POLITICAL PARTIES AND ELECTORAL CAMPAIGNS: VOTER MOBILIZATION STRATEGIES IN ARGENTINE PROVINCES

A Dissertation

Submitted to the Graduate School
of the University of Notre Dame
in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements
for the Degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

by

Carlos Mariano Lisoni

Scott Mainwaring, Director

Graduate Program in Political Science

Notre Dame, Indiana

April 2012
POLITICAL PARTIES AND ELECTORAL CAMPAIGNS: VOTER MOBILIZATION STRATEGIES IN ARGENTINE PROVINCES

Abstract
by
Carlos Mariano Lisoni

This dissertation explores the particular mechanisms by which political parties attempt to win people’s votes by embarking on specific electoral campaign strategies. It also develops a more comprehensive theory and a novel way to systematically measure the centrality to campaigns of clientelistic, programmatic, personalistic and incumbent’s performance voter mobilization strategy types.

This dissertation produces an argument in which the campaign strategies political parties use are influenced by, not only district factors such as socioeconomic development and electoral competitiveness, but also by party factors such as candidate nomination compromises and the dispersion of power within parties.

This is a comparative case study in which causation is viewed as a combination of conditions where the causal factors are seen in interaction with one another in a context. The comparative method, based on in-depth study of cases and qualitative data analyses, allows a comprehensive view of campaign strategies’ processes. The
study of cases also permits a justification of the importance of the local political party apparatus to mobilize voters in campaigns in a way which complements, and in many aspects transcends, the mass media campaign. The dissertation, for example, reveals that particular mechanisms in the clientelistic relationship and the relative autonomy of the broker have unique consequences to governance and accountability in the respective communities.

This mostly qualitative study of five Argentine provinces is primarily based on original data from eighty six interviews of local, provincial and national elected officials, with the goal of tracing meaning and causal relationships in specific contexts. The dissertation also counts with supporting evidence from content analysis of newspapers and public opinion surveys.

The dissertation provides measurable factors and indicators, which improve the available comparative tools used in the study of clientelism, personalism, programmatic and incumbents’ performance as strategy types.
DEDICATION

I dedicate this dissertation foremost to my family – particularly to my wife Katherine, whose unwavering and unconditional love and support simply made this dissertation possible; to my daughters Victoria and Sofia who warrant our most precious loyalty in life; to my parents Carlos and Mirta, and grandparents Nicolás and Irma, who encouraged and inspired a dedication to seek opportunity in life and a will to envision a better future for our family and nation.

I also dedicate this dissertation to the people of Argentina – working on this project helped me learn and understand our diversity as a nation which is a resource which should be used to foster tolerance and to better promote the common good.
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I was raised in a small Patagonian town. I later traveled to the big city and even overseas, and the further I went the greater the distortion and (reasonably) simplification of things that seemed so familiar back home (albeit not necessarily understandable to me) regarding political parties and electoral campaigns. This dissertation is a study of political parties in which I try to show a complexity and diversity within Argentina which seems to be ignored, not only by academics, but even by the locals in such a vast country. Besides any social science and methodological contributions I intended from this dissertation, a propelling force behind the dissertation is the unfair and sometimes invalid simplifications of the complex processes which constitute the democratic Argentina of today which includes, for example, clientelism. My hope is that the specialized reader will have more elements to judge and prescribe solutions to perceived institutional needs, and that the non-specialized reader will better empathize with the people involved in the circumstances described here.

I chose to resort to first hand experiences to illustrate the thought processes of candidates, from the personal micro level experience to the more general party and district level views of campaigns and politics. I went on to do the field research with a theoretical background; however the powerful firsthand experience and the contrasts among cases helped me find new approaches to study some of the issues involved in the dissertation and new ways to conceptualize ideas which might more clearly reflect the reality of Argentina. Given the importance of tracing meaning and thought processes
of the political actors in campaigns most of the multiple quotations to interviewees are kept in the original Spanish language.

I want to acknowledge my wife Katherine for the many weeks traveling with me around Argentina when I was doing field research, and for the countless proofreadings and constant encouragement to carry out this project.

I want to acknowledge my dissertation advisor Scott Mainwaring for his guidance and the multiple discussions, constructive criticism and suggestions to improve my work. I also want to acknowledge the other members of the dissertation committee Michael Coppedge and Reverend Timothy Scully for their thoughtful comments to advance my work. It was an honor to have worked with all of them.

I also appreciate the generous funding received through the years at the University of Notre Dame which made my graduate studies possible and later contributed to field research and living expenses. Specifically I am grateful for the graduate tuition scholarship, the Political Science Department Summer stipends, the Kellogg Institute Seed Money Grant for dissertation proposal improvement, the Kellogg Institute Dissertation Year Fellowship, the Moore Fellowship, all at the University of Notre Dame, and stipends to attend the Institute for Qualitative and Multi-method Research at Arizona State University in January 2008.

I also want to recognize the work of Maira Carretero, Luciana Amarilla Meles, Fabiana Yeri and Federico Alonso who were at the time the university students that coded the hundreds of newspaper issues, and to my brother, Nicolás Lisoni, who helped me coordinate this work.

I want to acknowledge all the individuals who in good faith contributed their experiences to me. I include the eighty six formal interviewees and the many others who also supplied experiences, points of views and information which helped me form a more clear understanding of the cases I studied. In this regard I particularly want to thank
Carlos Fara & Asociados who allowed me to include a number of questions to be added to two pre-election surveys in October 2007.

Finally, I want to acknowledge the many people who gave me rides when no means of transportation was available in my search for interviews and those who hosted me in their homes in cities and towns across the country. This work was also possible because of them.
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION - CLIENTELISTIC, PERSONALISTIC, PROGRAMMATIC AND INCUMBENT’S PERFORMANCE VOTER MOBILIZATION STRATEGIES TYPES

1.1 Introduction

How do political parties recruit voters? This question addresses the collective action problem political parties attempt to solve for democracy. Much of the literature in the developed world focuses on programmatic competition by parties in an attempt to sway people’s vote in their favor, which may be arranged along a left-right ideological, or multiple issue dimensions in the quest to win elections (Downs 1957; Hinich and Munger 1996). While ideology and program may have a role, in reality there are multiple other ways parties and candidates obtain votes. One of the ways is for example clientelism which, broadly speaking, is exchanging particularistic favors for votes. Clientelism has, in the last few years, mostly been studied in the developing world, although it exists elsewhere as well. Additional ways parties may also recruit voters include emphasizing the personal qualities of their candidates or evaluations of the incumbent’s performance. In this dissertation I want to build the missing theoretical and methodological bridge between these literatures in the study of the methods political parties use to recruit voters by studying the case of Argentina.

Mainstream political science sees political parties as though they should take a stance on issues, build reputations and be information short-cuts to voters (Sartori 1976; Aldrich 1995). Parties which often shift positions are considered non-institutionalized and should then lose the confidence of the voters for not keeping a reputation of “probity and
“consistency” (Hinich and Munger 1996: 8). It is true that a loss of confidence in political parties characterizes Argentina and arguably most countries (Latinobarómetro 2002; Rose 1995; Mainwaring 1999; Dalton and Wattenberg 2000); however, the two main traditional parties in Argentina consistently gather the overwhelming support of citizens over other alternatives. This is probably because people do not only vote based on programs or consistent stands on issues.

How do parties recruit voters in Argentina, a country that is socially stratified and regionally unequal, and where political parties are one of the least appreciated institutions and are not programmatically coherent? This dissertation plans to address this knowledge, theoretical and methodological lacunae by producing an argument in which the voter mobilization strategies parties use are primarily, but not exclusively, influenced by the socio-economic characteristics of the electorate and the electoral competitiveness of the district. To do this I develop a novel way to operationalize and measure parties’ voter mobilization strategies.

“Mobilization is the process by which candidates, parties, activists, and groups induce other people to participate. We say that one of these actors has mobilized somebody when it has done something to increase the likelihood of her participation.” (Rosenstone and Hansen 1993: 25-26, italics in the original) In this study I precisely study the inducements to participate and not the participation of voters; i.e. I study the strategies to mobilize voters. Also important, I study the mobilization strategies of voters, that is citizens who participate at elections by casting votes. I do not study mobilization of citizens in support of issues, for example by asking people to write to Congress.

Political science in the United States has developed a literature on programmatic campaigns. When studying campaigns, the literature focuses on the media and on voters’ surveys alone and do not study the politicians (e.g. Downs 1957; Hinich and Munger 1996). One reason for this truncated type of analysis could be the difficulty
accessing party leaders and activists (See Crespo 2003: 25). All of these authors (for example Crespo 2003, and Lazarsfeld et al 1944) refer to campaigns as just “political communication,” but implicitly mean “media” and ignore other party activities in campaigns. One of the most prominent examples of this type of one-sided approach is Lazarsfeld et al 1944 panel study. Even prominent studies focusing on parties’ mobilization strategies observe the voters through opinion surveys and not the parties themselves which they claim to study (e.g. Rosenstone and Hansen 1993). Experimental studies have tried to capture the effect of the media on voters (See Iyengar 1991; Cappella and Jamieson 1997), and the qualitative approach is dominated by the content analyses of the media. However, it is not unusual to find out that people say that campaigns do not influence them (Crespo 2003: 74), because people want to feel independent, blurring an effective study of campaigns.

Nevertheless, I am not primarily interested in the effects of campaigns, but on the decision making and mechanics of the implementation of certain types of campaign strategies. In Argentina the study of electoral campaigns is very limited and the study of campaign strategies even more. Pollsters and “campaign experts” tend to focus their analyses on the media campaigns and ignore the ground work of the party. Like other studies, this dissertation also resorts to quantitative analysis of survey data and the content analysis of newspapers; however, it is largely based on the qualitative analysis of interviews of political elites for the uncovering of meaning and causal relationships.

Even though campaigns may be seen as efforts made by parties and candidates to communicate with prospective voters, its analysis should not be restricted to mass media communication. Many other types of tactics or actions are used in every campaign in Argentina and other countries, and ignoring them could only bias the researcher’s conclusions. In my study I bring forward the role of the local and provincial
party machines as well, which I argue are very important to mobilizing the vote and ultimately keeping the party alive.

This dissertation has three major tasks, the first of which is the most relevant: to understand the causal mechanisms which lead parties to adopt certain campaign strategies. The second is to explore the voter recruitment appeals tailored by parties to specific socioeconomic and electoral environments by looking at strategies in light of the environment in which candidates and parties find themselves when competing for votes. The third goal is to develop a way to systematically examine the four voter recruitment strategies, in order to complete a more comprehensive theory of electoral mobilization.

Appreciating the diversity of the Argentine electorates should not only help us find answers about parties’ electoral strategies, but should make us raise new questions about institutionalization, the quality of democracy and the conception of citizenship in Latin America. (See O’Donnell 1998)

In a regionally diverse society, nationalized parties may have to organize and behave differently in different subnational units in order to be representative and still win elections (Erikson et al. 1993; Key 1949, 1956; Elazar 1966). The party may rely more on clientelistic appeals in one region and on programmatic appeals in another (Magaloni et al. mimeo; Gibson 1997). In this study I unavoidably also explore the Argentine Peronist (PJ) and Radical (UCR) parties (as well as other district relevant parties) and the determinants of their electoral strategies by considering three key characteristics: 

1) the great socio-economic diversity among districts, creating constituents who are attracted by different types of appeals, 2) the relative autonomy exercised by local political and party leaders in a federal country, allowing parties to have diverse strategies among regions, and 3) the electoral competitiveness of the provinces. As well-

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1 I later further qualify these statements in footnote # 12 to argue that PJ and UCR are both still the two most relevant nationalized parties in the country.
functioning electoral machines, the nationalized parties adapt their strategies to the
different local environments to procure electoral success. Hence, we are in the presence
of distinct electorates in the country, and political practices that correspond to them to
attract those votes. I provide evidence for differentiation in a country which O’Donnell
(1994) once called a “Delegative Democracy” by showing variation among parties as
builders of collective identities and interests.

In principle there are four types of exchanges between the party and its voters. In
exchange for a vote, the party may offer the candidate’s personality and style
(personalistic strategy); a program (programmatic strategy); an evaluation of the
incumbent’s performance in office (performance strategy); and particularistic benefits
(clientelistic strategy).

Most commonly, and intuitively, the characteristic of the “programmatic strategy”
is that parties elaborate policy packages based on fundamental principles and later
campaign on them. These principles must be simple enough for voters to be able to
envisage the policy stances of the parties on given issues (Converse and Pierce 1986;
measure programmatic linkages between voters and parties have received the most
attention in political science. Most research on clientelism, on the other hand, has been
case studies with their consequent limitations to generalize conclusions.²

Clientelism has been under the scrutiny of social scientists for several decades.
The literature seems to concur in the substandard of clientelism vis a vis other ways of
political representation. What also prevails in those studies is the centrality of the clients
as enduring at least a moral oppression. Clientelism may be characterized by concepts

² Relevant works on clientelism in Argentina are Auyero (ed.) 1997; Auyero 2004; Dinatale
2004; Sautu (ed.) 2004; Szwarcberg 2003; Trotta 2003; and Cuenya et al. 2004. Also see Fox
1994 on Mexico and Hagopian 1996 on Brazil. In an informed way, Ames (2001) studied the
electoral incentives and the socioeconomic structure of districts to explain legislators’ behavior in Brazil.
of hierarchy and submission to the patron (usually a politicians or resourceful person) or brokers (people who mediate between a patron and client-voters). Clientelism may also be seen as a remnant of traditional societies (See Hagopian 1996, and Gunes-Ayata: 46 in Auyero 1997 for more literature) but it very much persists in modern societies and is used by modern political elites. I adopt a more normatively neutral view given that I focus on the action of the “political entrepreneurs” (candidates, party activists, patrons, brokers) in electoral campaigns. Constituents, who in light of certain campaign tactics may be for example retrospective voters and in other cases clientelistic voters, are important to understanding the campaign strategies parties adopt. However, to these political entrepreneurs, people are part of the environment based on which strategies are adopted and must be dealt with appropriately. I understand that clientelistic relationships also exist in contexts in which there are no major socioeconomic problems; however, a relationship in which particularistic material benefits are exchanged for support or loyalties involves an asymmetry of power between actors.

I agree with Auyero (1997: 30) that reducing the dynamics of clientelism to the mere actions of the individuals involved can make us lose sight of the shared meanings which “emerge and sustain those actions” and reducing clientelism to a mere consequence of utility maximization strategy of actors. Since I study campaign strategies, I do not so much focus on what is exchanged in the clientelistic tactics but on why and how it is exchanged from the point of view of the patrons. I pay attention to the patrons and clients, but I also have a particular emphasis on the brokers and their role and performance. Auyero (1997) makes an insightful study of the brokers in the metropolitan areas of Buenos Aires. Here I also show the differences I found in the poorer interior of Argentina.

In this work, I use the term clientelism to signify the particularistic (promise of) delivery of cash, goods, services or influence (from political entrepreneurs) to a
constituent (or his family) expecting to get his vote. Clientelism is an asymmetric but mutually beneficial relationship where deference and loyalty towards the authority is common (Trotta 2003; Roniger 1997; Grassi 1996), but not necessary; however clientelism can be differentiated by the type of relationship between the patron/broker and the client. In “personalized clientelism” there is a bond of loyalty and respect between the actors which takes time to develop. The clientelistic relationship can also be between an anonymous electoral machine and anonymous clients in an environment of competition between providers of selective incentives (Scott 1969; Eisenstadt & Roniger 1981; Lemarchand 1981, 1988). The exchange is direct as the recipient of the benefit is expected to support or cast a vote for the benefactor, and not because of the fact that the recipient is a citizen. In this respect my conceptualization of clientelism differs with that of Brusco et al (2002) where they only limit the exchange for “material private goods” leaving aside the great number of resources (which are not material and are not individually private) that politicians in fact use to entice voters in a direct, particularistic way expecting electoral support (public jobs, pay raises, “club goods” -to a small number of constituents belonging to a group or district- and favors in general where a person with access to particular scarce resources can solve the problems of another).  

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3 In clientelism there is, hence, the perception of “particularism” in the exchange (as opposed to a universalistic policy or exchange). In this respect what is in the United States known as “pork barrel” exercised by their national legislators may be classified as a tactic or activity in a clientelistic strategy, as well as in a personalistic strategy. Most, if not all resources administered by politicians are limited and public, and are allocated to benefit some instead of others expecting an electoral benefit (which is particularly the case of “pork barrel”). Brusco et al (2002) limit their distinction to what in “…the perspective of recipients are public goods…” (Page 5 fn.) Hence pork barrel would not be clientelistic. However, from the point of view of a person who receives a bag of food from the Mayor and sees him do the same in the neighborhood, the actions are viewed as public as a tax break which may benefit the same person. Still, an expensive bridge may benefit only a very small number of people, where that money could have been used to help a larger number of people elsewhere. Politicians are not unaware of those tradeoffs and still do it. Again, pork barrel is not a strategy, it is a tactic or activity which may be used in what we as observers evaluate as part of different voter mobilization strategies.
The literature on clientelism, as a method to recruit voters, is mostly limited to case studies and qualitative approaches which focus on the demand side of the equation or the “clients” given the difficulty in accessing elected officials, who conceal their clientelistic practices (e.g. Brusco et al 2004; Stokes mimeo 2003; Valdez 2004; Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007), or has been studied using restrictive assumptions to try to overcome the ecological inference problem of dealing with aggregate data (e.g. Magaloni et al mimeo; Brusco et al 2002; Calvo and Murillo 2004). Furthermore, existing studies of clientelism in Argentina are mostly limited to large metropolitan areas, marginalizing the reality of millions of citizens in the rest of the country (e.g. Auyero 1997) and, in fact, in many parts of Latin America.

Some quantitative studies on clientelism have tried to overcome the ecological problem of dealing with aggregate data –that is, making inferences about individuals based on data which do not reflect individuals but groups (Magaloni et al mimeo; Brusco et al mimeo; Calvo and Murillo 2004); there are also recent attempts to capture the clientelistic relationship with game theory (Stokes mimeo); and from surveys in, for example, three Argentine provinces (Brusco et al 2004; also see Valdez 2004).

Experimental research was attempted as well in Benin by comparing a “programmatic platform” versus a “clientelistic platform” but ignoring the actual direct exchange of gifts for a vote and the personal relationship between voters and a broker/ patron (Wantchekon 2003). Despite the limitations in scope and assumptions, these works are important contributions in terms of finding patterns of regularity.4

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4 Brusco et al (2004: 72) found that poor voters are more likely to be targeted by clientelistic appeals; Wantchekon (2003: 422) found that in Benin “women are more likely than men to have preference for public goods.”
Clientelism is widespread in Argentina and elsewhere, and does not seem to be just a remnant from traditional politics, but a current and dynamic practice. The existing theoretical accounts of the linkage between parties and voters, however, do not constitute a “systematic comparative literature on the rise or decline of clientelistic and programmatic linkage strategies” (Kitschelt 2000: 855). The strength of these theories is diminished by contradictory empirical evidence (see Kitschelt 2000 Table 1). Besides, comparative politics has not developed a precise operationalization of voter recruitment mechanisms such as clientelism (Kitschelt 2000; Roniger 1994: 207). Politicians conceal their clientelistic practices, and indirect techniques such as measuring the lack of programmatic cohesion and levels of corruption are poor alternatives.

There are two other ways parties recruit voters to win elections. One is the performance strategy in search of the retrospective vote. In a “performance strategy,” parties campaign on praising or criticizing the incumbent’s performance in office. In this case parties do not offer anything in exchange for a vote, only point to an interpretation of government performance. Fiorina’s argument of voters’ “running tally of retrospective evaluations” (1981: 89) is a must reference. However, just as with much of the literature on clientelism, I do not study the constituents’ vote, in this case the retrospective vote.

In my study, again, I study the political parties, candidates and activists, and not the voters as Fiorina did. I also do not base my conclusions on surveys alone. Fiorina acknowledges his model is limited and not always applicable; “…we should remember that we are dealing with citizens who live in a reasonably stable democracy, who observed many of the same people fighting about many of the same issues over time.”

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5 Hagopian (1996) refers to clientelism in Brazil as a “remnant of traditional politics” p4.

6 In reality, however, parties not only praise or criticize performance, but implicitly also point to the better party option the voter should choose. In his 1981 study Fiorina has a straightforward model and panel data and focuses on voters, not on political parties. His is then a “correlational study” with central tendency measures based on opinion polls and what the study says about parties’ strategies is limited.
(p. 83) His model also carries important assumptions, for example; “…the cost of having candidate characteristics implicit in performance judgments and future expectations is that we get no explicit estimates of the weights the electorate attaches to such characteristics”. (p. 150) Finally, Fiorina also says “[n]o one knows what thermometer scores measure…their contribution to explanations of voting behavior is purely statistical, not substantive.” (p. 154) In my study, on the other hand, I attempt to give substance to the explanation of mechanism in order to understand campaign strategies.7

Finally, the other way parties recruit voters is with a personalistic strategy in which parties get the votes in exchange for “grand gestures and personal styles” which appeal to voters (Kitschelt 2000: 845). Personalistic attachments are also characterized by the asymmetry between the party/candidate and the voter (Kitschelt 2000). Deference and loyalty towards the authority describe these as well as clientelistic attachments. Despite Kitschelt’s evaluation that parties built on personalism produce legislative caucuses and factions, it does not mean that parties relying on personalism to win elections do not also invest in the party’s organizational infrastructure.8 This strategy should not be set aside from comprehensive analyses of parties’ strategies; it is a recruitment strategy and may be combined with others with the goal of winning votes. However, I later explain how some tactics or activities in a personalistic strategy may be more fruitful in some electoral environments over others (e.g. large vs. small towns, and the use of the media versus direct contact with voters).

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7 Fiorina, as well as Key (1966), view voters as either/or (for example, either prospective or retrospective voters) in their theories. Due to the sort of data they have to work with, these authors simplify and make assumptions about reality which at times make their conclusions sterile to understand real world cases (even though their theories do provide an explanation to make sense of a phenomenon at the aggregate level). They focus on theories that look at voters without the complexity of real people. True, in his book Fiorina often refers to the retrospective electorate and not the retrospective voter, given that the book’s conclusions are good for aggregate level evaluations. In any case, Fiorina and colleagues could be argued to be looking at the campaign strategies’ outcomes, and I am interested in the campaign strategies’ processes.

8 Parties relying on personalism to win an election and the investment on organizational infrastructure are analytically distinct, conceptually different ideas.
I pay particular attention to the mechanisms and the decision making processes to adopt such strategies; acknowledging the relevance of independent or more structural causal factors (such as the socioeconomic characteristics of the electorate) but putting special attention to the factors which may not be structural but are necessary to fully understand the relevance of clientelism, personalism, programmatic and performance types of voter mobilization strategies.

1.2 Cases

Research was conducted in Argentina. The cases in this dissertation are subnational districts, specifically 4 provinces and the Federal District of the city of Buenos Aires where I performed field work. The criteria for selecting the cases were to obtain a sample of diverse districts with high and low socioeconomic developments and high and low electoral competitiveness. I focus my study of campaign strategies primarily on the parties with effective national reach in Argentina (Jones and Mainwaring 2003) and the other district relevant parties. Argentina is a country where the income per capita of some districts is three or even four -fold that of others and the effective number of electoral parties in the different provinces varies from 2 to almost 4 (See Calvo et at 2001). Furthermore, Argentine federalism and electoral institutions “place the legislators’ reelection decision not in the hands of the voters, but rather in the hands of the provincial governor/ party boss(es).” (Jones et al 2002, abstract; Jones et al mimeo; De Luca et al 2002) Party leaders in Argentina mostly control the candidate selection, the order in which the members are elected, and the fact that the votes are pooled among all the candidates in the national elections, making party reputation more important than personal reputation for election (Mainwaring and Shugart 1997: 422). The institutional design in Argentina makes for the relevance of party bosses and respective

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9 The number of legislative parties varies from 1 to 6 (Calvo and Murillo 2004).
party machines to explain parties and elected officials’ behavior. Hence, the voter recruitment strategies political parties use are not the product of atomized circumstantial individual electoral efforts, but lasting and organized machines at the municipal and provincial level which have their own local history which tends to be ignored in aggregate national studies.  

I unavoidably focus on the main parties in Argentina: in the first place the Partido Justicialista (PJ) or Peronist Party, and secondly, the Unión Cívica Radical (UCR) or Radical Party. However, I do take into account the parties relevant in specific districts. The PJ has been determinant in shaping Argentina’s politics in the last sixty years. During that period, the party has been classified as all of the following: ideologically heterogeneous, a “policy switcher” (Murillo 2001, Levitsky 2003, Stokes 2001, Weyland 2002), “highly institutionalized” (Jones 1997; Stokes mimeo), “weakly institutionalized” (McGuire 1995; Levitsky 1997), right of center (Alcántara Saez 2004; Coppedge 1999) and center-left (Coppedge 1999). Furthermore, the PJ seems to have concurrent progressive, moderate and conservative leaders (Lisoni mimeo 2005) and is more likely than UCR to target poor voters with “gifts” (Brusco et al 2004). Many variables have been suggested to elucidate this and other apparent contradictions without complete success and this study is also a contribution to explaining that (e.g. Gibson 1997; Ostiguy 1997). Century old Unión Cívica Radical (UCR) or Radical Party is also taken into account in the study, as it is the main party capable of rivaling the PJ power.  

According to Scott (1969) electoral machines, at least in the U.S., flourished not at the national but at the sub-national level.  

Furthermore, in Argentina and Latin America political parties cannot be assumed to be institutionalized or that are not simply the formal stage for a single person’s quest for office (I thank Carlos Melendez for suggesting this clarification). Hence, in Chapter 2 I argue that in order to study voter mobilization strategies we should focus on the “political entrepreneurs” such as candidates, activists, etc. and not necessarily on parties as an actor per se.  

It could be argued that UCR has all but disappeared from the national political scene and that other political organizations represent the hope of opposition to the PJ probably due to the popularity that media based parties and their leaders in places like the city of Buenos Aires have
My goal is that my theory (which is developed in Chapter 2) and findings will be relevant also to the study of the parties' voter mobilization (or recruitment) strategies in the different provincial environments (24 districts), given that the provinces in Argentina are the main political units below the national level. Furthermore, studying the provinces in one country allow me to control for variables and get insights which in an inter-country study may not be feasible. The institutional and socio-economic characteristics of Argentina and the characteristics of the selected districts and political parties increase the probabilities of finding a broad range of cases in this study, and also allow for the use of some of the advantages of the case study approach. The strengths of the case study approach (versus the large-N cross-case studies) are, namely, studies oriented to hypothesis generation, prioritizing internal validity, prioritizing casual mechanisms, the scope of the causal inference are deep, the populations of cases is heterogeneous and the causal relationships of interest is strong. (See Gerring 2007: 37)

I selected a subset of five districts for an in-depth study. These districts constitute a sample of “diverse cases” and were selected for the wide range they represent on the independent variables, here as the Effective Number of Opposition Parties (Gubernatorial/mayoral election of 2003) (see Chapter 2 for the explanation) and Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita respectively (in Argentine Pesos 1996); Capital Federal (0.60; 20,544), Catamarca (0.42; 7,459), Mendoza (0.43; 8,748), Formosa (0.10; on the money rich and vote rich national capital and its metropolitan area. However, the UCR is the only political organization which rivals the PJ in ground level infrastructures, and positions of power to eventually produce good governance. The 2003 and 2005 gubernatorial elections (the most recent ones before my field work in 2006) gave the PJ 14 (58.3%) provinces, the UCR 7 (29.2%) provinces, and the remaining three districts were to each of the Frepaso party and the provincial parties Movimiento Popular Neuquino (Neuquén) and Frente Revolucionario (Misiones). Another indicator of the current relevance of UCR is the number of municipalities it holds. By 2003 out of 1963 elected mayors, at least 1003 (51.1%) were PJ and at least 420 (21.4%) were UCR. The rest belonged to other municipal, provincial and national parties and alliances many of which also were formed by PJ and/or UCR. (Source: Juan Pablo Micozzi database 2009) These UCR municipalities represent the existence of working electoral machines, networks of brokers, voter mobilization infrastructure, etc.

13 In Spanish GDP is “Producto Interno Bruto Interno” (PIB) or the level of economic activity.
(6,206) and Santa Cruz (0.13; 14,207). However, this sample can also be seen as a set of "most similar cases" by matching provinces on one of the independent variables (E.g. Formosa and Santa Cruz on level of electoral competition).

1.3 Data

The main source of data and insight in this dissertation are the 86 interviews to elected public officials on their campaign efforts which are hoped to add up to reveal mechanisms which have eluded political scientists using statistical analyses to try to understand processes as complex as, for example, clientelism from the "supply" side. The other data sources are the content analysis of newspapers and opinion surveys.

1.3.1 The interviews

Field research was conducted in the Provinces of Formosa, Mendoza, Catamarca, Santa Cruz and the city of Buenos Aires (Federal Capital) in Argentina, between March and December 2006. I personally interviewed 86 elected officials. These included mayors, city, provincial and national legislators. These officials were selected with a convenience sampling method. I did not systematically exclude groups. I made three pools from which I selected officials: city council members, mayors, and provincial and national legislators. I did it this way in order to get a fair view from the different political posts and political parties. I also had informal conversations with other elected officials, staff, and citizens who contributed valuable insights to the investigation.

Interviews had as an objective the uncovering of patterns, agreements and differences among officials, to capture the actual workings of the parties in campaigns. These were semi-structured interviews with a list of topics to cover but did not force the order or flow of the conversation. The interviews began with broad questions about the campaign effort by the party, and then moved to the personal effort by the interviewee. I
attempted to make the official make explicit certain points with questions on topics they
touched or phrases and words they themselves would use, but could have been too
contentious to bring up myself (such as clientelism, handing out food to voters, etc).

I used open ended questions because I was interested in tracing meaning and
causal relationships in specific contexts, and only secondarily was I interested in
correlations. The mid size-N of observations in each of the selected electoral districts (14
to 20 interviews) is the evidence to show the completeness of the story, the holistic
account of the campaign strategies in a district. Some data may be contradictory and
show breaks in the story, but those breaks I hope are limited in the eyes of the reader.

The topic areas where I focused my questions included the following: "How do
candidates get nominated?" This helps in the understanding of the relations of power
and the direction of power in the political party. It tells us something about the agency of
the actors and their role in the political structure. "How is the campaign organized and
carried out?" Whether the campaign is centrally or locally organized tells us something
about the autonomy and resources of the actors in a campaign, and also about the
complexity and improvisation of it. In all of these, one hour or longer, interviews, I also
inquired about campaign activities and processes, about the relationship with and use of
the media in campaign, and about the interaction of candidates with other candidates,
militants and especially prospective voters. The answers to these questions yielded
outstanding consistency that helped corroborate the accuracy of the reported findings.
The “consistency” or “agreement” that I refer to relates to the complementarity and
completeness of the accounts. The numerous quotations in this dissertation are used to
exemplify and provide evidence to the main argument.

The correlations observed among the interviewees, even though relevant, are
secondary to the understanding of the processes which a campaign entails. I am
interested in the campaign strategies as “processes of decisions making in contentious
environments.” Table 1.1 shows the classification of interviewees based on their relationship to the provincial ruling party or coalition, and their elective office.

**TABLE 1.1:**
**INTERVIEWS CONDUCTED TO ELECTED OFFICIALS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party of the provincial Governor</th>
<th>PJ Formosa</th>
<th>UCR Catamarca</th>
<th>UCR Mendoza</th>
<th>PJ Santa Cruz</th>
<th>OTHER Capital Federal</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mayor</td>
<td>Ruling party</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Opposition</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>City Legislator</td>
<td>Ruling party</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Opposition</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provincial Legislator</td>
<td>Ruling party</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Opposition</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Legislator</td>
<td>Ruling party</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Opposition</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>15</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Political scientists working in developing countries may be skeptical of the kind of data that interviews to elected officials can provide on topics like clientelism. It is rare for provincial elected officials to be interviewed by academics; most interviews are done by journalists who are usually trying to uncover and expose misdeeds or corruption cases (In fact, this was the case of several elected officials in Formosa in the recent history). Formosa is considered a “backward” peripheral province, and the style of politics used there is viewed with a negative eye by the more progressive citizens and media in the center of the country. It was therefore not always easy to arrange and conduct interviews. However, I was able to audio tape all but two of the 86 interviews.

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14 One strategy I used to get at issues of clientelism when the issue was very contentious was to inquire about the needs people in the district have, and what were the things people requested from him/her (the candidate); in this way it was easier to get at the situations when the candidates hand out benefits to voters.
1.3.2 The content analysis

The second strategy of inquiry involved the content analyses of twelve newspapers published in the districts in the last 15 days of the electoral campaign for the October 2005 legislative elections. I studied campaign advertisements and relevant newspaper articles to determine whether a programmatic, clientelistic, personalistic or performance strategy was being used to win votes. Where the interviews allow for the uncovering of mechanisms and processes in the campaigning, the content analysis of newspapers allows for a broader view of the campaign given that other candidates and minor parties see the newspapers as a more accessible media outlet in terms of monetary costs compared to television; more financially constrained parties use their resources in the last stretch of the campaign and not a long time before when people are not yet focused on the election. Newspapers are also seen as the reference points for later radio and television commentaries, and are also the medium for a more detailed expression of the messages that candidates and editorialists want to convey, compared to radio or television. Another reason why I chose to use the printed paper and not the online version of newspapers is that the online versions rarely reproduce the campaign advertisements and government paid announcements, which also play a role in campaigns. Yet another reason for choosing the printed version of newspapers instead of the online editions is that there is some evidence that people still prefer the printed version. For example, in a survey done in the province of Catamarca by Delfos (December 2006) yielded that, first, 91% of interviewees read newspapers regularly, and that 83.2% of those who do, usually read the paper version of their preferred

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15 These two were indeed in the province of Formosa: PJ mayor of Ibarreta Mr. Dasso and to Pirané council member Mr. Orlando Barslund (UCR). While I was in Formosa, my family members received telephone calls to inquire about me and corroborate that I was a PhD student. I also had interviewees tell me that people could suspect that I belonged to the media, or even the secret services. In some cases it took me an hour of prelude talk to be able to ease the anxiety of the officials or staffs.
newspapers (only 3.4% read the online version, and 4% read both equally). For all these reasons, the content analysis of these 12 newspapers becomes a relatively important and independent source of data vis a vis the interviews.¹⁶

The newspapers I selected for the analysis are: from the city of Buenos Aires, Clarín and La Nación; from the province of Formosa, La Mañana, El Comercial, and Opinión Ciudadana; from Catamarca, El Ancasti and La Unión; from Mendoza, Los Andes and El Sol; and, from Santa Cruz, La Opinión Austral, Tiempo Sur and, La Prensa de Santa Cruz. When I was in the provinces I made an informal assessment on the relevance of the local newspapers by interviewing people. These newspapers were hence chosen because they are among the most circulated and relevant in the districts. Those newspapers from Buenos Aires are national newspapers, the rest tend to limit their distribution to their provinces. The series of fifteen days before the election is not complete for all the newspapers (some issues could not be accessed and some had to be photocopied because they were not available in the original format).

Four Argentine university students coded the newspapers. Newspapers were coded to evaluate campaign advertisements and campaign articles. I also study other advertisements which are not explicitly electoral but which also influence the campaign (for example, government publications about its performance, a union’s endorsement of a candidate, etc.). Some of the questions considered regarding the analyzed advertisements and articles are: What kind of messages did they have? Did they have pictures of the candidates? Were candidates present with the governor while opening public works? How did candidates refer to the governor/mayor/rival candidates while

¹⁶ I chose to study newspapers for the reasons given above; however, I acknowledge the importance of radio and television in campaigns. Local radio stations are particularly important for local level candidates with fewer resources, and the television is mainly used by more resourceful national and provincial level campaigns. Nevertheless, it would be dauntingly complicated to collect audio and video samples in the selected districts, and it would be a very limited and biased sample.
campaigning (positively, negatively or in a neutral manner)? What proposals (if any) did candidates announce (as reported in the articles)? The goal of the codification was to measure the evidence (on each of the analyzed pieces) of the existence of the campaign mobilization strategies studied here.

The data from the content analysis do not provide statistically significant conclusions, but illustrate typicalities in the campaigns which are also coherent with the campaign strategy types prevalent in the districts. These data is also evidence for the arguments of mechanisms involved in the campaign strategies. Finally, the content analysis data is a source for further hypotheses on topics of campaigns and elections.

1.3.3 The opinion surveys

Finally, I used opinion surveys to study the “demand side” of the equation, or the voters. This is to see the correspondence of what the parties are doing in a district to what the voters are saying. The interviews and content analyses provide evidence of what could be called the “supply side” of the campaigns, and the surveys are a reflection of the “demand side”. I was able to access the following surveys; From Carlos Fara & Asociados: Formosa (2002), Nacional –including the province of Mendoza- (October 2007) and Río Gallegos –capital of Santa Cruz- (October 2007); From Delfos: Catamarca (December 2006); and, from Analogías: Capital Federal. (2003)

1.4 Methods

In this dissertation I explore and test the four types of voter mobilization strategies. I explore whether, how and why these four voter mobilization strategies are central to campaigns in the five studied districts.

\[^{17} \text{I provide more information on the survey data beginning in Chapter 3.} \]
My dissertation attempts to bridge the divide which separates quantitative and qualitative types of research; variable oriented research and case oriented research; research which emphasizes generality versus complexity; large-N versus small-n. Charles Ragin (2000) argues that “despite the many interdependencies and complementarities of case-oriented and variable-oriented research…there are very good reason to expect disjunctures in the knowledge they produce” (p. 30). In variable-oriented research the cases leave center stage to the variables when the researcher computes a correlation; in comparative case studies the cases are chosen because of their significance or theoretical relevance. The construction of the representation of social phenomena also differs for how outcomes are viewed in these two types of research. In correlational studies the researcher identifies a “dependent variable” which must vary across cases, to explain why it varies, and it is assessed relative to the average of all cases (central tendency measures); in comparative case studies the outcome often does not vary substantially. The focus is on cases with specific outcomes (e.g. revolutions), and this type of research is concerned with the question how. Finally, the way both types of approaches view causation also differs; in correlational studies causes are inferred from a pattern of covariation, trying to find out which variable explains the most variation in the outcome variable. Here the independent variables compete with each other to explain variation. In comparative case studies causation is viewed as a combination of conditions. The same causal conditions may even yield different outcomes and the researcher must, with in depth knowledge, elucidate how sets of conditions yield certain outcomes.

My dissertation is a comparative case study and embarks on a mixed methods approach with a particular stress on descriptive inference (See Lieberman 2005). The dissertation combines qualitative and quantitative analyses to test the hypotheses and implications of the theory presented in Chapter 2. The strategy of inquiry to triangulate
data has as a central pillar the interviews of elected officials of different posts and parties in the five selected districts. Second, I look for consistency in my argument with the content analyses of newspapers. Finally, to triangulate the data sources, I look for consistent evidence in the statistical analysis of public opinion surveys.

In a sense, however, the first step in the dissertation could be classified as a “Nested analysis” given that I focus on a small-n analysis of a larger data set of Argentine provinces (or larger if we consider the universe of provincial or state polities in federal countries); I derive hypotheses and expectation from a theory based on assumptions and the existing literature; I select the cases on the independent variables, leading to a model testing research. However, my main data source, the semistructured interviews, allows not only for the testing of the model but for the further specification and correction of it.

1.4.1 Fuzzy sets

The second step in the dissertation is the formation of “fuzzy-sets” which correspond to the voter mobilization strategies (See Ragin 2000). Fuzzy-sets are different from the conventional “crisp sets” used in social sciences in which membership to a set is mutually exclusive. The cases in crisp sets either belong or do not belong to a set of cases. Crisp sets need not be binary. Even in multichotomies (where more than one variable is used to determine membership to a set of cases), members either belong to the set (getting a score of 1) or do not belong to the set (getting a score of 0). The idea behind fuzzy sets is that there could be partial or “fuzzy” membership. A score of 1 indicates full membership to the set, a score of 0 indicates full non-membership to the set. Cases with a score of .5 are neither more in nor more out of the set (for example, of districts
where clientelism is relevant as an electoral campaign strategy). Scores between .5 and 1 indicate strong but partial membership to the set, more “in” than “out” (e.g. .7 and .8). Cases between 0 and .5 indicate weak membership to the set (e.g. .2 and .3), cases are more “out” than “in” a set. The values of the set must be carefully and substantively calibrated. For this reason, the calibration of the four “centrality to campaigns of clientelism/ personalism/ performance/ programmatic voter mobilization strategy” sets is finalized after each strategic type is analyzed in the four different competitive and socioeconomic environments. Fuzzy-set techniques emphasize degree of membership in theoretically defined sets, and not levels relative to a sample data (Ragin 2000: 270).

In order to determine the type of fuzzy-set I consider the definition of the set (i.e. for example “the centrality to campaigns of personalism as a voter mobilization strategy”) and the type of data available since “it would be pointless to create fine-grained distinctions that are theoretically irrelevant” (Ragin 2000: 167). Hypothetically there could be continuous fuzzy-sets and not just two or three values. What makes fuzzy-sets so special is that the values of the membership are qualitatively anchored. I use five-value fuzzy-sets when possible, and three-value sets when the quality of data does not allow further differentiation. In this manner the values of a five-value fuzzy-set would be 1 for a full membership, 0.75 for a strong but partial membership to the set, 0.5 for the cases in which there is complete ambiguity whether they belong or not to the set, 0.25 for a weak membership to the set, and 0 for cases of non-membership to the set.

This is not a mere rank ordering of categories relative to each other, where all cases either belong or do not belong to the set. This method allows for the interplay between evidence and theory (Ragin 2000). New cases can refine concepts and theory. This method is useful when one has different sources of data, different types of data, or data which is qualitative in nature.
The three sources of data (the in-depth interviews, the content analysis of newspapers and the people's surveys) complement for the relative weakness of each to testing the theory. However, the main goal of the approach is to uncover meaning and causal relations in the adoption of campaign strategies, not simple correlations. For example, the relationship between income and democracy has been well established, however, a ten thousand dollar per capita difference between two countries in the top end of the spectrum of cases (say 35,000 and 25,000 dollars per capital) tell us a different story about, for example, “the quality of democracy”, than the difference between the same amount of money in the bottom end (say 500 and 10,500 dollars). The proper evaluation of the effect of income on democracy should be substantively informed (not be just a mere correlation). For this reason, the full membership or partial membership to a set of “high quality democracies” or “low quality democracies” (whatever these categories may mean) should be qualitatively anchored. We may find out that “high quality democracies” have an income per capita above 15,000 dollars and that “low quality democracies” have an income per capita between 500 and 2,000 dollars. Each breakpoint in the five-value fuzzy-set should have an explicit rationale.

As the example above shows, one important advantage of fuzzy-sets is that it ignores irrelevant variation for theoretical formulations in the sets. The difference between two highly developed countries, one with an income per capita of 35,000 and another with 30,000 is theoretically irrelevant for the study of the quality of democracy, compared to the difference between a country with 500 and another with 5,500 dollars per capita. With fuzzy-set theories, the concepts should apply with full force to those

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18 Scholars using quantitative tools often use natural log in this cases. However, the natural log here is a convention and is also arbitrary. On the other hand, fuzzy-set breakpoints have substantive knowledge, and the argument of each of the breakpoints is in the arguments and evidence of this dissertation. Using natural log would be arbitrary and probably useless for my data and type of analyses. Still, natural log is a conventional tool when social scientists have quantitative data and must simplify reality in their analyses.
cases in a given set--hence, the importance of determining the theoretically relevant qualitative breakpoints of the different values.

I then define the four different strategy sets as a combination of factors. These enabling factors (e.g. “availability of material and human resources to perform clientelistic tactics”) have themselves characteristic attributes and observable indicators. The attributes and indicators of the concepts to be evaluated (i.e. the four voter mobilization strategy sets) are often themselves qualitative in kind, such as evaluations or relationships. These attributes, then, are also “fuzzyfied” when necessary or measured for qualitative distinctions as enabling the outcome concept (e.g. “centrality to campaigns of clientelism…”) to occur. However, the attributes are also differentiated with nominal and ordinal categories. Below there is an example of ordinally differentiating an attribute of the concept “the centrality to campaigns of clientelism as a voter mobilization strategy in a district.”

TABLE 1.2:
EXAMPLE OF CAUSAL FACTOR’S ATTRIBUTE: OCCURRENCE OF PERSONALIZED AND PARTICULARISTIC CAMPAIGN TACTICS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1</th>
<th>0.66</th>
<th>0.33</th>
<th>0</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Often</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not often/ occasionally</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unusually</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Never or very rarely</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: How often do highly personalized campaign tactics entailing the actual delivery of particularistic benefits occur?

The four scores (1, 0.66, 0.33 and 0) are decided based on the quality of the data gathered and because it would be theoretically irrelevant to make more differentiation for this attribute. Other concept attributes may be more or less differentiated. All the different attributes’ values are meant to have substantive difference which will allow
researchers a clear scoring of cases. In the end each case has a simple average of the list of attributes’ scores which is crucial for assigning the case its proper place in the fuzzy-set. My choice of values for these attributes was significantly based on the theory in Chapter 2, the hypotheses and the research. Particular characteristics and combinations of similar factors could yield similar or different attributes score averages, hence the importance of settling the qualitatively anchored breakpoints to assign cases to set values (the substantive chapters detailed the respective Fuzzy-set breakpoints).

We should not then be deceived by the appealing range of score averages that the attributes’ tables in each of the substantive chapters present, and the possibilities that could present for quantitative type of analyses, because again, the attributes of the concept measured here are not weighed (or a default equal weight is assumed), and are only an instrument for the appropriate placing in the five-value Fuzzy-set. For example, the clientelism attributes’ average score of 0 for the case of Capital Federal does not mean that there is no clientelism in the district. It does mean, however, that we should place the district with a value of 0 in the fuzzy-set where clientelism is definitively not central to campaigns as a voter mobilization strategy. Hence, cases having similar attributes’ score averages could not realistically be ranked, and should instead be considered cases of the same type.

In chapter 3, continuing with the example, we find the following clientelism attributes score averages: Catamarca 1, Formosa 0.87, Santa Cruz 0.58, Mendoza 0.32 and Capital Federal 0. Hence, having a five-value Fuzzy-set forces us to decide where to place the Fuzzy-set breakpoints (0, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75 and 1) and the breakpoints of the range of attributes’ averages (0.13, 0.38, 0.63, and 0.88) –See Figure 1.1. In other words, the five cases studied here should get the following qualitatively anchored values because they fall within the breakpoint ranges: Catamarca, 1; Formosa, 0.75; Santa Cruz, 0.5; Mendoza, 0.25; and Capital Federal, 0.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Capital Federal</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mendoza</td>
<td>0.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Santa Cruz</td>
<td>0.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Formosa</td>
<td>0.87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catamarca</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Definitively not central | Probably not central | May or may not be central | Probably central | Definitively central

0 | 0.13 | 0.25 | 0.38 | 0.5 | 0.63 | 0.75 | 0.88 | 1

**Figure 1.1: Fuzzy-Set Placement of Cases Based on the Concept Attributes’ Score Averages**

Both the cut off points in the indicators used in measurement and to the fuzzy-set breakpoints are obviously arbitrary, and it is good that they are. The judgment to make those cuts is based on substantive knowledge (in the method there is interplay between the theory and the evidence)\(^\text{19}\). There should be cut off points only when it makes sense to include them.

At a minimum we have the values 1 and 0 but then, provided we have evidence and substantive knowledge, it makes sense to have intermediate cut off points; when it is evident that there is a meaningful difference which is not 1 (“a case definitively belongs in the set” —when talking about the fuzzy-set) or 0 (“a case is out of the set”). For example, the values 0.33 or 0.66 in a fuzzy-set are arbitrary, I could use verbal labels for those (in the chapters I do, too); it does not mean that the “substantive distance” between the values of 0 and 0.33 is the same as 0.33 and 0.66, etc.; that is, “a case with a value of 0.33 in a set is half as “democratic or clientelistic, etc” as a case with a value of 0.66”.

The actual cases compare to the theoretically defined set, or the degree of membership in that set; e.g. “the centrality to campaigns of clientelism as a strategy”.

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\(^\text{19}\) The fuzzy-set values “allows for the interplay between evidence and theory.” This instrument can be improved with further case studies. New cases can refine concepts and theory.
The breakpoints in the fuzzy-set should be there when we find important, relevant qualitative distinctions.\(^{20}\)

The measure of the indicators or attributes of the dependent variable can give us for example numbers 0.33, 0.34 and 0.66, but then we have to place cases in the different fuzzy-set values. Let’s say the fuzzy-set values are “clientelism is NOT central to campaigns (value 0)”, “probably not central (0.33)”, “probably central (0.66)” and “definitively central to campaigns (1)”. We cannot simply take the average score number of the indicators and translate it into a fuzzy-set value; one reason is that the way we measure the indicators can alter the ultimate average score number (an attribute/indicator can have 2, 3, 4, 5 values, etc. only if it is meaningful to do that differentiation in an indicator) hence that would affect the average score number of a case. Also one indicator/attribute could not necessarily be of equal weight than another, or it could be theoretically more important. That is why we cannot simply place the case in a fuzzy-set value by looking at the average score number of the indicators/ attributes. However, the scoring of indicators and the average score number should approximate or reflect the fuzzy-set numerical values.

The fuzzy-set breakpoints in chapters 3, 4 and 6 have a reason; cases that fall in one value are significantly different from cases falling in another value; it is not just a matter of degree, but a matter of kind. There are qualitative distinctions why the clientelism in Catamarca is different than the clientelism in Formosa, or in Mendoza. There are, of course, differences in degrees/quantities (e.g. amount of resources used, etc), but it is not just that, there are also qualitative differences in the type of

\(^{20}\) In any case I think it is more meaningful to say that “clientelism is probably not central to campaigns in x district” (and argue and present evidence to what it means), than to say “a case scores 0.27 in the set of cases where clientelism is central to campaigns” – I use this second way, however, when I take the 4 strategy sets as only two-value sets when estimating the cases’ membership in the 16 campaign types at the end of chapter 7.
relationships among patron-broker-clients that are different that make clientelism as a strategy be central to campaigns (reflected in the fuzzy-set breakpoints).

The indicators’ average score cannot, by itself, determine the case placement in a fuzzy-set; a good judgment by the case expert should also be used.

1.5 Voter Mobilization Strategy Types

The fuzzy-set approach allows me to improve the view of cases as configurations or as combinations of qualitative attributes for the constitutions of populations and types. Having two “crisply define sets” would yield four types or property-space locations (e.g. a case scoring “High” in “Clientelism as a voter mobilization strategy” and “Low” in “Personalism as a voter mobilization strategy”). Now, with fuzzy-set I am able to determine the degree of membership of the case in said property space (Figure 1.2).

Figure 1.2: Hypothetical Two-Dimensional Property Space Showing “Clientelism as a Voter Mobilization Strategy” Against “Personalism as a Voter Mobilization Strategy”
The property space locations correspond to the combination of full membership (membership score = 1) and full nonmembership (membership score = 0) in the four voter mobilization strategy fuzzy-sets of the property space. In other words in this study there would be 16 property spaces or types (See Table 1.3). Many of these hypothetical locations of the property space may not have real world examples. In set theory this is used to derive fewer combinations with more groups of cases. For example, if no cases where found for the combination “high clientelism-personalism-programmatic and low performance” and the combination “high clientelism-personalism-programmatic and high performance”, then these combinations could be joined into the more inclusive combination “high clientelism-personalism-programmatic”. “The end result is a reduction of the hypothetical combination in a property space to a concise statement describing the limits on diversity that exists within it”. (Ragin 2000: 83)

In the concluding chapter the different set memberships of the districts (one for each campaign strategy) yields a number of theoretically possible campaign types’ scenarios for which there may or may not be real world examples –that could be determined with further research. Finally, the model is refined in order to explain campaign strategies as set relations of causal conditions. Its testing with new cases, however, is outside of the scope of this study.
TABLE 1.3:
HYPOTHETICAL COMBINATION OF FOUR-DIMENSIONAL PROPERTY SPACE
WITH FOUR DICHOTOMIES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Combination No.</th>
<th>Clientelism</th>
<th>Personalism</th>
<th>Programmatic</th>
<th>Performance</th>
<th>Hypothetical Empirical Instance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>HIGH</td>
<td>HIGH</td>
<td>HIGH</td>
<td>HIGH</td>
<td>?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>HIGH</td>
<td>HIGH</td>
<td>HIGH</td>
<td>LOW</td>
<td>?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>HIGH</td>
<td>HIGH</td>
<td>LOW</td>
<td>HIGH</td>
<td>Santa Cruz</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>HIGH</td>
<td>LOW</td>
<td>LOW</td>
<td>LOW</td>
<td>Formosa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>HIGH</td>
<td>LOW</td>
<td>HIGH</td>
<td>HIGH</td>
<td>?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>HIGH</td>
<td>LOW</td>
<td>HIGH</td>
<td>LOW</td>
<td>?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>HIGH</td>
<td>LOW</td>
<td>LOW</td>
<td>HIGH</td>
<td>Catamarca</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>HIGH</td>
<td>LOW</td>
<td>LOW</td>
<td>LOW</td>
<td>?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>LOW</td>
<td>HIGH</td>
<td>HIGH</td>
<td>HIGH</td>
<td>Capital Federal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>LOW</td>
<td>HIGH</td>
<td>HIGH</td>
<td>LOW</td>
<td>?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>LOW</td>
<td>HIGH</td>
<td>LOW</td>
<td>HIGH</td>
<td>?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>LOW</td>
<td>HIGH</td>
<td>LOW</td>
<td>LOW</td>
<td>?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>LOW</td>
<td>LOW</td>
<td>HIGH</td>
<td>HIGH</td>
<td>Mendoza</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>LOW</td>
<td>LOW</td>
<td>HIGH</td>
<td>LOW</td>
<td>?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>LOW</td>
<td>LOW</td>
<td>LOW</td>
<td>HIGH</td>
<td>?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>LOW</td>
<td>LOW</td>
<td>LOW</td>
<td>LOW</td>
<td>?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1.6 Dissertation overview

In this dissertation I explore the mechanisms by which parties in a district embark on a specific campaign strategy. I look at the actual workings of the actors in the campaigns. I do not have preconceptions about tradeoffs among voter mobilization strategies. This dissertation develops a method to systematically measure the centrality to campaigns of the voter mobilization strategies in districts.
The research question I explore here, then, is how do political parties mobilize voters? The premise behind this research is that the type and intensity of the adoption of a mobilization strategy to a large extent are influenced by the socioeconomic characteristics of the electorate and the level of electoral competition in the district.\footnote{These variables are also the focus of an edited book by Kitschelt and Wilkinson (2007).} This research provides further evidence to commonly held assumptions and limited research made by scholars in the relatively new field of Argentine Comparative Politics in regards to subnational politics, party bosses and nomination incentives (See for e.g. Jones et al 2002: 657-8). This study may also help in the development of new ways of understanding incentives of politicians in developing democracies. If we do not know the right questions to tackling social problems/phenomena we will not know where to look for relevant answers; relevant to us and to society. Digging deeper into the cases is a way to making better, more relevant questions.

In Chapter 2, I elaborate on the conceptual characterization of political parties I adopt and I detail the theoretical framework to understand the voter mobilization strategies. I also expand on the study’s hypotheses and criteria for the cases selection. Chapters 3, 4, 5 and 6 deal substantively with the clientelistic, programmatic, personalistic and performance voter mobilization strategies.

Each of the substantive chapters begin with a conceptualization of the type of mobilization strategy; hypotheses based on the theory in Chapter 2; a list of attributes of the concept to be study in each chapter, that is “the centrality to campaigns of the voter mobilization strategy type in the district”, and observable indicators; I also score the cases on those attributes and indicators; I elaborate the fuzzy-set breakpoints for the strategy type studied, or the qualitatively anchored values for determining levels of set membership, thanks to which we will be able to determine partial memberships to score...
the cases; I later present the evidence gathered by developing the cases in the remainder of the chapter; finally, I end each chapter with a characterization of the analyses to more parsimoniously understand the relevant causal mechanisms.

I argue that parties and candidates act to win or do well in elections, but that the strategies they embark on are not necessarily deliberate or conscious. The strategies might be a learning process; one action leads to another, action and reaction in the specific environment. The naming and classification of strategies is a heuristic work. I hypothesize that each of the districts I selected are closer or further away from the types in each of the strategic types (e.g. the Argentine province of Formosa and personalistic strategy, the province of Catamarca and clientelistic strategy, etc.). In each of the chapters, then, I disentangle the campaigns to elucidate the strategy of the most illustrative main case, and then consider the remaining cases with respect to that one strategy and evaluate its relevance, mechanisms, nuances, etc.

In Chapter 3 I hence focus on the case of Catamarca and the relevance of the machine clientelism as a strategy; then I consider the case of Formosa where clientelism plays an important role but in this province it is the personalized clientelism type which is more relevant; I finally refer to the provinces of Santa Cruz, Mendoza and Capital Federal to show how (little) clientelism plays a role in campaigns. In this chapter I differentiate clientelism based on the type of interaction and how the relationships are constructed and maintained between the patron, the broker and the client.

In Chapter 4 I refer to the “programmatic strategy” to mobilize voters. I conclude that this strategic type is not distinctively more important than the others in any one district. However, it does share centrality with other strategic types in the district of Capital Federal. In this chapter, as in the others, there are several important factors to understand the voter mobilization strategy which particularly include specific party organizational resources (e.g. to draft campaign platforms), checks on the party leader’s
power and the expected degree of personalization of programmatic-type tactics. After considering the case of Capital Federal, I refer to the remaining districts.

In Chapter 5 I focus on the case of Formosa, and to a different extent Capital Federal, to develop the argument for a personalistic strategy to win votes. In the first case the environment and the tactics lead to a personalism of the “charismatic/paternalistic type”, whereas in the latter it is of a “technical/expert type”. In this chapter I stress the significance of the candidate nomination processes and needed compromises as an important factor to understand the relative relevance of the candidates and party leaders in campaigns above the party as a whole. I conclude the chapter with references to how the “personalistic strategy” plays a role in the remaining districts.

In Chapter 6 I refer to the incumbent’s performance campaign strategy and show its primordial relevance in the province of Santa Cruz. This strategy type plays a central role to campaigns in all districts but has a larger significance in this Patagonian district’s campaigns. The degree of institutionalization of conflict between the civil society and the political elites and how conflict is channeled plays a role as a factor as well. Chapter 7 reconsiders and further specifies the theory and concludes.
2.1 Introduction

Political parties and candidates make use of certain tactics during campaigns because they think they are effective, ultimately, to win votes. Whether they are actually effective or not is (for now) secondary; one could presume that if parties won seats or a mandate, their strategies were effective in campaigns. Furthermore, officials themselves have opinions about the effectiveness of certain tactics, which may be presumed to have at least some factual basis. But, how does it get done? What are the mechanisms and what are the decision making processes that lead to these tactics and strategies to be adopted? In this chapter I lay the bases for an explanation of the mechanism which will be developed in the subsequent chapters.

In this chapter I develop the theoretical framework necessary to understand the strategies to mobilize voters used by parties in specific districts. First, I clarify some conceptual points on how to understand political parties and the actors with agency in the campaign process. Here I stress the role of the “political entrepreneur” in campaigns who may not only be candidates, but also include political activists, brokers and patrons, all with agency to affect the development of the campaigns. Then, I develop and differentiate the types of mobilization strategies. I initially introduce the parties’ voter mobilization strategies as dependent variables to later understand them as combination of factors. Later, I develop the independent variables which were used to select the
cases (electoral competitiviness and socioeconomic characteristics of the district).

Shortly after, I set up the hypotheses to be tested. Finally, I expand on the criteria and methodology for the provincial cases selection.

2.2 Political parties

I study “voter mobilization strategies” in electoral campaigns. Political parties are at the center of this study given that they monopolize the access that citizens have to elective public office. In Argentina parties nominate candidates and candidates must run with a party label; all candidates must be endorsed by a party. Political parties are then important to the study of democracy, and particularly to the study of electoral campaigns. The conception we have of political parties in turn affects the way we go along studying voter mobilization strategies because it affects where and what we look into.

One of the classical debates on political parties is whether political parties should be seen as collective actors with clear goals and agency in themselves (as A. Downs - 1957- sees them) or whether parties should be studied as groups of individuals with agency who use the party to carry their electoralist interests forward (e.g. Aldrich 1995). In addition, in the literature there are two broad approaches to understand the individual actor’s behavior; the “rational choice” and the “organizational” approaches.

From the “rationalist” camp John Aldrich says in “Why Parties?” (1995) that political parties are just the instruments, formed by politicians to solve collective action problems and social choice problems;\(^\text{22}\) for example, strategic politicians subsidize cost for prospective voters. Aldrich does not view parties as holders of principles (like Sartori -1976- would argue). The actors in this approach are individuals (candidates, party leaders, legislators) and not collectives (like parties). The actors’ goals are simple, clear

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\(^{22}\) These concepts have been developed in the US Congress literature regarding committees and institutional maintenance actors, for example. (See Meyhew 1974, Fenno 1978, Krehbeil 1991, Cox and McCubbins 1986, among others)
and transitive (an actor does not have contradictory goals). Finally, a specific arrangement of the independent variables can precisely measure the dependent variables’ values (see Carey and Shugart 1995: 434), in studies where the environments are accounted, measured and controlled for.

For the “organizational” approach, it is insufficient to look at the system level; one also needs to look within political parties in order to understand actors’ behavior. These studies, like Levitsky’s (2003) on the Peronist party in Argentina, are able to avoid some of the limitations which Rationalists impose upon themselves to truly tap into the crucial issues of politics. Panebianco’s (1988) perspective is one in which “the dynamics of the struggle for power within an organization…offer the key for understanding its functioning, as well as the changes it undergoes” (p. xii). He develops an approach that treats political parties from the vantage point of the theory of complex organizations (p. xvi). The party itself produces organizational inequalities, which is one of the sources of internal party conflict.

Whereas Panebianco identifies a series of opposing needs that the party must counterbalance, or organizational dilemmas, for “the rational choice model” organizations are instruments for the realization of specific goals. To rationalists like Aldrich (1995), the organization’s internal arrangement is comprehensible only in light of these goals (p. 6-7). On the other hand, to Panebianco, the “real” aims of an organization are never determined a priori and the goal of a party is never the simple maximization of votes, as some “rationalists” claim. Second, a plurality of aims is often pursued within an organization, sometimes as many as there are actors in the organization. The “organizational aims” are but the effect derived from the simultaneous pursuit of particular aims by the different actors. The “official” aims cannot be reduced to a mere façade, and they continue to influence the organization.
The view of political parties as unified actors (e.g. Downs 1957) is only useful in broad theoretical terms and in cases in which there is complete coordination and coherence among individual actors within the party. In order to find coherence there needs to be similarities of interests, goals and approaches to dealing with those individuals’ needs (Aldrich); hence, “ideology” would be one of the key terms for this situation where goals and means are established. Coordination presupposes a leadership role of one or many over the rest and obedience to that leadership. In one theoretical extreme, however, the desires of the leaders equate the party’s and hence the party and its leader are the same. However, it is not very fruitful to devote effort theorizing on parties as unified actors, a concept which finds little reflection in reality because people indeed have different individual goals.

Kitschelt (1989) takes a more schematic approach to the position of parties as complex organizations. To Kitschelt, parties are conflict systems with subcoalitions of activists (ideologues, lobbyists, and pragmatists) advocating a variety of different strategies and even contradicting goals. Parties are not only concerned with electoral vote maximization, they also communicate and have ties with the state, with civil society and its organizations aside from the electoral contests (Kitschelt 1989: 46-7). Kitschelt’s view of parties is closer to how I consider parties in this study; however in his view it goes beyond the party’s role in campaigns and elections which is the focus of this study.

Ultimately, I see parties as instruments for political entrepreneurs. Parties have a value in themselves, though; ideologies, traditions and history also give them value in themselves and an identity to their members, making them not just a simple instrumental resource. Parties become the main asset for candidates with expectations of winning important elections. The party’s history also constrains individuals because it is costly to
them to move against or leave the institution. Nevertheless, the center of the analysis should also include the goals of individuals. These goals of individuals are not just winning votes, although this is a primary goal, particularly of politicians and candidates. However, I focus this study on electoral campaign strategies, where the major goal is winning votes; hence, this is a central goal of individuals in this study.

In the absence or weakness of coherence and coordination among members, we cannot effectively talk about parties as agents. The internal heterogeneity forces us to explore the individual leaders in order to make sense of the actions of the “party”; without disregarding the collective nature of parties. Also, parties in a federal system, where local subpolities hold domains of political power, are likely to have more diverse strategies than parties in a centralized polity or environmentally homogeneous districts.

Parties acting to access power in democracies may be very permeable to voters' demands. Parties which face a credible sanction from society may change their ways in order to select candidates and policy positions in a diverse country. Given this characterization of parties, one must acknowledge the possibility that heterogeneous leaders in diverse districts may resort to different strategies to win elections. Parties may display a wide range of activities to win elections. These activities may be orchestrated from a central campaign authority or may be isolated, or autonomous.

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23 For example, the Peronist party cannot be fully appropriated by any group of politicians; Peronism transcended the party framework and belongs to the infinite interpretations of the supporters of Peronism. That is how we find fervent Peronists acting in other parties or simple citizens who at times do not recognize the Peronist party authorities as legitimately Peronist.

24 Winning votes may also be an intermediate goal of some actors who have other goals in mind, like a job, or benefit.

25 In fact, the notion of studying voter mobilization strategies through the action of “political entrepreneurs” and not political parties as such, is a more comprehensive approach which ponders the political ambitions in places where electoral campaigns are basically the candidate’s effort, and also contemplates (from a lower level of abstraction) places where political parties have an entity and value as such.

26 Smaller parties may actually be less permeable to society given the smaller and more homogeneous scope of their electorates; hence, they are interested in keeping the loyalists. (See Kitschelt 1999)
One other crucial function of political parties that I consider in order to understand campaign strategies is the nomination of candidates to elective office. As Schattschneider (1975) notes, “[t]he nature of the nominating procedure determines the nature of the party; he who can make nominations is the owner of the party.”27 In this respect, De Luca et al (2002) provide us with an insightful study of a highly decentralized case that falls into their non-institutionalized category: Argentina. They conclude that the decision to nominate candidates through direct primary elections, assembly elections or elite appointments depend on the political context of the party at hand in the district at hand. Independent variables like whether the Governor (and usually provincial party boss) is authorized to run for reelection, whether the national party elites support the same candidates as the provincial elites or whether the party is governing the province or is in the opposition are all important to predict the probability of a party deciding for a specific candidate nomination procedure in this decentralized party system.28 (Also see Jones et al 2001.)29 Basically, nomination systems like those in Argentina mean more complex systems since, even though they may still have formal and informal rules and procedures like in the institutionalized cases30, we need to comprehend other factors to anticipate their actual functioning.31

28 “Decentralized” here refers to the autonomy of the party organizations in each province to decide their internal procedures without interference from the national party leaders.
30 An example of an “institutionalized” candidate nomination system is the United States; where the established rules are followed and are always assumed to be that way.
31 De Luca et al’s study was based on the National Deputies (Representatives) alone, and not other elected offices, and again, it is a correlational analysis. Since I study campaign strategies in a district, I will consider the nomination criteria for all types of office, especially since mid-term national legislative elections where in many districts parties only campaign for two or three seats, are not the most contested elections and are not representative of the districts’ campaign strategies (studying national deputies only has the convenient advantage of their being all in the same building in Congress and their large quantity).
Nationalized parties in Argentina are decentralized, with their hubs in the provinces. I focus on individuals, who may have multiple particular goals, but since I study campaign voter mobilization strategies, winning votes is the prime goal of political parties and candidates. Since parties are decentralized, the different districts are able to nominate candidates and campaign on their own. The campaigns of the candidates for different levels of government (local, provincial and national) may hence overlap.

The actors in the parties in campaign are the politicians, party members and activists; people who, through politics, with public and private means and in the public sphere try to maximize their benefits. Hence, political parties are organizations that, among other things, compete for votes, but the political entrepreneurs are the main actors. The party as a collective actor, with traditions, ideology, with a value in itself is present at all times but it affects or structures the individual actors behavior differently depending on whether the party is mostly active as a campaign period organization or through the off campaign periods as well (as the Peronist party in Argentina).

What is necessary in a party is the agency of individual actors. In some cases the agency may include only one prominent charismatic leader, but most often, and particularly in the case of Argentina, there is a multiplicity of leaders at the different levels of the political and party power structure, from governors to neighborhood party brokers who are free to choose tactics which we, as observers, interpret as the larger party strategy. These agents control resources and put them to work with specific goals. (Even though these goals may be loosely defined or coordinated)

The federal institutional structure of Argentina makes nationalized parties and their party members, like the Peronist party, focus their loyalties and accountability around the provincial governors (in the case of the incumbent parties). This causes the national parties to be relatively weak as an organization nationally, but relatively strong as an organization within each of the provinces in which there is a powerful figure like a
governor of that party. Or more simply, political parties in the provinces (and their governors) have or cultivate a provincial pride and identity of their own.

This apparent “loyalty” or support to governors and party leaders is not necessarily because of coherence on programs or projects, but because the governors control the distribution of much needed resources to the rest of the political actors in the district. Contrary to some literature (e.g. Jones 1997), political party discipline (in order to secure a future political post/candidacy) may be to either the president or the governor (or both). But it is rare for legislators not to have a political boss; everyone needs a padrino (or political sponsor) who is crucial for the nomination of the candidate and for him to have a feasible campaign. In fact, as we will see, there is a mutual assistance; the lower tiers work closer to the people for votes while the upper tier (governor) pays or supports with resources. If later a new leader gives more resources than the former one, then the lower tier agents may shift “loyalties” or support. Politicians with an independent resource base (monetary or political) are the ones more likely to challenge higher offices or powers; governors may dream of becoming president, and mayors of major cities of becoming governors by challenging the incumbents.

It is true that electoral goals and ambitions are not the only ones held by parties and politicians; politicians may want to move forward societal as well as personal projects, and parties form for reasons beyond competing for votes. However, democracy makes them gather supporting votes from citizens every so often and in this dissertation I study how political entrepreneurs and their parties struggle to do so.

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32 Some mayors, for example, may keep loyalty to outgoing leaders, but eventually they will have to bring themselves up to date to keep receiving the necessary support from above, and hence be able to keep the support of their own electorate.
The most relevant political parties I consider in this dissertation are the Peronist and the Radical parties. These two parties were the most important political parties of the twentieth century in Argentina and are still the most important ones in the twenty-first. The PJ has 3.6 million party members and the UCR has 2.5 million party members, in a country where more than 8 million people, or 30% of the electorate, are registered as party members. (source: Cámara Nacional Electoral 2008)

2.3 Theoretical Framework

In a democracy, elections are the primary way by which most parties get power. In order to win elections, politicians and parties try to get the peoples’ votes by different means. Parties can attempt to win votes with programmatic and ideological stands, or with benefits in exchange for people’s votes. Middle class voters may be more appealed to by coherent programmatic stands than by minor gifts which may have more influence on lower income classes. Some groups of the electorate may be the “exclusive domain” of a party because of loyalty, resources, etc. (core supporters), but others may be up for grabs and be the turf of competition among parties (swing voters) - See Fenno 1978; Cox and McCubbins 1986. Hence, parties adapt their voter recruitment strategies

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33 In these particular parties there is a gravitational force that keeps members together or close, particularly the older party members, or those who have party or office positions; many times these are undefined, unspecific goals as a society, individual family traditions or life experiences. In Peronism it is social justice and a loyalty to the working classes, even thought the party does not commit to any of the commonly recognized ideological paradigms in the rest of the world. For example, it is relatively conservative in social aspects and values, by the lay voter sometimes coexisting with a loyalty and devotion similar to that of Catholicism (but instead to Evita and Juan Perón) in the interior of the country; at the same time the PJ is often progressive or “leftist” in the goals and generally the means of pursuing social justice. The Radical party raises the flag of republicanism, and democracy and respect for institutions. The UCR is also a member of the Socialist International which also includes a progressive agenda which mostly attracts the middle classes in urban centers.

34 Parties may also get power by brokering among other parties or tie breaking, for example, in a Parliamentary system. Financial strength of wealthy party supporters can also, for example, influence the mass media and hence the public opinion.

35 For example, Calvo and Murillo (2004: 742) argued that $1 provides more utility the poorer the person receiving it.
to the specific electoral environments in which they compete, that is, the electoral competitiveness of the district and the socioeconomic characteristics of its population.

The primary outcome to be explained in this study is the “centrality to campaigns of the different types of voter mobilization strategies” parties use in a given environment (characteristics of the electorate and the competitiveness of the district). The outcome concepts to be explained will yield different types given the different combinations of four measurable sets: the centrality to campaigns of programmatic, clientelistic, personalistic and performance strategies to appeal to the voters in the studied districts.

Conceptually, any campaign activity may be evaluated for the degree to which it is consistent to an ideally typical programmatic, clientelistic, performance and a personalistic campaign strategy; it is up to the informed observer to evaluate. For example, a tactic like showing the gubernatorial candidate appearing on television to announce his platform is consistent with a programmatic strategy, and also to some degree with a personalistic one.

2.3.1 Types of Voter Mobilization Strategies

In principle there are four types of exchanges between the party and its voters as the product of the parties’ and candidates’ voter mobilization strategies. In exchange for a vote, the party may offer: the candidate’s personality and style (personalistic strategy); a program (programmatic strategy); an evaluation of the incumbent’s performance in office (performance strategy); and particularistic benefits (clientelistic strategy). These campaign strategy types are the heuristic tools I use to evaluate the actual campaigns in the selected cases. The meaning and intent of actors’ actions in campaigns are tallied vis a vis the four strategic types in order to better understand the actual voter mobilization strategies in the districts. Next, I develop the campaign strategy types.
2.3.1.1 Programmatic strategy

Incentives to voters in the programmatic exchange could be ideology and also party program or platform; these are promises. A strictly programmatic party strategy involves a set of decision making and activities to attempt attract the vote with an indirect exchange of votes for a policy package. The program (promise) is given first by the party and the vote is given later by the voter. The non-compliance of the party, by not fulfilling the promises made in the campaign, may result in less reliability on the party and the voter choosing an alternative party in the next election.

Loyal partisans also partake in an exchange with the party. The loyalty to the party exists for the commitment to an ideology or simply an icon, long gone performances and/ or past charismatic leaders. This loyal voter may also be considered a programmatic voter; he believes in the principles and ideology the party stands for (according to his own views). Repeated betrayals to the nature of the principles will, however, erode the loyalty. Hence, this is a long term programmatic voter. The program goes beyond specific projects or policy proposal for an election as in the case of the strictly programmatic voter (voter appealed by a program or policy proposal), but the ideology or principles contain a view of the world in the long term. In exchange for his vote, the loyal voter receives a more immediate sense of belonging to the party as a distinctive and exclusive social construction capable of making a difference in people’s lives.\footnote{Also belonging to this dimension is Panebianco’s (1988: 24) “System of Solidarity”, in which common ideals bind individuals to a party, given that the party is the vehicle to achieve the goals implicit in those ideas.}

The kinds of activities or tactics used in campaigns to appeal to a strictly programmatic voter may include the diffusion of policy proposals with the strategic goal to affect the broader society; this may be done through the mass media through
advertisements, interviews, debates, or through more directly or even personally manifesting to the voters those plans. The appeals to entice those loyal voters who stand by the principles sustained by the party may include references to the party’s founders, long term party principles, and visions of a better society. The appeal to loyal voters may also include references to struggles or successes the party members lived and which constituted them as a community, which reinforce the commitment to the idea of a better society for which the party stands.

2.3.1.2 Clientelistic strategy

Incentives to voters in the clientelistic strategy are more particularistic than incentives in a strictly programmatic strategy, and voters generally receive them before they vote or soon after. In “machine clientelism” there is a direct exchange of votes for example, for food, clothing, house appliances which are distributed at events in the neighborhoods days or hours before the election. The majority of people going to these events, receiving these benefits and later going to polling places, do not necessarily have a close relationship with the broker (puntero) or the candidates and participate only for the material benefits they expect to get immediately, and may vote for the party only out of a feeling of indebtedness, because at least this party gave them something (the other party gave them nothing). The broker or puntero may personally know only some of the clients, and then he may only be able to enforce the contract with those people.37

Those people involved in a “personalized clientelistic relationship” with a broker or politician, on the other hand, comply with their part of the contract because they have a daily contact with the broker and the costs of defection are high. These clients also

37 In Argentina parties have ways to control/monitor clients because “…selective incentives can trump programmatic offers” and the latter tend to be indivisible public goods, and the fear of being cut from the particularistic benefits (Brusco et al 2004: 77); and because party operatives can observe and make inferences from the voter’s attitudes and behavior (Auyero 2001) among other enforcement mechanisms discussed in Chapter 3.
usually receive greater and more continuous benefits than voters do through the more anonymous machine-clientelism which is brought out right before the elections, hence the clients in the personalized clientelistic relationship seem more loyal to the broker and patron. In consequence, these voters are also more stable.

These two types of relationships may be simultaneous and happen in a single environment. Common tactics or activities used in a machine clientelistic voter mobilization party strategy include, for example, the mass distribution of bags of food in a neighborhood days or hours before the election. In personalized clientelism the patron and client meet, not because the patron may need a vote and the client can give it, but because the person needs help and the patron is the only or one of the few people in a position to help. There may be a necessity such as a person that needs to travel to a provincial capital to go to a hospital, and the mayor may give him the bus tickets and eventually buy him the medications; it may be that a family does not have drinkable water, and the official then delivers the water to this one family. Personalized clientelism is manifested during elections, but it is cultivated year around. Officials and people often view this type of relationship as part of what is expected from the politician.

### 2.3.1.3 Personalistic strategy

The two other voter recruitment strategies are the personalistic and the performance. In the personalistic vote the voter is appealed to by the candidate’s “unique personal skills and power of persuasion” (Kitschelt 2000: 849; also Mainwaring 1998, Mainwaring and Torcal 2006). In a personalistic strategy parties get votes in exchange for “grand gestures and personal styles” which appeal to voters (Kitschelt

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38 Patronage is also a type of personalized clientelistic practice in which the exchange of votes is often given for public employment or pay raises by incumbent parties. The knowledge the patron/broker has about the employees/voters is high. The control exercised in the patronage relationship is higher than that in the anonymous machine clientelism, because the permanence of the patron in power may be a condition for keeping the job (Lemarchand 1981; Scott 1969).
which would make it a personalistic strategy of the “charismatic or paternalistic type”, but parties may also put emphasis on more delimited domains of expertise possessed by the candidate (for example, as a good administrator) which would make it a personalistic strategy of a “technical or expertise type”. Personalistic attachments are characterized by the asymmetry between the party/candidate and the voter as well (Kitschelt 2000). Deference and loyalty towards the authority describe these as well as clientelistic attachments. Despite Kitschelt’s evaluation that parties built on personalism produce legislative caucuses and factions, it does not mean that parties relying on personalisms to win elections do not also invest in the party’s organizational infrastructure. This strategy should not be set aside from comprehensive analyses of parties’ strategies; it is a recruitment strategy and may be combined with others with the goal of winning votes.

A personalized clientelistic strategy (discussed earlier and on Chapters 3) does not necessarily complement the personalistic appeals of the patron or broker, rather, it is conceptually different from the personalistic strategy type because it relies on the highly regarded and particularistic clientelistic goods. The actual, real world, campaign tactics may display elements of both strategies.

**2.3.1.4 Performance strategy**

In the performance strategy the parties appeal to the retrospective and prospective voter, who will reward or punish an incumbent candidate or party with his vote based on its performance in office (Campbell et al 1960; V. O. Key 1966; Downs 1957; Fiorina 1981). People may base their vote on the parties’ campaign on praising or criticizing the incumbent’s performance in office. In this case parties do not offer anything in exchange for a vote, only point to an interpretation of government
performance. The voters” might find it difficult to deem this variable as part of parties’ voter mobilization strategies because voters may also decide their retrospective vote based on personal experience and the independent media, and not from parties’ campaigning. However, in this study I focus on the “supply side” (the political entrepreneurs). Nonetheless, parties and candidates do invest time and resources to tell prospective voters their view of the incumbents during the campaigns.

The construction and diffusion of programmatic ideas by political parties usually come after the evaluation of the current state of affairs which, in an electoral contest, tends to be adjudicated to incumbent parties and candidates. Programmatic ideas tend to be an “added value” in campaigns to performance evaluations, or as Fiorina says “…retrospective voting requires far less of the voter than prospective voting.” (1981: 10)

By performance I mean the incumbent’s performance, whether referring to the formal job he is paid to do or the “expected job”, beyond the statute job. This includes people’s expectations regarding the promises made during the previous campaign.

Performance as a voter mobilization strategy always involves an evaluation on the expectations people had about their leaders. Opposition parties make the case that expectations were not met, while incumbent parties argue that they were. Strong electoral competition and a resourceful and organized people can also push the government to show its performance in campaigns.

Voters’ expectations can be, and in fact often are, manipulated in campaigns by parties and candidates. I do not talk about “accountability” (as Przeworski, Stokes and Manin do 1999:40) where “incumbents act in best interest of and are controlled by voters”. I talk about “performance” as a “voter mobilization strategy.” Parties can and frequently do manipulate the information they use in campaigns. The media is a good

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39 In reality, however, parties not only praise or criticize performance, but also point to the better party option the voter should choose.
resource to recreate and manipulate performances of the duties of incumbents and the expected performance of policy and ideological compromises of the incumbent government.

The margin the candidates in campaign have to alter people’s perception of reality is often small and hence it is more difficult to cheat voters on a performance evaluation than it is in a “promises contest” which would be the case in an “only programmatic campaign strategy.” The more developed and complex the society is, the more difficult it is for the parties and candidates to control the flow of information to voters and there is less maneuverability to adjust the perceptions of reality in a performance driven campaign.

As mentioned in Chapter 1, less capacity to question and control the performance of the incumbent by the civil society and the opposition parties, allows the incumbent to require less effort to win elections. In Chapter 6, as in each substantive chapter, I develop the relevant factors and attributes of the concept to properly evaluate the centrality to campaigns of performance as a voter mobilization strategy.

2.4 What is a strategy?

A strategy should be understood as a series of activities or tactics aimed at achieving a common goal. The use of the media, for example, can be part of a programmatic strategy as well as a personalistic one. A strategy implies a conscious effort to achieve a goal. The conscious effort is to win votes with a set of tactics; social science can interpret those actions and decision making as types of strategies. The strategy to win votes could be preconceived by the actors or developed as part of a “learning process”. There could however be spontaneous campaign activities (tactics) by actors which fit in one strategy more closely than another. Lastly, the strategy may not be centrally coordinated by the national party, or even by the provincial party authorities,
but even if only coordinated by a city mayor this concept still applies. As social observers we can classify strategies as programmatic, clientelistic, performance or personalistic; these four strategies should be, for now, understood as ideal types. These types may interact and combine. The idea of tradeoffs among strategies could only be given by the social scientist at a theoretical level; however, politicians find constraints in the real world of finite resources. In this study I do not preconceive tradeoffs among strategies, meaning that in principle a candidate may be able to, for example, similarly rely on a clientelistic strategy and a programmatic strategy to mobilize voters in campaign.

Diversity (and quantity) of tactics diminishes the relevance of any single one; because the resources candidates have are disseminated among the different tactics (instead of being focused on one). Tactics are real and objectively measurable (its resources, message and actions), however, strategies are interpretations and conceptualizations of the former done by the strategists or in this case the social scientists. Still, this could mean that a diversity of strategies (as a configuration of tactics) would diminish the centrality to campaigns of each one strategy type. However, several campaign strategies could be equally central to campaigns in a district. The combination of particular campaign strategies leads to types of campaigns in districts. Theoretically campaign strategies with two values (e.g. a high value and a low value) for each of the four campaign strategies yield a theoretical space of 16 campaign types (many of which may not find empirical cases). Finally, the elements to evaluate strategies as a set of tactics should include:

1) Awareness: the actors could be conscious or not of the strategy involved in the tactics they implement. Awareness of the actors is not necessary to define a type of strategy, which is the job of social scientists; however it helps when the officials themselves acknowledge the strategies. It is central to campaigns when, for example, clientelism is recognized as “important for an election,” or that “clientelism cannot be ignored;” and this is acted upon.

2) The candidate’s availability of resources and needed structures; these could be partisans, brokers, money, access, etc.
3) The actual action or activity the political entrepreneurs carry out.
4) The content of the campaign activity: what is being said, done or given.

2.5 Centrality to Campaigns and Development of Voter Mobilization Strategies

Centrality to campaigns of a voter mobilization strategy refers to a strategy's importance for the overall campaign in a district. The degree of development of a voter mobilization strategy-type specifically refers to the amount and use of the resources available. Political parties with more resources could do more for the campaign in terms of, for example, television ads, hiring consultants, clientelism, etc.

Given that resources are finite there is a commonsense resource tradeoff among specific tactics (e.g. If I have $10 for a television ad, I do not have them for a radio ad). However, a specific tactic such as a candidate visiting a voter’s home can be evaluated as a tactic of any of the four strategy types; that is, to evaluate how the tactic fits as part of a clientelistic (or personalistic, or performance, or programmatic) voter mobilization strategy. It is perfectly reasonable for a political entrepreneur to use tactics more in accordance with a programmatic strategy type with some voters and tactics more in accordance with a clientelistic strategy type with other voters; there are no logical tradeoffs among strategy types, only on tactics’ resources. The campaign strategist or social scientist can evaluate that one type of voter mobilization strategy is more or less central to campaigns than another in a specific district. Hence, all strategy types can also be somewhat central to campaigns at the same time. All strategy types can also be significantly developed at the same time. Again, there is no trade-off among strategy types; there is only a tradeoff among tactics’ resources. Real world examples can prove the heterogeneity of campaigns, with multiple independent actors (with different electoral needs) and heterogeneous voters.

Strategy types (as theoretical edifices) may compete on resources in the real world; for example, money and effort put into programmatic message-type tactics takes
away from money and effort put into clientelism, performance and personalism
message-type tactics as part of a campaign strategy. However, the resource tradeoff
can only be evaluated by an observer at the strategy level because it is at this level of
abstraction that we identify strategy types and their relative centrality to campaigns in a
voter mobilization effort.

While the logic to understand the centrality to campaigns of clientelism is tied to
the “patron-broker-client relationship,” and that of personalism is tied to the “candidate
nomination compromises,” and that of program as a voter mobilization strategy is tied to
the “party power decentralization,” the logic to understand the centrality to campaigns of
performance as a voter mobilization strategy is tied to all three. Because the logic and
simplest reason of elections in a democracy is “to change or keep the same
party/officials in power,” and because the other three strategy types also imply that
dichotomy of change versus keeping the same, performance as a voter mobilization
strategy, or as an appeal to the voters’ expectations, is the bedrock of campaigns on
which the other three strategy types are built (further explained in chapter 6).

The strategy types should not be viewed as compartmentalized, but as one
integrated whole. There is the logical link between the three strategy types and
performance (past-future dichotomy), but strategies are analytically independent from
one another. Tactics and their messages could even be exclusive to each strategy type.
They may only compete on resources, but necessarily, there is not a relevant logical
tradeoff. Some resources are pretty much exclusive to some strategy types, e.g. brokers
and clientelism, or, for example, the media is not particularly useful for clientelism, but it
is functional for the other three strategy types.
2.6 Degree of personalization of the party-voter relationship

An important factor necessary to understand the voter recruitment strategies as an outcome is the degree of personalization of the party-voter relationship. A voter can be anonymous to party operatives, which sets him in a symmetric relationship with the party in his decision to cast a vote. These voters are objectively uncommitted supporters of a party, have no lasting attachment to it, and they vote on the basis of what the party or politicians provide them in each election. At the opposite end of the spectrum is the voter who receives particularistic (personal) benefits, and whose personal association with the party or party operatives then sets him in a situation of compromise (maybe even dependence) when deciding to cast a vote. He votes for a party because of the preexisting linkages or attachments to it. Known linkages are, for example, loyalty and social pressure. The commitment to support the party is higher because so are the costs of defection. For example, the exchange in machine clientelism is purely ad-hoc and for the occasion, whereas in the case of personalized clientelism the patron-client relationship extends beyond the electoral contests and into affecting daily life.

In both programmatic and clientelistic exchanges between the party and the voters, for example, degrees of loyalty and personalization in the party-voter relationship differentiate what I above distinguished as a strictly programmatic and a loyal partisan vote, and a machine and personalized clientelistic vote. The differences imply degrees of loyalty to a broker, party, ideology or program, which in turn implies degrees of deference to party authorities, traditions and procedures. Variation in the degree of personalization allows for the conceptualization of incentives given to groups (pork barrel) --as opposed to the public in general or to individuals. The idea of personalization refers to seeing the individual as a person. Particularism, on the other hand, refers to the indivisibility of the benefit (which may be given to a person or an anonymous individual).
The degree of personalization in tactics may vary across districts due to the population size, which may prevent politicians and party operatives from having a more personal relationship with the prospective voter. Districts with large populations may prevent individual candidates from personally reaching a significant number of voters as compared to districts with fewer numbers of voters. The district’s geographic size may have the same effect if long distances have to be traveled in order to visit prospective voters. Hence, districts where candidates do not need to travel long distances to cover its geography may make it easier for candidates to reach voters personally than in districts with extensive geographies.

A high degree of personalization of tactics also depends on the material and organizational resources available to the candidate and party. Organizational resources include the local structures and people, such as local offices, local activists, etc, as well as the coordination among the leaders and the base organizations. One of the most relevant organizational resources in Argentine parties in many districts is the personalized access to voters through brokers or punteros.40 On the other hand, there may be direct personalized contact of candidates with voters in a small town. Here local leaders/candidates have a quasi-monopoly of local resources –no competition for economic or political resources, and no need for punteros.

The candidate also needs material resources such as money, access to the media, marketing, gifts for voters, etc. These organizational and material resources determine the availability (or the possibilities) of the degree of personalization of tactics. The choice of the degree of personalization of tactics also relates to the size, distribution and socioeconomic characteristics of the electorate. Finally, the tactics used as well as

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40 Broker networks (for a large district) range from autonomous dirigentes sustained with favors to keep their support as is the case in the province of Catamarca, to the puntero dependent on a specific party or official usually kept with patronage in the province of Formosa. Beginning in Chapter 3 I will expand on this topic. It is difficult for both types of brokers to work together, but in reality they are usually hybrids.
the content of the actions taken (the message) is influenced by the electoral competition the party faces. For example, parties may not have large rallies if there is no competition, since it would be a waste of resources mobilizing people in a district where there is not much competition. Hence, the choice of action is related to competition the candidate is facing. Whether a candidate walks the streets of a neighborhood visiting houses, or arranges a televised press conference is related to the tactic capabilities (organizational and material resources), electorate characteristics and competition.

District size can be large if the city has a large population or if the land area is large, and parties’ infrastructure can reduce the “distance” in both this instances. An in situ network of brokers allows candidates to opt for more personalized tactics. Also, in the case of small but distant towns or regions, few but important local leaders can serve as nexus or broker between the provincial or national candidate and the people.

Again, the competition a candidate faces represents a challenge to his chances to win the election or simply win an office seat in a PR (proportional representation) legislature. Hence, the choice of tactics which a party or candidate adopts will be based on a number of factors. In a single election campaign, parties usually adopt a series of multiple tactics in a single district. But the relative relevance of each tactic adopted and the relative relevance of each of the messages of those tactics shape the campaign mobilization strategy adopted in that district.

Specific tactics involve tradeoffs among the prevalence of the strategic type efforts for reasons such as time and other material resources. For example, a house-to-house visit activity by a candidate and a broker in a poor neighborhood will quickly move to the candidate listening and learning the problems and concerns of the family. The people expect some short, mid and/or long term solution addressed by the candidate, and there might be little time left for discussing other concerns which do not particularly concern the family. However, it would not be strange for the meeting between the
candidate and the family members to develop into discussing the city’s problems,
criticizing or praising other candidates. The choice of a very personalized tactic does not
mean that programmatic contents will be absent; in fact it is very often up to the voter to
decide what the contents of the exchange between himself and the candidate entail.

A less personalized tactic such as a neighborhood gathering of 100 people with a
candidate gives the candidate a more central role in the event than when he is a guest in
someone else’s house. At the other end of the spectrum, a candidate who has the
necessary resources may use the media to address the public on whatever matter he
thinks is appropriate.

Degree of personalization is not an independent variable. Higher offices or larger
districts, which mean that the candidate is personally more distant from the people,
would require an adaptation of tactics, but not necessarily a difference in the centrality to
campaigns of a type of strategy. For example, it would require more established
structures like networks of brokers to bridge the gap.

2.7 Simplification of social complexity

In democracies, where candidates must win the people’s votes, certain campaign
activities may be more fruitful than others depending, in part, on the environment where
the election is taking place. For instance, a candidate who wants to win the favor of
middle class professionals in a district where there are two other viable candidates
campaigning for the same voters may have to work harder than if there were no other
candidates in an uncontested election. On the other hand, whether the voters are middle
class professionals or illiterate, unemployed minorities may also affect the candidates’
activities and discourse to entice these people.

The premise behind this research is that the type of the campaign strategy
adopted is in part explained by the socioeconomic characteristics of the electorate and
the level of electoral competition in the district.\footnote{Reality is of course more complicated. Political parties take the initiative in campaigning, but they also react to these environmental characteristics/ conditions and expectations. A candidate’s tactic to ultimately win votes can comprise undermining the voter mobilization capabilities of the competing parties (e.g. through cutting access to the media, preempting tactics, etc.). Hence, the dependent variable may ultimately affect the independent variables; a party’s strategy theoretically may change the nature of the competition and future competition. The nature of the tactics towards voters may affect the nature of voters themselves; for example, clientelistic practices may help perpetuate the poverty in a community, which in turn may maintain clientelism. But then again, they may not.} However, there may be other causal factors which affect the candidate’ or party’s decision to undertake certain activities. Other important factors to consider with respect to party tactics are the resources these have to campaign and the autonomy of the party members from the central party authority. Also, local, national or international context may affect the public opinion on how parties should behave: for example, a much publicized corruption case close to an election may inhibit candidates from campaigning on the personal qualities of candidates or from handing out gifts to voters, because it could backfire.

I study the centrality to campaigns of certain voter mobilization strategies that parties use in different districts in order to win votes, and not so much how developed those strategies are \textit{vis-a-vis} an ideal type. Political parties in a district may win elections relying completely on a set of, for example, clientelistic tactics which do not actually amount to an ideal type of clientelistic strategy.

Resources such as time and money are limited in campaigns; however, even though strategists need to choose among campaign activities, this does not mean that to them there is a conceptual or logical trade-off among strategies. Actual candidates do not see campaign activities through the lens of strategic types, but rather in terms of how effective they would be and recognizing the environment they compete in and the
limitation in resources they have. Theoretically there could be an environment in which all four strategy types are equally central to mobilize voters in a district.

Next I develop the independent “variables,” which are actually the interrelation of multiple factors which combine to give content to the outcome concept studied here: the centrality to campaigns of clientelism (or personalism, or programmatic, or performance) as a voter mobilization strategy in a district.

2.8 Independent variables

The first independent variable to understand the voter recruitment strategies is the socio-economic characteristics or resources of the electorate. The second independent variable is the electoral competitiveness of the districts. I verbally refer to them as “variables”, and use them as variables in order to select cases. However, these are really set-relations, which I as a social scientist have to (always imperfectly) operationalize. This is particularly true for the “socioeconomic characteristics” of a district. Acknowledging that people with certain social or economic characteristics are more likely to behave in a particular way derives from a central tendency measure from a given set of cases, but hides the fact that there might be multiple combinations of factors leading to similar outcomes. Furthermore, many blunt “objective” measures ignore the important context specific “relative” effect of, say, a deprivation variable. The indicators I use to operationalize the variables are informed choices (but are not exclusive ones) to formulate and test hypotheses. The theory will be refined once the cases are substantively analyzed.

42 I do not refer to “linkages” as Kitschelt (2000: 853) and others do, or as Randal (1988: 177) also calls combining linkages a “schizophrenic blend;” I am instead evaluating the overall campaign strategies in a district. These authors refer to a combination of a “fully clientelistic” and a “fully ideological” linkage with ideal type characteristics in a binary type of conception of linkages; instead, with a Fuzzy-set analysis, I allow for the different characteristics that are present in the real world.
2.8.1 Electoral Competitiveness

More competition forces parties to try to set out a strategy which make them improve their performance given the competitive threat from rival parties. For example, in a very competitive low income district, parties may not find an advantage from simply handing out food (as the competitors also do), but by distinguishing themselves by promising projects like a school or a health center for the neighborhood. In other words, when both (or more) competing parties provide a voter with similar incentives, the tie breaker would have to be a stronger incentive of the same type or an additional different type of incentive. Hence, the reason for the voter’s choice is not necessarily as based on a, for example, predominantly clientelistic exchange with the party as it might be in a district with less competition. Again, parties in a competitive well-off district may not find a decisive advantage with a party platform, but by promising more specific benefits to groups like a salary raise for teachers, which they would not have to give with less pressure from the competition. Hence, as the examples show, more electoral competition intensifies the appeals in the parties’ exchange strategies to recruit voters (See Kitchelt and Wilkinson 2007, Introduction) and may also increase the personalization of the exchanges as a way to differentiate the candidates from the competition.

What are the expectations from parties given the effects of these two independent variables? Why should we expect these to be the predominant strategies adopted by parties and candidates? The fact that I see parties as groups of political entrepreneurs means that a single voter may be affected by the strategies of different candidates of the same party; hence a governor may have certain activities planned, and a mayor or representative may have different ones, and these are not necessarily
coordinated. In this dissertation I assess the campaign strategies in specific district environments (i.e. the four provinces and the federal capital district).

What can we expect as a consequence of having more electoral competition in a district? First, parties and candidates face more pressure in general to perform better in the campaign. As a consequence of competing parties, voters are likely to be more aware of things they would not know otherwise, for example, regarding the performance of the ruling party, officials, or candidates. The competition can copy and improve effective campaign activities and tactics. The competition may represent a threat to holding on to power if they have a real chance of winning the election. In general, parties pay more attention to opinion polls if competition is high than if competition is weak or non-existent. More competition forces parties and political entrepreneurs to try to organize better, and to be more conscious in the effective allocation of limited campaign resources. In my research I argue that the level of competition in a district affects the strategies parties use to recruit voters.43

Laakso and Taagepera (1979) developed a, now popularized, way to count the “Effective Number of Competing Parties” (ENCP). However, as shown below, the ENCP does not help to distinguish the type of competition in districts which, while sharing the same ENCP score, display different levels of competition (See Table 2.1). Districts with similar ENCP score could mean having one strong opposition party or several weaker ones (ENCP is not meant to measure competitiveness). Hence, what I show below is a way to account for the strength (or weakness) of the incumbent and opposition parties. The “Effective Strength of Opposition Parties” (ESOP)44 accounts for the problem of

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43 Small parties may tend to focus their limited resources to small constituencies and coherent programmatic stands (e.g. small leftist or rightist parties), but do not attempt to incur in clientelistic practices (which demands man-hours, money, etc.). On the other hand, a large party is able to compete on more equal terms with a strong incumbent party. It is able to administer some clientelism and credible programmatic stands.

44 Where i-th is any party and o-th is any opposition party (all parties except the incumbent).
coordination and the use of resources (economy of scale) which several smaller opposition parties face vis-à-vis fewer and larger opposition parties.

### TABLE 2.1:
EFFECTIVE STRENGTH OF OPPOSITION PARTIES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Share of votes</th>
<th>EXAMPLE 1</th>
<th>EXAMPLE 2</th>
<th>EXAMPLE 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Parties</td>
<td>A B C D</td>
<td>A B C D</td>
<td>A B C D</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>0.6 0.4 0 0</td>
<td>0.7 0.1 0.1 0.1</td>
<td>0.6 0.3 0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ENCP</td>
<td>1.92</td>
<td>1.92</td>
<td>2.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ESOP</td>
<td>0.308</td>
<td>0.058</td>
<td>0.217</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Where political party A is the incumbent and the rest are the opposition (Where $v_o$ is the vote share of a non incumbent party and $v_i$ is the vote share of all parties or coalitions). $\text{ENCP} = (1/\sum v_i^2)$; $\text{ESOP} = \sum v_o^2 / \sum v_i^2$

With this new way of measuring the strength of opposition parties we can distinguish between the 1.92 parties (ENCP) found in the Example 1 and 2 in Table 2.1. In the first example the opposition is much stronger than in the second example. The opposition in the first example is also stronger than in the 2.17 parties’ Example 3, even though the opposition accounts for 40% of the vote in both cases. This is the case because in Example 3 the opposition parties would incur in transaction costs when opposing the incumbent. The ESOP index varies from 0 when the opposition gets 0% of the vote, to 1 when the opposition gets 100% of the votes. I adopt this new measure in my research with the goal of broadly comparing competitiveness in the different districts.\(^{45}\)

\(^{45}\) The ESOP index assumes that all other parties outside of the incumbent party are opposition. ESOP does not contemplate the possibility of evaluating the degrees of ideological or resource distance or proximity among parties which could also affect the campaign contest.
2.8.2 Socioeconomic Development

What can we expect in campaigns as a consequence of having more developed voters in terms of socioeconomic conditions, human development and the complexity of society in general? First, parties have to include more abstract goals as part of their campaigns in a context in which voters have basic subsistence needs covered and may want the government to improve their lives in non-material ways (Inglehart, 1984). Politicians’ discourses are more elaborate and complex to appeal to a public who are, for example, more educated. However, there are also more targeted and specialized discourses to appeal to active societal pressure groups and at the same time there are organized citizens pursuing specific goals. These voters are more likely to be economically independent from government and hence more steadfast in their demands, which lead candidates and parties to have more elaborated messages, political marketing, and image of candidates and parties.

2.8.3 Principal factors to understand voter mobilization strategies

Below is a list of factors which are relevant to understanding the voter mobilization strategies in districts. These are not an exhaustive list of factors (reality is always more complex than any academic formulation) but all those factors mentioned in the list below are taken into account at some point in this dissertation. Some of these factors may be more pertinent to explain the centrality to campaigns of one voter mobilization strategy and less relevant to explain others. For example, nomination processes are more important to explain the centrality to campaigns of personalism as a voter mobilization strategy than to explain the centrality to campaigns of clientelism, for the reasons I give in Chapter 4.

These factors are associated to the District characteristics and the Electoral competitiveness of the district. The meaning, relevance and interdependence of these
factors become evident throughout the dissertation. This so called list of factors
differentiation is the result of in-depth study and analysis of cases. The list only names,
and does not explain, relevant factors. Each of the substantive chapters has a schematic
representation of the interaction of the relevant factors to explain each voter mobilization
strategy based on the list below.

Factors differentiation:

i) Socioeconomic characteristics/ civil society characteristics (e.g. activism of voters)
   (a) Rich-poor voters
   (b) NGO-activism

ii) District size/ dispersion (e.g. isolation of voters)
   (a) Large-small geographic size
   (b) Large-small population size

iii) Effective Strength of Opposition Parties

iv) Party Resources
   (a) Material-physical resources (e.g. degree of personalization of tactics, media
       relevance)
       1. Money
       2. Goods, etc.
       3. People (e.g. activists in situ, dirigente-type brokers, etc.)
   (b) Organizational resources
       1. Candidate nomination process (e.g. electoral alliance compromises or not, etc.
          i.e. intraparty competition and consequences on programmatic consistency and
          relevance)
       2. Checks on leader (e.g. effective political party leadership and relevance)

v) Electoral rules
   (a) Reelection rules
   (b) Overlapping districts or not for different offices
   (c) Decentralization of office competition (e.g. a single proportional representation
district vs. multiple single member districts).

vi) Decentralization of political and financial resources in district

The dichotomous evaluation of the “independent variables” (socioeconomic
development and electoral competitiveness) leads to four scenarios where parties and
candidates compete for votes. The factors which help explain the mechanisms or the hows of the voter mobilization strategies which generate more questions are addressed in each of the four substantive chapters. The following hypotheses, however, are based on each of the four campaign scenarios and the theoretical framework above. These hypotheses venture on the why of the voter mobilization strategies in the districts. The cases selected for in-depth study are justified and described later in the chapter.

2.9 Hypotheses

2.9.1 Low socioeconomic development and low electoral competitiveness in the district

*Hypothesis 1:* In this environment programmatic voter mobilization strategy is probably not central to campaigns. The opposition party’s strategy does not significantly mobilize voters; 1) it lacks credentials as a party capable of governing, 2) it has problems accessing the media, and 3) its level of support is low among voters. Also, it may seem pointless to have a province-wide program due to the imbalanced electoral competition. The ruling party, on the other hand, is dominant, making a program unnecessary as an appeal to mobilize these voters. Parties may have a written program, but it is not used as a voter mobilization strategy.

*Hypothesis 2:* Personalism as a strategy is central to campaigns. In poor districts where information and communications are difficult for people to access, the local candidates and/or local party structures and actors take a more relevant role in the campaign than in districts where provincial and national candidates and sources of information can be accessed rather easy (e.g. Trust in the person of the successful mayor is common). *Hypothesis 2.1:* In smaller electoral districts, like the one a small municipality mayoral candidate could face, there is more personalized politics, or less institutionalized relations, than in larger districts where also bureaucratic structures are
necessary to deal with the problems of large numbers of people. Hence, electoral campaigns are also more personal, less mediated by institutions like political parties or the media. This latter point applies to all levels of development and competition. However, province-wide elections (e.g. gubernatorial, provincial or national legislative) do not allow for much personal contact between candidates and a significant number of voters, due to a larger and geographically disperse constituency. These campaigns are more dependent on cults of personality of the governor, and government propaganda. Hence, the mediation is established by a more abstract link to the voters than that required by local level candidates. A “distance” with the leader is needed in order to have a cult of personality, to make him above ordinary mortals.

**Hypothesis 3:** Poor and noncompetitive districts tend to have a weak civil society and a single (or few), usually political and social leader. This leader would sustain his legitimacy with more direct assistance to the needy, including during electoral campaigns (also because there is not much else outside the state). This creates a relationship in which people owe their political benefactors (mayor, punteros or brokers, candidates, etc.); therefore, personalized clientelism is more common. Contact and personal relationships create bonds of loyalty and even deference and trust; but also fear and distrust of outsiders. The use of machine clientelistic voter mobilization strategies will depend on the availability of resources. The dominant party candidates have more access than the weaker party in this respect. *In this environment clientelism as a voter mobilization strategy is central to campaigns.*

**Hypothesis 4:** Those candidates from the ruling party show the good deeds the government is doing for them. The weak opposition parties have little access to the media or resources to effectively show a negative picture of the government. *Performance has medium centrality to campaigns as a mobilization strategy for parties,* and mainly reflects the incumbent’s effort to further validate his role.
2.9.2 High development and high competitiveness district

Hypothesis 5: Clientelism as a strategy is not central to campaigns. This electorate could be prohibitively expensive for parties to make a real important contribution in terms of votes. Hypothesis 6: Parties produce platforms which cover a broad range of issues. However, since competing parties are doing the same thing, the campaign programmatic message stresses only a few strong key ideas from the platform, to get to the voters; The strategy cannot solely explain campaigns in this district. The programmatic strategy is of medium to high centrality to campaigns in this district. Hypothesis 7: In terms of personalism, candidates emphasize their persona, but since there are probably many candidates campaigning, it is not a “necessary” factor (it may be only for governor or mayor). However, the persona has to be more than the image, much more complex and elaborated than in the “low” development districts given the higher levels of scrutiny from the media, the opposition and the sophisticated electorates. For this reason, it is less charismatic and more human, and more vulnerable to criticism and errors. For all these reasons, it is likely that campaigning candidates and parties also rely in mobilizing voters with evaluations of the incumbent’s performance as evidence or proof of their better candidacy (hypothesis 8).

2.9.3 Low development and high competitiveness district

Hypothesis 9: Personalism is not a central voter mobilization strategy in such district. The fact that there is a real alternative to the incumbent means that it is more difficult for single “all powerful” charismatic figures to emerge (they would be criticized by the other party/ies). There has to be something more than the leader, the party (multiple leaders and political party structure, etc) plays a role in societies’ life and prevents or tempers the emergence of sole charismatic leaders. This does not mean, however, that in small districts there is not personal contact with officials, etc. but they are not the
undisputed voice (there could be high degree of personalization, but personalism be not too central to campaigns as a strategy to win elections).

**Hypothesis 10:** On the same token, the clients in a clientelistic relationship are more difficult to keep loyal (there is another political party doing the same thing). The clientelism effort is stepped up before the election by both/all parties (machine clientelism) and is central to campaigns in their voter mobilization attempt. The relevance of clientelism to the votes a party gets in fact depends on the material and organizational resources of the party. More competition also leads to more machine clientelism; but personalized clientelism is less central to campaigns than in the low competition district because the alternation of officials in power (or uncertainty officials will be reelected) make people less dependent on single patrons (there are multiple, circumstantial patrons). These parties are like parties of “cadres”, with several middle/high rank leaders who are necessary for the effectiveness of the party in campaigns. They are the “enlightened” class of politicians above the rest of a society which is loosely organized (weak civil society organizations). Both programmatic (hypothesis 11) and performance (hypothesis 12) strategies are of medium to low centrality to campaigns as strategies to mobilize voters. Programs and performance evaluations are present in campaigns, particularly for the media and its middle class consumers, but the leading parties know that the close elections are won in the last hours of the campaign with the flexing of the muscle of the party machine and clientelism.

### 2.9.4 High development and low competitiveness district

**Hypothesis 13:** A programmatic strategy has medium to low centrality to campaigns in such a district. The formality of having a program has to be kept: a pseudo debate of ideas and proposals appear in public, but alternative political parties are not credible (seen as not viable or too radical, with little experience, with only few
experienced or seasoned candidates/cadres). New leaders emerge within the ruling party who echo the voice of society’s demands, and put pressure for the regime to satisfy them. In consequence, a program is not too scrutinized, hence not too developed or campaigned on either. But it has some presence (at least formally). **Hypothesis 14:** *Performance as a strategy is central to campaigns because the incumbent political party is the only one responsible for what happens.* It points out achievements, but this public quickly demands more, and wants to see what is next. Basically officials account for their time in office to a demanding public, not to the weak opposition parties. **Hypothesis 15:** *Personalism has medium centrality to campaigns;* since there is only one relevant party (the incumbent), the ruling party candidate has to validate his position (also within his own party) and the “edge” in campaigns is given by the persona of the candidate/leader, but the level is not high because voters pay more attention to performance than anything else. **Hypothesis 16:** *Clientelism is medium to low in centrality to campaigns but in the form of patronage* (affecting low-paid public employees like police officers, teachers, municipal workers and positions depending on political appointees).

### 2.10 Hypotheses testing

With Fuzzy-sets I dwell into the complexity of those four scenarios by arguing for different degrees of centrality to campaigns of the strategy types in the five provinces/scenarios. Hence, no specific case necessarily emerges with all the characteristics of the hypotheses on anyone scenario. In some provinces we may find a strategy type which is “definitively central to campaigns as a voter mobilization strategy” but the others are probably, definitively not central to campaigns or there is complete ambiguity where they are or not central to campaigns. The in-depth study of the cases allows for the reasonable choice of qualitative breakpoints in the Fuzzy-set of cases.
where a strategy type is definitively central to campaigns as a voter mobilization strategy in a district.

I compare the five districts on each of the strategies and argue how is it that, for example, clientelism is definitely central to campaigns in Formosa and definitely not central to campaigns in Capital Federal, etc., and fitting them to qualitatively value anchored strategy sets. Each province's full account of the campaign strategies still appears and references to the other voter mobilization strategies are provided when necessary in each chapter.

2.11 Case selection – expanded

I conclude this chapter with a more developed explanation of the criteria for the provincial cases selection. I selected the cases in order to obtain a sample with significant variance in the independent variables (i.e. socioeconomic development and electoral competitiveness). Table 2.2 summarizes the average strength of opposition parties (ESOP) in gubernatorial elections for the periods 1987-2003 and 1995-2003, the Human Development Index (1996) and the percentage of urban population (2001). This table also shows the variety of cases and spread of value on these indicators.

Table 2.3 compares the five selected districts on socioeconomic and quality of life indicators to indicate that the Federal Capital and the province of Santa Cruz can be classified as being of high development and the provinces of Formosa and Catamarca of low development (the province of Mendoza is of medium development).

Formosa is one of the poorest provinces in Argentina. The percentage of people with Necesidades Básicas Insatisfechas (NBI) or Unmet Basic Needs was 33.6% in 2001, while the country score was 17.7%. The Human Development Index score of

\[ \text{Human Development Index} \]

46 This indicator (NBI - Necesidades Básicas Insatisfechas in Spanish; or Unmet Basic Needs) refers to the percentage of population who suffer at least one of the following deprivation indicators: a) homes with more than three people per bedroom; b) inconvenient living space:
0.764 only followed by Chaco with 0.755, but far from the 0.826 of the country as a whole. Only 34.2 % of people in Formosa have some kind of health coverage (51.9 % nationally) and 28.3% of the homes are of very poor quality materials and construction (6.1% nationally)\(^{47}\) (Source: INDEC 2001). This is a sharp contrast to the characteristics of districts like Santa Cruz or the Federal Capital.\(^{48}\)

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\(^{47}\) The reported percentage refers to CALMAT IV homes (the lowest category) as evaluated by INDEC. CALMAT IV houses have non resistant or solid material, or discarded materials in at least one the observed parameters (floors, walls and roof).

\(^{48}\) GADIS/PNUD/BID published a study of the development of the civil society in Argentina which generally supports my classification of cases (Accessed Sep8, 2008) (http://www.gadis.org.ar/documentos/IDSC%20de%20Arg.pdf). Some of the organizations of the civil society (OSC in Spanish) include for example school PTA, social and sports clubs, retirees’ associations, unions, professional associations, communities’ soup kitchens, neighborhood associations, popular libraries, and other groups defending certain rights, research, etc. The report presents a Civil Society Development Index which looks at the Structure, Processes and Results of the civil society organizations in the Argentine Provinces. The ranking of our cases out of 24 districts is the following: Capital Federal 2; Mendoza 6; Santa Cruz 9; Catamarca 16; Formosa 20. To illustrate the indicators of the index, for example, in the sub index of Structure, the financial autonomy is measured. The percentage of state or government funds that the civil society organizations get are (other options are “own funds”, “private sector donations”, “international cooperation”): Capital Federal, 4.7%; Mendoza, 7.3%; Formosa, 55.4%; Catamarca, 24%; Santa Cruz, 30.4%.

Some of this study’s conclusions, with respect to our districts, are; Formosa: “Little relevance of an associative tradition”…“Little interaction and articulation among OSC”…“Very low level of citizenship participation”. Catamarca: “Low institutional articulation and participation in networks…Low citizen participation”. Mendoza: “High vitality; little development of networks and low articulation…High coverage and citizenship participation”. Santa Cruz: “High significance of the relationship of OSC/1000 inhabitants, relativized due to the low population density. High significance of human resources with predominance of volunteers…Very high level of institutional articulation and participation in networks…Moderate citizenship participation”. Capital Federal: “High capacity to mobilize human and financial resources, with high levels of professionalization…High institutional articulation and participation in networks…High levels of citizenship participation”.

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motels, precarious house or other; c) homes with no kind of toilet; d) homes with a child (between 6-12 years of age) not attending school, and; e) homes with four or more people per family member with a job, in which also the family head did not complete the third grade. Source: INDEC.
TABLE 2.2:
COMPETITIVENESS AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE 24 ARGENTINE DISTRICTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Buenos Aires</td>
<td>0.30</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>0.27</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>0.820</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>96.2</td>
<td>3</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Catamarca</strong></td>
<td><strong>0.45</strong></td>
<td><strong>9</strong></td>
<td><strong>0.42</strong></td>
<td><strong>7</strong></td>
<td><strong>0.799</strong></td>
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<td><strong>74.0</strong></td>
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<td>6</td>
<td>0.42</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0.755</td>
<td>24</td>
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<td>17</td>
</tr>
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<td>Chubut</td>
<td>0.40</td>
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<td>0.38</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>0.819</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>89.5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Capital Federal</strong></td>
<td><strong>0.60</strong></td>
<td><strong>1</strong></td>
<td><strong>0.60</strong></td>
<td><strong>1</strong></td>
<td><strong>0.892</strong></td>
<td><strong>1</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
<td><strong>1</strong></td>
</tr>
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<td>4</td>
<td>88.8</td>
<td>7</td>
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<td>11</td>
<td>0.772</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>79.4</td>
<td>17</td>
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<tr>
<td>Entre Rios</td>
<td>0.46</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0.47</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0.801</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>82.3</td>
<td>15</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Formosa</strong></td>
<td><strong>0.28</strong></td>
<td><strong>20</strong></td>
<td><strong>0.18</strong></td>
<td><strong>22</strong></td>
<td><strong>0.764</strong></td>
<td><strong>23</strong></td>
<td><strong>77.2</strong></td>
<td><strong>20</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Jujuy</td>
<td>0.36</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>0.36</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>0.772</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>85.3</td>
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<tr>
<td>La Pampa</td>
<td>0.31</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>0.28</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>0.821</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>81.2</td>
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<tr>
<td>La Rioja</td>
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<td>24</td>
<td>0.19</td>
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<td>0.804</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>83.3</td>
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<td><strong>Mendoza</strong></td>
<td><strong>0.49</strong></td>
<td><strong>2</strong></td>
<td><strong>0.51</strong></td>
<td><strong>2</strong></td>
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<td><strong>78.9</strong></td>
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<td>Neuquen</td>
<td>0.26</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>0.23</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>0.817</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>88.6</td>
<td>8</td>
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<td>Rio Negro</td>
<td>0.48</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.51</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.810</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>84.4</td>
<td>12</td>
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<td>0.33</td>
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<td>0.35</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>0.792</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>83.2</td>
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<td>San Juan</td>
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<td>4</td>
<td>0.39</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>0.798</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>84.9</td>
<td>11</td>
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<tr>
<td>San Luis</td>
<td>0.23</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>0.16</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>0.801</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>87.2</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Santa Cruz</strong></td>
<td><strong>0.29</strong></td>
<td><strong>19</strong></td>
<td><strong>0.24</strong></td>
<td><strong>19</strong></td>
<td><strong>0.843</strong></td>
<td><strong>3</strong></td>
<td><strong>96.1</strong></td>
<td><strong>4</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Santa Fe</td>
<td>0.41</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>0.42</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0.821</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>89.2</td>
<td>6</td>
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<tr>
<td>Stgo. del Estero</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>0.774</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>65.8</td>
<td>23</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tierra del Fuego</td>
<td>0.47</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0.47</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0.854</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>97.1</td>
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<td>Tucuman</td>
<td>0.46</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0.44</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0.790</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>65.7</td>
<td>24</td>
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</table>

---

### TABLE 2.3:

SOCIOECONOMIC AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT IN SELECTED DISTRICTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Socioeconomic Development</th>
<th>Income per capita-ARS 1996</th>
<th>NBI 2001</th>
<th>% pop. w/ health coverage</th>
<th>CALMAT IV</th>
<th>HDI 1996</th>
<th>HDI rank (24 districts)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>10300</td>
<td>17.7</td>
<td>51.95</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>0.826</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HIGH</td>
<td>Federal Capital</td>
<td>20544</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>73.82</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.892</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HIGH</td>
<td>Santa Cruz</td>
<td>14207</td>
<td>10.4</td>
<td>70.77</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.843</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MEDIUM</td>
<td>Mendoza</td>
<td>8748</td>
<td>15.4</td>
<td>49.42</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>0.82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LOW</td>
<td>Catamarca</td>
<td>7459</td>
<td>21.5</td>
<td>54.95</td>
<td>22.4</td>
<td>0.799</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LOW</td>
<td>Formosa</td>
<td>6206</td>
<td>33.6</td>
<td>34.19</td>
<td>28.3</td>
<td>0.764</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: INDEC; Programa Argentino de Desarrollo Humano 1999.

Regarding the second independent variable (competitiveness of the district), the table below (Table 2.4) shows the percentage of votes obtained in gubernatorial elections by the two nationalized parties studied here (PJ and UCR; and their alliances or coalitions). The provinces of Formosa and Santa Cruz have always been ruled by the Peronist Party and have obtained overwhelming victories on several occasions. The remaining three districts have alternated parties to lead the executive and the electoral contests show to have been closer in percentage points. Table 2.4 also shows that, with the exception of the Capital Federal district, the PJ and the UCR have always been the most relevant parties in those districts.
TABLE 2.4:

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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PJ</td>
<td>42.85</td>
<td>52.94</td>
<td>44.25</td>
<td>59.34</td>
<td>73.71</td>
<td>71.79</td>
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<tr>
<td>UCR</td>
<td>27.58</td>
<td>46.38</td>
<td>33.51</td>
<td>40.29</td>
<td>26.06</td>
<td>24.41</td>
<td></td>
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<td>MID</td>
<td>23.11</td>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PJ</td>
<td>55.71</td>
<td>49.3</td>
<td>60.76</td>
<td>66.37</td>
<td>54.59</td>
<td>70.85</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UCR</td>
<td>39.86</td>
<td>47.99</td>
<td>36.18</td>
<td>32.29</td>
<td>44.3</td>
<td>27.91</td>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PJ</td>
<td>36.03</td>
<td>46.65</td>
<td>54.13</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>28.8</td>
<td>35.71</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>UCR</td>
<td>47.08</td>
<td>36.95</td>
<td>33.49</td>
<td>20.46</td>
<td>37.94</td>
<td>42.89</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEMOCRATA</td>
<td>13.3</td>
<td>13.71</td>
<td>7.76</td>
<td>17.88</td>
<td>32.17</td>
<td>9.44</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Movimiento Popular Catamarqueño</td>
<td>16.48</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alianza Frente Pais Solidario</td>
<td></td>
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<thead>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PJ</td>
<td>39.72</td>
<td>54.16</td>
<td>37.8</td>
<td>43.94</td>
<td>44.72</td>
<td>43.47</td>
<td>37.63</td>
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<tr>
<td>UCR (and Frente Cívico y Social) + Kirchner in 2007</td>
<td>36.06</td>
<td>41.36</td>
<td>49.07</td>
<td>53.03</td>
<td>52.6</td>
<td>50.78</td>
<td>59.36</td>
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<tr>
<td>Movimiento Popular Catamarqueño</td>
<td>16.48</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alianza Frente Esperanza Nueva Catamarca</td>
<td>11.66</td>
<td></td>
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<table>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PJ</td>
<td>18.62</td>
<td>1.68</td>
<td>23.77</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UCR</td>
<td>39.89</td>
<td>49.31</td>
<td>1.89</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frente Pais Solidario</td>
<td>26.5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beliz-Francos; Cavallo-Beliz</td>
<td>13.1</td>
<td>33.2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Ibarra-Tellerman</td>
<td></td>
<td>33.54</td>
<td>20.7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alianza Frente Compromiso para el Cambio; or Alianza Propuesta Republicana</td>
<td>37.55</td>
<td>45.62</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Autodeterminación y Libertad</td>
<td></td>
<td>12.29</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alianza Union para Recrear Buenos Aires</td>
<td></td>
<td>9.76</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Figures expressed in percentage of valid votes.
Table 2.5 shows the composition of the provincial legislatures in early 2007 (provincial deputies). The Peronist Party holds 73% of the seats in the Formosa Legislature and 92% in the Santa Cruz Legislatures. The situation in the province of Mendoza is more balanced, where the PJ and the UCR hold 40% and 44% of the Provincial Deputies seats respectively; however there is a 16% of the seats held by other parties. In the case of Catamarca the PJ\textsuperscript{50} and the UCR hold 51% and 49% respectively in a divided government (the Governor is from UCR). Finally, in the city of Buenos Aires the *Frente Para la Victoria* which supports President Kirchner and hence is a “Peronist Party” holds only 23% of the seats in a divided government (the governor/mayor was from a UCR extract). The official UCR party holds only 2% of the seats in the Legislature.

**TABLE 2.5:**

PERCENTAGE OF SEATS IN THE PROVINCIAL DEPUTY LEGISLATURES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Legislative parties/caucuses 2007</th>
<th>FORMOSA</th>
<th>SANTA CRUZ</th>
<th>MENDOZA</th>
<th>CATAMARCA</th>
<th>CAPITAL FEDERAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>UCR</strong></td>
<td>26.7</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>43.8</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>48.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PJ</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Fte.P/Victoria</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>- Partido Justicialista</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Justicialista</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>- 62 Organiz. Peronistas</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>DEMOCRATA</strong></td>
<td>14.6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ARI</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>JUNTOS POR BS.AS.</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>COMPROMISO POR EL CAMBIO</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>15</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

\textsuperscript{50} The PJ is divided within the provincial legislature in Catamarca.
Table 2.5 (contd.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Legislative parties/caucuses 2007</th>
<th>FORMOSA</th>
<th>SANTA CRUZ</th>
<th>MENDOZA</th>
<th>CATAMARCA</th>
<th>CAPITAL FEDERAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Other 10 parties with less than 10% of seats</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seats in Prov. Deputies Legislature</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Figures may not add up to 100 due to rounding. The party of the incumbent governor is in shaded figure. Source: Dirección Nacional Electoral, Ministerio del Interior.

To more formally classify the selected districts according to the "competitiveness" independent variable, below (Table 2.6) are the Effective Number of Competing parties' index elaborated by Laakso and Taagepera (1979). Again, we see that Formosa and Santa Cruz display the lowest number of parties in the last ten years. Catamarca has had changes in the party in control of the governorship between the PJ and the UCR (Frente Cívico y Social) - See Table 2.3; there are two strong parties. In Mendoza there are basically three parties and in Capital Federal there are more than three.

Table 2.6:

EFFECTIVE NUMBER OF COMPETING PARTIES IN THE FIVE ARGENTINE DISTRICTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ENCP</th>
<th>FORMOSA</th>
<th>SANTA CRUZ</th>
<th>MENDOZA</th>
<th>CATAMARCA</th>
<th>CAPITAL FEDERAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>2.02</td>
<td>2.11</td>
<td>2.68</td>
<td>2.15</td>
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<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>2.89</td>
<td>2.00</td>
<td>2.43</td>
<td>2.52</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995 (1996)</td>
<td>1.94</td>
<td>1.84</td>
<td>3.44</td>
<td>2.11</td>
<td>3.56</td>
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<tr>
<td>1999 (2000)</td>
<td>1.64</td>
<td>2.02</td>
<td>3.03</td>
<td>2.10</td>
<td>2.79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>1.74</td>
<td>1.72</td>
<td>3.09</td>
<td>2.23</td>
<td>3.59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AVG ENCP 1987-2003</td>
<td>2.05</td>
<td>1.94</td>
<td>2.93</td>
<td>2.22</td>
<td>3.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AVG ENCP 1995-2003</td>
<td>1.77</td>
<td>1.86</td>
<td>3.19</td>
<td>2.15</td>
<td>3.31</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Effective number of competing parties in gubernatorial elections (1987-2003): ENCP = $\left(\frac{1}{\sum v_i^2}\right)$
I have expressed my concerns about the ENCP index in the previous chapter. Below, I show the competitiveness of the districts using the ESOP index in order to demonstrate its relevance. An illustrative example is the gubernatorial election of 1999 and 2003 in the provinces of Santa Cruz and Catamarca. The ENCP index is 2.02 and 2.10 for Santa Cruz and Catamarca respectively, and the ESOP is 0.40 (actually 0.397) and 0.420 respectively for 1999. These numbers seem basically similar. The actual election outcome in percentage points of the two major parties were 55 and 44 in Santa Cruz, and 53 and 45 in Catamarca (as seen in Table 2.4). In this case there does not seem to be a problem with ENCP.

However, the ENCP in 2003 is 1.72 and 2.19 for Santa Cruz and Catamarca respectively, which does not really reflect not only the absolute different between the two major parties (43 and 7 percentage points respectively), but also the overwhelming superiority of the incumbent party (71% and 51% respectively) or weakness of the opposition parties (largest opposition parties 28% and 43% respectively). For this reason the ESOP index is more appropriate when studying campaigns and campaign strategies. In the given example the Effective Strength of Opposition Parties index yields 0.135 for Santa Cruz and 0.424 for Catamarca.

Table 2.7 further shows the instances in which the party of the governor lost the governorship to the opposition. This happened in the provinces of Mendoza, Catamarca and the Federal Capital since 1983 (shaded figures). This demonstrates the capability of the opposition to organize and defeat the administration which holds the resources of the state, this however happened with the aid of the party at the national level and the power of the president. The figures in bold represent electoral results which were not of the party of the incumbent president or of the winning president that same year; this in turn shows the capability of the provincial machines or the autonomy of the provincial politics which goes against the “national trend”.
Santa Cruz and Formosa show one strong party. The governorship has not changed hands in the last 24 years when the presidency has changed parties 3 times. Catamarca shows two stable and strong parties (UCR and PJ), and the opposition is concentrated in one party. Mendoza shows more than two parties; the opposition is in more than one party. Capital Federal shows more than three parties; the opposition is in several parties and account for a majoritarian share of the vote. In these last three districts the provincial administration has changed parties at least twice since 1987. To conclude, further details on the characteristics of the districts is given when relevant in the substantive chapters. Next chapter deals with clientelism as a voter mobilization strategy in the five selected districts.

<table>
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<tr>
<th>ESOP</th>
<th>LOW FORMOSA</th>
<th>LOW SANTA CRUZ</th>
<th>HIGH MENDOZA</th>
<th>HIGH CATAMARCA</th>
<th>HIGH CAPITAL FEDERAL</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>0.43</td>
<td>0.49</td>
<td>0.63</td>
<td>0.37</td>
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<td>1991</td>
<td>0.43</td>
<td>0.26</td>
<td>0.29</td>
<td>0.64</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995 (1996)</td>
<td>0.32</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>0.36</td>
<td>0.41</td>
<td>0.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999 (2000)</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>0.40</td>
<td>0.75</td>
<td>0.42</td>
<td>0.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>0.43</td>
<td>0.42</td>
<td>0.60</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| AVG ESOP 1987-2003 | 0.28 | 0.29 | 0.49 | 0.45 | 0.60 |
| AVG ESOP 1995-2003 | 0.18 | 0.24 | 0.51 | 0.42 | 0.60 |


The ESOP series begins in 1987 when first a party was competing for the governorship as an incumbent after the return to democracy in 1983. Since I did field work in 2006 I truncated the indices to the last election before the interviews. Capital Federal had elections in 1996 and 2000. Also, before 1996 the mayor of Capital Federal was appointed by the President, hence in 1996 there was an incumbent party in the district. I considered only the first round of elections in Capital Federal when there were ballotage elections in 2003.

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CHAPTER 3
THE CENTRALITY TO CAMPAIGNS OF CLIENTELISM AS A VOTER MOBILIZATION STRATEGY

Politicians in democracies often use clientelism as a way to reach or conserve political power. The specialized literature tells us that poverty is a strong predictor of the existence of clientelistic relationships (See Chapters 1 and 2, for example see Magaloni et al 2007) between a patron (usually a politician) and a client (usually a voter). In this exchange, the patron gives the client particularistic benefits (e.g. money, food, favors, house appliances, etc.) in exchange for electoral support. This exchange is usually enabled by a broker or a person who may give the patron information about the district’s constituents, organizes clients and grants the patron access to those constituents, and at the same time delivers the particularistic benefits to the clients who in turn are expected to support the patron. As argued in Chapters 1 and 2, the comparative literature has explored different aspects of this relationship. However, the existing research has disregarded the perspectives of politicians with respect to clientelism as a voter mobilization strategy and have mainly focused on voters, given the relative ease of access to data. In this chapter I view clientelism from the politicians’ point of view.

In this chapter I attempt to view clientelism from a midrange theoretical perspective, as part of a more comprehensive analysis of political parties and electoral

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52 For example, Stokes 2005 and Calvo and Murillo 2004 discuss how the patron will attempt to enforce the client's compliance. Some authors see clientelism as an anachronism of modernity destined to disappear (Hagopian 1996, Auyero 1997).
campaigns. In order to do this I look for meaning and intention of the individual actors to construct an explanation with a higher level of abstraction which will enable the measurement of the centrality to campaigns of clientelism as a voter mobilization strategy. This chapter also sheds light on the above-mentioned issues about anachronism, client compliance, and questions of clientelistic tactics as part of parties’ voter mobilization strategies which are not yet adequately addressed by the literature.

In the theory presented in Chapter 2 I stated that in order to understand clientelism as a voter mobilization strategy, we should carefully consider the socioeconomic characteristics and electoral competitiveness of the district. One of the latest analyses comes from Kitschelt’s edited book (2007) where these are the two main variables to explain variation in clientelism. As this is primarily a qualitative analysis, I expect that the causal mechanisms of clientelism as a voter mobilization strategy will not be completely independent from the mechanism of the other voter mobilization strategies (personalism, programmatic and performance strategies), or other aspects of political parties which are not central to the understanding of clientelism as a voter mobilization strategy. Not surprisingly, the studied districts where clientelism is more relevant as a voter mobilization strategy are those where the population endures relative socioeconomic hardships. The level of electoral competition is also important to understanding clientelism. As stated in Chapter 2, the competitive pressure that one party or candidate exercises on another in a contest for votes, forces the latter to sharpen or to change his tactics to mobilize voters more than if the competition was weaker or absent. In other words, where clientelism is relevant and elections are competitive, we see more carefully planned and complex clientelistic tactics.

Another contribution of this dissertation is that by adopting a qualitative approach, it also facilitates the generation of more refined hypotheses about clientelism. Often, more questions get asked than answered. Before I develop the theoretical and
methodological approach of this chapter I present the definitions of the three distinctive types of clientelistic relationships that I use in this chapter.

3.1 Three distinctions within clientelism as a voter mobilization strategy

3.1.1 Machine clientelism

In machine clientelism there is a direct and immediate or nearly immediate exchange of particularistic benefits to prospective voters for support, usually votes. Voters generally receive the benefits before they vote or soon after. These clients may vote for the party out of a feeling of indebtedness (because at least this party gave them something that they can already enjoy, while the other party gave them nothing), however, most clientelistic relationships have some sort of compliance, control or enforcement mechanism. The machine clientelistic relationship may occur between a bureaucratic electoral machine and anonymous clients in an environment of competition between providers of particularistic benefits.

3.1.2 Personalized clientelism

The particularistic benefits are not necessarily given to clients during the electoral campaign period but when needed and asked for during the rest of the time. The personalized clientelistic relationship may occur between a patron politician or his brokers and identifiable clients in an environment which often lacks alternative sources of benefits. In personalized clientelism voters may comply with their part in the clientelistic bargain (the vote) more because there is daily contact or familiarity with the broker and/or patron, and hence there is usually also a bond of loyalty and respect among the actors than is the case of more anonymous machine clientelism; clients’ compliance is also characterized less because of the enforcement mechanisms by the patron than in the case of machine clientelism.
3.1.3 Patronage

In the context of a strategy to mobilize voters to the polls, patronage is a type of clientelistic practice in which votes are given to an incumbent (or perspective candidate) in exchange for public employment or wage increases.\(^53\) The control exercised by the patron/broker in the patronage relationship is greater than that in machine clientelism because the permanence of the patron in power may be a condition for keeping one’s job (Lemarchand 1981).

The qualitative analysis of cases allows us to acknowledge and consider the significance of multiple relevant factors when trying to understand phenomena, beyond the major independent variables of socioeconomic characteristics and electoral competitiveness of the districts. There may be obvious independent variables, antecedent variables, intervening variables and a host of other variable denominations to identify the multitude of factors which constitute the complexity of the reality we are trying to explain. In Chapter 2 I formulated hypotheses about clientelism in four selected socioeconomic and electoral environments (high and low values for both variables).

The qualitative research undertaken in this dissertation allowed me to dig deeper and find other intervening and more proximate factors that are also relevant to more precisely and fully understand the mechanisms which explain the HOW and not only the WHY of clientelism. To understand the centrality to campaigns of clientelism as a voter mobilization strategy, besides the socioeconomic development and the level of electoral competition in a district, we should also acknowledge the relevance of the infrastructure of the political party, the electoral system, the degree of decentralization of municipalities, the candidate nomination procedures, and the relative isolation of voters

\(^{53}\) Patronage may also involve elected officials granting contracts to companies in exchange for money or support but not directly votes in elections. This interpretation of patronage is valid as a money collecting mechanism but I do not take it into account because it is not directly a voter mobilization mechanism which is the focus of this chapter.
(i.e. from other localities, NGOs or civil society organization). To dig even deeper we must also study factors which shape the broker-client, the patron-broker, and the patron-client relationships. In this respect we must consider, for example, the autonomy of brokers from patrons, the closeness or personalization of patrons to voters and the type of insertion that the broker has in a community where the clients live.

I do not attempt to provide a sociological explanation of clientelism (e.g. Auyero 2001), but instead to find observable (and with different degrees of difficulty measurable) factors and indicators, which allow us to improve the available comparative tools used in the study of clientelism. I illustrate these relevant factors to understand clientelism as a voter mobilization strategy as concentric rings which surround the very concrete and specific patron-broker-client interactions (Figure 3.1). Rings which are closer to that crucial patron-broker-client interaction are more of an intervening variable, or less antecedent or less independent from that interaction, and thus more case specific and also plausibly more susceptible to influence by the actors themselves. The first, or outer, ring of factors is constituted by the socioeconomic characteristics and electoral competitiveness of the district. The second ring concerns the degrees of decentralization (political, financial and administrative) and electoral laws (reelection laws, electoral systems, etc) in the district; these affect the relative power of different office holders and the incentives to campaign. For example: a) provinces that give little power to mayors and give governors discretion to allocate the public monies have different distribution of incentives and power, versus provinces where local authorities are more autonomous; b) Reelection laws also shape candidates’ incentives by, for example, opening up internal competition when a powerful governor is forbidden from running again; c) Finally, legislators with a locale specific electorate like Catamarca’s Provincial Senators (which may lead to more personalism and personalization of tactics) have different incentives to
campaign and compromise with other political actors, as opposed to province-wide PR legislators (who may have no significant contact with party brokers and voters).

The third ring of factors concerns the candidate nomination practices in the district. For example, provinces where the candidate nomination of proportional representation lists are done discretionally by the governor or are done with a say of the local authorities may also affect clientelism as a voter mobilization strategy. Rings 2 and 3 may, in turn, affect each other. For example, cash-strapped towns’ electoral machines cannot effectively do machine clientelism. The fourth ring of factors refers to the resources of the political party; a party could have specialized infrastructures like brokers’ networks, or parties may also concentrate resources and efforts on marketing and media campaigns, etc.

Also relevant is whether the brokers’ network is far-reaching with in situ brokers with trust, confidence from local people, and experience, versus a puntero-type brokers’ infrastructure which reaches people only sporadically and occasionally. Finally, brokers could be paid punteros who work as patrons’ delegates versus a dirigente-type broker who is autonomous from the patron and holds patrons accountable, and the range in between these two extremes.
Finally, one relevant factor which was addressed in the previous chapters is the degree of personalization of the party-voter relationship and the personalization of the tactics. This factor is actually, in part, a consequence of all other factors above, save those in the outermost ring. As mentioned in Chapter 2, the candidate's and party's closeness to the voter or personalization in campaign depend on several factors which include the obvious sheer geographic and population size of the district, as well as the resources available to the party and candidates, and the incentives the political entrepreneurs can have from the electoral system and nomination procedures.

Survey questions taken in four of our five districts in October 2007 yield supporting evidence to two points made so far (Catamarca was not sampled). First, the high personalization tactics of the campaign (or direct contact tactics) are more common
in places with smaller populations. Second, high personalization tactics only lead to clientelism tactics in the districts with poor populations.

The first survey question asked: “Have party militants or candidates stopped by your home in the last few weeks to talk about the electoral campaign?” The second question asked: “Have you seen or heard about party militants/activists handing out things like food, clothes or money in this neighborhood during this campaign?” Tables 3.1 and 3.3 show the proportions on both questions for the four districts sampled. We can then have six different pairs of provinces with each question, many of which can illustrate and give evidence to the hypotheses in this chapter. Tables 3.2 and 3.4 show the p-value of the Chi-Square Test of proportions of the six possible pairs of cases.

### TABLE 3.1:
CAMPAIGN HOME VISITS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>N/A</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Capital</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>181</td>
<td>188</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Count</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% within Province</td>
<td>0.50%</td>
<td>3.20%</td>
<td>96.30%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mendoza</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Count</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% within Province</td>
<td>7.70%</td>
<td>11.50%</td>
<td>80.80%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Formosa</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Count</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% within Province</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>23.10%</td>
<td>76.90%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Santa Cruz</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Count</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% within Province</td>
<td>2.00%</td>
<td>46.00%</td>
<td>52.00%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>352</td>
<td>490</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Count</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% within Province</td>
<td>1.60%</td>
<td>26.50%</td>
<td>71.80%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

### TABLE 3.2:
CAMPAIGN HOME VISITS TEST OF PROPORTIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Capital Federal</th>
<th>Mendoza</th>
<th>Santa Cruz</th>
<th>Formosa</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Capital Federal</td>
<td>0.034</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mendoza</td>
<td>0.034</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.331</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Santa Cruz</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.020</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Formosa</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.331</td>
<td>0.020</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Pearson uncorrected chi-square test of proportions; p-value.

### TABLE 3.3:
CAMPAIGN HANDOUTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>N/A</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Capital</td>
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<td>7</td>
<td>181</td>
<td>192</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% within Province</td>
<td>2.10%</td>
<td>3.60%</td>
<td>94.30%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Santa Cruz</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>228</td>
<td>250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% within Province</td>
<td>1.60%</td>
<td>7.20%</td>
<td>91.20%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mendoza</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% within Province</td>
<td>3.80%</td>
<td>7.70%</td>
<td>88.50%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Formosa</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% within Province</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>26.90%</td>
<td>73.10%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>451</td>
<td>494</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% within Province</td>
<td>1.80%</td>
<td>6.90%</td>
<td>91.30%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### TABLE 3.4:
CAMPAIGN HANDOUTS TEST OF PROPORTIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Capital Federal</th>
<th>Mendoza</th>
<th>Santa Cruz</th>
<th>Formosa</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Capital Federal</td>
<td>0.318</td>
<td>0.111</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mendoza</td>
<td>0.318</td>
<td>0.901</td>
<td>0.076</td>
<td>0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Santa Cruz</td>
<td>0.111</td>
<td>0.901</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Formosa</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.076</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Pearson uncorrected chi-square test of proportions; p-value
There is a statistically significant difference in the sample’s proportions which indicates that the strategy to reach voters is more direct, with a higher degree of personalization or with more personalized tactics in Santa Cruz than in Capital Federal (Table 3.2 p-value 0.000). However, this does not mean that the high personalization of tactics in rich Santa Cruz signifies more clientelism (campaign gifts) than in rich Capital Federal (Table 3.4 p-value 0.111). There is no statistical difference in the samples’ proportions of people seen or listening about party militants handing out things like food, clothes or money to people in their neighborhood during the October 2007 electoral campaign. This may indicate that highly personalized tactics like home visits are not very relevant in parties’ voter mobilization strategies in a district with a large population like the city of Buenos Aires (Capital Federal) and that it is more relevant in a smaller population city like Rio Gallegos (Santa Cruz).

Another interesting pairing of samples is that of the large and rich Capital Federal district and the smaller population and poor Formosa district. In this case the statistically significant difference of proportions indicates evidence that personalized tactics are more relevant in Formosa, and that also clientelistic tactics are more relevant in campaigns as well than in Capital Federal.

A third relevant comparison would then be that of small and rich Santa Cruz electorate and small and poor Formosa electorate (both cases also happen to be of low electoral competitiveness). In Santa Cruz high personalization tactics are more widespread than in Formosa; also, both Santa Cruz and Formosa scored higher than Capital Federal. Both samples were taken in the provincial capitals only, and Formosa city is larger than Santa Cruz’s capital -Río Gallegos. Also, as expected, clientelistic tactics are more relevant in poor Formosa than in rich Santa Cruz (p-value 0.001).
In both comparisons, that of the Capital Federal and Santa Cruz with the province of Mendoza, we find no statistically significant difference in the incidence of clientelistic campaign tactics, even though the sample proportions indicate a higher relevance in Mendoza, second in Santa Cruz and finally in Capital Federal. The question on direct contact tactics as expected shows statistically significant difference, making those tactics more relevant in Mendoza than in Capital Federal. That difference between Mendoza and Santa Cruz show a statistically significant difference making the tactics more relevant in the latter (and smaller population) Santa Cruz province.

Finally, in the pairs with the smallest sample sizes (Mendoza and Formosa) we do not find statistically significant differences in the sample proportions.

The data suggests that personalized tactics which are common in Formosa and Santa Cruz only translate into particularistic exchanges in the case of Formosa (poor district) but not in Santa Cruz (rich district). In the case of Santa Cruz the highly personalized tactics of the campaign do not allow for tactics with particularistic benefits, presumably because of the high socioeconomic characteristics of the electorate which prevent parties from using these tactics.

### 3.2 Hypotheses

Next I summarily restate the hypotheses which are declared in Chapter 2; 1) In districts with high electoral competitiveness and low socioeconomic development I expect to find that clientelism is definitively central to campaigns as a voter mobilization strategy; 2) In districts with high electoral competitiveness and high socioeconomic development I expect to find that clientelism is not central to campaigns as a voter mobilization strategy; 3) In districts with low electoral competitiveness and low socioeconomic development I expect to find that clientelism is probably central to campaigns as a voter mobilization strategy; 4) In districts with low electoral
competitiveness and high socioeconomic development I expect to find that clientelism may or may not be central to campaigns as a voter mobilization strategy.

In this chapter I use quotes from elite interviews to mainly illustrate processes of clientelism. Each of the provincial cases represents a unique environment where factors shape clientelism. Next I reiterate how each district scores in the development and electoral competitiveness factors, and I mention the main characteristics of clientelism as a strategy in those five districts which I argue in the rest of the chapter.

In the case of Catamarca (HIGH competition and LOW development) clientelism seems to be central to campaigns as a voter mobilization strategy where candidates have no alternative but to reach the prestigious local and fairly autonomous brokers if they want to win elections.

In the case of Capital Federal (HIGH competition and HIGH development) clientelism is definitively not central to campaigns in campaigns because publics are not receptive of the practice and the commonly distributed clientelistic gifts, and parties are not prepared to effectively campaign with clientelistic tactics; In the province of Formosa (LOW competition and LOW development) the enduring and stable personal relationship between a patron and clients is based on the reliable and familiar presence of a leader who distributes particularistic benefits in exchange for electoral support which also nourishes a loyalty among the actors; In the province of Mendoza (HIGH competition and MEDIUM development) political parties cannot rely only on clientelism as a voter mobilization strategy given that most people are not receptive to those tactics. However, parties are prepared (i.e. decentralized and resourceful) to use clientelistic tactics/means to those minority publics who, in the context of electoral competition, could sway the scale in an election; Finally, in the province of Santa Cruz (LOW competition and HIGH development) many people are tied to public employment jobs, but people judge and vote based on the perceived performance of incumbents, and hence elected officials
may often lose office (the alternative officials may often come from within the same ruling party, however).\textsuperscript{55} We cannot say that clientelism is central to campaigns as a voter mobilization strategy in Santa Cruz just because many people work for the state as Magaloni et al would argue (see Magaloni et al Unpublished manuscript; Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007). We cannot say that clientelism is not central to campaigns because there is no strong opposition, either (e.g. Kitschelt et al 2007 and Stokes 2005). But also, we cannot say that clientelism is not central because people are “rich”, or because there are no significant roles of brokers. Instead, the relevant factors combine in such a way that I argue there is complete ambiguity whether clientelism is central to campaigns as a voter mobilization strategy in Santa Cruz (clientelism may or may not be relevant).

The factors which lead to these hypotheses seem to explain the centrality to campaigns that clientelism will have as a voter mobilization strategy in each district. In this chapter I explore these factors and also those relevant factors in the patron-broker-client relationships.

I next present a set of attributes of clientelism as a voter mobilization strategy based on the theory in chapter 2, the hypotheses, and on the type of research and data gathered. These attributes and indicators become an instrument for the clientelism researcher and are a roadmap to the discussion of cases in the rest of the chapter.

3.3 Attributes and Indicators for the measurement of the centrality to campaigns of clientelism\textsuperscript{56}

High in the ladder of abstraction is the concept of the centrality to campaigns of clientelism as a voter mobilization strategy in a district. The districts considered are the

\textsuperscript{55} Opposition parties may actually be able to win a mayoral election when there is a bad PJ performance in the larger cities, or in smaller towns when there is not much of a pool within the PJ locally to have another viable candidate.

\textsuperscript{56} See Munck and Verkuilen (2002) for a more complete justification and standards of measurement concept definitions.
provinces. The centrality to campaigns of clientelism refers to how important it is to the overall campaign effort of the most important parties and candidates in a district. The attributes of clientelism then can vary across districts. For example, in some districts the role of the brokers is necessary and in others it is irrelevant for the clientelism exchange. The coordination between the local and provincial level of the electoral machine may be well oiled while in others that may not be the case, and still in all cases clientelism be relevant as a voter mobilization strategy. Clientelism is a relationship with a message where the patron/politician wants to get support from voters by offering particularistic benefits. As discussed in Chapters 1 and 2, we as observers interpret the set of actions or tactics in a campaign as a strategy.

I hence consider specific parties’ and candidates' tactics: actions to mobilize or appeal to voters in ways in which the message, or part of the message, includes particularistic benefits which are often material (e.g. food, money), but could be symbolic as well (e.g. a promise of food, money, a job or club goods). I interviewed elected officials as a way of finding out about tactics (and strategies) in campaigns by inquiring about actions, contents, and resources; i) Actors’ actions: what is being done in the campaign and how; ii) Contents of actions: what is being said and given to voters; iii) Resources that include the availability and presence of brokers, material resources, media access and organization, things which help deliver the message. Often candidates do not have a choice and do act in campaigns with whatever resource is available to them. Hence, low personalization tactics (i.e. activists not getting to voters face-to-face) are a choice and sometimes a result from lack of resources.

The message in tactics is a product of what and how is being said or given to the voter, and also the things that were not said or given. The message entails a receiver in an environmental context. As with the rest of the attributes of the concept and due to the sort of data gathered (the interviews), the message, and eventually the Fuzzy-set score,
is an interpretation of the case as a whole (the province). A campaign tactic, such as the candidate visiting people’s homes, means little without knowing the contents of it. But also action and contents may not mean much to the overall campaign effort if the resources are insufficient.

When studying clientelism we interpret a message in certain types of relationships, for example, between a broker and a client. Hence, in order to operationalize the concept of *the centrality to campaigns of clientelism as a voter mobilization strategy* I must also evaluate the relationships within it. It is by evaluating the characteristics of the multiple interactions in clientelism that we could be able to judge its relevance as a strategy to mobilize voters in campaigns. Figure 3.2 is a representation which holistically synthesizes the clientelistic relationships in the province of Formosa and which is essential to understanding Formosa’s Fuzzy-set score (similar representations for all five districts appear on this chapter).\(^{57}\) The solid line in Figure 3.2 represents when high personalization tactics are relevant to the campaign. The dotted line represents when high personalization tactics are not relevant (and other tactics like TV ads are more relevant instead). Figure 3.2, for example, represents that there is little or no coordination between the local and higher level candidacies and parties in the implementation of clientelistic tactics (they may act with autonomy and independently). That is why only the local actors have effective and relevant personalized tactics with the target group of voters where clientelistic tactics are aimed at (i.e. high personalization tactics of provincial level actors are not important for clientelism as a voter mobilization strategy). Furthermore, only through the local brokers can these groups of voters be reached effectively and significantly. In Figure 3.2, the space shared by candidates and

\(^{57}\) This holistic view of the clientelistic interactions is central to the Fuzzy-set placing of the case given the theoretical limitation set by the concept’s attributes’ aggregation rule (explained later).
voters, but not the brokers, represents the clientelistic tactics' attempts that, precisely, do not involve brokers but at the same time do not represent the most relevant clientelistic efforts in campaigns. This diagram below (Figure 3.2) represents relative degrees of autonomy and type of interaction, exclusively in clientelism, and does not explicitly take into account the relative amount of resources and organizational capabilities of the actors used in clientelism or any other strategy type, but still tells us a lot about clientelism in the district.

![Diagram of Predominant Types Of Relationships In Formosa’s Clientelism](image)

**Figure 3.2: Predominant Types Of Relationships In Formosa’s Clientelism**

To operationalize the concept I must then identify and evaluate attributes such as the predominant type of patron/candidate-broker relationships, patron/candidate-client/voter relationships and the broker-client/voter relationships, with respect to the autonomy of the broker from the patron/candidate, the coordination among the different
levels of the electoral machine (e.g. local, provincial levels of the party). This, of course, closely relates to the resources available and coordination of the different actors, for example: is there a clients’ monitoring system in place, or, can the patron/politician reach voters with clientelistic benefits without the aid of local brokers?

This study uses Fuzzy-sets to qualitatively distinguish cases because the centrality to campaigns of clientelism as a voter mobilization strategy, as well as the other strategy types, in some cases does not vary in degrees of intensity but in kind (Fuzzy-set method is explained in Chapter 1). The types of relationship present in clientelism (e.g. between brokers and clients) vary qualitatively among districts. Hence, the score on a specific attribute or indicator could be the same in cases where clientelism has an overall different centrality to campaigns as a voter mobilization strategy. All the attributes and indicators are first coded and interpreted, and the case with its specific configuration has to be seen as a whole before the coder is able to accurately place a case in the Fuzzy-set; there is no weighing of attributes and indicators precisely because clientelism may not only vary in intensity but in kind of relationships, and individual factors which are important in one case may not be in another. The differentiation of each of the attributes of the concept is to capture the specific relationships and relevance of those relationships to the campaign effort of actors, which we then interpret as clientelism. Further research can specify and simplify the list below.

Some of the attributes may appear as more determinant to placing a case in a given category of overall centrality to campaigns, but all issues addressed by the attributes try to get to the heart of clientelism as a campaign strategy in a district. With the sort of data I chose to gather there could be the possibility that officials may all lie about a straightforward question about clientelism, but the more specific clientelism attributes issues and a good sample of interviewees allow for a good evaluation of the case. The attributes and indicators are meant to guide the placing of the case in the
**Fuzzy-set.** The average aggregation rule of these attributes is evidence of my assumption that no single attribute is determinant for the placing of the case in the Fuzzy-set, but the whole set of attributes and a good judgment by the case researcher is the appropriate tool for doing so.

These attributes below are not twenty-two questions to necessarily be asked to the interviewed elites, but twenty-two issues that the researcher should answer with an in-depth study of the case. The choice of up to five values for the attributes, and eventually the five-value Fuzzy-set, is a personal judgment for qualitatively distinguishing the centrality to campaigns of clientelism in campaigns. The highest value on each of the attributes presented below (or an attribute of a district where clientelism is definitively relevant as a voter mobilization strategy) does not intend to represent an ideal type, but a meaningful score; there are real cases that do fall into one of the five values of the set.

I based my coding on multiple interviews and data gathered in each case. The indicators are meant to be balanced, specific enough without making them trivial, but broad enough to find cases in each. When interviewing 14 or more politicians on an issue, I found similarities and differences in their answers. They agreed among themselves many times or strongly rejected opinions from colleagues in the same district regarding the voter mobilization efforts in campaigns. Agreement on an issue among the officials here means that there is basic coincidence on what really matters and does not necessarily mean a complete consensus on an issue. Again, the coding of an attribute or indicator should be the product of an in-depth study of the case. For example, a “monitoring system” organization and procedures could vary from district to district, but the goal, effort, availability of necessary resources be equally relevant to those campaigns.
1) Is there agreement among the interviewees about the relevance of the types of tactics which include the delivery of particularistic benefits to campaigns/elections? In other words, do officials acknowledge the relevance of clientelistic tactics in campaigns? (E.g. delivering foodstuffs and other goods in door-to-door visits, or gathering people at a school, plaza, etc.). Officials may know whether clientelism makes a difference in the elections and hence these tactics are something that must be done.

Centrality to campaigns of clientelism as a voter mobilization strategy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Centrality Level</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Most central to campaigns</td>
<td>Yes. Tactics are central to campaigns. Incumbents and opposition candidates and officials admit the presence and relevance of clientelistic tactics in campaigns. No agreement. To some these are relevant, while to others these are only a supplement to the campaign effort. Opposition officials say clientelism exists and that it is relevant. Some incumbent party officials do not deny clientelism but say it is not what makes the difference (i.e. another source for the legitimizing support is also claimed, e.g. personalism, program). During the campaign these are not significant or relevant, but they may occur (Patronage may have an effect). Club type benefits announcements/promises occur during campaigns. Politicians (especially from the opposition parties) may say that clientelistic tactics occur during campaigns, but there is no agreement among incumbent or opposition party officials whether it is relevant to the campaigns. During the campaign these are neither significant nor relevant, but may occur (Patronage may have an effect). Club type benefits announcements/promises occur during campaigns. Politicians (especially from the opposition parties) may say that clientelistic tactics occur during campaigns, but they do not think clientelism is relevant to the campaign effort of the incumbent and elections.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Least central</td>
<td>There is agreement on the irrelevance of them. These practices are non-inexistent or very unusual. Incumbents and opposition officials deny the existence and/or relevance of clientelistic tactics in campaigns.</td>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes. Tactics are central to campaigns. Incumbents and opposition candidates and officials admit the presence and relevance of clientelistic tactics in campaigns</td>
<td>No agreement. To some these are relevant, while to others these are only a supplement to the campaign effort. Opposition officials say clientelism exists and that it is relevant. Some incumbent party officials do not deny clientelism but say it is not what makes the difference (i.e. another source for the legitimizing support is also claimed, e.g. personalism, program). During the campaign these are not significant or relevant, but they may occur (Patronage may have an effect). Club type benefits announcements/promises occur during campaigns. Politicians (especially from the opposition parties) may say that clientelistic tactics occur during campaigns, but there is no agreement among incumbent or opposition party officials whether it is relevant to the campaigns.</td>
<td>During the campaign these are neither significant nor relevant, but may occur (Patronage may have an effect). Club type benefits announcements/promises occur during campaigns. Politicians (especially from the opposition parties) may say that clientelistic tactics occur during campaigns, but they do not think clientelism is relevant to the campaign effort of the incumbent and elections.</td>
<td>There is agreement on the irrelevance of them. These practices are non-inexistent or very unusual. Incumbents and opposition officials deny the existence and/or relevance of clientelistic tactics in campaigns.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
2) Is there agreement about the mechanisms for the implementation of clientelistic tactics which include the delivery of particularistic benefits (how people are approached or summoned, conversation style, tone of voice – e.g. paternalistic, fraternal, etc)? (Note: If clientelism tactics are frequently used by all, candidates would know what is being done and how; Then least effective tactics would tend to be dropped and the more effective be used more frequently).

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<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>There is some agreement; OR, there is no agreement, because a large proportion of people may be affected by &quot;clientelism&quot; (club goods)</td>
<td>No; OR, there is agreement, but the number of voters affected is not thought considered to be relevant in number. (there may be anecdotal accounts more than personal experience)</td>
<td>No mechanisms considered and no tactics to be implemented. Officials may only theoretically agree on clientelistic mechanisms</td>
</tr>
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3) Are high personalization tactics relevant to the campaign effort? Do officials feel they rely on face-to-face campaign activity with voters to eventually win their support? Size and area of district, as well as local culture can also affect this.

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<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
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4) How often are the contents of messages particularistic in highly personalized tactics (e.g. dialogues in door to door visits)? The contents of messages refer to what is being discussed with the voter in those tactics, including particularistic symbolic benefits.

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<tr>
<td>Very often particularistic (about basic things like food, jobs, medicines)</td>
<td>Often particularistic (jobs, housing) but it is frequently about the community.</td>
<td>Never or very rarely particularistic (voters may be concerned about a particularistic problem, but it is never addressed by candidate)</td>
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</table>

5) How often do highly personalized campaign tactics entailing the actual delivery of particularistic benefits occur?

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Often</td>
<td>Not often/ occasionally</td>
<td>Unusually</td>
<td>Never or very rarely</td>
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</table>
6) Is there agreement among the political actors on the types of particularistic benefits given to prospective voters?

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes. These are basic food, clothing, medicines, etc.</td>
<td>There is little agreement on the type of benefits and involve jobs, housing, more like club goods. Some candidates use clientelism and others do not or with not as many resources. Disagreement on which benefits -- rather than if benefits -- are being given to voters.</td>
<td>Agreement on what but not on if benefits are being given to voters.</td>
<td>No agreement on what and on if benefits are being given to voters. Or the goods mentioned are actually public goods instead of particularistic ones. There may be a theoretical agreement about types of benefits, but no personal or second hand account or experience.</td>
<td>None relevant given. Things like food and clothing may be mentioned.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

7) Is there agreement on the role and function of political actors in the implementation of tactics geared towards the delivery of particularistic benefits in campaigns? This attribute of the centrality to campaigns of clientelism addresses the professionalism and clear duties of actors. From who and how are requests gathered and decisions made? Who talks to who in, for example, a bureaucratic clientelistic machine which reaches everywhere in the district?

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes. The role of brokers, other activists, patrons, etc. is clear. E.g. brokers announce the place and time of gifts to be delivered, and arrange what, and where is best with candidate, etc, etc.</td>
<td>There is some agreement. In some places brokers approach people and in others, the approach is made by the officials/candidates themselves.</td>
<td>No. The resources and organization for the tactics to distribute particularistic goods demonstrate improvisation or lack of expertise in this respect. In only a few places these roles/functions are clear and exercised.</td>
<td>No. Some officials may say one thing, others another thing and many do not know or address the issue. The resources and organization for the tactics demonstrate improvisation or lack of expertise in this respect. In only a few places these roles/functions are clear and exercised.</td>
<td>None present/existent</td>
</tr>
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</table>

8) Is there agreement about the groups of people being targeted with particularistic benefits in campaigns? In other words, who are the possible clients? This addresses the familiarity officials have with clientelism target group in the district and its significance.

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes. It is easier to identify those people falling outside of the target group –e.g. middle class- since everyone else falls within it.</td>
<td>There is not agreement on the delimitation of the groups of people who may be subject of clientelistic tactics (or of who may be outside of these groups).</td>
<td>Yes, and these are relatively small, identifiable by location and characteristics.</td>
<td>There is no significant target group of voters subject of clientelistic tactics because it is negligible.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
9) Are decisions and power regarding clientelistic tactics centralized? Centralization is preferable when clientelism is relevant and affects the entire district, but it is not when clientelism affects only specific areas and localities are better off dealing with clientelism themselves. Hence, when clientelism decisions are left to the local party authorities and out of the hands of the provincial governor or district’s party authorities, means that clientelism is less relevant in the district as a whole (e.g. Mendoza)

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<tr>
<td>Tactics which involve the delivery of particularistic benefits are often centrally conceived and organized at the provincial level (they could instead be locally or nationally organized)</td>
<td>The distribution of particularistic benefits is mostly organized at the local level. The provincial level party and candidates use tactics in this respect but are not relevant and are not direct (like giving out food, etc.); instead, the provincial government/party allows it to happen at the local level. Not all actors (candidates/politicians) are involved in these types of tactics, but relevant strata are, usually for example, mayors and councilmembers.</td>
<td>Tactics which involve the delivery of particularistic benefits are generally organized at the local level, and not centrally organized at the provincial level.</td>
<td>Tactics which involve the delivery of particularistic benefits may be isolated locally conceived by individual candidates.</td>
<td>None conceived. These may be anecdotal isolated cases locally conceived by individual candidates.</td>
</tr>
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</table>

10) Are there client monitoring systems which are relevant in the campaign effort? I.e. where people/clients are for example given a ballot they should cast, threats or other types of pressure.

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes, and these are not just rare and isolated mechanisms</td>
<td>No significant clients' monitoring systems in place; there may be rare and isolated mechanisms set up only for specific occasions and places.</td>
<td>No significant clients' monitoring systems in place. Isolated accounts in cases where clientelism is claimed to be irrelevant</td>
<td>There are no clients' monitoring systems present</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

11) How important are the party's Election Day transportation arrangements? This shows capabilities to mobilize, control voters and commit voters to the election. Not only the clients and not all the clients are transported to the polls, in fact most clients probably are not. However, the tactic may be seen as a personalized benefit/favor (sometimes it is more anonymous). It could be used to control clients. It shows the infrastructure, resources of the parties and the reliance on personalized tactics (as opposed to knowing people will go to vote on their own).

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Very important in the overall campaign effort.</td>
<td>May be significant arrangements (considerable efforts and resources devoted to it) but are not relevant in the campaigns.</td>
<td>Very limited in reach, very limited in significance to the overall campaign effort.</td>
<td>Negligible importance</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
12) Are brokers relevant in the overall campaign effort? The question refers to the whole campaign effort knowing that brokers are relevant in the clientelistic relationship. It addresses the candidates' dependence on the brokers' job knowing that brokers may also have a regular contact with voters.

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Somewhat irrelevant. A district where officials need some contact because some personalized tactic is important to the campaign. These are likely &quot;puntero&quot; type brokers, with limited agency, or an activist who focuses on a place and interacts between voters and officials/candidates</td>
<td>No</td>
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</table>

13) How is the patron/politician-broker and electoral machine coordinated?

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Local broker holds the monopoly of access to voters in clientelistic tactics. Complete or near complete coordination in the implementation of clientelistic tactics between higher and lower levels of the electoral machine in the district.</td>
<td>There is not necessarily a coordination between higher (e.g. provincial) and lower (e.g. local) levels of the electoral machine in the district with regards to the implementation of clientelistic tactics. Local and provincial branches of the electoral machines act with autonomy on clientelistic tactics. Only local branches and its brokers have the most effective reach to voters with clientelistic tactics (provincial level-only organized tactics also occur)</td>
<td>Brokers have a limited role and are bypassed by candidates. Higher office candidates may communicate with local party leaders with respect to the tactic (&quot;asking for permission&quot;)</td>
<td>No significant coordination in the clientelistic tactics efforts between local and provincial or national branches of the electoral machine in the district. Candidates may act autonomously in isolated events.</td>
<td>None / N.A.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

14) Do the patron/candidate-broker relationships in campaigns tend to be personalized and more informal or bureaucratized/mediated and more formal? This points to the professionalism and complexity of clientelism as a strategy, and also to the anonymity among the patron-broker-voter relationships.

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<tr>
<td>Bureaucratized (electoral machine contacts intermediary, etc. e.g. when there are large numbers of brokers but also a large number of lieutenants of the patron.). I.e. a large electoral machine, in which the broker is more autonomous and with many commitments.</td>
<td>Personalized. Broker has a clear, single patron/boss. There may be something more than just clientelism for people's support (e.g. personalism, program).</td>
<td>Bureaucratized (electoral machine contacts intermediary, etc.) because there are other more relevant aspects of campaigning. Brokers not seen as too relevant by the candidates.</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
15) Is the broker autonomous or dependent on the patron? If brokers are predominantly autonomous agents then the vote and loyalty of the clients is to the broker’s job (i.e. particularistic benefits). If a brokers are dependent (e.g. a delegate of patron), then there is the chance that the voters’ support comes because there are things like isolation, fear, candidate’s personalism, etc., not just the benefits.

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Autonomy. Brokers are more concerned about people’s support than the patrons’. There may be multiple, shifting, unstable patrons. Broker cannot rely on a single patron.</td>
<td>Dependency. Brokers who do not have a patron lose legitimacy with people. There may be a single patron.</td>
<td>Dependency, but the actor’s role as broker is very limited in time and scope. Broker does a specific and isolated, sporadic job.</td>
<td>Not relevant. N/A</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

16) How is the broker-client relationship manifested in campaigns? This not only refers to the clientelism exchange per se, but also to other aspects of the campaign such as arrangements of Election Day transportation or candidates’ visits. The confidence, trust and loyalty people have towards a broker also affects type of enforcement mechanism, and the need to use other campaign tactics like TV advertisements, or candidates’ visits, etc.

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<tr>
<td>Close. Very relevant in high personalization tactics. Brokers are known and more trusted by people than politicians. Most are known more as agents of the people than as delegates of patrons.</td>
<td>Not necessarily close. Somewhat relevant in high personalization tactics. Brokers are known as the patron’s delegate and not as much as an independent agent of the people. People ask to talk to patron instead. Brokers are more as couriers with a patron’s mandate than coming from the clients.</td>
<td>Not necessarily relevant. Brokers meet clients only during campaign. Role as broker unusual. Broker not known in the community or known for something else (other sources of legitimacy).</td>
<td>Not relevant/ inexistent</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
17) How important is the broker-client relationship for clientelistic tactics? (i.e. organization, communication of the event, information about the clients, distribution of goods, the delivery of the message). This evaluates the importance of the broker's job in clientelism.

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Necessary for an effective tactic. Patrons cannot do without brokers. Brokers are agents.</td>
<td>Broker-client relationship is greatly simplified and not necessary to reach voters with clientelistic benefits. The &quot;relationship&quot; is not important, only to grant a “safe passage” to candidates/goods in small marginalized areas and not for detailed client information.</td>
<td>Broker are somewhat irrelevant to reach voters; they do not hold crucial client information or access.</td>
<td>Brokers are important for an effective tactic. Brokers hold the fine grained client information. Brokers are the hands and eyes of the patron.</td>
<td>Important for an effective tactic. Patrons cannot do without brokers. Brokers are agents.</td>
<td>Non-existent</td>
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</table>

18) Do brokers cover significant areas of the district? This evaluates resource aspects like a network of brokers.

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes, they reach all corners of the district whether clientelism is relevant or not.</td>
<td>No, only selected areas where clientelism may be relevant.</td>
<td>No/ almost no coverage.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</table>

19) How important are the patron/politician-client/voter personalized tactics in campaigns? (E.g. candidates visiting people in homes or small groups). In other words, are brokers necessary? Do voters need to see and touch the leader? (Which would involve another source of legitimacy besides clientelism) Media and mediated candidates’ communication may not work with ordinary people with problems. However, face to face addresses often lead to particularistic issues being discussed. Also voters who need a candidate’s personalized contact may not be informed about “the incumbent’s performance" (voters may not have access to or trust in the mass media).

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Not very relevant. Brokers are the key to the voters. Patrons are not necessarily present.</td>
<td>Very relevant, because the broker-client relationship is seen as not enough legitimization since broker is only a delegate.</td>
<td>No significant high personalization contact between patrons and clients exist; positive PR effect is more relevant than actual contact.</td>
<td>Candidate’s personalized clientelistic tactics are not relevant to the campaign; PR effect could be negative.</td>
<td>Personalized contact of candidates with voters is not relevant to the campaign effort in any case.</td>
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</table>
20) Can patrons reach clients effectively (i.e. summoning or going to meet clients or possible clients) without the aid of brokers?

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No. Brokers are the key to access these relevant groups of voters.</td>
<td>Often occurs without local brokers</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No. Brokers are necessary to access the small marginalized groups of people.</td>
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21) Can relevant party candidates dispose of clientelistic benefits in campaigns?

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes. They may be personal resources or the party machine makes them available.</td>
<td>Candidates do not have enough resources to give to a significant number of people in particularistic ways.</td>
<td>Most candidates do not have resources to give to voters in particularistic ways.</td>
<td>Clientelistic benefits are not available to the candidates (public jobs, food and other gifts items).</td>
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22) How relevant is the mass media in the campaign effort?

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The media is acknowledged NOT to be the most significant means to reach people.</td>
<td>The media is acknowledged as the most significant means to reach people; IF NOT, then the direct contact activities only occasionally include the distribution of particularistic goods. (See attribute # 5)</td>
<td>The media is acknowledged as the most significant means to reach people; IF NOT, then the direct contact activities only very rarely involve the distribution of particularistic goods. (See attribute # 5) and if they do, the resources and organization for the tactics are ad-hoc. (See attributes # 9, 10, 11 and 21)</td>
<td>The media is acknowledged as the most significant means to reach people.</td>
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TABLE 3.5:
CODING SUMMARY OF THE CENTRALITY TO CAMPAIGNS OF CLIENTELISM AS A VOTER MOBILIZATION STRATEGY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Most central</th>
<th>Least central</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Catamarca</td>
<td>Formosa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Relevance of Clientelism tactics in campaigns</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Tactics mechanism</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Personalized tactics relevant</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Particularistic message in personalized tactic</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Delivery of particularistic benefit regularity</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Benefits delivered</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Role of actors</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 Target group</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 Centralization of decisions</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 Monitoring system</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 Election Day transportation arrangements</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 Brokers relevant in campaign</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 Patron/politician-broker relationship</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 Patron/politician-broker, and electoral machine coordination</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 Brokers' autonomy</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 Broker-client relationship</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 Broker important for clientelistic tactics</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17 Brokers' network</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18 Patron/politician-client relationship</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19 Can patron/politician bypass broker?</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 Candidates dispose of clientelistic benefits?</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21 Media relevance in campaign</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sum of scores | 22 | 19.14 | 12.77 | 6.96 | 0 |
Average score | 1 | 0.87 | 0.58 | 0.32 | 0.00 |
Table 3.5 shows the coding of the five studied cases on the attributes of the centrality to campaigns of clientelism as a voter mobilization strategy. The concept studied in this chapter, “the centrality to campaigns of clientelism as a voter mobilization strategy”, is a five-value Fuzzy-set with values (0, 0.25, 0.50, 0.75 and 1). Hence, as explained in Chapter 1, the breakpoints of the range of attributes’ averages (0.13, 0.38, 0.63, and 0.88) points to assigning the following Fuzzy-set values to our cases: Catamarca, 1; Formosa, 0.75; Santa Cruz, 0.5; Mendoza, 0.25; and Capital Federal, 0.

3.4 Qualitative breakpoints in the Fuzzy-set membership

What then are the qualitative distinctions or qualitatively anchored breakpoints which we could use to differentiate the centrality of clientelism in the campaigns of each district? Parties devote resources to an organization infrastructure, which is useful to better perform in implementing different strategic types. In this manner, I view the concept of “clientelistic voter mobilization strategy” as a set, and not as variables, by looking at the resources, activities and contents of the tactics parties implement in campaigns. This allows me to ignore irrelevant variation to the concept. Because I talk about “set-relations” of causes that combine, it does not make sense to try to isolate the effects of each supposed cause. It only makes sense to understand cases as configurations (Ragin 2000: 39).

Why can I say that Catamarca is different than Formosa or Santa Cruz? And why is clientelism more central to campaigns as a voter mobilization strategy in some provinces than in others? As mentioned in Chapter 2, I elaborate a five-value Fuzzy-set membership of districts where clientelism is a relevant voter mobilization strategy. This requires five qualitatively anchored breakpoints with values 1, 0.75, 0.5, 0.25, and 0, which indicate “a district where clientelism is definitively a relevant voter mobilization strategy,” “probably a relevant voter mobilization strategy,” “may be/ may be not a
relevant voter mobilization strategy,” “probably not a relevant voter mobilization strategy,” and “definitively not a relevant voter mobilization strategy.” This cross-over point of 0.5 is not data driven or sample specific as in variable-oriented research. This crossover point is calibrated with theoretical and substantive knowledge (See Ragin 2000 p167). The rest of the chapter justifies these five qualitative breakpoints. Next, I begin describing the five Fuzzy-set values and their qualitatively distinctive characteristics.

**Value 1:** “A district where clientelism is definitively central to campaigns as a voter mobilization strategy.”

There is a distinctive set of relationships which are predominant in such a district. Clientelistic tactics to lure the vote must go through the local brokers to be effective; the candidates do not or cannot access the voters effectively by themselves with these types of tactics. The district of Catamarca conforms to such evaluation. In this district we find the attributes of clientelism averaging scores within the value of 1 range in the list of attributes above. The solid line in Figure 3.3 represents that high personalization tactics and linkage are important in the district’s clientelistic efforts, and that the patron’s clientelistic efforts only reach the voters when the broker is involved.
The distinctive set of relationships is the fact that there is no coordination between the local and higher level candidacies and parties in the implementation of clientelistic tactics; they may autonomously try to reach brokers and/or clients. However, only the local actors carry out effective and relevant personalized tactics to the target group of voters where clientelistic tactics are aimed (see solid line of local candidates vs. dotted line of provincial candidates on Figure 3.4). These groups of voters can be reached effectively only through the local brokers. In Figure 3.4 the space shared by candidates and voters, but not the brokers, represents the attempts at clientelistic tactics which, precisely, do not involve brokers but also do not represent the most relevant clientelistic efforts in campaigns. In this figure the patrons’ efforts are most relevant.
when the brokers are involved but there are attempts to reach clients without the participation of brokers. Clientelism as a voter mobilization strategy is less coordinated in this case than in the previous one. Formosa conforms to such evaluation. In such districts we would find the attributes of clientelism with average scores within the value of 0.75 range.

Figure 3.4: Structure of Clientelism as a Strategy in Districts Where “Clientelism is Probably Central to Campaigns as a Voter Mobilization Strategy”

Value .5: “A district where clientelism may be/ may not be central to campaigns voter mobilization strategy”

There is a distinct type of clientelistic relationship; brokers are not necessary for candidates to effectively reach voters with clientelistic type tactics. Personalized tactics are relevant only for the local candidates (solid line in Figure 3.5), and they can
effectively reach voters without the assistance of brokers. Most or all voters might be subject of clientelistic tactic attempts. There is not complete coordination among the local and higher level actors with regards to clientelism as a strategy. The district of Santa Cruz conforms to such evaluation. In this district there is no significant evidence of activity which could be geared towards clientelism. There are no significant structures and/or resources for it and no significant direct contact of candidates with people. The exchange is limited to listening to voters’ concerns, but candidates are limited in what they can do; candidates do not have the resources at their personal disposal to help a significant number of voters in particularistic ways. In such a district we would find the attributes of clientelism with average scores within the value of 0.5 range.

![Diagram](image_url)

**Figure 3.5: Structure of Clientelism as a Strategy in a District Where “Clientelism May / May Not be Central to Campaigns as a Voter Mobilization Strategy”**
Value .25: “A district where clientelism is probably not central to campaigns as a voter mobilization strategy”

Here there is also a distinct type of clientelistic relationship. Personalized tactics are not relevant to candidates/parties’ campaign strategies, and candidates can reach voters with clientelistic type tactics without the necessary aid of brokers. There is not a clearly defined group of voters who are the target of the different non-coordinated attempts to reach voters with these types of tactics. The district of Mendoza conforms to such evaluation. In such a district we should find the attributes of clientelism with average scores within the value of 0.25 range.

Figure 3.6: Structure of Clientelism as a Strategy in a District Where “Clientelism is Probably Not Central to Campaigns as a Voter Mobilization Strategy”
Value 0: “A district where clientelism is definitively not central to campaigns as a voter mobilization strategy”

Here as well the distinct relationship in clientelism is that candidates reach voters without any intermediary or brokers, and that personalized tactics are not relevant to campaigns (Figure 3.7). The district of Capital Federal conforms to such evaluation. In such a district we find the attributes of clientelism with average scores within the value of 0 range.

Figure 3.7: Structure of Clientelism as a Strategy in a District Where “Clientelism is Definitively Not Central to Campaigns as a Voter Mobilization Strategy”

I will next argue for each district’s Fuzzy-set score value by providing evidence to the distinctive set of relationships within clientelism, and by providing evidence to the numerous attributes and indicators of clientelism as a voter mobilization strategy summarized in Table 3.5. For the sake of organization, succinctness and presentation of the evidence, attributes and indicators of clientelism are grouped under different
headings in each of the districts below. Characteristics of clientelism such as the relevance of clients’ monitoring systems and the Election Day’s transportation arrangements may be grouped into an organization and resources category for the sake of presentation of the evidence. Hence, attributes of clientelism which more directly refer to resources and organization are presented together; those attributes addressing the relationships in clientelism are presented together as well.

I start by discussing the case of Catamarca. Clientelism in Catamarca is more developed as a voter mobilization strategy than in any of the other districts. In Catamarca machine clientelism and dirigente-type brokers are very important to understand campaigns. Second, I discuss the case of Formosa; I argue that the clientelism found in Formosa is a less developed form of clientelism as a voter mobilization strategy than the one found in Catamarca. However, personalized clientelism is relevant to understand campaigns as well. Third, I discuss the case of Capital Federal and the non-centrality to campaigns of clientelism. Fourth, I discuss Santa Cruz and the incidence of patronage. Finally, I discuss Mendoza regarding the use of clientelism as a campaign strategy to further its understanding in different electoral environments.

3.5 Catamarca: clientelistic machines at their best

Catamarca is a district which is electorally competitive and with low socioeconomic development. (See Chapter 2) Catamarca is “a district where clientelism is definitively central to campaigns as a voter mobilization strategy.” In this district we find the attributes of clientelism averaging scores within the value of 1 range in the list of attributes above. Also, as Figure 3.3 shows, there is a distinctive set of relationships which are predominant in Catamarca’s clientelism. Clientelistic tactics or the tactics in which particularistic benefits are given to prospective voters to lure the vote must go
through the local brokers to be effective. The brokers are the effective linkage to the
target group of voters; the candidates do not or cannot access the voters effectively by
themselves with these types of tactics.

3.5.1 Relevance of clientelistic tactics 1 (attributes 1 and 2)

Machine Clientelism is acknowledged by all political and social sides in
Catamarca. It is characterized by the large quantity of particularistic “gifts”/benefits
distributed at once and by the “last-minute” timing. It is seen with resignation by some
officials and with a sense of duty by others. Below Provincial Deputy Victor Brandán
explains his view about the pervasiveness of clientelism (attribute 1).

No digo que esto suceda en toda la provincia. O sea, en el centro [de la
ciudad capital] y gente de clase media alta para arriba es muy difícil que la
compres con un bolsón [de comida], una cama y un par de zapatillas. Pero
tampoco creo que sea comprar el voto. Yo creo no va a compra el voto, el que
aparece al lado de la gente que está necesitada. La gente que duerme en el
suelo, y de repente apareció una persona, que puede ser político o no, porque
puede ser que alguien de una ONG va a entregarle una cama, colchón, zapatilla.
Es muy probable que la gente va a estar eternamente agradecida de esa
persona. Y que si luego esa persona le pide que lo apoye con su voto para esa
candidatura, lo va a hacer porque está agradecida de que le dio una solución a
un problema puntual que tenía.

One of the interesting differences I noticed between the poor and the rich
provinces, where I interviewed officials, was the underlying sense of duty that many
officials in poor districts manifested about the particularistic distribution of benefits to
voters. From Brandán’s account we gather a few points which help us understand
clientelism as a voter mobilization strategy in general and as a personal relationship in
particular. First, and not surprisingly, the distribution of particularistic benefits such as
food, a bed or shoes to people, is a practice which works and hence is implemented to
all except those middle classes which mostly live in the capital city. Second, Brandán
corrects himself to say that giving particularistic benefits to people does not equate to
buying votes, but he stresses people’s appreciation for those who help them in their
need; that is, Brandán’s evidence is the consequence of those actions (“…la gente va a estar eternamente agradecida…”) and not the action itself or its ultimate goals (helping people). Third, Brandán does recognize that “the vote” is a consequence of the distribution of particularistic benefits because people are “agradecida de que le dio una solución a un problema puntual que tenía.”

Clientelism, and particularly machine clientelism, seems to be a principal strategy of parties in Catamarca. If this is the case then certain type of public works or assistance to the needy would get delayed to the campaign periods because it matters most when the goal is to win votes. In this respect Brandán continued to give me a perspective of the reasons why that might be the case, with the relative freedom that being a legislator (and not a more resourceful and accountable executive official) gives him when talking about clientelism (attribute 2).

No creo que sea que vaya a comprarlo el voto. Lo ideal sería que esa gente no tenga esa necesidad, y que esa necesidad sea cubierta en épocas electorales. Si cada periodo demora 4 años, deberíamos estar 4 años buscando solución para esa gente necesitada. Pero bueno, forma parte de la idiosincrasia, del folklore que tiene que ver con la manera de hacer política de estas regiones. (Brandán is a Peronist in the Frente Cívico y Social -FCyS)

First, Brandán recognized what should be done and what is actually done in government; that is, people should have those needs addressed not just during the campaigns, and searching for solutions to those problems is the full time job of the elected officials. However as Brandán says, leaving those solutions to problems to the campaign periods is the way to do politics in Catamarca, “la idiosincracia”. There is a sense of resignation in this comment, but also an acceptance of the rules of the game.

3.5.1.1 Clientelism seems to be essential to win elections

Porque muchas veces algunos políticos, en mi caso, queremos dejar de lado ciertas formas que creemos que no son buenas de hacer política, pero debería ser consensuado con todos los partidos políticos. Si alguien decide no usar la metodología de dar cosas, deberían ser todos los partidos políticos los
que deciden no dar cosas. Porque si no, si dando cosas te permite ganar, indudablemente estaría en una competencia desleal. (Brandán)

Officials in Catamarca see clientelism as something that probably should not occur but they are willing to do it while others do as well; “it would be unfair competitive advantage otherwise.” In Catamarca political parties cannot back down from relying on a machine clientelism strategy and still win elections (attribute 1).

All these assistentialism campaign tactics to “help” people are in a sense conservative: a make-work job, a subsidy or a roof are important for the welfare of people, but they will rarely help them leave their marginal condition. Several officials seem to think that clientelism is appropriate for Catamarca. Their arguments also accentuate the idea that officials feel as belonging to a particular class, above the rest of society, and are aware of their power to touch people’s lives, and in Deputy Brandán’s case with a hint of condescending attitude towards people’s goals in life. Brandán said:

“People don’t want a new house, they are happy with a room in which five people sleep…la idiosincracia [local idiosyncrasies], etc.” Deputy Salcedo (UCR) justified their job as politicians as also getting things for people, she said: “Hay que entenderlo. Mas allá de que sea un canje, voto por algo…Si decimos ser políticos y queremos mejorar la vida de la gente, no lo hacemos por casualidad…” Salcedo continues:

La gente sabe que en campaña puede pedir. Y hay que ser realista, muchas veces en la campaña, se entrega cosas sin organización, que si se hiciera organizado durante el mandato tendría mejores resultados…Pero esto de proceso la gente no lo ve. El efecto positivo se da en los 5 días últimos. Y hay gente que ha dado vuelta la campaña la noche anterior: materiales de construcción, puestos de trabajo, contratos, becas…Pero la gente no valor esto….Hoy recibió, pero a los dos meses ya quiere otra cosa… (attr. 1 and 2)

3.5.2 High personalization clientelistic tactics (attributes 3, 4, 5 and 6)

Machine clientelism is done openly, it is admittedly effective as a voter mobilization strategy because, paraphrasing Salcedo (above), people do not value the long term achievements, and in competitive Catamarca you may not know the outcome
until the last vote is counted. In order to win elections, machine clientelism as a voter mobilization strategy is relevant in Catamarca. In Salcedo’s view, it is people’s fault, because if they only appreciated the year long efforts, and not just the last-minute hand-outs, then things like the distribution of construction materials, etc, could be better organized (attribute 5 and 6). These next quotes are about the personalization of tactics and contents, but also about the conservative views politicians have towards societal change, clientelism and the role of politics.

_Cuando uno va a una casa a pedir un voto, creo que el 70% pide algo material para él; o trabajo, o beca para hijo que estudia, o material de construcción para vivienda, medicamento. Y un 30% de la gente pide la ayuda comunitaria, ‘mire en mi barrio hace falta luz,’ etc, etc….En Catamarca se hizo tan fuerte la política de la dádiva que creo que va a tener que pasar mucho tiempo, muchas campañas [for it to change]. Se hizo costumbre el cambiar el voto por algo._ (Councilwoman Stella Ramos, Valle Viejo, FCyS)

_El tema de la dádiva va a existir hoy y siempre, pero nosotros…pensamos que a partir de un contrato gane 150, 200 pesos por lo menos para subsistir. Que eso es la política [para ayudar], no para llenarse el bolsillo y chau._ (Mayor Marcelo Saavedra of Los Varela, PJ)

This mayor is here referring to the “Planes jefes y jefas de hogar” subsidies (with temporary make-work contracts). Above, with a slight sense of disgust or disappointment, Councilwoman Ramos was calling the voters responsible for the particularistic distributions of benefits in campaigns; she suggests that the parties and candidates only cave in to the local custom or an external force, pushing them to exchange particularistic benefits for votes. Both officials see clientelism as rooted in the district. As stated in the following quote, the Mayor of Fray Mamerto Esquiú also seems to be blaming people for the machine clientelism: “Hay sectores que aprovechan bien. Van, y ‘traé, traé, si vienen para acá traigan algo.’ ¿Qué piden?: cuchetas, colchones, zapatillas, algún bolsón [de comida]. Es lo más común…. A todos los partidos, ‘si no trae nada, no venga.’” (Humberto Valdez, UCR) People (probably local dirigentes) would tell candidates to bring hand outs if they wanted to be welcomed (attributes 3, 4, 5
and 6). However, in these close elections handing out food or clothes before the election may not be enough to assure the vote and the results. (Later I show how a highly competitive election may bring along more intrusive tactics to win votes)

In places where there is more isolation, and hence less chance of competition, people have stronger loyalties, in this case to local dirigentes (community brokers). Personalized clientelism tends to occur under these conditions (i.e. smaller and poor/isolated populations). This is similar to what happens in Formosa (later) and the loyalty given to mayors. The difference with Formosa is that since in Catamarca there is alternation in power, patrons are not stable and the loyalty from the people is then to the dirigente-type brokers and not as much to the mayors themselves as is the case of Formosa.

3.5.3 Organization of actors and resources (attributes 7-11)

3.5.3.1 Organization, centralization and resources

One can campaign without money, but if one wants to campaign to win, then you need money. People need solutions right then, not later. (Prov. Senator Figueroa, PJ)

It is not only the party of the governor which has resources for clientelistic tactics (in this case UCR), but the PJ as well. Holding office positions always gives access to resources because office holders must contribute to the party coffers from their salaries, according to party rules. Still, there may be other ways political parties gather resources for clientelistic tactics, for example, as PJ Provincial Deputy Burgos told me, by getting money and resources from neighboring PJ ruled Tucumán province. The previous quote by Figueroa makes explicit that solving particularistic problems during the campaign is fundamentally important in order to win elections. This next quote is from a Peronist deputy allied to the UCR in the FCyS who favors handing out food, just not only during campaigns. To the question of whether the campaigns resources they got were enough
to buy food and clothes to hand out he said: “Nosotros no entregamos, puede entregar más disimuladamente sin prensa nuestro dirigente en los barrios. Pero no así al montón, con un camión…Y los radicales que están el gobierno sí lo hacen. Nosotros le decimos que eso no tendría que ser solamente en época de elección, la función del estado es sacarlos de la miseria.” (Prov. Deputy Castillo, PUC). All parties do hand out particularistic benefits to voters; the amount of resources one has only changes the way of doing it. Provincial Senator Kent de Saadi (PJ), wife of the former governor, gave me another example: “ya hay depósitos enteros en el interior con todo lo que se va repartir las últimas semanas, la última noche.”

The larger handouts are bought and organized by the provincial party level, not only the incumbent, but the opposition party as well. Individual candidates and local party organizations (with the probable exception of the two or three largest cities) do not have the resources to hand out large quantities of “gifts,” and may be more discrete and targeted when implementing clientelistic tactics. Still, local candidates and legislator do spend money, often their own, to give personalized particularistic favors to prospective voters (medicines, school supplies, etc). As expressed by the various quotes, clientelism is common, considered necessary and justified, and is acknowledged by parties that want to win elections. (Attribute 9)

3.5.3.2 The mechanisms 1: the relevance of the Dirigente-type brokers (attrib. 7)

The candidates need the dirigentes as the key to access the people. The house-to-house type of machine clientelism tactic is more personalized, as the dirigente-type broker and often the candidate meet the person and listen to demands in the voter’s domicile (as described above by Councilwoman Ramos). The large scale hand-outs,

56 She also added that the FCyS had 4000 "Jefes y Jefas" subsidies to give and also threaten to take away from people.
done with truckloads full of merchandise, etc. are instead organized by the party at the provincial level. This latter is of course also machine clientelism, but is more anonymous; here the *dirigente*-type broker announces and organizes the distribution to the public often in a centralized location, while the purchase, and transportation are done above him. One difference is that the clientelism in the house-to-house visits, even though it is only an electoral event and people know they can request more things than if there was no campaign, is also a chance for the voter to first hand privately show the candidate and *dirigente* his family’s needs and problems. The face-to-face interaction forces a commitment from the *dirigente*, and in some respect (probably to a lesser extent) from the candidate. The voter sees the *dirigente* more often than the candidate and eventual elected official, and the commitment of the *dirigente* to deliver on his promise is greater, for he has a smaller and narrower group than the politicians who will hold him accountable. For this reason the *dirigentes* pressure the officials to make them deliver, or *dirigentes* will remove their support from the officials. (Attribute 7)

### 3.5.3.3 The high octane clientelistic and monitoring tactics of competitive elections (attribute 10)

In this section I illustrate clientelistic tactics in urban and more rural areas to show incentives, resources and particularly the organization put forth for clientelism. These tactics are also a consequence of politicians having the conservative views addressed earlier. I begin with Senator Figueroa who complains about the tactics used by an opponent which meant his party losing an election in his county:

Senator Figueroa (PJ): *No se puede comprar 7000 votos, imposible. Pero se puede comprar una franja de 50, 100 votos. Que en el último tramo decide la elección. En 2005 íbamos ganando perfectamente hasta las 4, 5 de la tarde. Y el intendente recibió un llamado: ‘estás perdiendo la elección; ¿por qué no te instalás?’, y se instaló con un maletín... Llevamos un candidato, un profesor de secundaria. Perdimos en un padrón de 7000 por nada más que 200 votos que nos costó la recta final. Nos ganó el intendente porque había gastado en la última media hora de elección, 50 mil pesos. Se paró en la escuela y empezó a
pagar votos directamente. Como es el gobierno el que maneja la policía, las
instituciones y demás.

This scene shows how close elections are and the capacity to know (guess) how
people voted. It also shows how the mayor avoids prosecution despite his
questionable/illegal behavior, if it is true. The quote also subtly shows that, at least for
Figueroa, the mayoral race was not a critical one, maybe because they recognized they
could lose or because the other races (city council and provincial deputies and senators)
were similarly relevant in the district. Another point to make is that campaigns are
viewed as a team effort in which there is not clear single leader (as is the case in the
Formosa’s local races). In Catamarca the party gains in relevance over specific
candidates. I further illustrate with the case of Councilwoman Lia Quiroga (UCR,
Tinogasta), who also recognizes clientelistic tactics of paying votes with cash:

...Pero últimamente, en las legislativa en Tinogasta, se hacía desde
algún partido eso [buy people food, medicines, etc.], pero el último día, hay
gente que paga el voto, con plata. Yo creo que eso puede cambiar al voto. ...Y,
si, puede dar vuelta una elección. Mas en un pueblo, donde no es mucha la
diferencia de un partido a otro, 60 o 100 votos. ...Pagar, no lo hicimos, pero yo lo
observé. Y vi que ese pago de votos nos costó a veces en la elección.

Very contested elections, which can be won or lost by a small quantity of votes,
not only lead parties and candidates to buy votes with cash or to distribute clientelistic
goods, it also leads parties to use other questionable tactics. Next, Provincial Deputy
Salcedo UCR) speaks on the logistics and tactics to try to achieve compliance from the
voters and protect them from the efforts of the competition. Salcedo said:

No olvidemos el 2 de marzo, se quemaron urnas, se voltearon una
elección. Cuando la dádiva no alcanza, hay estrategias más fuertes... He visto
gente con poca educación...le retiran el documento, y los acompañan. ...Otra
estrategia que hemos usado...tener gente conocida, el camino de la escuela
hasta la urna, podés ir charlando. ...Eso está prohibido por ley...La estrategia la
usamos, vos me traés tres electores y yo te los espero en un determinado lugar,
en la vereda [de enfrente a la escuela] (por la policía) y te lo voy charlando, y

59 Elections in which there are no national candidacies are guarded by the provincial police,
not a federal force as when there are national contests.
Salcedo recognizes some illegal practices, like campaigning during the election day and by the polling places; however, the party seems to be prepared for carrying out tactics to convince voters right to the last minute before they vote. Next, Deputy Salcedo further elaborates on tactics in a much contested election:

It is not just the money for food or transportation on the Election Day; the campaign effort also requires the compliance of poll authorities, who can influence the election process by, for example, letting people vote without clearly establishing their identity. She says the actual outcome of the election may come down to taking care of those issues. Deputy Salcedo continues with a tactic to bring voters to the polls which also reveals the party organization and capacity to mobilize voters (attributes 9-11):

Elections are always close in Catamarca and since with the oblivious or corrupt help of a poll official people could, for example, vote with someone else’s identification

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60 On the case of the burning of the ballot box, Deputy Salcedo is referring to what occurred on March 2 2003, where Peronist supporters of Luis Barrionuevo picketing highways, stole and burned ballot boxes to complain about the Provincial Judiciary not allowing Barrionuevo to run for Governor, and the elections where ultimately postponed.

61 When she talks about the Mayor providing the food, in this case it refers to food to be given to the party activists and polling place party representatives, not necessarily food for voters.
papers, party workers try to prevent from being affected by this practice by double checking the whole constituency roster and making sure to identify those not allowed to vote (e.g. the deceased, those who moved to a different jurisdiction, etc.). This roster is also important because during the Election Day the party representative at the polling place can communicate (e.g. during a bathroom break via telephone) with party activists outside the names of voters who have yet to vote, in a final attempt to sway them their way. Carrying out all these tactics and preparation activities require a significant amount of party resources, staff and organization. Both PJ and UCR parties in Catamarca have these necessary resources, however, smaller parties or the parties in the rest of the studied provinces do not have or do not need these characteristics. There are, as is probably expected based on the above comments, tactics to win elections in Catamarca that go beyond the efforts to mobilize voters (attributes 7 and 9). In this respect Salcedo told me (in fact many officials mentioned similar tactics):

Hay que ver los sobres, si hay alguno de mas ¿qué se hace?...La campaña no termina hasta que minimamente salen los resultados...Porque hay gente que es muy estratega, muy ágil....Atento en las actas, del escrutinio ...En Catamarca hubo gente que se comió un voto; perdíamos por un voto, se levantó y lo comió. (Deputy Salcedo, UCR)

In a ballot box there cannot be, of course, more ballots than constituents registered to vote at that place, but also since probably not all people showed up to vote, accounting for every single vote is a very delicate matter. After polls close at 6 pm, the “presidente de mesa” or chief polling official and the present party representatives open the ballot box to start counting the votes. One of the things that could happen is to find more votes than people voted that day, or fewer, also the document with the final tally should be checked. As Salcedo mentioned, there was a case of a partisan who, when losing by one vote “he stood up and ate it”. That is, he literally (according to the story) put the piece of paper in his mouth and swallowed it. For these and other reasons in Argentina most polling places are open to receive no more than 300 registered voters
and the army (or other federal force) is the custodian of the ballot boxes and tally forms in a national election.

Deputy Salcedo (UCR) said: “Hay cosas que no se ven, hay cosas que la gente no las sabe, pero cuando empezás a ser partícipe…y si, también como que adquirís un derecho de pertenencia, que uno hace cosas, y no se da cuenta…lo vivís, lo sentís, perdés y llorás.” Deputy Salcedo feels and suffers the competition; she is passionate about winning and takes these tactics as part of the electoral process. Both major parties seem to raise the stakes of the election by displaying and using a considerable amount of resources and organizational capabilities. Because of the contested elections, even small towns are scenarios where high octane tactics to mobilize voters take place, as the mayor of Los Varela told me (attributes 6, 7, 8, 10 and 11):

Son peleadas, hasta el último voto. …Hace dos años se ganó la senaduría por un voto. Y el municipio, sí son peleadas. No sé si juego medio sucio…nos cuesta…pero gente que viene del otro lado se para en la puerta [de la escuela] y le quita [la boleta nuestra], y le da el voto [boleta de ellos]…Se pelean…los punteros nuestros se encargan de que eso no te pase. Entonces lo tenés que cuidar para que no pase…a la gente que traemos nosotros…Acá pasó que te daban 20 pesos por voto, hasta 50 pesos, sin embargo le fue mal….Todo pasa por la confianza y seguridad que tenga [la persona] …No queda nadie, se busca hasta la última persona…Acá se busca hasta los viejitos de 70 años, se los busca y espera hasta que salga… (Marcelo Saavedra, PJ)

As the mayor suggests, in contested elections in rural areas, there are logistical issues which have to be solved; from the familiar face of a local dirigente to pick up the voter from their home, to the infrastructure to transport people from their distant rural homes. Saavedra, the mayor of a small town, mentions that activists of other parties come to his town to try to sway people’s votes at the last minute by switching the paper ballots people are bringing with themselves to vote or even by paying cash for switching the vote. Saavedra refers to the people his party brought to vote from their homes as if they were his property. His party gave those people the right paper ballot and his is not going to let the other party activist switch them for theirs. What seems to be more likely
to occur in Catamarca than in Formosa are cases of Election Day “dirty tricks” which are not particularly clientelistic but that reflect the value of winning governmental power in this poor district and the condescending and denigrating attitude towards voters by the politicians. The intense competition promotes these tactics, and the resource poor people allow it. Also, this may be a reason why parties in Catamarca work more like teams than in Formosa, because they have a strong and clearly identifiable contestant.

3.5.3.4 Election Day mobilization (attribute 11)

I do not repeat characteristics of the Election Day mobilization efforts which were already discussed in the previous section, but I pay special attention to the aspects which reflect tactics appropriate to the competition in the district. I begin by quoting Deputy Burgos (PJ) who said, “…Las punteras las revisan para ver si la gente no tiene votos de los otros…” Candidates and punteros must be careful and lead people almost to the voting room. Punteros also control, for example, that men do not visibly carry the ballot in a see-through shirt pocket because it could be seen (and the vote would not be secret, and hence declared not valid). The low level of education (at least) in the rural areas and the competition, leads party activists to be sharp in this respect, and as Burgos said, even search people’s clothes (attribute 10).

Logistics for setting up the election-day transportation is expensive, as earlier Senator Albarracín told me. Regarding the issue Deputy Burgos told me (attribute 11):

...Vamos con recursos nuestros. 7000 [pesos] cada colectivo, desde Tucumán hasta Santa María... La campaña más cara es el cerro: 20,000 pesos. Se alquilan 3 camiones 4x4, de alta montaña. Hay que llevarles cosas de...todos los alimentos. Se unifican todos los cerros en una sola localidad, no hay camino, a caballo, 200 pesos cada caballo. Es caro por la campaña. ...Hay que ir una semana antes. En cada localidad, uno tiene 200 votantes otro 70.

These are competitive elections: “hemos perdido por 100 votos.” The access infrastructure is poor (requiring 4x4 trucks or horses), and the few votes from the mountain people (as few as 200 or 70) are indeed important to many officials. Burgos’
party would invest in driving people from neighboring provinces (Tucumán) to their
districts (Santa María) in order to vote. Senator Figueroa gives us an idea of the
numbers of people being given a ride to the polling places in his town; “…De 7000, se
trasladarán 400 personas. …Pero esos 400 pueden definir la elección.”

Mayor Jalile further explains the details of the Election Day mobilization in a more
urban center (attributes 7, 9-11): “Cada dirigente tiene su padrón personal de 30
personas, y combustible para la gente que vaya a votar. O se alquila o de la misma
gente nuestra, amiga.” (Gustavo Jalile, UCR, Valle Viejo) This is showing us that well-
organized parties for campaigns, such as the PJ and UCR in Catamarca, can have a
clear idea of the number of votes they get and individually for whom people voted.

However, it is important to keep in mind that these people trust their dirigentes,
not the politicians or other party activist per se. It is in the interest of the parties to keep a
good relationship with those dirigentes. In this respect from Deputy Brandán’s quote we
gather that the local dirigente is the key to bring people to vote (attribute 12):

…Por más que tengas una flota de remises, si no tenés al dirigente. La
gente si no lo ve al dirigente en el auto, en la combi, la gente la deja pasar a la
combi y se viene a votar a pié o en el colectivo. Ese folklore te permite saber que
dos días antes el dirigente está haciendo el listadito en el barrio, para
preguntarle a doña Juana a qué hora quiere que la pase a buscar.

Catamarca is a district in which machine clientelism seems to be a very relevant
strategy to mobilize voters. To access the people for these clientelistic tactics and the
Election Day mobilization activities, candidates and parties need the favor of the local
dirigente-type brokers.

3.5.4 The broker’s relationships (attributes 12, 16, 17 and 18)

Given the competitive elections in Catamarca where there is alternation of those
in office and where both parties have enough resources for campaigns, patrons are not
stable and the loyalty from the people is then to the dirigentes and not as much to the
mayors themselves as is the case of Formosa (next). These Catamarca *dirigentes* are not seen by people as much as part of the political machine, but rather are seen more as one of them (attribute 16). However, in larger cities the *puntero*-type broker gains relevance over the *dirigente*-type broker, because there are more services and opportunities and the voter becomes more independent, while the candidates still need the fine-grained information about the needs and wants of this larger number of voters. Brandán put it in these terms: “*El interior es más pobre pero es más caudillosco, la manera de hacer política, y la gente responde a ciertos dirigentes. Y digamos por más que le lleves lo que le lleves, esa gente es fiel a cierto dirigente.*” (Attribute 17) Brandán is not only saying that people have strong loyalties to the local *dirigentes*, but also that: first, people indeed follow those *dirigentes*; second, he suggests that those small town *dirigentes* have caudillo type attitudes and behavior; and third, that there are probably clientelistic tactics attempted by parties to win loyalties by outperforming rivals.

The next question then is who are these all important *dirigentes* who have people’s loyalties? Are they mayors like in Formosa, or senators, etc.? Brandán’s response was: “*A veces no llegan a ser nada. Son dirigentes políticos por naturaleza, que creo que primero son dirigentes sociales más que políticos. Muchas veces, quizá alguno llega a ocupar un cargo…en la mayoría de las veces, desde su dirigencia social, luego trabaja en la política para determinado candidato.*” *Dirigente*-type brokers are often leaders of the civil society who are not necessarily affiliated to a political party. However, *dirigente*-type brokers are fundamental for clientelism to work in Catamarca, and clientelism seems to be fundamental to win elections.

**3.5.4.1 Who are these dirigente-type brokers?**

Catamarca officials make a distinction between the *punteros* and the *dirigentes*. The *dirigentes* are, as one official put it, “*intermediadores sociales*” (social
intermediaries) or social brokers. They seem to be more independent from political patrons than the *punteros*, probably because of the changing of hands of local and provincial offices. Incumbent parties and officials change, but *dirigentes* remain in their neighborhoods and towns, and they need to be bold enough to deal with and request aid from officials of any party, regardless of their personal party preference.

We will see that in Formosa the long standing Peronist monopoly of power subsumes the power of the “*dirigentes*” and the *punteros* become appendices of the officials, more as delegates, because there is no alternative from another party to help them. If the local mayor does not help the local *dirigentes* in Catamarca, then they may resort to the county senator, or provincial deputies, etc. The competitive nature of the district and consequent resourcefulness of alternative parties allows the local *dirigentes* to have a more ample/diverse source of resources to help their communities. Hence it is more difficult for a mayor to have complete control of the local *dirigentes/punteros*, or to pressure them (attribute 15). Mayors need the *dirigencia* to win elections. In turn, these differences between the *dirigente* and the *puntero* type brokers mean a difference in the party infrastructure and incentives to hold them loyal, and a difference in the type of relationship and of mechanisms of interaction, not only among broker and patron, but also broker and client, and client and patron as well.

Competition (compared to Formosa) takes some power away from the local boss to give more to the local *dirigencia/punteros* (of course the politicians in Catamarca can make an effort to drain the *dirigencia* of needed resources as a way to retaliate for “disloyal behavior”, and support “loyal” *punteros*). Mayors are usually the most powerful actors in towns because they control the town’s budget and public employment, and are closer to people than other higher elected offices.

There is in Catamarca the typical *puntero* who is more of a delegate of the candidate than a broker, but in the context of high levels of competition, the figure of the
dirigente takes on great relevance because they are the holders of trust. Provincial senators, deputies, and mayors may have teams of 15 up to 30 close dirigentes in their districts, who in turn may gather up to 150 minor dirigentes/punteros who commit to the campaign effort. However, these latter ones may have stronger loyalties to other officials. (Attribute 18)

The dirigentes’ reputation in the community is valuable. They need to deliver to their community, so they support officials who do not lie to them and deliver on their promises. The dirigentes may be community leaders, in church, school, sports clubs, in charge of soup kitchens, professionals or not, but in general are people somehow committed to helping their community. Some may be employees of the local municipality and so are closer to the decision-making process.

Brandán and others were explicit on how dirigentes broker solutions. The dirigente may come to the provincial capital for a couple of days to start brokering people’s needs to the Education Ministry, Health Ministry, to the Provincial Legislature, health insurance for the elderly, etc. Mayor Guzmán (UCR) of the capital city on the relevance of dirigentes said (attributes 12, 15-18):62

Dirigentes of first and second order may open the doors of mayors and the governor, their party affiliation is second to their role of dirigentes in the civil society, their loyalty depends on the quality of the solutions they get for their community. I would say that the famous door-to-door is only possible when you have the support of the prestigious territorial dirigentes, otherwise it is impossible

On the loyalty of dirigentes, Councilman “Abeto” Barrionuevo (PJ, V. Viejo) said: “you have to be loyal to them.” This indicates how important dirigentes are and how independent they are compared to Formosa’s puntero-type brokers. On the autonomy, relevance and role of dirigentes, Councilman Millán (UCR, Catamarca) added:

...lleva a la gente de manera directa el programa de gobierno, las actividades de gobierno. Y con posterioridad el día de la elección son aquellos

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62 Brandán and puntera Elia Morales also gave similar views on this point.
que se acercan y le dice, ‘necesito que me acompañes con tu voto.’ Son líderes barriales. …Lamentablemente muchas veces sucede [que los punteros se cambien de patrón político porque les da más recursos]. (attributes 12 and 15)

A dirigente needs a more independent base of resources, so he is more “truthful” to his people. Competition and independence (or interdependence) of dirigentes and of candidates (as is explored further in Chapter 5) reduces the chance candidates have to develop personalism as a campaign strategy which would have to compete for people’s loyalty with the much needed local dirigente’s. This is another incentive to strengthen the image of the party above the image of the candidate. The mediation of a dirigente-type broker creates or consolidates a buffer, a distance between the party and the people.

3.5.5 Patron-broker relationship (attributes 13, 14 and 15)

Personalized clientelism is present in Catamarca as well as in Formosa, but the difference is that, unlike in Formosa, there is more than one provider of benefits; there is a competition to give people particularistic benefits. Hence, loyalties to patrons are weaker because people see more benefactors. They have a choice and the alternation in power by the elected officials makes them unstable patrons. In consequence, the machine clientelism of the last few days of the campaign is what candidates may resort to in order to weigh in more than the opponents. The multiple sources of benefits also gives brokers more leverage over patrons. When there is no campaigning the dirigentes-type brokers (community brokers) take the initiative to find solutions to people’s problems by going to the politicians. Now, during the campaigns there is also the interest of the politicians to bring “solutions” to the people; candidates then have a more proactive role in this respect (while not true for all, many politicians do have an active role bringing particularistic material benefits to people outside of the campaign period).

People are hungry not only during the campaign periods; hence, the dirigente takes charge of more real needs. During the campaign people know candidates may bring gifts
to them in search for their vote, so people also take the chance to ask for more. It is in the interest of the candidates to reach the voters with clientelistic goods given that the candidates (and the voters) expect the other party to do the same.

Officials and candidates compete for the support of local dirigentes. Dirigentes, in order to keep the support from their communities and keep being their broker, must request the material support from the officials, and shop around officials to bring solutions to the people. This work is done year around by the dirigente and it is of course personalized (attribute 13). The relevant personalized relationship in Catamarca may be between the patron-politician and the dirigente-type broker (of which each one may have many of the others), and that of the dirigente and the client-voter, and not the relationship between the politician and the voters directly, as in Formosa. But in the end, to the politicians and candidates this continuous support of dirigentes pays off during the electoral campaigns.

3.5.5.1 The mechanisms 2: patron-broker coordination

Next, Senator Albarracín (PJ) tells me about his interaction with local dirigentes in rural areas and how to prepare for the election in a routine which keeps the voter center-stage, but has the broker as the effective means to get to the people (attr. 13):

*En ese día [de la elección] hay que asistirlo [al dirigente], con un refrigerio, la empanada, el locro, el sangucho, a la gente, toda la gente que va a votar. Un grupo de gente que los espera en la sede [del partido]. ...Y la movilidad la tiene que pagar también el político. Se va a buscar gente lejos; contrata colectivo, camioneta, ... Ya para esa gente [los del cerro], son los votos más caros que hay, le tiene que dar [dinero] para el pasto del animal o el juego de herraduras del animal; Caballos de ellos.*

Albarracín is describing a near festive occasion for the election where political parties become the hosts and the voters their guests of honor. Food and transportation from and to people’s homes are a given in Catamarca, as is for the rural populations in Formosa. In this competitive district, all votes are relevant and more expensive tactics
are used to get them, for example, to bring the few people from up in the cerros (mountains). Albarracín continues: “...O si voy,...no tengo para darle de comer allá [en los cerros]. Y hay que comprarle un vacuno, para hacer un asado, vino, gaseosa, botas, y se va.... Usted tiene que subir, hablar con el dirigente, y el dirigente es conocedor de todo, y si está con el tiempo necesario...hace reuniones.”

Albarracín is not only telling us about the complications for getting to where these people live and bring them at least food for the occasion of his arrival, but that the dirigente is the “conocedor de todo” and the must-see person for the candidate. In fact, in the earlier quote Albarracín first said to tribute the local dirigente and then added “toda la gente que va a votar”. Only if time allows a meeting with people may be organized, but the candidate must make sure to at least talk to the local dirigente (attributes 12 and 13) because “...son votos necesarios, con un voto pierde y con otro gana. ... Hay que ir a buscar el voto y darle una solución, llevarle medicamentos, etc.”

Finally, Deputy Burgos went at length to tell me how parties work more as a team and that there is less personalism than in, say, Formosa. It may be because she is a Deputy working in the provincial capital and not a locally residing official like a mayor, but her personalism or persona does not seem crucial in campaigns. She has a team who lives in her district: three asistentes sociales, and another local dirigente addressing local problems. In the end it is she who finds the “solutions,” but she lives away (in the provincial capital), and travels every week. So it seems like a team effort. Now, this may also be the case in Formosa, but as we will see, in Formosa the only strong local figure is the mayor; in this Catamarca town the mayor belongs to the UCR, while Burgos is a PJ legislator, so she needs a local infrastructure to keep her base alive. There is a small “working bureaucracy.” (Attribute 14) Also, she argues with her local PJ councilmen, and shares campaign activities with the county’s Provincial Senator (PJ), so they work as a team. The UCR seem to have more resources for machine clientelism, and PJ
seems to need to secure some more “personalized clientelism” and loyal voters to keep up with the UCR governor’s machine. This Deputy, as mentioned earlier, actually said she goes to neighboring PJ ruled Tucumán province to ask for campaign help and resources. The electoral competitiveness (and the relevance of dirigente-type brokers) is yet another reason which prevents the development of effective personalized clientelism and also strong personalisms and personalistic attachments to officials.

3.5.6 Patron-client relationships (attributes 19-21)

3.5.6.1 Little evidence of the relevance of “personalized clientelism”

In Catamarca both parties have access to public office and resources, and hence are able to reach voters more evenly between each other than the parties in Formosa. This, added to the fact that officials may lose their posts in the next election, leads to the uncertainty of both the patron politician and the client about the stability of their relationship. However, elected officials do resort to a personalized constituency service, which of course carries along the personal imprint of the official. This nevertheless does not “tie” the clients to the official given that they are minimal particularistic benefits in comparison to what the local dirigentes’ regularly and the provincial party during the campaign do. For example, with respect to constituency service, Deputy Burgos (PJ) buys out-of-province students the bus tickets to come back and vote in the province and also; “Me dan 2,000 pesos, no más, en becas y hay que fraccionarlo en 100 pesos. El que está más o menos [bien] $50, para sacar fotocopias, por mes; Tengo 20 becas. A los senadores les dan $6,000 para becas.”

This clientelism of giving a minimal amount of money to students carries the personal imprint of the politician. However, it is not of major significance to these people, and eventually of little consequence to the election outcome. There is competition among providers of benefits and the limited amount and type of benefits does not tie the
client to the candidate/patron. Politicians, when able, undertake this minor personalized clientelism with a few voters. It is also an opportunity to improve their personal image among voters. Senator Albarracín (PJ) and his team do the “constituency service” helping with official transactions in the capital city like retirement paperwork, subsidies, and pensions of people who live far from the capital or are less resourceful to deal with the bureaucracy. But we may also find this other scenario which is more similar to Formosa’s towns regarding the power of the mayor, but relativized by the presence of electoral competition (attributes 19-21). The Mayor of La Puerta (population 752) told me: “Yo mando gente, casa por casa, veo las necesidades, y solucions los problemas, desde la municipalidad.” (Javier Morra, PJ) In this small town the personalized clientelism is a policy of the mayor; there is no need to follow a legislated procedure when the mayor’s aides visit people inquiring about needs. The situation of relative isolation of voters allows (or forces) the mayor to embrace this approach in his district. Albarracín’s (PJ) quote below is supportive of the idea of isolation and personalized clientelism, and the relevance of machine clientelism in Catamarca: “Yo hacia la visita cada 15 días. Subíamos [al cerro], llevábamos medicamentos e íbamos entregando una vez por mes. Eso es lo que la gente ve…Los del Frente Cívico no van a los cerros, únicamente cuando necesitan el voto. Y le llevan la cal, el cemento, una chapa.”

Albarracín is proud of his effort and denounces that the UCR only provide machine clientelism, not the permanent assistance to the needy as he does. Albarracín is actually making an electoral investment because he knows he cannot compete with the UCR machine clientelism expected during the campaign. The single member district plurality election of the Provincial Senator and the competitive nature of all offices may be one of the incentives he has to preserve an autonomous local infrastructure of his own. He may not entirely rely on the support of the mayoral or gubernatorial candidate’s
machine to win in his district. Albarracín may also be trying to win local dirigentes' and people’s loyalties.

### 3.5.7 Summary

Political parties in Catamarca seem to have a more complex organization for using clientelism as a voter mobilization strategy than in the other districts, as they deal with relatively autonomous dirigente-type brokers, intense Election Day mobilization tactics, and clients' compliance tactics. There is a “team feeling,” and rivalry towards the other party.⁶³ Both parties in Catamarca have office posts and can keep the party organization running.

What are notable in Catamarca are the highly contested election-day activities. A few votes can turn elections, and activities occur which move between clientelism and mere violence and intimidation. Clientelism seems relevant to elections’ outcomes in a place like Catamarca, but competition seems to move political parties to not only resort to clientelism, but to perhaps more “intrusive” / persuasive ways and even illegal ways to sway the vote, or alter electoral outcomes. Of course officials try to keep in touch with people year-around, but campaigns are very important for staying in power. While having a good performance in government is important, when there is a divided government parties cannot take credit for everything that is being done, and cannot blame others for what is going on either.

The above mentioned tactics of clientelism are allowed by the culture,⁶⁴ socioeconomic characteristics of voters (and the overall weak policing institutions, of course), but encouraged by competition when elections are close and mean so much in

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⁶³ Formosa officials remembered this team rivalry during the presidency of Raúl Alfonsín - 1983-1989-, when UCR had a stronger presence in the province.

⁶⁴ I say “culture” because it is a tradition or common for people to have a local “dirigente” as an agent when in need. In turn these dirigentes are fundamental links the parties have with their constituencies.
terms of access to the limited resources in this society. Some of these “tactics” may be used in other provinces (such as checking the list of voters to see who has not yet voted and picking those people up to bring them to the polls), but the incentives to do so seem stronger in Catamarca, where the margin of error to win elections is narrower.

In Catamarca parties are the actors that drive politics. While throughout the country people may have their Peronist or Radical loyalties, in Catamarca parties’ discourse and campaign tactics are often shaped by each other. In Catamarca there is divided government in all levels (provincial and many municipalities). This strengthens parties because they need to stick together if they do not want to lose (more) power. Also, the type of relationship between people and their local dirigente-type broker and the relevance of these brokers for accessing voters with clientelistic tactics, might have the effect of making voters’ loyalties to dirigentes strong and to candidates weak, which in turn is another incentive for a candidate to rely on the party per se and not on personal loyalties he could inspire on voters (personalistic strategy). Parties are less likely to spend time claiming credit for policies or public works (performance strategies) as they focus on winning the immediate electoral contest in the most effective way.

Finally, similar to what other authors have written on clientelism (e.g. Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007), Catamarca is a case where competition seem to make it a more “developed” type of machine clientelism; candidates are more reliant on clientelism, and on fraudulent and intrusive tactics in campaigns compared to the rest of the cases.

3.6 Formosa: Personalized clientelism and the isolated electorate

Machine clientelism in large cities may naturally find opposition in a sizeable middle class and independent media, and hence isolate patrons and clients from the

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65 This is in contrast to what we see in Santa Cruz (where unions or social contestation is relevant) or Capital Federal (the media is relevant).
public eye. However, in this peripheral province with high levels of poverty and non competitive elections (See Chapter 2 and Appendix B on Formosa), even machine clientelism was not seen as taboo and was acknowledged by several elected officials with details of criteria, procedures and contents. Personalized clientelism is nurtured daily and bears its fruit in elections. Instead, machine clientelism is only a ritual of campaigns, and in most cases does not influence the outcome of the election. In Formosa clientelism is “probably central to campaigns” as a voter mobilization strategy.

This is personalized clientelism and not patrimonialism, because there is acknowledgment of the entitlements of the citizens to access the benefits which the politicians dispose of and deliver in particularistic ways. That is, in Formosa the elected officials are better off not denying benefits in order to keep loyalties. The officials know they are accountable to the community and must maintain a level of support if they do not wish to see their legitimacy being challenged. Dissatisfaction with the leadership could open the door to new leaders.

3.6.1 Clientelism and the local Mayor's machine (attributes 2, 3, 5, 6, 9, 19-21)

Mayors are the first and, many times, only recourse for help for the poor and not so poor people in the isolated interior areas of the province, and even in towns not too far from the provincial capital. This situation of poverty and marginalization is exacerbated by the poor public infrastructure. Mayors are also likely to control the most resources in town. People may need food, a job, money to buy medicines, etc. and the mayors are there to help (nobody else can). He (or she) receives people in his office,

66 In a patrimonial relationship the patron owns the goods and the client does not have recognized entitlements to them or cannot recognize them. This is an important distinction because clientelism is a relationship natural to democracies and is not a “remnant of the past” (as Hagopian -1996- said).

67 As a way of example, 87.4% of constituents in the province do not have a car and 64.3% do not have telephone; Also, the only major hospital is in the provincial capital (Source: Carlos Fara & Asociados 2002).
listens to their concerns and then reaches into his pocket to help his neighbor. There is not a bureaucratic office aiding people, it is the mayor himself. The mayor lets them know that he is not doing an easy favor; budgets are tight, the need is great everywhere and the recipient of this benefit leaves with a problem solved and in his conscience the favor he now owes to “the good mayor that helped me.” This is an explicit view of a mayor: “Today there were three urgent cases that had to travel to Formosa [city’s hospital], I had to give them a solution, a subsidy that they account for later. When they return, we buy them the medications.” (Mayor Carlos Meza, PJ)

Small towns may not need a separate office for dealing with these cases of needy people; after all, people know the mayors in these small towns and would not want to talk to somebody who does not have the power to help them. In this sense, perhaps personal politics (which may cultivate personalism and clientelism) is the only logical way to conduct politics in small districts; it is not necessarily less efficient. An important feature of this relationship is precisely the personal aspect of it. There is a notion that the mayor is the key to solving the personal problems of people. The fact that the mayor himself delivers solutions to a person’s problems creates a bond which is less institutionalized than when bureaucracy is involved.68

This personal relationship of people with officials, besides cultivating a cult of personality, nurtures links of clientelism among constituents and the mayor’s electoral machine. This type of relationship (personalized clientelism) may take years to give political fruit. Many families solely depend on the fresh water distributed by the “mayor’s trucks;” many depend on food, or subsidies administered directly by him.69 In this

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68 Three of the five mayors I interviewed in Formosa explicitly said they felt like the major benefactors of their communities. The careers of many prior to entering politics was in some kind of service, whether administering a government program, as a doctor or teacher, or by being wealthy or having enough connections with powerful family or friends to give favors.

69 The plan Jefes y Jefas de Hogar is a nationally funded program which gives $150 monthly (US$50) to those adults with children who apply and qualify due to their underprivileged situation;
environment, contact and personal relationships create bonds of loyalty and even
deferece and trust; but also fear and distrust of outsiders. Eventually, some people will
see their mayor as a father figure who will advise them in, for example, who to vote for
President. (A quote is shown on Chapter 5)

Personalized clientelism is closely related to the personalization of the voter-patron relationship; in towns in Formosa this relationship is understandable given the
district’s characteristics, infrastructure, etc. In the capital city, the electoral machines
count with punteros or brokers working as transmission belts with the patrons, but this
personalized clientelism works anyway; people get the goods year around. However in
the big city personalized clientelism is less relevant (relatively more relevant is the
presence of media, civil society organizations, etc) than in smaller towns and rural areas.
(Attribute 22)\(^70\)

The tactic of, for example, a quick visit of the candidate to a voter’s home days
before the election could be both a tactic of personalism (because of its contents) and of
high personalization (the manner the tactic is carried out) where the focus is the
greatness of the leader carried out by the leader himself or by party operatives.

\(^{70}\) In Formosa clientelism and personalism go hand in hand, but personalism is not the same
as personalized clientelism. Personalism is not an exchange for “material” things or particularistic
benefits (that would be a characteristic of clientelism). The “personalized” in personalized
clientelism is the client, not necessarily the patron; that is, the particularistic favor is given to a
particular person with a name, in a personalized manner, not just as an anonymous someone
waiting in line for the gifts. It could be done with an adequate and efficient brokers’ network in the
cases of cities (like Formosa city). In small places personalism and personalized clientelism seem
to go hand in hand. In one the leader is the focus (personalism) and in the other it is the client
(personalized clientelism). (Attributes 3 and 19)
Generally these high personalization personalistic tactics are carried out with gifts to the voters which would also qualify it as a clientelistic tactic, even though the clientelistic aspect of this tactic is not central to the overall voter mobilization strategy in the district. However, it is expected that if the candidate is welcomed to someone’s home with mate/coffee and pastries, then he might bring or offer (usually minor) particularistic benefits in return. Again, the relevant work of personalized clientelism is done routinely in the community and bears fruit during the election and the relevance of the personalized and even particularistic exchanges between the voter and the candidate or patrons during the campaign is minor in significance to the personalized clientelism as a strategy. (Attributes 2 and 3)

The mayor’s strong personal legitimacy does not deny the fact that sometimes politicians may lose the support of their team of collaborators, especially when out of power. In this regard Mayor Meza told me: “The team continues, the only thing you lose when you are not governing is the monetary aspect…When I win I demand that they put back my people, in education, health. I appoint the director of the hospital…There was a loyalty in the group [of close supporters], but there were people who left me… If you win, though, you get everything back.” (Mayor Carlos Meza, PJ) From Meza’s quote there are a few things to infer. First, Meza is telling us that the disadvantage of being out of office is the restraint on money it would cause, presumably money from the city coffers and in turn from the provincial government. (Attribute 21) Second, this leader’s machine counts with the loyalists but also with those that are with him for the money or jobs that come with supporting the current administration. (Attribute 9) Third, we see that the mayor is such an influential post that the mayor affects the appointment of provincial appointees in the locality, giving the mayor bigger clout in these relatively isolated places (e.g. hospitals and schools are of provincial jurisdiction). (Attribute 9) Finally, Meza mentioned that when he was out of office it was because he supported the presidential
candidate that was not in the favor of the governor which meant that another PJ mayoral candidate won the local election for a term, until he switched his support for the governor's presidential choice. When, as in the case of Formosa, the governor concentrates political and financial decisions and power, and then the candidates he supports will end up winning the elections. Eventually all mayors, who also want to keep their local power, will side with the governor and any other contestant will have little chance. (Attribute 9) Only when the local mayor and governor's relationship falls apart then another faction has a chance of beating the local incumbent.

Even though the provincial executive is the source of resources that keeps the local electoral machines oiled, an eventual loss of power by the governor only means that the new governor will take control of the machine (There have only been PJ governors since the return to democracy in 1983). Governors still need votes from the bases, and mayors are keys to delivering those votes. As we will see in Chapter 5, personalistic politics mix with clientelism and patronage to become a common token in Formosa.

### 3.6.2 Party resources 1: procedures and enforcement mechanisms (attr. 2, 8, 10)

The case of the indigenous people… They visit the party offices of the different 'sublemas' of the PJ and the UCR, to get things, and then afterwards you don’t know who they vote for. Inside their community there are people that answer to you, identified with us. But you can’t obligate them, you have to persuade them. And you aren’t going to do that the day of the election; you have to do it over time. (Mayor Mario Brignole, PJ)

On giving out food and supplies … If it is during the campaign, I don’t go out to do it; you have your people for that… They say that they come in the name of the mayor. You can match the quantity of things; the difference is if they believe in you. (Mayor C. Meza, PJ) (attr. 7, 14, 16)

There are a few points to be made about clientelism based on these mayors’ opinions. Mayor Brignole is concerned because the natives would take the gifts from the party offices but he could not ascertain who they would vote for; that is why he counts on puntero-type brokers in their communities (attributes 8, 10). From this quote (and many
other agreeing ones) we can infer that; first, the mayor does not know for certain how people vote which is, to a degree, an issue of some concern for him for fear of losing loyalty from those voters;\textsuperscript{71} second, the mayor needs a network of brokers \textit{in-situ} to have a more clear idea of where he stands in the community (attribute 10, 12, 14, 18); and third, the machine clientelism of the last few days of the campaign is secondary to the personal loyalty he has to build over time to assure the vote(attributes 1, 2, 19). With reference to the second quote, Mayor Meza has his “people”/brokers hand out gifts to voters, as do the other parties and factions. Meza does hand out gifts personally during non-campaign periods, but during the campaign he may not because that work gets more intense and he has no time, and maybe because there might be more eyes on the lookout to denounce clientelistic practices (from the national media or opposition parties) –attributes 2, 9, 17-. From this quote we can infer that, as a mayor he controls far more resources than his rivals. As with the \textit{Planes Jefes y Jefas de Hogar}, the mayor has resources to affect people’s lives over time, not just before the election (see Footnote 69). Second, in a context in which a party (the PJ in this case) receives well over 70% of the votes, clientelistic goods are most likely delivered to those who favor the candidate in an effort to mobilize the vote, and not necessarily to those “weakly predisposed in their favor” as has been argued (See for example Stokes mimeo 2003) –attribute 8-. Third, the vote buying of machine clientelism is not crucial for these officials; they characterize it as the culmination of a year-round activity of “tending to their neighbors.” (Attributes 1, 3, 19) Fourth, mayors take the occasion of elections to reaffirm their leadership, personalism and role as benefactor.\textsuperscript{72} To sum up, people go where they can get the

\textsuperscript{71} In this respect, according to Mayor Brignole (PJ), UCR candidates get some monetary and in-kind help from neighboring UCR governed Chaco province.

\textsuperscript{72} In this regard Mayor Brignole told me about a useful tactic he implemented and was willing to repeat, which not only fits well in a district where clientelism is relevant, but also stresses the person of the candidate in a tactic which is actually more personalistic than clientelistic (attributes 1, 2, 19):
most benefits, but there is an element of trust and loyalty that is more difficult for the candidates to achieve. It takes time to demonstrate that they care for the community, and mayors would rather give payoffs to people who may actually defect from the clientelistic bargain than tarnish their image as magnanimous benefactors to the community as a whole.\textsuperscript{73}

3.6.3 Party resources 2: Punteros as political brokers (attrib. 2, 7, 9, 12, 15, 17-19)

The ‘puntero’ walks the entire neighborhood… and tells you ‘look here, in the house of Pérez you yourself have to go, no matter what.’ … There are people that don’t want to commit to the ‘puntero,’ but to the candidate. . . . The people have a problem and come to their ‘dirigente,’ and the ‘dirigentes,’ ‘if they don’t have the resources; they come here [to the Municipality]. And we have the responsibility to help them. Mayor Fernández (PJ, Laguna Naineck)

Puntero and referente político are the “scouts” of a party and the lowest link of the party’s machine. The “dirigentes” in Formosa, in the context of small towns, are like “neighborhood captains;” they may head a Unidad Básica (local party office), they have contact with the officials and have some organizational capabilities and also usually bring and distribute the “solution to people’s problems.” (Attribute 7) Key to any campaign is to count on punteros in the different neighborhoods in the town and related rural areas (in big cities there may be a puntero per city block). (Attribute 18) These are people who belong to their community, know their place and its people. (Attribute 16) Using this knowledge from the base candidates know what to say where. From Fernández’ quote above we can infer at least the following points about the patron-

\textit{Hablé con un amigo que tenía una concesionaria, subí un auto a un acoplado y ‘si gana Mario,’ y daba los numeritos, ‘rifó el auto’: Gané las elecciones. Es un complemento [en el contexto de la campaña]. En el 2003 vuelvo a hacer lo mismo de poner el auto. Te tienen que conocer, dar respuesta, y eso es un plus, la sumatoria.}

Brignole does not have to buy the car from his friend during the campaign, but he would buy it and give it to the people if he wins the election.

\textsuperscript{73} This argument contradicts the commonly held statistical inferences or assumption that resources “…devote[d] to people who are unlikely to turn out or unlikely to support them are resources wasted” (Rosenstone and Hansen 1993 p 163; Also see Stokes 2005).
broker-client relationships. First, as just mentioned, the *punteros* provide valuable information not only for the campaign but for the mayoral business at large. (Attributes 7, 9, 13) Second, these *punteros* are not always in confidence with the local people as they are seen as the candidates’ political delegates with no power of decision. (Attributes 13, 14) Third, these brokers carry out the mayor’s business of a personalized clientelism strategy, solving people’s particularistic demands if they can and going back to the patron when they cannot. (Attribute 3, 9) Fourth, the mayor knows that his legitimacy depends on the satisfaction of those multiple, and minimal, particularistic solutions he gives and hence tries to keep his local political and electoral machine well oiled. (Attribute 5)

In the context of a province in which the PJ wins with large margins, the *punteros* do not usually have much choice of patrons. *Puntero*-type brokers in small towns are usually tied to the city government with stable pay from a public employment job. (Attribute 15, 16) But, how are *punteros* kept in line and organized, particularly during the campaign efforts or in the case of those working for out of office candidates or a weaker legislator’s machine? (Attributes 14, 15) Councilman Colusso (PJ, Formosa):

“Well, they all collect a paycheck or you have to give them something… but if you want them to put up pamphlets you have to give them cigarettes, but also, if you make it [get elected] you also have to give them a job, because it’s also a job [being a party militant].”

The *punteros* are held with favors. However, candidates feel *punteros* are better if kept because they are loyal, not just for the pay. Quoted above, Councilman Colusso justifies paying for the campaign work, even paying with public jobs, which would not be given on a meritocratic basis but on clientelism. Colusso was also disillusioned on the lack of “traditional loyalty” on the part of party workers and supporters. Nevertheless, both sides of this bargain, even if they contrast the current model as negative compared
to the “good old days” of more loyalty (when UCR was stronger in the province 1983-89),
seem to win out financially and politically.

3.6.4 Organization: Election Day transportation arrangements (attributes 7, 9-11)

On Saturday at 11 p.m. we have everything done. [Elections are always on a Sunday] Many of us have pickup trucks to bring people that want to come with us…There are people that live 15 or 20 kilometers away. (Mayor Fernández, PJ)

Punteros are also in charge of making the list of people who will need a ride to the polling places. Candidates and close supporters give their own vehicles to transport people. Mayor Oviedo (PJ) specified for me: “We use forty small cars and fifteen pickup trucks, all private.” (“All private” she said as a way to point to me that the municipality’s vehicles were not used for the party’s benefit.) Some voters live up to 70 km away from the polling places and rides have to be organized several days prior. Rain can be an insuperable hazard to voters because roads become impassable. Parties then arrange to bring people ahead of time, host them at school gyms and feed them, and of course provide them with their paper ballots. Even if there is no mayoral election, still it is the mayor who coordinates this campaign effort. The governor could not do it; neither could the president or senators, etc. The punteros are crucial in this effort given that they know and organize the people wanting to vote.74 To many people the mere fact of going to town for the day means a chance for getting a free ride, free food and a sort of festive occasion.

The voter mobilization activities described above may, at times, be regarded as inappropriate in democratic states. Poverty and social marginality become barriers to the dignified exercise of the rights and duties of many citizens in Formosa. I talked to the Mayor of Las Lomitas on an investigative reporter’s case that appeared on national

74 The UCR also transports voters to polls but with much fewer resources.
television\textsuperscript{75} which “uncovered” seemingly illegal practices to affect the electoral processes in several of the poorer provinces in Argentina, including Formosa.\textsuperscript{76} Mr. Meza said: “…if I don’t bring them, the other faction goes, so one has to be there. The municipality brings them water, the plans [government subsidies], etc., they want to vote, but you have to go get them…” Interestingly, PJ officials do not deny bringing people from rural areas, hosting, feeding and giving them their ballots to vote. They see it as something noble to do; these poor, illiterate, hungry people, many of whom do not speak Spanish, would not vote otherwise.\textsuperscript{77} The market does not reach these people, and other parties (besides the Peronist party) do not reach them either. Clientelism is important for keeping the support of the party machine and the voters. The clientelism is personal from local leaders and officials. (Attribute 4, 19)

3.6.5 Other mechanisms: Machine Clientelism (attributes 1, 2, 3, 6 and 9)

In 2005 … I let my candidate run on his own…I supported him in speeches showing his merits, but I didn’t contribute with money. To see if with all the works I had done, saying ‘this is my candidate!’…The week before the election, the other candidate came with many things and people to hand them out, and bought support. If I spent money of the municipality he [the opposing candidate] would not have made it [to the city council]…To save money and believing in the people I didn’t get the two council members elected… Now I know; I have to give out food and supplies. If I don’t, I lose the election…it was his strategy of handing out things at the last moment…He didn’t give me time to react. Mayor Carlos Meza (PJ).

\textsuperscript{75} The subject also came up with Deputy Juárez, who was also affected by investigative reporters, as well as with other officials.

\textsuperscript{76} On November 13th 2003 the daily Clarín, the most circulated national newspaper, reported that people from the two PJ mayoral candidates contesting the October 19, 2003 election in Lugones collected more than 150 of impoverished native population from the rural areas and kept them in warehouses for up to two days before the election where they were given the ballots to put in the ballot box. These were particularly folded ballots to later account for their compliance during the counting of the votes. In the account of the journalistic report, people are promised money, food or cheap roofing materials for their houses.

\textsuperscript{77} I noticed that many criollos or white people, public officials or not, behaved as if the indigenous people were inferior, with paternalistic attitudes towards their cognitive abilities, work ethics, and cultural practices. The numerous underprivileged native people seem to be treated as second class citizens.
The infrequent closer competition among parties or factions also can lead the campaign to become more intense. From this excerpt we see the reaction of someone who is always in control of the situation in the town except this one time he was preempted by strong competition and was not planning to use machine clientelism tactics in the campaign. He claims to be sad that people still sell their vote for material goods despite having known him for so long and that he therefore needs to step up the effort by giving more than his opponents. We get the attitude of a father figure who let his candidate run by himself, without the help from the municipal coffer. Mayor Meza hoped that his administration and persona would be enough for his candidates to win both seats of the municipal council.78

Overall, more than 1/3 of officials I interviewed in Formosa openly admitted to handing out food or medicine to voters during the campaigns. Still, the type of gifts given out may depend on the level of need. Very casually Deputy Gamarra said: “They [candidates] have parades, go door to door, give out food and supplies, sports equipment; each one has their own methods. And in the interior [of the province] it’s different; you see more of a need for food, clothes.” (Provincial Deputy Juan Domingo Gamarra, PJ) Relatively wealthier voters in the capital must be enticed with more expensive gifts than the basic food and clothes which are the more urgent needs of people in the poorer interior. (Attributes 2 and 6)

3.6.6 Summary

Personalized clientelism may be possible because of the economic and political near-monopoly of mayors in the small towns to control resources like money and

78 By the way, his candidate (Eladio Gaetán) did win the election with ~1,700 votes. However he did not get the second seat which now belongs to another faction of the same PJ party (Atilio Basualdo reached ~1,000 votes).
access to public decision and bureaucracy. Mayors who support the governor will have a constant supply of resources. The governor will want to keep electoral and social control in the districts. At the local level the mayor has a machine to aid him in supervising the electorate. The personal interaction with the voters of the district is routinized. People bring their requests to the mayor's brokers or to the mayor himself. The mayor addresses his people personally or it is acted on his name. Finally, during the campaign period, the mayor reminds people of his deeds (of course some gifts for the occasion may be in order as well, but they are only part of the idiosyncrasy of the place, the polite, expected, thing to do, as it were) and people renew their support for the mayor. Candidates do not need to spend additional limited resources in tactics typical of machine clientelism (such as truck loads of gifts to a location, more expensive gifts such as refrigerators, television sets, and tighter controls on voters’ compliance and competition interference).

In Formosa we saw the centrality to campaigns of personalized clientelism and the existence of machine clientelism as a "cherry on the top", only significant in rare cases. In Formosa candidates have the machine with local punteros and have a mechanism to reach people as delegates of the mayor. Everyone in town counts on the strong personalism of the leader, and the goods/ gifts will still be there after the election in the context of poverty and a single provider. However, the act of giving is a mechanism to reinforce the personalism, loyalty and legitimacy in small towns.

3.7 Capital Federal: the irrelevance of clientelism in campaigns

*Capital Federal* (or the city of Buenos Aires) is a district with high electoral competitiveness and high socioeconomic development (See Chapter 2). It is “a district where clientelism is definitively not central to campaigns as a voter mobilization strategy.” In such a district we find the attributes of clientelism with average scores
within the value of 0 range (See Table 3.5). However, the distinct characteristic of what clientelism does exist would be that candidates reach voters without any intermediary or brokers, and that personalized tactics are not relevant to campaigns (See Figure 3.7).

Clientelism in general is not central to campaigns as a voter mobilization strategy in Capital Federal. The complexity and size of society prevents parties from affecting electoral results through this strategy. First, it would be prohibitively expensive to try to buy votes from the mostly middle class constituents. Second, parties could be severely punished if constituents found out the party resorts to clientelism, given that progressive middle class voters tend to abhor this practice. Parties find no concrete benefits in clientelism. The low percentages of public employment also prevent patronage from making an electoral difference. In this respect, the effect of the electoral competitiveness of the district is marginal to the decision to resort to clientelism as a strategy. Furthermore, political parties are not prepared for this type of strategy and instead devote their resources to tactics which involve the mass media.

While, as in the case of Catamarca, I group the different attributes of clientelism for the sake of presentation, I next go over the typical candidate experience regarding particularistic exchanges with voters during campaigns and show its non-relevance as a party or candidate’s voter mobilization strategy. I argue for these parties’ lack of specialized infrastructure for clientelism and other conditions that prevent clientelism from being central to campaigns in this district. First, however, I present the arguments of those who do argue for clientelism in the city of Buenos Aires, which however end up being more evidence towards its irrelevance in this district.
Those who argue for clientelism (Attributes 1, 2)

There are those politicians who, however, may argue that there is some clientelism in this district (attributes 1 and 2). For example, Deputy Di Filippo (ARI), an opposition official arguing that there is indeed clientelism in Capital Federal, said:

No llega a ser la expresión que pasa en el interior, lo que pasa acá mismo en el conurbano. Pero si hay un aparato clientelístico que muchas veces no solo depende de los partidos tradicionales, digo, tanto el radicalismo como el peronismo. Hay organizaciones sociales que tienen cierto sistema clientelístico hacia adentro, las organizaciones piqueteras que también manejan planes, manejan bolsones. Obligan a la gente a ir a marchas a cambio de un bolsón.

However, he admits that clientelism has no importance in the elections: “... No hay niveles de cooptación política tan grande como en la provincia de Buenos Aires....No influye, es un resultado tan mínimo que no influye,...sinceramente no creo que llegue ni al 1% del electorado de la Capital.”

Clientelism, of any sort, does not count for much in the elections. Di Filippo showed his frustration towards the other parties in order to show the clean practices of his own party, however he admitted that the distribution of particularistic goods was not necessarily carried out by parties, people were not mobilized in this way to go to the polls (only protest demonstrations) and this type of activity did not affect the electoral outcomes. Next, Deputy Sergio Molina (Autodeterminación y Libertad party) belongs to another opposition party and also gave me his opinion about the presence of what he considered to be clientelism:

Interviewer: ¿Existe el clientelismo en las elecciones de Capital Federal?
Deputy Molina: Sí, a full. Terrible.
Interviewer: ¿Influye en el resultado de la elección?
Deputy Molina: No, pero hay mucho de enviar fondos para campañas mediáticas, de hacer las campañas con fondos públicos, y después mucho clientelismo en las organizaciones barriales, de prebendas, afiches, pegadas.

Molina was not able to elaborate on any actual clientelistic practice, when asked about activities exchanging goods or favors for votes, even though, as coming from a
small opposition party, if other parties were engaging in such activities it would seem to be to his advantage to bring them forth. Both Molina and Di Filippo showed frustration or anger to other parties and social movements for their resources and mobilization capacity which they do not have. Basically these opposition officials argued for clientelism out of a position of electoral weakness and limitations, but could not specify or elaborate any particular cases.

3.7.2 Irrelevance of personalized and particularistic content tactics (Attrib. 3-6, 22)

In a city of 3 million people the electoral relevance of personalized contacts between candidates and voters is minimal. Nevertheless, I present a few examples of particularistic requests and exchanges. Particularistic exchanges between candidates and voters are inconsequential to electoral outcomes. To begin with, Deputy Blasco shares her experience on the types of demands people have on the campaign trail and after, illustrating that clientelism and patronage play a minimal role in electoral campaigns. “¿Hay gente que busca trabajo?, sí. Cuando yo asumí, mucha gente me mandan cartas. Yo entrevisté dos chicas una era socióloga y otra politóloga. Me mandaron cartas al despacho. Las entrevistó, las conozco…” This official receives resumes from university graduates to get a job, but this is the extent of the demands she personally gets. She also admits that her political boss gets other types of demands from people and that she personally is not seen as a problem-solver in this respect (particularistic benefits). Many of the officials I interviewed in Capital Federal mentioned the fact that they regularly get resumes asking for jobs as one of the important direct contact experiences they have with voters. Next, I quote another city legislator on how he deals with particularistic requests:

Interviewer: ¿Le piden cosas?
Deputy Velazco: Sí, trabajo, medicamentos… En general la tendencia del candidato es a una respuesta evasiva, digamos… [Asistente] Claudia recibía los pedidos a [then mayoral candidate] Patricia [Bulrich]. Cae en saco roto. Vos
People ask for things in Buenos Aires as well, but the reaction of the candidates is different from that in other districts. Candidates do not take the responsibility to solve these particularistic problems. Velazco is asked for jobs and medicines, as a candidate searching for votes he takes note of these and tries to direct the demand thought the institutionalized channels. Candidates do not offer particularistic goods, but some voters ask for them from the candidates. Velazco says “we behaved very responsibly,” when justifying not giving people particularistic benefits, which is actually the opposite attitude argued by politicians in the provinces of Catamarca and Formosa, where politicians instead argue that it was their job to satisfy those particularistic demands.

Candidates in Capital Federal then, do not satisfy these voters’ specific requests because they do not need to; such tactics do not win elections and can damage them electorally in this district if the media and the larger public were to find out (attributes 4, 5 and 6). Besides the more common requests for jobs, legislators may also get requests of other types, as Deputy Daniel Amoroso (PRO) told me:

> Casos concretos…la [zona de] prostitución… …Hasta sacar un árbol de la vereda. Yo digo, ‘yo no te puedo sacar un árbol de la vereda, yo lo que te puedo hacer es la gestión’… yo presento expediente, cualquiera. … ‘solicita reparación de acera’ firmo todo esto, yo hago todo los pedidos, si después lo hacen, no se…Yo no le digo te voy a cortar el árbol, yo te hago la gestión, si el ejecutivo no se lo corta…

Concerns about the location of the prostitution “Red-light districts” or requests to trim the trees are clearly needs of a person who has some basic needs covered in a place where the state is present; otherwise he/she would have trimmed the tree himself or would be making requests for more basic subsistence things. Candidates cannot be seen or thought of as resorting to clientelism in this district because it could be futile for
their electoral aspiration. Candidates have personalized direct contact with only a negligible proportion of voters in campaigns, and the particularistic benefits type of exchanges make candidates feel uncomfortable (Tables 3.1 and 3.2 showed the little personalized contact people have with candidates and party activists, which is of course relevant in clientelistic exchanges).

3.7.3 Lack of appropriate infrastructure to make clientelism central to campaigns

(Attributes 7-21)\textsuperscript{79}

3.7.3.1 Specialized party infrastructure

Party infrastructure in Capital Federal is not geared towards carrying out clientelistic tactics; networks of puntero or dirigente-type brokers and of local party offices to reach people personally are non-existent and unnecessary in Capital Federal, as Deputy Velazco indicates:

\begin{quote}
Acá no [es fundamental esa estructura de punteros, como en el interior del país]. Acá es un problema de cultura política. En 2003 lo demostramos y [Luis] Zamora también. En el caso de Luis más basada en los principios políticos que en el ingenio, en nuestro caso más el ingenio que los principios. Demostró que sin aparato se puede tener una buena performance electoral, si vos tenés un buen candidato y tenés una buena campaña. Sin estructura y sin recursos. Manejamos muy poca plata. Luis sacó 12, y nosotros 10%.
\end{quote}

In Buenos Aires candidates can perform well electorally without a traditional party machine. Velazco begins referring to the specialized party structure (punteros) as a

\textsuperscript{79} Since clientelism as a voter mobilization strategy is not relevant, then there is no significant target group of voters subject of clientelistic tactics. As a corollary, there is a nonexistent role and function of political actors in the implementation of tactics and party infrastructures geared towards the delivery of particularistic benefits in campaigns.

However, it is fair to say that patrons could not, hypothetically, reach clients effectively without the aid of brokers (i.e. summoning or going to meet the few socially marginalized voters as clients or possible clients). Local brokers would be necessary to access these electorally irrelevant (very few votes) groups of people which are socioeconomically marginalized because of the social and communicational gulf between a candidate and the possible clients and even because of the personal safety of the candidate. However, candidates can personally reach voters in general without the necessary aid of brokers or activists, and the personalized contact of candidates with a significant number of voters is not relevant to the campaign effort.
problem; that having those structures would mean having a problem of political culture. He obviously considers those types of actors as backward and even criminal figures. Velazco shows the attitude of a candidate who does not have the infrastructure for clientelistic tactics and does not have the incentives to pursue those types of tactics. In this quote Velazco gives us clues as to finding what the relevant voter mobilization strategies in the district are: a good candidate, political principles and ingenuity are all standards he appreciates and argues that they paid off in campaigns. Next, Deputy Amoroso’s quote adds support to the idea of a different type of party organization in this district and against the role and relevance of punteros (attributes 12… 20). Deputy Amoroso said: “Se perdió mucho eso, la gente está cansada de eso; en el interior no pero en Capital Federal sí. El puntero era el que tradicionalmente no trabajaba, repartía las prebendas…Ya queda muy poco de lo que era el puntero tradicional …yo particularmente no tengo intermediario…yo estoy en la calle con la gente.”

This official says not to have intermediaries, and that he “deals with people personally”. But how many people can he personally see? Not many in a city of three million. The campaigns are fought in the media, as the chapter on Personalism as a campaign strategy, particularly, attests (attribute 22). Again, candidates feel they need to talk to people directly and those activists seen as parts of “the machine” are not appreciated, in this, the richest and most educated electorate of the country.

3.7.3.2 People are aggressive

Direct contact and personalized tactics in Capital Federal have another difference with those in provinces like Formosa and Catamarca (attributes 3, 4, 5, 6 and 19). The comparatively well educated people in this city are a few minutes away from the Presidential Palace, the National Congress, the Mayor or Legislators’ offices, a fact which has always reduced the costs of efficient and noticeable demonstrations to the
authorities. The higher development of the civil society also leads the city’s voters to be more proactive in demands to the government. All of this has shaped the type of dialogue which a candidate is able to have with voters in campaigns.

Interviewer: ¿Tiene contacto directo con la gente?
Deputy Ritondo: Todo el tiempo
Interviewer: ¿Le piden cosas?
Deputy Ritondo: Todo el tiempo...La gente no tiene medida de lo que te pide. Hay vecinos que son agresivos, que se ponen agresivos con la política. Hay cosas que vos la podes resolver, pero en general la gente cree que el Diputado Nacional puede resolver todo.

Ritondo acknowledges that people ask him for things all the time and that people are aggressive when “demanding” particularistic things. The attitude of “demanding” from the candidates and officials is different from that of the poor in Formosa. Someone who believes to have entitlements and is sure of himself is capable of demanding. Still, the proportion of prospective voters being given particularistic benefits is negligible.

Finally, what seems radically different in Capital Federal from Formosa and Catamarca is the type of personal relationship between candidates and people. In Formosa we see a more patrimonial relationship, while in Catamarca that situation was eased due to the alternatives people have because of the competition and the role of the dirigente-type brokers. In Capital Federal the role may be seen as opposite to that of Formosa; people demand from candidates without any intermediaries and the candidates are sometimes even afraid to face people directly during campaigns. National Deputy Argüello mentions the following in this respect: “El contacto directo con los votantes se dan en las mesas que se colocan en la calle... Pero hasta hace no mucho tiempo era riesgoso poner una mesa de campaña en la calle. O que era natural recoger muchas puteada. Muchos reclamos, mucha queja...”
3.7.4 Summary

Clientelism in Capital Federal does not play a role as an electoral mobilization strategy. Clientelism, in order to be a voter mobilization strategy requires at least either isolation of the clients, or a considerable infrastructure of the patron. These may be sufficient conditions for clientelism to exist and be central to campaigns. In the case of Formosa isolation of the clients makes the mayors (and other officials) the only source of benefits and enables the benefits to be delivered with a minimum of brokers or logistics. In the case of Catamarca competition forces a patron (i.e. major parties’ leaders) to count on an infrastructure to distribute material benefits and have a permanent presence with the clients thanks to the dirigente-type brokers. In Capital Federal the electorate is less likely to request material benefits which candidates can deliver in campaign in particularistic ways: first, because the people are not as poor, and second, because the candidates do not have the infrastructure and resources to provide relevant benefits.

Candidates from new single-leader parties in Capital Federal (discussed in Chapter 5) who base their campaign on the mass media take a national stage; they become TV personalities even to people in the furthest and poorest districts in the country. Eventually many will want to campaign in the country as a whole but have no infrastructure to do so.

Candidates and officials stress the relevance of the media, the limited role of field party activists, and the irrelevance of clientelism in a campaign. The particularistic requests they get from people are more tied to jobs and pensions, and to duties of the city government (e.g. trimming trees). People approach and demand from officials; it is not the candidates who approach the voters with gifts. Clientelism is definitively not central to campaigns as a voter mobilization strategy in the district of Capital Federal.

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80 Where central to campaigns, machine clientelism appears and is exacerbated due to the electoral competitiveness in a district. It is notable even in Formosa where competition is only
3.8 Santa Cruz: the incidence of Patronage

Santa Cruz is a district with a high-development electorate and a non-competitive party system dominated by the Peronist party (see Chapter 2). As in Formosa, the governor has a centralized control of resources and decisions, making the 14 towns in the province dependant on the central executive.\(^{81}\) In this section I account for patronage as a voter mobilization strategy in Santa Cruz and argue that “clientelism may or may not be central to campaigns as a voter mobilization strategy.”

Patronage works silently in a district in which there are few private enterprise opportunities and initiatives, and people know the government is “rich.” In most accounts it is the prospective voter who is asking for a government job. However, these are too marginal a number to make them central to campaigns.\(^{82}\) As a campaign strategy patronage is not widely used by candidates, but in very specific cases. Nevertheless, as present within the PJ party (e.g. Mayor Meza’s 2005 story and the Provincial Capital), but in Formosa personalized clientelism is what drives and assures the vote.

I here point to a different view than that of Steve Levitski’s (page 211 in the Kitchelt and Wilkinson 2007 book) who says that PJ changed to clientelism because of the “challenge” it faced when the UCR was powerful in the 1980s. In Formosa there is no challenge to PJ and it is very clientelistic. Levitsky only focuses his research on Buenos Aires and other large cities. Levitsky (page 215) says that PJ and Mayor Carlos Grosso shifted to patronage in Capital Federal with the 400 Unidades Básicas (UB) run by people with government jobs; however, those UB do not really mobilize significant numbers of people with patronage to win elections (Grosso could mobilize the activists with patronage, but not voters themselves) A better example for Levitsky’s point would have been the UCR in Catamarca, which also resort to clientelism due to, among other things, competition. Again, Capital Federal has 4.1 percent public employees while in Santa Cruz the percentage is 11.8. In Santa Cruz patronage may be relevant to win votes, but not in Capital Federal. Levitsky says that PJ made a rapid transition “along clientelistic lines” (p211) for a variety of reasons which considers the PJ as if it had always been a labor based party, but it had not. The labor unions had power where there were unionized workers in industrial cities (which seem to be where Levitsky studies), not in rural and poor areas; in these latter places the more conservative style of politics were and are common. Finally, the adaptation to clientelistic practices, which existed prior to the PJ transformation of the 1980s, is not only the prerogative of the Peronist party, but rather the UCR adopts clientelism as a strategy as well.

\(^{81}\) Santa Cruz (like Formosa) also has the Cumulative and Simultaneous Double Vote (or Law of Lemas) electoral system for all local and legislative provincial elections. (Also see Appendix B)

\(^{82}\) Unemployment rates are the lowest of the country in Santa Cruz. It was 3% in 2002 when the country average was 15%. In the same year in Capital Federal it was 13.5%, in Formosa 9.2%, in Catamarca 20.2% and in Mendoza 11.5%. Source: Martín Cicowiez. 2003. “Caracterización Económico-Social de las Provincias”, Documento de Federalismo Fiscal Nro. 5, Universidad Nacional de la Plata.
a government/party governance strategy, patronage has been used for years to keep social peace and standards of living. This long term government/party strategy which bears fruit in elections is similar to the long term nourishment of the personalized clientelism in Formosa, which also bears fruit in elections. They are similar in the sense that both take longer than a campaign’s time frame to function properly and both seem to get a side seat during the campaigns period under tactics more related to other types of strategies (these are “performance” in Santa Cruz and “personalism” in Formosa).

3.8.1 Patronage as a governance strategy (attributes 1, 6, 8, 9 and 10)

Deputy Omar Husain Hallar (UCR): Lo que ha pasado con [former governor] Kirchner es que acá ha usado el clientelismo político a las mil maravillas para él. Vos fijate que esta provincia que tienen 200 mil habitantes impreme más de 45000 recibos de sueldo; empleados públicos, ya sea provinciales, nacionales, municipales, jubilados de esos mismos tres poderes. Quiere decir que en cada familia, si multiplicas por 4, en cada familia hay un empleado público. … La única ‘industria,’ entre comillas, es la administración pública. No se quiso cambiar y no se cambió de hecho; ¿por qué?, porque es más fácil tener a la gente atada de un sueldo, de un subsidio, de una vivienda hecha por el estado, el empleo público. Esa gente está por encima del nivel de pobreza, no necesitaría de la dádiva para sobrevivir, pero si la necesitan parar vivir, porque no quieren trabajar. Quieren seguir recibiendo, y eso lo interpretó muy bien Kirchner y tuvo tres mandatos… Entonces la administración pública, las empresas del estado, en lugar de tomar personal en planta permanente, primero que no resiste por la cantidad de empleados y segundo que lo tomaban o con un cargo político o con un contrato. ¿Entonces qué pasa?, ya sabe que llegan las elecciones y si no lo votan a quien le da el cargo político, a quien lo contrato...

Interviewer: ¿Esta gente recibe amenazas?
Hallar: No, el sistema te va llevando.
Interviewer: ¿Temen perder el trabajo?
Hallar: Claro. ... Lo que hizo Kirchner acá en la provincia es hacer obra pública, obras, el puerto,...pero nada que le cambie la vida a la gente; la industria, que haya desarrollo económico.

In Santa Cruz clientelism takes the form of patronage. Deputy Hallar is outlining several of the reasons to understanding clientelism (mainly patronage) as a voter mobilization strategy. First, a large proportion of the population in the province depends on a government salary (from the many levels, branches and departments of
government) or subsidies. Second, there are basically no poor people in the province; however everybody does need a job. Third, since there is little other “industry” besides the public administration, people want and demand government assistance (jobs or subsidies) –attribute 19-. Fourth, the capacity of the state to take more workers reached a limit to the point where now it is better to simply hand out temporary work contracts and subsidies to people. (Attr. 9, 21) Fifth, people know that there are an excess of workers in the government rosters and that their benefits may depend on the ruling party staying in power. (Attribute 10) Finally, the bottom line is that the type of public works investments made by the government does not promote the development of new industries which would free people from having to work for the state. (Attr. 9, 10)

Relatively low paying public jobs which seem to be tied to the administration are susceptible to influence supporting their source of benefits (the incumbent candidate). However, there is not necessarily an explicit threat to these employees from the “patrons”, most likely because for many people a state or government job (or a subsidy) is the only option, or as PJ Deputy Miriam Aguiar said, “the most secured option they have.” “Quique” Campaña (the senior provincial legislative UCR advisor) on patronage and state monopoly said; “most people buy, sell, or work for the state and speaking against it can mean isolation.” (Attributes 9, 10)

Due to these conditions of having a large percentage of the population working for the state in a very extensive province and having no viable alternative political party,

83 The percentage of population (of any age) in Santa Cruz holding a provincial or local government job is 11.8% (Capital Federal 4.1%, Mendoza 4.8%, Formosa 7.9% and Catamarca 9.4%). These figures do not include jobs in public companies or official banks. Source: ASAP, based on data from Secretarías de Hacienda y de Asuntos Universitarios, Dirección Nacional de Coordinación Fiscal con las Provincias and INDEC. However, an “Editorial Opinion” article with an obvious critical view, places that percentage to be much higher; “El 60 por ciento de la población económicamente activa de Santa Cruz se desempeña como agente del Estado, ya sea en el nivel provincial o en el municipal. Son 55.000 de las 220.000 personas que viven en aquellas tierras.” La Nación newspaper (09-09-09), accessed 10-20-09, http://www.lanacion.com.ar/nota.asp?nota_id=1172286
is that unions or simply groups of people with similar current or former jobs are important to understanding, not just the how relevant clientelism is as a voter mobilization strategy, but the other strategies and governance in general as well. (Attributes 1, 5) Some workers’ unions are difficult to tame (e.g. the teachers’) and are subject of operations to discourage strikes. Small groups of displeased workers can block the few highways that cross the province and disturb most flow of people and goods, halting important sectors of the economy (like oil production). These are but only two examples to show that clientelism may not be enough to win elections in a society in which there is only one major source of jobs and benefits in the province and only one party to blame for people’s problems, particularly if people have a considerable organizational capacity which is typical in places with high socioeconomic development.

3.8.2 Mechanisms: Financially dependent towns and patronage (attributes 2, 9)

In Santa Cruz’s towns, basically all the jobs are tied to the government one way or another; commerce is tied to the salaries of public employees and even the media is tied to government sponsorship. The towns themselves, according to many officials, are tied to the money coming from the provincial government. I present only three quotes but both UCR and PJ legislators acknowledge this:

Te imaginas que si acá [Río Gallegos] tenemos dependencia del estado, en los pueblos chicos ni hablar. En su gran mayoría terminan siendo empleados de la municipalidad del pueblo o delegaciones de Servicios Públicos, Vialidad Provincial, todos están relacionados con el estado, y ni hablar del comercio que ahí, en pueblos chicos, viven de eso. (Councilman Naim, PJ, Río Gallegos)

84 However, also larger protests happen as well with significant consequences to the provincial state. For example, see the report on an oil workers’ protest during the 13th day of strike (out of 19): “La falta de producción hace que la provincia pierda unos 580 mil dólares por día por regalías de petróleo y unos 150 mil de gas, de acuerdo al promedio de regalías de los primeros cuatro meses. Una cifra cercana a los 800 mil dólares que informó el Gobierno como pérdida diaria. A hoy, se ha dejado de percibir el equivalente a casi el 20% de la masa salarial mensual que afronta el Estado provincial.”La Opinión Austral (8-19-09), accessed 10-20-09 http://www.laopinionaustral.com.ar/diario.asp?Modo=Noticia&NId=5541&A=2009&M=8&D=19.

85 I will provide more pertinent characteristics of Santa Cruz in Chapter 6.
Deputy Hallar (UCR) expands on how the central provincial government works to have control over the municipalities and the Provincial Legislature. Mayors have to request the governor additional funds to pay salaries, a fact which in practice tends to align mayors to the governor if they do not want to face local social discontent. In turn, the city provincial legislators, who also tend to be tied to the local mayor, add to the support of the governor in the provincial legislature.\(^{86}\) Hallar said:

\textit{Otro sistema de clientelismo, o con el sistema de coparticipación municipal que tenemos en Santa Cruz, que prácticamente reparte menos del 9\% en los 14 municipios. Entonces el gran poder lo tiene el gobierno central. Los municipios del interior no pueden autofinanciarse. Dependen de la dádiva del gobierno central.}

Councilman Ojeda was a Peronist in the opposition.\(^{87}\) He elaborated on how the PJ provincial government financially strangles the UCR local mayor, but actually affecting their performance as councilmen as a side effect: \textit{“A la vez nos arrastra a nosotros. Si porque después queda como ‘no pero si no hacen nada,’ no...”} In this manner, the PJ provincial government eases the job of the critics that the opposition officials are not doing a good job. Patronage is then not only to try to control the will of the people, but that of lower level officials as well.

Clientelism is of intermediate centrality to campaigns in this district (neither “definitively central,” nor “definitively not central to campaigns”) and mostly takes the form of patronage (affecting low paying public employees like police officers, teachers, municipal workers and positions depending on political appointment). (Attribute 8) The tactics used in the patronage strategy are very subtle at times and do not particularly occur during electoral campaigns; such as keeping employees not as full-time workers (\textit{de planta}), but as “hires” (\textit{contratados}), so there is no union involved, no binding

\(^{86}\) In Santa Cruz there are 10 PR “List” Provincial Deputies and 14 SMD “Town” Provincial Deputies (One per municipality).

\(^{87}\) Since 2007 PJ is ruling Perito Moreno again after only one four-year term of a UCR mayor.
contracts, no major benefits paid, etc., and the employees hope for an eventual appointment as full-time workers. (Attribute 2) Another example, regards teachers, where pay raises have been given as “bonuses” instead of as part of the formal salary, hence they cannot be recognized for retirement benefits, and can be given more informally and temporarily; this also is a way to discipline the labor force. Another way to attempt to control the labor force is to give rewards for attendance or presentismo, for which a good/perfect work attendance in the month means 50% more pay that month; this weakens the strength of the teachers’ union by making strikes more financially costly for teachers. (Attribute 10) The big oil companies in the district help finance many of the government programs to aid the unemployed in order to avoid protests and road closings to keep their very profitable businesses running smoothly (and the provincial government gets a share of it –regalias petroleras); however people are aware of this situation and frequently strike/block highways/interfere with oil companies’ production to request more “jobs” and pay raises, even though they may not even be employees of the oil companies themselves, or be qualify for the job at all. (Attributes 10, 19)

This patronage is then relevant to keep the “social peace” in a relatively more organized and mobilized civil society than for example Formosa and Catamarca (See Chapter 2, footnote 49). However, as we will see, patronage tactics are not the most important or determinant activities in the electoral mobilization efforts of parties. Still, patronage support takes a long time in the making to give fruit during the elections.

3.8.3 Tactics: Very limited machine clientelism in campaigns

The relevance of machine clientelism is very limited and is mostly in the form of public works and other club-type goods, promises or announcements, together with public works openings for small communities and in the media in the weeks prior to Election Day in a series of tactics which are also relevant in a “performance strategy.”
The few people who are poor in Santa Cruz are not as poor as in any other district studied here. The “gifts” given in the clientelistic exchange cannot be simple goods such as food or clothing (as in the other districts); instead school gyms, public plazas, housing, subsidies and cash contributions to NGOs., etc. are typical pork-barrel and club-type goods “given” during campaigns. (Attribute 6) Highly particularistic benefits such as money or food gifts to individual people are rare. The opposition parties do not resort to machine clientelism because there is no significant public for it, and in any case they do not have the resources for it or the organizational capacity to match the incumbent PJ party. (Attr. 1, 22) Councilman Saa (UCR, Río Gallegos) blames the government for the people who live off the state and recognizes that it is futile to enter a machine clientelism contest with the incumbent party. (Mayor Roquel -UCR, Río Gallegos- also concurred). Regarding house visits by candidates Saa said (attr. 2-4, 19):

Saa: La gente sabe y saca provecho de todos los que los visitan, pero no se puede dar respuesta a todo el mundo, y eso te juega en contra. En realidad, uno cree que utiliza a la gente y la gente utiliza a todo el espectro político... Le tenés que decir que no [a la gente]. No se puede tampoco entrar en esa competencia con el gobierno provincial que tiene una estructura infernal; que reparte víveres, que reparte materiales.

This UCR Councilman portrays people as “reaping the benefits” during campaigns, where the candidates would almost become victims of the demanding public. The PJ party is usually acting through government agencies when in campaign. Large sectors of the constituency are recipient of the “pork” announcements made by the ruling party in the months before the election. However, opposition parties denounce that these club-type goods and promises are held off just for campaigns and do not promote the private enterprise initiative of the community but a deeper dependence and reliance on the state.  

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88 Personalism is actually what is important in this type of activity as well, to relate the candidate and administration to the goods being given, and is also the chance for the governor
I asked Deputy Aguiar if there were any problems of people asking for food and she said the following: “No, porque digamos que desde el Ministerio de Asuntos Sociales,…alguien levanta el teléfono, llama y eso se soluciona rápido.” Aguiar’s experience shows how the resources of the state may be put to use for campaign activities. However, it could also be said that the elected official, who happens to be campaigning, becomes aware of the need of these people and uses his influence to give rapid solution to the problem. (Attr. 7, 9) There is a blurred distinction between the party in campaign and the government at work.

Most interviewees said that the machine clientelism tactics of handing out gifts is rare and is not very relevant in terms of votes, but it may occur. (Attribute 2) For example, Deputy Alejandro Victoria (PJ) told me “there are those who hand out money…they may need $200 to pay due electricity bills, and if you have 3 or 4 children those $200 might make a difference”…“I only hand out the ballot.” The giving of gifts of monies is portrayed more like a favor one neighbor is doing to another and should be done privately because the mostly middle class population does not like the highly personalized and particularistic clientelism common in other district and instead prefer (and enjoy) club goods. The recipient of this highly personalized benefit of cash may pay the candidate back eventually. The candidate is not forcing the voter to vote for him, but adding to his campaign, to a possibly positive evaluation of the candidate. (Attr. 19, 20) The difference with Formosa’s “clients” is that the attitudes and the way in which the politicians address the prospective voters is not as explicitly paternalistic. In Santa Cruz the political party does not change, but the officials at the local level often do. In Formosa there was the sense that the official will always be there and was doing people

(who usually presides over the ceremonies) to endorse the local candidates; performance is important in campaigns rather than machine or personalized clientelism.
a favor out of his magnanimity; contrasting with Santa Cruz where the official is “just like another neighbor” as the most convenient attitude to take in campaigns.

I found, however, evidence that machine clientelism occurs also in those rare occasions when there is greater uncertainty about the electoral outcome (and evidence to what for example Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007 said). (Attributes 1, 2, 6) Former Provincial Deputy Argentino Álvarez (former PJ and Frepaso) told me: “Repartieron electrodomésticos en Caleta Olivia y Río Turbio cuando en el plebiscito estuvieron cerca. Había ganado el “NO” en Caleta, y [then Mayor] Córdoba recibió el tirón de orejas. Amenazaban de pérdida de subsidios a la gente.” However, this was an unusual case, a one point in time tactic done in the larger towns. 89 (Attribute 10)

3.8.3.1 Pervasiveness of patronage

Interviewer: ¿Hay clientelismo político en Santa Cruz?
Halar: Funciona a las mil maravillas. …Siempre son dádivas del estado...Acá viene la gente con un criterio totalmente distinto; que el estado le tiene que dar la vivienda, que el estado te tiene que dar el trabajo, que el estado te tiene que dar la bolsa de comida.

Halar is disgusted by the clientelism in place. He is also qualifying his statement by giving us the types of particularistic benefits being given: housing, jobs, and food. (Attr. 6) But Halar is also saying that the state is seen by people as having to provide them with those benefits as entitlements. (Attr. 19) I noticed that many officials refer to people as being used to the state providing for their wellbeing, expecting and demanding solutions to problems which are usually personal in nature. 90 The interviewees imply that

89 The occasion was a referendum to approve a constitutional reform electors’ election back in the 1990s, not a contest among candidates and parties, even though the opposition parties were rejecting such reform. People were only voting for “Yes” (to go ahead and call another referendum to reform the Provincial Constitutions) and “No” (to reject that proposal).

90 An example of a common situation in Santa Cruz is the following. In the winter of 2009 a group of unemployed climbed a public water tower and threatened not to come down until somebody gave them a solution to their problem. The local government brokered that the men would get a job in the oil companies while the women would get paid training of some sort,
there is a particular culture in the province which is also being fuelled by other people moving from other provinces.\footnote{In 2004 then UCR National Senator Carlos Prades submitted a bill (S.-157/04) proposing the development of infrastructure and promotional programs for the development of agricultural activities, and justifying its necessity in Santa Cruz, he said: “Una debilidad marcada de toda Santa Cruz es la escasa cantidad de empresarios, y la impronta cultural del modelo económico vigente. Se requiere diseñar programas que permitan incorporar nuevos actores, especialmente jóvenes. Existe una cantidad enorme de recursos humanos desocupados o poco aprovechados, que sobreviven como empleados públicos o cuentapropistas.” Again, the arguments come down to little private investment initiatives and an economic model, the cultural foundation of which weakens the province.} To illustrate this point, Councilman Saa said:

Saa: Acá hay mucho ocio, mucha gente que no tiene trabajo, muchos planes, mucha gente que está en la casa, es una provincia con mucho empleo público y poca actividad privada. ...Por ahí hay tipos que tienen resuelto casi todo y te piden...hay mucho extranjero que se aprovecha de la situación, no extranjero, sino gente que no es de acá, sino del norte que no busca trabajo, busca el plan y la ayuda social, no es culpa de esa gente. Creo que de alguna manera los hemos acostumbrado a esa forma.

And Mayor Roquel seems to agree: …Un estado que generalmente ha actuado con un criterio asistencialista y yo no generalizaría, pero hay gente que se ha acostumbrado a eso.

Both officials (Saa and Roquel) are saying: first, that the provincial state uses its riches to hand out jobs and subsidies without trying to promote progress seen as a self-reliant activity, private job, or autonomous from the state (attribute 10), and second, that people know the characteristics of the provincial state and its government, and are willing and seeking to join in the state-sponsored subsidies and jobs. Saa, Roquel, Hallar, but also later Aguiar, Reynoso and Ojeda (and many others not quoted here) seem to agree that having a provincial state with enough money and a weakly diversified economy becomes a big incentive for people to flock around a “Sugar Daddy State;” because there is no other alternative or simply because it is the easier thing to do.

The issues revolving around government jobs and subsidies in particularistic manners were prevalent in all the interviewees’ accounts as being one of the primary...
demands people have for them. (Attribute 6, 19) Councilwoman Reynoso (PJ, Caleta Olivia) also shares her views that people request jobs and housing:

La gente lo que espera es entrar como un empleado municipal. …La gente quiere estar cómoda, trabajar 6 horas sentadita en un lugar, que a veces ni siquiera está suficientemente capacitada para las nuevas tecnologías que permiten otro tipo de agente laboral. …Y también quieren trabajo para siempre. Quieren sentarse en un lugar y jubilarse.

A final example of a benefit people seek from the provincial state is retirement benefits, as Hallar noted: “Acá cualquiera aterriza en la provincia, quiere dejar su trabajo también por el tema de la jubilación. Muchísimo más redituable la jubilación provincial que una nacional o una de la actividad privada.” Hallar is another official who explicitly refers to the people coming to the province from other places with these goals in mind, and subtly showing a discomfort for the added tensions that generates (Aguiar and Saa are two others quoted here). (Attribute 19)

3.8.4 The irrelevance of puntero-type brokers

The fact that these are all small cities or towns in Santa Cruz, and the relatively high organizational capacity of people and resources in general (e.g. relatively high levels of formal education) are factors that make party brokers useless in clientelism as a voter mobilization strategy. (Attributes 11-18) As in most of the other districts, door-to-door home visits of the local candidates are common, and as Deputy Aguiar (PJ) pointed out, in the larger city of Río Gallegos the candidate may attend meetings organized by the neighbors themselves. It is in these personal contact tactics with people that the candidates have a chance to make particularistic promises (I am mostly referring to patronage). The relationship between a candidate or an official (patron) and a voter (client) are often (but not always) on an equal level of hierarchy or respect. In these small towns many patrons and clients know one another, went to school together or get together in PTA meetings.
Voters may be offended if the candidate does not fulfill his personal promise to get him a job in the public administration (the media has also reported cases of elected officials being harassed by voters because they were not given a job as promised during the campaign). Brokers are rare in campaign since people tend to talk to candidates or officials first-hand. (Attribute 12) Candidates and officials feel the need to try to satisfy the voters’ demands, but in the end, I have no reports that these campaign demands are significant enough in terms of numbers of votes to turn an election; although the demands may be of significance in terms of the inter-personal relationships in a small community. Voters’ expectations throughout the term are campaigned on by candidates in the next election, even though people do not demand universalistic public policies, but rather particularistic or club-type benefits.

3.8.5 Summary

The PJ leadership power in Santa Cruz has not been threatened for many years. Then Governor Néstor Kirchner changed electoral regime and system rules to favor his party when there was a perceived threat from another party or from within his own party (Lisoni 2002). Patronage by itself could not explain the electoral campaign efforts or voter mobilization strategies in Santa Cruz, but patronage does play a significant role explaining the support the PJ party gets from voters.

In Santa Cruz people may ask for particularistic benefits like jobs during the campaigns, but candidates do not feel any excessive pressure to comply because those votes cannot modify the election’s outcome, but instead because in the smaller towns people likely personally know one another and that could affect interpersonal relationships. Then the key to winning elections for the candidates does not lie in

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satisfying those demands, but on the “performance” of the government which is expressed on occasions of “pork” announcements during the campaigns. The public employment patronage, as a campaign strategy, is then not really central to campaigns. Patronage exists, it has an effect on the election, it is relevant for the district’s governance, but it is not significantly used in campaigns, besides the occasional promise to give a job to somebody’s son or daughter, or upgrade “categoria,” or pay scale. But the electoral results are never in question for provincial positions.⁹³

3.9 Mendoza: limited incidence and relevance of clientelism

Mendoza is the case of a district with middle to high socioeconomic development and competitive elections (see Chapter 2 for details). At the time of the interviews the UCR had the governorship and the two chamber legislature did not have a majoritarian party. Political parties regularly resort to internal elections to decide party offices and candidacy nominations, a fact that indicates the absence of a single powerful leader who imposes nominations, and instead more evenly distributed shares of power. In this section interviewees often refer to internal party elections as a very relevant part of their political life. One of the reasons for these decentralized parties’ power may be the electoral regime and system rules. For example, the governor in Mendoza cannot be reelected; provincial senators do not compete in the province at large, but have smaller districts in single member district contexts. However, the competitiveness of the district probably makes parties more cohesive (factions splitting from parties are not as common as in other districts). These characteristics are factors which help us understand not only the centrality to campaigns of clientelism in Mendoza but, later in this dissertation, the centrality to campaigns of the other voter mobilization strategies. Political parties in

⁹³ Election outcomes may be in doubt in some local elections among candidates of the same party which, as shown in Chapter 6, is better explained by a performance-type strategy.
Mendoza may be the most complex of all the studied districts’ for having to adapt to effectively deal with all four voter mobilization strategies in a competent manner.

First, in Mendoza clientelism is present in the parties’ campaign strategies, particularly in internal party elections, but its relevance is limited in scope and reach in general elections given the relatively small proportion of people who are poor or dependent on government employment or benefits. Second, personalized clientelism is not central to campaigns in Mendoza because cities are larger and personal contact of candidates and activists with a significant number of people is more difficult than in the other provinces, and parties tend to favor media campaigns. Third, being in the opposition does not necessarily mean that the clientelistic tactics are out of reach for the candidates because resources can be funneled to them from other more resource rich districts/cities. Fourth, incumbents count with patronage tactics affecting public employees and financially dependent local NGOs; however, these tactics and clientelism as a strategy seem limited in scope and reach because the proportion of people being affected by it is small and hence parties cannot rely on patronage to win elections. Fifth, provincial or national legislators have little territorial power due to the relative autonomy and concentration of power around the local governments, which take a leading role in campaigns (not just mayoral but all electoral campaigns) and are necessary to implement clientelistic tactics. This weakness of legislators is contrasted, for example, to the position of more power in the case of the Catamarca legislators who had their own local infrastructure with local dirigentes. Sixth, the executives and particularly the mayors are the actors who are more able to act on clientelistic tactics. In larger cities this job

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94 The median size municipality in Mendoza has 78,471 inhabitants, while the median size municipality in the province of Catamarca is 7772; Santa Cruz, 8316; and Formosa, 8530. In a federal country such as Argentina, the provinces have the prerogative to legally organize themselves. These data are given for the populations governed by a municipal government (Source Grupo Provincias or INAP paper. Cao y Vaca; INFORMACIÓN SOBRE MUNICIPIOS: Ubicación, Población, Partidos Políticos a cargo del Ejecutivo. Accessed 30/8/2009. INAP, http://www.sgp.gov.ar/contentos/inap/publicaciones/docs/otros/Cepas9.pdf.)
gets delegated to other actors such as councilmen or dirigente-type brokers, but it also loses relevance and reach, given the existence of other campaign tactics being implemented with equal or more strength (such as the use of the media).

Decentralization of decisions and the limited centrality of clientelism in general election campaigns result in limited party infrastructure and resources dedicated to clientelism in.

3.9.1 Patronage tactics in Mendoza

3.9.1.1 Public employees and subsidy recipients

Pressure put on public employees can vary from the public endorsement of a candidate by their bosses, to actual intimidation. Provincial Deputy Carmona (PJ) said (attributes 2, 3, 10): “Tuvimos la situación de empleados municipales que fueron visitados en su domicilio para advertirles, digamos, de parte de funcionarios municipales, para advertirles que se tenían que salir de nuestra lista sino corrían riesgo de ser trasladados, ser cambiados de destino, etc., este tipo de situaciones existe.” Carmona is referring to explicit threats to municipal employees to weaken the mayor’s internal party opposition. In this particular example the threats extended to worsening the working conditions of the employees. When asked if those practices were exclusive of the major parties, Carmona said: “Actualmente son 2 los municipios bajo el PD [Partido Demócrata], y en esos municipios se aplican prácticas clientelares similares.”

Officials from the three major parties seem to agree on patronage as a practice carried out in municipal governments particularly. But how relevant is it to the electoral outcomes? Carmona again:

“… y yo te diría que es bastante determinante de los resultados electorales,… En la general quizá tiene menos impacto… [porque] hay un factor imponderable que lo genera el hecho de que la gente tiene una obligación de ir a

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95 The Partido Demócrata (PD) is a center-right or conservative party, and the third party in Mendoza after the UCR and the PJ.
votar, y por lo tanto la posibilidad de condicionamiento es menor y la posibilidad de control también de por quién se vota es menor."\textsuperscript{96}

Carmona is basically arguing for the relevance of clientelism in internal party elections, not the general elections (attribute 1). This fact stresses at least three points: first, the dynamic internal political life of parties; second, the recognized limits of clientelism enforcement mechanisms in these electorates (attribute 10), which implies a lack of adequate party infrastructure for it and/or a public which is not susceptible to these practices (attribute 3, 8); finally, the relatively small proportion of public employees susceptible to clientelistic practices, making them only relevant in internal party contests.

Councilman Ramírez (PJ, Mendoza) however describes a specific tactic of intimidation used during the general election campaign using a clientelistic (patronage) strategy: "Tuvieron reuniones en la última semana cuando ya veían que parecía que el Peronismo ganaba, hicieron reuniones con todos los empleados públicos y les dijeron ‘ustedes o nos hacen ganar, o nosotros tenemos de octubre a diciembre que asumen los peronistas, para rajarlos a todos.’" (Elections were in October and the ascension to power in December.) Different from Carmona, here Ramirez assures the direct threat to terminate the employment of public employees if the UCR incumbent did not win. However, I interpret this opinion as more likely to be applied to contracted employees and not as often to the full time public employees who are bound and backed up by their

\textsuperscript{96} When referring to the internal elections Carmona said:

“En una interna hay sistemas para determinar, y ahí es donde viene lo compulsivo por ejemplo respecto de los empleados públicos. Hay formas de, desde el tipo de firma que hace el fiscal; generalmente un empleado municipal en el caso de la lista oficialista; hay formas de marcar y saber por quien votó un empleado municipal. Y esto implica una forma de coerción...” “Por ejemplo marcar, hacer una firma distinta el fiscal a aquellos que sabe que son empleados municipales, entonces de algún modo verificar cuantos empleados municipales votaron por la lista oficialista y si alguno votó para el otro lado y empezar a hacer un estudio del padrón tratando de suponer quien fue o quiénes fueron los que votaron para el candidato no oficialista. Todo esto existe, y hay gente muy ducha, muy preparada en todos estos quehaceres del manejo de las elecciones internas..."
unions. Councilman Ramírez is from the minority PJ party in the provincial capital and his opinion probably reflects his political weakness.

Councilman Ramírez also referred to another common clientelistic tactic related to patronage (already considered in other provincial cases) which is the influence the incumbents can have on people receiving government subsidies (attributes 2, 6). He said: “…cuando [el beneficiario] va a que le firman la planilla de asistencia diario, bueno ahí le recuerdan que si no ganan después no van a seguir ellos.” The previously mentioned Plan Jefes y Jefas de Hogar national subsidy is used politically in Mendoza as well. The accusations of the political and patronage usage of these subsidies cross party lines. Provincial Senator Martínez (UCR) also speaks against patronage and the political use of subsidies in his County: “Hoy en una planta de personal, que tiene Tupungato, que hoy tiene casi 600 personas trabajando, 200 de ellas son ‘contratos basura.’ Te lo van dando por mes porque así te tienen de rehén.” These denunciations were common in the other three provinces, in what seems to be a common practice in towns in the country (attributes 2, 6, 10).

3.9.1.2 NGO patronage

According to Councilman Ramírez (PJ, Mendoza), the relationship of party brokers is closer to them (councilmen) than to the mayor of Mendoza city. As expected, the personal interactions of mayors with individual voters seem to be more significant and central to the campaigns in smaller cities. Ramírez said: “...Los intendentes...la comunicación ya no es el puerta a puerta, sino con las entidades intermedias.” Ramírez gives an example of clientelistic tactics that are adequate to a society which is better organized than, for example, Catamarca or Formosa. The mayor would meet with NGOs and other civil society organizations, but would not really do the door-to-door work in this large capital city; that was the job of the candidates to city council (attrs. 2-4, 8, 9, 16).
As an example, Ramírez, Carmona and Senator Morales (PJ) argued that a local government also has influence on other sectors of the civil society closely linked to the municipal government. Morales said:

[En las elecciones] no solamente [hay presión o control] sobre los empleados públicos, tenés que tener en cuenta que un municipio, es una red de servicios, de asistencia, de relaciones con productores, con empresarios, en determinado momento eso se pone en juego. Y el intendente sabe y pide el voto a un sindicato, a una ONG, lo que sea, y todas esas pequeñas estructuras se movilizan a favor de esa situación.

The control of resources of the mayor allows him to negotiate support with the organized sectors of society (attributes 9, 19, 20). The exact content of those negotiations are unavailable, but the personal and particularistic character of them can be inferred from these interviews (attributes 3, 4, 6, 8). These tactics of pressure add up to a deliberate strategy of clientelism to mobilize voters (attributes 1, 10). Next quote shows that mayors reach cash-strapped civil society organizations to commit and to pressure them prior to the elections: Deputy Carmona said:

...El condicionamiento y el apriete a veces se terminó orientando hacia las ONGs locales, digamos, uniones vecinales, clubes. Organizaciones de la sociedad civil que tenían algún vínculo con algún programa de la municipalidad y que desde el municipio inicialmente había un accionar de buscar, de algún modo sumarlos al proyecto político a través de ese condicionamiento y en algunos casos también, sobre todo con las uniones vecinales, con los clubes deportivos, de decirles ‘bueno muchachos, si no nos bancan se quedan sin tal o cual beneficio, tal o cual subsidio.

### 3.9.2 Tactics: the limits of Machine Clientelism

En las internas hay alguna suerte de canje a cambio del voto. . . . Hay una cuestión que yo aprendí en las internas, que hay un punto de saturación en cuanto a la capacidad de compra de los aparatos municipales. Es, vos dispones de 100 mil pesos para la campaña, si ponés 200 mil pesos no hay grandes incidencias en la cantidad de votos, porque la población dispuesta a ser clientelizada es acotada. (Provincial Deputy Carmona, PJ)

Carmona explains that the population to be “bought” is small and significant only for internal/primary elections (attributes 1, 8). Carmona also points to the municipal machine as responsible for the clientelism, not the provincial government, which signals
the autonomy and resourcefulness of the mayors in Mendoza (attributes 7, 9, 21). One of the reasons commonly mentioned for arguing against the effectiveness of clientelism in the general election, as Carmona also remarked, is the compulsory voting law in Argentina which incentivizes people to go to the polls (attribute 1). In this respect Carmona said: “[la] ‘compra de votos’ se limita mucho más en la general, por la efectividad por lo menos.” However, this argument is more valid to explain clientelism effectiveness in internal party elections where elections are not compulsory. The cases of Formosa and Catamarca are evidence that the compulsory nature of the vote in Argentina is no reason to make clientelism not central to campaigns as parties’ voter mobilization strategies. Mendoza’s municipal electoral machines work on the local clientelism but officials acknowledge its limits. This recognition, by officials of all three major parties that clientelism occurs but that at the same time it is not really relevant to the electoral outcomes, points to a district in which officials do not see themselves jeopardized by the clientelism which occurs, and; that Mendoza officials use clientelistic tactics themselves and try to “hide” their use of clientelism by minimizing their opponents effectiveness with clientelistic tactics.

Councilman Ramírez (PJ, Mendoza city) gives further reasons for the limited centrality to campaigns of clientelism in Mendoza.

En algunos sectores es necesario hacer el puerta a puerta, y en los edificios tenés que hacerlo a través de la televisión, de otra manera, porque no podés ingresar en los edificios. ...[Y] además el mismo sistema de vida, todo rápido, que viven en esos departamentos, hace que no te permitan el persona a persona. En cambio en la periferia sí; no solo que podés hacerlo, sino que es necesario hacerlo, porque ahí exige conocer al candidato.

The lack of door-to-door campaign tactics in larger cities complicate the reach the candidates have with the voters; it ends up being a mediated and limited contact (attributes 1-5, 8). Parties which have the infrastructure and know-how for carrying out
clientelistic tactics see themselves as unable to use them due to the socioeconomic characteristics of the voters.

Here is Ramírez on machine clientelistic tactics:

No es el caso nuestro por una cuestión de posibilidades económicas. Si puede y lo hace el ejecutivo [provincial y departamental –municipal] en la distribución de colchones, de materiales de construcción, de mercaderías, de zapatillas, de guardapolvos, lo hace, en los últimos meses, previos a la elección, a la general vuelca todo. …Lo mismo ocurre en los departamentos en donde somos gobierno.

Ramírez seems to relativize the implementation of clientelism to merely economic reasons, not moral or civic ones (attribute 1, 9 and 21). It is a strategy his own party also uses when able to (attributes 2, 5, 6). Next, Senator Martínez (UCR, Tupungato) refers to the trail of the money and the decentralization of decisions and resources (attributes 9, 14):

Martínez: …Ahora, cuando vengan las elecciones la Nación va a repartir guita. …Pero en la mayoría de las veces no es plata, es contratación publicitaria que te la hacen allá arriba,… es ayuda alimentaria, que también viene en las áreas de Desarrollo Social, y también viene a tu municipio, y te dicen ‘bueno, acá tenés 10 kg de arroz, repartílos como te dé la gana. …O te llegan zapatillas, o te llegan guardapolvos…

Ramírez and Martínez say that people are influenced and answer with the vote for the patrons, even though those votes may not be determinant to the election’s result (attributes 1, 9, 10). Local party machines may then have the discretion to use the resources in their districts. This is evidence of the autonomy of the mayors from the governor to have resources at their disposal (the subject of the autonomy of the mayors is better explored in Chapter 4). This is a decentralized clientelistic effort by parties.

Finally, I further illustrate the limits of clientelism in Mendoza. To Councilman Laciar (UCR, Mendoza city) handing out foodstuffs is not primordial for the election (attribute 1). Laciar said: “Y sí. Que es parte de lo que se gasta de cada partido de campaña.” “…Siempre se consiguen cosas que a la gente le sirve. Tampoco es tanto, porque se priorizan otros gastos, una campaña, uno gasta en autos, impresión de los
afiches…” Next, Councilpeople Gómez and Páez denied that his mayor proceeds in clientelistic ways and that the benefits of food are given by the appropriate municipal office. Gómez: “Cecilia [Páez] ha repudiado en una sesión la actitud de un Diputado Nacional del PJ que vino y repartió comida.” Páez: “Con fondos de la Nación, del Ministerio de Desarrollo Social de la Nación, vino al Bajo de Luján a repartir cosas.” These (and earlier) quotes show that clientelistic tactics are applied, but they are not typical of a campaign because parties prioritize other tactics. (Attrs. 1 and 2)

3.9.3 The Media in Mendoza

The importance of the media in campaigns relativizes the effect and the effort parties put into clientelistic tactics, added to the fact that for example in the many high rises the highly personalized contact with voters is very difficult (attributes 1, 2, 22). Dario Fernández (Senior PD advisor) said: “… Somos los que menos clientelismo tenemos. Pero generalmente las estrategias de campaña es bastante mediática.” The media may be one of the most important resources the parties can count on (attributes 2, 3, 22). Next, Provincial Senator (and former Mayor of Tupungato) José “Pepe” Martínez (UCR, Tupungato) said: “Los medios tienen más poder que los políticos,…Y son necesarios [los medios] porque cuesta mucho el puerta a puerta. …Porque vos no podés [como senador] estar allá [en el distrito el tiempo necesario]…aparte la prensa, la radio y la televisión entra a tu casa sin golpear la puerta.”

Martínez also admits to the clientelistic practices used in the district, even involving paying people money for their vote. However, he admits that the relevance of clientelism in the electoral outcome is not as significant as it is in the internal party elections. Martínez’s opinion reflects a different situation to that of Catamarca where the door-to-door canvassing was crucial to elections. He is also pointing to a lack of resources of the type of party activist to do canvassing, etc. (attribute 12) Next, the
Mayor of Luján de Cuyo, Mr. Parisi, concurs that the media is probably the most relevant element in campaigns, and that (just as Martínez denounced) it favors Parisi himself:

“Son absolutamente necesarios; lo que no dicen los medios no existe. …Seguro [hay preferencias de los medios por ciertos partidos], preferentemente por los oficialismos.

Acá en Luján, yo no voy a mentir, las FM tienen preferencias por el oficialismo.

…siempre necesitan de la plata del estado para poder subsistir. Todos.”

3.9.4 Machine clientelism: Clients Expect the Gifts

Finally, Mendoza officials showed me how differently they view clientelism compared to Formosa’s. The population’s need in Formosa is so great that candidates and officials make a great effort to give particularistic goods, whereas in Mendoza this is more marginal in terms of votes. The poor are not as many, and officials are “afraid” of the dependence they could have on those people. In some respects this is a different conception of what “handing out particularistic goods in campaigns” means, and is closer to the experience in Capital Federal. Next is the experience of someone who does not rely on clientelistic practices to win elections. Senator Suárez (UCR) said:

La gente, creo, que cada día vota menos por clientelismo. ...El político ya no va a sacarle nada a la gente, sino la gente espera a las elecciones para ver que les saca a los políticos...Si [los otros partidos políticos lo hacen], muchos lo hacen y en mi partido hay algunos que también lo hacen en barrios más necesitados y se aprovechan de esa necesidad. Y la gente se aprovecha también de la política.

On the other hand, regarding their contact with the poorer sectors of society, PD advisor Fernández goes further and says that people only respond if they are preempted with gifts (attributes 4, 5, 8). Fernández said:

Yo te diría que en esos sectores [más necesitados], la propuesta [programática] uno trata de llegar pero el entendimiento que puedan llegar a entender de la propuesta es relativo porque están tan acostumbrados al clientelismo político que dicen, ‘bueno, ¿y para nosotros que hay?’ De todos modos a través de fundaciones hemos tratado de llegar, acercándole copas de leche, acercándole, tratar, pero, siempre viste, menos recursos.
Regarding machine clientelism and handing out foodstuffs and other gifts, parties do in fact use these types of tactics and it seems to have some incidence in campaign strategy decisions. However, the opinion on whether people actually follow the side of the patron is divided. Clientelism is not central to campaigns in Mendoza (according to the officials), but it is present and acknowledged. (Attribute 1)

### 3.9.5 Decentralized Aparato machine (Attributes 7, 9, 14)

Mayors in Mendoza have more autonomy vis-a-vis the governors, compared to the other cases (further explained in chapter 4). Mayors intervene in the nomination process, not only at the local level where they have the major say, but also for the provincial and national candidacies. Deputy Carmona refers to the type of deputy who is dependent and an appendix of the mayor who nominated them, and then he adds:

> Con los intendentes fuertes, el candidato a gobernador tiene que salir a negociar con los intendentes. No solamente negociar las adhesiones, en algunos casos negociar como ingresar a militar el departamento. Y tuvimos casos de municipios en donde los intendentes fueron, digamos, cercaron el departamento, procuraron ganar su departamento como principal objetivo y dejaron a la buena de Dios al candidato [a gobernador]. ...Lo cual implica un impacto también sobre los candidatos a legisladores nacionales y provinciales. (Provincial Deputy Carmona, PJ)

Carmona suggests that the campaigns and clientelism as a strategy may be up to the autonomous electoral machines at the local and provincial level (Páez, Ramírez

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97 Here are other contradictory opinions on whether machine clientelism makes a difference, showing that there is a lack of first-hand knowledge and agreement on how clientelism affects the campaign.

Ramírez: “[La gente] responde con el voto, por una cuestión de lealtad y de agradecimiento, que la mantiene aun dentro del cuarto oscuro.”

Martínez: “Si [el clientelismo se hace], porque todo suma. ...Pero es más difícil, porque aparte, cuando el problema es grave, por más que vos das, la gente en el cuarto oscuro hace lo que se le da la gana.”

Páez: “...Y la gente...dice que lo acepta pero después en el cuarto oscuro decide, la gente está más despicha.”

98 This is very different from what happens in Formosa and Santa Cruz, where the governor nominates national candidates.
and Laciar gave me similar opinions). The clientelistic tactics may not necessarily be coordinated or even agreed upon among partisans. (Attributes 7, 9)

The power of mayors in the political machines creates a clout around them, which drastically diminishes the relevance of any other political post in the district where the mayor acts (attributes 9, 14). On who hands out the Jefes and Jefas subsidies, Ramírez said: “Siempre es del intendente,…porque hay un sistema descentralizado, entonces el que toma las decisiones, en qué momento distribuirlo es el intendente; en qué momento por ejemplo entregar viviendas, en qué momento inaugurar.” Ramírez does admit that those practices are similar in the cities in which his party is in power.99

3.9.6 Summary

Clientelism tactics are decentralized to the local level and mainly applied by mayor only where and when necessary. The evidence points to a district in which parties resort more evenly than the other districts, to all four strategic-types’ tactics, and clientelism in particular is probably not central to campaigns as a voter mobilization strategy in general elections.

3.10 Conclusion

In this chapter I (1) argue for a method to measure the centrality to campaigns of clientelism as a voter mobilization strategy and present the evidence from the five case studies. I also argue (2) for the multiple mechanisms to understand the centrality to campaigns of clientelism. Bellow I present some of the conclusions about clientelism gathered from the case studies.

99 Finally, in more than one occasion I was told of the relevance of the Election Day voter transportation arrangements in the poorer districts, which can signify between 3 to 5% of the voters, as for example PD Advisor Dario Fernández told me, (attribute 11): “Si, tenemos un sistema para movilizar gente, porque dicen los estudiosos de que aproximadamente un 5% del electorado se gana de esa manera.”
Politicians consider the giving of particularistic benefits to relatively poor people regardless of the level of competition. Even in districts where there is no significant number of poor constituents, the references to clientelism relate to the poor.

The implicit contract between the patron and voters in personalized clientelism is long term and has to do with personal trust and loyalty in exchange for the continuous help with benefits (e.g. Formosa). In machine clientelism, carried in the last few days of the campaigns, the value of loyalty is drastically reduced and so is the “feeling of debt” the client has towards the patron; hence, there has to be an enforcement mechanism to replace it (e.g. Catamarca). Effective regular electoral competition may not only call into question the efficiency of the patron as such, but also prevent those feelings of dependence from ever settling in place. In a district where personalized clientelism is possible, reliance (and dependence) on the patron is precisely what sustains his legitimacy and power. In districts where machine clientelism is central as a campaign strategy, candidates incur into machine clientelistic tactics because they are “forced to” by the environment in order to win elections; the other party is going to get their votes if they do not do it first, or better.

When candidates do not feel pressure from the electoral competition they control the use of their limited resources (e.g. Formosa); of course they are then the sole responsible incumbent and need to be accountable to the constituents. On the other hand, when there is competition, political parties put off this clientelistic effort to the last minute, when it seems to matter most (as happens in Catamarca).

One key difference between these two types of clientelism is that for personalized clientelism to work it cannot just be a promise from the patron to the client; there has to be a history of fulfillment of promises between the leader and the voters. It is not a special type of “performance strategy” because the politician is not necessarily claiming credit for what he did (but of course he often does so at the same time), but he
is implicitly or explicitly renewing the promise to take care of this person in particularistic ways. In the “machine clientelistic strategy” there is an immediate or pseudo-immediate gift, with the hope that the people will reward politicians with their support. Again, in personalized clientelism, the mayor or candidate may come with a gift when meeting these people, but that gift is just a token for the occasion; the true promise or gift being acknowledged is the continuous exchange on and off the campaign season.

Personalized clientelism works in places where little competition, relative isolation of voters, and/or poverty are relevant factors.

Personalized clientelism is only central to campaigns in places where there is isolation and dependence on the patron. Contesting parties in this respect have an entry cost but can eventually destabilize the cohesion between the patron and clients. That is because there is a bond of loyalty and trust between the actors which is eroded when and if the clients realize that the new patron can be more reliable than the former (or other environmental variables change). Better infrastructure, communications, and societal development in general, and in general a people’s sense of autonomy will bring personalized clientelism to an end. However, there is plenty of room for the machine clientelism to set foot and blossom in societies with inequality.

Machine Clientelism is indeed exacerbated by competition; in some cases this exacerbation can reach violent tactics and outcomes (e.g. Catamarca). However, in other cases (e.g. Formosa), machine clientelism is part of the “local culture,” is understood as a ritual of campaigns, as a festive event, and does not alter the electoral outcomes.

To close, then, machine clientelism is favored by competition (the pressure or challenge made by contesting parties to one another), and is allowed by socioeconomic conditions of the electorate. Personalized clientelism is a traditional (conservative) practice and is favored and allowed by both the lack of competition and the poor
socioeconomic conditions. In conclusion, the socioeconomic development of the constituents is more relevant than the level of electoral competitiveness to determine whether clientelism is central to campaigns in a district as a voter mobilization strategy.

There is a level of development in which even high levels of competition deter parties from resorting to machine clientelism; it becomes too expensive, not just for the costs of gifts, but the damage it can cause in the larger public through the media. The level of development may also mean a higher level of social organization and the presence of NGOs, for example, which also leads to attempting clientelistic tactics with club goods which could be a more expensive and less immediate of a gift or promise (e.g. Santa Cruz). Inequality and the expectations of people are relevant. Of course the richer the people the more expensive for the party to buy those votes (Calvo and Murillo 2004 p 742), and the more difficult to satisfy those particularistic demands until there is a point in which it is not worth doing or cannot be done. It is then not poverty per se, but the possibility of an actor giving particularistic benefits to those in need. This could be “the perception of relative deprivation” of some voters, in relation to their richer neighbors, as the case of rich Santa Cruz shows. Of course it is easier and cheaper for parties to incur in these tactics where people are poor.

The relative significance of clientelism as a campaign strategy in the pockets of poverty found in Mendoza, for example, shows that competition and/or the presence of strong political parties led to and allowed, the adoption of clientelistic tactics respectively; these pockets of poverty are far less significant in terms of votes in Capital Federal where political parties are not equipped for implementing these tactics either (parties do not have the infrastructure needed and the retaliation costs by the media and society in general could outweigh its benefits).

In this chapter I also differentiate among key actors in the clientelistic relationship, the brokers. I propose ways of doing so by analyzing the autonomy of
brokers from patrons, by observing the single or multiple sources of benefits they have, studying the type of relationship of brokers with their clients and whether the broker is acting more as an advocate of the voters or a delegate of the patron.

One could hypothesize, based on the elite’s interviews and the survey questions presented at the beginning of this chapter, that the voter psychology differs depending on the environment and that people from small communities expect to have personal contact with the candidate to see him fit for office, or at least that the personal contact makes a greater impact on them. It turns the politician from a media personality to a real person; a personal bond is created, increasing the probability of sympathy for the candidate, which may be stronger than any campaign advertisement or platform/program. Candidates know this, and do not miss the chance to reach people if they can; here we find the relevance of a good dirigente-type broker easing the access to the voter. This vote may be more reliable. Also, the personalized interactions are mostly positive. On the other hand, media campaigns may alienate or consolidate opposing views on a candidate (but not change those views), as these cannot be micromanaged (this topic is discussed further in Chapter 5).

In conclusion, in small communities there is a smaller probability of finding alternative candidates, which may increase the probability of finding more personalized clientelism than in larger places. Also, the anonymity of larger districts leads candidates to make use of machine clientelism, as it is more efficient given limited time and resources, than personalized clientelism.

From the evidence and discussion above I hope it is clear that the case of Catamarca illustrates where clientelism thrives as a campaign strategy.

On the opposite extreme we have the city of Buenos Aires and the complete irrelevance of clientelism as a strategy to mobilize voters.

The case of Formosa shows that machine clientelism is present but it is not really what explains voter mobilization strategies. What is more central to campaigns than machine clientelism in Formosa is “personalized
clientelism,” anchored by mayors and their constituencies. This clientelism in Formosa, however, has to be complemented with a particular form of performance and personalistic ingredients in the campaign. That is, the elements that constitute the personalized clientelistic strategy also indicate the presence of other strategic types such as the presence and role of strong and possibly charismatic political leaders in the campaign efforts.

The case of Santa Cruz evidences the existence of the clientelistic strategy, but this is not crucial to campaigns. The power asymmetry among “clients” and “patrons” is not as great as in the poorer districts. There is evidence of tactics constitutive of a clientelistic strategy in the form of patronage, but the district cannot be considered decisively as a case of it, since these are not central enough to explain the working campaign strategies in the district.

The province of Mendoza shows evidence that clientelism in all its forms is present as a voter mobilization strategy; however, there is also evidence that it is not as such central to campaigns.

To sum up, what is then the degree of membership of the cases to the set where Clientelism is central to campaigns as a voter mobilization strategy? I hope the criteria presented for the 5 qualitative breakpoints and the evidence in the chapter was sufficient to convincingly assign a Fuzzy-set score of 1 to the province of Catamarca where clientelism is definitively central to campaigns as a voter mobilization strategy; and a score of 0 to the Capital Federal where clientelism is definitively not central to campaigns as a voter mobilization strategy. The province of Formosa gets a score of 0.75 where clientelism is probably central to campaigns as a voter mobilization strategy; the province of Santa Cruz gets a score of 0.5 where clientelism may or may not be central to campaigns as a voter mobilization strategy; and Mendoza score of 0.25 where clientelism is probably not central to campaigns as a voter mobilization strategy.

Even though in Mendoza there is some indication of the presence of clientelistic tactics during elections, they do not seem to affect the elections themselves and only touch a minority of people, and are not very central to the parties’ campaigns. These clientelistic tactics are organized and carried out at the local level in small places (there
is not a central organization like in Catamarca). Even in these towns and smaller communities in Mendoza, these tactics are not central to any campaign. Even though the types of activities are similar to those in the provinces of Catamarca and Formosa, it is so because of the environment of those areas of the district and the parties’ characteristics and resources. However, in Santa Cruz, even though there are even fewer resource-poor voters than in Mendoza (proportionally and objectively), the role patronage plays in the minds of candidates and officials (and presumably people too) does not let us conclusively say that in Santa Cruz clientelism as a campaign strategy is not at all central to campaigns. The criteria to establish these five qualitative breakpoints, again, should be ongoing points of discussion in the field as a whole.

Besides the knowledge gained from the case studies and the evidence of the diversity within Argentina regarding clientelism and the types of mechanisms of clientelism, the contribution of this chapter is the consideration of qualitative differences of clientelism as a campaign strategy. The students of clientelism should evaluate these qualitative differences taking the cases as a whole and observing the different attributes and indicators to understand the centrality to campaigns of clientelism as a voter mobilization strategy in a district. Next is Chapter 4 which focuses on Programmatic voter mobilization strategy.
CHAPTER 4
THE CENTRALITY TO CAMPAIGNS OF A PROGRAMMATIC VOTER MOBILIZATION STRATEGY

Interviewer: ¿Armaron plataforma?
Deputy Molina (AyL): No, lo que armamos fue una especie de agenda...una radiografía de los problemas y con propuestas...a la gente le cuesta mucho reflexionar, leer. El primer documento que hicimos era muy largo, de 20 hojas, y era imposible, no lo leía nadie. Entonces tuvimos que hacer uno de 4 hojas, y nadie; entonces tuvimos que hacer uno de un punteo. Y terminás con el tema de las consignas, terminás sin reflexionar. ... Entrás en una dinámica en que también lo único que te interesa es que la gente también te conozca superficialmente.

Los partidos no tienen programas. La propuesta [del ARI] es “el contrato moral,” ¿qué es eso?, no se... Es un truco marquetinero. Tirás una categoría y el que la recibe la llena de contenido. Deputy Velazco (ARI)

La plataforma electoral no es ni una demanda de los candidatos ni una demanda de la ciudadanía...Nunca he discutido mi plataforma electoral y seguramente en más de una campaña no la debo haber leído toda; porque no es relevante. National Deputy Argüello (PJ)

4.1 Introduction

In this chapter I seek to understand the mechanisms and try to uncover the factors which decide the centrality of a programmatic voter mobilization strategy in political party campaigns in each of the five studied Argentine districts.

I argue that the electoral competitiveness of the district and the socioeconomic development of the electorate will affect the centrality that programmatic voter mobilization strategies will have in the campaigns in a given district. However, my
contribution in this chapter is that I argue that a third important factor, which has been overlooked in the literature, better explains the centrality that a programmatic strategy will have in campaigns: the distribution of power within the political parties. In this chapter I identify the mechanisms which help us recognize and measure the centrality to campaigns of programmatic voter mobilization strategy.

4.1.1 Summary of argument and hypotheses

An electorate that is more socioeconomically developed will be more attracted by programmatic campaign appeals than poorer electorates. Also, districts with stronger opposition parties bring to bear pressure among one another to differentiate themselves by resorting to sharper incentives with which to appeal to the voters (e.g. more clearly defined policies, stronger personality leaders, more clientelistic gifts, etc.). More competition does not necessarily mean more centrality of program as a strategy, but does mean the party has a more conscious allocation of limited party resources, which in some cases means more centrality of clientelism or personalism, for example. Finally, political parties in which power is dispersed among actors and institutions (i.e. power is not concentrated) are more likely to have the building blocks to make a programmatic strategy central to campaigns.

Hypothesis 1: A “programmatic strategy” is more likely to be central to campaigns when the district is electorally competitive, than when it is not.

Hypothesis 2: A “programmatic strategy” is more likely to be central to campaigns when the electorate is socioeconomically developed, than when it is not.

Hypothesis 3: A “programmatic strategy” is more likely to be central to campaigns when the power within political parties is dispersed, than when it is concentrated.
4.1.2 Outline of chapter

In this chapter I first recall how the literature has dealt with the issue and the argument from previous chapters about the limited power of conclusions that only draw from national legislators’ surveys, stressing the fundamental importance of the provincial and especially local party machines in order to explain the actual mechanisms involved in voter mobilization strategies. I develop the independent variables (socioeconomic development and electoral competitiveness of the district and distribution of power within parties). I also outline the theoretical argument to understand the centrality of a programmatic voter mobilization strategy in districts, and the decision-making processes in campaigns. Then I draw the theoretically derived hypotheses. Later I address the indicators of the distribution of power within parties’ factor. Next, I measure the dependent variable with qualitative data. I then define the Fuzzy-set qualitative breakpoints to determine the centrality to campaigns of a programmatic strategy in a district. Finally, I present additional quantitative evidence. In the second part of the chapter I develop the five cases in order to justify my evaluations.

4.2 Programs and programmatic strategies

A program denotes the idea of coherence, coordination, complexity, and a stepwise plan of government. Specific campaign platforms, which candidates often embrace as commitments if elected, in turn may or may not be based on party programs. When voting, people are not only sold on the multiple issue dimensions of a program or platform; the person of the candidate, the history of the voter, etc. are also relevant in a voter’s decision. Very few voters read parties’ programs before voting. Some may listen to a televised debate or read interviews, but the modern mass media pace does not encourage detailed or developed presentation of ideas or programs. Nevertheless, parties and candidates may resort to a programmatic strategy at least in
part in order to win elections. In a straightforward sense, as discussed in chapter 2, incentives to voters in the programmatic exchange for votes could be ideology and also a party program or platform; these all are implicit or explicit public policy promises. A strictly programmatic party strategy involves a set of decision making and activities to attempt to attract the vote with an indirect exchange of votes for a policy package. In this chapter, I will inquire to what extent a programmatic strategy is central to parties’ campaigns in the different electoral districts (provinces) considered in this dissertation.

4.2.1 The current treatment of the question

Developmentalist accounts predict that as citizens become more affluent and educated, the opportunity costs of clientelism will increase. Politicians and society will then find clientelism increasingly expensive and there will more likely be a prevalence of programmatic linkages between parties and voters in those societies (See for e.g. Huntington 1968, pp.71, 405-406, Sartori 1986, Hagopian et al 2009). These theoretical accounts find much empirical evidence, but remain statistical generalizations (usually based on national legislators) which do not explain the actual mechanisms of decision making and communication between politicians and voters.

Middle class voters may be more appealed to by coherent programmatic stands than by minor gifts which may have more influence on lower income classes. Also, some groups of the electorate may be the “exclusive domain” of a party because of loyalty, resources, etc. (core supporters), but others may be up for grabs and be the turf of competition among parties (swing voters) -See Fenno 1978; Cox and McCubbins 1986. Parties will hence adapt their voter recruitment strategies to the specific electoral

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100 For example, Calvo and Murillo (2004: 742) argued that $1 provides more utility the poorer the person receiving it.
environments in which they compete, that is, the electoral competitiveness of the district and the socioeconomic characteristics of its population.

Most commonly, and intuitively, the characteristic of the “programmatic strategy” is that parties elaborate policy packages based on fundamental principles and later campaign on them. These principles must be simple enough for voters to be able to envisage the policy stances of the parties on given issues (Converse and Pierce 1986; Hinich and Munger 1996; Kitschelt et al 1999: 336-339; Thomassen 1999). Political science sees political parties as though they should take a stance on issues, build reputations and be information short-cuts to voters (Sartori 1976; Aldrich 1995). Parties which often shift positions are considered non-institutionalized and should then lose the confidence of the voters for not keeping a reputation of “probity and consistency” (Hinich and Munger 1996: 8), and at the party system level the argument goes that “where ideological linkages to parties are weaker, electoral volatility is higher” (Mainwaring and Torcal 2006 pp 6-7). However, this loss of confidence of voters or the higher electoral volatility of the party system may not be found in every case of weak party-voter programmatic linkages, since people may consistently support a party because they value the leader, the gifts they receive and the performance of the incumbent, even if it means programmatic campaign promises are not kept. While much of the literature in the developed world focuses on programmatic competition, arranged along a left-right ideological, or multiple issue dimensions (Downs 1957; Hinich and Munger 1996), this neglects other very important types of party-voter linkages such as clientelism.

Methods to measure programmatic linkages between voters and parties have received the most attention in political science. After evaluating the literature on “linkages between citizens and politicians” Kitschelt (2000 p869) says that “we cannot simply ask politicians to explain their favorite linkage mechanism.” In his view politicians will conceal their clientelistic practices and instead always claim compliance with
programmatic competition. Indirect techniques to “identify more clientelist or programmatic linkage mechanisms” are more valid in his account. These indirect techniques are based on surveys to national legislators and voters. These involve asking politicians to score their own party and its competitors on a variety of issues scales, to later measure the party’s programmatic cohesion which voters can use to discern the party’s policy commitments. Programmatic discipline may be measured by the uniformity of legislative roll-call voting. These national legislators’ measures and the congruence with voter’s issue positions are the quantitative tools that Kitschelt et al (1999) and Kitschelt et al (2010) take to study Post-Communist party systems and Latin American party systems.

Still another indirect measure of “programmatic linkage” is the level of corruption of the polity given that, supposedly, clientelistic systems tend to be more corrupt than systems where a programmatic linkage between politicians and voters prevail. However, these “corruption indices” tend to rely on the opinion of “financial risk assessment firms and other commercial surveys of experts, such as business people, economists, or journalists, who score the ubiquity and intensity of corruption in a variety of countries” (Kitschelt 2000: 871). These “experts” likely have little contact with actual voter mobilization tactics. While clientelism may be seen as “corrupt” in the sense that is an “inappropriate” use of state (but could also be personal or party) resources, it is not the same type of “corruption” that these observers come into contact with and cannot be used to generalize across all levels of politics and even less with respect to how parties mobilize voters. These types of evidence are one snap-shot based on mean values and standard deviations of two types of surveys. They provide evidence to an outcome, but no mechanisms of programmatic linkage are substantiated.

Based on Aldrich’s (1995) account, Kitschelt (2000 p847) argues that “programmatic parties invest in intraparty procedures of conflict resolution among
diverse preference schedules based on deliberation, persuasion, indoctrination, coercion, and bargaining” (p848) and that “…programmatic linkages build on politicians’ investments in both procedures of programmatic conflict resolution and organizational infrastructure” (p850). These elements in Kitschelt’s theoretical construction are specific and actual indicators to substantiate an explanation of programmatic voter mobilization strategies which deals with actual mechanisms.

Kitschelt et al (2010) operationalize the concept of “Programmatic Party Structurization” or PPS. In their account

“[t]hree elements need to come together … [to produce] lasting programmatic linkages. First, political actors must have the capabilities…to process the information and build the organizations that make possible programmatic linkages. Second, they must have opportunities to engage in collective action and electoral competition… [And, finally,] citizens and politicians [must] perceive political stakes …that motivate them to organize the political process…” (p. 31).

Not surprisingly, “PPS occurs at the level of individual party, measured by the coherence of programmatic messages created by politicians running under a single party label, or at the systemic level, based on the discernible differences among parties’ programmatic appeals that matter for citizens’ party choices.” (p17) Due to the sort of data the authors work with, they give the long term conditions more weight than the short-term mechanisms, because these latter “tend to be endogenous to prior long-term prior conditions for PPS and short-term economic crisis.” (p57) The authors explain an outcome with a snap-shot survey on issue congruence to argue system level conclusions which are only valid with a theoretical construction which has long term justifications. I instead look into the concrete and complex mechanisms of politics to develop a qualitative measurement tool.

As I discussed in chapter 2, a strategy should be understood as a series of activities or tactics aimed at achieving a common goal. If researchers claim to study the mechanism of a strategy to mobilize voters on programmatic appeals they should focus
on specific tactics and the tactic’s messages, the coordination of those tactics, and the factors which are helpful to explain those tactics and coordination among the actors. Research has turned to reaching conclusions based on correlational statistical analyses often supported on the ideological and issue placement of national legislators and voters. I earlier mentioned the difficulties of reaching conclusions based only on the opinion of national legislators who usually do not have much power of nomination and actual mobilization of voters, and who usually run in the coattail of their governors and party leaders.\textsuperscript{101}

Instead of looking at an outcome, such as “Political Party Structurization” (as Kitschelt and collaborators have done – 1999, 2010), I am interested in campaign strategies’ processes. In my study I bring forward the role of the local and provincial party machines as well, which I argue are very important to mobilizing the vote and ultimately keeping the party alive.

Tactics are real and objectively measurable (by their resources, message and actions), however, strategies are interpretations and conceptualizations of the former done by the strategists or in this case the social scientists. As argued in chapter 1, the elements to evaluate strategies as a set of tactics should include:\textsuperscript{102} awareness (the actors could be conscious or not of the strategy involved in the tactics they implement), the candidate’s availability of resources, the actual activity the political entrepreneurs carry out, and the contents of the campaign activity.

\textsuperscript{101} Political party discipline (in order to secure a future political post/candidacy) may be to either the president (e.g. Jones 1997) or the governor (or both). See for example Eaton (2002) and Mustapic (2001) who while discussing the relationship between the President and the Argentine Legislature, mark the centrality of provincial level politics in Argentina.

\textsuperscript{102} The elements Kitschelt et al (2010) identify as constitutive of a PPS are the capabilities, the opportunities and the political stakes, which include both long and short term conditions. Since I attempt to develop a methodological instrument to measure the centrality of voter mobilization strategies with qualitative tools, I draw from more easily observable and measurable indicators.
4.3 Theory

Next are the three causal factors to account for the centrality to campaigns of a programmatic voter mobilization strategy.

4.3.1 Socioeconomic development

An electorate that is more socioeconomically developed will have more public policy demands than less developed electorates. As mentioned earlier, developmentalist accounts predict that as citizens become more affluent and educated, the opportunity costs of clientelism will increase. Politicians and society will then find clientelism increasingly expensive and there will more likely be a prevalence of programmatic linkages between parties and voters in those societies (e.g. Huntington 1968, pp. 71, 405-406, Sartori 1986, Hagopian et al 2009). Middle class voters may be more appealed to by coherent programmatic stands than by minor gifts which may have more influence on lower income classes.

The socioeconomic development of the electorate is a factor to understand the centrality to campaigns of a programmatic voter mobilization strategy. It should be understood as a type of pressure which is exerted over candidates and parties during campaigns.

As argued in chapter 2, what happens as a consequence of having more developed voters in terms of socioeconomic conditions, human development and the complexity of society in general? First, parties will have to include more abstract goals as part of their campaigns in a context in which voters have basic subsistence needs covered and may want the government to improve their lives in non-material ways (Inglehart, 1984). Politicians’ discourses will be more elaborate and complex to appeal to a public who are, for example, more educated. However, there will also be more
targeted and specialized discourses to appeal to active societal pressure groups and at the same time there will be organized citizens pursuing specific goals.

Low levels of socioeconomic development characterize a society in which the demands over candidates are often by isolated individuals. The public’s demand on candidates is disarticulated and particularistic, and the media and press are usually not a catalyst for citizenry activism, keeping individual voters relatively isolated from their broader community and issues. (Candidates in this environment need to address those “particularistic demands,” however.) On the other hand, high levels of socioeconomic development characterize a society in which there are active NGOs, there are more holistic, comprehensive demands and initiatives from constituents and candidates need to address more comprehensive public demands in order to get legitimized with votes.

4.3.2 Electoral competitiveness

As a consequence of competing parties, voters are likely to be more aware of things they would not know otherwise, for example, regarding the performance of the ruling party, officials, or candidates. This awareness is more significant when the voters are poor and lack resources to independently gather information to decide their vote.

Districts with stronger opposition parties may bring to bear pressure among one another to differentiate themselves by resorting to sharper incentives with which to appeal to the voters (e.g. more clearly defined policies, stronger personality leaders, more clientelistic gifts, etc.). The party competition can copy and improve effective campaign activities and tactics. More competition does not necessarily mean more centrality of program as a strategy, but more competition will force parties and political entrepreneurs to try to organize better, and to be more conscious in the effective allocation of limited campaign resources.
More competition forces parties to try to set out a strategy which will make them improve their performance in campaigns given the competitive threat from rival parties. The tie breaker in a competitive district would have to be a stronger version of the incentives given to voters (e.g. public policy) or an additional different type of incentive (e.g. personalistic appeals). Hence, more electoral competition will intensify and/or diversify the appeals in the parties’ exchange strategies to recruit voters (See Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007, Introduction).

Competition means a challenger who not only tries to favor their side, but also diminish, tarnish or bastardize the other. Furthermore, constituents find new alternatives, compare and choose among campaign proposals; hence campaign platforms are put in perspective. Competition forces parties to be more complex in their campaigns; more leaders emerge to address more intricacies of complex problems and differentiate themselves from the others.

In poor districts competitiveness will increase the centrality to campaigns of a programmatic strategy because parties will diversify the incentives given to voters by moving beyond clientelism and personalism for example, and into public policy appeals. In rich districts the centrality will also increase because parties will intensify and diversify the policy appeals which are already likely to be important.

4.4 Distribution of power within parties

The distribution of power within parties could range from being concentrated in the hands of few political actors, to being dispersed among many actors. Many of the reasons for the distribution of power within parties being concentrated/ dispersed could be political party characteristics, or external characteristics which are often related to the institutional design and other traditions/customs in the district. In order to be more efficient in the use of campaign resources, parties may decide to decentralize decision-
making powers, particularly when the environment and the available resources make it more difficult to manage those decisions by a single leader (for example due to the diversity of the electorate and district, due to electoral competition, etc.).

4.4.1 Dispersion of power within parties and compromise

Given an electorally competitive district, dispersed power distribution in political parties means the eventual need to come together of the actors within the parties and compromise in order to pursue collective action effectively. A compromise can occur only among those who have a share of power (otherwise there is an imposition of will, a façade of compromise). In turn, a compromise in these terms results in an agreement on common denominators. A compromise means a reduction of the issues available to each part under such agreement. The common denominators resulting from the compromise become the solid argument for sustaining the agreement among actors (e.g. agreement on candidates, platform issues, etc.). Then, in a district in which the power in political parties is dispersed among many actors, the compromise agreements on programmatic contents and tactics that occur may hence be more central to their

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103 There are a few party and district characteristics that may push the power within parties to be more or less dispersed, which will be addressed in the second part of the chapter. These are causative factors of the distribution of power within parties, and they are helpful to keep in mind when predicting whether power within a party will be more or less concentrated/dispersed in a particular district. Dispersion of power within parties may happen due to the province’s different offices’ electoral districts tending to overlap (criss-crossing the province) instead of tending to extend over one another (coinciding on boundaries). When district boundaries coincide strong district leaders do not need to coordinate with other districts’ leaders on campaign issues. Other reasons which will also be addressed in the second part of the chapter include reelection laws and bans, the decentralization of government budgets from provincial to local governments, the district’s diversity/heterogeneity in terms of the electorate’s distribution and/or socioeconomic characteristics, the fact that the political parties are primarily new parties or do not have a tradition in the community, and finally the fact that in some district or party specific particular traditions/ideology may lead to collegiate decision making—e.g. in the past the PJ’s union/women/etc sectors of society being represented.

104 By dispersion of political party power I do not mean atomization of power. When there is atomization of power distribution the actors are not capable or have no incentives to come together for collective action. (Electoral competitiveness may in turn interact with any particular distribution of power in the parties as an incentive which promotes collective action within the parties).
campaigns than in districts where the power of political parties is concentrated in one leader or faction who does not share participation in the decision making process.

Dispersion of party power and the eventual need for compromise (given specific electoral competition and social demands) lead to the need of parties to create a bureaucracy, a nexus, or institutions to cement and make more dynamic those compromises/communication/coordination, particularly when elections are held periodically. That party bureaucracy will specialize and institutionalize. The dispersion of political party power gets reflected in more resources put into conflict resolution mechanisms (e.g. candidate nomination and platform drafting mechanisms which are more collegiate and democratic than when power is concentrated in one or a few hands) and on checks on the power of party leaders. The consequence is that a “programmatic strategy” is more likely to be central to campaigns when the distribution of power within political parties is dispersed, than when it is concentrated.

4.4.1.1 Party platform resources as indicator of the distribution of power within parties

In order to evaluate how central a programmatic strategy is to campaigns, we should study how power within parties is distributed. The making of campaign platforms is a useful marker to observe the concentration/dispersion of power within parties. As mentioned earlier, dispersion of power within parties gets reflected in more resources put into conflict resolution mechanisms, such as the resources and mechanisms in the party platform drafting. The “platform” could be the wishes of only one leader or it could be the work and compromise of many people. By observing the negotiations that go into the making of the political party “platform,” we can judge the effort the actors put into developing it (a combination of resources, incentives and opportunity costs), to better understand the choice of campaign tactics and eventually measure how central a
programmatic voter mobilization strategy is to the campaigns in a district. Are the “programs” made by committees, teams, experts, etc.? How complex were the mechanisms for making a platform? Also, how broad or narrow is the effort to make a platform? How inclusive is the effort of the different participating political actors in the organization?

The resources the party and candidates have, in order to come up with a programmatic electoral platform, evidence a particular distribution of power within parties. These assets range from Fundaciones or “think tanks” which also have inputs from pressure groups and civil society to Comisiones permanentes, or permanent party committees which are mostly an intra-party entity made up of party leaders and their advisors. Parties also have some sort of election committee, which are in charge of formulating messages and programmatic ideas for the campaign. There could also be ad-hoc conventions with sectors of civil society where parties have meetings with groups of the civil society with the goal of collecting the issues of concern to society and ideas for solutions. Opinion surveys are carried out with the goal of learning what the hot topics are. Finally, networks of punteros and dirigentes bring their clients' concerns to the table; the other alternative is the “single vision” or top-down and often implicit project. Other party conflict resolution mechanisms (e.g. candidate nomination decisions) as well as resources to enable highly personalized tactics (e.g. on the ground brokers and activists) and professional media interventions are indicators of the distribution of power within parties as well.

Political parties may have ideologies, programs and policy preferences which may be the base to draft campaign platforms, or they may simply have an issue list; both of these set a framework to the agency, and hence the power, of party actors. Also, electoral alliances imply, among other things, compromises in the policy proposal of the campaign. The policy position to campaign, or the campaign platform, is affected by the
political actors’ resources, specific mechanisms utilized to arrive at those campaign platforms and its contents. Party platform building mechanisms and intra and inter party electoral compromises are indicators of the distribution of power within parties and hence help explain the centrality to campaigns of a programmatic voter mobilization strategy.

Most parties may end up relying on a list of issues taken from public opinion polls when planning tactics with programmatic-type contents. Does it mean that parties campaigning on just five issues can have an “issue agenda” strategy central to the voter mobilization effort? Yes, they can, because that “programmatic” strategy may be central because “just a few issues” are the kind of “programmatic-type contents” that voters can digest. It is practically impossible for voters to process a large, complex party platform. Therefore, political parties realistically can only campaign on issues, which would be a valid characteristic of a real world programmatic-type strategy. The making of a platform is an indicator of the distribution of power within a party and hence helps explain how central the programmatic strategy is because we evaluate the importance and effort the actors put into developing it (a combination of resources, incentives and opportunity costs).

Hence, there is an apparent ranking of relevance among these three causal factors to predict the centrality to campaigns that a programmatic strategy will have. Socioeconomic development may be the single most important one because candidates must appeal to the voters, even with few party resources (intellectual, infrastructure, organizational, etc.) and even with single-policy messages; more “developed” voters are more attracted to public policy than poorer voters. Next is the factor of the concentration or dispersion of power within the parties, because this factor reflects the capabilities and resources that the parties have to produce and project programmatic ideas in campaigns. Finally, electoral competitiveness acts as the incentive parties have to act on
the public demands and on the resources they have by pushing parties to campaign on a programmatic strategy.

4.5 Dependent variable: the centrality to campaigns of programmatic strategy

4.5.1 Strategy as a set of tactics with an ulterior goal

The dependent variable is the centrality to campaigns of a programmatic voter mobilization strategy in districts. As argued in chapter 2, political actors choose campaign tactics which we as observers interpret as part of the larger party strategy or strategies. These agents control resources and put them to work with specific goals (even though these goals may be loosely defined or coordinated). Hence, tactics can be observed and measured; strategies are the interpretation or understanding given to a set of tactics.

In order to measure the dependent variable, or the centrality to the campaigns in a district of a programmatic voter mobilization strategy, I must inquire as to what the political actors actually do and what they say about the “program.” That is, I must observe the tactics.

The specific campaign tactics are a decision based on the available resources (e.g. expertise, manpower, money, etc.), tactics’ action, contents and coordination. Tactic decisions are also affected by socioeconomic development of the electorate, media requirements\(^{105}\) and what the other parties are doing to campaign.

Finally, the centrality to a district’s campaign of a programmatic voter mobilization strategy is affected by the overall voter mobilization strategy, resources, and efforts put into them by the political actors

\(^{105}\) The media has specific formats for the contents it presents.
4.5.2 Hypotheses

A binary evaluation of the independent factors gives us eight logical combinations, eight theoretical scenarios from which I derive hypotheses.

There is a ranking on the centrality to campaigns of a programmatic voter mobilization strategy among these eight theoretical scenarios which follow from the ranking of causal factors argued above. The five-value evaluation of the dependent variable in these hypotheses (Low, Medium-low, Medium, Medium-high and High centrality to campaigns of programmatic voter mobilization strategy) is a convenient and practical way to judge and compare cases taking into account that program as a voter mobilization strategy is only one of the four types studied in this dissertation, and the nature of the qualitative data with which independent and dependent variables are evaluated; the evaluation of variables marks qualitative differences among values (See chapter 1). However, there are two critical breakpoints in the hypothesized centrality of a programmatic strategy, that of hypotheses 3 and 4 and that of hypotheses 5 and 6.

106 The scenarios of hypotheses 2 and 3 (Medium-low centrality) and 6 and 7 (Medium-high centrality) are the four combinations of factors in which power (either within parties or among parties) is concentrated in only one of the two factors (distribution of power within parties or electoral competitiveness).
### TABLE 4.1:
EIGHT THEORETICAL SCENARIOS AND DERIVED HYPOTHESES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>THEORY/ CAUSAL FACTORS</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
<th>8</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Socioeconomic development</td>
<td>LOW</td>
<td>LOW</td>
<td>LOW</td>
<td>LOW</td>
<td>HIGH</td>
<td>HIGH</td>
<td>HIGH</td>
<td>HIGH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dispersion of power within parties</td>
<td>LOW</td>
<td>LOW</td>
<td>HIGH</td>
<td>HIGH</td>
<td>LOW</td>
<td>LOW</td>
<td>HIGH</td>
<td>HIGH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electoral competitiveness</td>
<td>LOW</td>
<td>HIGH</td>
<td>LOW</td>
<td>HIGH</td>
<td>LOW</td>
<td>HIGH</td>
<td>LOW</td>
<td>HIGH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HYPOTHESIS</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Centrality to campaigns of programmatic strategy</td>
<td>LOW</td>
<td>MEDIUM LOW</td>
<td>MEDIUM</td>
<td>MEDIUM HIGH</td>
<td>HIGH</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In both scenarios of hypotheses 5 and 6 voters are likely to be appealed by public policy proposals and in both cases parties will not be particularly suited to provide them, however, in the scenario of hypothesis 6 the electoral competition pushes parties to differentiate themselves and try to reach voters with policy proposals more than in scenario of hypotheses 5. Such pressure/incentive does not exist in hypothesis 5 where parties may resort to performance evaluations alone instead.

In both scenarios of hypotheses 3 and 4, voters are not likely to be appealed to by programmatic proposals even though in both cases parties would be particularly suited to provide them, however, in the scenario of hypothesis 4 the electoral competition pushes parties to differentiate themselves and try to reach voters with policy proposals more than in the scenario of hypotheses 3. Such pressure/incentive does not exist in hypothesis 3 where parties may resort to clientelism alone instead.
4.6 Measurement of the independent and dependent variables

4.6.1 Socioeconomic development and electoral competitiveness

From chapter 2 I use the Effective Strength of Opposition Parties index (ESOP) and the Human Development Index (HDI). Table 4.2 is a summary of the classification of the provinces on two of the independent variables in this chapter (a more detailed classification appears in chapter 2).

TABLE 4.2:
PROVINCES’ ELECTORAL COMPETITIVENESS AND SOCIOECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT CODING

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Electoral Competitiveness</th>
<th>Socioeconomic Development</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ESOP</td>
<td>PROVINCE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.60</td>
<td>HIGH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.29</td>
<td>LOW</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.49</td>
<td>HIGH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.45</td>
<td>HIGH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.28</td>
<td>LOW</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4.6.2 Distribution of power within parties

Next, I present the indicators to measure the distribution of power within parties in the provinces. Higher values of the indicators point to a higher dispersion of power within parties in the district. A “family resemblance” approach (not an additive one) should be used to judge a case’s concentration/dispersion of power within parties. Some indicators should not be evaluated in isolation but within the specific case; e.g. having “party factions” may eventually contribute to programmatic strategy being more central to campaigns only when there is electoral competitiveness which forces the
facasions to cooperate. In Table 4.3 I summarize how the five studied cases score on those indicators and in Table 4.4 I give their aggregate and average score.

List of indicators to evaluate distribution of power within parties and their values

1) Do parties’ political entrepreneurs need to come together, coordinate campaign decisions and are forced into compromises (e.g. on candidate nominations and platform drafting and message)?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1</th>
<th>0.5</th>
<th>0</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Sometimes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2) Are the parties’ campaign decision-making powers and campaign resources decentralized from the provincial to the local level organizations?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1</th>
<th>0.5</th>
<th>0</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Somewhat</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3) Do the relevant parties have significant party factions? Where there are long lasting party factions power is not concentrated.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1</th>
<th>0.5</th>
<th>0</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>More than one strong party faction</td>
<td>There is one strong party faction which does take into account dissent within the party</td>
<td>Only one party position which is organized; dissidence is ignored</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4) Is party power to draft campaign platforms centralized in one or few leaders imposing their ideas, or is that power decentralized into many bureaucracies and specialized institutions open to receive inputs from many actors in order to draft a campaign platform? Distribution of power within parties is reflected in the available resources like established party bureaucracies which would claim a role in the programmatic campaign as they may be the long time keepers of any traditions, ideology, statutes, programs, etc.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1</th>
<th>0.75</th>
<th>0.5</th>
<th>0.25</th>
<th>0</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fundaciones or think tanks which also have inputs from pressure groups and civil society</td>
<td>Comisiones permanentes, or permanent party committees which are mostly an intra-party entity made up of party leaders and their advisors</td>
<td>Ad-hoc conventions with sectors of civil society where parties have meetings with groups of the civil society with the goal of collecting the issues of concern to society and ideas for solutions.</td>
<td>Networks of punteros and dirigentes who bring their clients' concerns to the table</td>
<td>There is the &quot;single vision&quot; or top-down and often implicit project</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
5) Are there few or many leaders in the district’s relevant parties?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Score</th>
<th>Many</th>
<th>Somewhat</th>
<th>Few</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**TABLE 4.3:**

INDICATORS OF DISTRIBUTION OF POWER WITHIN PARTIES AND CASES’ SCORES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Capital Federal</th>
<th>Mendoza</th>
<th>Santa Cruz</th>
<th>Catamarca</th>
<th>Formosa</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Campaign compromises</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decisions and resources</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parties with more than one faction</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resources to draft platform</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.75</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Many leaders</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**TABLE 4.4:**

INDICATORS OF DISTRIBUTION OF POWER WITHIN PARTIES AND CASES’ TOTAL AND AVERAGE SCORES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Metric</th>
<th>Capital Federal</th>
<th>Mendoza</th>
<th>Santa Cruz</th>
<th>Catamarca</th>
<th>Formosa</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total Score</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4.75</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average score</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td>0.95</td>
<td>0.40</td>
<td>0.80</td>
<td>0.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dispersion of power within parties</td>
<td>LOW</td>
<td>HIGH</td>
<td>LOW</td>
<td>HIGH</td>
<td>LOW</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

According to the evaluation made in Table 4.3 (which is justified in the second part of the chapter) the ranking of districts where the distribution of power within parties is more dispersed is led by the province of Mendoza, followed by Catamarca, Santa
Cruz, Formosa and finally Capital Federal where the power within parties is more concentrated (see Table 4.4)

**TABLE 4.5:**

CASES AND HYPOTHESES PREDICTIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CASES</th>
<th>FORMOSA</th>
<th>CATAMARCA</th>
<th>SANTA CRUZ</th>
<th>CAPITAL FEDERAL</th>
<th>MENDOZA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Socioeconomic development (HDI) T.4.3</td>
<td>0.764 (LOW)</td>
<td>0.799 (LOW)</td>
<td>0.843 (HIGH)</td>
<td>0.892 (HIGH)</td>
<td>0.820 (HIGH)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distribution of power within parties (avg. score) T. 4.4</td>
<td>0.30 (LOW) Concentrated</td>
<td>0.80 (HIGH) Dispersed</td>
<td>0.40 (LOW) Concentrated</td>
<td>0.20 (LOW) Concentrated</td>
<td>0.95 (HIGH) Dispersed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electoral competitiveness (ESOP) T.4.3</td>
<td>0.28 (LOW)</td>
<td>0.45 (HIGH)</td>
<td>0.29 (LOW)</td>
<td>0.60 (HIGH)</td>
<td>0.49 (HIGH)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HYPOTHESIS</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Centrality to campaigns of programmatic strategy</td>
<td>LOW</td>
<td>MEDIUM</td>
<td>LOW</td>
<td>MEDIUM</td>
<td>MEDIUM</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**4.7 Measurement of the dependent variable**

I qualitatively evaluate the cases with specific indicators which directly measure the centrality to campaigns of program as a voter mobilization strategy. Next, are eight qualitative evaluations of the dependent variable done based on the in-depth case studies, which are exemplified (together with the causal argument) in the rest of the chapter. I chose the different values of each of the eight evaluations based, not on detailed descriptive differences of cases, but on meaningful thresholds to assess the centrality of program as a strategy in each district. Table 4.6 shows how the five studied cases score on the qualitative evaluations of the dependent variable and their aggregate and average scores.
The up to five values in each of the eight evaluations are decided based on the quality of the data gathered and because it would be theoretically irrelevant to make more differentiation for this attribute. All the different attributes’ values are meant to have substantive difference which will allow researchers a clear scoring of cases. In the end each case will have a simple average of the list of attributes’ scores which will be crucial for assigning the case its proper place in the fuzzy-set. The average aggregation rule of these attributes is evidence of my assumption that no single attribute is determinant for the placing of the case in the fuzzy-set, but the whole of the eight attributes and the judgment of the case expert is the appropriate tool for doing so.

Qualitative measure of the centrality to campaigns of a programmatic voter mobilization strategy (dependent variable)

1) How concerned are candidates to deliver a coherent programmatic message?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1</th>
<th>0.5</th>
<th>0</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The actors recognize that the campaign platform is central to their campaign (and not just a formality)</td>
<td>Actors want to demonstrate that they have a coherent program (to show people), but acknowledge it is not central to campaigns.</td>
<td>Candidates know the policy message is not central to get votes and do not campaign on it</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2) What is the centrality of programmatic messages in specific campaign tactics?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1</th>
<th>0.75</th>
<th>0.5</th>
<th>0.25</th>
<th>0</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>High centrality does not decrease whether the office post is high (e.g. governor) or low (e.g. councilmember)</td>
<td>Activities are carried out to express a position on issues (all offices). However, “the issue position” is often not the only and central message transmitted (e.g. a candidate’s image may be transmitted as well).</td>
<td>Higher office tactics tend to have policy contents as central, not local office candidates</td>
<td>Only high office candidates in mediated tactics (e.g. TV) have policy contents as central</td>
<td>Even on mediated tactics, the messages tend to be particularistic or personalistic for all office posts.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
3) What is the programmatic content of tactics?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1</th>
<th>0.75</th>
<th>0.5</th>
<th>0.25</th>
<th>0</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>There are actions with contents that emphasize “program” (policy and costs to all society)</td>
<td>Candidates campaign on issues or fragments of program.</td>
<td>The political actors campaign on current affair issues; however, the position on issues is not necessarily coherent or similar among candidates of the same party. Nevertheless there is an issue platform.</td>
<td>Communication with voters tends to be more in particularistic terms. Communication is limited in terms of a general district view, in both personalized and mediated communication with constituencies. Instead, it tends to be, for example, on arguments about the individual wellbeing, over arguments about public policy cause-effect.</td>
<td>There is little communication with constituencies on a platform or program and if there is, the communication (tactic’s action and content) does not convey ideas for the future. They may be messages about the past, persons or clientelism, but not ideas about the wellbeing of the public in general, as a goal of the future tenure.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4) Do tactics in general emphasize programmatic ideas only? (Or, do tactics emphasize personalism or clientelism besides programmatic ideas?).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1</th>
<th>0.75</th>
<th>0.5</th>
<th>0.25</th>
<th>0</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tactics are only about delivering a programmatic message</td>
<td>Tactics emphasize the programmatic message above anything else</td>
<td>Tactics evenly combine a policy message with other strategy type contents</td>
<td>Policy message in tactics is subsumed under other strategy type contents</td>
<td>There is no policy message in tactics.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5) Do candidates/party do issue differentiation depending who they are talking to? (Do messages tend to address the whole of the constituency uniformly or tend to address a segment of the constituency?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1</th>
<th>0</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>There is no issue differentiation</td>
<td>There is issue differentiation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
6) Do candidates know what the main platform issues affecting their district are and campaign on them?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1</th>
<th>0.75</th>
<th>0.5</th>
<th>0.25</th>
<th>0</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Candidates know what the main platform issues are and they campaign on them</td>
<td>Parties have a team to organize &quot;líneas discursivas&quot; (coherent positions on issues), but there are only two or three main issues talked about</td>
<td>There is an individual &quot;programmatic voluntarism&quot; on the part of many candidates because the programmatic efforts are not coordinated or coherent with the rest of the party effort: I.e. Decentralization without resources leads to a relative isolation of candidates which translates into a &quot;programmatic anarchy&quot; in campaigns. Hence, the programmatic message is not particularly clear and is confusing if the party candidates have different messages.</td>
<td>There is no clear organization in terms of coherent party views about the future of the district. There may be similar wishes about recognized problems, but no comprehensive solution to them is transmitted.</td>
<td>No policy message awareness or communication</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

7) Do opposing parties and candidates significantly engage their opinions about their own party’s policy positions (i.e. they also de-facto see the program as important)?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1</th>
<th>0.66</th>
<th>0.33</th>
<th>0</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Opposing parties and candidates engage their opinions about the party’s policy positions in a complementary way.</td>
<td>Opposition party candidates only engage on incumbent performance evaluation (maybe also on personalism and clientelism)</td>
<td>Opposition party candidates engage neither on programmatic nor performance evaluation messages in the campaign</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

8) Do high profile candidates’ campaign appearances (mayor, governor and national candidates) in the media engage on policy issues concerning the district?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1</th>
<th>0.5</th>
<th>0</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Campaign media appearances are exclusively about policy issues</td>
<td>Campaign appearances in the media engage on policy issues concerning the district, among other types of message</td>
<td>Campaign appearances in the media do not engage on policy messages</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
TABLE 4.6:
CASES’ SCORES FOR THE QUALITATIVE EVALUATION OF THE DEPENDENT VARIABLE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>CAPITAL FEDERAL</th>
<th>MENDOZA</th>
<th>SANTA CRUZ</th>
<th>CATAMARCA</th>
<th>FORMOSA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Concern on message deliverance</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Message on tactics</td>
<td>0.75</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Content of tactics</td>
<td>0.75</td>
<td>0.75</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Programmatic message</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.75</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>0.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Issue differentiation</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Campaign coherence</td>
<td>0.75</td>
<td>0.75</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>0.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Programmatic opposition</td>
<td>0.66</td>
<td>0.66</td>
<td>0.66</td>
<td>0.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Candidates in the media</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total Score</td>
<td>5.41</td>
<td>5.41</td>
<td>4.66</td>
<td>2.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Average score</td>
<td>0.67</td>
<td>0.67</td>
<td>0.58</td>
<td>0.27</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The above qualitative evaluation of the dependent variable (which is illustrated in the second part of the chapter) reveal a ranking of the cases in which Capital Federal and Mendoza appear as the district where the centrality of a programmatic voter mobilization strategy is the highest, followed by Santa Cruz, Catamarca and Formosa (see Table 4.6).
4.8 Programmatic voter mobilization strategy as a Fuzzy-Set\textsuperscript{107}

I view the concept of “the centrality to campaigns of programmatic voter mobilization strategy” as a set of conditions (and not exactly as a variable). This allows me to ignore irrelevant variation to the concept. Because I talk about “set-relations” of causes that combine, it does not make sense to try to isolate the effects of each supposed cause (socioeconomic development, electoral competitiveness and distribution of power within parties). It only makes sense to understand cases as configurations (Ragin 2000: 39).

As argued in chapter 1, the cases in crisp sets either belong (getting a score of 1) or do not belong to a set of cases (getting a score of 0) The idea behind fuzzy-sets is that there could be partial or “fuzzy” membership. A score of 1 indicates full membership to the set, a score of 0 indicates full non-membership to the set (of cases where a “programmatic voter mobilization strategy is central to campaigns”). Scores between .5 and 1 indicate strong but partial membership to the set, more “in” than “out” (e.g. .7 and .8). Cases between 0 and .5 indicate weak membership to the set (e.g. .2 and .3), cases

\textsuperscript{107} As argued in chapters 1 and 2, and paraphrasing Charles Ragin (2000: 6-7) “to grasp the critical difference between fuzzy sets and continuous variables”, consider the difference between a conventional measure of the degree of centrality to campaigns of a programmatic strategy, and the fuzzy set of districts where programmatic strategy is central to campaigns. The conventional measure is based on a variety of indicators of programmatic strategy resources, behaviors and tactics, and that these different indicators strongly correlate with each other, justifying their combination into a single index of degree of centrality of programmatic strategy. But where on this scale is a programmatic strategy full-fledged central to campaigns? Where on this scale is programmatic strategy not central to campaigns? Where on this scale is the cut-off value separating those districts which are more in the set where programmatic strategy is central to campaigns from those which are more in the set of not-central to campaigns?

To answer these questions, we not only need the fine-grained index of centrality to campaigns of programmatic strategy, but also a good base of substantive knowledge about programmatic strategies and a solid grasp of its theoretical relevance –why degree of membership in the set matters and how it should be assessed.

The infusion of substantive and theoretical knowledge transforms rankings that are almost entirely relative in nature (e.g., degree of centrality to campaigns of programmatic strategy) to ones that show degree of membership in a well-defined set (e.g., degree of membership in the set of cases where programmatic strategy is central to campaigns). This infusion of knowledge redefines portions of the range of a conventional continuous variable as irrelevant.
are more “out” than “in” a set. The values of the set must be carefully and substantively calibrated. Fuzzy-set techniques emphasize degree of membership in theoretically defined sets, and not levels relative to a sample data (See Ragin 2000: 270). Each breakpoint in the fuzzy-set should have an explicit rationale.

The choice of five values for the fuzzy-set where programmatic voter mobilization strategy is central to campaigns is given by the type of data I gathered and the difficulty to have comparable, precise, measurable information. (See Ragin 2000:157)

The attributes of the concept measured in Table 4.6 are not weighed (or a default equal weight is assumed), and are only an instrument for the appropriate placing in the five-value fuzzy-set. For example, the value 0 for a specific province does not mean that there is no programmatic strategy in the district’s campaigns. It does mean, however, that we should place the district with a value of 0 in the fuzzy-set where programmatic voter mobilization strategy is definitively not central to campaigns. Hence, cases having proximate attributes’ score averages could not realistically be ranked and should be considered cases of the same type.

Figure 4.1: Dependent Variable Case Score And Fuzzy-Set Value Assignments
Having a five-value fuzzy-set forces us to decide where to place the fuzzy-set breakpoints (0, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75 and 1) and the breakpoints for the range of attributes’ averages (0.13, 0.38, 0.63, and 0.88) – See Figure 4.1. In other words, the five cases studied here should get the following values because they fall within the breakpoint ranges: Capital Federal and Mendoza, *Probably central* (0.67 each); Santa Cruz, *May or may not be central* (0.58); Catamarca and Formosa, *Probably not central* (0.27 and 0.16).

What are then the qualitative distinctions or qualitatively anchored breakpoints which we could use to differentiate the centrality to campaigns of programmatic voter mobilization strategies of each district? As mentioned in Chapter 2, I elaborate a five-value fuzzy-set membership of districts where *programmatic strategy to mobilize voters is central to campaigns*. This requires five qualitatively anchored breakpoints with values 1, 0.75, 0.5, 0.25, and 0, which indicate “a district where a programmatic voter mobilization strategy is definitively central to campaigns,” “probably central to campaigns,” “may or may not be central to campaigns,” “probably not central to campaigns,” and “definitively not central to campaigns as a voter mobilization strategy.” This cross-over point of 0.5 is not data driven or sample specific as in variable-oriented research. This crossover point is calibrated with theoretical and substantive knowledge (See Ragin 2000: 167). Next, I begin describing the five fuzzy-set values and their qualitatively distinctive characteristics.

*Value 1:* “A district where a programmatic voter mobilization strategy is definitively central to campaigns”. There is a distinctive set of relationships which are predominant in such a district. In such districts we find that:

There are campaign tactics with contents that emphasize “program” (policy and costs to all of society).
Candidates know what the main platform issues are and they campaign on them.

The actors recognize that the campaign platform is central in their campaign (and not just a formality, etc.).

The importance of programmatic messages in campaign tactics do not decrease whether the office post is high (e.g. president) or low (e.g. councilmember).

Opposing parties and candidates engage their opinions about the party’s positions (that is, they also de-facto see the program as important).

Campaign appearances in the media engage on issues concerning the district.

Value .75: “A district where a programmatic voter mobilization strategy is probably central to campaigns”. In such districts we find that:

Candidates campaign on issues or fragments of program.

Much of the “programmatic messages” involve the specific candidates’ area of expertise on specific issues.

Parties have a team to organize “líneas discursivas” (coherent positions on issues), but there are still two or three main issues talked about.

Activities are carried out to express a position on issues. However, “the issue position” is often not the only message transmitted (e.g. a candidate’s image may be transmitted as well).

Campaign appearances in the media engage on issues concerning the district.

Actors are concerned for showing that they have a coherent program (to show people).

Value .5: “A district where a programmatic voter mobilization strategy may be/ may not be central to campaigns” (complete ambiguity). In such districts we find that:

The political actors campaign on current affair issues; however, the position on issues is not necessarily coherent or similar among candidates of the same party. Nevertheless there is an issue platform.

Campaign appearances in the media engage on issues concerning the district.

The future of the district and the well-being of the electorate are common in candidates’ appearances, however they are not the only message which
is intended to be transmitted (others are personalism, performance, clientelism).

There is an individual “programmatic voluntarism” on the part of many candidates because the programmatic efforts are not coordinated or coherent with the rest of the party effort. Hence, the programmatic message is not particularly clear and is confusing if the party candidates have different messages.

The issue agenda or platform “anarchy” due to the individual voluntaristic programmatic efforts occurs because the strategy type is not irrelevant and candidates must invest at least something into it.

The importance of programmatic messages in campaign tactics rapidly loses relevance the lower the office post of the intervening candidates.

Value .25: “A district where a programmatic voter mobilization strategy is probably not central to campaigns”. In such districts we find that:

Communication with voters tends to be more in particularistic terms. Communication is limited in terms of a general district view, in both personalized and mediated communication with constituencies. Instead, it tends to be, for example, on arguments about the individual well-being, more than arguments about public policy cause-effect.

There is no clear organization in terms of coherent party views about the future of the district. There may be similar wishes about recognized problems, but no comprehensive solution to them.

Even though some national or provincial candidates may resort to the media for campaigning, party programs are not emphasized.

Local candidates basically ignore tactics where programmatic messages are emphasized.

There may be a programmatic message at higher levels of office, but it is not central to mobilize voters (not effective, efficient, etc.).

Value 0: “A district where a programmatic voter mobilization strategy is definitively not central to campaigns”. In such districts we find that:

There is little communication with constituencies on a platform or program and if there is, the communication (tactic’s action and content) does not convey ideas for the future. They may be messages about the past, persons or clientelism, but not ideas about the well-being of the public in general, as a goal of the future tenure.
Communication with voters is mostly on particularistic terms, particularly on personalized tactics, and on personalistic terms on less personalized or mediated tactics.

Even on mediated tactics, the messages tend to be particularistic. They may be about particularistic clientelism benefits, personal (not public) benefits from electing the candidate with certain personal attributes, or for praising or repudiating the consequences of incumbent’s performance on oneself (not the whole of society).

Issue agendas are limited to particularistic promises.

Based on the above argument about the causal factors and mechanisms to evaluate the centrality of a programmatic voter mobilization strategy, and based on the evidence summarized on Table 4.6 (which in turn are evidenced in the rest of the chapter) I am able to say that programmatic voter mobilization strategy is probably central to campaigns in the districts of Capital Federal and Mendoza because the political actors to a large extent do conform to this fuzzy-set value’s parameters. The evidence presented in this chapter also allows me to say that the programmatic voter mobilization strategy may or may not be central to campaigns (or centrality ambiguity) in the province of Santa Cruz. Finally, I conclude that the programmatic voter mobilization strategy is probably not central to campaigns in the provinces of Catamarca and Formosa.

**4.8.1 Further evidence**

Next I present evidence obtained from a content analyses of newspaper advertisements in the five studied districts\(^{108}\) (as discussed in chapter 2)\(^{109}\). Table 4.7

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\(^{108}\) I dropped Capital Federal from this analysis given that the small number of advertisements codified makes it more difficult to obtain statistically significant results and because this confirms that political parties in the nation’s capital do not resort to newspaper ads as a campaign tactic.

\(^{109}\) I want to mention that each data point in the database is the average of three independent evaluations done by trained university students acting as coders. There were a total of four coders.
shows the average score of the public policy and ideological contents of each of the newspaper advertisements published in the provinces during the 2005 electoral campaigns. Tables 4.8\textsuperscript{110} and 4.9\textsuperscript{111} show the statistical significance of the difference of means among the provinces. The points which support my argument above and which are backed up by the data below are the following:

Political parties’ newspaper campaign advertisements resort to ideological appeals more in Mendoza and Catamarca (competitive parties and power within parties is dispersed) than in Formosa (where there is one relevant party with no significant opposition). (Table 4.8)

Political parties’ campaign advertisements resort to policy messages to appeal the voters more in Mendoza, Catamarca and Santa Cruz, than in Formosa. (Table 4.9)

As the hypotheses on page 2 claimed, the data also supports the expectation that the higher level of electoral competitiveness of Catamarca would predict a higher centrality to campaigns of a programmatic voter mobilization strategy than in Formosa which has a lower level of electoral competitiveness; the expectation that the higher level of socioeconomic development of the electorate in Santa Cruz would predict a higher centrality to campaigns of a programmatic voter mobilization strategy than in Formosa which has a lower level of socioeconomic development of the electorate; and the data also supports the expectation that both, higher socioeconomic development and higher electoral competitiveness in Mendoza would predict a higher centrality to campaigns of a programmatic voter mobilization strategy than in Formosa. The differences of means among Santa Cruz, Mendoza and Catamarca are not statistically significant.

\textsuperscript{110} The specific question asked to the trained coder was: *Hay evidencia de la existencia de una estrategia en la que el partido político o el candidato agente trata de atraer votantes promoviendo programas, plataformas de campaña/ proyectos que involucran a todo la comunidad?* 4 si, 3 un poco, 2 muy poca, 1 no.

\textsuperscript{111} The specific question asked to the trained coder was: *Hay evidencia de la existencia de una estrategia en la que el partido político o el candidato agente trata de atraer votantes apelando a los principios constitutivos del partido/ ideológica considerada como la visión de una sociedad mejor?* 4 si, 3 un poco, 2 muy poca, 1 no hay evidencia.
TABLE 4.7:
PROGRAMMATIC STRATEGY NEWSPAPER ADS' AVERAGE SCORE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Catamarca</th>
<th>Formosa</th>
<th>Santa Cruz</th>
<th>Mendoza</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>2.60</td>
<td>1.97</td>
<td>2.48</td>
<td>2.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policy platform message</td>
<td>2.54</td>
<td>2.20</td>
<td>2.98</td>
<td>2.77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ideological message</td>
<td>149</td>
<td>177</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Valid N (listwise)</td>
<td>149</td>
<td>177</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TABLE 4.8:
IDEOLOGY CONTENT CAMPAIGN ADS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Catamarca</th>
<th>Formosa</th>
<th>Santa Cruz</th>
<th>Mendoza</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Catamarca</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.034</td>
<td>0.316</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Formosa</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.009</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Santa Cruz</td>
<td>0.034</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.484</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mendoza</td>
<td>0.316</td>
<td>0.009</td>
<td>0.484</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Difference of means, Independent Samples Test [Sig. (2-tailed)], Equal variances assumed.

TABLE 4.9:
POLICY PLATFORM MESSAGE ADS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Catamarca</th>
<th>Formosa</th>
<th>Santa Cruz</th>
<th>Mendoza</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Catamarca</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.544</td>
<td>0.955</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Formosa</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.006</td>
<td>0.004</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Santa Cruz</td>
<td>0.544</td>
<td>0.006</td>
<td>0.727</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mendoza</td>
<td>0.955</td>
<td>0.004</td>
<td>0.727</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Difference of means, Independent Samples Test [Sig. (2-tailed)], Equal variances assumed.
4.9 Additional evidence

In Appendix C, I present data and analysis from public opinion surveys which add support to the arguments upheld in this chapter and corollaries. People seem to say they decide their vote based on the characteristics of the candidates and their platforms. However, the politicians I interviewed admit that they do campaign on the personal attributes of candidates and that the so-called “proposals” are limited to power phrases and announcements which will be popular among the electorates. The platforms or proposals are not usually developed during the campaigns, and when asked specifically, the voters agree on that as well (as I show in Appendix C). Hence, a programmatic voter mobilization strategy and a vote on a platform are probably not as important as has been pointed out, and have a much relegated centrality compared to other strategies and criteria.

4.9.1 Complementary evidence

There is also supporting data from a survey done in the capital city of the province of Santa Cruz (Río Gallegos) that directly addresses the issue of centrality to campaigns of a programmatic strategy. When people are asked what they had seen or heard from the 2007 mayoral campaign, 22% say “the proposals”, presumably from parties and candidates (See TABLE C.9 in Appendix C). However, when directly asked how much they know about the proposal of their candidate of choice for mayor more than 79% say they know little, almost nothing or nothing (See TABLE C.10 in Appendix C). This concurs with the idea that candidates campaign on slogans and power phrases, and do not or cannot develop ideas or programs. Furthermore, a cross tabulation from

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112 These data suggest that performance may be the major strategy considered by candidates when campaigning (even if they have a platform with genuine proposals), that program as a strategy may be less important than is usually assumed to be, and that personal aspects of candidates have a major influence on voters in elections.
TABLE C.9 and C.10 would yield that 40 (73%) out of the 55 respondents who said that in the campaigns they have seen or heard “proposals” also answered they know little, almost nothing or nothing about their choice candidate for mayor’s platform (Only 14 - 25%-answered they know “bastante” or plenty).

Next, beginning with the case of Capital Federal, I use interviews to substantiate the mechanisms and factors to understand the centrality to campaigns of a programmatic voter mobilization strategy in a district [I signal the indicators’ numbers from Tables 4.3 (e.g. i1) and the “attributes” from Table 4.6 in parentheses (e.g. A1)].

**4.10 Capital Federal**

**4.10.1 Introduction**

Buenos Aires is the richest, most developed district in the country, and a cosmopolitan fast-paced city of three million. People’s fast paced city life, bombarded by the media, in a multiparty competitive district are too much stimulus on people for each particular party to control if they wanted to campaign on something else than their top personality candidates. Parties are not prepared to campaign otherwise.

In Capital Federal what generally can be called a “party program” is common in parties and can be accessed by voters if they put the effort (some political parties have one available on the Internet, but usually it is a “statement of principles”). These are fairly new personality-based parties which have a prominent leader and often lack a coherent and an appealing enough ideology, and/or the resources to campaign on it.

Parties do not promote programs as such; they campaign on the hot current topics taken from opinion polls. Many candidates in the long lists of PR city legislators “specialize” in particular issues. These people have a career or experience on some socially important aspect and they bring this experience to the party, and to the “platform.” They will be the ones expert on the issue in the campaign and eventually in
government. Even though socially problematic issues may be addressed by candidates in campaigns, these are usually not part of a holistic party program but in response to current public opinion and are, hence, fragmented as a campaign discourse.

4.10.2 The making of campaign platforms

In Capital Federal there are three common ways to draw up campaign platforms which could be categorized as the “individual wish list”, the “team of appointees” and the “Think Tank-type body”, all of which do not seem to make a difference on the centrality to campaigns of a programmatic strategy. First, Deputy La Ruffa (PJ) comments on the platform elaboration in her party saying:

De los temas locales hicimos una división de tareas por temas que nos gustaban o a fines entre los diez primeros [candidatos] y más o menos íbamos haciendo propuestas, ... Lo que hicimos... los ‘diez compromisos de campaña’; cada uno [de los candidatos] tomó un tema, una ley que van a poner, en mi caso eran los tribunales vecinales... Y el material que entregamos a la prensa eran los diez proyectos.

The “programmatic platform” is practically no more than the candidates’ individual wishes based on their particular expertise and concerns. The party’s local legislature’s platform was not a centrally coordinated and debated resource. Moreover, when I asked La Ruffa if they (candidates) thought they were able to campaign on the proposals or if it was left aside, she said, “para mí eso quedó de lado” (A 1, 3, 5)

According to Deputy Di Filippo (ARI) the platform in his party demands more work than in the previous example: “Carrió ha designado un grupo de 35 jóvenes, que son los que, a través de específicas aéreas en donde trabajan, crean informes que van a ser el origen de las propuestas a futuro en el ARI. ...companeros que tienen una referencia temática muy específica; economistas, abogados, que muchos otros trabajan conmigo acá... (Abogados ambientalistas)”

This team of appointees had the job of working on the party’s programmatic campaign platform, which shows a more conscious effort and more resources put on it.
However, again, the campaign platforms are not suitable instruments to be communicated and to attract voters. Di Filippo said:

No [hay posibilidad de difundirla en la campaña], se limita a enunciar. Tiene que ver con este concepto mercantilista de la política, de economizar materiales, que política se vende como un producto,…La gente lo que busca son más slogans, no tanto desarrollo. Entonces sacamos un volante en donde tocamos cinco tópicos, 5 párrafos con diferentes propuesta. Y lo que hacemos es, anexamos, o ponemos una referencia a una página web. (A 1-6)

Finally, National Deputy Argüello shows the fragmented nature of the “party program” and its irrelevance to the campaigns.

Interviewer: En la elección anterior, ¿tenían una plataforma de campaña? Argüello: Sí, exhaustiva. Sí, hubo una plataforma especial, específica para la Cámara [de Diputados Nacionales]. …[L]as propuestas son elaboradas por los sectores técnicos de los candidatos, y el partido en una reunión rápida, a libro cerrado, aprueba la plataforma que el candidato propone. La propuesta es del partido, ahora en la campaña electoral en la Argentina normalmente, los ejes de discusión electoral no pasa por las plataformas. Por lo tanto se aprueba a libro cerrado y se mantiene más o menos cerrado…La plataforma electoral no es ni una demanda de los candidatos ni una demanda de la ciudadanía, y quien diga lo contrario en realidad esta recitando un verso lindo…Nunca he discutido mi plataforma electoral y seguramente en más de una campaña no la debo haber leído toda porque no es relevante.

To Argüello, Di Filippo and La Ruffa a party platform or program is not central to the campaign; no matter the amount of resources dedicated to its elaboration. Think Tanks, exclusive committees or individual programmatic wishes, are not central in these officials’ campaigns. What must be taken into account is that large nationalized parties, like the PJ, have resources and are competitive in many districts. Hence, even though Arguello’s party (PJ) does not fare well in Capital Federal, it has stakes at the national level and many provinces, which is an incentive and provides resources to have Think Tank type organizations to elaborate campaign platforms. Parties’ like Di Filippo’s ARI or Meis’ PRO (later) are only locally competitive and must have a more conscious effort and invest relatively more resources to elaborate campaign platforms. (A 1, 2)
4.10.2.1 Centrality of a platform message (l 1-5; A 1, 2, 3-5)

When a programmatic message is not central in the campaign effort of parties, then the public policy debate is diminished and poor, and other campaign assets are brought forth. Deputy Marcelo Meis (PRO, López Murphy loyal) on the relevance of the candidate and the program in the elections said:

Muchos candidatos van a hacer propuestas razonables. Y la diferencia va a estar dada en la credibilidad que pueda tener el candidato respecto de las propuestas que hace. Pero puede haber propuestas idénticas entre candidatos, pero va a ganar uno, ¿qué hace la diferencia? La credibilidad que genere. En base a tu personalidad, tu imagen. Lo que va a vender es la imagen, en el fondo.

In agreement with previous opinions, National Deputy Ritondo (PRO) refers to the resources he has in order to elaborate policy proposals which will be more helpful when in office than in the campaign contests.

En general lo arma los equipos técnicos y después vos adherís. …Yo puedo ir cuarto y tengo experiencia en área de seguridad que el primero no la tiene, o el noveno. [En definitiva cada diputado / candidato tiene su área de especialidad] En Argentina no hay tradición de leer la propuesta. Acá se vota mucho por la persona y los partidos. Y siempre se discute sobre 4 o 5 bases [ideas].

Only a handful of policy issues drawn from current public concerns are discussed in each campaign, which further diminishes the importance of having long term party programs and campaign platforms. Deputy Cantero (ARI) also said about the party platform: “Es todo una elaboración con dirigentes políticos y cuadros técnicos. …Un proyecto global, que cada vez es más puntual que global. La gente quiere, ‘tráiganme diez puntos, pero diez puntos acotados’. ‘Que tengan posibilidad de cumplir…’” “…La agenda te la imponen los vecinos…”

Furthermore, electoralists needs might force parties into an electoral alliance which does not have public policy as a common denominator. Deputy Velazco (ARI) elaborating on campaign programs said:
La alianza se formó por la excelente relación que había entre Patricia Bulrich y Ricardo López Murphy. Ahora, lo cierto es que no hay afinidad ideológica... Primero se armó la alianza, distribución de cargos... y después empezamos a hacer ese programa. ...[Q]ue por suerte la gente acá no tiene costumbre de leer programas porque sino no nos hubiera votado nadie. Porque las contradicciones eran absolutamente flagrantes,... tuvimos que hacer un gran esfuerzo para que por lo menos a la lectura no resultara ofensivo, el programa de esa alianza.

Velazco said that in the campaign only a few specific point of the platform were addressed, that since it was a city election with urban related issues, the ideological contradiction where not too obvious, and that his party’s platform was basically left aside of the campaign as the party (Union por Todos) opted to allied electorally with another party (Recrear).

Even the apparently and presumably more ideologically coherent smaller leftist party lacked a platform, and policy was not central in their campaign either. Deputy Molina: “No, lo que armamos fue una especie de agenda. Con problemas y con propuesta… Yo creo que había mucho voto al personalismo de Zamora.” Deputy Molina is aware of the weaknesses of political parties for lacking platforms and thought out plans, the real reasons for the support they received in the elections which has more to do with the rejection people feel about the more traditional parties and leaders than the appeal the Autodeterminación y Libertad party produces.\textsuperscript{113}

4.10.3 Campaign organization: programmatic tactics and contents

4.10.3.1 PRO political party

I will extend on the case of a specific party in order to show aspects of its organization, the resources and contents put to the campaign in general and the programmatic message in particular. First, the following city deputy is not fond of the party. They finished second in the local legislative election with 12.54% and the Zamora-Molina ticket finished third for mayor with 12.29% of the votes in 2003; the party got 3.51% in the 2005 local legislative election finishing fifth.

\textsuperscript{113} The party finished second in the local legislative election with 12.54% and the Zamora-Molina ticket finished third for mayor with 12.29% of the votes in 2003; the party got 3.51% in the 2005 local legislative election finishing fifth.
planning of the campaign with a “business-like mentality/ marketing-type planning,” and I compare him to Deputy Luciana Blasco who is. Both are in the same party but this contrast shows that parties are not organically coordinated (e.g. the candidate did not know the campaign platform), do not have ideologically based membership, and are instead like electoral machines.

Deputy Farias Gómez: [El partido] tenía un programa que yo nunca lo conocí. Mauricio [Macri] tiene muchos técnicos,…Yo fui a algunas cosas que parecían más propio de una empresa que de un partido político. No discutimos mucha política. Trabajaban mucho con el tema de que hay un jefe, estas cosas, y yo no creo en eso.” Farias Gómez does not trust the view of a party as a business; maybe he misses the old activist-type activities of years past. On the other hand, this next young Deputy shared her positive view on the same issue, where program and personalism seem to go hand in hand. Deputy Blasco:

[Yo] estaba dentro del equipo, gran equipo de campaña que tenía como coordinador al candidato a vicejefe de Mauricio (Horacio Larrreta), y después al interior de ese equipo había grupos donde se generaban ideas para mostrar tal o cual faceta de Mauricio que era conveniente mostrar. De ‘Ejecución de Actividades’ surgió una idea y hay que transformarla en un evento de campaña. …por ejemplo iba Mauricio y saltaba un bache [en la calle] y se ponía a hablar sobre ese tema.

Relevant campaign issues get promoted with meticulous expert organized tactics which also, and fundamentally, emphasize the personality of the candidate. (I 2, 4; A 1-4, 6, 8)

Deputy Amoroso (PRO) further refers to the organization of a campaign committee and the issues to campaign on: “Se organizó bajo la conducción de Durán Barba, un consultor ecuatoriano…se desarrolla una idea macro y después cada uno de nosotros en las reuniones de campaña da una opinión”. For example and coinciding with Deputy Blasco, “el salto al bache” is an activity to be done in poorer neighborhoods, but only makes sense if the media is present. The main parties make major investments
on advisors and campaign experts; it is an issue-campaign with high-impact media appearances. The issues are picked by polling voters. Essentially, candidates tell voters what they want to hear at a particular moment in time. (I 1-5; A 2, 8)

Deputy Luciana Blasco refers to important programmatic contents but reveals the weight of the party leader’s image:

 Nosotros estábamos enfocados en esos dos ejes [seguridad y trabajo] porque eran los que queríamos marcar, pero claramente [existen otros temas importantes también]…van pasando un montón de cosas día a día, o le contestan a Mauricio determinada cosa, o tiene que hablar de cosas que los periodistas le plantean. También hay un montón de gente que está atenta a los cambios de la coyuntura y con un termómetro de lo que está pasando y se trabajan permanentemente…

The PRO party campaign is geared around two public concern issues, they address the media-driven problems superficially in ways which basically test and promote the personality of the candidates. (A 1, 2, 4, 8)

Blasco says the party had a team of 4 or 5 people making the strategic decisions and below there were teams to do the work which, in all, accounted for less than 30 people for a campaign which mostly focused on the party leader (Macri): “Yo estaba en el equipo que trabajaba en la organización de las actividades de campaña, pero como candidata no [tenía publicidad propia]. Se concentró muchísimo en la figura de Mauricio [Macri]…” These parties spend money in expensive international campaign advisors, are organized like “businesses” marketing a candidate to deal with the campaign, instead of programs or platforms sprouting from their party members. The campaign moves around issues, and very often present time issues, based on opinion polls. The national campaign pulls the district campaign, which means that (excepting the mayoral race) only the national candidates’ issues get much better media coverage than the local issues in this large city. (I 1-5; A 1-8)

Finally, Deputy Meis (PRO, Recrear) talks about the different levels of campaign which go on concurrently in an alliance/coalition between his party led by Macri and the
Recrear party led by López Murphy. Also, the candidate’s personal campaign uses resources which could be put to emphasize the idea of a party and of program.

Nosotros teníamos campañas personales, que incluían reuniones con vecinos, actos en distintas zonas de la capital, la confección de afiches y volantes propios, personales míos, con una campaña diseñada y pensada por nosotros. Que expresara lo que nosotros pensábamos, además de mostrar la cara de alguno… Y después el aporte dentro de la macro campaña; esto de viajar en subte, tocar timbres, participar de los distintos eventos…

As we can see, this deputy has some resources which give him autonomy to do a personal campaign. He may defend some issue positions of his own in his own neighborhood, but this fact is unlikely to strengthen a party platform or make a programmatic message more central to the campaigns in the district, rather he is searching for a personal vote.  

4.10.3.2 Other tactics

Deputy Velazco (ARI) comments (also Deputy Morando –PRO- among many others) on the tactics used by a party with relatively fewer resources than Macri’s PRO, in order to get campaign issues across using the media. Getting the media coverage is the major goal of these tactics:

Tuvimos que aplicar una gran inventiva para hacer actividades de campaña que eran originales y que por sí misma produjeran un impacto. Yo recuerdo que fuimos los primeros que navegamos el Riachuelo con Patricia [Bulrich]. Después, lo hizo todo el mundo. Otra cosa que hicimos fue ir a la cola de la guardia de un hospital a las 3 de la mañana. Otra cosa, ir a la cola de los desempleados del diario Clarín; como los clasificados salen antes que el diario hay una cola inmensa a la madrugada, y el diario le da gratuitamente la parte de clasificados para buscar trabajo. Íbamos siempre con Patricia [Bulrich], dos o tres [candidatos a legislador]. Llamábamos a los medios para que cubrieran eso.

Velazco says his former party was also small and targeted a particular type of voters: “Buscamos un perfil, no masivo, porque sabíamos que la posibilidad de voto

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114 Interviewer: ¿Es común que los candidatos a diputado hagan campaña propia?

Deputy Meiss: “… yo sí tenía una pequeña estructurita de campaña, y hoy la tengo más asentada, porque obviamente el hecho de ser diputado permite una mayor eficiencia en ese sentido y uno puede pagar asesores, puede manejarse de una manera distinta.”
nuestro estaba en un voto que fuera más racional...que pudiera sentirse atraído por las muestras de ingenio, por la campaña o por las propuestas, o por la solvencia de Patricia y de los candidatos.” Still, the media impact of certain tactics seems to be more relevant than the issues talked about in this mentioned television debate, as Velazco proudly told me: “[Patricia Bulrich] llevó una foto de Macri con los [trabajadores] municipales, que se yo, una cosa medio escandalosa. Y una [foto] de Ibarra no se con quien. Y bueno, y eso nos permitió poder consolidar el 10% de votos que tenía y que en las últimas semanas se estaba diluyendo.” Velazco shows that the media and the personal appeals of the candidates are the main ingredients in a campaign which is also substantiated by the issues the candidates bring forward to talk on the media about. (A 1-8)

Next, Deputy Molina (AyL) is from a smaller leftist party based on the person of Luis Zamora and here he shares aspects of the programmatic strategy they used, which also has the personal component of the main candidate:

Cada grupo de los barrios tenían libertad para hacer lo que se les dé la gana. Y cada uno de nosotros hacía campaña...Lo que si se hacía era un par de veces por semana se hacían encuentros. Zamora y yo fuimos recorriendo la Sociedad de Arquitectos, la Facultad de Economía, que nos invitaban íbamos a la noche...asociaciones barriales a un salón que nos invitaban y debatíamos un par de horas. ... Yo trabajaba el tema de emergencia habitacional. ...Armábamos esquina donde salíamos los candidatos a hablar con la gente. Se dio que éramos un grupo de muchos profesionales comprometidos que trabajábamos en distintas temáticas.

This smaller party does not have money and media access for ignoring opportunities of more personalized tactics like attending meetings with sectors of the civil society.

4.10.4 Creating a suitable (short and superficial) policy message

Next, Deputy Luciana Blasco gives us a nice brief summary of her party’s elaborate and complex programmatic campaign: “Estuvo trabajando con nosotros Jaime Durán [Barba], que es un comunicador que trabaja en muchas campañas electorales.
Daba los grandes lineamientos. Las ideas se hizo todo dentro del partido”. Public policy projects are allegedly thought out in the party’s Think Tank well in advance of the campaign and also with the legislators’ advisors.

Yo trabajé mucho en un grupo las líneas discursivas de Mauricio. Pero, teniendo 3 o 4 eventos por día, no tiene tiempo para sentarse a escribir. Había otro grupo que pensaba acciones concretas [e.g. salto al bache] … Como ejes de fondo, el tema de la inseguridad y el desempleo. …Tanto él [Durán] como nosotros realizábamos focus [groups], la metodología de las encuestas, en la ciudad…

The PRO party has a clear division of labor to prepare and execute the campaign tactics. These tactics and their messages must be thought carefully for the specific electorate in this cosmopolitan city:

Hoy los índices de participación no son los mismos. Los tiempos y dedicación que la gente le dedica a la política es otra. …sino la realidad es que aburre. Lo que hacíamos era pensar o de que formas, eventos concretos para que ese mensaje sea escuchado. Fundamentalmente influyó mucho la televisión. …Se vota el mensaje corto, breve. (A 1-4, 6, 8)

National Deputy Ritondo (Peronismo Nacional, PRO allied) seemed to agree with the idea that in the campaign there is room for only a few issues: “La propuesta, a partir de la especialización que tiene cada uno. Vos buscás 5 temas, no tenés que buscar muchos, no hay espacio.” People do not have the time to listen to elaborated platforms: “la gente quiere escuchar el título y como lo van a hacer” (Deputy Amoroso, PRO). Parties then act according to the constrains and possibilities that society gives them. Campaigns deal with the current events and not with deeper problems in society, “las campañas electorales se meten demasiado, no mucho, demasiado en la coyuntura, en la circunstancia política que se vive en el momento” (National Deputy Argüello, PJ) and the role and the speed with which the media works is a reason for that. Deputy Morando (PRO) seems to agree as well: “la verdad de la milanesa es que a la gente no le interesa [el programa o plataforma de campaña]. A uno porque lo llaman de la radio, televisión, no es para hablar de ideas, que se yo, sino es para hablar de alguna cosa,
algún motivo raro, llamó la atención.” As Deputy Molina (AyL) said, parties must adapt their programmatic tactics as well:

No [armamos una plataforma], lo que armamos fue una especie de agenda, con problemas y con propuesta;…a la gente le cuesta mucho reflexionar, leer,…entonces tuvimos que hacer uno de un punteo. Y terminás con el tema de las consignas, terminás sin reflexionar. …Entrás en una dinámica, en que también, lo único que te interesa es que la gente también te conozca superficialmente. (A 1-6)

Among the culprits for the lack of programmatic campaigns the interviewees mentioned the media, the parties themselves, and the people. Deputy Velazco (ARI) refering to his own party added:

…[L]a política no es una política de principios, de programas. Los partidos no tienen programas. La propuesta [del ARI] es ‘el Contrato Moral’; ¿qué es eso? No sé, para vos tendrás tu idea, ella la suya. Es un truco marquetinero. Tirás una categoría y el que la recibe la llena de contenido. No sos vos el que la llena de contenido, [es] el receptor. Lo cual también es una explicación de porque también las fuerzas políticas son tan efímeras. Y cuando no son efímeras, son efímeras en los principios que sostienen

4.10.4.1 Issue differentiation and voluntaristic individual efforts (A 4)

Earlier Deputy La Ruffa (PJ) said each of the first ten deputy candidates would come up with an issue to campaign on, and Arguello (PJ) and others would come up with their own policy issues. This lack of coordination and, sometimes, coherence in the programmatic messages is evidence that it is not central to the campaign effort and that instead, as Blasco (PRO) and Velazco (ARI) showed, the personalism of leaders might be more central to the campaign. Furthermore, several proportional representation candidates also campaign on their own candidacy by holding specific/ private campaign activities and having their own specific “platform” with a few issues they master, all of which helps to build a personal political capital for the future. Amoroso said:

Todo sirve para sumar y conseguir votos. En la campaña, a los 60 [candidatos a legisladores] si nos preguntan de seguridad, todos decimos lo mismo, pero después uno se centra en lo que sabe. Santini es un candidato que es contador, y su especialidad es el presupuesto…cada uno le ponía un valor agregado…
Deputy Amoroso (PRO) refers to the issue differentiation by regions of the city, the small number of issues dealt with in a campaign and the emphasis on areas of specialization when campaigning on the candidate himself, in parties which agglutinate the remnants of the traditional parties. Still, there is no campaign on a program, but on issues which are not necessarily *always centrally and coherently coordinated*. Deputy Amoroso said:

> No es lo mismo la zona sur que la zona norte donde vale mil dólares el metro cuadrado. Son distintos los mensajes... Uno hace un estudio previo. Los problemas se dividen en los genéricos o universales que tiene la ciudad, alumbrado, pavimento, seguridad, y salud. Pero ya cuando entran en educación y salud ya se divide en dos, porque la zona norte puede pagar una prepagas, la zona sur tiene que ir a un hospital [público]... Cada barrio, cada sector tiene una idiosincrasia distinta, hay que diagramar campañas de acuerdo a cada barrio.

The public and the media demand a message from candidates, and the competing parties try to outperform contestants in the campaign. The evidence points to a campaign where the person of the lead candidate is what makes a difference, given that all relevant candidates count on appealing policy messages to the public (appealing formats and appealing contents). A programmatic voter mobilization strategy is probably central to campaigns.

Next, is the case of the province of Mendoza where we find a more important role of the political party as institutions which limits the relevance of individual candidates’ messages.

### 4.11 Mendoza

Mendoza is a province in which, due to the interparty competition at the provincial level and to the relative strength mayors have due to decentralization, parties have resources and incentives to organize permanent committees where the fate of the party is debated. The provincial party authorities (many of whom are only local leaders) are often in contact with one another, which present an opportunity in which a debated
or at least a known-by-the-lay-member party platform can be drawn up with ease; there are mechanisms to have a platform. Still, having a platform does not mean, as in the case of Capital Federal, campaigning on one and Mendoza is no exception. (I 1, 2, 4, 5)

Not surprisingly, executive candidates (mayors and governors) tend to lead the campaign, sometimes even the all legislative elections (particularly for the city council). Campaigns tend to focus on just 4 or 5 issues and the mass media is the most useful instrument for the national and provincial candidates, while the personal contact of door-to-door tactics and the local radio stations are relevant to the local candidates.

4.11.1 Organized parties and decentralized campaigns

Political parties in Mendoza also reflect the decentralized nature of municipalities. Councilman Laciar (UCR, Mendoza) said:

El comité en sí, radical, está dividido en seccionales. La ciudad está dividida en 6 seccionales. Cada seccional tiene un presidente, esos forman una mesa de comité de campaña. El comité de campaña divide en dos la actividad política. Una la parte publicitaria, de propaganda, que lo hacen con una agencia de publicidad en general, un creativo experto, que son los que comunican el mensaje en los medios de comunicación, de folletos, todo eso, el comité designa una idea fuerza, todo. Y esa es la campaña masiva de publicidad. Y por otro lado se encara el trabajo puerta a puerta...

The campaign work is, more often than in the other provinces, taken as a team work with leaders who coordinate and delegate work (Indic. 1, 2, 4 and 5). In other districts only the maximum authorities oversee all strategic decisions in the campaign.

On the party platform, Provincial Deputy Canal (PD) said the following: “Cuando se empieza la campaña ya se tiene la plataforma y el mensaje, el candidato… nosotros particularmente tenemos nuestras comisiones de trabajo…” These commissions will focus on different areas of government, like Public Works, health, education, etc. “Cada departamento tiene su plataforma y a nivel provincial hay otra, como corresponde.” The fact that they have teams to make the program and that it is not something handed down from the leader to the candidates is an indication that the role of the single leader is
smaller than in the case of Capital Federal, for example. Provincial Senator Suárez (UCR) agrees on the mechanisms to coordinate and promote the message: “*Siempre se hace un comité de campaña.*” This is chaired by a trusted person by the top candidate. “*Y se forman diferentes comisiones*”; which are in charge of collecting funds for the campaign, organize and promote campaign events, meet and coordinate with local and provincial candidates, etc. (Indic. 4; Attributes 1, 5, 6)

Hence, according to Canal (and many other officials) the party at the provincial and departmental level is organized in different committees for the different aspects of the campaign, including the program.

The platform seems to be a hybrid of, on the one hand, the product of the political party members, an ideology, internal debates, etc., and on the other hand, the campaign experts who subordinate the platform to public opinion poll numbers (I 1-5, A 1). However, here is Provincial Deputy Canal again on how the platform gets communicated to the electorate:

> Lo que aconsejen los medios. Lo que aconsejen los encuestadores. Primero se hacen las encuestas, con la encuesta se sabe la posición que se tiene; Que es lo que más le interesa, que propuesta es lo que más atrae al electorado, que es lo que el electorado quiere. En función de eso se arma el plan de trabajo. Y bueno, hay folletería, puerta a puerta, la prensa, la televisión.

Not surprisingly, local candidates use very personalized tactics, more frequently use fliers, door to door tactics and the local radios, and provincial and national candidates get the television advertisements (A 1-6).

**4.11.1.1 Decentralized campaigns and the power of mayors**

Local candidates may get a television ad only at the very end of the campaigns; it is too expensive and only the provincial level party can gather the needed funds. For example, here is Councilman Chávez (PD, Junín de los Andes) referring to their local campaign: “*A nivel provincia, la única asistencia que había es que pasen el candidato*
por los distritos, para juntar a alguna gente, para escuchar el mensaje. …La única participación fue una reunión armada, y después nos trajeron folletería que tenía que ver con Mendoza." Finally, Mayor Joaquín Rodríguez (PJ, Tupungato) said regarding the campaign help from the provincial level of the party: “Muy poco, muy poquito, algo para movilidad, algunos afiches también,…pero muy poco.” (I 1, 2, 5)

More autonomy of municipal level institutions also means that they are, more than in other districts, “on their own” when needing funds for campaigns. Mayor García (UCR, Guaymayén) and Provincial Deputy Carmona also agree as well in all those accounts. Mayor Juan Manuel García explained that, if in the opposition, they try to show how they could improve and renew the city and would show his team. Working with a local NGO on local matters was the base to come up with the 2003 party platform. In the 2005 elections his now incumbent party candidates were mainly validating their performance in office and the steps ahead. The mayor is so important that even the provincial legislators campaigned on defending the mayor’s administration. (A 4-6)

Next, Mayor Mario Abed (UCR, Junín de los Andes) is an example of the role mayors play at elections in Mendoza –Deputy Maza (UCR) was also present (I 1-5; A 1, 2, 6). This leader runs his party’s all-legislative campaign in the town, instructs his candidates on what they should say about the local administration, and decides the key issues to be addressed in the campaign. The local electoral machine is independent from that of the provincial party, which may have as a consequence the overlapping multiple layers of campaign tactics (local, provincial and national). Mayor Abed said:

Creo que nosotros en eso [coordinación del mensaje de campaña] lo producimos algo, es como si estuvieses en un colegio y das clases; no todos pueden conocer la realidad del gobierno. Estoy hablando del gobierno comunval y provincial, entonces le pedimos a cada uno de los candidatos que vengan, en este caso podemos tomar nosotros dos, explicamos cuales son las líneas, donde estamos, adonde estamos parados, cuales son los réditos que ellos tienen, y también los hacemos realidad los proyectos que ellos tienen, porque ellos salen a vender una imagen, salen a decir 'yo voy a luchar, porque represento a un distrito, o un departamento, o un pueblito chiquito', tienen que saber qué es lo
Mayor Abed would then instruct the city council candidates on what they can and cannot promise in campaign, and use his government to fulfill on the promises made by his candidates.

According to Provincial Senator José “Pepe” Martínez (UCR, de Tupungato) campaigns are a coordinated effort between the provincial and the local level. They also get the “pautas” (advertising money, line of speech, message) from the provincial level which they adapt to their relatively well heeled county: “Normalmente se reúnen [los candidatos] a nivel provincial, vamos recibiendo las pautas a seguir desde la provincia y después cada uno en su departamento hace lo que también, porque todos los pueblos no son iguales y la gente no es. En cada uno hay economías distintas...” As a former mayor, he had to deal with a strong competition which often promised unreasonable projects. On why a mayor might be important to a provincial legislator Martínez said: “...y [el intendente] te dice, ‘necesito para mi gestión que me salga una ley”. But why would a provincial legislator cave to that request? “Claro porque también vos [provincial legislador] necesitás, y para concejales también, vos tenés concejales, no puedo estar cambiando o negociando cosas. Porque después también pasa eso, se canjean cosas.”

4.11.1.2 Programmatic message

Carmona agrees with García, Abed and Martínez in that the executives are the most relevant to people (candidates also use the image of the president in the case of the PJ and the governor for the UCR); that the personal contact with voters is relevant for the local candidates, and agrees with Canal that people want and end up consuming slogans instead of full fleshed platforms (A 1-6). To Provincial Deputy Carmona the PJ platforms are too much of a draft and slogans, and media ads become relevant instead:
En general en Mendoza si bien tenemos bastante estratificada la sociedad, creo que tiene mucho peso todavía, y creo que se va a terminar de reforzar el discurso orientado a la clase media. ...que rescatando elementos populares sea también asumida por la clase media que en Mendoza tiene mucho peso. ... El mensaje tiende a ser homogéneo [for the different social clases] en función de que se prioriza el mensaje publicitario.

Hence, there is an effort for the message to be homogeneous and oriented to the middle class which, many in Mendoza argued, is very conservative. Carmona talks about having one discourse strategy, with a language good for the middle class. This evaluation may be because programmatic campaigns often times present vague ideas, which leaves the middle class with only a performance evaluation. It seems that performance evaluation and assuming a compromise on specific issues is common in the personalized tactics (because in the face-to-face people expect it, and it is difficult for the candidate to deny at least that he will try to fulfill the promise).

Next, Councilman Laciar (UCR, Mendoza) agree with Carmona: “Yo creo que fundamentalmente [la persona] vota el reconocimiento a la gestión. Valora mucho la parte humana, y estar y acercarse,...y yo creo que en menor medida la plataforma en concreto. ... Mendoza es una sociedad muy conservadora y le gusta lo que hay, y le gusta y lo tolera.”

Next Deputy Merino (UCR) elaborates on the complexity of the district when working to deliver the message during the campaign (A 1-6):

Nosotros tenemos distintos sectores sociales, los sectores humildes, los sectores medios y los sectores altos. Y ahí las diferencias son bastante marcadas, porque en los sectores medios, medios-altos o altos demandan de todo; la figura, la honestidad de la persona, las características de la persona, la propuesta, el proyecto político, ‘¿qué vas a ser si sos [electo]?’ Ese demanda de todo. En los sectores más humildes y sin ánimo de no querer ofender, es distinto, van mucho más con la personalidad, la sencillez, la humildad del candidato, que la gente lo sienta mas como ellos.

Merino says the working class and the poor welcome and want to meet the candidates, while the businessmen do not since they already have more information and are aware of what is going on and he adds: “...Los partidos tenemos que esforzarnos en
Merino had been a San Rafael’s councilman. He commented that the “equipos técnicos” may work on projects, but the candidates know it is not relevant for the campaign, they might need the equipos técnicos once in office, but people do not vote based on those projects...people do not want to read (I 2, 4; A 1):

Lo que uno intenta hacer en una campaña es que la gente reconozca al candidato, visualmente, que reconozca la cara del candidato. Eso por un lado, con un mensaje, si, indudablemente elaborado, si por los equipos técnicos, que trabajan en el partido muchos meses antes donde se terminan elaborando todos los proyectos a ejecutar en el gobierno...

Finally, similarly to the other two major parties, according to PD Senior party advisor Dario Fernández, the Partido Demócrata also forms a campaign committee that collects funds for the campaign, that hires the marketing consultant, carries focus groups, comes up with the main message (or power phrases) and arranges from the street graffiti to the television ads (I 4): “Se trata de cubrir todos los espectros de la producción, los espectros de la industria, los espectros del comercio, llevando nuestra propuesta a esos lugares.”

The PD’s main (and relatively exclusive) electorate is the wealthy and educated middle classes. This fact, and the fact that the PD does not count with as many office post as the UCR and the PJ, hinders their chances to lure in the poorer voters, as Fernández explains: “Porque los que gobiernan con algún plan trabajar, con alguna cuestión pueden comprar un dirigente de esa naturaleza.” “[And we do it as well, but] en

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115 Fernández tells me that since theirs is a provincial party with a provincial infrastructure, they attempt to ally with national parties, like Macri’s or López Murphy’s. The PD could use the nationally renowned candidates and pull, in an attempt to get national representation (Deputies and Senators), and those renowned candidates could use a party with on the ground experience and resources (for their eventual presidential aspirations).
menor medida que los otros partidos, pero, por el hecho de tener legisladores,… por el hecho de tener concejales alguna serie de cargos manejas; tenemos dos intendencias”

Fernández, now in the presence of PD Provincial Senator Carlos Aguinado, argued for the uneven field for the PD since lower class citizens demand a bag of food, a “Plan Trabajar” job from the candidates, and the PD has fewer resources than the PJ and UCR to compete on those grounds. And then he adds: “Yo te diría que en esos sectores, la propuesta, uno trata de llegar pero el entendimiento que puedan llegar a entender de la propuesta es relativo porque están tan acostumbrado al clientelismo político que dicen, ‘bueno, ¿y para nosotros que hay?’” (A 1, 2, 4-7)

This PD advisor’s opinion ads support to the idea of the Mendoza parties’ tendency to decentralize activities and to organize committees for the campaign. Fernández also notes the complexity of the electorate and the consequent complexity of the campaign strategies parties must adopt in this socially stratified province.

PD councilpeople Gómez and Páez both agreed that the 2005 campaign was focused on the evaluation of the mayor’s performance. The campaign would show the new built infrastructure, transparency in government, balanced budget, etc. On whether they adapted the language used to the neighborhood they visited, Páez said: “No, esa es la ventaja de pertenecer a un partido provincial…el discurso es el mismo, por ahí la profundidad de la explicación cambia… Lo que no pasa en el PJ, y eso está bien marcado, en los discursos se amoldan al auditorio que tienen, bien variado. Nosotros no, nosotros tenemos un solo discurso.”

In the province of Mendoza we found that smaller parties may be more ideologically homogeneous, which eases the message in campaigns. But larger political parties do not rely as much on a programmatic message. With more resources, larger political parties can opt for other strategy types as well. Decentralization, institutional design and multiple leaders eases and promotes cooperation within political parties to
elaborate platforms. However, that does not mean that political parties will rely on those platforms to campaign.

4.11.2 Tactics: The diffusion of campaign platforms

As is probably expected, the private for profit mass media outlets in Mendoza do have some impact on the parties‘ decisions on how to promote candidates and ideas. Ultimately, the ideas that go public are not the product of internal party debates, but experts‘ suggestions which are formatted for the specific media outlets and the obvious budget constraints (1, 2, 4). That is what Provincial Deputy Hugo Morales (PJ) from San Rafael says:

Cada vez más, la razón de ser de las campañas electorales tienen que ver con el aspecto mediático. Yo no veo grandes discusiones por las plataformas electorales, al menos yo no he participado. Creo que hay un gran interés, cuando se define el perfil de una campaña electoral, se definen consignas, se designan actividades, se nomina a ver quiénes son los candidatos que van a ejecutar esas actividades. (A 1, 2, 4)

As mentioned earlier, provincial and national candidates rely more on the mass media outlets for their campaigns than the local candidates who are, in turn, more prone to use more personalized tactics like door-to-door events. Next, Provincial Deputy Casteller (PD) complains about the uneven playfield in the media advertisement and the incumbents‘ upper hand: “Nosotros tenemos el gran problema de los partidos, es que los medios periodísticos en general obviamente responden a intereses. Y el estado hace publicidad, desde cuando dice ‘pague sus tasas a término’, ‘pague sus impuestos’, entonces van dándole a cada medio una pauta [i.e. money] publicitaria.” Casteller then moved on to give examples of “unfair” media space and media scrutiny given to the incumbent parties versus the opposition parties.

Next is Councilman Ramírez (PJ, Mendoza city) with another example on the difficulty in accessing the media in campaigns:
La relación con los medios tiene que ver con los dueños del medio y la plata que pongas en la campaña...en campaña, la única forma que llegamos a los medios es poniendo plata en el medio... La única forma que podés hacerlo solo [utilizar los medios de comunicación, sin mucho dinero] es una buena relación que tengas con alguna FM, que te ofrezca el micrófono o alguna folletería puerta a puerta...Y la otra, el caso de la televisión y los diarios generalmente, y no, esto se hace en el partido [a nivel provincial] y generalmente muestran a los candidatos de los principales cargos.

Next is an opposition official, Councilman Rosas (PJ, Junín) on the media and campaigns:

[La gente] muy influenciada por los medios, pero hay muchos medios que están pagados por los gobiernos de turno, donde durante todo un año han hecho campaña electoral. Pero yo te repito que pasa a nivel local. Acá tiene la radio que es de la municipalidad prácticamente, sacan la gestión de la municipalidad. Nunca van a hablar mal. Encima cuando vos vas a decir que esto está mal hecho, [los medios] te pueden llegar a criticar [a vos]...

Next, Mayor Mario Abed (UCR, Junín) says that the campaigns are all coordinated, but that the media is basically for the national and provincial level candidates. The edge of the local campaign is in the face-to-face contact they have with constituents:

...La gente, es imposible que pueda grabar en su memoria alrededor de 70, 80 caras de candidatos de capital, que lo vemos acá, el gobierno, éste, el otro. Las teorías de campañas políticas se basan en un par de figuras, o sea, el intendente, o los candidatos a intendentes, o los candidatos a gobernador, el vice, y listo. Si es la elección intermedia, el diputado nacional y algún par de figuras más. Porque es muy difícil que la gente se pueda acordar de tantas caras, es imposible. ...El mensaje se trata siempre de unificar. Las 5 ideas famosas. ...y después cada uno la va adaptando a una realidad que tenga local. (A 1-8)

The provincial level parties' leaders/ organization do hire campaign experts and use the mass media similarly to what is common in the city of Buenos Aires. However, the local level party structures, as mentioned earlier, are more autonomous which opens up the spectrum of diversity in campaign strategies and tactics, and also the self initiative of candidates and local branches of the party to come up with a platform.

Councilman Chávez (PD, Junín) complained about the expert-driven campaigns:
No hicimos promesas, sino salimos a caminar con un cuadernito a anotar las sugerencias de lo que pedía la gente. ...En cambio no, [los consultores políticos a nivel provincial] te dicen, 'el 80% dice que la educación está mal, el otro 20 que la falta de trabajo', entonces te arman las campañas así, y creo que sería importante que salga un proyecto de, no te digo de la comunidad, pero si de un partido,...y no de una consultora que lo termina armando y que después no sepas [el contenido]... ...Las últimas elecciones han sido así. El PD trabajó con el tema de la inseguridad que existía en la provincia; el PJ con el tema de que se tenían que renovar los planos y que se tenía que trabajar de otra forma y el Radicalismo basado en la buena imagen del candidato. Cada uno priorizó un aspecto que le sirviera para sacar los votos. Yo creo que no es elaborado. Son campañas de publicistas, arriba. ...En el caso de nosotros [campaña local para concejales] no propusimos, no propusimos, dejamos que la gente propusiera.

(Councilman Chávez, PD Mendoza)

4.11.2.1 Personalized campaign tactics: door-to-door activities

The macro campaign which mainly promotes national and provincial candidates are run with the influence of marketing experts which affect the programmatic message being delivered to the people. The local campaigns also adapt to the issue-agenda idea, with strong elements of personalism (above Chávez proudly denied making original programmatic proposals) –A 1-8-. Mayor Joaquín Rodríguez (PJ, Tupungato) said:

Y busqué 4, 5 cosas que hacían falta en el departamento. ...yo empecé un año antes de las elecciones a hacer campaña, y 60 días antes de las elecciones me tomé el trabajo de golpear todas las puertas de Tupungato. Que iba puerta por puerta diciendo 'buenas tardes señora, yo soy el candidato, quería charlar dos palabritas con usted.' Terminamos tomando mate, con la gente, y sobre todo mostrar la humildad que siempre me caracterizó, sencillez, y bueno me fue muy bien.

Casteller also referred to the door-to-door activities as relevant to promote their platform, which is always limited in depth and scope:

...El diálogo es así, uno golpea la puerta, 'pertenezco al PD, estamos haciendo conocer nuestra propuesta,' que a veces hemos hecho una propuesta en forma de volante, corta, con consignas cortas, y otras veces como si fuera una especie de diario, lo que se piensa hacer en cada aspecto, obras públicas, educación, en salud, bue. Y se le dice si tiene ganas de conversar sobre puntos en particular y si no le dejamos la propuesta.

Keeping a personal contact with voters is somewhat important in Mendoza, particularly for the local authorities in smaller towns. The presence of the media in these
events is not as important as in the case of the city of Buenos Aires. In Mendoza, personalized tactics still have some real impact in campaigns.

4.11.3 Conclusion

Political parties and candidates in Mendoza do resort to programmatic appeals to campaign. These programmatic messages adjust to the specific tactics’ characteristics. Provincial and national candidates tend to use the mass media and local level candidates find highly personalized tactics very important. The high competitiveness among the three main political parties, and the socioeconomic development and diversity of Mendoza’s electorate forces campaigns to tailor policy messages which apparently are faithful to their political base. The comparatively equitable distribution of power among parties, the decentralized nature of campaigns and of party power in Mendoza also contribute to the centrality to campaigns of programmatic messages, particularly from provincial and national level campaigns.

4.12 Three more cases

The remaining three provinces to consider are Santa Cruz, Catamarca and Formosa. In all three districts the programmatic voter mobilization strategy are less developed and less central to campaigns than in Capital Federal and Mendoza. This strategy type is less central in these three districts relatively to some or all three other strategy types. But also, the mechanisms in place to construct and campaign on a party program, platform, or issue agenda are simpler than in the cases already analyzed. However, the fact that mechanisms are simpler and the centrality to campaigns is less also means that they are qualitatively different since there are different factors affecting the decisions to campaign with a programmatic strategy.
Similarly to Capital Federal, where there are single and unquestionable party leaders, in the provinces of Santa Cruz and Formosa the governors, who are also the leaders of the dominant parties, have a major say in defining the programmatic content in campaign tactics. Also, similarly to Mendoza, where political leaders decide a platform in a more collegial way than in the above mentioned districts and where there are party institutional or de-facto constraints on the party leaders, in Catamarca it is not just a single leader, but a committee of several provincial and local leaders who come to those decisions regarding a programmatic voter mobilization strategy.

4.13 Formosa

In Formosa I found negligible evidence for the efforts put into having a programmatic campaign platform in a district where the campaign effort is put on the other three strategy types. In Formosa candidates do not really need to compete on ideas, even though the pro-government newspapers do print promises and hopes for the future usually made by the governor. Opposition parties find little echo in society and they also put little effort in developing a programmatic strategy either at the national or provincial level contests. At the local level, just as the incumbents, the opposition basically resorts to similar clientelistic, personalistic and performance tactics. I do not find evidence of effort devoted to the elaboration of a party campaign platform, beyond the personal effort of individual local level candidates who have the usual issue-agenda imposed by reality.

Communication with voters is most often particularistic or club type. Personalism of the governor and mayors, on whom all decisions are delegated, do imply programmatic contents which those paternalistic leaders will come to realize while in office (e.g. “the mayor will help ease everyone’s suffering”). Finally, the media is an
appendix of the governor’s press apparatus, communicating the governor’s agenda and leaving little room for alternative ideas, and is consumed by a very small middle class.

4.14 Catamarca and Santa Cruz

I found differences in the degree of development and centrality of programmatic campaign tactics used in Catamarca and Santa Cruz than in Formosa, but for different reasons. In Catamarca the opposition party pressures the incumbent to come up with a platform, or at least solutions to specific problems. The public for these tactics however is a small middle class, the media, and the politicians themselves. In Santa Cruz, the little platform work there is, exists because the government is facing a selective public and, at times, an “angry mob” demanding more benefits, employment, salaries, and issues like protection for the environment. However, in Santa Cruz people judge performance, tend to be reactive, and go behind the action of the government. People demand answers to club-type and local public concerns, so the programmatic campaign becomes putting out fires or “pipedream” public works project announcements which are only a corollary to the all-important satisfaction of the particular sector/ local demand.

4.15 Catamarca

4.15.1 Ad-hoc mechanisms for drafting platforms

Listening to people is the first thing to do when coming up with a platform, then those demands people have need to be send back in the way of proposals or promised solutions. Still, this does not mean an ideological discourse or long term projects for Catamarca as a society or community (even though some candidates may promise, unsubstantially, pipedream projects). This process of “making proposals” also means that candidates propose issues to solve specific problems, but do not elaborate programs (planned, organized, and strategically considering the future of the society).
Without hesitation Mayor Guzmán (UCR, Catamarca city), among others like Provincial Deputy Castillo (PUC), told me that the platform “is a product of what we gather people need, people’s problems. What the dirigente gathers…we sift it a little bit and that is the platform (‘lo sarandeamos un poco y esa es la propuesta’).” Even though the central provincial parties’ organizations do carry out opinion polls, the “feel of the people”, particularly in towns, is done through the extensive and reliable network of dirigentes (Ind. 2, 4). Executives, particularly mayors, have and need accurate diagnoses of their districts in order to address it in the campaign. Legislators, on the other hand, do not have such pressure, since they do not have much leverage and once in office their particular (personal) platforms become wish lists. (A 1, 2)

Councilwoman Stella Ramos (FCyS) provides an example of how the “platforms” are made: “Se arma una plataforma de gobierno, los ejes, que es lo que quiero lograr en mi gestión. Se tiran ideas en el grupo de candidatos…Se trata de armar lo mejor. …los tiempos son muy cortos, no hay tiempo de llegar a la gente con la claridad del mensaje…Se focaliza en las principales necesidades; Personales y comunales.” This is the organization and strategy; the content is left to the candidates’ initiative to make “proyectitos” (or little projects), as she put it. (I 1-5; A 1-6)

In Catamarca there seems to be more ideas displayed out in the campaign than in Formosa. Provincial senators have single member districts (instead of a single PR list like in Formosa’s Deputies), and even though they have personal dirigente-type brokers to get to voters, the electoral victory must be a party-wide concerted effort due to the competitiveness of the district. Also, provincial senators have the incentives to put the imagination at work, since there are fewer incentives to free ride campaign work than the province-wide PR candidates, for example, by using own public policy appeals in newspaper ads. Also, competitiveness leads incumbent candidates to make an effort to validate their work in the face of the contestants’ position and critiques. (I 1-5; A 1)
4.15.2 Message

Regarding the content of the messages elaborated for the campaign, Mayor Jalile (UCR, Valle Viejo) said; “…¿Mensajes?: 4, 5 mensajes que se van repitiendo y llegan. Y lo mismo en los diarios, los grafitis, en las caminatas, callejeras…El mensaje, ‘para volver a crecer’, y ‘para salir del caos en la municipalidad’, y ‘para seguir creciendo’, en la continuidad en la provincia [los mensajes de campaña]. Y eso pegó.” These are basically slogans empty of content, the recipient needs to fill it with their own preferences and experience. And here is the opinion of Provincial Deputy Salcedo (UCR) telling me what her campaign message was: “Que éramos una alternativa, que éramos nuevos, que nos den la oportunidad de equivocarnos; Docentes, jóvenes que habían trabajado en la comunidad, en los clubes, haciendo catequesis, en la capilla… Mi ofrecimiento fue el mensaje claro y sincero…” Basically, candidates are asking for a vote of confidence based on personal characteristics, not programmatic ideas. (A 1-8)

4.15.3 Media tactics

Buying space in newspapers is one of the activities candidates do to promote “ideas”, but it is done from the party or municipality (not the individual candidates). Provincial Deputy Burgos (PJ) said; “Se compra una página; [el diario] La Unión es del gobierno hay que pagar el doble, cobran más en campaña. El otro, El Ancasti, es más independiente, es para ambos [partidos]” She did not explicitly mention what was published on those pages. Deputy Burgos and also Deputy Castillo (FCyS, PUC) speak of the media as not being good to them. The local media may not be independent in the partisans’ words, but the newspapers also criticize both parties (Deputy Brandán –FCyS, PJ- also complained about the media). The media seem to be more of a battle ground for the campaigns in Catamarca than in Formosa or Santa Cruz. Candidates complain of the price hikes during campaigns (Provincial Senators complain because they campaign
in single member districts and often have to pay for their own personal campaign ads in this competitive province).\textsuperscript{116} (Ind. 1, 2, 8)

Provincial Deputy Burgos (PJ) commented on a more modest but autonomous activity aimed at promoting “the platform”: “Con una computadora escribí “proyectitos” que luego repartí en el casa por casa.” This activity is done by herself and her close team. These were her own ideas for the town and were not coordinated with the rest of the party or even overseen by “her mayor” or “political boss”. She did this in her home city to get more political backing and be more credible/feasible than a simple wish list. (I 1, 2, 4; A 1-6)

4.15.4 Personalized tactics and programmatic message

Councilman Barrios (UCR, Fray M. Esquiú) refers to the organization and dynamic of the communication with people at the local level, which may be characteristic of districts where the party organization, and not single leaderships, is relevant:

\textit{Hicimos una plataforma de campaña, de mejorar el tema riego. Algunas cosas le gustó a la gente. \textit{Lo armamos todos, con el intendente, la juventud}…Y} llevamos esa propuesta… … [The work was done “casa por casa”, from home to home] \textit{Empezamos saludando, ‘lo venimos a visitar, habrá escuchado la publicidad’. Y alguno empieza, ‘que ustedes recién vienen, han pasado dos años.’}…

As seen in Chapter 3, the personal relationship between people and their dirigentes or candidates is important to the campaign. In Chapter 3 I also noted that clientelism is an important component of many tactics in campaigns in Catamarca, and the evidence of the programmatic component of the tactics are understandably sometimes embedded with clientelistic contents as well. (A1-6)

Barrios continued to say: “Nosotros hasta sanearle la cuenta del pago del agua, ‘si quiere voy y se la pago allá’…Y allí te arriman sugerencias, reclamos. Alguno te

\textsuperscript{116} In Formosa media is very important for the Governor, but not for the other offices.
solucionará en el acto, o mediano plazo, o le iniciás el trámite. ...Al estar en el gobierno, vos podés dar soluciones. Cuando no eras del oficialismo, te costaba.”

To many people, local candidates are the only real face the (provincial) government has, and the candidates commit to defend it: “Nosotros vemos las falencias [del gobierno provincial], o errores...defendemos hasta donde conocemos.”

Another local candidate’s tactic is to bring the “unknown” provincial candidate closer to the people. In many towns, and at the local level, voters look at the candidates and pay attention to personal characteristics, but cannot tell the difference between particular candidates at the provincial level. People tend to see “the party” (and see provincial and national candidates as “the party”); provincial or national legislators will only be known in their home towns and not province wide. “Nosotros le llevamos a algún diputado que vaya con nosotros...ya conoces vos a la familia...” (Councilman Barrios, UCR, Fray M. Esquiú).

Like Barrios, several officials in Catamarca gave me the impression that, when in office, it is obviously easier to move resources around and please people’s needs during campaigns. The relevant highly personalized tactics in campaign are more often dominated by personalism (mainly for local candidates) and clientelism contents, than programmatic ones.

4.16 Santa Cruz

4.16.1 Keeping the formality of the campaign and of the programmatic message

The fliers political parties make and print (and local candidates many times do it on their own) are just an excuse to knock on people’s doors. The personal contact is

117 Barrios also mentioned that they get complains, for example, from people who want their sons/daughters to be accepted in the Provincial Police academy (a stable government job) when that is not the competence of a councilmember.
more important than the programmatic substance those brochures can contain. The content of those is basically the enunciation of public projects to be done in town with money from the province since the provincial government is the only source of funds.

However, and even though candidates do request the vote, in basically no circumstance do the incumbent party candidates show the need (or anxiety) for those votes since victory is an almost sure thing.

People vote for the person on the ballot. People know those local (or national and provincial legislative) candidates cannot really do much and that the power is in the provincial executive government, so the election always becomes a plebiscite on the executive positions. Deputies cannot promise big projects, they do not have the power, but they can become the brokers of communities or minor favors to specific people. Those favors cannot sway an election but help candidates in their own communities, with the “word of mouth”, to say they are serving the community. Deputy Alejandro Victoria (PJ) openly says that the party cannot solve those particularistic concerns people may have because it has no resources and that instead it is the provincial government which solves the problems they encounter during the campaign.

Usually the tactic of handing out campaign brochures door-to-door is carried out in pairs of activists, or as Victoria said, “un sector de la sociedad lo agarran los candidatos [instead of the activists], como ser el sector del barrio militar o el sector de la sociedad que por ahí necesiten una atención del candidato, más que nada.” There is little investment and effort put into the programmatic contents of the tactics, which mostly stress performance and personalism messages (I 1, 2, 4; A 2-5). Victoria continues:

[El trabajo de campaña] En los pueblos es fácil. Es gente que te la cruzás en el supermercado, con los chicos en el colegio…se llega con la propuesta, se le habla al vecino con que es lo que uno pretende para su pueblo, que es lo que tiene proyectado hacer, se le explica lo mismo que, por ahí, en la folletería se entrega en pocas palabras. Se hace un trabajo de 45 días por lo menos, puerta a puerta.
Victoria kept on telling me of the difficult economic moments his mayor had to endure in his three terms, when bills could not be paid and public projects were halted. Now, during better economic times everything is much easier and “la propuesta es trabajar en conjunto con el gobierno nacional” and carry on with the infrastructure projects.

Son propuestas básicas de campaña, que en esta última se facilitó mucho por sobre todo la ayuda que estamos recibiendo todas las provincias. [At the time the President of Argentina was a former governor of Santa Cruz who favored the province] Proyecto simple, impresión propia en donde ponía el eje en tres o cuatro temas: como es la ayuda a la juventud, el tema de trabajar junto al gobierno provincial para el desarrollo de nuestra localidad, hacer proyectos de desarrollo para Puerto Santa Cruz…

Those development projects, according to Victoria, should put the emphasis in the private enterprise of tourism and the fishing industry, moving away from public employment (A 1-6, 8).

The candidates’ “programmatic platforms” are a formality of the campaigns. Even though there may be several platforms from the many competing Law of Lemas candidates, which does not mean that they are significantly different among one another. Victoria said: “Básicamente en los pueblos primero se fijan en el candidato, conocen la radiografía de cada uno de nosotros,… En ese sentido se fijan en la persona primero y después en el tema de las propuestas, son todos muy similares.” Victoria mentioned that people often suggest projects for the town, and the candidates take note of that:

Se toma nota de todo y por supuesto todo lo que esté a mi alcance y se pueda dar. Muchas veces, alguna inquietud del vecino de que depende del estado provincial y se le acerca al estado provincial. Por ahí muchas cosas se hacen por el pedido de los propios vecinos. …Por suerte no hay pobreza en los pueblos… ¿La necesidad de la gente…? es el tema laboral, sobre todo la parte femenina. Porque el hombre al haber tanta obra pública, el puerto, las rutas y demás, se inserta en ese mercado laboral, y falta por ahí un poco apuntalar el mercado laboral para las mujeres.

Most commonly parents ask politicians for jobs for their young sons and daughters, if they cannot afford sending them out of town to study beyond high school.
These quotes show the particularistic promises or commitments, and lack of a party-wide programmatic agenda for the campaign; incumbent candidates are basically putting out fires. (I 1, 2, 4; A 1-6) For example, some problems in the community may be addressed by the local or provincial assistance programs and bureaucracy, which effectively reaches nearly all of society (aided by the fact that the rural/isolated populations are negligible in number):

Comúnmente se resuelve en el instante. Si estás dentro del esquema municipal se resuelven a través del municipio, a través del área de acción social, se envía al asistente social, que haga el informe, que corrobore la realidad y la necesidad. Y si no estás dentro del esquema municipal se plantea en el ministerio de asuntos sociales, se hace el mismo trabajo a través del asistente social, se llega a la casa, se ve la necesidad y se resuelve. (Deputy Victoria, PJ)

Most often people inquire candidates on local issues rather than on broader (provincial, national) topics. Only local, and sometimes provincial, candidates reach to talk to people directly. Those “local” problems are the ones people really know about, and can more clearly demand/complaint about; for a lay voter to complain about policies which demand studies and research to a candidate who stop at his house would take some knowledge, the candidates may not even be prepared to answer that, the voter may not even know how to inquire about the problem and it might be the only chance the voter has to question on an issue for which he can show and tell to the aspiring candidate. Hence, candidates know they do not need to prepare programmatic platforms for the campaign.

4.16.2 The formality of the platform

The ideas candidates and parties may have about what to do if they make it to office are often not put into print, only a few bullet points to show to people in fliers. Programs are not important in the voter mobilization efforts.

Councilman Lozano (UCR, Rio Gallegos) is in the minority in the council, but the mayor is a partisan UCR. He shows that being in office or having had elective office
experience helps in the elaboration of a party platform because they know more precise information on issues and how to solve them. On the issue of making a campaign party platform he said:

...Ya lo teníamos...no es que se elabora previo. Primero se tiran líneas gruesas de más o menos que es lo que quisiéramos delinear. Por lo menos en la campaña no hubo un trabajo muy puntual o conciso en relación a la propuesta. Lo que sí es tratar de llevarlo a cabo, pero no hay un estudio previo...tal vez sí, como el proyecto son ordenanzas, o se fue al archivo en más de una oportunidad, se logra reflotar... (I 1, 2, 4; A 1-6)

The party platform is not often discussed in campaign, particularly in highly personalized tactics. The written platform does not develop the bullet point idea, but on occasion candidates must elaborate on those bullet point ideas when the face-to-face tactics finds an inquisitive voter. On the development of the bullet point ideas of the platform/fliers, Councilman Lozano (UCR) said:

Si bien no está desarrollado en lo escrito y demás, cuando uno charla se desarrolla bastante la idea. Por una parte yo estoy tratando cuestiones un poco profundas: cuestiones, el tema de audiencias públicas, cartas orgánicas, presupuesto participativo, pero en el medio también esta, parquización, espacios verdes, reserva costera, y demás, entonces, perrera, control fitosanitario, entonces, la gente cuando pregunta dice 'que va a pasar con los perros', que pasó esto, que vamos a hacer con la basura'. ...Ahí uno es donde tiene que estar un poquito más preparado y saber qué es lo que va a hacer.

Candidates are not often asked about the complex and sometimes abstract problems of government, but on problems that more directly and particularly affect voters. Mayor Roquel (UCR, Río Gallegos) said that they tell voters what they want to hear. They survey what the main problems in the community are and go back to them with those problems in the form of a brochure with bullet point projects: “Yo te diría que, en términos generales, era un enunciado y algunas con algún grado de desarrollo.”

“...Creo que las propuestas fueron, en buena medida, difundidas.” (A 1-6)

However, Councilman Beroiza (PJ, Los Antiguos) says the campaign brochure is just an excuse to get into people’s homes (Victoria had a similar opinion): “Se hace una cartilla para figurar, porque la gente ya lo sabe eso. Que haya una cartilla y no se
cumple ni el 10% de la cartilla. …Si, [los candidatos] lo hacen igual, por una cuestión de formalidad. De un uso para llegar a una casa, 'te entrego esto'. Pero bueno."

4.16.3 From the survey to the flyer

Mayor Maimo (PJ, Pico Truncado) shares a similar perspective to Roquel's. Maimo’s approach to the platform and the campaign seem simple and requires less imagination than more abstract platform promises. Mayor Maimo said:

Se arma un equipo profesional político a ver que son las cosas que por ahí demanda la gente. Porque vos cuando haces una encuesta; ¿'qué cree usted que le está faltando...?' , 'y ya está todo': Las conclusiones. No tenés muchas cosas para inventar. Esto es lo que necesita la gente y vos vas completando la propuesta. Esto es lo que nos está faltando, esa es la propuesta.

He is proud of his administration: “[The survey] te ayuda un montón…después hacemos un tríptico…y esa es la propuesta: La educación, el deporte, la cultura, servicios, obras, y bueno...”

4.16.4 Centralized power

Councilwoman Reynoso (PJ, Caleta Olivia) is submissive to her political boss (the mayor) and is hesitant to talk to voters directly, she has basically no programmatic ideas of her own for the campaign, no power to take the initiative on much of anything regarding the campaign. The local leadership would prep her on the local issues and how things stood, but when asked if any topics where banned to her by the mayor or that she could not address some topic because it might upset the mayor she said:

No, no, nunca sentí eso. Lo que sí por ejemplo, acá yo les decía que íbamos a tal lugar o por ahí me decían, 'acá seguramente nos van a pedir la construcción, … Entonces si te preguntaban [yo respondía]: 'si, si el señor intendente con su equipo de trabajo está trabajando en ese tema'. Yo no me explayaba porque sino hacían mas preguntas, pero las derivábamos perfectamente. (I 1-5; A 1, 2, 6)

118 Councilman Cifuentes (Socialismo - allied with local UCR-, Caleta Olivia) is an opposition candidate who is aware of the power of the ruling PJ, also shares the PJ’s broad programmatic strategy concepts: “En la campaña uno tiene que decir lo que la gente quiere escuchar.”
The candidate’s house visits or door-to-door tactics are the excuse to have a personal contact, hand out the party literature and first hand learn how people are feeling in these small communities. All the messages given to the voters, from the candidate themselves to the lay party activist are coordinated. The outcome of these tactics can convey ideas which vary from the father-like figure and sole “savior” candidate whom we saw in the case of Formosa in other chapters, to a capable leader with the supportive team (or the “first-among-equals” candidate) which is more commonly the case in the province of Santa Cruz. Here is Provincial Deputy Banicevich with an example of the latter from when he campaigned for mayor:

[When you visit a voter’s house] y bueno se habla,...’venimos a visitarlo a los efectos de llevarle...la propuesta de que es lo que queremos hacer. Las personas que me están acompañando, me van a acompañar en esta instancia como concejales. Considero que son las personas que me puede acompañar, que me van a acompañar en el proyecto, no van a poner obstáculos.’ Y eso. Después me empezaban a preguntar una cosa, que es lo que iba a hacer, digo que esto, y se producía un diálogo que capaz que estabas una hora, dos horas. Por eso me tomaba más de un mes [hacer el recorrido en el pueblo]. (A 1-6)

Now, not all visits are as long as one hour for the candidates in Santa Cruz, but what seems to be a constant is the respect for the cognitive abilities of the voters, which can also be interpreted as fear for embarrassment if a bad experience in a voter’s house gets to be public. Of course, candidates in the other districts also convey respect when talking individually to voters in their homes, but in Santa Cruz differently than in Formosa candidates do not seem to portray themselves as more able or intellectually superior to the lay voter. If broken, the “equal-ness” between candidate and voter in these small towns, can translate to public humiliation with electoral consequences.

Provincial Deputy Banicevich is an older politician, who has been the mayor of 28 de Noviembre four times and his authority and leadership was not questioned. Next, Banicevich shows how irrelevant a particularly programmatic tactic would be for him.
For these all-powerful incumbents, performance instead of program, seem to be the winning card because there is no equally powerful counter voice opposing them. People may get a brochure/flier with “proposals” from any candidate, but they vote on the performance of a job well done. Again, Banicevich on “platform” said: “Hoy hacemos una plataforma, en todas las áreas, cultura, educación...obra pública que es lo que más repercusión tiene en la ciudad. … [During all his tenures] yo hice escuelas, hice gimnasios, piletas de natación.”

He took credit by personalizing the successes (“I did it”) and I asked if he was who did all those projects: “A través de gestiones [con los gobiernos provinciales, nacionales, etc.]. …porque si vos vas a estar esperando que el gobierno lo haga, no te lo va a hacer; esa es la gestión. …Dios atiende en todas partes, pero, acá está en Gallegos. Yo venía cada 10 días, cada 15 días...” As mentioned earlier, in Santa Cruz the municipalities have little autonomy and depend on the central provincial government for money and projects. Hence, the promise of a platform made in campaign is always dependent on the governors wallet and will, which by the way, in times of campaign comes down pouring resources and projects to all the 14 communities in the province. This way, the usually incumbent PJ candidates do not tend to campaign on what they might be able to get done, but on what they were able to achieve. –See chapter 6.

Another example of what was said above comes from Councilwoman Elisa Ramos (PJ, Los Antiguos) and the projects she promised in campaign: “Como 10, 15 [propuestas hice] no me acuerdo. … Asfalto, hacer la terminal [de ómnibus], la ampliación del hospital, o el hospital nuevo, hacer un natatorio, hacer una dulcera, que
Councilwoman Ramos was basically campaigning with a platform suitable for the governor or the mayor, in the 2005 all-legislative election. In other words she was campaigning on the future performance of the executives, on projects she could not achieve herself from the city council. (I 1-5; A 1-6)

Finally, Provincial Deputy Miriam Aguiar (PJ) is an example of the de-facto fusion between the party in government and the provincial government using public resources to promote the party’s candidates:

*Generalmente esta última elección, que fue a Diputado Nacional, y Senadores se hizo más que nada con actos institucionales, no hubo casi actos políticos, hubo uno solo que fue el cierre de campaña. Y se hizo todo un recorrido por la provincia con actos institucionales, con obras, subsidios a entidades intermedias y demás. El gobernador con los candidatos a diputados y senadores, sí. (I 1-5)*

### 4.16.5 The case of Perito Moreno

In 2003 Councilman Ojeda (PJ, Perito Moreno) was defending the incumbent mayor, and Moro (UCR) was trying to become the new mayor. Both admittedly had little on the programmatic campaign side. The campaign was basically on the mayor’s performance evaluation. On the city council election platform in 2005 Councilman Ojeda said: “*Bilardo era intendente y nosotros en la lista de concejales... El tenía la experiencia de sus gestiones: que le estaba faltando, o que le faltó en su momento, en base a esto nosotros incorporamos...o modificábamos [nuestra plataforma].”*

Mayor Moro (UCR, Perito Moreno) in 2003 was trying to defeat the long time incumbent PJ mayor, and on the platform they made for the town he said: “*Respecto de eso, fue algo muy sencillo, muy simple. Solamente un par de hojas que resumían un poco la actividad a desarrollar estando dentro del municipio. Fue algo muy light. No hubo un gran compendio de ideas...*” One could expect that an opposition candidate with
good chances of winning would come up with a well developed platform, but again in this case it is not necessary since the performance of Mayor Bilardo was at stake and a serious contestant only had to be trustworthy enough in order to win. For this reason Moro’s platform was a lean evaluation of the problems without too specific projects: “Siempre interviene un poco el supuesto, porque no conocemos a fondo, en su momento, todo. Entonces trabajamos con algunos supuestos, pero nunca apartado de la realidad. Por eso hicimos una cartilla breve, pero conteniendo puntos fundamentales.” The bullet points of Moro’s platform included the need to further develop sport and cultural activities in town: “No la puntualizamos con qué tipo de actividad íbamos a hacer, pero sí que era lo que veíamos que se puede llegar a hacer.” In Santa Cruz the diffusion of ideas or public project proposals are only acceptable in campaign tactics when backed up by evidence of performance.

4.17 Conclusion

I argue that in order to understand the centrality to campaigns of a programmatic voter mobilization strategy we should study how parties make a campaign platform and how they campaign on programmatic messages. On this first point we should consider the effort and resources put into it. This ranges from the presence of exclusive long standing organizations for the formulation of the parties’ platforms, to a lower degree of effort such as networks of punteros/brokers who transmit needs to candidates, and opinion surveys to uncover the current wishes of the voters, i.e. punteros are non-specific or multi-functional actors to make a party program or platform.

Parties which are set up as personality-based electoral machines do not seem particularly suited to elaborate programmatic campaign platforms (e.g. Capital Federal). Some of these parties may have “think tanks” or branches of the party in charge of working on issues which get turned into platforms for the campaigns (e.g. Capital
Federal and Catamarca), but this does not necessarily mean the platforms will be central to the campaigns. (Catamarca)

In some districts parties do have structures to work on programs, make committees, compromise and arrive at agreements about issues on which to campaign (Mendoza, Catamarca). In others there is hardly a debate on the issues, as the agenda is already set and is handed down by the party leaders. (Formosa, Santa Cruz, and in part Capital Federal)

To understand the centrality to campaigns of a programmatic voter mobilization strategy we also have to study the tactics and messages parties use in the context of the overall campaign. These tactics can vary in their degree of personalization between the voter and the candidates, from a “house visit by a candidate” to “a television appearance,” or “printed media publications” for example. The audiences in highly personalized tactics will likely be interested in issues which concern the individual and his community; the exchange will less likely deal with the holistic visions of society present in campaign programs.

In provincial towns and cities people usually ask candidates about local issues rather than broader (provincial, national) topics. This is in part due to the fact that only local and sometimes provincial candidates reach a significant number of people directly. These personal or local problems are the ones people really know about, and can more clearly and confidently make demands about them in a coherent non-embarrassing way in the limited time they have with the candidate. Hence, candidates know they do not need to prepare programs for the campaign’s highly personalized tactics. (Particularly in Catamarca and Formosa)

There are a few other conclusions I draw from this chapter. In places with electoral competition the local candidates do not always count on incumbent provincial authorities for promising investments in their localities (besides, not all relevant
candidates are of the incumbent provincial party); they are on their own (e.g. Mendoza, Catamarca). In places with no competition (and no decentralization of resources) the local authorities depend on the governor’s favor (Santa Cruz, Formosa). In Formosa and Santa Cruz, for example, the governor is the agent of growth. Local candidates cannot credibly make promises on major policies or investments, as only the governor can. In Santa Cruz local candidates can promise to broker for provincial governor and promise specific projects (this is due to the local demands pushed by sectors of the civil society).

Usually political parties in all districts and all levels of office campaign on the issues which are relevant to the people in a district in a particular moment in time, but they do not necessarily elaborate programmatic campaign platforms. Local level candidates, who have a chance to meet with a significant number of voters more easily than national candidates, rely on a list of issues (like specific problems or projects) but not necessarily on a platform or party program. (All districts)\(^1\)

It is common for legislative candidates to run on issues beyond their scope because legislative elections are basically a vote to evaluate the higher-level executives (All districts)\(^2\). Incumbent party legislative candidates participate in and campaign at government events (e.g. Santa Cruz and Formosa), which shows an erosion of the separation of powers and the use of the state for private (candidate campaign) goals.

The mass media (with its quick pace and brief windows for candidates) also constrains the campaign from being more programmatic. However, in some cases it forces candidates to make programmatic statements which would not be present otherwise (particularly Catamarca and Formosa). A campaign could be programmatic,  

\(^1\) Voters may only care for the very concrete issues that affect their lives at the local level. In people’s minds more long term projects are blurred to irrelevance when there are more urgent issues which need to be addressed

\(^2\) For example city councilwoman Ramos (PJ) in Los Antiguos (Santa Cruz) promising a Hospital, when the Provincial government is in charge of actually doing those types of infrastructure projects.
through media debates or interviews, but these are tactics usually only reserved to the major candidates and only a few can occur during each election. The programmatic use of the mass media is often a formality which in many districts is expected by the media, while parties may primarily use the media to campaign on personalism and performance as well. (All districts)

Besides the knowledge gained from the case studies and the evidence of the diversity within Argentina regarding the centrality of programmatic campaigns, the contribution of this chapter is the reflection of the qualitative differences in the campaign strategies. Next is chapter 5 which focuses on the centrality to campaigns of personalism as a voter mobilization strategy.
CHAPTER 5
THE MECHANISMS AND CENTRALITY TO CAMPAIGNS OF PERSONALISM AS A VOTER MOBILIZATION STRATEGY

5.1 Introduction

This chapter provides a qualitative approach and a technique for assessing the centrality to campaigns of personalism as a voter mobilization strategy in Argentine provinces based on in-depth interviews to elected officials and comprehensive analyses of districts as cases.

In this chapter I seek to understand the factors which decide the centrality to campaigns of personal attributes of candidates, or other leaders, in parties’ campaign strategies in a given electoral district. In the literature there is a lack of attention to personalism as a campaign strategy in itself. Here I identify the mechanisms which help us recognize and measure the centrality to campaigns of personalism as a strategy.

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121 I do not study personalism, but rather the centrality to campaigns of personalism as a strategy in a district. In order to study the centrality to campaigns of a specific (strategy) I must consider the whole (campaign strategies in a district). Hence, even though we could find differences in the messages communicated among office types (e.g. a mayor, governor or legislator), here I evaluate the voter mobilization effort as such in the district as a whole. Campaigns cannot credibly be isolated by office when elections are held concurrently (and even if they are not) if we wish to comprehensively study a campaign. For example, a councilmember candidate often does advertise his gubernatorial or presidential candidates while campaigning for himself, probably without the awareness of that higher office candidate.

122 Most literature on campaign strategies or party-voter linkages focuses on clientelism and programmatic strategies as the only relevant ways in which parties relate to voters. (for more see e.g. Kitschelt 2000, and on chapter 1)
5.1.1 Summary of findings

Besides the district’s electoral competitiveness and the socioeconomic characteristics of the electorate, one other factor seems particularly relevant when identifying the centrality to campaigns of personalism as a voter mobilization strategy in a district. It is important to know the compromises in which the relevant parties incurred when nominating candidates.

Higher socioeconomic development makes it more costly and difficult for personalism to be central to campaigns as a voter mobilization strategy. Richer voters are more likely than poorer voters to request governments to improve their lives in non-material ways, to pursue more comprehensive public policy demands and have the resources to do it, presumably making personalistic appeals not as central in political parties’ campaigns. However, I argue that although richer voters make it more costly to parties to make personalism central to campaigns, personalism still is central if there are no candidate nomination compromises in a district with high electoral competitiveness.

Electoral competitiveness leads parties to intensify and diversify campaign tactics and messages, and does not have a linear effect on the centrality to campaigns of personalism. When the district is generally poor, lower competitiveness increases the centrality of personalism to campaigns (candidates consolidate a “father-like” style personalism – paternalism). Competition among parties, in principle, diminishes the role, effectiveness and centrality to campaigns of the father-like personalism in campaign.

Alternatively, when the district is generally rich and personalism is less likely to be central to campaigns to begin with, higher competitiveness increases the centrality of personalism because increased electoral competition forces parties to diversify the types of messages to mobilize voters, hence increasing the likelihood that personalism’s importance would also become more central to campaigns (candidates differentiate on
“expert-like” style personalism messages). Therefore, I argue that the fact that electoral competitiveness leads parties to intensify and diversify campaign tactics and messages is not enough to predict whether personalism is central to campaigns. Only the interaction of the three factors can make the causal argument intelligible.

Finally, as rational actors, those who compromise (or not) for candidate nominations make strategic decisions taking into account the resources available and the constraints on power to communicate campaign messages. More compromises involved and required in the candidate nomination procedures of the relevant parties leads to less centrality to campaigns of personalism as a strategy in the district.

The five case studies in this chapter show us the workings of personalism in campaigns. I explore the high centrality to campaigns of the sole “all powerful father-like figure” candidate of Formosa, as opposed to the high centrality to campaigns of the “expert” candidate who has a few key public-attractive dimensions in Capital Federal and the sole “first-among-equals” in Santa Cruz, where the appearance of parity, and not superiority of candidates above the simple folk is a prudent approach. Personalism is not central to campaigns in Catamarca and Mendoza due to district and party features.

5.1.2 Outline of the chapter

In the first part of the chapter I first deal with a conceptual clarification of personalism. Then, I outline the theoretical argument about the effects of socioeconomic development, electoral competitiveness and candidate nomination compromises in order to understand the centrality to campaigns of personalism as a voter mobilization strategy in districts, and I formulate theoretically derived hypotheses. Later I operationalize the causal factors of the concept here evaluated (the centrality to campaigns of personalism

123 The above “labels” given to the different personalism styles or types predominant in the provinces will be ultimately understood once the cases are comprehensively analyzed.
as a voter mobilization strategy). I measure the dependent variable with quantitative and qualitative data to test the hypotheses. In the second part of the chapter I develop the five cases in order to justify my evaluations.

5.2 Conceptual clarification

In the personalistic vote the voter is appealed to by the candidate’s “unique personal skills and power of persuasion” (Kitschelt 2000: 849; also Mainwaring 1998, Mainwaring and Torcal 2006). In a personalistic strategy parties get votes in exchange for “grand gestures and personal styles” which appeal to voters (Kitschelt 2000: 845). Possibly one of the most primal sources of legitimacy for choosing leadership is a personal appeal. Although Max Weber (1947) expected charisma to wane as societies become more rational, the appeal of the candidate in a democracy never completely disappears but it may be overshadowed by other sources of legitimacy (policy program, particularistic gifts, rational calculations about the future). According to Weber, a charismatic leader is like a prophet who transforms his audience, repudiates the past and revolutionizes. I instead refer to campaigns on personalities and personal attributes; they may even be false attributes, but if people concede their vote, then it was useful as a voter mobilization strategy. Since a charismatic leader is not needed to develop an electoral campaign based on attributes of charisma, then a personalistic campaign can indeed be done on preserving tradition and not necessarily on repudiating the past.

As argued in chapters 1 and 2, personalism as a voter mobilization strategy is the conceptualization of a concert of tactics aimed at luring the voter by resorting to the appeal of personal attributes of the candidates or leaders. A set of tactics based on the aspects of a candidate’s personality or persona may be interpreted by social scientists as a personalistic strategy.
A campaign tactic, for example, aimed at emphasizing the candidate’s honesty, boldness or warmth, may not necessarily contain a policy message. However, a strategy to win votes based on aspects of a candidate’s personality used during the time-limited campaign should not be confused with a term like populism, which, as Robert Barr (2009) argues, is characterized for its “anti-establishment” appeals.\textsuperscript{124} After reviewing the literature on concepts like personalism, charisma and populism, Barr concludes:

\begin{quotation}
[Populism] is a mass movement led by an outsider or maverick seeking to gain or maintain power by using anti-establishment appeals and plebiscitarian linkages. To be clear, one cannot reduce populism to the use of fiery, antielite rhetoric, nor to the rise of demagogic outsiders, nor even to highly vertical connections between leader and followers. Rather, the specific combination of these factors defines populism. (Barr 2009: 44)
\end{quotation}

Barr’s definition restricts those actors who may be labeled as populist and loads the term populism with explicit or implicit policy messages to the prospective supporters (anti-establishment appeals) which are not necessarily present in a campaign where appeals to the personal characteristics of the candidates are central in the campaign effort. Of course specific tactics may combine aspects of both (populist policies and personal appeals). Finally, the tactics in a personalistic strategy may be carried out by any political entrepreneur and not necessarily by the person whose aspects are the basis for the tactic. In fact, those personal aspects of the candidate or leader do not need to be real or true, and may be fabricated with the goal of winning votes.

Next, but referring to the internal party life, Ansell and Fish’s (1999) account of non-charismatic personalism\textsuperscript{125} shares with rational legal authority a substitution of transcendent means for transcendent ends. This leader represents the party itself and,

\begin{footnotes}

\item[\textsuperscript{125}] Ansell and Fish discuss party leadership and internal party conflicts and refer to “\textit{non-charismatic personalism},” which is a useful category for understanding personalism in some of the districts under scrutiny here.
\end{footnotes}
like a charismatic leader, the basis for the leader’s legitimacy is personal. In the authors’ account, members of the organization identify with the leader as a person more than as an officeholder. But the authors say that this noncharismatic leader is not “traditional leadership” because he does not appeal to the past. The author’s conception may be proper for ideal types; however, in the real world politicians speak about the past or future depending on who or what they are facing. It is a way candidates use to delimit the boundaries of the debate, setting straight with their voters what is “good” and “evil;” this could mean praising or criticizing the past. It is not rare in Argentina to find candidates who appeal to both the past and the future.

Ansell and Fish also say: “in the literature on political parties, only one type of leadership authority is both personal and means oriented: patronage-based clientelism.” They add, “…But personal loyalties associated with clientelism are particularistic and private regarding, whereas noncharismatic personalism, like charismatic leadership, is universal and public in character.” (Page 285) This distinction is useful for differentiating the type of loyalty people in Formosa can have to their local mayor (because he satisfies their particularistic needs). However, the mayor performs his personalistic rituals in a “universal and public” manner. Hence, in reality both characteristics (particularistic-private and universal-public) may be present in the type of leaderships in some of these cases. Parties can have “noncharismatic personalistic leaders” or charismatic ones,

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126 In their text, see chart on page 285 that the “claim to leadership authority based on representation of ‘transcendental means” where “the loyalty of membership is impersonal” (rational-legal, bureaucratic party, mass party, etc.) and where the “loyalty of membership is personal” (the noncharismatic personalistic party).

127 This “noncharismatic personalism” Ansell and Fish talk about could then better describe leaders in Santa Cruz (or in places where the institutions like parties are relevant), but not in Formosa where the elements of charisma are important and subsume or weaken political parties as formal institutions.
but campaigns on personalistic appeals made about political leaders can be autonomous from the actual leaders, and be carried out by other candidates.

5.3 Theory

Three variables are particularly pertinent to understanding the centrality to campaigns of personalism in a district. These are: the socioeconomic development and electoral competitiveness of the district, and the candidate nomination compromises incurred by the relevant parties. However, as mentioned above and argued throughout this dissertation, I am not interested in which variable explains the most variation in the outcome variable, but in how sets of conditions yield certain outcomes; causation is a combination of conditions (this argument is developed in Chapter 1). Nonetheless, below is the argument of how socioeconomic development and electoral competitiveness individually affect the centrality of personalism to campaigns, which I partially challenge.

5.3.1 Socioeconomic development

The socioeconomic development of the electorate is a factor to understand the centrality to campaigns of personalism as a campaign strategy. It should be understood as a type of pressure which is exerted over candidates and parties during campaigns.

As argued in chapter 2, what can we expect in campaigns as a consequence of having more developed voters in terms of socioeconomic conditions, human development and the complexity of society in general? First, and what is arguably the conventional wisdom, parties have to include more abstract goals as part of their campaigns in a context in which voters have basic subsistence needs covered and may

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128 The non conformity of reality to the ideal types in the literature also points to the appropriateness of a qualitative data approach to measuring social phenomena and a “family resemblance” approach when elaborating concepts to describe it.
want the government to improve their lives in non-material ways (Inglehart, 1984).

Politicians’ discourses are more elaborate and complex to appeal to a public who are, for example, more educated. However, there is also more targeted and specialized discourses to appeal to active societal pressure groups and at the same time there are organized citizens pursuing specific goals. These voters are more likely to be economically independent from government and hence more steadfast in their demands, which lead candidates and parties to have more elaborated messages, political marketing, and image of candidates and parties.

Low levels of socioeconomic development characterize a society in which the demands over candidates are often by isolated individuals. The public’s demand on candidates is disarticulated and particularistic, and the media and press are usually not a catalyst for citizenry activism, keeping individual voters relatively isolated from their broader community and issues. (Candidates in this setting need to address those “particularistic demands,” however.) Alternatively, high levels of socioeconomic development characterize a society in which there are active NGOs, there are more holistic, ample demands and initiatives from constituents and candidates need to address more comprehensive public demands in order to get legitimized with votes.

These two scenarios allow for the development of a more “charismatic” candidate or at least one who uses paternalistic messages (poor voters) versus an “expert” with the key important skills, knowledge or attributes who has a “team” of capable people surrounding him (rich voters).

However, a paternalistic or “father-like-figure” personalism as a campaign strategy is possible with a socioeconomically developed constituency, as well. This will happen if there is a crisis which affects or credibly threatens to affect the community. When people fear or are ignorant about things like war, natural disasters, economic crises, the leader can take a paternalistic attitude (E.g. Menem during the hyperinflation
in 1989). Once the uncertain situation has passed, then people are more “balanced” and put a check on the aspects of personalism which do not seem republican. In the case of “low development” constituents, the situation of uncertainty is more or less a constant (due to hunger, unemployment or personal safety concerns, etc.), hence the effectiveness of a protective father-like-figure image in campaigns.

Higher socioeconomic development makes it more difficult for personalism to be central to campaigns as a voter mobilization strategy, or at least constituents demand more sophistication from the candidates. Candidates need to show more evidence of expertise/capabilities on different areas of policy. These more sophisticated leaders are hence more vulnerable in the public eye (it may hence be easier for personalism to be central to campaigns in poor districts). However, although higher socio-economic development in a district makes it more costly to parties to make personalism central to campaigns, personalism may still be central.

5.3.2 Electoral competitiveness

As a consequence of competing parties, voters are likely to be more aware of things they would not know otherwise, for example, regarding the performance of the ruling party, officials, or candidates. This awareness is more significant when the voters are poor and lack resources to independently gather information to decide their vote. Electoral competition reduces this isolation because candidates and parties fight to reach people and their votes with increasingly more elaborate tactics and messages. The party competition can copy and improve effective campaign activities and tactics. More competition forces parties and political entrepreneurs to try to organize better, and to be more conscious in the effective allocation of limited campaign resources.

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More competition forces parties to try to set out a strategy which make them improve their performance in campaigns given the competitive threat from rival parties. The tie breaker in a competitive district would have to be a stronger version of the incentives given to voters (e.g. public policy) or an additional different type of incentive (e.g. personalistic appeals). Hence, more electoral competition intensifies and/or diversifies the appeals in the parties’ exchange strategies to recruit voters (See Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007, Introduction).

The competition among parties would in principle diminish the role, effectiveness and centrality to campaigns of the father-like personalism in campaigns. Competition means a challenger who not only tries to favor their side, but also diminish, tarnish or bastardize the other. Furthermore, constituents find new alternatives, compare and choose among candidates; hence personalism is put in perspective. Competition forces parties to be more complex in their campaigns; more leaders emerge to address more intricacies of complex problems and differentiate themselves from the others.

5.3.3 Candidate nomination compromises

As mentioned earlier in the chapter, more compromises involved and required in the candidate nomination process of the relevant parties will lead to less centrality to campaigns of personalism as a voter mobilization strategy in the district. But, what is a compromise? A compromise means a negotiation among actors with agency. (An imposition of will does not require compromise.) The tradeoff to the actors in the negotiation which leads to the compromise also means that the actors have a share of power. A compromise binds the parts and pushes them to cooperate and build on common ground. For example, a compromise among party leaders and candidate aspirants combines joint resources from the battling parts, creating a more resourceful party infrastructure, but also no single leader, no unilateral faction or set of ideas. A
losing faction is less likely to want to emphasize the image of the winning candidate than it is to support common party programs, slogans, or ideals; the winning faction will not want to risk irritating the losing faction by emphasizing the personal qualities of their leader. The compromises incurred over candidate nominations are the consequence of a balance of power within the political parties. The agents of power that participate in candidate nominations could be party leaders and candidates, as well as committed party militants or power brokers who control valuable resources (as in the case of leaders with assets such as ground level broker’s networks, mass media connections or importance sources of finance). The more compromises that are necessary to nominate candidates, the less central to campaigns personalism is as a strategy.

In the absence of a strong single leader and in the case of parties with internal opposition, there may either be negotiations and compromises among faction leaders (primaries, party conventions, leaders’ negotiations), or there is a lack of compromise among factions regarding nominations and a faction withdraws support or leaves the party. In the former case, compromise is greater and personalism is decreased; in the latter, there is no further need for compromise and personalism is likely to be increased.

Party leaders are important in candidate nominations and legislators’ behavior (See Jones et al 2002). The institutional or de facto checks on the power of party leaders, and the further checks to power which other contesting parties represent, are relevant to understanding the compromises the actors incur into to nominate candidates. Personalism works more efficiently with very few leaders of a party at a

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130 Electoral formulas: I will not directly address the issue of electoral formulas and their "incentives to cultivate the personal vote" (see e.g. Carey and Shugart 1995 study of legislative formulas). As mentioned in Chapter 1, Argentine federalism and electoral institutions "place the legislators' reelection decision not in the hands of the voters, but rather in the hands of the provincial governor/ party boss(es)." (Jones et al 2002, abstract; Jones et al mimeo; De Luca et al 2002). The party (and leader) controls the access to the ballots and legislative candidates are not particularly concerned about their reelection (as Carey and Shugart 1995 did argue) as a career path (See Jones et al 2002).
single time in a district, who have few checks on their power (i.e. fewer candidate nomination compromises are required). When the persona of a leader is stressed, necessarily it is done putting him above the others that are present, at least with respect to the unique features that are being stressed. Alternatively, if the personal attributes of multiple fellow candidates from the same party are stressed in a campaign ad/event, then the “team” emerges above the individual, so the mere mention of the personal attribute does not constitute a tactic for personalism (the collection of those personal attributes become ingredients of a team -not a personal- project). Parties and candidates may use tactics in which they emphasize personal attributes, but personalism as a strategy will not be as central to campaigns in a district with no single leaderships.

5.3.4 Competitiveness and resources

Finally, there is inevitably interaction between the variables of competitiveness between parties and the variable of candidate nomination compromises. Party leaders often do negotiate nominations (and hence broaden the alliance base) because they fear losing in the general elections to the competing parties. Some parties may negotiate nominations based on, for example, the ground infrastructure resources of some factions which they expect to be very valuable in general election campaigns (e.g. legislative positions given to union leaders, regional bosses, famous personalities, etc.).

I also earlier mentioned (from chapter 4) the difficulties of reaching conclusions based only on the opinion of national legislators who usually do not have much power of nomination and actual mobilization of voters, and who usually run in the coattail of their governors and party leaders. Contrary to some literature (See for example Jones 1997), political party discipline (in order to secure a future political post/candidacy) may be to either the president or the governor (or both). See for example Eaton (2002) and Mustapic (2001) who while discussing the relationship between the President and the Argentine Legislature, mark the centrality to campaigns of provincial level politics in Argentina. The Carey and Shugart (1995) study which ranks legislative electoral formulas would hence be of little help here. Electoral systems will be treated as a constant in this chapter.

I focus on the differences in the candidate nominations compromises which are a much better predictor of the centrality to campaigns of personalism as a voter mobilization strategy in a specific provincial district than electoral formulas.
5.4 Interactions among explanatory variables

Next, I combine the theoretical evaluation of the effect of socioeconomic development, electoral competitiveness and candidate nomination compromises on the centrality of personalism as a strategy to campaigns. Figure 5.1 succinctly graphs the variables’ interactions.

The independent causal factors do not act in isolation with the dependent variable (the centrality to campaigns of personalism), but interact with one another. Electoral competitiveness, interacting with socioeconomic development, does not have a linear effect on the centrality of personalism to campaigns. When the district is generally poor, lower competitiveness increases the centrality of personalism to campaigns (candidates consolidate the “father-like” style personalism) and when the district is generally rich, higher competitiveness increases the centrality of personalism (candidates differentiate on “expert-type” style personalism messages).
Figure 5.1: Simplified Theoretical Model Of The Centrality To Campaigns Of Personalism

Political parties (through a single leader appointment or democratic procedures, etc.) decide candidate nominations. The specific criteria and procedures are a consequence of certain political party characteristics (e.g. the leader’s resources, intra-party opposition, alliances, etc.) and other reasons such as electoral competiveness of the district, and civil society activism and the centrality to campaigns of mass media (as characteristics of the socioeconomic development of the electorate). The specific candidate nomination compromises can hence tell us a great deal about the
characteristics of the candidates, the message the candidate conveys in the campaign and even the type of tactics which are used (these are explained later in the chapter).\textsuperscript{131}

As shown on Figure 5.1 and as was argued earlier in the chapter, the socioeconomic development and electoral competitiveness of the district together with specific party resources\textsuperscript{132} also affect the type of tactics parties implement. Electoral competition reduces the isolation of voters and intensifies and diversifies the tactics and messages in campaigns. Competition may also lead to more personalized tactics and messages.\textsuperscript{133} The more personalized the relationship with the voter is, the more secured the voter could be for that party; consider the example of a candidate visiting a voter’s home. For a person deciding his vote, the issues discussed at his home with the visiting candidate may become less relevant than the personal relationship experience/impression left by the candidate; feelings of empathy may be created and the idea that “the candidate is one of us.” This type of relationship leads to a greater centrality of personalism in campaigns. However, for increased competition to lead to more personalization of tactics (e.g. face to face interaction) and probably to an increased centrality of personalism in campaigns, a party must possess a specialized infrastructure to carry out those personalized tactics. The centrality to campaigns of personalism as a

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\textsuperscript{131} As mentioned earlier in the chapter and discussed in chapters 1 and 2 we cannot see “strategies,” we instead see a number of campaign tactics which we then interpret as a strategy.

\textsuperscript{132} The political party infrastructure is relevant to understanding the types of tactics which are a possibility for a party in a campaign. Party infrastructure refers to a variety of assets at the party’s disposal. These assets could include networks of punteros/brokers, marketing experts, money, etc. For example, a tactic like visiting every house in the district could only be carried out if there is a manpower base of activists and brokers to cover the geography of the district. In turn, the actual tactics which make sense to implement are also related to the type of communication which is attractive to those voters. In districts like Capital Federal people would feel harassed if candidates showed up at their homes or tried to reach them at their apartments. However, that type of relationship with the voter is expected in many towns in Argentina.

\textsuperscript{133} Again, as explained in Chapter 2, “personalization” of tactics refers to how close and personal the voter is to a specific campaign tactic; the concept considers the voter without addressing message contents. On the other hand, “personalism” refers to the centrality to campaigns and characteristics of the leader’s personal attributes emphasized in a specific tactic; here the concept considers the candidate and addresses the message contents.
voter mobilization strategy is weighted by the overall voter mobilization effort in the district (all tactics, resources, and efforts put into them by the political actors).

As argued earlier, the interaction of the causal factors (socioeconomic development, electoral competitiveness and the candidate nomination compromises) conceive the idea of the development of a personalistic strategy in which the messages would be more or less “father-like” (paternalistic) or “expert-like”, depending on the characteristics of the voters and the enabling resources such as a party’s ground infrastructure and media. In other words, in poor districts, electoral competition reduces the centrality of personalism to campaigns (i.e. parties will want to make a difference by resorting to clientelism, etc.). In rich districts, where personalism is less likely to be central to campaigns to begin with, an increased electoral competition diversifies the types of messages to mobilize voters, hence increasing the likelihood that personalism’s importance would also become more central to campaigns.

In the end, the candidate nomination compromises of parties reflect the realm of resources and capabilities available to the parties (from ground infrastructure, media and technical resources, policy and ideological resources to campaign). The socioeconomic characteristics of the district tell us about what are likely the type of messages parties give voters in campaigns (e.g. more or less material satisfactions, See Inglehart 1984), given the resources and capabilities available to the parties in the district. Finally, electoral competitiveness in the district reflects the pressure on the campaigning parties, independent from the demands stemming from civil society, and from the resources and capabilities the party has to address those demands and electoral competition.

5.5 Hypotheses

One conclusion that can be drawn from the factors and theory considered above is that even though electoral competitiveness and socioeconomic development of the
electorate have an important role in understanding the centrality to campaigns of personalism as a voter mobilization strategy, we must also look within the political party and its functioning. Table 5.1 summarizes the eight theoretically derived hypotheses based on the fundamental role of candidate nomination compromises to the centrality of personalism in campaigns, then the role of socioeconomic development in shaping the type of messages and strategies parties adopt, and finally the electoral competitiveness which I theorize to intensify and diversify campaign tactics and messages.

TABLE 5.1:
HYPOTHESES ON THE CENTRALITY TO CAMPAIGNS OF PERSONALISM AS A VOTER MOBILIZATION STRATEGY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>THEORY/ CAUSAL FACTORS</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
<th>8</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Candidate nomination compromises</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>NO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socioeconomic development</td>
<td>Rich</td>
<td>Rich</td>
<td>Poor</td>
<td>Poor</td>
<td>Rich</td>
<td>Rich</td>
<td>Poor</td>
<td>Poor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electoral competitiveness</td>
<td>LOW</td>
<td>HIGH</td>
<td>HIGH</td>
<td>LOW</td>
<td>LOW</td>
<td>HIGH</td>
<td>HIGH</td>
<td>LOW</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HYPOTHESES</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Centrality of personalism to campaigns</td>
<td>LOW</td>
<td>LOW</td>
<td>LOW</td>
<td>MEDIUM</td>
<td>MEDIUM</td>
<td>HIGH</td>
<td>HIGH</td>
<td>HIGH</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These eight hypotheses are drawn from the interaction of the three explanatory variables considered with binary values yielding a ranking of centrality of personalism to campaigns in the different scenarios. Hypothesis 1 is the one in which the causal factors predict personalism as a strategy would be the least central to campaigns. In turn, hypothesis 8 is the one in which the explanatory variables predict personalism as a strategy to mobilize voters would be the most central to campaigns.
The Low-Medium breakpoint (hypotheses 3 and 4) and the Medium-High breakpoint (hypotheses 5 and 6) which hence lumps together hypotheses 1-3 in the “Low centrality of personalism” category and the hypotheses 6-8 in the “High centrality of personalism,” are not arbitrary.

The difference in the scenario of hypotheses 3 and 4 is that in the former one the increased competitiveness pushes parties to try to make a difference and differentiate from the competition by resorting to particularistic goods and other campaign incentives (e.g. club-type and public policy promises). This competitive pressure is not present in the scenario of hypothesis 4, where the incumbent party does not need the resource-consuming machine clientelism to stay in power and campaigns on cheaper incentives such as leaders’ personalism (also performance evaluations).

The second breakpoint is between hypotheses 5 and 6. In the scenario of hypothesis 5 the incumbent leaders needs a campaign which satisfies the demanding developed (rich) voters (e.g. a performance evaluation campaign). The increased competitiveness in the scenario of hypothesis 6 pushes parties to try to differentiate themselves with other resources at their disposal. These parties resort to personalism to mobilize voters (programmatic campaigns lack the parties’ resources, commitments and incentives to do so).

The three-value evaluation of the dependent variable in these hypotheses (Low, Medium and High centrality to campaigns of personalism as a voter mobilization strategy) is a convenient and practical way to judge and compare cases taking into account that personalism as a voter mobilization strategy is only one of the four types studied in this dissertation, and the nature of the qualitative data with which independent and dependent variables are evaluated; the evaluation of variables marks qualitative differences among values (See chapter 1).
5.6 Operationalization of causal factors

5.6.1 Socioeconomic development and electoral competitiveness

From chapter 2 I use the Effective Strength of Opposition Parties index (ESOP) and the Human Development Index (HDI). Table 5.2 is a summary of the classification of the provinces on two of the independent variables in this chapter (a more detailed classification appears in chapter 2).\textsuperscript{134}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Electoral Competitiveness</th>
<th>Socioeconomic Development</th>
<th>PROVINCE</th>
<th>HDI</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ESOP</td>
<td>PROVINCE</td>
<td>HDI</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.60 HIGH</td>
<td>Capital Federal</td>
<td>HIGH</td>
<td>0.892</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.29 LOW</td>
<td>Santa Cruz</td>
<td>HIGH</td>
<td>0.843</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.49 HIGH</td>
<td>Mendoza</td>
<td>HIGH</td>
<td>0.820</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.45 HIGH</td>
<td>Catamarca</td>
<td>LOW</td>
<td>0.799</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.28 LOW</td>
<td>Formosa</td>
<td>LOW</td>
<td>0.764</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5.6.2 Candidate nomination compromises

Next, I qualitatively operationalize the causal factor of candidate nomination compromises. I am not aware of any established measure of the degree of “candidate nomination compromise.”\textsuperscript{135} In order to study this variable across different districts, I

\textsuperscript{134} In chapter 2 I classify Mendoza as having medium socioeconomic development, but ranking 7 out of the 24 districts in Argentina and with the goal of making this a binary category; I recategorize Mendoza as a province of high socioeconomic development.

\textsuperscript{135} However, there is an interesting article by De Luca et al 2002 who do a quantitative work on likelihood that a party will use primaries or elite arrangements to nominate candidates for national legislative elections in Argentine provinces but not getting in depth into the negotiations leading to these outcomes (nomination procedures) or their consequence (e.g. centrality to
need to look at what identifies whether nomination compromises are in general more likely to occur in a particular district over a period of time. First of all, information may not always be available about the inner workings of a specific compromise, and rather than looking at one particular nomination at a particular moment in time, I am trying to look at the overall characteristics of a district or group of districts over a longer period of time. The measures below help to identify whether or not candidate nomination compromises are likely to occur in a particular district.

These indicators identify the number of party leaders (actors with power) and the checks on power those leaders have (e.g. nomination procedures, reelection laws, party bureaucracies, etc.) which determine whether there is compromise in candidate nominations.

Estimation of “candidate nomination compromises” as a causal factor:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>a) Is there a single party leader who decides nominations?</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>0</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>There is a single effective leader of the political party in the district: it may be an undisputed provincial leader (usually the governor) or a local leader (usually the mayor).</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>There is not a single effective leader of the political party in the district, but instead committees or collegiate bodies make decisions regarding the campaign. (role of party)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>b) How is the candidate nomination procedure decided?</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>0.66</th>
<th>0.33</th>
<th>0</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>One or very few leaders decide nominations and important strategic calculations are made when nominating the candidates (the assets each candidate or faction can bring to the table).</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very few leaders decide nominations and important strategic calculations are made when nominating the candidates (the assets each candidate or faction can bring to the table).</td>
<td>0.66</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Candidate nominations are decided democratically. Losing factions may not participate in the party tickets.</td>
<td>0.33</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Candidate nominations are decided democratically and the losing factions remain and participate with candidates in the party tickets as well. Important strategic calculations are also made and may include broadening alliances with losing factions or other parties.</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The authors look at the incumbency/opposition situation of the major parties with respect to the governor and the president, and the reelection laws of the province.
c) Are there internal party checks on the leader’s power when nominating candidates (e.g. nomination based on party official’s election results)?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1</th>
<th>0.5</th>
<th>0</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>There are no effective checks on the leader’s power to affect candidate nominations: i) the wishes or preferences of the leader find little or no opposition by other political actors; ii) the institutions and rules do benefit one leader above other political actors in the allocation of resources (monetary, political, etc.).</td>
<td>There are some effective checks on the leader’s power to affect nominations: i) and these are related to the resources he can dispose of for a good campaign performance, which might be withheld by other political actors; ii) the wishes or preferences of the leader may be questioned by other political actors; iii) the institutions and rules do not necessarily benefit one leader above other political actors in the allocation of resources (monetary, political, etc.).</td>
<td>There are effective checks on the leader’s power to affect nominations: i) the wishes or preferences of the leader find checks or opposition by other political actors; ii) the institutions and rules spread the allocation of resources (monetary, political, etc.) in ways that no single political actor can impose himself on the others regarding the nominations.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

d) Are there institutional checks on leaders’ power within their party, which are outside of the parties’ organization which force compromise (e.g. reelection laws, overlapping districts)?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1</th>
<th>0.5</th>
<th>0</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No.</td>
<td>Some; e.g. reelection laws.</td>
<td>Yes; e.g. governors cannot be reelected; provincial legislature districts overlap those of mayors.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Cases' scores on the candidate nomination compromises' causal factor:

Following is the coding summary of the five districts on the operationalized evaluation of nomination compromises as a causal factor of personalism as a voter mobilization strategy.

These values on Table 5.3 are a reference number to the candidate nomination compromises' causal factor of the centrality to campaigns of personalism in the district but, given the purposefully unweighted factors above, they cannot be used to calculate an exact relationship among the cases based on these numbers alone. Lower numbers indicate more “nomination compromises' characteristics” in the district’s political parties.
Table 5.4 shows cases’ scores on the independent factors and pairs the cases with the corresponding hypotheses.

**TABLE 5.3:**

ESTIMATION OF PARTIES’ NOMINATION COMPROMISES AS A CAUSAL FACTOR

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>FORMOSA</th>
<th>CAPITAL FEDERAL</th>
<th>SANTA CRUZ</th>
<th>CATAMARCA</th>
<th>MENDOZA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a  Single party leader?</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b  Cand. nomination procedures</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.66</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.33</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c  Intraparty checks on leader?</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d  Institutional checks on leader</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sum</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3.16</td>
<td>3.50</td>
<td>0.83</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.79</td>
<td>0.88</td>
<td>0.21</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**TABLE 5.4:**

CASES AND HYPOTHESES PREDICTIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CASES</th>
<th>MENDOZA</th>
<th>CATAMARCA</th>
<th>SANTA CRUZ</th>
<th>CAPITAL FEDERAL</th>
<th>FORMOSA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Causal factor: nomination compromises (avg. score) T. 5.4</td>
<td>0 (YES)</td>
<td>0.21 (YES)</td>
<td>0.88 (NO)</td>
<td>0.79 (NO)</td>
<td>1 (NO)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socioeconomic development (HDI)</td>
<td>0.820 (Rich)</td>
<td>0.799 (Poor)</td>
<td>0.843 (Rich)</td>
<td>0.892 (Rich)</td>
<td>0.764 (Poor)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electoral competitiveness (ESOP)</td>
<td>0.49 (HIGH)</td>
<td>0.45 (HIGH)</td>
<td>0.29 (LOW)</td>
<td>0.60 (HIGH)</td>
<td>0.28 (LOW)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HYPOTHESIS #</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Centrality of personalism to campaigns</td>
<td>LOW</td>
<td>LOW</td>
<td>MEDIUM</td>
<td>HIGH</td>
<td>HIGH</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5.7 Dependent variable

I measure the dependent variable with two different types of data. I qualitatively evaluate the cases with specific indicators which directly measure the centrality to
campaigns of personalism as a voter mobilization strategy and I use public opinion survey data which indirectly assesses the centrality of personalism.

Table 5.5 draws from public opinion surveys and refers to voters and their reasons for choosing a governor. (Unfortunately, there is no data available for the province of Santa Cruz.) The percentages represent the percentages of the first-choice reasons for voting for the preferred gubernatorial candidate grouped by the personalism type motivations, by the programmatic, performance, clientelism, “lesser evil” type motivations, and other motivations (e.g. “I always vote for the same party”) and percentages for the “other” not specified motivations. Since I study the centrality to campaigns of personalism I observe the relative importance of personalism with the other strategy types, hence Table 5.5 also specifies the percentage difference between the personalism reasons and the programmatic/ performance/ clientelism reasons. From this table I draw the relative ranking of the cases. The personalism type reasons for choosing a governor are more important than the non-personalism reasons in the cases of Capital Federal and Formosa. Mendoza (followed by Catamarca) is the province where personalism type reasons are the least important for choosing a governor.

---

136 Example of personalism type reasons given by interviewees are: Es honesto-no es corrupto, Porque es mujer, Es capaz-inteligente, Es creíble-me da confianza, Es serio-responsable. Porque es de Boca, Es una buena persona-humano, Es fuerte-tiene poder de decisión, Es empresario exitoso, Se acerca a la gente-recorre los barrios, Es trabajador-emprendedor, Por su carisma-buena imagen, Es joven, Es humilde-perfil bajo-sencillo. Examples of given programmatic and performance reasons: Por el partido al que pertenece, Por sus propuestas-ideas-proyectos, Para ver un cambio de política, Ayuda social-se ocupa de la gente-de los necesitados, Por su gestión, Por su trayectoria, Se preocupa por la desocupación-generar empleo, Por descarte. Hizo obras publicas-hace cosas-va a hacer cosas, Buena administración-Jefas-Jefas de hogar, Por su entorno, Se preocupa por la salud, Se ocupa de la educación. There are many and diverse reasons/options in each category in what here are the Personalism and Programmatic/Performance/Clientelism reasons respectively: Mendoza; 7 and 5 different reasons respectively; Formosa 5 and 5; Catamarca 12 and 19; and, Capital Federal 15 and 17.
TABLE 5.5:
TOP REASONS FOR CHOOSING THE GUBERNATORIAL CANDIDATE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Personalism</th>
<th>Performance/ Program/ Clientelism</th>
<th>Difference (Personal.-PPC)</th>
<th>Other</th>
<th>Ranking</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mendoza</td>
<td>45.8</td>
<td>54.2</td>
<td>-8.3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catamarca</td>
<td>48.8</td>
<td>50.8</td>
<td>-2.0</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>780</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Formosa</td>
<td>48.1</td>
<td>44.4</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capital Federal</td>
<td>59.6</td>
<td>40.4</td>
<td>19.2</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>307</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: data from three different surveys were used; a provincial survey in February 2003 by Analogías (Catamarca), a survey in May 2003 by Carlos Fara (Capital Federal) and a national survey done in September 2007 by Carlos Fara (rest of the cases). Note: First answer of top three reasons for choosing the gubernatorial candidate in accumulated percentages. The Ns represent the valid cases in this question of the survey, excluding cases where respondent did not answer the question.

5.7.1 Qualitative evaluation of the dependent variable

The centrality to campaigns of the strategy type is related to the relative effort or investment into it that parties and candidates make in relation to the overall voter mobilization endeavor. To better measure its centrality to campaigns, we also have to consider how the personalistic tactics are made, by candidates, committees, teams, experts, etc.; this is done through in-depth case studies. I propose three major areas to evaluate the centrality to campaigns of “personalism as a voter mobilization strategy,” and which the qualitative evaluation of the dependent variable must combine:

The evaluation must consider the resources the party and candidates have in order to come up with a personalistic campaign strategy.

It also must take into account the content of specific campaign tactics from which I evaluate the personalistic message (which of course can have more or less degrees of development; however, a high degree of development does not necessarily mean centrality to the campaigns in order to mobilize voters).

---

137 The exact survey question is: ¿Cuáles son las tres principales razones por las que piensa votar a ese candidato a gobernador? “What are the top three reasons for choosing the governor’s candidate?”
Finally, the proper evaluation of the dependent variable must consider the actions of tactics in campaign: the choice of action/event depends on the environment with a degree of personalization ranging from media usage to door-to-door tactics.\(^{138}\)

Next are seven qualitative evaluations of the dependent variable based on the in-depth case studies, and which are exemplified (together with the causal argument) in the rest of the chapter. I chose the different values of each of the seven evaluations based not on detailed descriptive differences of cases, but on meaningful thresholds to assess the centrality to campaigns of personalism as a strategy in each district.

Following are qualitative measures of the centrality to campaigns of personalism as a voter mobilization strategy (dependent variable).

1) How do political parties promote the personal characteristics of the party leaders in campaigns?

| Party’s effort is conscious and demands a considerable amount of resources (time, hiring experts, media experts, etc.). | There is some party’s effort to promote the personal characteristics of the leader which require some specific resources (time, hiring experts, media experts, etc.), but it is not a central concern. | There is no specific concern about sustaining or promoting personal characteristics in campaign on behalf of the political party |

2) Does the intended message in campaign tactics emphasize leader’s ability to solve specific problems (as a matter of technical, expert knowledge)?

| Message emphasizes leader’s ability to solve specific problems | Message emphasizes leader’s ability to solve specific problems but as an instrument of an ideology, a policy program, a party, etc. | Message does not emphasize leader above other contents. |

\(^{138}\) Tactics are more media driven the higher the political office or the less personalization of the office due to geography or size of district. The norm seems to be the use of television and newspapers for the national and provincial offices and radio and door-to-door tactics for the local offices.
3) Does the intended message in campaign tactics emphasize the leader as a person capable of solving all problems (present and future)?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Score</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Message emphasizes leader’s ability to individually solve present and future problems of the community.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>Message emphasizes leader’s ability to solve present and future problems in the community, but as an instrument of an ideology, a policy program, a party, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>Message does not characterize leader in such a way.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4) Does the message in high personalization tactics emphasize the district’s party leader above all other non-personalism type contents?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Score</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Messages to voters emphasize the leadership role of the district’s leader.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.66</td>
<td>Messages equally emphasize the party leaders and ideas or programs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.33</td>
<td>Messages to voters do not emphasize the leadership role of the district leader, but instead the party, ideas and programs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>Highly personalized tactics are irrelevant or non-existent.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5) Does the message in high personalization tactics emphasize other candidates (not district’s leader) above all other non-personalism type contents?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Score</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Messages to voters emphasize personalism type contents of candidates</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.66</td>
<td>Messages equally emphasize personalism type contents of candidates as well as ideas or programs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.33</td>
<td>Messages to voters do not emphasize personalism type contents, but instead the party, ideas and programs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>Highly personalized tactics are irrelevant or non-existent.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

6) Are candidates (or leaders) emphasized over political parties in campaign media outputs?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Score</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Names and images of the leaders are prominent over the names of their parties or offices.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>Names and images of the leaders are not necessarily prominent over the names of their parties or offices.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

7) Are candidates’ images emphasized over ideas in mass media messages? (policy proposals or performance evaluations)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Score</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Candidate’s personal characteristics are emphasized over events or ideas in media reports.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>Candidate’s personal characteristics are not emphasized over events or ideas in media reports.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5.6 below assesses how the studied cases score on the different qualitative evaluations of the dependent variable. In some districts highly personalized
tactics (e.g. door to door in highly rural Formosa) are very important in the campaign efforts while in others they are not central to campaigns (e.g. Capital Federal). Each of the seven evaluations is not exclusive from one another and a “family resemblance” approach should be taken to derive conclusions.

**TABLE 5.6:**

**CASES’ SCORES ON THE QUALITATIVE EVALUATION OF THE CENTRALITY OF PERSONALISM AS A VOTER MOBILIZATION STRATEGY**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>FORMOSA</th>
<th>CAPITAL FEDERAL</th>
<th>SANTA CRUZ</th>
<th>CATAMARCA</th>
<th>MENDOZA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Party's promotion of personalism</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Leader as a problem solver message</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Father-like leader message</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Leader's personalism in personalized tactics</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.66</td>
<td>0.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Candidates’ personalism in personalized tactics</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.66</td>
<td>0.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Candidates over parties in media</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Candidates over ideas in media</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Average score</td>
<td>0.86</td>
<td>0.64</td>
<td>0.40</td>
<td>0.14</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5.6 indicates a ranking in which the provinces where personalism is most central to campaigns are Formosa and Capital Federal, followed by Santa Cruz, Mendoza and Catamarca. This is a similar outcome to the one obtained in the quantitative evaluation of the dependent variable (Table 5.5).

---

139 On “family resemblance” approach to concept structures see Goertz (2006) esp. chapters 2 and 5.
Both available independent measures of the dependent variable, the quantitative voters’ opinions (Table 5.5) and the qualitative in-depth case study (Table 5.6) show that, as expected, in both Formosa (poor and non-competitive) and Capital Federal (rich and competitive) personalism is central to campaigns, and that in Catamarca (poor and competitive) and Mendoza (rich and competitive) personalism is not central to campaigns as a voter mobilization strategy. The candidate nomination compromises factor is hence important to explain the centrality of personalism to campaigns.

The bivariate correlations (See Table 5.7) among the independent variables and the qualitative evaluation of the centrality to campaigns of personalism show, as expected, no statistically significant results for the development (HDI) and competitiveness (ESOP) variables. The theory predicts that there will not be a positive or negative correlation of electoral competitiveness or development with the centrality of personalism as is measured here. On the other hand, the theory does predict a negative relationship between candidate nomination compromises and the centrality to campaigns of personalism (the “compromises” variable has a score of 0 when there are compromises and 1 when there are not).

---

140 The quadratic curve fit in a regression having Competitiveness as an independent variable and the qualitative evaluation of the dependent variable with an R-value of 0.823 (N=5).

141 As discussed earlier, low levels of socioeconomic development (with low competitiveness) allow personalism with “father-like” or paternalistic characteristics, and high levels of socioeconomic development (with high competitiveness) allow personalism of an “expert-like” leader.
Finally, Formosa and Capital Federal shared the first and second position in the ranking of the evaluation of the dependent variable (See Table 5.8) where the centrality of personalism to campaigns as a voter mobilization strategy is the highest. Mendoza and Catamarca shared the bottom two scores in the same evaluations. The sole evaluation of the dependent variable for the case of Santa Cruz puts it in the middle of the five cases. The evidence supports the five hypotheses tested.
Next, beginning with Formosa, I illustrate the causal mechanisms to justify my evaluations of the centrality to campaigns of personalism as a voter mobilization strategy. As a reference in parentheses I write the dependent variable indicator’s numbers from Table 5.6, and nomination compromises indicator’s letters from Table 5.3.

**5.8 Formosa: the “father-like figure” type personalism**

**5.8.1 Introduction**

**5.8.1.1 Background**

In Formosa personalism is central to campaigns as a voter mobilization strategy; the background, indicators and mechanism to understand the statement are detailed below. Formosa is one of the poorest provinces in Argentina (See chapter 2). The *Peronist* party is the only competitive political party. Electoral competition, if it exists at all, is actually most likely among PJ factions at the local level, thanks to the province-wide *Law of Lemas* electoral system which allows parties to run with more candidates.
than positions being contested for the local and provincial level elections.\textsuperscript{142} The state is the most important economic agent. The government employs the most people (15\% of the workforce)\textsuperscript{143} and provides for education, health, public services and assistance to the needy (+16\% of workforce).\textsuperscript{144} As mentioned in chapter 2, Argentine provincial governors have the power to distribute resources to the mayors and Formosa is no exception. Even though municipal governments in Formosa are not capable of self-financing operational costs and in some respects are subsumed to the governor, the mayors have important machine power and access to voters which become crucial when mobilizing the vote.\textsuperscript{145}

\textbf{5.8.1.2 Argument}

Low socioeconomic development of society and the lack of party competition may lead to voter isolation (See Chapter 3). There is a monopoly of resources around the leader (Indicator a), and a dependence of voters on what the mayor, as leader of the municipal government, can do to get solutions to their (personal) problems. All of this decreases immediate pressure on the mayor to campaign, as there is no press, NGOs, unions or opposition parties contesting his decisions, position or domains of power. This

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item The CSDV electoral system could be viewed as a way to solve internal elections at the same time as the general election. As was also mentioned earlier, votes to "sublemas" or fractions of the same party (or Lema) are added up to determine the winning party. (Lisoni 2003 and see Appendix B)
\item Source: Own estimates based on census data (INDEC 2001) of the economically active population (ages 14-64) and data elaborated by an NGO - La Asociación Argentina de Presupuesto y Administración Financiera Pública (ASAP), www.asap.org.ar (2000).
\item The estimate is based on the number of the Jefes y Jefas de Hogar subsidies on August 2006 (See chapter 3) and the economically active population (INDEC 2001).
\item Besides the governor and vice-governor, in Formosa there are 36 mayors (plurality election). There are a minimum of 4 member city councilmembers (proportional representation - PR) and a maximum of 12 in the provincial capital renewable by halves every two years. There is a provincial legislature with 30 province-wide members (PR) also renewable by halves every two years. There are 5 national deputies (closed list PR) and 3 national senators (two seats for the first plurality and one for the runner-up).
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
isolation of voters and lack of pressure on the leader remove the need to use “machine clientelism,” which is wasteful, as the case of Catamarca shows (see Chapter 3).

The pressures (demands) on the local mayor are disarticulated and made by individuals (neighbors). The lack of societal development prevents parties from being questioned regarding major policy directions (i.e. no NGOs or unions questioning policy decisions, etc.). In this respect constituents are in fact isolated from other constituents due to their lack of civil societal resources. Consecutively, these disarticulated demands translate into particularistic problems and demands which the mayor or leader needs to address. In turn, the mayor also needs the legitimization of the elections. There is no real horizon for a change of leader (no competitive elections) and the satisfaction of people’s demands, which are particularistic, is the monopoly and responsibility of the leader (i.e. throughout the year, not just the election period): 1) pointing to the job well done and satisfaction of demands, 2) pointing to the uniqueness of the leader, and 3) pointing to the leader as a path for future satisfaction of demands (Indicators 1-3).

Personal contact with voters and the idea of a father-like leader who is necessary to the well-being of “all of us” is important to campaigns in Formosa (Indicators 3-5). Personalized communication between the mayor and the voters is also common because of the small size of towns and the efficient network of puntero-type brokers. Personalism needs to be complemented or engaged with the material back up of clientelism in order for officials to keep popular legitimacy for several terms in office in a district where there is one dominant party and people are relatively poor. People still require seeing their needs being met by officials. The local leader (usually the mayor) behaves as a father-like figure on and off the campaign trail, and as the people’s advocate to the provincial government. These leaders embody, or personify ideas of progress, well-being and hope. Frequently it is not what these candidates say but how they say it, which is relevant to the campaign effort.
In smaller districts, like most municipalities in Formosa, there is more personalized politics, or less institutionalized and mediated relations, than in larger districts where bureaucratic structures are necessary to deal with the problems of large numbers of people. That is, electoral campaigns are also more personal, less mediated by institutions like political parties or the media. Isolation and lack of competition (lack of information, lack of alternative leadership or sources of solutions) seem to force Formosa leaders to make it a personalized and personalistic relationship with the voter.

However, tactics with candidates in province wide elections (e.g. gubernatorial, provincial or national legislative) do not allow for much personal contact between candidates and a significant number of voters, due to a larger and geographically disperse constituency. These campaigns are more dependent on cults of personality of the governor and government propaganda. Hence, the mediation is established by a more abstract link to the voters than that required by local level candidates. Voters need the “distance” with the leader to have a cult of personality, to make him above ordinary mortals. Often times, it is the local level party machine which is in charge of asserting that message of personalism of provincial and national candidates. It is in Formosa where we find personalism the most central to campaigns of any of the studied districts, but not necessarily most developed as a strategy.

In Formosa the provincial governor has the resources to overwhelm the mass media outlets with a message which not only shows the good deeds of his administration but primarily portrays him as the only, unquestionable and effective advocate for the people of the province and the people’s advocate to the national government. The mayors in Formosa may use the media as well, but reach voters mainly through personal contact with their teams of punteros, and through the complementary and necessary personalized clientelism. Therefore, and given the important and close
communication between the voters with the local level party machine and the lack of competition, the media is not seen as fundamental for campaigns in Formosa.

Next, the candidate nomination procedures are important to understand the centrality to campaigns of personalism because these party leaders nominate the candidates who in turn implement campaign tactics.  

5.8.2 The power of mayors and governor to nominate candidates (Indicators a-d)

The candidates [for city council] are chosen by the [main] candidate; for mayor, in my case. We chose them, the 22 members of the party committee… But of course there’s always the “finger” [the party leader picks the candidate]. But the party committee signs off that they have chosen the candidates. Mayor Carlos Meza (PJ, Las Lomitas)

Mainwaring and Shugart were correct to say that party leaders in Argentina mostly control the candidate selection, the order in which the members are elected, and the fact that the votes are pooled among all the candidates in the national elections, which tends to make party reputation more important than personal reputation for election (Mainwaring and Shugart 1997 p422). However, as I will show, the personal reputation of those party leaders who nominate candidates becomes crucial for the election of all those other candidates; they fight to defend it. The quote by Mayor Meza emphasizes the scenario of “personalized and personalistic” exercise of power, in which local legislative officials depend on their executives to be nominated and elected.

The province of Formosa is divided into electoral areas which formally can nominate candidates in their towns. However, in reality, these committees are made up of approximately 15 local party leaders who select the candidates for mayor and city council. Later, these candidates are presented to the rest of the community of party

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A personalism-based campaign strategy could be the exploitation of one’s own personal attributes which make a candidate unique, and also could be that the candidate is related to that someone with particular personal attributes by links of party affiliation, sponsorship or blessing. This second scenario allows for the development of a cult of personality which is independent from the actual leader; this means that the campaign may run on the personal qualities of the governor/ mayor (the political boss) who sponsors and nominates the particular candidate.
members for their acknowledgement. As Mayor Meza pointed out, coming into these party meetings, people already know who the mayoral candidate will be, and it is the mayor who selects his council member candidates. Three of the five mayors I interviewed in Formosa were explicit that they themselves choose candidates for mayor and city council; the other two mayors implied that at least they have a major say in it (these latter mayors would refer to “we chose them”, or “the local leadership did”).

(Indicator b) These mayors’ nomination powers are indeed of strategic relevance to campaigns, as Mayor Meza shows us:

_The ‘sublemas’ appear because it’s convenient to the party… I say, I am going to make two ‘sublemas.’ I invent them: I go as mayor, you make a ‘sublema’ as candidate for city council, make several. I support them all financially, and they all support me [electorally]… Two large ‘sublemas’, they are the ones that are really in opposition, and then all the other small ones that help._

If there is opposition to the mayor’s nomination decisions, then, thanks to the existing “Law of Lemas” electoral system, dissidents can form their own lists of candidates running against the mayor without leaving the party. These factions, of course, do not get help from the municipality coffers for their campaigns. If one of these factions or rival parties threatens the mayor or the mayor’s candidates (because the candidate is a respected person in the community or has a sponsor who sends money to the campaign making him a competent rival) then as shown in the above quote, the mayor may create and sponsor even more factions (lists of candidates) as a tool to maximize vote gathering (Indic. b, c). These factions may even compete criticizing the mayor himself, but they also draw votes from the real threat to the mayor’s candidates. Mayor Fernández put it this way: “You might have friendships, acquaintances that aren’t going to vote for your candidate because they don’t like him, but will vote for the other one, within the same party.” Many times competing on these “second rate” lists is the first step in a person’s career in politics. The votes he gets in the election are his political capital to bargain for a more expectant position next time around.
The mayor’s personal influence also goes towards what his city council candidates say in the campaign (he decides the “platform”): “I pass down to the council members what we are going to do…Defending the provincial and local government” (Mayor Meza, PJ, Las Lomitas). There obviously is a paternalistic attitude towards “his” candidates that were expressed to me multiple times by several mayors and council people themselves across the province, for example; “The mayor is the one who handles the budget. He is like the father of everyone, he decides what gets fixed or bought.” (Councilman Chaparro, PJ, Laguna Blanca). (Indicator 3)

The above quotation by Mayor Meza stresses the preponderance of the mayor in the local scene. His “team” has the instruction to defend not only the local (his) administration, but the provincial one as well. What is interesting here is the coordination and leadership of the mayor in the campaign; it is his campaign to win or lose, even in an all-legislative contest. Good interpersonal relationships are very important for the mayor to lead his electoral machine, since (most) decisions regarding the campaigns are done with the mayor’s preeminence among a very small number of people.

Hence, the consequence of a personalistic (“he is like the father of everyone”) and personalized (“I invent them [candidate alternative]”) nomination process undergone by the city legislators, or because of the source of their positions of power, is that the city council members are like simple pawns of the mayor. In the case of the mayor’s candidates, any independent action would be seen as threatening and betraying the mayor; whereas those in the opposition would unlikely have enough resources to campaign and political support to do anything in office in the context of non-competitive elections. Of course the candidates get nominated because they are people with a good image in town; they are hand-picked for how many votes they can marshal, and affiliation with the mayoral candidate, not necessarily for their ideas.
Finally, in the case of the nomination of Provincial Legislators, National Deputies or Senators, the preeminent role is that of the Governor: “The governor tells them [Provincial Deputies] the day before [the party congress] who are going to be the candidates for deputy. So they don’t fight—everyone wants to be candidate.” (Mayor Nerea Oviedo, PJ, Mision Laishi) Deputies many times did not know who would be candidates until one day before the formality of the party convention, until the governor himself told them. (Indicators a-c) National and provincial legislators are people who the governor knows will support him. The strong leadership and persona of the governor himself underlies the ruling party and its procedures (such as candidate nominations), and hence the institutional relations among political offices like mayors and the governor. This adds to Mainwaring and Shugart’s (1997) assessment, because the personal reputation of national (or other local and provincial) legislative candidates may not be too relevant in their election, but in a district like Formosa that of the leaders who nominated them is important.

5.8.2.1 Centrality of the mayor and patronizing messages (Indicators d, 1-7)

In Formosa, the clientelistic aspects of specific campaign tactics are generally secondary to issues of attitudes, empathy and origin the candidate has with the people. There is a personal bond between the mayor and these people. Next, Mayor Meza refers to how his strategy to distribute particularistic benefits differed from that of the former mayor he defeated in 2003 when he ended a four year interregnum in which he was not mayor of Las Lomitas. Referring to the other mayor’s strategy he said: “Era una fuerza fuerte, pero sin dedicación a la gente. Yo me dediqué a la gente mientras estaba afuera. El recurso era mal distribuido; solo en las elecciones. En cambio

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147 In Carlos Meza’s account, he lost that one mayoral election when he contradicted the governor and supported a different PJ’s national faction (that of Carlos Menem); in the following election he sided with the governor.
As observed in Chapter 3, personalized clientelism takes time to develop (it is not the consequence of a few days' work) and it seems to need a strong personal reference to the patrón. That personal reference, of the mayor in this case, is central in this specific case and district because particularistic benefits to the poor would come anyway by means of other provincial or local government officials; hence the personalistic tactics to focus the vote on the candidate as “the advocate of all” has to be a sustained effort (and validated with satisfactory feats, of course). (Ind. 6, 7)

Specific campaign events rely heavily on the personal aspects of leaders, their history, localness, and who they are tied to. Next, Mayor Meza refers to aspects of a legislative campaign strategy: “Vos mostrás tus candidatos, los concejales. Y después mostrás a los demás, nacionales, etc. Tus concejales tienen que ser buenos, presentables. Cada uno aprovecha la figura del gobernador. Acá se usa el nombre del candidato, del más conocido.” (Indicators 1, 6, 7) The PJ party name is not used so much because eventual rivals probably belong to the same party, also, to many in town mayor Carlos Meza is just “Carlitos”, a name which brings him even closer to people. In turn the person of “Carlitos” Meza embodies more than his own present as an advocate for all to the outside world and the source of concrete particularistic benefits, he also represents the legacy of past successful leaders. In this regard he said:

La ‘Marchita Peronista’ y figura de Perón la ponemos en todos lados; [pero] acá es mi papá [what weighs heavily], el último caudillo, yo uso mucho a la imagen de mi papá. Era un líder provincial. No tenía necesidad de repartir cosas. El 100% de los aborígenes lo votaban a él, porque él lo decía. Los viejitos siempre me siguen pidiendo, [as Mayor Meza gives me a small wallet size sticker image of his father]. (Indicators 1, 3-5)

Such is at least part of the complexity of the personalistic strategy in his town.

The personalism used in the campaign appeals to both the future and the past as well.
5.8.3 Controlling the elites and the governor’s machine (Indicators a, c, d.)

We have autonomy on the local level in terms of proposals, but only in some things. We can’t go outside of certain lines that mark the national and provincial policies. You know that you depend on the federal co-participation of taxes, national and provincial. Mayor Ricardo Fernández (PJ, Laguna Nai Neck)

To win votes and to govern, candidates need resources. People are rational actors and go where they get the most benefits (Of course, there is a component of loyalty to consider as well – as a built up capital of accumulated positive interactions). Since the governor controls resources, the mayors who oppose the governor have a hard time surviving in office due to constraints on resources (for example to pay municipal salaries, getting machinery for its functioning, etc), and money is poured to a candidate who favors the governor. Hence, mayors usually shift alliances/allegiances to support the current governor. This also means that mayors tend to support (i.e. mobilize his local machine) the presidential choice of the governor: “People don’t know the [out of town] candidates. For example Kirchner; we did the entire campaign ourselves, at the grassroots, going to explain door to door. Here [former President] Menem had roots, he was God. But I said that he had governed poorly at the end, and we defended Kirchner.

All of the ‘sublemas,’ all of us worked for Kirchner” (Mayor Meza, PJ, Las Lomitas). “The governor’s and mayor’s are the most important, the presidential [election] is a little too far from the community. We support the presidential alternative that gives us the most possibilities for the reelection of our governor…” (Councilman Chaparro, PJ, L. Blanca).

Image and charisma of the leaders, and mainly resources that translate into benefits are what gains loyalty, particularly in small towns, and it does not matter whether your mayor tells you to vote for conservative Menem (PJ) or progressive Kirchner (PJ). In the previous quote by Meza, he tells us that the people of Las Lomitas followed his advice to vote for Kirchner after years of voting for his rival Menem; Meza has the trust of his people. (Indicators 1-5) In the second quote by Chaparro, we see that
the governor picks the presidential candidate people should vote for (particularly in 2003 where the PJ party had three presidential candidates) (Indicators 1, 3-4). Supporting the governor’s decision translates, of course, into money for the campaign and administration. In a survey performed to voting age population (N=443) by Carlos Fara & Asociados in 2002 in the province of Formosa, 49.4% of interviewees did not know or did not want to give opinion about Kirchner; only 3.2% gave the same opinion about former president Carlos Menem; Kirchner was literately unknown to the people of Formosa. The strong personalism of Meza and other mayors, and governor Insfrán seemed to be necessary to shift presumably strong alliances with former president Menem. Again, in 2003 Kirchner received 41.11% of the vote and Menem 26.35%.

The centrality to campaigns of personalism of leaders is higher and also strengthened because, due to the electoral system, the competition, if it exists at all, is usually among candidates of the same party. Hence, no one candidate at the local level can wholly appropriate the symbols and party icons such as Evita, Juan Perón, etc. What makes people vote for a candidate is given by the candidate (charisma, benefits, good administration, etc), not the larger structure, the party (because the PJ party is not a variable in Formosa, it is a constant) (Indicator 1). As Councilman Cantón (UCR, Formosa city) said; “They [people] decide their vote based on, not ideology, but rather on what the candidate says, the candidate’s trajectory, their persuasion; they vote for the person, not the party.” Two thirds of officials I interviewed in Formosa thought that people vote for the candidate, as opposed to programs or parties.¹⁴⁸

¹⁴⁸ Five of the interviewees expressed that middle class voters vote based on performance, as opposed to the person of the candidate or clientelism which lower class voters use as a primary reason to vote. (For similar conclusions see Calvo and Murillo, 2004.)
5.8.4 Conclusion

The campaign on the personalism of the governor and mayors is very central to campaigns as a voter mobilization strategy for any office position in Formosa. The handing out of particularistic benefits (which is not only done during campaigns) only substantiates and gives additional content to the personalism. Formosa politicians want an electoral legitimacy, which does not completely mean the winning of the most possible votes; it also means getting the renewed recognition that he is the leader in the community. It is a personal vote, and public recognition and the manifestation of appreciation are important. In the cited examples of “machine clientelism” in Formosa, the two mayors refer to beliefs; “the difference is in that they believe in you” (See Chapter 3). Mayors in Formosa do count on their relationship with the people, and it is very different from the case of Catamarca where clientelism is more anonymous also affecting personalism as a strategy. Mayors are the embodiment of the local community, a protective father-figure for whom there is loyalty and trust. Since there is no electoral competition, the voters have no contrast to look at, and vote based on what the candidates produce: their charisma, particularistic benefits, performance and promises.

The cult of personality of the governor is created because he is very influential for the destiny of small town communities’ officials and for Formosa’s provincial and national candidates. Because of the executives’ role in their nomination process, legislative candidates and officials in turn also feed the cult of personality of the governor and mayors and cultivate the cult of personality, charisma, and “uniqueness as benefactors to communities” of their bosses. The validation given to any of the appointee legislative candidates is given by their closeness to the leader. All the lower ranked candidates help in the promotion of the personalism of their leaders.
Personalism also relates to elements of distance between the leader and the follower. If the physical distance/separation is not much, as in the case of a small town mayor and his voters, then the way to do it is by showing a familiar face; paternalism (with a patrimonialist tendency), a father figure. In small towns personalism cannot be like the personalism of a governor or a president; in these latter cases personalism needs to be kept with a machine, and show the glamour of the leader, the halo of sainthood. That halo of sainthood cannot be kept if the mayor is one’s neighbor; a mayor needs material resources/answers to back it up more immediately and more concretely than more distant officials in higher offices.¹⁴⁹

In Formosa it is easy to see the use of the media, television and newspapers for the governor. The radio is used also by national and provincial legislative candidates. Large rally gatherings of people are rare and are usually led by the governor. In towns, smaller campaign gatherings can have up to 150 people and are led by the mayor even if it is not a mayoral election. The role of other legislative candidates and party members in these events is only important for what they do to promote one’s likeability for association to the leaders. “Buzz,” “mystique,” and word of mouth are important as well.

Personalism in very low levels of political power or office, as with councilmen or a puntero, is difficult to sustain as a main source of legitimacy and is very much tied to particularistic benefits or clientelism, efficiency and performance. That is why it is more difficult to rely on personalism as a campaign strategy when there is competition. That is,

¹⁴⁹ In Formosa we see Governor Insfrán as a Santa Claus type figure during campaigns; the media does not criticize him and additionally shows him as an advocate of all and equal to the president. The rest of the candidates and militants reinforce that idea. The PJ controls much of the media (which depends on government propaganda to survive), resources, and since they control most of the office positions, they also have more opportunities to address people in this respect. Also, since the demand for party programs/platforms is small and the opposition has few resources, on the campaign the vast majority of constituents are only feeding on personalism. As quoted earlier by one official, the president is too distant from the community, so during concurrent elections the campaign may be geared towards the election of the governor and mayor (even though the Presidential candidates may have TV adds streaming from outside the province).
those candidates pressured by competition quickly try to outperform their challengers by addressing particularistic benefits to voters, making promises and/or pointing to past performances. At the local level, it is more likely to be a competition among punteros for support from the mayor or councilmen. Personalism works well when one has the monopoly on the aspects of the personality which are emphasized, for example, the “executive candidate,” the “savior” or the “clean candidate” (as in Capital Federal).

5.9 Capital Federal

5.9.1 Background and argument

Electorally competitive Capital Federal is the district, together with Formosa, where personalism as a voter mobilization strategy is central to campaigns, but for somewhat different reasons. The direct contact with people is negligible to the campaign effort (Ind. 4, 5), and hence, the only relevant type of contact with people is through the media (Ind. 6, 7). The media is relevant due to district-specific characteristics (the large number of voters) and party characteristics (resources put towards media and not significant ground level campaign infrastructure), leading to less personalization of tactics (Ind. 4-7). There is also less loyalty to candidates and parties than there would be with effective highly personalized tactics as in Formosa or also competitive Catamarca.

Since direct contact of candidates with voters is negligible, the personalism sustained with clientelistic goods is negligible as well; hence, the personalism that prevails in this district is sustained with more abstract benefits. A predominantly middle class electorate, like the one in Capital Federal, is more likely to abhor paternalistic attitudes and lean towards more issue specific and the expert knowledge of their candidates to solve problems.

Personalism in Capital Federal is much more limited in reach and scope than in Formosa. First, the leader/candidate cannot overwhelm the political space and media
because he has competition. And second, the best strategy is to limit the personalistic efforts to certain aspects of the personality like, for example, efficiency, honesty, etc. The all-encompassing personality of Formosa’s leaders does not work because voters in Capital Federal demand more intellectual substance and complexity, sophistication and attention to specific issues. Voters find many candidates with similar personal qualities and then move to expect something else from candidates; candidates need to articulate an argument, a métier, an expertise, specific ideas or issues to be addressed. Aspects of the personality of candidates need to be worked out very carefully for the campaign.

5.9.2 Nomination criteria and procedures (Indicators a, b, c and 1)

In many respects the candidates’ nomination procedures in Capital Federal are similar to what happens in Formosa, strengthening the position of the leader in the party and in the campaign. The nomination procedures in Capital Federal increase the personalism of the leaders, as the appointee candidates tend to owe loyalty to the party boss and only relevant politician, campaigning on his attributes due to the absence of significant party structures, ideologies, programs and traditions. Parties are weak and built around particular leaders; these are young parties created during party or societal crises. These leaders have veto power over nominations. The group which may participate in nominations is small and represents the different sectors of the “coalition” (groups of former militants from PJ, UCR, other groups, etc).

5.9.2.1 The candidate nomination powers of the party leader

Internally, the political parties in Capital Federal are coalitions of factions from other parties where, different from the other provinces, the capacity to meticulously scout

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150 See footnote 155 for details.
151 This is another of the reasons why these parties may be ephemeral; because the usually single leader coalition groups may rearrange into other “parties” for political convenience or personal animosity of the leaders.
prospective voters is not seen as a relevant asset to the campaign. As Deputy Amoroso (PRO/ with PJ roots) said, the votes one can mobilize is not a relevant reason for nominating candidates, rather, one’s trajectory, image, reputation. Amoroso said:

_Ingresar en una lista es producto de una negociación. O sea, es muy difícil, que alguien te invite a entrar en una lista, salvo que sea en el primer lugar. Poner una figura extrapartidaria, importante, dentro del sector donde uno milita. …Aunque tenga 60 lugares, ya sabe que entran 7, 8 o 9. …No se hicieron internas, fue negociación. …los referentes de cada sector negocian con el líder del partido de Macri._

…Mauricio Macri fue el que definió que candidatos estaban. Pasaba por el tamiz de Mauricio Macri, tenía poder de veto…

Factions of former PJ or UCR militants can bring some “party infrastructure” (like people to count votes on Election Day, etc.). Not every party in the city of Buenos Aires has enough militants to be present at every voting place, increasing the cases that fraud could be committed against them (Indicator b).

Next, Deputy Cantero (ARI) confirms that Elisa Carrió (ARI’s leader) unilaterally decides the nominations for National Deputies: “_Fue una decisión unipersonal de la líder del partido._” Candidates in expectant positions are recycled from previous contests (incumbent officials) and, in order to fill requirements the candidates at the bottom of the lists are advisors with no legislative experience (Ind. a-c). To add just one more example of the monopoly of the party leader in the nominations I quote Deputy Sergio Molina (Autodeterminación y Libertad) on the weak, improvised party built around its leader:

_Era un movimiento muy chico. Centralmente por la figura de Zamora… [La nominación] era la aprobación de Zamora….Me llamó a la casa, para participar como candidato a vicejefe de él… En realidad parte de la campaña era conseguir la afiliación; teníamos que conseguir 4000 firmas de afiliados [para validar el partido]. …Todos los días se armanaban 10 mesas en la ciudad._

This weak and small party however finished fifth with around 3.51% of the votes in 2005 and one city Legislature seat and came up third with 12.3% in the mayoral

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152 Deputy Amoroso said: “…Macri tiene un partido que se llama ‘Compromiso para el Cambio’, que tiene aliados; De [Ricardo] López Murphy, que es ‘Recrear’; Tiene aliados radicales y nosotros somos los peronistas. Cada uno de nuestros sectores, unidos, peleamos para tener mayor cantidad de lugares. …Si vos te fijás entre los primeros 11, 4 somos peronistas. …”
election in 2003 and 2 seats in the National Congress. These campaigns are based on a personalistic strategy, “leftist principles” and relying on the media. This is a party with very little structure which shows the type of votes they carry; basically following the personal appeal of Zamora and the leftist principles he represents. Next, Deputy Juan Velazco (PRO) gives another insight into the power of the party leaders and the weakness of parties (Indicators a, c): “… [En Argentina] más que tradición de partidos políticos, tenemos tradición de liderazgos, para decirlo de forma elegante. En general aparecen partidos políticos alrededor de líderes, no de principios. Los principios son accesorios a los liderazgos. Entonces la relación personal de los líderes de primer orden o segundo orden, en mi caso, es muy importante, o trascendente.”

Velazco is with Mr. Macri now and was with Mrs. Patricia Bulrich (Unión por Todos) before. In relation to his previous party affiliation he gave a similar opinion (by the way, at the time of this interview Bulrich was with the party led by Carrió, ARI).

These single-leader based parties or coalition of single-leader parties may have statutes about the nomination of candidates where, for example, a “directors’ council” determines the candidates. However, very often the nomination is not such a collegial procedure at all (Indicator b). Not only can the estimation of the opinion polls, or the expected resources one can bring to the campaign, tilt the nomination decisions, but also a good personal relationship with the party leader can be a card for a candidacy nomination. Deputy Velazco said: “Acá el líder decide quien es el candidato, más allá de que puede haber mecanismos. …Y eso ocurre en todos los partidos políticos. … [En la campaña se fueron] desviando los recursos y la prensa hacia la figura de Patricia [Bulrich], y los diputados nacionales quedaron en un segundo plano.” (Indicators 1, 5-7)

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An exception could be the Socialist party, which is well known for their tradition of holding internal/primary elections.
5.9.2.2 Out-of-party personalities are invited as candidates (Indicators a-d)

In Capital Federal candidates may be invited due to expertise, star quality, or personal relationships, as with Deputy Morando: “...no tuve que hacer absolutamente nada para estar acá, en ese sentido, por una relación si querés de conocimiento con el líder carismático, que es Macri, yo me dedico a crearle contenido...Sí, sí, a mi me llamaron por teléfono y me dijeron, ¿‘querés estar en tal lista?’” Morando admitted he did nothing in the campaign effort and was invited to participate because he is an economist who was critical of the former government. There were four “Listas colectoras” or parallel PR lists of candidates in the same party, which is basically giving away nominations for the simple reason of giving “candidates” incentive to work for the party leader, because the would-be-candidates contribute to the campaign with money or resources like special access to media outlets or marketing experts, and also allow voters to have more “choice.” People leading those lists may satisfy electorates from the left, the center, or from the right. Many candidates that are invited are also well known “personalities,” people who “lend their prestige” (as Morando said). Recent cases are María Eugenia Estenssoro or folk singer “Chango” Farias Gómez, pediatrician and TV personality Lorenzo Borocotó. Farias Gómez tells his experience:

Fui candidato a diputado por el macrismo. Todo una cosa que me pasa como artista. …Yo participé con mi nombre artístico, ‘Chango’ Farias Gómez. Esto fue en 2003...Yo fui tercero en la lista, pero con el mismo tamaño de letra del que encabezaba la lista y con mi nombre artístico, porque yo me llamó Juan Enrique. [Me invitaron] cuando se estaban cerrando las listas, faltan uno o dos días; Ahí arreglamos, y arreglé y entré.

Gómez was invited because of his fame and popularity, not his participation in the party. Also, as he mentioned, even though he was third in the PR list of candidates, his name was stressed with a font size as big as that of the leading candidate in a list which contained around 40 names. Gómez’s nomination/invitation does not seem to have been planned in advance by the party leadership. Besides the leader, also the
opinion polls are relevant when nominating candidates, often people from outside politics, “esto es en el marco de la vida política partidaria casi muerta, no hay vida partidaria,” as National Deputy Argüello (PJ) said. Argüello continued: “Ahora la encuesta manda mucho más de lo razonable. …porque el nivel de conocimiento, y de la opinión favorable y de la intención de voto influye definitivamente en el armado de la lista.” Argüello then detailed examples of officials who ran in different districts from where they were originally from, because it was politically convenient.154 Public recognition and star quality of the candidates are very important assets in campaigns.

**5.9.2.3 Personality based parties and fear of democratic candidate nominations**

*(Indicator a-c)*

There is another reason to explain the weakness of party life in Capital Federal, which eventually conditions the voter mobilization strategy at their disposal. Since the last decade, the parties which access power in this district are new organizations built to promote their single emergent leaders.155 These parties then lack much of the infrastructure and membership which the nationalized parties in the rest of the country have, and hence need to build ad-hoc coalitions with sectors of the civil society or other parties or movements to have a chance at winning. Deputy DiFilippo (ARI) gives us his view of his “modern party” and justifies not holding internal elections and inviting political outsiders to be on the lists: Deputy DiFilippo:

154 On this Argüello said: “Y esto explica estos trasplantes que estamos viendo en Argentina, donde, Cristina Kirchner puede terminar un mandato en Santa Cruz y ganar las elecciones en la provincia de Buenos Aires; o Daniel Scioli de un fin de semana al otro dejar de ser candidato a jefe de Gobierno de la Ciudad [de Buenos Aires] para ser candidato a gobernador por la provincia [de Buenos Aires]. Para hablar solamente de nuestro partido. Todos los partidos lo hacen. Lilita Carrió es del Chaco.”

155 For example: Mauricio Macri and his party “Compromiso para el Cambio” founded in 2003; Elisa Carrió and her “Afirmación para una República Igualitaria” (2002); Ricardo López Murphy and his “Recrear para el Crecimiento” (2002); Patricia Bulrich and her “Union por Todos” (2003), to name a few. Other more long standing parties also count with one or a few noticeable leaders (for example Luis Zamora participated in the “Movimiento al Socialismo,” “Izquierda Unida” and since the late 1990s in his own “Autodeterminación y Libertad.”
Those “consensus” lists are meetings of no more than 10 party leaders who basically agree on Carrió's preferences. Candidates and politicians play down the role of party activists, and instead give more centrality to campaigns to the “technocrat” type of party members. Their quantity is not as relevant as their expertise in a media dependent campaign district. There is no need, and there is even an aversion to spending resources on developing a party infrastructure (unlike parties in other districts); they could be seen as sources of corruption associated with patronage and clientelism.

The way in which nominations are decided and the types of people recruited aid the emphasis on the personality of the party leader over that of other candidates. Deputy Luciana Blasco discussed the reasoning behind her own and other recruitment decisions, made to not overshadow the leader. She acknowledges that Mauricio Macri decided the lists of candidates because “he is clearly the one getting the votes.” Blasco was not a partisan before she was nominated and she had no experience in politics, but was put in that place for her work in Macri’s “Think Tank.” The fact that there is not a party activist base in these parties removes any “entitlements” party members could claim from the leader in his nomination decision (over personalities and other political outsiders). The lack of a partisan base and of internal party democratic processes also removes any potential threat to the party leader’s position of power.

However, there are also parties with larger structures in Capital Federal, but that are having trouble in finding the popular support they enjoyed in the past, basically the
remains of the PJ and UCR which also manifests itself in the candidate nomination process. City Deputy Kravetz shared his experience in the party/faction based on the person of National Deputy Miguel Bonasso, a journalist and leftist human rights advocate turned politician, and the assessment that these are weak parties with “political entrepreneurs” more than party loyalists. What matters in the candidate nomination process is “who you know.” (Indicators a-c)

Kravetz: Para los que no militamos nunca dentro de la estructura del Partido Justicalista era un tema ir al PJ....En ese momento tenía un peso muy fuerte lo que planteaba Bonasso...nosotros íbamos en una de las tres listas que llevaban a Aníbal Ibarra como candidato. Éramos la única lista que reflejaba más claramente a Kirchner. ...Porque Bonasso tenía una relación muy estrecha con Kirchner. Y después finalmente hubo dos candidatos a legisladores que en su momento entraron, que respondían a dos referentes muy fuertes de Kirchner, uno entró como cuarto legislador, Claudio Ferrenio, una persona que milita con Alberto Fernández y Eduardo Valdez que tenía un cargo con el Jefe de Gabinete del canciller Bielsa.

As shown in the above quote, the nominations were based on personal relationships (Indicator b). However, this also implies the presence of a much larger, albeit dormant, party structure than in the case of Deputy Blasco’s party. Nominations are still a personal decision of one or a few leaders, but the considerations also involve the fair representation of important factions led by people who are not candidates themselves. It means that those faction leaders can bring important resources to the campaign.

5.9.3 Campaigns which emphasize the person of the party leader (Indicators 1-7)

Campaign tactics are carefully crafted and geared towards tying aspects of the party leader’s expertise and personal assets, with policy proposals. These parties are made up of relatively small groups of “experts” who know how to use the media and market a candidate. Deputy Blasco:

[Yo] estaba dentro del equipo, gran equipo de campaña que tenía como coordinador al candidato a vicejefe de Mauricio [Macri], Larreta, y después al interior de ese equipo había grupos donde se generaban ideas para mostrar tal o
cual faceta de Mauricio que era conveniente mostrar. De ejecución de actividades, surgió una idea y hay que transformarla en un evento de campaña. …por ejemplo iba Mauricio y saltaba un bache [en la calle] y se ponía a hablar sobre ese tema.”

These single-leader based parties are the rule in the Argentine capital and the campaign tactics have some programmatic contents to satisfy the public, but they are usually attached to the personal attributes of the candidate (e.g. “honesty” to combat corruption, or “business experience” to run the city). These campaigns on personalism are in the hands of experts and pollsters, and not in the hands of the candidates or even the party leaders. (Indicator 1, 2, 6, 7)

Next, Deputy Meis (Recrear) comments on how the “campaign platform” is elaborated, justifying the lack of participation of the candidates in its elaboration, and revealing that the personal qualities of the leader are indeed relevant to the campaign (Indicators 1, 2).

Meis: Hubo una plataforma [en 2005] pero no podemos decir que hubo una reunión para hacer eso. Hubo una pequeña plataforma que se trabajó. …Ahí los equipos técnicos eran compartidos. Los candidatos no participamos demasiado. …Yo veo que se criticó eso [gobierno de Ibarra] y también una actitud de propuesta de trabajo que la gente valoró y la imagen de Mauricio Macri era absolutamente opuesta de la imagen de Ibarra…la imagen de Macri podía pensarse en una imagen mucho más eficiente, más ordenada, más propositiva. Y creo que eso fue la diferencia que se vió.

Next, Deputy Di Filippo refers to the various tactics (personalistic type and others) in the party campaign strategy, where the main objective of the tactics is to show and promote the leaders of the party or to attract followers by using his/her image. This shows the singularity and centrality to campaigns of each of the parties’ leaders. When simply asked “What do you [the party] do to reach people?” Deputy DiFilippo answered:

DiFilippo: Lo que se hace en el ARI. Carrió, su figura es, como comunicadora, excelente. Nosotros utilizamos mucho los espacios que son gratuitos…” “Hay como un cerco mediático que se le pone a Elisa Carrió. Pero en las pocas participaciones que conseguimos, eso se multiplica exponencialmente mucho más que cualquier otro candidato, esto es lo que tiene la facilidad de Carrió. …cuando habla Carrió en un programa [de televisión] es importante para el programa. Salir un diputado en un programa es importante
They are aware of and exploit the image of the candidate with a press team organized since the beginning and a consciousness of the single-candidate campaign.\textsuperscript{156}

5.9.3.1 \textit{Personalism tactics in Capital Federal} (Indicators 1-7)

\textit{Television appearances} and debates are a tactic usually reserved for the top candidates of the main parties. On the other hand, candidates from smaller parties who are not invited or cannot access high profile television shows, mostly go to talks at university forums/debates (without the mass media), or appear in the second ranked media (cable TV and FM stations).

Candidates embellish their persona, but the fact that there are so many candidates in the campaign force them to give a twist to that aspect of the personality that addresses a particular need of the electorate. The candidate has to be more than the image, a much more elaborated and crafted image than in the “low development” districts. But for this same reason, the personality is less charismatic and more human, and more vulnerable to criticism and errors.

\textit{Lower ranked legislative candidates} (i.e. candidates in non expectant positions) may walk the streets of their neighborhoods; hence, splitting the city in a large number of areas where these candidates may personally appear. City legislators in Capital Federal do some outdoor, more personalized activities in campaigns, but leaders interviewed feel that it has little effect on the number of votes. In these direct contact activities, the

\textsuperscript{156} Second tier candidates also participate in specialized tactics. Di Filippo said: “En campaña...son varias cosas que se organizan, radios abiertas, carabanas de coches, mesas en las secciones, suelta de globos, repartida de flores, de todo se hace para hacer una campaña. El año pasado hicimos una batucada; arrancamos en Plaza Italia y fuimos todo por la avenida Santa Fe tocando tambores. ...Se trata de que organizadamente, los candidatos se dividan en los diferentes barrios, para que en cada lugar haya una presencia de candidatos.”
legislators campaign in part on personalism, “*to get an image out there,*” but it makes little impact on the overall strategy, which is mostly media based.

The system reduces the “personalism” of these “lower candidates” (even though they fight for it with direct contact tactics such as setting up a table on a street corner and through the secondary media of cable TV and FM radios), in part because there are so many parties in contention, with a plethora of campaigning legislative candidates that are always overshadowed by the party leaders; so the focus is on the top leader in this fast-paced city of 3 million residents. The lower-ranked candidates know they have a central leader, but also want to emphasize their own personal qualities, and hence end up stressing the idea that “the team” per se is important.

5.9.3.2 Candidates cannot deliver on personalized tactics (Indicators 4-7)

There is an attempt to reach people in a more personalized manner but it is not significant for the small number of people parties personally reach, but rather for the media effect. Those tactics to personally reach voters are covered by the media if the leader of the party is present; otherwise the tactics are not covered by the media and is a responsibility of the lower ranked candidates to carry out. In both cases there are a limited number of people it affects personally. Even those reached by the candidates do not get a very personalized contact (as would people in Formosa, for example) but a flyer or a short conversation on a busy street corner. Deputy DiFilippo said:

*Es mucho más difícil en la ciudad de Buenos Aires hacerlo [el puerta a puerta]. …*Si dejar propuestas del ARI, o volantes, cosas que tampoco irrita a la gente.*

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157 Direct contact tactics are face-to-face tactics, which in the case of parades, or even street corner tables are not very personalized since voters are anonymous transients.

158 Since the proportional representation lists of candidates in local elections are long (usually 30 candidates in each and at least 10 substitute candidates), it makes it impossible for a voter to know something about all candidates (they may know about some), hence “the party” needs to be important, and its label protected to make it easier for people to grasp. (For example, in Formosa, where there is only one party with real chances, the label of the party is less important; even if the party has a bad reputation, one leader can “save” the province/city.)
La idea es no avasallar…Nosotros tuvimos una idea que la implementamos…dejamos por ejemplo en los porteros eléctricos de un edificio grande, un extensil muy cortito que decía ‘Cacho, acordate de mañana votar a Carrió, un abrazo…’ Entonces era una persona X, que no vivia ahí, pero dejarlo colgado…porque cada uno que iba a tocar el timbre leía el papelito; era una forma de comunicación mas.

All major parties in Capital Federal seem to be built and campaigned around one important person and leader. They are not only the parties’ candidates at the time, but in many cases those leaders are the parties’ founders and only significant personality. The available resources are geared towards promoting those leaders, even the ground level activities are often focused on promoting the main candidates.

5.9.4 Conclusions

Leaders and candidates in Capital Federal tend to belong to small, new parties which are teams of experts (on policies, on campaigns), and also hire campaign experts. Campaigns try to show that the candidate is a “team player,” with a façade of institutionalized intra-party relationships which middle class people appreciate in candidates (it is actually not real because these parties are only personality-based; e.g. see the case of nomination procedures in Capital Federal).

These new parties are weak; the parties have no ground level infrastructure and significant party membership. The parties often need ad-hoc coalitions to have a chance at winning a significant share of the votes. The parties have no traditions or notable principles to be identified by. The party leader is above the political party itself. In these recently created parties the leader chooses candidates; there is little party structure and limited ideas/program.

When, like most cases in Capital Federal, political parties have no relevant campaign program and make electoral coalitions with other similar parties, then they may reach an electoral agreement where some campaign issues are shared, but no policy program is underlying campaigns (See chapter 4). “Platforms” are even more
diluted in their contents due to the necessary coalition negotiations and compromises. The parties’ programmatic contents are tied to the person of the leader, who is “the one getting the votes” (as officials suggested).

The common situation of these parties is to have a good candidate with a project or issues on which to campaign. A campaign needs a candidate with the right qualities to govern and specific skills. Electoral campaigns seek a personal vote for candidates with a crafted image. The high level of electoral competitiveness and educated organized middle class electorate also makes the personalism-campaigned candidate more likely be in the spotlight and hence be less charismatic, and with more flaws and vulnerable to criticism and errors.

In Capital Federal the mass media is relevant to campaigns and helps the personalism of the leaders of those parties. These parties could not significantly reach voters without the mass media; these parties do not have infrastructures like networks of “punteros.” With so many parties and candidates in the district, campaigns focus on one or a few candidates (usually the mayor and top legislators). His or her reputation is key and difficult to replace and the fate of the whole party may be tied to it.  

The individual, personal reputation of the top leaders is crucial to the victories of the party in Capital Federal. The free information and easy access to the personal aspects of the candidates puts these leaders in everyone’s eyes. In the city of Buenos Aires there is no market for the type of personalism which is typical of more patrimonial-run districts. However, the image of the leading candidate is very relevant; in fact it may be the most relevant element in a campaign. The media in this respect is crucial to

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159 In Capital Federal “performance as a voter mobilization strategy” will be less relevant than it could be, because with the particular kind of high competition with a large number of political parties, the odds of competing against a political party which was never in office are higher, and the candidates then cannot criticize each other’s performance (because they do not have any), but their programs and personal attributes (non-incumbents also compete against one another – See chapter 4).
shape and promote the image of the often professionally marketed candidates. The strategy is a “personalistic strategy” which not necessarily is ruled by a strong personalism, but could be marked by a candidate image tailored to the campaign.

5.10 Santa Cruz

5.10.1 Background and argument

In Santa Cruz personalism as a voter mobilization strategy has medium centrality; is not irrelevant but it is not central to any electoral campaign either. The province of Santa Cruz is a district with low electoral competitiveness and high socioeconomic development of the electorate (See chapter 2). Similar to the case of Formosa and Capital Federal, the candidate nomination procedures in Santa Cruz are heavily influenced by single political leaders. There may be intra-party competition at the local level (thanks to the CSDV electoral system), but it only serves the goals of the monolithic power of the governor and the weakening of the opposition parties. The infighting dilutes the efforts of the already weak alternative candidates and electoral machine at the local level. In order to understand campaigns in many provinces and in the country, we have to keep the governors center-stage.

There is no significant competition among parties; the PJ party position of power at the provincial level, and most municipalities, is not at stake in elections in Santa Cruz, and the victory of the party is not questioned. There is not much point in campaigning on the qualities of one’s party, because the PJ party is hardly a variable in the electoral contest (it is a quasi-constant victor). Because other parties do not count for much or the competition comes from within, the candidate has to turn to himself (or the leader above him) as a main asset in campaigns.

However, given that voters are more resourceful (organizational, material and informational resources) the candidate/leader is more reachable and “tangible” than in
Formosa, and hence a more questionable and vulnerable figure that needs to be validated. The personal qualities of the candidates become relevant given that the candidates have to demonstrate their personal importance in the eyes of the more sophisticated and inquisitive voters. This fact is exacerbated by the fact that urban conglomerates in this district are relatively small. The publics in the towns in Santa Cruz (like in those of Formosa) demand performance from their leaders, or they will oust officials (unlike in Formosa). Yet, the expected performance from officials in Santa Cruz (club or public type) may differ from what is expected in Formosa (particularistic type).

The personalistic ingredient of campaign tactics differs from Formosa’s as in the case of clientelism (See Chapter 3). The strategy in Santa Cruz is to leave implicit the unique qualities of the candidate (particularly if the candidate himself is speaking). The goal of the tactic is to place the candidate as “team player” (as in Capital Federal), even though there might not be such a team and only the candidate is known or qualified.\footnote{The Law of Lemas electoral system may be a reason for this (See Lisoni 2002, 2003).} Candidates cannot put themselves in a superior light to other citizens; they portray themselves as a “bridge” between people with needs and those with solutions. Yet, candidates campaign that they are the appropriate and capable ones for doing the job.

5.10.2 The governor’s blessing as a legitimizing resource (Indicators a-d)

With regards to the candidate nominations and how the local PJ party factions appear, Councilman Beroiza (PJ, Los Antiguos) said, “…\emph{porque viene ‘Don Pedro’ y dice, te bendice, y te dice ‘vos tenés que ser,’ también lo bendice al él, también lo bendice a él, y se forman todos y el que gana llega a intendente, y se crean esas divisiones políticas.}” The party leader (Néstor Kirchner) “blesses” the mayoral nominee, and in turn that mayoral candidate appoints or brings along candidates for city council and Town Provincial Deputy: “\emph{Cuando vos hacés lista de intendente llevás concejales, y}
Néstor Carlos Kirchner has been the undisputed PJ provincial leader since the early 1990s (when he subsumed former Governor Antonio Puricelli’s faction). Kirchner left the governorship in 2003 but has retained de facto control of the party. When Provincial Deputy Miriam Aguiar was asked if (then) President Kirchner came up with the list of candidates himself for the nomination of the 10 PR provincial legislators, she said: “No, no, no, la lista la armaron, el gobernador. Después una vez que estaba conformada la lista y demás, lo que hace Kirchner es ver si estaban todos los sectores y demás. Pero fue una decisión mas que nada que tomó el gobernador.” (Indicators a-c)

Santa Cruz’s legislature also has 14 deputies, one per locality, who are elected by plurality vote and are usually politically close to their mayors. The governor may not interfere in the nomination of these candidates. Aguiar said; “[Son] expresiones de deseo mas que nada...quien mejor que la persona del pueblo para saber como mide dentro de su pueblo.” Lastly, the nomination of National Deputies and Senators is a prerogative of the party’s provincial elite. “Sí, en realidad hay un solo sector: el ‘Frente para la Victoria Santacruceña.’ Un grupo de varias personas. No digo 20, ni 15, pero...” Aguiar was obviously referring to a very small group of people. (Indicators a-c)

Mayor Maimo (PJ, Pico Truncado) also referred to the power of the governor to nominate and bless provincial and national candidates, which seemed to exempt them from campaigning at all. Provincial and national candidates do not go to Pico Truncado because they ride the governor’s and the party’s coattails. Maimo belongs to another PJ faction which was not openly opposed to the governor’s at the time. Similar to other mayors in Santa Cruz, he largely determines the nominations and platform in his own
town, in his case with four or five other people. “No, la propuesta se hace en conjunto, y la propuesta es del intendente. Y los concejales acompañan.” (Indcs. a-c, 4-7)

Maimo also refers to how people relate the candidate’s person and their performance when voting: “Hoy [la gente] vota a la persona. ...vota al que creen que es más potable. ...Por eso vos tenés que hacer las cosas bien, y no acordarte durante los 2 meses de campaña…”

Ojeda and Labado are two other examples of candidate nominations, in this case for city council. Similar to cases in other provinces, Ojeda (Perito Moreno, PJ) was invited by the leader to be a candidate. “Yo soy militante de hace varios años. Por ahí mi nominación vino directamente de quien era en ese momento el intendente Bilardo, en un momento me llama a su despacho, y me plantea si yo quisiera ser…” Labado (PJ, Caleta Olivia), a career beaurocrat, was also invited by the Mayor to be a candidate for city council: “¿Cómo surge mi nombre? --después de estar trabajando durante 12 años con el ex intendente Córdoba y estar trabajando mas que nada atendiendo a la gente con una necesidad real…” Hence, the local and provincial party leaders have a determinant role in the candidate nominations. In turn campaigns revolve around those executives, around their personas, but also their performance.

Nominations in Santa Cruz are made by the party leadership and not by the lay party members. This may be a reasoned way to save resources and avoid confrontation, to maintain coherence within the party ranks, and to try to prevent internal party opposition from gaining political office and the resources that come with it.

Furthermore, as Councilman Ojeda says, the local factions within the PJ arise because of conflicts of personality among politicians and their unwillingness or lack of capability to resolve those differences (Indicators a-d). Ojeda said:

...Bilardo era el candidato fuerte del justicialismo… Y después el resto de la gente hizo una campaña jugando en contra. Sabemos nosotros que participando dentro del lema le van a estar sumando al mas votado, pero la
Ojeda recognized that the electoral system adds to their own the votes won by the internal party opposition. As the incumbent candidate’s ticket, they had no fear of losing to any of those PJ factions.

5.10.3 Resources and use of the media

Beroiza is a Peronist who is not siding with the mayor. “En nuestro pueblo se hace difícil y a veces se hace fácil hacer política. …Los fondos los maneja solamente el intendente, a gusto y piacere, si estás con él o no estás con él; te maneja la vida. Gracias a Dios, no es mi caso.” Beroiza is an example of the dissent within the ruling party at the local level which does not alter the monolithic rule of the party at the provincial level (Indicators a, c, d). In the larger capital city of Río Gallegos, the “control of the media” exercised by the provincial government is relevant as well. Councilman Raul Naim (PJ, President of the City Council) says that people in Río Gallegos are very well informed, with some 60 FM radio stations, 5 public and private TV channels and 3 local newspapers. Then he added:

... Acá hay muchos medios de información que tienen dependencia indirectamente con el estado provincial. ¿Cómo subsisten los medios de información? A través del auspicio publicitario. Acá el auspicio te lo da generalmente el estado. …Como candidato, sí, son importantismos [los medios]. …Pero si vos no tenés un apoyo económico estás muerto. Y en una campaña electoral tenés que vender tu cara, tenés que vender todo, no solamente el artículo [en el diario] porque con eso no alcanza. Porque no toda la gente te conoce. (Indicators 1, 6, 7)

Particularly candidates for the city council need to show their image, literally their face on pictures, next to the party leaders’ (mayor or governor) to make people associate the candidate with the leader. However, these efforts are not necessarily monitored by the mayor or provincial party machine and are left in the hands of the candidate himself, since these tactics usually are not considered to be influential for the
big ticket candidates (mayor, governor and provincial and national legislatives), who
generally do not care which councilman candidate wins, as long as it is from their party
(See chapter 4 for data supporting this statement).

5.10.3.1 Other tactics and indicators (Indicators 1-7)

Split voting may be evidence of a “personal vote” over a “party vote”. As Labado
suggests, people vote performance, but do not rely on the party, but rather on the
candidate. Labado: “Hasta hace muy poco eran pocos los corte de boleta. ...hoy te
encontrás a un peronista con un radical. ...Te das cuenta que están votando a la
persona. ...Después tiene que ver con la gestión de uno: caso de Kirchner, caso de
[intendente] Córdoba.”

As for the reasons people vote for a candidate, Ojeda above referred to the
incumbent’s performance as crucial for the election (Actually, Bilardo was not Mayor
between 2003 and 2007; lost the 2003 and won again the 2007 election). People end up
voting for the most attractive personality, and Ojeda added: “...yo creo que la gente vota
al que no pierde. Y hoy por hoy, sobre todo se está dando mas en los jóvenes que no se
identifican con ningún partido.” “...Pero generalmente eligen al candidato, por amistad,
por afinidad, porque le gustó la propuesta.” (Indicators 2, 3)

Even though there is then some campaigning on the personal qualities of the
candidates, the negative campaigning of the incumbent or the opposition towards one
another does not reach high rhetorical decibels without being costly to the
candidate/party making those negative comments. Deputy Suárez (PJ) verbalizes why in
some small towns negative campaigning may not be effective: “Porque a lo mejor [en
Perito Moreno]...sea la característica de la pequeña localidad, a lo mejor ataco al mejor
candidato, pero en forma indirecta estoy atacando a otras personas que lo acompañan y
The candidates in Santa Cruz do not often visit voters’ houses during campaigns even in the small towns (Indicators 4-7). Candidates only visit where people ask them to. Suárez had a team of around 18 young people who would go around town bringing campaign literatures and would talk to the people wanting to talk to him about issues or concerns and take note if the candidate was requested to go himself. These party workers are not brokers and have no power of decision, only deliver the literature and take notes of issues brought up by people. Here is Suárez: “... yo voy solo o con la persona que quedó comprometida a que yo vaya a hacer la entrevista con esa persona. ...Ya hace 33 años que vivo en Perito Moreno, nos conocemos todos. ...De los que piden una entrevista, yo voy.” Suárez is a well-known professor in Perito Moreno, an example of the image of the candidate attached to a performance.

Santa Cruz shows that personalism is not necessarily central as a voter mobilization strategy for most candidates in districts where one party controls most political power behind one strong governor. Candidates invest in personalism (their personality, etc) to some extent, in part because they do not have anything else to campaign on (money/program, etc). However, other strategies like performance may be more relevant as voters demand it.

5.10.4 Conclusion

In Santa Cruz there is one dominant party in which the governor centralized the control of resources and the local mayors often act as delegates of the governor due to their lack of financial autonomy. The electorate in Santa Cruz is comparatively rich, educated and with good skills to organize to pursue public and club-type demands.
Personalism has medium centrality to campaigns as a voter mobilization strategy in Santa Cruz. On the one hand, the fact that there is an active and demanding public and one major party forces elected officials to be publicly identifiable in defense of the administration during campaigns. The centrality of the executive roles of governor and mayor forces the PJ party to campaign with the image of the party leaders who are often seeking reelection. Although the party has an almost certain victory, the particular incumbent party official needs the personal recognition as leader if he hopes to be mayor, for example. Also, the fact that the executives (governor and mayors) usually nominate their legislative candidates shows their strength in the district and their centrality in party life.

But, on the other hand, officials are anxious to satisfy people’s club-type demands and the consequent credit-claiming on the government sponsored media. Officials feel that people are not concerned for who is in power as long as they satisfy the public. When the public is not happy with the administration then the mayors can credibly blame the higher level authority (provincial government) for lack of support. Civil society is more developed in Santa Cruz than in Formosa and hence demands are more “public demands” which need to be satisfied. Hence, performance with respect to the satisfaction of those demands is tested. There is less room for paternalistic-type personal attributes of the candidates to play a role where multiple and complex public demands need to be addressed, with a mobilized civil society behind those demands (See Chapter 6). The fact that cities are small in Santa Cruz also incentivizes elected officials to keep low profiles; that is, with no paternalistic attitudes, no arrogance or presumption, and no excessive displays of wealth because it could be costly in small and active communities.

161 Also see Chapter 3 section on Santa Cruz and Chapter 2 footnote 30, page 39 on civil society organizations.
The factors here discussed combine in such a way as to make personalism as a strategy have medium centrality to campaigns in Santa Cruz, although it would not be sufficient to fully explain how political parties campaigns in order to mobilize voters (as chapter 6 discusses, performance as a strategy is central to campaigns).

5.11 Catamarca

5.11.1 Background and argument

Catamarca is a province with high electoral competitiveness and low socioeconomic development (See Chapter 2) and personalism as a voter mobilization strategy is not central to campaigns. Catamarca, like Formosa, is a district with small towns and a significant poor electorate. However, the fact that there is a real alternative to basically all the incumbents and very contested election processes (e.g. see chapter 3) means that it is more difficult for single “all powerful” charismatic figures to emerge (leaders are contradicted and bastardized by the other parties). Personalism as a strategy is muffled by the high political party institutionalization, organization, intra-party competition and multiple layers of leaders. The party plays a role in the life of society and prevents or tempers the emergence and relevance of sole charismatic or paternalistic type leaders. As a result, necessarily there is something more than the leader’s image in the campaigns (e.g. clientelism). The necessary nomination compromises and the unavoidable competition political parties in Catamarca face within and among themselves and with the larger society, lead me to conclude that personalism is not central to campaigns as a voter mobilization strategy.

5.11.2 Candidate nominations: Competition and Compromise (Indicators a-d)

As argued earlier in the chapter, the mechanisms in which candidate nominations are resolved are a factor to understand the centrality to campaigns of personalism.
Parties in Catamarca may go to internal elections to decide nominations. The other mechanism, common in UCR for example, is to allocate nominations according to the last party office elections (See De Luca et al, 2002). There is great relevance of the internal party lines/ factions when deciding nominations. However, there is always the “small table” where leaders of those party lines decide national and provincial legislative nominations. Local nominations for mayor and city councils, as well as most of the cases for Departamental (County) Senators are decided locally.

Parties would rather avoid internal elections, as they are a very resource-intensive process. Internal elections consume resources that could be used in the general elections, but also, and maybe more importantly, the heat of the internal elections may sharpen differences among internal party lines which could later affect the party’s strength in the general election (Indicators a, b). On the other hand, internal elections could stimulate the vitality of the party infrastructure, activism, etc. (Indicator c)

The local party “Dirigencia” or group of local leaders is who decides who should be nominated, but they resort to internal elections in case of disagreements. However, the local party leaders tend to be pragmatic and try to converge to the names with the best chances of winning the post in the general elections. (Indicators a-c)

The “Frente Cívico y Social” is led by UCR, but it also has other political forces, most notably the Peronist-based PUC (Partido de Unidad Catamarqueña) and Mobilización parties. The members of these parties are openly and vocally Peronist

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162 Losing candidates from an internal party contest, may not fully support the party’s nominee, or may even play against him in a strategic move for future rewards.

163 In 2009 the Frente Cívico y Social was made up of the following parties: UCR, Movilización, Recrear para el Crecimiento (Recrear), Partido Socialista (PS), Movimiento Popular Catamarqueño (MPC), Movimiento de Integración y Desarrollo (MID), Democracia Popular por el Frente Social (DP), Nuevo Espacio de Opinión (NEO), Movimiento de Identidad Popular (MIP), Unificación Populista (UP), Movimiento de Militancia Catamarqueña (MOMICA), Partido de Unidad Catamarqueña (PUC), Partido Nacionalista Constitucional (PNC-UNIR), 26 de Julio por la Justicia Social, Partido Movimiento Solidaridad y Altruismo, Partido Popular Santarroseño,
that were expelled from or were disgusted by the provincial PJ leadership, or they were attracted by the then rising Frente Cívico y Social in the early 1990s. According to the Frente's rules, each party should conduct its own nominations, or internal process, and then the coalition leaders meet to define nominations honoring the support from the smaller forces in the Front. This is how the Peronist provincial senator and Peronist provincial deputy in the Frente Cívico got their expectant positions. It is convenient to the Radicales to have a “pata peronista” or “Peronist Leg” (according to Councilman Juan Pablo Millán, UCR, Catamarca), to attract union members and Peronist people in general from the rival PJ party. (Indicators a-c)

The UCR party “Convencionales” (or Party Delegates) are around 110 and the Frente Cívico y Social delegates to decide the nominations are around 12 (from the different Frente’s parties). The leaders that nominate national candidates are even fewer. The UCR internal lines are the Celeste, led by the Governor Brizuela del Moral, and the MIRA led by Valle Viejo Mayor Gustavo “Gallo” Jalile 164. The dirigencia who decide the list of provincial deputies may include the governor himself and the leader of MIRA, the mayors of the other relevant cities in Catamarca (Tinogasta, and the provincial capital). The objective is to have people in the Provincial Legislature (Senate and Deputies) who represent all counties in the province. (Indicators a-c)

In the instances in which the “mesa provincial” (the governor and provincial leaders) imposes a candidate at the local level (e.g. for provincial senator) this may damage the relationship with the local dirigencia, which is necessary to traction the vote. Usually the local leaders choose the local candidates, including Provincial Senator, and

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Partido Movimiento Tinogasteño, Acción Departamental de Valle Viejo, y Partido de Integración Catamarqueña (PIC).

164 One of the relevant PJ internal lines is that led by the Saadi family (caudillo Vicente Saadi and his twice governor and son Ramon Saadi); another is led by Luis Barrionuevo, a conservative leader with union ties to the PJ (now a National Senator). The UCR caudillo was Arnoldo Castillo, whose son, Vicente Castillo, was governor of Catamarca as well.
contradicting their preferences may weaken the campaign effort. A provincial leader/provincial mesa may impose a candidate because of negotiations at the provincial level meant to reach a fair balance among the internal party lines, and/or resolve nomination decisions which are very conflictive at the local level, when the local leaders do not want to go to internal elections given the risk of sharpening differences. This may happen, for example, when the party line which is supposed to nominate the candidate (a group within the party composed of the winners of internal contests for party posts) has a candidate that is “not potable” (not fitting for the campaign) and hence the issue is taken to the provincial level so as not to antagonize these party members.

Since the provincial senators’ elections are plurality vote within their counties, the nominees need the support of the local party leaders to traction the vote. Imposed-from-above candidates who are disliked locally may run into trouble. Provincial Deputies, who compete in a PR provincial election, are negotiated in more “political terms” among the provincial leaders, many times ignoring local wishes (See for example, complaints below by the Mayors of Los Varela and La Puerta). (Indicator a-c)

Mayors impose the names of candidates for city council more rarely than in Formosa. Their own position as mayors and mayoral candidates is often debated and contested. The highly contested elections make parties resort to a more rational nomination process in which the “best” candidates get nominated through the “best” nomination process; the candidate with the best chances of winning the general election, the best in “political terms,” gets nominated through a process which does not waste money and support from his or her own party.

In the case of PJ the list of Provincial Deputies favors the districts with the most people (basically the capital city), ignoring the more scarcely populated counties. The mayor of La Puerta was adamant about this fact, and mentioned the Liga de Intendentes Justicialistas, as an effort to counter the power of the PJ provincial elite of the capital.
Also, this is an example that there is not an all-powerful leader of the party like in Formosa or Capital Federal. Still, a neighborhood in the capital can have more voters than entire cities in the provincial interior.\footnote{In September 2007 this \textit{Liga} decided to join the President Kirchner's faction of PJ, leaving the provincial PJ leaders.}

In conclusion, party leaders have more constraints when nominating candidates than in Formosa, Capital Federal and Santa Cruz, as there are more party leaders and they cannot ignore the party factions and bases. Officials also limit the preeminence and relevance of individual party leaders in the campaigns.

5.11.3 \textit{Role of the party: resources and campaign organization}

5.11.3.1 \textit{Organization and resources (Indicator 1, 3, 4)}

The complexity of campaign organization and of campaign decisions is an indicator to understand the centrality to campaigns of personalism because it may relativize the importance of personal attributes of candidates. Next, I provide evidence of the complexity of campaign organizations in Catamarca.

There is a necessary coordination within the political parties given that they need to work as teams (more so at least than in Formosa) thus diminishing the role single leaders have in the decision making process of the campaign. The \textit{Frente Cívico} counts with political marketing and image advisors to basically focus on the UCR top provincial leaders, but also coordinating broad campaign topics like colors to be used, or pictures of minor candidates with the more relevant ones. One main campaign advisor was hired for the party (actually, the mayor of the provincial capital hired another one too, at the same time in 2005), and has the power to determine the marketing strategies of the different provincial candidates. The members of the \textit{Frente} that are not Radicals, like \textit{PUC} or \textit{Mobilización} do not participate in this decision making process; however, they
may benefit from it as well. Provincial Deputy Brandán and Provincial Senator Castillo do their own small “marketing” and platform activities, but get the benefits of the more powerful UCR hires in this respect. PJ provincial senators and mayors may get the support of PJ leaders in neighboring provinces since they have fewer resources than the provincial incumbent UCR party. (Provincial Deputy Burgos referred to this in chapter 3)

The big campaign moneys are centralized around the governor and mayor of the provincial capital; legislative candidates do not see any campaign money. However, campaign money is also distributed for campaign needs down to the local level. There are campaign committees not only at the provincial level, but at the county or even town level, which are in charge of the campaign tactics to be implemented in the district. Sometimes, the party in a couple of small nearby towns in the same county may join resources and have a shared campaign committee. The contentious electoral campaigns and the complexity of the party structure in its different levels (national, provincial and local) render that no single clear-cut personalistic approach to campaign would be effectively central in the effort to mobilize voters given the multiple leaders, actors and interests involved in a campaign strategy.

5.11.3.2 Coordination: the party above the candidates’ image (Indicators 1-7)

For the UCR campaign chief (Councilman Juan Pablo Millán), the provincial general elections are easier on him because the whole party and its dirigentes have incentives to mobilize. When there are midterm national elections, and only 3 national representatives are at stake, he needs to travel with the top two candidates around the

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166 Also, like in Capital Federal, both PJ and UCR parties carry out many surveys to help decide nominations, as well as during the campaigns. As Concejal Barrios (UCR) said, “the party does survey polls every 15 days, a company from Buenos Aires.” Councilman Millán (UCR) said: “we should do more surveys than we currently do.”
province and the local elites are not really interested. The campaign chief is almost the absolute authority during the campaign to coordinate and to talk to officials and candidates; basically, he organizes the agenda. Millán went around the province, ahead of the candidates (National Deputies and Senators) to smooth the field: “so I would get on the phone with the capital and ask for this or that, to solve the problems, so when the candidate goes he does not have to waste his time dealing with problems which could be very minor, and instead they can talk about their ideas, etc.” (Millán, UCR). The PJ also hire marketing and image advisors. They have a campaign chief, and both chiefs come to an agreement not to play negative or “dirty” campaign ads; however in the last stretch it always gets out of hand.

In any election campaign, departmental and district campaign committees have little financial autonomy and depend on the provincial committee for “afiches” (posters), etc. The central committee may organize 2 or 3 teams/cuadrillas of people to paint walls around the province with the national and provincial candidates’ names. They would then leave the provincial capital on a Friday up one road and come back on Sunday night down another road. The local party people would arrange to host and feed these teams. Local people would be in charge of painting for the local candidates’ campaign. Local party leaders may tell the provincial committee what media they can use to campaign (e.g. local friendly FM radio stations), and the provincial committee may send money or organize directly with the local radios (again, local organizations are financially strained). Candidates also walk the streets and make house visits. The house visits have to be preceded or organized by the local dirigencia; the walks in the town or neighborhoods may be organized by the dirigencia or not, but if the local

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167 The National Deputies election and campaigns are then not the most representative to evaluate political parties in Argentina. The literature on political parties in Argentina have based their conclusions on these type of elections for the convenience of some data.
dirigencia/punteros announce to people the imminent visit of the candidates, this may turn the event into a more fruitful one.

5.11.3.3 House to house tactics and mediated candidates (Indicators 1-7)

For city council candidates, as Mrs. Barrios said, the house visits are very important; candidates in small towns literally visit almost every house in the district, “some 2 or 3 times.” Punteros are also very relevant because they know the mood in each house; “they are ok, they just wanted to talk to you personally,’ ” or “in this house you should not talk about this or that subject.” (Councilwoman Barrios) The are “big gatherings” in smaller towns when the provincial or national candidates are in town, otherwise campaigns for local candidates tend to be house-to-house or small gatherings.

In the larger capital city the door-to-door tactics are also carried out. In the capital city, Millán said, “we gather ‘the little bees,’ a group of 50 women, divided them in four groups with a coordinator in each, told them we had problems in such and such neighborhood, area, and ask them to find out what was going on.” They would come back with detailed information on the people and their demands; in some cases it could be they needed a street light, or “well, you go and take the medicines they need,” etc. This organizational infrastructure works well for clientelism too, but also shows the mediation between the candidate and the people. The contact of candidates with people is mediated by the actors like the local dirigente and the “little bees” in this case.

5.11.4 Conclusion

In Catamarca personalism is not central to campaigns as a voter mobilization strategy. Personalism is muffled by the political parties’ institutionalization, organization, competition, the multiple layers of leaders and the necessary brokers in a successful
campaign. The media is more competitive\textsuperscript{168} and, since parties have a stronger infrastructure and coordination, there may be other personalities within the same party capable of or willing to replace the leader than in Formosa or Santa Cruz.

The PJ and the UCR-led \textit{Frente Cívico} seem to respect \textit{pre-established nomination procedures which do not depend on the wishes of one party leader or faction}. The particular case of the \textit{Frente Cívico} is a two-step nomination procedure for national and provincial candidates. First, each of the alliance’s parties decides who will be candidates and second, the Frente’s parties’ delegates negotiate the definite candidate nominations. The PJ and the UCR arguably base their nominations on the internal party offices election outcomes to decide the share of candidates given to each party faction. However, these parties also may hold internal elections to decide nominations, but these are avoided because of the amount of resources and efforts that internal party elections require. Hence, \textit{parties with strong long lasting party factions which are also able to have a unified campaign against another strong party, put particular value on the products of the intra-party negotiations (e.g. candidate nominations, platforms, or other decisions) more than in cases in which parties are led by single factions or leaders}. If there is some resentment in the losing party faction, then candidates will campaign on the value of the “alliance” or “party”, and likely not on the “party leader” (they just lost to). \textit{The strong electoral competition centralized in one other party and the consequent uncertainty about the electoral outcomes is an incentive for faction leaders to cooperate.}

There are also campaign committees at both the provincial and at the local party level, which evidences a high level of organization and collegiate decision making.

\textsuperscript{168} \textit{El Ancasti} daily is supposedly more pro-Peronist and \textit{La Unión} more pro-Radical.
because representatives of all party factions or viewpoints must be involved in order to support the campaign.

Personalized door-to-door tactics by candidates are usually mediated because the dirigente-type brokers are crucial for such events where clientelism is also part of the contents of the tactics. *Personalism exists to some degree, as everywhere, but it is muffled by the political party’s institutionalization, organization, competition and the multiple layers of leaders, making it weakly if at all central to campaigns in Catamarca.*

### 5.12 Mendoza

#### 5.12.1 Background and argument

In the province of Mendoza there is high electoral competitiveness, medium to high socioeconomic development of the electorate and personalism is not central to campaigns as a voter mobilization strategy. In Mendoza mayors can be reelected indefinitely, but governors cannot be reelected (Indicators d) making the governor a temporary leader, who cannot appropriate the state apparatus to favor him by staying in power. In fact, one of the cards the governor can play is to favor his successor (Indicators a-c). Mayors, on the other hand, can work to put the municipal apparatus to work in electoral efforts to perpetuate themselves in power (as seen in Chapter 3). This makes the mayors very relevant political actors and diminishes the relative power of the governor as compared to provinces in which the governor can be reelected. Furthermore, resources and functions are more decentralized than in other provinces, favoring the budgets mayors can work with and the lesser reliance on the provincial government for money (Indicators d).

There is competition within and among parties and political actors. This means that hard-fought internal elections or primaries, which utilize much needed resources for the general election and may exacerbate internal party animosities, are avoided in favor
of negotiated nominations (Indicator a-c). These negotiated candidate nominations have the mayors as prime actors. However, no single mayor imposes candidates for provincial or national elections because the electoral districts include several Departamentos (counties), which forces mayors of several cities (and other party leaders) to negotiate candidacies among themselves. This process is done in the four electoral districts in the province, and leads to mayors trying to impose “their own” provincial legislators in expectant positions of the PR lists. The districting also leads to the constitution of committees for the campaign and elaboration of platforms, because no single leader can impose his will on the district.\(^{169}\) Furthermore, the socioeconomic development of the society, and for example the existence of large numbers of voters living in “high-rise buildings” with different lifestyles than the typical single family home neighborhood, forces parties to mix tactics which emphasize personal contact with solely media driven tactics to reach voters. (Indicators 1-7)

Finally, due to the very competitive general elections in cities and towns, mayors are careful not to expose themselves or take the lead in midterm legislative elections for fear that getting into the heat of the campaign can damage the “good” relationship with the other parties which he will need to govern whether the incumbent party wins or loses the midterm election. The fact that candidate nominations and the campaign efforts have to be negotiated within parties forces campaigns to not only rely on personalistic tactics, but on programmatic and performance tactics, and as we saw in chapter 3, on clientelistic tactics as well.

\(^{169}\) In other provinces electoral districts for legislative positions sometimes coincide with counties, or mayoral districts, like in Catamarca
5.12.2 Negotiated nominations and the power of mayors (Indicators a-d)

Candidate nominations are an indicator of the complexity and resources of the party, and hence a factor of the centrality to campaigns of personalism. In Mendoza mayors have more autonomy than in any of the other districts; there are many (local) leaders, and a relative weakness of the governor. Below, Provincial Deputy Carmona (PJ) comments on the issues of candidate nominations and the power of the mayors in Mendoza: “En caso del justicialismo y UCR se ha dado el fenómeno de legisladores adictos a determinado intendente. Vos tenés dos tipos de legisladores...aquellos que llegan de la mano de algún intendente, que influyeron en la negociación…” He continues to say that there are four electoral districts in the province and in consequence the mayors weigh in heavily in those nomination negotiations: “…mas que ser legisladores por el conjunto de la provincia terminan siendo legisladores de sus departamentos, que su actuación se restringe a su departamento, su municipio y que en general responden a las directivas de su intendente, y después tenés el caso de legisladores que llegan por negociación de sectores.”

Why do mayors try to nominate “their own” legislators? Provincial Senator José “Pepe” Martínez (UCR, and former mayor of Tupungato) said: “El intendente...te dice, ‘necesito para mi gestión que me salga una ley”. Legislators, both local and provincial, need the mayor’s machine and help in order to get elected. “…Claro, porque también vos necesitas… Porque después también pasa eso, se canjean cosas.” (Indicators a-d)

At the local level, the mayors are so strong that it is rare or difficult for the internal party opposition to win internal elections. Here is Carmona: “…en determinado departamento justicialista, y, hay acuerdos con los radicales y demócratas. Acuerdos, entre comillas, de ‘gobernabilidad’ pero que tienen que ver con favores políticos. Como
Deputy Casteller (PD) is from the smallest of the three main parties in the province, but even in this party there is negotiation involved in the nomination process. Casteller said: “Algunas veces se puede acordar armar una lista sin necesidad de una interna, y si no hay acuerdo se va a una interna. ...la interna últimamente la tratamos de evitar porque es muy duro.” Like the PJ and UCR, the Partido Demócrata does not have a single leader either; former governors, mayors or national deputies are the main “references” of these parties: “No hay liderazgos únicos, no.” Concejal Rojas (PJ, Junín), like many others, agrees that internal elections are costly and avoided if possible.

Deputy Merino (UCR) says that in his party nominations are negotiated; there may be a suggestion from the Governor, but it is ultimately up to the local district to nominate (that is, usually the mayors and top party members): “No, no hubo interna...Dentro de mi sector interno se terminó consensuando que el candidato era yo. ...y hacia abajo iba uno y uno, alternando y mezclando.” The group of people making the decisions reaches more than 50 in Merino’s account. Sometimes the governor may give his opinion regarding a candidate, but he does not decide the nominations. Again, Merino: “el distrito define quien es el candidato. Lo del gobernador, puede tener una opinión, puede no conocerlo,...yo iba en la lista de Cobos: en la categoría a gobernador Cobos, en la categoría a Diputado Provincial yo. Pero la verdad es que no nos conocíamos, entonces difícilmente podía haber opinado a favor o en contra de la candidatura.” (Indicators a-d)

Legislative candidates first need to pass the county/departmental level (that is, the approval of the mayor and faction leaders) and then the district level nomination or

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170 Also, Mayor Joaquín Rodríguez (PJ, Tupungato) and many other officials agree with these assessments on the nomination mechanisms.
approval, which is a negotiation among the leaders of the other counties in the district to make the list of candidates. The idea of the governor meddling in the nomination of candidates was viewed by Merino as against common sense, since “…la verdad es que no nos conocíamos, entonces difícilmente podía haber opinado…” revealing a drastic difference with respect to the governors’ nomination powers in the provinces of Formosa and Santa Cruz. The group rises above the individual leader in Mendoza.

However, to Hugo Morales (PJ), while the mayors have territorial power, the governor has important power to nominate candidates as well. The governor’s blessing for a party’s candidate is a good card the governor can play when trying to retain influence within his own party. Morales said: “…Lo que pasa es que debajo del gobernador se organizan los intendentes. El gobernador tiene intendentes propios,… Como en esto hay expectativa política, inclusive de sucesión, a veces hay un intendente que tiene las aspiraciones de suceder al gobernador.” To Morales, the mayors do not necessarily depend financially on the governor, but do need him for their political aspirations. The governor only has a handful of mayors on his side, which means that he does not have exclusive power over the local electoral machines. However, Morales also said that people tend to vote for performance, and hence, nobody has an electoral result already secured. “…hoy se pone el acento, la gente califica una gestión. Una gestión es buena, mediocre, es mala, y en base a eso decide su acompañamiento. A éste intendente que está gestionando bien lo acompañó, a éste que gestiona mal no lo acompaño, aunque sea del grupo del presidente.” (Indicator 1)

There was a general opinion that the mayors are strong actors in the nomination and the campaigns even with more power than the governor himself. Regarding candidate nominations Senator Suárez (UCR) said: “Generalmente el gobernador participa. Se le da cierta derecha para que lo haga, obviamente que esto va en relación al poder político que tiene el gobernador… [The fact that there is no reelection of
governors]...hace que no se constituya el gobernador como líder político, es más, dura
lo que dura su gobierno, nada más...Tiene mucho que ver porque no permite que se
solidifiquen caudillos. Mendoza no es una provincia de caudillos. [However at the county
level] Ahí sí, ahí sí, ahí hay tipos que duran años y años." And Provincial Deputy
Carmona gives an even more graphic example of the power of mayors:

Con los intendentes fuertes, el candidato a gobernador tiene que salir a
negociar con los intendentes. No solamente negociar las adhesiones, en algunos
casos negociar como ingresa a militar el departamento. …En Mendoza,
habiéndoperdido la elección a gobernador, se ganó en 9 municipios. Es decir, la
mitad de los municipios hoy esta en manos justicialistas, muchos de esos
municipios ganó el intendente y perdió nuestro candidato a gobernador. Falta de
compromiso político con la elección provincial. Este fenómeno que yo te decía
de feudalización, de atomización que se fue produciendo.

These are examples that tell us about the efforts, loyalties and dynamics of
campaigns; the legislators do not campaign to promote the governor and his image, only
themselves. The mayors’ machine and relationship with the governor can influence the
outcome of the national and provincial legislative elections, as well as the gubernatorial.
The powers of these mayors also make the legislators lean towards trying to get along
with their mayors and not necessarily with a governor who will invariably leave office
next time around.

Mayors and their local electoral machines may have a higher relevance to the
electoral outcomes than the governor himself (Indicators a-d). Deputy Merino (UCR) who
was formerly a councilman in the city of San Rafael said: “El candidato a intendente,
ibamos juntos en la boleta, el me apoyaba a mi. …Y, en todo sentido; en lo económico,
en dirigentes políticos... Creo que...fue un buen momento para mi, de suerte, porque en
ese momento el intendente decidió jugar una figura nueva y yo era el presidente de la
juventud.” Merino is appreciative of the mayor who catapulted him into politics. These
Mendoza mayors put their electoral machines to use, which also include the influence
they have over civil society in the local scene, as Morales and Ramírez suggested
(Related to this topic Morales is quoted on Chapter 3 Page 81 on the issue of patronage.) These quotes show that the mayor’s machine is necessary to nominate candidates, this was told by many interviewees, but it is not like in Formosa where the mayor individually actually nominates candidates. In Mendoza mayors have the machine power, but not necessarily the personal power to nominate. The society and the civil society in particular are more complex and developed than in Formosa. Political parties in Mendoza also have multiple leaders and more relevant actors than in Formosa.171

5.12.2.1 Feudalization of power

Comparing Mendoza with the previous cases, one conclusion that can be drawn is that a strong governor allows for internal opposition at the local/lower levels (e.g. Santa Cruz, Formosa) for the political party to “breathe” (allow opposition and process conflict). But if the mayors are strong, as in Mendoza, there is no room allowed for internal party opposition locally and the “factions” are at the provincial level among each other while keeping a tight fist at home (the local level). The governor is comparatively peripheral in the nomination process.

Carmona referred to a “feudalization of politics” given the relevance of the municipal mayors and hence the relevance of multiple sectors/factions in the provincial political landscape. Carmona said that when the PJ also had the governorship: “… de algún modo había una suerte de negociación y concertación respecto de estas cuestiones, pero en general las pulseadas las ganaban los intendentes por encima de la voluntad del gobernador, en cuanto a la conformación de listas.” (Indicators a-c)

171 Another indicator to understand the little centrality to campaigns of personalism is the role of powerful figures like the governor in the formulation of the party campaign platform or program. Mendoza does not have single all-powerful leaders and hence this is also reflected in the more collegial mechanism for drafting platforms (See chapter 4).
5.12.3 Mayors’ midterm elections low profile (Indicators 1-7)

Another indicator to understand the little centrality to campaigns of personalism as a voter mobilization strategy in Mendoza is the fact that mayors are careful not to get too involved in midterm campaigns (e.g. Councilman Laciar; Mayor Garcia, Deputy Merino, all referred to the mayors’ campaign efforts for their councilmen in an all-legislative election). Mayor Juan Manuel Garcia (UCR, Guaymayén) describes how he helps the campaign of his councilmen in an all-legislative mid-term election: “Mas que nada con la gestión. Uno no participa en forma demasiado directa,...si vos también confluis mucho con tu candidato, después hay que convivir con los otros partidos políticos cuando termina la elección.” He protects himself, like was already mentioned, because these are competitive elections. Accordingly, Garcia takes a step aside from the heat of the campaign because he knows the election might be lost, or if won, that it would not give his party complete control of the city council.

Deputy Merino (UCR) gives a different scenario, in which the mayor does campaign for his candidates, but coincides in that he also protects himself from electoral backlashes: “En la actualidad los intendentes salen a hacer campaña, de cualquier partido político, así sea una legislativa. Salen también a caminar, tal vez menos, porque no se juegan ellos, y tratan de preservarse.” What then is the reasoning of a mayor to campaign or not for his candidates? Here is Merino again:

...eso depende como venga; si el intendente ve que la elección la gana, sale. ¿Por qué? Porque si la elección preveé que la va a ganar, las encuestas preveen que la va a ganar por el 10%, y el intendente sale porque se sube a la victoria, que la victoria fue de él. ...Ahora, llega a ser que le viene mal, se preserva y no sale, para no ser “el autor de la derrota.”

We find two reasons then: mayors try to protect themselves in a competitive environment and do not want to risk political capital by aiding a losing candidate; second, the mayor will still have to negotiate with the other parties after the election and
cannot get into too bloody of a campaign. Both these reasons justify a low profile of the mayor at least in midterm elections, but also show that mayors are not a "sure" thing/card either in any case.\footnote{172}

\textbf{5.12.3.1 Diversifications of tactics for a diverse electorate (Indicators 1-7)}

To conclude, I will only mention some aspects of the specific tactics which are relevant to understanding the significance of personalism in campaigns. Concejal Ramírez (PJ, Mendoza) said: "En algunos sectores es necesario hacer el puerta a puerta, y en los edificios tenés que hacerlos a través de la televisión, de otra manera porque no podés ingresar en los edificios…. En cambio en la periferia sí, no solo que podés hacerlo, sino que es necesario hacerlo, porque ahí exige conocer al candidato.” The campaign tactics and hence any personalism tactics are different in the city of Mendoza where, if there is any, it would be through the media. In the peripheral poor neighborhoods parties may instead resort to the more “charismatic” types of personalism, but here it is relativized by the high levels of competition.

Councilman Ramírez specifies particular tactics: “Los intendentes…la comunicación ya no es el puerta a puerta, sino con las entidades intermedias, centralizándolo en entidades intermedias.” In consequence the elements of personalistic strategies are about the mayors, governor and some other top leader; they overlap and therefore diminish in strength. The direct contact of puntero-type brokers is not with the mayors in many of these big cities (which are larger than in the other 3 provinces) but with council people or government offices/bureaucracy, which means less of a chance that the punteros are campaigning for the candidate on personalism. Some officials told

\footnote{172 It is interesting to note that a winning margin is a 10% difference in Merino’s account; these would be very small “confident margins” in provinces like Formosa and Santa Cruz.}
me that people look at the party as such for the provincial level elections and at the mayoral candidate for the local level elections.

**5.12.4 Conclusion**

There are many elements determining the low centrality to campaigns of personalism as a voter mobilization strategy in the province of Mendoza. First of all, electoral competitiveness is again an important factor, as is the socioeconomic development of the district, for similar reasons found in the previous provinces. Political parties in Mendoza are teams without a single monolithic leadership (similar to Catamarca); mayors in Mendoza have even more autonomy than in Catamarca. The effective appeals to personalism are more similar to those in Capital Federal in the larger cities. They may tend towards more father-like characteristics in smaller cities and towns, but they never amount to be significantly central in campaigns. There are other institutional factors which are intermediate or more proximate factors to explain personalism as a campaign strategy, or as consequences of the level of competition and socioeconomic development, which also help to understand personalism as a campaign strategy. These factors are: the decentralization of resources to the mayors, institutions like the electoral districts which divide the province as a district and group together different Departamentos (Counties). Provincial legislative districts overlap the mayor-led counties, incentivizing mayors to negotiate candidate nominations given that no single powerful mayor can impose candidates. This fact moves the centrality of mayors in campaigns towards the party (as the product of a negotiation) more than in other provinces. Campaign decisions are taken in a more collegiate fashion than in any of the other districts studied (for example, to draft platforms and nominate candidates). Another relevant factor is the no reelection of the governor and indefinite reelection of mayors, limiting the power ambition of the former and makes the electoral machines less
of an instrument of governors than mayors’ (compared to other provinces). Finally, the significance of the media and of middle class voters in Mendoza makes parties put considerable effort in media campaigns with programmatic contents more than in provinces like Formosa, Santa Cruz and Catamarca (provinces where the on-the-ground party infrastructure is more important to campaigns).

The above elements force parties to negotiate within themselves and with other parties and prevent the emergence of a single leadership. This in turn forces parties and candidates to use tactics which have not only elements of a personalistic strategy, but of a programmatic and a performance strategy as well.

There is arguably a “feudalization” of politics and of party power in Mendoza as a result of the decentralization of power away from the central provincial government. Therefore, and even though there is a place for personalism in Mendoza’s campaigns, the multiple institutional checks on the individual power incentive-structure, vis-à-vis other provinces, are important to understand why personalism is not central to campaigns as a voter mobilization strategy.

5.13 Conclusion

In this chapter I (1) argue for a qualitative method’s instrument to measure the centrality to campaigns of personalism as a voter mobilization strategy and present the evidence from the five case studies. I also argue (2) for the multiple mechanisms and factors to understand the centrality to campaigns of personalism. Below I present some of the conclusions about personalism gathered from the case studies.

Personalistic strategy or a conceived effort to win votes by appealing to a leader or candidate’s personal attributes may be central to campaigns in any electoral environment. Electorally competitive districts or those dominated by one party, districts with wealthy electorates or poor ones are all susceptible to allowing personalism to be
central to their campaigns. The specific characteristics of personalism as a strategy in a
district hence vary according to these and other factors which I explored in this chapter.

Besides the socioeconomic development of the electorate and the
competitiveness of the district, social scientists should explore specific characteristics of
the relevant political parties, particularly the candidate nomination compromises.
Candidate nomination compromises are in fact a subject which also leads the researcher
to explore several relations of power within the district which eventually paints a picture
on the decentralized or centralized distribution of power of political parties, and more
specifically of the electoral campaign process.

There are other factors which are relevant to evaluate the centrality to campaigns
of personalism as a voter mobilization strategy: some are of institutional design (such as
electoral districting, and reelection laws), some are of political party infrastructure and
the need to personally reach voters, and some are of the necessity and relevance of
mass media in order to convey a message to mobilize voters.

I hope the criteria presented on Table 5.6, the evaluation of the dependent
variable and the evidence in the chapter was sufficient to persuasively say that in the
province of Formosa and in the city of Buenos Aires (*Capital Federal*) personalism is
*central to campaigns*; that in Santa Cuz *personalism may or may not be central to
campaigns*; and in the provinces of Catamarca and Mendoza *personalism is not central
to campaigns as a voter mobilization strategy.*

In the case of Formosa there seems to be basically no constraint on the party
leader to nominate candidates and to dispose of state and party resources. The fact that
there is no electoral competition lets the incumbent party avoid expensive tactics such
as those of machine clientelism. In campaigns these uncontested leaders use their
charismatic appeal to validate the party's candidates.
In the case of Capital Federal the internally authoritarian nature and small activist base and infrastructure of the relevant parties also makes the party leaders the sole relevant asset to offer voters. The demanding electorate and the opposing parties force the candidates to focus on specific relevant programmatic issues which the candidate will address once in office. The fact that there is little else of the parties to show as such makes the persona of the candidate the sole campaign asset.

In the case of Santa Cruz there are little constraints on the party leaders to nominate candidates. The governor and mayors have near complete control on who gets on the incumbent party ballots. However, personalized and media contact with the voters tend to avoid a focus on the personal characteristics of candidates and instead emphasize performance and promises on behalf of those leaders.

In both Catamarca and Mendoza there are constraints in the power of party leaders and candidates. However, these are different types of limits imposed on the leaders susceptible of being the protagonist of a personalistic strategy. Catamarca’s parties find constraints primarily in the strength of the parties’ factions. The main parties’ long standing factions and allied parties are a main incentive to negotiate candidacies and issue stands given the competitive and contentious nature of elections. Furthermore, the necessity parties have in reaching voters personally though the trusted local dirigente-type brokers also diminishes the centrality to campaigns of a personalistic strategy. The reason being that the trusted dirigente imposes a mediation and distance between the eventual candidate and the local voter on any attempt to impose a candidate’s personal attributes above the dirigente’s.

In the case of Mendoza the relative strength of mayors vis-a-vis the governor, the institutional design to force party leaders to converge on issues of nominations and politics in general and the competitive nature of the district in general, are all factors which diminish the importance of specific leaders and make the parties’ different local
and provincial electoral machines momentarily collude in order to be competitive. Hence, in both Mendoza and Catamarca, but for different reasons personalism is probably not central to campaigns as a voter mobilization strategy.

Besides the knowledge gained from the case studies and the evidence of the diversity within Argentina regarding personalism, and the evaluation of its centrality to campaigns as a strategy to mobilize voters, the contribution of this chapter is the consideration of qualitative differences of personalism as a campaign strategy. Next is Chapter 6 which focuses on the centrality to campaigns of performance as a voter mobilization strategy.
CHAPTER 6
THE CENTRALITY TO CAMPAIGNS OF PERFORMANCE AS A VOTER
MOBILIZATION STRATEGY

“He [the retrospective voter] passes judgment on leaders, not policies.” Fiorina 1981: 11

“Retrospective judgments have direct impacts on the formation of future expectations…” Fiorina 1981: 200

“Government is motivated by voters’ opinions, not their welfare, since their opinions about welfare are what influence voting.” Downs 1985 [1957]: 90 fn.

6.1 Introduction and summary

This chapter provides a qualitative approach to assessing the centrality to campaigns of performance as a voter mobilization strategy in Argentine provinces, based on in-depth interviews with elected officials and comprehensive analyses of districts as cases. In this chapter I identify the mechanisms that help us recognize and measure the centrality to campaigns of a strategy of seeking votes by appealing to the incumbent government’s performance.
In the literature, it is accepted that a retrospective voter rewards or punishes an incumbent government for the perceived public policy outcomes (e.g. Fiorina 1981) to explain presidential or congressional vote most commonly in the United States. Even though I base my theoretical argument on the existing literature on the retrospective voter and the performance vote, I approach the subject from the perspective of the political parties. I study how political parties appeal to voters with a message about the performance of incumbent officials and I must, then, resort to new theoretical tools.

Performance as a voter mobilization strategy involves a party’s assessment of the expectations people had about their leaders. Political parties attempt to appeal to voters by interpreting a government’s performance in a light which favors their own electoral interests and aims to relate to the electorate in ways which are meaningful to the voters. More specifically, opposition parties make the case that voter expectations were not met, while incumbent parties argue that they were. The literature delimits these to public policy expectations when appealing to the retrospective voter (these are the policy outcomes); hence I also limit my analysis to parties’ performance strategy, which appeals to voters on incumbent government’s public policy outcomes.\textsuperscript{173}

In Chapter 2, I argued that, besides the socioeconomic development and electoral competitiveness of the district, the logic to understand the centrality to campaigns of performance as a voter mobilization strategy is also tied to the remaining three strategy types. This is because, in the first place, programmatic, personalistic and clientelistic appeals imply a dichotomy of change versus keeping the same party/officials

\textsuperscript{173} Retrospective voting is limited to the voters’ evaluation on the incumbent’s policy outcomes, however, voters may also reward or punish incumbents for other reasons. Manin et al (1999: 44) say; “Indeed, Manin (1997) points out that voters can decide whether to reelect the incumbent on any basis they want, including qualifying for the World Cup, and that they can change their mind between the beginning and the end of a term.” However, in this dissertation I do not deal with the theoretical implications derived from the fact that voting may respond to individual interest on “any bases” and how political parties campaign on those individual’s expectations having been met or not.
in power every time those appeals are made. Second, effective programmatic, clientelistic and personalistic appeals or promises to voters require a degree of trust from the voters which usually must result from a history behind those parties who make the promises (which is often related to ideological and past public policy outcomes). Finally, there is obviously a resource trade off among the tactics used.

6.1.1 Outline of the chapter

This chapter reviews some key literature on retrospective voting, marking the difference from my study of political parties. Then I develop my theoretical approach to understand performance as a voter mobilization strategy. After that I operationalize the dependent variable. Later I develop the causal factors and theoretically derived hypotheses. In the second part of the chapter I develop the five provincial cases in order to justify my conclusions.

6.2 Retrospective vote and democratic accountability

One way parties recruit voters to win elections is a “performance strategy” in search of the “retrospective vote.” In the performance strategy, the parties campaign on praising or criticizing the incumbent’s performance in office.\footnote{174}

Morris Fiorina’s argument of voters’ “running tally of retrospective evaluations” (1981: 89) is a must-read reference. However, just as was the case of much of the literature on clientelism, I do not study the constituents’ vote, in this case the retrospective vote. Rather, I study the political parties, candidates and activists, and not the voters as Fiorina did.\footnote{175}

\footnote{174} In this case parties do not offer anything new in exchange for a vote and only point to an interpretation of government performance. In reality, however, parties not only praise or criticize performance, but at least implicitly also point to the better party option the voter should choose.

\footnote{175} I also do not base my conclusions on surveys alone. Fiorina acknowledges his model is limited and not always applicable; “...we should remember that we are dealing with citizens who
Voters’ performance evaluations are a cheap way or a cost cutting way of deciding the vote. “[D]ifferences between the pocketbook and sociotropic characterizations of citizen politics should be regarded not as one of motivation, but as one of information. Pocketbook voting reflects the circumstances and predicaments of personal economic life; sociotropic voting reflects the circumstances and predicaments of national economic life.” (Kinder and Kiewiet 1981: 132)

Reviews of the literature on retrospective voting have concluded that “…almost all extant economic voting research, assumes the most relevant evaluation dimension is global economic output, i.e. ‘How is the nation’s economy doing?’ ” (Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier 2000: 212) The core hypotheses guiding retrospective economic voter research boil down to the perception of “an electorate that treats elections (especially midterms) as referenda on the incumbent administration’s handling of the economy.” (Fiorina 1981: 25-26)

The statistical models of the research on retrospective voters also essentially come down to a dependent variable which is the vote share for the incumbent in presidential elections, regressed on the economic independent variables such as decline of GDP growth, unemployment rate, inflation, etc. Even the studies focusing on the United States congressional elections link their conclusions to the incumbent president. Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier conclude that “[a]ll told, the survey work on economic voting at the congressional level seems to establish the proposition that in House elections, voters do punish the president’s party for economic bad times and reward it for good times”.

live in a reasonably stable democracy, who observed many of the same people fighting about many of the same issues over time.” (p. 83) His model also carries important assumptions, for example; “…the cost of having candidate characteristics implicit in performance judgments and future expectations is that we get no explicit estimates of the weights the electorate attaches to such characteristics.” (p. 150) Finally, Fiorina also says “[n]o one knows what thermometer scores measure…their contribution to explanations of voting behavior is purely statistical, not substantive” (p. 154).

176 For more on the sociotropic voter see Fiorina 1981 and Kinder and Kiewiet 1981
(p.199) As a result of such type of research design we obtained aggregate level conclusions in the order of: "Voters who believe that conditions in the nation’s economy have improved over the previous year are much more likely to cast their ballots for congressional candidates of the incumbent president’s party than are voters who believe that national economic conditions have deteriorated." (Kiewiet 1983:107)

Much of the research on retrospective voters involves “forecasting models” that say little about the mechanism of politics or the thought processes involved in an outcome such as a vote choice of a person, and run the risk of extrapolating aggregate results to the individual level (ecological problem). These forecast models offer us conclusions such as Alvarez & Nagler’s (1998): “If a group of voters shifted their national economic assessment from ‘worse’ to ‘better,’ the probability of their voting for Clinton rose by 0.38.” (pp. 1360-62) Or statements such as: “[E]ach percentage point decline in real per capita Gross Domestic Product [costs] the incumbent governments about 1.1% of the vote.” (Pacek & Radcliff 1995:735)177 On the other hand, I am interested in the politics and the agency of actors in political parties’ campaign efforts.

Research work on incumbents’ performance evaluations, even though vast in quantity and reliable in their predictions, has not been deep in exploring the issues of politics (as the management of state power). Most studies only focus on the US presidential office (or the highest executives in other countries), ignoring the huge number of elective office holders at the local and provincial level who also have specific domains of policy they should be accountable for, and which have little to do with the economy. As Berry and Howell (2007) state, “According to the 1992 Census of Governments, 487,796 elected officials serve in local U.S. governments… And vitally, the job responsibilities of individuals serving in single function offices often have little to

177 The two quotes are extracted from Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier. (2000: 194 and 212)
I argue that in order to comprehensively evaluate the campaigns in a district such as a province we must acknowledge that the function of most of the elected officials who may be integral parts of the parties’ electoral campaign machines have little to do with the national economy. The principle for defining what a performance campaign appeal is must be guided by the function of the elected offices which are relevant in the district’s campaign. We must then be aware of the (not so) well defined function of a mayor, a governor and city and provincial level legislators.

The boundary between claiming credit for public policies or good government performance, and clientelism is blurred for the office of, for example, mayor in small towns (as argued later). Brusco et al (2002) conclude that “whereas most public goods provisions are the stuff of programmatic politics, not all private goods provisions are the stuff of clientelism” … “whereas private-goods provision may be part of either clientelism or programmatic politics, public goods provision is deeply in tension with clientelism.”

The mere fact that the focus of a policy was a specific, identifiable group of people does not make the policy or the credit claiming clientelism.

It is then important not only to understand what the policy which is the focus of the credit claiming in campaign is, but why and particularly how the appeals are made.

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178 Berry and Howell’s (2007: 844) give the following examples:

Though presidents and members of Congress attend to a dizzying array of public policies, sheriffs, district attorneys, highway superintendents, and school board members oversee considerably simpler policy universes that revolve around public safety, criminal conviction rates, traffic, and student learning. Given the sheer number of elections that involve a well-defined set of corresponding public services, local elections present obvious, though heretofore unexplored, opportunities to test claims about retrospective voting.

179 The authors’ example refers to the tax code:

“… alterations of the tax code follow lengthy public debates, must be approved by multiple actors in executive and legislative branches, and are tailored to help (and hurt) abstractly constructed subsets of the citizenry (the middle class, single parents, technology corporations), categories that are more abstract than people who will vote for us.” (Brusco et al 2002: 5)
The threshold is that programmatic and performance appeals must involve “the provision of what from the perspective of recipients are public goods...” (Brusco et all 2002: 5 fn)\textsuperscript{180} In clientelism the recipient of the benefit is expected to support or cast a vote for the benefactor, and does not receive the benefit just because the recipient is a citizen.\textsuperscript{181}

In the end, in performance strategy, the parties appeal to the retrospective and prospective voter, who will reward or punish an incumbent candidate or party with his vote based on its performance in office (Campbell et al 1960; V. O. Key 1966; Fiorina 1981). People may base their vote on the parties’ campaigns, which praise or criticize the incumbent’s performance in office. In this case, parties point to an interpretation of government performance only in terms of public policy. However in this study, I focus on the “supply side” or the political entrepreneurs. Parties and candidates do invest time and resources to tell prospective voters their view of the incumbents during campaigns.

\textsuperscript{180} My perception from the field research was that none of the 86 interviewees expected their performance in office to be evaluated in economic terms (much less as the literature does regarding the “national economy”), not even the National Deputies I talked to; the interviewees campaign in consequence to that expectation.

The function of mayors and local and provincial legislators is largely tied to the improvement of the infrastructure and public services in their districts, and the employment and welfare of the people. However, considering “the implementation of public policy which leads to the sustaining of public employment and the general welfare of citizens” as clientelism (e.g. Magaloni et al mimeo) is the unfortunate consequence of a narrow view of the role (and functions) of a democratic state -a state for the people and not for free market Washington-Consensus’ interests (for the policy suggestions see Williamson, John. 1993. “Democracy and ‘The Washington Consensus.’ ” \textit{World Development, Vol. 21, No. 8, pp. 1329-1336}). The democratic state must be for citizens and not for consumers (the market is). In consequence, to differentiate public policy/ performance appeals and clientelism I use the guiding principle that given the function of the office, from the perspective of the relevant agents involved, the policies are a public good.

\textsuperscript{181} As argued in chapters 1 and 3, other distinctions between clientelism and performance (and programmatic) appeals are that clientelistic relationships imply a power asymmetry among the actors in the exchange, there are control mechanisms to enforce that exchange, and in clientelism appeals the voters/ recipients are expected to return the favor for the specific policy.
6.3 Theory

6.3.1 Understanding performance as a strategy type

The logical and simplest purpose of elections in a democracy is “to change or keep the same party/officials in power,” which is intrinsically a performance evaluation of the current state of affairs. Furthermore, performance as a strategy is important to campaigns because any type of appeal to a future state of affairs for voters (as in the case of personalistic, clientelistic or programmatic appeals) must be based on judgments of the current state of affairs which are usually attributed to the incumbent government.

Incumbents’ performance evaluations become an efficient and effective way to reach voters with a message, be it a positive or a negative evaluation of incumbents. For example, Kinder and Kiewiet said: “[V]oters must only develop rough evaluations of national economic conditions, and then credit or blame the incumbent party accordingly” (1981:132). However, people just do not know enough to fully evaluate the actions of the government; hence, the availability of information is crucial to voters to hold incumbents accountable beyond their own personal experience.

Retrospective voters evaluate the incumbent government policy outcomes on themselves (egocentric voter) or on “the nation/larger electorate” (sociotropic voter). The parties’ campaigns, in turn, try to convince voters with an interpretation of the government performance which addresses those types of voters.

6.3.2 What and whose performance?

From the point of view of the parties, the strategists try to convince voters that the party’s interpretation of the “state of affairs” is correct, and the party would try to convince voters that the policy outcomes were good (incumbent party) or bad (opposition party).
Performance voter mobilization strategy refers to appeals to people’s expectation about the incumbent’s performance (which is usually restricted to the executive positions even if they are not up for election). By performance I mean the performance of the incumbent executive officials (president, governor, mayor), whether referring to the formal job being paid to do or the “expected job,” beyond the statute job. As one of the chapter’s epigraphs suggest, people normally do not assign responsibility to a “government” but to the leaders of those governments. This includes people’s expectations regarding the promises made during the previous campaign, and expectations raised during the tenure. Political parties and candidates make the case that those expectations were met (incumbent party) or that they were not (opposition party). A voter decides whether his expectations about government performance were met or not.

6.3.2.1 Strategies in Argentine provincial districts

Public policy appeals made in small communities - and eventually the appeals to judge the public policy decisions, accomplishments and failures of incumbents- often concern the consequences of policies on relatively small groups of people, given the small size of the electorates, and the consequent close or personalized contact among candidates and voters. There is then a blurred territory to factually distinguish between appeals to the retrospective voter in a standard sense (good or bad policy outcomes) and some programmatic, clientelistic or personalistic appeals. I anticipate the many circumstances (in the cases I studied in Argentina) in which these situations of blurred distinction between performance appeals and clientelistic/ programmatic/ personalistic

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182 The effort and coordination of the political entrepreneurs at the different levels of the party machine in campaign (from the local to the national level) and the focus on a performance type of message would make the strategy a more effective and efficient one. It would also indicate the importance (or the centrality to the campaign) of that strategy type.
appeals occurred given the sizes of the electorates and the resultant close contact among voters and candidates.\textsuperscript{183} The challenge is, again, identifying the public policy functions of the elective offices and the provision of what from the perspective of the actors involved are public goods.

\textbf{6.3.3 The ubiquity of the performance message in campaigns}

As argued throughout this dissertation, performance strategy is relational to the other strategies. The centrality to campaigns of performance strategy is tied, not just to the socioeconomic development and electoral competitiveness of the district, but to the other three strategy types as well.\textsuperscript{184}

Performance-type evaluations in campaigns are a solid grounding for the voters, and for parties which want to run effective campaigns. Political entrepreneurs know that “\textit{r}etrospective judgments have direct impacts on the formation of future expectations…” (Fiorina 1981:200), acknowledging the practical complementarities of a performance-type message with different message types in campaigns (e.g. performance and programmatic messages). Political parties in campaigns do not do programmatic,

\textsuperscript{183} Based on 1991 census data, out of the 1,610 “population centers” only 54 had more than 50,000 people (only 26 had more than 100,000). There were 546 cities with populations between 2,000 and 9,999, and 825 towns with populations between 500 and 1,999. Of course, the four largest conglomerates included about 50\% of the country’s population (metropolitan areas of Buenos Aires, Cordoba, Rosario and Mendoza cities). However, the large number of small towns and cities in Argentina is an important data given that I study the dynamics of campaigns, and the recurrence and relevance of the more or less personalized access to voters that parties have when campaigning. There are 16,177 elected officials (among local and provincial level only) or one local or provincial elected official for every 1,490 constituents. When we put together these data on elected officials and the size of towns and cities (most of which have elected officials) we should come to realize the significance of parties’ local electoral machines and the way they conduct campaigns. (Source: Indec, \textit{Dirección Nacional Electoral, Centro de Estudios Nueva Mayoría}, Roldan y Llach 2001)

\textsuperscript{184} As argued earlier in the dissertation, the idea of “centrality to campaigns” of a strategy type refers to how important it is relative to the general campaign efforts in a given district. The idea of “centrality of a strategy type” does not directly relate to the sheer amount of resources used, but to the amount of resources used in campaign in a given district vis-à-vis the other strategy types. Hence, the fact that increased competitiveness may force parties to use more resources in campaigns does not translate into predicting on which strategy type parties will rely more on in order to mobilize voters.
personalistic and clientelistic tactics without having made prior, at least implicit, evaluations of the state of affairs in the district; in turn those evaluations are often on public policy outcomes and may be used as part of the campaign messages. There is then a ubiquity (not necessarily a centrality) of the performance-type message in campaigns; this does not occur with the other three message types. I will explain why this is the case, next.

In programmatic, personalistic and clientelistic strategies the messages delivered to voters are more effective if there is a sense of trust from the voters. There is an implicit or explicit history of commitments (a performance) which serves as evidence to the voters that the future commitments will be upheld.\(^{185}\)

This performance evidence provided by parties decreases the uncertainty voters might have about the parties’ claims about the future. The more uncertainty voters have about policy outcomes, the more they should rely on information about past performance (See Harrington: 1993, in Manin et all 1999: 46). Downs (2001 [1957] p.40) would say “…we believe it is more rational for him [voter] to ground his voting decision on current events than purely on future ones.” It is perfectly rational for parties to campaign providing “performance evidence” to voters when they are also appealing to them with promises about the future.

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\(^{185}\) Programmatic, personalistic and clientelistic strategies appeal to a future state of affairs or that project present or future commitments to the voters. In turn, a political party which campaigns on these strategy types is substantially more effective when the voters know where the party is coming from and their past. From the point of view of the voters I could add that “[i]n Down’s (1957; also Fiorina 1981), voters use the information about the past performance of the incumbent and, if available, of challengers, but this is also a mandate model in the sense that voters use the information about the past only to choose a better government for the future” (Manin et al 1999: 44-45). The authors argue that performance evaluations are necessary for voters to make judgments about the future.
6.3.3.1 Caveats within the ubiquity of performance messages

There are, however, differences in the importance of the performance-type messages delivered when parties also use personalism and programmatic strategies, versus when they use clientelistic strategies. Personalism and programmatic strategies, which deliver abstract or intangible messages about the future, require from the voters a share of trust or evidence of the future fulfillment of the promise. Personalistic and programmatic contents in a campaign are more authoritative when they are accompanied by a performance evaluation which aims to satisfy a retrospective voter. *Performance evaluations tend to accompany personalism and programmatic messages.*

On the other hand, performance as a strategy will be less central to campaigns when parties campaign on clientelistic appeals to voters and incur in a direct exchange with voters by providing immediate (or pseudo-immediate) benefits because voters do not “require” that history of commitments as much as in the former two strategy types. The immediate consummation of the candidate-voter deal/ exchange (in clientelism), makes this performance strategy minimal or not necessary. *Performance evaluation messages are less likely to accompany direct exchange message tactics than indirect message exchange tactics with voters.*

To sum up, districts in which campaigns are dominated by strategy types which involve indirect-linkage exchanges between parties and voters (programmatic and personalistic appeals) in order to be more effective “require” evidence that the commitments they are making should be trusted by the voters. Districts in which clientelism or the direct-linkage exchange is predominant do not force parties to also appeal to voters with performance messages. In the former scenario, political parties have a clear incentive to resort to incumbents’ performance evaluations to better
transmit their message to the voters; this in turn is reflected in the centrality to campaigns of performance as a strategy type.

6.3.4 Manipulating voters’ performance evaluations

Voters’ performance evaluations can be, and in fact often are, manipulated in campaigns by parties and candidates. Parties manipulate the information they use in campaigns. The media is a good resource to recreate and manipulate the perception of past performances of incumbents and policy outcomes. This was acknowledged for example by Kinder and Kiewiet who said: “…firm conclusions about the quality of sociotropic decision-making are not yet possible. There remains considerable room for confusion on the citizen’s part, distortion on the part of media, and orchestration and manipulation by the politician.” (1981: 157)

Regarding performance, an incumbent could show statistics, for example, “that crime was reduced by 25%,” but the impact of the information might be quickly dwarfed by a more attention-grabbing media report on a few recent crimes which would favor the message of the opposition candidates. On the other hand, incumbents are more likely to get a message through if it shows things that can be seen and touched, because there is less risk of distortion when fewer cognitive elaborations on the part of the voters are necessary to grasp the idea.

The margin the candidates in campaign have to alter people’s perception of reality is often slim and hence it is more difficult to cheat voters on a performance evaluation than it is in a “promises contest” -- which would be the case in an “only programmatic campaign strategy.” However, the lack of control or the limited access voters have to resources for information may isolate the voters and limit them only to their own personal experience of what the performance of the incumbent was like.
Consequently, the more developed and complex the society is, the more difficult it is for parties and candidates to control the flow of information to voters and there is less maneuverability to adjust the perceptions of reality in a performance driven campaign. Also, as mentioned in Chapter 1, less capacity to question and control the performance of the incumbent by the civil society and the opposition parties allows the incumbent to require less effort in order to win elections.

Hence, the resources available to the voters play a role in politics. Opposition parties, the media and organized civil society pressure groups have interests in political outcomes. It hence comes down to the original causal factors to begin to understand how central to campaigns a “performance strategy” is in a given district: the electoral competitiveness and the socioeconomic development of the district.

6.4 Measurement of the dependent variable

The next six qualitative indicators assess the centrality to campaigns of performance as a voter mobilization strategy in a given district. They measure the campaign’s emphasis on performance by the incumbent and opposition's gubernatorial campaigns, incumbent and opposition mayoral campaigns, and by the incumbent and opposition's legislative campaigns (municipal, provincial and/or national). Higher values indicate more centrality to campaigns of performance as a strategy.

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186 It makes sense to have the different levels of legislators’ campaigns together in this chapter. Earlier I argued about the preeminence of the executives’ campaigns in Argentina. Also, in Capital Federal there are no “provincial” legislators since it is a city, but these local legislators are basically provincial legislators for all practical matters in the district. Hence, these two indicators measure the legislators’ campaign emphasis on the virtues of the parties’ governing record which could be local, provincial or national.
1) Does the incumbent party’s gubernatorial campaign emphasize the virtues of the party’s governing record?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1</th>
<th>0.5</th>
<th>0</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes. A very significant number of tactics exclusively have performance evaluation messages (e.g. as is the case in some media publications).</td>
<td>Somewhat. Performance messages are for the most part shared with other message types in tactics (e.g. often the message transmitted in personalized or media tactics include important personalism contents).</td>
<td>No. Performance evaluation messages in tactics are implicit. No special efforts to convey a performance evaluation in tactics exist (e.g. clientelism tactics unlikely include explicit performance evaluation messages).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2) Do the opposition parties’ gubernatorial campaigns emphasize the deficiencies of the incumbent party’s governing record?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1</th>
<th>0.5</th>
<th>0</th>
<th>N/A</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes. A very significant number of tactics exclusively have performance evaluation messages.</td>
<td>Somewhat. Performance messages are for the most part shared with other message types in tactics.</td>
<td>No. Performance evaluation messages in tactics are implicit. No special efforts to convey a performance evaluation in tactics exist.</td>
<td>No. There are no significant opposition parties or the campaign effort is insignificant in the context of the district.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3) Do the local incumbent parties’ mayoral campaigns emphasize the virtues of the party’s governing record?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1</th>
<th>0.5</th>
<th>0</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes. A very significant number of tactics exclusively have performance evaluation messages.</td>
<td>Somewhat. Performance messages are for the most part shared with other message types in tactics.</td>
<td>No. Performance evaluation messages in tactics are implicit. No special efforts to convey a performance evaluation in tactics exist.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4) Do the local opposition parties’ mayoral campaigns emphasize the deficiencies of the incumbent parties’ governing records?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1</th>
<th>0.5</th>
<th>0</th>
<th>N/A</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes. A very significant number of tactics exclusively have performance evaluation messages.</td>
<td>Somewhat. Performance messages are for the most part shared with other message types in tactics.</td>
<td>No. Performance evaluation messages in tactics are implicit. No special efforts to convey a performance evaluation in tactics exist.</td>
<td>No. There are no significant opposition parties or the campaign effort is insignificant in the context of the district.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
5) Do the incumbent parties’ municipal, provincial and/or national legislators’ campaigns emphasize the virtues of the parties’ governing record?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1</th>
<th>0.5</th>
<th>0</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes. A very significant number of tactics exclusively have performance evaluation messages.</td>
<td>Somewhat. Performance messages are for the most part shared with other message types in tactics.</td>
<td>No. Performance evaluation messages in tactics are implicit. No special efforts to convey a performance evaluation in tactics exist.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

6) Do the opposition parties’ municipal, provincial and/or national legislators’ campaigns emphasize the deficiencies of the parties’ governing record?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1</th>
<th>0.5</th>
<th>0</th>
<th>N/A</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes. A very significant number of tactics exclusively have performance evaluation messages.</td>
<td>Somewhat. Performance messages are for the most part shared with other message types in tactics.</td>
<td>No. Performance evaluation messages in tactics are implicit. No special efforts to convey a performance evaluation in tactics exist.</td>
<td>No. There are no significant opposition parties or the campaign effort is insignificant in the context of the district.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

6.5 Causal factors

The electoral competitiveness and the socioeconomic development of the district affect how central to campaigns is performance as a strategy or as a set of tactics implemented by the political entrepreneurs to mobilize voters with a performance-type message. In this section I develop the causal factors, followed by the theoretically derived hypotheses.

6.5.1 Electoral competitiveness

Independent theoretical effect of the variable: More electoral competitiveness leads to less centrality to campaigns of performance as a voter mobilization strategy in the district. High electoral competitiveness leads to parties making intensive use of the available campaign resources, and a high diversification of tactics and messages to achieve differentiation among candidates. That is, more competitiveness means opposition parties may campaign not only on the negative performance of the incumbent, but also set the difference with the incumbent and with other opposition
parties with strategy-type messages other than performance. Even though ubiquitous to campaigns, performance as a strategy type is less central to campaigns as increasingly more importance is given to other strategy types in more competitive districts (See Chapter 3, 4 and 5).

6.5.2 Socioeconomic development

Independent theoretical effect of the variable: More socioeconomic development of the district leads to more centrality to campaigns of performance as a voter mobilization strategy in the district. More socioeconomic development of the district means voters have more capacity to demand satisfaction of their expectations and have more tools to press for government accountability (in turn, political parties seeking votes cannot ignore these constituents’ demands). Constituents in a socioeconomically developed district expect more public policy answers from incumbents than poor, isolated, individual voters who think more about their personal, immediate future. Electorates with richer voters and/or an organized civil society (NGOs) have more diverse expectations and have the resources to demand satisfaction, translating into more effort and resources from political parties to make effective performance strategy appeals; when voters have few resources, they have little capacity to demand

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187 Any competitive alternative to the incumbent party would have to not only denounce the wrongdoing and deficiencies of the incumbent, but also present alternative paths in the attempt to outperform rival parties; hence, for example, programmatic alternatives are presented and the programmatic strategy is increasingly more central to the campaign (A survey shown in Chapter 4 shows that opposition candidates cannot only compete on performance but must differentiate from the incumbent and other opposition candidates by resorting to other types of messages - also see Appendix C). Alternatively, less electoral competitiveness translates into fewer incidences, less intensity in the overall use of campaign resources and, for example, less importance to the campaign or centrality to campaigns of programmatic (see Chapter 4), personalistic (see Chapter 5) and clientelistic strategies (see Chapter 3). However “little campaign effort,” a dominant party must still incur on an ever present performance strategy (especially if the electorate demands it). Dominant incumbent parties still need to get votes in a democracy.

188 Similarly, when there are many competitive contenders, voters do not just evaluate how good the incumbent was, but also whether the alternative will be better or not based on appeals other than performance evaluations made by parties.
accountability from the leaders and verify performance-type messages received during campaigns (e.g. little access to information, organization).\(^{189}\)

Districts with higher socioeconomic development demand more from the parties in order to campaign with an effective performance strategy message than poorer districts (i.e. voters are more demanding and are more difficult to be deceived by campaigns), however, political parties cannot ignore a demanding sovereign in campaigns (the voters). Hence, performance as a strategy to mobilize voters (everything else held constant) is more central to the campaigns in a more developed district than in a less-developed one where voters do not have resources to demand a performance evaluation from parties. That is, in more developed districts people are more resourceful at demanding answers and parties cannot ignore those demands for answers in their campaigns.\(^{190}\)

6.6 Hypotheses and measurement of the independent variables

Next are the theoretically derived hypotheses for the four electoral environments of the binary combination of the causal factors.

**Hypothesis 1**: Performance as a voter mobilization strategy has low centrality to campaigns in districts with high electoral competitiveness and low socioeconomic development.

\(^{189}\) More socioeconomically resourceful voters are more costly to deceive by parties’ competing performance evaluation messages in campaigns.

\(^{190}\) The key point is that voters are the sovereign in a democracy and the objective of electoral campaigns is to mobilize voters to an electoral choice. In turn, the accountability demanded by voters in more developed districts requires more resources from political parties than in less developed districts. Resourceful people can push government to show its performance, but are not resourceful enough to demand a “project”/program. Political parties are the only ones capable of making, articulating and pushing programmatic agendas. NGOs, etc. can push club-type demands, etc. at most.
Hypothesis 2: Performance as a voter mobilization strategy has medium centrality to campaigns in districts with low electoral competitiveness and low socioeconomic development.

Hypothesis 3: Performance as a voter mobilization strategy has medium centrality to campaigns in districts with high electoral competitiveness and high socioeconomic development.

Hypothesis 4: Performance as a voter mobilization strategy has high centrality to campaigns in districts with low electoral competitiveness and high socioeconomic development.

TABLE 6.1:
CASES AND HYPOTHESES PREDICTIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CASES</th>
<th>CATAMARCA</th>
<th>FORMOSA</th>
<th>CAPITAL FEDERAL</th>
<th>MENDOZA</th>
<th>SANTA CRUZ</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Electoral</td>
<td>0.45 (HIGH)</td>
<td>0.28 (LOW)</td>
<td>0.60 (HIGH)</td>
<td>0.49 (HIGH)</td>
<td>0.29 (LOW)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>competitiveness</td>
<td>(ESOP) Table 2.2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socioeconomic</td>
<td>0.799 (LOW)</td>
<td>0.764 (LOW)</td>
<td>0.892 (HIGH)</td>
<td>0.820 (HIGH)</td>
<td>0.843 (HIGH)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>development</td>
<td>(HDI) Table 2.2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HYPOTHESIS</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Centrality to</td>
<td>LOW</td>
<td>MEDIUM</td>
<td>MEDIUM</td>
<td>MEDIUM</td>
<td>HIGH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>campaigns of</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>performance</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>strategy</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
6.7 Summary of evidence

As in the previous chapters, the cases’ values are given after in-depth study of each of the districts. Table 6.2 summarizes how the five cases score on the indicators of how central this particular strategy type is to campaigns. In support of the hypotheses, Table 6.2 shows that, in Santa Cruz, there is high centrality to campaigns of performance as a strategy and a low centrality in Catamarca; the provinces of Formosa, Mendoza and Capital Federal score middle values of centrality albeit with differences.

TABLE 6.2:
CASES’ SCORES ON THE DEPENDENT VARIABLE EVALUATIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Governor’s incumbent campaign</th>
<th>Santa Cruz</th>
<th>Capital Federal</th>
<th>Mendoza</th>
<th>Formosa</th>
<th>Catamarca</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Governor’s opposition campaign</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Mayors’ incumbent campaigns</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Mayors’ opposition campaigns</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Legislators’ incumbent campaigns</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Legislators’ opposition campaigns</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Sum</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Average</td>
<td>0.80</td>
<td>0.62</td>
<td>0.66</td>
<td>0.62</td>
<td>0.08</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
6.8 Centrality of performance voter mobilization strategy as a Fuzzy-Set

As in previous chapters (and particularly explained in Chapter 1), I view the concept of “the centrality to campaigns of performance voter mobilization strategy” as a set of conditions. The logic of studying cases as configurations of causes that combine lies in the idea of viewing the amalgamation of the relevant variables as potentially different types of cases (See Ragin 2000:72). As in previous chapters, I use the Fuzzy-set method for the reasons given in Chapter 1. However, the main goal of the approach is to uncover meaning and causal relations in the adoption of campaign strategies.

The attributes of the concept measured in Table 6.2 are not weighted (or a default equal weight is assumed), and are only an instrument for the appropriate placing of a case in the three-value Fuzzy-set. For example, the value 0 for a specific province does not mean that there is no performance strategy in the district’s campaigns. It does mean, however, that we should place the district with a the Fuzzy-set value where performance voter mobilization strategy is definitively not central to campaigns. Hence, cases having proximate attributes’ score averages could not realistically be ranked and should be considered as cases of the same type, albeit with partial memberships.

What are then the qualitative distinctions or qualitatively anchored breakpoints which we could use to differentiate the centrality to campaigns of performance voter mobilization strategies of each district? I elaborate a three-value Fuzzy-set.

Value 1: “A district where a performance voter mobilization strategy is central to campaigns.” There is a distinctive set of relationships which are predominant in such a district. In such districts we find that a very significant number of campaign tactics in the district exclusively have performance evaluation messages. Also, most resources dedicated to campaigns by incumbents are used on performance tactics. In other words, performance tactics concentrate most efforts in campaigns.
Value .5: “A district where a performance voter mobilization strategy may or may not be central to campaigns” (complete ambiguity). In such districts we find that considerable resources used by incumbents on campaigns are not dedicated to, and are instead diverted from performance tactics (resources may be put to elaborate programmatic and/or personalism tactics and messages instead.). Also, the opposition to the incumbents puts significant amounts of resources and effort to elaborate and project an evaluation of the incumbents’ performance (opposition candidates see performance strategy as important, among other strategy types). Finally, performance messages are for the most part shared with other message types in tactics (e.g. often the message transmitted in personalized or media tactics include personalism or programmatic contents.)

Value 0: “A district where a performance voter mobilization strategy is not central to campaigns.” In such districts we find that most campaign resources used by incumbents are not used on performance tactics. Incumbents dedicate most time, energy and resources to elaborate tactics and messages which are not oriented to performance evaluations (campaigns may intensely develop around programmatic, personalism and/or clientelistic strategies.). Also, opposition candidates dedicate most resources to tactics which are not performance oriented either. Finally, performance evaluation messages in tactics are, at most, implicit. No special efforts to convey a performance evaluation in tactics exist (e.g. clientelism tactics unlikely include explicit performance evaluation messages.)

Based on the above argument about the causal factors and mechanisms to evaluate the centrality of performance as a voter mobilization strategy, and based on the
evidence summarized on Table 6.2 (which in turn are evidenced in the rest of the chapter) performance voter mobilization strategy is central to campaigns in the district of Santa Cruz because the political actors to a large extent do conform to this Fuzzy-set value’s parameters. The evidence presented in this chapter also allows me to say that the performance voter mobilization strategy may or may not be central to campaigns (or is of ambiguous centrality) in the provinces of Formosa, Capital Federal and Mendoza. Finally, I conclude that the performance voter mobilization strategy is not central to campaigns in the province of Catamarca.

Appendix F gathers further evidence to the arguments above, taken from newspaper publications. The data on Appendix F support the idea that there is little negative performance publication towards the incumbents and publications tend to be positive towards the incumbents in general in districts with low electoral competitiveness, and considerably more negative performance evaluations of the incumbents and more negative publications towards the incumbent in general in competitive districts. The data further supports the theoretical claim that in district with low electoral competitiveness (e.g. Santa Cruz) performance as a strategy is more central than in districts with high competiveness (e.g. Capital Federal). Lastly, the data also shows the apparently higher incidence of public works achievement publications in the smaller districts (and where newspapers may financially depend on the government’s publications) than in more populated and complex districts.

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191 Higher competitiveness not only leads to more negative evaluations of the incumbents, but to parties’ higher reliance on programmatic, personalistic and/ or clientelistic campaign strategies. (See chapters 3, 4 and 5)

192 In other words, performance as a campaign strategy is not enough to be a viable party in competitive districts (as is the case in non competitive districts), and parties must diversify and intensify campaign appeals to voters.
Next, I begin with the evidence from the Province of Santa Cruz (followed by Mendoza, Capital Federal, Formosa and Catamarca) in support of the theoretical argument and indicators of the centrality to campaigns of performance as a strategy.

6.9 Santa Cruz

6.9.1 Background

Next I offer some background information on Santa Cruz which helps explain the social and political relationships among actors, the dynamics of politics and the centrality to campaigns of performance.

Santa Cruz has more than 243,000 Km2 (94,000 square miles) and less than 200,000 people in two cities (Río Gallegos and Caleta Olivia with approximately 80,000 and 40,000 people respectively) and twelve towns. The closest of these towns to the provincial capital, Río Gallegos, is 240 Km away (Comandante Luis Piedrabuena); the furthest is 1,000 Km away (Los Antiguos). There are one paved road which crosses the province from north to south and only two from east to west. The rural population is negligible (<5000). These facts have shaped the organization and life of the 14 communities, as Provincial Deputy Suárez (PJ) said: “Cada uno de los pueblos, debido a la distancia, tiene que formar su propia infraestructura de energía, de servicios públicos como agua, gas propio, servicio de salud propio, servicio de educación propio.”

The comparatively harsh weather conditions and the long distances to the large cities in the country, for a long time hindered large waves of immigrants. Many of those who have come to Santa Cruz, have done so moved by jobs in the oil companies which operate in the province and are the major sources of revenues for the district. The

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193 This is according to the last valid national census (2001) at the time I conducted research.
194 While Buenos Aires is more than 2600 Km from Río Gallegos, the Marambio Argentine Antarctic Base is under 1600 Km.
other and more important source of jobs is the government itself; local and provincial. Public administration, teachers, police, municipal employees constitute 60% of the workforce.\textsuperscript{195} As a result of all of this, there are no significant indices of poverty, and a provincial government with money in vast and virgin spans of land.

The lack of an effective opposition party and the fact that the actors of the civil society have resources to organize and mobilize behind their club-type demands, leads to an active confrontation with the authorities, which tends to run outside of the formal institutional channels (in the form of road blockages, demonstrations and strikes).\textsuperscript{196}

\textit{People do not channel demands through opposition parties. People cast their demands directly} to the government or to the oil, mining, fishing companies, etc.; formally constituted unions, or simply current or former workers are routinely acting to claim more benefits, and the government and (most often) oil companies are continuously “\textit{putting out social fires}” (these are effective tactics in small towns); “\textit{sino te patean los talones}” (Concejal Mihanovich, UCR, Río Gallegos). This has left aside either party as effective channels for social demands. In campaigns, the ruling party wants to soothe people and assure them that the government is doing the best job possible, by showing all the public works done, and to be done (See Appendix F, Tables F.1, F.2 and F.3). During electoral campaigns the differences in roles and use of resources of the incumbent party and the state itself get blurred (see Chapter 4). The PJ has been in

\textsuperscript{195} \textsc{“El 60 por ciento de la población económicamente activa de Santa Cruz se desempeña como agente del Estado, ya sea en el nivel provincial o en el municipal. Son 55.000 de las 220.000 personas que viven en aquellas tierras.” Source: “Santa Cruz, un espejo que adelanta”, in \textit{La Nación}, 9/9/09.}

\textsuperscript{196} \textsc{The fact that in Santa Cruz there are mostly small isolated towns makes the local government officials the buffer for social protest or demands, and conflicts are personalized.}
power since the return to democracy in 1983. The UCR cannot echo social demands and has little resources to change that dynamic.\textsuperscript{197}

\section*{6.9.2 Argument}

Since there is one dominant party in Santa Cruz, the relevant voter mobilization strategies are those used by the PJ party (acknowledging the UCR’s campaigns). Thanks to the reigning public works agenda the campaign strategy is limited to a performance type in the weeks prior to the elections. Campaign tactics act as voter reminders of the incumbent provincial administration’s achievements. Opposition parties have a chance at winning elections only when the incumbent’s performance was bad enough and the opposition manages to properly organize for the electoral campaign. The sequence to understand how and why performance as a voter mobilization strategy in Santa Cruz is important is as follows:

1) The government has to please the unions and social groups, which tend to be fairly well organized and led (they are mobilized). The damage these groups can do to the economy or general daily life disruption is large (towns are small and the activists’ action affects towns largely). These groups of people are combative because of their collegiate characteristics of their (former) jobs, such as coal miners, oil workers, teacher, etc.; for example, most of the money going to the province comes from oil companies and demonstrators blocking one highway can stop or severely slow production. Hence, many groups can blackmail companies and the government for subsidies and other benefits. These pressure groups have a short memory and do not articulate holistic

\textsuperscript{197} The better UCR electoral outcomes came with elections where the national mood shifted away from PJ, and still the PJ governors could split the dates of the district and national elections and hence minimize the damage to their power in Santa Cruz, and so the district elections would clearly go in favor of the PJ and the national election would be more competitive but still with PJ wins (except in three midterm occasions since 1983; in 1985 when the UCR won by 8\% points and Alfonsín (UCR) was the president, in 1997 UCR won by 227 votes or less > 1\%, and in 2009 by 1,700 votes or less than 2\% -12 years apart each election-; PJ has won with margins of more than 54\% point difference in the national legislative elections since 1983).

The percentages with which the PJ has won provincial elections have been categorical (About 63\% for PJ to 20\% for UCR in 2003 district wide Provincial Deputies election), and those of local elections have been even more impressive in many towns.
views of society (as in any striking group, they want improved working conditions or benefits for themselves, their own sectors).\textsuperscript{198}

2) The opposition parties do not show leadership, organize and represent people’s demands, are weak, lack resources and adequate organization. This scenario reduces the incumbent’s need for investing in programmatic, clientelistic or personalistic appeals (chapters 3, 4 and 5), limiting the campaign to performance appeals.

3) The government seems to be more in check and accountable to the societal pressure groups than to the opposition parties.\textsuperscript{199} People do not channel demands through the parties. People want to talk directly to the authorities when they need to. Even though the larger electorate is content with acknowledging the incumbents’ accomplishments, the ruling party feels the pressure to comply often with club or particularistic promises, and sometimes bows to those demands in order to keep social peace and governance.

4) The provincial government often acts as a mediator between the “parts in conflict” (sector of society vs. municipality, oil, mining companies, etc.). In the end, even though several but isolated sectors of society may have their club-type demands addressed, unaddressed or partially addressed by the provincial government, it is the much publicized “performance on the public works agenda” which galvanizes the electorate as a whole in support of the incumbent provincial government.

\textbf{6.9.3 Tactics (Indicators 1-6)}

Resources come from the provincial government to the municipalities to beef up the mayor’s performance and loyalties. Councilman Cifuentes (Partido Socialista, Caleta Olivia) said: “...y ¿ayuda financiera por parte del municipio a la gente?: Entrega de terrenos, entrega de casas, utilizan entre fondos públicos para mantenerse en el poder, lo han logrado con total éxito todo este tiempo, del ‘83 a esta parte...” The active role of the public sector in society and the economy is reinforced on the media, particularly during campaigns.

\textsuperscript{198} I am not here addressing the quality of democracy. Incumbents may be corrupt, but they still respond to people’s (mostly particularistic/club) demands, and on those expectations incumbents may be evaluated.

\textsuperscript{199} For example, in 2011 the PJ had 20 seats to only 4 of the opposition in the provincial legislature. The PJ also had 12 out of 14 municipality mayors in 2005; 13 out of 14 in 2008, and all 14 mayors in 2011).
Incumbent officials use the media to campaign on these accomplishments. Moreover, media outlets (newspapers particularly) are biased towards favoring the ruling party and candidates (See Tables F.1, F.2 and F.3) and, as many interviewees confirmed, they survive with government advertisement money. Here is Cifuentes again:

“...He analizado unos balances...y mirando los canales yo veo que le pagan 50.000 pesos por mes de publicidad al canal de televisión de acá de Caleta. Y si uno ve el canal de acá; una hora del noticiero, 55 minutos hablan del intendente. Con los diarios lo mismo...la oposición no existe, y cuando a uno le hacen una nota, la cortan y la sacan de contexto...”

Cifuentes’ statement points to the multifaceted aspects of campaigns. His examples combine clientelism and performance, with elements of personalism as well. Giving land parcels, houses or a “financial assistance” to people, who probably duly qualify for the benefits or have made the due payments, but given only weeks before an election, transform a plain legislated benefit into a pseudo clientelistic tactic, given the difficulties and exeptionalism to get those benefits in the eyes of the recipient. The act of government also contains a personalistic message considering the usual manner in which those benefits are adjudicated, where the mayor himself hands over titles or checks in front of the media cameras. Incumbent candidates boast the great effort and sacrifice they incur for getting those people their benefits.

Benefits are often withheld to be given during the campaign, which serves two purposes: adjudicate the due benefit and campaign. The greater effect of such tactics may be on the larger electorate who learn from the media that the incumbents get things done. Opposition candidates, of course, have little to counter that kind of concrete evidence that the incumbents are doing a good job. The timing and the manner in which those tactics are implemented are carefully calibrated.
6.9.4 Mechanisms 1: a tight leash from the centralized provincial government

To explain the mechanisms and centrality to campaigns of performance as a strategy, I next expand on three means by which it is achieved: the provincial-local government relationship, the prevalence of state entitlement and benefits, and punishment to those who deviate from the government’s path. The three mechanisms shape relations of power among political actors and civil society and, for example, illustrate the focus on the provincial executive’s performance and the coherence in concentrating campaign resources on performance tactics. (See Appendix E)

6.9.4.1 The provincial-local government relationship

Towns themselves are tied to the money coming from the provincial government, which in turn affects the elections (among other political implications). The PJ and the provincial central government have considerable control on the local governments and on people, as Deputy Hallar and Mayor Roquel addressed respectively. Hallar (UCR) said: “...[E]l sistema de coparticipación municipal que tenemos en Santa Cruz, que prácticamente reparte menos del 9% en los 14 municipios. Entonces el gran poder lo tiene el gobierno central. Los municipios del interior no pueden autofinanciarse; Dependen de la dádiva del gobierno central.” This financial dependence of local governments yields some political benefits to the provincial government as well, as Hallar illustrates: “‘El intendente lo aseguramos al gobierno de turno’, y el diputado por pueblo va atado al intendente; Se aseguran los 14, 13, 12 diputados por pueblo.”

6.9.4.2 The prevalence of state entitlement and benefits

People seem to be content with a state of affairs where all sources of benefits come from the government. Mayor Roquel (UCR) said: “Hay una gran proporción de la

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200 These “Town Provincial Deputies” are usually nominated to run in the election by the local mayoral candidate.
población activa que depende del estado. Y un estado que generalmente ha actuado con un criterio asistencialista y yo no generalizaría, pero hay gente que se ha acostumbrado a eso.” People depend on the state, and candidates are part of that society and campaign to satisfy people’s needs which translates into profiting from the state coffers, from the simple municipal worker to the big company contracted to pave a road, build an airport or a dam. People’s judgments about the government’s fulfillment of expectations seem to be in those terms; “Did I benefit enough from these incumbents? Are there other candidates credibly capable of doing better?”

In small communities the terms of the performance evaluated in campaigns may be confounded with clientelism. Incumbents use their office (and public money) to stay in power, but it is also fair to say that many do it because they also want to improve the living conditions of the local population (who are not that many) and they feel they cannot change the system. Councilman Beroiza’s (PJ, Los Antiguos): “…Simplemente velando por la necesidad del prójimo…y lo que se espera, como acá no tenemos una actividad privada fuerte…termina dependiendo del estado porque también nosotros somos cómodos.”

6.9.4.3 Punishment to those who deviate from the government’s path

When the PJ losses a municipal election and becomes the local opposition, the provincial government may cut the supply of monies to that municipality which will soon generate criticism from below to a local government which cannot deliver: However, it is unusual for PJ councilmen to be in the opposition. Nevertheless, the drainage of resources the provincial PJ government submits the local UCR government to, also affects the performance of the councilmen. “[The mayor’s lack of resources to work] a la vez nos arrastra a nosotros. Si porque después queda como, ‘no pero si no hacen nada’, no…” (Councilman Ojeda, PJ, Perito Moreno). Now Mayor Bilardo (PJ) is back in
power after 4 years of UCR interregnum. That was the strategy of the provincial
government towards the UCR in Perito Moreno; to drain the opposition mayor of
resource and hence affect its performance.201 (For more details on the case of Perito
Moreno see Appendix E)

6.9.5 Mechanism 2: Performance Strategy at the local level (Indicator 3)

Mayor Maimo, next, shares why and how campaigning on performance is
advantageous to them, and that it does not make sense to have a campaign “platform”:

“¿Te imaginás, metido toda una vida acá? Lo que yo persigo es poder
cumplir por lo menos en lo posible el 100% de la propuesta. Entonces, si querés
seguir o tenés la posibilidad de la reelección, decís bueno, ‘esto es lo que
prometí, y acá está lo que cumplí’. ¿Qué vas a salir a sacar un [programa?]…. [Estar en el gobierno es] una ventaja sobre el resto. Porque vos, que se yo, el
lunes entregamos viviendas, y vos que estás de afuera [non incumbent] ¿qué
tenés?, tenés que inventar algo para que la gente te dé el [voto]; ‘vamos a tener
que hacer otro tipo de vivienda’. Vamos [nosotros] a hacer una recorrida de obra:
vamos a ir a la cementera, al interconectado, a la planta de tratamiento de
residuos sólidos, a la planta de hidrógeno, al parque eólico, ¡los matás!, ¿viste?
¿Me entendés lo que te digo? Que se yo, tenemos para inaugurar cuadras de
pavimento; hacemos una y vamos con los vecinos, corte de cinta con un vecino
que hace mucho que vive ahí. Eso es política.” “… ¿Cuál es la ventaja también
nuestra? Y no es soberbia. ¿Qué te pueden plantear hoy? ¿Pavimento? Tienen
el 95% del pueblo pavimentado. ¿Energía? Hay en todo el ejido urbano.
¿Teléfono?, tenemos 4000. Red cloacal, el 90%. ¿Qué te puede demandar el
vecino?, ¿una plazoleta? Ojo que no es que esté cubierta toda...pero es difícil
que te pueda pedir, de los servicios nada. Puede haber un perro muerto, un
gato, ‘que no me juntaron la basura’. Que se yo…”

Mayors do public works and campaign on them. And governors if they did a good
job of discipline and financing his mayors will have no problem in keeping the job.

201 Finally, “party troop controls” also occur within towns. Councilman Beroiza (PJ, Los
Antiguos) refers to the inner circle of power in town and that he was left outside of that circle for
not playing along. Beroiza:

“Hay otros tipos de beneficios. ...Yo estuve dos años sin cobrar una comisión de
servicio, el intendente a mí no me la quería dar... ¿Por qué? Porque era oposición. Los otros
[alligned with the mayor]; tenés beneficios de otra forma. ...comisión, beneficios, y algunos
otros placeres por abajo; Que se vende un terreno y reciben alguna 'cometa'. Y bueno. ... Es
corrupción. ...y es difícil. Por eso es que te digo, me da impotencia. No me creo en, no quiero
levantar la bandera de la honestidad, y coso porque, pero tampoco arrastrarse así y a veces
son beneficios muy baratos...” (Sic)
Politics tend to be local since the mood of the people is largely affected by local problems. The local authorities are faced with social discontent, but it is usually the governor the known ultimate responsible. Mayors and city council candidates, in the eyes of the people are, de facto, the fuses; the performance of the government is brought to their face and they may be electorally sanctioned. However, the PJ has managed to replace one PJ mayor for another PJ mayor.²⁰²

6.9.6 Campaign tactics

6.9.6.1 Acción Social (Indicators 1, 3, 5)

To understand the centrality of performance messages in the campaign we should acknowledge the important year-around work by municipal and provincial offices of “Acción Social” (Social Assistance).²⁰³ These are the nexus to solve people’s problems and the tools of a kind of aid which is particularistic and in some respects personalized (because in small towns this is about helping neighbors with a name, which will bear fruit when the performance campaign is carried out). The work done by the party’s Unidades Básicas in Santa Cruz is minimal, compared to that of the offices of Social Assistance, and in this respect it is the government which is doing the work. This work would not be clientelism because everybody who needs the help is getting it—not a discretionary number--; of course only a small number of people do. The opposition, however, see that the government policy to help those pockets of “poverty” or people in need is a particularistic policy which is arbitrarily adjudicated and conveniently implemented during campaigns.

²⁰² On how the PJ manages to renew mayors without relinquishing power see Appendix E.
²⁰³ The work is similar to the work carried out by punteros and PJ referents of party offices (Unidades Básicas) in Formosa
6.9.6.2 Actos institucionales (Indicators 1, 3, 5)

The “actos institucionales” (government events) are the kind of tactics the incumbent party carries out to promote its candidates; opening or inaugurating public projects, handing out subsidies or showing performance (For example, Mayor Maimo above). Next, Deputy Aguiar (PJ) describes how the provincial state is used to campaign for the incumbent party’s candidates:

“Generalmente esta última elección…se hizo más que nada con actos institucionales, no hubo casi actos políticos, hubo uno solo que fue el cierre de campaña. Y se hizo todo un recorrido por la provincia con actos institucionales, con obras, subsidios a entidades intermedias y demás. El gobernador con los candidatos a diputados y senadores, sí.”

Deputy Victoria (PJ) told me that all the factions which appear for the local level elections disappear when a national election occurs and stand behind their candidates:

“[The 2005 legislative election] Se centró en actos institucionales, no actos políticos, sino actos institucionales. Y bueno, la figura de Alicia [Kirchner], era justo el Ministro de Desarrollo Social de la Nación, así que vino, si bien haciendo campaña, pero de manera institucional, llegando a charlar con las diferentes ONGs, los organismos del estado.”

Opposition Deputy Hallar (UCR) agrees; “…el que está en el gobierno lo hace mucho más fácil porque va inaugurando obras. Van con la comitiva oficial, no dicen que es campaña, pero…” In the “actos institucionales” there are also announcements of future projects, but the tactic only makes sense when the higher authorities (e.g. governor) is present to show what has been done (i.e. concrete things).

6.9.6.3 Other tactics (Indicators 2-6)

1) Provincial candidates, such as deputies, try to meet people in groups with organized sectors of the civil society. These events are often covered by the local media, but it is mostly used by the opposition candidates to make themselves known personally (Provincial or national candidates do not usually go door-to-door, that is the job of militants and city council and sometimes mayoral candidates). Candidates meeting
NGOs as tactics are not very relevant in the overall voter mobilization strategies and are not particularly aimed at campaigning on performance (except against the incumbents).

2) In the door-to-door visits, as in the other districts, the topics of conversation generally concern the locality. It may be of local jurisdiction (e.g. pavement), or provincial (e.g. crime and safety), but to a lesser extent provincial level problems in general are addressed, and even less national issues. Partisans who visit people’s homes are local candidates and local militants, and their recognition is local. However, they must somehow campaign for their party’s provincial and national candidates as well.

It is very common for people to criticize or to want to talk about what the town needs or the local port, mine, etc., and sometimes to ask for a job for their sons or daughters, etc.Politicians and candidates feel the pressure by people and try to focus their message on the performance of the government because they cannot credibly promise much (legislative candidates do not have the power to make promises. In Santa Cruz this is a “performance” of public works and public jobs, not a vision of the economy independently from the provincial state.

But, what does a good or a bad performance mean? What do people retain from the campaign? The public works done are there for everyone to see. Showing the relevance of performance to campaigns Mihanovic said:

“Yo digo siempre que la gestión te ayuda mucho a la campaña política. Si es mala tu gestión evidentemente te tenés que guardar, y que salga otro candidato si se quiere más limpio. Generalmente las gestiones te van desgastando...particularmente hemos logrado... que no suceda de esa manera...”

Every four years, if there is an electoral sanction to an official, it would be for the obvious or perceptible lack of public works, or progress of the locality in general, and not so much for the unfulfilled promise to specific people. What matters and makes a

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204 These are small towns, so if a mayor or councilperson promises something to a particular person or family and then does not fulfills that promise, then people may retaliate on the official.
difference are people’s general expectations from the incumbents, and not any particularistic expectations.

6.9.7 Incentives to stay the course on the performance strategy

6.9.7.1 Incumbency and executives

Being the incumbent helps the development of the campaign because of the infrastructure and resources at their disposal. In Santa Cruz incumbency helps in the formulation of diagnosis and “appropriate” solutions for campaigns. The gap in this respect with non-incumbents is much larger than in other districts where political parties do count with effective networks of brokers or activists. Next Lozano (UCR) shows that performance is what candidates campaign on and voters seem to vote on:

“In the door-to-door visits to people] hay que decirle,...a ver, convengamos que en ese momento para nosotros era mucho más fácil, porque nosotros no éramos gestión. No sé qué va a pasar ahora...y...las cloacas que no se hizo y ahora estamos en gestión. Va a ver a que ir con cuestiones mucho más contundentes y decir, ‘se está haciendo de cual o cual manera’, o ‘no se está haciendo por tal cosa’. Creo que ahora la responsabilidad de los candidatos que representan los intereses de esta gestión va a ser muchísimo más que aquel que es de la oposición.”

Performance is the best strategy and the best tool the incumbents have to mobilize voters in Santa Cruz, mainly because the availability of resources allows

Hence, candidates try not to lightly promise particularistic or very specific things in campaigns. The retaliation for an unfulfilled particularistic promise in small towns would not be, significantly, electoral, but a direct action one (like protesting or even harassments).

205 For example, Río Gallegos councilpeople (See Lozano) have access to the “Centros Integradores”–CENIN- (or local government neighborhood delegations) which help them learn people’s needs and concerns, just as dirigentes or punteros aid candidates in Catamarca and Formosa.

“No tenemos locales [partidarios]...ahora estando en una gestión, nuestros Cenines, puede actuar para los concejales, pero no solamente para los concejales radicales...como un canalizador de las distintas inquietudes de los barrios, entonces eso a vos te ayuda al plantear los problemas que tenés en cada uno de los lugares...‘che, que pasa en el barrio Belgrano, en...’ Entonces uno cuando va la tiene más o menos clara. Inclusive te dicen, ‘mirá, ojo con esta persona, no le estamos solucionando tal problema, y hace dos meses que va al municipio’,...entonces esa facilidad te lo da el hecho de estar en la gestión.” (Councilman Lozano, UCR, Río Gallegos)
incumbents to have relatively smooth administrations. However, the “relatively smooth administrations” of the PJ mayors occur because there is a PJ governor sustaining them, which is not the case of the isolated UCR mayors (such as the cases of Roquel and Moro).206

6.9.7.2 Incumbents’ information control over the opposition (Indicator 1-4)

Candidates of the incumbent party do not make programmatic proposals and even make it difficult for the opposition to do any as well.207 Councilwoman Labado (PJ, Caleta Olivia) comments that she (and her incumbent partisans) does not provide information to the opposition parties so they would not be able to make precise proposals in the campaign.

In Labado’s opinion it is easier to criticize being in the opposition. In any case, either because it is easier to criticize or because there is not good data/information available, the emphasis is put in the performance evaluation of the incumbent administration and not in making programmatic proposals. Labado said:

“El hecho de ser gobierno, si bien corrés con muchas ventajas, a veces corrés con muchas desventajas. Porque el que es gobierno le podemos cuestionar lo que no hizo, o lo que hizo mal, o lo que dejó de hacer, o como lo hizo. En cambio el que no tiene la responsabilidad de gobernar es mucho más fácil. Digamos, cuestionar o proponer...”

Opposition candidates have trouble campaigning on a public policy program because they have little reliable information on the city finances and general state of affairs giving the incumbents the upper hand. Labado says she has to protect from the lies and illusive projects proposed in campaigns by the opposition; “También porque,

206 In the 2011 elections both Roquel and Moro lost to PJ mayoral candidates.

207 As argued on the chapter (4) on programmatic strategy, and in the particular case of Councilwoman Ricci (UCR, Perito Moreno), the party platform is the same for all sublemas, then sublemas differentiate from one another with different publicity and pictures of candidates. Council candidates do not have a platform of their own, but they are there to support their mayor (or mayoral candidate). For example, Mayor Maimo said: “No, la propuesta se hace en conjunto, y la propuesta es del intendente. Y los concejales acompañan.”
Regarding campaign proposals, Provincial Deputy Freile (UCR) said: “¿Que tengo que andar estudiando o explicando cómo voy a hacer las obras, con la plata que tiene la provincia?!” He is not concerned when making campaign promises because the province is rich! (The problem is getting to power). Freile seemed upset when I asked him if they did research or study the viability of projects before making the campaign proposals.

**6.9.7.3 Tactics: do nothing to get the performance vote (Indicators 4-6)**

Noting that the executive elections are the most relevant to people, and considering that the opposition parties only have real chances of winning seats in legislative bodies, Deputy Freile (UCR) played at two candidacies in the 2003 election. Freile ran for Provincial Deputy and for mayor of a city at the same time, in a move to bring votes to his party, and because people pay more attention to the mayoral election and the candidate’s reputation, than the legislative contest itself. This implies that the local Caleta Olivia UCR leadership does not count with new faces and go back to the more common names to fill the ballots. Freile said.

“No era algo que realmente me interesaba. Pero yo ya había ganado la nominación a diputado, como la ley me permitía ser candidato a intendente la intención mía era...apoyar la fórmula a gobernador de Freddy Martínez. … Le aporté mil votos. Pero resulta que como candidato a intendente, y yo no hice campaña; ni un solo día fui a la radio, no pegué ni un solo cartel.” “…Saqué 1000 votos, así de candidato a intendente.”

Did Freile cheat those 1,000 voters who wanted him to be mayor? The votes Freile got were almost certainly performance votes (against the PJ incumbents) and/or personalism votes (the personal qualities people recalled Freile had.

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208 The electoral law in Santa Cruz allows those types of candidacies.
6.9.8 Conclusion

In Santa Cruz the focus of campaigns is on the executives (particularly the governor), there is little deflection of resources away from performance tactics, there is little regarding other strategy types and linkages between parties and voters, and there are exclusive performance tactics.

Performance as a voter mobilization strategy is central to campaigns in Santa Cruz. Also, performance is more important to campaigns than the other three voter mobilization strategy types. To make sense of those statements we had to consider several interplaying factors which are not particularly unique to the case and hence help us understand electoral scenarios where this type of campaign efforts might be relevant.

The lack of viable and credible alternative parties and candidates leaves (to some extent) incumbents without a contesting “adversary” and must face elections on their own merit. Furthermore, in any district people may want change, but in Santa Cruz change can happen within the ruling party; the PJ adapts to the new realities but keeps power (See Appendix E). For example, days before the 2007 general election a majority of Rio Gallegos’ voters said the provincial government needed a change (Table D.1). It is of no surprise to find that 94% of those wanting “continuidad” (continuity) would vote for the incumbent, but one in five people wanting change would vote for the incumbent candidate, as well. (See Appendix D)

“Actos institucionales” as tactics which bring elements of clientelism and personalism to an eminently performance activity, and a powerful support from the media for the case of incumbents are the main tactics and resources put to use in campaigns in Santa Cruz. A timid display of the negative aspects of the incumbent’s performance by the opposition parties through the biased media access also exists.
As mentioned in Chapter 5, the opposition parties fear to suggest a change in the public jobs set up because that could antagonize most people depending on those jobs and also the opposition’s programmatic proposals often lack accurate information due to their lack of data (See Labado and Freile’s quote earlier). Performance, instead, is the easier, most efficient (because it deals with people’s palpable unsatisfied needs) and at times effective strategy for the opposition to adopt. In Santa Cruz there is not really a competitive party facing the PJ, but incumbents must show their performance to satisfy the general public in a district where civil society can check incumbents.

6.10 Mendoza

6.10.1 Background and summary

Performance has medium centrality to campaigns as a voter mobilization strategy in Mendoza. Mendoza is a district with relatively high socioeconomic development and high electoral competitiveness, and the programmatic strategy is probably central to campaigns, clientelism is probably not central and personalism is of low centrality to campaigns as voter mobilization strategies (see chapters 3, 4 and 5).

There is another characteristic to understand performance as a voter mobilization strategy in Mendoza: that the local executives are evaluated remarkably independently from the provincial or national governments making the focus of campaigns limited to few political actors (basically the governor and mayors). Performance plays a role in campaigns, but it is not exclusive since tactics of other strategy types need also be considered to understand campaigns in Mendoza.

In Mendoza the media is biased towards the incumbents (and their performances) who pay publicity and sometimes financially sustains media outlets. According to Councilman Ramírez (PJ), in the urban center of cities the media is more important than the personal contact, and in those cases it may be the national and
provincial legislators’ campaigns which help them (councilmen) get votes. However, it is the other way around in the neighborhoods where the personal contact with voters is more relevant than the media.

As mentioned in Chapter 5, in Mendoza there is more decentralization than in the other provinces, which gives more resources to mayors, affecting the way they conduct electoral campaigns. The relevance of the performance of the mayors and their active participation in midterm legislative campaigns may be related to their relative autonomy in relation to the central provincial government and, hence, to the responsibility they have in the eyes of people.

6.10.2 Bimodal focus of responsibility in campaigns: mayors and governor

(Indicators 1-6)

During legislative-only local elections, even during legislative provincial elections, the performance of the local mayor is evaluated above anyone else’s. In legislative elections people vote the performance of the executives associated to those legislators. Even provincial level legislators are often more associated to the local mayor than to the governor.

In Mendoza the performance of the mayors is center-stage in elections. It is true that the president of the country and the governor’s elections are more important in people’s minds, however, the mayors’ relative autonomy allows them to make the local elections comparatively more relevant than in other districts.

Provincial Deputy Carmona (PJ) describes performance messages in the different levels of government for the incumbents and the opposition. “[What is said in the door-to-door tactics] Depende mucho de las circunstancia, si es una campaña municipal donde sos gobierno se intenta ponderar la gestión que se ha realizado, los avances que ha tenido, asumir compromisos sobre temas barriales o locales.” He later
added that the PJ and UCR candidates used the images and performances of President Kirchner and Governor Cobos respectively.

“El gobernador se pone al hombro la campaña, y en el caso del oficialismo a veces tiene más preponderancia el gobernador que el propio candidato. En el caso del oficialismo departamental pasa lo mismo [con el intendente]. … [¿El gobernador salía a hacer campaña por su lista de legisladores en 2005?] Si, porque se juegan, intentan plebiscitar la gestión. Salen muy fuertemente. El lema del radicalismo era ‘sigamos con Cobos’, no ponderaba al figura de Cornejo que era el candidato a diputado nacional.”

6.10.3 Message and tactic diversification (Indicator 1-6)

The socioeconomic diversity of Mendoza’s society and the electoral competitiveness, forces parties to have a broad range of tactics and styles of message, which not only includes performance. Next, is Deputy Merino:

“Nosotros tenemos distintos sectores sociales, los sectores humildes, los sectores medios y los sectores altos. Y ahí las diferencias son bastante marcadas, porque en los sectores medios, medios altos o altos demandan de todo: la figura, la honestidad de la persona, las características de la persona, la propuesta, el proyecto político, ‘¿qué vas a ser si sos [electo]?’; Ese demanda de todo. En los sectores más humildes,…van mucho más con la personalidad, la sencillez, la humildad del candidato, que la gente lo sienta mas como ellos.”…“En los sectores más humildes a veces la gente nos recibe mejor que en los sectores altos, por una cuestión de que la gente tiene más ganas de verte o de conocerte o de saber quien sos o que pensás, que un empresario. El empresario, la tiene más clara, tiene mayor nivel de información… En los sectores más humildes donde el nivel de información tal vez sea menor, por no tener acceso a todas estas cosas… Entonces a veces tenés mejor nivel de receptividad de parte de esa persona, que del otro sector.” (Provincial Deputy Merino, UCR)

Adding to the experience above, Councilman Rosas (PJ, Junín de los Andes) said: “Incidé muchísimo el candidato que uno lleva a nivel nacional. En el caso nuestro, hacíamos referencia a Néstor [Kirchner]. [Aunque no era candidato] claro, pero lo sentíamos primero, y aparte porque nos puede ayudar.” It is not only the performance of the executives; it is also many times their image, which is relevant to the campaigns. It is a resource for those aspiring legislators, but it is also a resource which executives need to use in order to maintain power.
6.10.4 Tactics and messages (Indicator 3-6)

Provincial Deputy Guillermo Merino (UCR) shows that the tactics used for personalism, performance, programmatic and sometimes clientelism overlap in some places. The style and message of campaigns must also be adapted according to, in this example, a more competitive environment: “...la campaña pasada la figura fuerte fue Cobos, fue el gobernador. Donde salíamos a pedirle a la gente a apoyar al gobernador, votando a sus legisladores, y a sus concejales para poder gobernar...,” and later he said, “...no me animo a decir que son campañas sucias,...en temas de la gestión, si, hemos tenido cruces fuertes, pero en cuestiones personales no.” Midterm legislative elections are in reality a plebiscite on the executives’ performance and image. There is a fight on imposing an interpretation of the executives’ performance through the media and the more personalized tactics, but which also mix personalism contents to enhance the message: “En la actualidad los intendentes salen a hacer campaña, de cualquier partido político, así sea una legislativa.” Provincial Senator, and former Mayor of San Rafael, Hugo Morales (PJ) agreed with Merino: “Para un intendente es muy importante ganar una elección legislativa, porque eso lo fortalezce en su gestión. Entonces los ejecutivos ponen mucho en la elección legislativa aunque ellos no vayan en la boleta...”

The tactics adopted emphasize the role of both the media, and in smaller cities like San Rafael, the personalized contact with voters. Here is Morales again:

“Cada vez más, la razón de ser de las campañas electorales tienen que ver con el aspecto mediático.... Se eligen aquellas actividades que tienen gran difusión. A veces se hacen reuniones con pequeños grupos de vecinos, pero generalmente se eligen aquellos hechos que tienen que ver con la inauguración de obras, con hechos impactantes, que generen digamos, una gran expectativa publica, y que puedan tener prensa.”

The media is relevant; however the personal contact with voters is still valued. And how does the door-to-door tactic actually work? “Nosotros salimos a hacer caminatas...” “¿Cómo funciona en la práctica? Va gente del partido, invitando a la gente
Next is Councilman Luis Colonia (UCR, Junín de los Andes) on how competition makes candidates (and incumbent mayors) campaign in support of their legislators. Consequently, the mayor’s performance is evaluated. Colonia said: “Tenemos [Gobernador] Cobos, muy buena gestión; al intendente, muy buena gestión. Pero necesitábamos que nos apoyen legislativamente,...porque necesitan una continuación de personas que apoyen al intendente.” The work done at the local legislature is also seen as part of the mayoral performance.

Local mayors (who control campaign assets) exchange their campaign support to provincial and local legislators for support in their legislative bodies. In the end mayors call the shots and legislators become part of the political clout generated by the mayor. When I asked Provincial Senator (and former Mayor of Tupungato) José “Pepe” Martínez (UCR) who was the big personality in his campaign as a legislator, he said: “El intendente. ...y te dice, ‘necesito para mi gestión que me salga una ley [¿aunque usted sea de nivel provincial?] claro porque también vos necesitas, y para concejales también, vos tenés concejales, no puedo estar cambiando o negociando cosas. Porque después también pasa eso, se canjean cosas.” Next, Councilman Laciar (UCR, Mendoza) refers to the relevance of the mayor in campaigns and the performance vote:

“El intendente tiene dos elecciones, la que va él con sus 6 concejales,...y la elección legislativa, que si bien él no va nombrado, la encabeza en la acción política. Sale a caminar, aunque él no sea el candidato... Yo creo que fundamentalmente [la gente] vota el reconocimiento a la gestión. Valora mucho la parte humana, y estar y acercarse... Mendoza es una sociedad muy conservadora y le gusta lo que hay, y le gusta y lo tolera. ...Hay una tendencia a
la continuidad (en los municipios), aunque se revierte en los casos donde ya se deteriora.”

Local opposition Councilman Ramírez (PJ, Mendoza) emphasized the use of (then) President Kirchner’s image in campaign, setting aside any programmatic message in the strategies of both UCR and PJ. However, performance seems to have a role in the campaigns of opposition parties too. “Al ser oposición, permanentemente tenés que estar mostrando los errores del oficialismo. Pero sin agresión, hay respeto. ...El mendocino es conservador...Cortan y mucho [cortan boleta]...En Capital son 23 años de radicalismo, la gente está acostumbrada a que gobiene el radicalismo.”

Next, Councilman Colonia’s political godfather, the mayor of Junín de los Andes, refers to how to prepare for the campaign. Mayor Mario Abed (UCR, Junín de los Andes) appoints his candidates and actively participates in the midterm legislative campaign as well. He “coordinates the message” and instructs his candidates on what they can and cannot say, what they can and cannot promise, etc. He tells people to vote for his candidates because he needs their support in this electorally competitive city:

“...tratamos de tener las mejores personas, pero también quien interprete mejor la línea de la gestión de gobierno que se está llevando a cabo... lo interpretamos de esa manera y así son puestos los candidatos.” Here is Abed on how people vote based on a performance evaluation diminishing the importance of the actual campaign tactics and

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209 This next opinion adds to the impression I got from the interviewees about the general conservatism of people in Mendoza who, in Mayor Abed’s opinion seem to be risk averse when voting (others who brought up similar opinions were Councilman Ramírez, Advisor Fernández and Councilman Laciar).

Mayor Abed: “Lo normal es que la gente no cambie para mejor, cambia porque está mal. O sea, si estoy mal, cambio, si estoy medianamente bien, después de todos estos procesos, hiper-económicos, de hiperinflación, y todo lo demás, dice ‘ahora que estoy medianamente bien, y creo que la cosa va a seguir más o menos bien, no voy a cambiar’. Un paradigma, real y efectivo de la política Argentina.” “…Una serie de factores positivos, por más que vos vengas como candidato, ‘y usted va a ganar el doble, va a ganar esto’ no lo va a votar, porque la gente se aferra a las cosas que más o menos van bien.”

210 I used this passage in Chapter 5 regarding program. Provincial Deputy Maza (UCR) was also present during the interview.
role of the media, as if people did not need to be influenced by campaigns in order to decide their vote. As an incumbent, he feels comfortable campaigning on performance.

Mayor Abed: “El que está gobernando, el 80 % de la gente que lo puede seguir votando, no es porque salió mucha o menos veces por televisión, o porque salió a caminar mucho, más o menos, que de hecho se hace para mostrar...hacen la evaluación de su gestión; si su gestión es buena lo seguimos votando, pero la oposición es la que necesita mostrarse más. El intendente, en este caso, el gobernador, en este caso, sería, ‘yo soy lo que ustedes ven que he hecho, que ha progresado y todo lo demás’. La gente, normalmente, vota en base a esa evaluación. Cuando ve que la cosa va mal, que no se hicieron obras, que no se hicieron adelantos, que no se hicieron nada, por más que salgas todos los espacios que quieras en televisión, que salgas a dar la mano y poner la mejor sonrisa, no lo van a votar.”

UCR Provincial Senator and former mayor of Tupungato José Martínez also said that the mayoral campaign experience is characterized by incumbent’s performance and opposition’s promises (However, he acknowledges that clientelism is relevant):

“In my last campaign the message was] seguir creciendo como veníamos. Yo había remodelado toda la calle principal...obras que se ven y obras que están tapadas, como la cloaca. La oposición me venía diciendo que estaba todo muy lindo, pero que la educación tenía muchas falencias... ... ¿Y qué han hecho?, nada; Porque en realidad es que no hacía falta eso.”

To both Martínez and Abed delivering a performance type of message in campaigns is important, however, they are not exclusive to winning elections, recognizing the relevance of other strategies type elements as important too.

As was mentioned in previous chapters by other officials in Mendoza, the autonomy of mayors from the provincial politics is also reflected in campaigns and in voters’ choices. Here is Morales again:

“Hoy se pone el acento, la gente califica una gestión. ... A este intendente que está gestionando bien lo acompañó, a este que gestiona mal no lo acompañó, aunque sea del grupo del presidente. Te digo más, no te garantiza nada ser candidato a intendente y estar con Kirchner, porque en esto la gente hace una cuidadosa lectura. Hay departamentos donde ha ganado Kirchner y no ha ganado el intendente que decía estar con Kirchner. Y hay departamentos que han dicho llevar al intendente que respondía a Cobos y ha ganado el justicialista.” “La gente mide gestiones, mide resultados...Yo te diría que sí [la gente de todos los sectores sociales mide gestiones, resultados].” (Provincial Senator Hugo Morales, PJ)
Nearly all interviewees recognized the media as very important in electoral campaigns, particularly favoring the incumbents. Here I only present a few of the opinions regarding the media, their role, bias and relevance in campaigns. Councilman Rosas (PJ, Junín de los Andes) said:

“[La gente está] muy influenciada por los medios, pero hay muchos medios que están pagados por los gobiernos de turno, donde durante todo un año han hecho campaña electoral. Pero yo te repito que pasa a nivel local. Acá tiene la radio que es de la municipalidad prácticamente, sacan la gestión de la municipalidad. Nunca van a hablar mal.”

Councilman Chávez (PD, Junín de los Andes) and Provincial Deputy Canal (PD) agreed that the media and opinion polls set the campaign agenda. Paid polling companies suggest the agenda and the party’s relative stances on issues by telling parties what people want to hear. On how the campaign message is delivered Canal said: “Lo que aconsejen los medios. Lo que aconsejen los encuestadores.” Expensive advertisements are the prerogative of the more important provincial candidates and the local/departmental candidates resort to fliers and door-to-door contact with the voters which is easier at the local level.

These legislators had a somewhat negative view of the media in campaign, either for shaping the contents of the messages delivered by parties or because the media is not independent, but paid (basically financed) by politicians. These are not contradictory opinions. These are large media conglomerates and technical experts who may impose their views on candidates, but there are also weak media outlets which are influenced by politicians.211

211 Next is Mayor Joaquín Rodríguez (PJ, Tupungato) on more specific reasons for the relevance of certain media outlets:

“[La campaña en Tupungato es] muy mediatizada. …Mucha veces los medios de acá son mucho más eficientes que los medios provinciales…cuando dan las propagandas meten propagandas locales. …Nosotros no contratamos este año. Se quisieron hacer los locos [con
Provincial Senator Martínez (UCR), on the relative relevance of the media versus the "on the ground" campaign work, said: “En un 60% es la prensa. Yo te aseguro que la prensa es importante… La gente no lee los diarios, la gente lee los títulos…” Finally, Mayor Parisi also recognizes the media as very important in campaigns, he said: “Son absolutamente necesarios; lo que no dicen los medios no existe.” The media also tends to favor the incumbents. “Seguro, preferentemente por los oficialismos. Acá en Luján, yo no voy a mentir, las FMs tienen preferencias por el oficialismo. …Siempre necesitan de la plata del estado para poder subsistir; Todos.”

6.10.7 Conclusion

Mayor Parisi’s (PD, Luján de Cuyo) account provides evidence in accordance to the idea that media is relevant but personal contact is as well in smaller places, and that smaller parties, without large infrastructures rely more heavily on a good performance to stay in power than parties which can also count with brokers’ networks and clientelism. Also, parties in the opposition need the personal contact in campaign, while the incumbent party has other resources to get to people. “…Nosotros es pura gestión…” PD candidates do not have as many resources as PJ and UCR to use clientelism. “No tienen estructuras, es más volátil, si gestionan mal, se van. ...Te doy un dato, en la última elección el candidato a gobernador nuestro sacó el 8%, y nosotros sacamos el 52% acá.” According to many interviewees people split their vote and vote on performance.

In 2005 now Mayor Parisi campaigned on his predecessor’s key performance highlights like transparency and fiscally conservative conducts. Regarding their campaign message Councilwoman Cecilia Páez (“Recrear” party, Luján de Cuyo) said:

los precios]. ...quisieron cobramos mucho más y cancelamos el contrato.” In these towns the most effective media outlet may be the radio: “La radio es muy efectiva.”
“En darle continuidad a la gestión, a la buena gestión que había hecho el intendente Omar Demarchi.” And Councilman Gómez (PD, Luján de Cuyo) said: “En el reconocimiento a la gestión municipal, basado en eso.” “…Acá era mostrarte a la gente como había cambiado Luján. ‘Luján cambió’ se llamaba, el slogan…”, as advocating the no need for change.

Campaign tactics are adapted to the party characteristics, regarding degree of personalization, and content of messages: “Todo depende de si estás en el oficialismo o en la oposición. El que es opositor normalmente necesita ese contacto, y tenés que ir a tocar el timbre. Nadie te viene a buscar. En cambio acá [en la municipalidad], a esta altura de la mañana te tenido reunión con no menos de 50 personas.” (Mayor Parisi)

Mendoza’s campaigns seem to be the most complex of all the studied districts. The diversity of electorates, of parties in power, and parties’ resources allows for all four strategic types to be significantly represented in this district. This is not mixed evidence on the medium level of centrality to campaigns of performance as a voter mobilization strategy, but evidence that in order to explain the parties’ mobilization strategies in campaigns we cannot only look at performance. However, performance as a voter mobilization strategy plays an important role for the incumbent party’s candidates. This affects the tactics of local party machines by forcing an active role of mayors in their legislators’ campaigns.

### 6.11 Capital Federal

#### 6.11.1 Tactics and media in performance strategy *(Indicators 1-6)*

Capital Federal is a district in which performance as a voter mobilization strategy has medium centrality to campaigns. This district has high electoral competitiveness and socioeconomic development, personalism has high centrality, programmatic strategy is probably central to campaigns and clientelism is definitively not central to campaigns as
voter mobilization strategies (See chapters 3, 4 and 5). Since this is a multiparty system, most relevant parties are in the opposition and hence campaigning on the performance of the incumbent cannot be the edge for any single opposition party aiming to win because other opposition parties would be doing the same thing.

In Capital Federal, the media is freer from political influence than in any other district because parties in the district are weak and even ephemeral as institutions and the large size and complexity of the district (See Chapter 5). Media is also freer because it is more difficult for any single party or candidate to control or, because the multiplicity of “patrons” diminish their relative hold on the media, allowing the media outlet not to rely exclusively on any single one of the political parties, and hence opposition politicians can more easily put themselves as voices of society’s demands. Where many candidates denounce the social injustices or problems, then they have to distinguish themselves from the other opposition voices with an edge; this edge can be a program, or being more radical in the criticisms to incumbents, in proposals, personalism, etc.

The electoral competition makes the opposition candidates work harder to attract a larger proportion of voters because they have to compete not only with the incumbents but with the other opposition parties as well. Opposition parties resort to imaginative tactics in order to get the attention of the voters (Voters who are also more sophisticated than in other districts). Hence, voters can choose who (party or candidate) best represents their frustrations.

Also mentioned in Chapter 4, Deputy Velazco (ARI) comments on the tactics used by a party with relatively fewer resources than Mayor Macri’s PRO party, in order to get campaign issues across using the media:

“No teníamos un gran presupuesto, así que tuvimos que aplicar una gran inventiva para hacer actividades de campaña que eran originales y que por sí misma produjeran un impacto.” Velazco tells me for example: “…Fuimos los primeros que navegamos el Riachuelo con Patricia [Bulrich]. Después, lo hizo
These are tactics aimed at attracting people’s attention, while explicitly showing a critical evaluation of the incumbent’s performance and also providing an alternative with the persona of the candidates and some proposal to face the social problem as well. The media is usually summoned by the candidates to witness these events and make the event useful to the party in this large district. (Indicators 4, 6)

The smaller parties which do not have as many resources for a full blown media or activists’ campaign must make the most of the media access opportunities they can get. For example, Velazco’s leader appealed to a negative personal evaluation of the two leading mayoral candidates in order to avoid the “polarization” of the election:

“...Nos salvó una actuación que tuvo Patricia espectacular en los debates, muy buena, muy llamativa, con mucho ingenio. Que llevó una foto de Macri con los municipales, que se yo. Una cosa medio escandalosa. Y una [foto] de Ibarra no se con quien. Y bueno, y eso nos permitió poder consolidar el 10% de votos que tenía y que en las últimas semanas se estaba diluyendo.”

Velazco shows that the media and the personal appeal of the candidates are the main ingredients in a campaign which often subordinates the issues the candidates bring forward to talk to the media. However, the three activities he mentions are closely related to a negative evaluation of the performance of the government, the incumbent candidate and another opposition candidate; “navigate one of the most polluted river in the country”, “queue with the unemployed at 3 am” (or in a hospital’s ER), “bring compromising pictures of rival candidates to a televised debate.” (Indicators 4-6; also see Tables F.1, F.2 and F.3)

Next Deputy Luciana Blasco gives us a summary of her party’s strategy, which in the case of an opposition party begins with the negative evaluation of the incumbent’s performance and attempts to entertain prospective voters:

“...Pero teniendo 3 o 4 eventos por día, [Mauricio Macri] no tiene tiempo para sentarse a escribir. Había otro grupo que pensaba acciones concretas
(salto al bache). Como ejes de fondo, el tema de la inseguridad y el desempleo. … Los tiempos y dedicación que la gente le dedica a la política es otra. …sino la realidad es que aburre. Lo que hacíamos era pensar o de qué formas, eventos concretos para que ese mensaje sea escuchado. Fundamentalmente influyó mucho la televisión. …Se vota el mensaje corto, breve.”

The “salto al bache” (jumping the street pothole) on a city street to show the problems, and inefficiency of the incumbents, as well as the more generalized issues of safety (crime) and unemployment presented in media appearances, were the central aspects of the performance strategy. However, these political parties need much more resources and ingenuity to campaign on “performance” than in other districts: because of the large electorate, variety of mass media outlets; electoral competition and the sophisticated and hectic-life voters. These facts divides people’s attention and campaigns tend to deal with the current issues and not with deeper problems in society, “las campañas electorales se meten demasiado…en la circunstancia política que se vive en el momento” (National Deputy Argüello) and the role and the speed with which the media works is a reason for that. Deputy Morando seems to agree as well; “la verdad de la milanesa es que a la gente no le interesa [el programa o plataforma de campaña]. A uno porque lo llaman de la radio, televisión, no es para hablar de ideas, que se yo, sino es para hablar de alguna cosa, algún motivo, raro, llamó la atención.”

People and the media are interested in current day problems and demand solutions to those urgent problems. The pressure people and media put on candidates and the need of votes in a competitive election candidates have, forces candidates and parties to leave aside elaborate programmatic presentations in the media (See Chapter 4). The campaign becomes a “media fast” (as the media allows) evaluation of the performance of the incumbents and an even briefer suggestions of the solutions to these day-to-day issues. What are left are impressions of the candidates with good wishes.

The development of performance as a voter mobilization strategy using the mass media is the most pronounced of all the districts for the money and technical resources
put to criticize and defend the incumbent administrations. However, performance alone cannot fully explain the development of campaigns in Capital Federal. The personalism of candidates and the demand for alternative ideas are also important in a good campaign strategy in Capital Federal.

6.12 Formosa

6.12.1 Background and summary

Performance has medium centrality to campaigns as a voter mobilization strategy in Formosa. In Formosa there is low electoral competitiveness, low socioeconomic development, and as analyzed in previous chapters personalism has high centrality to campaigns (chapter 5), clientelism is probably central to campaigns (chapter 3) and programmatic strategy is probably not central to campaigns as voter mobilization strategies. (Chapter 4)

While similar to Santa Cruz in the control on the media exercised by the PJ, in Formosa the “puntero” type broker (as delegates of mayors) has a relevant role with a frequent contact with people and tends to bring “solutions” to people in the name of the mayor.

The mayor sets himself at a distance from people, which is not physical in small towns, but symbolically. The mayor is not only a very important and resourceful person; he is also the father-figure in town (see chapters 3 and 5). Hence, the performance which is evaluated in local elections may be confounded with clientelism and personalism; not only with the delivery of particularistic and social/public benefits, but with the sense that people are being taken care of, that the mayor is also symbolically the advocate of the town to the outside world. As in other districts, performance as a strategy in Formosa is related to the expectations people have from the government. If the mayor delivered when people were in need, then the mayor did well; on very
specific, concrete and often particularistic personal issues which are common in very small towns.

The governor’s performance tactics are carried out on the government sponsored media with very dominant personalism messages. A performance which is mostly associated to the much needed public works infrastructure (See Tables F.1, F.2 and F.3). (Indicator 1)

Key characteristics to take into account in Formosa are the widespread particularistic (clientelistic) benefits to the large number of isolated poor, and a leadership style which is Cesar-like for the governor and caudillistic for mayors.

The focus of responsibility in campaigns is not dispersed (all eyes are set on the Governor), there is a considerable effort to carry out performance type tactics in campaigns, but the resources used and the centrality to campaigns of the personalism of the district’ leaders detracts from (but also complement) the performance messages. (Indicators 1-6)

6.12.2 Media control and personalism-performance strategy tandem

6.12.2.1 Context

The media is a major vehicle for a style of performance message and strategy which grows out of this clientelism described in Chapter 3. Candidates from the ruling party use the media to show the “good deeds” the government is doing for the people, focusing on material benefits to communities and the personal authorship (personalism) of officials. Next, is Mayor Meza as an example of the relationship of the media and politics in small towns, which often mix government, party and personal interests:

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212 Candidates from the opposition party use what media they can access to show a negative picture of the government- but without effectively giving an alternative program (see chapter 4) or, obviously, making any significant dent in the electoral outcomes.
“I have television, it is my mother’s. You put on a football program, we have a spot during halftime, and then another at the end, explaining how your projects are going to be, the same by radio…We give them a place on television [to the opposition], 5 minutes like the law dictates. We are on all day… I reach the indigenous people with television too… An expenditure that we make… National radio, all that, I provide it.” Mayor Carlos Meza (PJ).

The media is available to candidates. As shown in the above quote, some towns have a local cable channel that retransmits television and have then access to a channel for their campaign. However, television and newspapers are far from most candidates in terms of distance and resources (FM stations are instead relatively easy to set up; both incumbent and opposition parties and factions have access to these outlets in almost every town). The media is more accessible to provincial (governor and deputies) and national (deputies and senators) candidates. In fact, only provincial deputies and the two council members from the provincial capital I interviewed agreed that television and newspapers are relevant in their campaigns. Elected officials in small towns did not see the media as relevant in their voter mobilization effort and depend more on door-to-door work. This is both because they lack resources (monetary or technical) and because of the smaller magnitude of their respective electorates which allows candidates first-hand contact with voters.

The newspaper is used by all parties in campaigns. Its reach is limited to people wealthy enough to buy the paper; however; a group of office workers may buy one copy and share it, and articles may spark discussion in other forums. “To people, if it came out in the newspaper, it’s true. It is our culture-- later in the radios it can be twisted.” and may then generate controversies or “debates”, according to Deputy Juárez (PJ).

The PJ party reported to have spent more than AR$324,000 in Formosa, UCR just over AR$35,000 in the 2005 midterm elections. The 2005 campaign expenditure reports show that the far reaching PJ spent 4.3 times more money on “operational costs” (movilidad and viáticos –transportation and living expenses-, printing ballots) than
“advertisements” (TV, radio, literatures, etc), and UCR, on the other hand, spent almost 3 times more money on “advertisements” than on “operational costs” (Source: Cámara Nacional Electoral). This may be a way to rationalize expenditures according to the party’s type of electorate (UCR has more penetration among middle class voters than in other socioeconomic sectors of society) and its real chances of winning office positions (larger constituents and districts with proportional elections reduce the threshold for the UCR to achieve a post). See, for example, that UCR got its best returns in counties with the largest constituencies (TABLE B.1).

I further analyzed the campaign ads which appeared in two provincial newspapers in the last 15 campaign days prior to the October 23rd 2005 legislative election (also see Tables F.1, F.2 and F.3). The main points to make are that, first, the most circulated La Mañana daily published overwhelmingly more PJ ads than UCR’s (17 and 0 respectively); second, all ads have the pictures and the names of the candidates; third, of the 56 ads in Opinión Ciudadana (which is mostly circulated in the provincial capital) by UCR and PJ, 42 of them (or 75%) do not include the name of the party, only the candidates’. Finally, Peronist advertisements usually do not have a verbal message besides the name of the candidates and sometimes party, as opposed to the opposition party ads. However, the opposition messages are also not very elaborate and try to convey the character of the candidates rather than their ideas or positions on issues. For example, the text in an ad may be just one of the following: “The needed youth”, “Yes to renewal”, and “In the same frequency as the people”.

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213 A survey carried out by Carlos Fara in 2002 in the province of Formosa yielded that 40.1% of the interviewed voting age population (N=442) read La Mañana and 2.9% read Opinión Ciudadana (33.5% does not read newspapers, 15.1% did not answer, 6.2% read national newspapers and only 2.3% read other Formosa newspapers).

214 Candidates advertise themselves on their own merit in addition to the publicity they might receive from the provincial party authorities. This can be understood in the context of the Law of Lemas electoral system in which candidates may form their own fraction within the party. This is
6.12.2.2 Performance strategy in the media (Indicators 1-6)

Now, let us look at the content of articles during the same period. In *La Mañana* newspaper there were more articles about the PJ or PJ candidates (66%) than UCR (10%) or other parties (24%). I also identified other articles which were not explicitly about any party but were about the electoral process, or included mentions of the election, candidates, direct mention of government action, etc. Of these articles, 48% (n=33) were about public works, usually project inaugurations, by the government, or as they are also known “actos institucionales”. Furthermore, 52% of articles on public works explicitly mention Governor Gildo Insfrán in their title, as responsible for the activity or as attending the inauguration ceremony. Candidates participate in the inaugurations of the multiple public work projects throughout the province, at which the governor and the candidates appeal to the voters to keep supporting the governor’s administration/ project. The constant mention of the popular governor and regular identification of PJ candidates with the governor is evidence that the candidates incur in a “coattail” personalistic strategy, using the persona of the charismatic leader to validate themselves as candidates.

consistent with a strategy in which candidates appeal to their image and closeness to the people, not to ideals or abstract concepts from a party program.

215 Under the provincial program “Por nuestra gente, todo”—“For Our People, Everything”—, the governor traveled around the province days before the election with teams of doctors, dentists, optometrists, and lawyers, addressing people’s basic needs. This was closely reported by the newspapers. Local authorities and candidates would tag along with the governor while people were being served.

216 The remaining articles include 9 on the election process itself and 3 about various religious leaders’ opinion of the election. The rest were reader’s letters to the editor, people’s demands or complaints around the province, or other government action.

217 The analysis of the much smaller *Opinión Ciudadana* newspaper shows a somewhat different picture of the campaign. There was a more even distribution of articles about the PJ (n=21) and UCR (n=25). There were also far fewer articles mentioning the opening of public works (n=4). Let’s however repeat that this publication is mostly read by a minority in the capital city alone.
Newspapers, which could be used to publish parties’ and candidates’ positions, do not appear to be relevant in this respect. Newspapers seem, instead, to be an outlet to show the name and faces of candidates and in the case of the incumbent party to embellish the governor’s performance.

The candidates in province-wide elections, who make greater utilization of the media than occurs in local campaigns, depend on the cults of personality of the incumbent governor and general government propaganda (see chapter 5). Personalism serves as a pseudo-programmatic appeal, as Governor Gildo Insfrán embodies ideas of progress and hope among the poor. There is, however, evidence that performance as a voter mobilization strategy is present in the different tactics to remind people of who are taking care of them; be it the local mayor visiting someone’s domicile, or the media showing the public works by the Governor.

In Formosa the media campaign may be more significant for the personalism aspects than for the performance ones. In Formosa the performance tactics are tied to the governor’s media control.

6.13 Catamarca

6.13.1 Background and summary

In the province of Catamarca there is low centrality to campaigns of performance as a voter mobilization strategy. Also, there is high electoral competitiveness and low socioeconomic development, clientelism is definitively central to campaigns, programmatic strategy is probably not central to campaigns and personalism has low centrality to campaigns as voter mobilization strategies (See chapters 3, 4 and 5). In this district, performance as a voter mobilization strategy is not central to campaigns. The “performance voter mobilization strategy” is in many respects confused with particularism in Catamarca.
The opposition party is a voice of criticism of the government, and embodies “the opposition” in people’s lives (as opposed to a specific opposition leader, or union, or NGOs, as the main agents of opposition to the government). However, these parties do not organize the “social forces” well (peasants, people living in the mountains’ small and relatively isolated towns are out of the parties’ hands in terms of organization/mobilization). This shows the low penetration of the parties in society, even though they reach almost everywhere. It also shows the difficulty of controlling people whose strongest attachment may be to the Catholic Church.\textsuperscript{218}

There is a gap between the civil society and the political society. People may have more relation with the local “dirigentes” than to the parties themselves. The dirigente-type brokers, in turn are the link, and voters judge the dirigente’s role, at least for local issues and personal problems. The parties try to lure these dirigentes (see chapter 3). The dirigentes’ voice has weight when voting for a candidate. So the performance that is put to test in elections and which parties try to protect/embellish may be confused with particularism or clientelism.

We see negative media campaigns at the higher levels of office, which are consumed by a small middle class, and not really affecting the mobilization of the vote, the type of media tactics which abound in districts like Capital Federal. However, again, those are not the type of performance tactics which are significant for these parties to mobilize large numbers of voters in Catamarca.

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\textsuperscript{218} The Catholic Church is central in this society and may mobilize people, but rarely mobilize people for political reasons aimed at a specific government. People in Catamarca are mobilized from above (Political parties’ effort or the Church), but there are no significant unions to deal with; people have little or low social capital which is ameliorated by the important presence of the dirigentes type leaders of the civil society.
6.13.2 Dirigente-type brokers and performance-clientelism strategy tandem

(Indicators 1-6)

In this chapter and section I develop more of the character of dirigente-type brokers in Catamarca (which I started in Chapter 3). These people have a consequence on the performance strategies parties use, and as we have already seen, in the clientelistic and personalistic strategies as well.

There is a difference between the “dirigente” and the commonly known “puntero”. First, puntero is more applicable to an urban setting, he is more of a delegate of a party or politicians, and hence more tied or dependent from it/him. The dirigentes could be urban or rural, but they are simply “leaders of the civil society”; their function is to solve their neighbors’ problems and they may side with any party or politician who favors his objectives. Of course dirigentes may have their heart put into one party or the other. But who are these “dirigentes”, “intermediadores sociales” or social brokers? What do they do? How do they help us understand the centrality to campaigns of performance as a voter mobilization strategy? Brieftier than in Chapter 3, these are the opinions of some officials:

“… En algunos casos son profesionales, dirigentes de organizaciones de la sociedad civil, clubes de barrio… Personas comprometidas con sus respectivas comunidades….. su afiliación partidaria es secundaria a su rol de dirigente, o representante de los intereses colectivos de su comunidad” Mayor Guzmán (UCR, Capital).

“Es aquel que cuando no hay campaña es la persona al que recurre, que vive al frente, porque se le quemó un chiquito, y no tiene para comprar un remedio, … y es el que se encarga de gestionar ante los organismos oficiales que se le pueda dar el remedio. …lleva a la gente de manera directa el programa de gobierno, las actividades de gobierno. Y con posterioridad, el día de la elección son aquellos que se acercan y le dice, ‘necesito que me acompañes con tu voto’.” Concejal Millán (UCR, Capital).

“En el interior es muy distinto. El dirigente barrial no existe, existe el intermediador social; la persona que puede venir a la ciudad, y todos le dan los problemas que… y cuando vuelve, vuelve con la solución.” Provincial Deputy Brandán (Peronist in FCyS).
When a dirigente did his job well, then the candidate who helped him knows the *dirigente* is putting a good word about him. Parties and candidates are forced to deal with the “*dirigentes*”; first because people distrust politicians and *dirigentes* are trusted actors in the communities, and second because the high level of competition and frequent change of hands in the governments (at all levels) prevents local *dirigentes* from uniquely marrying one party or officials, that would anchor his future as *dirigente* to the electoral fortune of the patron. Hence, *dirigentes* have a strong commitment to their community and “shop around” for politicians with solutions, and in consequence politicians see them as the trusted key to reach the voters. Pleasing the *dirigentes* to get a good evaluation from the voters (and to mobilize the voters as well) is the strategy candidates follow. Concejal Barrionuevo said: “*Por eso tenés que tener una red de dirigentes. Esa persona te abre a vos las puertas, te hace conocer. Para mi es fundamental contar con dirigentes.*” These dirigentes are very important to any politicians because they are “*Inserto en la comunidad, tiene diálogo con los vecinos y son reconocidos como colaboradores del senador. Y si a esa persona la tengo que ver, me voy a ese paraje, lo visito. …. Justamente en Santa Rosa, he sido exitoso en estos veintipico de años porque hubo un contacto permanente con los dirigentes.*” (Senator Figueroa, PJ)

The Senator instructs his “*dirigentes*” to say NO when favors cannot be given, which will show that the Senator’s word will always be worth. However, the Senator still needs the dirigentes to do this; to communicate with the people, to bring or deny favors. His *dirigentes* do not get “burnt” for lying to people. Senator Figueroa is aware that his performance evaluation will also depend on the performance evaluation people have of his dirigentes on the ground.
Brandán argued for the importance of dirigentes to their campaigns, that they cannot be substituted by the media or street adds campaign or party clientelism (these only compliment the role of the dirigente). To Brandán the dirigentes are more responsible than the political party for the votes they get:

“Viene mas por el dirigente…hace campaña por nosotros y da soluciones a la gente. La intermediación social del dirigente es irremplazable. El gobernador no puede saber lo que le está pasando él….pero el dirigente seguramente sabe. Y si ese dirigente tiene la capacidad de hacer llegar esa necesidad a los oídos del gobernador, y a partir de eso la solución va a la gente, termina siendo el dirigente el que da la solución.”

Interestingly, the elements of a campaign he mentions, which cannot substitute a dirigente, are the media, street ads and the “dádiva” or machine clientelism. He refers to dirigentes as “they” who do campaign for “us” indicating that Brandán sees that the candidates and parties are not the same as dirigentes; that dirigentes are autonomous and closely linked to society but often outside of the party structure. Finally, Brandán acknowledges that “it is the dirigente who brings the solution” to people’s problems. Again, the performance tied to clientelism of dirigentes and the good word they can put on about candidates seems important to campaigns in the eyes of these officials.

The dirigentes owe their position to the fact that they lead and bring solutions to their people. Again, they would look for answers from any source and hence are never tied to one or other politicians, making the dirigente a more autonomous agent than the typical party puntero. However, many dirigentes hold their jobs in, for example, city governments and consequently are more biased towards one leader (patron). Other dirigentes can be “bought” with jobs or money, expecting to bring along “their voters”. However, people evaluate the dirigentes on their accomplishments and hence the overwhelming majority of dirigentes do not have people captive either.

Brandán: “El dirigente lo que necesita es solucionar los problemas de la gente…Y sino lo consigue por acá, lo consigue por acá…sino no existiría el
Mayor Guzmán (UCR, Catamarca) also said “Generalmente adhieren a la persona que le da respuesta”. Councilman Millán (UCR, Catamarca) supports that position: “Lamentablemente muchas veces sucede [que los punteros se cambien de político porque les da más recursos]. Cuando te hablo de agrupaciones justicialista, te hablo de eso, punteros PJ que al no haber tenido respuesta se cambian al Frente Cívico….para dar respuesta a su gente.” Salcedo and Millán belong to the same Frente Cívico (UCR), but where she sees dirigentes being bought, he sees them as dirigentes looking for answers to people’s problems.

**Dirigentes** are so important to campaigns that officials often realize and fear dependence on them. Figueroa refers to how he deals with his dirigentes. “Yo en Santa Rosa, he sido exitoso en estos veintipico de años porque hubo un contacto permanente con los dirigentes.” Next, Councilman Millán further explained:

“Yo soy muy adepto de hablar en forma directa con el vecino, sin desatender al puntero, pero no me gusta ni yo ser dependiente de un puntero político, pero que la gente tampoco sea…porque se transforman en esclavos de hecho. Y si está de mal humor el dirigente político quizá se le ocurre no darle algo a esa persona porque no le gustó la cara ese día, o porque se peleó y no es así. Si él representa o lleva beneficios que pueda dar el gobierno, se lo tiene que dar a todos.”

The councilman of the incumbent party sounds acquiescent and weak to the fact that dirigentes have so much power, as if the state can only reach society through the dirigentes. Dirigentes and punteros seem to be very important to the daily running of government and to campaigns. The performance of those dirigentes also affects the votes the candidates/patrons get. In a smaller town, the personalized relationship of the mayor with the voters mitigates this “dependence” on the dirigentes’ work.

“Todo depende de vos. Si vos venís y me decís, Juan Pérez necesita cemento….si yo te doy a vos cemento y que le lleves, la gente va….pero si yo le digo, ‘venga, que hable con migo’ y yo doy la orden…Yo doy la orden…Entonces la gente sabe que el que corta el queso es el intendente.” (Javier Morra, PJ, Mayor of La Puerta)
He is from a small town and could arguably have more control over what goes on in town. Still, given the competition in elections and the autonomy of dirigentes, this mayor is aware not to cede shares of power or representation to some dirigentes. He wants to assert his authority to his people. Yet, this quote also shows that it is a reality the fact that dirigentes have some autonomous power to demand from the officials.

**6.13.3 Catamarca’s conclusions**

The result of electoral competitiveness among parties in Catamarca (and the “dependence” of politicians on dirigentes-type brokers to mobilize the vote), is that it prevents the emergence of strong personalistic leaderships and force the cooperation, the “team work” on the part of politicians and candidates; the work cannot be done on their own. People evaluate the incumbent’s performance through the local dirigentes on what could be seen as particularistic feats. Political parties use the prestige/ influence of dirigentes to mobilize voters. The parties as such are mediated by local (often non-partisan) dirigentes and by corporatists perceptions about parties in a society which, on the one hand favors the general ideas of party principles and stands on issues above what particular party leaders might embrace (which may strengthen the parties as ideologically coherent institutions), but at the same time the centrality of dirigente-type brokers consolidates a divide between the lay voters and the partisan actors.

**6.14 Conclusion**

This chapter provided a qualitative approach and a technique for assessing the centrality to campaigns of performance as a voter mobilization strategy in Argentine provinces based on in-depth interviews to elected officials and comprehensive analyses of districts as cases.
Performance as a voter mobilization strategy refers to the parties’ efforts to win votes by appealing to people’s expectation about the incumbent government’s performance. The performance which is campaigning on, and which is important to people (given the size of towns), seems to be that which communicates or links the elected officials and the voters, which often does not seem to be public policy or ideology as it is confounded with clientelism and personalism. Hence, the content of the performance strategy varies in each district because they adapt to the type of linkage between parties and voters. For this reason alone it makes sense to study the centrality to campaigns of performance as a strategy taking the case study in a configurationally manner, taking into account the contexts.

The resources available, the message transmitted and the actual action taken in tactics are the measurable elements of strategies which were observed in this chapter. The cases showed diverse tactics where performance was part of the message. Yet, we were able to measure and compare the degrees of centrality to campaigns of performance as a strategy, precisely because cases were viewed as configurations.

Performance as a voter mobilization strategy showed different degrees of centrality to the campaigns in the five studied districts. Santa Cruz proved to be a case where performance is central to campaigns as a voter mobilization strategy: the dominant PJ party basically campaigns on public works done. In Santa Cruz the centrality to campaigns of performance as a strategy is the highest in the sample, followed by Formosa, Mendoza, Capital Federal and Catamarca. Catamarca, in turn, proved to be the case where performance as a strategy is not central to parties’ effort.

Next is the conclusion chapter where I recapitulate the argument and evidence of this dissertation. I also advance conclusions about campaign strategy types.
CHAPTER 7
CONCLUSION

This dissertation has focused on two main important questions to political science and the students of political parties in democracies. How do political parties campaign for votes? How can we conceptualize and measure the way parties strive to mobilize voters? This dissertation also utilized a mixed-methods approach and stresses the significance of configurational thinking in comparative studies (not just on single case studies) research and theory building because it produces meaningful conclusions.

I argued that in order to avoid partial and biased conclusions when drawing conclusions about campaign strategies we should view electoral campaigns as an integrated phenomenon in each district which involves from party activists at the local level and local level party leaders, to the top most recognizable district party leaders campaigning concurrently every time there are elections, and we should keep in mind that wholeness of campaigns in the lives of parties (which are periodic events which usually lasts a month and finishes the day of the election). I also argued that there are four categorically distinctive types of messages political parties resort to in order to appeal voters. The appeals to voters can be classified as programmatic, personalistic, clientelistic and/or performance oriented.

A strategy should be understood as a series of activities or tactics aimed at achieving a common goal. A strategy implies a conscious effort to achieve a goal. The conscious effort is to win votes with a set of tactics; social science can interpret those actions and decision making as types of strategies. The strategy to win votes could be
preconceived by the actors or developed as part of a “learning process”. There could however be spontaneous campaign activities (tactics) by actors which fit in one strategy more closely than another. Lastly, the strategy may not be centrally coordinated by the national party, or even by the provincial party authorities, but even if only coordinated by a city mayor this concept still applies. As social observers we can classify strategies as programmatic, clientelistic, performance or personalistic.

The tradeoffs we find among campaign strategies are only about the resources which are used in tactics; more or less resources can be used in one type of message tactics or another (eventually we see strategies). However, politicians and campaign strategies do not see a contradiction in relying in one or multiple strategy types to win votes. Hence, all strategy types could eventually have equal relevance or the same centrality to campaigns in a district. In the end, any idea of tradeoffs among strategies could only be given by the social scientist at a theoretical level; politicians, instead, only find constraints in the real world of finite resources. In this study, besides the matter of finite resources, I did not preconceive tradeoffs among campaign strategies, meaning that theoretically a candidate may be able to for example, similarly rely on a clientelistic strategy and a programmatic strategy to mobilize voters in a campaign. There are no “logical” contradictions among/ about using different strategy types.219

Tactics are real and objectively measurable (its resources, message and actions), however, strategies are interpretations and conceptualizations of the former done by the strategists or in this case the social scientists.

The main contributions of this dissertation are 1) the theoretical distinction and complementation among the four strategy types, 2) the method to inquire about the

219 I say in chapter 2 that I disagree with Randal (1988: 177) who calls combining linkages a “schizophrenic blend;” combination of linkages, and in my case, combination of campaign messages happen every time in real life. In fact, having just one type of message never occurs in real life; most campaign tactics combine messages of program, performance and personalism.
centrality which each of the voter mobilization strategy types has in districts’ electoral campaigns and, 3) the empirical findings which give light to the case of Argentina by showing the diversity within the country.

One important clarification I made throughout the dissertation is that I study the political parties and political entrepreneurs (which include candidates, political activists, brokers and patrons, all with agency to affect the development of the campaigns). This was not a study of voter behavior, but of political parties’ behavior. I studied the processes (the campaign strategies) and not the outcome (the votes). Rather than only focusing on the voters in order to understand their democracy, I believe we need to also study the institutions and parties that lead to the outcomes in question.

The comparative method based on in-depth study of cases and qualitative data allowed the comprehensive view of campaign strategies’ processes. The substantive knowledge that this approach provides is a solid bridge to conclusions about political parties, which is often missing when only quantitative data and indirect measurements are used. The in-depth study of cases also allowed for a justification of the importance of the local political party apparatus to mobilize voters in campaigns which complements, but in many aspects transcends, the mass media campaign which is often the only source of data to many studies about campaigns.

Argentina was the selected country to study given its federal political organization, and diversity in terms of socioeconomic development and electoral competitiveness among its provinces (I better justify the case choice in chapter 2). Argentina proved to be a fruitful country given the diversity of outcomes.

As argued in the introduction, in principle there are four types of exchanges between the party and its voters. In exchange for a vote, the party may offer the candidate’s personality and style (personalistic strategy); a program (programmatic
strategy); an evaluation of the executive incumbent’s performance in office (performance strategy); and particularistic benefits (clientelistic strategy).

Throughout the dissertation I argued that the socioeconomic development and electoral competitiveness of the districts (provinces) are important factors to explain the degrees of centrality to campaigns of each of the four voter mobilization strategies (dependent variable). In the configurational analyses of cases all the causal factors are seen in interaction with one another in a context. And in this sense, both factors (socioeconomic development and electoral competitiveness of the district) have distinctive “effects” in all four strategy types, they are important in all cases. The factors should not be considered in isolation. Furthermore, an important contribution of the study is the particular focus on the intraparty mechanisms and processes that ultimately affect the dependent variable.

In this conclusion chapter I summarize the methodological approach to the issue and the argument to understand the centrality to campaigns of each of the four voter mobilization strategy types. I also present the conclusions about the empirical evidence regarding the five cases on each of these strategy types. I then use the four campaign strategies to make campaign types. Finally, I summarize the theoretical and methodological breakthroughs.

7.1 Cases as configurations and fuzzy-sets

In a sense the first step in the dissertation could be classified as a “Nested analysis” given that I focused on a small-n analysis of a larger data set of Argentine provinces (or larger if we consider the universe of provincial or state polities in federal countries). I derived hypotheses and expectations from a theory based on assumptions and the existing literature, and I selected the cases on the independent variables, leading to a model testing research. However, my main data source, the semistructured
interviews, allowed for not only the testing of the model but the further specification and correction of it.

In chapter 1 I argued for studying cases as configurations which produce a different type of conclusions compared to the conclusions produced by “variable-oriented” research. Charles Ragin (2000) argues that “despite the many interdependencies and complementarities of case-oriented and variable-oriented research…there are very good reason to expect disjunctures in the knowledge they produce” (p. 30).

The construction of the representation of social phenomena differs for how outcomes are viewed in these two types of research. In correlational studies the researcher identifies a “dependent variable” which must vary across cases, in order to explain why it varies, and it is assessed relative to the average of all cases (central tendency measures); in comparative case studies the outcome often does not vary substantially. The focus is on cases with specific outcomes (e.g. revolutions), and this type of research is concerned with the question how. Finally, the way both types of approaches view causation also differs; in the conventional variable-oriented studies causes are inferred from a pattern of covariation, trying to find out which variable explains the most variation in the outcome variable. Here the independent variables compete with each other to explain variation. Also, the context of a score on a variable is not usually taken into account. In comparative case studies causation is viewed as a combination of conditions. The same causal conditions may even yield different outcomes, and the researcher must, with in depth knowledge, elucidate how sets of conditions yield certain outcomes. “To view each case as a configuration, it is necessary to examine relevant aspects of a case all at once, as an interpretable combination of elements.” (Ragin 2000: 66)
The main goal of the approach is to uncover meaning and causal relations in the adoption of campaign strategies, not simple correlations. For example, as mentioned in chapter 1, the relationship between income and democracy has been well established, however, a ten thousand dollar per capita difference between two countries in the top end of the spectrum of cases (say 35,000 and 25,000 dollars per capital) tell us a different story about, for example, “the quality of democracy”, than the difference between the same amount of money in the bottom end (say 500 and 10,500 dollars). The proper evaluation of the effect of income on democracy should be substantively informed (not be just a mere correlation). For this reason, the full membership or partial membership to a set of “high quality democracies” or “low quality democracies” (whatever these categories may mean) should be qualitatively anchored. We may find out that “high quality democracies” have an income per capita above 15,000 dollars and that “low quality democracies” have an income per capita between 500 and 2,000 dollars. Each breakpoint in the fuzzy-set should have an explicit rationale.

As the example above shows, one important advantage of fuzzy-sets is that it ignores irrelevant variation for theoretical formulations in the sets. The difference between two highly developed countries, one with an income per capita of 35,000 and another with 30,000 is theoretically irrelevant for the study of the quality of democracy, compared to the difference between a country with 500 and another with 5,500 dollars per capita. With fuzzy-set theories, the concepts should apply with full force to those cases in a given set--hence, the importance of determining the theoretically relevant qualitative breakpoints of the different set-values.

The logic of studying cases as configurations lies in the idea of viewing the combination of the relevant variables as potentially different types of cases (See Ragin

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220 Fuzzy-sets and indicators and fuzzy-set breakpoints are explained on chapter 1 beginning on page 22.
In other words, for example, the study of the centrality to campaigns of performance as a voter mobilization strategy does not involve two relevant variables (the districts’ characteristics of socioeconomic development and electoral competitiveness of the electorate), but four configurations conceived as types of cases.

As was also argued in chapter 1, the idea behind fuzzy sets is that there could be partial or “fuzzy” membership to a set. A score of 1 indicates full membership to the set, a score of 0 indicates full non-membership to the set. Cases with a score of .5 are not fully out and not fully in. Each breakpoint in the values of the fuzzy sets should have an explicit rationale. Fuzzy set techniques emphasize degree of membership in theoretically defined sets, and not levels relative to a sample data (Ragin 2000: 270).

In order to determine the type of fuzzy-set I considered the definition of the set (i.e. for example “the centrality to campaigns of personalism as a voter mobilization strategy”) and the type of data available since “it would be pointless to create fine-grained distinctions that are theoretically irrelevant” (Ragin 2000: 167). Hypothetically there could be continuous fuzzy-sets and not just two or three values. What makes fuzzy-sets so special is that the values of the membership are qualitatively anchored. This method is useful when one has different sources of data, different types of data, or data which is qualitative in nature. However, the main goal of the approach was to uncover meaning and causal relations in the adoption of campaign strategies, not simple correlations.

The qualitative analysis of cases allowed us to acknowledge and consider the significance of multiple relevant factors when trying to understand phenomena, beyond the major independent variables of socioeconomic characteristics and electoral competitiveness of the districts. There may be obvious independent variables, antecedent variables, intervening variables and a host of other variable denominations to identify the multitude of factors which constitute the complexity of the reality we are
trying to explain. The substantive chapters inquired into important causal factors to predict the centrality of strategy types but which also provide insightful knowledge about political parties in districts.

The qualitative research undertaken in this dissertation allowed me to dig deeper and find other intervening and more proximate factors that are also relevant to more precisely and fully understand the mechanisms which explain the HOW and not only the WHY of clientelism/ programmatic/ personalism/ performance strategy.

I provided observable (and with different degrees of difficulty measurable) factors and indicators, which allow us to improve the available comparative tools used in the study of clientelism, personalism, programmatic and performance as a strategy type.

This study used Fuzzy-sets to qualitatively distinguish cases because the centrality to campaigns of clientelism as a voter mobilization strategy, as well as the other strategy types, in some cases does not vary in degrees of intensity but in kind (Fuzzy-set method is explained in Chapter 1 –page 22). The types of relationship present in clientelism (e.g. between brokers and clients) vary qualitatively among districts. Hence, the score on a specific attribute or indicator could be the same in cases where clientelism has an overall different centrality to campaigns as a voter mobilization strategy.

Parties devote resources to an organization infrastructure, which will be useful to better perform in implementing different strategic types. In this manner, I viewed the concept of “the centrality to campaigns of clientelistic voter mobilization strategy” as a set, and not as variables, by looking at the resources, activities and contents of the tactics parties implement in campaigns. Because I talk about “set-relations” of causes that combine, it does not make sense to try to isolate the effects of each supposed cause. It only makes sense to understand cases as configurations (Ragin 2000: 39).
We should not then be deceived by the appealing range of score averages that the dependent variable attributes’ tables in each of the substantive chapters present, and the possibilities that could present for quantitative type of analyses among cases, because again, the attributes of the concept measured here are not weighed (or a default equal weight is assumed), and are only an instrument for the appropriate placing in the five-value Fuzzy-set. For example, the clientelism attributes’ average score of 0 for the case of Capital Federal does not mean that there is no clientelism in the district. It should mean, however, that we ought to place the district with a value of 0 in the fuzzy-set where clientelism is definitively not central to campaigns as a voter mobilization strategy. The case expert should also consider whether the case adheres to the fuzzy-set breakpoint rationale. Hence, cases within the same fuzzy-set value but having similar (but not equal) attributes’ score averages could not realistically be ranked, and should instead be considered cases of the same type. On the same token, it would be a mistake to equate two cases which are similar on many ways but differ on one key aspect; that difference may be one of kind, and not simply of degree. (Ragin 2000, p71)

7.2 Theoretically defined sets and degrees of membership to sets

Theoretically defined sets do not depend on the relative cases (on circumstantial data) and are instead the solid benchmark to determine how the actual and real cases approximate to the realization of concepts which interest us; for example “democracy” or, “the centrality to campaigns of clientelism as a voter mobilization strategy”. If we do not define what democracy is we will never know for certain what we are talking about and how far we are from it. In this study, I presented the characterization of what a district where “personalism is central to campaigns” and that of a district where “personalism is not central to campaigns” as definitions of what those cases would look
like. I also defined intermediate values in the four sets I studied here (centrality to campaigns of clientelism, programmatic, personalistic and performance).

The fact that I make sets with five degrees of membership to those sets is due to the data which was available to me (in principle there could be infinite degrees of membership). However, since we should study cases as configurations (we should look at how causes combine and interact in a context), it would be a mistake to rank one case above another simply because, for example, one of the indicators of the dependent variable pushed the average score of Table 3.5 higher. Higher or lower average scores among cases could be the product of the differentiation with which I made the indicators (e.g. one indicators with three possible values and another indicator with four).

The dependent variable average scores and the fuzzy-set breakpoints are of course, and should be, close or proximate in value. In the fuzzy-set approach there is interaction between theory and data. However, if we are to give substance to the concepts we create and solid grounding to the conclusions we arrive at, then we should do exactly that and rank cases for the degrees of membership they have in a theoretically defined set, and we should not rank a case because of the relative data of third cases (that would not be studying cases as configurations). For example, if we define the set of “high development democracies,” then a country with GDP per capita of $35,000 would not be a more highly developed democracy than a country with a GDP per capita of just $30,000; both countries would be “high development democracies” and hence the difference is GDP per capital is theoretically irrelevant and we should not rank one above the other in the set.

I measured whether and to what degrees provinces belong to the set of provinces where “x” voter mobilization strategy is central to campaigns, not whether in province A the strategy type is more central to campaigns than in province B; this latter ranking is a consequence of the first one.
Next, and before I develop the findings in each of the strategy types, Table 7.1 summarizes the cases’ characteristics on the relevant causal factors and the cases’ scores on the four strategy types using the assigned verbal labels which are developed next (later in the chapter I use the numerical set membership scores).

### TABLE 7.1:
CASES’ SCORES ON VOTER MOBILIZATION STRATEGY TYPES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Causal Factors:</th>
<th>Electoral Competitiveness</th>
<th>Socioeconomic Development</th>
<th>Distribution of power within parties (chapter 4)</th>
<th>Nomination compromises (chapter 5)</th>
<th>Evidence / Province:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>HIGH</td>
<td>LOW</td>
<td>(HIGH) Dispersed</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>CATAMARCA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>LOW</td>
<td>LOW</td>
<td>(LOW) Concentrated</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>FORMOSA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>HIGH</td>
<td>(LOW) Concentrated</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>CAPITAL FED.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>HIGH</td>
<td>(HIGH) Dispersed</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>MENDOZA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>HIGH</td>
<td>(LOW) Concentrated</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>SANTA CRUZ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>CHAPTER 3:</strong></td>
<td>DEFINITELY CENTRAL</td>
<td>PROBABLY CENTRAL</td>
<td>DEFINITELY NOT CENTRAL</td>
<td>PROBABLY NOT CENTRAL</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Centrality to campaigns of CLIENTELISM strategy</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>PROBABLY NOT CENTRAL</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>CHAPTER 4:</strong></td>
<td>PROBABLY NOT CENTRAL</td>
<td>PROBABLY NOT CENTRAL</td>
<td>PROBABLY CENTRAL</td>
<td>PROBABLY CENTRAL</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Centrality to campaigns of PROGRAMMATIC strategy</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>MAY OR MAY NOT BE CENTRAL</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>CHAPTER 5:</strong></td>
<td>LOW</td>
<td>HIGH</td>
<td>HIGH</td>
<td>LOW</td>
<td>MEDIUM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Centrality to campaigns of PERSONALISM strategy</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>CHAPTER 6:</strong></td>
<td>NOT CENTRAL</td>
<td>MAY OR MAY NOT BE CENTRAL</td>
<td>MAY OR MAY NOT BE CENTRAL</td>
<td>MAY OR MAY NOT BE CENTRAL</td>
<td>CENTRAL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Centrality to campaigns of Performance as a voter mobilization strategy</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The more developed theoretical arguments, hypotheses, indicators, measurements of the independent factors and dependent variables, and fuzzy-set breakpoints are all in the respective chapters. Here is a summary of the more empirical findings and theoretical innovations.

7.3 The centrality to campaigns of clientelism as a voter mobilization strategy (chapter 3)

The specialized literature tells us that poverty is a strong predictor of the existence of clientelistic relationships (See Ch. 1 p 6 and Ch. 2 p 12, for example see Magaloni et al 2007) between a patron (usually a politician) and a client (usually a voter). In this exchange, the patron gives the client particularistic benefits (e.g. money, food, favors, house appliances, etc.) in exchange for electoral support. This exchange is usually enabled by a broker or a person who may give the patron information about the district’s constituents, organizes clients and grants the patron access to those constituents, and at the same time delivers the particularistic benefits to the clients who in turn are expected to support the patron.

When studying clientelism we interpret a message in certain types of relationships, for example, between a broker and a client. Hence, in order to operationalize the concept of the centrality to campaigns of clientelism as a voter mobilization strategy I also evaluated the relationships within it. It is by evaluating the characteristics of the multiple interactions in clientelism that we could be able to judge its centrality to campaigns as a strategy to mobilize voters in campaigns.

In order to operationalize the concept, in chapter 3 I identified and evaluated attributes such as the predominant type of patron/candidate-broker relationships, patron/candidate-client/voter relationships and the broker-client/voter relationships, with respect to the autonomy of the broker from the patron/candidate, the coordination
among the different levels of the electoral machine (e.g. local, provincial levels of the party). This, of course, closely relates to the resources available and coordination of the different actors, for example: is there a clients’ monitoring system in place, or, can the patron/politician reach voters with clientelistic benefits without the aid of local brokers?

### 7.3.1 Types of clientelism relationships

In this dissertation I differentiated and utilized three distinct types of clientelism relationships. The three distinctions within clientelism as a voter mobilization strategy are:

- **Machine clientelism**: In machine clientelism there is a direct and immediate or nearly immediate exchange of particularistic benefits to prospective voters for support, usually votes. Most clientelistic relationships have some sort of compliance, control or enforcement mechanism.

- **Personalized clientelism**: The particularistic benefits are not necessarily given to clients during the electoral campaign period but when needed and asked for during the rest of the time. In personalized clientelism voters may comply with their part in the clientelistic bargain (the vote) more because there is daily contact or familiarity with the broker and/or patron, and hence there is usually also a bond of loyalty and respect among the actors as opposed to the case of more anonymous machine clientelism; clients’ compliance is also characterized less by enforcement mechanisms of the patron than in the case of machine clientelism.

- **Patronage**: In the context of a strategy to mobilize voters to the polls, patronage is a type of clientelistic practice in which votes are given to an incumbent (or perspective candidate) in exchange for public employment or wage increases.\(^{221}\) The control

\(^{221}\) Patronage may also involve elected officials granting contracts to companies in exchange for money or support but not directly votes in elections. This interpretation of patronage is valid as
exercised by the patron/broker in the patronage relationship is greater than that in machine clientelism because the permanence of the patron in power may be a condition for keeping one’s job (Lemarchand 1981).

7.3.2 Concluding remarks about clientelism and the centrality to campaign of clientelism

The implicit contract between the patron and voters in personalized clientelism is long term and has to do with personal trust and loyalty in exchange for the continuous help with benefits (e.g. Formosa). In machine clientelism, carried in the last few days of the campaigns, the value of loyalty is drastically reduced and so is the “feeling of debt” the client has towards the patron; hence, there has to be an enforcement mechanism to replace it (e.g. Catamarca). Effective regular electoral competition may not only call into question the efficiency of the patron as such, but also prevent those feelings of dependence from ever settling in place. In a district where personalized clientelism is possible, reliance (and dependence) on the patron is precisely what sustains his legitimacy and power. In districts where machine clientelism is relevant as a campaign strategy, candidates incur into machine clientelistic tactics because they are “forced to” by the environment in order to win elections; the other party is going to get their votes if they do not do it first, or better.

One key difference between these two types of clientelism is that for personalized clientelism to work it cannot just be a promise from the patron to the client; there has to be a history of fulfillment of promises between the leader and the voters.

To close, then, machine clientelism is favored by competition (the pressure or challenge made by contesting parties to one another), and is allowed by socioeconomic a money collecting mechanism but I do not take it into account because it is not directly a voter mobilization mechanism which is the focus of this dissertation.
conditions of the electorate. Personalized clientelism is a traditional (conservative) practice and is favored and allowed by both the lack of competition and the poor socioeconomic conditions. In conclusion, the socioeconomic development of the constituents is more relevant than the level of electoral competitiveness to determine whether clientelism will be central to campaigns in a district as a voter mobilization strategy.

7.3.3 The key role of brokers

In chapter 3 I also differentiated among key actors in the clientelistic relationship, the brokers. I proposed ways of doing so by analyzing the autonomy of brokers from patrons, by observing the single or multiple sources of benefits they have, studying the type of relationship of brokers with their clients and whether the broker is acting more as an advocate of the voters or a delegate of the patron, among other differentiation criteria.

One contribution of chapter 3 was the focus on three crucial types of relationships in clientelism. The broker-client, the patron-broker, and the patron-client relationships are important factors to understand the centrality to campaigns of clientelism. In this respect we must consider, for example, the autonomy of brokers from patrons, the closeness or personalization of patrons to voters and the type of insertion that the broker has in a community where the clients live.

7.4 The centrality to campaigns of a programmatic voter mobilization strategy (chapter 4)

I argued that the electoral competitiveness of the district and the socioeconomic development of the electorate affect the centrality that programmatic voter mobilization strategies have in the campaigns in a given district. However, my contribution in chapter 4 is that I argue that a third important factor, which has been overlooked in the literature,
better explains the centrality that a programmatic strategy will have in campaigns: the distribution of power within the political parties.

An electorate that is more socioeconomically developed is more attracted by programmatic campaign appeals than poorer electorates. Also, districts with stronger opposition parties bring to bear pressure among one another to differentiate themselves by resorting to sharper incentives with which to appeal to the voters (e.g. more clearly defined policies, stronger personality leaders, more clientelistic gifts, etc.). More competition does not necessarily mean more centrality of program as a strategy, but does mean the party has a more conscious allocation of limited party resources, which in some cases means more centrality of clientelism or personalism, for example. Finally, political parties in which power is dispersed among actors and institutions (i.e. power is not concentrated) are more likely to have the building blocks to make a programmatic strategy central to campaigns.

7.4.1 Dispersion of power within parties and compromise

Given an electorally competitive district, dispersed power distribution in political parties means the eventual need to come together of the actors within the parties and compromise in order to pursue collective action effectively. The dispersion of political party power gets reflected in more resources put into conflict resolution mechanisms (e.g. candidate nomination and platform drafting mechanisms which are more collegiate and democratic than when power is concentrated in one or a few hands) and on checks on the power of party leaders. The consequence is that a “programmatic strategy” is more likely to be central to campaigns when the distribution of power within political parties is dispersed, than when it is concentrated.

There is an apparent ranking of relevance among these three causal factors to predict the centrality to campaigns that a programmatic strategy will have.
Socioeconomic development may be the single most important one because candidates must appeal to the voters, even with few party resources (intellectual, infrastructure, organizational, etc.) and even with single-policy messages; more “developed” voters are more attracted to public policy than poorer voters. Next is the factor of the concentration or dispersion of power within the parties, because this factor reflects the capabilities and resources that the parties have to produce and project programmatic ideas in campaigns. Finally, electoral competitiveness acts as the incentive parties have to act on the public demands and on the resources they have by pushing parties to campaign on a programmatic strategy.

7.5 The mechanisms and centrality to campaigns of personalism as a voter mobilization strategy (chapter 5)

Besides the district’s electoral competitiveness and the socioeconomic characteristics of the electorate, one other factor seems particularly relevant when identifying the centrality to campaigns of personalism as a voter mobilization strategy in a district. It is important to know the compromises in which the relevant parties incurred when nominating candidates.

Higher socioeconomic development makes it more costly and difficult for personalism to be central to campaigns as a voter mobilization strategy. Richer voters are more likely than poorer voters to request government to improve their lives in non-material ways, to pursue more comprehensive public policy demands and have the resources to do it, presumably making personalistic appeals not as central in political parties’ voter mobilization strategies. However, I argued that although richer voters make it more costly to parties to make personalism central to campaigns, personalism will still be central if there are no candidate nomination compromises in a district where there is high electoral competitiveness.
Electoral competitiveness leads parties to intensify and diversify campaign tactics and messages, and does not have a linear effect on the centrality to campaigns of personalism. When the district is generally poor, lower competitiveness increases the centrality of personalism to campaigns (candidates consolidate a “father-like” style personalism). Competition among parties would in principle diminish the role, effectiveness and centrality to campaigns of the father-like (paternalistic style) personalism in campaigns.

On the other hand, when the district is generally rich and personalism is less likely to be central to campaigns to begin with, higher competitiveness increases the centrality of personalism because increased electoral competition forces parties to diversify the types of messages to mobilize voters, hence increasing the likelihood that personalism’s importance would also become more central to campaigns (candidates differentiate on “expert-like” style personalism messages). Therefore, I argued that the fact that electoral competitiveness leads parties to intensify and diversify campaign tactics and messages is not enough to predict whether personalism is central to campaigns. Only the interaction of the three factors can make the causal argument intelligible.

Finally, as rational actors, those who compromise or not for candidate nominations make strategic decisions taking into account the resources available and the constraints on power to communicate campaign messages. More compromises involved and required in the candidate nomination procedures of the relevant parties lead to less centrality to campaigns of personalism as a voter mobilization strategy in the district.
7.5.1 A note on candidate nomination compromises

A compromise means a negotiation among actors with agency. (An imposition of will does not require compromise.). The tradeoff to the actors in the negotiation which leads to the compromise also means that the actors have a share of power. A compromise binds the parts and pushes them to cooperate and build on common ground. The compromises incurred over candidate nominations are the consequence of a balance of power within the political parties. The agents of power that participate in candidate nominations could be party leaders and candidates, as well as committed party militants or power brokers who control valuable resources (as in the case of leaders with assets such as ground level broker’s networks, mass media connections or importance sources of finance). The more compromises that are necessary to nominate candidates, the less central to campaigns personalism is as a strategy.

In the end, the candidate nomination compromises of parties reflect the realm of resources and capabilities available to the parties (ground infrastructure, media and technical resources, and policy and ideological resources to campaign). The socioeconomic characteristics of the district tell us about what are likely the type of messages parties give voters in campaigns (e.g. more or less material satisfactions, See Inglehart 1984), given the resources and capabilities available to the parties in the district. Finally, electoral competitiveness in the district reflects the degree of pressure on the campaigning political parties, independent from the demands stemming from civil society, and from the resources and capabilities the party has to address those demands and electoral competition.

Personalistic strategy or a conceived effort to win votes by appealing to a leader or candidate’s personal attributes may be central to campaigns in any electoral environment. Electorally competitive districts or those dominated by one party, districts
with wealthy electorates or poor ones are all susceptible to allowing personalism to be central to their campaigns. The specific characteristics of personalism as a strategy in a district hence vary according to these factors which I explored in chapter 5.

7.6 The centrality to campaigns of performance as a voter mobilization strategy (chapter 6)

Performance as a voter mobilization strategy entails a party’s assessment of the expectations people had about their leaders. Political parties appeal voters with an interpretation of the government’s performance in ways which are meaningful to voters. The literature (and here I do too) delimits these to public policy expectations when appealing to the retrospective voter (these are policy outcomes).

I argued that, besides the socioeconomic development and electoral competitiveness of the district, the centrality to campaigns of performance as a voter mobilization strategy is also tied to the remaining three strategy types because of the dichotomy of change versus keeping the same party/officials in power implied in programmatic, clientelistic and personalistic appeals. Also, effective programmatic, clientelistic and personalistic appeals or promises to voters require a degree of trust from the voters which usually must result from a history behind those parties who make the promises (which is often related to ideological and past public policy outcomes). Political parties in campaigns do not do programmatic, personalistic and clientelistic tactics without having made prior, at least implicit, evaluations of the state of affairs in the district. Finally, there is obviously a resource trade off among the tactics used.

Furthermore, In order to comprehensively evaluate the campaigns in a district such as a province we must acknowledge that the function of most of the elected officials who may be integral parts of the parties’ electoral campaign machines have little to do with the national economy.
I also point to the general difficulties to study performance based campaigns in small districts and districts with personalized candidate-voter contact. However, the principle for defining what a performance campaign appeal is must be guided by the function of the elected offices which are relevant in the district’s campaign. It is then important not only to understand what the policy which is the focus of the credit claiming in campaign is, but why and particularly how the appeals are made. The threshold is that programmatic and performance appeals must involve “the provision of what from the perspective of recipients are public goods…” (Brusco et al 2002: 5 fn)

Finally, in chapter 6 I also built six qualitative indicators to assess the centrality to campaigns of performance as a voter mobilization strategy in a given district.

7.7 Campaign types

The fuzzy-set approach allowed me to improve the view of cases as configurations. This approach also allows the combination of qualitative attributes for the constitutions of populations and types. Having two “crisply defined sets” would yield four types or property-space locations (e.g. a case scoring “High” in “Clientelism as a voter mobilization strategy” and “Low” in “Personalism as a voter mobilization strategy”). Now, with fuzzy-set we are able to determine the degree of membership of the case in said property space (as in the cases of chapters 3, 4 and 6).

The property space locations correspond to the combination of full membership (membership score = 1) and full nonmembership (membership score = 0) in the four voter mobilization strategy fuzzy-sets of the property space. In other words in this study there would be 16 property spaces locations or types. Many of these hypothetical locations of the property space may not have real world examples.

Crisp sets only allow membership (value of 1) and non-membership to the set (value of 0), and cases have membership scores of two values (1 or 0). Fuzzy-sets allow
membership scores in the interval of 1 and 0. As argued in chapter 1 a score of 1 in the set of cases where “clientelism is central to campaigns as a voter mobilization strategy” indicates full membership to that set; scores of .9 or .8 indicate strong but partial membership. Scores below 0.5 are more out of the set than in the set of cases where clientelism is central to campaigns; a score of 0 indicates full non-membership to the set. “Unlike variables, fuzzy sets are strongly coupled to theoretical concepts.” (Ragin 2000: 171)

Negation:
Fuzzy-sets can be negated just like crisp sets when cases have a Boolean score of 1 or a score of 0. For example, a case with a Boolean score of 1 in the set of “males” has a score of 0 in the set of “not males”. For the case of fuzzy sets, for example, a district with a score of .75 in the set of cases where clientelism is central to campaigns also has a score of .25 in the set of cases where clientelism is NOT central to campaigns.222

Logical and:
When two or more sets (four sets in this dissertation) intersect are joined together by “logical and.” For example, two sets of cases of “women and Irish fans” can be identified in a cell in a two-by-two table. With fuzzy sets the logical and is identified by taking the minimum membership score of each case in the sets that are intersected. (See Ragin 2000: 173)

Table 7.2 shows the cases' membership scores in the four sets of campaign strategy types. Table 7.3 shows the cases' membership scores in the sixteen possible combinations of strategy types, or the sixteen campaign types. I use fuzzy sets to derive memberships in crisply defined property-space locations.

222 Case fuzzy membership score in set not A = 1 – fuzzy membership in set A. This can also be displayed as ~A = 1 – A (where the symbol “~” denotes negation).
TABLE 7.2:
NUMERICAL SCORE FOR THE FOUR STRATEGY TYPES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CASE</th>
<th>CATAMARCA</th>
<th>FORMOSA</th>
<th>SANTA CRUZ</th>
<th>MENDOZA</th>
<th>CAPITAL FEDERAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Centrality to campaigns of clientelism</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.75</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Centrality to campaigns of programmatic strategy</td>
<td>0.16</td>
<td>0.27</td>
<td>0.58</td>
<td>0.67</td>
<td>0.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Centrality to campaigns of personalism</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>0.86</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.36</td>
<td>0.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Centrality to campaigns of performance</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.62</td>
<td>0.80</td>
<td>0.66</td>
<td>0.62</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Based on the theoretical arguments in this dissertation, cases in campaign Type 1 are “socially not possible.” This is a study of the centrality to campaigns of strategy types in a district. By definition a campaign strategy to mobilize voters involves appeal to voters in at least one of the four types, even though the appeals may be explicit or implicit.

Also, the theoretical argument and the evidence presented above lead to the conclusion that clientelism as a voter mobilization strategy can only be central to campaigns when the socioeconomic development of the district is LOW. At the same time programmatic strategy can only be central to campaigns when the socioeconomic development of the district is HIGH. Hence, Types 13-16 are not relevant types since we would not expect such cases to exist. We hence end up with eleven types of campaigns which may be pertinent to study.

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223 See footnote on George and Bennet’s (2005: 249) book on "socially not possible cases."
TABLE 7.3:

CASES’ MEMBERSHIP SCORES: FROM STRATEGY TYPES TO CAMPAIGN TYPES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TYPE OF CAMPAIGN</th>
<th>Combination</th>
<th>Catamarca</th>
<th>Formosa</th>
<th>Santa Cruz</th>
<th>Mendoza</th>
<th>Capital Federal</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Type 1</td>
<td>~CL•~PR•~PE•~PF</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td>0.33</td>
<td>0.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type 2</td>
<td>~CL•~PR•PE•PF</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>0.42</td>
<td>0.33</td>
<td>0.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type 3</td>
<td>~CL•PR•~PE•~PF</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td>0.33</td>
<td>0.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type 4</td>
<td>~CL•PR•PE•~PF</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>0.40</td>
<td>0.33</td>
<td>0.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type 5</td>
<td>~CL•PR•~PE•PF</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td>0.34</td>
<td>0.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type 6</td>
<td>~CL•PR•PE•PF</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>0.64</td>
<td>0.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type 7</td>
<td>~CL•PR•PE•~PF</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td>0.34</td>
<td>0.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type 8</td>
<td>~CL•PR•PE•PF</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>0.40</td>
<td>0.36</td>
<td>0.62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type 9</td>
<td>CL•~PR•~PE•~PF</td>
<td>0.84</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type 10</td>
<td>CL•~PR•~PE•PF</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>0.42</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type 11</td>
<td>CL•~PR•PE•~PF</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>0.38</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type 12</td>
<td>CL•~PR•PE•PF</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.62</td>
<td>0.40</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type 13</td>
<td>CL•PR•~PE•~PF</td>
<td>0.16</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type 14</td>
<td>CL•PR•~PE•PF</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type 15</td>
<td>CL•PR•PE•~PF</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>0.27</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type 16</td>
<td>CL•PR•PE•PF</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.27</td>
<td>0.40</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NOTE: Clientelism (CL), Programmatic (PR), Personalism (PE) and Performance (PF).

Arthur Stinchcombe said “a typology is a statement that a large number of variables have only a small number of combinations of values which actually occur, with all other combinations being rare or nonexistent. This results in a radical improvement in social scientific theory” (1968: 47). Further evidence of cases or more empirical instances could lead to a further reduction of the property space and to the conclusions that there are fewer campaign types which are relevant for research.

The case expert’s questionnaire for each of the four strategy types in chapters 3, 4, 5 and 6, can lead the placement of case studies to the appropriate campaign type on Table 7.3; however, new, more specific questions arise, among cases and within cases.

Let’s remember that fuzzy-sets membership scores are tied to theoretical concepts. Having a strategy type as central or not central to campaigns implies particular...
political processes which occur within the political parties, imply the relevance of specific
types of infrastructures and resources which need to be in place, an also may imply
certain socioeconomic and electoral competitiveness characteristics of the district in
question. In other words, the specific campaign type is a shortcut to districts’ and political
parties’ characteristics when making comparisons across cases.

For example, the five “socially possible” types of campaigns where personalism
is not central to campaigns as a voter mobilization strategy (Types 2, 5, 6, 9 and 10) are
districts where the relevant parties are expected to tend to incur in candidate nomination
compromises, hence capturing important aspects of the internal life of political parties.
In addition, the four campaign types where a programmatic voter mobilization strategy is
central to campaigns (Types 5, 6, 7 and 8) synthesize information regarding the
distribution of power within the political parties in the district which make viable such a
campaign strategy.

The constitution of campaign types is, of course, an instrument for selecting
populations. Grouping cases according to their strength of membership in a property
space location that interests us facilitates the judgment about the comparability of cases.
One could theorize that campaign Type 6 (and also Type 5) combines district and party
characteristics which could be labeled as belonging to more institutionalized and
internally democratic political parties and districts, then derive hypotheses about (for
example) party activism, citizen participation or social conflict, etc.; subsequently one
judges the cases brought together to that property space location and evaluates (with
further knowledge) whether they belong together or whether the property space should
be called into question.

On the other hand, campaign Type 3 combines district and party characteristics
which could be labeled as belonging to the least institutionalized and internally non-
democratic political parties and districts; in these cases power within parties is
concentrated and there are no compromises in the candidate nominations. Furthermore, even though personalism is central to campaigns, clientelism is not, evidencing the lack of parties’ resources and/or public demands for those types of exchanges. Again, a configurational analyses of campaign types and the sorting of cases’ degrees of membership to property space locations of our interest is a powerful tool in comparative politics.

In Table 7.3 we observe that the province of Catamarca has a strong membership score to the set of cases where clientelism is central to campaigns, and programmatic strategy, personalism and performance are NOT central to campaigns (Campaign Type 9 with a value of 0.84). The case of Formosa also has a strong membership to Campaign Type 12 (value of 0.62). The province of Mendoza has a relatively strong membership score to Campaign Type 6 (value of 0.64), and Capital Federal to Campaign Type 8 (value of 0.62).

The case of Santa Cruz is a particular case given that the mid-range scores in three of the campaign strategy types (clientelism, programmatic and personalism) or, in other words, the ambiguity of those three campaign strategies in the district makes it more difficult to identify a specific campaign type. More questions arise about this particular case and further specification of the strategy type measurements may be required.

Next are two more remarks I want to stress which are the product of this study.

7.8 Measuring electoral competitiveness

One contribution of the dissertation is argued in chapter 2. In chapter 2 I argued for an improved and more relevant measure of a district’s electoral competitiveness. Laakso and Taagepera (1979) developed a, now popularized, way to count the “Effective Number of Competing Parties” (ENCP), however, the ENCP does not help to
distinguish the type of competition in districts which, while sharing the same ENCP score, display different levels of competition (See chapter 2, Table 1). Districts with similar ENCP score could mean having one strong opposition party or several weaker ones. Hence, I developed a way to account for the strength (or weakness) of the incumbent and opposition parties. The “Effective Strength of Opposition Parties” (ESOP)\(^\text{224}\) accounts for the problem of coordination and the use of resources (economy of scale) which several smaller opposition parties face vis-à-vis fewer and larger opposition parties.\(^\text{225}\) This is a useful measure of electoral competitiveness when studying electoral campaigns.

7.9 Concluding remarks about political parties in Argentina

The federal institutional structure of Argentina makes nationalized parties and their party members focus their loyalties and accountability around the provincial governors (in the case of the incumbent parties). This causes the national parties to be relatively weak as an organization nationally, but relatively strong as an organization within each of the provinces in which there is a powerful figure like a governor of that party. Or more simply, political parties in the provinces (and their governors) have or cultivate a provincial pride and identity of their own.

This apparent “loyalty” or support to governors and party leaders is not necessarily because of coherence on programs or projects, but because the governors control the distribution of much needed resources to the rest of the political actors in the district. Contrary to some literature (See for example Jones 1997), political party discipline (in order to secure a future political post/candidacy) may be to either the

\(^\text{224}\) Where i-th is any party and o-th is any opposition party (all parties except the incumbent).

\(^\text{225}\) Where political party A is the incumbent and the rest are the opposition (Where \(v_o\) is the vote share of a non incumbent party and \(v_i\) is the vote share of all parties or coalitions). \(\text{ENCP} = (1/\sum v_i^2); \text{ESOP} = \sum v_o^2 / \sum v_i^2\)
president or the governor (or both). But it is rare for legislators not to have a political
boss; everyone needs a padrino (godfather, or political sponsor) who is critical for the
nomination of the candidate and for him to have a feasible campaign. In fact, as we saw,
there is a mutual assistance; the lower tiers work closer to the people for votes while the
upper tier (governor) pays or supports with resources. This is indeed a reason why we
should study the province as a case, and not a particular office type or particular party.

Furthermore, the internal heterogeneity of the major Argentine parties forces us
to explore the individual leaders in order to make sense of the actions of the “party,”
without disregarding the collective nature of parties. In addition, parties in a federal
system, where local subpolities hold domains of political power, are likely to have more
diverse strategies than parties in a centralized polity or environmentally homogeneous
districts.

The strengthening of certain institutional practices (e.g. primaries, etc) could lead
to party power decentralization or at least to a political culture which is more open to
take opinions from outside the party elites.

Party power decentralization and institutionalization of social and political conflict,
de-personalizes offices and may promote public policy positions (instead of
particularistic ones) and action. This could be done by strengthening the role of
“dirigente-type” brokers –as in Catamarca-, or by empowering decentralized actors in
politics –as mayors in Mendoza.

The role of democratic political parties as a collective actor itself is increased and
the communication with voters is more fluid with parties as such, when party power is
not concentrated and citizens have a more close-to-hand access to parties.
APPENDIX A:
LIST OF INTERVIEWEES

Details of the 86 formal interviews carried out in 2006 (there were other interviews with officials, activist, sympathizers and people in general not reported in this Appendix); office, name, party, district, 2001 Population Census, date of interview.

PROVINCE OF FORMOSA: population 486,559 (15 interviews)

Diputado Provincial Osvaldo Rojas, UCR
Intendente Rubén Antonio Dasso, PJ, Ibarreta (not taped) (pop. 8,687)
Concejal Errol Alberto Campello, PJ?, Ibarreta (pop. 8,687), March 20th
Diputado Provincial Jorge Román, MID-PJ
Diputado Provincial Antonio E. Juárez, PJ, March 22nd
Concejal Amado Cantón, UCR, Formosa city (pop. 198,074)
Concejal Colusso, PJ, Formosa city (pop. 198,074)
Intendenta Nerea Oviedo, PJ, Misión San Francisco de Laishi (pop. 4,384), March 25th
Intendente Mario Brignole, PJ, El Colorado (pop. 12,780), March 28th
Concejal Orlando Barslúm, UCR, Pirané (not taped) (pop. 19,124)
Intendente Carlos Meza, PJ, Las Lomitas (pop. 10,354), April 3th
Concejal Rodrigo Chaparro, PJ, Laguna Blanca (pop. 6,508), April 6th
Intendente Ricardo Fernandez, PJ, Laguna Nai Neck (pop. 2,115), April 6th
Diputada Provincial Beatriz Ramírez de Caja, UCR
Diputado Provincial Juan Domingo Gamarra, PJ
PROVINCE OF MENDOZA: population 1,579,651 (19 interviews)

Asesor Fernández, PD, September 18th
Diputado Provincial Carmona, PJ, Sept. 18th
Diputado Provincial Hugo Morales, PJ, Sept. 19th
Diputado Provincial Casteller, PD, Wednesday, Sept. 20th
Concejalo Laci, UCR, Mendoza capital (pop. 110,993), Sept. 20th
Concejalo Ramírez, PJ, Mendoza capital (pop. 110,993), Sept. 20th
Diputado Provincial Merino, UCR, Sept. 20th
Concejalo Rosas, PJ, Junín (pop. 35,045)
Concejalo Chavez, PD, Junín (pop. 35,045)
Concejalo Colonia, UCR, Junín (pop. 35,045)
Intendente Abed, UCR, Junín (pop. 35,045)
Diputado Provincial Maza, UCR
Intendente Joaquín Alberto Rodríguez, PJ, Tupungato (pop. 28,539), Sept. 25th
Senador Provincial Martínez, UCR, Tupungato
Diputado Provincial, Canale, PD, Sept. 26th
Intendente Juan Manuel García, UCR, Guaymallén (pop. 251,339)
Senador Provincial Mauricio Raúl Suárez, UCR
Intendente Omar Parisi, PD, Luján de Cuyo, Sept. 28th (pop. 104,470)
Concejalo Sergio Gómez, PD, Luján de Cuyo, Sept. 28th (pop. 104,470)
Concejalo Cecilia Paez, Recrear, Luján de Cuyo, Sept. 28th (pop. 104,470)

PROVINCE OF CATAMARCA: population 334,568 (19 interviews)

Diputada Provincial María del Valle Burgos, PJ, Oct. 2th
Intendente Humberto Valdez, UCR, Fray Mamerto Esquiú (pop. 10,658), Oct. 2th
Intendente Gustavo “el Gallo” Jalile, UCR, Valle Viejo, Oct. 3th (pop. 23,707)
Diputada Provincial Salcedo, UCR, Oct. 3th
Intendente Javier Morra, PJ, La Puerta, Oct. 4th (pop. 1,067)
Intendente Marcelo Saavedra, PJ, Los Varela (pop. 1,908), Oct. 4th, 2006
Concejal Lia Quiroga, UCR, Tinogasta, Oct. 3th (pop. 14,509)
Diputado Provincial Maria Julia Acosta de Ahumada, PJ, Oct. 4th
Provincial Senator Kent de Saadi, PJ, Oct. 4th
Concejal Stella Ramos, FCyS, Valle Viejo (pop. 23,707)
Diputado Provincial Rafael Castillo, PUC (Peronist in FCyS), Oct. 5th
Senador Prov. Jasús Albarracin, PJ, Departamento Santa Maria, Oct. 5th (pop. 10,800)
Concejal Alberto “Abeto” Barrionuevo, Fte. para la V., Valle Viejo, Oct. 6th (pop. 23,707)
Concejal Ceferino Barrios, UCR, Fray M. Esquiú, Oct. 6th (pop. 10,658)
Concejal Adolfo Herrera, UCR, F M Esquiú, Oct. 6th (pop. 10,658)
Concejal Juan Pablo Millan, UCR, Capital, Oct. 6th (pop. 141,260)
Senador Provincial Mario Figueroa, PJ, Depart. Santa Rosa, Oct. 9th (pop. 10,349)
Senadora Silvia Tello, UCR, Departamento Tinogasta, Oct. 9th (pop. 22,570)
Intendente Guzmán, UCR, Catamarca (pop. 141,260)
Diputado Provincial Víctor Brandán, PJ-Frente Cívico y Social, Oct. 10th

SANCTA CRUZ (pop. 196,958) (20 interviews)

Diputado Provincial Carlos Suarez, PJ, Oct. 16th
Diputado Provincial Alejandro Victoria, PJ, Puerto Sta. Cruz, Oct. 16th
Diputado Provincial Omar Hallar, UCR, Oct. 17th
Concejal Esteban Mihanovic, PJ, Rio Gallegos (pop. 79,144), Oct. 17th
Concejal Saa UCR, Rio Gallegos (pop. 79,144), Oct. 18th
Concejal Lozano, UCR, Rio Gallegos (pop. 79,144), Oct. 19th
Intendente Roquel, UCR, Rio Gallegos (pop. 79,144)
Concejal Raul Naim UCR, Presidente del Concejo, Rio Gallegos (pop. 79,144)
Diputado Provincial Banicevich, PJ, Oct. 20th
Diputada Provincial Miriam Aguiar, PJ, Oct. 23th
Concejalo Reynoso, PJ, Caleta Olivia (pop. 36,077), Oct. 25th
Concejalo Labado, PJ, Caleta Olivia (pop. 36,077), Oct. 26th
Concejalo Cifuentes, Socialista, Caleta Olivia (pop. 36,077)
Intendente Maimo, PJ, Pico Truncado (pop. 14,985)
Concejalo Ojeda, PJ, Perito Moreno, Nov. 7th (pop. 3,588)
Intendente Moro, UCR Perito Moreno, Nov. 7th (pop. 3,588)
Concejalo Elisa Ramos, PJ, Los Antiguos (pop. 2,047), Nov. 8th
Concejalo Beroiza, PJ Los Antiguos (pop. 2,047), Nov. 8th
Concejalo Ricci, UCR, Perito Moreno, Nov. 8th (pop. 3,588)
Diputado Provincial Freile, UCR

CAPITAL FEDERAL: population 2,776,138 (14 interviews)
Legislador de la ciudad, Fernando Alfredo Cantero, ARI, Nov. 22th
Leg. de la ciudad, Luciana Blasco, (Frente Compromiso para el Cambio), Nov.27th
Diputado Nacional, Cristian Adrián Ritondo, Peronismo Nacional (with Macri) Nov. 27th
Legislador de la ciudad, Juan Velazco, ARI (he is Peronist) Nov. 28th
Legislador de la ciudad, “Chango” Farias Gómez, PJ-Frente para la Victoria, Nov. 30th
Leg. de la ciudad, Daniel Amoroso, Juntos por Buenos Aires, PRO, Dec. 1st
Legisladora de la ciudad, Silvia La Ruffa, PJ-Frente para la Victoria, Dec. 4th
Legislador de la ciudad, Facundo Martín Di Filippo, ARI, Dec. 6th
Leg. de la ciudad, Sergio D. Molina, Autodeterminación y Libertad (Del SUR) Dec. 7th
Legislador de la ciudad, Diego Gabriel Kravets, PJ-Frente para la Victoria, Dec. 11th
Legislador de la ciudad, Marcelo Fernando Meis, Recrear, Dec.12th
Legislador de la ciudad, Mario José Morando, Juntos por Buenos Aires, PRO, Dec. 13th
Diputado Nacional Arguello, PJ-Frente para la Victoria (December 14th or 15th
Legisladora de la ciudad, Ana Maria Suppa, PJ-Frente para la Victoria, Dec. 20th
APPENDIX B:

FORMOSA’S ELECTORAL SYSTEM AND COMPETITIVENESS

Formosa is one of the poorest provinces in Argentina. TABLE B.1 shows the relatively high percentage of rural population and high NBIs (Unsatisfied Basic Needs) in the Formosa Counties. Table B.2 shows the results for the Provincial Legislature elections (1983-2005); the PJ has won every election, even when the President was of an opposition party. Finally, I address the particular Law of Lemas electoral system in the province.

TABLE B.1:

POPULATION CHARACTERISTICS AND GUBERNATORIAL ELECTIONS, OCTOBER 19TH 2003

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COUNTY</th>
<th>%Rural Pop.</th>
<th>% NBI 2001</th>
<th>% Native Pop.</th>
<th># of VOTERS</th>
<th>% PJ</th>
<th>% UCR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Matacos</td>
<td>21.64</td>
<td>51.4</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>5,175</td>
<td>93.84</td>
<td>5.82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ramón Lista</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>84.6</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>3,547</td>
<td>88.69</td>
<td>10.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bermejo</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>5,146</td>
<td>88.26</td>
<td>11.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pilagás</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>35.9</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>8,788</td>
<td>82.86</td>
<td>15.51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pilcomayo</td>
<td>32.37</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>34,808</td>
<td>82.32</td>
<td>15.86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laishi</td>
<td>77.32</td>
<td>40.3</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8,405</td>
<td>72.76</td>
<td>26.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Páinó</td>
<td>42.64</td>
<td>41.2</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>30,711</td>
<td>71.29</td>
<td>27.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Formosa</td>
<td>7.46</td>
<td>25.8</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>89,999</td>
<td>66.16</td>
<td>27.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pirané</td>
<td>40.75</td>
<td>36.6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>29,127</td>
<td>65.91</td>
<td>32.65</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: INDEC, Ministerio del Interior; Gov. of Formosa

* Rural population: conglomerates of less than 2000 people.
TABLE B.2:
PROVINCIAL LEGISLATURE ELECTIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>1983</th>
<th>1985</th>
<th>1987</th>
<th>1989</th>
<th>1991</th>
<th>1993</th>
<th>1995</th>
<th>1997</th>
<th>1999</th>
<th>2003</th>
<th>2005</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PJ</td>
<td>42.83</td>
<td>44.95</td>
<td>52.91</td>
<td>58.67</td>
<td>45.02</td>
<td>55.46</td>
<td>58.82</td>
<td>57.46</td>
<td>72.28</td>
<td>72.27</td>
<td>63.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UCR</td>
<td>27.83</td>
<td>44.06</td>
<td>45.86</td>
<td>37.39</td>
<td>33.74</td>
<td>37.54</td>
<td>40.39</td>
<td>39.12</td>
<td>27.47</td>
<td>24.33</td>
<td>26.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Formosa is a province in which the Peronist party (PJ) is hegemonic. TABLE B.1 shows the clear dominance of the PJ party over the UCR in every county in the 2003 second reelection of Governor Gildo Insfrán (PJ), and TABLE B.2 shows that the PJ control of the provincial legislature was such that it has never lost an election since 1983. The PJ party overwhelmed the UCR in gubernatorial and presidential elections since 1983, even when PJ lost nationally, as in the presidential elections of 1983 and 1999. The UCR holds only 8 out of the 30 seats in the Provincial Legislature. The UCR is a nationalized party with a long history in the province of Formosa, but to date is no match for the PJ.

Electoral competition, if it exists at all, is actually most likely among PJ factions, thanks to the province wide *Law of Lemas* (Cumulative and Simultaneous Double Vote) electoral system which allows parties to run with more candidates than positions being contested for the local and provincial level elections.

The “*Law of Lemas*” is a type of intra-party preference voting system. Preference voting systems exist in several countries and are characterized by allowing voters have a direct influence on party nomination decisions.227 The requirements to register

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226 Gildo Insfrán was elected governor for the fourth time in 2007 with over 76% of the votes.

227 Other countries using different types of preference voting electoral systems are Finland, Italy (for its Chamber of Deputies), Greece, Luxembourg, Switzerland, Denmark, Belgium, Austria, Norway, Sweden, Ireland and Malta. To this list Richard Katz adds the Japanese use of the single-nontransferable vote system and the United States use of the open primaries. Katz, Richard: “Intra-party Preference Voting”, pgs. 85-103 in Grofman and Lijphart, *Electoral Laws*, 1986.
nominations under the *Law of Lemas* vary from country to country and in Argentina they vary from province to province as well. In the province of Formosa and Santa Cruz the "*Law of Lemas*" consists of the following main elements: 1) The political parties or electoral coalitions that compete in an election are called "*Lemas*." 2) A *sublema* is defined as a fraction of a *Lema* that competes in an election, which in Santa Cruz needs the endorsement of at least 10% of the affiliated members of the political party in the district to which they belong. In Formosa this requirement is of only 5% of the affiliated members (See Vieta y Willi, 1998: 94, 97). 3) Voters may split their vote by physically splitting the paper ballots and pick an electoral category (for example "Mayor") from one *Lema* or *sublema* and another category (for example “City Council”) from another *Lema* or *sublema*. Lists of candidates are fixed; the order of the candidates cannot be altered. 4) In the election, it is the *Lemas* that compete first, not the *sublemas*. This means that all the votes of the individual sublemas (candidates or lists of candidates according to the type of candidacy) in a given electoral category are summed or accumulated in favor of their *Lema* (party or coalition). 5) The winning candidate is the one nominated by the winning *sublema* within the winning *Lema*. 6) Therefore, it is said that, even though people vote once, the first vote is to the *Lema* (or party/coalition), and the second vote to the *sublema* (or particular candidate/s). 7) In the event of having lists of candidates, the distribution of seats is made among *Lemas* first, according to the existing formula of allotment (D’Hondt) and among the *sublemas* of each *Lema* secondly (See Lisoni 2003). To be precise, the name of this electoral system should have the three parts and be referred to as “*Cumulative and Simultaneous Double Vote*" (CSDV).

However, the use of these *sublemas* is a prerogative of the parties, which may choose not to use it and have regular primary or internal elections. Provincial level
offices (governor and legislators) in both Formosa and Santa Cruz tend not to have *sublemas* and have a solid alignment behind the governor or other party leader. We may find local candidacies with more *sublemas* since it is usually easier for an internal party opposition to gather locally the necessary party members’ endorsement to validate the faction for election. However, in many occasions party leaderships are not challenged at all and the *sublema*/fraction formation is a way of displaying loyalty and support to that leadership by putting a local/neighborhood leader/broker's machine to work with a brand name (the *sublema’s* name). It is also a way to measure the voter mobilization capacities of these local leaders/brokers’ machines.
APPENDIX C:
PUBLIC OPINION: PRESIDENCIAL PERFORMANCE, VOTE CHOICE, AND CAMPAIGNS

After reviewing nationwide survey data, I found evidence that programmatic campaign strategies are relatively less important across all the districts than are other campaign strategies. The sample sizes of each of the studied districts in this survey are relatively small (except in Capital Federal) which lent me to also take into account the national sample in order to draw conclusions. TABLE C.1 shows results of a national sample (however, the sampled cases of Capital Federal, Mendoza and Formosa also concur with the national sample). Those voters who did not like President Néstor Kirchner’s administration would not necessarily vote for (eventual runner-up) opposition candidate Elisa Carrió because there are other opposition candidates. Hence, Carrió cannot only campaign on the bad incumbent’s performance; she has to differentiate her campaign with other things like program. However, those who did like Néstor Kirchner’s administration would vote for Cristina [Fernández de] Kirchner; people may be risk averse and try to keep the “good thing” going (only 8 out of 550 Cristina Fernández de Kirchner’s supporters in the sample –or less than 1.5%- said the incumbent administration was “bad” –n=8- or “very bad” -n=0).

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229 National Survey (October 2007) by Carlos Fara & Asociados.
230 Incumbent party presidential candidate Cristina Fernández de Kirchner (PJ) received 45.3% of the valid votes and runner up opposition candidate Elisa Carrió (ARI) received 23% of the valid votes nationwide in October 2007.
Carrió (or any other opposition candidate) cannot base her strategy solely on the [bad] performance [of the incumbent], at least when there are competing non-incumbent parties. The opposition candidates not only compete with incumbents but also against each other, which may be an incentive to campaign on programmatic ideas to differentiate themselves from one another.

**TABLE C.1:**

PERFORMANCE EVALUATION AND PRESIDENTIAL CHOICE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Opinion on Néstor Kirchner's administration</th>
<th>N.A.</th>
<th>Cristina Kirchner</th>
<th>Elisa Carrió</th>
<th>Neither</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Very Bad</strong> Count</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>15.00%</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>70.00%</td>
<td>15.00%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Bad</strong> Count</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1.00%</td>
<td>8.00%</td>
<td>36.00%</td>
<td>55.00%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Neither good nor bad</strong> Count</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>139</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>366</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>7.10%</td>
<td>38.00%</td>
<td>28.70%</td>
<td>26.20%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Good</strong> Count</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>332</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>423</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2.40%</td>
<td>78.50%</td>
<td>12.30%</td>
<td>6.90%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Very Good</strong> Count</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>88.60%</td>
<td>10.00%</td>
<td>1.40%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>N.A.</strong> Count</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>16.70%</td>
<td>75.00%</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>8.30%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong> Count</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>550</td>
<td>214</td>
<td>185</td>
<td>991</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4.20%</td>
<td>55.50%</td>
<td>21.60%</td>
<td>18.70%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N.A.: Does not know/ answer

---

231 This situation repeats for the comparison between Cristina Fernández and opposition presidential candidates Roberto Lavagna and Ricardo López Murphy, as well.

232 Furthermore, if voters think the administration was "regular" (or "neither good nor bad" in Spanish), in this case of non electoral polarization, that tended to favor the incumbent, as these voters did not clearly favor one candidate or the other. This fact also repeats with Lavagna and López Murphy (not presented here).

233 The question was “Who would you vote for if the choice were Cristina Kirchner and Elisa Carrió?”
A multinomial logistic regression model with Néstor Kirchner performance evaluation as a causal factor and the presidential vote choice as a dependent variable yields that the probability that the null hypothesis is true is significantly low (See Table C.2). This model gives an adequate prediction compared to the Intercept Only (Null model). Table C.3 shows in its upper third the outcome of “Cristina Kirchner” compared to “Doesn’t know/ doesn’t answer” the presidential vote choice question. For example, those people who said that Néstor Kirchner had a “Good Performance”, compared to those who said he had a “Very bad performance”, were more likely to vote for Cristina Kirchner (p.=0.000). In the case of the outcome of opposition candidate Carrió compared to “Doesn’t know/ doesn’t answer” the presidential vote choice question (middle third of the table), for example, those people who said that Néstor Kirchner had a “Bad performance”, compared to those who said he had a “Very bad performance” where not more likely to vote for Carrió.

**TABLE C.2:**

**KIRCHNER’S PERFORMANCE AND VOTE CHOICE**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model Fitting Information</th>
<th>-2 Log Likelihood</th>
<th>Chi-Square</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>Sig.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Model</td>
<td>Intercept Only</td>
<td>402.68</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Final</td>
<td>54.474</td>
<td>348.205</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
TABLE C.3: KIRCHNER’S PERFORMANCE AND ELISA CARRIÓ’S VOTE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Classification</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>Std. Error</th>
<th>Wald</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>Sig.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cristina Kirchner</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>-17.91</td>
<td>0.972</td>
<td>338.99</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very good</td>
<td>39.196</td>
<td>5353.682</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.994</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Good</td>
<td>21.382</td>
<td>1.023</td>
<td>437.03</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neither good nor bad</td>
<td>19.591</td>
<td>0.996</td>
<td>386.95</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bad</td>
<td>19.741</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very bad</td>
<td>0c</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elisa Carrió</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>1.574</td>
<td>0.651</td>
<td>5.849</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very good</td>
<td>17.52</td>
<td>5353.682</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.997</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Good</td>
<td>0.042</td>
<td>0.735</td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.954</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neither good nor bad</td>
<td>-0.164</td>
<td>0.687</td>
<td>0.057</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.811</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bad</td>
<td>1.794</td>
<td>1.126</td>
<td>2.541</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very bad</td>
<td>0c</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neither</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>0.16</td>
<td>0.806</td>
<td>0.039</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.843</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very good</td>
<td>17.356</td>
<td>5353.682</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.997</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Good</td>
<td>0.871</td>
<td>0.884</td>
<td>0.97</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.325</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neither good nor bad</td>
<td>1.153</td>
<td>0.836</td>
<td>1.902</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.168</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bad</td>
<td>3.642</td>
<td>1.218</td>
<td>8.94</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very bad</td>
<td>0c</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The reference category is: Does not know/does not answer

C: This parameter is set to zero because it is redundant.

TABLE C.4: KIRCHNER’S PERFORMANCE AND PREDICTED VOTE CHOICE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Classification</th>
<th>Observed</th>
<th>Predicted</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>Percent Correct</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Cristina Kirchner</td>
<td>Elisa Carrió</td>
<td>Neither of them</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doesn't know/answer</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>36.0</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cristina Kirchner</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>532.5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>98.6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elisa Carrió</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>163.7</td>
<td>13.8</td>
<td>35.6</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neither of them</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>125.7</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>54.9</td>
<td>29.8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall Percentage</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>87.8</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>10.2</td>
<td>61.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

451
Table C.4 shows that this performance evaluation model (“Opinion about Pres. Kirchner’s administration”) compared to the Null model gives better accuracies for the “Cristina Kirchner” (predicting ~99% of the variance) and to a lesser extent “Neither or them” (predicting ~30% of the variance) groups of voters but not for the “Carrió” voters (predicting only 6.5% of the variance). Though the model fitting information shows that the current model is outperforming the null hypothesis, we see that it is not a good model if our interest is to predict the Carrió group of voters. Hence, Carrió cannot only campaign on a performance strategy, consequently she must add elements of a personalistic and programmatic strategy in her campaign.

If in elections where the opposition is not centralized in one party and opposition candidates cannot solely rely on performance to win elections what other strategy types might be involved in their campaigns? One of the available questions in the same survey is “what are the three reasons to vote for that [presidential] candidate?” as a follow up to the “presidential choice” question. I only present results to the first reason given because I assumed the second and third reasons to be less relevant to the interviewee, and also because much fewer people answer those subsequent questions.234

Reasons to vote for the presidential candidate of choice

In the context of my theory, the “reasons for selecting the presidential candidate of choice” could be viewed as the consequence of several factors. I view that the “reasons for the vote” are in part the product of the different strengths of all the campaigns nationally, provincial and locally.235 Very many reasons were tabulated for

234 Neither of these questions was asked in the provinces of Santa Cruz or Catamarca.

235 Reasons to explain the vote choice could find a source in the campaign of the chosen presidential candidate and that of all other candidates, the influence of other political actors and the media, and the voters’ personal experiences. However, I will restrict the interpretation and view the “reasons to vote for the presidential candidate of choice” as a consequence of the voter
some of the candidates (37 different reasons for 2007 Presidential candidate Cristina Fernández de Kirchner), hence TABLE C.5 only discriminates the reasons given which comprise a sizeable number of first responses (>60%) for all the major national presidential candidates in 2007.

**TABLE C.5:**

**REASONS TO VOTE FOR THE PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE OF CHOICE**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TYPE</th>
<th>REASON</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Valid Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PERF</td>
<td>Para continuar el proyecto actual</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>9.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PERS</td>
<td>Es mujer</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>6.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PERS</td>
<td>Honestó/Digno/Sincero</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>6.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Ns/nc</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>6.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PROG</td>
<td>Tiene proyectos buenos/Buenas ideas</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>6.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PERS</td>
<td>Me gusta/Me agrada</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>5.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PERF/PROG</td>
<td>Mejorará la economía/Buen economista</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>4.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PERF</td>
<td>No hay otro/Es el menos malo</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>4.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PROG/PERF</td>
<td>Va a mejorar el país</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PERF/PERS</td>
<td>Es Nuevo</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>3.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PERS/PROG</td>
<td>Experiencia política/Buena gestión</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>3.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OTHER REASONS</td>
<td></td>
<td>351</td>
<td>39.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td></td>
<td>899</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TABLE C.5 shows that the number one reason mentioned by interviewees to vote for their presidential choice was “to continue with the current project” making it a clear performance type justification presumably in favor of the incumbent party. Personalism type reasons such as “the candidate is a woman” or because of the mobilization efforts of all the parties involved in the district. I assume that parties target all voters and not just a segment of them.

236 The question was “which are the three reasons for selecting your presidential candidate of choice?” The data shown is for all candidates and all sampled districts (Personalism –PERS-, Programmatic –PROG-, Performance –PERF-, and Clientelism –CLIENT-).
candidate’s “honesty/dignity/sincerity” make the second and third reasons mentioned. (I.e. personal attributes of the candidates)

The main first choice reasons for voting for incumbent party or opposition candidates may hence differ as a consequence of campaign strategies and personal experience. Hence, in TABLE C.6 we see that the reasons to vote for the incumbent party candidate was topped by “to continue with the current project,” followed by four personalism-type reasons and one programmatic-type reason.

**TABLE C.6:**

**TOP REASONS TO VOTE FOR THE PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE OF CHOICE**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TYPE</th>
<th>REASON</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Valid Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PERF</td>
<td>Para continuar el proyecto actual</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>16.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PERS</td>
<td>Es mujer</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>12.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PROG</td>
<td>Tiene proyectos buenos/Buenas ideas</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>6.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PERS</td>
<td>Me gusta/Me agrada</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>6.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PERS</td>
<td>Tiene fuerza/Carácter/Empuje</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>5.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PERS</td>
<td>Es la mujer de Néstor</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>5.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OTHERS</td>
<td></td>
<td>218</td>
<td>46.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td></td>
<td>460</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Sample among nationwide voters of incumbent party candidate Cristina Fernández

The reasons to vote for the eventual runner-up opposition candidate Elisa Carrió are clearly topped by the opinion people had of her as an “honest/dignified/sincere” candidate, which is a personal quality which gains centrality when the incumbents are accused of the opposite attributes, hence an evaluation of the incumbents' performance is implied too (Table C.7). Furthermore, other clear and implied reasons related to the incumbent’s negative performance (“she is new”; “she is the best available”; “she
denounces corruption”) also lead the ranking, providing evidence to the messages Carrió wanted for her campaign.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Valid Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PERS</td>
<td>Honest/Digno/Sincero</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PERS/PERF</td>
<td>Es Nuevo</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PROG</td>
<td>Tiene proyectos buenos/Buenas ideas</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PROG</td>
<td>Denuncia hechos de corrupción</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PERF</td>
<td>Es lo/a mejor que hay</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Ns/nc</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PROG</td>
<td>Justicia</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PERF</td>
<td>Entorno</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OTHERS</td>
<td></td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td></td>
<td>97</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In a survey done in Río Gallegos, the provincial capital of Santa Cruz (by Carlos Fara & Asociados -October 2007-) the number one first choice reason to vote for incumbent party presidential candidate Cristina Fernández was also performance (“para continuar con el proyecto actual”, 22.2%). As in the other provinces, for the case of opposition candidate Elisa Carrió the number one reason to vote for her was “Honesto/Digno/Sincero” (36.7%).

TABLE C.8 shows that people surveyed nationally are not particularly contented with the incumbent government’s performance on many issues. Noticeably, 64.3% of

---

237 In this Santa Cruz survey Cristina Fernández had a vote preference of 50.4% over 19.6% of Elisa Carrió (the third candidate was Roberto Lavagna with 6%).
surveyed people had a negative view of the administration on “seguridad” (safety, security, crime, etc). Other relevant issues also received negative grades, for example: inflation (64.1%), unemployment (47.5%), education (37.7%), and health (37.2%), among others. By looking at the specific issues on TABLE C.8, one would say that people are not clearly in favor of the administration actions, but still a 46.4% plurality of the sampled voters would choose the incumbent party’s candidate. Perhaps people liked the performance but on more diffuse, non specific terms. Perhaps the campaign tries to emphasize growth and how much better the country is without looking too much into the details of performances, because then is when people start seeing the problems and associating them with the incumbent administration. Perhaps the incumbent is still more appealing than the alternative. Another possibility is that campaigns are more focused on the personal attributes of candidates, rather than on specific policy outcomes.

There is also supporting data from a survey done in Río Gallegos (Santa Cruz) about centrality of a programmatic strategy. When people are asked what they had seen or heard from the campaign, 22% say “the proposals”, presumably from parties and candidates (TABLE C.9). Yet, when asked how much they know about the proposal of their candidate of choice for mayor more than 79% say they know little, almost nothing or nothing (TABLE C.10). This concurs with the idea that candidates campaign on slogans and power phrases, and do not or cannot develop ideas or programs. Finally, a cross tabulation from TABLE C.9 and C.10 would yield that 40 out of 55 respondents who said that in the campaigns they have seen or heard “proposals” also answered they know little, almost nothing or nothing about their candidate for mayor’s platform (Only 14 answered they know “bastante” or plenty).
TABLE C.8:
EVALUATION OF PRESIDENT KIRCHNER’S ADMINISTRATION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Very bad/ bad</th>
<th>Regular</th>
<th>good/ very good</th>
<th>Does not know</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Obras púbicas</td>
<td>18.8</td>
<td>36.1</td>
<td><strong>34.6</strong></td>
<td>10.6</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Política exterior</td>
<td>16.1</td>
<td>28.6</td>
<td><strong>31.4</strong></td>
<td>23.8</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Política Económica</td>
<td>25.6</td>
<td>38.0</td>
<td><strong>28.2</strong></td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acción Social</td>
<td>23.3</td>
<td>42.5</td>
<td><strong>24.6</strong></td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seguridad</td>
<td><strong>64.3</strong></td>
<td>27.0</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>La inflación</td>
<td><strong>64.1</strong></td>
<td>25.1</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>La justicia</td>
<td><strong>60.5</strong></td>
<td>29.6</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lucha contra la corrupción</td>
<td><strong>59.7</strong></td>
<td>24.3</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Desocupación</td>
<td><strong>47.5</strong></td>
<td>36.1</td>
<td>13.4</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Educación</td>
<td><strong>37.7</strong></td>
<td>38.9</td>
<td>20.1</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salud</td>
<td><strong>37.2</strong></td>
<td>39.9</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mejora de los salarios</td>
<td>35.3</td>
<td>39.0</td>
<td>20.8</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defensa del medio ambiente</td>
<td><strong>33.9</strong></td>
<td>31.0</td>
<td>14.5</td>
<td>20.5</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jubilaciones</td>
<td><strong>32.4</strong></td>
<td>33.7</td>
<td>28.4</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Derechos Humanos</td>
<td><strong>30.5</strong></td>
<td>30.8</td>
<td>23.2</td>
<td>15.5</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NOTE: The survey question was "¿Cómo evalúa al gobierno nacional en…?". I aggregated the valid percentages of responses "very bad" and "bad", and "good" and "very good". N=992.
National Survey by Carlos Fara & Asociados, October 2007.
Campaign messages
TABLE C.9:
VOTERS’ PERCEPTION OF THE MAYORAL CAMPAIGN

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>What voter heard or saw</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Valid Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ns/nc</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Propuestas de los candidatos</td>
<td>55</td>
<td><strong>22</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carteles en vía pública</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Otros</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Campaña sucia</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nada</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Problemas por la Ley de Lemas</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Limpieza en la Ciudad</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Futuro de los jóvenes</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*NOTE*: Survey question “43) ¿Qué ha escuchado o visto sobre las campañas a intendente en Río Gallegos?” (What did you hear or see from the mayoral campaigns in Río Gallegos?) By Carlos Fara & Asociados, October 2007.

TABLE C.10:
RÍO GALLEGOS: MAYORAL CAMPAIGN AND PLATFORM AWARENESS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Valid Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nada</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Casi nada</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poco</td>
<td>119</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bastante</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mucho</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ns/nc</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*NOTE* Survey question: “Muchas veces en la campaña los candidatos y partidos políticos anuncian sus plataformas y proyectos a realizar. ¿Conoce Ud. mucho, bastante, un poco, casi nada o nada, sobre lo que piensa hacer en el gobierno su candidato a intendente si ganase?” (How much do you know about your candidate’s platform?). I rounded percentages.
APPENDIX D:
PUBLIC OPINION ON PROVINCIAL AND LOCAL ELECTIONS IN SANTA CRUZ

In this appendix I provide quantitative evidence in support of my argument in chapter 6 on the centrality to campaigns of performance as a voter mobilization strategy. Table D.1 shows that an important number of those Santa Cruz voters who want “change” would still vote to reelect the incumbent governor.

TABLE D.1:
VOTE FOR CHANGE AND GOVERNOR’S REELECTION

Who would you vote for Governor between…? * Do you believe the Provincial Government needs a change, or needs continuity?238

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Ns/Nc</th>
<th>Cambio</th>
<th>Continuidad</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Neither</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>%</td>
<td>26.7</td>
<td>73.3</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>%</td>
<td>10.3</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daniel Peralta (PJ)</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>73.3</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>%</td>
<td>16.8</td>
<td>63.2</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>%</td>
<td>53.8</td>
<td>19.7</td>
<td>94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eduardo Costa (UCR)</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>88.4</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>%</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>%</td>
<td>23.1</td>
<td>66.1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ns/nc</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>%</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td>46.7</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>%</td>
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<td>5.5</td>
<td>3.6</td>
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<td>127</td>
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</tr>
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<td></td>
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<td>50.8</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>%</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Source: Elaborated by the author with data from Carlos Fara & Asociados.

238 Question in the original Spanish: 15) A quién votaría para gobernador entre... * 21) Ud. cree que en el gobierno provincial hace falta un cambio, o debe haber continuidad?
As argued in this dissertation, voters evaluate the role of the executive offices, and the legislative elections (and officials) are a reward or punishment for the executives' performance. The October 2007 was a general election but people seemed to ignore legislative candidates. The survey used in this appendix was done just days before the election and 85% of respondents did not choose a “Provincial deputy by town” they would vote for. The most preferred candidate received only 2.8% of responses (TABLE D.2). A similar thing happened when the category was city councilman (see TABLE D.3). Another of the aforementioned reasons for this (besides the relevance of the executives) is the disaggregated nature of the campaigned messages and campaigns themselves under the Law of Lemas electoral system, at least for the local level elections. In chapter 6 I mentioned the lack of resources or diluted party strength that these legislative candidates have in campaigns. Table D.3 shows the consequence of weak and disaggregated campaigns and, as some interviewees mentioned (e.g. Deputy Aguiar and Mayor Roquel in chapter 6), these legislative candidacies are just a personal efforts of people running as candidates. However, these “campaign efforts” are not relevant since people pay attention to the executive campaigns.

Table D.4 shows that 66% of respondents say the incumbent mayor has been doing a “good” or “very good” job; less than 7% say it is “bad” or “very bad”. When the same question was asked about former mayor and candidate for mayor Villafañe (Table D.5), 40% of respondents said it was “bad” or “very bad” and 25.6% said it was “good” or “very good”. People probably ousted Villafañe because of bad performance.
### TABLES D.2 AND D.3: LEGISLATIVE PREFERENCES IN RIO GALLEGOS

Who would you vote for Town Prov. Deputy? Who would you vote for councilmen today?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
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</tr>
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<td>7</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Varavino</td>
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<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P. Gonzalez</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alvarado</td>
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<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
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<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iván Saldívia</td>
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<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figueroa</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>F. Concepezon</td>
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</tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gomes</td>
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<tr>
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<td>2</td>
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</tr>
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<td>0.4</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hector Diaz</td>
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</tr>
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<td>A. Van Akem</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
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<td>Luis Menendez</td>
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<td>0.4</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
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<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
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</table>
TABLE D.4 AND D.5:
OPINION ABOUT RIO GALLEGOS’ MAYORAL CANDIDATES

<table>
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<tr>
<th>ROQUEL</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Valid Percent</th>
<th>VILLAFÁNE</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
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<td>Muy mala</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mala</td>
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<td>75</td>
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<tr>
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<td>64</td>
<td>25.7</td>
<td>Regular</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>20.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>151</td>
<td>60.6</td>
<td>Buena</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muy Buena</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Total</td>
<td>249</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NOTE: 1 missing value. TABLE D.4: What is your opinion about Mayor Héctor Roquel’s administration? TABLE D.5: What is your opinion about former Mayor Villafañe’s administration?

Another indication that this might be a “performance vote” (and a performance campaign) on the executives is that over 60% of the survey respondents said to sympathize with no party (only 14.4% with PJ, 5.2% with Frente para la Victoria, and 7.6% with UCR, and only 0.4% -one case- sympathizes with ARI, the party of presidential runner up Elisa Carrió), which indicates that the campaign messages do not necessarily have or need high partisanship contents, as could be the case of the Peronists in Formosa.

Party ID is not relevant in Santa Cruz: Evidence for that is, for example, that PJ sympathizers would rather vote for Roquel (UCR) than for the other PJ candidates for mayor (Villafañe or Cantín). Also, given the choice between the incumbent UCR candidate (Roquel) and one of the PJ candidates (former mayor Villafañe), of those 36 cases of PJ sympathizers (table not presented here) 55.6% (n=20) of PJ sympathizers would rather choose for Roquel than Villafañe/neither/no answer; and only 22% (n=8) of
PJ sympathizers would choose the PJ candidate. The surveys’ overall sample preferred Roquel over Villafañe by 64% over 16% (12.8% said neither and 7.2% NS/NC).

The more feasible reasons for this outcome are that (knowing that candidates usually do not campaign on program and that clientelism/patronage are unlikely reasons) in the eyes of the voter; a) Roquel’s performance is good, b) Villafañe’s performance was bad, or c) there are personality issues with the candidates as more important reasons than their performances.

When directly asked to people whether they would vote for the other major PJ mayoral candidate Juan Carlos Villafañe (PJ); Out of those 36 PJ sympathizers, 66.7% (n=24) said NO; the whole survey sample’s rejection was similar (67.2% said NO and only 22.4% said YES). This opinion is not against this one particular candidate since the other relevant PJ candidate, Cantín, was rejected the same way; 58.35% of PJ sympathizers would not vote for this PJ candidates (only 25% would). Finally, when the same yes or no question on whether they would vote for incumbent Roquel was asked; the 58.3% of self proclaimed PJ sympathizers’ said they YES, and only 33.3% said NO. Performance seems the reasonable basis for this vote.

At the governor’s level, given the choice of the PJ (incumbent Peralta) and the UCR (Costa) candidates; 28% of PJ sympathizers would vote for Costa over Peralta/none/or NC; and, 21% of UCR sympathizers would rather vote for the PJ candidate (of course, most of the votes in elections come from people who are “independent” (non-partisans). In conclusion, in Santa Cruz some people want change and they vote for the incumbent; and some people say to sympathize with a party and vote for the candidate of the other party, against their party’s candidate.
APPENDIX E:
MECHANISMS TO HOLD ON TO POWER IN SANTA CRUZ

In this appendix I address some of the characteristics of employment and daily life for many voters in the province of Santa Cruz and the mechanisms the PJ party uses to process internal differences locally without jeopardizing the provincial central power.

E.1 Campaigns focus around the Provincial Government performance

The provincial state is the source of all the benefits for most people, which might be, according to the interviewees, a culprit for patronage and the aversion for change of the “easy” living conditions in Santa Cruz. One factor to consider then, is the financial dependence mayors, and the local economy in general, have on the central provincial government; the significance of public employment. The behavior of people and local governments are shaped by these characteristics, as these officials assert:

“[El] interior de la provincia, te diría que es un voto cautivo al justicialismo. …porque hay un sistema de trabajo, donde el intendente que representa al pueblo está muy ligado al gobierno [provincial] de turno. Y dependen en lo económico exclusivamente de lo que le dé el estado provincial. Entonces, la única forma de poder lograr los objetivos que necesitan para su pueblo es acatando la decisión que dé el ejecutivo provincial. … ¿Y qué pasa?; las localidades del interior tienen que atender las necesidades de educación, la asistencia social y todo eso. Y la única forma de poder los tipos cubrir esas necesidades es teniendo una buena relación con el ejecutivo provincial.” (Deputy Naim, PJ)

Many people work as municipal employees or in provincial agencies, which also makes the local commerce dependent on the public employees' welfare. At the same time, those public jobs are objectively the most realistic choice people have, even in the more “economically diverse” capital Río Gallegos. Again, Naim: “Lamentablemente, en
E.1.1 The performance and patronage tandem

This is a rich district where people from other districts also come for the social benefits they find in Santa Cruz, which in turn (given also because of the lack of electoral competitiveness), feed the cycle of the incumbent government campaigning on performance achievements and the risk averse voters supporting the incumbents. The socioeconomic and electoral competitiveness characteristics of the district make the PJ party and voters’ behavior rational. Here is Hallar again:

“En la provincia con 20 años de aporte, y en su época era con 10, te podés jubilar con la Caja Provincial que paga un 82% móvil al 90%, comparado con las cajas nacionales, que tenés que tener 65 años [de edad], 30, 35 años de servicio y que te jubilás con 400, 500 pesos. Acá cualquiera aterrizá en la provincia [i.e. Comes from outside the province] quiere dejar su trabajo también por el tema de la jubilación; Muchísimo más redituable la jubilación provincial que una nacional o una de la actividad privada”.

Councilman Saa (UCR, Río Gallegos) agrees and expands Hallar’s view:

“... [In the electoral campaign] por ahí hay tipos que tienen resuelto casi todo y te piden...hay mucho extranjero que se aprovecha de la situación; no extranjero, sino gente que no es de acá, sino del norte [i.e. Basically the rest of the country’s other provinces] que no busca trabajo: busca el plan y la ayuda social. No es culpa de esa gente. Creo que de alguna manera los hemos acostumbrado a esa forma.”

E.2 Performance strategy and keeping the one party regime afloat

In Santa Cruz there are two distinct but interconnected levels of political power, the provincial and the local levels. They are led by the governor and the mayors respectively. The governor is the unquestionable leader. Governors control the finances of the province and tend to be the president of the party in the district. Regarding mayors, I observed two kinds of situations in the towns, those where the same PJ faction has been in power and those where the incumbent faction cannot keep power; A) the case, like in Pico Truncado, in which the same party and the same faction rules all the
time. B1) Like in Caleta Olivia, in which another candidate of the same party emerges as an alternative to the current mayor so as to sanction the incumbents and offer an alternative without relinquishing power to another party. However, in these cases there is the possibility, B2), to get the power to another party only if the incumbent was really bad, there is no obvious alternative within the local PJ and if the opposition (UCR) party is relatively well organized in town, like in Perito Moreno. 239

Next, I present four examples of the competitive and power struggle situations described above to show that (a particular type of) performance is what people evaluate and what candidates tend to campaign on. I begin with 1) Mayor Maimo (PJ, Pico Truncado). 240

Mayor Maimo: “Hace 34 años que estoy en la municipalidad…” “…y bueno, Osvaldo Pérez que era intendente en ese momento, venía por dos gestiones, entonces nuestro conductor político, Sergio Acevedo, no quería que fueran eternos los candidatos…” “…y hablamos dos, tres candidatos de la agrupación Eva Perón…” “Se fue decantando, distintos, con encuestas y con distintas opiniones de compañeros y compañeras del sector, y bueno, quedé yo como candidato. Había dos o tres sublemas que llevaron listas de concejales....”

Pico Truncado is the third largest city in the province and this PJ faction learned how to be respected by the other provincial factions. 241 The group of four or five faction

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239 However, I still see the election of Mayor Moro (UCR) of Perito Moreno as mainly sanctioning Mayor Bilardo (PJ), and not voting a new “program”; Bilardo was back in power after a term. In fact, Moro had a real chance of beating Bilardo because the PJ was “divided” at the local level; Provincial Deputy (and also former mayor) Suárez (PJ) supported Moro because he was upset with Bilardo’s faction.

240 Maimo argues that his faction is more autonomous from the provincial party, and the faction’s succession in power since 1983. In this part of the interview he described the nomination processes, the strength of the local PJ faction in Pico Truncado (which has, at times, suffered political moves from the governor’s faction).

241 The governor’s faction has tried to open up or split the PJ local faction’s power in town by sponsoring alternative candidates. This is a unique case in Santa Cruz. Regarding the candidate nomination and the provincial party’s intromissions Maimo said:

“No. Por lo menos en la agrupación nuestra no. Puede ser en otro sector, sí. …Lo decidimos nosotros en una mesa chica [la nominación de candidatos].” “Sí, y lo han hecho y lo van a hacer. …y acá lo intentaron todas las veces, desde el ‘83, hasta las elecciones pasadas y seguramente lo van a volver a hacer ahora; siempre perdió [el gobernador tratando de influir].”
leaders has rotated offices among mayor, local ministries, councilmen, Provincial or National Deputies. In Pico Truncado the faction’s power is shared among a broad enough number of political leaders to allow a credible rotation. Even though there is one top leader (Acevedo), there are other capable ones, too (a merit of the faction).

This next example of the first scenario occur when the single faction leader counts on some relevant aspects of personalism besides performance, which has also made him the sole leader above the rest (a situation which more commonly occurs in the province of Formosa). Provincial Deputy Banicevich (PJ, 28 de Noviembre) said: “Yo estaba agotado, 16 años de intendente no es poca cosa. 16 años permanentes... quedó [reemplazándolo como intendente] un compañero que estaba trabajando conmigo… La gente no está de acuerdo con él. Y bueno...me quieren devuelta a mí.” Banicevich’s rule (16 years) did not allow the development of alternative leaders to succeed him in power (it is a narrow base faction).

Next is the second scenario (B1) where PJ factions compete for power. There is competition within the PJ which, while holding a tight fist at the provincial level, allows the party to breath (and also bleed and heal) locally. Provincial Deputy Victoria (PJ, Puerto Santa Cruz) said:

“[La competencia es dentro del PJ] si, totalmente, el radicalismo en Puerto Santa Cruz...desde el año ‘99 que no tiene concejales... [En el ‘95 tenían 1 y ‘99 nada] ...[Son muy peleadas las elecciones] dentro del peronismo si...se dio en estas últimas 3 elecciones ‘95, ‘99,y 2003, que en el caso de intendente la diferencia entre el primero y el segundo no pasaba el 1%, 2%. En una hubo 14 votos de diferencia, en otra 17 y en esta 40. Y eso se está dando en muchos pueblos de la provincia. En Piedrabuena...el actual intendente, dos elecciones atrás ganó por 1 voto.”

PJ is the only game in town as long as the provincial government is in the hands of the PJ and/or the towns are so financially dependent from it.
E.2.1 The case of Perito Moreno

Finally (B2), this next is the only scenario where the UCR was able to win power, detailed by two council people and a “Town” Provincial Deputy of Perito Moreno. Councilman Ojeda (PJ, Perito Moreno) said: “...Bilardo era el candidato fuerte del justicialismo… Y después el resto de la gente hizo una campaña jugando en contra. …la campaña en sí se centró un poco en contra de él, un poco por el desgaste que tiene en la función. Entonces surgen, otras ideas, o que ‘yo lo puedo hacer mejor.’” Eight years in power seemed to be enough and PJ partisans and the opposition coalesced to temporarily oust Bilardo.

Next is councilwoman Ricci (UCR, Perito Moreno) with a hint on their campaign alliance and strategy, or in other words, the opposition found an opportunity to defeat the incumbent mayor’s faction: “...Aparecimos solos porque...veníamos de 8 años de un mismo gobierno y los últimos años, bastante terribles....un muy mal manejo del municipio en cuanto a lo económico....esto era un caos...” “...de hecho nosotros ganamos con [Provincial Deputy] Suárez [PJ]...” Both Ojeda and Ricci referred to “erosion” and the “bad administration of the township” to justify the loss of the incumbent.

Suárez, on the one hand, is himself a case like those mentioned by Victoria (in Puerto Santa Cruz), and Banicevich (in 28 de Noviembre), and the cases of Pico Truncado and Caleta Olivia, where PJ mayors give place to another PJ mayor. On the other hand, however, in 2003 this former mayor allied with the small local UCR machine to defeat his PJ rival. Suárez (PJ Perito Moreno) said: “Yo directamente estoy enfrentado con los que se autodenominan líderes del partido peronista en Perito Moreno [i.e. Bilardo]. He surgido, como en otras ocasiones, por el consenso de la comunidad. Yo, es más, en mi lista no llevaba candidato a intendente.” Moro, the UCR candidate, was the mayoral option. “Lamentablemente habíamos colocado gente joven en la lista
de concejales, no tuvimos el apoyo de la gente. La gente sabrá lo que hace, pero aun así yo me pude imponer [como diputado por pueblo] a las otras listas que estaban con la conducción local del peronismo.” People in Perito Moreno did vote for Suárez, a former mayor, but split their vote giving the UCR mayor a Bilardo’s PJ-dominated city council. This UCR mayoral interregnum only lasted one term.242

The fact that UCR seems to have (and do have) some infrastructure in every town, even though they have little positions of power, makes the UCR a true latent force. Because people judge officials on their performance, when there is a bad incumbent’s performance and, for whatever reason there is discontent in society, then UCR sees the chance of getting those votes “by default” and getting a post, or even winning an election.243

E.3 “Law of Lemas” and disincentives to deflect resources from performance messages (the case of candidates to city council)

Campaigns on the performance of the executives also dominate the tactics in the more competitive elections, where some competition may actually also be from the same party thanks to the “Law of Lemas” electoral system, which forces candidates into avoiding certain messages and effectively tying the city council candidates’ hands not to criticize intra-party competitors which could hurt the party’s fate. For example, Saa said:

“…Se hace hincapié en que el intendente tiene una lista oficial de sus concejales. Pero es difícil también, a la hora de, no se podría marcar mucha diferencia, porque eso también jugaría en contra del intendente.” “…Hay un acuerdo que no está escrito, pero se trata...es un sistema perverso que hace que tengamos que recurrir a no marcar diferencias, a tratar con cuidado al otro candidato [of the same party].” Councilman Saa (UCR, Río Gallegos)

242 A similar “conflict” to the one described by Victoria in Puerto Santa Cruz, and Suárez vs. Bilardo in Perito Moreno, happened in Caleta Olivia between the factions led by former Mayor Córdoba (and his disciple Concilwoman Labado) and PJ National Senator Tito Fernández, who promoted current PJ Mayor Cotillo (and Councilwoman Reynoso).

243 However, in some places, UCR ended up supporting a PJ candidate to channel their force against the incumbent PJ candidate; as was the case recalled by Victoria of the local UCR supporting a PJ mayor.
Their message was then against the incumbent PJ party and the fact that the electoral system allows other same party contestants did not greatly altered the UCR candidate’s message. “Sí, sí, en eso se unieron todos los sublemas en marcar el desmanejo que habían establecido en el último periodo de los justicialistas al frente de la municipalidad.” The “competition” created by the electoral system does not necessarily promote a programmatic competition, but a multiplication of “performance evaluation” voices, and pretty much avoiding confronting with same party competitors (not necessarily a diversity of voices, but simply a “multiplication” of voices).

Often parties present many sublemas, not necessarily because they have different factions, but because the sublemas are incentives and a mechanism to mobilize more militants (Lisoni 2003) and get more votes – As Deputy Aguiar (PJ) said, “son ambiciones personales”; however, PJ has enough resources to fund those many sublemas, UCR does not and will affect the candidates’ ability to mobilize voters.
APPENDIX F:
CENTRALITY TO CAMPAIGNS OF PERFORMANCE STRATEGY – EVIDENCE FROM
NEWSPAPER PUBLICATIONS

Additional evidence to Chapter 6

The following data is taken from newspapers coded by four university students (See Chapter 1). The values of the items coded (publications by national, provincial or local governments, opinion editorials, accusations, replies or other type of publication unedited by the newspaper, and that are NOT party publications) are not averaged and are instead added. Hence, the percentages among cases are the more appropriate values for comparison. The data could be viewed as the "average newspaper issue." I present this as evidence of the centrality to campaigns of performance as a strategy.

First, the data supports claims of the theory, particularly regarding the electoral competitiveness factor. The tables show evidence to support the claim of the influence of the incumbents on newspaper publications regarding performance, and the resultant bias and/ or relative dependence of the printed media. There is little negative performance publication towards the incumbents in districts with low competitiveness and considerably more negative evaluations of the incumbents in competitive districts.

In Table F.1, the provincial and municipal government performance publications represent a clear majority of all publication in this category in Santa Cruz (61%) and only a small minority in Capital Federal (7.4%). This supports the theoretical claim that in district with low electoral competitiveness (Santa Cruz and Formosa), performance as a strategy is more central than in districts with high competiveness (Capital Federal.)
Furthermore, the data also support the theoretical expectation that we will find more negative evaluations (and more use of resources) in districts with more electoral competitiveness than in those with less. Hence, we see that there are few “accusations/criticisms" publications in the districts with little electoral competitiveness (6% in Formosa and 12% in Santa Cruz) and considerably more incidence of them in districts with high competitiveness (48% in Capital Federal, 28% in Catamarca, and 21% in Mendoza); there are few opposition publications in Formosa and in Santa Cruz.

In Table F.2 the provincial government publications (public works deeds) indicate that in the smaller provinces (Santa Cruz, Formosa and Catamarca), the governments sustain the newspapers financially and drive the performance campaigns. This is evidence to the interviewees' claims that in Santa Cruz and Formosa newspapers are biased towards the provincial governments. In Santa Cruz 75.4% of this type of publication is about the government inauguration of infrastructure (58.7% in Formosa and 60.5% Catamarca). Yet, in Catamarca, which is an electorally competitive district, the “accusations” are high (28.4% in Table 6.5) as a display of openness or at least competitiveness in the media. Finally, Table F.3 evaluates the positive, neutral or negative view of the incumbents on this type of publications, which is also an indicator of the competitiveness and the incumbent’s performance evaluations. More competitive districts show a more negative view of incumbents in general (e.g. 56% in Capital Federal, 42% in Mendoza and 32% in Catamarca). Publications tend to be positive toward the incumbent in district with low competitiveness (79% in Santa Cruz and Formosa).
### TABLE F.1:

**SUBTYPE OF PUBLICATIONS IN NEWSPAPERS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Theme</th>
<th>Catamarca</th>
<th>Capital Federal</th>
<th>Mendoza</th>
<th>Formosa</th>
<th>Santa Cruz</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N</td>
<td>Percent</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>Percent</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nat.Gov.Publication</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>12.3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prov.Gov.Publicat.</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>40.7</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>21.1</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local Gov.Publicat.</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accusation</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>28.4</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>48.1</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reply</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>21.1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paid announcement</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>21.1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### TABLE F.2:

**CONTENTS OF PUBLICATIONS IN NEWSPAPERS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Theme</th>
<th>Catamarca</th>
<th>Capital Federal</th>
<th>Mendoza</th>
<th>Formosa</th>
<th>Santa Cruz</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N</td>
<td>Percent</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>Percent</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infrastructure inauguration</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>60.5</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>44.4</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Project announcement</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>13.6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Call for bids for public works project</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social or economic successes</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>22.2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other achievement</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not relevant</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>15.8</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>System</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>63</td>
<td>100</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### TABLE F.3:

**BIAS TOWARDS THE INCUMBENTS OF PUBLICATIONS IN NEWSPAPERS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Effect/ Evaluation</th>
<th>Catamarca</th>
<th>Capital Federal</th>
<th>Mendoza</th>
<th>Formosa</th>
<th>Santa Cruz</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N</td>
<td>Percent</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>Percent</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NEGATIVE</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>32.1</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>55.6</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NEUTRAL</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POSITIVE</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>61.7</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
APPENDIX G:
MAPS AND PHOTOGRAPHS

Next are maps (approved by the *Instituto Geografico Nacional*) of Argentina and the four provinces where I did field research. The names of cities where I conducted interviews are indicated (not italicized), as well as other relevant locations. The shown photographs are descriptive of characteristics described through the dissertation.

![Map of Argentina](image)

Figure G.1: Map of Argentina
Figure G.2: Province Of Santa Cruz And Locations Of Relevance

Patagonian landscape near Perito Moreno; oil well near Pico Truncado.
Figure G.3: Province Of Formosa And Locations Of Relevance

Pictures description clockwise: Ibarreta’s main street; visiting doctors in a rural school near Las Lomitas; office of the mayor in El Colorado (See Perón, Evita and Gov. Infrán); old campaign ads in Las Lomitas.
Figure G.4: Province Of Mendoza And Locations Of Relevance
Figure G.5: Province Of Catamarca And Locations Of Relevance

Typical mountainous terrain and church near Fray M. Esquiú.


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Ministerio de Trabajo, Argentina; www.trabajo.gov.ar/