activities or obligations, continue to self-identify as Catholic and go through the rites of Catholic initiation (see Figure 4.4). Once again, a comparison with France puts Italian religiosity in relief:

![Figure 4-3 National Participation in Catholic Initiation Rites](image.png)
While the numbers of Italian baptisms has declined in recent years, most of those who are baptized go on to take their first communion and become confirmed. As the graph also shows, in France, where many fewer children are baptized in the Church every year, strikingly fewer of those children go on to receive their first communion and even fewer of them ever become confirmed Catholics. Despite being the fille ainée of the Catholic Church and sharing with Italy a history of clerical-anticlericalism, an important canon of Catholic saints, artists, theologians, kings, associations and political movements, and diverse numbers of internal religious associations as well as external competitors, France did not promote religion as a public good. Her children were socialized into civic values within the framework of laïcité and taught that religion’s place was in the private sphere. As the national memory of equating the identity of French citizens to French Catholics faded and lost substance without any systematic public attempt at regenerating that myth, the numbers of French interested in participating in religious rites of passage or even considering themselves Catholic radically declined across France (Hervieu-Leger 1992b).

Thus even if increases in external or internal religious pluralism did produce positive effects on religious participation in Italy, such increases need to be understood in a context of institutional favoritism that sustained the collective, societal perception of Italy as a culturally religious country throughout the second half of the twentieth century.

4.4.5 Final Observations: New Public Voices and Loose Religious Identities

Two further points could be made about the significance of this religiosity in Italy and the contemporary role of the Catholic Church in Italian politics and society. First, the Catholic Church has continued to successfully draw on its institutionally favorable
position in Italy and the strength of these numbers to sustain its role as a public religion in Italy. As Casanova’s (1994, 2001) description of a public religion would suggest, the Italian Catholic Church has taken advantage of its state-supported roots in civil society to maintain an important voice in Italian public debates about the future shape of Italian society. Through its directing presence in the public sector, in Catholic hospitals, institutions of charity, schools, unions, business leagues, farmer associations, summer camps and daycare and in the considerable network of well-attended parish communities throughout the country, the Church continues to exercise direct influence on how Italian society organizes itself (see Garelli 1991, 2006). As a result, the Church also influences the norms which govern how individuals and associations interact with one another and the state.

The importance of the Italian Catholic Church as a public religion in Italy could be most clearly seen in the public role it assumed following the demise of the DC in 1994. When the DC broke apart in the early 1990s under the weight of corruption scandals and long-festering ideological divisions, it ceased to exist as a political party and placed the entire Italian party system into crisis. The Catholic Church, however, emerged unscathed and strengthened. Rather than abandoning the Church on account of the deep moral and political failures of Italy’s Catholic political party, levels of Italian religiosity remained steady throughout and after the crisis. The Catholic Church, in fact, remained one of the few public institutions\textsuperscript{129} which garnered high levels of societal trust and

\textsuperscript{129} Along with police and industrialists, while political parties, politicians and unions received the lowest levels of societal trust. What is more, beginning in the 1970s, societal levels of trust in the Church actually began to rise (Cartocci 1994).
confidence and took on the role of a public guarantor of the nation’s stability, a role which has consolidated the Church’s position as a moral critic of Italian politics.

The Church was able to survive the DC so well in large part because it had adapted to the changing nature of society and politics in Italy. By loosening its authoritarian model of interaction with Italian society, which had led it to try to micromanage Italian party politics for its own ends, the Italian Church also stopped staking its future on the success of the specific political project of the DC. By taking its distance from party politics, the Italian Church also reinforced the decisions of the Second Vatican Council and its emphasis on the Church’s pastoral and prophetic mission as a guide of consciences and souls rather than (principally) an enforcer of absolute Truth. In *Dignitatis Humanae*, as Appleby and Lederach write (2009), the Catholic Church recognized that religious error has its rights. It also recognized, as Maritain had argued, that a plurality of morally acceptable but politically distinct political platforms exist in a modern democratic society and that it was not the Church’s moral responsibility to relentlessly press for Catholic political unity. This has led the Church to remain largely silent, for example, with regard to recent proposals of reviving an Italian Catholic party of the center.

The Church’s relative acceptance of religious and political pluralism in Italy, however, also reveals the precariousness of the Church’s new model of authority in Italian society. And this brings us to our second observation, namely, that contemporary Italian Catholic identity is inherently loose, fragile and shifting.

While I have thus far argued that Italy’s religiously friendly state institutions have helped sustain more robust levels of religiosity than otherwise expected, I now want to
consider the other side of the coin for a moment. Strikingly, around 85% of Italians continue to consider themselves Catholic. This number implies some level of consensus among Italians about the connection between Italian society and the Catholic Church, but, as we have seen, it does not imply that 85% of the population are faithful to and obey Church goals and doctrine. Only a minority of Italians, in fact, are regularly practicing Catholics, and even among this minority, there is a wide range of personal devotion and fidelity to the Catholic Church as a moral or political “governing body.” In their study of religious pluralism in contemporary Italy, for example, Bove and Cipriani (2003) categorize Italian Catholics into six distinct groups according to their opinions on values and morality. These groups run the gamut from “rigorists” to “open radicals” who, despite their religious identity, pick and choose which Church teachings they believe with more or less coherence. The “open radicals,” who represent 18% of Italian Catholics, represent the group that is most open to gay marriage, euthanasia, and abortion, political positions which the Catholic Church has singled out as morally unacceptable. As Bove and Cipriani note (2003: 174), these positions systematically distances the members of the group from major Church teachings. Perhaps even more telling of Catholic religious pluralism, over 40% of Italian Catholics, including 10% of regularly practicing ones, do not believe in one of the most fundamental markings of Catholicism, namely the belief in Jesus Christ as God and man (de Sandre 2003: 135).

While the Church continues to use its moral capital and standing within Italian society to push and critique national policy goals, therefore, the Church cannot automatically count on Italians’ confidence and good disposition towards them. As Pace (2007) writes, there are limits on the extent to which the Church can contain a highly
plural political spectrum within its ranks. Although non-intervention in politics risks political irrelevance, when the Church intervenes in the public sphere in favor or against specific policies, it also risks losing its force as a moral voice above the political fray. The Church can only push so hard on issues to the right (such as blocking same-sex marriage\textsuperscript{130}) or the left (such as backing pro-immigration legislation\textsuperscript{131}) without irrevocably alienating individuals on either side whose left-right political identity has eclipsed that of their religious identity in the fundamental make-up of their identity repertoires.

In this regard, in an evolving democratic political society, the relationship between religion, state and society is not static. Levels of societal religiosity and the content of religious belief can change over time and, as Fox (2008) emphasizes, states can decide to stop promoting a religion or even actively begin to regulate it. In 1984, for example, the Italian state negotiated some institutional changes to its relationship with the Catholic Church, which left certain institutional privileges for the Church but made Catholic education optional for public school students, struck old legislation on crimes against the Church from its penal code, and placed an opt-out for taxpayers to decline to give the previously allotted 0.8% of their taxes to the Catholic Church. It remains to be seen whether Italy’s relatively consolidated bloc of regularly practicing and cultural Catholics, who had been helped and protected by the state during society’s transition to modernity, will now be strong enough to independently continue to regenerate itself

\textsuperscript{130} See \textit{Corriere della Sera}, February 13\textsuperscript{th}, 2010, “Gay, duro affondo di Caffara: ‘Guai a chi propone il matrimonio.’”

\textsuperscript{131} See \textit{La Repubblica}, September 26\textsuperscript{th}, 2009, “Praga, il Papa: ‘No a false ideologie: Accogliere tutti. Si all’economia responsabile.’”
without that help. The future of the Italian Catholic Church’s public role in Italian politics and society is, accordingly, an open question of research.
CHAPTER 5:
RELIGION AND DEMOCRACY IN ALGERIA

5.1 Islam, Nation, State and Democracy in Algeria

“Muslim Algeria has recently felt gentle breaks of wind blowing that announce the arrival of rectifications which have been long deserved by the country. The country could have avoided committing these errors if it had kept itself on the way of righteousness advocated by the Holy Book and the Sunna.”

*From the First Algerian Islamist “Manifesto,”* Algiers 1982

The purpose of this section is to give some background to the origins and development of the relationship between Islam, state, nation and democracy in Algeria. In doing so, the aim is to evaluate the nature of the hostility of Algeria’s Islamist parties and candidates towards democracy prior to their electoral participation in a more religiously-friendly, liberalizing, political regime. The sections which follow will then trace 1) to what extent this hostility has evolved over the last fifteen years of electoral politics in Algeria and 2) to what extent the participation of Algerian Islamist parties in a religiously friendly and partially democratic arena has affected the religious life of the nation.

The historical event against which modern Algeria continues to most define and measure itself, and with which it ferociously wrestles, is its 132-year period of French colonialization, stretching from 1830 to 1962. Shortly we shall examine the implications
of that period for the religious and democratic life of Algeria today. Before doing so, however, I want to briefly introduce two important historical events here which have provided important referents for the debates about religion, politics and nation in Algeria throughout French colonialization and up to the present day.

5.1.1 The Ottoman Empire in Algeria

Before France, Ottoman Turks held political control over Algeria and most of the Maghreb, from 1533 to 1830. The Ottomans were not especially well-loved by the population of Algeria at the time (Stora 2004), however, their presence signified at least three important elements which would take on growing importance for Algerian Muslims under the French. First, while tribal conflicts would remain the norm throughout the period, the Ottomans helped the geographical space of “Algeria” attain some administrative unity. Throughout Turkish rule, the Dey of Algiers, a gubernatorial title conferred by the Ottoman Sultan, appointed Beys to govern over the districts of Tlemcen to the West, Medea in the center and Constantine in the East. Secondly, although despotic, the Turks ruled from a distance, leaving behind unpopular military garrisons in the cities to regularly extract taxes in addition to oaths of loyalty and bring back the revenue to Constantinople (Stora 2004). The Ottomans, however, did not send their population to colonize Algeria.

Third, and finally, the taxes and loyalty demanded of the Algerians were in the service of the Ottoman Califat. Although Algerians politically chaffed under the Turks,

132 And before them, stretching back a few millennia, the Spaniards, the Almoravids, the Arabs, the Byzantines, the Vandals, the Romans, the Phoenicians and the Berbers.
while in the Ottoman dominion, Algeria remained in Dar al Islam. The Califat whom the Algerians served under still represented some ideal “Defender of the Faithful,” and, as Algerians were wont to remember under the French, did nothing to repress their religious faith or identity as a community of Muslims who belonged to the larger political community of the Umma. As their ruler, the Ottoman Sultan retained the charge of nominating Algerian muftis from among Algeria’s own Ulema who then, in turn, nominated other Algerian clergy to fill religious posts including various grades of Imams, muezzin and other “subaltern” official religious positions (Carnet 1959). Under the Ottomans, however, the Ulema retained its independence as a religious body. They were free to make their own juridical decisions within society, write their own fatwas, censure the mores of Algerian society and, importantly, manage the income and investments accrued to the institution of Habous (Ainouche 1987).

5.1.2 Abdelkader and Djihad.

While much of the center of Algeria, including Algiers, tumbled rather quickly after the arrival of the French, the son of an important sheikh of the Qadriya Sufi order near Mascara in the West, the young Emir Abdelkader, organized an effective army of resistance which fought the French for another fifteen years, surrendering, finally, in

133 Including both Malekite (the dominant Sunni rite in Algeria) and Hanafite muftis. Later, the French would elevate the title of a Malekite and Hanafite mufti to create two Grand Muftis of Algeria (Ageron 1966). In addition to Malekites and Hanafites, Algeria hosts Sufi orders and culturally important, but isolated, groups of Ibadites, who trace their religious origins to the earliest split between Sunni and Shi’a, which the Ibadites refused to take part in, and whose presence in Algeria goes back to the eleventh century.

134 The Habous, or what is sometimes also referred to as the institution of Wakfs, are property and real estate donated to or put under the temporary ownership of the Ulema for religious and charitable purposes.
1847. As the son of a religious leader who was religiously educated himself, Abdelkader proclaimed Djihad, or Holy War, to unite Algeria’s tribes to a war of resistance against their powerful, organized, nationalist and Catholic adversary. Abdelkader’s resistance provided the seeds for the growth of a truly Algerian and independent nation. In his fifteen years of resistance against the French, Abdelkader, in fact, organized a proto-Algerian state, printing his own currency, raising taxes and organizing an Algerian political administration. The heroics and organization of Abdelkader would be mythologized by Algerians throughout the colonial period and revisited at independence. What is important to remember at this point is that in continuation with the Ottomans, Abdelkader’s Djihad and proto-nationalism kept the idea of Islamic nation and state closely linked in Algeria.

5.1.3 France

In 1830, before taking the city of Algiers, the French General de Bourmont wrote the following to the inhabitants of the city:

I equally guarantee you, and make you a formal, solemn, inalterable promise, that your Mosques, great and small, will not cease to be frequented as they are today and will be even more so, and that no one will impede you of the things of your religion and your cult (as cited in Ainouche 1987: Annex 1).

He then continued, in the eventual peace treaty signed with the Dey Hussein of Algiers several weeks later that,

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135 Abdelkader, a fascinating and colorful personality, was also widely open and cosmopolitan and spent much of the later part of his life living as a scholar, interesting himself in, among other things, Christian scripture. Famously, in 1860, through the intervention of Abdelkader, the lives of 15,000 Christians living in Damascus were spared their lives. He was reported to have said that he was obliged to fight the French in Algeria because they were not comporting themselves as true Christians.
The exercise of the Mahometan Religion will remain free. The liberty of the inhabitants of all classes, their religion, their properties, their commerce and their industry, will not be infringed upon. Their woman will be respected. The commander-in-chief takes this engagement on his honor (as cited in Ainouche 1987: Annex 1).

Despite Bourmont’s statement of noble intentions, the text of which no Algerian would forget, the French quickly began to take over the institution of Islam in Algeria. In what would prove to be the two least-well-loved policies in this respect, the French military command (1) assumed control and management of the Ministry of Habous, thereby robbing Algerian Imans and Mosques of their revenue and all the activities supported by it, from charities to schools to the maintenance of the Mosques themselves; and (2) put the Algerian Muslim clergy under the strict control of the (patently non-Muslim) French state. After fifteen years under the direct control of the French War Minister, in 1846 the Muslim clergy were put under the Department of “Justice and Cults,” whose minister was charged with the “surveillance and policing of the mosques, Marabouts, Zawiyas, and other religious establishments,” as well as nominating clergy members and paying their salaries and mosque upkeep (Carret 1959).

The French colonial administration went on to manage the Habous badly and pay poorly the official clergy they had hoped to control. As colonials began to arrive in the country, the French government destroyed mosques, converted others into Catholic Churches and closed madrasas, religious-run schools, across the country. They also severely limited the number of Algerians permitted to make the Hadj to Mecca, sought

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136 Zawiyas are Sufi religious brotherhoods in Algeria, usually localized around the tomb of a saint to whom the Zawiya is dedicated. The Heads or Sheikhs of Zawiyas are respected as religious leaders and continue to exercise a certain religious authority in the country.
out Fatwas to condemn Djihad and bless the French government, and the put the Zawiyas under control and surveillance (Sellam 2007).\textsuperscript{137}

In 132 years of colonialization, there was, naturally, some variation in this general policy. From Burmont’s intentions through the 1950s, various French intellectuals and administrators warned against the repressive policies of the French colonial government and argued that France needed to apply its revolutionary principles of \textit{liberté, égalité, fraternité} in Algeria. The reign of Napoleon III in France, for example, saw the rise an “Islamojuste” politics, which included a famous visit to Algeria by Tocqueville who counseled the state that the worst thing it could do if it wished to limit religious passions in Algeria would be to suppress them. He went on to write that, to that point, colonial policies towards religion had only served to make the Algerian nation more ignorant and dangerous (Ageron 1966, Sellam 2007). Tocqueville and others recommended the creation of a wider system of French-run madrasas to educate a modern, tolerant Muslim religious elite (Sellam 2007). Although they would eventually construct several madrasas, the colonial government continued both to nominate all official Algerian Islamic clergy and carefully control the sermons the clergy preached in their official mosques. As a result, both the number of mosques and the number of official Imams were relatively sparse in the years immediately preceding Algerian independence.

In 1905, when the forces of laïcité succeeded in passing the law on the separation of church and state in France, many Muslims hoped that the law would grant Islam

\textsuperscript{137} For a deeper analysis of the relationship between religion and politics in Algeria under early French colonial rule, see, especially, the scholarship of Sellam (2007), Aïnnouche (1987), and Ageron (1966).
similar freedom in Algeria. While France rigorously insisted on treating Algeria as a regular “department” of France, politically equal to any other region of the country,\textsuperscript{138} the French Algerian government vociferously opposed the application of the law of separation of church and state in Algeria. It justified its concern by citing the special status of the Muslim religion, claiming it was in the best interests of the native Algerian population who expected and greatly benefited from the state revenue that sustained the Muslim clergy.\textsuperscript{139} In reality, the French colonial government was acutely aware of the importance of the mosque and religious sentiment in Algeria and understood that losing what management they had acquired over the Muslim clergy in Algeria would represent a significant loss of a source of control and surveillance for the French authorities over the Algerian population.

5.1.4 Ben Badis and the Association of Ulema

In the early 1900s and taking root especially after the First World War and the defeat and dismembering of the Ottoman empire, an intellectual and cultural movement of modernist Islamic reformism grew across the Middle East. The reformists, whose ideas developed in various directions in different national settings, shared common cause in preaching the need for Muslim society to emancipate itself by recuperating its moral integrity and putting to use a rationalist analysis of socio-economic problems to promote Islamic ideals. Among others, the movement included the appearance of Abul Ala

\textsuperscript{138} Despite the fact that Muslims weren’t allowed to vote.

\textsuperscript{139} Naturally, many Algerians had hoped that the law on separation of church and state would mean that the French would be obliged to \textit{restitute} the Habous they had confiscated from them, thereby making the law a net financial gain for institutional Islam in Algeria.
Mawdudi, who created the *Jamaat e Islami* in Pakistan and Hussain al-Banna who founded the *Muslim Brotherhood* in Egypt. In Algeria, the Muslim Reformist trend took on its own colors and causes under the leadership and energy of Abdelhamid Ben Badis, who established the Algerian Association of Muslim Ulema (AUMA) and, in 1925, began to publish a journal to disseminate the movement’s causes. In the spirit of the greater reform movement, Ben Badis and the AUMA could be understood as socially engaged moral theologians who preached above all the need for a heartfelt return to the sources and morals of Islam and who saw such a return as the necessary element which could lead Muslim society to authentic, organic, modern progress and self empowerment.

Ben Badis and others within the Algerian reform movement understood this project of moral renewal to be non-dissociable from their need to reclaim a specifically Algerian patrimony or Algerian history as a nation. To this end, while proclaiming their loyalty to France and their apolitical nature, the AUMA challenged the French government to grant its Algerian subjects both French citizenship and official respect of their religious faith by 1) allowing the Algerian Muslim community the right to freely organize the education of the Arabic language and the diffusion of Islamic culture and 2)...

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140 Officially registered with the French Government in 1931.

141 As in this incredible passage from an article in Ben Badis’ journal *Chihab*, “We, Muslim Algerians, who live in our Algerian nation, in the shadow of the French tricolor, firmly united to the French…we live with the French as sincere friends. We respect their government and their laws; we observe their commandments and their interdictions. We desire that they respect our religion, our language, that they safeguard our dignity, that they guide us on the path towards political, social and economic emancipation. In this manner, we can live, them and us, as loyal friends. And if it is necessary one day to die for the defense of the nation of France and the nation of Algeria, they will find us on their frontlines, ready to die at their sides, as loyal friends. It is upon such a base that mutual understanding will be possible and every error will disappear” (as cited in Merad 1967: 338).
to apply the law of separation of church and state in Algeria (Merad 1967 and Deheuvels 1991).

It is striking to note with what animating fervor Ben Badis, who would inspire Algerian Islam for decades, fought for the independence of Islam from the political regime, and the degree to which he called on the democratic and republican history of France to do so.\textsuperscript{142} Ben Badis’ political openness can even be seen in the hope which he placed with other Reformers across the Middle East in the reconstruction of a future Islamic Califat, after Mustafa Kemal did away with the Ottoman Califat in Turkey in 1924.\textsuperscript{143} As Merad notes, Ben Badis distinguished himself in this manner by expressly praising Kemal’s decision against the Califat which, in Ben Badis eyes, had turned out to be an historical and moral failure that had bent too easily to political influences and lost the confidence of Muslim peoples. As Ben Badis wrote,

\begin{quote}
The Turks have not abolished the Califat in its Islamic sense; they have simply abolished a governmental regime which was proper to their state, and suppressed an illusory symbol which had vainly seduced Muslims. (Merad 1967: 313)\textsuperscript{144}
\end{quote}

In the spirit of the true Califat, Ben Badis proposed the creation of what he termed a “Muslim Magistrate” for Algeria, to be composed of members representing the various tendencies of Islam in Algeria, including the Zawiyas, the reformed Ulemas, and the Malekites, Hanafites, and Ibadites. Ben Badis envisioned this Magistrate to be strictly

\textsuperscript{142} As was typical of others in the Algerian reform movement of the time (McDougall 2004, among others).

\textsuperscript{143} Making the restitution of the Califat a key symbolic political demand which would inspire the minds of many future Islamists, including in Algeria.

\textsuperscript{144} While praising Kemal for his abolition of the Califat, however, Ben Badis did take him to task for doing away so completely with the practice of Islamic law in Turkey (Merad 1967).
independent of the political administration which, he argued, in every state, including Algeria, must take on its own particular form according to its history and circumstance. Ben Badis likened the magistrate to a sort of Pope without the hierarchical trappings of the Vatican and Roman Curia (or an infallible, sacrosanct personality), but which would remain a unique, apolitical authority in the religious affairs of a nation and the moral life of its faithful. The Magistrate was not intended to receive any interference or even financial support by the government of the state, nor, equally, to show any interference towards the government (Merad 1967). Tayyib al-Oqbi, another influential, former member of the AUMA, went so far as to propose that such a council ought to be comprised of elected members, a proposition which, however, was not seen as morally desirable by the heads of the Zawiyas (Carnet 1959). In making these proposals, Ben Badis did not condone the “Islamic-ness” of democracy, but he did not oppose it either. His hopes were to help renew the vitality of a moral, Islamic society, and his rational analysis led him to be open to the various political arrangements which might aid such a renewal.

As Sellam (2007) argues, the original sin of the French in the eyes of Ben Badis and the AUMA was not French colonialization itself, nor France’s liberal, democratic political ideals, but that, as non-Muslims, they had confiscated the Muslim institution of Habous and directly managed the Muslim clergy and Zawiyas. To this end, the AUMA accused the official clergy and Zawiya sheikhs of moral corruption and decadence for

145 It should be noted, however, that even as he called for a separation of religion and state, Ben Badis did, still, encourage the adoption by the state of Islamic law.

146 For a description of Oqbi’s own views see McDougall (2004).
having compromised themselves with the French and begged them to reform. Although not officially recognized as Imams, Imams belonging to the AUMA also began to preach and teach in Mosques around Algeria as “free Imams.” The French government responded to the AUMA with the infamous “Circulaire Michel,” named after the French Prefect of Algiers, Marcel Michel. The Circulaire banned all members of the AUMA from preaching in state mosques, imprisoned several of their Imams and established a “Consultative Committee of the Muslim Cult” with Michel at its head (Carnet 1959). The effect of the Circulaire, was to give the French state the excuse to assume wide powers in the repression of “non-official” religious leaders (Sellam 2007).

Although from the beginning the AUMA avowed its nature as a religious and cultural organization, their specific grievances with French colonial rule had immense political implications, and the French repression of the organization had the effect of politicizing many within the organization, driving them towards armed resistance (Carnet 1959). The Algerian independence movement, in turn, drew greatly on the AUMA’s articulation of Algerian nation and culture and the phrase with which Ben Badis defined his movement, “Islam is my religion, Arabic is my language, Algeria is my nation,”147 helped define Algerian nationalism and inspire Algeria’s war against the French.

147 Ben Badis used the term “patrie” which has a wider meaning in French than the English word “nation.” The phrase was popularized in part thanks to the growing cadres of Muslim boy scouts whom Ben Badis helped form in Algeria and teach (Stora 2004, Sellam 2007).
5.1.5 Revolution, Independence, Islamic Laïcité and the Origins of Contemporary Algerian Islamism.

The AUMA represented what was perhaps the most articulate source of Algerian nationalism and organic Algerian unit. But as an apolitically declared religious association, it never pretended to claim a monopoly over the shape of Algerian political demands for independence from France. Historians have typically classified Algeria’s pre-independence political movements as rising from four distinct social-political sources: (1) religious (AUMA); (2) communist (represented by the Communist Party in Algeria PRA); (3) secular-democratic (most represented by Ferhat Abbas) and (4) (radical) nationalist (Messali Hadj’s party l’Étoile Nord-Africaine and then the FLN, le Front de Libération Nationale). The radical nationalists, led by Messali Hadj, were the first to demand full political independence from France and then, later, through the leadership of Ahmed Ben Bella and others, to begin to organize a military resistance to achieve that independence. Although these four political currents were briefly united in the ensuing war with France, the nationalists emerged with the upper political hand, first under the presidency of Ben Bella and then throughout Houari Boumedienne’s rule from 1965-1978.

Ben Bella and Boumedienne politically acknowledged the religious roots and personality of the national identity of Algeria and, in the founding constitutions and documents of the country\(^\text{148}\) held up Islam as the religion of state and as an important source of social legislation. In doing so, the new Algerian political regime won over a

\(^{148}\) Including the 1963 and 1976 constitutions, the Algiers Charter of 1964 and the National Charter of 1976.
large cadre of the reformist Ulema. When faced with the opportunity of a state run by Algerian leaders who were themselves Muslims and who promoted Islamic culture and Islamic values, the Ulema dropped Ben Badis’s proposals for a separation of religion and state. Instead, the Ulema placed themselves within the state institutional apparatus of Islam in the hopes of steering Algeria’s Islamification and protecting it against any secularizing tendencies in future state policies (Deheuvels 1991: 238).

5.1.5.1 Authoritarian Islamic Laïcité

In its inaugural national charter the FLN, recognizing the egalitarian spirit of Islam and its lack of “sacramentally” ordained authority, transferred the task of fatwa-production away from the muftis to a Superior Islamic Council and created a state-appointed Ministry of Religious Affairs charged with managing the official Algerian clergy. A French sociologist, Henri Sanson, defined this arrangement as “Laïcité Islamique” (Sanson 1983). The Algerian state declared itself to be nominally Muslim and encouraged that identity through, for example, laws making it illegal to sell alcohol to Muslims and for Muslims to raise pigs; declaring Friday as the national day of rest; and by promoting Arabic-speaking education which required all students to study Islamic sciences. The Muslim clergy in Algeria, however, remained in the paid service of a state which declared itself to be both socialist and democratic. In theory, therefore, whatever Islamic law was embedded in state institutions by the FLN, such as the individual’s freedom of conscience and religious belief, was also subject to the civil liberties and rights of the constitution. For Sanson (1983), the theocratic elements of a religion of state
In 1970s Algeria, therefore, could be described as being mediated by democratic rules and rights.

In reality, however, at the same time that Ben Bella and Boumedienne nationalized the institution of Islam, they put it under the direct control of the state. Significantly different from the French, the FLN placed a practicing Muslim in charge of the official institution of Islam. Like the French, however, the FLN continued to manage that clergy and use the pretext of promoting Islam to politicize it for their own ends. These ends were above all directed towards legitimizing the one-party rule of the FLN state and making the socialist “revolution” a religious and moral imperative for the Algerian Muslim faithful. Thus, in the Algerian national charter of 1976, the FLN proclaimed that,

Islam has revealed itself as one of the most powerful ramparts against all enterprises of depersonalization…to regenerate itself, the Muslim world has a single task: to go beyond [Islamic] Reformism and engage itself on the path of social Revolution…The Revolution enters well into the historical perspective of Islam…Islam, in its spirits understood correctly, is not linked to any particular interest, to any specific clergy, nor to any temporal power… The reconstruction of Muslim thought must, in order to be credible, inevitably reflect a much greater enterprise: the total reinforcement of society….Socialism identifies itself with the flowering of Islamic values (Cited in Sanson 1983: conclusion).

Even Boumedienne’s successor, Chadli Benjidal, who would attempt to liberalize the polity and economy, continued to charge the Minister of Religious Affairs in 1980 to “explain and diffuse the socialist principles contained within social justice, which constitutes one of the essential elements of Islam” (Sanson 1983). While this policy was certainly Islamic and “laïque,” it was also, in the words of Luizard (2008) an
Thus we may define the relationship between religion and state under the FLN in Algeria as being one of “authoritarian Islamic laïcité,” which combined both relatively high levels of government favoritism of religion with relatively high levels of government regulation of religion.

5.1.6 Islamism in Algeria

As the authoritarian and “laïque” elements of the FLN’s state policy towards Islam became clear, a growing number of the successors and students of the reformist Ulema of the AUMA refused to acquiesce to what they perceived to be the forced submission of Islam to the state. In the 1960s, a group of official clergy who were connected to the AUMA and given a place within Ministry of Religious affairs in recognition of their support and work towards national liberation began to challenge the Islamic nature of the FLN regime through the publication of the journal, Al-Qiyam. When the journal took issue with the Islamic authenticity of socialism as an ideology, the FLN shut down the journal and placed some of its members under house arrest. The FLN accused the Ulema reformist of “empty moralism” and charged them with a lack of ideological progression in failing to wholeheartedly legitimate the socialist projects of the FLN (Sanson 1983).

After the publication of Al-Qiyam was suspended, conservative religious elements stayed on within the regime in the Ministry of Religious Affairs. These religious conservatives developed a relatively fundamentalist but ultimately timid Islamist

149 Or, to return to Kuru’s (2008) terminology from chapter 1, an “assertive secularism.”
discourse, and although they waged episodic “moralization” campaigns (Deheuvels 1991), their discourse always defended the FLN state. As a result, their orthodox sermons, which preached the socialist ideology of the state, became stale, lacked authenticity and excitement, and their fortunes declined along with those of an ossified regime (Vallin 1964).

Like the AUMA before it, the founders of Algerian Islamism tried to break away from such an institutionally stagnant religious system. Some consider the beginning of the contemporary Islamist movement in Algeria to be the publication in 1976 of *Le mazdaquisme est à l’origine du socialism*\(^{150}\) by Abdelatif Soltani, a former student of Ben Badis who accused the socialist ideology of the FLN to be impious. Soltani, another former AUMA member, Ahmed Sahnoun, and a young professor, Abassi Madani, installed themselves in the University of Algiers, where they took to preaching and teaching. They gained popularity especially among the disaffected “Arabizing”\(^{151}\) students on campus whom they armed with arguments against students from the powerful Marxist unions. The Islamist students and Marxist unions came increasingly into open hostility and, in 1981, a communist sympathizing student was killed in a fight between the two groups. In 1982 Madani and others wrote what could be considered a First Islamist Manifesto and were shortly imprisoned thereafter. While in prison, other Islamists such as Mafoud Nahnah from Blida, in the center of Algeria, and Abdallah

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\(^{150}\) Referring to the religious sect of Mazdakism whose origins lay in 5\(^{th}\) century Persia and was later counted as heretical and revolutionary in the Islamic Middle East.

\(^{151}\) Although the FLN state introduced Arabic-speaking reforms into the University and school system, in doing so it created a painful gap between Arabic university training and a job market which still favored French-speakers. Within the university “useful” majors such as science and foreign languages were still taught in French, while the exploding Arabic-speaking student population were stuck with the humanities and, especially, Islamic sciences.
Djaballah from Constantine, in the East of Algeria, kept the movement alive, drawing in not only students but also a growing number of merchants and educated professionals who distrusted the socialist policies of the FLN and were left disgusted by their corruption. When Soltani died in 1986, some 10,000 people marched in his funeral.

The message of the Islamists at the University of Algiers resembled that of the reformists of the 1930s. They championed Arabization efforts, promoted the diffusion of Islamist culture, and preached a rigorous return to Islamic morals. Yet, while the AUMA were a self-avowed apolitical, cultural-religious force, Algeria’s Islamists openly embraced the need for a political response to the failures of the state in the 1980s. Rather than calling for a separation of religion and state like the AUMA, the Islamists militated for a greater unity of religion and state and preached the need for a new constitution that more clearly announced the Qu’ran and the Sunna at its heart. In order to protect Islam from state interference and promote a virtuous Muslim society, the problem, as the Islamists diagnosed it, was not to free Islam to be independent, but to give it steering power over the state. In such a way, Islamism singled out both colonialism and the FLN for failing to recognize the rightful place of Islam in society and politics. The socialist-democratic institutions which both the FLN and the French had championed to different degrees could not grant the sort of independence and place of honor which the AUMA had hoped for Islam because, a priori, they were secularizing, “laïque” institutions. In placing the sovereignty of the government outside of the divine, these secular institutions

152 It should be noted here that even after the disbanding of Al-Qiyam, some Imams within the “official” Algerian clergy continued to protest their manipulation by the state yet, taking a different track than the Islamists, as Ben Badis had done, tried to take the state to task by recalling the true democratic nature of Islam. See, especially, Cheikh Hammani reacting to the state’s control over religious education to the IV FLN congress (as cited in Deheuvels 1991: 25).
had submitted the divine to the corrupt hands of men. Returning to the language of Sanson (1983), rather than allowing secular institutions to mediate Islam, we could say that the Islamists wanted Islam to more fully mediate all aspects of political life.

Soltani, Sahnoun, and Madani, therefore, while retaining the impassioned, moralizing discourse of the AUMA, combined that discourse with the language of other Muslim reformists from Ben Badis’ time who had explicitly linked the need for the moralization of society to the restoration of an Islamic state. Adopting the rhetoric of Mawdudi and Sayid Qutb of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, Algeria’s Islamists began to openly oppose the Algerian state in the 1980s and joined the Islamist refrain heard in much of the Middle East and Asia for the return of the Califate and the golden age of Islam.

This discourse radicalized in Algeria at a time when the FLN revealed itself to be incapable of responding to Algeria’s exploding social and economic problems and the authoritarian regime turned to cronyism and manipulation to deal with dissent. Using seminars, University courses, and mosques which were not occupied by official state Imams, the Islamists responded to the growing sense of political crisis by preaching that the solution to Algeria’s social and economic problems was to replace the corrupt men of the political system with men of Muslim virtue who respected Islamic law.

As quoted at the beginning of this chapter, Soltani, Sahnoun and Madani wrote in their 1982 “manifesto”:
Muslim Algeria has recently felt gentle breaks of wind blowing that announce the arrival of rectifications that have been long deserved by the country. The country could have avoided committing these errors if it had kept itself on the way of righteousness advocated by the Holy Book and the Sunna…. This is why we demand the redress of the following points with such an insistence which must be responded to clearly and in such a fashion as to leave no room for mistakes:

1: The existence of elements in the machinery of the State which are hostile to our religion, and that are merely agents executing the plans hatched by colonialism. This situation has favored the multiplication of immoral acts and a perdition of responsibility at all levels of administration and all instances of the State (Al-Ahanf et al 1991: 45-46).

In order to advance the stability of such a virtuous political system, therefore, the Algerian state had to take a more active part in encouraging the moral education of society and, crucially, stop manipulating the institution of Islam for its socialist, western, secularizing ends.

Neither the Islamist movement in Algeria, however, nor the immediate political parties it produced, ever really articulated the precise institutional arrangements they intended to construct, other than making general references to a return of the Califat and the restoration of an Islamic state. Their call for an Islamic state, as in the quote above, implied that the version of state Islam already present in Algeria was not good enough, but the institutional particulars of how to go about achieving the proper rectifications were left aside. Their lack of political precision extended to their characterization of democracy. The essential difficulty Islamists had with liberal democracy, in fact, was no different from the difficulty they had with communism, capitalism, socialism, or Marxism, all of which had severed the tie between political authority and divine authority and thus failed to recognize and respect the sovereignty of God. By placing the constitution’s source of political power and legitimacy in the will of the people, as Qutb
argued, democracy instituted political idolatry and insured that man’s evil ways would corrupt the truth revealed by God (Deheuvels 1991: 257). In doing so, Muslim nations condemned themselves to live in what Mawdudi described as modern jahiliyya, or religious ignorance of God, which is to say, outside of Dar al-Islam (Deheuvels 1991).

This theology, the heart of which animated all of Algeria’s Islamists, prompted Islamist leaders who formally agreed to participate in democratic institutions to adopt ambiguous political intentions and behavior toward democracy. On the one hand, many of the Islamists’ elder Algerian teachers, such as Ben Badis, al-Oqbi and Bennabi, did not reject democracy as a means to realizing their project of society. On the other hand, as we will explore in greater detail below, the Islamification from above (Kepel 1994) that Islamists hoped to achieve by entering into politics appeared to leave little political space for the protection of individual liberties and rights for the non-religious and less-religious persons and associations. To different degrees, therefore, all of Algeria’s Islamists could be viewed as carrying with them some implicit, unresolved hostility towards democracy. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, it was not clear whether these parties would use their political gains to concentrate power away from plural, secular party politics, or establish an Islamist style of party politics with full respect for democratic institutions and plural party politics (as some scholars hoped and the Islamists sometimes promised).

5.1.7 October, 1988

Throughout the 1980s, President Chadli Benjedid adopted a strategy of carrots and sticks towards the Islamists, as he had chosen to do with respect to the other two social movements that could become potential political rivals, the Berbers and the
Marxists. Chadli tried to court the Islamists’ support by building mosques and creating an Islamist friendly family code in 1984. Yet, at the same time, he centralized the Ministry of Religious Affairs, tightened control over the formation of Imams and the content of their sermons, and kept their ring leaders in jail.

As Chadli’s crisis of legitimacy grew in the late 1980s when external debt and the fall of oil prices buckled the Algerian economy and intra-governmental splits over political reform began to surface, Algerians took to the streets. In October of 1988, worker strikes and student protests against high food prices, which turned into riots across the country, were brutally suppressed by the regime. Islamists, who were led into the streets by a fiery preacher from Algiers, Ali Belhadj, quickly mobilized several thousand marchers and confronted governmental forces who proceeded to shoot on the crowds. The Islamists used the space they had carved out in the mosques to their advantage, mobilized the congregations of their neighborhoods for large Friday prayer rallies and quickly assumed leadership of the protests that channeled widespread national anger at the FLN regime. When the word spread that the Algerian police had tortured arrested protestors, what had begun as worker strikes burst into a crisis of governmental legitimacy. In an effort to restore order and avoid a full political meltdown, President

\footnote{Who, it could be noted, in the eyes of scholars of the time, represented much more potent, politically dangerous social movements for the FLN regime than the Islamists. In this light, the carrots he gave the Islamists could also be understood as part of a strategy of keeping the Berbers and Marxists in check.}

\footnote{In 1980, Rouadjia (1991) estimates that 2000 of Algeria’s 5183 Mosques were without an official state Imam and were left open for Islamist preachers outside of the state’s control to appropriate.}

\footnote{And thus cancelling the legitimacy which the FLN had long claimed as revolutionary fighters who had themselves been tortured by the French.}
Chadli responded to an open letter by Sahnoun, met with Sahnoun, Madani, Nahnah and Belhadj and announced elections.

5.1.8 Madani, Belhadj, Nahnah and Djaballah

With the electoral doors opened wide in 1988, Abassi Madani and Ali Belhadj rode the wave of support they had gathered throughout the protests and strikes in October 1988. Together, they quickly formed the explicitly Islamist political party, the Front du Salut Islamique (FIS) and were allowed by Benjedid to contest the upcoming, multiparty elections. Sahnoun, the Islamists’ senior elder, cautioned the FIS to proceed carefully, resist the urge to move on the energy of the protests too quickly and not be too hasty with the formation of the leadership of the party. Sahnoun also feared that Madani and Belhadj’s management of the FIS would alienate important Islamist leaders (as they did), and he worried that such alienation would damage the long-run cause of Islamism in Algeria. He, therefore, established a non-political Islamic league, Rabitat al-Dawa, intended to unite Algerian Islamist leaders ideologically, even as Islamists went their separate ways politically. Mafoud Nahnah and Abdallah Djaballah, both of whom had their own political ambitions and refused offers by Belhadj and Madani to join leadership of the FIS, nevertheless joined Sahnoun’s league, and continued to regularly meet together with Madani and Belhadj. Although Sahnoun was personally closer to Madani than Nahnah, Nahnah’s prestige as a leading Islamist in Algeria won him consideration as the second-in-command of the league. (Al-Ahnaf et al. 1991: 34).

Apart from their ambition, as Sahnoun had feared, Nahnah and Djaballah’s decision not to join the FIS was also motivated by the mounting, fiery rhetoric of
Belhadj. Although Madani, the FIS’s party secretary and presumed presidential candidate, assured the (francophone) press of the FIS’s intentions to respect democratic rule of law and governance, Belhadj’s sermons and articles (directed towards an Arabic-speaking public) charged democracy as being “kufr,” which is to say, heretical. In his sermons, he issued ominous warnings to non-believing Muslims of what was in store for them in a moral, Islamic, FIS regime, and he also attacked important aspects of democracy:

In Islam, the sovereignty of the divine law; in democracy, the sovereignty of the people, and of the scum and charlatans. That which is forbidden is forbidden, even if an order arrives from all the parliaments of the earth. The only right the people has is to chose a Muslim sovereign who governs by the Shari’a (Al-anaf et al 1991: 93).

The ideological inconsistency of the Belhadj-Madani duet reflects the heterogeneity of political actors within the FIS, and Algerian Islamism as a whole, and their lack of a coherent institutional plan for Algerian politics. While all Islamist leaders were united by the desire to see a more Islamic Algerian state, they differed on the best strategy to go about building it. As Labat (1995) argues, the political strategies proposed by the FIS generally reflected the differences between “technocrats” and “theocrats” within the party. The technocrats, who had the ear of Madani, represented a better educated, Islamist constituency with ties to those in the business and professional world who were fed up with the FLN. The most important goal for the technocrats was simply to propel competent Islamists into power and replace the FLN ruling elite with an Islamist one. In order to achieve political power, Madani’s statements to the press made it clear that they were open to accepting democratic rules of the game, however, only to the extent that those rules did not promote a secularization of politics and society. As he said,
simultaneously expressing his openness to democracy and his implicit hostility towards it,

We say that the elections are determinant for everyone. No matter what the results are, we will respect the majority even if it is only made up of one lone vote. We consider, in effect, that he who has been elected by the people reflects the will of the people. In contrast, what we will not accept is this elected person not acting in the interests of the people. He must not be in contradiction with the Shari’a, its doctrine, its values. He cannot make war on Islam. He who is the enemy of Islam is the enemy of the people (as cited in Burgat and Dowell 1997:131).

For Belhadj (in 1990), and other “theocrats” within the FIS, the purity of creating an ideal “Muslim City” was more important than the benefits of political pragmatism, and this ideological purity made him less open to democracy. Democratic institutions, Belhadj believed, could only be permitted within the ideal Islamic state as a very limited tool of political consultation or “shura,” which would allow a Muslim population to ratify the just conduct of an Islamic government, but not have a say in the creation of its specific laws or policies, which are to be solely given and inspired by the Qur’an. For Belhadj and other theocrats, democracy by any other means only served to encourage fitna or discord and political faction among the Umma, whose proper state of being, as designed by God, was one of unity and accord. This led the theocrats within the FIS to argue that “laïque” political parties, especially those that proposed a stricter separation of religion and state\textsuperscript{157} ought to be made illegal in an Islamic state and not be allowed to

\textsuperscript{156} This shura as ratification might be something that occurs regularly, or once every great while, or once a ruler dies….Belhadj was not especially concerned with these details.

\textsuperscript{157} Here the Rassemblement pour la Culture et la Democratie (RCD), a political party centered in Kabylia, was usually singled out by the FIS for its more explicit campaign for a separation of religion and state in Algeria, although the implications also sometimes extended to the Front des Forces Socialists.
participate in elections. The explicit articulation of this policy goal by Belhadj set the theocrats apart from the technocrats who, through their rhethoric were more open to the multipartyism of democracy. However, as Burgat\textsuperscript{158} argues, all Islamists in their early years, including technocrats and theocrats, shared this ideal of Muslim unity and its concomitant, doctrinal rejection of pluralism (Burgat and Dowell 1997: 124).

5.1.8.1 Mafoud Nahnah

Nahnah, who has often been portrayed in the scholarship as the most moderate Islamist leader because of his important decision to renounce violence and embrace elections in the early 1990s,\textsuperscript{159} nonetheless shared some of the Belhadj’s ambiguities with respect to democracy, if to a much lesser degree. As Zoubir (1996) writes, the distance between Nahnah and the FIS in the early 1990s, as that between Madani and Belhadj, was not so much in the theology that animated them but in politics, in which Nahnah proved himself to be more pliant. Nahnah’s path towards political moderation, however, could not have been wholly inferred from studying his previous actions or by means of ideological differentiation from other Islamists of the time. He and his party’s growing commitment to democracy, I will argue in the next section, represent the evolution of a platform that was strengthened by policies of inclusion and the party’s experience in power-sharing coalitions.

\textsuperscript{158} Although I use the later, 1997 edition translated into English by Burgat and Dowell, the original text, interviews and arguments were made and published by Burgat in 1993.

\textsuperscript{159} See, for example, Zoubir and Hamadouche (2006).
By certain standards, Nahnah appeared to be just as likely to support non-democratic, extra-political actions to pursue an Islamist agenda as other leading Algerian Islamists of the time. Nahnah had spent years building a network of Islamic donors, intellectuals and faithful from his base in Blida, through the creation of the charitable organization *irshad wa islah* (which was incorporated officially as an association in 1989). Of all Algeria’s Islamist leaders, he is the one most associated with the International Muslim Brotherhood, and, therefore, by association and ideological formation, to the writings and political vision of Qutb and al-Banna. Carrying the Muslim Brotherhood’s footprints, Nahnah’s intentions were never solely spiritual, and he cultivated a program of contentious political action. In 1976 he was arrested and imprisoned for three years for a botched attempt at sabotaging power lines. While this represented a relatively harmless act of civil disobedience, Nahnah also played a significant part in recruiting and sending Algerian Islamists to Peshawar, Pakistan, and then on to Afghanistan to help fight the Soviets. Although Nahnah openly renounced violence as a political option in Algeria in the early 1990s, he and his parties’ objectives, especially in earlier elections, must be put into this proper context. Nahnah espoused a more moderate form of political Islamism, which became even more moderate over time, but it was not clear how much Nahnah’s dedication to the creation of an Islamic state would allow him to support democratic precepts of pluralism and contestation, and

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160 See, especially, Nahnah’s discussion of this activity in *El Watan*, February 2nd, 1999 and June 11th, 2001. Nahnah also appeared to have briefly flirted with Mustafa Bouyali’s group, which organized the first truly violent Islamist group in Algeria, in the early 1980s, although Nahnah was later accused by one of Bouyali’s lieutenants of eventually betraying him to the Chadli government in return for more freedom of movement himself.
whether his willingness to contest violently a profane government in Afghanistan would lead him to do the same in Algeria.

In earlier interviews, Nahnah’s attachment to more exclusive Islamic goals was clearer in discourse and context. In the 1990s, Nahnah qualified his political vision by coining the term “shuracracy” to describe the type of democracy he and his party stood for. Although he employed the term “shura” more loosely than Belhadj, like him, Nahnah used it to define limits on the extent to which politics ought to express the “will of the people” through the electoral process. For Nahnah, Islamic law as given by the Shari’a and enforced by the state did not permit compromise or changes made by popular sentiment (Boumezbar and Djemila 2002). As he explained in his 1995 presidential platform, individual liberty is to be encouraged and protected, “provided that these liberties are not exploited in order to destabilize the bases of society, to plot against the nation or to spread immorality among its members” (as cited in Zoubir 1996:11). Or, as he said, recalling the same openness and implicit hostility towards democracy expressed by Madani above,

The moment that democracy does not touch the foundation of the Islamic faith, it becomes a quest for the believer… Each Muslim is asked to seek wisdom where he can find it, as long as it does not go against the faith. If this point of view intersects with the democrats in our country or elsewhere, we are the first to be obliged to call for democracy, not according to the Greek conception, which has torn apart society, nor according to the Roman conception which imposed a military regime, but following the Islamic vision which gives the right to the most humble to express himself (Cited in Burgat and Dowell, 1997:130).

Nahnah, therefore, supported the construction of a participatory electoral regime, but, like Madani and Belhadj, ideally wanted to limit the range of power and choice
accorded to it by popular suffrage through Islamic legislation and moral guarantees.\textsuperscript{161} Nahnah liked to describe himself and his party as “people who believe in Shari’a law, but not one imposed by swings of an axe.”\textsuperscript{162} Nahnah renounced violence as a legitimate political recourse, but also left open doubts about his attachment to an electoral system that would allow non-religious parties to propose secular or “immoral” policies and legislation which were opposed to his own “Islamist vision” of democracy. As we will see, although Nahnah and his party would continue to mobilize around some Islamic goals, over time the attachment to an Islamic state as an end in itself dropped from their discourse. As they changed the context of their Islamic pitch, they more openly traded in ideological compromises for political goals.

5.1.8.2 Abdallah Djaballah

Djaballah was even clearer than Nahnah about his dedication to the construction of an Islamic state, and he was quite open about the tensions that such a dedication posed for a democratic regime. Throughout the 1990s, Djaballah was hard pressed when questioned to be openly pro-democratic, and the support he lent to elections was always hidden between lines of attack against the democratic west and “laico-communists.” Like Belhadj, Djaballah also explicitly contested the political legitimacy of secular parties (especially the RCD and the FFS), bemoaned political pluralism as contrary to the spirit of Muslim unity, and seemed to suggest that he would try to impose moral legislation to

\textsuperscript{161} See Larierge (2007: 25) and Impagliazzo and Giro (1997).
\textsuperscript{162} El Watan, February 23\textsuperscript{rd}, 1999.
put an end to “signs of impiety” within Algeria, such as women not wearing the veil (Al-Ahnaf et al 1991: 52-53).

Unlike Nahnah, Djaballah at no time rejected either the FIS or the decisions of Islamist groups associated with the FIS to engage in violence against the state. At times, especially in the early 1990s, Djaballah’s statements were laden with questionable indecision, leaving open the door to support violence against governments that discriminated against Islam. For example, he once said, “We privilege, in permanence, political action, but when the fuse is lit, everyone silences. So what to do then?” He once referred to the killing of children by the Group Islamique Armée (GIA) as “just a detail.” Djaballah had no significant history of violent contestation, although he was imprisoned along with Madani, Soltani, and Sahnoun in 1982 for signing Islamism’s first manifesto and for his connection to University protests.

Not only was it difficult for him even to embrace democracy in the 1990s, but Djaballah’s platform was overwhelmingly, exclusively religious, with little politico-economic content. His religious goals of the time were not tempered by the possibility of much space to work with non-religious parties, nor did he signal any desire for cooperation with them. As he said in 1992, “Islam is a total agenda….It is not simply an empty slogan that anyone can use to do what they can. It is a total agenda whose application requires men who are competent in the material.”

5.2 Religion and Democratization

It is therefore no longer necessary to Islamize the state and society. Algeria is a Muslim country. Algerians are Muslims. In this country there is the call to prayer. The mosques are full. What would it serve to Islamize a society where Islam is the religion of state?

_MSP-HAMAS Parliamentary Member, Bejaia, 2006._

As we saw in the last chapter, charting the rise of Islamism in Algeria, the Algerian Islamist leaders of the 1980s and early 1990s shared basic ideological hostilities towards what they defined to be the institutions of “Western” political regimes and the various manifestations of those regime tendencies as found in Algeria. The charge they leveled against the Western features of the Algerian government was most directed at the assertive secularism (or authoritarian Islamic laïcité) which Algerian Islamists associated with the Algerian government and the way that it encouraged secularization in both politics and society. By doing these things in the name of Islam, the Islamists sometimes argued that the post-colonial Algerian regime was worse than the French themselves. As the last section illustrated, this ideology led the Islamists to say and do things that cast their commitment to upholding plural, non-religious party politics and protecting democratic freedoms of choice and conscience in doubt. When Islamist parties were given the chance to and agreed to participate in plural political elections, therefore, following the protests of 1988, their long-term democratic intentions were suspected with good reason.

As prefaced in the introduction to this chapter, this section traces the subsequent evolution of these Islamist parties and candidates and establishes to what extent they moderated their behavior and discourse with respect to democracy as the result of their
participation in electoral politics and a favorably changed religion-state institutional framework. The section also tracks how much and in what ways this process could be said to generate democratic support and aid the transition to and consolidation of democracy in Algeria. As our theory in chapter three predicts, we expect to find evidence of Islamist moderation to be triggered by 1) the need to mobilize a larger, non-religious electorate; 2) the changing demands of that electorate, including the core religious faithful; and 3) the need to stay in political power and win future elections.

In order to accomplish these tasks, the section first considers the composition of the Algerian Islamist political movement as a whole and the various Islamist political parties which were formed out of the movement beginning in 1988. The section theoretically justifies the decision made in this chapter to analyze the political trajectories of the Islamist political parties of MSP-HAMAS and el Islah-Ennahda from 1995 onwards and evaluates the nature of Algerian political liberalization in addition to the state’s religiously friendly institutions from that time period.

The section then explores the evolution of the Algerian Islamic movement from 1995 to 2009. It first analyzes the trajectories of political change of MSP-HAMAS and Islah-Ennahda. With respect to MSP-HAMAS, the section emphasizes the triumph of the party’s strategy of adaptability and the effects that such a strategy had on the ideological stances which the party took with respect to two religiously symbolic pieces of legislation, namely the reform of the Algerian family code and education reform. The section ends by evaluating to what extent the evolution of either party could be said to be constrained by the changing political interests of Algerian individuals. While fewer individual-level data are available in Algeria as opposed to Italy, the section analyzes
voting records and survey data to chart changes in individual political preferences and their effects on the transition to democracy in Algeria.

5.2.1 Islamic Religious Political Movement

Table 5.1 reproduces our table from chapter three and names the principal actors within the Algerian Islamic political movement considered in this section as well as outlines their evolution over time with respect to several attributes. Two immediate observations should be made about this table. The first observation is that the composition of principal actors within the Algerian Islamic movement is notably different from the Catholic political movement of Italy. In Italy, institutional religious authorities possessed important influence and power over the political goals pursued by the Christian Democrats in the first years of Italian democratization and had a distinct set of political preferences from those held by the Christian Democratic elite. In Algeria, the religious leaders of institutional Islam are employed by the state and do not have the same independent status as the Vatican. In theory, these religious leaders support the Algerian state and, as we will see, had little influence over the goals pursued by Algeria’s Islamist political parties, even though many sympathized with Islamist political goals. As a consequence, our analysis of the evolution of the hostility of the Islamic political movement in Algeria is much more centered on Islamist political parties and their relationship with the Algerian electorate, than it is on official Algerian Islam. The following section of this chapter will analyze how the institution of Islam in Algeria, together with Islamist parties, has affected the contemporary religious life of Algeria.
### TABLE 5-1

**COMPOSITION OF ALGERIAN ISLAMIC POLITICAL MOVEMENT BEFORE AND AFTER RELIGIOUSLY FRIENDLY DEMOCRATIZATION**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Attributes:</th>
<th>1991</th>
<th>2006</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Religious Political Parties</strong></td>
<td>Democratic Support:</td>
<td>Ambivalent/Hospitable</td>
<td>Democratic Support:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1) Harakat Mujtama al- Islami (HAMAS)</td>
<td>Positions of Power within Movement:</td>
<td>Ascendant and Independent</td>
<td>Weakened</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2) Ennahda (MRN)/El Islah</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Religious Institution</strong></td>
<td>Democratic Support:</td>
<td>Democratic</td>
<td>Democratic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Religious Affairs</td>
<td>Position of Power within Movement:</td>
<td>Independent</td>
<td>Governmental</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Religious Associations</strong></td>
<td>Democratic Support:</td>
<td>Ambivalent</td>
<td>Democratic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zawiyas, Association of Ulema, Islamic Student Unions</td>
<td>Position of Power within Movement:</td>
<td>Divided on Policy Positions and Loyalties</td>
<td>Divided on Policy Positions and Loyalties</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Religious Individuals</strong></td>
<td>Democratic Support:</td>
<td>Ambivalent</td>
<td>Democratic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslim Faithful</td>
<td>Position of Power within Movement:</td>
<td>Obedient</td>
<td>Independent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Religiosity:</td>
<td></td>
<td>Tight</td>
<td>Loose</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Religiosity</td>
<td>Religiosity</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The second observation about this table is that despite their role as the protagonists of Algerian politics from 1988 to 1991, this chapter does not consider the electoral experience of the FIS. The FIS were the first to constitute themselves officially as a legal political party and win elections in Algeria. As we saw in the last section, the intentions of the leaders of the FIS were essentially ambivalent and often openly hostile towards democracy, making the party a strong candidate for testing our hypotheses.\textsuperscript{167}

Some scholars argue that a FIS-government would have been detrimental to the consolidation of democracy in Algeria in the 1990s, and cite as evidence the declarations of some FIS mayors on the morrow of the municipal elections of 1990 to instate a “Muslim City” and the FIS’s postelection formation of an Islamic “moral” police force (Boumezbar and Djamila 2002: 109, Lamchichi 1992, Tlemcani 2003). Other scholars, however, point to the relatively good conduct of the FIS in districts that they won; their generous welfare policies (Burgat and Dowell 1997); their ability to mobilize disaffected Algerians to vote (Guillard 1995);\textsuperscript{168} and the evolution over time of Belhadj’s statements towards democracy\textsuperscript{169} (Impagliazzo and Giro 1997: 137) to argue that a FIS government would have helped expand democracy in Algeria in the long run. As Addi argues (1994), if the Islamists themselves did not change their hearts, their electoral presence might have

\textsuperscript{167}In fact, much of the early debate over an inclusion-moderation hypothesis centered on the FIS experience (see, for example, Addi 1994).

\textsuperscript{168}Saying, “It will be because he has given his hand to the hand of the big brother whose name is Islam that the little infant whose name is democracy will tomorrow be welcomed by the Algerian family.”(Guillard 1995: 110).

\textsuperscript{169}In a series of letters from prison, and throughout the Sant’Egidio negotiations in the early 1990s, Belhadj consistently pronounced himself in favor of democracy and ready to offer “guarantees” to sustain it.
eventually strengthened democracy by waking Algeria’s democratic forces out of their slumber in order to mobilize an effective opposition.

The experience of the FIS in government, however, was short-lived and abruptly ended when the Algerian state dismissed elections which the FIS had won in 1991, established an authoritarian regime and sent the FIS underground. Given these circumstances, it is difficult, if not impossible, to evaluate whether our hypotheses are valid with respect to the evolution of the FIS as a party. The two sections that follow, therefore, examine the more recent and more lengthy experience of the Islamist political parties established and led by the two other leading figures of the Algerian Islamist movement of the 1980s, namely, Mahfoud Nahnah and Abdallah Djaballah. Although the names of these parties and their compositions have changed from election to election, their founding fathers and principal actors have largely remained the same. Thus, to simplify, in this chapter we examine the development of the political goals and discourse of the Harakat Mujtama al-Islami (HAMAS)/Mouvement de la societé de la Paix (MSP)/Harakat Mujtama al-silm (HMS) as the party of Nahnah (until his death in 2003), and those of the Ennahda /Mouvement du Rénouveau National (MRN)/El Islah, as the party of Djaballah.

The decision of the state to dismiss the electoral results of 1991 sparked a period of intense violence and political closure in Algeria. The state, led by the army, formed what was essentially an authoritarian regime that was formally headed by a High Council of State that suspended elections, repressed the FIS’s political activities, and sent Madani

\[170\] This is due to both the 1997 change in legal requirements for acceptable political party platforms and, in the case of Ennahda, internal crises.
and Belhadj to jail. Armed Islamist groups with murky ties to the FIS engaged in a war of terrorism with the Algerian state who, in turn, attempted to violently repress and “eradicate” the Islamist political movement. The years of brutal violence which followed, in which common figures estimate between 150,000 and 200,000 Algerians lost their lives, had a deep impact on the psychology of the Algerian nation (Moussaoui 2005). Importantly, the years of terrorism discredited armed Islamism in Algeria. The violence, however, did not deal the same fate to political Islam. Following the three year interim authoritarian rule, when elections resumed in 1995 and Islamist parties were allowed to contend for power, they still had a legitimate claim to being one of the more popular political formations in the country. As Burgat (1997) is quick to point out, it was the FLN-state, not the FIS, which officially put an end to democratic politics in 1992 in Algeria, and it was never clear to what extent the FIS was fully implicated in the worst of the domestic terrorist acts throughout the 1990s. The state, which had created its crisis of legitimacy by torturing protestors in October of 1988, also went on to mistreat thousands of suspected armed Islamist prisoners throughout the 1990s; play a sinister role in some of the violence against civilians of the same period; and prove less willing than the FIS to negotiate an end to the conflict (Burgat and Dowell 1997, Impagliazzo and

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171 The Algerian experience of terrorism has some echo in the Italian experience of WWII. In both cases violent conflict set the stage for democratically ambivalent and hostile religious actors to join in the democratic process, even as those actors hoped to use the process to institute non-democratic goals.

172 Two armed Islamic groups formed in the early 1990s to fight the state and, eventually, one another: the Armée Islamique du Salut (AIS) and the Groupe Islamique Armée (GIA). The AIS had clear connections to the FIS and generally targeted political and military objectives. The connections between the FIS and GIA, who eventually fathered the Groupe Salafiste pour la Predication et Combat (GSPC) elements of whom then formed Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), were always much murkier and many suspect that elements of the Algerian armed forces helped coordinate or fund some of the GIA’s activities to gain larger popular support for a harsher “eradicateur” anti-terrorism operation. The GIA and then the GSPC were accused of the worst and most brutal violence against Algerian civilians.
Giro, 1997). These failures of the state kept the promise and potential of political Islam to reform Algerian politics and bring prosperity and peace an untested, and, thus, open possibility throughout the 1990s.

The renunciation of violence, to a greater and lesser degree, by the MSP and Ennadha, coupled with the traumatic experience of a decade of terror for Algerian society meant that it was unlikely that either party would turn to radical, violent politics in the short run. However, given that the Islamists never really had a chance to exercise power before the army took over in 1991, both Nahnah and Djaballah entered the political process in 1995 with an ideological vision which was essentially the same as that which had led them to form their parties in the first place in 1989, with all of its implicit hostilities towards democracy. As we saw in the first part of this chapter, the whole raison d’être for both MSP and Ennahda was to advance politically the construction of an Islamic state governed by the laws of the Shari’a, which would give religious authority its proper legal footing. It was not clear how much non-religious or secular politics either party would tolerate while still accepting the legitimacy of electoral politics. As was the case in Italy, the participation of such parties in elections produced the fear among many that winning elections would only bolster the Islamist parties’ radical claims, push them to pursue exclusive religious policies, and block democratic governance from taking root.

Nahnah and Djaballah’s subsequent political trajectories have followed different courses. The direction of these paths reflect both the particular variations in either’s electoral successes as well as the general changes in the institutional framework which set the boundaries of the public and political space for Islam in Algeria (see Table 5.1).
The following subsection considers these institutional changes and the post-1995 nature of democratization in Algeria.

5.2.2 Political Liberalization and Religiously Friendly Institutions

Following Algeria’s period of political closure, which had begun with the ban on the FIS in 1992 and the creation of a High Council of State, Gen. Liamine Zeroual’s assumption of the office of Presidency in 1994 and his election to the post in the 1995 multiparty presidential elections marked the beginning of a new period of political openness in Algeria. Although he rejected the validity of the Sant’Egidio Peace Accords negotiated between Algeria’s Islamists and leading opposition parties in Rome in 1994, Zeroual (and Bouteflika after him) tried to appropriate the wording and intention of the accords and work towards national reconciliation. His 1995 presidential campaign, therefore, promised the normalization of plural party competition, including (non-FIS) Islamist parties, and hinted at secret governmental plans to negotiate a favorable deal to reintegrate Algeria’s armed Islamists as well.

After three years in power, partially for having failed to deliver on these promises, Zeroual surprised Algeria by calling early presidential elections for 1999. In his winning presidential campaign, Abdelaziz Bouteflika intensified Zeroual’s offers. If elected, Bouteflika promised a greater inclusion and liberalization of the Algerian political system and explicitly articulated his desire to strike an historic compromise with Islamism by

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173 These peace accords were mediated by the lay Roman Catholic community of Sant’Egidio and might have reintegrated the FIS back into politics (see Impagliazzo and Giro 1997).
increasing government favoritism of religion as well as producing a political blueprint for national reconciliation.
### Table 5-2

**Algerian Electoral Results**

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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>RND</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>61%</td>
<td>33.7%</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>85%</td>
<td>10.33%</td>
<td>90.2%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>FLN</strong></td>
<td>23.2%</td>
<td>14.3%</td>
<td>73.7%</td>
<td>8.2%</td>
<td>6.4%</td>
<td>22.98%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>MSP/HAMAS (Nahnah)</strong></td>
<td>25.7%</td>
<td>14.8%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>9.64%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ennahda/Islah (Djaballah)</strong></td>
<td>8.7%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>9.5%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>FIS</strong></td>
<td>47.3%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
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**Total Islamist vote**  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>47.3%</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>23.5%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>17.6%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Election turnout**  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>59%</td>
<td>75.7%</td>
<td>65.6%</td>
<td>60.9%</td>
<td>46.17%</td>
<td>58.1%</td>
<td>35.7%</td>
<td>74.6%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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174 In 1999 Bouteflika ran as an independent candidate but was still symbolically close to the FLN and had the support of the MSP coalition. In 2004, he also ran as an independent but with the support of the MSP and RND, while Benflis ran as the FLN candidate. In 2009 Bouteflika had the support of the FLN, RND and the MSP.

175 In the previous year’s municipal elections, the first real multiparty elections in Algeria, the FIS did even better, winning 57.4% of the vote on a turnout of 65%; the FLN polled only 28.13%.

176 I have included the percentage of votes in this count that went to Tayeb Ibrahimi (12.54%); The total Islamist votes in these presidential elections are underreported because the MSP votes were presumably folded into those of Bouteflika.

177 This includes the 1% of votes which went to candidates from Ennahda (as opposed to Islah) who had broken from Djaballah’s leadership.
In the next chapter we will look more closely at the nature of the governmental favoritism of religion promoted by Bouteflika, which included various measures intended to bolster symbolically the Islamic identity of the Algerian Republic. With regards to political reconciliation, while Bouteflika notably did not allow the FIS to run for elections again, he did quickly pass a *Law of Civil Concord* after the 1999 elections, which he then intensified through the *Draft Charter for Peace and National Reconciliation Calling for a Strengthening of National Cohesion in Algeria*. The charter offered armed Islamists the chance to reintegrate into civilian life without any further legal prosecution if they turned in their arms. It was ratified through a popular referendum which gained a 97.36% approval vote and appeared to be genuinely popular (Mezoui 2003).

It is a difficult, maddening task to try to interpret the full “democratic” legitimacy of the electoral results from this period (Table 5.1). Scholars of Algeria differ in their assessments about which of these elections were most free and fair and what sort of political meaning should be attached to any election (see discussions in Roberts 1998, Burgat and Dowell 1997, Tlemcani 2003, Mundy 2009). Although some suspicion of vote-rigging hangs over each of these results, what vote rigging does go on does not necessarily invalidate the results. Most scholars agree, for example, that these elections do appear to register a genuine changing, dynamic expression of the popularity of Algeria’s political parties and especially of its opposition parties (Roberts 1998, 2002). Comparing what few political polling and surveys are available in Table 5.2, we can see that whereas the the winning presidential candidate’s numbers look inflated, the polled
support for the opposition parties does not appear to be wildly off from the actually recorded results.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Zeroual/Bouteflika</th>
<th>Nahnah/MSP</th>
<th>Djaballa/Islah/Ennahda</th>
<th>Ibrahimi</th>
<th>FLN</th>
<th>RND</th>
<th>Unreport/Undecided</th>
<th>total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>1995</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Poll)</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>51%</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Results)</td>
<td>61%</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>1999</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Poll)</td>
<td>33.8%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>46.2%</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Results)</td>
<td>74%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2001</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Poll)</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>58%</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2002</strong></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(WVS)</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>8.5%</td>
<td></td>
<td>49%</td>
<td>8.8%</td>
<td>18.7%</td>
<td></td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Results)</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>9.5%</td>
<td></td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>8.2%</td>
<td>40.3%</td>
<td></td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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178 Both the 1995 and 1999 polls were conducted by *El Watan*, as reported in Mohamed Réda Mezoui, “Esquisse d’une Reflexion sur Le Sondage Politique,” Revue IDARA n. 24 (2003). In the 1999 poll, 26.4% of the population were reported to be “undecided,” explaining, perhaps, the underestimation of Bouteflika’s final electoral support. The 1995 poll does not report the percentage of undecided voters.
Moreover, some elections have been freer and fairer than others. Most scholars seem to agree that 1995\textsuperscript{179} was a “real” election and that 2004 came close, despite the large margin of victory for Bouteflika. The results of the 2002 elections also appears to mirror surveys conducted by the World Values Survey near the time of the elections as well as the Algerian newspaper *el Watan*, and would seem to indicate little evidence of doctoring. Both the turnout rate and results for these elections are probably much more credible than those of 2007 and 2009. The abstention rates and the frequent decision of serious candidates to boycott elections\textsuperscript{180} complicate these evaluations and probably exaggerate Zeroual and Bouteflika’s margins of victory at the expense of under-reporting the opposition’s numbers.

Although Bouteflika never consolidated the democratic gains he introduced, we could generally characterize this period between 1995 and 2006 as one of relative political liberalization in Algeria following a three-year period of closure. Although clientelism continued to damage Algerian political life and the concentration of power in the executive threatened the independence and political power of the parliament, the courts and the opposition,\textsuperscript{181} political parties of all stripes were able to compete for and win power; a fast-growing and critical press was left relatively free to skewer its politicians, including the president; and associations and unions were also allowed to

\textsuperscript{179} Burgat (1997) dissents, here, but see Mundy (2009), Roberts (1998), Tlemcani (2003).

\textsuperscript{180} As all of the presidential candidates did in 1999, pulling out of the race in the last week, a move repeated by several other contenders in 2004 and 2009.

\textsuperscript{181} Thanks, especially, to an official state of emergency which has not been dismissed since 1995, granting the state wider power of authority than it would have normally, and to legislative rules which allow the executive to appoint a one third of the Senate, giving the executive increased veto power over the success of proposed laws (Hachemaoui 2003).
grow and challenge policies. Political liberalization led several scholars of Algeria to talk about the return of democracy (Quandt 1998) and earned Algeria some of the highest “democratic” marks in the Arab world on several rankings of democratic indicators (especially on Polity’s 2000-2004 and Vanhanen’s 2000 rankings).

In his second presidential mandate, however, stronger accusations surfaced that Bouteflika’s regime manipulated electoral results and used repressive tactics against opposition political parties and the national press. Indeed, Bouteflika’s Minister of Interior hassled Djaballah and others during the 2007 parliamentary elections, and even more brazenly in the 2009 presidential elections. In order to make himself eligible to run for a third term, Bouteflika bribed the parliament to pass a constitutional change on presidential term limits, and he then proceeded to crush what few opponents decided to contest him by using every institutional ploy to his advantage, including the state-run media and religious institutions. The level of voter participation reported in 2009, higher than any political campaign since 1995, was certainly doctored and officially hid what appeared to be very high levels of voter apathy. Not only is the post-2006 period less politically open, but it has also witnessed increasing levels of government regulation of the religious market which the next chapter will examine more closely. In order to evaluate our expectation that religiously friendly democratization would help generate more democratic support on the part of a democratically hostile religious political

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182 The government raised the already exorbitant annual salary of Algerian parliamentarians the day before they voted unanimously for the constitutional change, with only Djaballah’s parliamentary block abstaining, see “Salaire du Député, Loi de Finances et la Révision de la Constitution,” November 9th, 2008, El Watan

183 Even though he searched in vain to have more serious candidates enter the electoral ring.

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movement in Algeria, this section focuses on the evolution of Islamist parties and the Algerian electorate throughout the period between 1995 and 2006. For reference, table 5.3 charts the major changes in the direction of contemporary Algerian governmental policies with respect to 1) political liberalization/democratization; 2) governmental favoritism of religion; and 3) governmental regulation of religion.

TABLE 5-4

DEMOCRATIZATION, GFI AND GRI IN ALGERIA

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Liberalization/democratization</th>
<th>GFI</th>
<th>GRI</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1995-2006 P.s Zeroual and Bouteflika</td>
<td>Med-hi</td>
<td>Hi</td>
<td>Med</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006-present P. Bouteflika</td>
<td>Med-low</td>
<td>Hi</td>
<td>Med-Hi</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5.2.3 Political Evolution of Nahnah and MSP-HAMAS

In the Presidential campaign of 1995 Nahnah was able to capitalize on the re-opening of the political space in Algeria, the continued ban on FIS politics, and his own stature as one of the Founding Fathers of Islamism in Algeria. Out of four presidential candidates, Nahnah came in second behind Zeroual with 25% of the popular vote. Although Nahnah captured a much smaller share of the vote than the FIS had in 1991, he
garnered nearly as many nominal votes. Adding Djaballah’s share of aggregate votes to Nahnah’s, the two Islamists recuperated more than three-fourths of the aggregate Islamist votes that had presumably gone to the FIS in the elections of 1991 (Hachemaoui 2003).

Nahnah’s decision to support the Algerian regime during its period of closure (1992-95);\(^\text{184}\) his decision to participate in the 1995 elections; and his strong showing in those elections were rewarded with several middling ministerial portfolios, two for the period 1996-97, and seven in 1997-99 (Larierge 2007). Then, in 1999, after being ruled ineligible to run as a presidential candidate,\(^\text{185}\) Nahnah accepted an invitation to ally with the new presidential candidate, Abdelaziz Bouteflika. By contributing to the success of Bouteflika’s election, Nahnah’s party was rewarded with more important ministries (albeit lesser in number by two), such as “Industry and Redevelopment” and “Labor and Social Protection.” These cabinet ministries were also, arguably, some of Algeria’s most politically trying and technically difficult (Lariege 2007). They forced the MSP to try to prove to the Algerian electorate that they were politically competent on non-religious issues which affected the Algerian common good, or risk losing political credibility.

By joining the presidential coalition and incorporating itself into the Algerian political apparatus, Nahnah signaled that the MSP’s first goal was to stay in political power and that that goal took precedence over the ideological purity projected at the party’s founding. In order to stay in power the party played by the rules of the game and

\[^\text{184}\] Nahnah’s support for the government, antagonism with the FIS and accusations of “treason” in the Bouyali case cost his party dearly during these years of terrorism, and the walls of the MSP headquarters today are lined with the portraits of party members and Imans close to the party who were killed by radical Islamists throughout the 1990s, including Nahnah’s mentor, Mohamed Bousilmani.

\[^\text{185}\] He was officially rejected because he had not participated in the Algerian war of independence against the French, a requirement of all presidential candidates.
sought to win influence through its alliances with the presidential coalition and by keeping itself popular with the Algerian public. The MSP-HAMAS, thus, attempted to adapt their appeals to the electorate and the political goals promoted by the presidential alliance. This adaptation led to a noticeable shift in the pattern of MSP action and discourse in which, as we will see: 1) candidates remain ready to mobilize on Islamic issues, but not to advance a larger project envisioning the creation of a wholly Islamic state governed by the laws of Shari’a; 2) MSP politicians are increasingly open to forego programmatic goals for political gains; and 3) candidates more clearly and credibly articulate that their first loyalty is to the ideal of an Algerian republic that is informed by its Islamic history, rather than an Islamic state which is informed by its Algerian history.

In a sign of their growing willingness to work across religious-secular lines for political goals, beginning in the second half of the 1990s, Nahnah and other MSP politicians stopped referring to the desire to create an Algerian “shuracracy,” which had still been present in their discourse as late as 1994, and adopted, instead, the language of democratic political development. In all of my interviews, MSP-HAMAS politicians emphasized this change as one of political evolution in which an ideological-religious movement was transformed into a political party whose aim was to win votes and govern in a democratic arena. Echoing what many other Islamist politicians said in interviews, the chair of the MSP party bureau in Oran explained to me that,

Islam is something very good and it is civilizing, but we are not a religious party. Our religious side is simply our history and our reference.

\(^{186}\) Participating, among other things, in seminars run by the *National Democratic Institute* of Washington, DC.

\(^{187}\) Interview with author, February 26\(^{th}\), 2009, Oran, Algeria.
In order to forge itself into a party with sustained national clout, MSP-HAMAS sought to prove that their political platform was an inclusive one which could be made acceptable to the majority of Algerians. In an interview, the spokesman for MSP-HAMAS in Algiers emphasized to me just how much the party had attempted to adapt the religious aspect of the party for the Algerian public, describing the change in this way,

Many [Algerians] were afraid of an Islamic party and so our first gain as a party was to make an Islamic movement acceptable ... The MSP is a party in evolution. We are not a religious party, not even in our way of “Islamic” thinking – we are a civic party and do not try to make religion a totalizing aspect of our politics like the FIS did.\(^\text{188}\)

This evolution also reflects the changed politico-religious landscape of Algeria in a politically liberalized, religiously friendly regime. As we will see in more detail below, due to Zeroual and Bouteflika’s favorable policies towards Islam, and Algerians reception of those policies, it has become more difficult for the MSP-HAMAS to justify any push for more religious political goals. Thus, as an MSP deputy in Bejaia notes,

It is therefore no longer necessary to Islamize the state and society. Algeria is a Muslim country. Algerians are Muslims. In this country there is the call to prayer. The mosques are full. What would it serve to Islamize a society where Islam is the religion of state? (As cited in Amghar and Boubekeur 2007: 11).

This drive to make their religious identity acceptable for the Algerian political arena has led the MSP-Hamas to make important political compromises which indicate that their change in discourse also reflects a real change in political goals. Thus, in the early 2000s, the MSP continued to declare itself in favor of Bouteflika’s program of

\(^{188}\) Interview with author, Mouradia, Algiers, March 15\(^\text{th}\), 2009.
reconciliation with armed Islamists and increased Arabic education, but against any changes to the pro-Shari’a family code. It was also quick to capitalize on symbolic religious issues.\textsuperscript{189} Yet, even in the most heated, recent religious-cultural battles in Algeria, the MSP continued to show it was ready to put aside its Islamic ideology for political gains. In 2004, for example, the MSP voiced opposition to the government’s proposed education reform that would suppress the offer of a degree in Islamic sciences in high schools, but backtracked once it became clear that the President was not going to budge on this issue. Instead, the MSP reframed its opposition to the proposal by noting other advances in the promotion of Islamic identity and deciding that, after all, the intent behind some school reform was going in the right direction.\textsuperscript{190}

Similarly, together with Djaballah, the MSP originally rejected any revision to the family code proposed by the government, whom it accused of forcing through laws that would encourage the secularization of society. Although the MSP-HAMAS and Islah-MRN have split in their political strategies, the MSP-HAMAS throwing its lot with the government and Islah with the opposition, the combined pressure that both parties, together, have put on Bouteflika for this and other symbolically “Islamic” issues are representative of the limits to which Bouteflika has been able to use the split in Islamist votes to his advantage.

Even though both parties had openly declared that there was no room for compromise on the family code, the MSP then publically stated it was ready to accept the

\textsuperscript{189} Pressuring the government-run TV to drop a “profane,” Arabic version of \textit{Star Academy} and protesting Algeria’s relations with Israel and Denmark.

\textsuperscript{190} “Le MSP fait marche arriere [MSP Takes a Step Backwards],” \textit{El Watan}, June 28\textsuperscript{th}, 2005.
full reform of the code if Bouteflika would only lift the state of emergency which the regime had left in place in 1995 to combat terrorism. In doing so, the MSP showed it was willing to put aside its ideology in order to win more political freedom for itself and the whole of the Algerian system by working to put an end to the state of emergency. When Bouteflika denied such a deal, the MSP again proved willing to compromise on its religious goals. After continuing to press against alterations to the family code, the MSP was able to block the proposed removal from the code of the legal requirement for women to present their male “tutor” in order to sign a marriage contract. While other revisions were pushed through over their objections, the MSP was quite enthusiastic about the results and remained generally happy with the compromise and generally optimistic about the government’s friendliness to Islamist goals.

Although the ability to compromise is not the only democratic value that matters, it is essential to our distinction between “radical” and “moderate,” which are defined in terms of the exclusivity of the party’s religious platform and behavior. The MSP’s actions show a growing attachment towards accepting policies and proposals that do not match the original formulation of their Islamic goals in order to keep playing the electoral game. Compromises on education and the family code are especially indicative of the extent to which an exclusive Islamic identity has ceased to be the driving force animating the MSP-HAMAS. The party, instead, has reduced the role that Islamic identity plays in the party’s policy-making and presentation of itself and it is now simply one part of a larger strategy of trying to win and stay in power within the electoral arena.

This fundamentally political desire of the MSP-HAMAS to make the Islamist side of its platform “acceptable” to a larger electorate that does not necessarily, or no longer, share its animating religious political goals has been determinative in allowing the MSP to change over time to accept and promote the political institutions within which it operates. Rather than allowing the exclusively religious ideals that inspired the party’s formation to dictate the party’s politics and goals, party leaders have adapted the spirit or ethics of those ideals to a new, partially democratic environment. By systematically compromising, the MSP-HAMAS have made their claims to accepting pluralism and legitimate, non-religious opposition much more credible.

Thus, there is little evidence today that the MSP harbors hidden plans to do away with the institutions of electoral democracy or contest the legitimacy of democracy in order to achieve an Islamic state. Rather, there is ample evidence to suggest that the MSP has accepted the political legitimacy and authority of Algeria’s semi-democratic institutions to mediate, in the terms of Sanson, whatever Islamic goals they do seek and to accept, as well, the legitimacy of other parties to contest those goals. In such a way, Nahnah and the MSP have moved from an exclusively religious agenda whose openness to democracy was in doubt (from 1989 to 1994), to a nominal embrace of the democratic rules of the game (1995-1999) to an increasingly full acceptance of them (1999 to present). We could say, in very broad strokes, that Nahnah travelled a path from theocracy to shuracracy to democracy. His party’s policy goals still remain informed by a nationalist Islamist identity but over time Nahnah became more of what some have termed a “Muslim (as opposed to Christian) Democrat” than an “Islamist” (Nasr 2005), a parallel which some within the MSP now explicitly seem to acknowledge (Boubekeur
An Islamic inspiration remains, but the practical institution of an Islamic state is no longer an immediate political quest.

5.2.4 Political Evolution of Djaballah and Islah/Ennahda

Perhaps even more clearly indicative of political moderation and the generation of democratic support as the result of participation in religiously friendly institutions is the evolution of Abdallah Djaballah as a political figure. Djaballah spent much of the 1990s defending his political program in purely religious terms and rejecting attempts to fold his party into the presidential alliance or in any political alliance for that matter. In doing so, he dodged a fully democratic discourse. Yet, by the year 2000, his tune had begun to change. In 1998 Djaballah’s party, then officially Ennahda, suffered the first of a series of crises, with leading members publically criticizing his overly-emphasized religious discourse and his reluctance to speak about Algerian democracy or even an Algerian Republic as the reason behind their weak electoral results, especially given the relatively strong results garnered by MSP-HAMAS.\textsuperscript{192} Djaballah rejected what he perceived to be a coup d’état from within and left the party to form a new, independent political party, \textit{el Islah} or the MRN, with his leading supporters. A few members tayed behind in Ennahda and have continued to contest elections until the present, but, without Djaballah, the party has only been able to muster meager results totaling less than 1% of the national vote on average.

While rhetorically keeping up his “\textit{pur et dur}” version of Islamism and defending the FIS, Djaballah began to significantly alter the course and strategy of Islah-MRN

\textsuperscript{192} See, for example, coverage from \textit{El Watan}, August 30, 1998.
following this crisis. In 2000, he went on record for the first time conditionally supporting the national promotion of Tamazight (the language of Algeria’s Muslim, but not ethnically Arabic, Berber minority), a shift from a full and exclusive defense of Arabic as a national language, with its accompanying connotations of Islamic authenticity and heritage. Then, in the 2002 parliamentary election campaign, Djaballah significantly widened the platform of his party to appeal to a larger, less-religious audience. Symbolically, he stopped wearing the conservative Islamic long dress, or qamis, in public, donning a Western suit and tie instead; he put women at the head of his party lists in the Kabyle regions (simultaneously dropping ex-FIS members from the lists); and devoted a good portion of his political platform to the cause of youth recreation and sports, including proposals for the creation of a Youth Cabinet Ministry and the activation of specialized athletic courses and activities in schools and Universities (Islah Promotional Brochure 2004).

Djaballah’s strategy of remaining independent, and Islamist, but more open, reaped some results, and the Islah-MRN became the largest opposition force in parliament in 2002. Following the elections, Djaballah and his deputies pressed for a wide range of economic, wage and electoral reforms. In a rare example of a successful and opposition-led piece of legislation for the Algerian parliament, MRN deputies proposed and then mobilized a majority parliamentary vote to pass a reform of the electoral law. Islah-MRN deputies had designed the law to give individuals more rights of information regarding candidates and party lists and, in general, to increase the transparency of the electoral process. Islah won over the support of secular political parties for the law by pitching it as a measure that would grant both Islamists and secular
opposition forces more institutional protection from electoral fraud by making it more
difficult for the government to manipulate elections.\(^{193}\)

With his eyes on the 2004 presidential elections, Djaballah declared that the MRN represented above all [including religion] the “Algerian nation”\(^{194}\) and that,
diversity is positive and perfectly sanctioned by God and it is only the misunderstanding of Islam which leads people to say that all must be of the same political color.\(^{195}\)

To contest President Bouteflika’s re-election campaign, Djaballah entered into an electoral alliance with the only Algerian political party to continue to militate openly for a fully secular democracy, namely, Said Saadi’s Rassemblement pour la Culture et la Democratie (RCD). As we noted in the earlier part of this chapter, Djaballah had challenged the legitimacy of the RCD to exist as an Algerian political party in the early 1990s on account of the RCD’s secular political platform. The symbolic resonance of this temporary alliance reflected the political transformation of Djaballah and his political party from a party in 1991 which emphasized religious ideology over democratic commitment, to one in 2004 which sought to establish, above all, a democratic alternation of power. As with the electoral law, Djaballah and his party understood that such an alternation represented a desirable check on the limits of government power, even if it equally strengthened the possibility for all opposition parties to assume power. As a former Islah MP in Algiers explained to me, in this context,

\(^{193}\) For example, abolishing the practice allowing soldiers to vote in their military barracks, under the exclusive “monitoring” of their military superiors. See the Loi organique relatives aux elections n. 04-01, passed in February of 2004 and available at www.joradp.dz/TRV/Elect.pdf

\(^{194}\) Saying in an interview, “It is true that the MRN represents the Islamic current, but it is also true that it represents, above all, the Algerian nation.” El Watan, June 23\(^{rd}\), 2002.

\(^{195}\) Quotidien d’Oran, interview, January 31\(^{st}\), 2004.
The essential goal is to continue to work, again and again, within the legal framework, within the legislature, through peaceful change and even through alliances … to create a change in this current political power.\textsuperscript{196}

Although the Islah members I interviewed were more reluctant to acknowledge how much the party had changed since Djaballah first formed Ennahda, their commitment to winning votes in order to contest power and their commitment to strengthening democratic intimations in order to keep the Algerian regime in check showed just how far the party had travelled from their original, hesitant, equivocating stance towards democracy.

5.2.5 Electoral Shifts and Logics of Support

The evolution of Islah’s goals and discourse parallels that of the MSP and represents a shift of the locus of the parties’ activities and energies. Rather than being consumed with the political promotion of Islam, both parties have turned more of their attention to addressing other mundane,\textsuperscript{197} non-religious issues in order to remain politically relevant and sell their message to voters whose desires for religious politics is not their first political priority. As a result, over the last five years, the MSP-HAMAS and Islah have said more about strikes, teacher’s wages, electoral laws, the new five-year budget and the Algerian housing crisis than they have on the Islamic nature of the Algerian constitution. On all of these issues, both parties have found themselves bargaining and agreeing with other, more secular parties (and each other), forming alliances and strengthening plural party politics as a result.

\textsuperscript{196} Interview with author, March 8th, 2009, Algiers, Algeria.

\textsuperscript{197} Here in the truly Latin sense of the word, as being “of this world” as opposed to the divine one.
As Islah’s current party spokesman explains, while on questions of identity, the party chooses to remain in opposition to secular parties and try to militate for a more “Islamic” character, they,

cooperate with any political party whatsoever on those issues which concern the general interest [italics by author] of the country, even if those parties are very different [from ourselves] … for the issues of general interest for the country, for democracy, for the Algerian citizen.\textsuperscript{198}

While Islamism as a mobilizing identity has continued to help both parties remain politically significant over the last fifteen years, the dynamics of party politics and the need to win elections have relegated these identity issues to the margins of both parties. The success of Bouteflika’s politics and electoral campaigns has also helped to reinforce this shift. While it is difficult to evaluate how many former Islamist votes Bouteflika successfully courted (Hamadouche and Zoubir 2007), Bouteflika masterfully established a wide, grassroots voter base by creating support committee cells everywhere in Algeria and reaching out to every sector of society, including especially, youth and religious individuals (Gera 2007). By pursuing an historic compromise with Islamism, Bouteflika seriously weakened the Islamist claim to a vote for Islamic parties on the basis of their identity alone: “What would it serve to Islamize a society where Islam is the religion of state?” While recent electoral results prove that Islamism remained a mobilizing force in Algerian politics, Bouteflika’s success also appears to have stimulated a recalibration of voter’s expectations of their politics and what they perceive to be Algeria’s most pressing goals. The simple merit of their Islamic identity alone has not helped the combination of either party to win more than a quarter of the popular vote since 1995, forcing both

\textsuperscript{198} Interview with author, Bir Mourad Rais, Algiers, June 2\textsuperscript{nd}, 2010.
parties, despite exceptionally high rates of national religiosity, to campaign on the merit of their political competence and wider, non-religious political ideas.

To that end, they have not been very successful. Despite slogging through what some observers deemed the most competitive and contested elections in contemporary Algerian history, Bouteflika’s 2004 reelection campaign was greatly successful.

Djaballah was not able to capitalize on his party’s 2002 results and fared poorly in the general elections. Likewise, as table 5.1 illustrated, MSP’s electoral results in 2002 and 2007 seemed to indicate a similar weakening of public support for the party. This relative decline of Algerian Islamist parties since 2002-2004 can in part be attributed to their failure (as of yet) to mobilize voters around strategies to confront those more pressing political goals which Bouteflika has addressed, including the housing crunch, domestic terrorism, and Algeria’s international standing. In 2004, Bouteflika was able to credibly convince a majority of voters of his policies for responding to all of these issues and at the same time effectively appeal to voters’ Islamic sensibilities.

The World Values Survey’s 2002 snapshot of Algerian political values provides some evidence of these electoral sentiments among Algerian voters. On the one hand, the surveys indicate that while Islamist voters widely support some religious influence on their politics, they simultaneously wish for those politics to be competent and democratic. What the World Values Surveys also indicate, however, is that these dual desires are

199 Although weakened, both parties remain relevant. In a 2009 online poll conducted by the popular Arabic daily, Echorouk, asking who would be your ideal president, Djaballah came out in first place in head of Bouteflika and 10 other options, with 250,000 online clicks. In a recent 10,000 man showing of force for the 5th year anniversary of Nahnah’s death and, then, by placing his party at the center of Algerian outrage against Israel’s blockade of Gaza, the current head of MSP, Bougherra Soltani has recently shown that his party has survived corruption scandals and internal crises and remains a political force.
political sentiments that are widely held by the general population. The surveys report, for example, that 84% of Algerians think that democracy is the best form of government despite its problems. Yet, at the same time, 75% of Algerians would also like to see the government implement “laws of the Shari’a,” even as 91% of the same population think that those same laws need to respect the people’s wishes. Supporters of Ennahda are particularly illustrative of this double wish: they are the most likely of party faithful to list “more say for people in government” as their top national concern; one of the most likely to support “Western” democracy; one of the least likely to think religious leaders should influence government; and yet, simultaneously, one of the most likely to wish to see laws conforming to the Shari’a. While it is important to remember that this survey gives us only a snapshot of Algerian citizen’s political values, given Djaballah’s statements from the early 1990s concerning secularization, the West, laico-communists and atheists, it is striking to see the relatively high support among his followers in 2002 for “Western” democracy as a legitimate form of government. Like the population as a whole, Islamist party supporters seemed to have internalized the political need for democratic institutions and the “will of the people” to mediate and limit the authority granted to religious authorities, even in an idealized Islamic state. This support, in turn, has also constrained Algerian Islamist parties from proposing a more radical religious vision for an Islamic state.

One way of interpreting these survey results, in line with our story above, is that while the political project of a religiously friendly government is one that resonates with
a majority of Algerian citizens, the powerful desire for a religiously friendly
government that is democratic, one that respects the wishes of the people, protects their
rights and liberties of expression and is economically competent, has pushed Algerian
voters towards supporting Bouteflika and the nationalist parties of the FLN and RND.
Although the Islamist parties have become, perhaps, the most articulate about their dual
religious and democratic values, the nationalist parties in the governing coalition have
been able to make the most convincing case that they are able to get the job done.

200 Who, as we shall see in more depth below, are truly predominantly Muslim.
### TABLE 5-5

**ALGERIAN ATTITUDES TOWARDS RELIGION AND DEMOCRACY, 2002**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total support</th>
<th>FLN</th>
<th>Nahnah/ MSP</th>
<th>Djaballah/Islah/ Ennahda</th>
<th>RND</th>
<th>FFS</th>
<th>Country Average</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Democracy Support</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>201</td>
<td>84.4%</td>
<td>91.2%</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>88.9%</td>
<td>96.4%</td>
<td>92.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>“Western” Democracy Support</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>44.9%</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>52%</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>64.1%</td>
<td>47.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>People Should Have More Say in Government</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>12.4%</td>
<td>12.7%</td>
<td>22.8%</td>
<td>6.8%</td>
<td>21.1%</td>
<td>14.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Laws must respect people’s wishes</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>91.4%</td>
<td>94.9%</td>
<td>79.3%</td>
<td>85%</td>
<td>90.1%</td>
<td>90.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Religious leaders should not influence Govt (disagree)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>35.6%</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>27.7%</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>23.5%</td>
<td>32.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Support for Shari’a law</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>75.5%</td>
<td>86.7%</td>
<td>84.2%</td>
<td>66.7%</td>
<td>52.9%</td>
<td>71.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Democracy is a Western form of Government incompatible with Islam? (disagree)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>50.2%</td>
<td>44.1%</td>
<td>57.1%</td>
<td>45.9%</td>
<td>59.6%</td>
<td>50.9%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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All results sum the answers for each question to “strongly agree” and “agree.” The fourth question listed here asked respondents to list the most pressing national aim of the country. Other than increasing the say of people in government, other options included 1) Improving the Economy (of which 67% of the population listed as the country’s first aim) 2) A Strong Defence and 3) Beautification of the city and countryside. The full wording of the seventh question was, “Democracy is a Western Form of Government Incompatible with Islam? Agree or Disagree.”
Although, unfortunately, they did not ask respondents to self-identify their preferred party choice, the following data (see table 5.6) comparing the 2002 World Values Survey data to the 2006 Arab Barometer survey conducted in Algeria, allow us to explore how average national political attitudes have evolved since 2002 a little further. The 2006 surveys were conducted by the same team of scholars at the University of Algiers who had conducted the 2002 World Values Survey and despite some modifications, many of the same items concerning Algerian political attitudes were included in both surveys.
### Table 5-6

**Algerian Attitudes Towards Democracy (National Percentages)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2002 (World Values Survey)</th>
<th>2006 (Arabbarometer)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Democracy has problems but is better than any other form of Government (agree)</td>
<td>88.4%</td>
<td>95.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy is good (agree)</td>
<td>92.7%</td>
<td>69.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combined democracy support</td>
<td>86.1%</td>
<td>77.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy is a Western form of government incompatible with Islam (disagree)</td>
<td>50.9%</td>
<td>54.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious leaders should not influence how people vote (disagree)</td>
<td>36.8%</td>
<td>26%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious leaders should not influence government (disagree)</td>
<td>32.4%</td>
<td>30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laws must respect people’s wishes (agree)</td>
<td>90.4%</td>
<td>58.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support for Shar‘ia law (agree)</td>
<td>71.6%</td>
<td>79.7%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The data offers some support for our theoretical expectations, but also introduces an apparently puzzling result which we will interpret below. On the one hand, overall support for democracy remained high throughout this four year period. The reported support for democracy, however, either grew or declined depending on what question was posed in the survey to the respondent. When asked if democracy represented a better form of government than any other, “despite its problems,” more Algerians responded in the positive to the question in 2006 than in 2002. However, when asked if having a democracy system was “good,” less respondents answered the question in the positive in 2006 than in 2002. Following Tessler and Robbins (2007), we can reduce some of this inconsistency in the varied responses by combining answers from these two questions and counting only those respondents who answered both questions in the affirmative. Doing so reveals a modest decline in the overall support for democracy in Algeria between 2002 and 2006. Despite this decline, however, the vast majority of Algerians throughout the period, over 75%, continued to report a high level of support for democracy, as expected by our theory. In addition, and also expected by our theory, more Algerians reported that they did not think it was appropriate for religious leaders to influence politics in 2006 than in 2002. This is especially evident in the decline of Algerian individuals who thought religious leaders should influence how people vote (down from 37% in 2002 to 26% in 2006) but also in the decline of Algerians who though religious leaders should influence governmental decisions (slightly down from 32% in 2002 to 30% in 2006). Also in keeping with our theoretical story, in 2006 more Algerians reported that they thought democracy was a Western form of government which was compatible with Islam than they did in 2002.
On the other hand, and more troubling given our theoretical expectations, the data gives evidence of a drastic decline in the numbers of Algerians who thought that legislative laws must respect people’s wishes (down from 90% in 2002 to 58% in 2006) and a growth in the numbers of Algerians who expressed their support for Shari’a law. While the decline, especially, in the numbers of Algerians who reported that they thought the law must respect people’s wishes is worrying, neither this decline nor the increase in support for Shari’a law are necessarily inconsistent with our theoretical expectations. As we argued above, support for Shari’a law does not automatically preclude support for democracy: even as they express strong support for Shari’a law, Islamist party constituents are not necessarily less likely to value the need for their government to take account of its citizen’s wishes. In table 5.4, we saw that more MSP constituents than FLN, RND or FFS constituents in 2002 thought the law “must respect the people’s wishes” and Islah supporters were more likely than FLN, RND and FFS supporters to think that instituting more say for the people in government was a “pressing national concern.” We also noted that while MSP and Islah supporters were more likely than other party constituents to express support for Shari’a law, the majority of individuals from all of Algeria’s major parties also expressed the same support. In terms of aggregate numbers, in fact, given the high level of support of Algerian individuals for the FLN in 2002, there were more Algerian individuals in the FLN who supported Shari’a law (37% of the total Algerian population) than those who supported Shari’a law among the combined supporters of MSP and Islah (20% of the total Algerian population).

Furthermore, without the data on individual party identifications in 2006, it is difficult to conclude which individuals became less likely to think laws must respect
people’s wishes or more likely to support Shari’a law between 2002 and 2006, and why they did so. In this respect, it is interesting to note that there is good reason to believe that the numbers of Algerians who did not express support for democracy in 2006 were FLN constituents who were upset with the results and quality of the 2004 elections. In their analysis of the Arab Barometer data Tessler and Robbins (2007) found that there was a strong, positive association between the numbers of individuals who perceived the 2004 presidential elections to be neither free nor fair, and the numbers of individuals who did not support democracy in 2006. Extrapolating from their analysis and the results of the 2004 presidential campaign, the authors suggest that many of those who expressed their dissatisfaction with democracy in the 2006 survey were likely to have been supporters of Ahmed Taleb Ibrahimi, a former FLN insider who had been successful in attracting the support of many religious and conservative Algerians. Ibrahimi had performed well in the 1999 presidential elections (garnering 12.5% of the popular vote) but had been barred from contesting the 2004 elections, ostensibly because he had not collected enough signatures to enter the campaign, and he subsequently dropped out of Algerian political

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202 In making this conjecture, Tessler and Robbins (2007) report that when perceptions of the quality of the 2004 elections are not controlled for, there is no significant statistical association between the numbers of Algerian individuals who support the influence of religion on politics and those who support democracy, as was the case in the 2002 data presented above. However in the 2006 data (but not the 2002 data), if perceptions of the quality of democracy are not controlled for, individuals who support the influence of religion in politics were more likely to be dissatisfied with democracy. In other words, many of those individuals who perceived that the 2004 elections were not free and fair were also individuals who supported the influence of religion and politics. Given the ruling against Ibrahimi and the profile of his constituents, it is plausible that this set of individuals, in fact, represents Ibrahimi’s disaffected supporters.

203 Ibrahimi had served as an Education Minister under President Boumedienne and, throughout the 1980s, was President Chalbi’s Minister of Foreign Affairs. His father Bashir Ibrahimi, had been an associate of Ben Badis in the Algerian Association of Ulema. Despite attracting the support of conservative Algerians, Taleb Ibrahimi did not present himself as an Islamist candidate, had imminently democratic credentials and had not said or done anything to imply hostility on his part towards democratic ideals and institutions (see, for example, Karim Idrissi’s interview with Ibrahimi in *Le Matin*, April 22nd, 2002).
life following the ruling. In light of this interpretation, therefore, it would not be correct to conclude that Islamist constituents had hardened in their views towards democracy in Algeria. Given the high national level of support for democracy maintained throughout this period in Algeria, in fact, it is likely that most MSP and Islah supporters continued to express high levels of support for democracy.

These results from the 2006 Arab Barometer survey nevertheless add a note of caution to our conclusions regarding how the shifts in the Algerian Islamic political movement described above have helped the success of democracy in Algeria. On the one hand, we can affirm Isabelle Werenfels’ (2007) observation that the Islamist parties’ growing pragmatism, what we have described here as animating the growth in their support for democracy, has not been enough to make democracy work in Algeria. Likewise, neither has the overwhelming support for democracy on the part of Algerian individuals been able to insure that a full democratic regime has been or will be consolidated in Algeria. What is more, Algeria’s robust support for democracy is not without limits and is linked to Algerians’ perceptions of the quality of their electoral process. Unfortunately, as we will examine in more depth below, the quality of the elections in Algeria worsened between 2007 and 2009, disaffecting even more Algerian individuals from the voting process as the record lows of electoral participation in the 2007 and, most likely, 2009 elections (see table 5.2) attest to.

That said, however, within the limited space of a semi-democratic electoral regime, we can conclude that Islamist political parties who once espoused an exclusive religious ideology have exercised power in more democratic ways, growing in their recognition of the legitimacy of non-religious political parties and generally promoting
the political rights of non-religious individuals. The electoral results and survey data presented here indicate that, in general, Algerian individuals support this evolution and vote for parties who they perceive to be politically competent as well as religiously astute. The participation of Islamists in Algerian politics has certainly helped shift Algeria’s political and social landscape in a more religious direction, which the next section analyzes, and this has consequences for future democratic life which should not be discounted. Yet, it is becoming more difficult to argue that Algeria’s Islamists would not subject themselves to the same constraints of governing within a more fully democratic regime in order to compete with other political forces and win over votes from a national electorate which does not perceive religious goals to be their most important political concern. The presence of Islamist parties in a multi-party political regime cannot be said to have harmed Algeria’s democratic life, therefore, and the worst characteristics of authoritarianism in Algeria have been sustained and steered by the executive and national political parties, not the Islamists or their constituents. As Guillard (1995) had once hoped with respect to the FIS, there is good reason to believe that the MSP and Islah have been able to help channel a popular religious-political feeling in Algeria towards a democratic project, sustaining the potential future of democracy in Algeria in ways which President Bouteflika has recently shown signs of squandering.
5.3 Democratization and Religion: Religious Growth and Change?

Islam?!? Of course. We are all Muslims. I’m a Muslim. We don’t vote. We don’t know anything about politics. We’ve seen everything. That means that we have known poverty. Ten years of shit. With Islamists and all that. America is good. Algeria is the best. There’s nothing here. No future. But I’ll never leave.

_University Student, Algiers, smoking pot in a backalley staircase._

Like Togliatti and other secular Italian politicians in post-war Italy, part of the goal of President Zeroual and Bouteflika’s strategies of inclusion was to depoliticize and thus weaken the most threatening aspects of Islamism by reaching out to it. While such a strategy of inclusion paid dividends by moderating the stances of Algeria’s Islamist parties toward the democratic regime and the state, the public encouragement of the practice of Islam which went along with that inclusion has also meant that Islamists have gotten what they want: not only the chance to win political power but also a greater role for Islam in the state.

The goal of this section is to trace the impact that such government favoritism shown towards Islam in the context of a more democratic Algeria has had on the intensity and shape of how Islam is lived in Algerian national life today. If our theory from chapter three is correct, we expect to find evidence of 1) religiously-friendly state policies promoting religious regeneration or growth in Algeria, yet, also, 2) democratic norms and institutions shifting religious authority away from traditional Muslim leaders and towards the Muslim faithful.

After considering the relationship between the state and institutional Islam in Algeria and the level of government favoritism of religion towards the Islam of state, this section explores trends in contemporary Algerian religiosity. Unlike in Italy, recent levels of religious participation in Algeria have experienced a period of rapid growth which has
kept national levels of religiosity high. While this growth can be traced to both Algeria’s religiously friendly governmental policies and more global trends in Islamic religiosity, this section focuses on the particular nature such religiosity has taken in Algeria as a result of its religiously friendly democratizing institutions. The Algerian political context has favored the growth of a pluralism of Muslim religious practices and what I will define as the *individualization* of Muslim religious belief within a robustly Islamic national religious identity. The section ends by evaluating recent tensions between the Algerian government and Islamist parties over the management of that religious identity which underscore the fragility of Algeria’s democratic transition even as it confirms the political shift among Algeria’s electorate away from exclusively religious politics.

5.3.1 Mosque and State in Contemporary Algeria

To bring into relief what is new about this institutional relationship between religion and state as promoted by Zeroual and Bouteflika, it is useful to recall what the institutional relationship between religion and state of their predecessors looked like. In the first section of this chapter, we described the religion-state relationship under Boumedienne as a *laïcité* which was simultaneously *authoritarian* and *Islamic*. This religion-state arrangement promoted an Islamic national identity, but the state highly regulated that identity and made sure that Islamic leaders held no authority over the Algerian regime’s fundamental political projects. Under Boumedienne, the Algerian state charged the official institution of Islam in Algeria with providing a religious justification of its political program; rigidly controlled sermons; ordered fatwas to serve the state’s political needs, and punished religious leaders who resisted such state-led politicization
of Islam or who proposed other political positions inspired by Islamic values. This regulation was coercive of religious behavior and discourse (as in Type A GRI which is always harmful for democracy) and strictly politicized (as in the sort of Type B GRI which is also dangerous for democracy). Although President Chadli offered important concessions towards Islamist figures who were angered at the political treatment of Islam, as was the case under Boumedienne, until 1988 it was clear that the secular political party from which both hailed held the monopoly over the official control of Islam in Algeria and preferred that it remain meek in its politics, harmless in its religiosity and strong in its preservation of Algerian culture.

Zeroual and Bouteflika began to change this religion-state relationship in two different ways, which could be described in our theoretical terms as a reduction of government regulation of religion (in both of its senses) and a simultaneous increase of government favoritism of religion. While continuing fiscally to support and manage the institution of Islam in Algeria as the religion of state, a popular and uncontested task, Zeroual and Bouteflika also oversaw the depoliticization of Algeria’s mosques. In the 1996 Constitution political parties were forbidden from claiming to be partisans of Islam, and a change in the penal code of 2001 made it illegal for Imams to allow any political activities to associate themselves with the Mosque. While strengthening the official institution of Islam in Algeria, Zeroual and Bouteflika also strengthened its role as a source of religious authority which was independent of the branches of state government. Even the extent to which the state continued to directly control Islamic religious institutions, by, for example, constructing a more demanding education for Imams and training mosque inspectors, was understood as a move towards depoliticizing Islam and
as a means of preventing a repeat of the difficulties of the 1990s, when radical religious leaders took over mosques and used them as bases of political mobilization and organization. This change from an ideologically driven management of Islam by the government to one which was simply meant to organize it apolitically represents a significant shift and one that was well-received by official Imams and Islamists themselves. Whether they supported the Algerian regime or not, everyone had something to gain from this depoliticalization of Islam: Islamists no longer had to hear official Islam in Algeria sing the praises of socialism and Imams could focus on the religious duties for which they had been trained.

At the same time, the Bouteflika regime increased its government policies of favoritism towards Islam. Apart from allowing religious parties to participate in elections, Bouteflika has required a daily, public call to prayer, initiated government-sponsored international competitions of youth Quranic recitation, and financed the construction of nearly 3,500 Mosques (Amghar and Boubekre 2007). Of important symbolic importance, Bouteflika has undertook a massive state-led project to construct a new Grand Mosque in Algiers, and, along with it, to recreate the institution of an Algerian Grand Mufti. Although Arabizing educational initiatives by Boumedienne and Chadli meant that Algerian public schools already socialized Algerian youth into a national identity full of Islamic referents, this governmental favoritism of the Bouteflika

204 Reported to be the third largest mosque in the world after, respectively, those in Mecca and Medina.

205 Muftis, it should be remembered here, have not been appointed in Algeria since French rule (and the Turks before them). The French had appointed both a Malekite and a Hanafite mufti in Algiers, who was charged with issuing fatwas, a role transferred to the Superior Islamic Council at independence.
government has powerfully activated this national identity by promoting the identification of Islam as Algerian national belief and the everyday practice of that belief.

5.3.2 Religious Growth

Although it is difficult to date the inflection points of religiosity within a nation, especially with so little attitudinal data, studies of the early 2000s indicate that these measures of government friendliness and openness to religion have coincided with a trend towards growth in societal religious practices, especially in the outward wearing of the veil and general mosque attendance. The origins of these trends were already noticed in the early 1990s, when the rise of Islamism and the FIS were associated with the sudden appearance of non-Algerian Muslim fashions among men and women and the growing importance of Algerians congregating at the mosque for Friday prayers. This already represented a significant change in the direction of religiosity in Algeria. From pre-independence times, sociologists had perceived what they described to be a decreasing level of regular national religious practice in Algeria, down to what one French sociologist estimated at less than 1 percent in 1964 (Vallin 1964). Although women had traditionally worn a Maghrebi style veil which changed in form from region to region, it was a clearly diminishing practice and was more and more only kept by a percentage of elderly Algerian women. In the early 1990s, however, that all began to

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207 And outside the mosques as well, leading the government to make a law against congregating to pray in the streets.

208 Which he had deduced “from personal observation.”
change, when growing numbers of practicing Muslim women started to cover themselves with a Middle Eastern “foulard,” and religiously practicing men, especially those with Islamist political sympathies, began wearing a qamis, the short length tunic found in many countries of the Middle East, and sporting beards with their mustaches and top hair trimmed.

These growing number of religiously practicing faithful filled the spaces of a number of self-made “free” mosques built outside the structure, and thus control, of the official institution of Algerian Islam and which, as we noted above, became flashpoints for the difficulties between the government and Islamists in the early 1990s (see, especially, Rouadjia 1990). In fact, the immediate task of the Ministry of Religious Affairs in the late 1990s and early 2000s was to reintegrate these organically-built mosques and give them an official Imam of the state. In doing so, however, the state sanctioned and subsidized the trend towards religious growth. As Islamism began to lose its fire, the Zeroual and Bouteflika governments, after restructuring the Ministry of Religious Affairs, literally built on the Islamists’ initiative, so to speak, constructing new mosques and training new cadres of Imams.

Over the 2000s, levels of religiosity seemed to, in the least, hold steady and perhaps even grow. Although they are not strictly comparable surveys, the following table charts religious beliefs as registered in Algeria through the 2002 World Values Survey, the 2006 Arab Barometer and the 2009 Gallup World Poll:
TABLE 5-7

RELIGIOSITY IN ALGERIA

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2002 (World Values Survey)</th>
<th>2006 (Arab Barometer)</th>
<th>2009 (World Gallup Poll)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Weekly Mosque Attendance</td>
<td>50.1%</td>
<td>37.6%&lt;sup&gt;209&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>63%&lt;sup&gt;210&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religion Important in Your Life/Daily Life</td>
<td>94.8%</td>
<td>86.8%&lt;sup&gt;211&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>93%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Confidence in Mosques/Religious Organizations</td>
<td>89.0%</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>81%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In General Would You Describe Yourself As Religious?</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>54.9%</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Results from a commonly designed set of surveys on the egalitarian perceptions of Algerians collected in 2000 and 2008 by Collectif 95 Maghreb-Egalité (CME 95) and the Centre d’Information et de Documentation sur les Droits de l’Enfant et de la Femme (CIDDEF) confirm these trends. In 2008, 60% of adolescent girls (aged 13-17) and 80% of adult women (aged 18 and over) wore some sort of Islamic veil in Algeria. However, what is striking is that 90% of women under the age of 41 reported that they only began

<sup>209</sup> As they did not inquire about weekly mosque attendance, here I used the Arab Barometer’s question of whether an individual read the Qur’an often or not.

<sup>210</sup> The increase in the Gallup number is mostly fueled by an increase in the number of female respondents who said they went to the mosque- up from 26.5% in the World Values Survey to 52% in the Gallup World Poll, while the male respondents grew only from 72% to 74%. This illustrates one of the problems with the statistical use of mosque attendance (often the most widely used in political science and sociology today) as a measure of religiosity in the Muslim world: Going to the mosque to pray on Friday is a predominantly male ritual (which is religious obligatory for neither men or women in Islam). There is often little space constructed for women within mosques and they are often left at home to cook on Fridays. There is no measurable difference, however, between men and women’s responses to either the importance of God in their lives or their confidence in the mosques.

<sup>211</sup> As they did not have a specific question regarding whether religion was important in an individuals’ daily life, here I used the Arab Barometer’s question of whether a respondent prayed or not.
to wear the veil recently, attesting to the spectacular growth of the veil in Algeria over the last fifteen years. The two most commonly cited reasons by women for their decision to wear the veil was because it allowed them to walk out in public more freely and because everyone else was wearing one. At the same time, although in lesser order of importance, almost all of these same women gave some level of religious justification to their choice.

In addition, between 2000 and 2008, the number of men and women favorable to “egalitarian” values between the sexes weakened, as measured according to a composite of answers to questions concerning attitudes towards divorce, polygamy, custody rights, inheritance rights and women at work. These questions could be equally interpreted as a register of the extent to which Algerian society has internalized or “bought into” the validity of the religious message of reform preached by both the Islamists and traditional Ulema. Interestingly, the effect of education on a respondents’ adherence to these egalitarian values weakened over the same period from 2000 to 2008. This led the researchers conducting the survey to conclude that recent education and socialization efforts in Algeria have favored the promotion of collective religious and national identities and the political values associated with such identities (CIDDEF 2009).

This observation reflects similar work done by Algerian sociologists such as Hassan Remaoun (1997), Mohammed Harbi (1992) and Noureddine Toualbi (2000) on the promotion of the identity of the Islamic community in Algeria. All of these scholars link this trend to the “Arabizing” education reforms which evolved throughout the postcolonial years and that favored Islamic sciences through the end of high school. As

212 Down from 18 to 7% of men with favorable perceptions and 36 to 25% of women. The researchers are quick to note that the majority of both men and women, some 65%, classify themselves as being “somewhat, as opposed to “strongly” in favor of egalitarian values
Etienne (1976) wrote, part of the pact the FLN had thought they had struck with religious leaders was that they would be given a large measure of freedom in education and support in the mosque but that, in return, they would leave the politics to the FLN. Like Mussolini, the FLN saw itself as taking care of the task of pulling the Algerian nation towards modernization and understood Islam as giving that project legitimacy and social cohesion. As the Algerian state’s needs for legitimacy grew, so did their promotion of the religious element, and through education, the construction of mosques and religious friendly social policies, the state was partly responsible for empowering the trajectory of Islamism in the 1980s. The Islamists, in fact, were then able to take advantage of the religious education of Algerians to their own ends and make the case that they embodied the Islamic ideals of a virtuous, Islamic government which most Algerians had internalized since grade school. This also explains why the Islamists have been so opposed to reforms for a more secular public school education as proposed by the Bouteflika government and why the MSP’s compromises over reform are significant.

5.3.3 Universalizing and Personalizing Islam

This connection between a collective growth in religious identification, Islamism and contemporary government favoritism of religion in Algeria is only one part of the story, however. Religious growth in Algeria, encouraged by both state policies and the presence of Islamists, has taken on a life of its own and the content and direction of

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213 In fact, for years under Boumedienne, the Minister of Religious Affairs was titled the Minister of Religious Affairs and Original Education, so termed for the Minister’s responsibilities towards religious education. In 1976, when all schooling, including most forms of religious education outside of the school, were united under the Minister of Education, the Islamists took it as another affront against religious morality in Algeria.
specific religious practices reflect entirely new inputs. New Algerian religiosity, thus, could be best characterized as a embodying a trend towards the individualization of religious belief that is most likely linked to processes of globalization, especially through the diffusion of internet usage, and democratization. As we will explore in more detail in our large-n statistical analysis in the chapter to come, global trends in Muslim religiosity have affected majority Muslim countries in general, although the effect of such global trends has varied from one national setting to another. Contemporary Algerian religiosity reflects both these global dynamics and the promotion of Islam by the Algerian state. The contemporary character of Algerian religiosity, however also reflects the political liberalization of the nation and the growing worth individuals enjoy within a politically liberalized regime and the increase of choice and exposure to the new ideas, criticisms and fads that go along with it. This section takes a closer look at these intersecting dynamics.

In Islamic states like Algeria, which have begun “timid” processes of democratization, Luizard (2008) has argued that the pluralism of political ideas and personal expressions of liberty that we expect democratic institutions to promote and globalization to amplify still exist. That pluralism of ideas and expressions, however, as Luizard (2008) observes, is contained within a greater Islamic identity that is deeply rooted and regenerated within society and promoted by the state through its public education and politics. Reflecting on the same theme, the Algerian anthropologist Moussaoui has thus characterized contemporary Algerian religiosity as the growth of
“communitarian individualism” within Algerian religious belief, similar to what Addi (1995) defines as a process of secularization within a culture dominated by a religious (Islamic) ethic.

Returning to our theoretical insights in chapter three, the secularizing effects of modernization and democratization have been restrained in Algeria within an overwhelmingly Muslim religious market which has, in turn, been protected and encouraged by the state since independence. The “secularization” which these scholars recognize is, above all, the multiplication and legitimization of a new plurality of ideas, activities and choices (including the offer of more political, social and religious choices), even as one religious referent continues to dominate those choices. Within the religious domain, we might say that modernization has helped give more individuals access to reading the sacred texts for themselves; globalization has helped introduce those same individuals to a wider range of interpretations and criticisms of those texts; and democratization has helped to legitimize those criticisms and encourage the personalization of those individuals’ own religious belief. As Moussaoui notes, to some extent, even Islamism in Algeria, which promoted a strict interpretation of Islam in politics and society, was itself the product of such a process. The authority of untrained Imams rose from the new opportunities available to them to formulate their own religious-political vision outside that of the traditional body of Islamic scholarship and

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authority (Moussaoui 2009). In the context of the decentralized institution of Algerian Sunni Islam, there was even more immediate possibilities for a heterogeneity of religious beliefs in democracy for regularly practicing individuals in Algeria than in the context of the centralized institution of Italian Catholicism, a point we will return to in our conclusion. The same process, however, which weakened the authority of traditional Islam in Algeria also weakens the authority of Islamism. This effect was magnified when politically liberalizing reforms took on some traction in the late 1990s and early 2000s and as Zeroual and Bouteflika depoliticized the official institution of Islam in Algeria. One striking result is that the most ardent supporters of strong religiosity in Algeria, the Islamists, have diminished in their political power and societal support even as religiosity has remained so high. This can especially be seen in the reduction of the Islamist voting bloc and the numbers of Algerian voters who are in favor of religiously friendly governmental institutions, but do not support Islamist parties. Thanks to the institutional and societal embeddedness of Islam in Algeria, neither democratization nor modernization has yet to significantly weaken the national identity of Islam itself in Algeria.

In this light it might come as less of a surprise that although both Islamism and government favoritism of religion have helped sustain high levels of religious identification and religious practice in Algeria, neither can claim any sort of dominant leadership within the trend. As schools and mosques socialize every new generation of Algerians into a “universally” Muslim Algerian national identity, for example, a clear distinction exists between Islam and Islamism in the minds of the majority of Algerians who self-identify as Islamic believers, but who hold no sympathy for political Islam as
manifested by Algeria’s Islamist parties. To paraphrase Moussaoui, Algerian religiosity, therefore, has produced Islam à la carte, one in which mufti.com\textsuperscript{215} and star tele-preachers from across the Middle East compete with Islamists and traditional Zawiyas and Ulema for the believing Muslim’s attention and affection. This multiplication of religious choices reflect both the relative deregulation of the Algerian religious market and a growing liberty of individual choice (see also Luizard 2008:259).

Thus, as the CIDDEF (2009) report notes on egalitarian values in Algeria, even as the greater majority of Algerian women wear a veil, most, and especially women under the age of 60, wear the (non-native-to-Algeria) foulard in a number of styles. These range from quite modest to those inspired by fashion designers, and can be accompanied by a wide array of jeans, dresses, pants, high heels, lipstick and eyeliner. And even as more men and women are reluctant to say that polygamy is religiously wrong and divorce morally permissible, the numbers of the former continue to fall and the latter continue to rise.\textsuperscript{216} Likewise, despite increasing religious reticence about women in the workplace and the moral hazards of modern life, more women feel comfortable going out in public “into the streets;” the rate of women going to work continues to grow (albeit modestly); and fewer parents admonish their children to not drink beer.

These trends towards Islam à la carte are especially evident among the youth. In almost every conversation I attempted with an Algerian University student about their religious beliefs and faith, for example, the question of whether or not they considered

\textsuperscript{215} Where, on sites such as www.muftisays.com and www.fatwa-online.com, any Muslim can shop around for an appropriate, convenient fatwa, even if the mufti lives three cultures away.

\textsuperscript{216} See also \textit{El Watan}, May 9\textsuperscript{th}, 2010, “Une Circulaire du Ministre des Affaires Religieuses Crée des Situations Embarassantes.”
themselves to be a “practicing” Muslim, always elicited an odd, uncomfortable, and unnatural reflection, as in the quote that opened this chapter: “Islam?! Of course! We are all Muslims. I’m a Muslim…” For the majority of students I encountered, Islam represented an unquestioned part of their identity as an Algerian, a divine ideal and message, or something intrinsically and unquestionably good. Beyond that, Islam for them might point the way to human happiness, justice and freedom, virtue and discipline or many, many other things, but their religious identification had no necessary connection to political Islam—“that’s a completely different thing,” as many students would say. Some students certainly understand their religious beliefs to logically imply specific political positions and engagement, as we shall see with the case of the student Unions tied to the MSP, but many others tended to distance themselves from Islamism, Imams and the Mosques altogether by describing their faith, over beers and cigarettes, as simply Islam à notre façon: Islam in our own way.

To summarize so far, through 2004, the government’s strategy of inclusion helped produce the phenomenon of a more moderate and politically weakened Islamism, yet also a renewed national attachment to Islamic belief characterized by individual choice. This internalization and universally shared myth of what it means to be an Algerian and a Muslim, at once a wide but shallow and loose identity is, in part, what really marginalizes Islamist political parties. Islamist religious demands focus on an Islamification of Algerian politics on the margins. They fight over the shape of Muslim Algerian identity politics, but can no longer fight the fact that Algeria is a Muslim state, that Islam is a state-sponsored religion, and that Muslims can freely propose political and social projects
therein. As a friend explained to me with respect to Algerian Islamism’s chances of future success,

Islam is written into the constitution. We have Islamic law. For all the most important things of life, it will be Islam which decides their legal status - inheritance, marriage, divorce, adoption. People forget to reflect on that. I have no fear of the Islamists. The only thing they can do is force us to wear the veil. Which is nothing. Islam already decides the most important parts of our life… There’s nothing the Islamists can do.

5.3.4 Religious Reregulation

As introduced in the last section, since 2006, President Bouteflika has done little to consolidate the democratic gains acquired by Algeria between 1995 and 2005. He has made it more difficult for political parties of all stripes to oppose him in elections; hassled the media; changed the constitution in his favor; and, most likely, doctored electoral results, all in an apparent attempt to manage and hold on to political power in Algeria. To that end, Bouteflika has also attempted to employ religious sentiment in his favor and assert some state leadership over religious practice in Algeria. Thus, despite doing much to depoliticize the institution of Islam in Algeria, the Bouteflika regime has recently attempted to regain its religious authority through regulation and, as we saw in the last chapter, by more openly dividing and ruling Islamist parties. As our discussion of the electoral results of table 5.1 suggests, Algerian individuals have largely responded to the politics of Bouteflika’s new strategy by dropping out of the electoral process rather than transferring their votes to opposition parties. Given the evolution of the Algerian electorate and Algerian Islamist parties over the last fifteen years, it is difficult to imagine a re-radicalization of religious politics in Algeria in the near future, even as a form of protest against the current regime. While re-radicalization appears to be an unlikely
event, Bouteflika’s recent actions to re-regulate the Algerian religious market have produced new tensions between Islamists and the state, illustrating the potential for states with an established religion to abuse their religious authority.

The Ministry of Religious Affairs, for example, has recently begun further restructuring in 2007-8. As in previous reforms in the 1970s and 1980s, the 2008 changes add more hierarchy to the ministry, creating a denser rank system of salaries and positions. When it was first structured after independence, there were four categories of state religious personnel, including the Imam mumtaz, who has a specialized license as a professor, the Imam who recites the five daily prayers, and the muezzin. In the 1980s that number rose to six under Chadli (Rouadjia 1991), ten in 2000 and nineteen with the new reforms. This current restructuring is also significantly more regulatory in nature. The Ministry of Religious Affairs has created, for example, stricter codes of dress for Imams in order to ensure that they conform, in both appearance and religious speech, to a traditionally Algerian, Malekite-style Islam, as opposed to what is perceived to be more Islamist-friendly Middle Eastern styles of prayer and dress. In addition, the reforms legally empower the Ministry of Religious Affairs’ Imam inspectors with the right to legally penalize wayward Imams and mosques.217 This restriction has occurred at a time when the Ministry of Religious Affairs has also flexed its constitutional authority as the Ministry of the protected religion of state to publicly discipline individuals for disrespecting Islam. Such recent disciplinary action has included the sentencing of a

woman from Biskra to ten years in prison for showing disrespect to the Qur’an;\textsuperscript{218} the sentencing of four Berber boys to three years in prison for not respecting the Ramadan fast;\textsuperscript{219} and, similarly, the imprisonment of two soldiers from Guelma for smoking in public in the middle of the day during Ramadan.\textsuperscript{220} In 2006 the Ministry of Religious Affairs was also given wider legal powers to work against proselytism on the part of either Christians or Shiites by creating prison sentences of two to five years for anyone who “incites, constrains or uses any means of seduction to convert a Muslim to another religion.” This has made it difficult for non-Sunni Muslim religious figures to obtain Algerian visas, and several Christians have been stopped by the police for travelling with bibles in public (Teissier 2008).

While the Minister of Religious Affairs, Bouabdallah Ghlamallah, justifies the need for more robust inspectors and an authentically “Algerian” Islam in the name of keeping Islam moderate and Algerian, his position has become politicized because of his closeness to the Bouteflika regime and Bouteflika’s recent use of the ministry. Ghlamallah, who was originally appointed in 1997 by Zeroual, is a registered member of the RND and comes from the same geographical and political region of influence as President Bouteflika (the northwest of the country). In 2009, in addition to most of the Zawiya brotherhoods’ endorsement of Bouteflika’s presidential campaign, Ghlamallah publically exhorted that it was every Islamic individual’s religious duty to vote. In an

\textsuperscript{218} She was later acquitted on appeal to a higher court. “Une Femme Condamnée à 10 ans Ferme pour Atteinte au Coran,” \textit{El Watan}, October 10th.

\textsuperscript{219} They were released after serving two months of their term. “Le Syndrome de Biskra Refait Surface à Alger,” \textit{El Watan}, November 11th, 2008.

\textsuperscript{220} \textit{Echourouk}, October 9th, 2007.
election where all viable contenders had refused to compete, Bouteflika’s only “competition” was abstention and Ghlamallah’s exhortation was interpreted as an attempt to use the Algerian religious institutions to legitimate Bouteflika’s campaign and eventual victory.

The assertiveness of the Ministry of Religious Affairs has also coincided with Bouteflika’s clampdown of Djaballah’s political activities and with growing tensions between the MSP and the Ministry of Religious Affairs. In 2006 and 2008, the Ministry of Religious Affairs accused the MSP of harassing state religious personnel inside of mosques for the ill favor they demonstrated towards MSP politics. The MSP, in turn, accused the Ministry of Religious Affairs of undemocratically muzzling religious persons and blocking the formation and promotion of Imams who were favorably inclined towards the MSP. In doing so, the MSP has pushed back against what it believes to be the growing over-regulation of the mosques by the government. An MSP spokesman distinguished these tensions as arising not from the question of the state “managing” Islam, which is normal and expected in an Islamic state, but of politically “controlling” the mosques. The MSP has likened the situation to the unfair manipulation of the press by the government and tried (unsuccessfully) to introduce parliamentary laws prohibiting it.

As the this spokesman explained to me,

221 Bouteflika’s Minister of the Interior, for example, repeatedly blocked political gatherings by Djaballah in 2007-2008, and then simply barred him from engaging in political activity altogether.

222 These tensions were affirmed by interviews with the directing heads of the other ranking institutions of official Islam in Algeria, the High Islamic Council and the Islamic Cultural Center, both of whom, along with the Minister of Religious Affairs, share no private sympathy for Algeria’s Islamist parties even as the MSP remains within the Presidential alliance.

[the state] has promoted the Zawiyas as a counterweight to the Islamists, and that happens above all at the moment of elections. We have legislation that makes partisanship (of the mosques) illegal. But the legislation is not always respected. Imams need to be independent...like journalists. MSP is for the independence of Imams and, as a public personality, for their liberty of expression.224

The MSP and the Ministry of Religious Affairs have also publicly disagreed on the Islamic legitimacy of several parliamentary projects led by Bouteflika over the last five years, including the revisions to the family code,225 the importation of alcohol,226 and, most recently, a proposed law requiring citizens to remove their religious veils for national identity card photos.227 In all cases Ghlamallah contended that Bouteflika’s propositions were in conformity with Shari’a law, while the MSP charged that the ministry was imposing irreligious laws. These tensions between the government and the MSP over the religious character of the nation have been underscored by the growing hostility of the University student organizations loyal to the MSP, the Union Generale des Etudiants Libres (UGEL) and to the FLN, the Union Nationale des Etudiants Algeriens (UNEA). The UGEL, which has shown its strength within the university by leading student strikes for better university living conditions, has also used its influence to press for a more “Islamic” student atmosphere, such as requiring men and women to eat in separate cafeterias228 and contesting immoral activities such as “cultural dances.”

224 Interview with author, Mouradia, Algiers, March 15th, 2009.
227 “Documents Biométriques : La Polémique sur le Hidjab et la Barbe Enfle,” Le Quotidien d’Oran, April 7th, 2010.
Opposition to UGEL’s activities and ideology has provoked hostilities between the UGEL, the University, UNEA and other student groups and which have resulted, in 2003, in at least one student death.229

Thus, the Bouteflika government is in the process of once again changing the framework and dynamics of the relationship between religion and state in Algeria and is reminiscent of earlier patterns of government actions which led to the politicization and radicalization of Algerian religious leaders in the 1970s and 1980s. Since 2004, Islamist discourse has shown signs of what might be interpreted as a relative regression from their full support for plural, democratic politics. These signs include the recent rhetoric of two current MSP leaders, Abdelmadjid Menasra230 and Bouguerra Soltani,231 who have emphasized their commitment to promoting a more rigid interpretation of Shari’a law in Algeria. The student conflicts associated with MSP and national groups are especially worrying, particularly given the history of the Algerian University as the locus of religious versus state contestation.


231 See interviews, June 3rd, 2007 and January 15th, 2009 in *El Watan.*
CHAPTER 6:
STATISTICAL EXPLORATIONS

6.1 Introduction

The goal of this chapter is to begin to test statistically the main hypotheses of the theory as we presented them in the first half of this dissertation. Now that we have established that the theory’s expectations reasonably explain the dynamics generated by religiously friendly democratization processes in Algeria and Italy, in this chapter we want to test to what extent those hypotheses also systematically predict the same outcomes on a larger, cross-national sample of states in the world today. Even as the statistical method sheds less light on the causal mechanisms at work in our theory, the analyses presented here will allow us to explore whether the principal predictions of our theory are born out in a large number of cases.

The chapter is broken into three sections, each of which analyzes one major prediction of the dissertation. The first section introduces the data on religion-state arrangements which we will use throughout the chapter and then tests the claim from chapter one that substantial levels of democracy are possible in countries with religiously friendly governmental policies.

The second section then tries to test the first claim of chapter three, namely, that a religiously friendly democratization strategy is a viable strategy (although not necessarily
the only strategy) for countries who host a predominant, society-wide religion with seemingly hostile intentions towards democracy. Given the short time span on our data of religion-state arrangements and given that since the 1980s Catholicism has been theorized to be a positive explanatory variable linking its religious culture to democracy (Huntington 1991, Philpott 2004), I limit the analysis of this section to a sample of predominantly Muslim countries. As detailed in chapters one and two, Islam is still considered by many to be the most important variable explaining why many societies dominated by Islam are not democratic. In this section we will also try to test to what extent, as predicted by our theory, religious individuals in predominantly Muslim countries hold attitudes which are both more politically secular and democratic in those countries with relatively high levels of government favoritism of religion (GFI) but relatively lower levels of government regulation of religion (GRI).

Finally, in the third section we try to test for the effects of government favoritism of religion on levels of national religious participation and belief. After controlling for other factors that have been theorized to predict levels of national religious life, we primarily test whether there is a positive relationship between government favoritism of religion and our two measures of religious participation worldwide.

6.2 Religion-State Arrangements and Democracy

In chapter one, we specified the following two hypotheses regarding the possibility of friendly religion-state arrangements in democracy, namely:
**Hypothesis 1**: States with higher levels of government regulation of religion (GRI), which discriminate and regulate either against religions and religious belief or on their behalf violate Stepan’s twin tolerations and are less likely to be democratic than those with lower levels of GRI.

but that:

**Hypothesis 2**: To the extent that a government favors one religion without actively denying the liberties of any other, states do not violate Stepan’s twin tolerations. In other words, at reasonable levels of GRI, more or less government favoritism of religion (GFI) should have little effect on national levels of democracy.

In order to analyze these two hypotheses, I use four basic databases. For levels of democracy and for some indication of their quality, I employ the widely used, if flawed, *Freedom House* and *Polity IV* databases. Freedom House attempts a more comprehensive, if messier, definition of democracy and scores countries by employing checklists of essential democratic political rights and civil liberties in a way that can be combined onto a 1 to 14 point scale. One of Freedom House’s criteria in establishing its measure of civil liberties is whether or not a country respects “freedom of religion.” This criteria, however, is only one of several indicators which add up to Freedom House’s civil liberty variable. What is more, although their definition of violations of freedom of religion would seem to be much closer to our definition of GRI than GFI, Freedom House does not make any clear distinction between the two different types of government interference with religion presented here. Controlling for levels of GRI and GFI in the following analysis will therefore tell us whether GRI or GFI (or both) is more likely to correlate with violations of other civil liberties and political rights, and, thus, lower levels of democracy in general.
Unlike Freedom House, the Polity IV database does not specifically look at religion-state arrangements and gives democracy scores on a scale of -10 to 10. Polity focuses its ledger of democracy less on the political and civil rights required of democracy and more on the minimal democratic requirements of institutional procedures, with particular importance given to the competitiveness of elections (Munck and Verkuilen 2002). Positive results on both the Freedom House and Polity databases will strengthen our confidence that the dimension of GRI captures those aspects of government involvement in religion which are harmful to democracy while GFI captures those which are not.

Finally, for the relationship between religion and state, I use Grim and Finke (2006) and Fox’s (2006) databases. Grim and Finke (2006) construct three main indices on religion and government for 247 countries and territories, based on several measures which they coded from three separate years (2001, 2003 and 2005) of the International Religious Freedom Report, created annually by the United States Department of State. The authors disaggregate the information from the report into different types of government regulation or involvement with religion for each country. While the authors provide the data for each year separately, they encourage researchers to use an aggregate dataset which they have constructed that combines and averages the scores for each country across years. The authors defend this promotion by explaining that the coding from any single annual report sometimes tends to highlight media-friendly but isolated religious events. Averaging the scores over a four year time period, therefore, helps correct for reporting exaggerations. It also allows the indices to capture the larger flavor of the religion-state relationship in any given country rather than highlighting incremental
policy changes within such a relationship. Given that our theoretical expectations concern the bigger changes in the institutional relationship between religion and state made at critical political moments, this aggregate measure is an appropriate measure with which to test our hypotheses about the effects of religions-state arrangements on politics and society.

In this paper I am interested in Grim and Finke’s (2006) indices of government regulation of religion (GRI) and government favoritism of religion (GFI). As they define it, GRI refers, “to the actions of the state that deny religious freedoms, government regulation includes any laws, policies, or administrative actions that impinge on the practice, profession, or selection of religion.” The coding of the index construction for GRI poses six basic questions232 to the Religious Freedom Reports. These questions scrutinize whether a government regulates or restricts public preaching, “foreign” evangelization, and the generally free practice of religion. It is important to notice here that Grim and Finke’s indicator of GRI is almost exclusively focused on GRI of our type A in which a government explicitly regulates and even coerces religious behavior. This also fits our expectations of what is most harmful within religion-state relationships with respect to democracy. As we will see below, however, Fox’s data will allow us to check for the effects of GRI of our type B on democracy, in which governments explicitly regulate the organization and administration of a religion. The Grim and Finke index, thus, should not be considered to be an exhaustive list of the ways in which governments can potentially regulate religion, and future iterations of the index might pose further

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232 I have included the questions used by Grim and Finke to code GRI and GFI in Appendix A.
questions, for example, about the degree to which governments’ appoint and manage religious clergy.

The GFI indicator, on the other hand, is not concerned with whether the state officially tries to regulate and control religion (or vice versa), but the extent to which a state allows and encourages the expression of certain religious traditions in public and political life. As Grim and Finke (2006) write, GFI refers, “to the actions of the state that provide one religion or a small group of religions special privileges, support, or favorable sanctions.” The coding of the index construction for GFI poses five basic questions to the Religious Freedom Reports and essentially scrutinizes whether the state financially funds certain religious “brands” and symbols, religious education, clergy, religious infrastructure and religious charities. Once again, this index is not exhaustive and other iterations could ideally include additional aspects of this favorable or friendly dimension of the religion-state arrangement, for example, including indicators of how much the state not only funds the religion(s) of its society but also turns to them for guidance on social and moral policies by mandating religious education, instituting national-religious calendars and allowing religious jurisdiction over legal matters like marriage, divorce and inheritance laws.

It should also be noted that GFI does not measure the full public power religions possess to orient societal values. By recording the level of state favoritism towards a religion, GFI does measure what I argue is the non-restrictive institutional presence of that religion in the political realm. However, GFI does not tell us whether or not that particular religion is an active protagonist with respect to such public institutionalization. Even in the context of high GFI, some religious actors might be either unwilling or
unable to effectively use its favorable position as a political asset. An institutional framework with high GFI will continue to bias the bases of the public arena toward that religious tradition, for example, by socializing the nation’s youth in that religious tradition’s worldview and keeping that worldview as the moral and symbolic reference in public discourse and legislation. Over time, however, that traditions’ leaders might have lost the “hearts and minds” of their faithful, reducing GFI to a latent, but important, institutional influence.

While they are certainly related (both measure some type of government involvement in religion), as measured in this way, these two indices appear to tap into two distinct enough concepts to warrant analyzing them as two separate dimensions. Using exploratory factor analysis, Grim and Finke (2006) report that the GRI and GFI indices cluster into two statistically distinct regions with respect to the state’s relationship to religion. The eigen values reported in the factor analysis for GRI and GFI are 5.47 and 2.17, respectively. If our hypotheses are correct GRI should be a stronger indicator of levels of national democracy, and GFI should have little bearing on them.

There is much overlap between Grim and Finke’s (2006) measure and Fox’s (2006) coding rules on world-wide separation of religion and state. Fox’s (2006) data is not specifically designed to disentangle the difference in government regulation and favoritism towards religion as in Grim and Finke (2006), and he combines his indicators into one continuous measure of government involvement in religion (GIR) which stretches from official hostility towards religion to official support for one religion and codes countries over a twelve year period from 1990 to 2002. As a composite measure which builds on five major sub-variables which themselves can be easily disaggregated,
it is relatively easy to design variables from Fox’s (2006) GIR dataset which are similar to Grim and Finke’s (2006) distinction between regulation and friendliness or favoritism. Fox’s (2006) data is also useful as it allows us to add other ideal attributes of these two dimensions which Grim and Finke (2006) do not include in their coding.

For an alternative measurement of government regulation of religion, I therefore also run regressions using a composite measure which adds Fox’s (2006) indicators on government “regulation” and “discrimination,” which I term GRI (Fox). Fox’s measure of discrimination is, “designed to examine restrictions the government places on the practice of religion by minority religious groups,” and his measure of regulation “addresses whether the state regulates either all religions or the majority religion.” As noted above, this definition of regulation includes both our Type A and Type B GRI, as it includes the extent to which a state actively discriminates against religious beliefs, as well as whether it actively regulates religious organizations.

For an alternative measure of government favoritism of religion, I use a composite measure of Fox’s two indicators of “official support” for religion and religious “legislation,” which I term GFI (Fox). As Fox notes, support for a religion can be “can be practical, legal, or monetary.” Accordingly, GFI (Fox) measures not only the financial support of a religion by the state, as GFI above, but it also measures to what extent governments “legislate religion into law” by allowing laws and government practices to be influenced by religion. Among other subcomponents, GFI (Fox) thus records whether a government allows inheritance laws to be based on religious precepts; requires

233 The full wording of Fox’s coding guidelines which also lists the many subcomponents each variable includes can be found at http://www.religionandstate.org/.

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businesses to shut down for holy days or feast days; and obligates children to take religious education courses in public schools. Adding this religious legislation variable onto our second (Fox-based) measure of government favoritism of religion reflects our theoretical expectations, but which could not be tested on the basis of Grim and Finke’s (2006) indices alone.

In order to test the hypotheses I run several multi-variate regression models on both the Polity and Freedom House measures of levels of democracy, using both Grim and Finke (2006) and Fox’s (2006) indicators of government regulation and favoritism towards religion. I add region and religion dummy variables to explore whether these relationships hold independently of various religious and cultural traditions. I also control for the effects of levels of combined human development and national economic well being, using measures of country size, population size and growth and the United Nations’ measure of human development (the HDI index). Although it is a composite measure, and thus less statistically precise, the Human Development Index was designed to measure the bundle of forces which are introduced by processes of economic development, including the growth in a country’s level of literacy, life expectancy and standard of living. This bundle captures those dynamics of modernization which, as we theorized in chapters one and three, ought to be associated with national levels of both political and religious secularization. In order to report results which are consistent throughout this chapter, I set all of the variables (except Grim and Finke’s aggregate
measures) to the year 2000, as several variables which will be important for later analyses have not yet reported data beyond the year 2000.234

The most statistically significant parameters which hold across all of the models using both Fox (2006) and Grim and Finke’s (2006) data as well as Polity and Freedom House, are the GRI and HDI parameters. Other than confirming one of the most important statistical relationships within political science, namely that between democracy and economic well-being, these results also begin to tell a story about the effects of these two dimensions of the religion-state arrangement on democracy.

The GRI index is significantly and substantially associated with lower levels of democracy, supporting our first hypothesis that too much government regulation of religion diminishes the chances a country has of being democratic. Less government involvement with religion or religious involvement in government along this dimension appears to be desirable for the sustainability of democratic regimes and ought to remain an integral part of the definition of democracy.

234 That said, I have tested the following regressions using more current data (see, for example, Driessen 2010), and, lending credence to our expectations of the slow change in the overall nature of religion-state relationships, the results are not substantially different.
### TABLE 6-1

RELIGION-STATE ARRANGEMENTS AND DEMOCRACY: GRIM AND FINKE

(2006) AND FREEDOM HOUSE

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NOTE: Coefficients of multi-variate regression analysis. Religion dummy variables coded 1 for majority religion in country with “Protestant” as the reference category. Region dummy variables coded 1 for region of country with “Western Europe” as reference category.

SOURCES: GRI is “Government Regulation of Religion” and GFI is “Government Favoritism of Religion” from Grim and Finke coded in 2006 as the mean score of GFI and GRI coded for the three years of 2001, 2003 and 2005. HDI is the United Nations Human Development Index coded for the year 2000. Freedom House and all other variables likewise coded for the year 2000.

*P= .05 level, **P= .01 level
### TABLE 6-2

**RELIGION-STATE ARRANGEMENTS AND DEMOCRACY: GRIM AND FINKE**

*(2006) AND POLITY IV*

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**NOTE:** Coefficients of multi-variate regression analysis. Religion dummy variables coded 1 for majority religion in country with “Protestant” as the reference category. Region dummy variables coded 1 for region of country with “Western Europe” as reference category.

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*P= .05 level, **P= .01 level
### TABLE 6-3

RELIGION-STATE ARRANGEMENTS AND DEMOCRACY: FOX (2006) AND FREEDOM HOUSE

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**NOTE:** Coefficients of multi-variate regression analysis. Religion dummy variables coded 1 for majority religion in country with “Protestant” as the reference category. Region dummy variables coded 1 for region of country with “Western Europe” as reference category.

**SOURCES:** GRI is “Government Regulation of Religion” and GFI is “Government Favoritism of Religion” from Grim and Finke coded in 2006 as the mean score of GFI and GRI coded for the three years of 2001, 2003 and 2005. HDI is the United Nations Human Development Index coded for the year 2000. Freedom House and all other variables likewise coded for the year 2000.

*P= .05 level, **P= .01 level
### TABLE 6-4


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<th>M.5</th>
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<td>Hindu</td>
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<td>11.61**</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jewish</td>
<td>5.20</td>
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<td>-.963</td>
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<tr>
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<td>-3.61</td>
<td>-2.17</td>
<td>-3.13</td>
<td>-2.26</td>
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<tr>
<td>R2</td>
<td>0.608</td>
<td>0.331</td>
<td>0.609</td>
<td>0.617</td>
<td>0.652</td>
<td>0.644</td>
<td>0.706</td>
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<tr>
<td>R2 adj</td>
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<td>0.308</td>
<td>0.592</td>
<td>0.600</td>
<td>0.615</td>
<td>0.606</td>
<td>0.654</td>
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<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>148</td>
<td>148</td>
<td>148</td>
<td>144</td>
<td>148</td>
<td>148</td>
<td>148</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**NOTE:** Coefficients of multi-variate regression analysis. Religion dummy variables coded 1 for majority religion in country with “Protestant” as the reference category. Region dummy variables coded 1 for region of country with “Western Europe” as reference category.

**SOURCES:** GRI is “Government Regulation of Religion” and GFI is “Government Favoritism of Religion” from Grim and Finke coded in 2006 as the mean score of GFI and GRI coded for the three years of 2001, 2003 and 2005. HDI is the United Nations Human Development Index coded for the year 2000. Freedom House and all other variables likewise coded for the year 2000.

*P= .05 level, **P= .01 level
With regards to the Freedom House data, it appears that higher levels of GRI increase the likelihood that religious freedoms are violated in a country and that these violations bundle together with other violations of civil liberties and political rights and thus result in a lower score of democracy. The results of the Polity regressions add confidence to this result: high levels of GRI are strongly associated with lower levels of democracy even when democracy is measured using institutional attributes which do not focus on civil liberties and political rights.

This finding, of course, will not come as a great surprise, given our expectations of what constitutes a democracy and the measures we use to determine its presence. The more interesting result of this analysis is that once levels of GRI are controlled for, the degree of friendliness of government towards religion, as measured by GFI, seems to have little statistically significant effect on whether a regime is predicted to be democratic or not. It is important to note, however, that when the models do not control for GRI, as in M.2 of tables 6.1-6.4, GFI is negatively associated with higher scores of democracy. Yet, as our regression analyses in these tables show, once levels of GRI are taken into account GFI appears to have either little statistically significant value or, even, in those models where it takes on some significance, GFI appears to take on a positive association with higher levels of democracy. The dependence of the coefficient of GFI on whether the model controls for GRI is likely the result of correlation between the two indices, especially at the indices’ higher and lower ends. Many democratic countries who have instituted low levels of GRI have also instituted low levels of GFI, as is the case in the United States. Similarly, many other countries who have instituted high levels of GRI have also instituted high levels of GFI, as is the case in many non-democratic Muslim
majority countries today. The simultaneously high levels of GFI and GRI in this group of non-democratic countries is probably the cause of the negative coefficient on GFI with respect to democratic scores in model two of tables 6.1-6.4. Despite this correlation, as Grim and Finke’s factor analysis suggests, there is significant variation within the relationship between GRI and GFI which would be analytically lost if the measures were collapsed into one continuous index. While many countries may institute similar levels of both GRI and GFI, as table 1.1 in chapter one suggested, there is an important group of countries with high levels of GRI and low levels of GFI, in addition to an important group of countries with low levels of GRI and high levels of GFI.

These results, thus, also support our second hypothesis and indicate that as long as state authorities are able to contain government regulation of religion at an acceptable level, they can offer more or less favoritism to religion without necessarily risking harm to their national levels of democracy as measured by Freedom House and Polity. In other words, it is possible for a democratic state to have an institutionally friendly relationship with religion while simultaneously protecting essential democratic rights and rotating political power through elections. Carving out a favorable space for religion in the public and political realm, therefore, does not necessarily entail a trade-off with the democratic values which build and sustain democracy. These results remain consistent even when employing different measures of democracy and different indicators of government regulation and friendliness. In addition, the region and religion control variables tell us that, on average, the hypotheses are valid regardless of region or type of national religion.

While his study is not motivated by the same investigation of these two specific dimensions of religion-state arrangements, these results also mirror Fox’s most recent
analyses (2008) of the correlation between indicators of democracy and his five sub-measures of government involvement in religion (GIR). In his results, there is little difference in the correlation between democracies as opposed to non-democracies and those measures of GIR that I have conceptualized as pertaining to the dimension of Government Favoritism of Religion (GFI). However, democracies have a higher level of correlation than non-democracies with higher levels of those measures of GIR which I have conceptualized as pertaining to the dimension of Government Regulation of Religion (GRI). Fox also notes, however, that the absolute highest levels of these types of GIR I have defined as pertaining to this dimension of government favoritism of religion are to be found in non-democracies.

The following chart, which lists 17 countries that have GFI scores greater than 7 and are simultaneously considered to be “free” by Freedom House, helps illustrate the wide range of religion-state arrangements which are compatible with high levels of democracy.
TABLE 6-5

DEMOCRACIES WITH VERY FRIENDLY RELIGION-STATE ARRANGEMENTS:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country:</th>
<th>GFI score:</th>
<th>GRI score:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>6.76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malta</td>
<td>8.31</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Venezuela</td>
<td>8.12</td>
<td>1.20</td>
</tr>
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<td>Bolivia</td>
<td>8.07</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>Iceland</td>
<td>7.99</td>
<td>0.93</td>
</tr>
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<td>Israel</td>
<td>7.99</td>
<td>4.81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>7.90</td>
<td>1.02</td>
</tr>
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<td>Croatia</td>
<td>7.82</td>
<td>1.67</td>
</tr>
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<td>7.79</td>
<td>1.57</td>
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<td>Czech Republic</td>
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<td>0.19</td>
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<td>Luxembourg</td>
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<td>0.19</td>
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<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>7.49</td>
<td>1.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>7.43</td>
<td>4.81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>7.33</td>
<td>3.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>7.26</td>
<td>0.74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>7.19</td>
<td>1.39</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NOTE: Countries coded as “Friendly” religion-state arrangement if their Government Favoritism of Religion score > 7.

SOURCES: GRI is “Government Regulation of Religion” and GFI is “Government Favoritism of Religion” from Grim and Finke coded in 2006 as the mean score of GFI and GRI coded for the three years of 2001, 2003 and 2005. Countries coded as democracy if they were scored as “Free” for an average of three years prior to 2000 by Freedom House.
Strengthening Fox’s point from above, the chart also illustrates the possibility of the existence of some ceiling on the absolute extent to which states can institute GFI and still be considered democratic. While it appears to be relatively common for democracies to institute medium and low measures of GFI (but not GRI), there are increasingly fewer democracies with levels of GFI in the very upper registers (four with scores above 8, still surprising, but none with scores above 9) while a whole series of autocratic states lurk there. Up there, an absolute identification between religion and state leaves no room for guaranteeing exit options for religious minorities which would be essential to make democracy work. To test for this possibility of a curvi-linear relationship between GFI and levels of democracy, in model four of these tables (6-1 to 6-4) regress the model using the log of GFI. The results offer some support for the evidence of an upper ceiling: the coefficients on the log of GFI are stronger and their signs remain consistent, although only the coefficients on the log of GFI variables in the Polity regressions retain statistical significance.

To summarize, all the analyses strongly support the two hypotheses of chapter one: too much government regulation of religion diminishes the chances a country has of being democratic, however, once a country’s level of GRI is controlled for, government friendliness towards religion has little statistical association with whether that country is democratic or not. In other words, a religiously friendly democracy represents a viable but not inevitable possibility. A highly regulated, religiously friendly democracy does not.
6.3 Government Favoritism of Religion and Democracy in the Islamic World

So far, we have established that there is strong statistical evidence for our claim that religiously friendly governmental institutions are compatible with high levels of democracy. We now want to look for evidence that such institutions can actually aid democratization processes in those countries with a predominant, society-wide religion with seemingly hostile or ambivalent intentions towards democratic ideas and institutions. In chapter three, we argued that by instituting or maintaining government favoritism of religion during periods of democratization state leaders made it more likely that hostile religious leaders and individuals would embrace democracy, rather than defend themselves against it, and thereby also make democratization in those countries more likely to take on traction.

Because our data on religion-state arrangements is limited to the contemporary period only, and because, as discussed in chapters two, three and four, Catholicism, in the scholarly opinion of many, has transitioned from representing a stumbling block to a global promoter of democracy, we limit our analysis here to the group of predominantly Muslim countries\textsuperscript{235} coded by Grim and Finke (2006).

The first step we can take to explore our hypothesis is to test whether the results of the previous section hold across this sample of predominantly Muslim countries. Table 6.6 presents these results.

\textsuperscript{235} As we defined it in the introduction, a predominant, society-wide religion must be able to claim at least 70\% of individuals’ self-reported religious identities in any nation.
RELIGION STATE ARRANGEMENTS AND LEVELS OF DEMOCRACY IN
PREDOMINANTLY MUSLIM COUNTRIES

<table>
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<th>Freedom House</th>
<th>Polity</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
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<td></td>
<td>M.1</td>
<td>M.2</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>GRI</strong></td>
<td>.458**</td>
<td>.427*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>GFI</strong></td>
<td>.414*</td>
<td>.054</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>HDI</strong></td>
<td>.006</td>
<td>.011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Area</strong></td>
<td>7.88e-07</td>
<td>6.85e-07</td>
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<td><strong>Pop</strong></td>
<td>-2.35e-08</td>
<td>-2.52e-08</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Popgw</strong></td>
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<td>-.203</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>R2</strong></td>
<td>0.438</td>
<td>0.334</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>R2 adj</strong></td>
<td>0.355</td>
<td>0.236</td>
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<td>N</td>
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NOTE: Coefficients of multi-variate regression analysis.

SOURCES: GRI is “Government Regulation of Religion” and GFI is “Government Favoritism of Religion” from Grim and Finke coded in 2006 as the mean score of GFI and GRI coded for the three years of 2001, 2003 and 2005. HDI is the United Nations Human Development Index coded for the year 2000. Freedom House, Polity and all other variables likewise coded for the year 2000.

*P= .05 level, **P= .01 level

Although less statistically significant and weaker in substance, the results for this sample of predominantly Muslim countries mirror those for the general sample. Within predominantly Muslim countries this gives us some confidence that, as expected by our theory, the regulation of religion by governments is more detrimental than government favoritism of religion for the democratic rankings of Muslim countries. Once such regulation is controlled for, these results continue to indicate that government favoritism of religion seems to have, in the least, a neutral effect on levels of democracy in Muslim nations.
A graph charting religion-state arrangements in majority Muslim countries according to their levels of government regulation and government favoritism of religion helps us to begin to probe this result a little further:

Figure 6-1
Religion-State Arrangement Categories in the Muslim World
(Grim and Finke 2006)
The graph highlights several interesting points. First, as expected, many of the former communist countries with predominantly Muslim populations, such as Azerbaijan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, fall into the category of states with high levels of GRI and low levels of GFI. Second, while a few near-democracies (and one full democracy: Mali) fall into the category of states with low levels of GRI and GFI, only one state is listed as a country which could be described as taking the “Catholic route” towards democracy by maintaining high levels of GFI and instituting low levels of GRI. That state is the relevant country of Senegal. Although not as fully democratic as many countries in the West, Senegal has received quite a bit of scholarly attention of late as an example of a Muslim country with a relatively high level of democratic political life (An-Na’im 2006). Most of the predominantly Muslim countries, however, seem to land in the upper right hand quadrant of the graph and possess rather high levels of both GFI and GRI. What is more, none of these countries are listed as being “free” democratic regimes according to Freedom House in 2000.

This last observation reminds us of the original problem in theorizing about Muslim democracies, i.e. that there are so few of them. Yet, at the same time, putting all these countries of the upper righthand quadrant into the same regime category hides quite a lot of variation in the democratic openness of countries. Sudan, for example, is certainly more autocratic than Indonesia. This represents one of the problems inherent in democracy scales, namely, that at the highest and lowest points on a scale, scores have

236 Which, as we noted in chapter one, is the typical place liberal democratic theory would expect democracies to be.

237 Of predominantly Muslim countries, only Mali (since 1995), Senegal (2003-2008) and Indonesia (since 2006) have been categorized by Freedom House as fully free political regimes.
larger margins of error (Trieir and Jackman 2008). This results from the insufficiently discriminatory nature of these scales, which only allow countries to drop or ascend so far. As Trieir and Jackman (2008) write, at these extreme ends of the scale, countries might be further distinguished in their levels of democracy by finer, but yet-to-be theorized indicators of democracy.

Our theory, coupled with the regression results above, leads us to suspect that as far as religion-state arrangements go, it is probably the index of GRI rather than GFI which is aiding what these databases seem to code as non-democratic political life. A qualitative glance at the upper righthand corner would seem to confirm this expectation, namely, that it is the government regulation of religion in a religion-state arrangement which is most damaging to democratic life. Thus, many of the worst “gross offenders” against democracy in the Muslim world are to be found among those countries in the upper righthand quadrant who have instituted the highest levels of GRI, including Sudan, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Iran. Conversely, many of the rising democratic “hopefuls” whom scholars have pointed to recently are to be found among those countries within the upper righthand corner who have instituted relatively lower levels of GRI. These include the big non-Arab Muslim countries of Turkey (Nasr 2005), Malaysia (Stepan and Robertson 2003) and Indonesia (Hefner 2000); the Gulf states of Kuwait and the UAE (Luciani 2007); and, finally, with important variation among the three, the nations of former French North Africa, including Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia (Luciani 1994, Quandt 1998, Brumberg 2005). These countries have kept or even increased high levels of government favoritism of religion while at the same time taking some important steps forward towards democratic reform.
We can further test whether this suspicion holds ground by digging into the various components which make up the democracy “scores” reported by aggregate databases and which might tell us more about the variation in the democratic openness of these countries than the simple, one-dimensional aggregate scores which Polity and Freedom House report. In order to get a better sense of the variation in terms of levels of democracy among what is mostly a non-democratic set of countries, I examine both the aggregate and disaggregate components of six databases of democracy indicators. The goal of doing so is to look for evidence which might tell us in which specific ways religiously friendly regimes who institute relatively lower levels of government regulation of religion might be coded as more democratic than religiously friendly regimes who do not. Their low aggregate democracy scores indicate that it is most likely that religiously friendly countries with relatively low levels of government regulation of religion are not significantly more democratic on all indicators of democracy (hence their low, all around scores compared to democracies in the West and elsewhere), but, given our qualitative and theoretical insights, we expect that they ought to be significantly more democratic on some of these disaggregate indicators.

Table 6.7 reports the coefficients on GRI and GFI variables as regressed on selected aggregate and disaggregate measures from these six databases of democracy. The regressions include the same set of control variables we used in our Model 2 regressions in table 2.1 on the relationship between religion-state arrangements and democracy scores in predominantly Muslim countries.
TABLE 6-7

RELIGION STATE ARRANGEMENTS AND LEVELS OF DEMOCRACY IN
PREDOMINANTLY MUSLIM COUNTRIES: COEFFICIENTS OF GRI AND GFI ON
COMPONENTS OF DEMOCRACY SCORES

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<tr>
<th>Component of Democracy</th>
<th>GRI</th>
<th>GFI</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Vanhahen index of demo</td>
<td>-0.869</td>
<td>0.758</td>
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<tr>
<td>Party Competition</td>
<td>-3.43*</td>
<td>1.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participation</td>
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<td>-0.853</td>
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<td>2. Polity</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Competition for Executive Recruitment</td>
<td>-2.86*</td>
<td>2.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regulation of Participation</td>
<td>-2.46^</td>
<td>2.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Competitiveness of Participation</td>
<td>-2.58*</td>
<td>2.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Executive Constraints</td>
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<td>2.54</td>
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<td>3. Unified Democracy Scores</td>
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<td>5. Freedom House</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Rights</td>
<td>0.44*</td>
<td>0.038</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Liberties</td>
<td>0.260*</td>
<td>0.052</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Freedom of the Press</td>
<td>0.183*</td>
<td>-0.015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Freedom of Association</td>
<td>2.39*</td>
<td>0.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Cingarelli and Richards</td>
<td>-3.88</td>
<td>0.056</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Freedom of Speech</td>
<td>0.077</td>
<td>-0.012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Worker’s rights</td>
<td>-0.201*</td>
<td>0.061</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women’s pol. Rights</td>
<td>-0.093</td>
<td>-0.002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women’s soc. Rights</td>
<td>-0.024</td>
<td>-0.079</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NOTE: For Vanhahen, Polity, Coppedge and Maldonado, and United Democracy scores, higher scores means more democratic. For Freedom House and Cingarelli and Richards lower scores represent a higher democratic ranking. All scores are listed for their year=2000 values.

*P= 0.05 level, ^P < 0.10 level
With a few notable exceptions, as expected by our theory, the results follow the same pattern as reported in table 6.6 above: higher levels of GRI are generally associated with lower levels of democracy and the association is statistically significant, while the coefficients of GFI are generally not statistically significant. However, taken at face value, the GFI coefficients are either substantially weaker (as in the Freedom House, United Democracy and Coppedge and Maldonado scores) or of the opposition sign (as in the Polity and Vanhahen scores) than the GRI coefficients. This lends evidence to our expectation that while instituting higher levels of GRI might harm a country’s chances of being democratic, higher levels of GFI might actually favor higher levels of democracy under certain circumstances.

That said, the results also reveal this relationship between government regulation of religion, government favoritism of religion and levels of democracy to be somewhat uneven. Hence our notable exceptions. The coefficients on the Cingarelli and Richards’ measures illustrate the possibility that even as lower levels of GRI might be good for the institutionalization of many aspects of democracy, those lower levels of GRI are not necessarily good for all aspects of democracy. Thus, reversing the trend of most of the other indicators of democracy, for the Cingarelli and Richards data, higher levels of government regulation of religion are usually associated with higher levels of political rights and civil liberties, even though most of these coefficients are not significant. There seems to be an especially strong and statistically significant relationship, however, between higher levels of government regulation of religion and higher levels of political rights for workers. While none of the GFI coefficients are significant, the signs on the GFI coefficients on the Cingarelli and Richards data likewise appears to reverse some of
the trends observed above. Higher levels of government favoritism of religion seem to be associated with, specifically, lower levels of worker rights and lower levels of freedom of movement.

What can we conclude with these results? On the one hand, the evidence supports the claim that it is possible for predominantly Muslim countries to institute key components of democracy while maintaining high levels of government favoritism of religion and medium levels of government regulation of religion. That said, the mixed nature of these results also suggest that predominantly Muslim countries with lower levels of government regulation of religion have been reluctant to protect the whole gambit of democratic rights and liberties. The rights of workers, in particular, seem to suffer in predominantly Muslim countries with little government regulation of religion, perhaps even as a result of the tolerance shown to religious actors and the decision to allow them to participate in and contest elections in some of these countries. This lends support to the conclusions of Kunkler and Leiniger (2009) with regard to their study of the role of religious actors in give democratization processes, including Muslim religious actors in Indonesia and Mali. The authors find that on the whole, religious actors positively contributed to the transition and consolidation of democracy in these five countries, through their protests against authoritarian regimes, rhetorical support for the democratic processes and their consistent democratic behavior and participation in elections. From a normative and attitudinal point of view, however, the authors also claim that religious actors hindered the consolidation of certain liberal values that are associated

238 The other countries under study in their project were Germany, Georgia and the Ukraine (Kunkler and Leiniger 2009).
with more substantive definitions of democracy, especially regarding morality laws and the sphere of “personal status.” (Kunkler and Leiniger 2009:1077). In Mali, for instance, and echoing the evidence presented on Algeria above, Islamic associations blocked the passage of more liberal family laws and the abolition of the death penalty. Even though democratization processes which are inclusive of religious actors might be good for the general democratic nature of a country as a whole, therefore, this very inclusivity might also lead to sub-optimal democratic results in some substantive areas of political rights and civil liberties. This confirms our note from the introduction above, namely, that while a religiously friendly democratization process may enable the consolidation of a democratic regime, that democracy will probably not look exactly like that form of liberal democracy which many Western political theorists argue to be a democratic ideal.

There are other limits to the conclusion we can make with the results above. While the data covers a large number of countries, it is really only available for one time period only. Our hypotheses, however, are predictions about the effects of processes over time. Past changes in the religion-state arrangement during periods of religious hostility are expected to have an effect on the future behavior of political and religious actors. Rather than measuring change, our data here gives us a snapshot of contemporary relationships between religion-state arrangements and our predicted outcomes. As such the results, at best, represent reflections of what we would expect our variables to produce over time. As a snapshot these results do not tell us whether countries with relatively lower levels of GRI and higher levels of GFI are more democratic because they have engaged in a process of reducing their levels of GRI while maintaining or increasing their levels of GFI. They simply indicate that those Muslim countries with lower levels of
GRI are more democratic today than those with higher levels of GRI and that GFI has little significant effect on their democratic status.

As discussed in chapter one, however, given the historical Islamic political tradition of high GRI and GFI and given our theoretical expectations, we have some reason to believe that those countries within the upper righthand quadrant with lower levels of GRI and relatively higher levels of GFI have reduced their levels of GRI over the years and, thus, approach our model of a religiously friendly democratization process. The results, however, remain inconclusive. To test to see whether the actual process of reducing GRI while maintaining GFI seems to generate higher levels of democracy, the best strategy would be to continue to produce historical narratives, as we did in the Algerian and Italian cases, to trace the sequence of events and forces which have led states with lower levels of government regulation of religion and relatively higher levels of government favoritism of religion to be more democratic than those states with relatively higher levels of government regulation of religion.

6.3.1 GRI, GFI and Attitudes Towards Democracy

Without directly confirming this process, however, and while we wait for those historical narratives to be produced, we can use our data here to test for the effects of GFI and GRI on the democratic attitudes of religious individuals within these countries. Such a test ought to give us an idea of whether higher scores of democracy within predominantly Muslim countries might be aided by a higher level of support for democracy by religious actors and individuals due to more favorable and tolerant national religion-state arrangements, as expected by our theory.
There are many pitfalls to performing such a test and linking the statistical association between national level variables (on religion-state arrangements) and individual level-variables (on support for democracy) to a different national-level result (an aggregate score of democracy). What is more, some scholars have found evidence that religious persons in the Muslim world, in general, are no less likely to have more democratic attitudes than less religious persons (Tessler 2002, Tessler and Jamal 2006) even as more religious persons also seem more likely than less religious persons to support Islamist parties (Robbins 2009) many of whom, as this dissertation has discussed, have ambivalent or even anti-democratic political agendas. Nor do responses to questions about individuals’ support for democracy tell us what, exactly, these individuals understand or hope democracy to be and whether those individuals are yearning for democracy as a regime type or the economic prosperity and promise of equality which “democracy” might represent to them. Higher levels of individual level support for democracy in any country does not necessarily entail that that country will correspondingly boast a highly democratic political regime. Examining the relationship between religion-state arrangements and individual attitudes towards democracy in Muslim majority countries, however, ought to give us some indication of whether GFI correlates with positive support for democracy among religious individuals. Evidence of this relationship would help support our expectation that religiously friendly policies on the part of the state can help win religious actors’ over to democracy, thereby generating wider societal legitimacy for democracy and making it more likely for a democratic transition, if initiated, to succeed. Due caution, therefore, is necessary in the interpretation of the results here.
Tables 6.8 and 6.9 present the results of multiple regression analyses on several
different models of individual support for democracy and religious political authority in
the predominantly Muslim world, as measured by World Values Surveys data (the
Appendix includes a full wording of the questions used from the surveys). For the
following regressions I used round four of the World Values Survey, which was
conducted between the years 1999 and 2004 in 70 countries, including 12 countries
which, according to my definition, are predominantly Muslim. In the first set of
regressions (table 6.8), lower values correspond to higher support for democracy. In the
second set of regressions (table 6.9), higher values correspond to higher support for the
influence of religion on politics. The models are focused on the associations between
national levels of GRI and GFI, individual levels of religiosity and individual support for
democracy.

The results tend to support several observations. First, and mirroring our results
from the last section, government regulation of religion is negatively associated with
positive individual levels of support for democracy, as measured on both of our measures
of support for democracy in table 2.3. Similarly, government favoritism of religion is
positively associated with positive levels of support for democracy. This lends evidence
to our expectations that, on average, religiously friendly but non-regulatory government
policies can help diffuse the hostility of religious actors towards democracy and stimulate
more support among individuals for democracy.

With respect to the effects of religiosity on attitudes of support for democracy,
the coefficients on our measure of regular religious participation tend to confirm Tessler
and Jamal’s (2006) observation, namely, that religious individuals say they support
democracy more than non-religious or less-religious individuals in the Muslim world. However, that relationship only seems to hold true for the regularly practicing religious. The coefficients on our measure of individuals who identify themselves as culturally religious in the two models are either statistically insignificant or, as in the coefficient on our measure of support for democracy, they are positive and associated with less support for democracy. It is a somewhat surprising result. Perhaps the result is indicative of a stronger association between institutional religious piety and democratic support than between feelings of a vague Muslim religious identify and support for democratic institutions. This is just speculative, however, and more analyses would have to be done to parse out the meaning behind this relationship.
**TABLE 6-8**

GRI, GFI, RELIGIOSITY AND SUPPORT FOR DEMOCRACY IN THE ISLAMIC WORLD

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Democratic System Better</th>
<th>Support for Democracy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>M1</td>
<td>M2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GRI</td>
<td>.189**</td>
<td>.171**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GFI</td>
<td>-.108**</td>
<td>-.095 **</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religiosity</td>
<td>-.026**</td>
<td>-.015**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious Identity</td>
<td>-.002</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HDI</td>
<td>.047**</td>
<td>.044**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>-.008</td>
<td>-.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income</td>
<td>-.064**</td>
<td>-.055**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sex</td>
<td>.076**</td>
<td>.049**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>.001</td>
<td>.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cont</td>
<td>-1.935</td>
<td>-1.711</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R2</td>
<td>0.070</td>
<td>0.062</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R2 (Adj)</td>
<td>0.070</td>
<td>0.061</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>9942</td>
<td>9942</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**SOURCES:** GRI is “Government Regulation of Religion” and GFI is “Government Favoritism of Religion” from Grim and Finke coded in 2006 as the mean score of GFI and GRI coded for the three years of 2001, 2003 and 2005. Religious Pluralism as coded by Alesina et al. (2003). HDI is the United Nations Human Development Index coded for the year 2000. All WVS values represent values from the post 1998 waves.

*P= .05 level, **P= .01 level*
The results of the regression analyses displayed in table 6.9 paint a more complex picture of this relationship between GFI, GRI, religiosity and support for democracy. Even as GFI seems to be associated with higher individual levels of support for democracy, as reported in table 6.9, it is also associated with more support for Shari’a law and the general influence of religious leaders on government. In other words, individuals living in predominantly Muslim countries with high levels of GFI are more likely to support democracy as well as support the institutionalization of religious law. This result reflects one of our key findings in the Algerian case, namely, that religious voters politically desire their political regime to possess both the electoral checks of democracy and the religious framework of Shari’a law. Voters in the Muslim world living in a national context of more GFI, therefore, appear to support the creation of a religious democracy in addition to the political institutionalization of their ability as citizens to affect that regime’s shape and character.

The coefficients of our measures of religiosity add a further wrinkle to this story. Individuals who report higher levels of regular religious practice or report that they are culturally religious are more likely to not support the national institutionalization of Shari’a law. This may lend further evidence to Tessler and Jamal’s (2006) finding that more religious Muslims are more likely to support democracy, in all of its components. At the same time, however, the coefficient on our measure of cultural religiosity flips signs in this table: although less significant, culturally religious individuals are also more likely not to support the influence of religious leaders on government. This also might be further evidence of the simultaneous desire of many Muslims living within a predominantly Muslim context for both a democratically accountable government which,
however, institutes some degree of religious legislation. At the same time, however, this
relationship also requires further study and we will leave the interpretation of these
results open to future speculation.
### TABLE 6-9

**GRI, GFI, RELIGIOSITY AND SUPPORT FOR RELIGIOUS INTERFERENCE WITH POLITICS IN THE ISLAMIC WORLD**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Religious Leaders Should Influence Voting $^{239}$</th>
<th>Support for Shari’a Law</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>M1</td>
<td>M2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>GRI</strong></td>
<td>.001</td>
<td>.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>GFI</strong></td>
<td>-.019*</td>
<td>-.024**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Religiosity</strong></td>
<td>.005</td>
<td>.059**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Religious Identity</strong></td>
<td>-.115*</td>
<td>.24**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>HDI</strong></td>
<td>-.008</td>
<td>-.010**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Education</strong></td>
<td>.006</td>
<td>.021**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Income</strong></td>
<td>.005</td>
<td>-.012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sex</strong></td>
<td>.008</td>
<td>.009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Age</strong></td>
<td>-.001</td>
<td>-.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Cont</strong></td>
<td>-1.533</td>
<td>-1.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>R2</strong></td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>R2 (Adj)</strong></td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td>0.008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Observations</strong></td>
<td>8960</td>
<td>7865</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**SOURCES:** GRI is “Government Regulation of Religion” and GFI is “Government Favoritism of Religion” from Grim and Finke coded in 2006 as the mean score of GFI and GRI coded for the three years of 2001, 2003 and 2005. Religious Pluralism as coded by Alesina et al. (2003). HDI is the United Nations Human Development Index coded for the year 2000. All WVS values represent values from the post 1998 waves.

*P = .05 level, **P = .01 level

$^{239}$ For comparability with table 6.8, I switched the signs from the original survey so that positive values correspond to more support for the influence of religious leaders on government, just as positive values on the second question correspond to more individual support for Shari’a law.
6.4 Religion State Arrangements, Democracy, and Religious Beliefs and Participation

In this final section we want to test for evidence concerning the dissertation’s third major set of hypotheses, namely, that religion-state arrangements affect the religious life of their nations. As we were careful to describe in chapter three, this dissertation does not assert that religion-state arrangements are the principal force affecting the quality and intensity of religious life in any nation, but that they provide an important mediating context for that religious life. As a mediating structural variable, religion-state arrangements interact with other important dynamics which also affect the religious life of the nation as specified, especially, by secularization and religious market theories about national religiosity levels. In chapter three we advanced two principal hypotheses about the effects of a religiously friendly democratization on levels of religiosity, namely:

**Hypothesis 5**: By empowering individuals with political choice, democratization reduces religious authority in politics and will have some downward effect on national levels of regular religious participation.

and

**Hypothesis 6**: Government favoritism of religion will have a positive effect on national rates of religious belief and the regeneration of a national religious identity.

Throughout the third section of the third chapter we built up the argument that religiously friendly governmental policies would have a positive effect on levels of religiosity (H6), yet, that the combination of these government policies within a democratization process would favor the regeneration of a loose national religious identity. Even as they continued to identify with a religious faith, we argued that religious individuals would be less tightly connected with the religious institutions of that faith. In
addition, religious leaders and actors as a whole would be more tolerant of a pluralism of religious belief within their tradition and, possibly, the presence of religious pluralism outside of their religious tradition as well.

Measuring the looseness of national religiosity on a cross-national sample poses difficulties. The relative looseness and internal tolerance of religious belief must be measured according to specific national and religious contexts. Counting how many Catholics report that they go to church on Sunday paints a relatively comparable picture of regular religious participation to that painted by counting how many Muslims say they go to the mosque on Friday.\(^{240}\) However, comparing attitudes of tolerance or the growth in the internal pluralism of religious belief is much more difficult to pin down, and does not compare across countries and religions in the same way. In order to measure whether a Muslim or a Catholic is more tolerant with respect to traditional religious orthodoxy, for example, we would need data which measures specific attitudes in specific doctrinal beliefs and we would need to devise a way to compare these tolerances across religious traditions.\(^{241}\) Our problem is further compounded, once again, by the focus on “process” within the hypothesis. A more loose religious identity would need to be measured as an effect over time which begins at the moment of religiously friendly democratization.

Nearly all of our national data on religion-state arrangements and much of our attitudinal

\(^{240}\) It should be noted, however, that regular attendance at religious institutions is not required with the same intensity across religions. Although not often acknowledged in studies of religiosity worldwide, in Islam, for example, regular Friday mosque attendance is not theologically required. Even though most men who consider themselves to be regularly practicing Muslims do go to the mosque on Friday, many women in many Arab countries do not, and mosques, in fact, are not often even built to support crowds of women participants.

\(^{241}\) Such a dataset would be fascinating to build and analyze, but, unfortunately, for the purposes of this dissertation, the construction of such a dataset will be left for a future endeavor.
data on religiosity, including most of that data for predominantly Muslim countries, however, are available for one time period only. This section, therefore, is trained on testing the first of these two hypotheses, namely whether government favoritism of religion has a positive effect on levels of religiosity.

Within these tests, however, the second hypothesis is not entirely abandoned. In chapter three, we hypothesized that the “looseness” effect of a religious friendly democratization process was the product of the combination of the forces of government favoritism of religion, which subsidizes national religious identities, and democratization, which reduces national religious authority. In the regression analyses to follow, we include a measure of levels of democracy, using Freedom House’s measure of democracy. Even if we cannot measure the growth in the “looseness” of a national religious identity, if both of our hypotheses are correct, we would expect to see that higher levels of democratization ought to have a negative effect on levels of religiosity, even as government favoritism of religion has a positive effect on religiosity, independent of regime type. It should be remembered throughout, however, that using levels of democracy as a control variable is not an ideal measure of our looseness effect. At best it represents a reflection of the process expected by our theory. As we noted in chapter three, in certain circumstances we could imagine contexts in which religiously friendly democratization produces a more loose but also a more robust religious market, as seems to be the case in Algeria. In those contexts, democratization would not be negatively associated with religiosity, just to the closeness of that religiosity to institutional religious belief.
In the results presented below, I use the standard indicator of regular church or mosque attendance as a measure of regularly practicing religiosity and the question of “whether you consider yourself to be a religious person” for a measure of our looser religious identity variable. In both measures, higher values signify lower levels of individual religiosity. I test whether GFI has a positive effect on individual levels of religiosity across the whole cross-national sample, as well as whether GFI has a positive effect on just those individuals who report that they belong to the predominant religious tradition of their country. Using both measures will give us a sense of how much GFI affects not only its “target” audience, but also affects the entire national religious market as well. In addition to Grim and Finke’s (2006) measure of GFI, which, as discussed above, is mostly trained on the financial subsidies endowed to any religious tradition by a state, I include our measure of GFI from Fox. In some ways, GFI (Fox) is a more comprehensive measure of government favoritism of religion as it gauges both financial subsidies as well as legislation which gives other legal and symbolic support to a religious tradition. Finally, as we specified it in chapter three as an important piston within the motor of government favoritism of religion that works to help regenerate national religious identities and beliefs, I measure the effect of public religious education, as coded by Fox, on levels of religiosity. States who require religious education but allow students to opt out are assigned the value 1; states for which religious education is mandatory for all students are assigned the value of 2.

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242 A full wording of all survey questions can be found in the Appendix.
Through our theoretical conversation with both religious market and secularization theories in chapter three, we argued that secularization theory’s expectations of a negative association between indicators of modernity, especially levels of income and education, and indicators of religiosity were essentially sound, with two qualifications. First, as noted above, we argued that government favoritism of religion could act as a mediating variable to the downward forces of secularization as produced by combinations of the forces of modernization and democratization. Secondly, we argued that this association would be especially evident among democratic as opposed to authoritarian regimes. It was possible, we noted, for authoritarian regimes, but not democratic ones, to sustain robust religiosity despite high levels of income and education through coercive regulatory measures in favor of religion. Conversely, despite low levels of income and education, an authoritarian regime could also enforce lower levels of religiosity. As in our earlier models, we measure levels of development according to the Human Development index (HDI) and expect that higher levels of HDI will be associated with lower levels of religiosity, and that this negative association would be especially strong within democracies.

With regard to religious market theory, we pointed out that not all government interventions in favor of religion resulted in religious market inefficiencies and, thus, lower rates of religiosity. We argued that high GRI and not high GFI was the real culprit for any negative association between religious regulation and lower levels of religiosity, not the monopoly, per se, of a religion over a religious market. As described above, however, we might hold that even after controlling for government favoritism of religion, there are some circumstances, once again, especially possible in the context of an
authoritarian regime, when coercive state regulation of religion could actually help maintain higher national levels of religiosity. To test for religious market theory’s claim that more competition among religions creates a more vibrant national religious market, I control for both national levels of GRI and religious pluralism in our models.

The following tables report the results for several series of multiple regression models on our two different indicators of religiosity as gathered by World Values Surveys. In addition to our variables controlling for national levels of religious regulation, democracy, development and religious competition, in the models which follow I also include four standard individual control variables - education, income, gender and age - which also might affect an individuals’ reported level of religiosity. Finally, I include three dummy variables for the major faith traditions we theorized about in the dissertation, Islam, Catholicism and Protestantism, to controls for the national religious context in which any individual finds himself. These three variables give us some cultural measure of the extent to which an individual’s religiosity may be the result of the historical presence of one religious tradition. The variables, CatholicID, MuslimID and ProtestantID, therefore, represent dummy variables which code whether or not an individual is a Catholic, Muslim or Protestant individual living within, respectively, a predominantly Catholic, Muslim or Protestant national context. This variable also gives us a control for the endogeneity of GFI. If GFI has a positive association with religiosity even with these controls in the regression analyses, it provides further evidence that higher levels of religiosity in a predominant, society-wide religious setting are not simply the product of the cultural residues of that religion, but also the product of how states
actively decided to institutionally regenerate that national religious tradition and identity over time.
### TABLE 6-10

RELIGION STATE ARRANGEMENTS AND LEVELS OF NATIONAL REGULAR RELIGIOUS PARTICIPATION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regular Religious Participation (Church/Mosque Attendance)</th>
<th>Total National Religious Participation</th>
<th>Predominant Religion Religious Participation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>M1</td>
<td>M2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GRI</td>
<td>-.124**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GFI</td>
<td>.082**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GRI(Fox)</td>
<td></td>
<td>.020**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GFI (Fox)</td>
<td></td>
<td>-.033**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relg Ed</td>
<td></td>
<td>-.594**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HDI</td>
<td>.103**</td>
<td>.105**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy (F.House)</td>
<td>.067**</td>
<td>-.011**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relig Pluralism</td>
<td>.960**</td>
<td>.663**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catholic ID</td>
<td>-.199**</td>
<td>-.183**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslim ID</td>
<td>-.106**</td>
<td>-.738**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protestant ID</td>
<td>-.171**</td>
<td>-.239**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>-.017**</td>
<td>.002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income</td>
<td>.057**</td>
<td>.037</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sex</td>
<td>.038**</td>
<td>.149**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>-.009**</td>
<td>-.009**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R2</td>
<td>.181</td>
<td>.170</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R2 (Adj)</td>
<td>.181</td>
<td>.170</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>61821</td>
<td>42979</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


P= .05 level, **P= .01 level
These tables illustrate several very interesting sets of results. First of all, once government regulation of religion and religious pluralism have been controlled for, our measures of government favoritism of religion are positively and significantly associated with higher national averages of religiosity, with one important exception. Catholic, Muslim and Protestant individuals living in a predominantly Catholic, Muslim or Protestant society are especially likely to report higher levels of religiosity, but once these national contexts are controlled for, GFI still has an independent, general, positive effect on individual levels of religiosity across this sample. In our regression results focused on regular religious participation, our measures of GFI from Fox are substantively associated with higher individual levels of reported religiosity, and this association is especially strong for Fox’s measure of public religious education. Surprisingly, however, and unexpected by our theory, the coefficient on Grim and Finke’s measure of GFI on the religiosity of individuals across the whole religious market is associated with lower levels of religiosity. While Fox’s measures of GFI are more closely associated with our theoretical story about the relationship between religiously friendly governmental policies and the regeneration of national religious identity, this unexpected result will add a note of caution to our conclusion about that relationship: with respect to regular religious practice, some measures of GFI do not appear to systematically help sustain or generate higher levels of regular religiosity, here especially when GFI is measured simply according to the financial subsidies which a religion enjoys.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Religious Identity (Do you consider yourself a religious person?)</th>
<th>Total National Religious Participation</th>
<th>Predominant Religion</th>
<th>Predominant Religion Religious Participation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>M1</td>
<td>M2</td>
<td>M3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GRI</td>
<td>-.006</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GFI</td>
<td>-.017**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GRI(Fox)</td>
<td></td>
<td>.005**</td>
<td>.006**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GFI (Fox)</td>
<td></td>
<td>-.009**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relg Ed</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HDI</td>
<td>.019**</td>
<td>.021**</td>
<td>.016**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy (F.House)</td>
<td>.021**</td>
<td>-.013**</td>
<td>-.003*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relig Pluralism</td>
<td>.276**</td>
<td>.496**</td>
<td>.277**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catholic ID</td>
<td>-.391**</td>
<td>-.325**</td>
<td>-.378**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslim ID</td>
<td>-.374**</td>
<td>-.124**</td>
<td>-.354**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protestant ID</td>
<td>-.362**</td>
<td>-.405**</td>
<td>-.364**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>.011**</td>
<td>.013**</td>
<td>.011**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income</td>
<td>.003</td>
<td>.004</td>
<td>.003*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sex</td>
<td>-.114**</td>
<td>-.111**</td>
<td>-.114**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>-.003**</td>
<td>-.003**</td>
<td>-.003**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cont</td>
<td>.287</td>
<td>.144</td>
<td>.569</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R2</td>
<td>.195</td>
<td>.211</td>
<td>.198</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R2 (Adj)</td>
<td>.195</td>
<td>.211</td>
<td>.198</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>56964</td>
<td>38934</td>
<td>56964</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**SOURCES:** GRI is “Government Regulation of Religion” and GFI is “Government Favoritism of Religion” from Grim and Finke coded in 2006 as the mean score of GFI and GRI coded for the three years of 2001, 2003 and 2005. GRI is a composite measure of governmental regulation of religion taken using variables from Fox (2006) for the year 2000. Religious Education, also coded by Fox (2006) for the year 2000, records whether national religious education, either mandatory or facultative, is offered in all public schools. Religious Pluralism as coded by Alesina et al. (2003). HDI is the United Nations Human Development Index coded for the year 2000. Level of democracy as coded by Freedom House for the year 2000. All WVS values represent values from the post 1998, pre 2005 waves.

P= .05 level, **P= .01 level
In our second set of models, with our measure of cultural religious identity as a dependent variable, I use logistic regression as our measure of religious identity is essentially a binary variable: individuals who self-identify themselves as a religious person are coded 0 and those who do not self-identify themselves as a religious person are coded 1. All of our measures of GFI, including Grim and Finke, are positively associated with higher individual levels of reported religiosity. Curiously, this positive relationship, in both sets of models, is stronger across the whole sample as opposed to simply the supposed target audience of GFI, namely those individuals who report that they belong to a predominant, society-wide religion of the nation. In other words, GFI appears to have a positive effect on the religion of not only the adherents of the predominant religion, but all individuals in that market as well. Despite the one negative association between Grim and Finke’s measure of GFI and our measure of regularly practicing religiosity, the evidence confirms our principal theoretical expectation, namely, that the state subsidies and friendly policies of government favoritism of religion can actually have a positive effect on national levels of religiosity. These results represent a serious challenge to the theoretical claim of religious market scholarship that all government market interventions in favor of religion are harmful to religious life. Instead, some government aid seems to help such religious life. The predicted values of two of these models, as reported in table 6.12, indicate how substantive this result is, even within a relatively developed and democratic national context. In table 6.12 we assume our regression model for explaining individual levels of religiosity is the following, as in model three of our regressions:
Religiosity =
\[ \beta_1 \cdot GRI + \beta_2 \cdot \text{Relg Ed} + \beta_3 \cdot HDI + \beta_4 \cdot \text{Demo} + \beta_5 \cdot \text{Pluralism} + \beta_6 \cdot \text{CatholicID} + \beta_7 \cdot \text{Ed} + \beta_8 \cdot \text{Inc} + \beta_9 \cdot \text{Sex} + \beta_{10} \cdot \text{Age + Cons tan t} \]

Table 6.12 then calculates the values of religiosity according to this model for a male individual with and without public religious education. For the predictions, we assume relatively low national levels of Government Regulation of religion (GRI (FOX)=1) and religious pluralism (RELF=0.1), a relatively high level of economic, social and democratic development (HDI=80, Freedom House=1), and hold all other control variables at their mean.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Predicted Value of Model:</th>
<th>With Public Religious Education</th>
<th>Without Public Religious Education</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Regular Religious</td>
<td></td>
<td>2.45</td>
<td>-.465</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultural Religious</td>
<td></td>
<td>3.64</td>
<td>.393</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Identity</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

For our measure of regular religious participation, our model predicts that mandatory religious education will essentially bump our male individual up one category of religiosity. Taken at face value, if we round both numbers up, our male individual would jump from a reported religiosity of around “3,” to a reported religiosity of around “2,” meaning that he is more likely to report that he goes to religious services once a week, as opposed to only once a month. Although the model appears to “over-determine”
the religious identity of our male individual in this case, as the table illustrates our male individual would also be about 85% more likely to report a score of “1” in the second category of our table and, thus, 85% more likely to consider himself a religious person rather than not a religious person according to our measure of cultural religious identity.

Even as it challenges religious market theory, however, the same results could be interpreted as a refinement of the original insight of the theory, namely, that what is most harmful to religious life (at least in terms of numbers) is government regulation of religion that bureaucratizes religious organizations and turns the institution into a lazy, dependent monopoly rather than an independent, thriving public good. As expected by religious market theory, in all of our models, low levels of government regulation of religion and high levels of religious pluralism are also associated with higher levels of religiosity, adding evidence to religious market theory’s expectation that religious competition can help create a robust religious market.

The positive relationship between GFI and religiosity also challenges the oft-held assumption of secularization theory that religious decline in the face of such forces is constant, inevitable and secular and adds even more weight to our theoretical expectation that governments who socialize their youth to a religious referent can help that national society mediate the effects of modernization and democratization on their collective identification with religion.

However, despite this mediation, our results do not dethrone secularization theory’s basic expectation of a strong, negative relationship between higher levels of development and negative levels of religiosity. On all of our models, the HDI index is substantially associated with lower levels of religiosity. That said, here, too, there is a
wrinkle to the story. Once levels of development are controlled for, our measure of
democracy, by Freedom House, is generally weak, flips several times in the models, and
an overall pattern of association is difficult to discern. On our measure of cultural
religiosity, higher levels of democracy are generally negatively associated with religiosity
but on our measure of regularly practicing religious, higher democracy scores are
generally positively associated with religiosity. Across these models, the strength of a
nation’s democratic regime has an indeterminate effect on national levels of religiosity. A
democratic regime might result in higher levels of religiosity, but it might not. In the
least, this confirms our theoretical story that, as far as secularization goes, the economic
modernization of a country has a much stronger and negative impact on traditional levels
of national religiosity.

At the same time, the mixed nature of this result also limits how much we can
conclude about the relationship between levels of democracy and a loose national
religious identity. If we assume that a negative relationship between levels of democracy
and levels of religiosity is a sign of democracy’s loosening effect, than we have little
systematic evidence of this. As we noted in the introduction to this section, however, it is
quite possible that democracy might reduce religious authority within a nation without
reducing apparent levels of religiosity. Although this could explain, in part, why it is
difficult to see a general pattern between national levels of democracy and religiosity, the
relationship merits closer, future and systematic study. Some of the inconsistencies in the
results above is almost certainly due, as noted above, to the limits of conclusively testing
a complex, interactive theory using these simple statistical methods on data from one
time period only. The multi-regression analyses presented here assume the causal arrows
of the theory flow in one direction. In reality, as discussed in our theoretical chapters, many of the variables in these analyses, such as levels of economic development, religious pluralism, religiosity, and even population growth, evolve, interact with and depend on one another. These analyses also assume that no omitted variables have been left out of the equation which also might affect individual levels of religiosity and explain some of the results presented here. More sophisticated statistical studies of these relationships, in addition to more data measured over a longer time period, could certainly resolve some of these weaknesses and help us better determine the validity of our theoretical expectations. Further in-depth case studies, as mentioned above, could also serve to complement these results. That said, these analyses do show some support for our theory with respect to levels of religiosity. As our theory predicts, we can conclude that there is evidence to support our expectation that individual levels of religiosity within a democracy are dependent not only on national levels of economic development and religious market structures, but also the institutional context that a regime adopts with respect to the religion(s) it hosts.
This dissertation began with an ambitious research question, namely, *what are the effects of bringing religion into the public sphere in new democracies, especially those, such as Islam and Catholicism, which have been considered to be hostile to democratic precepts?* By asking this question, the dissertation explicitly sought to engage the recent debate over the compatibility of Islam and democracy; put that debate into a larger comparative context; and use the exercise to articulate something more general about the relationship between religion, state and nation in contemporary modern societies.

In order to accomplish these tasks, the first chapter began by reviewing theories about democracy and the role of religion in the modern world. The chapter drew upon these theories and then expanded them to define why a “religiously friendly democracy” and, subsequently, a “religiously friendly democratization process,” were viable political possibilities. Building upon the theoretical insights of chapter one, in chapter two we examined the history, organization and political theology of Catholic and Islamic faith traditions. We noted significant differences in either tradition’s institutional organization and preferred set of values and ethics. Nevertheless we argued that important similarities in the theological traditions of Islam and Catholicism and their historical encounters with modernity warranted a compelling comparative study of their experiences with
democratization. Despite the boundaries imposed by their theological worldviews, we stressed the multivocal nature and inherent capacity of both Islam and Catholicism to evolve over time and adapt to new political arrangements. Throughout the chapter, however, we also outlined the similarity of the ideal relationship between faith and nation found in both Christendom and Dar al-Islam which historically prized religious authority within the polity and which set the stage for the hostility of religious actors towards liberal ideas which challenged that authority in either tradition.

By qualifying this comparison between Islam and Catholicism and defining in what ways a religiously friendly democracy is possible, in chapter three we were able to return to our original ambitions and analyze what happens when a religiously friendly democratization is initiated in a national religious context dominated by democratically hostile or ambivalent religious actors. The dynamics introduced by a religiously friendly democratization process, we argued, were complex and, what is more, interacted with and evolved alongside other complex and varied processes of modernization. While recognizing the difficulties imposed in making generalities about such big and nuanced phenomena, we articulated two major and interactive sets of dynamics created by a religiously friendly democratization in a country whose religious market is dominated by democratically hostile or ambivalent religious actors.

First, we argued that a religiously friendly democratization process could generate more support for democracy among hostile religious actors. By giving religious actors a stake in the regime, forcing religious leaders to compete for votes to win power, and exposing religious individuals to new ideas in a religiously friendly context, states help resolve the hostility of religious actors towards democracy. Religiously friendly
democratization does this by dampening the political salience of religious identity in the electorate. Such a weakening of the political salience of religious identities reframes the political desires of individuals and encourages both religious leaders and religious individuals to internalize the democratic rules of the game; recognize the legitimacy of non-religious political actors and ideas; and set aside their most religiously exclusive political goals. Secondly, we argued that a religiously friendly democratization process also affects the manner in which religious ideas and values are propelled forward in society and influence the future political and social life of a nation. By embedding religious values in state institutions and subsidizing the activities of religious actors, we argued that the state helps regenerate national religious identities, props up the social-religious authority of religious leaders, and makes the appearance of a public religion more likely. At the same time, however, by accepting and internalizing the democratic rules of the game, religious elites and individuals actively transform the conditions of collective religious beliefs, changing the way religious beliefs are expressed and decided upon. Democratization, we argued, and the empowerment of individuals within society that democracy favors, would tend towards the creation of a loose national religious identity that was widely felt but not necessarily accompanied by deep devotion to religious authorities. As such, religiously friendly democratization would be more likely to help sustain higher national levels of religious participation but they could not impose religious identification on its citizens or ensure an orthodoxy of belief. Whatever public authority religious leaders gained in a religiously friendly democratization would be subject to the electoral box and the changing goals and values of religious individuals.
In making this argument and articulating these complex and often overlooked dynamics, this dissertation could be understood as making two important sets of scholarly contributions to the study of religion and democracy. After examining these two contributions, I will make two further observations about the limits of this dissertation which will simultaneously allow us to outline several promising avenues for future research.

7.1 Two Contributions

7.1.1 Religious Political Identities

The first major contribution of this dissertation is that it synthesizes and advances a wider scholarly debate about the moderation and incorporation of hostile religious actors and ideas into democratization processes. The dissertation synthesizes this debate by systematically putting disparate scholarly literatures into conversation with one another. As we framed this task in the introductory chapter, the dissertation’s point of departure begins with the question of the compatibility of Islam and democracy and the various arguments which have crystallized around that question through the formulation of the inclusion-moderation hypothesis. We argued that the expectations of the inclusion-moderation hypothesis and the mechanisms which scholars utilize to explain it are analytically close to those used by scholars to explain the behavior of Christian Democratic parties in Europe and, more generally, Western European political parties as well. The central insight of this group of theories is essentially the same, namely, that electoral participation favors pragmatic politicians as opposed to radical ones and,
therefore, that democratically hostile political parties will moderate their ideologically exclusive goals over time. The theoretical stories of this scholarship are strengthened and gain in explanatory power when their logics explaining change are combined and added together.

The dissertation then advances this debate by, simultaneously, broadening these theories’ agent of change as well as broadening their unit of analysis. With regards to the former, the dissertation theorizes about how the electoral participation of religious parties might be understood as representing an important part of a larger structural change in the relationship between religion and state and gives these larger structural changes a name: *Religiously Friendly Democratization*. With regards to the later, the dissertation then considers how these broader changes might affect not only religious political parties, but religious political movements as a whole. By broadening the scope of these theories, we shift analytical attention away from a study of how the dynamics of electoral participation affect the strategies of religious political parties and towards a more comprehensive analysis of how religiously friendly governmental policies combine with electoral dynamics to affect the goals and strategies of religious individuals in addition to religious political party elites. While other authors have pointed out that religious political party leaders will change the tone of their message as they calculate the message’s capacity to win votes over electoral cycles, our theory explicitly argues that religiously friendly changes in the relationship between religion and state create entirely new dynamics by affecting the political salience of the religious identity of religious individuals. Rather than assuming a voluntaristic, top-down theory of change, therefore, the dissertation focuses on the political power of individuals that is engendered by a
religiously friendly democratization process’s impact on the identity politics of the nation. As religious political party elites respond to electoral dynamics, religious individuals are also autonomously responding to those dynamics. By reframing the identities of religious individuals and the extent to which religious concerns shape their political desires, religiously friendly democratization shapes and constrains the political goals of religious political party elites. When threats to their identity as religious individuals are removed, religious individuals are more likely to see democracy as a legitimate forum to solve their political problems and are more likely to pressure their political elites to do the same.

7.1.2 Public Religions and Loose Religious Identities

The second major scholarly contribution of this dissertation is that it analyzes the forward effects of religiously friendly democratization processes. The combination of religiously friendly governmental policies and electoral politics does not only generate democratic support on the part of democratically ambivalent religious political parties and religious individuals, but it also has an effect on the shape of a national society’s religious and moral identity. Once again, while other authors note how religiously inclusive democratization might impact the religious life of a nation (see, especially, Casanova 1994, Kalyvas 1996, Nasr 2005, Warner 2000) this dissertation is the first study to systematically explore this possibility. It does so by drawing a direct line from debates within political science about the political effects of religiously friendly democratization to debates within the sociology of religion which attempt to explain variation in national levels of religiosity. The dissertation’s theoretical focus on the
evolution of the political weight of an individuals’ religious identity allows the
dissertation to engage sociological insights about the place of religious values and the
future of religious beliefs in modern, democratic societies.

As we explored in chapter three, the dynamics set into motion by a religiously
friendly democratization process with respect to national religious identities and beliefs
interact with other complex bundles of dynamics, including the state of a country’s
economic development, the structure of a religious market and predominant cultural
traditions. Despite these interactions, we articulated a general effect caused by religiously
friendly democratization towards what we termed to be a loose national religious identity.

Depending on the timing of a religiously friendly democratization process and
how it interacted with other bundles of forces which also affect national levels of
religiosity, we saw how this loose religiosity could take on different forms in different
national settings. In Italy, thanks to an intense period of economic development at the
time of its post-war democratization process, Italian society as a whole became less
institutionally religious, even as regular practicing religiosity remained higher than
elsewhere in Europe, and a strong majority of Italian citizens continued to identify
themselves with the Catholic Church. In Algeria, on the other hand, Algerian society did
not appear to be any less religious following religiously friendly democratization,
although individuals do appear to be living their religious beliefs in increasingly diverse
and theologically loose ways. In both cases, therefore, we argued that a same general
effect of religiously friendly democratization could be distinguished: a relative reduction
of institutional religious authority which encouraged individual expressions of religious
belief within a wide but not necessarily deeply felt national religious identification. In
Italy we observed how this change had a major impact on the evolution of the relationship between religious authorities and religious individuals in the Italian Catholic Church. We noted that a similar change was forcing an intense debate about the same relationship in Algeria today.

7.2 Two Observations

In light of these contributions, I would like to offer two concluding observations which, on the one hand, bring the limitations of the central thesis of this theory into light, and yet, on the other hand, also clarify the theory’s potential to explain something generalizable about the relationship between religion and politics, thereby paving the way for future avenues of research.

Both observations stem from the fact that Islam and Catholicism are not fluidly interchangeable subjects of analysis. In order to make the case that Islamic and Catholic experiences with democracy could be put into a meaningful comparative context, the impetus of the dissertation was to carefully point out in which ways either religion was similar in their political and theological worldviews. The second chapter of the dissertation, in particular, made the case that a similar theological understanding of political authority and a similar historical organization of the proper relationship between faith and nation led to similar patterns of response to processes of political liberalization on the part of religious elites and religious individuals in either religious tradition. This response was generally hostile, but that hostility was checked by the inherent multivocality, other-worldly focus, and varied political experiences of both religions that
created the possibility of a bounded space for compromises to be made with democratic ideas and institutions.

In making this argument, we specifically downplayed, but did not ignore, the major institutional differences for organizing religious authority within either religious tradition. Despite Catholicism’s hierarchical organization of religious authority, we claimed that Catholic religious leaders were not immune to an evolution of religious ideas within their tradition. Despite Islam’s relatively decentralized organization of religious authority, we claimed that Muslim religious authorities could still guarantee some orthodoxy of religious thought among their religious faithful. Putting aside these similarities for the moment, I would like to use this conclusion to articulate two specific ways in which differences between Islam and Catholicism’s institutional structures, as showcased in the case studies, affected this general pattern of response.

7.2.1 Temptations to Abuse Religious Power

In both Italy and Algeria, we observed a temptation on the part of elites to abuse the special privileges accorded to either religious tradition in a non-democratic manner. It should be re-emphasized that these temptations were limited: on the whole the response of religious political movements to religiously friendly democratization processes helped advance the transition to and consolidation of democracy in either country. Religious individuals, in particular, had an important part to play in constraining the range of actions of religious elites within the democratic arena. Hostile religious actors in both cases, however, did not become whole-hearted democrats over night. What is interesting to observe in either case is how institutional differences in the organization of religious
authority framed the location and intensity of these temptations. As we saw in chapters four and five, differing preferences for a confessional and centralized religion-state arrangement in Catholicism as opposed to an established and decentralized religion-state arrangement in Islam had a direct effect on the composition of the religious political movement in Italy and Algeria. This difference also affected which actors in either country were most likely to attempt to abuse religious privileges.

In chapter four, elites within the Catholic political movement in Italy were largely categorized into two groups with respect to their support for democracy. The first group, represented by the founders of the Christian Democratic party (DC), were supportive of democracy. At the time of democratization, however, the Christian Democrats were also politically weak. The second group, largely represented by the Vatican hierarchy, were more ambivalent about their democratic intentions and, initially, were politically stronger than the elites of the Christian Democratic party. As Italian individuals became more autonomous of the Vatican hierarchy in their political decisions and as pragmatic Christian Democratic leaders became stronger and pushed for their independence from the Catholic hierarchy, we observed how this also gradually affected a change of both strategy and heart on the part of many within the Catholic hierarchy with respect to democracy. All of these changes, in turn, moved the Catholic political movement towards greater support for democracy and helped consolidate the new Italian democratic regime.

While the Christian Democrats grew in its political independence, the confessional nature of the religion-state arrangement in Italy meant that the legal privileges accorded to the Catholic Church accrued directly to the Vatican hierarchy, not to the Christian Democratic party or the Italian state. To be sure, the Italian state legally
protected the financial privileges and religious hegemony of the Catholic Church in Italy, but the state also renounced any voice over the institutional organization of the Catholic Church or the political and religious goals which they chose to pursue. This arrangement endowed the Vatican hierarchy with the keys to determine what counted as a moral affront to the national religious identity in Italy and, therefore, ought to be legally punished. As we saw in chapter four, Church leaders actively used this authority to further their political as well as their moral goals by attempting to marginalize political enemies (i.e. Communists) and spiritual foes (i.e. Protestants) in order to consolidate their religious monopoly in the country. This authority was ultimately limited and checked by the dynamics taking place among the Italian electorate and within the Christian Democratic party itself which made the direct intervention of the Catholic Church into the political and social affairs of Italian society increasingly unpopular and counter-productive.

In Algeria, the decentralized nature of Islam and its traditional preference for an established religion-state arrangement also affected the composition of Algeria’s Islamic political movement and its institutional relationship to political power. Thanks in part to its decentralized character, there was not such an evident split as there was in Italy between clerical and religious political party preferences with respect to democracy. The location of the hostility and ambivalence towards democracy in the Algerian Islamic political movement was chiefly to be found within religious political parties. The evolution away from that hostility on the part of these parties occurred relatively independently of the religious authority of Algeria’s official clerical structure which had been incorporated into the bureaucratic apparatus of the Algerian state. As we noted in
chapter five, despite this independence religious political parties could still command moral legitimacy and popularity among religious individuals in Algeria by drawing on religious rhetoric and symbols. Official religious authority, therefore, had much less direct say in the evolution of Algerian religious political parties than they did in Italy, even if many within official Algerian Islam supported these parties.

The established nature of Islam in Algeria also meant that many religious privileges accrued much more directly to the state than they did in Italy. Because it appoints the official Muslim clergy in Algeria, pays their salary and oversees their education, the Algerian state retains a direct voice over the political and moral goals of official Algerian Islam. While in Italy an independent religious organization directed and manipulated its religious privileges, in Algeria the religious organization was explicitly regulated by the state. This state regulation caused the temptation to abuse symbolic religious capital to be felt most acutely by the Algerian political regime rather than an independent religious organization, as was the case in Italy. In chapter five we observed how the Zeroual and Bouteflika regimes resisted this temptation between 1995 and 2006 as they attempted to depoliticize official Algerian Islam by making the Ministry of Religious Affairs into an autonomous, apolitical governmental organization. In time, however, as opposition religious parties continued to draw on religious sentiments to sustain their political power, and as those religious sentiments remained widely felt in Algeria, the temptation to profit from their position of religious authority grew for the Algerian government. This explains, in part, why the Algerian government has increasingly mettled with the message of official Algerian Islam over the last several
years, as they have attempted to capture Algerian religious sentiment for their political favor.

7.2.2 Pathways to Religious Pluralism

A decentralized religion not only moderates differently than a centralized religion does, but it also takes on the dynamic of religious pluralism differently. In chapters four and five we argued that religiously friendly democratization helped produce a looser national religiosity in both Italy and Algeria. As noted above, this new looseness of religiosity took on different forms in either country. In Italy, religiously friendly democratization could be thought of as slowing the rate of decline of regular religious practice and buoying high nominal religious identification. Religiously friendly state policies created a religious market wherein a majority of Italian Catholics have regular institutional contact with the Catholic Church, but the Catholic Church remains an important source of authority over the lives of only a minority of those Catholics. For the rest of Italians, who only nominally identify with the Catholic Church, the Church represents a distant source of authority. Within this web of relationships, the Italian Catholic Church has accepted a much greater tolerance of a pluralism of religious beliefs among Italian Catholics as well as the growing presence of a pluralism of non-Catholic religious beliefs, especially in the form of recent immigrants from the East and South who are predominantly Orthodox or Muslim believers. Algeria has not experienced recent religious decline and religiously friendly democratization preceded a period of religious growth in Algeria. As a result, the increase of religious pluralism in Algeria has been limited to an internal process within Islam, in which a more heterogeneous and
pluralistic set of religious beliefs and intensities have been adopted by Algerian individuals who continue to consider themselves both nominally and practicing Muslims.

In Italy, therefore, a centralized, independent religion suffered relative decline by integrating itself into a democratic regime. In Algeria, on the other hand, the absence of a centralized and independent religious authority structure has allowed religious belief to flourish in a political system which, theoretically, was designed to encourage tolerance of a diversity of opinions and belief.

Some of these differences in national trajectories of religious growth can certainly also be traced to factors which are independent of religious-state arrangements and the institutional organization of either religion. An intense process of economic modernization and democratization threatened religious identities more powerfully in Europe after the Second World War than is the case in North Africa and the Middle East today, where economic modernization and democratization processes have been more staggered. In addition, international events like the Iraq war have affected religious identities in the Muslim world in the positive sense. Nonetheless, as we illustrated by comparing the Italian case with other European countries, we would expect that Algeria’s religious market would prove to be more characteristically loosely religious thanks to its religiously friendly democratization process than other national religious markets in the Middle East and North Africa whose states have not adopted such processes. The paucity of comparative evidence currently available for making a stronger conclusion on the experience of Algeria certainly represents a weakness of the dissertation. As the next section describes, however, the need for more data on the religious life of Muslim
majority countries also points the way towards a very promising future avenue for research.

7.3 Future Avenues of Research

Given the results of the case studies and large-N data presented here, we have strong reason to believe that our theoretical expectations are not simply idiosyncratic explanations of the relationship between religion and democracy in Italy and Algeria. While there are many other factors explaining national levels of democratic support and religiosity our findings support our theory’s predictions about the independent dynamics set into motion by a religiously friendly democratization process in a country with a predominant, society-wide religion with seemingly hostile intentions towards democratic ideas and institutions. However, these findings really represent an initial inquiry of these predictions. Especially given their complex and interactive nature, much more could be done to further isolate the effects of religiously friendly democratization processes and test the mechanisms of this theory on a larger sample of national settings.

This pursuit is particularly attractive with respect to other Muslim majority nations which remain the focal point of much of the debate surrounding the relationship between religion and democracy today. Our hypotheses and quantitative data help us to outline some interesting candidates for further research and to make predictions about the democratic and religious life we would expect to find in these countries.
7.3.1 Comparing Muslim Religiosities

As we began to suggest in the previous section, it would be useful to study the experience of Algeria in the context of two other types of religion-state arrangements in the Muslim world in order to isolate the effects of religiously friendly democratization on the religious life of Muslim nations: 1) states with similar levels of government favoritism of religion to Algeria but with higher levels of government regulation of religion, everything else being equal, and 2) states with relatively similar levels of government regulation of religion to Algeria but with lower levels of government favoritism of religion to Algeria, once again, ceteris paribus. Studying Algeria in the context of these two groups of countries would allow us to better determine to what extent Algerian religiosity could be characterized by larger, globally Muslim trends which shape the form of transnational Islamic religiosity today but which, at the same time, has taken its particular form of loose national religiosity thanks to Algeria’s religiously friendly democratizing context. Due to their more authoritarian institutional setting, we would expect countries in the first group, with more religious regulation and relatively similar religious favoritism, to support a national level of religiosity which is less internally diverse or plural than Algerian religiosity. Due to their lack of government favoritism of religion in a relatively regulated religious setting, we would expect countries in the second group to support a less robust level of religiosity than Algeria. Figure 6-1 of chapter six helps us to identify candidates for either group. Moving vertically up the graph, towards higher levels of government regulation of religion than Algeria but relatively similar levels of government favoritism of religion, we would expect countries like Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Qatar, who also possess similar levels of
economic development to Algeria, to be characterized by a less religiously diverse internal religious market. Moving horizontally across the graph, towards countries whose regulation of the national religious market has generally been less favorable to Islam over the last twenty years, we would expect countries like Turkey and Tunisia and, even more so, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, to have lower levels of religiosity than Algeria.

In terms of raw numbers of religiosity, the following table using the most recent data from the World Gallup Poll reporting regular religious practice suggests that these expectations bear out. Turkey, Tunisia and the former Muslim Majority Soviet Republics all have national levels of religiosity significantly lower than Algeria. All of the countries in the first group, on the other hand, have higher national levels of religiosity. Although high levels of religiosity is not an indicator of lack of internal religious pluralism, in the least, they might represent evidence that this group of states has successfully stimulated their levels of religiosity. As we argued in chapter six, in depth case studies of these countries would allow us to determine the political and social realities behind these numbers and to understand how much these figures of religiosity can be linked to institutional patterns of religion-state arrangements and recent traditions of governmental policies which favor and regulate Islam in any given context.
TABLE 7-1

RELIGIOSITY IN THE MUSLIM WORLD

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Regular Religious Attendance 2009 (percentage of population)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Qatar</td>
<td>77%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>68%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>61%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>55%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>42%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>36%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tajikistan</td>
<td>30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kyrgyzstan</td>
<td>27%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SOURCE: All data from World Gallup Poll, 2009

7.3.2 Comparing Muslim Support for Democracy

With respect to our expectation that a religiously friendly democratization process would generate greater democratic support among hostile religious actors, our future research task would be similar. We would search to expand our number of case studies to include other countries where Islamist political parties have been allowed to participate in elections in a more religiously friendly environment. In countries such as Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan and Morocco, we would expect to find evidence that religious individuals, over time, signal less interest in exclusively religious politics and that religious political parties drop their more radical religious claims in favor of more pragmatic political goals. Kurzman and Iqbal’s (2010) recent attempt to quantify Islamist moderation over electoral periods tends to support this thesis. However, more
comparative case studies tracing the behavior of both political parties\textsuperscript{243} and religious individuals would help us further determine the strength of this dissertation’s theory.

7.3.3 Other Pathways to Democracy

It would also be instructive to study cases in which states have attempted to democratize in an opposite fashion from that under study here, namely, when states institute a religiously un-friendly democratization process. As we noted in chapters one and three, our theory does not imply that a religiously friendly democratization is the only path to democracy for states who host a predominant, society-wide religion with seemingly hostile intentions towards democracy. As was the case with France, it is quite possible that a Muslim-majority country might successfully democratize after effectively eradicating a religious political movement. In light of the events unfolding in the Middle East at the time of this writing, Tunisia makes for a very compelling case study of this possibility. After marginalizing Islamist parties from the political arena over a thirty year period and enforcing a relatively secular religion-state arrangement, the political apparatus in Tunisia has now cracked open and religious actors are testing the waters. While some have argued that Tunisia’s policy of marginalization originally worked to radicalize what was already a relatively moderate Islamist party (see Dunn 1994), their marginalization was so powerful and the Tunisian government’s secularizing religion and state arrangement was so successful that the state might have also made the Islamist an

\textsuperscript{243} Most recent studies of Islamist political parties, as noted in chapter three, have focused on the relationship between state and party, with much less emphasis, if any, on the evolution of individual political goals, including, for example, the following analyses of Islamist party behaviors in Yemen (Schwedler 2006), Egypt (Wickham 2004), Morocco (Lust-Okar 2004), Indonesia (Hefner 2000) and Mali (Kunkler and Leininger 2009).
irrelevant political actor for the time being. In Tunisia, as elsewhere, we would expect to
find evidence supporting elements of our theory, for example, that some inclusion led to
some political moderation, even as other factors ultimately led to a different overall
result.

7.3.4 Comparative Catholic Contexts

While further analysis of the predominantly Muslim world make for a compelling
and timely future research agenda, there is also much more that could be done to extend
the present analysis to the predominantly Catholic world. Within Europe, as we began to
do with our comparative case study of Italy and France in chapter four, it would
illuminating to track how Catholic political movements and citizens responded, both
politically and spiritually, to specific national changes in the arrangement between church
and state before the second Vatican Council, when the Catholic Church could still be
considered to represent a stumbling block towards democracy. Especially telling
candidates include Austria and Belgium, where the Catholic Church had originally
resisted attempts at liberalization but was also successful in winning compromises over
the relationship between religion and state in earlier waves of democracy. While many
studies have charted the trajectory of political liberalization and the growth of Christian
Democratic parties in these and other countries of Europe (Kalyvas 1996, Gould 1999,
Warner 2000, Kselman and Buttigieg 2003), as noted in chapter three, there has been
little systematic exploration of the effects of those trajectories on the variations in
European trends of religiosity.

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Beyond Europe, the relationship between Catholic Church and state and society in Latin America also holds great promise as an avenue for future research. Several states of Latin America, including Brazil, Chile, Uruguay, Argentina and Mexico, experimented with political liberalization in a democratizing direction before the Second Vatican Council and instituted a variety of concordats and religion-state arrangements (Casanova 1994). A systematic study of the relationship between the historical legacies of these religiously friendly and un-friendly democratization processes on the support for democracy among religious individuals and the shape of religious markets in Latin America would make for a very interesting study.

Another promising avenue of research, particularly in regards to the experience of Latin America and Europe where the creation of loose national religious identities is most evident, would be to analyze the extent to which a loose national religious identity continues to matter for national political trends. Gould’s recent work (2009) analyzing the response to patterns of predominantly Muslim immigration towards predominantly Catholic nations in Europe is an example of what a study of this genre might look like. While much recent work has been done on immigration from predominantly Muslim countries to Europe, most of that work has been based on Anglo-Saxon and French experiences, some of the most religiously and politically secular nations in the world. While these experiences are analytically important, they often sweep over dynamics which are key to integration in other, less secular nations where citizens remain attached to a very loose sense of national religious identities. Italy, once again, proves to be illustrative in this aspect. Italy’s own experience with the Catholic Church and religious politics has created a different political plane of interaction between religious and
political actors. In recent years, a burgeoning political alliance has formed between leaders of immigrants from predominantly Muslim countries and Catholic and Vatican politicians which has challenged traditional labels of left and right and redefined the religious-secular debate in Italy. Catholic and Muslim politicians in Italy and elsewhere have increasingly pressed for “spiritual rights” which they argue ought to be protected as equally as human rights.

7.3.5 Looking to other Religious Traditions

Finally, although this dissertation has followed two major religions as they struggled through big, historical moments to respond to modern democratic politics, we would expect that some of the insights of this theory would hold theoretical promise for predominant, society-wide religions of other religious traditions who are not necessary facing such great historical conjunctions. We would expect, for example, that religious parties could be successfully integrated into democratic contexts both in countries where the predominant, society-wide religion remains ambivalent of democracy, and where it is not. Likewise, we would expect that religiously friendly democratization would have some positive effect on national patterns of religiosity in other religious contexts, even those where religious leaders and individuals have been historically favorable to democracy. Studying the response of national Orthodox Churches to democratization efforts in Eastern Europe or Hindu and Buddhist political movements in response to political liberalization in Asia would help determine to what extent this theory has successfully articulated something about the general nature of religion and politics rather than the more specific political experiences of Islam and Catholicism.
Regardless of the results of these future studies and the recalibration which they will demand of the theoretical expectations presented here, it is my hope that this dissertation will stimulate a more precise and thoughtful analysis of the public role of religious ideas and actors in the contemporary world of today.
ARCHIVES

Archivio Centrali dello Stato (ACS) – Rome

Archivum Secretum Apostolicum Vaticanum (ASV) – Vatican City

Archivio Storico “Istituto Luigi Sturzo” – Rome

Fondazione Istituto Gramsci – Rome

Archives El Watan – Algiers

Archives Liberté – Algiers

Archives Revue de la Presse – Algiers


----------(2009a). “If you Render unto God What is God’s, is There Anything Left for Caesar?” *Review of Politics* 71 (609-617).


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APPENDIX A:

GRIM AND FINKE (2006) GFI AND GRI CODING QUESTIONS:
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable:</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Minimum</th>
<th>Maximum</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std. Error</th>
<th>Std. Dev.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Missionary Work is</td>
<td>196</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.3980</td>
<td>0.0425</td>
<td>0.5947</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Question:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Does the Report mention whether foreign missionaries are allowed to operate?</td>
<td>0=allowed and/or no limits reported, 1=allowed, within restrictive limits, 2=prohibited</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proelytizing, Preaching, or Conversion is Limited or Restricted</td>
<td>196</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.5357</td>
<td>0.0567</td>
<td>0.7934</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Question:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Does the Report mention that proselytizing, public preaching, or conversion is limited or restricted?</td>
<td>0=no; 1=yes, but (equally) for all religions; 2=yes, but only for some religions</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government Interferes with an Individual's Right to Worship</td>
<td>196</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.5714</td>
<td>0.0491</td>
<td>0.6869</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Question:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Does the Report indicate that the Government interferes with an individual's right to worship?</td>
<td>0=no or no interference; 1=some interference; 2=severe interference</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Legal or Practical Protection for Freedom of Religion</td>
<td>196</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.8673</td>
<td>0.0615</td>
<td>0.8610</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Question:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How is freedom of religion described in the Report?</td>
<td>0=law/Constitution provides for freedom of religion and the Government 'generally respects' this right in practice; 1=law/Constitution provides for freedom of religion and the Government generally respects this right in practice, but some problems exist, e.g., in certain localities; 2=limited and/or rights are not protected or are restricted; 3=does not exist</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Respect Freedom of Religion</td>
<td>196</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.9082</td>
<td>0.0664</td>
<td>0.9291</td>
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<td>Question:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Does this Section of the Report mention that the Government &quot;generally respects&quot; this right in practice?</td>
<td>0=yes; 1=yes, but exceptions or restrictions are mentioned; 2=the phrase 'generally respects' is not used</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government Policy Does Not Contribute to Freedom of Religion</td>
<td>196</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.6990</td>
<td>0.0577</td>
<td>0.8078</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Question:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Does this Section of the Report specifically mention that the government policy contributes to the generally free practice of religion?</td>
<td>0=yes; 1=yes, but exceptions are mentioned; 2=no</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Variable: Government Favoritism of Religion (GFI)</td>
<td>Alpha: 0.7900</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable: Imbalanced Government Funding of Religion</th>
<th>Alpha: 0.8832</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Question: According to the Report, what is the nature of Government funding (including ‘in kind’ such as funding buildings) to the religious sector?</td>
<td>0=no funding; 1=has a proportional balance; 2=has imbalance; 3=only goes to one religion or belief</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>Minimum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>196</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable: Degree to Which a Religion is Favored</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Question: To what extent is there a favored (or Established) Religious Brand?</td>
<td>0=none or all religious brands are treated the same; 1=Cultural or Historical legacies only, e.g., former established religious brand inherits buildings or properties; 2=Some religious brands have privileges or government access unavailable to other religious brands; 3=One religious brand has privileges or government access unavailable to other religions; 4=One single State or Official (Established) Religious Brand / Religion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>Minimum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>196</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable: Inequitable Level of Government Favors</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Question: How does the Government subsidize (incl. ‘in kind’) Religion?</td>
<td>0=no subsidies or equal to all (e.g., all are tax exempt); 1=Cultural or Historical legacies only (e.g., religion inherits Cathedrals from previous Government spending); 2=Only some religions are excluded from available subsidies; 3=Only an approved set of religions receive government subsidies; 4=Only one religion is subsidized (including ‘in kind’ subsidies)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>Minimum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>196</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable: Inequitable Government Funding of Things Related to Religion</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Question: Does the Report mention that the Government funds some things related to religion?</td>
<td>0=no; 1=yes, but equal funding for each religion; 2=yes, but funding is not equal for all</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>Minimum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>196</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable: Government Funding Index (schools, media, clergy, etc.)</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Question: Does the Report say the following religious things are funded by the Government? [Additive Index (alpha = .7206) formed by giving a 0-2 rating for each of the following six categories: education, buildings, clergy, media, charity, religious activities] 0=no; 1=yes, but equal funding for each religion; 2=yes, but funding is not equal for all</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>Minimum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>196</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure A-2

Government Favoritism of Religion (GFI)
APPENDIX B:

WORLD VALUES SURVEY QUESTION WORDINGS

F028.- How often do you attend religious services
Apart from weddings, funerals and christenings, about how often do you attend religious services these days?

1 'More than once a week'
2 'Once a week'
3 'Once a month'
4 'Only on special holy days/Christmas/Easter days'
5 'Other specific holy days'
6 'Once a year'
7 'Less often'
8 'Never practically never'

F034.- Religious person
Independently of whether you go to church or not, would you say you are…(Read out)

1 'A religious person'
2 'Not a religious person'
3 'A convinced atheist'

F063.- How important is God in your life
How important is God in your life? Please use this scale to indicate- 10 means very important and 1 means not at all important.

1 'Not at all important'
2 '2'
3 '3'
4 '4'
5 '5'
6 '6'
7 '7'
8 '8'
9 '9'
10 'Very important'
F065.- Moments of prayer, meditation...
Do you take some moments of prayer, meditation or contemplation or something like that?

0 'No'
1 'Yes'

F024.- Belong to religious denomination
Do you belong to a religious denomination?

1 'Yes'
0 'No'

E117.- Political system: Having a democratic political system
I'm going to describe various types of political systems and ask what you think about each as a way of governing this country. For each one, would you say it is a very good, fairly good, fairly bad or very bad way of governing this country?

Having a democratic political system is

1 'Very good'
2 'Fairly good'
3 'Fairly bad'
4 'Very bad'

E123.- Democracy may have problems but is better
I'm going to read off some things that people sometimes say about a democratic political system. Could you please tell me if you agree strongly, agree, disagree or disagree strongly, after I read each one of them?

Democracy may have problems but it's better than any other form of government

1 'Agree strongly '
2 'Agree'
3 'Disagree'
4 'Strongly disagree
**F105.- Religious leaders should not influence government**
How much do you agree or disagree with each of the following statement:

Religious leaders should not influence government

1 'Agree strongly '
2 'Agree'
3 'Neither agree or disagree'
4 'Disagree'
5 'Strongly disagree'

**F111.- Only laws of the Shari´a**
How much do you agree or disagree with each of the following statement:
It [the government] should implement only the laws of the shari´a

1 'Agree strongly '
2 'Agree'
3 'Neither agree or disagree'
4 'Disagree'
5 'Strongly disagree'