ANGER IN THOMAS AQUINAS AND HAN-FULL ANGER

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Abstract

by

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The goal of this dissertation is to bring together in conversation Aquinas's thoughts on anger and the han (한)-full anger as a culture-bound syndrome in South Korean people and society, and to make a constructive proposal for working with the anger of the han-filled. Aquinas' ontological cognitivist theory of passion and anger in particular provides a useful hermeneutical tool to analyze and articulate the inner structure of han-full anger and its moral character. The study of han-full anger offers Aquinas's normative language of anger a chance to encounter the etymological and phenomenological reality of embodied anger and further the life of its bearer living in a marginalized life. Finally, Aquinas’s virtue ethics, taken together with han studies, suggests a modified way to work with the han-full anger.
This is for Eunsil
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INTRODUCTION

Introducing the Topic

My dissertation, which is composed of four chapters, pursues two goals: it is designed to explore Aquinas’ notion of passion in general, and anger in particular, and to relate his normative vision of anger to a particular form of anger, han (恨)-full anger,¹ which is considered culturally-bound to Korea. The discussion proceeds in three steps, addressing Aquinas’ good and virtuous anger and han (恨)-full anger, respectively, to interpret and analyze han-full anger in the context of Aquinas’ scheme, and finally, to attempt to find a way to work with han-full anger in an extended Thomistic way.

What motivated me to pursue this topic is the fact that Aquinas’ theory of human and nonhuman passion in general, and anger in particular, offers a useful and sound “Christian” language with which to investigate my long-time interest, the relationship between emotion and morality, the problem of han and its associated anger (“han-full anger”), and its influence on moral agency. Han-full anger refers to the anger of the han-filled, who are experiencing suffering. Those with han, primarily

¹Han-full anger denotes the type of anger that is rooted in han. Han can be defined in various ways. For the purpose of this project, han can be described as “the wound in the depths of the soul” caused by repeated abuse and injustice, which is manifested as a psychological core of “the collapsed sadness, bitterness, rage, and hopelessness.” Andrew Sung Park, From Hurt to Healing: A Theology of the Wounded, (Nashville, TN: Abingdon Press, 2004), 11.
Korean middle-aged women of low socioeconomic class, suffer from a disordered habit of anger, which is related profoundly to their wounded agency. As we will see, 

*han*-full anger has long been considered to cause pain and have consequent, harmful effects on the social and physical well-being of many South Korean people and society (not only Korean women). However, it has only recently begun to be studied academically. Given the insufficiency of criteria and a theory for self-assessment in the *han* discourse, an external theoretical assessment is crucial. There have been various attempts, although not many, particularly in psychology, to grasp the nature of *han*-full anger, but there is still a shortage of research that provides a more thorough, and systematic understanding of *han*-full anger. Therefore, the question is, can Aquinas’ theory of emotion in general and anger, in particular, contribute to studies of *han*-full anger?

We find first that Aquinas’ theory of anger offers a relatively sound ontological tool to approach the state of *han* and its associated anger. Based on its nondualistic anthropology, Aquinas’ ontological and psychological theory leads us to approach *han*-full anger with a holistic vision of emotion, which is associated not only with the body, but is related to human rationality as well. With its concrete grammar and norms, we can analyze the inner structure of *han*-full anger confidently and identify its problems. His notion of anger and its conspicuous relationship to human rationality illuminates ways to approach and understand the character of *han*-full anger and its moral aspect in conjunction with the moral agent.

Secondly, he offers a Christian way to ponder the emotional life of the *han*-filled. Aquinas might not be the only pre-modern Christian theologian to discuss human
emotions, but his is the most thorough and systematic treatment of human and non-
human passions. When explaining our emotions, we are aided by our updated scientific
languages, as are many theologians, but we cannot attain a holistic picture of human
and nonhuman emotions without the profound meaning that Aquinas’ account provides.
His account of passion, and anger in particular, is positioned in his system of thought
meaningfully and beautifully, and is interwoven seamlessly with theological,
philosophical, and psychological insights. Having begun with Aristotle’s account of
passion, his in-depth theological inspiration extends to construe human emotions as
they relate to the drama of human life itself, and encompasses its whole spectrum, from
original sin to beatitude. Following Aquinas’ description of human passion, we can
engage in the narratives of creation, sin, and redemption, where human beings, the
world, and God are interrelated. Human passions are, for Aquinas, an essential
component of his theology and virtue ethics.

We can connect Aquinas’ virtuous anger and han-full anger in the relationship
between “normative” anger and a “particular” form of anger contextualized in a certain
reality, respectively. To relate these two types of anger in this way evokes a question,
whether or not it is just and proper to evaluate a particular anger within another form of
anger as a norm, which is in fact the product of a different context. This question
involves a postmodern concern relating to “universality vs. particularity,” because, as
witnessed, positioning two types of theories with different historical backgrounds in the
relationship between a norm and its deviation has resulted often in treating the latter in
a discriminatory and oppressive manner. It is probably true that we can take Aquinas’
normative idea to its extreme, and neglect the particular form and context of *han*-full anger. This is a general risk we encounter whenever working with any normative scheme of thought, which is why a cautious approach, rather than one that functions to justify the elimination of deviance, and creates a dominating, hegemonic worldview, is required. In that sense, Aquinas’ normative vision of anger can benefit from its conversation with *han*-full anger as well. The discourse of *han*—and *han*-full anger—has functioned as the narrative of the *poor* that embraces the life of the marginalized and weak, and encourages them to resist the violent and oppressive institutional and discursive power in South Korean history. Through its lens to the discourse of “norm,” the *han* narrative can help identify potential gaps in Aquinas’ normative thought.

Having said that, it is still true that Aquinas’ theory provides a good starting point to address *han*-full anger, which requires theoretical help; moreover, it is notable that Aquinas’ scheme of thought contains inherent “flexibility” that allows new interpretations to fit into a particular context. As his theory of passion was formed as a result of his dialectical methodology moving across his teleological vision, and his research on various forms of contextualized anger, we can conduct our studies through a dialectical contemplation between his normative frame of thought on anger and the particular reality of *han*-full anger. It should also be remembered that the norm of emotion that Aquinas envisioned was derived primarily from his Christian belief in Creation. For him, the normative vision of human—and nonhuman—emotions refers to the original goodness of God’s Creation, and is oriented to its perfection; thus, his norm
functions as guidance for the improvement of emotional life towards its *telos*, rather than as exclusive judgment for punishment.

For Aquinas, passion is an “event” in which the subject encounters the world, and anger is related particularly to an “unjust” situation. When reflected in Aquinas’ normative narrative, the discourse of *han*-full anger becomes a story in which the *han*-filled are struggling, but resisting injustice. We can see there the effects and power of *han*-full anger as it functions as a signal to reveal the suffering of the poor and to resist an unjust society. Through the proper practice of the virtuous anger that Aquinas envisions, *han*-full anger—as the anger of the “healed healer”—can contribute to the perfection of moral agency and further the transformation of society through its collective efforts. Aquinas did not intend precisely to bring together the social formation of anger and the collective aspect of communal anger, and yet we can find certain keys to relate his ideas to the situation of the *han*-filled and *han*-full anger in an extended Thomistic way. Interpreting *han*-full anger in a Thomistic framework thus not only leads us to see the deviation and limitations of *han*-full anger in the light of his normative vision, but also to discover its deeper meaning and a hope for its transformation.

**Overview**

The first chapter explores Aquinas’ thoughts on passion in general and anger in particular. I examine the nature of human passion (and anger) set forth in his whole scheme of anthropology, its moral character, the normative form of passion, and anger in particular. The chapter focuses on QQ 46-48 in the *Prima Secundae Pars* and Q 158 in
the *Secunda Secundae Pars* of the *Summa* to gain an understanding of Aquinas’ views on passion and virtue. I am indebted particularly to the interpretations of Aquinas of Diana Cates, Nicholas E. Lombardo, and William Mattison.

The second chapter examines *han* and *han*-full anger, which are regarded as culturally-bound to the society of South Korea. For the investigation of the *han*-full form of anger, which refers to a general form of anger associated with *han*, I use a particular case of anger syndrome, HB (*Hwa-Byung*).\(^2\) HB is an extreme condition of anger known to be rooted in *han*. Using the case of HB, we can reach a fair, although not exhaustive, understanding of *han*-full anger.

The goal of the third chapter is to interpret and analyze the inner structure of *han*-full anger, discerning its limitations and evaluating its morality from a Thomistic perspective. *Han*-full anger, due to its embodied feature, is not comparable directly to Aquinas’ normative form of anger.\(^3\) Yet, Aquinas’ treatment of anger furnishes a useful theoretical tool to begin the analysis of *han*-full anger, and enables us to evaluate its moral character. In addition, while examining *han*-full anger in relation to its historical and sociocultural matrix, we can reach a point at which we can appreciate it as morally meaningful.

\(^2\) *Hwa-byung* (HB), the literal meaning of which is “anger disease” or “fire disease,” is known as a cultural syndrome of anger in South Korea. It is listed in Appendix I, *Glossary of Culture-bound Syndrome of Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, 4\(^{th}\) edition* (DSM-IV).

\(^3\) In this dissertation, *han*-full anger refers not only to the form of anger that arises occasionally, but also to its prolonged form as a disposition of one’s character.
The final chapter addresses methods to cope with han-full anger from the perspective of Aquinas’ virtue ethics in conjunction with the han discourse. Anchored in the principle of “choosing to feel and act on anger for justice,” we consider a way for the han-filled to practice appropriate anger with some modification. This recalls the difficulty of practicing righteous anger in the harsh context of han-full anger, and brings to light the importance of individual will and efforts to change one’s life, as well as that of communal support.
CHAPTER 1:
AQUINAS ON ANGER

1.1 Introduction

The emotion, anger, has been regarded as a puzzling and confusing one among the emotions. Anger is difficult to define and demands scrutiny. Contemporary theorists consider anger a basic human emotion, and yet it is still sometimes confused with aggression or depression, or is neglected as an emotional experience entirely. Anger also seems to have been problematic for Aquinas as well. By comparison to the other emotions, he gave extensive attention to the question of anger, devoting a total of three questions to its investigation in his treatise on the passions in the Prima Secundae Pars (qq. 46-48), and also in the treatise on the virtues in the Secunda Secundae Pars of the Summa (q. 158). He examined anger in one question composed of five articles in the De Malo (q. 12), and in various passages in the commentary on Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics.

Aquinas described anger as a passion that consists of a combination of several passions, including love, sorrow, and hope, namely, love for good, sorrow for the lost good, and hope for good (vengeance). The complex and difficult nature of anger might have interested him more than any other passion, and yet his interest in anger was
related more to its affective quality and moral worth, rather than to its own nature. In his view, human emotion, including anger, is a component essential to becoming a moral agent. It is created to contribute to the attainment of one’s telos under rational guidance, and thereby normatively is affirmed as good. For him, as we will see later, the authentic nature of anger is revealed most clearly in its inherent proximity to reason, which is an attribute specific to a human being. It therefore was more important to him to examine anger in its relation to being a moral agent, rather than to probe it as a phenomenon.

To approach anger in this way, to consider an emotion’s relationship to morality, rather than in its own light, might evoke concern about “rationalizing” emotion and raise a question about its limitations. Aquinas’ view of passion was based on his anthropology, and naturally, he attempted to find a solution in the rational powers’ ability to analyze and control emotion. Yet, in contrast to modern dualism, passion and reason are not contradictory to each other, nor depicted as subject to each other. As we

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4 The approach of “rationalizing” emotion might sound “insidious” to many of us today. Its underlying premise considers emotion as involuntary and inherently antagonistic to reason, so that it must be controlled by reason. Moreover, this presumption has been misused to generate various skewed thoughts, i.e., the superiority of reason over body (emotion) and its extended sociological implications regarding gender and race. Yet, as Thomas Dixon revealed, it is the modern notion of rationality after the secularization of psychology during the nineteenth century— not the Western rationalist tradition itself—that leads emotions to be viewed as irrational, and thus to be controlled by reason in a dichotomous framework. In his book, *From Passion to Emotion* (2003), Dixon maintained that in the process of the secularization of psychology, the traditional and religious language of passions was replaced by a wholly new category, emotion. As this modern concept of emotions was created, the dichotomy between reason and emotion was newly established. The concept of emotion was conceived as “a set of morally disengaged, bodily, non-cognitive and involuntary feelings;” this over-inclusivity effaced all the subtlety and nuances the old categories of “passions” and “affections” conveyed originally. As a result, the reason-emotion dichotomy was rendered much starker than the reason-passion distinction. See Dixon, *From Passion to Emotion*, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 3. The idea of “rationalizing” emotion itself does not need to be regarded as problematic, but how or in what way it is elicited and explained. As we will see soon, Aquinas’ rationalist approach is different from that of modern forms of dualism.
will soon see, his view of the human being as a “soul-body composite” maintained the subtle nuances and balance between the two dimensions of the rational and the sensory, as well as the soul and the body, and these two realms communicate with each other by way of political rule, not despotic command. Anger is particularly close to reason and is designed to obey reason, but neither automatically nor forcefully. Anger as a passion has its own movements and sometimes resists the command of reason; thus, the persuasion of reason is important.

Aquinas basically considered passions to be sensory in nature, and he maintained the inherent connection of passion to reason. His cognitive view of anger sustained the rationality and moral character of anger via its proximity to reason, while not losing sight of its embodied dimension. Aquinas’ approach to human passion thus sought a comprehensive understanding of the entire dimension of a person as the soul-body composite. It construed passion on the continuum where the sensory and bodily conditions are connected to each other, and are related further to the intellectual life, which is ultimately linked to beatitude. Located on this continuum, human passion—anger in particular—displays its function as an indicator of the existential state of human life, which is hidden and sometimes manifested pathologically. It also demonstrates its created function to respond to various embodied situations and thus, via the enhancement of its moral goodness, to contribute to the fulfillment of telos in this world.

\[5 \text{ST. I-II. 56.4 ad 3.}\]
1.2 Aquinas on Passion

Aquinas defined passion as “a movement of the sensitive appetite when we imagine good or evil.” When we apprehend something (or some situation) that is good or evil with respect to our well-being, we, by virtue of our powers of sensitive appetite, are moved to seek what is good and avoid what is evil. Passion, as the term indicates, implies the passive power of “being moved” by the agent, which is the object of external apprehension. Yet, in the case of humans (and non-humans as well), it can also signify an active capacity to move oneself to respond to the outside world. As we will see later, passion was, for Aquinas, understood as a fundamental movement of created beings towards the ultimate *telos* in a world created intellectually. For an introductory understanding of Aquinas’ theory of passion, let us examine Diana Cates’ sketch of a passion:

All of us want to live happily and well. We want this not only for ourselves but also for others who are part of us or closely connected to us. When something happens that appears to bear notably on our own or a loved one’s well-being, a situation forms and holds our attention. We receive impressions and make judgments about what is happening and about how it concerns us. More than this, we are *moved* by what we apprehend. We might not be moved outwardly, in the form of physical movement, but we are moved inwardly [emphasis, original].

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6 *ST. I-II 22.3.*

7 *ST. I-II 22.1*

8 I am indebted to Diana F. Cates for her understanding of Aquinas’s theory of passion. Her interpretation is particularly helpful for showing how we can or should interpret Aquinas’s account of passion in our contemporary context. D Cates, *Aquinas on the Emotions: A Religious Ethical Inquiry.* (Washington, D.C: Georgetown University Press, 2009), 1.
Several points are noteworthy here: when we as embodied beings, encounter something seemingly meaningful, we grasp immediately what is happening and how it is relevant to our own or our beloved’s well-being. If something or some situation is apprehended as relevant to our survival or well-being, we are moved either towards or away from it, and the self “being-moved” towards or away from the object is what Aquinas regarded as passion. The passion is, whether we notice or not, an embodied phenomenon that entails bodily changes. It can be expressed outwardly in the form of actions, or remain as inward motions. These points denote the main features of Aquinas’s theory of passion, and yet a full understanding of them requires us to explore the structure of passions and the process of their formation. Before that, however, we need first to see how Aquinas conceived the subject of passion.
1.2.1 The Soul-Body Composite

Aquinas believed that a human being is “the soul-body composite,” and therefore, when he described a passion as a sensory movement, he had in mind its subject, the person who experiences the sensory motion. As the soul-body composite, the person as a whole participates in the process of forming a passion, and thus undergoes both intellectual and sensory experiences that entail physical modification. This leads us naturally to ask how a soul and body are connected. This is not only crucial to sustain the idea of the soul-body composite, but also because it involves controversies over the problematic dualism suggested in modern Cartesian anthropological philosophy, which views a soul and body as two independent substances and, consequently, renders the soul the center of a person, and the body rather like a complex machine. This conception is especially problematic when it is extended to human passions: in any theory of emotion based on such dualism—Humean, Kantian, or Jamesean—human emotion cannot be incorporated in interpretations of our moral life, which has unfortunate consequences, i.e., the slavish submission of reason (Hume) and the unjust suppression of emotion (Kant). This

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9 ST. I. 75.4.

10 According to Barad, the philosophers, including ethical thinkers who juxtaposed reason and emotion, such as David Hume and Emmanuel Kant, whether they held that the choice of ultimate values is attributable to the emotional side of our nature (Hume), or that reason is the sole determinant of morality (Kant), excluded emotion from our moral life, with unfortunate consequences. “If we base our understanding of morality on Hume’s call for the slavish submission of reason, we can justify all kinds of social exploitation and sensuous indulgence. On the other hand, if we follow Kant’s ideal of suppressing our emotions, then bodily desires can appear bad to us, and we may irrationally disallow many human
clearly is not the case in Aquinas’ framework. His thesis of a human being as a soul-body composite, which was based on Aristotelian hylomorphic philosophy, distances itself from a crude dualism that posits a strict dichotomy between soul and body. This notion of a composite soul-body rules out the possibility of theories that restrict the subject of passion to either the soul or body. In this formulation, a soul and body are distinguished conceptually, but together constitute an essential unity from the composite.

The soul (anima) as the form of a body, has, Cates summarized, at least three meanings in Aquinas’ view: first, the soul as the form is the “first principle of life.” Because of this principle, a material entity can exist as a living being. Second, the soul as form functions as “the defining principle of a living entity,” which denotes that an entity is of a specific kind. Third, it is “a principle of ordered operation” that enables an entity to function in a characteristic way. Thus, by virtue of these functions of the soul as a form, a body can be a living entity, a human being, and capable of functioning in a human way. While a soul as a form makes a body a human body, a body as matter individualizes a soul. The “principle of individuality” of the body links the soul to the body of a particular unique human being. Aquinas believed that only this principle of the


11 Diana F. Cates, Aquinas on the Emotions, 81.

12 ST. I. 75.1.

13 ST. I. 76.1; 76.3.

14 ST. I. 75.4.
form-matter relationship could sustain the idea of the unity of soul and body.¹⁵ This conceptualization is also regarded as a type of dualism, in that neither soul nor body is subsumed entirely to the other. However, Aquinas’ formulation of the relationship between soul and body based on hylomorphic philosophy at least manages to secure “unity” between the two entities, and in that sense, it is successful in differentiating itself from other forms of dualism.

Although this solution based on the form-matter relationship, saves the relationship between soul and body, it does not necessarily guarantee its infallibility as a theory. As Robert Pasnau pointed out, there are many instances in which Aquinas’ thesis that the soul-body composite is a unified substance seems less plausible.¹⁶ For example, his statement that the soul is a subsistent form, even like the substance of a hand,¹⁷

¹⁵ After having considered the soul in Question 75, Aquinas probed the question of the relationship of soul and body in Question 76. In the longest article of the Treatise, 76.1, Aquinas considered three possibilities to link the soul and the body, i.e., as knower to object, as cause to effect, and as form to substance, all of which had been proposed by Aristotle’s contemporaries or predecessors. In addition, Aquinas concluded that the Aristotelian form-matter relationship is the only alternative theory that guarantees the essential unity of soul and body. For a detailed understanding, see Robert Pasnau, Thomas Aquinas on Human Nature: A Philosophical Study of Summa Theologicae Ia 75-89. (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2002), Chapter 3, particularly 3.1.

¹⁶ Pasnau indicated that Aquinas’ various arguments regarding the human soul and its relationship to the body contain vulnerable points, which can be seen as similar to the views of substance dualism. In particular, the six objects of Q 76.1 include several controversial points that make it less plausible that the soul and body make one thing. See Ibid., 74.

¹⁷ According to Pasnau, Aquinas used a notion of substance here in a much weaker sense than we expect: Human soul and a hand are subsistent (ST I. 75.2 ad 1-2; 75.4 ad 2) in the sense that “something subsists even if it is a part of something larger that is itself subsistent.” He also used another sense of subsistence, a strong sense, for example, when he indicated things that are strongly subsistent, such as having the complete nature of some species. His examples were human beings and other animals (85.2 ad 1; cf. 3a 16.12 ad 2 and QDUVI 2c). Ibid., 49. His claim that the human soul is subsistent, although it implies in some way that the soul is independent, “does not mean that we are our souls, because human beings have an essential bodily component.” (45). See more detail in Pasnau, chapter 2, “Soul as substance.” According to Pasnau, Aquinas takes for granted that soul and body do in fact make one thing
could suggest that the soul and body are separable. This is more problematic when his claim of the immateriality of the intellectual soul\textsuperscript{18} is considered. This leads us to question the unity of the soul and body itself. However, as Pasnau asserted, none of these claims intend to support substance dualism, nor is Aquinas a substance dualist like Plato and Descartes. In fact, Aquinas made two explicit arguments that deny that human beings are essentially their souls:\textsuperscript{19} first, as natural creatures are composed of both form and matter, a human being should be conceived to consist of soul and body as form and matter; second, unless the person is viewed as a composite of soul and body, some existing operations of sensory powers, i.e., sensation, cannot be explained, because such an operation as sensation entails physical changes in which the intellectual soul is not involved.\textsuperscript{20} These arguments refute the reductive theories about human beings effectively; however, as we see, this second argument raises the problem of the immateriality of the intellectual soul. Further, this leads us to ponder again the existence of the soul without the body (and hence, the immortality of the soul).

for several reasons. “First, a human being certainly seems to be one thing, and Aquinas identifies a human being with the conjunction of soul and body (2.1). Second, a substance would seem to be a paradigmatic instance of a single, unified thing, and Aquinas holds that human beings count as complete substances, whereas their parts do not (2.2).” \textit{Ibid.}, 73.

\textsuperscript{18} \textit{ST}. I. 75.4.

\textsuperscript{19} \textit{ST}. I. 75.4. According to Pasnau, the background assumptions that motivated Aquinas to exert himself to claim the unity of soul and body, i.e., Q 75 & 76, were not simply substance dualism, but also “the various forms of monopsychism that were influential in his day. (Monopsychism is “the thesis that human beings share a single intellect”). See \textit{Ibid.}, 75. On the other hand, in Q 76, Aquinas did not deal with another form of reductive account, reductive materialism, which might interest many contemporary minds. However, he knew, “that some ancient naturalists, rather than crudely eliminating the soul, considered theories on which the soul is a material property of the body,” and he refuted them in \textit{De Anima I}. For more detail, see Pasnau, \textit{Ibid.}, 80.

\textsuperscript{20} \textit{ST}. I. 75.3 & 4.
This may be the point at which Aquinas combined theology and philosophy. Yet, in any case, this can hardly be regarded as a mere ad-hoc solution, in that, according to various interpretations, such as those of Pasnau, the two claims—soul-body unity and the incorporeality of the soul—can be compatible in its own logic within a hylomorphic philosophy.\textsuperscript{21} In Aquinas’ system, without his explicit solution of this problem (he probably would not have felt it necessary to explicate it further), we need to confirm at least that, although ultimately his emphasis was more on the intellectual soul, Aquinas did not intend to neglect the importance of body. Aquinas truly viewed the body as an essential component of the soul-body composite; this view is conspicuous in his discussion of human passion. To conclude, his idea of the soul-body composite cannot be interpreted in any sense to mean that “a human being is essentially a soul that happens (for a time) to inhabit a body, such that the body is an accidental property of the human, inessential to the human’s being.”\textsuperscript{22} As Farley interpreted, the soul thus “could not have existed in the first place without being individualized [...] by a material

\textsuperscript{21} Pasnau believed that “there is nothing incoherent or ad hoc in the account. Aquinas believed that the relationship between the human soul and the human body is fundamentally the same as all form-matter relationships. Soul actualizes body, with respect to both existence and the various operations of life. The only distinctive feature of this relationship in the human case is that the rational soul has an operation that surpasses matter, an operation that need not (and indeed cannot) be performed by the human body. This difference has the important consequence of making it possible (or so Aquinas believed) for the rational soul to survive when separated from the body. However, the difference is not a deep metaphysical one. The human soul is a form, just like other forms, and is different only in the extent of its operations. Moreover, because form or actuality is what is fundamental in nature, there is nothing peculiar or unnatural about a form existing on its own, independent of matter: “for since matter has existence through form, and not vice versa, there is nothing to prevent some form from subsisting without matter, although matter cannot exist without form” (QDSC 1 ad 6). Aquinas’ hylomorphism was intended to replace materialism with a more adequate metaphysics, while at the same time avoiding any sort of mind-body dualism. Far from being an embarrassment to this hylomorphic analysis, his conclusions about the rational soul’s status were an immediate consequence of the analysis.” \textit{Ibid.}, 72.

\textsuperscript{22} Cates, \textit{Aquinas on the Emotions}, 81.
principle; and it cannot exist after death without some ongoing relationship to matter (which makes resurrection of the body plausible).”

1.2.2 The Passion of the Soul-Body Composite

After having explored Aquinas’s concept of the soul-body composite, we are now in the position to explore passion as it occurs within Aquinas’ view of the soul-body composite. This section is an overview of the structure of passion; a more detailed exploration will follow. As we have seen, Aquinas’ notion of the soul-body composite allows us to begin our discussion on passion in a non-dualistic way and thereby to perceive a passion as a unified act in which the composite participates as a whole. A human passion is the phenomenon created by all the powers of soul and body together. In the passions, the various powers and capabilities of the soul, including sensitive and intellectual powers, operate in a coordinated way, while the body undergoes a corresponding transmutation. When we examine the phenomenon of passion, we see that passion arises in a three-layered way within the composite: (1) although all the powers of the soul are involved in the phenomenon of passion, there are specifically two sensory powers that engage directly in its arousal. A passion is thus regarded as

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24 Apart from the concept of the soul-body composite (passio animalis) we discuss here, Aquinas construed another kind of passion, that is, the passion of body (passio corporalis), such as a bodily injury. He considered that this passion of body “begins with the body and ends in the soul inasmuch as it is united to the body as its form,” while the passion of the soul begins with the soul and ends in the body. See Truth, 26. 2. Aquinas discussed the passion of the body in his lectures on the Nicomachean Ethics, but, in his mature work, the Summa, he focused on the passion of the soul.

25 ST. I-II 22.1, ad 3.
sensory in nature, and shares its structural similarity with nonhuman passion; (2) however, these sensory powers operate under the influence of the intellectual powers in the case of human passion. Human intellectual powers contribute uniquely to the formation of a passion, and (3) a human passion is an embodied phenomenon that entails certain physical changes.

First, a passion is aroused directly through the exercise of two particular powers belonging to the sensory realm of the soul—the powers of sensory apprehension and sensory appetite. According to Aquinas, life basically manifests itself as two actions, “knowledge and movement,”26 and these actions are performed by the powers of apprehension and appetite, i.e., the apprehension of knowledge and the appetitive power of movement. These two powers are divided again into two powers respectively, according to where they belong. Apprehension is divided into intellectual apprehension (intellect) and sensory apprehension, while the appetite is split correspondingly into intellectual appetite (will) and sensory appetite.27 A passion is produced primarily by virtue of the operation of the sensory powers of apprehension and appetite. When it encounters an object, the sensory apprehensive power allows one to apprehend the object in terms of its relevance to one’s sensory well-being.28 Thus, the sensory

26 ST. I. 75.1

27 Aquinas held that human beings possess all three kinds of appetitive powers: the natural appetite shared with all other creatures; the sensory appetite common in all sensible beings, and finally, the intellectual appetite unique to humans. ST. I. 80.1; Truth, 25.1.

28 ST. I-II. 22.2.
apprehensive powers do not simply receive the sensory data from the object, but also apprehend and process the data, including evaluating and making some initial judgment on certain *intentional* contents of the object ("an 'intention' of the thing") in terms of its relationship to one’s sensory well-being.\(^{29}\) As we will see in detail, the idea that the cognitive evaluation of the object begins from the basic level of the senses is crucial to an understanding of Aquinas’ cognitive theory of passion. When an object is apprehended by the sensory apprehensive power in this way, the sensory appetitive power makes it possible for a person to respond to the object by either being drawn to or repelled by it.\(^{30}\) This interior movement towards the object, which often entails outward actions, is called a passion. It is by virtue of the sensory appetitive power that one can orient towards what is beneficial to oneself as a sensory being. Without the sensory appetitive powers, one cannot be moved by the object outside and thus no passion occurs.

Second, in Aquinas’ view, the sensory apprehension of an object involves the higher powers of the intellectual part of the soul, the *intellect*, and the *will*, fundamentally. As noted above, the sensory apprehension, with its basic intelligence, orients one to what is good for one’s sensory well-being. However, this sensory cognitive process must be guided by the intellectual powers in order to promote

\(^{29}\) *ST*. I-II. 22.2. This process can be described in passive terms, in that, “the organs of the soul” undergo an intentional change in which “the organ receives an ‘intention’ of the object.” Aquinas claimed that this is “essential to the act of the sensitive apprehension.” *ST* I-II. 22.2. *ad* 3.

\(^{30}\) *Ibid.*
appropriate human functioning. While the sense grasps an object “materially and concretely,” the intellect apprehends it “immaterially in the abstract, which is to know the universal.” Thus, when apprehending what the object is, we apprehend the nature of the object by virtue of the intellect and also the nature of this object by the senses. These two levels of cognition are performed simultaneously and in an interpenetrating way. By virtue of the intellect, we can conceive the highest end for humans and judge whether and how a given object is related to the end. By virtue of the will, we can undergo appetitive motions in response to the object of intellectual apprehension. Therefore, we can orient towards particular objects that we judge will promote the well-being of our loved ones, and ourselves, and orient away from those objects that are likely to compromise our happiness. The intellect engages in the formation of a passion by presenting how the sensible object can appear intellectually, and also can lead the passion to modify its course and process by reshaping the apprehended contents of the object. Following the intellect, the will then executes and affects passions: the will cannot prevent the initial movement of the sensory appetite, yet can move it by allowing it to or preventing it from continuing in its initial form. Moreover, the will can

31 Our sensory apprehension can often register inaccurate information and lead to a false cognition, as it is performed largely through the functions of the memory (memorative) and imagination (phantasia). ST. I. 78. 3 & 4. We can imagine an example in which a person who has a bad memory with respect to a horse recoils easily from something similar to a horse that is not actually a danger.

32 ST. I. 86. 1. ad 4.

33 ST I-II 10.3. ad 1. Aquinas construed the human will (voluntas) as the power to orient towards or away from the object apprehended by the power of the intellect. By virtue of the will, one can orient towards the object apprehended as good in light of one’s highest end, and also, the object as an intermediate end relative to the highest end. ST. I. 80.2; Truth, 22.4. Unlike the sensory appetitive motion,
influence a passion, by allowing it to continue in some other form, as directed by reason. However, the intellect and the will do not necessarily guarantee that a passion is ordered, because, as we will see in more detail in the later sections; those intellectual powers can also be weak or corrupt, and therefore misdirect the passion. This shows us why we need to practice our passions—in their formation as well as their expression—in a virtuous way.

Lastly, although the higher powers engage in the arousal of passion, for Aquinas, a passion was basically an embodied motion of the soul-body composite. A passion is, as we have seen, a sensory appetitive motion that occurs within the soul-body composite, namely, an embodied soul. A passion is aroused particularly through the exercise of one’s sensory appetite, which entails some patterned physical changes. Although they are sometimes too subtle, these physical changes normally can be perceived as bodily sensations. Again, Aquinas opposed any attempt to reduce an emotion solely to a mental state or a bodily feeling, as, without physical changes, a passion cannot be aroused; without the consideration of the embodied dimension of passion, a passion’s phenomenon and meanings cannot be properly comprehended. Aquinas acknowledged the role of the cognitive powers, including their influence in the arousal of passion, but he also gave substantial attention to the relationship between passion and body.

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the passion, the acts of the will are described in Aquinas, as not being mediated directly by bodily changes. 
*ST. I-II. 22.3.*
In our exploration thus far, we see that Aquinas’ notion of the unity of the subject of a passion allows us to construe a passion in a holistic way, as that of the soul-body composite. In the phenomenon of passion, the diverse powers of the soul are, despite their structural differences, exercised and operate together, interpenetrating each other in a coordinated way. The body is also involved in this event and undergoes a physiological change. Consequently, according to this view, we can find a beneficial foundation for our study of human emotions: a passion is not separated from other cognitive functions of the mind. Cognition and passion are not opposing aspects of the powers of the soul; rather, they are complementary, and are connected inherently within the soul-body composite. This helps us avoid the dualism of reason and emotion, and allows us to continue to probe our emotional lives and explore further the relationship between passion and our moral agency. Such cognitivist approaches to emotion—viewing emotion as cognition—including Aquinas’ s, are now accepted by most philosophers and psychologists who study emotions.\(^\text{34}\) Thus, although they differ in theoretical detail, most scholars agree that some form of “cognition” is involved in

\(^{34}\) According to Lombardo, “cognitivist” accounts of emotion have gradually become dominant in Anglo-American philosophy since Errol Bedford’s article, “Emotions,” was published in 1957. Prominent representatives of the cognitivist account of emotion include Robert Solomon and Martha Nussbaum. There are alternative theories of emotion, such as a noncognitive or a “feeling” theory of emotion (Jesse Prinz), and also the perceptual theory of emotion (Ronald de Sousa and Robert Roberts). According to Lombardo, the “two poles of emotion as feeling and emotion as cognition are still the principal markers of contemporary discussion in analytic philosophy, but the lines between the different understandings of emotion are becoming increasingly blurred.” (Lombardo, 14). For more detail about the history of the cognitive theory of emotion, see the introduction of The Logic of Desire: Aquinas on Emotion, Nicholas E. Lombardo, (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2011).
arousing emotions.\textsuperscript{35} In the next section, we will examine Aquinas’ cognitivist account of passion, with a particular focus on the concept of intentionality; we will also see the detailed process of how the sense cognition is performed.

1.2.3. Sensory Apprehension and Intentional Object of Passion

Aquinas’ cognitivist theory of passion was expressed well in its central concept, the \textit{intentionality} of passion.\textsuperscript{36} According to Aquinas, a passion is always directed towards something that one apprehends in a certain way. When we apprehend something, the apprehensive power does not apprehend what it is directly, but “knows it by reason of an ‘intention’ of the thing.”\textsuperscript{37} Thus, the sense apprehensive power evaluates and judges some properties of the object in terms of our sensory well-being. According to the way in which the object appears vis-à-vis the perceiver’s interest, the corresponding motion of the sensory appetitive power—passion—is elicited. Because the apprehension of intention produces a passion, the passion itself is also conceived as

\textsuperscript{35} Cates, \textit{Aquinas on the Emotions}, 50.

\textsuperscript{36} Aquinas’ use of the term “intentionality” is regarded as similar to that in phenomenology. The technical term, \textit{intentionalitas}, had been used in the late Middle Ages, and was rediscovered by Franz Brentano, who launched the contemporary discussion of intentionality. Brentano is said to have been influenced deeply by Aristotle and Aquinas in many areas of philosophical psychology and also by Scholastic philosophy. See, Lombardo, \textit{The Logic of Desire}, 21. He cited Dermot Moran, \textit{Introduction to Phenomenology} (2000), 43, 45, 47-52, esp. n 80. The word “intentionality,” or “intention” in phenomenological usage, is distinguished from the word intention in a practical sense, i.e., the intention of an act. “Intention” in phenomenology denotes primarily mental or cognitive functions, and “intending” means “the conscious relationship we have to an object.” See Robert Sokolowski, \textit{Introduction to Phenomenology} (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 8.

\textsuperscript{37} \textit{ST}. I-II. 22.2.
intentional. The concept of intention allows us to understand how Aquinas’ object-centered account of the passions was established.

Aquinas’ theory of the intentionality of passion can be found particularly in Question 78 in the First Part of the *Summa*, where he described senses and sense-perception: Aquinas believed that the sensory apprehensive power enables a sensible being—either a human or a nonhuman animal—to receive and process sensible information from external objects. The power of sensory apprehension includes the five external senses—sight, hearing, touch, smell, and taste—and the four interior senses—“the common sense, the imagination, and the estimative and memorative powers.”

When the external senses receive the raw sense data from an object, a cognitive evaluation of these perceptions occurs through the internal senses. When a sensible object is presented to the external senses, the common sense associates the sense data with sensory images (“phantasm”)

Further, the cogitative power is involved in the process as well. *ST. I 78.4. Anthony Kenny asserts, “[t]hese forms or phantasms, we are informed, may be reshuffled at will to produce phantasms of anything we care to think about: we can combine, say, the form which represents Jerusalem and the form which represents fire to make the phantasm of Jerusalem burning” (Quaeiones Disputate de Veritate, ed. R.M. Spiazzi (Turin, 1953) 12.7. Kenny, Aquinas on Mind, (London: Routledge, 1994), 37.*

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38 *ST. I. 78. 3 & 4.*

39 “Phantasm (phantasma)” is a sensory image or impression of the object. It is formed via the sensory powers, and is created by the imagination (phantasia) from memories of past sense perception. Further, the cogitative power is involved in the process as well. *ST. I 78.4. Anthony Kenny asserts, “[t]hese forms or phantasms, we are informed, may be reshuffled at will to produce phantasms of anything we care to think about: we can combine, say, the form which represents Jerusalem and the form which represents fire to make the phantasm of Jerusalem burning” (Quaeiones Disputate de Veritate, ed. R.M. Spiazzi (Turin, 1953) 12.7. Kenny, Aquinas on Mind, (London: Routledge, 1994), 37.*
namely, the memory. In this process, the cogitative power focuses particularly on some properties of the object and evaluates them vis-à-vis one’s interests as intentions. According to this sensory judgment of its suitability or unsuitability to one’s sensory well-being, a certain form of passion is evoked. In a nonhuman animal, such intentions of the object are perceived largely in terms of “threatening” or “useful,” because a nonhuman animal perceives intentions by a kind of natural instinct. However, the human cogitative power that is capable of comparing different intentions allows one to apprehend multiple intentions in complicated situations. The memory, a locus of stored intentions, makes it possible to have a “sudden recollection” of them (by its power of “reminiscence”) in apprehending an object in the present situation.

This process of sensory apprehension provides an important point in understanding Aquinas’ account of passion: the object of the apprehension that causes a passion is not a physical object as it is, but an object processed and formed as

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40 The imagination allows one to retain and make use of the sensible forms of objects (phantasm) received from the external senses. It enables one to apprehend a sensory object even when it is present in front of one’s eyes; moreover, it allows one to conceive an imaginary object by virtue of its power of combining and dividing the forms, for example, “as when from the imaginary form of gold, and imaginary form of a mountain, we compose the one form of a golden mountain, which we have never seen.” Cates, Aquinas on Emotion, 113 & 117; See ST. I. 78.4; Truth, 15.2 ad 7.

41 See, for more detail, Lombardo’s description based on ST. I. 78.4. Lombardo, The Logic of Desire, 23.

42 Aquinas offered two examples of intentions in nonhuman animals: when a sheep fears and flees from a wolf, it is not because it perceives the wolf’s colors or shape itself, but because it perceives the intention of the wolf as a natural enemy. In addition, a bird gathers together straws because of their usefulness in building its nest, not because of the sensory pleasure. It is therefore the perception charged with evaluation that evokes passion, not perception per se. ST. I. 78.4.

43 ST. I. 78.4.
intention, i.e., an intentional object. Aquinas asserted explicitly that when an object is apprehended, it is not apprehended as what it is directly, but as how it appears vis-à-vis the perceiver’s sensory well-being.\(^{44}\) Thus, certain properties of the object are apprehended or imagined as intentions that are potentially suitable or unsuitable to one’s survival or well-being, and according to the intentional objects, its corresponding passion is evoked. Aquinas therefore distinguished the passions as two forms—the \textit{concupiscible} and \textit{irascible} according to two kinds of intentional objects.\(^{45}\) A concupiscible passion takes as its intentional object “sensible good or evil, simply apprehended as such,” while an irascible passion also takes a sensible good or evil as its object, but “under the aspect of difficulty or arduousness.”\(^{46}\) The motion of the concupiscible power enables a person simply to seek or avoid what is good or evil, respectively. Love, hatred, desire, aversion, joy, and sorrow are concupiscible passions.\(^{47}\) When these passions encounter obstacles in their tendency towards or away from the object, the irascible passion comes into play. This is “the champion and defender of the concupiscible.”\(^{48}\) It enables one to resist, attack, or overcome difficulties, and thereby continue the pursuit or avoidance of the object. Hope, despair, fear, daring, and anger

\(^{44}\) \textit{ST.} I-II. 22.2.  

\(^{45}\) \textit{ST.} I-II. 23.1; 23.4.  

\(^{46}\) \textit{ST.} I-II 23. 1.  

\(^{47}\) \textit{Ibid.}  

\(^{48}\) \textit{ST} I-II. 23.1; I. 81.2.
Aquinas considered that cogitative power was involved more closely in the arousal of the irascible passions. While the object of a concupiscible passion is simply apprehended as such, which causes pleasure or pain, an irascible passion involves a judgment, particularly of the possibility of overcoming the obstacle in its pursuit or avoidance of an object. Thus, the arousal of an irascible passion is more reliant on cognition, in that the sense and intellectual evaluation of the intentional contents of the object form the cognitive construct in mind. As we will see in a later section, an irascible passion, i.e., anger, is particularly influenced by the act of reason.

1.2.4 The Cognitive Construction of Passion

Aquinas’ theory on human sense perception might not be as clear as various contemporary phenomenological theories; however, what he suggested in the idea of intentional passions addresses the core of an important epistemological issue. His theory of the intentionality of passion indicated that a passion is rooted primarily in the function of one’s subjective mind, and what is apprehended—and therefore elicits the passion—cannot be coincident with objective reality itself. As noted, the passion is a

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49 ST I-II. 23.1.

50 According to Cates, although Aquinas’ view on the relationship between the concupiscible passion and the cogitative power is sometimes unclear, his theory of an intentional object should be applied to the concupiscible passions, although not all, as well. For example, when we are hungry and desire food, we apprehend only those things that are “suitable not simply for sensing but also for ingesting,” which engages the estimative or cogitative power. For more detail, see Cates, Aquinas on Emotions, 119-120.

51 As Kenny observed, there are some aspects that make people reluctant to accept Aquinas’ theory of intentionality. For example, Aquinas’ direct realist view lacks intermediary concepts such as “sense-data” that come between the perceiver and perceived. Kenny, Aquinas on Mind, 35.
corresponding response to the intentional contents of an object apprehended vis-à-vis one’s subjective interest, which is intertwined with one’s interpretation of daily events. Quoting Aristotle, Aquinas affirmed that, as one knows an external object through its intention, charged with one’s interest, “the true and the false” of that knowledge are, "not in things, but in the mind." Yet, in his view, the passion is not reduced completely to the functioning of one’s subjective world. Instead, there exists an external agent, some properties of which elicit a passion in the mind of the subject, and, in that mode of tending, the subject is connected to the object itself, not to a mere mental image created in the subject’s mind. In that sense, Aquinas is an ontological and epistemological realist. He did believe that the world is structured in organized ways, and that a human being is, by virtue of the intellect, able to perceive the structures or the forms that organize the external world. Nonetheless, he agreed with Dionysius, that, in this present life, one cannot apprehend incorporeal things directly, truth, or God, but only through reasoning from what one apprehends via sensory experiences.

52 ST. I-II. 22.2; Metaph. vi. 4 cited.


54 ST. I 84.7 ad. 3. Here we do not need to go so far as to say that Aquinas claimed the pure ability of a human being to know universal truth or the objective reality as modern philosophies and epistemologies claim. Aquinas believed in our created ability to know the universal truth, but also, he was well aware of our limitations as embodied beings unable to attain immediate and total knowledge of reality. For Aquinas, the truth was not some secret truth that can be discovered and possessed by the subject standing outside the world. The universal truth Aquinas indicated is what we can find only in and through our love and union with God and God’s created world. Such knowledge can be attained only through an intimate way of love. The relationship between knowledge and love is articulated well in
As we have seen, to form the intentional contents of a particular object, the intellect must rely on sensory images or impressions, which are basically the products of the sensory powers. Because the imagination and memory sometimes inform falsely and affect the whole process, the final construct as the intentional object can be misleading and lead to a sometimes indistinct and confusing apprehension of the nature of the objects. Thus, although the intellect is a more reliable source than is passion, its dependence on the sensory powers makes its apprehension imperfect as well. Aware of this, Aquinas therefore asserted that, in order to understand an object properly, one must repeat the reasoning process using phantasms repeatedly until one reaches a more distinct and determinate understanding of the object. By repeating this process, one can reflect one’s passion from a different angle and can sometimes alter it. Through the repetition of the process, one can develop one’s ability to construe a more abstract and higher truth. For Aquinas, reason (as a power of the intellect) joins with the lower appetitive powers in this way, which provides us with the ability to regard human


55 Note that, in real life, the objects of our passions are often complicated situations that involve persons and things. We sometimes find that what we have in mind while undergoing a passion is simply a product of our imagination. In addition, our memorative powers recall past memories and sometimes lead us to misjudge our present situation and experience unnecessary feelings. The power of memory is particularly influential in constituting a cognitive construct of what seems to be happening. As noted previously, the memory is the power that enables one to seek out and make use of the phantasms, including those that one made in the past. The memory makes it possible for one to recall past sensory impressions and judgments, and “to associate [them] with certain features of the present situation.” For more detail, see Cates, *Aquinas on the Emotions*, 117; See *ST*. I. 78.4; *Truth* 10.2. Aquinas presented several examples that show how the objects of our passions can be seen differently according to the intentions of objects. *ST* I-II 42.5 ad 3.

56 *ST*. I. 84.7.
passion as rational. Nonetheless, Aquinas also noted that the intellect cannot
command directly, but only persuade a passion to follow, because the passion moves in
its own way. The intellect or reason, nonetheless, can control a sensory appetitive
motion indirectly through the “consent” of the will. Thus, if we want to function
properly as moral agents and to make our emotional lives more balanced, we can find a
way to control and change our passions.

1.2.5. Passion, Embodiment, and Teleology

Thus far, we have explored the cognitive dimension of passion; we are now in a
position to examine its material dimension. For Aquinas, a passion was an embodied
phenomenon that occurs within the composite of soul and body. Experiencing a passion
denotes that one is moved internally in contending with the (intentional) object. When
one perceives and evaluates an object, and deliberates what it means intellectually,
one’s body undergoes certain internal motions. Aquinas described this physical
transmutation in the scheme of the form-matter relationship, as follows: the sensory
appetite is the form, and its corresponding physical change is the matter; these are
united to form the phenomenon of a passion. Without the physical change, a sensory

57 ST. I-II 24.1. Aquinas therefore maintained that the relatively higher among the sensory
powers—the cogitative power (particular reason), the imagination, and the memory—can be seen as
rational, inasmuch as they are affected by the participation of the intellect in their apprehension of a
situation on a sensory level. See Truth 25.2; ST. I 82.1 ad 2.

58 Aquinas held that “the intellect or reason is said to rule the irascible and concupiscible by a
politic power: because the sensitive appetite has something of its own, by virtue whereof it can resist the
commands of reason.” ST. I. 81.3 ad 2; See also, ST. I. 84.7. The sensory appetite is considered to move
naturally, not only by the cogitative power that is related to the universal reason, but also by the
imagination and sense.
appetitive motion—a passion—does not occur. When one loses the object in mind, the internal motion disappears. Although not specifying such material aspects of all the passions, Aquinas attended to, and described the physiological changes that occur with some passions, based on the biological knowledge of his time. His account of the physical causes and effects of several passions—i.e., pleasure, sorrow, anger and so on—might sound inaccurate because they are based on the limitations of thirteenth-century biology. Nevertheless, we can see that, in Aquinas' view, bodily change was an essential component in forming a passion, and therefore, a passion cannot be reduced solely to mental phenomena or physical sensations. A passion is rightly regarded as the passion of an embodied soul. Most people today would consider this psychosomatic understanding of passion as valid. It is largely accepted in contemporary discussions that all passions involve changes in the brain-body system, although it is controversial whether such changes are noticeable or not.

The embodied nature of passion is shown clearly in its passive character. As indicated by the definition, Aquinas construed that a passion as a sensory appetitive motion is a passive phenomenon initiated by an external agent. Undergoing a physical change in a passion signifies that our body is being acted upon by an agent, and our

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59 Aquinas linked several passions to certain physical effects as their material aspects. For example, anger is related to a “fervor of the blood around the heart” (ST. I-II. 46.2), joy occurs with the “dilation” of the heart (I-II. 31.3 ad 3.), and in fear, the heart in a way “cools off and tightens up” (Truth, 26.3).

60 Cates, Aquinas on the Emotions, 84-5.

61 ST. I-II. 22.1.
bodies are thereby drawn to or repelled by that agent. Two things here are noteworthy:
first, as passions arise from our physical existence, in that if we do not have bodies,
passions will not occur, our individual physical differences are somehow related to our
disposition to passions and their expressions. Aquinas suggested the relationship
between a passion and an individual’s temperament. He stated that a passion such as
anger is prone to ensue from a natural tendency that results from “a man’s individual
temperament” and that such a disposition to anger is also liable “to be transmitted from
parent to child.” Second, our physical existence also suggests that our passions are
formed inevitably through the influence of the social “body” as well. Where (i.e., in what
culture) and how (i.e., social, economic, and gender positions) we are located, are
important factors in the constitution of passions. Although Aquinas did not ponder the
social formation of anger, we can find a clue for it in his general conception of passion in
this way. Still, for him to say that a human passion is informed socially does not indicate
necessarily that it is constituted as a solely social phenomenon. A human passion also
has an active dimension that is able to transcend physical situations in which each
individual is situated within a social body. Thus, in Aquinas’ view, it is created to be
inclined towards the ultimate agent, God.

The embodied reality of passion signifies its creatureliness, which is ordained to
be directed towards the Creator. In his theological framework, passion as an embodied
phenomenon signifies both the potentiality and the limitations of the human capacity to

62 ST. I-II. 46.5.
know and reach the telos. Aquinas held that all beings participate in the world and are ordained to be inclined towards the first principle and final goal of all tending, that is, love. A human passion is created to be inclined to the proper good, which contributes to its sensory flourishing, and therefore is ultimately oriented towards union with God. A passion, in its physical dimension, is directed fundamentally towards what is good by the principle of love, and as a sensory appetitive motion (with the aid of the intellectual powers), it tends towards what is good and away from what is evil. When they function in this orderly way, human and nonhuman animals tend towards their intermediate good in their embodied contexts, and in their very tendencies, “animals implicitly tend to God, the principle of their perfection. They love God implicitly by interacting with the possibilities of their own being and with other objects in ways that actualize some of what is good within them.”

The embodiment of passion, however, also can hinder the agent’s pursuit of its telos. It can hamper good practical judgments because an intense bodily transmutation, i.e., as shown in love or anger, can affect the functioning of reason. One cannot then use one’s reason properly to judge what an object means in general and consequently, may misjudge and end up believing that some sensory good in the object is absolute. In this way, passions can lead one to sin. What causes such an intense physical change that

63 ST. I. 20.1.

64 Truth, 22.1.

65 Cates, Aquinas on the Emotions, 156.

66 ST. I-II. 77.2.
elicits a morally undesirable act? The cause also seems to be related to our embodiedness, for example, our disordered dispositions, which originate in part from distorted social influences and, more fundamentally, from original sin. Nonetheless, Aquinas’ cognitive view holds that humans are able to detach themselves from intense passions and find ways to control or modify their course and degree. We can, by virtue of our intellectual powers, step back from the passions and reflect and change them in light of either a broader or a modified vision. Moreover, Aquinas claimed that we can even form our passions in an ordered way. If we practice the deliberate tending of an object in a passion habitually, we can shape our passions in a virtuous way to some degree. Thus, whenever we encounter an object, we deliberate on whether or how it (or our union with it) contributes to our perfection, our pursuit of the final end, and are determined to act according to the first precept of law that, “good is to be done and pursued, and evil is to be avoided.” Thus, it is possible to have and express our passions in virtuous ways. We will explore the relationship between passions and virtues in the context of anger in a later section.

1.2.6 Conclusion

Thus far, we have explored Aquinas’ account of human passions, focusing on the points that are regarded as essential in his cognitive view. Passion is, for Aquinas, a motion of a soul-body composite that occurs through the exercise of the appetitive powers. It is formed by the sensory apprehension that also involves intellectual

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67 ST. I-II. 94.2.
cognition, and is accompanied by physical transmutation. It is thus often noticeable in
the form of physical sensations experienced, and yet Aquinas regarded it, more
importantly, as intentional. It is evoked by an object that the agent apprehends and
evaluates with respect to its relevance to well-being. This apprehension is formed on
the basis of sensory images and impressions, and is also constituted via the high forms
of cognition. This allows us to consider the *telos* of passion and accordingly, its morality.

As explored here, the most important point about human passion in Aquinas’
account seems to be that passion is described as a facet of a soul-body composite, like a
bridge connecting the soul and the body. This implies that passion is the phenomenon in
which the agent as a whole being—not simply a body, but also one with reason—is
involved, and thereby conceived as teleological. As the human being is bound to the
*telos* of the human nature, passion is affirmed basically to be oriented towards the
beatitude. For Aquinas, nonhuman and human animals as sensory beings both
participate in a universe ordered by love, but unlike animals that have limitations,
humans can “actively” tend towards good via their intellectual powers. Humans are able
to seek good in order to attain the goal of perfection. For Aquinas, something is desired
because it is good. A passion moves us towards or away from something because it
always has something to do with happiness or well-being. However, this sensory
inclination is sometimes in conflict with the intellectual inclination, in that something
suitable on the sensory level is not always desirable for one’s well-being on the
intellectual level. Here, the problem of choice and the morality of passion emerge,
which will be examined later in the case of anger.
Aquinas’ cognitive view of passion, on the other hand, does not ignore the importance of the body. The choice of thinking and acting, in terms of the passion as act, all involve the “context” in which the soul-body composite, as the subject of the passion, exists and lives as a being with a physical extension. Passion is an embodied phenomenon in which a human agent responds to and communicates with others and the surrounding world. Passion is evoked by the agent’s engagement in a particular context, and, without a body, there can be no experience of an emotion that is “moved” by appetite. The arousal and expression of passion is a way to respond to and engage with the world, and, through its proper practice, passion can function as a crucial means for moral action that leads to the perfection of being.

In an action, a moral agent can have goals that s/he wants to achieve, be disappointed when they fail, and delighted when they are fulfilled. All of these refer to the exercise and function of the rational powers, intellect and will, and yet, imply the precedence of the passion as the first step in engaging in a particular situation. Therefore, Aquinas viewed the ordered passion as a vital element in the functioning of a moral agent.

1.3 Aquinas on Anger

Aquinas’ view of passion as an aspect of the soul-body composite reminds us that we are embodied beings that communicate with the world through the passions, and also, that our being as moral agents is connected naturally to our passions, or more specifically, to what we do with them. In this context, anger is particularly conspicuous
and deserves to be noted. For, while maintaining that its passive nature is much affected by the physical condition, it reveals its closeness with reason, thereby highlighting the function and importance of the rational powers. In this section, we explore the nature and structure of anger as construed in Aquinas’ view, and thereafter, consider its moral character.

1.3.1. The Nature of Anger

1.3.1.1. Anger as Passion

Aquinas defined anger as “a desire, with sorrow, for vengeance, on account of a seeming slight done unbecomingly.” Anger is a sensory movement that arises when one apprehends that someone has committed a slight against one’s excellence. Anger is formed by the apprehension of an unjust slight against oneself, and moves towards vengeance. For Aquinas, anger is not a primary passion, such as love and hate, which lead to other passions. However, he regards it as a general passion “inasmuch as it is caused by a concurrence of several passions.” The arousal of anger involves several different passions. Anger is caused by sorrow and desire, that is, the sorrow resulting from the harm done against oneself and the desire for revenge that is aroused by the harm. Also, hope for an opportunity for revenge is necessary for the formation of

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68 ST. I-II, 47.2.

69 ST. I-II 46.1.

70 ST. I-II. 46.1; 46.2.
anger. Without the hope, for example, when “the danger is so great as to banish all hope of victory,” anger does not arise. Anger ensues from sensible and bodily pleasure, even in its anticipation of vengeance. As soon as vengeance is achieved, anger turns to pleasure, and the greater the sorrow or anxiety, the greater the pleasure. Like other irascible passions that arise from and terminate in the concupiscible passions, anger arises “from sadness, and having wrought vengeance, terminates in joy.”

Anger qua passion shares the common features of general passions: it arises as a sensory appetitive motion according to the apprehension of an object vis-à-vis one’s sensory well-being. This apprehensive process with respect to an object is performed in a coordinated act of the intellect and the sensory cognitive powers. Moreover, the entire process is accompanied by a physical change. Anger also is classified as an irascible passion. Recall that Aquinas distinguished two kinds of passions according to their objects: while the concupiscible passions are associated with sensory good or evil as such, the irascible passions require some effort to obtain good or avoid evil. Aquinas viewed anger as an irascible passion because it is arduous to pursue its object. Hope and fear, despair and daring, all other irascible passions have their opposites, but anger has no counterpart. Aquinas discussed why anger lacks an opposite, and while he noted

\[71\ ST.\ I-II.\ 45.4.\ ad\ 3.\]

\[72\ See\ ST\ I-II.\ 48.1.ad.\ 1.\]

\[73\ ST.\ I-II.\ 48.1.\]

\[74\ ST.\ I.\ 81.2.\]

\[75\ ST.\ I-II.\ 46.3.\]
Aristotle’s view that *calm* is contrary to anger, he disagreed.\(^{76}\) Anger arises when one desires to avoid some evil (initial hatred), but cannot avoid the evil because it is already present (sorrow). When there is a difficult evil present in this way from the outset, one possible response is to attack that evil. The other response is, for Aquinas, not to become calm, but to succumb to that evil without a struggle, which is sorrow.\(^{77}\)

1.3.1.2. Anger and Reason

Anger as an irascible passion maintains a peculiar feature, in that sensory and intellectual apprehension both play crucial roles in its formation. Note the functions of the cognitive powers in the formation of a passion: in Aquinas’ scheme, the sensory cogitative power and the intellect as well necessarily and essentially involve the apprehension of an object. Unlike love and hate, which are associated only with sensory good or evil, anger, as an irascible passion, involves a certain difficulty in its relationship to an object, and this necessitates judgments on the part of the cognitive powers on both the sensory and the intellectual levels. For example, anger requires not only the initial perception and judgment based on the sensory impressions, i.e., that one has been slighted, but also the relatively higher judgment that the revenge desired is possible, and even the abstract judgments that sometimes refer to a reflective moral idea, i.e., “unjust slight,” “one’s excellence,” or “vengeance.”\(^{78}\) Anger engages the act of

\(^{76}\) *ST* I-II. 23.3

\(^{77}\) *Ibid.*

\(^{78}\) See *ST* I-II 46.4.
Aquinas showed how the power of the intellect, namely, reason, is involved in the phenomenon of anger in *ST. I-II. 46.4.*

In this article, Aquinas claimed that anger “requires an act of reason; and yet proves a hindrance to reason.” The formation of anger necessitates cognitive judgments, and, in humans, responds particularly to the function of the intellectual powers. This does not mean, however, that nonhuman animals lack anger. Anger is a passion, which is sensory in nature, and human passion shares a structural similarity with the passion of nonhuman animals. Recall that we have seen that cognitive apprehension begins at the basic sensory level where the external and internal senses are exercised: the internal senses, including the estimative powers, memory, and imagination, allow animals to apprehend an object vis-à-vis their survival or well-being. Nonhuman animals can experience anger by virtue of such a “natural instinct,” which is imparted by the Divine Reason. However, because their apprehension cannot be complete without reason, nonhuman animals cannot experience anger in the fullest sense. For Aquinas, the experience of anger in a true sense necessarily involves the act of reason, and therefore, nonhuman animals, which are devoid of reason, can feel only something analogous to anger.

Aquinas held as well that humans can experience a form of anger similar to that of a non-rational animal. For example, human anger can be caused by an object that is apprehended thoroughly by the sensory powers. Aquinas described such anger as that

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79 *ST. I-II. 46.4. ad 2.*
which is evoked when the imagination denounces the injury; in this way, a human can be angry at “irrational creatures or inanimate beings.” However, human anger is supposed to be formed not only through imagination, but also through reason. Here, Aquinas introduced the second form of anger that is informed by reason and thought to be more natural to human beings. This type of anger is formed by the apprehension, aided and informed by reason, and arises only for the desire for just vengeance. It thus cannot be drawn towards “insensible things or with the dead,” for they can neither feel pain, nor do harm, so they are not appropriate objects of vengeance. This type of anger ceases at the sight of death because “the dead seem to have attained to the limit of evils.” Anger stops when “the hurt surpasses the measure of just retaliation.”

One might question the status of this reason-informed anger as a passion, as it might be perceived to be more like a rational judgment than a pure passion as a sensory motion. However, because Aquinas already presupposed such a characteristic of anger in his demarcation of it, it is legitimately considered a passion, while nonetheless showing its peculiar closeness to reason. Thus, his notion of the passion of the soul-body composite indicates that it is not surprising for any passion to be connected to human reason; further, as shown in his definition of the irascible passions, including anger, it is natural that reason plays an important role in the formation of anger. In Aquinas’

80 ST I-II. 46.7. ad 1.  
81 Ibid; Also see ST I-II. 46.4 & 46.5.  
82 ST I-II. 46.7. ad 1.  
83 ST. I-II. 47.4. ad 2.
scheme, as far as passions—particularly irascible passions—are understood and defined in this way, this type of anger properly remains a passion. This reason-informed anger also engages the sensory power and its corresponding physical changes directly, proving its essential nature as a passion. Expecting this kind of controversy, Aquinas provided additional notes about the way in which reason is involved in the arousal of anger. According to him, the sensory appetitive movement, passion, does not occur in such a way that reason commands a passion to follow immediately. A passion is not aroused directly by reason’s judgment, but through another appetitive power of the rational part of the soul, the will. When reason “denounces the injury inflicted,” when it judges that vengeance should be pursued in this situation, the will follows reason and thus moves the sensory powers.

1.3.2 The Cognitive Dimension of Anger

Anger arises from the apprehension that one has been slighted, and therefore one must punish the wrongdoer, despite the difficulty of doing so. Like all other passions, the structure of anger can be analyzed with respect to two dimensions: the cognitive and the material. While the cognitive apprehensive powers constitute the cognitive contents of anger, the material aspect of anger shows its embodied nature, which is essentially passive. By analyzing the cognitive constructs of anger, one can reach its inner structure, and in so doing, one can see how to cope with one’s anger at

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84 ST I-II 46.4.
85 Ibid.
its root. The cognitive aspect of anger is explored in this section, and its material aspect will be addressed subsequently.

1.3.2.1. Two Objects of Anger

The “object” of a passion in Aquinas’ usage refers to the object of the sensory apprehension, that which is apprehended as good or evil and causes a passion to move towards or away. Aquinas claimed that there are two objects in anger. First, he considered revenge, which is regarded as good because it is a component of justice. He added one more object, evil, “the person on whom it seeks revenge;” while anger seeks revenge as good, it moves towards the offender to take revenge, which is evil. Aquinas’ consideration of two objects in anger is extraordinary, as he did not consider dual objects in other passions. He explained these two objects based on a twofold tendency in the movement of anger. In Aquinas’ view, anger arises from multiple passions and moves in two directions. Anger is aroused from sorrow, and desires and hopes for vengeance as good, “wherefore it takes pleasure in it.” It also moves towards the person “on whom it seeks vengeance, as to something contrary and hurtful, which bears the character of evil.” Anger thus takes two objects, that is, vengeance under the aspect of good, and the noxious person under the aspect of evil.

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86 *ST* I-II 46.2.

87 *ST* I-II 46.3.

88 *ST*. I-II. 46.2.

89 Ibid.
While this description explains the dual objects of anger, it does not seem sufficient to satisfy our curiosity about why Aquinas made a particular exception of two objects in anger. Note the case of daring, an irascible passion similar to anger. With regard to the object of daring, Aquinas construed it as a single object that is evil, yet “the good of victory is conjoined.” However, following Lombardo, we might claim in the same fashion that daring has two objects, one evil object that is arduous and one good, which is overcoming the evil. Lombardo thus considered Aquinas’ treatment of the dual objects of anger as ad-hoc. According to him, Aquinas’ notion of the two objects of anger is inconsistent with the premise that permeates his overall account of passion—that a passion is directed towards the same object that elicits it. Moreover, interpreting anger as a conflux of passions “may not do justice to our intuitive understanding of anger as a distinct type of passion.” Lombardo thus asserted that the better solution is to interpret the two objects of anger as one intentional object. As we have seen already in reference to intentionality, Aquinas noted that the object of passion should be regarded as the intentional object. As Lombardo explicated, interpreting an object as intentional is crucial, particularly for understanding the

90 ST. I-II. 45.2. ad 3.
91 Lombardo, The Logic of Desire, 73.
92 Ibid., 73. Lombardo also claimed that Aquinas’ view that anger necessarily involves sadness is dubious. Lombardo, together with Knuuttila, pointed out the ambiguity in Aquinas’ account of anger arising from sorrow, because “Aquinas places anger before sadness in order of occurrence (see ST. I-II 25.3) and that this sequence is at odds with his claim that sadness causes anger (Knuuttila, Emotions, 246).” Ibid., 73n109.
93 ST. I-II. 22.2.
irascible passions, because only in that way is the principle sustaining his object-oriented account of passion affirmed in the irascible passions—that a passion moves towards or away from the same object that elicits it. Lombardo thus summarized the intentional object of anger as “a future good that is presently arduous, that is, a future good that is attained through the elimination of a present evil.”

While Lombardo’s claim so far makes a point, it also raises another question about the relationship between daring and anger. For, when translated into its intentional object, the two passions are almost the same, which is why Lombardo added, agreeing with Anna Terruwe, that anger “should be understood not as a separate passion, but as a kind of daring.” We can ask then, however, whether we are not experiencing daring and anger as unique passions. I am not arguing against Lombardo’s solution, but I think that it is worthwhile to continue to ponder and enjoy our interpretive latitude on Aquinas’ notion of the double objects of anger. What did Aquinas see in anger, and what aspects of anger led him to consider two objects in anger? To contemplate these questions, we need to examine the cause of anger first and then to revisit the object of anger.

94 Lombardo, The Logic of Desire, 73.

1.3.2.2 The Cause of Anger: Slight

Aquinas dealt with the cause and object of anger separately in different articles, but he described the cause and object of anger quite similarly. One way to distinguish the cause of anger from the object of a passion is, as generally conceived, to separate what is apprehended as that which passion moves towards or away (the object) from what causes the sensory motion, what draws one’s attention and initiates the sensory motion (the cause). While the object denotes the intentional contents of the apprehended entity, the cause can signify some situation or entity that can be described more objectively. Because of its two-fold movement, anger has dual objects, vengeance (good) and offender (evil). What causes this twofold movement? While anger takes two objects, its cause is construed as the sole objective, slight.96 Aquinas described a slight as the only cause that elicits two sensory motions, sorrow, and a desire for punishment. While slight is the objective cause, there are also subjective causes of anger. These refer to certain conditions or factors that lead the subject to be angry, or more specifically, to be hurt (sorrowful) and desire punishment.

A slight represents all the causes of anger. For Aquinas, a slight was an act that is committed against one’s excellence.97 It is an act that injures one’s excellence, and therefore makes one feel small or even forgotten by the one who committed the injury. Aquinas held that there are three kinds of slight: “contempt,” “despiteful treatment,”

96 ST. I-II. 47.2.

97 ST. I-II. 47.2.
and “insolence.” These three forms are the injuries that elicit anger and therefore, evoke the desire for punishment. In Aquinas’ view, there are several components sufficient to judge an injury as a slight: first, the injury or harm is committed against oneself or those who are related to him or her in some way, i.e., “either by some kinship or by friendship, or at least because of the nature we have in common;” second, the injury is considered unjust. Anger “seeks another’s hurt as being a means of just vengeance,” and just vengeance “is taken only for that which is done unjustly; hence, that which provokes anger is always something considered in the light of an injustice.” There “is no anger at what is just.” Thus, according to Aquinas, when an unmerited slight is committed purposefully, out of deliberate malice, its sinfulness is most grave and anger is most likely to be evoked. When the slight is committed through ignorance or passion, one is not likely to be angry or much less so. For, “to do anything through ignorance or through passion takes away from the notion of injury, and to a certain extent calls for mercy and forgiveness.” Thus, the cause of anger on the part of the object is an unmerited slight committed against the subject, usually intentionally.

However, not all of these conditions necessarily lead an individual to become angry. The arousal of anger also depends on the subjective conditions likely to elicit

98 Ibid.
99 ST. I-II 47, 1. ad. 2.
100 ST. I-II. 47.2.
101 Aristotle, Rhet. ii.3, cited in ST. I-II. 47. 2.
102 ST. I-II. 47.2.
anger. Aquinas considered some variables that make a difference in the arousal of anger. Aquinas’ description and distinctions of the objective and subjective causes are unclear and even confusing (note that the slight itself is rightly construed as the “perceived” slight, which ultimately involves one’s subjective perceptive-evaluation). Yet we still see the point that Aquinas tried to make with regard to the subjective cause of anger, particularly in two articles that discussed human excellence and defect. Aquinas’ view on the subjective cause of anger can be explained with two main factors that influence the formation of anger: one’s excellence and one’s disposition.

1.3.2.2.1. Anger and One’s Excellence

Firstly, one’s excellence is a necessary factor in a person’s anger. As Cates noted, one’s excellence is considered, first of all, as something that is recognized socially. Aquinas, with Aristotle, identified human excellence with various qualities, i.e., “[w]isdom, health, skills, wealth, power, superior social status, strength, and manliness” and even “the virtues and the goods of friendship.” These assets are not simply given or recognized socially, but also are those that have become part of the person. As Cates stated, Aquinas’ concept of human excellence indicated implicitly that one’s excellence is integrated with one’s self-understanding or self-esteem. When one’s excellence is injured by a slight, it is thus natural for a human to be angry and to desire to strike back.


104 Cates, Ibid., 55.
against the offender, because by injuring one’s excellence, one’s self-dignity is violated. Then, just as “everything naturally seeks its own good, so does it naturally repel its own evil.”

According to him, the more excellent a person is, the more the person deserves to be angered because the slight committed against him or her is considered more serious. The status of the slighter is another element that affects the gravity of the injury of one’s excellence and therefore the arousal of anger. When the slighter is someone who is not in a position to think little of others, the slighted can be angrier. For, the “deficiency or littleness” in the slighter “adds to the unmeritedness of being despised.” If the littleness or deficiency in the slighter occurs in another way, i.e., the slighter repents of and confesses his or her wrongdoing, and asks pardon, anger can be mitigated. These types of acts themselves show his or her respect to the slighted. However, when the slighter is one’s friend, the anger is greater. We usually expect more trust and regard from our friends than from strangers. In the aspect of the defect of the slighter, anger ceases at the sight of the death of the slighter, as it is impossible to

105 ST. I-II. 47.1.

106 ST. I-II. 47.3.

107 ST. I-II. 47.4. Aquinas thus claimed that, “a noble man is angry if he be insulted by a peasant; a wise man, if by a fool; a master, if by a servant.” Here we see, as Cates also pointed out, that one’s excellence is identified with one’s social class and status in the hierarchal social order, as in Aquinas’ thirteenth-century European community. Cates, “Thomas Aquinas and Audre Lorde on anger,” 55.

108 ST. I-II 47.4.

109 ST. I-II. 47.4. ad. 3.
punish the dead because they are “incapable of sorrow and sensation;” nor to punish them justly because, “the dead seem to have attained to the limit of evils”.\footnote{110}

Can there be anyone who does not possess excellence? Aquinas said not. For human excellence, at its deepest level, originates from human nature. He stated that we can be angry with those who harm others, not only because they are connected to us by some kinship or friendship, but also because they have “the nature we have in common.”\footnote{111} Aquinas’ notion of human excellence, as Cates indicated, therefore tells us that, “all human beings are due some personal and moral regard simply by virtue of the fact that they are human beings.”\footnote{112} Therefore, we can be justly angry at the sight of others’ suffering, even though they are not related to us. It is sufficient for anger that we are the human beings whose excellence is affirmed fundamentally. Here we can also pose another question: why are some people not inclined to be angered at an unmerited slight? Simply stated, it is probably because they do not perceive it as a slight. One way to approach this question is, in my view, to reflect on Aquinas’ discussion of excellence and slight in the light of one’s self-love.\footnote{113} That is, not being angered by a

\footnote{110} ST. I-II. 47.4.ad. 2

\footnote{111} ST. I-II. 47.1.ad 2.

\footnote{112} Cates, “Thomas Aquinas and Audre Lorde on anger,” 81 n49.

\footnote{113} Self-love can be approached in various ways, that is, psychologically, philosophically, or theologically, as explored by Aquinas. Here, for simplicity, self-love is employed in the general sense of denoting one’s understanding of and attitude towards one’s self.
slight can be explained by pondering how one conceives one’s own excellence. This can be considered in two ways.

Firstly, when people regard themselves as having their own excellence and being respected enough by others, they probably will not be angered easily. This is because such people, if they are the sort who have healthy self-love (not the narcissistic disorder that construes a false image of self, i.e., a grandiose self), would not often feel the necessity of having their excellence confirmed by others. Further, when they encounter some incidents that are akin to slights, they will probably not be inclined to consider them as such. Aquinas gave an example that seems to denote such a case; he said:

If a man be despised in a matter in which he evidently excels greatly, he does not consider himself the loser thereby, and therefore is not grieved: and in this respect he is less angered. But in another respect, in so far as he is more undeservedly despised, he has more reason for being angry: unless perhaps he thinks that he is envied or insulted not through contempt but through ignorance, or some other like cause.  

Thus, a person who is confident about his excellence with regard to self-affirmation is not prone to sorrow, so he will not be inclined to be angered easily. When something like a slight is directed to him, he will be more likely to understand and forgive it as an act resulting from the slighter’s envy or ignorance. He thus does not need to be angry. This does not mean of course that he is unable to be angered. He will be angry when the slight is too harsh or others are insulted unjustly, and this anger will likely be aroused because reason denounces the injury.

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114 ST. I-II. 47.3 ad 2.
Secondly, not being angered by a slight also can be manifested in a negative way, that is, by those who have disordered self-love. As Cates noted, we can consider the examples of the slave in ancient times or of women in a sexist society. How can these examples be understood? This case of not being angered can be understood better in the discussion of the next factor that causes subjective anger, one’s disposition.

1.3.2.2.2. Anger and One’s Disposition

Another factor that affects anger subjectively is one’s disposition. Aquinas agreed with Aristotle’s view that there are some people who are more inclined to be angry when they are despised for some failing or weakness, because they already suffer from their own defects. Aquinas said:

Now it is evident that nothing moves a man to anger except a hurt that grieves him: while whatever savors of defect is above all a cause of grief; since men who suffer from some defect are more easily hurt. And this is why men who are weak, or subject to some other defect, are more easily angered, since they are more easily grieved.

Those who are disposed to sorrow, those who are always conscious of and grieve over their own defects, are hurt easily and thus angered easily. It is clear here that the vulnerability to anger is related to one’s self-understanding about one’s own excellence. Because those people rarely see their own excellence, while grieving over their

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115 ST. I-II 47.3.
116 ST. I-II. 47.3. obj.2.
117 ST. I-II. 47.3.
weakness, they will be easily provoked by any remarks relevant to their defects. Further, this anger is, according to Aquinas, again more likely to be disposed, and even transferable from parent to child.\(^{118}\)

Now we are in a position to compare two groups of people who seemingly suffer from their lack of excellence, yet show different attitudes to unmerited slight: the one group refers to those people who are disposed to sorrow and so prone to anger, as described here, while the other refers to those who, although they have low-esteem, are not inclined easily to be angry at a slight, as was introduced as the second case above. In the latter case, we can ponder Cates’ remarks with respect to women who see themselves as inferior to men, and thus, are not really convinced that sexist slights are unjust.\(^{119}\) They might suffer from bad treatment from men, but are unable to consider the slights as injustices that deserve to be punished. They are incapable of going beyond their socially-given, inferior self-images, finding their own excellence in a more universal horizon of knowledge. As noted, in Aquinas’ view, this case can be seen to stem from one’s disordered self-love because, subsumed by their internalized images, they are unable to or do not try to see the ultimate source of all human excellence, God. The former case, on the other hand, is similar to the latter, in that these people are also unable to find their own good, but it differs, in that they are subsumed by their own sorrow. This state may result from their lack of social recognition as well, but it is still

\(^{118}\) ST. I-II. 46.5.

\(^{119}\) Cates, “Thomas Aquinas and Audre Lorde on anger,” 56.
more likely to be attributable to their own disposition. They recognize and judge the contempt of others as bad easily and tend to show their anger in the form of resistance to it. In summary, both groups of people have in common the fact that they grieve over their lack of excellence, and suffer from being slighted by others. However, they differ in that, while people in the first group possess the power to defend themselves, those in the second group, overwhelmed by social influence, dare not see, and resist the problem. From these cases, we note again two characteristics that make anger unique: first, it is “spirited” passion that requires one to have the courage to challenge evil, and second, more fundamentally, it is a passion, the arousal of which is influenced particularly by the intellectual powers, for it is the intellectual powers that make it possible for people to perceive their own goodness more broadly; further, they can create a critical inner space for self-reflection out of which to act according to their intellectual apprehension.

1.3.2.3. Revisiting the Object of Anger

Now that we have explored the cause of anger, we are in a better position to understand more deeply and to articulate more specifically the object of anger. In the previous section on the two objects of anger, I agreed with Lombardo to translate the dual objects of anger into one intentional object, but I said that we still needed to probe further to see what more we can elicit from Aquinas’ description of the twofold object of anger. In his view, anger takes two objects, each of which denotes, respectively, the slighter on whom anger seeks to take vengeance, and the vengeance itself that anger
desires to have.\textsuperscript{120} These twofold objects, as we have seen, can be reduced to one intentional object: “a future good that is presently arduous, that is, a future good that is attained through the elimination of a present evil.”\textsuperscript{121} This formal description can be articulated further in conjunction with what we have learned about the cause of anger.

1.3.2.3.1. Interpreting the Intentional Object

When examining these two objects, the slighter and the vengeance, we can relate them in such a way that both constitute one action of, “doing vengeance to the slighter.” In my view, this relationship can be considered by analogy to a sentence with two objects. This example might not be applicable immediately to the case of two objects of anger, but, when seen with this analogy, there are some points we might find interesting with regard to our discussion. In the sentence, “I gave a pencil to him,” we can identify two objects—a direct object (a pencil) and an indirect object (him). These two different words (a pencil, and him) are related to each other as the objects that modify the verb, together completing an act of “giving a pencil to him.” Here we see two things: first, the two objects, the pencil, and the person to whom the pencil is given, are the objects of the act of the verb itself, and both join in one action that seeks another kind of object, that is, the purpose of the whole action; second, if I expect something in return for giving a pencil to him, I will expect it from him, the recipient of my action. If

\textsuperscript{120}ST. I-II. 46.2.

\textsuperscript{121}Lombardo, The Logic of Desire, 73.
these points sound plausible, we can apply them to the case of the objects of anger, and interpret them as follows: first, we may regard anger as an act (i.e., the act of expressing anger, not just as the feeling of anger as an interior motion), and consider it to be manifested in the act of “doing punishment to the evil person;” then, we can see the difference between the twofold objects of anger clearly and what the intentional object signifies. Thus, the two objects of anger are almost equivalent to the components that constitute the act of anger, and the intentional object denotes the goal of the anger that one wishes ultimately to achieve through the act of anger. While the former is seen as a means to the end, the latter is regarded as the result as well as the end. Second, if I expect something as a result of expressing anger to the slighter, it will be something obtained by or from him.

This rough analogy may not be sufficient to clarify the ambiguities in Aquinas’ description of the objects of anger, but, if it sounds plausible, it leads us to a conceivable answer to the question of, what is the “future good” of anger? The good likely is something that we can achieve by expressing anger and can attain from the slighter. The good will be something beneficial to our well-being or happiness, something that contributes to perfecting our beings, and ultimately, is relevant to the telos of our lives. What would this future good of anger be in general terms? Considering the reasoning that we have used thus far, the future good is seen to signify one thing: the restoration of one’s injured excellence, and therefore, the reaffirmation of one’s self-esteem.

Cates noted that the goal of the anger towards the slighted will not be limited to “the corrections of defaults,” because the angry person desires more. The slighted
probably believes, as she reads from Aquinas’ implicit view, that “[the slighter] must also stop feeling the contempt he has for the offended person. He must acquire the regard towards the [slighted] that the latter is due.”\textsuperscript{122} Cates recognized that the end the slighted pursues through anger goes beyond the corrections of the wrongdoing, and refers to something that relieves the hurt and elevates self-esteem in the slighted, through some acts of the slighter, i.e., “acts of confession, repentance, and the begging of pardon” on the part of the slighter.\textsuperscript{123} Yet, she did not continue to conceptualize the end of anger. In my view, we need to push a little further and articulate what the formal description of an intentional object signifies, because when thinking about the idea of the end—which I have defined as the restoration of one’s excellence—we discover and learn more about anger in Aquinas’ account.

When we refer to the restoration of one’s excellence and/or self-esteem as the goal of anger, this leads us to three points crucial necessary to understand the just punishment, which is described as follows: first, the slighted wants to restore his/her own excellence, which has been marred by the slight, by denouncing and punishing the slighter; second, the excellence of the slighted can be reinstated by the revalidation of the slighter through his/her acts of repentance and of respect for the slighted, and third, this restoration of one’s excellence is considered to be arduous, in part because it is dependent ultimately upon the slighter’s response. In my view, these points also

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item Cates, “Thomas Aquinas and Audre Lorde on anger,” 60.
\item Cates cited ST. I-II 47.4: “according to Prov. xv.1: A mild answer breaketh wrath: because, to wit, they [offenders] seem not to despise, but rather to think much of those before whom they humble themselves.” Cates, \textit{Ibid.}, 60.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
suggest why Aquinas believed that the slighter is an additional object of anger. This will be examined later.

1.3.2.3.2. Slighter and Slighted, and Just Punishment

In conceiving and articulating the intentional object of anger in this way, we find several points that bring to light the nature of anger, as well as its object. The first thing of note concerns the punishment to be exacted on slighter. Considering the ultimate goal that the slighted wishes to achieve, the restoration of his excellence, we see why the punishment should be performed justly (“revenge” or “punishment” is not understood in a negative sense in Aquinas’ view). An angry person might want to harm the slighter simply to cause pain, but that is neither a proper nor an effective way to punish him. Even when the person believes he wishes to see the slighter in pain simply for his enjoyment, what he probably wants in his heart is the reaffirmation of his self through the slighter’s repentance. By forcing the slighter to show him respect, the slighted might experience power by reducing the slighter to submission, but he cannot elicit genuine regard from the slighter, which finally would allow him to let go of his anger. According to Aquinas, the vengeance should be executed in such a way that it maintains justice and corrects faults. As we can guess, in order for the slighted to attain the reaffirmation of self from the slighter and move forward, the vengeance must be performed in a way that restores justice and rectifies the wrongdoing. Only in that

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124 ST. II-II. 158.2.
way can the slighter be made to see and revalidate the slighted person’s goodness. In Aquinas’ view, just punishment is possible only when it is executed “according to reason,” and therefore, is performed correctly, to the right degree, and to the proper target.

The second point to be noted is related to the part of the slighter. As shown above, implicit in Aquinas’ description of vengeance is some degree of consideration on the part of the slighter. This can be considered first in the light of the relational nature of anger. For Aquinas, the passion of anger was seen clearly as relational and interpersonal in nature. In Aquinas’ scheme, anger is always directed towards a person because, if not, such a form of anger is not considered humane. Anger is aroused, executed, and solved in and through the relationship between the slighted and the slighter. Note that the end of anger, the restoration of one’s excellence, is dependent fundamentally on the slighter’s disposal. In the movement of anger towards the goal, the slighted inevitably must be associated with the slighter. Therefore, when anger strives to reach its end, it also seeks to recover the relationship with the slighter. The revalidation of the damaged self of the slighted is achieved with, or as a result of the restoration of the lost equality and mutuality with the slighter. Here we see why it is crucial to consider the part of the slighter. That might be one of the reasons why Aquinas particularly added the slighter as another object of anger. Well aware of the relational nature of anger, he might have intended to highlight the role of the slighter.

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125 See ST. I-II. 46.7. ad 1.
that is revealed conspicuously in the phenomenon and inner dynamics of anger. Anger is composed of twofold sensory appetitive motions—one that seeks vengeance and the other directed to the slighter, and yet these two motions are united and intertwined as the motion of anger. It can thus be said that, in the movement of anger towards the end, it seeks vengeance, and, in that act, the slighted is connected intimately with the slighter. If we consider this character of anger, we can conclude, as did Aquinas, that without the consideration of the slighter and the relationship with him, neither the object of anger nor anger itself can be understood completely.

On the other hand, we can press Aquinas further to tell us more about the slighter with regard to vengeance. In my view, just vengeance is performed not just for the slighted, but also for the slighter, in that just vengeance seems to be contrived to elicit a correct response from the slighter. While Aquinas claimed that a just punishment needs to be executed only to reestablish “the equality of justice” between them,\textsuperscript{126} how can this be accomplished? According to Cates’ interpretation with Milhaven, when the slighted denounces the slight and thus causes the slighter pain, the slighter is thereby “made to feel constrained in the exercise of his will as the [slighted] was made to feel constrained in the exercise of her will, thereby reestablishing a certain balance of (duly constrained, interpersonal) power.”\textsuperscript{127} This restoration of equality not only gives some satisfaction to the slighted, but also elicits repentance on the part of the slighter. Facing

\textsuperscript{126}ST. II-II. 108.4.

\textsuperscript{127}Cates, \textit{Ibid.}, 60; See also J. Giles Milhaven, \textit{Good Anger}, Chapter 11.
the slighted’s anger, when it is expressed rightly and performed justly, the slighter has more chances to reflect and repent of his wrongdoing, and further beg for forgiveness. This humbleness can then lessen the anger of the slighted. This process is important on the part of the slighter because, only when he shows his responsibility in this way, can he continue to grow and mature as a moral agent. Thus, Aquinas seemed to hold that, when the slighter humbles himself in this way, he deserves the forgiveness of the slighted. In this sense, Aquinas claimed that when the slighted is dead, anger ceases. Anger also is assuaged when the slighter is wounded seriously, to the degree that “the hurt surpasses the measure of just retaliation.” If the punishment of the slighted exceeds the measure of justice and turns to another hurt, the vengeance cannot be considered just. When interpreting Aquinas’ view of just vengeance this way, several questions arise: what if the slighted is still angry with the slighter who begs for forgiveness? Is it just to blame the slighted for his stubbornness in still being angry with the dead? These questions are all related to the slighted, which is the third point to ponder.

The questions presented here to introduce the third point are particularly intriguing to me because they are relevant to our later discussion about the people who live with unresolved anger. As we will probe this matter in the section on anger in the “han-filled” agent in Chapter 2, let us note here just one essential point raised by the

128 ST. I-II. 47.4.

129 See ST. I-II. 47.4. ad 2.
questions above: today we find so many people who suffer from their unsolved and therefore, deeply disposed, anger. Most dramatically, we can find examples in the cases of victims of violence and abuse, e.g., survivors of the Holocaust, African-Americans who still live with various forms of discrimination, visible and invisible, and, at the most individual level, numerous people who were the victims of child abuse. Such cases might be called “radical slights” or “fundamental slights.” They can be referred to as “slights,” in that their selves or self-esteem were damaged and violated; yet, unlike an incidental slight we have generally all experienced, the effect is so fundamental and potent as to continue to influence them throughout their lives. What is common in these three cases with regard to our questions, is first that they cannot easily identify the ultimate “slighter” to whom they should direct their anger (in the case of the child-abuse victim, when they are sufficiently grown enough to resist the violence, they are not likely to be with the abusers). Even if they manage to find their slighters and punish them, it is still extremely difficult for them to be satisfied and let go of their anger, as it is so deep-rooted and their pain is so profound.

Leaving a more detailed exploration of these questions to a later chapter, two things are notable in observing these cases from Aquinas’ perspective: first, if we apply Aquinas’ basic prescription here, the solutions stem from themselves, and it is their responsibility to stop nonetheless, overcome anger, and move forward. However, as mentioned, their anger is difficult to relinquish. On the contrary, it penetrates to the core of their beings and influences their personalities so that it afflicts them almost forever. To understand this complicated form of anger and its effects properly, it is
necessary for us to probe anger in conjunction with other related topics, such as violence and trauma, some of which might lead us beyond the scope of this project. Nonetheless, one thing must be clarified here. The essential point Aquinas made here is that anger is still within our power. We, as rational beings, fundamentally have the inner power to reflect on our anger, to analyze and gradually rectify what is constituted improperly as a cognitive construct in our deepest hearts, and finally, to overcome our anger. No matter how hard and laborious the process is, we will finally be able to extricate ourselves. This then illustrates another point about the character of anger: its intrapersonal nature. This form of anger persists a very long time in the mind, even after the source of the anger is, in effect, gone, e.g., the wrongdoers are dead. We can here see that anger is not only interpersonal, but also intrapersonal, in that the anger caused by the relationship with the slighter is now internalized in the mind of the slighted. To examine this kind of anger, we need to understand how the angry person is related to him or herself. In Chapter 2, we will probe this type of anger that is turned inward against the self in the case of people with a particular anger disorder.

1.3.3. The Material Dimension of Anger

Thus far, having examined and analyzed the cognitive dimension of anger, we will now explore its material dimension. As we have seen, even though anger is peculiar in its close relationship to reason, as a passion, it has a material dimension, which signifies its embodiedness. Anger is caused by the apprehension, including relatively complex judgments, i.e., that one has been slighted unjustly and that the slight must be
denounced and avenged in the interest of reasserting one’s dignity.\textsuperscript{130} Yet, as we noted earlier, such reflective judgments rely on sensory impressions, i.e., that one has been injured and that one must defend oneself. These kinds of impressions are primarily functions of the sensory apprehensive powers and bodily organs. The sensory apprehensions, like the sensory appetitive motions, involve changes in the body.

Aquinas noted explicitly the physiological changes that occur with anger. As we have seen, anger is composed of contrary motions. In anger, one recoils and feels diminished by the evil object, the noxious person, and yet, at the same time, one desires to punish the person in the hope of asserting oneself and taking revenge.\textsuperscript{131} These two interior motions are embodied, and together create “commotion” in the body.\textsuperscript{132} Aquinas believed that the motion of anger “produces fervor of the blood and vital spirits around the heart”\textsuperscript{133} and this phenomenon sometimes can be manifested with “great vehemence and impetuosity.”\textsuperscript{134} However, recall that the physical change cannot be reduced solely to a feeling. The bodily transmutation is linked closely to the sensory appetitive motion in the relationship between the form (sensory appetite) and the matter (bodily change), while the sensory appetitive motion is intertwined with the

\begin{footnotes}
\footnote{\textsuperscript{130} ST. I-II. 46.4.}
\footnote{\textsuperscript{131} ST. I-II. 46.2.}
\footnote{\textsuperscript{132} ST. I-II. 48.2.}
\footnote{\textsuperscript{133} ST. I-II. 48.2.}
\footnote{\textsuperscript{134} Quoting Gregory, Aquinas gives a vivid depiction of anger: “the heart that is inflamed with the stings of its own anger beats quick, the body trembles, the tongue stammers, the countenance takes fire, the eyes grow fierce, they that are well known are not recognized. With the mouth indeed he shapes a sound, but the understanding knows not what it says.” ST. I-II. 48.2.}
\end{footnotes}
sensory cognition and, indirectly, with cognition. The physical transmutation can be seen as “proportionate to the movement of the appetite.” When the cognitive content of anger changes and the appetitive motion undergoes changes thereby, then the body will be likely to undergo proportional material changes. As we might expect, when one reflects repetitively on one’s reasoning process and judgments, and finally comes to modify one’s interpretations of what happened, one’s anger will then be changed according to the changed apprehension, and proportionally one’s body will enter different states, i.e., changes in heart rate or blood pressure.

Can these changes in the physical state also elicit modification in the cognitive apprehensive process of anger? Considering that the sensory appetite and the body are united in the form-matter relationship, when our bodies are relaxed, we would expect our anger to be relieved. Aquinas did not say explicitly how bodily change can affect anger, but he did with respect to sorrow, in that he held that certain treatments of the body, i.e., sleep and bathing, are helpful in assuaging sorrow. Therefore, as we can surmise, anger will be mitigated as sorrow is eased. On the other hand, we can also consider the case in which the bodily changes affect the formation of passions, including anger. “The passion of the body” might be such a case. Aquinas stated that the passion of the body begins in the body, as bodily injury, and ends in the soul. He recognized this type of passion, but set it aside from his discussion of passion in the Summa. This

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135 ST. I-II. 48.2.
136 ST. I-II. 38.5.
137 Truth, 26. 2.
suggests that such a form of passion is scarcely responsive to the guidance of the intellectual powers, so that it cannot be dealt with properly in his discussion of a normative form of anger that is inclined ultimately to the final end, the beatitude.

Aquinas noted another effect of anger, namely, pleasure. According to him, when the object of anger, namely, vengeance is attained, pleasure ensues and anger ceases as a result.\textsuperscript{138} Because anger arises from “a wrong done that causes sorrow,” when the vengeance is complete, “perfect pleasure ensues, entirely excluding sorrow.” Pleasure here refers to “sensible and bodily pleasures,” which can be remedies against sorrow. When vengeance is achieved completely, the slighted takes pleasure in a full sense, and, even before that, some pleasure is present in the angry man “in the thought and hope of vengeance.”\textsuperscript{139} In our previous analysis of anger’s object, we interpreted the intentional object of anger as the restoration of one’s excellence. In light of that interpretation, it appears that, when a just punishment is levied and, as a result, elicits the revalidation of one’s excellence, perfect pleasure is present in the slighted because the objective has been achieved. Nonetheless, Aquinas claimed that even before the punishment is exacted, the slighted can feel pleasure in her pursuit of vengeance. As noted in the previous section, the feeling and expression of anger itself signifies that the slighted has the power to resist the evil. That is, when the slighted begins to feel and express her anger to the slighter, she is declaring to the slighter that she does not

\textsuperscript{138} \textit{ST.} I. 48.1.

\textsuperscript{139} \textit{ST.} I. 48.1. \textit{ad.} 1.
deserve such an unmerited injury. This can be interpreted to mean that, as it manifests itself, the process of restoring one’s self-esteem has already begun. As anger is aroused by the injured excellence of the slighted, as her damaged self is restored and her inner power is thereby felt in her anger, she takes pleasure.

1.3.4 Conclusions

We have so far explored the nature and structure of anger according to Aquinas’ view. Anger is a peculiar emotion in that, while maintaining its embodied character, as revealed in its apparent bodily sensations, it shows its close relationship with higher cognitive powers. Among the various forms of anger derived from objective and subjective factors, Aquinas, following Aristotle, discerned a normative form of anger, which deserves to be called “human anger.” This reason-informed anger is that which arises from one’s rational judgment of slight and pursues its goal—the restoration of broken justice and thereby the revalidation of self—through vengeance. The anger is thus not a mere episodic phenomenon that occurs arbitrarily, but, for Aquinas, was regarded as a human act initiated by the agent in pursuit of his goal. It is connected to justice, and thereby functions constructively towards the agent’s ultimate goal, his perfection, which is also happiness.

Aquinas’ definition of human anger and his analysis of its inner structure, including its object and cause, all are construed from a broader vision that connects emotions to the soul-body composite as the subject of anger. His view of anger thus leads us to grasp anger as teleological, in that we should try to practice it in a way that
benefits the pursuit of our goal as moral agents. It reminds us, at the same time, of our habits of anger and offers the grounds to reflect on our real anger, which is often evoked by the wrong cause or directed towards the wrong target, and therefore fails to achieve anything. In Aquinas’ view, human anger should be formed and expressed under sufficient rational guidance. It is direct and explicit in its pursuit of vengeance, and through its right expression, can attain its goal, punishment and the restoration of justice. As we have seen through Aquinas’ analysis of the cognitive construction of anger, our anger involves a personal projection of our values and expectations of the world, which is why we need to rely more on our rational counsel to inform and guide our anger, so as not to be misled. This might be one reason why Aquinas emphasized the judgmental character of anger, because in that sense, anger can be regarded as an ideal example of human rational emotion, as Aquinas’ cognitive account intended to show. Thus, while keeping its status as a passion (as a sensory appetitive motion), anger displays the rational constitution of emotion clearly, which leads us to discuss the morality of human emotion. This will be explored in detail in subsequent sections.

1.4 Anger and Moral Life

As we noted, Aquinas connected emotion with moral agency. Anger is the anger of the soul-body composite and thus functions crucially as an action for the agent to reach the perfection of powers via practice. Because the subject of anger is an embodied being, living in a particular context, one’s practice of anger always involves choice and thereby entails responsibility. This section concerns how anger can be
conceived in terms of the life of the subject as a moral agent. Anger, in its formation and expression, is seen to involve moral responsibility, as each instance of anger is an expression of the self that reveals how one’s will and reason are situated in relationship with others and the world, and towards which they are directed. We explored the moral dimension of anger, and then examined the relationship among anger, choice, and moral responsibility as conceived in Aquinas’ view; lastly, we addressed Aquinas’ vision of good and virtuous anger.

1.4.1. The Moral Character of Anger

1.4.1.1. Human Passion as a Moral Phenomenon

Is anger a moral phenomenon? To answer this question, we need to see how Aquinas perceived the morality of human passion in general. Following Aristotle, Aquinas claimed that “we are neither praised nor blamed for our passions considered absolutely,” but our passions can be “worthy of praise or blame, in so far as they are subordinate to reason.”¹⁴⁰ This view can be examined in two ways: first, a passion in itself cannot be seen as morally good or evil because it is sensory in nature, and second, by virtue of its relation to reason, the passion can be considered as moral. Firstly, a passion qua passion is sensory in nature, so it is basically incompatible with the idea of morality involving voluntary human acts in the first place.¹⁴¹ Yet, as Lombardo claimed, this should not be understood in such a way that a passion in itself has no intrinsic

¹⁴⁰ ST. I-II. 24.1. ad. 3.
¹⁴¹ ST. I-II. 6.1.
relation to the moral qualities of good or evil.\textsuperscript{142} It should be regarded rather as containing a normative quality. The passion in itself, namely, the “generic” passion, is a normative description of passion, which functions as the standard for the evaluation of “specific” passions in particular contexts. It cannot then be considered moral, not because it is morally neutral in a literal sense, but because it has a normative quality prior to the moral judgment.

Where does this normative passion come from? It originates in its ontological goodness in the Created order. In Aquinas’ view, the goodness or badness of all human acts and passions is determined in light of “the very essence of goodness,” that is, God.\textsuperscript{143} God is, by definition, perfect good, and God or the union with God is the ultimate \textit{telos} towards which all our human desires and acts are oriented. The \textit{telos} therefore signifies, for humans, flourishing, and happiness as well, because, in the union with God, all human pursuits of happiness are completed. The passion is ontologically good in the very sense that it is created to be directed towards the \textit{telos} by virtue of the principle of love. Moreover, in the case of human passion, it is also natural to follow the guidance of intellectual powers so that the passions can become virtuous and thus able to contribute to the attainment of the \textit{telos}. With the passions, we can respond to sensible objects as intermediate ends that lead us further to the ultimate \textit{telos}. Without the passions, as Lombardo described, we would not respond to sensible objects, which

\textsuperscript{142} See Lombardo, \textit{The Logic of Desire}, 111-113.

\textsuperscript{143} \textit{Truth} 22.1; \textit{ST} I. 3.2.
is the first step in engaging the world towards human flourishing. This is what a passion is supposed to be, one that, in Aquinas’ view, is connected intrinsically to goodness, which functions as a norm by which to evaluate other specific passions.

Secondly, a passion can be considered as a moral phenomenon through its connection to reason. The concept of morality, for Aquinas, can be employed only to distinctly human acts. Only human acts that are performed through reason and will, and therefore are voluntary, can be regarded as moral. Passions as sensory appetitive motions common to human- and nonhuman animals cannot be seen as voluntary in themselves, and thus are not considered moral. Aquinas claimed that a human passion, however, can have a moral quality to the extent that it is “subject to the command of the reason and will.” Passions can be considered to be voluntary, inasmuch as they are related to reason, and their moral character is thereby assumed. As Aquinas defined it, a passion is a sensory appetitive motion, but we cannot imagine any situational human passion that is divorced completely from the influence of reason. We can consider generic passion as a theoretical concept before it is situated in a particular context. In our real lives, passion, although fundamentally oriented towards the telos, requires the guidance of reason because, in complicated contexts, with the aid of reason, it can and should tend towards an appropriate object that serves in the attainment of the telos. By virtue of the cognitive process where the sense and intellect operate

144 Lombardo, *The Logic of Desire*, 41.
145 See *ST*. I-II. 24.1; 1.1; 18.5.
146 *ST*. I-II. 24.1.
together, our real passions can be specified by particular intentional objects, in
particular situations. Specified by varied objects in divergent contexts, the passions
are diversified in kind and mode. Thus, it can be said that the difference among passions
created in this process, the variations that stem from the cleavage between the specific
passions and generic passion render specific instances of passion morally good or evil.

1.4.1.2. The Moral Character of Anger

When applying Aquinas' view on the moral character of human passions to the
particular passion of anger, we can say the following: like other passions, anger qua
passion comes prior to moral assessment, in that it is considered to function as a norm;
however, all contextualized forms of anger may be evaluated as morally good or evil in
light of the normative form of anger. As we have seen, human passion is ordered
normatively to the principle of love, and to the reason and the will, in order to incline a
person to find and attain the appropriate objects successfully, and thereby help the
person ultimately to reach the beatitude.

Anger is defined as a sensory appetitive motion arising from the apprehension of
an unjust slight against oneself, and moves towards vengeance. Like all other passions,
while anger is directed fundamentally towards human flourishing and happiness, it

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147 Lombardo called the passions we experience in our daily lives “specific” passions in contrast to
“generic” passions. Lombardo gave examples of two specific passions that can be regarded as morally
good or evil, feeling sad about losing a friend and feeling sad about failing to murder a friend. For a more
detailed explanation, see Lombardo, Ibid., 112-3.

148 ST. I-II, 47.2.
seeks actively to attain the intermediate end (i.e., the reaffirmation of one’s excellence through just punishment) available in a given embodied context. When anger is manifested in that way, when it is aroused by reason-informed apprehension, and rightly performed in its pursuit of vengeance, it is considered morally good. As Cates pointed out, Aquinas sometimes used “anger (ira)” to signify “the will for revenge,” as if anger is aroused as a simple act of the will, without any sensory interior motion. Here, we can see what Aquinas envisioned as the perfect form of anger, the type that is aroused by its obedience to reason and thus, is aligned perfectly with the rational appetite.

We, the soul-body composite, experience various kinds and modes of passions in our real lives. The forms of anger we experience are also manifested in various ways according to their different contexts. As we have seen, Aquinas held that human anger may vary in form, yet always involves an act of reason. One thing noteworthy in the case of anger is that, although all human passions need the guidance of the intellectual powers, anger is peculiar in having a close relationship to reason: this feature allows anger to be considered as morally good or evil. Anger, as Aquinas conceived it, “requires an act of reason,” because the arousal of anger particularly involves the

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149 Cates, Aquinas on the Emotions, 94; Truth, 25.3.

150 We will see “zealous anger,” which is described as arising by the act of the will when we explore Christ’s virtuous anger.

151 ST. I-II. 46.4.

152 Ibid.
process of “comparing and drawing an inference,” which is an act of reason.\textsuperscript{153} Where Aquinas argued for the naturalness of anger, he claimed that, when anger is reason-informed in this way, it may be regarded as more “natural” to humans than other passions, because it includes reason.\textsuperscript{154} For him, a person can be angry “according to or against reason,” but not totally apart from an act of reason.\textsuperscript{155} Therefore, he claimed that a completely drunken person does not become angry, yet those who are slightly drunk, and thus are still capable of using reason, do.\textsuperscript{156} Similarly, animals can

\textsuperscript{153} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{154} When anger is caused by reason denouncing the injury, and so pursues revenge, the anger is regarded as “natural” because it occurs “with reason,” which is natural to human beings. In that sense, anger is more natural than any other passion, such as desire. The naturalness of anger being based on its proximity to reason probably sounds strange to most of us initially, because we, like the objector in Q 46.5. ob.2, are accustomed to thinking of nature and reason as opposites. However, considering that he neither treats human reason as separate from the other part of the composite, nor from passion, it is not surprising that Aquinas arrived at this conclusion. In the article of Question, 46.2, Aquinas argued anger’s naturalness in a comparison with desire. The first thing to note is that, by “natural,” Aquinas, following Aristotle, means “that which it is caused by nature.” In order for anger to be regarded as natural, it should be aroused according to its nature. With regard to the objective cause of anger, anger is natural when it arises for vengeance, yet less natural than desire because, for example, desire for sexual pleasure is more natural than that for vengeance. However, with respect to the subjective cause of anger, anger’s naturalness is examined through a consideration of human nature in three ways: first, on the level of a human being as an animal, human anger is seen as less natural than desire as, for a sensory being like an animal, it is more natural to be inclined to desire things good for sensory well-being; second, considering the specific nature of a human as a rational being, however, anger is more natural to humanity than desire because, as noted above, it has a closes relationship with reason. Aquinas noted that “revenge” is more natural than meekness because “it is natural to everything to rise up against things contrary and hurtful.” Lastly, anger is also regarded as more natural than desire on the level of a human as an embodied being. Aquinas holds that anger is more “prone to ensue from the natural tendency to anger”, than any other passion. Aquinas mentioned here a disposition to anger and its liability to genetic transference from parent to child. \textit{ST} I-II. 46.5.

\textsuperscript{155} \textit{ST}. I-II. 24.1. \textit{ad} 3.

\textsuperscript{156} \textit{ST}. I-II. 46.4. \textit{ad}. 3.
experience anger by their natural instincts imparted by the Divine Reason, but not in a full sense because of their lack of reason.\textsuperscript{157}

While human anger is prompted naturally by reason denouncing an injury and seeking vengeance, Aquinas also recognized another kind of anger humans can experience, that which arises basically from the imagination’s apprehension of the harm done and the urge to remove it\textsuperscript{158} (I will call these two types of anger reason-informed and imagination-based anger, respectively.)\textsuperscript{159} This imagination-based anger was, for Aquinas, akin to animalistic anger and thus is hardly responsive to the intellectual powers.\textsuperscript{160} The relationship between these two types of anger can be described as that between the ideal type and that which represents its similarities, rather than that between two opposite types on equal terms. If we consider the ideal form of anger as reason-informed anger, the latter denotes the imagination-based form of anger. These two types of anger may be evaluated as morally good or evil and thus are attributable to our responsibility.

\textsuperscript{157} ST. I-II. 46.4. ad 2.

\textsuperscript{158} ST. I-II. 46.7. ad 1.

\textsuperscript{159} For convenience, I refer to the two types of anger Aquinas mentioned as reason-informed anger and imagination-based anger. This distinction is not related directly to Murphy’s distinction between reason-dependent and reason-independent passion. Murphy’s category indicates two kinds of general patterns of passions divided by their constituting processes, while my distinction refers to the specific kinds of anger that are morally charged, so they are not only formed differently, but also have different meanings and significance.

\textsuperscript{160} ST. I-II. 46.4 ad 2.
1.4.2. Anger, Choice, and Moral Responsibility

1.4.2.1. Inordinate Passion and Moral Action

According to Aquinas, we always act in ways that we judge, on some level, will bring us happiness.\(^\text{161}\) In conjunction with the power of the will, the intellect makes it possible for one to specify and choose an object that contributes to “perfecting [one] after the manner of an end.”\(^\text{162}\) However, as we can imagine, our acts are not always performed in that way. In Aquinas’ scheme, human acts are composed of a four-stage process.\(^\text{163}\) Each stage comprises the acts of choice that contain cognitive and voluntary components, and thus, can involve errors. A passion—as inward motion—is not related directly to these acts, because human acts (performed in human ways) involve acts of choice, which are rational and performed as the result of free will.\(^\text{164}\) Although not related directly to the moral act of choice, a passion can influence it indirectly.

\(^{161}\) ST I-II 1.6 ad 3; 5.8.

\(^{162}\) Truth. 21.1.

\(^{163}\) According to Michael Sherwin, in Aquinas’ scheme, a fully human act can be analyzed into a four stage (sometimes 5) process, “each stage of which contains a cognitive and a voluntary component.” Aquinas described the stages of deliberation that underlie the properly human act (ST I-II 6-17). This four-stage model of action was presented by Daniel Westberg in Right Practical Reason (131) and modified by Sherwin. First, some good is apprehended and a corresponding simple act of the will follows. Second, intention occurs. Third, reason then specifies something as the appropriate means and the will chooses it. This “state of the process can occur with or without deliberation” (Sherwin modified this model by adding here a preliminary stage, “affirmation”). Lastly, “reason commands the powers of the soul to undertake the chosen act and the will moves these powers to act.” Michael Sherwin, By Knowledge and by Love: Charity’s Relationship to Knowledge in the Theology of St. Thomas Aquinas, (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2005), 84-85.

\(^{164}\) According to Sherwin, in Aquinas’ scheme, choice depends on both the acts of reason and will, and yet it is essentially an act of the will, in that the will does not necessarily follow reason (Truth, 22.15). The will is free to choose among the various things reason presents to it, and this makes choice a free
A passion can first of all incline a person to make a wrong decision by inhibiting the reasoning process. According to Aquinas, intense passions can cause one to fail to consider explicitly what the object means in general and also in particular, or to consider other reasons to judge the object (actually evil) to be good intellectually in order to justify oneself (“by way of opposition”). Aquinas stated that the person “reasons about another universal proposition suggested by the inclination of the passion, and draws his conclusion accordingly.” These reasons can become so compelling that one can continue to believe that the decision based on those reasons is crucial for one’s happiness. Moreover, an intense emotion can hinder one’s reasoning process “by way of bodily transmutation.” When one’s passion is too vehement, one can lose “the use of reason altogether,” and the “passion draws the reason to judge in particular, against the knowledge which it has in general.” Passions can influence the exercise of the will as well. According to Aquinas, passions can first of all hinder the decision. Sherwin summarized three essential points on the act of choice in Aquinas’ view: first, in the act of choice, the will always depends on reason; second, “nevertheless choice is essentially an act of the will in which the will is always free to choose among the various things that reason presents to it,” and third, “in the act of choice itself, the judgment of reason is always in harmony with the choice of the will.”


165 *ST.* I-II. 77.2. The typical example of this is that of “fornication.” According to Cates, although a person might believe that “fornication” is bad or wrong, the person can fail to consider or judge explicitly that “this would be a case of fornication” under the intense sexual appetites. See Cates for a more detailed explanation for Aquinas’ view on the influence of passion on the intellect, *Aquinas on the Emotions*, 232-235.

166 *ST.* I-II. 77.2.

167 *ST.* I-II. 77.2 ad 4.

168 *ST.* I-II. 77.2.
operations of the will “by a kind of distraction.” An intense passion can impede the proper movement of the rational appetite, the will, and undermine one’s rational self-command. This is conspicuous when, as Aquinas held, pleasing sensory-appetitive motions have a strong material component: excessive bodily pleasure drives the mind’s attention onto itself, collapses the interior space of one’s moral agency, and thus hinders the use of reason considerably or entirely. Moreover, a passion can influence the will by becoming “the will’s object, which is good apprehended by reason.” When one is moved in a powerful way by certain sensory images or impressions, one fails to exercise one’s intellectual powers, and as a result, “the judgment of the reason often follows the passion, and consequently the will’s movement follows it also.”

As we have explored, human passions can hinder the reasoning processes and distract the will, and thus lead one to fail to perform one’s moral agency appropriately and fully. Inordinate passions incline us to focus on a particular sense, which is, in fact, only one aspect of the object, and thereby can dispose us to act contrary to the universal and even the particular truths that we know habitually. According to Aquinas, when a person’s character includes disordered passion, it can be one of the causes that

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169 *ST.* I-II, 77.1.


171 *ST.* I-II, 33.3.

172 *ST.* I-II, 77.1.

lead the will to incline to sin. Aquinas believed that we, as rational moral agents, are responsible for shaping our characters in such a way that we can maintain our crucial interior space for the operation of reason. Although intense passion can impede the reasoning process, the passions cannot influence the will directly, and the will is not thereby moved of necessity. For Aquinas, it is ultimately up to the power of the will whether it surrenders to the disordered passions and is thus led to act wrongly. The will is construed as having the power to remove the passion: if the will is well ordered in relation to the passions—also united with the “right” reason—then, even while undergoing intense sensory inclinations, one can reflect on one’s passion, and alter it in accordance with the light of reason. Here we see Aquinas’ point clearly, as Sherwin indicated that the passions are disordered equally in the continent and the incontinent person, but the agents in both cases differ in the determination of their will.

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174 There are three causes—by the object, by the intellect, and by a person’s character—that lead the will to incline towards the wrong object (ST. I-II, 77.1). Aquinas conceived that, if one is deliberating about goods that are not good in every respect, the will is led to incline towards one limited good over another in three ways: first, the will inclines towards one aspect of the act because it objectively outweighs the other. This is the case when reason and will unite in the act of judging and choosing the good; second, “the will can incline towards one thing instead of another because a person thinks about one circumstance to the exclusion of all others.” This can happen whenever reason fixates on one aspect, i.e., from one’s ignorance,” and third, it is when a person’s disposition leads the will to incline in one way rather than another. Aquinas noted, following Aristotle, that the end appears to each person according to his or her character (De malo, 6). Aquinas construed that this happens in three ways: from nature, from habitus, and from passion. Sherwin, By Knowledge and By Love, 47-8; See ST. I-II. 77.2; I-II 24.3. ad 1.

175 ST I. 87.1; 87.3; 87.4.

176 Sherwin, By Knowledge and by Love, 105n160; ST. II-II. 155.3; 156.2 ad 2.
1.4.2.2. Consequent /Antecedent Passion and Moral Responsibility

Considering the close relationship between anger and reason, it is clear that anger affects acts of reason.\(^{177}\) Anger, like other passions, can prevent, although indirectly, the intellectual powers from functioning rightly, i.e., by distracting the will and disturbing the reasoning process, and thereby can influence our choices in moral actions. For Aquinas, it is our responsibility to keep our actions morally good under the influence of passion because our actions involve our volition, even when performed under the influence of our passions. We are now in a position to ask about our responsibility for our passions themselves. We begin our discussion of our responsibility for our passion with Aquinas’ distinction between antecedent and consequent passions.

In the case of the consequent passions, we can see clearly that, in Aquinas’ view, they are our responsibility. Consequent passions are conceived as aroused in two ways, first, by following acts of the will based on the judgment of reason (by way of choice), and second, by those that flow from the intense will as a natural consequence (by way of redundancy).\(^{178}\) The second type of consequent passion takes place when the rational appetite is so intense in willing something that it produces an “overflow” into the sensitive appetite.\(^{179}\) In this case, we are responsible indirectly for the consequent passion because we are responsible for the acts of will that cause them. Claudia Murphy stated that such passions are “unconsciously commanded” by reason because all acts of

\(^{177}\) ST. I-II. 46.4. ad 3.

\(^{178}\) ST. I-II. 24.3 ad 1.

\(^{179}\) See ST. I-II 24.3; QDV 26.3 ad 13m.
will are based on judgments of reason.\textsuperscript{180} Thus, both cases involve acts of the will and are therefore our responsibility. As Robert Miner, along with Gordon, claimed, our passions are passive, but we as the soul-body composite are not “passive with respect to the passions.”\textsuperscript{181} As the subjects of our passions, we have control over them, although not immediately, and it is thus our responsibility whether our passions continue in an ordinate or inordinate way. In the case of anger, when it persists after its initial arousal, we are expected to be able to stop or modify the course and mode of the anger through our will. However, what about the initial arousal of the anger?

The case of antecedent passion is slightly more complicated. We think first that the antecedent passion is excusable to some degree, because it is presumed to be a preceding act of the will (“obscuring the judgment of reason”), and thus can be seen as less voluntary and moral. Aquinas stated that, “it is more praiseworthy to do a work of charity from the judgment of reason than from a passion of mercy.”\textsuperscript{182} When we perform a good action out of an antecedent passion that arises while the rational judgment is obscured, it is regarded as less morally good than an action that arises from our decision. Yet this example shows our responsibility for our “action,” not exactly for our passion itself. Can we say that our antecedent passion is moral and thus calls for our

\textsuperscript{180} Murphy interpreted such passions by “overflow” that, while caused by a judgment of reason and volition, are “not caused as being the object of the act of will, but as sharing the same object with the act of will.” Claudia Murphy, “Aquinas on our responsibility for our emotions,” Medieval Philosophy and Theology, 1999, 8, 2, 185.


\textsuperscript{182} ST I-II. 24.3. ad. 1.
responsibility? In Aquinas’ view, we are responsible for some cases of our antecedent passions in that, as noted, we are ultimately responsible for our characters. It is presupposed in this view that it is we who allow ourselves to experience the antecedent passion repeatedly, without any intervention of reason, and allow it finally to become part of our characters.

This might sound unfair to many of us, as we know from our own experiences that we sometimes feel our passions, while not knowing the reasons why. To probe this, let us think about an example. We can imagine that of someone who insults his colleague while drunk. He says that alcohol caused him to become furious and led him to insult his colleague. We can consider his moral responsibility in three ways: first, regarding his insult, although he committed it in alcohol-induced anger, he is responsible for his offense because the action of insulting involved his volition; second, he is responsible for his intense anger. If his rage continues, he is accountable for the consequent anger because its continuation after its initial arousal requires the consent of the will, and third, with regard to his anger that arose antecedently, it can also be said that he is responsible for that because, although he might not have immediate control over the anger, he could have prevented it by avoiding the intoxication. As Aquinas asserted, it “could have been prevented by reason if it had been foreseen.” Miner used Murphy’s term and considered this kind of control as “indirect counterfactual

183 I modified the example of intoxication Miner presented. Miner, Thomas Aquinas on the Passion, 105.

184 ST. I-II 17.7.
control.” What is presumed here is that if he were of better character, he could have foreseen that his anger would be aroused as a causal consequence of his intoxication. This is the case Aquinas referred to as “indirectly voluntary,” because, “the will can prevent but does not.” We are responsible for such passions that arise because of our habitual disposition to experience them in certain circumstances.

On the other hand, there could be a case in which a passion arises as a result of the combination of certain circumstances we cannot foresee with our habitual dispositions. In this case, we are not responsible for the passions, as we had no idea what we were about to encounter in the complicated situation our dispositions and the circumstances together created. Moreover, there are cases where even a virtuous person would not have been able to anticipate such causal connections. The case of “propassion,” i.e., feeling sensory motion when confronted with a beautiful woman, is one such case. As Murphy noted, Aquinas recognized that even an ideally moral person can undergo irrational emotions when he encounters unexpected situations. In this case, the person is not responsible for her passions. However, even in this case, she

185 This can be the case that Murphy called, “voluntary through counterfactual control.” When the person has counterfactual control, he could have prevented the passions. Murphy held that there are two different ways in which a passion can be foreseen: (1) one may be able to foresee, at least broadly, what sorts of objects one is likely to encounter, and (2) one may be able to foresee how one will react to different sorts of objects if and when one encounters them. A person who has both kinds of foresight will have a very strong degree of foresight, which will yield a very strong degree of control. Murphy stated that while we do not often have this kind of foresight and thus this amount of control, we can have “a different sort of control as a result of a more general and weaker sort of foresight (only foresight (2) without (1)). This sort of weak or conditional foresight should enable [us] to try to alter [our] emotional habit[s].” For more detail, see Murphy, “Aquinas on our responsibility for our emotions,” 192-3.

186 ST I-II 77.7.

187 Miner, Thomas Aquinas on the Passion, 106.
will be responsible for “all of those if they last more than a moment, or if she does nothing to fight against them.” 188 We are not responsible for the initial arousal of such a passion, but we are responsible for our attitudes to it and for its continuation and development. This is what Murphy wished to highlight. We will return to this point in a later section.

1.4.2.3 Reason-informed Anger and Imagination-based Anger

When applying what we have seen above to anger, we can summarize our moral responsibility as follows: prolonged anger involves our volition, and is thus attributed to our moral accountability; further, in some cases, we are responsible for our spontaneous, i.e., antecedent anger, in the sense that we have responsibility for our characters in allowing that anger to arise at all. There also could be other cases of antecedent anger that simply arise and thus, involve no responsibility. Again, we can examine this view on passions in general according to Aquinas’ two types of anger, reason-informed and imagination-based anger. Aquinas held that, as noted, there are two types of anger in human beings, anger evoked “by the reason denouncing the injury” (reason-informed anger), and anger that arises “when only his imagination denounces the injury” (imagination-based anger). 189 As we have seen, our passions arise as a response to the act of an apprehensive power, which is the first way that reason

188 Murphy, “Aquinas on our responsibility for our emotions,” 194; She cited ST I-II 89.5; DM 7.6 ad 8; 7.8; SR n.563.

189 ST. I-II. 46.7 ad 1.
and will—associated with the sense cognition—affect passion. After the passion is evoked by the apprehension, reason and will can influence it in several ways, and this is the second way that reason has control over the passion.\(^{190}\) Reason and will affect the passion and it responds to their control; from this, we can say that we are responsible for the passion. However, our passions are not always moved by the command of reason, but move on their own, “by which, at times, they go against reason.”\(^{191}\) Aquinas noted that the sensory appetite is suited naturally to be moved not only by “the cognitotive power [in human beings] which the universal reason guides, but also by the imagination and the sense.”\(^{192}\) Here we have a basis for understanding the two types of anger. Clearly, reason-informed anger is formed as a response to judgments of particular reason or to volitions, while imagination-based anger is that which relies on sense cognition and imagination. What makes anger occur in these two different ways? We can probe the question with the above discussion of consequent and antecedent passions. We see first that reason-informed anger arises consequently because, by definition, the anger reveals its relationship to the judgment of reason.\(^{193}\) This type of anger can be construed then to be evoked either by following acts of the

\(^{190}\) Murphy described these two forms of control by reason and will over the passions as follows: “externally—when a passion is already occurring, it can be affected by reason and will—and internally—when reason’s or will’s activity gives rise to a passion.” \textit{Ibid.}, 175. I am attempting here to understand Aquinas’ two types of anger with reference to Murphy’s overall explication of the intrinsic and extrinsic account of responsibility.

\(^{191}\) ST. I-II. 56.4 \textit{ad} 3.

\(^{192}\) ST. I. 81.3 \textit{ad} 2.

\(^{193}\) There is an exception in Christ’s passion that we will discuss later. Christ’s passions, even when they arose spontaneously, are regarded as already having been informed by reason.
will or by “overflowing” from the will. Thus, anger is elicited by the reason’s judgment of the injury and the vengeance, and also by way of “overflowing” from intense acts of will. The anger that arises in the second way pertains also to reason-informed anger because all acts of will are based on judgments of reason. This type of anger is guided and controlled by reason already, so it is regarded as morally good (when by right reason). The case of imagination-based anger is rather more complicated. First, this type of anger is seen to arise against human nature because it occurs “without the command of reason.” Human passions, Aquinas believed, are formed naturally by their own source of cognition, the “cogitative” power. This power is to be guided by universal reason, but also by the imagination and the sense. Aquinas recognized that “it happens sometimes that the movement of the sensitive appetite is aroused suddenly in consequence of an apprehension of the imagination of sense.” It might be the case then, that this type of anger is evoked spontaneously by the imagination, without waiting for the final judgment of reason. This anger is aroused because of some cognitive apprehension such as, “someone insulted me,” and, “I have to punish it,” but this initial level of cognition is insufficient to produce reason-informed anger. In Murphy’s view, anger that is based on a preliminary evaluation of the situation cannot

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194 See ST. I-II. 24.3 ad 1.

195 ST. I-II. 17.7.

196 ST. I. 81.3 ad 2.

197 ST. I-II. 17.7.
be conceived as “reason-dependent,” because it is anger in which the subject did not commit herself to the final conclusion of reason, which can be obtained only after all relevant elements are considered.\textsuperscript{198} Likewise, Murphy’s analysis of reason-independent passion helps us see that this type of anger might be aroused by tentative preliminary judgments based on imagination and sensory impressions, without waiting for reason’s final judgment.\textsuperscript{199} Aquinas’ quotation of Aristotle seems to suggest how such anger is formed. As Murphy noted, Aquinas said:

\begin{quote}
[\textit{A}nger listens somewhat to reason} in so far as reason denounces the injury inflicted, \textit{but listens not perfectly}, because it does not observe the rule of reason as to the measure of vengeance. Anger, therefore, requires an act of reason; and yet proves a hindrance to reason [emphasis, original].\textsuperscript{200}
\end{quote}

As shown here, imagination-based anger is aroused not without acts of reason. While we perceive a seeming slight by virtue of our imaginative powers, we also apprehend it with our reason in a broader vision, in that we judge whether this situation is really a case of unmerited slight, and whether we need to be angry and seek just vengeance. It listens to reason, but not perfectly; it follows the sensory judgment formed based on the imagination. In this case, the agent has chosen to be angry based on his imaginative apprehension, not committing himself to reason’s final judgment

\textsuperscript{198} Murphy, “Aquinas on our responsibility for our emotions,” 180.

\textsuperscript{199} Murphy presented two reasons why she believes that, “being a response to preliminary judgments of reason does not make passions reason-dependent: first, in Aquinas’ view, the volition that is associated with reason-dependent passions is the response to final conclusive judgments of reason, not to preliminary reasoning about an object, and second, reason-dependent passions result from a judgment of reason that indicates, “the judgment of reason is its final judgment to which the agent is committed.” See \textit{Ibid.}, 181.

\textsuperscript{200} \textit{ST.} I-II. 46.4 \textit{ad 3}; He cited Aristotle, \textit{Ethic}, vii, 6.
elicited from the deliberating process. Therefore, we can say that this type of anger does involve a choice, and is thus aroused against reason.

Here we can also conceive how our responsibility involves imagination-based anger. We can consider this in two ways, when it arises spontaneously and when it persists. The former case can be explained by reference to “indirect counterfactual control,” as Murphy put it. If I can foresee that my inordinate anger—prompted by imagination—would arise at the sight of a certain thing or person, or in a certain situation, I can try to avoid the situation. I can even examine whether my habitual association between the situation and my anger is irrational and try to correct my emotional habit. Yet, as noted, I cannot avoid unexpected situations that my habit and other circumstances create together, and even though I can foresee that I will be angry in a certain situation, I sometimes cannot help but become angry. Such a case, as Murphy observed, does not yield counterfactual control, and thus, is not our responsibility. The initial arousal of such anger can be exempted from my moral accountability. However, I may be responsible for my prolonged anger after its first movement. Although we cannot help but experience the first movement of the imagination-based anger, when it persists, we can evaluate and stop or alter the mode of the anger in Aquinas’ view. He said that, “by applying certain universal considerations, anger or fear or the like may be modified or excited.”201 If we fail to deliberate or to apply the new apprehension to our imagination, then it can be seen as “voluntary

201 *ST*. I. 81.3.
omission,”^202 because human passions, including anger, are supposed to be moved by the consent of the higher appetite. In this case, it is seen that it does not “[await] the command of the will, which is the superior appetite.”^203 Imagination-based anger neither arises according to reason, nor obeys the command of reason and will thereafter. This anger is then regarded as morally bad, and our responsibility.

1.4.2.4. Limits of Our Control

Having explored Aquinas’ thoughts concerning our responsibility for passions, we see his logic in reaching this conclusion. Nonetheless, we might wonder whether this conclusion is too optimistic. Seen from this view, we are morally accountable for almost all instances of our anger, and we are expected to be responsible sometimes even for anger that arises spontaneously, because in Aquinas’ view, it is ultimately we—our characters—who allow that to happen.

We know that sometimes we encounter unexpected situations and lack rational control over our imagination episodically. In the case of intense passions that originate, in particular, from bodily transmutation, we feel that our ability to control our passions is limited greatly. We might ask then whether Aquinas’ view of our moral responsibility for passions is serious enough to consider these embodied situations, where there can be various conditions that hinder our control over our passions. As we see in the case of imagination-based anger, if we are already experiencing intense rage, it is extremely

^202 Murphy, Aquinas on our responsibility for our emotions,” 195.

^203 ST. I. 81.3.
difficult for us to stop and review the object and cause of our anger. Even if we manage to take a moment for deliberation, we may not be able to change the mode and course of our anger.

It is clear that Aquinas was not insensitive to our lived experiences. He did recognize that we do not always have sufficient control. He argued in several places that, while we are enraged, our ability to reason can be reduced or sometimes lost completely.\textsuperscript{204} Most obviously, Aquinas noted that our bodies, their conditions or dispositions, are “not subject to the command of reason,” and this limits the degree to which our passions are “wholly subject to the command of reason.”\textsuperscript{205} Recall that our passions, by definition, involve not only our sensory and intellectual powers, but also physical changes. Thus, according to the changes in our physical conditions, our passions can be manifested differently; as a result, so is our control over them.

Aquinas believed that our bodily disposition to a certain passion, or our physical condition, temporally heated through anger, can affect its responsiveness to the command of reason.\textsuperscript{206} He noted the case in which some people chronically lack control

\textsuperscript{204} See \textit{ST} I-II 10.3; 77.1; 77.7.

\textsuperscript{205} \textit{ST}, I-II. 17.7.

\textsuperscript{206} \textit{ST}, I-II. 17.7 \textit{ad 2}. According to Aquinas, our body conditions can affect the act of the sensitive appetite in two ways: firstly, “as preceding it:” we may be disposed to certain passions. In this case, our disposed passion is not “subject to the command of reason: since it is due either to nature, or to some previous movement, which cannot cease at once,” and secondly, “as consequent to it;” thus, we become heated through anger. In this case, it can follow the command of reason “since it results from the local movement of the heart, which has various movements according to the various acts of the sensitive appetite.”
over their imagination because of physiological problems. In this case, our physical makeup imposes serious constraints on our ability to control our imaginations, and no responsibility is entailed. Some people also are simply unable to experience anger in a reason-informed way because they are disposed to be hot-tempered. We might think that, as Cates stated, their lack of control over their passions is related to some environmental factors in their early upbringing that continue to influence them, but it is also due to the disposition of their bodily organs. In either case, it will be extremely difficult to change their emotional habits because they are unable to change their fundamental temperaments. We see here, with Murphy, that there truly exist some limitations of our control over passions, which Aquinas did not ignore. Here, Murphy noted that there are two views—optimistic and pessimistic—about control over passions that co-exist in Aquinas’ account of passion.

His recognition of the limitations of our control over passions raises a question as to how we should or can continue our discussion on passion and moral responsibility. In the case of people who are already disposed to be unable to rationalize their emotional

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207 ST. I-II. 17.7 ad 3. Aquinas believed that there are some people who are “unable to imagine the things that reason considers.” It is “either because they cannot be imagined, such as incorporeal things; or because of the weakness of the imaginative power, due to some organic indisposition.” Murphy described that, “just as someone born paralyzed lacks control over the movements of her limbs,” people who are “imaginatively challenged” are not responsible for their inordinate passions because their inborn deficiency of control over the imaginative power causes them to be subject to their imagination rather than to the ordering of reason. Murphy, “Aquinas on our responsibility for our emotions,” 196. Aquinas also indicated that the deficiencies in the imaginative power or the memory might be caused through practice. See ST. I-II 50.3 ad 3; 56.5. As Murphy claimed, we can say that, in such a case, we are indirectly responsible for the passions elicited from it.

life, how can we make the discourse of responsible passions useful and beneficial to them? Some people are born with good dispositions, and some are not. Some people are raised in favorable environments that cultivate and maintain their good characters, and some are not. If there are such conditions that dispose people’s passions, and those dispositions are hardly changeable, is it fair to say that, “you are still responsible for your character”? A feminist critique would note here that Aquinas’ system of thought was oriented basically towards improving the lives of the “haves,” rather than to the moral development of the marginalized. This is especially true when we consider that Aquinas did not investigate how the latter can heal their disordered passions, and thus be saved. It seems that, although he recognized their difficulty, he left such people without any prescriptions in the *Summa*. Yet we need not jump to this conclusion before we contemplate other aspects of Aquinas’ theory of virtue. It is possible to consider the problem of moral responsibility for our passions in a broader vision, but we need to come back to this after we explore Aquinas’ views of passion and virtue.

1.4.3 Good Anger and Virtuous Expression

In the previous section, we explored how our passions are or are not be our moral responsibility. We also saw cases where it is difficult for us to control our passions. Here, we examine Aquinas’ view of good and virtuous passions. Except in the extreme cases we have seen, Aquinas held that we are able to influence the formation of our emotions by cultivating our characters. First, we explore Aquinas’ account of virtue, particularly in terms of its relation to passion in general; second, we examine the ideal
type of anger that culminated in the form of Christ’s anger, and lastly, we reconsider anger as a choice, particularly in its relationship to moral responsibility.

1.4.3.1. Passion as Choice and Moral Virtue

As we have seen, a passion can influence moral actions, and, when disposed to one’s character, it can be a cause that leads the will to incline to sin. Do passions always influence our acts of choice in negative ways? Aquinas believed that passion is not a threat to human virtue, but rather an essential component of it. When ordered, it helps the functions of the reason and will. Aquinas stated that ordinate passions make it possible for the will to choose what reason apprehends “more promptly and easily,” as the passions are “closely connected with changes in the body.”\textsuperscript{209} For example, “when a man is virtuous with the virtue of courage the passion of anger following upon the choice of virtue makes for greater alacrity in the act.”\textsuperscript{210} Aquinas mentioned in various places that ordinate passions can be a help to the act of reason, although inordinate passions can hinder it.\textsuperscript{211}

As Cates noted, ordinate passions can help a person obtain “appetitive knowledge,” an intimate knowledge of the object through her union with the object at

\textsuperscript{209} Truth, 26.7.

\textsuperscript{210} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{211} Aquinas discussed the relationship between the passion and the reason in various places, including ST I-II 10.3; 33.3; 33.4 \textit{ad} 1; 37.1; 44.4; 46.4 \textit{ad} 3; 48.3; 77.7.
When the intellect is aided by an appetitive power, Aquinas held that a person can have a more perfect knowledge of the particular. He said:

[S]ince the act of an appetitive power is a kind of inclination to the thing itself, the application of the appetitive power to the thing, in so far as it cleaves to it, gets by a kind of similitude, the name of sense, since, as it were, it acquires direct knowledge of the thing to which it cleaves, in so far as it takes complacency in it.  

By virtue of this appetitive knowledge, a person can make a better judgment. Through the will’s consent (to “feel with”), she can have “a certain union to the object of consent” and gain a more complete knowledge of the object than she gains without the affection that belongs to the appetitive power. Moreover, ordinate passions increase the moral goodness of human acts. Aquinas argued that it is better when a person is moved unto good, “not only in respect of [her] will, but also in respect of [her] sensitive appetite.” It increases moral goodness when a person does the right thing and at the same time feels the right way. Note the case of a temperate person and a continent person. While the temperate person desires what is truly good for her in every respect, the continent person does not desire what is apprehended as good intellectually, but acts appropriately, because her reason stands firm to resist her evil passions.

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212 Cates, Choosing to Feel, 23-24.

213 ST. I-II 15.1; Recited from Ibid., 23.

214 ST. I-II. 15.1 including ad 3.

215 ST. I-II. 24.3.
Aquinas thus believed that continence “has something of the nature of a virtue [...] yet it does not attain to the perfect nature of a moral virtue.”

How, then, can we acquire a perfect moral virtue? As we have seen, it is difficult always to have passion under our dominion, because it has its own way and the intellectual powers can influence it only by way of politic rule, not despotic command. In order for us to act morally, it is important for us to try not only to make our acts morally good, but also to cultivate our characters to be oriented to feel and act in an ordered way as well. It is the work of moral virtue that makes it possible for a person to have such a disposition. Influenced by Aristotle’s view on virtue, Aquinas believed that moral virtue is “a habit of choosing the mean appointed by reason as a prudent man would appoint it.”

We can find here three elements that constitute the way to attain moral virtue. First, to have moral virtue means to choose habitually “both to act and to feel.” We should try to subject our passions to choice. How is this possible? We can find support for this claim in his view that we are inclined to objects that are apprehended via our sense apprehension, yet also we sometimes feel “by way of choice.” Aquinas stated that a person sometimes, “by the judgment of [her] reason, chooses to be affected by a

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216 ST. II-II 155.1.

217 ST. I-II. 56.4 ad 3.

218 ST. I-II. 59.1. Aquinas held that “[a]n imperfect moral virtue, temperance for instance, or fortitude, is nothing but an inclination in us to do some kind of good deed,” and a perfect virtue is “a habit that inclines us to do a good deed will” ST I-II. 65.1. The former comes from nature or custom and the latter is by habitus.
passion in order to work more promptly with the co-operation of the sensitive appetite." Thus, when we try to choose to act and to feel in the same way, and we do that habitually over time, we can gradually become virtuous. This of course presupposes that our practice is in accordance with the double standard of goodness: we should try to choose repeatedly to act and feel in accordance with external norms of action, while not losing sight of the direction in which we are heading, towards the perfection of our powers of action as agents.

Second, our choice to feel should be “in accordance with the mean, where the mean relative to us is defined with reference to the rule of human reason.” The mean of human action and passion is achieved by following an intellectual virtue, prudence. For Aquinas, prudence as a virtue was not irrelevant to passions. In order to act in a morally good way, while envisioning our telos, we need to determine what particular act is to be performed in the here and now, in our embodied situations. In the process of practical reasoning, our passion and will involve the act of choice, and here they require the guidance of prudence. Prudence concerns our reasoning about what is to be done, but reasoning well requires having well-ordered passions, because inordinate passions

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219 ST. I-II. 24.3 ad 1.

220 According to Jean Porter, Aquinas’ conception of virtue was formulated based on the dual meanings of goodness, that is, the general meaning of goodness in human action, and goodness as the perfection of the powers of the agent. Thus, a human act is considered good according to its conformity to reason, and at the same time, it is seen as good as well “in the sense of actualizing, and therefore perfecting, the powers of the agent, including passion, will, and intellect.” This dual reference of goodness and virtue enabled Aquinas to formulate his theory of virtue coherently, and led him particularly to envision the relationship between the morally perfect virtues and their similarities. Jean Porter, Moral Action and Christian Ethics. (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 142.

221 Cates, Choosing to Feel, 17.
can inhibit the judgment and command of prudence.\textsuperscript{222} Further, the removal of “the impediment of the passions” is achieved by moral virtue. Therefore, Aquinas said:

[I]t belongs to the ruling of prudence to decide in what manner and by what means [a person] shall obtain the mean of reason in his deeds. For though the attainment of the mean is the end of a moral virtue, yet this mean is found by the right disposition of these things that are directed to the end.\textsuperscript{223}

For Aquinas, prudence as a virtue is not an ability to reason what should be imposed in this situation apart from its context. The prudent and virtuous person is, when understood in our contemporary language, the sort of person who is engaged deeply in the given context and committed to numerous relationships at hand, and is still able to deliberate and choose what is truly good for her. Engagement with the context likely brings some distortion of prudence to those who do not attain prudence perfectly. That is why Aquinas accepted the concept of “prudence of the flesh” as being separate from “true prudence,” as “the latter directs the intellect towards what is truly good, whereas the former involves cleverness in attaining partial and limited goods.”\textsuperscript{224}

Although convinced of the existence of the true form of prudence, Aquinas did not ignore its analogous forms, which can serve as intermediate ends in a given situation.\textsuperscript{225}

\textsuperscript{222} ST. I-II. 58.5. \textit{ad} 3.

\textsuperscript{223} ST. II-II. 47.7.

\textsuperscript{224} Porter, \textit{Moral Action and Christian Ethics}, 144; She cited ST. II-II 55.

\textsuperscript{225} In Aquinas’ view, “true prudence” and “prudence of the flesh” are distinguished clearly as the true form of prudence and its analogous vices, but the latter can be regarded as at least “a wide range of...seemingly prudent acts,” which are generated from the contingency of the lived context. This allowed him then to recognize something partially good in those similarities. Porter, \textit{Ibid.}, 144. Two things can be said with regard to this view. Firstly, Aquinas’ approach (dialectical methodology) and recognition of a partial good in the analogous forms of virtues evidently shows that his concept of virtue cannot be
Third, this allows us to see why we need a moral ideal for the practice of virtue. As embodied beings, we need to accept our limitations to perfect our powers as a virtuous person does, but whenever we choose to both act and feel, we should do so as if we have become a virtuous person. In that sense, in our practice of virtue, we, as Christians, can remind ourselves how Christ would act. In Cates’ interpretation, our beliefs and perceptions play a crucial role in our practice of virtue. Aquinas recognized, following Aristotle, that “[a]ccording as a [person] is, such does the end seem to him.” Thus, according to what sort of people we are, we perceive the world in a certain way, and such perceptions—integrated with our beliefs—penetrate our deliberating process in making our choice. As Cates noted, we, as Christians, can choose, to some extent:

...to become certain sorts of believers and perceivers by about how we ought to regard our relationships with our fellow human beings and what our balanced responsibilities ought to be to ourselves and to others.  

construed to be a fixed rule as we find in the modern frame of ethics, which is imposed as a general theory everywhere. Aquinas began his studies with a diverse and heterogeneous tradition of the virtues and organized them through dialectical arguments and analogical comparison (142). He was therefore able to do justice to the lived context, and not neglect the partial good in analogous forms of virtues, and at the same time, to discern the true good from the partial good, and accordingly, the true virtues and their analogues. Second, this view leads us then to suspect the possibility of multiple versions of virtues according to our varied contexts. Of course, in Aquinas’ view, there is a clear distinction between the true form of virtue and its distorted forms, and yet, as we see, the heterogeneous forms of virtues are not totally invalidated. This forecasts, with the concept of the “mean,” the possibility for us to envision a dialectical way between virtuous anger and the various forms of our real anger with lesser good, and also, in a more general way, between the moral ideal and our reality in embodied contexts.

226 ST. I-II. 9.2.

227 Cates, Choosing to Feel, 27
When we choose repeatedly to feel this way, over time we can become persons “whose passions are partly composed of realistic beliefs and perceptions that are informed by well-deliberated desires for the humanly good.”  

1.4.3.2 Good and Virtuous Anger

Having explored Aquinas’ view of the relationship between passion and virtue, we see that our practice of virtue can lead us to attain moral virtue and thus bring us closer to our *telos*, where our powers—reason, will, and passions—are perfected. For right practice in accordance with goodness, we need a moral ideal to lead us to virtue. Based on this view, we examine here Aquinas’ views on good anger and virtuous anger. As we have seen in the previous section, Aquinas’ description of anger gives us an idea about the human form of anger, about how we, as rational agents, attempt to be angered by unmerited slight. As we have seen, good and virtuous anger is relevant to the dual meaning of goodness, that is, its conformity to reason, according to the general principle of human action and, more fundamentally, its contribution to perfecting the powers of the agent. In what follows, we can begin to consider Aquinas’ concept of good anger in terms of its accordance to reason and further find the ideal form of virtuous anger in Aquinas’ description of Christ’s anger.

For Aquinas, good anger is defined according to how it responds to the judgment of reason. As we have seen, anger as an irascible passion shows in its arousal its close

\[228 \text{Ibid., 28.}\]
relationship to reason. Despite this close relationship, however, anger as a sensory motion responds to reason in various ways and thus, the forms of anger can vary. In that sense, as we have seen, Aquinas’ two types of anger—reason-informed and imagination-based—represent two patterns of good and bad anger in terms of their relationship to reason, rather than signifying two distinct types, as if we experience only two kinds of anger. Aquinas’ description of reason-informed anger indicates how anger can become morally good. As noted, this type of anger is aroused by the reason’s judgment of the injury and the will’s desire for vengeance. It is constituted in a reason-dependent way, not based on the imagination. Aquinas described it as aroused “according to reason.”

Good anger is considered in a twofold manner, first with regard to the reasonableness of its object and second, with its mode. With regard to the object, we can consider first whether the anger is aroused by a just cause, an unjust slight. If not, the reasonableness of the object of anger cannot be counted at all. Only when anger is aroused by a just cause can it pursue the right object. There must be unmerited slight against oneself as judged by reason. Anger can be aroused, as we have seen, only by the initial cognition based on the imagination, disregarding the reason’s final judgment of whether it is in fact a slight or not. This is the first way in which reason controls anger, as

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229 ST. II-II. 158.1.

230 Aquinas held that the inordinateness of anger is considered in two ways, “with regard to an undue object, and with regard to an undue mode of being angry.” ST. II-II 158.4.
we explored in the previous section. When elicited by the right cause based on reason’s judgment, anger seeks vengeance on the slighter, which is its object.

Regarding the object of anger, Aquinas’ notions of “zealous anger” and “sinful anger” are illuminating.231 He distinguished two forms of anger in terms of their objects, namely, what they truly pursue. According to him, zealous anger desires to punish the slighter “in accordance with the order of reason” and moves towards the proper end, namely, “the maintaining of justice and the correction of defaults.”232 When the anger does not follow the order of reason, when it moves beyond its proper end, he called it sinful anger. Zealous anger denotes in particular the anger that arises when a person desires to avenge, “the wrong done to God and his neighbor, because charity makes him regard them as his own.”233 Anger that is motivated by “the fervor of love,” or zeal, is thus construed as being related to a virtue, vindictio.234 Zealous anger that is praiseworthy is directed to a reasonable object. We find here the two objects of anger, the just punishment, and the slighter. That is, good anger should be directed towards punishment exacted according to the order of reason and to someone who deserves punishment. Sinful anger, as Aquinas said, desires wrongly to punish someone “who has not deserved it, or beyond his deserts, or again contrary to the order prescribed by law,

231 ST II-II 158.2.

232 Ibid.

233 ST. II-II. 108.2. ad 2.

234 Ibid.
or not for the due end.” What is notable here is that just punishment also denotes that which follows a legal order. Just punishment is seen not as something executed in an arbitrary way, but as by some rational procedure, such as a legal order.

Aquinas believed that vengeance is a special virtue corresponding to “a special inclination of nature to remove harm,” and this virtue can be recognized by the intention of the person who is angered. When her intention is not to harm, which is in fact the intention of hatred, but to remove the harm done, it is associated with vengeance. Anger differs from hatred, in that anger is not always “contrary to charity.” Anger, unlike hatred, can become virtuous, but, when it persists too long, it can grow into hatred. By practicing the punishment habitually according to the order of reason, one can attain the virtue of vengeance. It is presupposed as well that, to experience a virtuous anger that seeks vengeance, one must be disposed by the virtues of fortitude and zeal to avenge evil. When one has a good intention, seeking vengeance is regarded as lawful. Lawful vengeance with good intention can lead to circumstances in which, for example, “the sinner may amend... [and] justice may be upheld, and God honored.”

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235 ST. II-II. 158. 2.
236 ST. II-II. 108.2.
237 ST. II-II. 158.3. ad 3.
238 ST. I-II. 46.3. ad 2.
239 ST. II-II. 108.2. ob. and ad 2.
240 ST. II-II. 108.1.
one’s right intention, two vices can result, that is, “the sin of cruelty or brutality,” or the sin of “being remiss in punishing.”

Reasonable punishment must follow the due measure of vengeance in terms of mode as well. Aquinas held:

Another way one observes the order of reason concerning anger is in the mode of becoming angry. The movement of anger should not be immoderately fierce, internally or externally. For in fact if this is neglected, anger will not be without sin, even if one desires just punishment.

As shown here, in terms of the mode, Aquinas was concerned with the intensity of anger. Aquinas noted particularly “the impetuosity of anger,” saying that, “anger would seem to have a certain pre-eminence on account of the strength and quickness of its movement.” Anger, particularly its impetuous movement, disturbs the use of reason. Even in zealous anger, one’s deliberative process is limited. Aquinas stated, quoting Gregory (Moral. v. 45), that “zealous anger troubles the eye of reason, whereas sinful anger blinds it.” Despite its impetuosity, zealous anger can remain virtuous, because its dangerous character nonetheless does not destroy the reason’s ability to rectify anger. Thus, anger, antecedently, does hinder the function of reason, but can be “an aid to the prompt execution of the judgment of reason,” and, consequently, “anger does not remove the order of reason which was already firmly established by the

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241 ST. II-II. 108.2. ad 3.

242 ST. II-II. 158.2.

243 ST. II-II. 158.4.

244 ST. II-II. 158.1. ad 2.
preceding judgment of reason." Therefore, even while “reason is briefly suspended,”
the anger is still regarded as “in accordance with reason,” and therefore can be virtuous. This suggests that, even while we are in the heat of anger, we are still able to deliberate and, when necessary, to change the mode and course of our anger.

In terms of the mode of anger, its duration is also important. Aquinas noted several forms of anger to which people are disposed by virtue of their characters. While indicating that a “choleric” person who is angered too quickly has a problem with the object of anger, he noted that “sullen” or “ill-tempered” people stray in the duration of their anger. The latter type of people, that is, sullen (or grievous) people, keep the memory of an injury too long, and allow themselves to be inflicted by “a lasting displeasure,” while the former, the ill-tempered (or stern) people, “do not put aside their anger until they have inflicted punishment.” Both types of people have a long-lasting anger, but for different reasons. A sullen person holds his anger “locked in his breast” and is unable to “break forth into the outward signs of anger,” nor to lay aside his anger, so he cannot help but wait for his anger to be worn out with time and finally,

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245 De Malo XII. 1. ad 4.


247 ST. II-II 158.5.

248 Ibid.
to cease. In the case of the anger of an ill-tempered person, anger does not wear out with time, but ceases only when vengeance is achieved.

One more thing to be said in terms of the mode of anger is that Aquinas, together with Chrysostom, considered the deficiency of anger as inordinate as well. Aquinas stated that, because either anger aroused by the simple act of the will, or as a sensitive appetitive motion resulting from a bodily change, involves the will, the lack of anger when confronted with a just cause denotes the lack or weakness of will, and consequently is a sin. Here we see that Aquinas construed that anger is basically voluntary. For, even in the latter case, the arousal of anger requires the act of the will in that, “the lower appetite necessarily follows the movement of the higher appetite, unless there be an obstacle.” This includes those cases when the reason or/ and will do not function properly: this can be the case when, although the reason apprehends the right object of anger, the will does not respond to the judgment of reason, or when the reason does not apprehend the object of anger properly, that is, “the judgment of reason is lacking,” because the lack of a passion (effect) indicates the lack of reason (cause). This is one reason why Aquinas considered anger to be useful because of its impetuous nature, in that anger is “conducive to the more prompt

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249 ST. II-II. 158.5. ad 2.
250 ST. II-II. 158.8.
251 Ibid.
252 See ST II-II 158.8.
253 ST. II-II 158.8. ad 3.
execution of reason’s dictate,” so that it prevents the movement of the reason (and the will) from being lacking or weak.\textsuperscript{254}

One thing is notable here: virtuous anger itself reflects ultimately the state of the person whose powers—passion, will, and reason—are altogether ordered rightly. This corresponds to the second meaning of good mentioned in the beginning of this part: a passion is good in that it is formed and expressed in such a way as to perfect the powers of the agent. Thus, virtuous anger is identified with good anger in accordance with the order of reason, and at the same time, it denotes further the anger of a virtuous person whose capacities of passion, reason, and will are fully actualized. We can experience good anger following the general principle of good human actions, and yet, the ideal type of anger that satisfies the conditions of the dual standard of goodness perfectly is hardly conceivable to us as creatures. Therefore, a good and virtuous human passion is not only obedient to the command of reason, but also, with reason, contributes to human flourishing, the perfection of human powers; Aquinas found such a virtuous anger in Christ. In the next section, we will examine the form of virtuous anger in Christ, and suggest how this ideal form of anger can be meaningful to us.

\textsuperscript{254} ST. II-II 158.8. including \textit{ad} 2.
1.4.3.3 Christ’s Anger as a Moral Ideal for Us

For Aquinas, Jesus Christ was fully human, and “our way to God.”255 Aquinas situated his Christology deliberately after his accounts of God and the human being, and wanted to show how “[h]is theology and anthropology thus provide an ontological foundation for his discussion of Christ, who is both God and man and the necessary way to the Father.”256 It was important for him to prove that Christ was the Son of God and, at the same time, that He truly assumed a human nature through the Incarnation. In Jesus Christ, the divine nature was joined to a human nature, and it was Aquinas’ job to explain how two natures can exist inseparably and yet without mingling.257 We can imagine that, in so doing, it was crucial for him to argue as he did, that Christ’s passions were truly human and, more correctly, as Lombardo described, more human.258 In ST III. Q 15, Aquinas discussed Christ’s passions in the context of the “defects of soul” assumed by Christ, and dealt with anger in its ninth article, “Whether there was anger in Christ.”259 Considering that our purpose is to see how Christ’s anger can serve as our moral ideal, we might find the discussion insufficient, as Aquinas dealt with Christ’s anger only in this article in the Summa, and primarily with respect to the existence of

255 ST. I. 2.

256 Lombardo, The Logic of Desire, 204.

257 Ibid., 205; ST. III. 2.1.

258 Ibid., 212.

259 ST. III. 15. According to Lombardo, the passions of Christ were a common theological topic in the thirteenth century. For a historic context of Aquinas’ Christology, see Lombardo, The Logic of Desire, 202-204.
Christ's anger. Yet in this description, we can still see the essential features of the exemplar of human virtuous anger that was actualized perfectly in Christ.

Aquinas explicitly affirmed that there was anger in Christ. He offered two grounds for his claim that correspond to the two objects of anger: first, because there was sorrow in Christ, anger, as an effect of sorrow, existed in Him. It was obvious to Aquinas from a soteriological perspective that, because Christ experienced true pain, “so too could there be true sorrow.”

“Christ’s soul could apprehend things as hurtful either to Himself, as His passion and death—or to others, as the sin of His disciples, or of the Jews who killed Him.” Moreover, given his optimistic view of human passion, it was no problem for him to affirm that Christ was able to experience sorrow. In responding to objections, nevertheless, he was forced to distinguish Christ’s sorrow from ours, in that His sorrow existed as a *propassion* in Jerome’s term, not a “perfect passion” signifying our passions, which can tend in inordinate ways. Because sorrow could be in Christ, there could be anger in Christ; second, Christ desired vengeance, but in a sinless way. We sometimes seek revenge “with sin, i.e., when anyone seeks revenge beyond the order of reason,” but such a sinful way of desiring revenge is not possible in Christ. Regarding Christ’s desire for vengeance, Aquinas was referring to zealous anger, in which desire seeks revenge according to justice.

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260 *ST*. III. 15.6.

261 *ST*. III. 15.6 *ad* 1.

262 *ST*. III. 15.9.
According to him, Christ truly assumed a human nature and nevertheless His passions differed from ours in three ways:

First, as regards the object, since in us these passions very often end towards what is unlawful, but not so in Christ. Secondly, as regards the principle, since these passions in us frequently forestall the judgment of reason; but in Christ all movements of the sensitive appetite sprang from the disposition of the reason...Thirdly, as regards the effect, because in us these movements, at time, do not remain in the sensitive appetite, but deflect the reason; but not so in Christ, since by His disposition the movements that are naturally becoming to human flesh so remained in the sensitive appetite that the reason was nowise hindered in doing what was right.  

We can apply this view to a discussion of Christ’s anger. First, regarding the object of anger, Christ’s anger is different from ours, in that Christ’s anger was never directed to illicit objects, i.e., unjust punishment. Second, regarding the principle, Christ’s passions in general and His anger in particular, were related to reason in right order. Frequently, our anger arises contrary to reason, and is sometimes barely controlled by it, but Christ’s passions, including anger “enjoyed their own proper autonomy and spontaneity,” while at the same time, “instinctively following the guidance of reason.”  

Here we see the exemplary anger of a virtuous person whose passions, reason, and will are ordered perfectly. Thus, as Lombardo stated, it was no problem for Aquinas to affirm that, “Christ’s passions may chronologically precede the conscious judgment of Christ’s reason.” For even the antecedent anger that arose in Christ spontaneously naturally followed the order of reason; third, Christ’s anger was

263 ST. III. 15.4.

264 Lombardo, The Logic of Desire, 211.

265 Ibid.
different from ours in terms of its effect. As we have seen, our anger disturbs the
functioning of our reason naturally, but that was not the case with Christ’s anger. In us,
the powers of our soul can “mutually impede each other,” as the intense operation of
one can weaken the operation of the other. However, in Christ, “by control of the
Divine power, every faculty was allowed to do what was proper to it, and one power
was not impeded by another [emphasis, original].”

Having explored what Aquinas said explicitly about Christ’s anger in the Summa,
we can make some broad observations about the anger of Christ. This is important for
Christians, as Christ’s anger is the moral ideal to imitate. Sinful human beings find
themselves overwhelmed easily by intense anger and do not know how to cope with it.
Even if we are firm enough to manage our actions rightly, we often experience internal
conflicts of appetites directed towards different objects. In our internal conflicts, we are
often confused and at a loss to know whether our anger is morally good or bad. When
we experience inordinate anger, the challenge is to cope with it in the light of Christ’s
anger, to imitate and practice how to work with our anger as Christ would have. Yet,
although, as Aquinas envisioned, Christ is no doubt the Christian’s Savior and the moral
ideal through Whom humanity is achieved fully, the image of Christ described here with
respect to passions seems in fact too far from our reality for them to be the model for
our emotional lives. Too great an ontological gulf seems to lie between Christ and

266*ST*. III. 15.9. *ad 3.*

humanity. In order to take Christ as our true model, we will need to ponder His passions and ours further, using the dialectical method. To do so, Lombardo’s discussion is quite illuminating.

Lombardo acknowledged that there are legitimate questions about Aquinas’ claim concerning the internal coherence of appetites in Christ.268 According to him, Aquinas’ position that, “Christ’s passions were ruled by reason in a way that did not destroy their spontaneity,” elicits the inquiry whether there are no cases in which Christ’s passions desired something that was not endorsed fully by reason’s judgment.269 Aquinas did recognize that, as shown in several places in the Bible, e.g., the devil’s temptation of Christ and his prayers in Gethsemane, Christ might having had internal conflicts between appetites. However, Aquinas held, as Lombardo summarized, that reason could not prevent His passion from desiring something else, yet “it did prevent his passion from tugging so forcefully towards inappropriate objects.”270 Aquinas even makes an explicit and stronger claim elsewhere, in which he denied that there were internal conflicts in Christ’s appetites.271

268 Lombardo, The Logic of Desire, 212.

269 Ibid.

270 Ibid.; Lombardo cited ST III. 18.1, 18.5-6, 21.2, 21.4 ad 1, 41 for Aquinas’ various arguments in defending the unity of appetites in Christ.

271 “Christ’s soul could desire something in its higher part that it shrank from in its lower part, and yet there was no conflict of appetites in him or rebellion of the flesh against the spirit, such as occurs in us owing to the fact that the lower appetite exceeds the judgment and measure of reason.” Ibid. Lombardo quoted Compendium Theologiae, trans. Cyril Vollert, (1947), 232.
This position of Aquinas’, Lombardo insisted, elicits two objections particularly relevant to the internal unity among Christ’s appetites. The first question concerns how passions informed by reason can desire something irrational.\textsuperscript{272} According to Lombardo, this objection seems to result from the lack of further clarification between “irrational” and “inappropriate.” Was the object of Christ’s passion something inappropriate or irrational? Christ’s passions might have been drawn to something else, but cannot be regarded as irrational, because they followed their inherent inclinations to the sense appetite’s telos. As we noted previously, human passions are affirmed normatively in their goodness by virtue of a passion’s fundamental orientation towards the telos. Lombardo’s point was this: given the normative quality of human passions, the criterion for the rationality of a passion should be the passion itself. Although a passion is seen as being drawn to inappropriate objects on the most obvious level, in it some part of the objects in fact might serve the sense appetite’s telos, as every passion “expresses a natural inclination towards some telos.” Therefore, the “extent to which a passion is in accord with the sense appetite’s telos is the extent to which that passion can be said to be in accord with reason.”\textsuperscript{273} Seen in this way, we cannot say that Christ’s passion, although seemingly inappropriate, was directed to an irrational object that, in effect, signifies that its nature is contrary to reason.

The second question concerns directly Aquinas’ claim of, “no conflict between appetites” in Christ. The answer to the first question is applicable here as well. The two

\textsuperscript{272} Ibid., 213.

\textsuperscript{273} Ibid.
appetites—sensitive and rational—might be seen to be directed to different objects, but they are, at a deeper level, oriented to the same object, the telos. Thus, as Lombardo stated, while recognizing that Christ desired different things, Aquinas believed that Christ’s desires did not undermine the inner harmony of His appetites. Christ in the Garden of Gethsemane might have shown that His love of His own life was in conflict with His earthly mission, but it also revealed, “…an even deeper harmony between his lower and higher appetites, insofar as his sense appetite accepts the priority of his rational appetite.”

Now we can ask what Lombardo’s further clarification of Christ’s passions implies for our considerations about Christ’s passion as our moral ideal. What does this tell us about our passions? From the point of view that the passions that seem to be directed to inappropriate objects are not necessarily contrary to reason, we first find a way to affirm our own passions as they are. Christians should try to make their passions virtuous, as Christ’s were, and yet it is also important to affirm and accept our own experiences of varied passions. For when we are able to face and affirm honestly our emotions and our emotional habits that sometimes seen inappropriate, when we are more confident about our existing emotions, we can aspire to something greater. With confidence and hope, we can take one more step in our moral development, following our moral ideal. In the obvious case of our irrational passions, we should follow the

guidance of our reason. In other cases, we can give more credit to our divergent passions, including negative feelings. Those passions also serve to attain certain intermediate ends, although we might not be able to recognize their true meanings immediately. Christ also underwent sorrow, pain, and anger, as we do, but His passions were formed and expressed in a sinless way. We must realize that our “negative” emotions can be virtuous if they are guided and ruled by reason.

Furthermore, as we have seen in the second point, the seeming difference between the objects of rational and sensitive appetites does not undermine Christ’s interior harmony, but, on the contrary, showed the deeper harmony of His soul, which was proven through the process of His will in overcoming passion. Likewise, our passions, which desire something inappropriate spontaneously, are sometimes themselves judged morally bad; however, what is more important is our effort to modify or control them by our will. As a moral exemplar, Christ showed Christians that He experienced the internal conflicts of appetites temporarily, but overcame them by His will. By doing so, He showed us both how He was human, and at the same time, more human. This is the very practice of virtue as well. Through our practice of overcoming our passions, through our practice of acting and feeling in the same way, we can gradually become virtuous and ultimately closer to Christ.

1.4.4. Anger as Choice and Moral Responsibility

As we have explored so far, there is good and bad anger in Aquinas’ scheme and the ideal form of human virtuous anger is found in the anger of Christ. Now, turning to
our own experience of anger, we are able to see how Aquinas’ overall view of anger and moral responsibility can be related meaningfully to our own experiences of anger.

In Aquinas’ view, every incident of anger involves reason. Even when the anger arises primarily based on the imagination, it does not arise without acts of reason, although it can disregard the final judgment of reason. This offers support for Aquinas’ claim that, except for a few cases of anger, i.e., spontaneous anger that originates from physiological conditions, most incidents of anger are attributable to the responsibility of the subjects of anger.

In what way, exactly, are we responsible for our anger? Aquinas stated that we choose to be angry. According to him, one way to experience our passions is by choice, and, in the case of anger, because of its close relationship to reason, we have seen that anger deserves to be regarded more as the result of one’s choice to be angry than does other passions. The idea of anger as a choice seems already to be presupposed in Aquinas’ normative description of human anger. For him, human anger is supposed to be aroused in a certain situation, that is, in response to an unjust slight.

We as rational moral agents are supposed to be angered only when we perceive an unmerited slight against ourselves. When such a thing happens, we should be angry because we should try to remove the evil and to restore justice according to our nature. This does not mean that it is not possible for us to be angry at situations other than slight, e.g., imagination-based anger. Nor does it mean that we cannot respond to the

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275 ST. I-II. 24.3 ad.1.
slight in other ways. While demarcating the types of anger, he recognized that people respond to an unmerited slight in different ways, for example, rather than being angry, one can ignore it, believing that it originates from envy, or one can become sorrowful. What this tells us is that anger is not the only possible response to a slight. We choose to be angry.

His view of anger as choice leads us to reflect further on two points. The first concerns not choosing to be angry in our daily lives. We can choose to be angry when our excellence is violated unjustly, and yet also can choose not to be angered in the same situation. The former is the correct response to an unmerited slight, but Aquinas did not regard the latter as simply wrong. Our passions, as noted, have an inherent normative quality, so our emotional responses may not be seen to be most fitting in an obvious sense, but they still can be regarded to serve certain needs. We may be able to say then what is implied in Aquinas' view, particularly in terms of our choice of anger in our daily lives: we should try to express our anger at the slight to defend ourselves, but, when it is inappropriate to express our anger, we would do better to try not to be angered, even at the right cause. Two things are concerned.

As Aquinas noted, the formation of anger involves not only objective factors, such as the right cause, but also various subjective elements, such as one’s excellence and defects. Even though the objective condition—at the sight of the unjust contempt—is elicited, we can still choose to remain calm for our own good, through the deliberate process of reflecting on the situation. Imagine a teen-aged girl who is slighted unjustly by someone who is in a superior position in terms of social power, age, gender, and so
She can be justly angry in defending herself against the slighter, but will probably choose not to be angry because expressing her anger could cause her to experience another emotion, such as anxiety, or fear of retaliation.

It would be ideal if she managed to express her anger to the slighter and it elicited from him a realization of his wrongdoing. In that case, she could avoid grieving over the hurt and, at the same time, prevent him from slighting her again in the future. She could become more mature through her repeated practice of anger this way; however, things often go badly in such cases. Thus, we could say that it would have been wiser for her to restrain her anger at the time and search for another way to express it. This confirms a point that Aquinas’ normative description of anger presupposes—that the slighted, who deserves to be angry, thus has “one’s excellence” recognized by the community.

Is there a way then for her to appropriate Aquinas’ theory of anger? Following Augustine (on Jo. ii. 17), Aquinas informed us of an exemplar of anger in Christ’s anger, who Himself lived a marginalized life. He expressed His anger immediately, but it was deliberate and thus was expressed with meekness: “[H]e is eaten up by zeal for the house of God, [W]ho seeks to better whatever He sees to be evil in it, and if [H]e cannot right it, bears with it and sighs” (emphasis original).276

Secondly, in practice, if not necessary, we would be better to practice as much as possible not becoming angry, because anger itself has negative effects on one’s body
and relationships. Aquinas recognized the physiological effects of anger, particularly on
the heart, and, as with the impetuous character of anger, noted the harmful effects of
anger in leading one to sin: “the foolish are killed spiritually by anger, because, through
not checking the movement of anger by their reason, they fall into mortal sins, for
instance by blaspheming God or by doing injury to their neighbor.”

Today we all know the harmful consequences of our inordinate anger, but often
are reluctant nonetheless to control or suppress it. This is in part because we hear
frequently that we should be honest about our passions and that it is not good to try to
control or suppress them. There may be cultural reasons for this phenomenon, but, on a
deeper level, as Carol Tavris suggested, the widespread myth about anger based on the
“ventilationists” view, can be traced back to the work of Freud. However, this popular
remedy for anger, ventilation, is not always useful. Rather, it can make matters worse,
e.g., it can have harmful effects on our body and damage our interpersonal relationships.

In Aquinas’ scheme, a moral ideal is not a strict rule to be preserved regardless
of our lived contexts. It is, instead, the ideal type of anger that leads and guides us to

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277 See ST. II-II. 158.5.

278 ST. II-II. 158.3. ad 1.

43. Tavris claimed that it is a myth that it is healthy to overcome our inhibitions and express our
emotions; according to her, some of the descendants of Freud and Darwin claimed that “anger,
aggression’s handmaiden, must not be blocked or silenced.” Advocates of this point of view have been
termed “ventilationists” by social psychologist, Leonard Berkowitz, because they believe it is unhealthy to
bottle up feelings. Ibid., 41.

280 For Aquinas’ view and treatment of the virtues and their similitudes, see Jean Porter, *Moral
Action and Christian Ethics*, Chapter 4, “Moral acts and acts of virtue.”
the most appropriate way to be angry in service of our happiness. We can be angry according to the normative form of anger, which is described as the right form of anger in a right situation. However, if we are not yet sufficiently mature to express anger in that way, it is better for us to take more time to deliberate with respect to what is happening before choosing to be angry, while trying to calm ourselves at the same time. Remaining calm can still provide us a partial good, such as something related to our sensory well-being. This does not mean, of course, that it is fine for us to remain in such a state and endure our anger forever. If we practice our anger systematically, and it gradually comes to bear the virtues of fortitude and prudence, it can be expressed appropriately and constructively. Then, we can manage finally to be angry as Aquinas taught us, so that we can experience the positive effects of anger fully, i.e., the full pleasure, and more, the perfection of our moral agency.

Second, some of us might be uncomfortable with this view of anger as choice from another perspective. As mentioned in the section of “Anger, Choice, and Moral Responsibility,” we experience inordinate anger in our daily lives, and are often frustrated by our lack of control over it. According to Aquinas, our anger—and our character—is our moral responsibility if it is not the case that our ability is limited physically. However, is our passion truly our responsibility? In the previous section, I raised the objection that Aquinas’ account of the passions as a whole might be seen only to pertain to the moral education of those who are already to some extent well bred and well-disposed, and asked, then, in what way the discourse of moral responsibility for passions can appeal to those who are not. In this sense, Murphy’s endeavor to
safeguard this discourse is meaningful. She claimed that we should focus on our “attitude” towards our passions, not on the passions themselves. Thus, we are responsible for our efforts to resist our irrational passions, rather than for the consequences. We cannot always control our anger, but we can do our best whenever we feel our anger arising or are already angry. As she pointed out, this does not give us a clear answer to whether or not this anger is our responsibility, as we still have to ask whether our efforts are sufficient. However, Aquinas’ message concerning moral responsibility for our passions was not intended to detect who is irresponsible with respect to their passions and thus make them feel guilty. It is seen properly as encouraging and helping people in their moral development, including those who are struggling with their emotional habits, but are trying to improve them and thus, make their lives better. In fact, retaining a sense of the moral responsibility for passions in the lives of those (including the marginalized) who already have a problem with control is like retaining the language of “sin” in discussions about victims of abuse, i.e., the sin as lack of care. The traditional language of sin—with reconstructed meanings—can be regarded as helping victims not to develop romanticist projections of external evil, and encouraging them instead to try to overcome the various negative effects that resulted

281 Murphy, “Aquinas on our responsibility for our emotions,” 200.
282 Ibid., 203.
from their abuse. Likewise, the discourse on our moral responsibility for passions can elicit efforts on the part of people to improve their problematic emotional habits, and resist the common tendency to blame an evil external structure in an effort to exonerate themselves.

1.4.5 Conclusion: The Anger of the Soul-Body Composite

Thus far, we have explored Aquinas’ account of passion, and anger in particular, and have examined the nature and characteristics of anger revealed in his interpretation of the inner structure of anger. We also have seen how he described the relationship between anger and moral action, and therefore, what type of anger is to be sought as the moral ideal in Christian belief.

As we have noted, based on his theological anthropology, Aquinas’ cognitive view of anger is characterized most importantly as teleological and normative. In his view, anger responds to the apprehension of slight and seeks the goal of vengeance—the restoration of justice and the revalidation of the injured self. Reason influences anger by shaping or reshaping the intention to which it responds, and also affects its execution via the will to follow the command of reason. Anger is particularly close to reason and oriented towards rational guidance, and yet obeys reason on its own terms. Anger as a passion has its own movement, which can prevent it from being informed fully or controlled by reason. This seemingly involuntary character of anger evokes feelings of embarrassment and insecurity in the agent, and thus makes her feel that it is akin to some extraneous power that threatens her agency. Aquinas also recognized that
this dimension of passion at times frustrates rational efforts to control one’s life, and yet, for him, passion’s enjoyment of some autonomy did not necessarily mean that it precludes agency from functioning properly.

For him, passion is affirmed as good originally in the Created order. It is born to be oriented towards union with the source of good, God, and is regarded as a necessary and crucial component for an agent to fulfill her telos. Passion as a sensory appetitive motion is, even in its inordinate form, directed towards a good for one’s sensory well-being or survival, at least in part. As we saw in our examination of the intentional object of anger, the function of anger is related to the defense of the self, in that it seeks the revalidation of what has been invalidated by the slighter. Nonetheless, its pursuit of the goal is not achieved, particularly when the anger is not formed and expressed in accordance with reason.

Aquinas believed that the disorderliness of passion arose from our original sinfulness (and, we could add, the unjust context in which we live, which affects our embodied subjectivity, as we will see more clearly in the next chapter). The object of anger also should be evaluated from the perspective of its bearer’s life within society, which is not always happy and just. Therefore, although anger’s movement towards the target contains its proper reason in a sense, it can have negative consequences for the agent’s relationship and physical health and therefore be harmful to her overall happiness. Anger is the anger of the soul-body composite and the sensory good it seeks is designed to contribute to the overall telos of the agent. That is why the apprehension of good in anger needs to be informed sufficiently by reason. Moreover, when anger is
apprehended as unsuitable with respect to the general good, it should be responsive to the final judgment of reason. If not, although the anger’s movement can satisfy the sensory desire of punishment, it might not be proper in terms of justice and thereby, harmful in the pursuit of the agent as a whole being moving towards the telos, that is, in the perfection of her agency.

As we see here, Aquinas confirmed the ontological goodness of passion that seeks good and ultimately is directed towards the telos, and at the same time recognized its possible conflicts with the movement of rational appetites. We find here how deeply Aquinas’ anthropology is Christian, in which the belief in Creation and the doctrine of original sin are well balanced. In this view, while appreciating the created form of passion in pursuit of the good, we also confess our existential state of passion as disharmonious with other powers, and thus in need of rational guidance. Again, these two views of the basic inclination of passion towards good and of its necessity to follow reason are consistent.

The arousal of our passion occurs when we seek something suitable for our sensory well-being, even in its disordered form, and yet its goodness can be increased by following reason and thereby showing its deeper harmony with the higher powers. Focusing on the disorderliness of passion rooted in original sin, we could begin our moral inquiry with the notion of corrupted human nature, where passion and will are in conflict. This then leads us to conclude that the key to our moral action is in disregarding our disordered emotions and subordinating them to our reason and will. For Aquinas, however, as God’s original blessing precedes our original sinfulness, so does passion’s
ontological goodness, as guided by reason, go before the disorderliness that we often experience as harsh. In addition, as shown by many Protestant theologians, we might find a solution for our disordered nature in our total dependence on God’s grace. However, Aquinas’ anthropological framework, in which reason and passion are intertwined and influence each other, makes it possible to hold that the active practice of virtuous passion in our moral action can invite God’s grace to rectify and perfect our emotional habits.

Aquinas’ main principle of a virtue ethic regarding passion by “keeping our passion passive to the higher powers,” is not the same as the simple suppression of our desire by the higher powers. As we see repeatedly, passion is not fundamentally separable from reason; they communicate via persuasion. Although they might be seen as conflicting on the surface, their ability to harmonize with each other exists on a deeper level. Therefore, the normative vision of passion and anger, particularly in Aquinas’ framework, does not necessarily lead to a conclusion that asserts a rule to follow. Rather, it provides us with the hope of modifying and controlling our emotional lives, and thus encourages and elicits the ortho-praxis of passion for our moral development.

From our moral ideal, we can learn how to exercise our powers as moral agents, how to deal with our emotions in certain situations, and how to improve our emotional habits. It also helps us maintain sight of who we are and the nature of our emotional states, and therefore elicits self-reflection. As we have noted, the power of our embodied passion is potent, especially in the case of a state of soul that has been
disposed to be disorderly since childhood. The prolonged, embodied form of anger is
scarcely responsive to the command of reason, and therefore, despite the will, is likely
to lead the agent to sin. In such a state, it is very difficult to continue the practice of
good anger because it the agent fails continuously, frustration results. Nonetheless,
through the dialectical movement of self-reflection in contemplating the moral ideal of
Jesus Christ and thinking about and analyzing our own emotional lives, we can enhance
the ability of our inner power to perceive a small change, which is created by our
practice of virtue in grace. This is supported by Murphy’s account of our moral
responsibility for passion.

Overall, in this chapter, we have explored Aquinas’ view of passion, and anger in
particular, including its relationship to our moral lives. Here, we reflected again on some
important points found in his normative vision of passion (anger) based on his
theological teleology. If there is one thing wanting in his account of passion, it is a
deeper consideration of the *prolonged* state of passion, and of anger in particular. As we
noted earlier, Aquinas recognized the embodied type of anger that is almost
uncontrollable, but did not give substantial attention to it in detail, particularly in the
*Summa*. This will be addressed in the subsequent chapters.

In the next chapter, we explore a particular form of anger, that is, “*han*-full
anger” which is common in the socioeconomic context of South Korea. This type of
anger is rather an extreme case, particularly compared to the ideal anger discussed by
Aquinas. It is prolonged and disordered and therefore involves several vicious states in
its habitual practice. Its disordered character can be traced to its root in “original sin,”
and yet, the effect of a harsh social context in frustrating and weakening the rational powers can be added as an external cause. Through this salient case of a contextualized form of anger, we can see how Aquinas’ account of anger can be evaluated and appreciated, and also how it can be extended to be more appropriate to our contemporary consideration of human anger.
CHAPTER 2:

HAN(恨) AND HAN-FULL ANGER

2.1 Introduction

In the previous chapter, we grasped how Aquinas conceived of anger, particularly its nature, structure, and moral character. We can now proceed to investigate a specific form of anger associated with han, that is, han-full anger as contextualized in South Korea. Aquinas’ view of what anger is and should be leads us naturally to apply his theory to a real form of anger that contrasts with his ideal anger. Han-full anger is regarded to have formed and accumulated personally and collectively in the Korean context and is characterized by its prolonged and embodied nature. Through this particular example, we see various points, which might have been

When approaching the notion of han, we see first that it inherently resists a clear-cut conceptualization. Han originates from a shamanistic term indicating “the unresolved entanglement of the dead, the bereft, and the down-and-out,” Andrew S. Park, Racial Conflict and Healing: An Asian-American Theological Perspective, (1996), 10. It has been used by the Korean public for a very long time, but began to be conceptualized by Korean scholars only recently. Although similar to Chinese hen (“to hate or dislike”) and Japanese kon (“to bear a grudge”), the Korean concept of han is not identified exactly with or replaceable by any of these terms. Ibid., 10. In Korean contemporary thought, han is construed to be a holistic concept connected to the cultural character of Korean people that maintains a certain organic unity indivisible or untranslatable into other languages. Here we see the mythic character of the han narrative embedded in Korean culture and history. While attempting to articulate and interpret han with other theories, Korean scholars have been cautious not to reduce it to any particular theory or scheme. They often explain han with contrasting concepts and ideas, such as “flowing” vs. “oppressing,” “Jeong-han” vs. “Won-han,” or conscious han vs. unconscious han, and yet also recall the fundamental inner relationships between those opposing concepts that underscore their coexistence and interchangeability.

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neglected or obscured in Aquinas’ normative vision of anger, such as its socially embodied character, its potent influence on moral agency, and its relationship to collective suffering. This case also allows us to see more clearly why Aquinas’ normative vision is needed to understand this specific form of anger.

In this chapter, we explore han-full anger, with the case of Hwa-Byung (HB, “Fire-like Illness”), which may be the extreme example of anger syndrome associated with han. In the third chapter, we will compare and interpret han-full anger in Aquinas’ framework, identifying its problematic points and finally, in the last chapter, we will attempt to find possible solutions for those problems from a Thomistic perspective.

2.2 Han, Hwa-Byung (“Fire-like Illness”), and Han-full Anger

“Han-full anger” indicates the anger associated with the state of han. In order to understand han-full anger, we should first grasp what han is and how it is related to emotions or anger in particular. Han, at first glance, denotes primarily a certain chronic psychosomatic state, which is known to be unique to the Korean people and culture. Han has both universal and unique elements. It is universal in the sense that it is a reaction to suffering in general, and is also culture-bound because the concept of han itself has been interpreted and developed together with the collective experiences within the particular history of Korea. In this chapter overall, while trying to understand han from a broader perspective, we focus primarily on its cultural dimension so that we
see its concrete factors, its causes and phenomenological aspects, and therefore see the particular characteristics of *han*-full anger.

Although not reducible only to “negative” emotions, *han* is considered to be associated primarily with the emotions of anger, sadness, and the feeling of unfairness, rather than with those of joy and hope. As there are only a few books and articles that approach *han* systematically and deal with its emotional manifestations, nor is there a unified theory of emotion in conjunction with *han*, it is not easy to isolate a particular emotion, anger, and to develop it further in conversation with Aquinas’ model of anger. Yet, we can study *han*-full anger, particularly in the case of HB. HB is a chronic anger syndrome listed in DSM-IV and is known generally to be rooted in *han*. HB is not the only form of anger disorder that originates from *han*, but it reveals most of the characteristics that we need for a further comparison of *han*-full anger with Aquinas’ anger.

In this section, we are concerned with what *han* signifies. We explore it particularly according to the definition of *han* as a “traumatic wound,” which conveys what *han* signals and bears. We examine first the phenomenon of *han* as manifested on the individual and collective level (the collective dimension of *han* and *han*-full anger will be explored in the last section); then, based on this preliminary investigation, we examine HB, focusing in particular on its etiological and phenomenological characteristics in the South Korean context. This includes not only the developmental issues related to the original *han*, but also social formative problems that occur through secondary *han*-full experiences.
2.2.1 Han as Traumatic Wound

What is han? Han has been described in various ways by Minjung theologians, who engaged actively in research on han in the 1970s. Han is first explained as some mixed “negative” feelings, such as “defeat, resignation, and nothingness” (Namdong Suh), “grudge or resentment” (Dongwhan Moon), “angry and sad sentiments turned inward” (Chi-ha Kim), and the feelings of “helplessness and hopelessness” (Kwang-Sun Suh). Han is often identified in this way, with its emotional manifestations, but, at the same time, is construed to signify what lies beneath the emotional phenomena. K.S. Suh described han as something that all of those emotions converge into, like “the suffering cluster of people.” Recently, Park referred to han as denoting a certain psychological state, namely, a wound.

In his book, From Hurt to Healing: A Theology of the Wounded, Park referred to han as an unfathomable wound in one’s soul. He refined the expressions of han with figurative language portraying its vital aspects, for example, “boxed-in hope,” “the

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285 The concept of han we are concerned with here refers to the notion of han as it is understood in han studies. It thus indicates a culturally-specific phenomenon and yet, as it has unfolded, reveals its universal dimension. One more thing to note with regard to the term han, is that it has been written in several ways, i.e., “hahn,” “han,” and “haan.” Each term seems to refer to the same phenomenon, but with different connotations, and each usage has its advantageous points. In this project, I use the term “han,” only because it appears to be the most widely used and quoted among the scholars outside the realm of han studies.

286 Minjung theology emerged as a reaction to the oppressive conditions to which Korean workers were exposed in the 1970s. Witnessing the tragic incident of Tae-il Chun’s self-immolation, Minjung theologians began to reflect on the experience of the han of the “Minjung” (roughly translated as “people” or “the poor” according to the context) and developed their political theologies. Minjung theologians construed han as something related deeply to the heart of Korean people, particularly Minjung (the “poor”), and developed their political theologies based on the han in Minjung.

collapsed feeling of anguish,” “an unfathomable wound,” “emotional heart attack,” “the void of abysmal grief,” and “internalized collective memory of the oppressed.” This figurative portrayal of han might not be sufficiently clear to explain the phenomenon of han fully, but it seems appropriate to reveal the multi-layered reality of han as a whole.

With that said, considering that our purpose is to analyze han and han-full anger and further, to bring them into conversation with Aquinas’ thought, it is also necessary to articulate and conceptualize han as clearly as we can. Thus, we might begin our consideration of han with Park’s definition of “traumatic wound.” This definition appears to address adequately the multifarious nature of han, capturing its complex features and implications. It also conveys its character, which involves psychosomatic problems that stem from traumatic experiences. It refers primarily to a mental affliction caused by a traumatic event, yet comprises its consequent somatic symptoms, and also, as we will see, reveals its sociological aspect.

2.2.1.1 The Generation of Han

First, Han is considered to be a response to pain or a painful situation. Park described han as “a visceral, psychological, and pneumatic reaction to the unbearable pain.” When “a person puts up with long suffering or a sharp, intense pang of injustice,” han is formed and becomes seated deeply as a “‘node’ of pain” in the soul,


289 A.S. Park, Racial Conflict & Healing, 9.
which continues to generate pain and bitterness.\textsuperscript{290} Two things are noteworthy with regard to the formation of han: the repression of emotion and the repetition of its cause. Firstly, in han literature, the generation of han is conceived to be related directly to the repression of one’s emotional response to the traumatic events. Psychologist Jaehoon Lee pointed out clearly that “the suppression of certain feeling” takes place in a traumatic experience and this is responsible for the generation of the han feelings.\textsuperscript{291} Han is manifested as feelings so intense that they almost jeopardize the subject’s life and this “intensification of feeling is related to its suppression.” Lee stated, “[W]hen these feelings are suppressed for a long period they turn inside and become the feelings of han. Where there is suppression of emotion, there is han.”\textsuperscript{292} The original han indicates a wound formed in infancy or childhood, and secondary han refers to that which is accumulated through various subsequent hurtful experiences.

Why are these emotions suppressed or repressed partially or completely? In the case of the secondary han-full situation, we can consider the interplay of subjective and objective factors, one’s personality traits (i.e., inability or reluctance to express emotions) and a social environment that is unfavorable to emotional expression, that join together to inhibit the spontaneous expression of emotions. We can imagine here the radical case of han, such as the original han that sets the developing pattern of one’s personality, or an extremely violent secondary han-causing situation that paralyzes

\textsuperscript{290} Ibid.


\textsuperscript{292} Ibid.
one’s reaction on the spot. To explain this within Aquinas’ framework, when one encounters a certain situation (as an object) that signals something relevant to one’s well-being, one goes through a process of apprehension, interpretation, and judgments with regard to the object. When this process is performed by the apprehensive powers, one is thereby moved by the appetitive powers. This cognitive process (where sensory and intellectual cognition are intertwined) and its ensuing physiological changes take place in the phenomenon called emotion or passion. Human passion is evoked as a response to the external object (usually a situation), and a human responds emotionally to the world represented as the object. When this natural process is performed in an ordered way, when one apprehends the object and is thereby moved towards or away from the object properly, one experiences it in a full sense and can move forward. Illustrated in modern terms, this can be seen as the process of integrating or normalizing a particular experience into one’s life stories.

When one encounters and engages in a certain incident, one undergoes the process of rationalizing it in order to incorporate it into the meaning-making system, making it, or accepting it, as one’s own. However, when an experience is too harsh or unbearably painful, the process proceeds differently. Han scholars have usefully

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293 The term han covers a rather broad range of experiences, from the ordinary han, i.e., the han of the lack of education or the loss of job, to radical han, i.e., that which originated from traumatic events, such as torture or rape.

294 This process does not need to be seen as chronological. The apprehensive and appetitive powers are considered as intertwined and interpenetrating in the phenomenon of emotion.
appropriated a Freudian scheme to explain han. In the case of trauma, the natural process of rationalizing and responding to the experience is halted. When a traumatic event occurs (and thereby one’s very core is attacked), one’s response to the event is frozen. The response, which is supposed to be expressed outwardly through emotions, is repressed consciously or subconsciously and its memory is repressed totally or in part.

We find several attempts in han discourse to relate the cause of han directly to Freud’s notion of libido. For example, Lee explained that han is formed from the “repressed sexual libido” that is rejected or not used by the ego. Bou-young Rhi modified this slightly and interpreted repression in han as that of the energy for both sexual and spiritual life.

Secondly, han literature reveals another element responsible for the constitution of han: the repetition of the cause that then leads to a chronic state of suffering. When a traumatic process is repeated and accumulated, secondary han is generated. As Park described it, when a person is hurt repeatedly and the pain and feelings are repressed

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295 A Freudian way of explaining the generation of han on the basis of the three-part stratified structure of id, ego, and superego, as well as the dynamics of libidinal energy and repression, seems to have been taken for granted as a background even in the han literature, which does not explicitly use Freud’s psychoanalytic theory.

296 According to Jae Hoon Lee, Kyu-tae Lee’s conception of han as libido was developed from his research on Korean folklore. K.T. Lee considered the figures of “mongdong-quishin” (bachelor-ghosts) or “songaksi” (maiden-ghosts) in Korean legends and myths to be the prototype of han. These figures emerge in a great deal of folklore literature, and are described as being created when young men and women have died before having a chance to discharge their sexual libido. J.H. Lee, The Exploration of the Inner Wound—Han, 12. Lee cited Kyu-tae Lee, The History of Korean Folklore, (1983), 93-104.

internally or oppressed externally, it “collapses into a compressed ache.” When the repression of suffering reaches a critical point, the pain then becomes “a singularity of agony.” A one-time painful incident might be overcome, but the repeated and prolonged hurtful experiences go deeper and permeate the core of the soul. The subject then enters, as Park described, a complicated psychological state in which “[t]he collapsed sadness, bitterness, rage, and hopelessness become the vortex of [her] agony, overwhelming [her] conscious and unconscious modes of thinking.” The unprocessed core of agony is repressed completely or in part and is hidden from the subject’s consciousness. When buried subconsciously, it renders her void, which is not “a mere hollowness, but an abyss filled with agony.” In the case of the partially repressed anger, it becomes aggressive and remains as “the will to revenge and resignation” in the conscious memory. When expressed, particularly on the collective level, it explodes as “the corporate will to revolt and corporate despair.” This signifies the collective han that we will deal with in a later section.

**Collective han** bears a strong feeling of unfairness and injustice, and at times includes a subversive energy that targets its structural causes, i.e., “chronic and systemic exploitation and injustice.” Collective han is thus described as an “internalized collective


299 Ibid.


301 Ibid, 10.
memory of victims (emphasis, original),” and yet, not all han-filled people show such aggression and rage. There are several stages of han.

2.2.1.2 Jeong-han, Won-han, and Hu-han

According to Hun-young Im, the Korean literary tradition reveals two large streams of understanding about han: Won-han (WH) and Jeong-han (JH). WH appears most conspicuously as the emotions of anger and resentment, which tend to bring about vengeance, social conscientization, and revolution. JH is characterized as an individual, sentimental, lyric, pessimistic, and regressive emotion, and often results in one’s resignation, adaptation to reality, and nihilism. WH and JH feelings cannot be distinguished from each other completely, because they are considered to coexist in han, although they sometimes conflict with each other, in which case one becomes dominant. These two kinds of han have been understood and interpreted in light of various psychological theories.

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302 A.S. Park, From Hurt to Healing, 15.


304 Ibid.

305 Ibid., 15-16.

306 Korean scholars have interpreted the dynamics of han according to various psychological theories. Lee considers them to be two kinds of psychological complexes, the inner realities of which can be analyzed by Melanie Klein’s “two anxiety theory” and “three position theory,” which provide a dynamic understanding of early personality development. Lee, The Exploration of the Inner Wound—Han, 27-55. Yong Hoon Hwang and Yohan Ka interpreted han with Kohut’s theory of self psychology (we will see this in the later part of HB). According to Lee’s interpretation of han as based on Klein’s two theories, WH feelings are related to the “persecutory anxiety” rooted in the fear of the annihilation of ego.
According to J.H. Lee’s interpretation, *han* is basically a mixture of love and hate, and when “hate gets stronger it becomes [WH], when love gets stronger it becomes [JH].” The relationship between JH and WH can be construed as representing the conflict between love and hate, or “life and death instincts.” During the fluctuation between love and hate, the transition between WH and JH takes place, a process that is not arbitrary. “When the depressive pain of [JH] is felt as too painful, [WH] is used as a defensive measure against feeling.” Although mutable, there is also a “tendency to stick to one type of *han,*” and thereby a person’s character is formed. Lee claimed that the transition from WH to JH is “a very slow and painful process, during which regression to [WH] takes place repeatedly.” As this implies, JH is a more mature state of *han* than is WH, in that, while the hostile impulse of WH is projected onto others, that of JH is directed primarily inward and produces less obvious problems.

JH, on the other hand, has its mature and immature form as well. Using Klein’s three position theory, Lee explains this tri-part nature of JH. Identified with the (connected to the “death instinct (Freud)”), and the “persecutory object relation” with the primary caregiver arouses strong feelings, including hate and vengeance, and ruthlessness, and results in the lack of guilt. *Ibid.,* 47. JH, on the other hand, is associated with the “depressive anxiety” related to the “fear about the well-being of the loved object.” JH feelings are aroused from the loss of the beloved object and, thus, include sorrow, love, self-reproach, resignation, hopelessness, loneliness, longing for the loved one, and emptiness.

The Korean word “*jeong*” means affection. While another word, “*ae*” is more generally used to denote “love,” *jeong* is the word that “has more of a connotation of libidinal love.” The word “*won*” means resentment or hate. Thus, Lee held that “the confrontation between WH and JH is in essence the confrontation between love and hate, or life and death instincts.” We will consider the idea of *jeong* in the last chapter. J.H. Lee, *Ibid.,* 36-37.


“depressive position,” JH itself contains love and aggression as its main elements and, depending on the dynamics between the two emotions, JH takes a mature or immature form. Lee describes it this way:

[JH] has two phases in it. In its early phase, the tendency of masochism and melancholy is strong. There is an overdose of sorrow and self-reproach. When the pain of [JH] becomes too much, a regression back to [WH] easily occurs as a defense measure against the pain. If one is fixated in this early phase of [JH], one will constantly suffer pain and sorrow for an unknown reason. In its later phase, along with the consolidation of ego and its internal objects, the element of self-affliction gradually transforms into a reparative wish. Melancholy is replaced by sympathy for others based on a realistic assessment of them, and it becomes the basis for having a social concern beyond the individual’s interest. The sorrow and longing for the loss of the loved object turn into the source for the energy for creating arts. The love in a more mature form of [JH] is better integrated with the aggressive impulse. The love overcomes hate, not by splitting it off and projecting it outward or turning it inward, but by mingling with it and becoming transformed into a new quality of love that can contain hate in it.  

Two points are notable with regard to JH: first, like WH, JH also can be dangerous in its immature state; for example, the feelings of self-reproach and resignation in the immature form of JH can be expressed harshly to oneself, and make it difficult for one to accept reality with hope, which is the sign of its maturity. These harsh, negative feelings in JH are mitigated as one passes through this transitional stage successfully and develops good internal objects that help one mature; thereby, the core of one’s self is established sufficiently and securely. Then the sense of self-reproach turns into the

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310 JH, as has been construed in the long tradition of Korean culture, is love, most conspicuously characterized by love entangled with hate. The love in JH is “not a sweet love, but a painful love.” Lee, *Ibid.*, 48. According to Ka, JH is formed from the lack or absence of enough Jeong in the relationship with the primary caretaker(s) during early childhood. We will see this aspect of JH as a narcissistic wound in later sections. Yohan Ka, “Jeong-han as a Korean culture-bound narcissism: Dealing with Jeong-han through Jeong-dynamics,” *Pastoral Psychology*, 2010, 59, 225.

proper sense of guilt, “which is capable of taking responsibility based on a more realistic assessment of reality.”

Second, Lee stated that this mature form of JH can contribute to social change. In mature JH, the emotion of love differs from the sentimental or melancholic love of immature JH. It still maintains an aggressive element, but it also manages to keep the hope and desire for a new reality. Therefore, JH can be used as the energy to help one face and accept reality courageously, and to fight “against injustice in society and to bring about a social change.” The aggressive movement of WH can be thought of as another source for changing the status quo, but this primitive energy “easily becomes [a] destructive force and destroys objects indiscriminately and ruthlessly.” Lee thus held that only aggressive energy that is based on love (the mature form of energy in JH, not WH) can be used to elicit a genuine form of social change for the creation of a more humane community. When JH “becomes fully mature it is no longer han, but love, which is the genuine power of healing.”

In addition to WH and JH, one more form of han is identified, “Hu-han (HH).” HH is the innermost form of han. It includes primarily the feelings of emptiness (“hu” means emptiness in Korean), which can be transformed easily from JH feelings, including sorrow, longing, and so on. Lee identified this type of han in the experience of the

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312 Ibid., 37.
313 Ibid., 49.
314 Ibid.
Korean poet, Eun Ko. In Ko’s writings, HH emerges as an unfathomably deep concept. Ko described HH thus:

Han is the world of emptiness existing in those minds who gave up the operation of their lives of positive will, courage, and adventurous spirit... Han is not the emotion of possibility, but the emotion of impossibility. It is not the emotion of hope or dreaming, but that of “I-absence,” which can be obtained by the resignation of hope. Han is where the beauty of art and the emotion of “jeong” vanish and become nothing, a phase needed to reach the highest state of nothingness.\(^{315}\)

HH includes, as shown above, the han feelings of emptiness, despair, hopelessness, resignation, and boredom. According to Lee, it denotes a state of complete withdrawal from both external and internal realities. People with HH, who hide themselves in the deepest part of the self, may reach the point where they lose their sense of self and of reality, which may lead to suicide.\(^{316}\)

JH, WH, and HH can be said to represent three prototypes of han that exist in the psyche of Korean people. As described above, these forms of han are believed to be formed through experiences in early childhood and disposed in the formation of one’s character. Each of these forms as one’s disposition denotes the “original han,”


\(^{316}\) J.H. Lee, The Exploration of the Inner Wounds—Han, 51. HH is the most interesting form of han. According to Lee, seen from Klein’s “object relation theory,” HH as the han of emptiness is developed when one shuts oneself off from any object relation with a good or bad object (Lee, 85). In its extreme form, one might be led to self-destruction (87). HH suicide can be seen as “a longing for the union with the idealized inner love object. Although their world of inner objects is impoverished and has become an empty shell, [HH] people still keep their primitive, extremely idealized inner object image that they are longing for” (51). Despite its paradoxical feature that signifies either a potential rebirth or actual death, Lee views this type of han as a pathological danger of the schizoid position (87). According to Ka, WH and HH are like “two sides of the same coin.” They “coexist fluidly in individual and communal unconscious, and confront and compete with each other.” Moreover, HH is a more radical state of han, as WH becomes HH when it goes deeper. Y. Ka, “Jeong-han as a Korean culture-bound narcissism,” 226.
distinguished from “secondary han,” which is accumulated from the ordinary psychological wounds that result from everyday life experiences.\(^{317}\)

These three forms of han—and others—are also used to indicate various secondary hans generated from personal experiences. For example, when han is caused by the separation from one’s lover and contains a longing for the beloved, it is called “jung (jeong)-han.” When han has a component of hatred and revenge, it is called “won-han.” When han is related to regret for not having done one’s best, it is called “hoe-han.” When han is very painful, it is referred to as “tong-han.” These states of han are not divided clearly and often overlap. According to Lee, when these secondary forms are manifested pathologically, people try to cope only with them, but that is not enough, because the secondary hans are related closely to the deeper han. The original han exists primordially and subconsciously. Yet, this han influences one’s moods and conscious thought processes, and therefore affects the process of generating the secondary han greatly. In the process of subjectifying painful experiences, the original han “intensifies and exaggerates the proportions of the current experience of suffering by reactivating primitive anxiety to the extent that the current experience of han becomes nearly unbearable.”\(^{318}\) Unless the original han is considered, modified, and healed properly, dealing with the secondary han is merely superficial. Only when the deeper han is at least touched and modified to effect some change in one’s personality,


can the secondary *han* be treated in various ways, i.e., “sustained, overcome, and creatively sublimated.”

Having explored these three forms of *han*, we may wonder why *han* is unique to Korean people and culture. Klein’s explanation of *han* assumed that virtually every human being inevitably goes through hurtful early childhood experiences. If such painful experiences and accordingly, the formation of *han*, can happen to anyone in any culture, what does it mean to say that *han* is unique to Koreans? Korean *han* scholars do recognize the universality of *han*, saying that any human or nonhuman being can suffer from *han*. Thus, some, as we noted above, have tried to expand the discourse of *han* by comparing it with and applying it to other concepts and theories. Apart from their efforts to extend the *han* narrative, however, they always reserve room to consider it as culture-bound. They view *han* as linked inevitably to the Korean historical experience, and therefore, as essential to the formation of the identity and character of Korean people. While the universal character of *han* can be found primarily in its definition as a traumatic wound, as its semantic background signifies, *han* cannot be comprehended fully without investigating its historical manifestations in Korean collective experiences. In that sense, *han* can be regarded as uniquely related to Korean culture. This aspect will be probed in a later section.

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2.2.1.3 Han and Anger

As noted earlier, han is related deeply to emotions. Although typically, it remains silent, han can sometimes be expressed radically as an outburst of feelings, like an “emotional heart attack.”\(^{321}\) Because it is recognized primarily by its emotional manifestations, han has been translated as a series of emotions, as if it is identified with them.\(^{322}\) However, listing emotions as a way to define han is obviously insufficient to disclose what han is as a whole; nonetheless, it highlights how closely han is correlated with emotions, and what emotions, in particular, are involved.

There is a variety of emotions related to han, most distinctively, sadness, anger, hate, feeling of unfairness (“uk-wool” and “boon”), “everlasting woe,” and so on. These emotions coexist and interact with each other, creating a dynamic formation of a specific state of han according to the circumstances.\(^{323}\) We have seen that this dynamic relationship gives rise to two main types of han, JH and WH. In each state, there coexist several emotions, including love, hate, rage, sorrow, feelings of emptiness and so on. The emotions are entangled with each other, and then, following their inner movements, sometimes sorrow or anger emerges as the dominant feeling or mood of the subject. Among them, anger takes a special position in the state of han.

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\(^{322}\) For example, in the Korean-English dictionary in general, han is described as emotions such as “grudge,” “rancor,” “spite,” “regret,” “lamentation,” “grief,” or “hate.”

Considering the relationship between han and anger in general, it can be noted first that anger is associated with both forms of han, JH and WH, and particularly dominates the state of WH. In WH, anger is one of the most potent feelings, is complicated and radical, and accompanied by other anger-related emotions, such as resentment, grudges, sorrow, and feelings of unfairness. Hidden and silent, this form of anger explodes at times and affects the bearer’s emotional, moral, and social lives. On the collective level—as social rage—this form also is regarded to have triggered the massive political movements in the 1970s, which we will examine closely later. Even in JH, anger is not excluded. While the anger in WH directs its aggressiveness outward, in JH, it exists as a controlled or modified form of anger that is turned inward. In its immature state, intense anger can still be triggered by even minor events. When controlled, as in its mature state, a han-full form of anger can be expressed outwardly and even used constructively. When sublimated and transformed, this anger can be a creative energy that makes one’s life rich and meaningful.

Based on what we have explored, we can investigate a particular form of anger associated with han. The goal of the following section is to investigate han-full anger, as it centers on the particular case of the anger syndrome, HB.\textsuperscript{324} Han-full anger in this case is not ordinary anger, but a far more complicated form that involves various

\textsuperscript{324} Hwa means both “fire” and “anger,” while byung means “illness.” HB denotes “fire-illness” or “anger syndrome.” “Fire is one of the basic elements in the Korean and Chinese cosmologies. A harmonious interaction of the five elements, along with a balance between yin and yang, is thought to be fundamental in matters of health and sickness. An excess of the fire element is associated with the behavioral manifestation of anger.” Miguel E. Roberts, Kyunghee Han, and Nathan C. Weed, “Development of a scale to assess Hwa-Byung, a Korean culture-bound syndrome, using the Korean MMPI-2,” Transcultural Psychiatry, 2006, 43.3, 384.
problems and issues. *Han*-full anger is not limited to the anger revealed in HB, because not all the types of anger associated with *han* are conceived as HB, and conversely, not all symptoms of HB are necessarily rooted in *han*. We investigate the *han*-full anger that involves HB here because, through this rather extreme example, we see clearly the pathological aspects of *han* and *han*-full anger, as well as its etiology, symptoms, and characteristics. In a later section on the collective form of *han*-full anger, we will discover another aspect of *han*-full anger that will help us grasp its holistic features.

2.2.2 *Han*-full Anger in the case of *Hwa-Byung* (HB, “Fire-like Disease”)

Recently, Korean psychologists have become concerned with HB,\(^{325}\) which is a complex syndrome that consists of various disorders.\(^ {326}\) The symptoms of HB include anger-related emotional, cognitive, behavioral, and somatic symptoms, such as anger

\(^{325}\) HB, well known in public, began to be discussed academically among Korean psychiatrists in the 1960s. Since the article by psychiatrist Si Hyung Lee, “A study on Hwa-Byung” was published in 1977, systematic studies of HB have been conducted with regard to its concept, epidemiology, symptoms, etiology, and dynamic considerations. It also has been studied by researchers and scientists in Oriental medicine and nursing care, and by counselors. HB was first introduced to English-speaking countries as a case report by Lin: K.M. Lin, “Hwa-byung: A Korean culture-bound syndrome?” *American Journal of Psychiatry*, 140.1 (1983), 105-107. HB was then listed in Appendix I of the Glossary of Culture-bound Syndromes in the DSM-IV in 1994 (*Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders*, 4\(^{th}\) ed.). In its etiology, symptoms, and treatment, HB comprises many elements that recall its roots in *han*, and thence we can find, through HB, a way to trace and grasp *han*-full anger as well as *han*. Due to its similarity to *han* in terms of its etiology and symptoms, it is often confused with *han* itself. *Han* and HB, however, differ in that, while *han* denotes a psychological wound entailing various psychosomatic problems, HB is one of them, that is, a chronic anger disorder that involves pathological symptoms. HB is regarded to be rooted in *han*, and to be culturally specific to Korean society and people.

\(^{326}\) The various disorders include “a dramatic (hysteric) depressive syndrome, a combination of somatoform, depressive and anxious anger syndrome, or an acute and chronic stress reaction,” and, based on these characteristics, HB syndromes can be distinguished in several groups, that is, “the group in which major depression is dominant; the so-called somatization group, and the group in which anxiety and autonomic dysfunction are the main symptoms.” Bou-Young Rhi, “Hwabyung—An overview,” *Psychiatry Investigation*, 2004, 1,1, 24.
(subjectively felt or expressed), a sensation of heat, feelings of unfairness, and hatred.

Although there have been a number of hypothetical speculations about the dynamics of HB, it is considered to be associated deeply with han and caused by the suppression of anger in han. This association of HB with han seems to indicate the former’s complex nature. The characteristics of han-full anger that develop into HB can be discovered through the self-reports of HB patients. The following story, which is introduced in several articles on HB, is regarded as typical of HB patients:

The patient was a 49-year-old housewife [let’s call her patient A]. She came to us with the chief complaint of pent-up anger, “hwa,” which was intermittently accompanied by a hot sensation, that had to be cooled with a fan, and something pushing-up in her chest. The other symptoms were “many things accumulated” in the epigastrium and respiratory stuffiness that used to be relieved by frequent sighing. Sometimes she used to feel so angry and so “ukwool” (a feeling of unfairness) that she felt almost like losing control or becoming crazy. Her self diagnosis was hwa-byung. The reason for her anger was her family situation with her husband and mother-in-law. Her anger began 15 years ago just after her marriage, when she realized that she had been deceived by her husband regarding his past history, including his lack of education and poorer economic condition than what he claimed before marriage. Since then, she lived in an angry mood with the frustration related to a hard life. Moreover, her mother-in-law had to live together with them, as her husband was the first son, and she began to treat her unfairly and every day the mother-in-law unfairly stepped into her private and marital life. She had to suppress her anger, and hide the hatred and obey her husband and his mother to keep peace in the family. While living with her husband, she found her husband to be a truly good man, and that is why she kept their marriage intact until now. Nevertheless, she gradually became irritable and nervous. She recently became more irritable, began to beat her husband, throw things at the children, or abuse them. She said the children never understand why she was so angry. When she recently stood up against her mother-in-law for the first time, she felt “cool” for a while. During the interview, she talked extensively with sighing and tears about how she had suffered from a life of “ukwool and boon” and with “many [han]”...[b]ut she said she did not feel depressed and had never thought about suicide. Rather, she has tried to live enthusiastically and actively, and she regularly attended her work place (cleaning buildings). She has tried to avoid being isolated from her fellow workers and she believed they might think of her as a “good” person. She
revealed her painful past memory that she had been discriminated against by her mother for being a daughter and her mother favored the sons, and she had been frequently beaten by her mother and older brother during her childhood. Sometime she had to escape under a table to avoid being beaten. Her mother did not even bring her to the hospital when she had broken her leg. She said her childhood was full of days of tears and her life was “full with many [han].”

According to S.K. Min, this narrative contains HB’s essential diagnostic features, including the chronic repression of anger, and accordingly, its accumulation (hwa). A’s anger, which formed in her childhood, appears to have been repressed in part, and then to have gone deeper until it developed into HB. As anger-provoking events recurred in her later life, the suppressed anger accumulated, becoming “dense,” which is usually described as “wool-hwa, “anger of fire”), and then developed finally into HB. HB patients are likely to be angry, often filled with hatred, and also tend to become aggressive quickly in response to even minor anger-provoking events, or unfair social situations. The impulsive tendency seems to relate to the somatic symptoms of the condition (which are likely to be immediate, autonomic nervous system responses to sudden impulsive feelings of anger) including headache, sensations of heat in the body and face, heart palpitations, indigestion, the sensation of something pushing up in the chest or of a mass in the throat and chest, dry mouth, and dizziness.

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327 This narrative was introduced in S.K. Min’s “Clinical correlates of Hwa-Byung and a proposal for a new anger disorder,” Psychiatry Investigation, 2008, 5, 126-127.

328 Ibid., 127.

According to Jieun Lee et al., to be diagnosed as HB, the condition must be accompanied by at least three of the six HB-specific symptoms (subjective anger, expressed anger, sensations of heat, hostility, uk-wool/boon [perception of unfairness], and [han]) (Criterion A), and four of the eight HB-associated somatic and behavioral symptoms: “pushing-up feeling in the chest, the sensation of epigastric masses, respiratory stuffiness, palpitations, mouth dryness, sighing, many recurring thoughts, and excessive pleading (Criterion B).”\textsuperscript{330} In addition to somatic discomfort, HB patients must also have “difficulty controlling their subjective stress due to their anger and anger-related emotional, cognitive, and somatic discomfort. Moreover, they experience impairments in social, occupational, or other important areas of function (Criterion C).”\textsuperscript{331}

A’s self-report, as Min observed, reveals han problems and women’s issues, which are typical in the Korean traditional culture. Such “unfair” situations seem to have caused her anger that she repressed, until she began to express her anger outwardly and to reveal behavioral problems. According to Min, negative or traumatic experiences in childhood often contribute to the development of HB, such as “parental abuse and neglect, isolation among peers, general discrimination, sex discrimination, and [being

\textsuperscript{330} Jieun Lee, et al., “Differences in temperament and character dimensions of personality between patients with Hwa-byung, an anger syndrome, and patients with major depressive disorder,” Journal of Affective Disorder, 2012, 138,1, 111..

\textsuperscript{331} Ibid.
bullied] by peers.” Such negative experiences are related to the causes of psychological problems, such as feelings of inferiority, “damaged self-esteem or even feelings of being persecuted or being a victim and a chronic paranoid tendency in children’s minds,” and, when these problems persist into adulthood, it is likely that these individuals will have a tendency to be sensitive and vulnerable to anger and to be provoked easily by trivial events.

A’s anger is not an ordinary form that exists at the surface, and can be identified easily by others, such as her fellow workers. According to her self-report, her anger began 15 years ago and since then, she has lived “in angry mood.” Nonetheless, she manages to conceal her anger at her workplace and even her coworkers believe she is a good person. Her repressed and accumulated anger, however, did not disappear, but developed insidiously into HB through a four-stage process: in her case, she probably experiences a sudden radical arousal of anger, but is unable to express it naturally (first stage); after anger disappears, she begins to reflect on it, but stops soon, probably because such reasons as being hated by her mother (for being a daughter, not a son) and by her mother-in-law (possibly for being closer to her son than she is) are not the sorts of reasons that are easy to accept or understand. She becomes accustomed to repressing her anger, without probing or seeking a solution to the problem, such that her anger becomes chronic. This, in turn, renders her more anxious and vulnerable to


\[333\] Ibid.
anger (second stage); she is now used to experiencing it as subjective anger, which remains her internal feeling, and she makes no effort to improve the pattern (third stage), and finally, the anger that has been repressed repeatedly and accumulated over time, begins to manifest as various emotional, behavioral, and somatic symptoms (fourth stage).  

Overall, we can say that the first stage of A’s HB probably began early in life (in infancy or childhood), and has become complicated through the recurrent pattern of its repression and accumulation, and developed finally into HB, with partial behavioral expression and somatization. As she reported, A’s anger usually remains hidden, but sometimes bursts out like a fire, and even involves such behavioral problems as beating her husband and throwing objects at her children. Her anger may be seen as both easily suppressed and expressed. It seems to be driven by painful memories that are somehow related to her current situation, and thus her cognitive understanding, based on her past sufferings, is not easy for others to identify. This is why her children reportedly never understood why she was furious. A’s anger is a typical case of han-full anger that originated from her han.

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2.2.3.1 Hwa-Byung and the Original Han

A’s han can be distinguished into original and secondary han. Her original han denotes that which formed early in her life, and affected the development of her character greatly. She stated that her mother hated and discriminated against her for being a daughter, and favored her male sibling. She was beaten by both her mother and older brother. She recalls her childhood as tragic and her life as “full of haan [han].” She probably had an unhappy infancy, considering that she was hated simply because she was a girl. She likely felt that her being itself was denied by her own mother from the beginning. Her tragic infancy and childhood experiences denote her “original” han, and this leads us to see her case from a developmental, psychological perspective. A’s HB is also a product of her secondary han-full experiences. The anger that originated from her early han-full experiences developed and was reinforced by repeated, oppressive situations, secondary han. With A’s narrative in mind, we will examine the various etiological aspects concerning the nature and characteristics of the anger in HB. Our exploration of the etiology of HB comprises its subjective/objective causal factors, which consequently require the investigation of the developmental and sociocultural aspects of HB.

It has been reported that HB patients show some common personality traits. According to psychiatrist Si-Hyung Lee, HB patients tend to show several personality traits that are seemingly relevant to the habitual repression of emotion, i.e., a passive tendency to tolerate suffering, a conservative character with a high regard for traditions and rules, and a tendency to appeal to somatic symptoms that apparently originated
from negative emotions. Their mood is basically depressed. When their anger erupts, their coping strategies vary, but rarely include problem solving.

According to recent research, patients with HB report pre-morbid personality characteristics. They show high HA (Harm Avoidance) and ST (Self-Transcendence) scores, and low SD (Self-Directedness), which indicates high levels of the tendency to avoid punishment, and low levels of willingness to adapt to changes in one’s environment. At the same time, they show high levels of impulsivity and quickness to anger. Reportedly, HB patients suppress and inhibit their anger to avoid further conflict with others. They also attempt consciously to forget or deny anger-provoking events, and withdraw actively or passively from social relationships. Lee observed that all of these behaviors reflect the characteristics of HA (harm avoidance). On the other hand,

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336 J.E. Lee et al., “Differences in temperament and character dimensions of personality between patients with Hwa-byung, an anger syndrome, and patients with major depressive disorder,” 110-116. This study uses a modified version of the Temperament and Character Inventory (TCI) model developed by Cloninger et al. The TCI model contains four temperament dimension categories including Novelty-Seeking (NS, the tendency to explore novel stimuli or pursue potential rewards), Harm Avoidance (HA, the inclination to avoid punishment), Reward Dependence (RD, social attachment that is based on approval and warmth), and Persistence (PS, perseverance in the face of adversity), and three character dimensions composed of Self-Directedness (SD, the willpower to adapt to changes in one’s environment), Cooperativeness (CO, the degree to which a person is agreeable), and Self-Transcendence (ST, the extent to which one identifies oneself as an essential part of the universe). While the four temperament dimensions “reflect inherited behaviors and result largely from genetic factors,” the three character dimensions are considered to be “environmentally determined, resulting from the integration of biographical experiences during childhood and adolescence to generate a self-concept, a view of others, and perspective on one’s role as a human being.” In this report, a Korean version of TCI, namely, TCI-RS (Temperament and Character Inventory-Revised Short) was contrived by B.B. Min et al., “Temperament and Character Inventory—Family manual,” Total Psychological Service, 2007.
they have high HA1 (Anticipatory Worry, a subcategory of HA) scores, which indicates the high level of anxiety seemingly generated by their suppressed anger and hostility.\textsuperscript{337}

From Lee’s research, we can see two conspicuous personality traits that HB patients share. Among the common characteristics, that most typical of patients with HB is the high HA score. HB patients have a tendency to avoid trouble and try to forget their anger and anger-related life events. These traits, obviously relevant to their habitual suppression of anger, make them likely to endure and accept their often-unjust situations. Interestingly, Lee observed, in agreement with Min et al., that this tendency can be connected meaningfully to the influence of Christian religious teachings, such as tolerance of suffering and the forgiveness of sin, which are emphasized particularly in the context of South Korea. Many HB patients have reported that they converted to Christianity while struggling to overcome their anger problems.\textsuperscript{338} The relationship between HB and Christianity will be discussed further later.

Low self-esteem is also prominent among HB patients, and Min indicated that it is regarded as an important causal factor of HB, especially among middle-aged women.\textsuperscript{339} Lee considered the patients’ defensive styles, namely, “their self-criticism, self-pity, and fatalism,” was likely to be rooted in their low self-esteem.\textsuperscript{340} HB patients

\textsuperscript{337} J.E. Lee et al., \textit{Ibid.}, 114.

\textsuperscript{338} \textit{Ibid}.

\textsuperscript{339} S.K. Min, “Clinical correlates of Hwa-Byung and a proposal for a new anger disorder,” 129.

\textsuperscript{340} J.E. Lee et al., “Differences in temperament and character dimensions of personality between patients with Hwa-byung, an anger syndrome, and patients with major depressive disorder,” 114.
are, by their self-reports, “weak-willed, sensitive, meticulous, or inhibited.” In particular, women with HB tend to evaluate their past lives as negative, saying that they “could not dare to resist unfair social pressures, which relates to the traditional Korean patriarchal family culture.” They tended to exhibit inhibition, resignation, self-defeat, subordination, or self-sacrifice. We can trace these signs to insecurity and low self-esteem, which require constant reaffirmation from outside. This feature then leads us to see how deeply anger influences the sense of self.

These personality traits—most conspicuously, HA and low self-esteem—can be regarded as the predisposing factors that make people vulnerable to HB. We may not be able to say that some people actually have an “anger-related personality,” but we can say that there are certain personality traits vulnerable to HB. This leads us to ask how such a character develops, how a han-full experience influences the developing personality, and how such a personality is connected to the illness of HB. These inquiries necessitate a psychological approach, with which we see developmental issues in the themes, han, self, and emotion. The following three sections deal with these subjects.

The first explores the topic of “narcissistic wound” (as the original han) and the developing emotions; the second deals with the relationships among the narcissistic wound, the self, and HB, and the third section focuses on the problem of sadomasochism in HB patients. Two psychological theories in particular are employed: Donald Winnicott’s “object-relation” theory, as interpreted by Martha Nussbaum, and Heinz Kohut’s self-psychology, as introduced by YongHoon Hwang. These theories remind us of the importance of early experience in the pre-oedipal period (which was
neglected by Freud), and allow us to see the interplay among narcissism, emotion, and the self, which is crucial for our understanding of HB. We do not intend to address these theories fully here, but will confine our interest to matters relevant to HB.

2.2.2.1.1 The Original Han and the Development of Emotions

The development of human emotions is affected greatly by the parent-child relationship in the early stages of life. In her article, “Emotions and the origins of morality,” Nussbaum emphasized the importance of the “history” of human emotion—especially in infancy and childhood—in understanding emotion. The history of the developing emotions is a crucial factor in determining adult emotions, and this history is created by the infant’s early experiences with the primary caretaker(s).

An infant, as Nussbaum described, needs psychological as well as physical care, that is, “sensitive care and comfort,” as well as the basic needs for nourishment and care. The satisfaction of these needs by the primary caretaker—particularly the need for security and ‘holding’—is the key for the infant to acquire the foundation of positive emotions. During the first months, the infant begins to distinguish himself gradually from the primary caregivers. As the infant recognizes them as objects, and his cognitive


342 Nussbaum stated that she was influenced by Donald Winnicott (1965-1986) and other earlier theorists of the “object-relations” school. According to her, unlike most other analytic views that reduced all needs to needs for bodily gratification, Winnicott developed the notion of “holding,” which incorporates nutrition, sensitive care and the creation of a ‘facilitating environment.’” Winnicott claimed that in a supportive facilitating environment, the infant’s need for omnipotence is met and acknowledged. Ibid., 71.
ability develops, the emotions develop as well. When this process of transformation goes well, joy arises, and also gradually, hope emerges. If the process is withheld, fear and anxiety develop instead. The emotions of love and gratitude and of wonder and delight, all exist in their rudimentary forms at this time. Love is not yet present fully, because the infant is as yet unable to conceive of the caretaker as a whole person. These inchoate forms of love and gratitude are linked to the child’s awareness that “others aid it in its attempts to live (Spinoza’s definition of love).” If, however, the infant becomes cognizant of their failure to support his efforts to live, anger arises. This underdeveloped form of anger emerges as a reaction, as the counterpart of love.

Emotional development is also the very process of developing practical reason and a sense of self, and this development is dependent on the holding and care of the primary caretaker(s). Based on the object-relation theory of Winnicott, Nussbaum described how the attention and care of the parents or caretaker are crucial for the development of the emotions of the child:

Winnicott draws attention to the way in which holding that is “good enough” permits the child to be at one and the same time omnipotent and utterly dependent, both the center of the world and utterly reliant on another...The parents’ (or other caregivers’) ability to meet the child’s omnipotence with suitably responsive and stable care creates a framework within which trust and interdependence may thus gradually grow: the child will gradually relax its omnipotence, its demand to be attended to constantly, once it understands that others can be relied on and it will not be left in a state of utter helplessness. This

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Nussbaum, “Emotions and the origins of morality,” 75.

Nussbaum viewed the roots of the emotions in “the inchoate sense that some processes of profound importance to one’s being are arriving and departing in a way that eludes control.” Emotions develop gradually, she described, “as the infant becomes more and more cognizant of the importance of the transformations to its being, and of the fact that they arrive, so to speak, from outside.” Ibid.
early framework of steadiness and continuity will provide a valuable resource in the later crisis of ambivalence. On the other hand, to the extent that a child does not receive sufficiently stable holding, or receives holding that is excessively controlling or intrusive, without space for it to relax into a relationship of trust, it will cling, in later life, to its own omnipotence, demanding perfection in the self and refusing to tolerate imperfection either in object relations or in the inner world.  

As described above, “good enough” parental (or caregiver) holding allows the gradual relaxation of omnipotence in favor of trust, and elicits appropriate emotional development in the infant. The child’s ability to trust and be confident, and the awareness of interdependence acquired from responsive and stable parental care, hold and sustain her in the later narcissistic crisis. In her feelings of security and trust, she can relax gradually and turn inward for her own personal project, and finally become capable of being alone.  

What would happen then to an unhappy child? This is what interests us particularly. When the child lacks sufficient care and holding, its omnipotence is reinforced as a reaction and its emotional development takes an unfortunate trajectory. As Nussbaum stated, because the infant adopts an omnipotent, narcissistic posture, any failure of the caretaker to fulfill the infant’s needs will be a frustrating experience of “being slighted.” This narcissistic injury generates reactive anger. This anger is linked closely to the infant’s emerging love, as the object of anger is also that of love. Yet the

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345 Nussbaum, “Emotions and the origins of morality,” 78.

346 Ibid., 90.

infant in this stage is not certain that love and anger are directed towards the same object, as the boundaries between self and other are still unclear. This form of anger may thus be directed towards some parts of its own self, “as well as outward, or fail to make this distinction.”\textsuperscript{348} This narcissistic injury and its corresponding reactionary anger are, however, not necessarily bad. As Nussbaum noted, “if everything were always simply given in advance of discomfort, the child would never try out its own projects of control.”\textsuperscript{349} Some frustration is appropriate to development, in that it breaks the infant’s omnipotence in an optimal way, and anger, likewise, can be seen to be “a valuable effort to seize control and to assert the integrity of damaged selfhood.”\textsuperscript{350}

This anger, however, can become intense and full-fledged during the crisis of “ambivalence,” which takes place from the second half of the first year to several years later.\textsuperscript{351} With its growing ability to discern itself and the other, the child comes to recognize that love and care are provided by the same person, and that person goes away at times and attends to other things. That is, as the child gradually is able to see her caretakers (as well as herself) as definite persistent objects, she realizes that they are not in her control.\textsuperscript{352} This is a painful realization for the child, because she knows now that she is very dependent on them. When this experience is severe (i.e., when the

\textsuperscript{348} Ibid., 76.
\textsuperscript{349} Ibid., 77.
\textsuperscript{350} Ibid., 89-90.
\textsuperscript{351} Ibid., 89n80.
\textsuperscript{352} Ibid., 91.
early holding of the caretaker(s) was inadequate), it leaves the child in a state of profound helplessness.\(^{353}\)

Nussbaum noted, from Winnicott’s analysis of “the patient B,” that this narcissistic wound causes three things to happen to such a child.\(^{354}\) First, due to the infant’s inability to trust, its anger loses its proper dynamics with love/gratitude and, as a result, it becomes intense and love possessive.\(^{355}\) Second, for that reason, “the play of wonder and curiosity has been arrested: the creativity…has never matured.” The child then grows up as an adult (like patient B), whose way of presenting herself is “stilted, rigid, entirely impersonal.”\(^{356}\) Lastly, another notable emotion, *shame*, becomes dominant. The primitive form of shame is related to the recognition of one’s humanity. When the feeling of shame is powerful, one cannot accept one’s weaknesses and vulnerability, so, as in the case of B, he becomes rigid, and unwilling to express himself in his attempt to “maintain omnipotent control over his inner reality.”\(^{357}\) For B, sleep was “a defense against anger—but it is also the reflex chosen by his shame lest some human part of himself be revealed.” This feeling of shame causes the genuine, 

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\(^{353}\) This can be described as the state of secondary narcissism in Kohut’s term, which is generated from the severe primary narcissistic injury.

\(^{354}\) Nussbaum’s analysis was based on Winnicott’s study of the case of patient B, who suffered from an inability to be spontaneous or to express any personal thought. She cited Winnicott, *Holding and Interpretation*, 1986. This case was analyzed by Winnicott as being related to rigidly anxious and unresponsive parenting in B’s early life. Nussbaum, “Emotions and the origins of morality,” 78.

\(^{355}\) *Ibid.*, 79. According to Nussbaum’s description based on Winnicott’s analysis, patient B is so fearful of his own anger that he frequently makes himself fall asleep.


\(^{357}\) *Ibid.*, 81.
vulnerable self to hide; the “inauthentic ‘false self’ to come to the fore.”358 This primitive shame, connected closely to infantile omnipotence, may take the “body” as its primary focus, as one’s lack of control is most highlighted by death.359

2.2.2.1.2 Narcissistic Disorder, Self, and Hwa-Byung

Winnicott’s insightful narrative about the narcissistic wound and the developing emotions was probed and articulated further—particularly in terms of the theory of self—in Kohut’s self psychology.360 We have seen how the features of the emotions can develop in a narcissistic way, but need to reflect further on them in terms of the child’s self-structure with the narcissistic wound, which will lead us to our topic, HB. While Kohut shared the Freudian psychoanalytic school’s view of narcissism, he explained it slightly differently, and focused on the child’s developing “self.” With the aid of his theory of self, we see how the weak and vulnerable sense of self (manifested as low self-esteem) of HB patients is connected to the formation of their emotions.

358 Nussbaum, Ibid., 81.

359 Ibid., 82. A primitive from of shame—resulting from “the demand of perfection and the consequent inability to tolerate any lack of control or imperfection”—often targets one’s “body,” and this shame’s concerns about bodily insufficiency elicit another important emotion, disgust. See pp 84-89.

360 Heinz Kohut (1913-1981) was a central figure in American psychoanalysis. While examining the practices of his patients, however, he postulated that they were suffering from a sense of fragmented self that formed in the parent-child relationship in the pre-oedipal period, not from a struggle between id and ego in the oedipal period. Kohut devoted himself to studying the narcissistic self disorder and founded self-psychology. For the understanding of Kohut’s psychology of the self and the relationship between the narcissistic disorder and HB in South Korean people, I am greatly indebted to Yong Hoon Hwang’s dissertation. Y.H. Hwang, “A Study of hwa-byung in Korean society: Narcissistic and masochistic self-disorder and Christian conversion,” Diss., Princeton Theological Seminary, 1995.
According to Kohut, a firm sense of cohesiveness and self-esteem depends on the empathic response on the part of the caregiver to the needs of the child in the pre-oedipal stage (around or before the age of three) and its experience of “optimal frustration.” Kohut’s version of narcissism is as follows: when the infant separates inevitably from the empathic relationship with the primary caregiver, its omnipotent posture is broken suddenly and repeatedly by the realization that he is not the center of the world. With this realization, the infant experiences narcissistic injury. This narcissistic injury can be “optimal frustration,” and thus beneficial in relaxing the infant’s omnipotent posture. However, when this narcissistic wound is serious, it

361 Kohut’s notion of self is different from a Freudian concept of self, which conceptualized as the separation between subject and object based on a Cartesian-Kantian worldview. J.T. Campbell, “Self or No-Self: Is there a middle way?” The Journal of Pastoral Care, 1999, 53,1, 8-9. For Kohut, self is “a unit, cohesive in space and enduring in time, which is a center of initiative and a recipient of impressions,” Kohut, The Restoration of Self, (1977), 99. According to Campbell, acknowledging “no clear distinction between subject and object,” Kohut, in his later thought, developed “a theory of self as a supraordinate organization.” This self is not a content of the ego, and not a fourth agency along with the id, ego, and superego. It is “a central organizing structure,” which is “the basis for our sense of being an independent center of initiative and perception.” Kohut, 177; Recited from Campbell, Ibid., 9. Kohut called this self the “nuclear self.” There can be various forms of self according to one’s self-representations, and yet this nuclear self is more than a self-representation; it is “the central sector of the personality (Kohut, 177)”. The nuclear self is formed through interaction between the infant and its caretaker. Kohut construed the nuclear self to be bi-polar. The nuclear self fulfills two further conditions, that is, it functions as “the carrier of the derivatives of the grandiose-exhibitionistic self (i.e., the potential executor of the goals, purposes, and ambitions which are in genetic-dynamic contact with the original aspirations of the grandiose-exhibitionistic self)” and also as “the self which has set its sights on values and ideals which are the descendents of the idealized parent imago.” Hwang, “A study of Hwa-byung in Korean society,” 92. Hwang cited Kohut, Self Psychology and Humanity, 1985, 35.

362 Kohut’s concept of a healthy or cohesive self is formed through the infant’s good enough “self-selfobject relationships.” For Kohut, the objects we experience are not mere external objects, but “self-objects” as part of our self. Here we can see a nuance to reveal his thought overcoming the subject-object dichotomy. The selfobjects “will allow for two basic psychological functions: a healthy self-assertiveness vis-à-vis a mirroring selfobject and a healthy admiration for an idealized selfobject. Under proper conditions, natural exhibitionism and grandiosity will be transformed into realistic assertiveness, ambitions, and self-esteem. And under the same proper conditions the other pole of the self, the idealized parent imago, will be structured in the nuclear self by internalizing the selfobjects’ goals and ideals. Through proper processes the child can perform the function for him/herself.” Hwang, Ibid., 100.
leads to secondary narcissism and as a result, the self is split into two different parts—
“the grandiose self and the depleted self.” These two poles of the self then generate
two different experiences, that is, the former part of the self experiences “exaggerated
feelings of one’s own greatness and importance, and the latter part experiences “the
bitter, painful emotions of humiliation, shame, and worthlessness.” Therefore, while
narcissistic patients tend to exaggerate their superiority and pride, they often suffer
from a sense of fragmentation of the self, manifested with neurotic suffering “such as
emptiness, shame, loneliness, lack of joy and enthusiasm, lack of empathy, depression,
extreme sensitivity to disappointments and failures, and mixed feelings of self-esteem
and inferiority simultaneously.” The swing between these two extreme poles of the
self is itself painful. Kohut’s narcissistic patients “were often quite successful

363 According to Hwang, unlike the one-line development of Freud, Kohut conceived two separate
lines of development. In the case of the child with the narcissistic wound, his or her developmental path
goes on “two separate, rather independent lines of development.” While Freud’s view suggests “one
developmental line from primitive to mature object love,” Kohut’s notion indicates two lines of
development, that is, one is “similar to classical formulation, and the second, a pure narcissistic line, lead
from archaic narcissism to higher forms and transformation of narcissism.” Hwang, Ibid., 79-80. In the
case of the grandiose self, the optimal frustration leads the child to learn “to accept his realistic
limitations, the grandiose fantasies and the crude exhibitionistic demands are given up.” Kohut, The
Analysis of the Self, (1971), 107: Recited from Hwang, Ibid., 82. Further, for his/her grandiose needs, “the
infant will create an inner psychological structure which takes over the mother’s functions in providing
narcissistic equilibrium. The grandiose self will provide the base for one’s developing ambitions for self-
assertiveness” (Hwang, 82). This infant’s narcissistic grandiosity transforms into his/her realistic self-
estem. “Another attempt is made to maintain the original perfection and omnipotence by giving over
the caretaker (selfobject) with absolute perfection and power. In this situation the internalization takes
place. In the internalization of the representation of the idealized object through identification: it can be
said that there is a narcissistic character in this process. To experience someone narcissistically is to
experience someone as an extension of oneself, is to experience oneself.” However, for Kohut, the
process of internalization is only half of the procedure. The narcissistic cathexis of the idealized object is
not only combined with features of object love, the libido of the narcissistic cathexis itself undergoes a
transformation.” Hwang, Ibid., 82-83.

364 Yohan Ka, “Jeong-han as a Korean culture-bound narcissism: Dealing with Jeong-han through
professionals with high level of education, and function quite well socially with acceptable impulse control,” but they experienced severe internal neurotic suffering.  

This narcissistic disorder is then connected meaningfully to HB. According to Hwang, the symptoms of narcissistic disorder overlap those of HB. Hwang argued that Korean HB patients generally suffer from narcissistic disorder and their illnesses results from insufficient, inadequate parental response to the child’s needs. Further, the reason why they fail to respond appropriately to their children, as Capps explained, is that they themselves often suffer from emotional depletion, which is also a symptom of narcissistic disorder. The parents themselves “have experienced coldness, indifference, and depression, boredom, embarrassment, and the lack of empathy and energy,” and this renders them “unwilling or unable to respond to the child’s need and desire to

365 Ibid., 223.

366 It is interesting to note that Hwang claimed that an American narcissist and a Korean narcissist are slightly different. Both “would be on the same line of the narcissistic disorder, but standing on opposite sides facing each other. The American narcissistic self is an understimulated one, and the Korean narcissistic self, an overstimulated one.” In the case of the understimulated self, “[s]ubjected to a prolonged deficit in stimulating selfobject responsiveness in early development, such an individual seeks to compensate for this condition—to fill the emptiness, enliven the deadness—by creating pseudo-excitement via self-stimulation of various kinds. The fragmenting self suffers from momentary and/or chronic experiences of the loss of the sense of the continuity of self in time, and of its cohesiveness in space.” In the case of the overstimulated self, in consequence of “unempathic overstimulation in childhood,” one is likely to seek to “avoid the danger of experiences which tap exhibitionistic, grandiose, or idealizing fantasies, the expression of which would be overwhelming.” “Especially, in the systems of Confucianism which emphasize keeping rules, roles and the hierarchical order, Korean children have to give up expressing their own feelings. The many spontaneous moods of the child are rejected and a small range of feeling is accepted. Because deviation from these values also evokes harsh discipline, they are unable to experience direct spontaneous narcissistic gratification. Rather, gratification must be mediated by the approval of a dominant other, by a specific role in an organization, or by attainment of a dominant goal. Especially, due to the overstimulation of the ideal self by unempathic selfobjects, it is natural for the overstimulated self to suffer from despair. As a result, the overstimulated self becomes hungry for “merger with an external ideal or an idealized figure” to maintain the narcissistic balance. Thus, American and Korean narcissists share the same coin of narcissism, although facing on opposite sides.” This suggests overall that the human being needs to be balanced “between the grandiose self need for achievement and the idealized self need for identification with ideals.” Hwang, Ibid., 95-97.
receive and return love (p. 29). The parents’ inability or negligence in care and attention renders the infants vulnerable to secondary narcissism, which causes them enduring suffering in their lives.

Some of us might ask then whether it is typical to experience this kind of narcissism in infancy and childhood in Korea, as the connection of HB to narcissistic disorder suggests that the disorder is as common in Korea as is HB. The answer is likely yes. Korean society has developed significantly in many ways, but still remains to some degree a culture of han (in the negative sense), where many people suffer from their unresolved han and pass it to their children. That is why we still need to address the discourse of han for a better understanding of the sociocultural milieu of Korea. This cultural aspect of the etiology of HB will be discussed further in a later section.

This supports Hwang’s claim that not only Korean women, but also men, suffer from HB. According to his argument, although not as frequent compared to HB in Korean women, HB in Korean male patients is not rare. Their HB is thought to be generated by their parent’s problematic attitudes or the child rearing method of “overacceptance of the child in an earlier period and a sudden correction of behaviors through child beatings.” This then causes a “narcissistic behavior disorder” that finally generates the problems of HB. While male Korean HB patients are likely to have


368 Hwang, Ibid., 99. It is notable that Korean people generally have a tendency to be reluctant to go to the hospital for their mental problems and, in the case of men, it is very rare to admit to and discuss their emotional problems with others.

369 Ibid.
narcissistic behavior disorder, female patients suffer from narcissistic personality disorder.\(^\text{370}\) In such a patriarchal and sexiest society as Korea, “men are allowed to express their disorder with delinquent behaviors, while women are limited to expressing disorders through the personality disorder.”\(^\text{371}\) The symptoms of the former include “perverse, delinquent or addictive behavior,” i.e., sexual misconduct, alcoholism, and domestic violence, which are also the top three direct causes of Korean women’s HB.\(^\text{372}\) The symptoms of the latter are “hypochondria, depression, hypersensitivity to slights, and lack of zest.” We find here, as Hwang argued, that these symptoms correspond to those of HB, which are “somatic illness, depressive mood, anxious mood, nervousness, suicidal thoughts, no joy in life, loss of interest, nihilistic attitudes, and so on.”\(^\text{373}\)

Hwang’s understanding of these two separate lines of the development of the self and their consequent problems according to gender might be seen as problematic, and he was also well aware of this fact, as this can suggest a stereotypical, dichotomous understanding of human development. However, in the case of a patriarchal, sexist society, this view is rather realistic.\(^\text{374}\) As noted earlier, in the Korean sociocultural

\(^{370}\) Ibid., 103. Kohut divided the narcissistic disorders into two basic categories. One includes narcissistic behavior disorders and the other narcissistic personality disorders.

\(^{371}\) Ibid., 103.

\(^{372}\) That is why Hwang held that the husbands of female HB patients are likely to be HB patients themselves.

\(^{373}\) Hwang, Ibid., 103; H. Kohut, The Restoration of the Self, 193.

\(^{374}\) In a similar sense, B. Lee pointed out that postmodern criticism, including Western communalists, despite its “contributions to celebrating others’ voices, makes similar mistakes to those of other Euro-centered movements: That of claiming our age to the ‘postmodern age’ while most of the
context, which is deeply male-oriented (under various ideological influences, e.g., Confucianism), it is not unreasonable to construe a gendered path of development. Of course, Hwang did not exclude the possibility of reverse cases, i.e., a man can suffer from narcissistic personality disorder, while a woman suffers from narcissistic behavior disorder. The illnesses of HB in male and female patients are both rooted in their narcissistic rage (associated with the original han), which is a reaction to insufficient, inadequate parental responsiveness to their needs. Yet, the different conditions under which they are raised and socialized engender two different paths in the formation of the self and the development of HB. In the case of female HB patients, as we have seen in A’s narrative, it is not difficult to guess that they had unhappy infancies and childhoods. Hwang noted that “many Korean women, in the extremely sexist patriarchal society, have been ignored and not well taken care of. In that kind of environment many Korean women must have received little attention and inappropriate child-care, i.e., the world’s population are still living in pre- or modern ages.” B. Lee, “Caring-self and women’s self-esteem: A feminist’s reflection on pastoral care and religious education of Korean-American Women,” Pastoral Psychology, 2006, 54, 4, 350. Lee held that, although Korean women’s social status has improved greatly regarding employment (“The 2001 Report of Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development”), female Korean laborers’ s still have the largest gap compared to that of male laborers among member countries (139). Further, South Korea is notorious for the unbalanced birth rate between boys and girls. “According to the 2001 Korean Census, there are 109.5 boys for every one hundred girls (Korea National Statistical Office, 2001). This imbalance is mostly due to commonly practiced sex-selective abortion which clearly demonstrates favoritism for boys.” B. Lee, Ibid., 346; B. A. Anderson, Population Change in Korea and Among Koreans in China, (2003).
The lack of parental care and attention causes their narcissistic selves to emerge. Unlike the male HB patients, who are comparatively free to express their disorder with delinquent behaviors, these women patients are “limited to expressing disorders,” which results in a personality disorder rather than a behavior disorder. To investigate the commonalities and differences in the characteristics of HB in men and women further, we need to address the dynamics of sadomasochism, which also result from the narcissistic wound.

2.2.2.1.3 Sadomasochistic Tendencies in Hwa-Byung Patients

According to Hwang, narcissistic wounds also generate sadomasochistic disorder, which is a symptom common among HB patients. Given the sexist environment in Korea, it can be seen in general that, while the development of HB in female HB patients is related closely to their tendency towards masochistic disorder, the HB of male patients is likely to involve sadistic behavioral problems.

Based on various theories of moral masochism posited by ego psychologists, Hwang related the development of the masochist self to a function of the ego. As we

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376 Hwang, Ibid., 107. Recall that we are dealing with the pathological development in the formation of self among HB patients, who are primarily from problematic families with underprivileged backgrounds, i.e., low-class, low-education and rural.

377 Ibid., 103.

378 What Hwang dealt with here is “moral masochism” related to “the personality functioning, in which people seek or accept unnecessary psychological pain,” neither “sexual masochism,” nor “feminine masochism” (treating a common aspect of women’s behavior under the sexist dichotomy of male and female). Hwang, Ibid., 163. To do so, Hwang drew from a series of psychological theories, including the social masochism of Reik, and the moral masochism of Marson and Menaker. Reik’s social masochism
have seen in the narrative of A, a female infant is often unwelcome, particularly in families who are less educated or lower class and live in rural areas. The parents’ failure to provide empathic care and attention, as noted, generates a weak self-structure in the child, causing her to “hunger” for the emphatic union with others throughout her life. The caretaker’s (usually mother’s) displeasure and devaluing attitudes towards her daughter can be incorporated in the child’s evolving self, and result in the experiences of “being unlovable, worthless, and inadequate” on the part of the children.\textsuperscript{379} This leads her naturally to have low self-esteem and renders her excessively vulnerable.

When a person is attacked, it is natural for her to seek revenge or react with an aggressive, sadistic impulse. However, the painful experience from her relationship with her primary caretaker leads the child to take another path for her survival. To avoid the painful consequence of losing her mother (acknowledging that revenge would provoke

interpreted masochism in terms of the self-preservative function of the ego. According to Hwang, in his theory, “masochism signifies not only an instinctual impulse [Freud] turning against the ego, but simultaneously accomplishing the instinctual aim in the phantasy.” Two obvious and inevitable factors play “in the psychic development from sadism to the intermediate phase and from there to masochism: the lack of sufficient satisfaction (the frustration), and the activity of imagination. In masochism the partner seems to take over the active role, but the passive role is a temporary resignation under pressure of external and internal necessities. In phantasy one secretly enjoys one’s victory. The sufferer subtly manipulates events or relationships so as to achieve one’s phantasied place in the sun through self-torture. The sufferer appears to be defeated, but in fact not only enjoys the sufferings but also awaits eventual personal victory.” Hwang held that this view can fit the case of female HB patients. Hwang’s explanation of Reik’s social masochism, \textit{Ibid.}, 164-165. He cited T. Reik, \textit{Of Love and Lust} (1957), 169-186. Further, based on Menaker’s and Markson’s views, Hwang claimed that we can find a clue to relate the narcissistic disorder to masochistic disorder: the exact same etiological process takes place in both illnesses. According to his interpretation of Menaker’s view, “a mother’s hostile and unaccepting treatment of the child’s needs is the cause of masochism.” For Menaker, the masochistic-depressive self is the consequence of the developmental deficits, particularly the narcissistic insult of early unworthiness. When the child is forced to relinquish the legitimacy of narcissistic needs and the right to pursue gratification, the child suffers from masochistic disorder. We see the narcissistic theme in their discussion of the concept of masochism.” Hwang, \textit{Ibid.}, 172-173.

\textsuperscript{379} Hwang, \textit{Ibid.}, 173-4.
hostile feelings, which would then result in her loss), the child denies the mother’s indifferent attitude towards her and allows all frustration to be attributed to her self-worthlessness. Thereafter, her narcissistic rage and sadness are turned inward, so that she regards herself as worthless and powerless. This allows the mother’s image to remain “good and perfect,” and the child’s own image to become “faulty and unworthy.” The lack of self-esteem and the conception of worthlessness are characteristic of the masochistic self.

In the case of Korean female children, Hwang noted, their masochistic tendencies are reinforced through early socialization. In later childhood, socialization begins with the process of forming an “idealized parent imago.” During this period, the child internalizes the parents’ ideals and values, not only through parental commands, such as praise and punishment, but also through the parents’ “functions and attitudes between spouses.” Here the child learns how to act towards people, and is socialized thereby. Hwang believed that, in this process, female Korean children go through a harsher process of experiencing “double damages in their growing experience.” Because they have been damaged already due to the lack of mirroring in their infancy, they come to pursue ideals given by parents and society to compensate

380 Ibid., 170.
381 Ibid.
382 Ibid., 179.
383 Ibid., 180-181.
384 Ibid., 184.
for the damage. They give up their narcissistic needs precociously and are immersed in achieving “parental or society’s approval by carrying out the womanly virtues designated by patriarchy. That is the only way for them to restore their self-esteem. However, when they find out that it is in vain, they suffer from total despair.”

Korean female HB patients, Hwang held, often pursue unreachably high goals of female social virtue because they try to “maintain their unmet needs of grandiosity by fulfilling the high self-ideal which are introjected parents’ or society’s expectations.”

Unfortunately however, her “thoughts and behaviors, which are measured by her high self-ideal, are always not good enough to meet the goal of being an ideal woman. Thus, the practice of being a virtuous woman ends with the illness of HB.”

This may be why patient A did not express her anger and hatred towards her mother-in-law for her ill treatment (she said she only “dared” to her mother-in-law), and why she still praised her husband as “a truly good man,” while acknowledging the prolonged anger caused by his deception about his background. Interpreting A’s case according to this view, we may understand that her failure to express her anger outwardly, and to seek revenge for a long while, was due to her narcissistic and masochistic tendencies. Thus, although she suffered from her husband’s lies and her

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385 Ibid., 185.
386 Ibid., 185.
387 Ibid., 186
388 Hwang gives an example of an HB patient, who said, “she could rather die for her husband.” According to his analysis, her remark revealed her masochistic attitude, the secret intention of which is to show herself to the world not as a loser, but as a winner. It is also narcissistic because she is self-righteous in her masochistic attitude. Hwang, Ibid., 167.
mother-in-law’s abuse, she put up with the suffering because she wanted to keep her fantasy—her righteous, grandiose self who does not speak ill of them—rather than face and admit how and who she is. While she is well aware of her suffering and pain in the unfair situation, she still wants to show herself to the world as a winner by not giving up her self-ideal as a “good” woman. However, this—vain—strategy only generates a worse outcome. Her suppressed rage turns inward, hardens, and at last generates various psychosomatic symptoms of HB. Her repressed rage finally explodes in a violent and sadistic way, ruining all of her efforts to endure her pain and live up to her ideals. In Reik’s view, her masochistic self has been waiting secretly for revenge. This is a passive form of revenge that denotes her masochistically disordered state, which can be transformed into a sadistic disorder at any time.

Masochism is likewise a passive form of sadism, which is why L.S. Chancer views sadism and masochism as “two sides of a similar coin,” not as two separate things. According to Chancer, sadomasochistic dynamics can develop between men and men, or between women and women, but develop “mostly in heterosexual relationship because of social factors.” As noted, in a sexist society such as Korea’s, the sadistic pathology is manifested more often in male patients than in female patients, and their sadistic behaviors are likely to be directed towards women. The sadistic tendency is, according to Chancer, developed from the child’s unsatisfactory “symbiotic” relationship...


390 Chancer, Ibid., 128, cited in Ibid., 186.
with a caretaker (typically in the relationship between a boy and his mother in a sexist society). When a boy is separated prematurely from the caretaker, and his dependency is denied, the boy might develop a sadistic tendency in his anger. According to her, in that case, sadism can be seen as “a strategy to reincarnate the symbiosis through power plays in his adulthood.” In the framework of “symbiosis,” masochism is understood as the result of “an enmeshed relationship in the symbiotic stage, from which the child cannot be individuated due to the conditional caregiving of mother.”

In the case of female HB patients, they appear primarily to involve masochism. Yet, this masochism is, in fact, also seen as sadism towards themselves, and, when they become more powerful, this sadistic pathology can be directed to other women, as found in the relationship between the mother-in-law and daughter-in-law. This type of sadomasochistic relationship is often discovered in relationships between HB patients—whether they are men or women—and their family members or other persons who are weaker or inferior.

391 Ibid., 187; Chancer, Ibid., 78-80.

392 Ibid., 187; Chancer, Ibid., 81.

393 The masochistic self can change easily into the sadist self when it gains a better sense of power. A mother-in-law who was in a masochistic position in her marital relationship with her husband or with her mother-in-law, can become a sadist in her relationship with her daughter-in-law, who is in submissive position to her. Hwang, Ibid., 189.
2.2.2.1.4 Original Han, Deficit of Self, and Narcissistic Rage

Thus far, we have explored how the narcissistic injury of the original han-full experience alters the path of the developing self and emotions, and constitutes the subjective conditions that make a person vulnerable to HB. From Nussbaum’s description of the relationship between the narcissistic wound and the developing emotions, we see that the primary caretaker’s care and holding affect the development of emotions in the infant’s life greatly. If the needs for security and holding are met, the child’s emotions develop naturally and, with her foundation of emotional resources, she is capable of responding to a life full of significant accidents. However, if those needs are not met, the child’s inner life becomes sterile, and consequently, she fails to develop emotions in an ordered way, and lacks self-confidence. The child may grow up then with various emotional and behavioral problems. This history of the nature of developmental deficits needs to be considered as a backdrop in understanding HB.

Also, when considering HB in its relationship with narcissistic disorder (from Hwang’s view based on Kohut’s self theory), we see why such personality traits as low self-esteem and the tendency towards harm avoidance that is common to HB patients are regarded as predisposing factors in HB. A serious narcissistic injury results in two separate senses of self, one generating an omnipotent feeling, and the other a void, empty feeling. The more one strives to preserve her narcissistic illusion through her attachment to the external idealized object, the more the other pole of self becomes depleted, and suffers from feelings of worthlessness, shame, and humiliation. While she avoids examining her own internal emotional needs, she internalizes social ideals and
attempts to live up to them, which will eventually render her worn-out and in despair. As seen in both the cases of Winnicott’s patient B and patient A in the narrative, the person with a narcissistic self lacks the ability to express anger because the inability or unwillingness to accept her imperfection paralyzes the resources of anger. This leads to tragedy in her life, as her true self is hidden and a false one becomes dominant.

Most importantly, from these psychological insights, we see several important characteristics of the anger of a person with HB. First, this type of anger is linked inherently to one’s sense of self. As noted, emotional development is entwined with the developing sense of self. In the case of the child who is wounded seriously by painful experiences in her parental relationship, that sense of self is already disposed to believe that “I did not receive what I deserve,” and this fundamental feeling of “slight” continues throughout her life. Whenever she encounters events that touch on her own sense of boundaries of self, her anger is elicited by the desire to secure control and self-affirmation. This emotional demarcation, although sometimes seen to be excessively sensitive, should not be regarded as absurd or invalid because it is, for her, an attempt to maintain the boundaries of self and, through the anger, to protect herself by asserting “the integrity of damaged selfhood.”

Nussbaum noted that such an effort is “adaptively valuable, teaching the child the importance of its boundaries, and rescuing it from a sense of helpless passivity before the world.”

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395 Ibid., 90.
Second, unfortunately, this type of anger takes the form of “narcissistic rage,” which also is a response to narcissistic injury. As noted in Nussbaum’s article, the rudimentary anger that formed as a reaction to the primary narcissistic injury becomes full-fledged during later adult crises. According to her description, this type of anger is ambivalent because of its character as a “device of control.” It is intertwined with the love’s wish to incorporate and possess the object needed; as a result, several emotions, including jealousy, shame, or envy become involved according to the context of the anger. Nussbaum held that “the most powerful and to some degree universal elements in this phase of development is [sic] ambivalent love/anger, attended by shame and envy.”

Third, this anger—which is itself ambivalent, rigid in its expression, and complicated with other emotions including shame, jealousy, and envy—develops a certain pattern, such as HB, through various anger-provoking life events. The anger in HB is largely silent, but when expressed outwardly (when the subject has a better sense of power), it often becomes aggressive and violent. Based on Kohut’s theory, Hwang asserted that this destructive aggression is related fundamentally to a sense of the

396 Ibid., 92.

397 Inevitably, this anger as a device of control involves other emotions related to the possession of the object. In jealousy, the anger would involve the judgment that to possess the good object more completely, the competing objects—i.e., other siblings or the lover or spouse of the primary caretaker—should be removed, and, in envy, that “it would be a good thing for her to displace the competing objects from their favored position.” Nussbaum, Ibid., 92.

398 Ibid., 94.
A person with a narcissistic self is one who tries to live up to society’s expectations. When the person is disappointed with himself or with others, narcissistic rage arises aggressively and intensely. According to Hwang’s interpretation of Kohut, sadism is not different from aggressive narcissistic rage, which is the “response of the damaged self to attacks or frustrations.” When the person is disappointed and frustrated by the unmet archaic narcissistic needs, his narcissistic rage is evoked as an expression of “power” and “control” over others.

In conclusion, this section has examined overall the etiology and pathological features of HB, particularly in terms of its relationship with the characteristics of the self-structure and personality traits of sufferers. This has shown us not only the subjective conditions that make people vulnerable to HB, but also what type of anger is involved in HB. Having noted the internal state as the predisposing factor for HB, we are now able to consider the external conditions that finally trigger HB. As we have explored, the narcissistic self that was created by the original han-full experience is prone to anger, which is manifested primarily in the form of narcissistic rage. Yet, as han is generated by the repetition of the cause, the precipitation of HB requires external conditions that eventually result in a pathological state. In the case of HB-rooted han, while the subjective element, one’s disposition or character, is connected to one’s original han,

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399 Ibid., 188-189.
400 Ibid., 189.
the objective condition responsible for the precipitation of HB is the secondary *han*-full situations.

2.2.2.2 *Hwa-Byung* and the Secondary *Han*

HB is, like other illnesses, generated from the interplay between external cause and internal response. The personality traits shared by HB patients suggest that there is a connection between HB and those traits, which begin to develop early in life. Following this assumption, we investigated the developmental etiology of HB in the previous section, and can see the correlation among the developing emotions, the self, and the narcissistic wound as the original *han*. What we have examined so far are the subjective, internal factors that make a person vulnerable to HB. Now we focus more on the external conditions that cause HB to manifest.

The secondary *han*, as the external element that elicits HB, can be considered on two levels, the individual/collective, and personal/sociostructural. However, we have to deal with these two-dimensional factors in combination, because, in most cases, they are linked inseparably and overlap in the development of HB. As found in A’s story, her personal tragedies, such as being hated for being a girl and suffering abuse by her mother-in-law, are related strongly to the entrenched sexist culture of Korean society. Although not explicit in the narrative, it is also probable that the outbreak of her HB with its associated behavioral disorder might have been triggered by her and her husband’s economic hardship during the developmental period in South Korea.
HB is thought to be generated from the interaction of the internal condition (one's disposition) and the external situation (micro- and macro-social factors). The typical example that highlights the interplay among these factors can be found in the case of HB in Korean women, particularly middle-aged, married women. While examining the social factors in their secondary *han*-full experiences, which are attributable to their HB, we shall encounter several feminist issues that are particularly relevant to the life of Korean women, such as their family conflicts and their consequent diminished agency, as well as the lack of a facilitating environment.

2.2.2.2.1 Korean Women, Family Issues and HB

Although large scale, systematic research on HB (i.e., based on a national sample) is not yet available, some studies have provided epidemiological information on HB in Korea. According to that research, approximately 4.2% of the general population in Korea, and nearly 11.9% of Korean American people, may suffer from symptoms of HB. The highest incidence of HB occurs among middle-aged, married women of lower socioeconomic status (low income, low education). The major life-events associated


with the onset of HB are reportedly family conflict (mostly with husbands and mothers-in-law), economic hardship, and problems with their children. While among these reasons, the economic factor involves both Korean men and women with HB, family conflict and problems with children (particularly involving separation from a son) are considered to be unique to the life of Korean women with HB. While taking the second factor as a common background, this section is concerned particularly with these two issues.

Many of these women with HB reported that their illness was triggered by conflicts with their husbands, more specifically, by their husbands' behavioral problems—including extramarital affairs, alcoholism, domestic violence, and neglect. Because of various feminist endeavors designed to make this issue visible, the problem of domestic violence in the Korean family is no longer a secret. This behavioral problem among Korean husbands can be explained first in its connection to their psychiatric illnesses, as we noted in the previous section. These husbands of HB patients, in

(less than high school, 84.9%), medium or low economic class (~87%), housewives (48.3%), and Christians (32.5%). J.-W. Kim, et al., “The characteristics of Hwa-byung patients based on Hwa-Byung epidemiologic data,” Journal of Oriental Neuropsychiatry, 2010, 21, 2, 160.


Hwang, “A study of Hwa-Byung,” 151. According to Hwang, the son’s separation from his mother for reasons such as marriage, affects her physically and emotionally more frequently than any other problems concerning children.

Hwang’s argument, have their own HB anger problem, which again, is embedded in their original han (narcissistic wound). In addition to their prolonged psychological vulnerability, we also can see that their behavior problems are engendered in part or intensified by their social frustration in the turmoil of Korean developmental industrialization. The epidemiological data—age, class, and education level—of Korean HB patients confirms that many of these husbands are from a low socioeconomic class.

On the other hand, women with HB are also subject to trouble with their mothers-in-law, which is a perennial problem in Korean society. According to Hwang, this conflict between mothers- and daughters-in-law shares its origin with the problem of the son leaving (the most distinctive example in problems with children), in terms of the etiology of HB: “the enmeshed relationship between mother and son.” Based on Miller’s view, Hwang claimed that: Korean female HB patients are “overly indulged in

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407 We have seen how the narcissistic behavior disorder of HB male patients (which Hwang deduced from the sample of the husbands of the HB female patients) is related to their narcissistic wounds, and accordingly to HB in the section on the original han.

408 It is notorious for mothers-in-law and daughters-in-law to be in conflicting relationships in traditional Korean families. Korean daughters-in-law have often been denigrated and abused by superior family members, particularly by mothers-in-law who were also victims themselves when they were young. The han of mothers-in-law is passed to their daughters-in-laws, whose han is intensified thereby. J.S. Park, “The anguish in the Korean woman’s soul: Feminist theologians on a real life issue,” Pastoral Psychology, 2011, 60. The case of the conflict between a daughter-in-law and mother-in-law is not a mere interpersonal or relational issue, but comprises a structural problem—a patriarchal and hierarchal familial system—that renders two women as victims. The patriarchal ideology in Korea is, as H.-K. Jung indicated, derived from the influence of Confucianism. According to Jung, Confucian ethics was employed to organize the social and familiar system in the Choson (Yi) dynasty (1392-1910) and since then, the life of Korean women, particularly of those who are in the lowest positions in terms of age, gender, and status, i.e., daughters-in-law, have been controlled and oppressed socially, culturally, and religiously for a long time. H.-K. Jung, “Han-pu-ri’: Doing theology from Korean women’s perspective,” The Ecumenical Review, 1988, 40,1, 31.

their children,” and demonstrate sacrificial love towards their sons, but their love is often a distorted form of narcissistic love.\(^{410}\) When the son leaves his mother upon his marriage or departure from the home, the enmeshed relationship ends and triggers the development of HB in the women. This is, as Hwang rightly stated, not only a personal, mental problem, but also one that involves the issue of social structures.

In the sexist, patriarchal family system of Korea, which operates based on the dynamics of power and control, “the son is a key source of power for the mother.”\(^{411}\) Moreover, her enmeshed relationship with her son is often reinforced by two relevant factors, her internalized ideals of a mother’s love and her husband’s indifference to her.\(^{412}\) In this context, the mother often becomes jealous and even hates her daughter-in-law, who she sees as an enemy who threatens her bond with her son. When she loses her son, who is her only hope to secure her position in the patriarchal family system, she feels “there is nothing left except her worthless self.”\(^{413}\) The mother’s HB and its consequent behavioral problems, tragically in turn, generate HB in the daughter-in-law. When a daughter-in-law becomes a mother-in-law, and thereby achieves power and

\(^{410}\) *Ibid.*., 152. According to Hwang, Miller located the root of her patients’ illnesses in their relationships with their mothers with narcissistic wounds. He cited A. Miller, “Depression and grandiosity as related forms of narcissistic disturbance,” *Essential Papers on Narcissism.*

\(^{411}\) Hwang, “A study of *Hwa-Byung* in Korean society,” 152.

\(^{412}\) The husband’s indifferent attitude and lack of emotions are, as Hwang argued, also seen as resulting from their narcissistic wounds, and in that sense, we may say that he is another victim in this system.

status in the family, she is likely to hate and behave violently towards her daughter-in-law, and the vicious cycle of abuse and suffering between these women continues.

The cycle of abuse in HB patients takes place not only in the relationship between the mother- and daughter-in-law, but also in that between the husband and wife. The first reason mentioned above highlights the problem. The HB of Korean women develops largely from their suppressed rage against their husbands’ behavioral problems, which themselves are also regarded to be the result of HB. These women with HB self-report that they feel that they are victims of a chronic stressful relationship and say that they have to suppress or inhibit their anger to keep peace and harmony in the family or in their social relationships. Their tolerance may be attributable to the cycle of abuse. Because a sadomasochistic relationship works only between a sadist and a masochist, such a relationship originates in essence from the desire to find a symbiotic partner.\textsuperscript{414} If the partner refuses the abusive relationship resolutely, the sadistic impulse loses its goal. The complete healing of one’s HB may be a lifetime project, but these women as daughters-in-law and battered victims can take the first step to stop the cycle of abuse by leaving the abusive relationship. Unfortunately, however, it is reported that many Korean female HB patients tolerate these secondary \textit{han}-full situations, suppress their pain and reactionary emotions, and therefore unintentionally allow the abusive relationship to continue in their lives and in those of future generations.

\textsuperscript{414} For the concept of a symbiotic relationship in sadomasochism, see Hwang, \textit{Ibid.}, 174.
Why do they tolerate this domestic violence? This is certainly not a new question, but it needs to be addressed here. It is not only related directly to our concern for the suppression of anger as the cause of HB, but also, more broadly, involves the problem of women’s agency, which becomes too constrained and limits their pursuit of happiness. Of course, we should recognize the imminent danger, i.e., the threats of their husbands, or economic hardship that prevents them from even reporting to the police, but this is not the only reason. We see at a deeper level their inability or unwillingness to act based on their emotions.

In the view of self-psychology, their wounded self and its associated disorders of narcissism/masochism prevent them from feeling and acting as free agents for their well-being and happiness. In brief, based on what we have seen in the previous section, the self, doubly wounded by the narcissistic injury and the oppressive socialization process in infancy and childhood, develops a severe sense of fragmentation. The vulnerable self then suffers from inner feelings of rage, sorrow, and emptiness, and hungers for an empathic relationship with others. These women are likely to avoid conflicted relationships with others in order to maintain the feelings of external security and reaffirmation. For them, negative emotions, including anger, should be repressed lest they endanger their social relationships. This, however, leads to a tragic situation. They tolerate painful relationship in order to keep their internalized ideals and values, which were given socially, in the form of the traditional virtues of women (i.e., “hyun-”
mo-yang-cheo” or “good wife and wise mother”).\footnote{There have been traditional specific behavioral codes to educate a woman to dedicate her life to her husband and his family, such as hyun mo yang cheo meaning “wise or sacrificial mother and submissive wife,” and samjong childo, referring to “the rule of three-fold obedience—obedience to their fathers in their childhood, their husbands during marriage, and finally their sons in old age when they become widows.” Such ideals of the Confucian womanly virtues to restrain the self-formative actions of the Korean women are believed to have been abolished, but their basic ideas still remain, and are taught by their parents and the society by way of internalization. For more detail, See A. Son, “Assertion and accommodation as a paradoxical dance in achieving self-formation of Korean women in evangelical churches,” *Pastoral Psychology*, 2011, 60, 603; A. Son, “Confucianism and the lack of the development of the self among Korean American women,” *Pastoral Psychology*, March 2006, 54, 4, 328-329.} Despite their tolerance, however, they secretly wish for revenge. By cleaving to the ideals approved and encouraged by their parents and the community, they can maintain their sense of self as secure and integrated and avoid social pressure, i.e., that towards divorced women. Nonetheless, their self-righteous self involves, in secret, their masochist wish, which awaits eventual revenge.

This explanation, on the other hand, leads us inevitably to revisit a structural problem: the patriarchal, hierarchical structure in the South Korean familial system, which threatens the vulnerable self continually and thus debilitates women’s agency. It would be wrong to exaggerate this social power to the extent that we obscure the women as agents, but it is not right either, to underestimate its oppressive effect and influence on women’s lives. The Korean family system, entrenched in the sexist, patriarchal ethos, is a perennial source of pain and unhappiness for many Korean women. Traditionally, Korean society promotes the values of kinship and harmony and relatedness in family,\footnote{According to Lee, based on “the family-centered communalism, the Korean people have developed communal personhood. Unlike individualism, the value of the individual in Korean society} emphasizing the hierarchical relationships among the family
members and the distinctiveness of gender roles. These ideals of family harmony and relatedness, however, can be maintained only when they are identified with loyalty to the hierarchical and patriarchal order and, for that, weak and less powerful members are forced to sacrifice themselves. The idealized image of the “virtuous woman” is completed with the sacrificial acts of women to preserve peace and harmony in the family and community. This family ideology, which is influenced strongly by Confucian ethics, has driven many Korean women to suffer inequality and loss of control in their daily lives, and even to tolerate physical and mental abuse from superior family members. Although women are abused and treated badly by their husbands and mothers-in-law, they are not allowed to talk about their personal situations to others. They must behave themselves to prevent blemishing the name and honor of the family. As we have seen in the case of HB patients, their symptom of “talkativeness” about their suffering in a supportive environment (i.e., with a doctor) reveals that their taciturnity and silence itself are painful to them. It also shows that their prolonged suppression or inhibition of their natural expression of emotions is a direct cause of HB.

Most of the Korean women suffering from HB, as we have investigated so far, struggle with family conflicts and other difficulties. The family issue is not simply a

depends on how well a person adopts communal norms and functions to promote social harmony. Attachments, relatedness, connectedness, oneness, and dependency among people are much more important than independence and individuality in Korean society. B. Lee, “Caring-self and women’s self-esteem: A feminist’s reflection on pastoral care and religious education of Korean-American women,” Pastoral Psychology, 2006, 54, 4, 344.

Ibid., 346.
personal problem, but is also a sociocultural product of society and the Korean family system. While exploring the concrete situations these women face and tolerate, we might wonder whether our approach is not too simplistic to understand their multifaceted realities intermingled with various coexisting issues. We might think that this approach is too conventional, i.e., viewing the Korean patriarchal family system as a monolithic source of oppression and treating women as victims of male domination.

However, we are dealing with a particular group of people who are victims in the system, probing the direct causal factors that provoke their illness and pathological symptoms. When we focus on these people, we cannot help but witness that their suffering and wounded agency are related directly to the family system, which leads us to concentrate on its oppressive power. That said, it should be noted as well that we not only see this issue within the framework of “the wrongdoer/the wronged,” but in order to understand these issues fully, we also must look beyond the dichotomous framework and inspect the subjective factors through the lens of psychological theories. Thus, their illness is also the result of their self-formation through various choices and acts the self has made for its survival. Their actions might be driven pathologically, but are still voluntary. There is a place to highlight this issue, which will help us probe the interplay between their ambivalent agency and a particular context: Korean Protestant churches.
2.2.2.2 Politics of Gender and the South Korean Protestant Church

Interestingly, many of those with HB have said that they converted to Christianity when they began to suffer from HB. In South Korea, where 25% of the population is Christian, it is common that people who are in trouble go to a church to find a solution, rather than seek professional help. For people with HB, it is natural to solicit a cure for their illness, as well as a refuge from their hard life, in the church. This may be a detour that avoids a direct solution, but is, nonetheless, a good step that the self chooses and acts on for its benefit. It is an alternative way to relieve their pain and seek a possible solution, which does not put themselves and their families in impending danger. What, then, happens to them after their conversion? What do they find in the church? This and the sections that follow deal with the problems and issues in the experiences of Christian converts with HB in the Korean religious context and in Korean Protestant churches in particular.

Based on her study of Korean women’s involvement in contemporary Korean evangelicalism, Chong stated that one of the common reasons that leads Korean women

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418 S.K. Min, “A study of the concept of HwaByung,” 8. According to Min, before seeing a psychiatrist, many HB patients had visited physicians other than psychiatrists (70%), traditional oriental physicians (55%), and other psychiatrists (20%). Some patients had also sought help from Christian faith healing (confirming prayer; 12.5%) and shamanistic rituals (7.1%). S.K. Min, “Treatment and prognosis of Hwabyung,” Psychiatry Investigation, 2004, 1, 1, 30.

419 In 1995, the number of Protestant Christians numbered 8,760,000, i.e., 19.7% of the population. Add to that the numbers of Roman Catholic Christians (6.6%) and Korean Christianity represents 26.3% of the population in that same year. Despite its short history, Christianity has become a main religion, together with Buddhism (23.1%). Y.-G, Hong, “Revisiting church growth in Korean Protestantism: A theological reflection,” International Review of Mission, 1995, 190.
to lean on Christianity is a problematic marital life. According to her, the women she interviewed struggle with the problem of “emotional deprivation in marriage,” such as “the felt absence of marital love, intimacy, and spousal respect,” and for them, Korean evangelical Protestant churches provide them with the experience of transformation and healing. They reported that, in their experience of God’s love, they felt their emotional pain alleviated and their fragmented selves empowered. This experience helped them rebuild a sense of inner confidence and self-worth so that they were prepared to “deal with their domestic situations and defend against emotional harm.”

Moreover, church involvement offered them a public space to experience their autonomy and empowerment, and opportunities to use their nondomestic talents and

420 Chong’s research was conducted between 1996 and 1999 in two Protestant churches—one Presbyterian and one Methodist—in Seoul. In South Korea, Presbyterianism and Methodism represent the two largest Protestant denominations. Her methods included in-depth interviews (96) and intensive participant observation; the majority of interviewees (60) were married women congregants between the ages of 35 and 55, which represents the largest membership category in both churches. These interviewees (mostly housewives) are largely middle class, or those on the border between the working and middle classes (702-703). This group is not of course identified with the Korean women with HB, which are our assumed group, particularly because of their economic classification. While Chong’s group was mostly from middle-class families, we presuppose that female HB patients belong primarily to the economically less privileged. Without this dissimilarity, it is possible to regard these two groups as largely overlapping. The majority of women in Chong’s article were housewives, who are, as we see in their interviews, suffering in their family situations. K.H. Chong, “Negotiating patriarchy: South Korean evangelical women and the politics of gender,” *Gender and Society*, 2006, 20, 6, 697-724.


422 Chong noted that one of the major sources of psychic injury for Korean women is the problem of emotional deprivation in marriage, especially “the felt absence of marital love, intimacy, and spousal respect, set especially against women’s expectations for conjugal love.” She introduced one narrative to show how women’s church involvement has led them to experience the transformative love of God: “I never felt like I received much love from anyone. But all this was compensated for by God. For the first time in my life, I felt loved, blessed, and special.” *Ibid.*
abilities.\(^{423}\) For many women, church participation, by allowing them time and a sphere outside the home, also serves as a “means of resistance against male authority and the constraints of domestic situations.”\(^{424}\) By being away from their homes, they experience a sense of autonomy and relief from domestic pressures. The replacement of the object of their devotions—from male authority and control to God and beliefs in God’s authority—can lead them to create an inner space in which to transcend their oppressive situations.\(^{425}\) Furthermore, although women’s subordinate role and status in Korean religious contexts have not improved substantially, and their assigned tasks are mostly “kitchen jobs,”\(^{426}\) church involvement nonetheless furnishes them opportunities to participate in various roles and works in the church that help them develop nondomestic talents and abilities.\(^{427}\) These experiences often allow them the feeling of

\(^{423}\) Ibid., 712

\(^{424}\) A woman’s narrative: “One 42 year-old woman, a small store owner, convinced her formerly abusive husband that the only way she could remain healthy and sane was for him to let her faithfully attend church: Yes, people tell me I’m “hanging” too much onto God. But my husband knows that if I don’t go to church like I do, I’d be a sick person! So now he says to me, for you, work is not the most important thing. What’s the point if you have money but get sick so we have to pay the hospital bills? My husband knows this, so going to church is one thing he doesn’t say anything about. For me, church comes before everything else. Even if I’m with nonchurch friends, I leave and go to church if a church matter comes up. But everyone knows what God means to me, that I can’t live without Him. For this woman, sickness and subsequent church participation were employed as a direct instrument of gender resistance.” Chong, Ibid., 713.

\(^{425}\) Ibid., 713-714.

\(^{426}\) As Chong indicated, in reality, women’s status in the Protestant churches still remains that of second-class members. In most South Korean Protestant churches, the ordination of women is prohibited. Historically, they have been, and are, subordinated strictly within the church hierarchy and authority structure. Although women comprise 70% of Christians in Korea, they are excluded from decision-making bodies and “generally relegated to support-level tasks within the church, where they are regarded primarily as helpers (do-eum baepil) and service workers (bojoja).” Ibid., 711-712.

\(^{427}\) Ibid., 713.
“enhancement of self-esteem and confidence,” even “dramatic internal transformations.”

However, the participation of Korean evangelical women in the church also brings about contradictory effects and consequences, both to the development of their subjectivity and to the status quo of the family/gender system. According to Chong, their church involvement is not only a means for their gender negotiation or struggle, but also for their “redomestication.” The religious patriarchal power of the Korean evangelical church, together with the structures and ideology of South Korea’s regime of patriarchy, in fact forces these Christian women to “consent” to patriarchy and actually to help sustain and reproduce the current family/gender arrangements. Chong also found an inner motivation for their acquiescence in “women’s conservative desires for maintaining the status quo;” for many women, she stated, the traditional family system is still attractive, in that it gives women “the best form of security and reward in a rapidly changing world.” They are also encouraged by their “powerful sense of obligation to maintain the integrity of the family, both as women and as moral persons.” While having two contradictory desires, to resist the oppression of the family system

428 Ibid. According to Chong, many women interviewed have reportedly experienced personality changes, i.e., “from being ‘meek’ and ‘shy’ to becoming more ‘confident,’ ‘bold,’ and ‘outspoken.’”

429 Ibid., 697.

430 Ibid.

431 Ibid., 719.
and to preserve its integrity, Korean women participate simultaneously in reproducing and resisting gender hierarchies through their church involvement.

Chong’s analysis contributes to our understanding of the paradoxical dynamic in Korean women’s engagement in the evangelical churches of South Korea. However, other feminist theologians see her analysis of women’s participation in the church as inadequate or overly narrow. In her response to Chong’s views, Son argued that, by construing women’s agency only in terms of their reactions to and maintenance of patriarchal structures (therefore, within the frame of resistance-accommodation), Chong does not account fully for the reasons that evangelical women still participate avidly in heavily patriarchal churches. Based on Kohut’s theory of the development of self-formation, Son claimed that viewing Korean women’s church participation as a process of “self-formation” discloses other meanings and values.

Son indicated that the church’s formative functions still work, despite its patriarchal structure. She explained three aspects in which the church contributes to women’s self-formation: firstly, churches provide women with an “affirmation” in their pursuit of self-formation. Seen from Kohut’s perspective, the affirmation of one’s healthy self-assertiveness by others is crucial to develop sound ambition and purpose in life. While their families are unwilling to recognize and appreciate their devotion to them, the church gives more affirmation of women’s assertive efforts and facilitates a


needed context for their self-formation. Secondly, it allows them to have healthy “admiration” for idealized figures, i.e., a high regard for God and church leaders, so that they can foster ideals and values in life. Lastly, the church provides a facilitating environment, which is more flexible and nurturing for women, and so enables them to develop their skills and talents.

With regard to this point, Son claimed that Korean Protestantism in particular has contributed to women’s lives. When Protestantism was introduced to Korea by Western missionaries, most Korean women, under the influence of Confucian rules, had to stay at home and received no education. Some middle class women received public education, but their status remained that of stay-at-home mothers who belonged in the household domain. Protestant churches held classes for girls and women, and thereby offered a public space for them to express their own assertions of self. Women could develop leadership skills, and even engage in formal education, both as students and as instructors. Moreover, the church eliminated many traditional rituals, such as ancestor worship, which was a huge burden to women, and thus allowed more time for women’s active participation in a public space.

Son’s description of the Protestant church’s role in the development of women’s agency is not entirely new, in that Chong also indicated the positive function of the

\[\text{434 Ibid.}\]
\[\text{435 Ibid., 603-604.}\]
\[\text{436 Son, Ibid., 604. Son cited Chong, Ibid., 16-20.}\]
\[\text{437 Ibid.}\]
church. Son’s analysis, however, employs a different paradigm. While Chong’s appraisal allows us to see the resistance-accommodation dynamic of women’s engagement in the church, calling attention to its contrary consequences with respect to the existing gender hierarchy in the family and church system, Son’s understanding of the formative aspects of participation in Korean Protestant churches clarified how the church can still help in the experience of self-affirmation and thereby the development of agency. Son’s framework of “assertion and accommodation as a paradoxical dance” provides a more balanced and holistic approach to the women’s experiences, which does not reduce women’s intentions and activities wholly to the effects and consequences of their relationship with religious patriarchy. It thus allows us to maintain hope for and the possibility of a liberating function of the Korean evangelical church—despite its inherent patriarchy—for Korean women, who need protection from and empowerment for their resistance against oppressive realities.

Yet, when it comes to the case of Christians with HB, who are in similar situations but are even more vulnerable, we can ask whether Son’s view of the Korean religious environment is too optimistic. In the next section, we will see how the wounded agency of women with HB is endangered in this religious context.

2.2.2.2.3 Wounded Self and the Religion of Han

As Son held, women’s self-formation can be enhanced in the dialectical movement between assertion and accommodation, aided by the formative function of the church, and Korean Protestant churches are regarded as having carried out this role
well. However, for HB patients, whose subjectivities are too debilitated to be exercised dynamically, the religious environment in South Korea appears harsh and might even be viewed as manipulative. In such a context, it can be argued that their evangelical faith, or their “attachment” to religion, is neither helpful to their self-development, nor to their ability to cope with their illness. Rather, it has been demonstrated that it often makes their HB worse and accordingly, renders them despondent and helpless. This outcome can be attributed to both subjective and objective factors: the narcissistic/masochistic tendency of women with HB and the distorted features of Korean Protestant churches contextualized in the culture of han.

First, an overview of the history of Korean Protestantism is needed in order to understand the unique situation of the South Korean Protestant church. Since it was introduced to Korea in 1884, Protestant Christianity has expanded rapidly and become the second most dominant religion in the country after Buddhism. The dramatic increase of the Protestant population is attributable first to the collective han-full situation in Korea, a series of national calamities—including the oppressive Japanese colonial rule (1910-1945) and the Korean War (1950-1953)—and the country’s economic

438 According to Hong, the Protestant church in South Korea is characterized by the rapid growth of its population and the emergence of many mega-churches. Since the early 1960s, South Korea’s Protestants have increased strikingly rapidly (from 323,574 in 1920, to 623,072 in 1960). By 1985, it increased “to 6,489,282, or 16.1 percent of the population. In 1995, it was 8,760,000, i.e., 19.7 percent of the population. Add on the numbers of Roman Catholic Christians (6.6 percent) and Korean Christianity represents 26.3 percent of the population in that same year. In spite of its short history, Christianity has become a main religion, together with Buddhism (23.1 percent). The number of Protestant churches increased from 5,011 in 1960 to 35,869 in 1995.” The growth in Korean Protestantism has resulted in a number of large churches. In 1999, it was estimated that there were Protestant ‘mega-churches’ with more than 10,000 adult members who attended regularly, and 400 Protestant churches with more than 1,000 members in Korea.” Y.-G. Hong, “Revisiting church growth in Korean Protestantism: A theological reflection,” International Review of Mission, 2000, 89, 353, 190-191.
development and rapid industrialization since the 1960s (which has led many people to the church). Many people who suffer from feelings of despair, sorrow, and alienation converted to Christianity in search of relief. It is noteworthy that, for these people with han, Korean Protestant churches are able to provide a facilitating environment by making themselves accessible and available to their needs, and they have made significant efforts to appeal to the Korean masses.

Unlike the Catholic church, which did not compromise its theology or adapt its methods of worship (except for accepting the time-honored practice of ancestor worship as a traditional custom), Korean Protestant churches have adapted to be more compatible with existing Korean religious traditions. They emphasize certain messages and doctrines, particularly those resonant with the concepts and practices of Korean religious traditions, including Korean shamanism. The most prominent examples of those messages are, “an emphasis on this-worldly life; the concept of Hananim; the image of God as the savior; the primacy of faith-healing, and the centrality of ethics and family values.”

The message of “this-worldly” blessings in both physical health and material abundance was immensely attractive to the Korean masses, particularly those who were suffering from harsh circumstances. Meanwhile, the churches also emphasized filial piety and accepted male domination, as well as teachings on ethical values based on

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440 Ibid., 118.
Confucianism,\textsuperscript{441} which have largely determined the attitude and behavior of Koreans, and translated its high moral code into Christian language. This removal of potential conflicts with traditional values and social codes has contributed to the rapid growth of the Protestant church.\textsuperscript{442} According to Kim, the passion and efforts of Korean pastors in particular have played a crucial role in this process of contextualizing Protestantism in Korea. It was through their efforts that Christianity was accepted in accordance with the tradition-bound religious inclinations of Koreans.\textsuperscript{443} The beliefs and practices of Korean Protestant churches assumed some shamanistic characteristics. Shamanistic wish fulfillment has become a this-worldly blessing that serves “as an advantage of converting to Christianity,” and the pastors took on many features of the shaman’s image, charismatic leadership.\textsuperscript{444} Today, most mainline denominations seem to be experiencing stagnation and/or declining membership and attendance, and church leaders are searching for reasons for these trends. However, most of the individual Protestant churches still maintain the early messages, practices, and charismatic pastoral style of the charismatic “Koreanized” form of Christianity.

The “successfully” contextualized and dramatically large presence of Korean Protestant Christianity, however, has engendered various problems, particularly in the lives of the vulnerable, such as those with HB. Based on interviews with Christian

\textsuperscript{441} Ibid., 130.

\textsuperscript{442} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{443} Ibid., 129.

\textsuperscript{444} Ibid.
converts with HB, Hwang’s research indicated several dangerous consequences that those with HB might suffer as a result of their attachment to religion.  

Firstly, Hwang claimed that Christianity can be used as a means to acquire a sense of “the power and control” in order to restore their shattered illusion of omnipotence (which Hwang views as a fundamental cause of HB). Their dominant other, which used to be their husbands or sons (or, among men, typically business or success), is replaced by God, and through their identification with another grandiose self, God, they can satisfy their needs and protect themselves from feeling deprived. As noted in Son’s description in the previous section, this might be one way in which the church functions as a facilitating environment for these people. Their endeavor, however, as Hwang noted, often leads to the danger of escapism, of avoiding the realities of their lives, and this tendency is reinforced when it meets the church’s need to appropriate their devotion in order to grow. Further, the churches’ teachings’ with regard to this-world happiness have motivated believers to work hard for social success, and tended to lead those with HB to become attached to materialism and mammonism as other idealized objects, and therefore aggravates their narcissistic desire to maintain their omnipotent illusion.

Moreover, their longing for the feeling of omnipotence is often manifested in a fanatical attitude and the pursuit of mystical experiences. Mystical experiences—similar

445 See Hwang’s Chapter VI, “Hwa-Byung and Christian.”

446 Hwang, ibid., 192-193.
to those of primary narcissism ("the sense of blissful unity with the loved one")—provide them with "a profound sense of the importance of [their] being[s]."\textsuperscript{447} Korean churches also have exacerbated this tendency by encouraging them to seek mystical experiences, such as speaking in tongues during Pentecostal revivals. Unfortunately, this can lead people to become bored easily when religious life does not include ecstasy, and draw them to superficial forms of religion.\textsuperscript{448} This feeling of ecstasy often serves as the only necessary proof they need of the truth of their new beliefs and leads them to become intolerant of other beliefs or religions.

This tendency towards absolutism and intolerance is, Hwang observed, an outcome of a defensive strategy to compensate for low self-esteem through the "attachment to an idealized Other." This tendency often leads not only to God, but also to "an authority figure who gives clear guidelines without hesitation and consideration."\textsuperscript{449} Not a few Korean pastors, as Hwang pointed out rightly, have been playing the role of "spiritual leader," foretelling the believers’ futures and interpreting tongues.\textsuperscript{450} These shaman-like pastors often demand obedience to God and devotion to


\textsuperscript{448} \textit{Ibid.}, 196.

\textsuperscript{449} \textit{Ibid.}, 197.

\textsuperscript{450} \textit{Ibid.}, 195n9.
the church, and therefore make their believers more dependent and vulnerable, further compromising their autonomy and will.\footnote{451}

Another danger comes from the masochistic disorder of these followers, which can deteriorate under a distorted image of God. Those with narcissistic/masochistic tendencies are likely to form the image of a “conditionally loving but demanding and punitive” God, which reflects their internalized childhood image of their narcissistic parents.\footnote{452} With this representation of God, they assume a submissive attitude towards Him. As they once did with their parents, they are forced to be willing to sacrifice everything for God in order not to lose His love. They are even willing to suffer for God, because their suffering is “meant to attenuate the conscious and unconscious need for punishment” and thus makes them feel safe.\footnote{453} For them, asceticism is a way to draw God’s attention and thereby, “to win love, gain power, and meet the narcissistic needs.” However, when they are disappointed with their object, God, for example, and feel that they lack God’s protection in their hardships, they become furious.\footnote{454} Just as they felt they were betrayed by their parents in childhood, they come to feel unexpressed hostility towards God or others for failing to satisfy them. Their narcissistic rage is triggered by their sense that “they do not get what they should have.” Some of them

\footnote{451}{It is noteworthy here that Chong related women’s devotion to the church to their deep needs for social recognition, particularly the acknowledgment of their accomplishments and contributions by the pastors. Chong, “Negotiating patriarchy,” 713.}

\footnote{452}{Following Ana-Maria Rizzuto (The Birth of the Living God), Hwang held that the distorted image of God is formed through their early active relations with their parents. Hwang, \textit{Ibid.}, 199.}

\footnote{453}{\textit{Ibid.}, 200.}

\footnote{454}{\textit{Ibid.}, 200-201.
then deny the existence of God and leave the church or “demonstrate passive-aggressive attitudes by not participating in religious programs actively, although they do not give up their religion.”

What we have seen so far might not be generalized readily to all cases of Christians with HB, but it is largely plausible. Considering both the ongoing situation within Korean Protestant churches—particularly in many evangelical or fundamentalist churches—and the reality of those who suffer from various forms of wounded agency, the dangers described above are not exaggerated. The church’s encouragement and acceptance of the self-assertive acts of the vulnerable can mold their self-formation, and therefore help them live their personal lives with courage. However, as noted, some of the church’s message and practices, which have been cultivated in the soil of han, often have led them in the wrong direction, resulting in the impoverishment of their authentic selves.

Thus, it could be said that the current state of Korean Protestant churches—not all, but many—makes them not necessarily safe places for both expressing their Christian beliefs and overcoming their illness. In some cases, religious participation results in worsening symptoms, and even leads them to further social isolation. In this regard, positive evaluations about the formative function of the Korean church, such as Son’s, should not be generalized to all Christian women. Rather, we also need to consider its function from the perspective of the most vulnerable, those with HB.

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455 Ibid., 202.
2.2.2.3 Hwa-Byung, Women, and Harsh Reality

We have explored the case of HB in order to investigate the nature of han-full anger and to understand how it is manifested. HB tends to develop among middle-aged Korean women with characteristic personality types that render them particularly vulnerable to anger. These women suffer from decreased self-esteem and a sense of powerlessness, in part from the imposition of traditional values and their desire to fulfill the role of the virtuous woman. They appear to be angered easily by minor daily events, are easily hurt, and have difficulty expressing anger appropriately. Their avoidance of any spontaneous, clear, and direct expression of anger seems to be related to their lack of self-confidence, which originates from their narcissistic injury, and is reinforced in harsh environments. The habitual repression of anger in HB patients is related to their masochistic tendency, which is, in part, attributable to their tolerance of violence. Although they suppress or repress their anger, the anger that is associated deeply with the core of their self, remains, and accumulates insidiously. They continue to endure a difficult life caused by secondary han-full experiences, such as poverty and/or conflicted family relationships, for long periods of time, but the situation rarely improves. Their feelings of victimization and mortification become so serious that their hope for improvement in their lives vanishes, and the anger towards the object that is inflicting pain on them surfaces, and the symptoms characteristic of HB develop. When they begin to experience various somatic expressions of anger or to suffer from behavior problems, they try to expose their emotional suffering and discuss their hard lives.
Korean female HB patients often have experienced unfair or violent treatment by their family members; these family issues are, as noted, not limited to personal problems, but are connected deeply to the social structure. In the case of the “feminine” form of HB, the social powers are manifested primarily as the patriarchal system and sexist culture of Korean society, which values family and community over the individual, men over women, the aged over the young—the powerful over the powerless. This family and communal system, undergirded by traditional Confucian ethics, discourages women’s natural and authentic expression of emotions. These powers collude with other conditions, leading them to develop HB in two ways, not only by generating various han-full situations, but also by forcing them to internalize the dominant attitudes about emotions. Here we see that the subjective cause and the objective situation are interconnected inevitably in the formation of han-full anger.

We might ask here whether we are putting too much emphasis on social causes, and ignoring individual responsibility. Of course, han-full anger is not triggered solely by external conditions. Even under the same harsh conditions, people respond in different ways. Internalizing and following social ideals are one’s choice and will, and therefore, they can hardly be considered involuntary. However, we have also noted how early such socialization starts, how seriously formative it can be to a child’s life (particularly if we view self-formation as beginning with the initial frustration in the parent-child relationship), and therefore, how difficult it can be later in life for the child to overcome ongoing frustration and suffering—rooted in the narcissistic wound—to lead and own her life. That is why we give more attention to social conditions. While not neglecting
the individual’s responsibility as a moral agent, we must continue to probe and
deconstruct the socially oppressive powers that affect one’s individual moral agency and
thereby one’s daily emotional life. It is particularly important within those aspects of
Korean society that make it difficult for individuals to resist social oppression and live
life on their own terms.

Once again, we should not neglect the conflicting role of the Korean Protestant
church. As Hwang described, the Korean Protestant church has offered a “breathing
place” for those with HB throughout the history of the Korean church.\(^{456}\) Many women
came to church, poured out their han in tearful prayers, then returned to their homes
and continued to endure their harsh lives. The church has functioned not only as an
empathic community that hears their pain and suffering, but also as a facilitating
environment to allow and encourage their assertive actions, which are crucial for their
self-formation. Yet, due to the limitations of their own patriarchal structures, many
Korean Protestant churches put great emphasis on self-sacrifice as a religious ideal and
thus encourage believers to endure unfairness and victimization in the family, as well as
society. Thus, some of their teachings have rendered these vulnerable people more
narcissistic and their agency more problematic.

2.3 Han-full Anger in the Culture of Han

As we have seen thus far, HB—and its implicated anger—has its roots in the original han generated from an insufficient parent-child relationship, and is thought to develop through the secondary han-full experiences the agent faced. We have focused on middle-aged Korean women, who are seen as most vulnerable to HB, and have examined the causes of han-full anger, its inner structure, and its phenomenological characteristics. This investigation of the subjective and objective causes of HB allows us to see how deeply it is connected with social influences—the culture of han—and therefore leads us to probe the nature of that culture and how it affects moral agency in particular and, further, how han-full anger, particularly in its collective form, plays a role in maintaining unjust conditions.

2.3.1 Han-full Anger and Wounded Agency in the Narcissistic Culture of Han

In general, Koreans enjoy better and more comfortable economic conditions today, but their lives still seem to be, to varying degrees, under the influence of the han present in the culture, as well as in individuals. As we saw earlier, han-full experiences are not limited to those generated by catastrophic events, e.g., long-term oppression, war, abuse, or violence, but also include mild forms, such as the han of poverty or of low education. These various types of han can be the cause of different degrees of intensity of han-full anger. As Ka indicated, han is formed not only from direct experiences, but
also through a learning process in interpersonal or intergenerational interactions.\textsuperscript{457} The transfer of narcissism from the narcissistic parents is one example. Viewed through the lens of HB, Korean society appears to be entrenched in narcissistic desires and impulses, which can be epitomized in the common expression: “please to parents.”\textsuperscript{458} The narcissistic self, wounded by serious injury early in life, continues to seek help and relief from without, and thus tries to maintain the feeling of the omnipotent, powerful self. While an individual struggles to satisfy her own narcissistic needs through union with various dominant others to gain a sense of power, she strives, at the same time, to keep the other side of the self—the impoverished self—hidden; thus, the problem of the emotion of “shame”—another potent feeling that impedes one’s moral agency—emerges. When the unfulfilled narcissistic longing for social recognition, and its accompanying emotion of shame, are manifested in the social context, society is perceived to require serious competition and comparison with others, where the loser is left with helpless feelings of shame and inferiority.\textsuperscript{459}

In Korean society today, it is not rare to see many young Korean students who are anxious about their academic success and desperate to receive recognition and admiration from their parents and society. According to Ka, this anxiety causes many of them to experience the neurotic sufferings of “narcissism and melancholia.” In

\textsuperscript{457} Y. Ka, “Jeong-han as a Korean culture-bound narcissism,” 225.

\textsuperscript{458} According to Ka, many contemporary Koreans commonly experience neurotic suffering when they fail to impress or please others in a competitive culture. Ka held that this symptom is related to the JH state, which he views as a Korean culture-bound narcissism. Ka, \textit{Ibid.}, 225.

especially serious cases, they come to suffer from “emptiness, loneliness, boredom, lack of empathy and joy, emotional hunger, dissatisfaction with oneself, depression, mixed emotions of pride and inferiority, self-criticism, and self-reproach.” These symptoms are, according to him, similar to the characteristics of JH. JH, as noted earlier, is an inward state of han related mostly to sentimental feelings and pessimism, and, in its immature state, is often manifested as “the lack or absence of joy, and the lack of meaning, direction, and enthusiasm for life.” The narcissistic culture of Korean society can be seen primarily as the state of JH, and yet, when its accompanying emotions, depression and sorrow, become severe, it can develop into WH or HH.

In the previous section, we have seen in the case of HB patients how han-filled agency is damaged and han-full anger is formed. The narcissistic self-conception and agency of female Korean HB patients, which were rooted in the original han through interpersonal relationships, are undermined continuously in the patriarchal family system and gendered social structure. Their combined narcissistic desire (longing for

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460 Ka, Ibid., 225.  
461 Ka found a solution for transforming JH from immature to mature in the dynamics of jeong and han.  
462 Ibid., 223.  
463 Korea has the highest rate of suicide among OECD countries (as of 2013), which may be regarded as examples of those cases.  
464 Narcissistic traits, on the other hand, can be seen as a rather universal phenomenon, in that we all inevitably go through a stage of narcissistic injury—either serious or not—early in life. Thus, this narcissistic tendency is present in varying degrees in every individual and people respond differently to the same incident. Here we find a place where the boundary of subjective and objective conditions is blurred. However, there are certain cultures that produce these sorts of personality traits more frequently
recognition from others at the pole of their omnipotent self) and vulnerability (at the pole of the impoverished self) make them more susceptible to the social discursive powers, and thereby more likely to appropriate social teachings that actually hinder the expression of their natural and honest feelings of anger.

Moreover, the narcissistic culture itself provides a harsh context that generates secondary *han*-full experiences in various ways; the narcissistic desire for self-affirmation through recognition from others and society renders the latter one of comparison and competition, which, in turn, increases the likelihood of *han*-full experiences in the individual and collective life. With vulnerable self-formation, a person internalizes and makes concrete the various ideologies of social success, and comes to live a life that focuses on other’s expectations, rather than on her own needs. While struggling to meet the ideal image of self, she “denies her own emotions, which eventually may create fake emotions. Thus, the child may lose access to her own emotions and joys of life, which generates tragic struggles throughout her lifetime.”

In such a harsh sociocultural environment, one’s life can be subsumed by the ideological image of social success in the system—principally, one of capitalism as the dominant grand narrative—and, when one fails, life devolves into chaos.

In the case of women with HB, their narcissistic need for continuous comfort and support from without is rarely met in such a society. This tends to make them even

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more attached to and often subsumed by the oppressive, gendered social teachings and dominant cultural demands, i.e., the ideals of a virtuous woman. These social, institutional and discursive powers are oppressive, in that they prevent them from finding meaning in their feelings of anger. Seen in its socialized context, han-full anger can be described as the anger of the “poor,” namely, that of those who have lost the game in a competitive society. Many of them began life with less hope and become increasingly worn out in the ongoing, harsh social environment, finding pleasure only in their shutdown inner world. As seen in the extreme case of HB women patients, they are disciplined to be docile and adhere to the traditional gendered ethics, and their lives are often confined to the family, which is in fact only one part of their multi-dimensional social lives. In both extreme and mild cases, there is often a desire to seclude themselves from society so that their struggle can stop and their frustration and painful feelings can be eased. If they manage to isolate themselves completely from others and the society, they may be able to remain aloof, without feeling anger, and therefore feel free from suffering. However, this is neither possible, nor is it suitable for humans as social creatures.

Interestingly, han-filled people seem to suggest by their anger that they still possess the will and power to resist the desire for isolation and continue the struggle to communicate with themselves and society. Unfortunately, their power is insufficient to allow them to express their anger in a just and rational way in order to achieve its goal. Nonetheless, their anger shows that they still maintain and express their will by judging
that the slight against them is undeserved. This aspect of *han*-full anger can be seen more clearly in the collective *han*-full anger that follows.

2.3.2 *Han* as Collective

*Han* is described primarily as a wound present in one’s soul on the individual level, but it also is described as a collective sentiment embedded in Korean culture and society. Of course, not all Koreans suffer from unresolved *han*, as it is a product formed through the interaction between external conditions and internal responses. People respond differently to the same event; some Koreans are neither affected by *han* nor its accompanying problems. However, when it comes to people’s lived reality, where their thoughts and actions are formed and influenced through interpersonal relationships and by an overall sociocultural matrix, it is hardly deniable that, even those who have not experienced a *han*-full event are still under the influence of *han*, at least to some degree. Because of its strong collectivist culture, South Koreans seem to be more inclined to, or more vulnerable to, sharing collective suffering and memory and thereby experiencing collective *han*.466

Here, we explore the collective *han* and subsequently, the political manifestations of *han*-full anger. Through this investigation, we will see that, unlike *han*-full anger on the individual level, collective *han*-full anger reveals its other-directed

466 Under the influence of Confucian ethics, the Korean people and society, like many other Asian countries, have developed a strong collectivist culture, “evident in an orientation towards family, communalism, and group thinking.” See Simone Sunghae Kim, “Individualism and collectivism: Implications for women,” *Pastoral Psychology*, 2009, 58, 568.
character, which seeks social change, and therefore shows its active and reflective, as well as its passive, aspects.

The collective han is described in general as a collective psychological complex that is repressed in the Korean subconscious. Therefore, it is linked to the inner structure of people’s minds and is handed down over generations. Its fundamental source is found in the history of suffering in Korea. According to Kim, three historical factors have contributed to the formation of collective han: “repeated foreign invasions, political oppression by a powerful elite, and interpersonal conflicts among family members in the large family system.”

The continuous invasions that have taken place since ancient times by the aggressive neighboring countries, China and Japan, and the resulting political oppression and economic exploitation have generated widely shared tragic memories in the minds of the Korean people and have engendered various forms of han. Particularly during the period of Japanese colonization (1910-1945) and the Korean War (1950-1953), casualties were high, while many were separated from their families and lost their properties. Even after the war ended, their suffering and hardship did not, because of the long period of dictatorship by corrupt South Korean governments through the 1960s and 1970s, and even into the late 1990s. This legacy of suffering in Korean history has provided a universal condition for the formation of han.

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Simply having a han-full experience as the result of a history of suffering or sharing han on a collective level does not explain the uniqueness of the collective han to Koreans and Korean society. There are many peoples and countries that have similar experiences of suffering in their histories. What makes it different from others is not the suffering itself, but how people respond to and make it their own. The collective han can be regarded as culture-bound to Korea not simply because of particular historical incidents and experiences, but also because of the people who have interpreted and related them within the han narrative, and made those experiences part of the stories that are connected to their collective identity. Therefore, the uniqueness of the collective han does not need to be understood in an exclusive way, but in the way that every culture and society has its own unique experiences and develops narratives composed of its own language and perspectives.

Although shared by Koreans generally, those han-full experiences and memories are even more embedded in the lives of certain groups of people, primarily those who were the most marginalized—politically, economically, and sexually. We have already explored in detail typical examples of this in the han of Korean women. However, it also occurred in workers during the developmental period of South Korea.

As Jung described, during the Japanese occupation in World War II, many Korean women were forced to be official prostitutes, so-called “Comfort women,” for Japanese
soldiers.\textsuperscript{469} Those women, who were mostly from poor, rural families, were abused sexually by Japanese colonial and military officials, and there was no government to protect them. The war ended and Korea became an independent country, but the status of Korean women did not improve dramatically. During the developmental age in the 1970s, many young women were forced to work under miserable conditions for the economic success of the country and received extremely low wages.\textsuperscript{470} They were economically exploited and sacrificed for national prosperity, but the government never compensated them properly for that sacrifice. Under the developmental ideal, discrimination, and sometimes, violent treatment, were either ignored or justified.

Under the rule of the military governments, the lives of South Korean women were rendered more miserable. The overall atmosphere of the society tended to be insensitive to the rights of the socially marginalized, including women, and was particularly insensitive to sexual violence. As a consequence, the military government committed many crimes that violated women’s personal and physical integrity. As can be seen in the case of the incident of the Tongil Textile Company,\textsuperscript{471} when the workers

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{469} Hyun Kyung Jung, “‘Han-pu-ri’: Doing theology from Korean women’s perspective,” The Ecumenical Review, 1988, 40, 1, 32.
\item \textsuperscript{470} The background information will be investigated in detail in the next section.
\item \textsuperscript{471} As Jung described, the case of the workers of the Tongil Textile Company is a notorious example of the way in which Korean women laborers have been exploited and sacrificed, and how they resisted desperately against the oppressive powers of the violent government and sexist males. Approximately 80\% percent of the workers at Tongil Textile Company were women. Even though women typically work longer hours than men do for lower wages, they have often not been regarded as real workers, and the union leader was a male. When women workers finally managed to elect a woman union leader, some of the male workers would not tolerate a woman as head of the union, and tried to destroy the woman-led union with the help of the police. It is well known that when police, together with
rose up to fight for their rights, they faced harsh and violent suppression by the government—including sexual humiliation. Further, in the well-known case of Kwon In-Sook, who, when arrested for her political protests, was humiliated sexually, tortured by the police, and forced to remain silent.

As we have explored, the forms of han in South Korean women have formed over a long period, as a result of their collective suffering and rage against harsh oppressive conditions. The sociopolitical situation is much better today, but the suffering experienced by women is still remembered and shared over the generations. The second example of the collective han is that of the Korean workers—including women—in the 1970s, which is particularly significant in its relationship to movements of political resistance.

2.3.3 The Collective Han-full Anger and Political Movements

The second example of the collective han occurred in the 1970s and manifested as a class struggle. During the dictatorship of Chung-Hee Park (1962-1978), South Korea was developed rapidly under an ambitious project of modernization, called the

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472 Ibid., 33. Kwon In Sook, a student activist and union organizer, filed suit against a police officer, Moon Kwi Dong, on the charge of police violence and rape. Her case was one of a series of events that triggered the June 1987 Revolt, which brought about a constitutional change that allowed general presidential elections.


Saemaeul (New Village) movement.\(^{473}\) With massive foreign (US) aid, Park’s project was successful, but the workers who sacrificed for the national economy did not share in the fruits of the success.\(^{474}\) To make matters worse, their suffering and anger were ignored and suppressed by the government, under the campaign of a future-oriented ideology. The rage of the people who suffered from social inequity and economic exploitation led to a tragic event with the self-immolation of worker Jeon Tae-il.\(^{475}\) It was a desperate protest of the working class, and triggered the rise of the labor and minjung (the poor) movements.

In Korean history, the collective han is considered to have been manifested as major or minor political uprisings or movements of minjung, most conspicuously, that of a farmers’ military rebellion against a corrupt local government (Donghak-ran) in the 19\(^{th}\) century, numerous resistance movements against the military dictatorship and economic exploitation in the developmental period of the late 1900s, including Kwang-Ju democratic movements in 1980, to, most recently, protests that demanded a serious


\(^{474}\) The partial success of the Park government’s economic industrialization in the developmental age was due primarily to its dictatorial policies on wage control and persecution of labor unions. The incident of Jeon Tae-il’s self-immolation highlighted the suffering of workers who received low wages and endured miserable working conditions.

\(^{475}\) Jeon Tae-il (1948-1970) was a worker and workers’ right activist who committed suicide by burning himself to death in protest of the poor working conditions in South Korean factories. *Doosan Encyclopedia*, 2005.
investigation of the tragic sinking of the ferry Sewol.\textsuperscript{476} These incidents have in common unjust or unfair situations that the ruling class or social elite have inflicted on the common people, and the rage this has elicited has been expressed as active social, political, or military resistance and movements. This can be interpreted as personal suffering and \textit{han} that had been accumulating and festering and found its social and political meaning. In finding a way to connect to the collective \textit{han}-full anger, it was expressed as a powerful, collective energy to resist injustice. The \textit{Minjung} movement in the 1970s is a particularly notable example of this.

The notion of collective \textit{han} was developed with the expansion of \textit{minjung} scholarship in the 1970s. It was \textit{minjung} scholars and theologians who discovered the notion of \textit{han} and began to see the unjust social, political, and economic system as responsible for the \textit{han of minjung},\textsuperscript{477} particularly among factory workers. For \textit{minjung}

\begin{itemize}
\item On April 16, 2014, the South Korean ferry Sewol, carrying 476 passengers, capsized en route from Incheon to Jeju. The incidence resulted in 304 deaths, including those of crewmembers and numerous Danwon high school students. Many, especially the parents of the school victims, criticized the South Korean government widely for its delayed response and failure to explain the reason. In addition to these movements, there were many struggles that were considered liberation movements of the \textit{minjung} as well. For example, the uprising of the Mangui and Mangsoyi in the peasant rebellion during the Koryo period (1176 C.E.), the rebellion of Manchuk for the liberation of slaves (1198 C.E.), the Imsul rebellion (1862), and the Donghak (Chondokyo) rebellion (1894-95), the March First Independent movement (1919), the April Student Revolution (1960), and so on. J.Y. Lee, “\textit{Minjung} theology: A critical introduction,” \textit{An Emerging Theology in World Perspective: Commentary on Korean Minjung Theology}. ed. Jun Young Lee. (1988), 12.
\item The term, \textit{minjung} or \textit{minjoong} is a Korean word that combines two Chinese characters, “\textit{min}” and “\textit{jung}.” \textit{Min} literally means “the people” and “\textit{jung}” the mass. It can mean “the mass of people” in general, but, in \textit{minjung} theology, has been interpreted in various ways. Lee indicated three meanings of \textit{minjung} understood by \textit{minjung} theologians. First, as Hee-suk Mun defined it, “\textit{minjung} are those who are oppressed politically, exploited economically, alienated socially, and kept uneducated in cultural and intellectual matters.” Second, these people are also construed as not merely victims, but also as “the true subjects of history and the carriers of culture” (Yong-bock Kim). Lastly, \textit{minjung} has been identified with the “Ochlos” in the Gospel Mark. While the term, “\textit{laos},” denotes the lay people in general, the “ochlos” is
\end{itemize}
theologians, the discovery of *han* in *minjung* was a turning point in the emergence of a new political theology. As Moon confessed, the *han* of *minjung* opened their “spiritual eyes” so as “to see the deeper truth about life.” He said, “[i]n *han*, we see clearly what is good and evil and learn to hate evil and love good. In *han* we encounter God who comes down to the *han*-filled people and justifies their plight.” In the suffering and *han* of *minjung* and their liberation struggle, they found another manifestation of the “Jesus-event,” where they could encounter the living Christ and his liberating work. The *minjung* with *han* were therefore understood not simply as victims, but also as agents of change who could choose their own destinies with vigilance and resolution in their cooperative work with the living Christ and the Holy Spirit.

By working with the *han* in *minjung*, they recognized and articulated the social suffering in *minjung* and thereby developed a powerful rhetoric to elicit their praxis for social transformation. In their political appropriation of *han*, they sometimes romanticized or idealized the *minjung* and also tended to describe the notion of *han* in a simplistic way. The limited interpretation of *han* in their theologies can be related to

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480 According to J.H. Lee, the interpretations of *minjung* theologians about the self-immolation of Jeon Tae-Il (i.e., “noble death” by N.D. Suh) is problematic, in that their interpretations were not careful to discern between “the healthy symbols that deserve to be lifted up to the level of social or religious symbol, and the unhealthy symbols originated from individual or collective pathologies” and therefore
its emergent context. It was a difficult time, as the corrupt military government
controlled people and society with violence and power; moreover, the ideological
narrative and propaganda of development was subsuming all other social values. The
majority of the middle-class was either persuaded by, or acquiesced to, the policies of
the government, while most mainstream conservative Christian churches cooperated
with the government uncritically. It was very difficult to dare to address, or even to
identify, issues of human rights and justice. In such a situation, we might say that it was
natural for their theologies of han to be more “ready-to-fight” praxis-oriented, with the
distinctive dualistic frame of the oppressors and the oppressed, and therefore
sometimes to appear one-dimensional.

It is interesting to note, on the other hand, that this limited interpretation of han
reflected the incomplete character of han-full anger in such a way that, just as the
former was an effective strategy to appeal to people (easily understood, and readily
evoking emotions), so did the latter make han-full anger ready for use in the fight
against injustice. Because han-full anger is not informed or controlled by reason
completely, in such an emergent situation, where reason is subsumed by potent social
and discursive powers, the uncontrollable and disobedient character of han-full anger
with respect to a higher rational power seems to have functioned like a light shining on

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can be seen as “potentially dangerous to the psychic environment of society, let alone to the healing
process of the particular individual involved.” Also in minjung theology, minjung with han was regarded as
the subjects capable of making an ethical judgment, but this cannot be generalized; moreover, the
meaning of han was often reduced to denote only its negative aspect, as seen in their identification of han
with “a tendency for social revolution (N.D. Suh).” Lee, The Exploration of the Inner Wounds—Han, 142-146.
what was right and wrong, revealing where the dangers to, and sufferings of, the people
lay, and suggesting what to do to rectify or avoid the problem. Moreover, the intense
and aggressive nature of han-full anger—mostly involving WH—served as a powerful
driver in acting against and repelling injustice and violence. Considering the severe
oppressive circumstances during the period of the military dictatorship, without its
impetuous and aggressive character, which reacted spontaneously to societal evils, such
a radical resistance to the powerful (as seen in the Korean workers’ movement in the
1970s) might never have begun.

Likewise, han-full anger rooted in WH can cause immediate action that forges
and actualizes the struggle for liberation. However, it is also true that its violent and
primitive character often yields destructive outcomes and thus, is sometimes
counterproductive to an ongoing movement. What is intriguing about the political
resistance movement in the late 1900s is that the struggle lasted throughout the period
of military dictatorship. Two factors in particular might have contributed to the
sustained struggle of minjung. First, there were incessant violent suppressions by the
government, which continued to evoke collective anger, but also mobilized the efforts
and leadership of the intelligentsia, including college students and professors, as well as
minjung scholars and activists, who helped, and sacrificed themselves for the
continuation of the movement. As individual han-full anger can be expressed outwardly
only when the agent achieves a greater sense of power, it is likely to be directed
towards the weak, rather than the powerful. Unlike individual han-full anger, collective
han-full anger seeks social change and is targeted directly at the oppressors. Its
spontaneous and aggressive character initiated the reactions of minjung against injustice, but, without the help of those who led the struggle, particularly of minjung scholars and activists who provided a theoretical—and theological—justification of why they had to continue to resist evil, it could not have continued and developed into a massive political movement.

We might still be hesitant about the political use of collective han-full anger. While recognizing its role in generating the energy for the fight against injustice, we can also see its limitations as a source of social energy for attaining the ultimate goal, namely, the reestablishment of justice and the advancement of Korean political history. Nonetheless, this does not invalidate the role of collective han-full anger as the energy that initiated the social movement for justice as much as it elicits a question: How can han-full anger be used best for the actualization of social justice and therefore, the transformation of society? We have already seen a clue to the answer in the earlier section of this chapter, in the idea of the transition from WH to JH and further, from the immature form of JH to its mature state. For han-full anger to be useful in the struggle for liberation, its motivation and energy need to be healthy and proper. We will see this point clearly in the next chapter, as we bring it into conversation with a way of coping with anger based on Aquinas’ virtue ethics.
2.4 Conclusions: The Anger of the Poor

We have thus far explored han and han-full anger. Given the limited literature on han-full anger, we have focused on the specific example of HB and its collective manifestation in the political movements in South Korean history. As we have seen, it is difficult to define what han-full anger is exactly and to theorize about its nature and character in a unified and systematic way. However, we can trace various aspects of han-full anger revealed through its relational and social manifestations within the context of its bearer, namely, South Korean society.

Han-full anger, seen in the case of HB, is formed by the repetitive suppression of the natural expression of anger in the face of various anger-provoking incidents. Its incomplete and disordered character is ascribed to the damaged agency of the vulnerable self, which is traceable, although not in an exclusive manner, to the influence of unresponsive relationships in early social development. In this sense, han can be passed to the next generation through insufficient care and holding by significant others, which reflects the narcissistic tendencies of their own han. In addition to the original han-full experience, we also see the culture of han embedded in the society of South Korea, which generates secondary han-full situations continuously, aggravating the function of agency in coping with anger. Han-full anger often takes the form of rage that is barely controllable by a higher power. In the worse case, it develops into a pathological form of anger, HB.

Han-full anger involving HB is triggered by harsh secondary han-full situations, and accordingly, is precipitated usually in the lives of those most vulnerable. It can be
seen as the anger of the *poor.* The subjects of *han*-full anger are those with *han*
acquired from their harsh lives, who are marginalized and underprivileged, socially,
economically, and sexually. They are often Korean women who have had to suppress
their anger in order to avoid being isolated from the patriarchal family and the
community. With their fragmented selves and low self-esteem, they are hurt repeatedly
by their feelings of slight, suffering from hunger for care and responsive relationship
with others, and yet, their restrained self-formation prevents them from expressing
anger appropriately, i.e., from “being themselves.” These are also the workers who
were exploited and forced to sacrifice themselves to violent ideological powers. They
wanted to fight against unfair treatment through their collective actions, but ultimately,
their struggle was quelled by violence, and their voices were not heard completely.
Their *han* accumulated and remained, and has been transmitted over generations.

*Han*-full anger, either personal or collective, is incomplete, and thus functions in
a limited way in its pursuit of its goal. Yet, as we have seen, the Korean people’s political
struggle via the collective form of *han*-full anger shows the possibility that such
communal anger can be used as a constructive source for social change, if it is guided
and controlled, at least to some degree, by a rational process. When it is rationalized by
collective wisdom and justified in conjunction with moral responsibility for the society,
as well as for individuals, collective *han*-full anger can function as a powerful energy to
engage people passionately in the actualization of social justice and the transformation
of society.
The particular meaning of *han*-full anger is revealed in the way the subjects understand their own anger and what to do with it in their given social conditions and with their limited subjectivity. This means again that the uniqueness of *han*-full anger is disclosed not only in its particular pattern of formation and expression, which is influenced by the culture of *han*, but also in the process through which the agents cope with it and create change, particularly in their collective efforts within history. This creates a space for a consideration of Aquinas’ normative theory of anger and suggests the direction that *han*-full anger must pursue. The meaning and significance of *han*-full anger as culture-specific will be disclosed more fully in the next chapter through its interpretation and comparison with Aquinas’ view of anger.
CHAPTER 3:

HAN-FULL ANGER IN AQUINAS’S FRAMEWORK

3.1 Introduction

We have examined Aquinas’ normative anger and han-full anger in the previous chapters, and now turn to a synthesis of these two types of anger. Thus, this chapter attempts to understand and evaluate han-full anger from a Thomistic perspective.

It is difficult to relate these two types of anger directly. Although Aquinas’ account of anger provides a norm to identify the ideal type of anger in theory, a particular type of anger, such as han-full anger, always involves a situation and a person, its bearer, which can make things complicated. Therefore, we must consider anger not simply in itself, but also in relation to its bearer and his/her situation. This chapter attempts to analyze han-full anger from a Thomistic perspective in three stages: first, to examine it as it arises incidentally, second, as the root anger disposed to one’s personality, and finally, to consider han-full anger with a particular focus on its contextualized characteristics. In light of Aquinas’ view of human passion and anger, each section reveals unique points about and meanings of han-full anger.

481 To interpret and relate the han-full anger as a contemporary experience to the normative anger Aquinas construes, I used various useful ideas such as “felt injury,” “anger as communication,” and “fundamental invalidation,” which are employed in the constructivist approach in anger management and
3.2 Han-full Anger and Anger in Aquinas

Firstly, we attempt to compare and evaluate the ordinary form of han-full anger—that evoked episodically—according to Aquinas’ understanding of anger. In Aquinas’ scheme, passions are aroused when, while apprehending an external object in a pre-existing situation, a person redefines and responds to the object vis-à-vis her conception of well-being. In the case of anger, this process of apprehension of the object is considered to be particularly complicated. Unlike concupiscible passions that move towards sensible good as such, anger, as an irascible passion, involves a rather high level of judgment as well, i.e., the judgment of slight and the method of vengeance, which require some reflective notion of “unjust slight” or one’s “excellence.” That is why Aquinas considered the arousal of anger to be involved particularly with the intellectual powers. Han-full anger is also formed through such an apprehensive process, but it is influenced deeply by one’s inner sense of self. The process through which han-full anger is formed is affected critically, impinged on, and motivated by the sense of “who she is.”

According to Josephides, cultural constructionists and physicalists together have neglected the aspect of the “innerliness” of emotions. Josephides argued that, in the constructionist view in particular, emotions are regarded as always interpersonal, “concerned with cognition, meaning and communication,” but not every emotion is formed in that way. There also exists such an emotion as “resentment,” which is experienced “as an arrow to the heart,” that is, fundamentally related to one’s sense of self. Josephides’s view of resentment provides a theoretical basis to elucidate the inward situation of han-full anger, and yet, in the case of such anger, we need to imagine a HB patient, whose self is slighted fundamentally, and situation is thus a bit more dramatic. Lisette Josephides, “Resentment as a sense of self,” Mixed Emotions: Anthropological Studies of Feeling, eds. Kay Milton and Maruska Svasek, (2005), 81-82.

482 According to Josephides, cultural constructionists and physicalists together have neglected the aspect of the “innerliness” of emotions. Josephides argued that, in the constructionist view in particular, emotions are regarded as always interpersonal, “concerned with cognition, meaning and communication,” but not every emotion is formed in that way. There also exists such an emotion as “resentment,” which is experienced “as an arrow to the heart,” that is, fundamentally related to one’s sense of self. Josephides’s view of resentment provides a theoretical basis to elucidate the inward situation of han-full anger, and yet, in the case of such anger, we need to imagine a HB patient, whose self is slighted fundamentally, and situation is thus a bit more dramatic. Lisette Josephides, “Resentment as a sense of self,” Mixed Emotions: Anthropological Studies of Feeling, eds. Kay Milton and Maruska Svasek, (2005), 81-82.
The most prominent characteristic of han-full anger is that it arises from the subject’s inner sense of being hurt, namely, her “felt slight.” As we have explored in the previous chapter, han-full anger associated with HB is considered to be particularly related to damaged selfhood. The sense of self in Korean HB patients is inclined towards the feeling of han, which is that of being wounded. The entrenched feeling of “what I did not receive that I deserve,” originates in a narcissistic injury that results from the failure of the parent-child relationship. Their painful cognition of “being deserted by the world,” as we have seen, conflates several emotions, including sorrow, despair, and anger, and this basic set of emotions continues to affect their emotional lives and to influence the formation of their characters. The han-filled person is therefore disposed to a fundamental feeling of slight, and the consequent anger develops through disordered practice over time into han-full anger, as seen in the case of HB. Han-full anger is then not anger that simply arises incidentally, but is also a disposition. When it arises in an anger-provoking situation, it remains a form of subjective anger that is either felt only inwardly or is manifested as anger expressed outwardly as well.\(^483\) Han-full anger thus comprises anger that arises incidentally and also the root anger that has been assimilated into one’s personality or character over time. In our comparison of han-full anger with Aquinas’ anger, we are referring primarily to han-full anger that is provoked occasionally. We will probe han-full anger as a disposition in a later section.

\(^{483}\) In Chapter 2, we saw the “masculine” form of anger in HB, which is expressed violently and its “feminine” form, which is likely to be suppressed.
3.2.1 Slight and Felt Slight

Aquinas’ anger has “slight” as its sole cause, measured with several conditions i.e., the intentionality of the offender and the degree to which the slight is unjust. The notion of slight presupposes a certain reality in an anger-provoking situation, where someone, other than oneself, is involved and something perceived as a slight occurs. Aquinas’ passion presumed that the external agent causes an inward motion on the part of the subject. If there is no external object that may be considered properly as the agent, an emotion cannot be formed. In the case of han-full anger, on the other hand, the apprehension of the external object relies profoundly on one’s felt sense of the injury of self. The formation of han-full anger is affected critically and motivated by the felt slight, which is the feeling that something fundamental to “who I am” as a person has been lost. This type of anger is seen to function clearly as “the demarcation of self,” as Nussbaum described.

When seeming slight is perceived, a person feels her self-boundary attacked and anger arises to restore the emotional balance and save her from utter helplessness. For the han-filled person who has already suffered from the feeling of radical slight for a long time, feeling slight, even over minor things, can make her feel that something in her very foundation has been invalidated. Through felt and/or expressed anger, she rejects the slight committed against her unjustly, claiming its revalidation from the

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484 ST. I-II 47.2.

485 Nussbaum, “Emotions and the origins of morality,” 89.
slighter. In doing so, she can protect herself from lapsing into painful defenselessness.

Seen in this way, *han*-full anger is an adaptive effort to secure control and to protect the boundaries of one’s damaged selfhood. \(^{486}\) *Han*-full anger naturally seeks revenge, but is likely to take an intense form because it focuses primarily on satisfying the needs of the self, and ensuring that the world does not mistreat her again.

In Aquinas’ view, anger is evoked by reason’s denunciation of the injury and the pursuit of vengeance. \(^{487}\) The revenge should be a just punishment, and thus should be expressed in a just way in terms of its object and mode. Therefore, the proper participation of the rational powers—reason and will—in the arousal and expression of anger are necessary. Seen from Aquinas’ view, *han*-full anger is formed primarily by the sensory imagination of a perceived slight. It is influenced heavily by past memory and imagination, rather than informed by reason’s judgment on the spot. Its primary source in judging the slight is the inner feeling of the injured self—rather than reason’s final judgment—and this often misleads the anger.

*Han*-full anger, constituted in that way, can lead the subject to be sensitive and overreact, sometimes with inappropriate behaviors. In the case of Korean female HB patients, their *han*-full anger arises as subjective anger felt inwardly, and is largely suppressed. However, this masochistic form of anger can be transmuted into a sadistic form of anger at any time, depending on their sense of power in the situation. The case

\(^{486}\) See the section on “The Original Wound and Narcissistic Rage” in Chapter 2.

\(^{487}\) *ST.* I-II, 46.4.
of Korean HB male patients shows that *han*-full anger often entails sadistic aggression, in which another is forced to reaffirm what has been slighted. In *han*-full anger, the personal pain of damaged selfhood—not respect for the law or norms—is a primary source of the arousal of anger, and thus, the inward sense of feeling slight is considered more seriously than the outside reality—whether or not the slight actually occurred.

There are several places where we can relate this form of anger to Aquinas’ concept. As can be seen in the concept of “excellence,” it denotes the cause of anger that inevitably involves one’s self-understanding or self-image. Aquinas was concerned with the inner condition of the bearer of anger as its subjective causal factor and presented several examples of various personal states of mind, i.e., “choleric,” “bitter,” and “ill-tempered.”⁴⁸⁸ His conception of the purpose of anger also was related ultimately to “the reaffirmation of self” (as we concluded in our consideration of “the Intentional Object of Anger” in Chapter 1). His account of anger acknowledged the role of one’s self-understanding in its formation, and yet seemed not to have gone so far as to construe the complicated influence of the self on anger. This might be, in part, because the idea of “self” *per se* had not yet been conceptualized as formally in his time as it is now, and also because his prime concern in the *Summa* was to conceive a human form of anger attuned to the *telos* of beatitude, rather than to establish a psychological theory to explicate various phenomena of human emotions. However, his exploration of

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⁴⁸⁸ *ST.* I-II, 46.8.
various lived forms of human emotions allows us to find relevance in his account of anger for our understanding of *han*-full anger.

3.2.2 Morality of *Han*-full Anger

In Aquinas’ framework, it is clear that *han*-full anger can be evaluated morally. Because no type of anger that arises from one’s cognition—including *han*-full anger—can be formed without some involvement of the reason, this qualifies anger to be evaluated morally. Seen from Aquinas’ scheme, *han*-full anger is a type of “imagination-based anger,” of which the primary source for the judgment of slight lies in one’s inner feeling of injury, rather than in the presence of an actual occurrence of unmerited slight. Aquinas regarded this type of anger as inappropriate to human nature. For Aquinas, a human can be angered in varied ways, but reason-informed anger is the only suitable form of anger.\(^{489}\)

*Han*-full anger is evoked by sensory judgment and imagination, which is connected with cognition, but is seen to listen to reason’s counsel only in part. Due to its focus on the felt sense of injury and its vehement nature, it occurs without being informed fully by reason’s judgment and is also expressed outwardly without reason’s proper intervention. Recall the anger of those with HB, which is either suppressed or expressed violently. Aquinas judged this type of anger to be immoral, and contrary to human nature in terms of its inordinate expression, as well as its disordered formation in not following reason’s judgment. He might have called it “animal rage” rather than

\(^{489}\) *ST*: I-II. 46.7 *ad* 1. As we have seen, reason-informed anger arises when reason denounces the injury, while imagination-based anger is evoked by one’s imagination.
human anger. The anger suitable for a human being should be aroused by reason’s judgment of slight, and seek just vengeance. The just mode and intensity of the anger and the right object as its target prove it just anger.

The antecedent form of *han*-full anger also cannot be considered morally good. As discussed in the first chapter, the morality of anger as it arises antecedently is judged in concert with the character of the bearer. *Han*-full anger, as antecedent anger is, as noted, not morally excusable, in the sense that one’s disposition to anger is her responsibility. As we saw in the narrative of A, it is she, after all, who has left the injury of self uncured and has allowed her anger to continue to affect her life; she, therefore, makes herself vulnerable to a problematic and uncontrollable anger disorder. For Aquinas, a moral human agent is one who is oriented fundamentally towards the ultimate good throughout his/her life. A person is supposed to continue her journey towards the ultimate goal, following the guidance of reason, rather than becoming attached permanently to any temporary object. If not, her disordered passions that are

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490 In his view, *han*-full anger can be seen as a kind of animal rage, inappropriate for a human moral agent. This term might make some of us uncomfortable because it reminds us of his anthropocentric view, in which human beings are superior to animals, just as he sees men as superior to women. Yet, it must be noted that the word, “animal rage” (not used in his later writing, *Summa*) is not used in the same way as the modern pejorative term, which separates us from nonhuman animals. It is true that, for him, the human being, and its agency is regarded as related most closely and actively to the *telos*, and in that sense, a human being is superior to animals, and therefore his view is anthropocentric. However, in his anthropocentrism (also in his usage and distinction of the terms of human anger and animal rage), what is supposed to be highlighted is our duty and responsibility as moral agents, not our ontological superiority to non-human animals. In addition, Aquinas’ categorization of human anger and animal rage should be understood in a dialectic way, as in his treatment of the relationship between perfect and imperfect moral virtues. Thus, unlike its modern counterpart, Aquinas’ category presumes a dialectical movement that links opposites, and thus allows space for variables with heterogeneous forms and degrees that exist between the two extremes. Here we see why Aquinas’ view can be seen as viable today. It provides a standard (“norm”) workable for our discussion of contemporary issues, while allowing room for modifications that fit better with our lived reality.
the result of unhealed attachment to hurtful objects, will assume control, rather than reason, and rule over her thoughts and actions, finally leading her to sin. In the case of the han-filled person, her persistent memory and anger have affected various aspects of her life and led her to HB. In Aquinas’ view, she should have reflected on her inner state at some point in her life and thus prevented herself from becoming the person she is now.

It seems apparent then that han-full anger is not morally desirable in Aquinas’ view, in either its antecedent or consequent form. It is likely to be aroused spontaneously as a disordered form accompanied by intense bodily movement, and thus is difficult to control. However, although we might draw this conclusion with regard to the anger per se according to Aquinas’ normative standard, it is possible to continue the discussion in a deeper or extended way in terms of the subject of the anger. While the anger as an incident is not morally good, but it can still serve for the sake of the subject of the anger. Recall the case of those with HB. Their han-full anger is often evoked as a means of survival that protects the self from the threat of disintegration. In this case, it may demonstrate normative goodness that contributes to the subject’s well-being.

We may also find a greater sense of morality if the bearer continues to improve her pattern of anger in the face of repeated failure. Her will not to give up and her unremitting efforts themselves may offer proof that she still possesses rational power and maturity, which might ultimately lead her anger to become virtuous. This displays the morality of the agent as the subject of passion, but also suggests the potential of the
passion to respond to reason. As passion does not lose its sensitivity to reason and its connection to the higher appetite completely, the subject—as the soul-body composite—is still able to be responsive and attempt to behave appropriately and morally.

This is the point that Murphy intended in connecting the morality of passion to that of the agent. Murphy focused on the agent’s will and effort rather than on the consequence of anger. Thus, Murphy’s version of moral accountability is compatible with that of Aquinas’. It corresponds with Aquinas’ account of passion by pursuing a holistic understanding of anger that includes that of the subject, rather than solely that of anger. It also highlights that the intention of Aquinas’ discussion of the morality of anger was to educate the subject, that is, to encourage and elicit her praxis in improving her emotional habits vis-à-vis her telos, by learning the proper form and expression of her anger.

Murphy’s approach is particularly necessary in evaluating han-full anger, as it is not considered morally good as anger in itself; however, we have argued that, depending on the agent, it may be assessed as morally meaningful. Even in Murphy’s view, judging han-full anger as morally good is difficult. Han-full anger, in its embodied state, often breaks one’s will and crushes one’s hope through repetitive failure. Yet this does not mean that the han-full agent is neither able to make any effort to improve his pattern of anger, nor that han-full anger can never be performed in a morally desirable way. We have seen that it can be performed meaningfully, particularly in its collective form, and can suggest ways in which it could be improved on the individual and
communal levels. We will explore this in later sections. Before that, however, we need to take a closer look at han-full anger in its root form. Through our exploration of the disposition of han-full anger in the next section, we can see how its cognitive construction can be understood in Aquinas’ language, and ways in which it can work effectively.

3.3 Han-full Anger as a Disposition

As noted, han-full anger refers not just to anger that occurs occasionally and episodically, but also to a prolonged state of anger that is assimilated in one’s character. Han-full anger as a disposition has its root in the narcissistic injury and continues to remain in the heart, where it gradually becomes a personality trait by influencing one’s daily thoughts and actions. This prolonged han-full anger is, for its bearer, not just a feeling, but also is an important element that is intertwined with his perception of himself, his values, and society.

One thing to note before proceeding is that there is no counterpart in Aquinas’ account of anger for han-full anger as a disposition. This is where we may find it difficult to apply Aquinas’ account to the case of han-full anger. His discussion of anger does not offer any concrete description of such a prolonged state of anger, which can be more properly called a “mood” that is then applicable to the case of han-full anger. Aquinas does note several personality types (such as “choleric”); the latter are characterized particularly by their angry disposition, but his interest, which is oriented towards
construing the ideal type of anger necessary to attain the *telos*, does not go further to investigate the types of anger that are assimilated in people’s characters.

Such a type of anger might, for him, be dealt with better as the state of the soul that already involves various *vices*, rather than isolated as a type of anger within his discussion in the QQ 46-48 in *ST* I-II. However, the omission of an explanation for those types of anger does not necessarily preclude us from interpreting *han*-full anger from a Thomistic viewpoint, as his overall treatment of human passion and morality, including human vices, provides a useful basis for our understanding of the prolonged anger found in *han*-full anger. As we shall see, his normative idea of passion and anger, in particular, offers crucial points of contact for our investigation of *han*-full anger.

In this section, we attempt to understand *han*-full anger as a disposition and to analyze its inner structure, including its cognitive construct, in Aquinas’ language, in order to expose its potential meaning, as well as its problems. As noted above, we cannot expect direct help from Aquinas’ account of anger in interpreting *han*-full anger as a disposition, but we can see some ways in which to approach it. One plausible way is to analyze *han*-full anger with an investigation of two particular passions that involve the formation and continuation of *han*-full anger—sorrow and despair. As noted, Aquinas argued that anger arises from sorrow, and without hope for revenge, it is not evoked. The examination of these passions allows us to see how the cognitive dimension of *han*-full anger is composed, and thereby to envision a way that it may be reformed or modified, which will be considered in the next chapter.
3.3.1 Sorrow as the Cause of Han-full Anger

The han-filled state of the subject of han-full anger can be seen as a chronic one that involves several vices in Aquinas’ view, such as anger (ira), despair, hatred (acedia), and envy; these vices are acquired through inappropriate affections of the will, as well as passions of the soul. Underlying them, we can find one passion in common, sorrow, and in this case, prolonged sorrow.

Because sorrow is a cause of anger, the sorrow embedded—continuously—in the han-full state can be seen as the cause of han-full anger as a disposition. The passion of sorrow (tritia) was, for Aquinas, not necessarily a bad thing, but could be useful when it assists the will in avoiding the evil in the journey to reach the telos. If the sorrow arises upon the perception of evil by “a right judgment of reason,” it can be used in “avoiding or expelling the saddening evil,” and therefore, be considered good. Yet, considering the vicious cycle of prolonged han-full anger, in which even the will is debilitated, sorrow as its cause can hardly be regarded as functioning in a useful way.

In Aquinas’ view, the immoderate form of sorrow, such as the prolonged sorrow in han, is not good, because its disordered state proves that it is not “regulated

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\text{\footnotesize 491} As we have seen in the case of female HB patients, han-filled people with a narcissistic disorder usually suffer from various forms of emotional pain and symptoms, including lack of will, avoidance of harm, lethargy, and torpor, together with negative emotions, including despair, hatred, emptiness, anger, and envy.

\text{\footnotesize 492} \text{ST. I-II. 71.1, ad. 3.}

\text{\footnotesize 493} Aquinas believed that despair, hatred, and envy, all arise from sorrow (II-II. 20. 4, ad. 2; 34. 6), and defined sloth, following Damacene, as “an oppressive sorrow” (II-II. 35. 1).

\text{\footnotesize 494} \text{ST. I-II. 39.2 & 3.}
according to the rule of reason, which is the root of the virtuous good.”495 The sorrow in han as a disposition originates from the deeply-ingrained narcissistic injury, together with its associated anger, and therefore affects one’s interpretive process and meaning-making system. Seen in Aquinas’ view, this prolonged sorrow is related to “a perverse reason and will,”496 and has the effect of “consuming” the soul,497 which in turn has dangerous effects on the body.498 As we shall see, this embedded sorrow thus offers a partial reason why the han-filled state involves various somatic problems, as seen in HB, and why it is more difficult for the han-filled person to function as a moral agent.

With respect to han-full anger, the most important thing to consider is the cause of sorrow in the sense that it affects the arousal of anger indirectly. If the cause of sorrow disappears, sorrow ceases and anger dissipates. In terms of the cause of the sorrow, Aquinas identified three subjective (Article 1~3), and one objective causes (Article 4) in ST. I-II. Q. 36.4.499 With respect to the objective cause, in order for sorrow to be elicited, the external power as an objective cause should not be so great as to

495 ST. I-II. 39.2, ad. 1.

496 ST. I-II. 39.

497 ST. I-II. 37.2 & 39.3, ad. 1.

498 ST. I-II. 36.4.

499 As Minor summarized, Aquinas construed three elements as the subjective causes of sorrow, the perception of something as an evil (Article 1), the presence of concupiscence (Article 2), and the desire for unity (Article 3), and noted a condition in which an irresistible external power produces sorrow as an objective cause (Article 4). One thing to be noted: in Minor’s reading, Aquinas’ notion of the cause of sorrow as present evil or the loss of good (denoting the same phenomenon in different aspects) is reduced to “the loss of the good as an evil.” Robert Minor, Thomas Aquinas on the Passions, : A Study of Summa Theologiae Ia2ae 22-48. (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. 2009), 197.
“take away from the will or the sensitive appetite” to resist or respond to the power.\textsuperscript{500}

In that case, “the result would be not sorrow but pleasure,” as such a great power elicits “consenting” rather than “resisting.”\textsuperscript{501} Here, we are reminded of the occurrence of anger when the will is sufficient to resist the external cause.

The subjective causes of sorrow, such as the sorrow embedded in \textit{han}, can be conceived first—in the light of the first cause—as “the injury of self (by slight),”\textsuperscript{502} which is perceived as present and evil. Thus, it can be conceived as “the loss of the integrated self (by slight).” Aquinas construed the cause of sorrow—in the light of the second cause—by way of the principle or movement, that is, by the inward inclination towards the possession of good.\textsuperscript{503} In the case of the sorrow of \textit{han}-filled people, it might be said that they are fundamentally sorrowful for what they had once enjoyed and then lost, the feeling of omnipotence—we might call it the sense of integrated self—prior to the narcissistic injury. The desire for the wholeness of self is considered a fundamental cause of the sorrow associated with \textit{han}-full anger. This appetitive movement is seen as “a universal cause of sorrow,” in that it denotes the basic movement of love for good.\textsuperscript{504} Without love for good, there will be no sorrow for its loss.

\textsuperscript{500} \textit{ST}. I-II. 36.4.

\textsuperscript{501} \textit{Ibid}. Here Aquinas quoted Augustine \textit{(loc. Cit.)}.

\textsuperscript{502} The cause of sorrow we are addressing here is related indirectly to anger.

\textsuperscript{503} \textit{ST}. I-II. 36.2.

\textsuperscript{504} \textit{Ibid}. 

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This desire for good as a cause of sorrow is then specified further in the third cause of sorrow, namely, “desire for unity.” This is particularly noteworthy in our consideration of the sorrow involved in han-full anger. According to Aquinas, “every thing naturally desires unity,” as “the good of each thing consists in a certain unity.” This fits especially well in the case of those people with han because, as noted, suffering from their damaged selfhood, they naturally desire a sense of the integrated self. Yet one thing should be noted: the desire for unity can be misdirected to an object that is not truly suitable. As seen in the case of HB patients with narcissistic disorder, they suffer from a sense of their weak and fragmented senses of self, and long for the omnipotent state prior to the narcissistic injury. Unfortunately, however, this desire for unity is not regarded necessarily as a natural desire, but is often seen to be a longing for an unrealistic fantasy that is no longer attainable and thus ends in an attachment to the narcissistic illusion.

We might ask here whether we all have such a desire sometimes, which is why it can be a universal cause of sorrow. However, sometimes, our desire for unity focuses tragically on the wrong object, without appropriate control, and renders us helpless. As we have seen in the case of Korean Christian converts with narcissistic disorder, those with han try to find something in religion to maintain their artificial image of the omnipotent self. They search for the narcissistic feeling in mystical experiences and try

\[505 \text{ST. I-II. 36.3.} \]

\[506 \text{Ibid.} \]
to repair their broken illusion of omnipotence by identification with a dominant other, i.e., God. However, this makes them more attached to their false grandiose self, and, as a result, their depleted selves become more impoverished. This then causes them more pain and suffering because of the very gap between the two poles of the self.

Therefore, we can say that, in the case of the han-filled state, there is another aspect of the desire for unity in addition to the fundamental inclination towards the integrated self—the desire to maintain the narcissistic fantasy of the omnipotent self-image through union with the idealized object. The fundamental desire for unity that arises from the appetitive movement of amor towards a suitable good conforms to the goodness that is “conducive to perfect being.” In the case of HB patients, however, the craving for unity often functions as a desire that serves to sustain or reinforce one’s narcissistic fantasy. This type of love of unity is not the kind “in which the perfection of nature consists.” Rather, it can function, through habitual practices, as a path that is “contrary to a thing’s perfection,” and that “destroy[s] the unity which is due.” Thus, separation from this kind of desire is a valid cause of sorrow. If the sorrow is caused by the desire to separate from the attachment to the narcissistic illusion, it can be used to overcome that which hinders the sense of the integrated self, and thus contribute to “a thing’s perfection.”

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507 ST. I-II. 36.3, ad. 1.
508 ST. I-II. 39.3, ad. 1 & 2.
509 ST. I-II. 36.3, ad. 2 & 3.
On the other hand, two types of the existing states of sorrow can be considered in the presence of slight: sorrow mixed with anger, and sorrow alone. For Aquinas, there is the case of “anger only” at the slight. Aquinas believed that anger could be evoked by the reason’s judgment and the will’s simple movement.  

Although it is controversial whether a passion can be elicited without bodily change, anger, particularly anger that includes a moral quality linked to justice, is regarded as sometimes due to a simple movement of the will, especially in a person whose passion occurs with reason.  

In this case, sorrow does not precede anger. Han-full anger obviously does not belong to this category. Rather, it is primarily a state of “sorrow mixed with anger,” and the sorrow, as the fundamental source of han-full anger as a disposition, is present as embedded sorrow, sorrow as a disposition.  

Recall Aquinas’ example of the person who is characterized as grieving repeatedly over her defect and is, therefore, easily hurt and angered.  

A han-filled person, who is already sorrowing over and suffering from his vulnerable side and its consequent low self-esteem, is very sensitive to any perceived evil that stimulates or provokes han-full anger.

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510 ST. II-II. 158.8.

511 See ST. II-II. 158. 8; also see Miner’s argument on the arousal of passion by will.

512 According to Lombardo, Aquinas’ description of the order of passion (ST. I-II 25.3) is ambiguous because, while Aquinas considered sorrow as the cause of anger, he argued that anger precedes sorrow. This suggests, Lombardo claims, that Aquinas “is not entirely committed to the idea that sadness is a necessary prelude to anger.” Lombardo, The Logic of Desire, 73. In the case of the han-full state, on the other hand, it is presupposed that sorrow coexists with anger either as a precedent (the cause of anger), or consequence (depression as the effect of the initial sorrow).

513 ST. I-II. 47. 3.
We may consider another possible emotional state in the relationship between sorrow and anger—the state of “sorrow only.” As noted earlier, when there is sorrow for the loss of good by slight, anger arises and pursues vengeance. For Aquinas, it is natural for a person to defend herself when harmed. When a perceived unmerited slight occurs, one is naturally prompted to remove the evil (slight) and to strike back against the noxious person. Through anger, one declares that she does not deserve such an unjust slight. This is one way in which anger as a passion functions for the self and for the restoration of justice. If one is not angered when one ought to be, it is a sin, a sign that the reason’s judgment and the will’s execution are not performed properly.\(^\text{514}\) This lack of anger at slight is attributed ultimately to weak or perverse rational powers. However, we can also consider another element that is directly responsible for it: the lack of hope, or the passion of despair.\(^\text{515}\) If one is sorrowful for the evil, but there is no hope for revenge, anger does not arise.

\(^{514}\) ST. II-II. 158.8.

\(^{515}\) We saw an example that belongs to this type of “sorrow only” in the first chapter. This group of people (i.e., the women in the sexist society presented by Cates) includes those who are not angered when they ought to be. They might sorrow for their defects, but not be angered at slight. See “Anger and one’s disposition” in the first chapter. We can consider two possible cases of this type. One is when a person does not see her own excellence, and therefore cannot recognize an injury. This is due to perverse reason, and in this case, neither sorrow nor anger arises. The other denotes the case in which, even if she perceives and judges the slight against herself rightly, she is only sorrowful for the injury, but is not angry. This is due to a weakness of the will (rather than the reason), as, based on the reason’s right judgment of the slight, anger can be evoked simply by the will. This can be interpreted in the sense that anger arises only for the sake of justice, and thus, regardless of the presence of hope for revenge. That is why the rational powers are seen as ultimately responsible for the lack of anger.
3.3.2 The Absence of Anger, Power, and Hope

According to Aquinas, the passion of hope takes its object as a “future good, difficult but possible to obtain.”\textsuperscript{516} In the case of slight, hope is evoked when vengeance as an arduous good seems achievable, which then promotes action for vengeance via anger.\textsuperscript{517} Relevant to the absence of anger, we ask what makes the slighted believe that the slighter may be punished. The first thing to note with regard to this question is that the arousal of hope is described as related closely to one’s power; Aquinas held that “a thing may be possible to him in two ways, viz., by his own power, or by another’s.”\textsuperscript{518} The power to elicit hope, to apprehend the possibility of achieving the object, despite its difficulty, can be enhanced by one’s material and spiritual excellence, including riches, strength, and, more importantly, experience.\textsuperscript{519} It can also be improved with another’s teaching or persuasion. We see here that the power to retain hope is related closely to one’s cognitive capacity—not separated from one’s sensory powers—which can be expanded through one’s own experience, education, and so on.

The goodness of hope is also connected to this rational ability to form the passion of hope. Aquinas considered good hope to be formed because of the reason’s judgment. Good and sound hope is that which arises from the proper apprehension and

\textsuperscript{516} ST. I-II. 40.2.

\textsuperscript{517} ST. I-II. 40.8.

\textsuperscript{518} ST. I-II. 40.2, \textit{ad} 1. Power can be understood as the power to enable particular operations or acts as a created being, including a human.

\textsuperscript{519} ST. I-II. 40.5. This reminds us of Aquinas’ point that one’s excellence makes a person prone to anger. ST. I-II. 47.3.
sound judgment of the possibility for vengeance, which is obtained through considering subjective (i.e., one’s shortcomings) and objective (i.e., “obstacles”) factors. If one’s rational powers do not function so that one is “steady in [one’s] own reality,” as is seen often in the cases of youths and drunkards, the hope cannot be true or good hope, but false hope. Aquinas’ description of the role of experience, in particular, indicates how one can experience a good and sound hope through the repeated practice of virtue-building acts. Through the experiences attained via practice, one can gain more knowledge, and thereby increase one’s rational powers in order to furnish the arousal of good hope. We can imagine here a virtuous person with magnanimity, whose rational powers are maximized. Despite her fear about the arduous object, her reason finds hope for vengeance at the unjust slight, and her will simply follows reason’s command, and exacts vengeance for the sake of justice.

The power to elicit hope, on the other hand, is not exclusive to the rational powers of humans, but also comprises the natural appetitive power common to all beings. Aquinas noted that hope also can be elicited by a certain “natural instinct,” as seen in animals. An animal does not know the “future” (as one of the three conditions

520 ST. I-II. 40.6. Here we can recall the example of a teen-aged girl who experiences anger, but wisely decides not to express it in an unfavorable situation (i.e., when the slighter is superior in position and age, and does not have a generous character).

521 ST. I-II. 40. 5, ad. 1.

522 ST. I-II. 40.3, ad. 1. Aquinas held that the good as the object of hope is considered to contain three conditions, future, arduous, and possible.
of the good as the object of hope), yet is still moved by its natural instinct, which partakes in “the Divine Intellect that foresees the future.” Aquinas believed that, “in the actions of irrational animals and of other natural things,” we see “a procedure which is similar to that which we observe in the actions of art: and in this way hope and despair are in dumb animals.”

Then what does “lack of anger” mean? The lack of anger over a given slight is due to the weakest state of the soul, and can be construed to result when one’s power is overwhelmed by evil and ceases to function defensively. Excessive sorrow enervates one’s soul, so that we lose altogether the hope of fighting back, and continuing the process of meaning making. This state can be articulated in terms of sorrow’s effect of “depressing the soul.” When prolonged, immoderate sorrow depresses and burdens the soul deeply, a serious depression follows, and one’s soul loses the hope of repelling the afflicting evil. In its extreme case, one is so depressed as to be entirely nonfunctional, and unable to retain any power that elicits hope. This is the most damaging effect of sorrow.

*Han*-full anger is clearly not a case in which anger is absent, because it presupposes the presence of anger, at least internally. Nonetheless, it is still worthwhile

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523 *ST*. I-II. 40.6.


525 *ST*. I-II. 40.3.

526 Miner interpreted the effect of pain and sorrow “depressing soul” or “weighed down” to be similar to the contemporary diagnosis of “depression.” Miner, *Aquinas on the Passions*, 201.

to consider it in conjunction with the lack of anger, in the sense that anger is not present in a genuine sense in the case of han-full anger: its outward expression is often missing in its “feminine” form, or not properly performed, i.e., it involves a behavioral problem in its “masculine” form. Taken together, these inappropriate expressions of anger seem to share a similar problem as the case of the lack of anger. In han-full anger, the problem is not a lack of, but insufficient hope. Two things are noteworthy here with regard to han-full anger: firstly, it proves that the inner power of its bearer has hope for vengeance and is therefore able to be angry. This is a better situation than the total absence of anger. The presence of anger demonstrates that one’s power is at least working for the self, and therefore, has the ability to respond to the evil and protect oneself by removing it. This discloses one’s will to refuse further victimization and continue to justify oneself, and thereby lessens the damage and moves towards the restoration of the damaged self.

Secondly, the power associated with the arousal of hope and, consequently, of han-full anger, often seems to be manifested inappropriately. One of the reasons for this is believed to be the insufficiency of hope, more specifically, insufficiently rationalized hope. When the hope is good and sound, anger is formed and expressed

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528 I am indicating the “feminine” (repressed) form of anger and the “masculine” (expressed violently) as seen in the HB patients. These two types are rooted in the narcissistic anger, but manifested differently according to their situations (we have presumed the context of a sexist society, such as that of South Korea). These forms of anger are, like two sides of a coin, interchangeable. We can imagine a woman with HB who expresses her anger towards her daughter-in-law violently, and a man who usually expresses his anger aggressively towards his wife, but tends to suppress his anger in front of his superiors in the workplace. We can consider these two forms of anger here as the same type of anger with different expressions according to the context.
justly and fully. However, when it is not, the power hardly can be appropriate to form anger and thereby, to repel the evil. As noted above, good hope is governed by reason, and false hope is influenced insufficiently by reason. There is also another type of hope not governed by reason, namely, that of dumb animals. We might say that han-full anger is not informed fully by reason, partly because its underlying hope is not constituted sufficiently due to the absence of reason’s guidance. Thus, han-full anger arises from sorrow and seeks vengeance based on a false hope to punish.

3.3.3 Han-full Anger as Communication

We have examined sorrow and despair (as lack of hope) as the causes of han-full anger. From our investigation of the cause/object of the embedded sorrow, it is clear that the sorrow is caused by the injury to the self from the incident of slight. Moreover, it is, deep inside, connected to the underlying pain from the loss of good at the core of the self, that is, the pain connected to a longing for the lost fantasy of the omnipotent self. The sorrow over the broken illusion of one’s narcissistic self, and its consequent desire for restoration, is manifested as the attachment to union with various dominant others, i.e., money, power, sexual pleasure, and sometimes, a distorted image of God. We can imagine also the case of a husband who needs his wife as the external other who helps him maintain his omnipotent self-image. When his symbiotic-seeking

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529 See ST. I-II. 40.6.

530 ST. I-II. 40. 3.
relationship with his wife is frustrated, as seen in the case of HB, the husband becomes furious and expresses his anger so violently to her as to threaten his marital relationship. His anger takes the form of narcissistic rage that traces back to the original han-full experience. In this case, what he should pursue rightly is not the desire to continue to see himself in a narcissistic way, but the separation from that desire, from the unnatural craving for the symbiotic relationship with his wife. His inability to separate from that desire is a suitable source of sorrow.

The hope to punish involved in han-full anger also shows what makes han-full anger inordinate. As seen in HB patients, han-filled agents are those who have difficulty retaining hope. They are suffering from pain that is connected deeply to frustration in their childhoods. We might say that they are disposed to fundamental despair, which causes in them a habitual lack of confidence in their own power and makes them vulnerable to slight. The goal of anger is to obtain the revalidation of self, to have the slighter hear what the slighted says, to recognize how she is injured, and therefore to re-validate what has been invalidated. Anger formed and expressed in a just way can make the slighter repent for the slight and affirm the slighted’s view of her excellence. Good is then reinstated, and justice is realized; sorrow diminishes, anger dissipates, and the relationship is restored. However, in the case of han-filled people, who suffer from the feeling that they are slighted fundamentally by the world, it is very difficult to find hope, and to be confident about their own power to create change in others’ views of or
reactions to them. Using the example of the angry husband who lacks self-assurance, he cannot help but struggle to maintain the hope that his needs and wants will be heard by his wife, and, with this frustration, his anger is expressed in a disordered way.

His immoderate anger does not stem from reason’s judgment and guidance in the full sense. Its underlying, inordinate, and misdirected sorrow depresses the soul, repelling the energy for the formation of a sound hope, and therefore causes the incomplete form of anger to arise spontaneously as a natural instinct. This violent anger cannot achieve what he wants at the bottom of his heart. Because his anger is expressed immediately and violently, it cannot be sufficiently powerful to communicate with his wife what he truly wants. The violent expression of his anger, and its consequent lack of communicative power, reveals not only the broken relationship with his wife, but also the deficiency of his self-assurance and his wounded agency, which can be traced to the problem of his weak and narcissistic self. If he has sufficient power to believe that she can understand—and accept—his feelings and needs through the expression of his anger, he might be able to gather himself and express it in a just manner that succeeds in communicating with her. In this way, he would believe in his power and relationship with his wife so that she listens to what he wants and needs, even though he does not raise his voice or force his wife to respond.

This leads us then to note the potential, as well as the limitation, of han-full anger as a means of communication. As seen above, although han-full anger is not

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531 We saw this lack of hope in a developmental perspective in the previous chapter.
complete and effective, it still conveys to the slighter the felt injury of the self and its
effect. Its inordinate mode of expression makes its function less effectively to
accomplish the goal, and thus, it is not successful in making the slighter recognize the
will and needs of the slighted properly, but it is still meaningful, in that it is an attempt
to communicate with the slighter. This is clearly a better situation compared to one in
which there is no anger. Imagine a couple who is never angered and/or never expresses
their anger towards each other. To express one’s anger is to reveal one’s own needs, to
open oneself to another. If one’s anger is controlled and expressed in an appropriate
form, it can function more efficiently and help the couple understand each other better.

We can further note here two important points in the function of han-full anger
as communication. Firstly, anger’s operation as communication is not limited to
conveying meanings between persons, but also, within a person. According to Kohut, HB
can be understood as the result of poor communication between the two poles of the
self. The lack of anger or its inappropriate outward expression can be seen to result
from the restraint or insufficiency of self-expression of the vulnerable side of the self by
the suppression of the other side. In the case of Winnicott’s patient B in the previous
chapter, the husband who never showed his anger to his wife was suffering from his
inner inability to recognize and accept his vulnerable side, and accordingly, his anger.
This is connected directly to the relationship between anger and one’s self-love, which
we will explore later.

Secondly, the function of han-full anger as a communicative tool also allows us
to see the crucial influence and function of the community as a “facilitating
environment” in the emotional lives of han-filled agents. In the example of the angry husband, the wife’s role can be understood as that of the emphatic community in that, in order for the husband to have more confidence in his ability to communicate his needs and desires, her support, and cooperation are essential. Yet, it is extremely hard for the wife to understand and accept her husband’s aggressive attitude, and acceptance cannot and should not be forced. We will return later to the role of the empathetic community.

3.4 Han-full Anger in Context

We have explored han-full anger as a disposition as well as in its episodic form, and now investigate it particularly in its contextualized aspect, focusing on its largely problematic characteristics as related to South Korean culture. As we have seen, the etiological factors and pathological aspects of han-full anger are related closely to the influence of the narcissistic culture of han embedded in the society of South Korea on the individual and collective levels. Here we explore socialized han-full anger, focusing on the problematic points that correspond to the problems of the culture, and we interpret this in light of Aquinas’ thought. Although Aquinas’ description may not relate directly, we can still obtain helpful insights from his view in identifying the essential problems of han-full anger as contextualized in the culture of han in South Korea.

Overall, three aspects of han-full anger will be discussed. First, we will address the social powers in the culture of han that debilitate moral agency and thereby
contribute to the incomplete and inordinate form of *han*-full anger. Seen from a Thomistic perspective, this problem is highlighted in terms of the inability to understand good anger. Second, we examine disordered self-love as one of the most conspicuous problems, and also as the fundamental source of the moral agency of the *han*-filled agent; finally, we contemplate how *han*-full anger for justice, as manifested and developed in the individual and collective lives of the *han*-filled, can be understood in light of Aquinas’ view on anger for justice.

3.4.1 Socialized Anger and Wounded Agency

As noted, it is difficult to discuss the social aspect of *han*-full anger in tandem with Aquinas’ view, because he did not deal with the formation of anger under social influence, nor did he imagine that human agency and one’s emotional life could be destroyed by social institutional powers. Aquinas did recognize, however, the interpersonal and social nature of anger, and was aware that anger arises in interpersonal relationships and forms through the construal of several concepts interpreted by the community, i.e., merit and justice. He did not, however, consider the possibility of situations in which, while human agency is missing, anger forms and develops into a disordered state almost completely as the result of social influences. Although manifested as various contextualized forms, anger itself is inclined fundamentally to the *telos*. For him, as affirmed good in the Created order, human agency, its surrounding social conditions, and the passions, including anger, cannot be
distorted so completely as to deny their original goodness and potential to be formed by Grace.

This view might appear to be overly optimistic in the context of *han-*full anger. As seen in the case of HB patients, the woman’s agency is shattered and distorted from the start by the potent influence of ideological social powers. We noted the narcissistic culture of Korean society as the main source that generates original and secondary *han-*full experiences and damages the agency of many people (as humans as well as moral agents). Some would say that the cultural situation has become worse, with late capitalism and political corruption that has made the society cruder, shallower, and more materialistic. The social, structural, and ideological powers that subsume all other virtues of Korean society, seem to be rendering it more and more a culture of comparison and competition.

In such a social context, “unresponsive” to the needs and suffering of the people, the *han*-filled experience the feeling of being slighted more often and more harshly, and they become more frustrated and enraged as a result. Their will to correct the situations is likely to yield to the ideological powers and their anger in seeking justice is not used correctly to effect change in their individual lives or in society. Under forceful social influences that almost cancel out the subjective will and render the agency impotent, they become immersed easily in sorrow and have difficulty maintaining hope. Accordingly, they are scarcely able to keep their anger informed rationally and expressed constructively. It is evoked easily due to the sensitive defense mechanisms that protect the self from a harsh and unjust society, and tends to dissipate quickly
during episodic events because their rational power is insufficient to preserve and use their anger to improve social conditions.

Thus, it can be said that han-full anger reveals a point that has been obscured in Aquinas’ framework, how potent the influence of the social powers can be on the formation and manifestation of anger and the agency of its bearer. This illustrates, again, how different the social conditions we live in today are from those in Aquinas’ time, and how different the context of han-full anger is from that of the normative anger Aquinas envisioned. Yet again, this does not necessarily lead us to conclude that Aquinas’ affirmation of moral agency is not valid in the case of han-full anger. The wounded agency in such a harsh context may not function properly, but it does still function. Although its disordered anger is formed and expressed incompletely, it is still connected to a sense of justice, for example, in the expression of its collective form in the political history of South Korea.

As we have seen thus far, the socialized form of han-full anger reveals clearly the problems of moral agency, which can become powerless and ineffective under the influence of social structural power. One thing is essential to the adequate functioning of agency on the formation of anger—reason’s vision of human anger, its true end, and how it should be expressed and executed. Reason’s lost vision of anger causes han-full anger to be informed insufficiently, and consequently, it is unable to elicit the will to control it in an appropriate way.
3.4.1.1 Lost Vision of Anger

In Aquinas’ framework, passion is related essentially to the whole process of the agent in reaching her *telos*—happiness—and anger in particular, is construed as contributing to its attainment by achieving its intermediate goal, namely, the restoration of justice with others and community. Anger for him is bound to justice. It is aroused and expressed when one’s own or another’s dignity is offended unjustly and, therefore, justice is broken commutatively and socially. If the situation at hand has nothing to do with justice, anger should not be evoked and the agent would be better to remain calm. For Aquinas, anger as an action is a choice performed by the moral agent. The agent always chooses to act with intention with respect to a goal, whether consciously or subconsciously. Every human possesses—at least subconsciously—the vision of the *telos* of her life and is able to grasp what should be done in a particular act to reach the goal by virtue of the exercise of the rational powers. That is why a passion as an act also needs to be chosen and performed self-consciously, via deliberation. In this view, *handful* anger, in its formation and manner of expression, falls short of rational guidance; one reason for this problem stems from the reason’s lack of vision of good anger. *Handful* anger is based primarily on sense and imagination, without the proper apprehension of what it would bring on the rational level and further, to the agent’s life as a moral process. This is related directly to the imperfect functioning of the agent’s rational powers, and is ultimately related to social conditions that weaken or distort them to such an extent that they are unable to perceive what anger is and what should be sought by its expression.
Among the social factors that lead to reason’s insufficient vision of the nature of anger is “modern secularization,” which has severed the finite from the infinite. Theologically speaking, without faith and love for God, Who is the only infinite good, the finite mind fails to grasp the other side of a finite good fully. This can be described in conjunction with the vision of humans as moral agents. For Aquinas, humans are beings who can grow to become better, richer, fuller persons, and their authentic development as moral agents, as well as human agents, is related crucially to their knowledge of what constitutes true happiness, as well as what is right. While knowing and doing good, people become good and happy, and, in that way, they are attentive to their choices and actions in the vision of life as a process. Without a vision that the end of human anger is attuned to the telos of human happiness, it is difficult for the moral agent to conceive the limits of the finite good that can be achieved through immediate anger, as well as what to expect thereafter.

This lack of vision of the human being as moral agent, and consequently, of human anger, leads us to note the influence of contemporary socioeconomic structures, in which all the values converge into the myth of economic success and social status in the capitalistic, dualistic principle of the “haves and have-nots.” In the context of contemporary South Korean society, the ruthless and insensitive socioeconomic conditions, aggravated by a corrupt political situation, make people blind followers who learn the grammar of how to survive, without questioning why they want to live in that way and what true happiness means to them. Their knowledge and imagination are confined within the social value system and order and their actions are determined by
social demands and codes.\textsuperscript{532} Lacking a clear vision of self, people have lost norms and
the communities that provide them altogether, and therefore, their ability to think and
act as moral agents is compromised. Tired and frustrated in the atmosphere of extreme
competition and comparison, people have lost hope and belief in the society, and have
turned into mere consumers who are becoming increasingly careless about the choices
and feelings reflected in their actions.

In the case of the \textit{han}-filled agent, life is even more arduous. Recall the
developmental deficit of \textit{han}-filled people, which hinders their full development as
moral agents. As seen in HB patients, their damaged agency and limited emotional
ability make it difficult for them to resist social influences and pressures. As we have
noted, the narcissistic, vulnerable self longs for external power to satisfy its narcissistic
needs and relieve pain, and therefore, it has a tendency to pursue and become attached
to various temporal material, sensory, and social goods. However, money, glory, honor,
bodily good, and pleasure are not, according to Aquinas, goods that stand for human
happiness alone, but exist to serve another end.\textsuperscript{533} That is, something or someone who
appears to signify these goods can quench their thirst for a sense of power temporarily,
but it is not an ultimate solution to satisfy and liberate them from their longing. Unable
or unwilling to see the true end of their beings and actions, they become more attached

\textsuperscript{532} According to Tavris, we live in an unjust social order where the system organizes our mental
faculties to see and have the knowledge, perceptions, and memories that serve to protect the system. In
such a condition, we become less sensitive to justice because injustices are already built into the system.

\textsuperscript{533} \textit{ST}. I-II. 2.
to those goods, for unnatural desire has no limits. The more they yearn for them, the emptier their impoverished selves become and the more painful their frustrations. This aspect of misdirected good is highlighted in the relationship between han-full anger and disordered self-love, which we address in the next section.

In such a destitute state, the han-filled agents cannot achieve a higher vision to construe themselves as moral agents and their lives as processes. Moreover, it becomes almost impossible for them to think and act as free agents, nor even to aspire to become mature agents because they lack communal support of their self-assertive practices. It is thus difficult for them to apprehend the true end of their anger and to function in a way that increases their happiness.

3.4.2 Han-full Anger and Self-Love

With respect to han-full anger as contextualized in the culture of han, we see the next problem, which is the fundamental source of the problematic agency: a deep-rooted and distorted self-love. This signifies the innermost root of the disordered subjective condition, and also shows its relationship with the culture of han. As we noted in the previous chapter, in the culture of han, where the original and secondary han-full experiences are common, the agency of the han-filled becomes weak and debilitated and their anger becomes han-full, and in serious cases, develops into HB.

The han-full form of anger, as discussed, turns inward and, over time, goes even deeper and reaches the core of the self. It concerns fundamentally how one feels the injury of the self, such that whether the slight is truly unjust in the objective sense is
considered only secondarily. *Han*-full anger, and its arousal and expression, are self-expressive acts, and thus are regarded as meaningful in terms of self-interest. Yet, due to its disordered manifestation, it often fails to attain its genuine goal. Taking Aquinas’ view, this incompleteness of *han*-full anger is, as we have seen, attributable to one’s lack of control over it, and thus to weak rational powers. On a deeper level, its problem is rooted in disordered self-love.

3.4.2.1 Disordered Self-love

In the case of *han*-full anger, one’s concern and care for the self focuses primarily on the needs and the injury of self, and this affects one’s perception and judgments, as well as the ability to choose and perform an act. Therefore, it influences the formation of anger. We might ask how self-care and concern can function in a negative way to make anger incomplete and further harmful to one’s emotional life. Should anger then be formed and expressed in an other-directed way? Is anger for justice completely irrelevant to self-love? These plausible questions, however, seem to be derived largely from confusion and misunderstanding about self-love, as we often encounter in the controversies regarding self-love in Christian theology.534

In Aquinas’ view and the traditions of Catholic virtue, self-love is not opposed to or incompatible with the love of neighbor or love of God, or understood in such a way

534 According to Vacek, there have been various understandings and discussions of self-love in the Christian tradition, and among them, there has also been an inadequate understanding of the self and consequent mistaken arguments against self-love. For the distinctions and explanations of similar concepts and terms related to self-love, see Edward C. Vacek, *Love, Human and Divine: The Heart of Christian Ethics*, (Washington D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 1994), 208-233.
that the former is bad and the latter is good. Aquinas regarded self-love as equally important to neighbor-love, in the sense that it is crucial for one’s authentic development (although “self-forgetfulness and self-denial” will be required ultimately for perfection), and can be regarded as a preliminary condition for neighbor love. For Aquinas, every human action that is chosen and performed is related fundamentally to self-love, as most clearly seen in his maxim that “all beings seek whatever is good for themselves and resist whatever is not.” For those of us familiar with the state of self-alienation in our times, this might not ring true. However, for Aquinas, it was self-evident that human and non-human passion is elicited fundamentally by the principle of love for good and hate for evil; when it is expressed as an action, it presumes the involvement of a voluntary consent or dissent of the will, which is also based on self-interest. For, “every nature desires its own being and its own perfection.”

With regard to anger, the anger that originates from a genuine self-love is exercised and manifested as self-connecting (leading to responsibility for oneself), self-expressive (elicited by “a desire to know and possess oneself”), and self-interested (for the sake of the well-being of the agent). Self-love indicates primarily a love that operates naturally and is inclined to the telos of the self, which is the perfection of the

535 Vacek, Ibid., 200.

536 Ibid., 245; ST. I-II. 29.1.

537 ST. I. 48.1.

538 “[Agape] self-love is neither an unselfconscious feeling of wholeness nor simply our biological and psychological tendency to grow. This self-love engages our consciousness in a reflexive way.” Vacek, Ibid., 241.
agent; however, this inclination to the telos does not occur automatically. Self-love is manifested most clearly in “a self-referential action in which we try to bring [our often divergent, and only partially integrated tendencies] into greater unity.” Thus, through the repeated practice of such self-referential actions, we can move our fragmented state towards a relatively integrated state of self, which is how self-love operates for our own good. This demonstrates why self-care and concern, as revealed in the formation of han-full anger, does not originate from self-love in a true sense.

Han-full anger, in its extreme form, is involved deeply with concern for injury and the needs of the self, but this concern does not lead necessarily to care for all aspects of the self, nor does it bring about a more integrated state of self by achieving its goal of self-revalidation. Overall, from a Thomistic view, it is neither truly a state of self-love, nor is the anger motivated by a proper self-love. This state might be seen in its extreme case as one of self-absorption, apart from self-love; han-full anger that arises from that state is not rationalized anger attuned by self-love.

Interpreting this in the frame of Kohut’s self-psychology, the han-filled state is one in which most of one’s care and effort for the self are invested only in one pole of the self, the side that is shown to others, while the other pole, which involves one’s vulnerability, is denied and neglected. While favoring one’s narcissistic self in order to feel admired by others, the other side of the self is left impoverished and isolated from the outside world. This causes the denigration of the self by alienating the two poles,

539 Ibid., 240.
and thereby results in the reinforcement of narcissistic exhibitionist tendencies, accompanied by severe narcissistic vulnerability. Alienated from others and the real world, as well as from the other side of the self, one becomes more indulgent—yet tragically insatiable—of one’s subjective, artificial world and, proportionately, the feelings of shame and envy intensify and render one more helpless and miserable.

In this narcissistic state, when one feels the self-boundary attacked and thereby the narcissistic fantasy broken, one becomes furious, and can display behavioral problems that are also an expression of the struggle to avoid painful, helpless feelings. Disordered self-love can make the expression of anger almost self-destructive, and just anger cannot be formed in such a state of self-hatred. Vacek noted that those “incapable of caring for their own needs” are “incapable of claiming their own dignity before others who would abuse them.”

Nonetheless, even the disordered state of self-love need not deny the fundamental work of charity that flows beneath. As Porter illustrated, like all other beings created by God, a human agent moves towards perfection, and yet, as a rational being, is able to pursue her telos actively by choosing how to attain it. This sometimes leads one to go astray, to be drawn to a wrong object, and through repetitive practice, to become stuck in the state of disordered self-love. She can alter her course in the right direction, however, by right reason and will with the aid of Grace. Proper self-love is

\[\text{\textsuperscript{540}}\text{Ibid., 233. Vacek cited Giles Milhaven, Good Anger (1989), 137.}\]
regarded correctly, therefore, as a “moral duty,” as well as a distinctively human expression of a metaphysical necessity.”\textsuperscript{541}

Han-full anger that originates from unhealthy self-love does not automatically signify fundamental wrong, but it must be transformed to anger that is derived from a genuine care of the self and is expressed as a self-referential action in a full sense. This requires that the han-filled person recognize and repent of her disordered state of self-love and its consequent habit of anger. Through that knowledge, she must commit herself as a moral agent to expressing her anger more self-consciously in the direction of appropriate self-love. Thus, her anger, through repetitive virtuous practice, can be transformed into its mature form and finally, into virtuous anger.

3.4.2.2 Shame

When pondering the disordered self-love revealed in han-full anger, we reach the problem of shame that is found commonly in the han-filled agent. “Self-affirmation” is an important element in the relationship between han-full anger and self-love (and the unity of the self). As we have seen, intense forms of shame and envy reflect the state in which the han-filled cannot accept their weakness and incompleteness. This prevents them from being honest about their emotions and accepting how they feel. When this tendency is severe, the ability to access their emotions (as revealed in an expressionless face) is lost completely and their emotional development is stunted. Even

\textsuperscript{541} Jean Porter, Nature as Reason, 205.

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when less severe, their emotions are formed and expressed incompletely, as in the case of han-full anger.

Right self-love that involves anger requires one to accept one’s anger as natural and to listen to one’s inner voice to discern how one feels and what one wants to convey through anger. This enables the agent to have the courage to express anger outwardly in a way that elicits a proper response from the offender. As we have seen, it is very difficult for the han-filled agent to exhibit anger in that way, particularly because it involves deeply rooted shame. The feeling of shame can be viewed as a developmental deficit, in the sense that the failure of the parental empathic relationship results in a hypersensitive form of shame, as we have noted in the case of HB. Still, we might also consider it from a social perspective, namely, the social formation of shame, as in the narcissistic culture of Korean society.

Narcissism inevitably entails the problem of shame, because “shame is an affective response to a perception of the self as flawed” (“guilt reflects a hurtful thought or action.”). In a shame culture, “[p]ublic esteem for the individual, or the lack of it, depends on that individual’s success or failure judged on the basis of some code which embodies that society’s values.” A person can have both public reputation and self-esteem separately, but, in a shame culture, public respect overrides self-respect, and tends to become the sole value. Thus, “if a man has lost his reputation then he has lost

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his value in the eyes of all the members of the group, and this includes himself.” Shame arises when he judges himself as inferior to what he believed, assumed, or hoped to be.\textsuperscript{545} This reveals that shame presupposes an observer’s point of view, and inculcates a certain standard by which he thinks of himself, a standard that is constructed socially.

Shame needs particular attention in our discussion of han-full anger, because it “involves discomfort in facing others because of one’s own vulnerability,”\textsuperscript{546} and thereby can lead to the suppression of anger. Park claimed that the anger rooted in han takes a form of “shame anger” on the part of the offended.\textsuperscript{547} He held that this type of anger is elicited because of frustration and helplessness at the failure to defend one’s own boundary, and its aggressive expression thus results from the feeling of shame attached to the anger.\textsuperscript{548} Shame causes anger to arise in the slighted as a natural response to an unjust slight, but it is often repressed and develops into prolonged anger, as in HB. This type of shame (humiliating shame) that originates from one’s own vulnerability generates “the sense of worthlessness, defectiveness, dishonor and

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\textsuperscript{545} Taylor, \textit{Ibid.}, 55.
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\textsuperscript{546} According to Park, there are several types of shame, including discretion shame, humiliating shame, the shame of failure, the shame of disgrace, and collective shame. While the forms of shame that involve humiliation and failure are those that the offended experience, and that we are dealing with here, the shame of disgrace belongs to that of the offender. Discretion shame is, on the other hand, a healthy form that everyone should experience; there is also a collective form of shame shared by a group of people. A.S. Park, \textit{From Hurt to Healing}, 37-44.
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\textsuperscript{547} \textit{Ibid.}, 35. Park distinguished shame from guilt, along with Smedes, in that, while shame arises when one’s self boundary is attacked, guilt is elicited “when trespassing others’ boundaries” on the side of the offender. He cited Lewis B. Smedes, \textit{Shame and Grace: Healing the Shame We Don’t Deserve} (San Francisco: Harper San Francisco, 1993), 9-10.
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\textsuperscript{548} \textit{Ibid.}, 52.
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repugnance,” and therefore drives the slighted to withdraw into herself, giving up her will and power to express how she feels towards the slighter.

Shame, as a problem of narcissism, is related fundamentally to disordered self-love, and the inability to accept one’s weakness and vulnerability. With a healthy self-love, one affirms one’s finitude and weakness, accepts anger as natural, and tries to express it outwardly, although it will still be expressed incompletely; it may be manifested in a disordered way, and, in the worst case, ruin our relationships with others. Yet one with proper self-love, as Vacek stated, affirms not only “good tendencies, both actual and ideal,” but also “whatever leads to the rectification of our evil tendencies or disordered affections.” Thus, based on appropriate self-love, anger can be exercised, rather than repressed.

The problem of shame that involves anger—feeling shame about expressing one’s anger and fearing how one’s anger will be seen by others—needs to be reflected in a theology of self-love, in which the doctrine of original sin and the belief in a good creation can be reconciled and harmonized. For the practice of han-full anger, this implies that the original sin, in the form of one’s disordered inclinations and vulnerability, is connected to the disordered and incomplete state of anger. However, the original sinful state should be understood in the broad vision of God’s Creation. That is, anger was created in God’s good will and power, and baptized to be oriented towards

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Ibid..

the telos of the human being, and, although temporarily seeming disordered, it is being improved and transformed gradually, through practice and God’s on-going creation, into good anger.

3.4.3 Han-full Anger and Justice

Another point to note in contextualized han-full anger is its relation to justice. Aquinas held that human anger is bound to justice, and can be evoked even when the precedent passions are absent, simply by an act of will. In this case, the anger is seen as oriented directly to the interest of others.\textsuperscript{551} This formulation of anger for justice apparently denotes anger on the individual level, and yet, here, we wish to explore the relationship between han-full anger, particularly in its collective form, and justice from a Thomistic perspective. Aquinas did not deal with this form of collective anger, perhaps because he did not consider the anger of the masses seeking justice against the ruling class desirable. As noted, in his affirmation of the basic goodness of social conditions, the rebellious social rage of people may well have seemed uncontrollable and dangerous, rather than a constructive force benefiting society. Yet, the overall anthropological and ethical insights presented in his account of anger offer a starting point on which to base our discussion of the relationship between han-full anger and justice, and lead us not only to see the limitations of han-full anger, but also to find its meaning and significance.

\textsuperscript{551} ST. I-II. 47, 1.
3.4.3.1 Anger for Justice

With regard to Aquinas’ view on anger for justice, we first need to consider the form of anger that arises simply for the sake of others.\(^{552}\) This other-directed anger is understood not as separate from, but as connected deeply to self-love in Aquinas’ framework. As we have noted earlier, love for self is not incompatible with love for others, and likewise, the anger flowing from a healthy self-love can be expressed in a genuine concern and love for others. Vacek’s description of self-love as “\textit{eros},”\(^{553}\) offers a theoretical ground for this case. Unlike agapic self-love, which takes the self as its immediate object, self-love as a form of \textit{eros} takes something other than oneself as its object. In \textit{eros}, we truly love the beloved as the object, yet \textit{eros} is also a form of self-love, in the sense that “the object is affirmed or promoted under the condition that this

\(^{552}\) The term, “anger for justice” is proper because all human forms of anger seek vengeance, which “belongs to justice.” \textit{ST. I-II}, 46. 2. What signifies this term here is the anger of which the motive appears not to be something done against the one who is angry, as discussed in \textit{ST. I-II} 47.1.

\(^{553}\) According to Vacek, self-love in Aquinas’ view can be distinguished two ways, namely, “agapic love for the self (love oneself for one’s own sake)” and “eros (love another for one’s own sake).” Agapic self-love is “a \textit{creative} love directed to our own growth.” It is self-affirmative. We have been examining self-love mostly in this sense. In this love, one affirms and appreciates both her own good and bad tendencies (Vacek, \textit{Ibid.}, 241) and, in this self-affirmative character, agape for self can lead one to be self-righteousness, but still can be appropriate. The agapic form of love, in contrast, can diminish egoism, and can allow one to be freer to love others (243-244). On the other hand, \textit{eros} takes something other than oneself as its immediate object. Self-love as a form of \textit{eros} is different from the former in that it “proceeds by way of love for the other.” Eros is a form of self-love, but also “a real love for others.” Arising from the interests or development of the self, eros “affirms the other in view of the benefits the lover receives” (247). In \textit{eros}, the beloved, “in at least some aspect of its goodness, is genuinely affirmed. Still, the object is affirmed or promoted under the condition that this love in the short or long run redounds to the good of the self” (248).
love in the short or long run redounds to the good of the self.”\textsuperscript{554} In this form of self-love, we can love others for their sake as well as our own.\textsuperscript{555}

Aquinas believed that our love for others already presupposes self-love through the principle of “alikes like alikes.”\textsuperscript{556} That is, “[t]he root of love is the similarity of the beloved to the lover because thus the beloved is good and suitable to himself.”\textsuperscript{557} As noted previously, we are angry with those who harm others, “because those who are injured belong in some way to us: either by some kinship or by friendship, or at least because of the nature we have in common.”\textsuperscript{558} Thus, our anger for others originates from our self-love, where we can love them as our extended selves based on our likeness. Through our anger, we can be angry in defense of their goodness, which is also related to our own. Our anger for them can also benefit ourselves, in that we may receive direct appreciation and reward from them, or their future solidarity when we are in trouble. Yet, most fundamentally, through a self-referential act of anger, the goal of which is to restore justice in our relationship with others and the community, we can

\textsuperscript{554} Vacek, \textit{Ibid.,} 248.

\textsuperscript{555} According to Vacek, in authentic erotic love, one affirms the goodness of others in a genuine sense, and this is different from the love for others rooted in the pathological narcissistic state (recall the case of HB patients). In narcissism, they often love others and identify themselves with their goodness, but their love is used to bolster a sense of their own worth, and often distorts reality for their own purposes. However, in authentic eros, one can affirm the goodness of others for their sake, and confirm the direction of one’s life towards the good, and therefore can love truly others. \textit{Ibid.,} 244.

\textsuperscript{556} \textit{Ibid.,} 251.

\textsuperscript{557} \textit{ST.} II-II 25.4; \textit{Sententiarum,} 3.27, cited in Vacek, \textit{Ibid.,} 245.

\textsuperscript{558} \textit{ST.} I-I, 47. 1, \textit{ad.} 2.
appreciate and reaffirm our own goodness, uphold humanity, and thereby continue our pursuit of perfection.

One thing notable with regard to anger for justice is that Aquinas suggested that this other-directed anger arises simply by the judgment of justice, and does not require preexisting passions.559 We see its archetype in his description of the anger of Christ or God. In the case of anger in God, no human act can actually harm God, but can be against God, either by despising His commandments or by harming oneself or another as “an object of God’s providence and protection.”560 The type of anger resulting from this case belongs to the judgment of justice, rather than to a passion.561 In the case of the zealous anger of Jesus Christ, on the other hand, the anger for justice does not exclude its arousal by sorrow. As a human Himself, Christ felt sorrow, so His anger was aroused by sorrow, and yet this sorrow was generated by His “zeal for the house of God,” so the anger sought revenge according to justice, not in any sinful way.562 This type of anger is attributed to reason, in that anger “follows reason, and is, as it were, its instrument, and then the operation, which pertains to justice.”563 Aquinas, following Gregory, viewed this type of zealous anger as possible in humans, while recognizing

559 Porter reminds us that justice is a virtue of the will, unlike temperance and fortitude, which are passions. Justice as a commitment of the will can thus “give rise to passions under the right circumstances,” but “cannot be identified with any of these passions, nor does it require any particular set of feelings in order to be exercised.” Porter, Nature as Reason, 204.

560 ST. I-II. 47.2. ad. 1.

561 Ibid.

562 ST. III. 15.9. Aquinas quoted Augustine (Jo. ii. 17).

another form of human anger, probably common in us, which cannot be seen as exactly working for the justice of God.\textsuperscript{564}

Anger that arises from the judgment of justice involves two important questions about the nature of anger and its possibilities. First, is it truly a passion? We ask this question because of Aquinas’ explicit separation of the anger based on reason’s judgment from that involving another passion and bodily change. As we see two types of anger operating differently here, the distinction is drawn based on its different origin. Reason-based anger is elicited by the reason’s judgment, and thereafter, can be followed by “being moved” on a sensory and bodily dimension. If it begins and also ends in judgment, it does not have to be a passion, but remains simply “a judgment.” As noted, another form of anger arises from sensory appetitive movement, begins by hindering reason, and therefore does not operate perfectly for God’s justice.

Second, is such anger possible for humans? Miner’s argument on this issue is interesting.\textsuperscript{565} He stated that, “[a] virtuous person may frequently choose to use her imagination to arouse the sensitive appetite, so that it ‘adds to the goodness of action’ (24.3 ad IM). The point is not limited to the virtuous.” As we see in the case of a good actor, Miner noted, at least some individuals “may become accomplished at producing certain passions at will” by methods of active imagining or visualization, although they

\textsuperscript{564} \textit{Ibid.}

\textsuperscript{565} Miner, \textit{Thomas Aquinas on the Passions}, 102. Miner cited Murphy’s idea of “the conscious project of forming a certain passion” in Murphy, “Aquinas on our responsibility for our emotions,” 185.
are not able to produce all passions at will.\textsuperscript{566} We can consider here two ways of eliciting the reason-dependent, consequent anger Aquinas has suggested: by way of “redundance (overflow)” and “choice.”\textsuperscript{567} Thus, anger can be evoked intentionally by the rational appetite’s willing anger and also by the reason’s choice.

3.4.3.2 Han-full Anger for Justice

How can han-full anger for justice be viewed from a Thomistic perspective? It is evoked spontaneously in the face of injustice and is quick to action (if not suppressed), even in a self-sacrificial way. This form of anger is therefore helpful for the restoration of justice, but it is difficult to regard it as one that flows from genuine self-love. Instead, because it is rooted in narcissistic rage, it can explode outwardly at any time at anger-provoking situations and often has self-destructive outcomes. It can arise and be expressed for others, but is likely to be triggered by the ulterior motivation of self-avoidance, rather than out of proper self-love, which generates a genuine concern and love for others.

Self-love in eros moves from the self to others, enjoying the union, and yet moves back to oneself or towards another object freely. Its essential nature is freedom and creativity that produces “uncharted relationships in order to discover new

\textsuperscript{566} Miner, \textit{Ibid.}, 102-3.

\textsuperscript{567} \textit{ST.} I-II. 34.3.
possibilities of the self." For Aquinas, *eros* is “not merely emptiness; it may also be a fullness that wants to be with others.” In its dynamic energy, *eros* seeks the sensation of being enjoyed and enriched in the company of others, thereby bringing about the development of one’s self. In contrast, in the case of HB, its desire for union with others is characterized as an incessant and insatiable thirst, often motivated by the deeper longing to avoid or forget oneself, and tends to attach to objects that are only temporary goods.

Already frustrated and disposed to sorrow, *han*-filled agents suffer from their own vulnerability and emptiness and seek external help. Yet, due to their insufficient inner powers and will, their acts are often performed carelessly, and do not necessarily promote their well-being. Their union with others may only enhance their narcissistic selves, and thus not increase their ultimate happiness. Therefore, *han*-full anger for justice that is expressed in this way cannot be viewed as motivated by a commitment to justice. Instead, it is likely to be triggered by the suffering of others, but originates in the intense desire to forget one’s own suffering by immersing oneself in another’s unhappy situation.  

568  Vacek, *ibid.*, 252.

569  Unlike Plato or Nygren, who focused more on the aspect of need or emptiness of *eros*, Aquinas emphasized its energy or dynamic aspects, that is, the ability of a being to maintain, restore, and increase its own self by relating to others. *Eros* is not merely emptiness; it may also be a fullness that wants to be with others. *Ibid.*, 251.

However, this does not necessarily eliminate the possibility that *han-full* anger can be transformed into energy for justice for others and for society. The other-directed expression of *han-full* anger might not function for others’ sake in a full sense, but can still work for it. We confirmed this role of *han-full* anger in its collective form in the second chapter. Communal *han-full* anger is not qualitatively different from its individual form, so cannot be regarded as anger for justice in a genuine sense. Yet, as we have seen from the example of the collective *han-full* anger of *minjung*, there are three noteworthy points in terms of the role and effect of collective *han-full* anger—more correctly, of the collective actions of the individual agents with *han-full* anger—for the actualization of justice in the society.

First, *han-full* anger, particularly by its impetuous character, forces the agent to become involved actively in the anger-provoking situation. In violent and oppressive situations, such as under military dictatorships in South Korea, without the effect of the *han-full* form of social rage, such a large group of people might not have resisted the powerful and oppressive government. *Minjung* theologians also confessed that, having witnessed the suffering *han* of the workers and the self-immolation of Jeon Tae-il, they were enraged, became fighters, and so changed their theological methodology from theory-oriented to praxis-oriented. It was a developmental age, during which all the values of the society were subsumed by the ideology and propaganda of developmentalism, and therefore, for the majority of the public, the workers’ suffering and sacrifice might have been seen as necessary, which was unjust, but could only be accepted for the sake of the interests of the nation. We might say here that, in such an
emergent situation, where reason was misled or paralyzed by a dominant narrative, uncontrollable *han*-full anger functioned as a moral emotion sensitive to justice rather than reason.

Second, in collective *han*-full anger, we find a more self-transcendent dimension than in its individual form. In the transition from its individual form to collective social rage, the *han*-full anger of individuals seems to undergo some process of rationalization, at least to some degree. As we have seen in the case of the workers’ political movement in the 1970s, with the help of *minjung* scholars and activists, personal *han* and *han*-full anger were recognized and justified, turned outward, and transformed into collective anger for social justice. We might apply the analogy of the relationship between the rational guidance of reason over the passion here. Just as reason guides and controls anger in order to be expressed appropriately and effectively, so *minjung* scholars and activists guided and controlled the *minjung* political resistance movements. They recognized and emphasized the suffering of the *minjung*, interpreted and theologized their *han* and *han*-full anger for use for social justice, and strived to direct the struggle to be manifested in more than merely a violent and self-destructive way.

Lastly, in such a harsh context, *han*-full anger and its accompanying resistance to power often take the form of “martyrdom.” Without sufficient hope for change in society, *han*-full anger—especially in its collective form—arises spontaneously as a reaction to evil and often exacts too great a cost. We find, as noted above, that such self-sacrificial acts by those with *han*-full experiences, including HB patients, are driven by the urge for self-avoidance or forgetfulness. Still, there seems to be something we
cannot reduce completely to its pathological origin and thereby regard as wrong, something that is very Christian and that *han* scholars have found valuable and worthy of being upheld—“the sensitivity to the suffering of others.”

3.4.5.3 *Han*-full Anger and Suffering

It is not rare for *han*-full anger to be evoked by another’s suffering, which forces the agent to become engaged in the unjust situation. This is often regarded as inattentive and reckless, because the *han*-filled agent has a tendency to become involved in others’ lives without deliberation, while neglecting or even jeopardizing her own life. Nonetheless, this tendency towards self-hate might be converted to an “ability,” the ability to perceive others’ suffering, which thus elicits compassion.

According to German theologian, Dorothee Soelle, those who work to improve social conditions are not usually those who are “free from suffering,” but those who “themselves are suffering.”571 Those who are free from suffering in this sense denotes those who are incapable of suffering, who cannot feel the pain in others as well as in themselves, and thus have no empathy. Only those who were or are suffering can perceive the suffering of others. Soelle stated that this is particularly true when considering the insensitivity to others’ suffering that is seen commonly today.572 Yet, as


572 Soelle mentioned her own experience, in which she has found it difficult to collect money in a church for the people in North Vietnam (*Suffering*, 4). Soelle identified *apathy* (*apatheia*) as the source of people’s indifference to the abolition of unjust social conditions today. According to her, the widespread state of *apathy* (literally meaning “nonsuffering, freedom from suffering, a creature’s inability to suffer”)

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we anticipate, experiencing suffering itself does not lead one naturally to become a change-agent for social justice. Those who “are so thoroughly destroyed through continual suffering” are not suited for social action, because they are likely to “respond only in helpless or aggressive attempts to flee.”\textsuperscript{573} Those who suffering, yet can function as change-agents, are those who have different attitudes towards their suffering.

They are those who have wrestled with the question of suffering through their own suffering, not only in the way our society has taught them (i.e., “through illusion, minimization, suppression, apathy”),\textsuperscript{574} but also by seeking its deeper meaning for life. They are those who do not merely suffer passively, but seek meaning actively and learn from their suffering, and therefore are serious about the question of social change.

Those who have wrestled with their personal suffering can deal with societal suffering in the same way. Only in that way can they function as change-agents in society, not by treating people who are suffering as mere statistics, but by making contact with their suffering. In that way, suffering can become strength and contribute to the abolition of

\textsuperscript{573} Ibid., 2.

\textsuperscript{574} Ibid., 4.
conditions “under which people are exposed to senseless, patently unnecessary suffering, such as hunger, oppression, or torture.”

From this view, we might confirm that han-full anger can work meaningfully for social justice in that, with its potential ability to feel empathy, it can be used for the transformation of society. As we know, the han-filled are those who have suffered for long periods, sometimes for their entire lives. Of course, as noted above, having han-full experiences and painful memories does not necessarily lead to compassion for others, but, if it does, their reflective and therefore healed memories will do. As Soelle discussed, a personal han-full experience can be contemplated in a traditional way, and its meaning sought in broader perspective. When articulated, reflected upon, and incorporated meaningfully into one’s meaning-making system, the painful memory can be healed; the agent can overcome the suffering and become a healer, ready to serve others and the world.

As we have seen in the transformation of individual han-full anger into its collective actions, the personal anger undergoes a process of rationalization. The pain and agony are confronted at the source of the anger, are interpreted and analyzed with the aid of collective intellectual powers and effort, until its deeply-rooted social cause is revealed. This process leads the han-filled individual further to discover deeper meaning in his suffering and at last to accept it as his own. Only after undergoing this process can their suffering and anger, and their consequent actions, work properly and fruitfully for

\[575\] Ibid., 3.
the restoration of justice. We recognized earlier that han-full anger can be used to improve social conditions through its impetuous and intense character. Yet, han-full anger that has undergone the whole process of healing can be used more correctly and powerfully for the establishment of justice in the society, correctly in the sense that it can work without joining further in producing suffering (recall the masochistic tendency of the han-filled agent) and more powerfully, in the sense that it can elicit a more empathetic response and support from people and the society.

3.5 Conclusions
In this chapter, we investigated how han-full anger is assessed morally in Aquinas’ view, and explored the prolonged form of han-full anger, particularly by examining its precedent passions, sorrow, and despair. Seen in a Thomistic perspective, han-full anger itself is regarded as morally undesirable. It is formed primarily by sense cognition, which focuses on the injury to the self, rather than by reason’s judgment, and thus is expressed outwardly in an inordinate and incomplete way. Its cause, object, and mode are altogether improper and thus, it does not meet the standards of Aquinas’ notions of good anger.

When it comes to its prolonged state as a disposition of one’s character (which is not treated in Aquinas' notion of anger), the situation becomes complicated. It leads us to consider anger in light of its subject, and thereby involves the morality of the agent as a whole, and anger in the context of the agent. Thus, we examined its embodied state
within the subject as a soul-body composite and also in the social body entrenched in
the culture of *han*. Considering the morality of *han*-full anger in conjunction with its
agent provides room for it to be evaluated as morally good. For, as in Murphy’s
interpretation, although the anger is judged in the abstract as not morally good,
depending on the agent’s will and effort to make it right, it can come to be regarded as
good.

It is of course not yet as optimistic in the case of *han*-full anger as a disposition
or character trait. Because it is an embodied state already assimilated into the character,
it will be very difficult, even for the agent, to realize the necessity to change the
disordered pattern of anger, and even more difficult actually to improve the habit of
anger. Moreover, we have seen how hard it is for the *han*-filled agent to maintain
courage and the hope of improving his habits of anger in the South Korean cultural
matrix. In the current state of Korean society and community, which continues to
generate *han*-full experiences and at the same time, fosters an atmosphere unfavorable
for individuals’ natural expression of passion, people are hurt constantly, their agency is
damaged continuously, and their emotional lives become disordered. Lacking a vision of
who they are and how they should experience emotions, their suffering, as well as their
damaged self-image and feelings of shame deepen and they are led astray, not knowing
where to go; thus, their *han*-full anger becomes intense and they express it destructively.
In such a context, we cannot expect the will and effort of the agent to change her
emotional habits. Change occurs only when the agent retains the hope of changing
others’ opinions of her. This means again that improving one’s pattern of anger by
individual effort needs to be accompanied by change within society.

Nonetheless, apart from judgments about the morality of *han*-full anger, we can
still articulate its role and function, although incomplete, for the sake of the agent. *Han-
full anger* is a self-expressive act motivated by an urgent need to defend the self and can
therefore, however incompletely or inordinately it is manifested, be regarded as
meaningful. Compared to the case of the absence of anger, it functions to convey what
the offended wants from the offender. It pursues a good that contributes to the well-
being of the agent, although it is partial and temporary. Moreover, it can be said that, in
its collective form, *han*-full anger has influenced the course of political history in South
Korea. It has exploded as the power of the people when the weak were suffering from
violence and exploitation by the powerful. Its impetuous character has led people to
fight for justice before their rational minds became paralyzed by the emergent
situations. Moreover, as noted, this again echoes Aquinas’ point about why human
anger should be guided and controlled by the rational powers. On the individual level, in
order to convey its embedded meanings to the slighter satisfactorily, the expression of
anger needs to be conducted properly, following reason’s command. On the collective
level, as shown in the case of the workers’ political movement in the 1970s, the rage of
the masses also required them to undergo a process of rationalization under the
guidance of their leaders. In that way, *han*-full anger showed its inner harmony, in part,
and together contributed to the good of the agents. It also revealed that efforts to seek
good can be achieved more effectively by the rational powers in their individual or
collective form. What remains then is to show how *han*-full anger can be transformed into a mature form of anger that is responsive to and controlled by reason and thus able to contribute to social justice. Speaking in terms of the agent, how can the *han*-filled be encouraged to make an effort to change their habits of anger? In the next chapter, we will see how Aquinas’ virtue ethics, in conversation with *han* studies, provides some insight and wisdom regarding the way to work with *han*-full anger.
CHAPTER 4:

PRACTICING HAN-FULL ANGER

Based on what we have learned so far, we are now in the position to consider how to work with han-full anger. We intend to find a way to work through han-full anger in light of Aquinas’ virtue ethics, and yet do not intend to confine our search exclusively within Aquinas’ framework. We draw naturally on the knowledge and experience we found in the studies of han discourse and Kohut’s self-psychology. Overall, we want to anchor our way of working with han-full anger in Aquinas’ principle, “choosing to feel and act on anger,” expecting that some modifications will need to be made to accommodate the practice of anger by the han-filled.

4.1 Working Through Han-full Anger

Working through han-full anger leads us to attend first to the workability of han-full anger. As we have seen, having been embodied for a long time, this anger is not easily malleable by or amenable to a higher power. The han-full state that remains uncured since childhood has already become part of the self and the anger pattern embodied in that state is difficult to change. Among the cases of the han-filled, there will be many serious ones that require professional help and treatment. If one’s rational
ability is too frail and disordered to communicate with others, the case will be beyond the scope of this project. If it is not too severe, then it is not necessarily the case that the han-filled cannot or will not be able change their lives or that the disordered pattern of han-full anger can never be transformed.

It is clear that the embodied state of anger is limited in its response to rational information and guidance. Yet, except in serious cases, the body can still be regarded as malleable by a modified vision of reason, however effective. For, as the habit of anger becomes assimilated in one’s character through repetitive practice, the ongoing practice of good anger could have an influence on the pattern of anger, however small. Again, this presupposes two conditions: the agent will and does practice to change the habit of anger, and the state of anger is responsive to the reason and will of the agent, at least to some degree. It should be noted that we have already excluded the extreme cases where there is insufficient rational ability.

The case of han-full anger we presuppose here is one in which the agent has sufficient rational ability, even if it does not always function properly, to reflect on her own habit of anger to some degree and maintains, a sufficient ability to will herself to improve her habit of anger and thereby to continue her practice of good anger, despite obstacles and frustration.

4.2 Practicing Anger: Choosing to Feel and Act on Anger

The principle of practicing anger that may be deduced from Aquinas’ framework can be summarized as a maxim, “to choose to feel and act on anger, whenever unjust slight occurs against oneself or another.” In Aquinas’ view, it is natural for human anger to be evoked by an unjust slight, and to be expressed outwardly and properly under rational guidance. Moreover, in the case of a virtuous person, anger arises only at the right situation by virtue of her will. However, this simple maxim is never simple in its performance. When applied to the case of han-full anger, it becomes much more difficult and complicated. As it arises primarily from the inner feeling of injury to the self, han-filled anger is often exaggerated, and thus so misleading that it nearly nullifies reason’s intervention and guidance. Although reason presents its judgment of the slight, the embodied, habitual anger is often already in charge, distracting and frustrating the will and preventing its ordered and right performance.

Having noted its difficulty, we can begin to construct a way for the han-filled person to practice anger in a slightly modified way: (1) whenever one feels anger inwardly, try to express it outwardly in a constructive way; (2) try to feel and act only in response to the right situation and, if not, to stay calm, and (3) try to feel anger for the sake of justice, as a virtuous person would.

The first step in practicing anger is to work to express anger outwardly and properly as reason commands. Among HB patients, the most distinctive problem of anger that plagues them has been its inappropriate (as in the “masculine” form of HB) or incomplete (as in its “feminine” form) expression. For those who have repressed their
anger habitually, simply expressing it can be a challenge. However, if they do not try to express it outwardly, they do not have the opportunity to realize what is taking place in their anger. To open up and show others what they need them to hear through their anger is a challenge, but when anger is expressed, it can have a cathartic effect. This catharsis can function as an initial step for the practice of anger for the han-filled who have repressed it.

In the practice of anger, the agent has a chance to deliberate on how to express her anger, considering that it can be expressed in either a constructive or a destructive way. For Aquinas, to perform anger in a just way is to follow the reason's judgment, which is attuned to the telos. Thus, the expression of anger must be reflected in a broader vision of the agent's happiness, and therefore her relational, social, physical, and emotional well-being. In that sense, remaining calm in the face of the slighter after the deliberate consideration of various aspects, including its expected unfavorable consequences, should not be excluded from the list of what-to-do to practice anger. Staying still in anger, however, is not simply swallowing one's anger without thought, i.e., suppressing it. It must be accompanied by other “non-destructive” methods to digest it, and not just remain a source for forming a bad pattern of anger. However, we should acknowledge that this may be a more laborious process than simply expressing anger towards the offender, because experiencing anger only inwardly is painful, and even when it is subdued successfully, sorrow remains to be borne.

In the second step, one should strive to feel anger only in the right situation, at unjust slights against our merits and, further, for another’s sake. For the han-ridden
agents whose emotions are in a disordered or even distorted state, willing to be angered at the right situation is a very difficult mission. \textit{Han}-full anger is usually not based on the objective estimation of slight. Their precedent emotions (prolonged sorrow over the injury of self and the lack of hope about others’ responses) prevent reason’s full participation in the formation of anger, and results in undesirable consequences. One can feel intense anger over minor events, or be unable to feel anger when it should be aroused. On the other hand, one can experience anger spontaneously at another’s affliction caused by injustice. For, as noted, their own suffering memories are ready to respond to others’ pain. Although often motivated by embedded self-hate, and manifested in overreaction, their feeling of anger for another’s sake can be appreciated, in the sense that, if accompanied by following the proper guidance of reason, it can lead to right action for social justice and to active involvement in work for social transformation. Still, as indicated in the previous section, \textit{han}-full anger evoked by another’s suffering cannot work properly if not based on right self-love. The anger of the \textit{han}-filled that arises from healthy self-love can be described as the anger of the healed healer; this will be considered later.

Third, for Aquinas, practicing anger is practicing \textit{virtue}. Practicing anger as a virtuous person would not only allows attainment of the goal of anger, but also leads to healing and further perfection of one’s powers. By trying to express subjective anger outwardly, overcoming subjective and objective obstacles, the agent practices the moral virtue of \textit{fortitude}; by trying to express it in an appropriate way, she practices the virtue of \textit{temperance}. Courage or fortitude strengthens her in resisting and overcoming
obstacles to attaining the aim of anger,\textsuperscript{577} and in its expression, temperance enables her to control its expression in order to follow reason’s counsel and judgment. These moral virtues as related to passion, of course, cannot function without the operation of prudence and justice. Prudence as a virtue of intellect enables her to choose to feel anger at injustice and another’s suffering, reason about what is to be done in expressing anger,\textsuperscript{578} and how it is to be done, and, via justice, will to pursue the restoration of right relationship with the offender. From a Thomistic perspective, by expressing anger in this way, she performs virtue and attains habitus over time; thereby, in the end, her powers can be perfected.\textsuperscript{579}

For the han-filled agent who is not disposed desirably with respect to her reason and passions, performing anger as a virtuous person is quite difficult. As we have seen, han-ridden agents have a tendency to attach to the ideal given from outside, and when they fail to sustain identification with it, are likely to lose hope and become frustrated greatly. The danger in practicing anger with a moral vision is that they might attach to and take up the vision of the morally ideal anger and hence, suppress “natural” expressions of their real anger; alternatively, they might be subsumed by their present state of anger and become so discouraged or frustrated by their embodied habits that they give up trying to improve them. In order to avoid that and to continue to practice

\textsuperscript{577} ST I-II, 61.2.

\textsuperscript{578} ST I-II, 58.5.

\textsuperscript{579} For a detailed articulation of the relationship among the practice of virtues, one’s well-being, and happiness; see Porter, \textit{Nature as Reason}, Chapter three.

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virtuous anger with patience, their practice must be an in-and-out dialectical reflection between the normative, virtuous anger and their real anger, which refers to what they want to be and what they are, respectively. They must be guided by the virtuous form of anger, but also maintain the ability to reflect on it. This means then, that they continue to follow the moral vision of virtuous anger, and at the same time, have a realistic goal for their practice of anger. While envisioning the ultimate goal their habit of anger should pursue, they need to accept their limitations and adopt an intermediate telos for their practice of anger. Setting up a temporary goal for their practice can only be achieved by self-reflection on their own anger and further, on themselves.

4.3 Reflecting Anger and Self

Expressing anger in light of a moral ideal involves a process in which one contemplates the self and one’s pattern of anger. This process should be performed based on self-love, by accepting one’s own anger as it is, and thereby having the potential to contribute to the wholeness of self. Thus, practicing virtuous anger together with self-reflection involves analyzing one’s anger and one’s self, with the goal to deconstruct gradually, and relinquish one’s false self-image, which is distorted by residual han or han-full memories. Ultimately, this motivates the han-filled to forgive and embrace the weakest part of themselves—the part enmeshed with sorrow, anger, and despair—and therefore to weaken or erase the source of the formation of han-full
anger. In this process, there is a risk that they may find themselves in greater despair due to their limitations, but there remains the promise of attaining a healthy self-love.

Self-reflection begins with considering one’s anger, pondering present anger, and understanding one’s behavioral patterns. This is designed to loosen the underlying construal process in the formation of anger, and modify it in order to change the habit of anger. Following Aquinas’ analysis of anger, one can begin by questioning the cause and object of anger to illuminate the cognitive construction of the anger. However, the cause of anger is not always easy to identify. People become angry about trivial things, and often do not know the source of their anger. The anger itself, however, is not trivial; there is always some value in it. The first step in self-reflection is to consider one’s own anger seriously, however trivial it appears, and to prepare oneself to examine and understand what actually constitutes the anger. The examination of *han*-full anger then requires a laborious process of deconstructing the self because, in its prolonged form, the cause of anger is connected deeply to the core of one’s self-image. The analysis of the structure of the self may require professional intervention—pastoral, as well as medical—to help one explore one’s hidden and fragmented self.

In the case of the *han*-filled, understanding their own self-image is particularly essential in the analysis of the anger, as their judgment of slight relies on it—more specifically, on the injury to the self. Through repetitive and deep reflection on why they become furious, where causal relations are not so obvious, they may realize what their anger reveals about themselves and identify what they want to say and show to others through their anger. On deep reflection, they might recognize themselves as suffering
from the fundamental feeling of “being slighted by the world” and realize the relationship between their anger and that feeling. The feeling of radical slight is formed from their early han-full experience (“original han”) and reinforced by the secondary han-full memories. The han-filled have been disposed to such a feeling since childhood and their self-image has been influenced and distorted by it. Their narcissistic attachment to the feeling of self-loss and its consequent developmental deficit (i.e., inflated negative emotions, such as fear, shame, despair, and envy) impair their agency and render it more vulnerable to outside stimuli. They are sensitive to and often become furious at any remark or action that reminds them of their vulnerable side, and thus are easily overwhelmed by their own anger.

One obvious problem in this case is that it is difficult for them to continue the process of self-reflection due to their reluctance to face who they are. The han-filled are less likely to be inclined to engage in self-reflection or to examine themselves and the nature of their anger. Their feeling of radical slight and its compensatory desire to maintain an artificial self-image—one that makes them feel secure and valued—prevents them from recognizing and accepting their reality—anything that touches their han-full memories, obvious or not, can be taken as an attack on their sense of self and their narcissistic world. Thus, they are sensitive to others’ remarks about them, typically are wary of the treatment they will receive from others, and strive to ignore why others perceive them in the way they do. This self-protective effort—simultaneously caring too much about their inner state and lacking communication with others—displays their disordered state of self-love. In that sense, their attempts at self-reflection are an initial
step towards right self-love, and self-love is, in Porter’s interpretation, justly regarded as a moral duty. It presumes a resolution and even a conversion experience, particularly for those with narcissistic tendencies, like the han-filled. Self-reflection requires a resolute will and action to see themselves and their anger from a different perspective, and changing their attitudes is the goal of practicing anger.

This leads us to see again how potent the effect of han or han-full memories on their ability to practice anger is. This also allows us to note how important the empathetic community is in sustaining and supporting their practice of anger. In the following section, we will consider this in light of three traditional concepts relevant to the healing of han in the han discourse.

4.4 Healing Han and the Empathetic Community: Han-pu-ri, Dan, and Jeong

Because han generates a continuous feeling of fundamental slight, its compensatory narcissistic desire hinders self-reflection. Unless this problem is addressed, han-filled agents find themselves returning continually to the source whenever they encounter an anger-provoking situation; hurt again, they lose control of their anger. The han-filled, disposed to sorrow and despair, are then likely to give up their efforts to improve their habit of anger because, for them, it seems futile to try to express good anger while they are in the potent grip of their persistent han-full memories. How, then, does one eliminate han? How do agents work with han-full
memories that are often traumatic? The issue of memory is too complex to treat properly in this limited section. Nonetheless, if we confine the scope to our main concern, i.e., “practicing anger” in the context of discussions within han studies, there are some useful insights to consider further.

4.4.1 Han-pu-ri and Dan

When we consider the topic of healing han in the context of han studies, three key words, han-pu-ri, dan, and jeong emerge. The “han-pu-ri” (pu-ri means to unfold or to release) refers to some action that frees the entangled han from the soul. It originates from a traditional shamanistic ritual, goot, which is performed to exorcise evil powers. Han-pu-ri is also believed to be achieved through artistic activities, i.e., Korean folk songs (pansori), mask dances(tal-choom), folk painting, and so on. Its principle is less articulated and not clearly understood, but we can imagine that its action is related somehow to catharsis. In the case of artistic performance, the han-filled become immersed in it, and experience a moment of relaxation that allows them distance from their reality. During or after the performance, they feel relaxed, and their pain and emotions are soothed, as if the problem has been solved and disappeared. We might think of this as an experience of “transcending” their hardship and suffering; they feel

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580 As noted in the previous chapter, han has been identified as negative emotions that generate pain, and also as the underlying entity that causes the pain. Among its several definitions, the one most relevant to this section will be han as “a lump of hurtful memories.”

their entangled emotions release, and thereby, become filled with new power to face their lives.

In the case of the shamanistic ritual, goot, han-pu-ri reveals an even more interesting aspect relevant to dealing with han. Goot is usually sought by those who are distressed for various reasons, such as their own illness or the death of their beloved. The most interesting part of the ritual is when the shaman narrates han-full stories of those in suffering or the dead and offers an interpretation of why they are suffering and shows how to repel the evil power that is causing their pain. When the audience that participates in the ritual hears their tragic stories, the han-filled are moved deeply and often cry; after the ritual, they feel comforted, and believe they have been liberated from the evil power.

Dan, which means literally, “cutting-off,” refers to a radical release from han and its negative effects. Rather than indicating particular acts, dan may be understood to signify a principle that underlies the unyielding individual or social will, and action taken to cut han from one’s soul or to end its vicious cycle as entrenched in society.582 A proponent of dan, Ji Ha Kim held that it is the radical separation from personal han through “self-denial or self-sacrifice.”583 This can be interpreted to mean that, because

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582 J.H. Lee, The Exploration of the Inner Wounds—Han, 154.

583 This personal dan as self-denial is depicted in a symbolic manner by renowned Korean thinker, Ji Ha Kim: “I separate my body and mind from every comfort and easy life, circles of petit bourgeois dreams, and secular swamps without depth. This is the total content of my faith—I know that only vigorous self-denial is my way. Let us leave as a wayfarer, leaving everything behind...The delusion is finished, ‘Ah, a sad and painful act of a spider which goes up in a single line in the air...’” This is quoted by Nam Dong Suh, “Theology of Han,” 64, cited in J.Y. Lee, “Minjung theology: A critical introduction,” 10.
ending one’s attachment to han or han-full memories is extremely difficult, dan can be accomplished through self-sacrificing acts, such as forsaking one part of the self. Only by radical self-denial can the han-filled be freed from the effects of personal han or han-full memories. When it is manifested on a collective level, dan is expressed as a radical event, such as a revolution—in order to end the vicious circle of han that permeates the structures of society. The collective han persists for generations, through a circle of endless revenge and destruction that affects individual and social lives. Only through the revolutionary form of dan can the collective han be ended.\(^{584}\)

The han-pu-ri way of healing han, if it is expected to generate a cathartic experience, is not the permanent answer in treating han. Cathartic effects do not last long and sometimes have harmful influences on the self-constitution of the han-filled (imagine a case in which the shaman’s consolation and answer are misleading and bring only further pain). Yet, the han-pu-ri can still be regarded as meaningful to the psychological well-being of the han-filled. Its function in relaxing their bodies and assuaging their emotional pain, although temporary, can protect them from imminent danger, i.e., the disintegration of self in the midst of dealing with harsh reality. As in the

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\(^{584}\) Kim observed further that, by practicing dan, one is liberated from han, particularly from its negative “masochistic exercise,” which can become sadistic behavior. Moreover, when dan is exercised through one’s particular effort, namely, one’s “religious commitment,” and thereby through “internal and spiritual transformation,” one can become an agent of change rather than a passive victim. As an effect or result of dan practice, her revengeful impulse is purified and transformed into “a desire for God’s justice.” On the social level, dan can therefore cause the han embedded in society to disappear. Kim calls this transformation the “miraculous transition.” This insightful view is however less developed, lacking detailed explanation of what each concept means exactly. J.H. Lee, The Exploration of the Inner Wounds—Han, 154. Lee cited Ji Ha Kim, Southern Land and Its Boat Songs (Seoul: Dooreh, 1985), 50-51.
case of goot, han-pu-ri can also function to help them “rationalize” their unreasonable suffering. With an answer given by a shaman’s interpretation—whether or not it is true—they are able to understand their unreasonable suffering and thereby accept it. In this sense, rather than disregarding the han-pu-ri method, we might find it useful when it is accompanied by the dan practice.

Compared to the han-pu-ri, dan is a direct way to approach the problem of han. As noted above, the dan practice indicates the source of the problem, demanding one’s steadfast will not to succumb to the potent power of han. The dan approach tells us that the source of the problem of han is one’s attitude towards it, namely, one’s attachment to han, as well as han itself. In the discourse of dan, han is recognized as something like an exterior entity to be removed from the life of the han-filled. This means that, to make han disappear from one’s soul is to cut off one’s connection to it. To break one’s attachment to it, subjective will and effort are necessary. To let go of han or of one’s attachment to it often requires acts of self-denial. According to Lee’s psychological interpretation, the principle of dan can be described as the act of “killing the ‘beast’ in one’s self” to get rid of “every root of the negative elements...[through] the sharpened sword of consciousness.”[^585] It asks for a heightened self-reflection in order to identify the part of the self that has been distorted by the effect of han and, by employing the principle of self-denial, removes it.

[^585]: J.H. Lee, Ibid., 156
The discourse of *dan* can be appreciated in the sense that it focuses directly on the root of *han* problems and encourages individual or social practice for change. Still, it has not been articulated well and remains too underdeveloped to answer the potential questions that might arise about the nature of the power of *dan*, and prospects for a practical methodology that is capable of eliciting the transformation.\(^{586}\) Moreover, one serious problem is that the *dan* practice may not be suited for everyone. The radical act of removing *han* from the deepest part of the soul, as described, requires a strong mind. Thus, it can be a dangerous practice for the vulnerable, such as HB patients. This “masculine”\(^ {587}\) practice, performed through the principle of self-denial, may lead those who are already suffering from a fragmented sense of self to a state of self-hate, rather than healthy self-love. Furthermore, when this *dan* method is manifested as a social revolution, it may become a threat to the well-being of others and to society as a whole. Lee thus claimed that the practice of *dan* must be regarded as one important element in the dynamic process of the transformation of *han*, and that it should be balanced by the “feminine” element. At that point, the principle of *jeong* emerges.

\(^{586}\) According to Lee’s interpretation of Kim’s notion of *dan*, the practice of *dan* itself seems to generate a special power to “[organize] and [control] the direction and the limits of the explosion of *han* in the revolution so that establishment of a new social reality based on justice becomes possible.” J.H. Lee, *Ibid.*, 154.

\(^{587}\) Lee noted that the practice of *dan* operates on the “masculine” principle and signifies coolness, cruelty, sharpness, justice, and bitterness, and lacks or denies the “feminine” form of love, which is the energy of acceptance, forgiveness, kindness, and sweetness. *Ibid.*, 157.
4.4.2 Jeong

*Jeong* can be defined variously, as “the feeling of endearment,” “the warmth of human-relatedness,” “compassionate attachment,” and “an intense longing for somebody or something.”\textsuperscript{588} Although similar to the concepts of “compassion” and “love,” like other heavily freighted Korean terms, *jeong* cannot be reduced to them.

In his theory of the “transmuting internalization” process, Ka attempted to explain *jeong* according to Kohut’s concept, “empathy,” which is achieved through the empathic self-selfobject relationship.\textsuperscript{589} According to Kohut, empathy is “not sentimentality or sympathy, but a research tool for entering into the subjective life of another.”\textsuperscript{590} Through empathy, one can reach another person’s soul, and therefore enable the other to feel empathically understood. When an empathetic relationship is established between people based on trust, healing begins. In his interpretation of *jeong* based on Kohut’s theory, Ka described it as “a powerful emotional bond between

\textsuperscript{588} A.S. Park, *Racial Conflict and Healing*, 110.
\textsuperscript{589} Kohut held that, when people with weak self-structure have a relationship with others, it is a self-selfobject relationship, rather than one of self-object, which they experience as a part of their life. In this self-selfobject relationship, “the border between self and others is fluid and permeable so that a self can cross interpersonal borders and include others.” Ka claimed that people with *han*, particularly with JH, also show this relationship pattern. The process of transmuting internalization denotes, on the other hand, “a particular and necessary intrapsychic process through which a certain psychic enzyme, a source of power for change and growth, can be slowly, but gradually transferred from selfobject into the weak structure of the self. The process begins when there exists basic intuneness (trust) and empathy in self-selfobject or patient-therapist relationships. The process of transmuting internalization is like the ingestion of foreign protein or psychic enzyme throughout one’s life in order to maintain one’s body.” Ka, “*Jeong-han* as a Korean Culture-Bound Narcissism: Dealing with *Jeong-Han* through *jeong* dynamics,” *Pastoral Psychology*, 2010, 59, 228-229.

people,” and “a real saving power like oxygen.”591 Jeong is transferred through jeong-dynamics, which can be interpreted as the process of transmuting internalization in Kohuts’s term. When a person experiences jeong from another person or a group of people, she gradually becomes able to return jeong to them.592 Everyone needs jeong-relationship, and particularly for those such as HB patients, jeong is critical because they did not experience it in their childhoods and thus hunger for it. When they have sufficient jeong experience, they experience a powerful interconnectedness, love, and friendship, and, further, may become a jeong-giver as a healed healer.

With regard to our discussion of dan practice, Lee claimed that it should be balanced by or incorporated into the jeong principle. He stated, while the masculine aggressive energy of dan “break[s] through the wall of the prison of han and free[s] its energy,” the feminine love—jeong —can “restrain the violent energy of han and [transform] it into life energy.”593 This state, in which dan and jeong are incorporated in a harmonious way, can be identified in “the mature JH.” As we learned in the previous chapter, Lee asserted that, unlike the sentimental nature that characterizes immature JH, its mature form maintains the assertive and even aggressive energy required to face


592 Ka explains jeong-dynamics using the concepts of jeong-cognition, jeong-emotion, and jeong-practices. Jeong-cognition and jeong-emotion are the ability to recognize and feel others’ need, suffering, hunger, or thirst cognitively and affectively. “Jeong-cognition is thinking or being concerned about others, while jeong-emotion is a strong feeling of endearment and empathy towards others.” Jeong-cognition and jeong-emotion “generate concrete jeong-practices such as simply being with others, providing advice and support for others, generous and gratuitous sharing and exchanging of necessary material and non-material goods.” Ka, Ibid., 231.

593 J.H. Lee, The Exploration of the Inner Wounds—Han, 158.
one’s real situation and fight for justice, while at the same time retaining the element of love in its aggressiveness. Through transformation with the right practice—the *dan* practice balanced by, and operating with, the principle of *jeong*—one can reach the mature state of JH and become a change agent in the transformation of society. When *jeong* is separated from *dan*, it “becomes the masochistic, self-inflicted pain of sorrow.” When *jeong* is integrated with, and accompanied by, the masculine aggression of *dan*, as in the mature state of JH, it “becomes the power of love that creates and nurtures life and beauty as well as justice.”

There may be a way to solve the problem of *han* for the *han*-filled as discussed in *han* studies: when, through *han-pu-ri*, their emotions are organized and their pain is relieved, the *han*-filled can make an effort to change their passive attitudes and to act for justice through the practice of *dan* balanced by the *jeong* principle. Thus, in the *han-pu-ri* way, such as through religious rituals or artistic performance, the *han*-filled can cope with their immediate emotional problems; through *dan* practice—self-negating resolution and action to let go of their *han*-full memories and their attachment to them—they can be liberated from *han* and its negative effects. Yet the *dan* principle should be balanced with or nourished by the principle of *jeong*, so that one’s resolute will in practicing *dan* does not go too far and become a ruthless and destructive power. At the same time, it is important that the *jeong* principle does not become self-pity that

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594 Ibid., 158.
595 Ibid.
makes one weaker and more vulnerable to *han*. In the case of HB patients with a vulnerable self-constitution, the experience of *jeong* is particularly important. If they are not sufficiently empowered through *jeong* to be able to appease their severe narcissistic thirst and thereby to strengthen their self-structure, they are unable to continue their efforts to overcome *han* through the practice of *dan*. This leads us then to note a necessary condition for their continuous practice of *dan*, that of the “empathic (or empathetic) community,” where they can experience and practice *jeong*.

4.4.3 *Jeong-Dan* Practice and the Empathic Community

Thus far, we have made several important points with regard to the healing process of *han* or *han*-full memory as a part of the virtuous practice of anger. First, Lee tells us that the mature state of JH—rather than the *jeong* state that is free from *han*—is appropriate as the goal of the *han*-filled for transformation through *jeong-dan* practice. This takes into account the practical impossibility of the complete separation from *han* or *han*-full memories, but also indicates a proper healthy state for those living in an incomplete world. The *han*-filled in the mature JH state are keenly aware of reality under the power of *han*, but do not lack their ultimate vision for the complete state of soul and society full of *jeong*. This recognition reminds us that our goal at this stage

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596 There seems to be confusion among scholars about the goal of the transformation of the *han*-filled. Lee distinguished the mature and immature forms of JH, and described the mature state of JH as the destination of the transformative process through *dan*. Other scholars, such as Ka, presuppose that the goal is the state of soul where only *jeong* remains. I prefer Lee’s usage of the mature state of JH as its end because, as described, it is more realistic. Moreover, the *jeong* state of soul that Ka presented as the goal of *jeong* practice by describing it as the state in which aggression and love coexist actually denotes the state of Lee’s mature JH. See Ka, “*Jeong-han* as a Korean culture-bound narcissism,” 227-228.
should be the *healing* of memory, not an expectation of its complete removal. Taking the latter as part of the goal of practicing anger might mislead one to practice anger in such a way that the needs and expressions of the self are repressed and lead ultimately to a state of self-hatred. The healing process of *han*-full memory through *jeong-dan* practice is designed to enhance the self.

Second, the theory of transformation through *jeong-dan* practice highlights the importance of the *community*. *Jeong-dan* practice requires the “empathic other”. Through *jeong* practice, the *han*-filled person can feel that her need and suffering are recognized and understood by others and thereby she is connected deeply with them. While experiencing others’ care and support, she can gradually cultivate her ability to accept herself. *Jeong* dynamic always necessitates another’s help to provide *jeong* experience, and yet also requires openness and courage to accept that other’s care and help. Here we see again the importance of the *dan* practice, because it asks for the resolute will to be courageous enough to be open to others, and overcome the inner obstacles that prevent it. With *dan* practice, one can accept *jeong* from, share it with, and give it to others. For this, the existence of the empathic community is a prerequisite for the practice of *dan*. Only when there is another person or a community to embrace and encourage her, and therefore to help her experience *jeong*, is she able to practice *dan* by opening herself to others, and thereby gradually becoming an agent who practices *jeong* for others, as well as for herself.

Third, then how does the *jeong-dan* combined practice heal *han*-full memories? Through the *jeong*-powered relationship, the *han*-filled one can see his suffering
memories through a different lens. In being acknowledged by people who demonstrate that they are like him and he is like them, he grows over time in the capacity to assure himself that he is normal and acceptable. A believer here can truly understand the message of “original sin,” which conveys the insight that everyone lacks (and thus needs) jeong, and that everyone is incomplete in giving and sharing jeong with others. The life-giving experience of being connected deeply to others that is acquired through jeong dynamics enables him to give his suffering memories a new interpretation, in that those who have hurt him are as incomplete as he is. As he starts to interpret his han-full memories from a new perspective, he is able to articulate them as what they truly are in the light of faith—by his own ability or with the help of a wise empathetic other—and to accept them as a part of himself and incorporate them into his meaning-making system.

This process of embracing and transforming the hurtful memories involves “forgiveness” of those who have injured him and also forgiveness of himself—his vulnerable side—which could not cope with or prevent being hurt. He is then able to let go of the memories by reorganizing and restoring them in a safe place in his mind, and can thereby be released from the emotions they entail, such as shame, hatred, and deep-rooted anger towards others and himself. Finally, then, he can move on. This method of healing memories produces the effect of self-cohesion, in which the omnipotent and the vulnerable sides of the self are reconciled and the self-structure becomes strengthened so that he is able to practice anger out of a healthy self-love.

There is one thing to note here—the role of the faith community as the empathic other. In the previous chapter, we saw that, in general, the Korean Protestant church...
has performed the role of empathic community to facilitate *jeong* practice. It has been a healing place and haven for those who are lonely, sad, and in despair. However, its role has often been confined to consoling their psychological suffering, which sometimes reinforces their attachment to the institution of the church itself. The role of the empathic other includes not only soothing their pain through *jeong* experience, but also helping them practice *dan*. The churches should help them face their reality, recognize their problems in a rational way, and make an effort to change their lives. In order to facilitate the empathic environment effectively, the church should extend its role to educate and help them identify the social origin of their suffering and their personal problems, as witnessed in *minjung* theology. In that way, the church will encourage their practical efforts for the transformation of society, as well as for the improvement of their individual lives, and help them resist falling into pseudo-altruism and emotional pacification through distorted religious experiences.  

The church can then help those with HB learn an alternative way to cope with their anger, for example, by helping them accept it as it is, and recognize the oppressive forces that prevent them from being honest about their anger. Here we see that the right message on self-love is crucial in the church’s teaching about suffering and anger. In that sense, it is regrettable that many Korean Protestant churches seem to have lost one important resource—the doctrine of self-love. Based on the teaching of self-love, the church can encourage those with HB to realize that their disordered anger is a form

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of self-expression that stems from the needs of their inner selves. They can therefore be encouraged not to repress their anger, but to accept it as it is, and then to reflect on it in light of who they wish to become. They should be led to recognize and resist the social powers that prevent them from being honest with their anger, so that they can continue the virtuous practice of anger and avoid lapsing into self-pity, guilt, or despair. The church can thereby lead them to become agents of change who can contribute to the transformation of society, as well as their own lives.

How do people cope when their traumatic memories are too painful to be processed? Although such cases often require professional help, even here the church can be of service. The tragic memories that resist articulation cannot be processed easily, even with professional intervention. The church can hold together the fragmented self of the han-filled by recognizing and sharing their urgent narcissistic suffering and desire, while at the same time relieving their emotional pain through the symbolic rituals that can be drawn from the principles of the han-pu-ri practice. Through the cathartic effects that are elicited, their bodies can relax and the sorrow and despair that remains unarticulated can be alleviated. Recall that Aquinas also noted that a relaxed physical state (achieved with such activities as sleeping and bathing) can relieve emotion and sorrow, and can even elicit some modification of its cognition in that the sensory appetite and the body are united in the form-matter relationship. Here we see one function of various nonverbal, symbolic rituals that are able to reach the deeper parts of

598 ST. I-II. 38.5.
the embodied soul. This suggests that forms of Protestant worship that rely primarily on verbal messages must be supplemented, balanced, and nourished by symbolic and ritual elements.

The Christian church is one authoritative institution that can provide a deep meaning and interpretation of human suffering. While expressing solidarity with those who are suffering, the church can provide a critical meaning for their suffering, or help them to find meaning on their own via nonverbal rituals. In this way, it can encourage them to practice virtuous anger in a non-threatening way. While participating in the rituals of the church and experiencing jeong within the community, they can hope and pray that they can be liberated from their suffering through the work of Grace. The hope is that someday they might be able to find meaning in their unreasonable suffering in the light of the suffering of the Christ, and to forgive themselves as well as others in the faith of Created goodness.

4.5 The Anger of the Healed Healer in a Violent World

As we have explored, the three principles of han-pu-ri, dan, and jeong have the potential to resolve han problems, particularly among those who have han-full memories. While sustaining the threatened self of the han-filled and relieving their pain through the han-pu-ri method, the combined jeong-dan practice in their social relationships can help them, gradually, become mature and robust so that they can continue to practice virtuous anger. These approaches are intended to aid the han-filled
to become agents who are able to reflect upon themselves and to practice good through a healthy self.

As noted, these methodologies do not seek to reach the perfect state free from *han*, but the mature state of JH. The perfect state is neither possible, nor desirable for the *han*-filled because they need a realistic goal to elicit their will and encourage their practice. The mature state of JH is stable compared to its immature state, but its stability is not complete, so it can relapse into its immature state or further WH or HH according to circumstances. In the mature JH state, people tend to preserve a rather pessimistic view of the world. However, their pessimism is different from skepticism, in the sense that they maintain a keen sense of empathy for others’ suffering and the will to recognize and act against injustice. Based on this image of the anger of those with mature JH, this section tries to envision what the anger of the *han*-filled is like when it has become virtuous through practice.

Their anger is unlikely to take the same form as that of a virtuous person, as theirs is formed by a rational cognition that is already tinged with pessimism, and consequently is inclined towards undesirable outcomes. The anger of the person with mature JH is regarded as an intermediate end in the practice of anger by the *han*-filled. Thus, while envisioning the ultimate goal of virtuous anger, the *han*-filled can strive realistically to practice anger like a person with mature JH. This form of anger in the *han*-filled can be called the anger of “a healed healer.”

The anger of the healed healer can be understood as follows: the mature form of *han*-full anger retains its sensitivity to suffering and injustice so that it tends to arise
spontaneously at any anger-provoking situation, forcing its bearer to be engaged in the unjust situation and act for justice with passion. While being affected by her intense sense of her own or another’s pain, the person in a state of mature JH can manage to take a moment to deliberate on virtuous anger, and try to express it as constructively as possible. For her, the sensibility of her own or others’ suffering and its consequent impulse to act are usually regarded as important, although not absolute standards, to judge whether this case is good anger, and thus, whether or not to act on it. Nevertheless, she is also aware of the incomplete function of her agency, and so tries to include as many potential consequences of her angry action as possible in her deliberation and thus to be cautious about her decision and action.

Because the anger springs from the keen awareness of the reality of an unjust and violent world, and therefore, its full rationalization is hindered, she might be compelled to act on it even in a self-sacrificial way. Her profound understanding of human suffering, which was gained through her struggle with her own memories of suffering, may lead her to be courageous, or even reckless, in accepting others’ suffering as her own and in finding happiness in being one with other sufferers. The risk is that this could lead to greater or more prolonged sorrow and despair. Alternatively, it may lead her to feel self-righteous and avoid acknowledging her real situation. Yet, the han-filled person with mature JH maintains the capacity for self-reflection, and therefore, it is possible for her to gather herself, contemplate her anger in its context, and pursue the rectification of her habit of anger with its entailing action.
For the mature Christian with han, practicing anger in the light of the virtuous anger of Jesus Christ is important. It enables her to self-reflect and continue her practice of anger in the light of a moral ideal. It is also critical for her to practice anger with the belief and in the hope for God’s ongoing creation, because those prevent her pessimism and prolonged sorrow and anger from devolving into total despair. Although, because of the effect of her retained memories, she is still angered easily by her frequent feeling of being slighted, she also possesses the power to protect herself against being overwhelmed by it. She tries to keep herself distant from intense anger, contemplate it, and find what her inner self needs and wants to be heard by others. Despite her efforts, she often fails to control her anger, but does not go further to hate herself or others. She manages to find sufficient self-justification to persevere. After doing her best to make her anger good, she tries to achieve small progress in her trial, however disorganized it may appear, and this sustains her hope for the improvement of her habit of anger in the future. In this way, she accepts herself and her anger as it is, and encourages herself to continue the practice of good anger.

She understands that, in Jesus’ anger, His zeal for justice was intertwined with His self-sacrificing love. His anger was a self-expression that arose from His commitment and devotion to the actualization of love and justice in this world. It conveys the message about the judgment of injustice and also shows His profound love for the weak, the vulnerable, and the sinner who suffers from injustice. Jesus’ anger was never confused with hatred towards people and the world. Jesus hated people’s sin, not the
sinner. His anger for justice was never ignored or obscured by His love for people; His love for the world was always accompanied by and balanced by His sense of justice.

The anger of the healed healer follows Jesus' way of expressing anger. It pursues the actualization of justice through anger and its consequent action, yet not in a way that lacks love for those who commit the wrongdoing. Because the world is unjust and violent, she understands that sacrifice might be inevitable in acting for justice. However, rather than becoming involved recklessly, she decides what to do because of sufficient apprehension, not only of the situation, but of her limitations as well. She is deeply aware of her finite distance from the being of Jesus Christ. She pursues and imitates the virtuous model of the anger of Christ, and therefore her anger sometimes can take the form of martyrdom. Nonetheless, via her own reflection, or with the aid of others, she always checks whether or not her anger is driven by her masochistic tendencies. She is well aware of the importance of collective efforts for social justice, and trusts her anger and its consequent actions to contribute to the collective social work for justice. She continues to practice anger in the hope for and belief in Grace, and tries to be humble enough to be satisfied with her incomplete practice of anger now and its insufficient outcome, and to stay calm in the hope of a better performance next time.
CONCLUSION

We have explored Aquinas’ account of passion and anger in particular (Chapter 1) and examined han-full anger and its subjective, physiological, and sociocultural components (Chapter 2). We then attempted to analyze and evaluate han-full anger in Aquinas’ scheme of thought on normative anger and virtue ethics (Chapter 3), and finally, developed a method to work through han-full anger in an extended Thomistic view in conjunction with the han discourse (Chapter 4).

Aquinas’ account of passion and anger in particular, based on his holistic anthropology, offers a sound foundation with which to approach han-full anger. His views about emotion bring to light most prominently the fact that cognition and emotion are not opposing aspects of the mind, but are complementary and inherently connected. In the case of anger, due to its conspicuous proximity to reason, the role of ideas, including the self-understanding that constitutes one’s construct system, is particularly crucial.

Han-full anger, as we have seen, is related profoundly to a feeling of victimization associated with the experience of injury. Interpreted in a Thomistic perspective, han-full anger that moves out into the world is charged already with a sense of felt injury, and, as a result, is informed only in part by reason and is expressed
in a disordered way. It is an example of morally bad anger, and its problem is rooted in
the agent, rather than in the world. In this view, han-full anger is “chosen” through the
process of interior logic, and thus, the felt sense of injury dominates the process. This is
the responsibility of the agent. It is one’s construction of anger that results in han-full
anger; it is she who allows it to occur.

Can we say, however, that han-full anger is chosen completely, and thus is the
responsibility of the agent? As we have explored, the agents of han-full anger—seen in
the case of HB—are those who struggle in harsh sociocultural contexts. Their vulnerable
self-structure and damaged agencies in the culture of han render their lives passive and
their emotions unnatural and disordered. This makes us question how their han-full
anger is their own, when their lives are not truly their own. Yet our exploration of HB,
particularly in its etymological aspects, together with its social and psychological
dynamics, informed us that there is, at least on some level, “voluntary” will that
compromises and engages in the development of HB (we have excluded extremely
serious cases of HB, in which responsibility might be exempted in Aquinas’ scheme as
well).

Yet, as we have seen, the disorderliness of han-full anger involves the problem of
social justice critically. The han-filled therefore cannot practice anger without engaging
in a practical effort for social change; here, the role of community in encouraging them
becomes crucial. This is missing in Aquinas’ account of anger. Han-full anger, although
incomplete, functions as a form of communication that conveys something powerful
about our constructions of the world and ourselves. Although the power of anger that
refuses further victimization occasionally entails hostility and violence, *han*-full anger, particularly in its collective form, has functioned as a powerful means to fight for justice and social transformation in the political history of South Korea. Therefore, this positive aspect of *han*-full anger is not contradictory with Aquinas’ view of anger. On the contrary, it highlights the normative goodness of anger that contributes to the well-being of the agent, and thus stresses the necessity of practicing good anger for the improvement of the lives of the *han*-filled.

Understanding *han*-full anger in the context of Aquinas’ scheme of normative anger has provided us a chance to ponder not only the fundamental meaning and significance of human anger, but also self-dignity and social justice. It has involved more than simply relating two types of anger that operate in two different contexts, but has included a broader contemplation of who we are and where we are going. From the perspective of Aquinas’ notion of anger, *han*-full anger acquires a normative vision about its essential role and *telos* affirmed in the Created order. Following the unfolded story of *han*-full anger, the Thomistic narrative of anger meets people’s everyday lives, and attains “appetitive knowledge,” particularly in the life of the marginalized, that allows it to be extended and elaborated further and to become more sensitive to contemporary experiences.

Lastly, there are two suggestions for the future consideration of anger. First, as noted above, various aspects involved in the embodied character of anger need to be probed, particularly with updated scientific knowledge and reflection, such as neuropsychology and theories of trauma. Aquinas’ view of anger noted that in its
prolonged state, it is assimilated into one’s disposition, and yet did not offer an elaborate account of it. Further exploration of Aquinas’ notion of human vice would be a useful starting point to approach such a type of anger in the Thomistic circle. Second, as we saw in Chapter 4, the concepts of han-pu-ri, dan, and jeong, which have been treated as outdated in han studies, may be useful in working with han-full anger. Further research on the han discourse, including the development of these concepts, will benefit comparative ethics.


______. *Suffering Presence: Theological Reflections on Medicine, the Mentally Handicapped, and the Church.* Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1986.


Han


