STRAATEGIES OF DOMINATION: UNCERTAINTY, LOCAL INSTITUTIONS, 
AND THE POLITICS OF FOREIGN RULE

Abstract

by

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While many have illustrated the poor track record of armed state-building projects abroad, few have asked why powerful states choose to employ this costly strategy given its inherent drawbacks. If institution-building strategies frequently fail to achieve their objectives, why do powerful states ever engage in the calamitous practice? This dissertation asks two interrelated questions: What determines a foreign ruler’s choice of strategy following armed intervention, and why do foreign rulers often fail to plan post-intervention strategies prior to the arrival of troops on the ground? I argue that pre-existing institutional strength of local territories largely guides major powers strategic choices following armed intervention, regardless of the foreign ruler’s prior goals and preferences. Second, uncertainty prior to armed intervention inhibits assessment of local contexts and prevents selection of a foreign rule strategy until after troops have arrived in the foreign territory. Only once the foreign ruler’s military intervenes into the foreign territory can the foreign ruler assess the strength of the local institutions in the territory and their suitability for meeting their goals.

To test my argument, I use a mixed-methods research design that comprises both quantitative testing of my argument across time and space with in depth case studies to trace my hypothesized causal processes. I first broadly test my claims using an original dataset of over 160 cases of foreign rule, which includes original data collection
and coding of foreign rule strategies across all cases. I then use a most-similar case design to carry out a structured paired comparison of the American interventions in Mexico and Dominican Republic under President Woodrow Wilson. Given the similarity between the cases in terms of time period, region, and international conditions, only the differences in local institutional strength between the cases remains as a plausible explanatory variable that can explain the variation in strategy. Combined, this dissertation illustrates the crucial importance local institutional strength plays in determining both the content and timing of a powerful state’s foreign rule strategy.
For Barbara J. Denison
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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Writing a dissertation is a demanding and rewarding endeavor that could not have been completed without the support of many people along the way. My biggest thanks must go to my excellent dissertation committee, Michael Desch, Sebastian Rosato, and Tanisha Fazal. First, Mike Desch has been invaluable in guiding me through the dissertation process and has been a strong supporter of my ideas from an early stage. His passion for supporting me as a thinker and a scholar has been invaluable and he continues to push me to live up to his high expectations. Sebastian Rosato consistently provided sound insights into my project and encouraged me to think more systematically and precisely about international politics. Tanisha Fazal has been a relentless supporter and consistently provided sharp comments about my work that has pushed me to think creatively about interesting research questions. I would also like to thank Michael Coppedge who has been useful to work with as a co-author and learn from on how to carry out data gathering and sound quantitative research that was instrumental for the quantitative chapter of this dissertation.

I must also thank Jasen Castillo and Chris Layne from Texas A&M University for encouraging me to embark on a Ph.D. program and helping to foster my early ideas about the military occupations and military intervention in a systematic way. Additionally, Vladimir Matic at Clemson University was the first to introduce me as a undergraduate student to questions of the legitimacy and efficacy of intervention through his wonderful courses on international politics, foreign policy and the Balkans. His study abroad program in Belgrade changed my academic and personal interests, fostering the earliest passion to study international politics at the graduate
level.

I must also thank the professors who helped foster my ideas as an early graduate student at Notre Dame, especially Gary Goertz, Guillermo Trejo, Victoria Hui, Alexandra Guisinger, Geoffrey Layman, Dan Lindley, and Monika Nalepa. I would also like to give a special thank you to Anieka Johnson and Julie Logue who have been exceptionally supportive in many different ways over the years at Notre Dame. Additionally the support from the Notre Dame International Security Center, the Kellogg Institute for International Affairs and the Nanovic Institute has been invaluable in this process, and I want to thank them for their continued efforts in supporting my work.

I have also been lucky to have the benefits of excellent feedback from various scholars at various conferences and workshops including Elizabeth Saunders, Paul MacDonald, Lindsey O’Rourke, Kenneth Schultz, Kimberly Marten, David Edelstein, Hendrick Spruyt, Jelena Subotic, Dan Nexon, Paul Musgrave, Joshua Kertzer, and Alex Cooley. Without their comments on various stages of this project, it would not have improved as much as it has. I must also thank the discussants and fellow panel members at APSA, ISA, IQMR, and the Harvard International Security Conference for their feedback that made this project immensely better.

My classmates and friends at Notre Dame also provided much support during this dissertation writing process, and made me fortunate to have such a strong intellectual community at Notre Dame. In particular Lucia Tiscornia, Fernando Bizzarro, Justin McDevitt, Maggie Shum, Tahir Kilavuz, Ana Petrova, Rita Konaev, Ilaria Schnyder, Chiara Bernardini and many others made my time at Notre Dame more enjoyable, and I could not have completed this dissertation without their friendship.

While writing a dissertation can be a lonely process, I was lucky to share this journey with my best friend and better half, Lucia Manzi. Beyond helping me to make my arguments sharper, she persistently inspired me with her passion for learning and
excitement for understanding politics. Her support for my ideas, interest in my hectic travel itineraries to visit occupation sights in Italy and the Balkans, and her drive to push me to keep believing in myself has been invaluable. Sharing this adventure with her has only improved my own work and added much joy to my life. I am lucky to finish my time at Notre Dame not only with a doctorate, but with a partner for many years to come.

Finally, this dissertation would not have been possible without my mother, who served as a tireless advocate for my education from a young age, and promoted a passion for reading and studying whatever topic I found most interesting. She always found ways to promote my interest in understanding the world more completely. From allowing me to visit Thailand in high school, to supporting a 20 year old who wanted to study abroad in Serbia, to traveling with her to Spain and Iceland, her support for expanding my interest in international affairs has been profound. This dissertation is dedicated to her and all of the support she has given over the many years leading to this moment.
CHAPTER 1
THE PUZZLE OF FOREIGN RULE STRATEGY

“Many specific means of achieving these goals are being worked out now. Many can only be developed once Saddam’s regime is gone. To a large extent, the means to these goals will depend on things outside our current control. We do not know, for instance, what damage Saddam Hussein’s regime may inflict on the Iraqi people in the regime’s last gasps. We do not know what we’ll find on the ground once the regime is gone.”
– Condoleezza Rice¹

1.1 Strategizing for an Iraqi Adventure

Following the 2003 invasion of Iraq, the coalition forces in Baghdad faced a conundrum. Prior to the launching of the invasion of Iraq, American military planners were confident in the ability of American troops to win a decisive victory in Iraq and oust the Ba’athist regime of Saddam Hussein in relatively short order. However while there was recognition that the post-Saddam period would require a transition to a new regime, the American planners were uncertain of the exact plans necessary to achieve their political goals.² To be clear, American planners did invest modest resources into thinking about the broad contours of a postwar Iraq, which included parallel planning processes occurring in the United States Central Command (CENTCOM), the

¹Rice (2003)

²Many have argued that the Bush Administration’s political goals for Iraq were targeted at a variety of different outcomes. These included removing Saddam Hussein from power, destroying Iraqi weapons of mass destruction, bringing democracy to the Middle East, aiding in the War on Terror, and even just asserting the military power of the United States. For various discussions concerning the types of political goals posited by Bush administration officials, see Jervis (2003); Mazarr (2007); Schmidt and Williams (2008); Kaufmann (2004); Packer (2005); Ricks (2006).
Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), the State Department, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), and the National Security Council (NSC), among other agencies. Each of these institutions attempted to think broadly and to formulate some plans for the post-invasion period; most notably, this included the State Department’s ‘Future of Iraq’ program, which enlisted the help of Iraqi opposition leaders and exiles to plan for the postwar period (Bensahel et al., 2008, 31-33). Yet even with these discussions across a variety of contexts, detailed and well-defined plans for the post-invasion period did not emerge. Instead the coalition forces were left waiting for the military mission to conclude before determining the appropriate strategy for the post-invasion period.  

While this planning process included some parts of the American defense bureaucracy that argued that the invasion would require a lengthy occupation to rebuild the state (Crane and Terrill, 2003), most others on the NSC and in the Defense Department argued that it would be most prudent to engage in a quick turnover to Iraqi opposition parties. This meant maintaining the current bureaucratic landscape of the Iraqi state while transitioning to a new regime. Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld and the Department of Defense sought to limit “the military’s postwar role in Iraq” so as to prevent in Iraq a “culture of dependency that had taken root in other post-conflict interventions” (Bowen, 2009, 8). While this was the default position in many agencies tasked with planning, in the end, “disagreements about the postwar plan remained unresolved right up to the invasion...[which] arose from differing assessments of prewar conditions in Iraq and what the consequences of deposing Saddam would be” (Bowen, 2009, 4). As the invasion was launched, neither the invasion force, the

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3In fact, CENTCOM only finalized OPLAN IRAQI RECONSTRUCTION in April 2003, which was after the complete takeover of Baghdad and the looting of the city had already begun (Bensahel et al., 2008, 10).

4This arose from a certain interpretation of the Clinton Administration’s interventions and foreign rule missions in the Balkans during the 1990s, where the continued presence of American forces in the territory was seen as a weakness by many Bush administration officials.
Department of Defense, the State Department, USAID, the Office for Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance for Iraq (ORHA), or any other institution had a firm grasp of exactly what plans would be implemented in the immediate aftermath of a successful invasion. What plans did exist optimistically assumed that the United States would be welcomed as liberators, and the Iraqi military would provide security and stability in the postwar environment.5

However, after capturing Baghdad and proclaiming that the mission was accomplished, American military commanders and Bush administration officials recognized that they faced a major problem. While they realized the need for a post-intervention strategy to transition Iraq to a non-Ba’athist regime, it was clear that the tentative planning that did exist prior to the invasion was inadequate for the conditions they were facing. The on-the-ground realities did not conform to the expectations of a quick turnover to Iraqi leaders and institutions. The tentative plans built by OSD and CENTCOM called for a light post-invasion footprint that would depose important party leaders and keep the majority of institutions and military in place to help transition to a more American friendly leader (Gordon and Trainor, 2006, 176-178).6 American planners for the foreign rule mission had “assumed that the most senior levels of ministry leadership – the minister and a few senior Ba’athists – could be replaced without substantially undermining the work of the ministries. The large civil service staffs in the ministries would keep them running under new leadership. As Condoleezza Rice expressed the concept, ‘we would defeat the army, but the in-

5As Bensahel et al. (2008, xxvii) explain “planning was based on a set of optimistic assumptions that was never seriously challenged: that the military campaign would have a decisive end and would produce a stable security environment; that U.S. forces would be greeted as liberators; that Iraq’s government ministries would remain intact and continue to administer the country; and that local forces, particularly the police and the regular army, would be capable of providing law and order.”

6Chandrasekaran (2006a, 69-71) portrays this debate as more about the competing visions of different agencies, but illustrates that the plans for expansive de-Ba’athification did not occur until Bremer arrived in Baghdad.
stitutions would hold” (Dobbins, 2009, 107-108). However, the conditions that the initial planners assumed would exist in the broader Iraqi bureaucracy did not materialize, and this planning process proved divorced from local conditions they found themselves in. Prior to the invasion “little understanding was shown about the nature of the Iraqi state, and whether its administrative mechanisms would be able or reliable enough to manage the demands of a post-conflict situation” (Allawi, 2008, 96-97). Even after the recognition that a cohesive postwar strategy was needed and as different agencies competed over different plans for how to manage the postwar period, or more importantly, which agency was to manage the postwar period, the assumptions about local institutions continued to drive the strategic decision-making process. There was supreme confidence in the ability to find welcoming locals, strong bureaucrats, and returning exiles that would want to rebuild the Iraqi state. Prior to the invasion, there was not much consideration of the possibility that the Iraqi centralized bureaucracy would not be strong and functional.

While the initial planning focused on maintaining current institutions, when Paul Bremer and the Coalition Provisional Authority took sovereign authority over the Iraqi state and surveyed the post-invasion local landscape it became clear that simply changing leaders in Iraq would not succeed as they had hoped. The pre-intervention discussions of strategy did not foresee the local landscape that was present in Iraq after the fall of Saddam. As Undersecretary of Defense Feith claimed, “the changing situation on the ground led us to a different analytical conclusion than what we had come to in March” (Dobbins, 2009, 57). Rather than a strong bureaucratic state that was run by a misguided and devious leader, one visitor to Baghdad reported back that Americans are “confronting a much more difficult problem than a traditional post-conflict reconstruction challenge. Iraq is also a completely failed economy. The CPA is confronting the equivalent of both a defeated Germany in 1945 and a failed Soviet Union in 1989” (Dobbins, 2009, 198). In order to achieve their political goals,
the United States needed to build new, stronger institutions, a mission that the American foreign rulers had not initially ever intended. President Bush had directly campaigned during his Presidential run against institution-building missions, and in a now apocryphal and foreshadowing conversation, prior to the invasion and Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld told OHRA head Jay Garner that “if you think we’re going to spend a billion dollars of our money over there, you are sadly mistaken” (Bowen, 2009, 42). Even as Garner, CENTCOM Commander General Tommy Franks, and others considered how to implement a quick turnover to Iraqi authorities and withdraw of the majority of the invasion force, as initially intended, local conditions held sway and did not permit the use of a quick leadership strategy. When faced with the poor state of local institutions and the collapsed bureaucracies after trying to work with current institutions, it became clear that institution-building was required, regardless of the initial goals.

Thus, as Bremer and the CPA took sovereign authority and declared that “the CPA shall exercise powers of government temporarily in order to provide for the effective administration of Iraq during the period of transitional administration” (Coalition Provisional Authority, 2003), it became clear that an institution-building strategy in Iraq was necessary for American foreign rulers to achieve their political goals. After investing resources in planning for a quick transition to local Iraqi leaders and a military force structure and drawdown schedule that assumed a quick victory and without long-term occupation, these initial plans did not hold up once the military was actually on the ground and could assess for themselves the local conditions in Iraq. The tentative prewar planning that assumed a functioning bureaucratic state

7 Bilmes and Stiglitz (2008) calculated in 2008 that the Iraq conflict would cost over three trillion dollars in economic impact on the United States. This includes future economic obligations for veterans’ medical care.

8 Allawi (2008, 118) highlights in particular the lack of local governance in provinces once the centralized state apparatus collapsed, as “during the Ba’ath regime, a system operated that was highly centralized, where no local decisions could be made without reference to the relevant min-
was completely inadequate for the situation the American foreign rulers found once arriving into the territory. Finally, with the signing of CPA orders Number 1 and Number 2, which effectively disbanded the Iraqi military and ordered the destruction of Ba’athist state institutions as part of the process of de-Ba’athification, the lengthy institution-building mission was fully underway.

Reflecting on American choices in 2003, a few concrete questions emerge. Why did the United States begin a mission of institution-building after President Bush during his presidential campaign claimed he did not want to do nation-building (Dobbins, 2003, 89)? Given the difficulties faced following the collapse of Baghdad, why did the United States’ military forces not possess a cohesive and comprehensive plan for the post-invasion period that reflected the local conditions they would find in Baghdad? Why did the United States think that they would be welcomed as liberators, and that they could successfully rely on overseas dissidents to run the Iraqi bureaucracy immediately after deposing Saddam? These questions prompt us to ask how we should think more broadly about how major powers develop their strategies for managing the post-intervention period and managing foreign rule missions more broadly. Rather than taking planning and strategy as a set object, understanding the determinants of the strategy for the foreign rule period is crucial to understanding both the processes and the effects that strategy can have on foreign rule missions.

Recognizing the crucial importance of foreign rule strategy as highlighted by the Iraq experience, this dissertation engages two interrelated and deceptively complex questions: What determines a major power’s choice of strategy when engaging in foreign rule following an armed intervention? And, given the importance of the post-intervention period for future stability and achieving political outcomes, why do foreign rulers rarely decide upon a strategy prior to the decision to intervene? I
argue that local institution strength, and the inherent uncertainty that foreign rulers possess over local institutions, provides the answer to both of these questions and drives the choice of strategy for foreign rule missions. Local institutional strength and local contexts in general are a crucially understudied variable when thinking about strategic decision-making. Understanding the importance of local institutions can help answer why major powers sometimes replace leaders after armed intervention while at other times foreign rulers choose to change institutions when engaging in foreign rule, i.e., why did Bremer and others decide to rebuild institutions in Iraq instead of working with existing bureaucrats and Iraqi state structures as was initially planned? Through this dissertation, answers emerge for each of these questions and provides a lens through which we can explain these seemingly puzzling strategic decision-making processes. It highlights the vital importance of local institutional strength in explaining the politics of foreign rule more broadly, while illustrating how strategy is contingent on local conditions, not just preferences of major powers.

1.2 The Puzzle of Foreign Rule Strategy

What makes the choice of foreign rule strategy puzzling? Reflecting on the history of the foreign rule mission in Iraq, a few key puzzles emerge that illustrate the importance of foreign rule strategy for understanding the politics of foreign rule missions more broadly. First, unfortunately for the planners of the American foreign rule mission in Iraq, when faced with the actual postwar landscape, the plans for a quick invasion and simple postwar mission to set up a stable and non-threatening regime in Baghdad did not come to fruition. Instead, the United States is still dealing with the long-term ramifications of the Iraq invasion, and the associated costs that are trillions of dollars and thousands of causalities higher than ever expected (Bilmes and Stiglitz, 2008). However, the difficulties associated with the foreign rule operation in Iraq highlights a crucial puzzle behind armed interventionism and foreign rule
missions across time more broadly. While the United States’ foreign rule mission in Iraq had created a particularly large set of negative externalities, the Iraq foreign rule operation is not as unique as many would like to think. As I illustrate below, foreign rulers have engaged in lengthy institution-building missions with surprising regularity since 1898. Over 160 cases of foreign rule have occurred since 1898, and yet the track record for foreign rule missions using institutional strategies over this time period is quite poor. Even when states claim that they will no longer engage in these institution-building projects, various international crises or temptations propel states to set up these missions. The disconnect between the lack of success and the number of continued attempts is a puzzle to be explained.

In the specific case of the United States, the American military has engaged in foreign rule mission with amazing consistency since the 1848 Mexican-American War. However, even with the continued regularity of these missions, the record of success in engaging in foreign rule, especially when using institutional strategies, is just as poor as every other state’s track record. Even worse, the military often fails to incorporate the lessons of previous missions into future foreign rule missions, and the strategy for the postwar phase continues to be relegated to later planning. Recognizing that warfare is focused on political objectives, Schadlow (2017, 1-12) highlights

9As Lake (2016, 16) states, “The fact is that the failure of statebuilding is overdetermined.” For a sample of the evidence concerning the general lack of success among institution-building missions, see Lake and Fariss (2014); Edelstein (2008); Downes and O’Rourke (2016); Downes and Monten (2013); Coyne (2008); Tansey (2014); Monten (2014); Grävingholt, Leininger and von Haldenwang (2012); Barnett, Fang and Zürcher (2014).

10I argue that part of this problem is that states seek to avoid the normative connotations of certain international legal definitions that try to define and limit foreign institution-building in the wake of concerns with colonial rule and military occupations in the 19th and 20th centuries (Denison, 2017a).

11To be clear, this is not a unique phenomenon of American foreign policy. These dynamics are a regular feature of foreign rule missions carried out by all major powers, as illustrated in future chapters of this dissertation.

12Schadlow (2017) gives the definitive treatment on the American foreign rule tradition and the inability to learn from previous foreign rule missions.
how frequently foreign rule operations can fail to achieve their political goals. While
in many armed interventions the stronger military power is often successful in the
initial military strike, the political objectives that the major power is attempting to
achieve remain elusive. Why states continue to impose foreign rule via armed force
without understanding how it can translate into political success is a major puzzle.\textsuperscript{13}
Beyond the United States, foreign rule missions are common features of major powers
worldwide, as major powers seek to use armed force to achieve political objectives of
various types. Yet, evidence continues to mount that when it comes to engaging in
armed institution-building, failure is more likely than success.

Thus a puzzle remains where it seems that rational states should be resistant to
using institution-building strategies given their costly nature and ineffectiveness, and
yet major powers continue to use these strategies frequently in various foreign rule
missions across time and different geographic contexts. As the scholarly evidence
concerning the difficulties surrounding armed institution-building missions continues
to grow, one must ask why major powers would ever pursue such strategies, given
the likelihood of failure? If major powers pursue their objectives rationally, why
would states ever attempt to build new institutions in their foreign dependencies
given the high cost in both blood and treasure?\textsuperscript{14} We have strong evidence that
armed interventions usually lead to worse economic conditions, more conflictual re-
lationships, and higher likelihood of civil wars in the targeted territory, among other

\textsuperscript{13}As Clausewitz (1976, 87) famously argues, using armed force is “a true political instrument,
a continuation of political intercourse, carried on with other means.” Why major powers cannot
achieve their political goals with armed force in certain cases of foreign rule is a puzzle across many
domains.

\textsuperscript{14}Similar questions have been asked about peripheral wars in a variety of contexts, or specifically,
why would major power continue to invest resources in what appears to be failing peripheral inter-
ventions. The answers that do exist however almost always focus on domestic features of the major
power and do not consider local conditions abroad. For some examples see Taliaferro (2004); Fearon
(1997); Tomz (2007); Gelb and Betts (1979).
negative externalities.\textsuperscript{15} And yet, they are still regularly attempted across all time periods, even given the likelihood that these missions will not achieve the lofty political goals major powers seek of them. The blood and treasure associated with these lengthy institution-building missions rarely seems worth it and indeed we find compelling evidence that they missions rarely succeed.\textsuperscript{16} Moreover, given the empirical track record of these missions, the regular recurrence even after major powers commit to never engaging in institution-building again is striking. Thus there must be a sound explanation for the regular recurrence of these foreign rule missions, even when states are resistant to engage in them and have natural preferences to avoid foreign institution-building.

A second puzzle that the Iraq case highlights is related to the strategic planning process for foreign rule missions. Given the resources that are involved in many of these foreign rule missions and the effects they can have on the foreign ruler’s military, it is unclear as to why foreign rulers do not undertake more planning to ensure they can avoid employing strategies they are not predisposed to prefer.\textsuperscript{17} While militaries are naturally resistant to planning for foreign rule periods, it is odd that more planning does not occur given the problems militaries have had in the past.\textsuperscript{18} Even with the clear importance of this work for the political goals of foreign rulers, “military and political leaders have consistently failed to devote appropriate attention

\textsuperscript{15}For a sample of the various negative externalities associated with institution-building missions, see Downes and O’Rourke (2016); Downes and Monten (2013); Peic and Reiter (2011); Lake (2016).

\textsuperscript{16}Of course, the post-World War II cases are notable exceptions. However, as discussed later in this dissertation, the local contexts there may have made these unique missions. For more on this logic see Monten (2014).

\textsuperscript{17}Some have argued that a focus on counterinsurgency operations and statebuilding missions has a deleterious effects on the preparedness for militaries for conventional wars. For example see Gentile (2009); Biddle and Friedman (2008); Porch (2013). For a contrasting view see Quackenbush and Murdie (2015).

\textsuperscript{18}For a quick overview of how the US military in practice was resistant to planning for foreign rule periods, see Carafano (2002, 10-22).
and resources for the political requirements of foreign rule missions (Schadlow, 2017, 2). Why do foreign rulers and their militaries not invest more in planning, so as to understand the challenges that local environments might provide? Simple resistance to postwar planning is not a satisfying answer, since there is good empirical evidence that carrying out these institution-building missions can have negative impacts on the foreign ruler’s military over a long period. For example, Nasser’s decision to engage in a foreign rule mission in Yemen nearly destroyed the Egyptian military and lead to poor performance in future wars with Israel (Ferris, 2013), causing irreparable harm to their interests and status as a regional power. Hence militaries should embrace planning, yet they rarely do.

If billions of dollars or major military casualties are at stake, then logically, militaries should prioritize planning for the foreign rule period. And yet we have evidence in many cases that planning for the postwar or post-intervention period is largely left until after troops have arrived on the ground. While we do have evidence of major powers recognizing that the resistance to planning for the postwar period is a problem, the issue continues to exist even after being identified by the military as an issue (Flavin, 2003). However, if more emphasis on planning for postwar periods was all that was necessary to achieve success in these foreign rule missions, it would be more readily instituted and we should see more investment in planning prior to any armed intervention. Thus given the common critiques of institution-building missions for their frequent poor planning, there must be an explanation for why the reticence to plan continues unabated even when identified as a problem. Similar to above, explaining the regular recurrence of the lack of planning for many of these missions then is an empirical puzzle that requires a satisfying answer. Recognition that the type of planning that can be done is constrained by uncertainty over local conditions

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19A good example of lack of planning being identified as a problem, but then not subsequently fixed, can been seen in Shultz Jr’s (1993) analysis of the American foreign rule mission in Panama.
might be a useful step to take, and provide an answer to this puzzle.

Third, the Iraq case highlights another puzzle related to foreign rule strategy across a variety of contexts and foreign rule mission more broadly: given the power balances involved between a foreign ruler and a local territory, it is theoretically surprising that major powers often find it difficult to project their power from afar and successfully complete foreign rule missions.\textsuperscript{20} One would assume that foreign rulers could conceivably find successful strategies to use their power to achieve their political goals in weaker territories. However if power was sufficient to achieve political goals in armed interventions, the empirical record for successful foreign rule missions should be much higher than it is.\textsuperscript{21} While in foreign rule missions the power differentials are often quite lopsided, where the foreign ruler possesses much more material power than the local territory, the former can still have difficulty projecting their sovereign authority over the territory and achieving their political ends. Hence, if power is not sufficient to achieve political goals in far away military interventions, this raises important questions about local conditions and how they impact and structure military missions abroad. While at times there is a supreme confidence in major powers that their material strength can be translated into political success on the ground, this often occurs without examination of the prudence of that statement. Power is focused on military outcomes and not thought to depend on local contexts, however the puzzling regularity in which powerful states cannot translate material power into political outcomes is important to reflect upon.

Indeed, in a variety of literatures we have sound evidence that trying to impose political order across a territory is more difficult than simply having more mate-

\textsuperscript{20}For how scholars have thought about power asymmetry and conflict, see Mack (1975); Arreguin-Toft (2001); Sullivan (2007).

\textsuperscript{21}As MacDonald (2014) has noted, the track record of major powers engaging in foreign rule is not as spectacular as one would expect given the power imbalances present. While MacDonald is interested in a concept he terms peripheral conquest, this is similar to my conceptualization of foreign rule.
rial power. For instance, the state formation literature addresses how state capacity and strength is built across territories and the difficulty many stronger actors can have in extending their rule.\textsuperscript{22} Translating material power into control over a larger territory is difficult, and while material power could achieve some goals, extending political rule is more of a challenge. Similarly, scholars of counterinsurgency and unconventional war, which often are a component of a broader foreign rule missions, have identified that asymmetries in material power are often less important than asymmetries in interests, time, or other factors in determining success.\textsuperscript{23} Similarly in foreign rule missions, local conditions and local factors might force foreign rulers to use different strategies than they initially intended, and that has important implications for how we think about power in international politics. And yet just like how counterinsurgency theorists talk about major power having to re-learn counterinsurgency strategies (Tomes, 2004; Kilcullen, 2006; Burton and Nagl, 2008), foreign rulers seem to forget and have to re-learn the lessons that material power is not sufficient to achieve political goals. Hence this remains a puzzle as to why these lessons are forgotten and what is driving this continued inability of material power to achieve political goals in foreign rule missions. Saying that mistakes or irrationality can explain this failure to learn from previous missions of foreign rule is unsatisfying.

Finally, combining aspects of all of the above puzzles, it is notable that the Iraqi mission of foreign rule highlights how, rather than being a unique military mission, the Iraqi foreign rule mission is actually part of a regularly recurring phenomena. States have engaged in foreign rule missions across all periods of history – including foreign imposed regime change missions (FIRC), military occupations, mandates and trusts, territorial administrations, and peacekeeping operations – with amazing reg-

\textsuperscript{22}For various arguments on the difficulty of extending political order across territories see Herbst (2000); Kurtz (2013); Tilly (1993); Mann (1984, 2008); Soifer (2008) and Fukuyama (2014).

\textsuperscript{23}For more on this argument see Mazarr (2008); Mack (1975); Simpson (2010); Schuurman (2011); Arreguín-Toft (2012); Arreguín-Toft (2001); Souleimanov and Aliyev (2015).
ularity. Whether in periods of great power war, imperial expansion, or humanitarian protection, there always seems to be some justification that drives major powers to attempt and engage in foreign rule missions. And while our understanding of the nature of foreign rule has changed overtime, it seems that the strategies major powers use when imposing foreign rule have largely remained the same. Despite this consistency, we know very little about what leads states to pursue various strategies when they are carrying out their foreign rule missions. While the choice of institutional or leadership strategies can greatly impact the effectiveness of foreign rule operations and have sweeping consequences for the territory under foreign rule, there has been scant attention paid to why certain foreign rulers choose different strategies at different times.\(^{24}\) Yet without a complete understanding of the origins of foreign rule strategies, we cannot fully understand the challenges facing foreign rulers and the perils associated with ruling territory from afar.

This dissertation seeks to explain these empirical and theoretical puzzles by exploring the choice of strategy when major powers engage in foreign rule. Rather than existing as four separate puzzles that require different explanations, this dissertation seeks to show how these puzzles are all emblematic of the choices and dilemmas faced by foreign rulers across a variety of time periods and locales. When engaging in foreign rule after armed intervention, foreign rulers are required to determine the strategy that would best achieve their political goals. Once the decision is made to launch an armed intervention and institute a foreign rule mission, foreign rulers are required to ascertain local contexts in order to determine what strategy is required. I argue then that due to the importance of local conditions in determining strategy, coupled with the difficulty in assessing local institutions from afar, states continu-

\(^{24}\)For example, Peic and Reiter (2011) examine the strategy states engage in in FIRCs and how that strategy impacts the likelihood of civil war in the targeted state. Downes and Monten (2013) also examine how strategies states take in FIRCs can impact the likelihood of a democratic transition in the targeted state.
ally utilize foreign rule strategies that are different from their preferred strategy and intended type of military operation. Understanding how states determine the best means to achieve their political ends after engaging in armed intervention is crucial to understanding all of these interrelated puzzles, and foreign rule missions more completely.

1.3 The Argument in Brief

What drives the choice of strategy in foreign rule missions? Why do foreign rulers sometimes replace leaders and at other times replace institutions? What factors determine these strategic choices and the decision-making process? I argue that contrary to the conventional wisdom, local conditions and the strength of local institutions largely determine foreign rule strategies, rather than the goals and preferences in the foreign ruler’s capital. Instead of opting for the preferred strategies of an individual leader or government, I argue that all foreign rulers prefer to work with capable leaders and existing local institutions, using leadership strategies when possible. Replacing leaders can allow foreign rulers to achieve their political goals more cost-effectively because it allows for a smaller military footprint. Hence, if the local territory possesses capable leaders and relatively strong local institutions, the foreign ruler will seek to install a new leader and work with existing institutions to accomplish their political goals, thereby allowing the foreign ruler to remove their troops from the territory quickly. It is the strength of the local institutions in the foreign territory determines whether the newly installed agent can effectively and capably govern the territory. If local institutions are weak or fragile, then the foreign ruler is required to build new institutions in order to meet their political goals, regardless of the possible local leaders in the territory. Weak local institutions prevent the for-

25 Principally, this is in contrast to the argument put forth by Saunders (2011) who argues that differences in individual leaders and how they view threats determines their strategy for intervention.
eign ruler from having the opportunity to delegate their goals to the existing local institutions and leave the territory quickly. Instead, the foreign ruler is compelled to utilize institutional strategies and engage in an institution-building mission, even when they had no intention to begin one in the first place. Thus, foreign rulers opt to use institutional strategies when the local institutional context mandates such, even when they never intended to use an institutional strategy prior to engaging in armed intervention.

Furthermore, local institutions also help determine the capacity of armed resistance in local territories, and how foreign rulers use strategy to avoid exacerbating that resistance. Stronger local institutions possess higher levels of latent armed resistance capacity, making it more costly for foreign rulers to depose institutions when they achieve their political goals through leadership strategies. In addition, weaker institutions can both possess less latent resistance capacity, but could also imply that there is no capacity to defeat an on-going resistance movement. Such situations require institutions to be built before the political goals can be achieved. In total, institutional strength largely guides the choice of strategy given the desire of foreign rulers to accomplish their political goals as cost-effectively as possible.

In the Iraq case, evidence of these mechanisms is present. American planners initially preferred a leadership strategy, attempting to maintain the bureaucratic apparatus of the state while removing the top level Ba’athists in power. In the American planners’ minimal preparation, they assumed that a leadership strategy could succeed as they laid it out “because it was premised on the notion that Iraqi governmental institutions would emerge from the war reasonably intact” (Bowen, 2009, 45). To the extent that there was a defined plan, it was “structured in belief that the Iraqi administration would remain in place, any American occupation would be short lived, and the main challenge would be dealing with the consequences of the use of weapons of mass destruction and other war related damage” (Dobbins,
However, this prewar vision of the foreign rule mission in Iraq did not live up to its promise. The conditions policymakers found on the ground after victory superseded the limited amount of pre-invasion planning that did take place for the foreign rule mission. Upon arriving in Baghdad, the American foreign rulers found that “Iraq’s infrastructure had been relatively unaffected by the war, but it was badly run down by years of mismanagement...Prewar American planning had called for fixing only what the invasion had broken. It soon became evident, however, that a much vaster program of reconstruction was called for” (Dobbins, 2009, xxvii-xviii). Because of the weak institutional environment that the United States found in the territory, the United States was unable to achieve its initial preference for a short-term leadership strategy mission. Instead, institution-building was required to achieve the political goals of the American foreign rule mission, and relegated pre-war preferences to tertiary importance.

Given the initial unwillingness of the United States to even discuss rebuilding institutions or engaging in a lengthy institution-building mission in the run up to the invasion, it is a puzzle as to why they would subsequently undertake one. I argue, however, that uncertainty and the fog of intervention prevent prior assessment of local institutions and postpones the selection of strategy until after the foreign ruler’s military intervenes abroad. Uncertainty inhibits the accurate assessment of local political institutions, pushing foreign rulers to wait to select a foreign rule strategy. Uncertainty over local contexts emerges from a variety of sources, but it is inherently difficult to assess institutional contexts from afar. Militaries are hesitant to spend resources on planning for post-conflict operations and resist investing in assessing local institutions abroad. This is enhanced by the military’s natural reticence to think about postwar operations, intelligence agency assessments, foreign policy bureaucracies, and the different actors in the local territory who will be lobbying and making claims to enhance their own preferred policy position. Local actors also have
incentives to misrepresent the strength of institutions in order to make the current institutions appear stronger or weaker than they actually are, depending on their preferred stance towards a prospective intervention. This inhibits the ability of intervening states to accurately assess local institutional strength prior to an intervention, leaving it for the military commanders once they have landed. In general, it is difficult to assess local institutional capacity from afar, and even more difficult to assess what these local institutions will look like after armed intervention and the destruction it can bring in its wake.

Foreign rulers recognize that uncertainty over local conditions severely hampers their ability to simply choose strategies based on their preferences, as it is not clear which strategies would allow them to achieve their political goals. Even while acting rationally, foreign rulers who rely too much on their goals and preferences prior to an intervention can find themselves creating a comprehensive strategy for placing the territory under foreign rule, only to subsequently find that their strategy is completely improper and ineffective as soon as they land in the territory. One way foreign rulers can try to plan for this uncertainty is to prepare multiple strategies while waiting to learn of the nature of local conditions. Thus for Iraq, “it was not inappropriate for the administration to have retained two options for governing Iraq, given uncertainties about what they would encounter once Saddam fell. In the event, finding Iraq descending into chaos and the Iraqi elites badly divided, it was not unreasonable to decide in favor of a more extended occupation” (Dobbins, 2009, xx-xxi).

Uncertainty can also contribute to overconfidence, selective intelligence gathering, and a goals-oriented decision-making process that all end up looking to the tactical military objectives, but fail to actual consider whether the strategies available will actually achieve their political goals. This serves to make leaders confident in their ability to control factors on the ground and achieve their political goals quickly, regardless of the veracity of this perception. Combined, all of these factors combine
to contribute to the idea that uncertainty prevents sound thinking of strategy: the focus is on what the foreign ruler wants to achieve, rather than asking whether they can achieve it. Only once troops arrive on the ground and attempt to work with local leaders and institutions can they assess whether maintaining local leaders or rebuilding new institutions can achieve their goals.

In the Iraq case, this uncertainty manifested itself as many in the American administration assumed the country was more functional than it actually was. “Planners for postwar Iraq had ‘very little knowledge...of what was going on in the Iraqi government,’ and failed to realize that the state had effectively withdrawn from the detailed management of the country, except in a few vital areas necessary for the immediate survival and continuation of the regime” (Dobbins, 2009, 110). Uncertainty led to optimistic assumptions about the capacity of the current bureaucracy and administration and Iraq after defeating Baghdad. As Dobbins (2009, 108) explains “this inattention to public administration stemmed in large measure from the U.S. administration’s initial uncertainty about how long, if at all, it would seek to directly govern Iraq before turning power back over to an indigenous regime. Similar uncertainty was exhibited about how to install or deal with local governments.” However, once troops landed in Baghdad uncertainty gave way to more certainty, and the American foreign rulers became keenly aware that they were dealing with a very different situation than expected. As Major General Carl Strock explains, “Our whole focus on our reconstruction effort was really not to go in and fix this country, but to fix what we broke, and we sort of made the assumption that the country was functioning beforehand. I had a dramatic underestimation of the condition of the Iraqi infrastructure, which turned out to be one of our biggest problems, and not the war damage” (Dobbins, 2009, 109). Rather than finding a stable centralized bureaucracy to lean on in the initial occupation period, General Jay Garner and the ORHA found that the central administration of the Iraqi state had essentially collapsed, and
the defeat of the Ba’athist regime had left a weakened institutional infrastructure in its wake (Allawi, 2008, 118-119).

Overall, local institutional strength is, I argue, a crucial variable that helps explain the choice of foreign rule strategy, while uncertainty over local institutions helps explain why states can end up with strategies they never intended to use. Only by understanding both the impact of local institutional strength on the choice of foreign rule strategy and the role of uncertainty over local contexts in the strategic decision-making process can we fully ascertain the process that drives strategic choices in foreign rule missions. In all, I illustrate that states pursuing their interests can often end up pursuing lengthy and costly institution-building missions when they had no prior plans to pursue them in the first place. The innate uncertainty surrounding local contexts can contribute to the overconfidence of foreign rulers in their ability to achieve their political goals quickly with leadership strategies, which only pushes them into the state-building trap against their wishes. Thus it is the simultaneous impact of local institutional strength on the choice of foreign rule strategy, as well as the pre-intervention uncertainty over institutional strength, which contributes to the timing and selection of a foreign rule strategy.

1.4 Relevance of Foreign Rule Strategy

Why is studying foreign rule strategy a relevant enterprise for modern foreign policy debates? Studying foreign rule strategies today remains highly relevant as armed intervention and prospective foreign rule missions are continually under consideration as possible policy options during various international crises. Understanding why states use different foreign rule strategies following armed intervention in different contexts is vital, especially given the high cost and relative lack of success
for certain strategies and their continued advocacy by policymakers.\textsuperscript{26} If certain members of the foreign policy bureaucracy are going to continue to call for armed intervention to solve international crises, it is necessary to think about foreign rule missions and foreign rule strategy more broadly.

Even with previous misadventures and seemingly current reticence for institution-building missions abroad, studying foreign rule strategy and foreign rule still remains a relevant enterprise\textsuperscript{27} Understanding foreign rule strategy matters for modern international politics and foreign policy as it is crucial to understand the factors that can drive post-intervention outcomes. While the occurrence of foreign rule missions ebbs and flows throughout time, much like the occurrence of armed interventions and warfare in general, it remains a policy option that becomes more attractive at different periods. Some may argue that in the current political environment armed intervention is less of a foreign policy priority among national political leaders. However, one cannot argue that foreign rule missions are not relevant, as once an international crisis emerges and armed intervention occurs, foreign rule missions often will follow. Furthermore, as highlighted by the Iraq case in general, even when political leaders claim they are not interested in engaging in institution-building, various crises can emerge that develop into foreign rule operations, and thus institution-building missions.

Foreign rule does not always generate the most interest in certain moments, nonetheless policies that would require foreign rule missions frequently lurk in various discussions of military missions. Understanding the contingent nature of foreign rule strategy should provide pause for policymakers before launching any armed intervention. Debates over armed military strikes in Iran, strikes in North Korea,

\textsuperscript{26}On why institution building is costly and difficult see: Huntington (1968); Lake and Fariss (2014); Downes (2010); Hegre et al. (2001); Fukuyama (2004).

\textsuperscript{27}See Bahador, Moses and Lafi Youmans (2018, 4) for a brief review of the salience of Iraq in the 2016 presidential election.
stabilization missions in Iraq and Syria, and even discussions of Russian actions in Eastern Ukraine all present cases with crucial concerns over how local conditions will prompt the intervener to respond through foreign rule. Yet in each of these cases it is notable how much the post-intervention period is largely left by the wayside in discussions; proponents of armed strikes are often confident in their assumption that the post-intervention period will be stable, with new local agents in power that can consolidate the political gains of the foreign ruler.

As calls continue for armed intervention against a variety of actors and in a variety of environments, the importance of understanding the origins of foreign rule strategy remains crucial. Understanding that armed intervention often cannot achieve its goals without foreign rule is important to recognize as policymakers make decisions over whether to use military force in pursuit of political goals. Further, if there is uncertainty over what local conditions will look like after the armed intervention, then there cannot be confidence that there can be a quick military mission to achieve the political aims. This implies that it would be more prudent to admit hubris and take into consideration that local contexts matter is necessary for sound policy decisions. However, if military missions become more attractive, understanding that strategies to achieve the political aims of the mission are contingent on the local conditions will hopefully give pause to some decision-makers and help them recognize the decision to launch an armed intervention is, at best, a roll of the dice that may not end in their favor.

Specifically, in recent debates about North Korea, concerns over how to limit military strikes and manage de-escalation hide the fact that armed intervention is

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28 A summary of these suggestions is included in: Crowley (2017); Fly and Schmitt (2012); Doran (2014) and Wright (2017). Russian operations in Eastern Ukraine would also meet this definition of foreign rule as discussed in Mitrokhin (2015) and Bowen (2017).

29 In addition, Schadlow (2017) highlights the amazing regularity American policymakers have in undertaking armed interventions around the world without consideration for the foreign rule period that can follow and what would be required to achieve their preferred political ends.
most likely to produce the need for a foreign rule mission (Wright, 2017; Cha, 2017; Gordon, 2017). However, discussions of what the post-armed intervention Korean peninsula would look like are often left to the wayside when thinking about policy options. Supreme confidence in the American ability to strike North Korea and not end up with a large military presence in the country seems common in these discussions, regardless of the belief of success or failure in the strikes on military facilities. A lack of consideration of what foreign rule strategy will be required once the foreign rule mission takes place belies the fact that armed interveners are often overconfident in their ability to control the situation when in actuality they are not sure what environment awaits them. Only once a major power opens the box of foreign rule can they be sure which strategy will be required to achieve their goals. These debates about North Korea focus on military strikes and what military objectives they can achieve. However, once an armed attack is launched, even in optimistic scenarios, the probability of an American foreign rule mission on the Korean peninsula is greatly enhanced. If this fundamental fact was more readily recognized, it would hopefully lead more policymakers to consider how the political ends sought by any military strike in North Korea are dependent on the strategies available after the armed military strike occurs.

Additionally, the relevance of studying foreign rule strategy is increased due to the possible changing nature of armed interventionism and its justifications in the near term. As the era of American unipolarity recedes, other major powers will be more likely to use military force and engage in foreign rule missions for a variety of political goals.\textsuperscript{30} In the post-Cold War era, foreign rule missions have been justified and legitimated based on humanitarian concerns and democracy building most commonly (Finnemore, 1996, 2004); yet, as new powers rise new justifications for

\textsuperscript{30}For a brief overview of the discussion over American decline and the rise of China, see Layne (2012); Brooks and Wohlforth (2016); Khong (2014).
foreign rule missions might emerge as well. As Chinese power continues to expand and their interests in different regions continues to grow, it is not unreasonable to think a Chinese foreign rule mission to support their economic interests or different political goals might occur in the future.\(^{31}\) There have already been signs of Russia attempting to re-assert itself as an equal on the world stage and launching foreign rule missions in Eastern Ukraine for status reasons or other political goals.\(^{32}\) In the past couple of years, we have already seen Russia act more assertively in Syria and end up expanding their intervention into a bigger mission than initially envisioned.\(^{33}\) Additionally, Turkey has recently expanded its control into northern Syria, starting to turn into an institution-building mission that it was not initially planned for.\(^{34}\) As a variety of new powers emerge with different political goals and become more assertive, their likelihood of engaging in armed interventions will be increased, and thus understanding the strategies they are likely to use is equally as important. For all of these powers, understanding how they structure their international dependencies and what strategies they use is critical for fully grasping how to manage their new foreign rule missions.

Beyond the relevance for modern foreign policy decisions, a better theoretical understanding of the origins of foreign rule strategy provides important theoretical contributions to various debates in international relations. Often scholars spend too much time treating the choice of strategy as an exogenous factor in determinants of

\(^{31}\)Griffiths (2016), for instance, has made the provocative argument that the rise of China to great power status might change norms of intervention in the global system. Garwood-Gowers (2016) and Lee and Chan (2016) have discussed how China is starting to reinterpret norms of humanitarian intervention.

\(^{32}\)See Bowen (2017); Phillips (2016).

\(^{33}\)See Lukyanov (2016); Souleimanov (2016); Stent (2016).

\(^{34}\)See Antonopoulos (2018); Crabapple (2018).
foreign rule success. A lack of understanding of foreign rule strategy allows modern cases of foreign rule to seem different and unique from prior eras, problematically fragmenting the literature and making policymakers more likely to fail to learn from the successes and mistakes of the past. This dissertation seeks to provide a general theory of foreign rule strategy and a unified conception of foreign rule that highlights the amazing continuity, across geographic locales and time periods, of major powers using armed force to assert sovereign authority. Focusing on the continuity of foreign rule strategy across time periods opens up our analysis to the various problems of extending political authority from afar. A critical examination of why states choose certain foreign rule strategies will hopefully allow for stronger analysis of the constraints that states face when engaging in foreign rule, and unite different strands of research to fully analyze the difficulty of imposing foreign rule.

Second, as the literature on international hierarchy continues to grow, coming to understand the varieties of ways that major powers can use military force to impose sovereign authority over foreign territories and use coercive forms of domination provides an important extension to the literature. Rather than international hierarchies existing as static moments, understanding how choices made by major powers can structure international hierarchies is important for a more comprehensive understanding of international politics. It is also important to note that what makes

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This type of argument is most prevalent in the literature on nationalist resistance under military occupation and colonial rule. For example, Hechter (2013) cites the use of indirect rule strategies as promoting more successful alien rule. Ferwerda and Miller (2014) argue that using a strategy of local rulers help reduce nationalist backlash to the foreign rule operation. In other contexts, Robinson (1972) and Hechter, Matesan and Hale (2009) argue that divide and rule strategies among various local elites provide the best chance at successful foreign rule. In all cases, why certain strategies of foreign rule were preferred is not examined and instead the choice of strategy is taken as an exogenous reason for the success and failure of different foreign rule operations.

Bially Mattern and Zarakol (2016) have noted that there are three broad logics of hierarchy which scholars write about when discussing the impact of international hierarchy on international politics. These three logics (trade-offs, positionality, and productivity), however, all focus on aspects of hierarchy that are unrelated to coercive imposition and the changing nature of hierarchy, instead reflecting static moments and the effects they can have across time.
international hierarchy unique from domestic hierarchies is that in international hierarchy states still have agency and operate under formal anarchy. This project helps illustrate the importance of continuing to focus on politics in lower status territories in international hierarchies, and how they can constrain the political options of the more powerful states during armed actions. Grasping the policy options major powers have available when engaging in foreign rule helps us think more completely about how international orders evolve over time and how international hierarchy can be furthered, sustained, and changed.

This project also expands our knowledge of international hierarchy imposed through armed force. Much of the current international hierarchy literature examines positionality, the impact of power differentials, and how international hierarchy structures international relations.\textsuperscript{37} However, there is less emphasis in this literature on how powerful states use military force to place other territories under their control.\textsuperscript{38} While much research exists different types of armed force that powerful states use to impose their will, such as armed intervention, regime change operations, peacekeeping, or other armed mission, less time has been spent thinking about how these armed actions are all types of coercive international hierarchy.\textsuperscript{39} Uniting these different literatures towards one view of imposed or coercive international hierarchy improves our understanding of how states have different policy options available to them while attempting to push states under their sovereign authority; states also have agency in choosing how to structure their hierarchical relationships. Having a

\textsuperscript{37}Some examples on how positionality has been argued to matter for understanding international relations include Paul, Larson and Wohlforth (2014); Zarakol (2014, 2011); Adler-Nissen (2014); Wendt and Friedheim (1995).

\textsuperscript{38}MacDonald makes this point when discussing Lake’s (2009) view of international hierarchy (MacDonald and Lake, 2008). However the study of hierarchy in international politics has continued to focus on either contractual choices or positions in the international system and not coercive impositions.

\textsuperscript{39}MacDonald and Lake (2008) and MacDonald (2018) provide important exceptions.
complete understanding of all the forms of international hierarchy that can be used and imposed in international politics creates a more comprehensive understanding of coercive hierarchy in international politics.

Third, as the literatures on armed statebuilding and armed intervention continue to focus on the effects of various intervention and statebuilding strategies on foreign territories, understanding where those strategies originate from is an important next step. While there has been a robust push in the literature on intervention and regime change operations to understand the effects of various types of these armed missions, less frequently considered is the origins of these strategies and decisions to engage in forms of foreign rule are less frequently considered. Taking an initial step in this direction, this dissertation seeks to provide a novel understanding of the origins of strategy and highlight how the choices of interveners are not as open as often portrayed. Frequently major powers are confident in their ability to achieve their goals in weaker environments abroad, given the vast power differentials and their sincere belief in the rightfulness of their political goals. Yet local contexts matter more than the efforts and resources of major powers to the achievement of a foreign ruler’s goals, as the environment structures the strategies available. Indeed, there has been much written on the determinants of armed interventions, the effects of armed interventions, and the possibilities of success for statebuilding and other missions. However, a conceptually prior step is necessary, where scholars examine why states choose certain strategies, and how is this option is linked to success or failure. Rather than thinking of strategies of armed intervention and foreign rule as

40 For a sample of the literature focusing on the importance of strategy for explaining various political outcomes, see Ferwerda and Miller (2014); Marcum (2015); Collard-Wexler (2013); Edelstein (2008); Downes and O’Rourke (2016); Downes and Monten (2013); Peic and Reiter (2011); Hechter (2013); Pickering and Kisangani (2014); Miller (2013); Sullivan (2007); Lake (2010a).

exogenously assigned options, understanding the origins of these strategies can help answer questions relating to the possible success of these missions.\footnote{Saunders (2011) and Finnemore (2004) do provide two important studies on the determinants of intervention strategy.} As I highlight in Chapter 2, scholars often portray strategy as an exogenous variable that is a given to a particular foreign rule mission, rather than a choice to examine. If we recognize when and why foreign rulers are more likely to use a certain type of strategy, we can then ask if there is a way to make that strategy more effective, or even whether a certain strategy seems required when failure is already more likely than success.

Third, while uncertainty has been a defining feature in many theories of international relations, it has been under-considered in the context of postwar period.\footnote{There is a robust literature on uncertainty and international conflict that cannot be completely listed here. Some examples of how scholars have thought about uncertainty and conflict include Debs and Monteiro (2014); Fearon (1995); Meirowitz and Sartori (2008); Powell (2002); Reed (2003); Slantchev and Tarar (2011); Gartzke (1999); Arena and Wolford (2012); Johnson (2004); Edelstein (2017); Schub (2015); Rosato (2015); Ramsay (2017); Rathbun (2007); Bas and Schub (2016); Yarhi-Milo (2014); Blainey (1988); Jervis (1976); Mitzen and Schweller (2011); Walter (2009).} This study highlights the importance of uncertainty in two new ways. First, uncertainty matters not only for the initial conflict phase, but for postwar phases as well. Taking uncertainty seriously is necessary for understanding the difficulties of major powers in achieving their political goals after armed intervention. It is also necessary to understand why seemingly sub-optimal decision-making in interventions abroad happens so frequently. If planning for foreign rule periods is sporadic, highlighting how uncertainty matters should help challenge our theories of strategic decision-making, and policymaking more generally. Failure to recognize that uncertainty is important for the postwar period, as well, can lead to major problems in our analysis of theories of international conflict.\footnote{Lake (2010b) highlights this problem when thinking about bargaining models for understanding international conflict. He notes that understanding costs and how states think about foreign rule periods should be included in bargaining models, illustrating that uncertainty over these periods is an important extension to make.} I contend that it is more logical to assume uncertainty...
over local territories and the conditions of the post-intervention period, rather than have confidence in perfect information about the strength of local institutions prior to invasion. Understanding why information about local institutions is important for strategic decision-making is a novel contribution for our understanding of the impact that uncertainty can have on the propensity for armed intervention and conflict, and also on the decision to engage in foreign rule missions more broadly.

Beyond the focus on the timing of uncertainty, this dissertation shows that uncertainty matters not only for intentions, military balances, and resolve, but also for local institutions and contexts as well. While we have good evidence that uncertainty over military balances or resolve of a peer competitor wrong can lead to disastrous foreign policy decisions, less scholarly interest has been spent on understanding uncertainty over local institutions and contexts.45 Assumptions over the postwar period can lead to sub-optimal foreign policy decisions as uncertainty prevents ascertaining how the postwar period will unfold. This dissertation highlights how uncertainty over local contexts can lead to equally costly foreign policy mistakes, as assumptions over quick interventions and relatively easy foreign policy successes can be undone by failure to grasp the local institutional context the foreign ruler will find themselves in. Failure to accurately assess the local context can also contribute to poor understanding of the strategy required to achieve the foreign ruler’s political goals, and the level of armed resistance they are likely to face. In general, I push the understanding of uncertainty forward by arguing that uncertainty over local contexts can lead to sub-optimal outcomes for major powers as both uncertainty over military force needed to achieve political goals, and failure to include calculations of post-intervention periods can lead to poor foreign policy decisions by a major power.

Finally, this dissertation highlights the importance of local contexts for understanding great power interventions more broadly. While armed interventions are

45For example see Copeland (2000); Blainey (1988); Gartzke (1999); Reiter (2003).
often categorized by the imbalance in material strength of the foreign ruler and the local territory, frequently the foreign ruler cannot simply exert their wishes and achieve their political goals successfully. This dissertation illustrates how in theories of great power foreign policy and military action, local contexts matter as a factor that can condition a major power’s ability to achieve their goals, and sets the stage for the difficulty and resources required to achieve a mission. This matters for both policy and academic understanding of international politics. While many scholars of international politics focus on the impact of power and the strategic choices made in the capitals of major powers, it is important to recognize that other actors, even in hierarchical relationships of power, do impact the policy choices that major powers have available to them for achieving success. While there is a robust literature on how the weak win wars and asymmetric conflicts, it is important to look at how local conditions structure the initial conflict to push certain foreign rulers into these types of military missions. Local conditions set the stage for the availability of foreign rulers to achieve their political goals and might allow certain major powers to have a more successful and less costly foreign rule mission under certain local conditions.

Often when discussing international politics and international hierarchy, conditions in the weaker state are not considered a factor for various outcomes. However, local conditions have been shown to matter for armed conflict. It is well known that local conditions on the battlefield can affect military operations. Once a military engagement begins, how those local conditions change can make success or failure of the military operation more or less likely.\textsuperscript{46} Similarly, this dissertation provides evidence that local institutional contexts are a crucial factor driving political outcomes following the use of military force to institute foreign rule. Even though

\textsuperscript{46}Similar to how Clausewitz (1976, 119-121) discusses friction in war as a crucial variable in warfare, local conditions and the actual situations which foreign rulers find themselves in are crucial for understanding foreign rule missions more completely. For more on how local conditions matter for battlefield effectiveness see Friedman (2017).
major powers can achieve much with military force, understanding the constraints that local conditions can play is crucial if ones wants to understand a foreign ruler’s strategic choices. In order to fully understand the true utility of power in the international politics, then we must also think about the local contexts through which major powers try to use their material strength. Power matters in international politics, but local conditions can also structure the political goals that power can achieve. This dissertation helps answer identify the in what ways in which local institutions and local contexts structure the strategic choices available for major powers to achieve their political aims through military force.

Overall, the policy and theoretical relevance of understanding foreign rule strategy cannot be overstated. Understanding why foreign rulers use certain strategies in different locations at different times is crucial if we are to understand the puzzles identified above. If it is true that local conditions drive the selection of strategy, it suddenly becomes more clear how major powers can continue to engage in institution-building missions consistently over time, even as they recognize the high costs and low probability of success. Identifying these factors, then, can help explain the empirical puzzles we see, while also trying to answer how to improve the policymaking process that can produce these sub-optimal outcomes.

1.5 Plan of This Dissertation

Clearly, foreign rule strategy is an important topic with relevance for divisive debates in both the foreign policy community as well as in the international relations literature. The rest of the dissertation will unfold as follows. In Chapter 2, I will conceptualize what I mean by foreign rule and foreign rule strategy. In particular, I highlight how using an expansive definition of foreign rule provides vast benefits in theorizing on foreign rule strategy and provides more comprehensive analysis. I conclude the chapter by reviewing the literature on various forms of foreign rule, and
highlight how the choice of foreign rule strategy has already been shown to have large
impacts on short term and long term outcomes of foreign rule missions. In Chapter
3, I lay out my theory of foreign rule strategy and discuss how uncertainty and local
institutional strength combine to make the timing and choice of strategy in foreign
rule missions contingent on local contexts. Through both the agent capacity and
armed resistance mechanisms, I show how foreign rulers rely upon local institutional
strength to determine what strategy they will utilize, and only once that context is
revealed can they accurately assess what is required of the foreign rule mission.

Chapter 4 discusses my research design to test my theoretical claims from Chap-
ter 3. In the chapter, I also undertake quantitative testing to determine the viability
of my broad theoretical argument over the relationship between local institutional
strength and foreign rule strategy. In particular, I highlight the original data collec-
tion process, gathered from over 160 cases of foreign rule, the strategies that foreign
rule used, and the local institutional strength of the local territories. The quantita-
tive testing in the chapter illustrates the relationship between foreign rule strategy
and local institutional strength across time and place, and shows how the relation-
ship between strategy and local contexts remains strong. In Chapter 5, I build on
the results of Chapter 4 with contrasting case studies of Wilsonian foreign rule mis-
sions in Mexico and the Dominican Republic in the 1910s. Given the similar time
period, goals, President of the foreign ruler, and region, the only meaningful differ-
ence in the two cases is the difference in local institutional strength. For each case,
I trace how agent capacity and armed resistance mechanisms play out, and highlight
how uncertainty prior to armed intervention inhibited prior strategizing. In the final
chapter, I return to the Iraq case and discuss how this case is emblematic of the
process of strategizing for foreign rule missions, rather than a misguided exception. I
then review the arguments discussed in the previous chapters and highlight the var-
ious theoretical debates that this argument contributes to. I conclude by discussing
potential extensions of my argument and my future research agenda.

Overall, this dissertation seeks to rectify a crucial missing element of many discussions of armed intervention and military action in the international relations literature. By taking foreign rule strategy as a given, or as a variable that can impact the success and failure of a foreign rule mission and without critically understanding the local origins of foreign rule strategy, any analysis of foreign rule missions is incomplete. Rather, only once we understand the local determinants of foreign rule strategies and how uncertainty over local contexts impacts the strategic decision-making process can we honestly re-evaluate how to think about foreign rule missions in the future.
CHAPTER 2

CONCEPTUALIZING FOREIGN RULE

“That which creates tyranny is the imposition of a form of government contrary to the will of the governed; and even a free and equal plan of government, would be considered despotic by those who desired to have their old laws and their ancient system” - Edmund Burke

2.1 Introduction

While the puzzle of why foreign rulers choose certain foreign rule strategies at different times is the focus of this dissertation, I must lay out and define the concepts that are the building blocks of my argument prior to discussing the causal linkage between local institutions and choice of foreign rule strategy. The goal of this chapter is to illustrate the conceptual landscape that guides my thinking on foreign rule and my theoretical arguments on the determinants of foreign rule strategies. Given the myriad of ways scholars have discussed the nature and consequences of foreign rule in the existing literature, in this chapter I work to clarify the conceptual landscape before I begin the discussion of my argument on the origins and timing of foreign rule strategies. Hence, this chapter answers three conceptual questions: 1) What is foreign rule? 2) What is a foreign rule strategy? 3) What distinguishes a leadership strategy from an institutional strategy?

1Burke (1981, 141)

2For more on the origins of the fragmented conceptual landscape surrounding foreign rule, see Denison (2017a).
I begin by providing answers to these important questions, which is followed by a discussion of the relevant literature regarding the importance of studying foreign rule and foreign rule strategies for international politics. In the rest of this chapter, I first define foreign rule and review the literature on international hierarchy with an emphasis on the benefits of an expansive foreign rule definition for comprehensive analysis. Ensuring our concepts can trace threads of continuity throughout political history, rather than creating a new legal concept for each small variation in the form a foreign rule mission takes, creates a better analytical basis for our theories. Second, I offer my definition of foreign rule strategy and show how it differs from the goals, intentions and preferences of a foreign ruler. Understanding the conceptual difference between goals, preferences, intentions, and strategies is crucial in building greater understanding of the unique impact foreign rule strategies have on political outcomes. Third, I define and distinguish two ideal types of foreign rule strategy: leadership and institutional strategies. Using historical examples and existing scholarly definitions, I illuminate how differentiating between these two ideal types of foreign rule strategies improves our analysis of how foreign rulers dominate their territories. Finally, I conclude with a survey of the related existing literature concerning the impact of strategy on foreign rule outcomes to illuminate why strategy is an important variable to focus on. As a whole, this chapter provides the conceptual landscape that grounds the theoretical and empirical arguments in the rest of this dissertation.

2.2 Foreign Rule

In this dissertation, the universe of cases I seek to explore are impositions of foreign rule by major powers. As such, in this dissertation I use an overarching concept of foreign rule, due to my belief in the benefits of broader concepts in international relations. While at times an expansive concept, I contend there are clear benefits to utilizing a broad conceptualization of militarily-imposed international hierarchy,
including that it allows for a more comprehensive understanding of this political phe-
nomena. While there are often incentives to bifurcate concepts in order to highlight
how unique time periods or international actors can produce particular outcomes,
focusing on overarching commonalities is a more useful way to categorize concepts
within international politics. As Butcher and Griffiths (2017, 330) argue when re-
viewing how international relations scholars discuss international orders, having a
broader yet consistent conceptualization of political phenomena can help “accumu-
late knowledge...and differentiate the general from the local and the similar from the
unique.”

Given my belief in the benefits of broader conceptualization, how do I
define foreign rule? Foreign rule is the relationship that powerful states engage in
so as to govern territory outside its sovereign jurisdiction through armed military
force. Formally, I define foreign rule as a hierarchical relationship in which a foreign
state, group of states, or international body uses military force to impose itself as
the *de facto* sovereign authority of a territory, while making no permanent claims to
include the territory as part of the foreign ruler’s home state. This definition excludes
annexation, conquest, economic dependency, covert regime change operations, con-
ditionality, secessionist groups claiming rule by an outsider, and other hierarchical
relationships that do not reach the level of surrendering sovereign authority through
armed force. It does include concepts that are traditionally considered separate phe-

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3In response to Butcher and Griffiths (2017), I argue that creating bright-lines between concepts
instead of thinking about the commonalities and overlapping nature of certain concepts causes
a rise in incomprehensible concepts. Instead, allowing for more unified but gradated concepts
can actually improve our understanding and maintain more accurate distinctions in international
relations (Denison, 2017b).

4For example, the IMF and EU using conditionality programs to push weaker states to reform
domestic institutions (Vachudova, 2005; Stone, 2008; Levitsky and Way, 2010).

5This definition implies that the territory under foreign rule remains a defined separate piece
of territory outside the foreign ruler’s home territory. Thus, territory under foreign rule does not
undergo state death as discussed by Fazal (2011), but has a foreign entity taking sovereign control
of the distinct territory and ruling from afar. On a continuum of international hierarchy, state death
would be one end of the continuum with full sovereignty at the other end, and foreign rule taking
up a large section of the middle.
nomena, namely military occupation, mandate and trust territories, foreign-imposed regime change missions (FIRCs), international territorial administration, and perhaps most contentiously, modern UN peacekeeping missions where the mission assumes *de facto* sovereignty of the territory.\(^6\)

This definition requires some unpacking. First, foreign rule is defined by the relationship between two entities rather than any unit-level characteristics of the foreign ruler or the foreign ruled territory. This is an important distinction as political units do not exist independent of their relationships with other political units in the international system, and defining concepts in international politics based on these relationships is a more fruitful and accurate representation of international relations. While unit-level characteristics are important for understanding the varieties and features of various political organizations, for understanding certain concepts in international politics, the relationship between the units is most critical (Jackson and Nexon, 1999).\(^7\) Similar to how interstate war and interstate trade occur between two distinct units in the international system, foreign rule is a unique relationship between two political units in the system that is defined by the stronger unit’s temporary takeover of the sovereign authority of a weaker unit.\(^8\) While unit-level characteristics can prove to be important causal variables when explaining variation in

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\(^6\)This includes post-Cold War operations where the UN has assumed control of territory as illustrated by Chesterman (2005). Crucially, however, I do not claim that all UN peacekeeping operations are forms of foreign rule, but rather only cases where there is a transference of sovereignty.

\(^7\)Relational thinking in international relations, as discussed in depth by Jackson and Nexon (1999), allows one to focus on the nature of the system through the relationship of units rather than defining the nature of the system through the characteristics of the units themselves. Relational analysis emerged in sociology in response to debates over the proper level of analysis for social relations. Scholars began to disagree over whether the unit-level characteristics were the proper level of analysis when units rarely change overtime. This manifested as relational sociology where the dynamic interactions between units serve as the unit of analysis (Emirbayer, 1997).

\(^8\)Examples of unit-level characteristics include: domestic political system, leadership attributes, domestic economic systems, organizational attributes and more. To reiterate, while all of these unit-level characteristics can serve as important variables that can help explain the emergence and effectiveness of certain international phenomena, they are factors that help explain the phenomenon rather than aspects of the phenomenon itself.
foreign rule strategies and outcomes (as I discuss in depth in the next chapter of this dissertation), defining foreign rule based only on unit-level characteristics does more to muddle our understanding of the phenomenon than clarify its uniqueness.

For instance, some argue that modern missions of international territorial administration are unique international relationships in the modern era and not just new forms of international hierarchy and trusteeship from earlier years. They argue that the UN territorial administration missions in the Former Yugoslavia and East Timor were unique operations due to the unit-level characteristics of the administrator—namely that it was the United Nations and not a unilateral nation-state administering the territory and the intentions and goals of the UN mission. However as both Wilde (2010) and Ratner (2005) illustrate, focusing on unit-level factors instead of relational attributes to define new concepts only served to blur the important similarities between the modern UN missions and cases of international trusteeship throughout the early 20th century. Thus, a definition of foreign rule based on relationships allows for a well-struck balance between generalization and historical contingency. In so doing, a focus on international relationships instead of unit-level factors pushes one to find a generalizable account that can explain the evolution of an international relationship and allows for historical contingencies and unit-level factors to exist as causal variables that impact the relationship in distinct ways. This creates a sounder conceptual basis for theory building. Concentrating on the relationship between actors allows us to move beyond unit-level characteristics to define foreign rule, leaving unit-level variation to help explain why such a relationship emerges or the success and failure of certain foreign rule operations.

Second, foreign rule is specifically a relationship of international hierarchy via domination, capturing a view of the growing importance of international hierarchy

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9For a full sense of this argument see Stahn (2008); Caplan (2005); Matheson (2001); Fox (2008); Zaum (2007); Bain (2003); Van Willigen (2013).
in understanding international politics. Traditionally, international politics has been conceptualized as a system defined by sovereign equality due to the presence of anarchy in the international system. As Waltz (1979, 114-116) argues, the lack of a global super structure forces states to act as sovereign equals. In recent years however, many have noted that international politics, although operating under formal anarchy, often find that relationships between states are categorized by sovereign inequality.\textsuperscript{10} While relationships between states still maintain formal sovereign equality, Lake (2007, 2009) and Buzan and Little (1996) both argue that in practice various relationships of sovereign inequality define the international system. Thus international hierarchy comes to define many relationships present in the international system. As MacDonald (2018, 136) argues, international hierarchy is “an authority relationship between dominant and subordinate states” and exists in “cases where a dominant state is exercising genuine authority over a subordinate.” With this relational definition, hierarchical relationships appear much more common in international politics, as powerful states exploit the inequality of the international distribution of power to take control of some part of the sovereign authority of weaker states.

This view of international hierarchy is relevant for international politics, and has sparked a large body of literature examining how states interact under conditions of hierarchy, and how hierarchy can explain various outcomes that more closely relate to actual political contracts, agreements, and domination. This trend of literature, nicely synthesized by Bially Mattern and Zarakol (2016), illustrates how the formal legal definition of anarchy does not map neatly onto the social reality we see in the international realm. While states still exist in anarchy and possess formal equality, as described by Waltz (1979), in practice, many scholars have now highlighted the

\textsuperscript{10} Examples of this interest in hierarchy in international politics include McDonald (2015); Cooley (2005); Cooley and Nexon (2013); Kang (2005, 2003); Donnelly (2006); Wendt and Friedheim (1995); Cooley and Spruyt (2009); Ikenberry (2012, 2004); Bially Mattern and Zarakol (2016); Nexon and Wright (2007); MacDonald (2018).
vertical stratification that often exists at the international level, and focus on the authority relationships between states under anarchy.\textsuperscript{11} Importantly, however, this focus on hierarchy does not mean that anarchy does not exist at the international level, but rather hierarchy exists amidst anarchy, as MacDonald (2018) conceptualizes it. Hierarchy amidst anarchy implies that the subordinate state does maintain its ability to act independently, however, they are constrained by the power differential that is imposing hierarchy among the system. International hierarchy remains distinct from Waltz’s conceptualization of domestic hierarchy, given that formal anarchy at the international level and sovereign decisions can still exist (Waltz, 1979, 81).

The move to conceptualize and focus on international hierarchy amidst anarchy is a recognition that formal anarchy still exists, insofar as there is no overarching body determining how states interact. Yet, often states and other international political units exist as parts of a hierarchical relationship, where the sovereign authority of one state is constrained by the actions of another state in the system. Based on this building block, many have thought about the various ways that international actors can supersede the sovereignty of other actors in the international system, and conceptualized hierarchy as various forms of political relationships that impinge on sovereign authority. While international hierarchy has been theorized to exist through a multitude of means, such as through contracting away sovereignty (Cooley and Spruyt, 2009), the role of military alliances and basing rights (McDonald, 2015; Cooley and Nexon, 2013), and trade relationships (Lake, 2009), I argue that foreign rule is a form of international hierarchy that is not determined by the agency of the weaker actor, but rather is defined by the use of force and coercion by the dominant member of the international system.\textsuperscript{12} Hence foreign rule is a form of what I call

\textsuperscript{11}It is important to note, however, that great power politics – the level of international politics that Waltz (1979) and others who write on the effects of anarchy are largely interested in – still largely operates as an anarchic system.

\textsuperscript{12}One problem is part of the hierarchy literature is the reticence to think about coercive forms
International hierarchy via domination refers to imposed authority relationships where the dominant power imposes sovereign authority upon the subordinate power through armed force, and the subordinate power is obligated to comply with the sovereign inequality imposed (MacDonald, 2018, 137). Given that international hierarchy is defined as a *de facto* relationship between different units in the international system, foreign rule is one form of international hierarchy imposed through military force and domination. It is a hierarchical relationship imposed by one unit onto another. The recognition that international hierarchy exists in the international system, and that force is used to impose hierarchical relationships via domination upon certain units, is fundamental for understanding the nature of foreign rule. However, rather than creating a bright-line between anarchy and hierarchy as organizing political principles, it is vital to recognize that hierarchical relationships, via domination between political units, exist on an continuum of international hierarchy ranging from full sovereignty to integration into a domestic order through annexation. I contend that my definition of foreign rule exists as a part of this continuum of international hierarchy via domination, whereby military force is used to place the territories under coercive hierarchy, while maintaining their nominal independent status. It is the focus on foreign ruled territories maintaining nominal sovereignty and the act of subordination being imposed through military force that defines the hierarchical relationship of foreign rule. Figure 2.1 presents a rough representation of this continuum on international hierarchy via domination. While there are other forms of international hierarchy on the the continuum that do not qualify as forms of foreign rule, of hierarchy and instead focus on the softer forms of hierarchy established by both parties. For instance, Lake (2009) only considers consensual hierarchical relations between states that misses out on the vast variation among types of hierarchy including forms of hierarchical domination and other forms on non-consensual hierarchy (MacDonald and Lake, 2008). Specifically, Lake operationalizes American hierarchy by claiming economic and military alliance hierarchies are the complete set of hierarchical relations possible. While this has improved, it remains an important distinction to maintain when thinking about relations of imposed sovereign inequality.
such as covert regime change, colonization, and conditionality, my conceptualization of foreign rule captures the relationships imposed by force and without interest in integrating them into a domestic order.

Once the benefits of defining foreign rule as a relationship that is not based on unit-level characteristics or legal definitions become clear, traditionally separate concepts combine under my definition of foreign rule. My conceptualization of foreign rule exists as one hierarchical relationship of domination: at its core, foreign rule is a coercive form of international hierarchy imposed by a powerful state on a foreign territory where domination and *de facto* sovereignty, backed by military force, defines the relationship. Such a definition recasts the American and Soviet Occupations of South and North Korea (military occupation), the American intervention in South Vietnam (statebuilding), the British and French mandates in the Middle East following World War I (mandate and trusts), the Soviet Union’s regime change mission in Mongolia and the Vietnamese regime change operation in Cambodia (FIRC), and NATO policy in Bosnia and Kosovo (peacebuilding), into one concept: foreign rule.13

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13Most contentiously, I include some UN peacekeeping operations in my analysis, but mostly only following the end of the Cold War where the UN acted as the *de facto* sovereign in territories they operated in. As an example, the UN mission in East Timor starting in 1999 is a mission of foreign rule, given the UN’s role in serving as the interim state authority as they transitioned to independent
As seen when plotted on a continuum in Figure 2.1, the similarities of these concepts become even more clear. Below, I go into more detail as to why these concepts as a part of my conceptualization of foreign rule, and the limits of my definition. Examination of these phenomena as part of one overarching concept presents many possibilities for increased understanding of the dynamics of foreign rule, and how different variations of this relationship can produce different outcomes.

Third, after establishing the international hierarchy continuum above, and in light of my view that foreign rule exists as a subset of international hierarchy via domination, it is useful to elucidate why I consider foreign rule to be a unique concept that does not include other related forms of international hierarchy. First, with regards to the far left of the hierarchy continuum: why does foreign rule exclude cases of a powerful state intending to include the acquired territory into their home state? When examining a continuum of international hierarchy, once territory is incorporated as part of the home state, it is no longer foreign rule. Conceptually, foreign rule stands apart from other actions taken by powerful states, such as annexation and irredentism, that aim to incorporate control of the territory into their own domestic orders. These cases are not interested in establishing an international hierarchical relationship to control the territory. Rather, they seek to include the territory as part of their own domestic order. For instance, when Nazi Germany annexed Austria during the Anschluss in 1938, the Germans integrated Austria into its own domestic order and governing structures, effectively eliminating Austria as an independent sovereign unit (Mazower, 2008, 46-52). Once a territory no longer retains even its nominal sovereign authority, it is no longer subject to foreign, but rather domestic, rule. I argue that managing foreign territory that it is not part of the domestic governance apparatus is a distinct process from attempting to integrate a territory into your domestic order, statehood. The UN mission in Burundi (ONUB), however, does not count as a mission of foreign rule, as the UN mission never assumed governance functions in Burundi. For analysis on when and why the shift in UN peacekeeping occurred, see Fox (2008).
and therefore different processes guide how states approach governing territory they view as their own versus territory they regard as foreign.\textsuperscript{14}

Additionally, if temporary control were removed from the definition of foreign rule, all cases of separatist movements and insurgency campaigns against a government (like Catalan in Spain and Tamil in Sri Lanka) would have a claim to exist as a case of foreign rule in their bids for independence. While both sets of relationships are important and merit in-depth study, they remain distinct phenomena. Instead, distinguishing the relationship of a powerful actor governing a foreign territory and the relationship of a powerful actor governing a territory they consider part of their home state is a critical conceptual distinction. Importantly, this does not imply that the length of the foreign ruler’s dominion over a territory determines whether a case meets the definition of foreign rule.\textsuperscript{15} As long as the foreign ruler does not attempt to include the territory as part of their home state, and maintains the territory as a distinct political unit outside of their home territory, then it is still foreign rule, regardless of the length of the foreign rule mission.

For example, the United States ruled over the Philippines for over forty years, but never moved to include the Philippines as the 51st state or make them a permanent American territory. Hence the Philippines are considered to be a mission of foreign rule from 1898-1945 when they achieved independence from American and Japanese rule.\textsuperscript{16} In contrast, the case of the Baltic states under Soviet rule do not qualify

\textsuperscript{14}Admittedly, the links between state formation literature and theories of foreign rule are connected, as linkages can be built between the challenges of administering the territory of a population who sees the ruler as an outsider. In any case, this is outside the scope of this dissertation but provides interesting avenues to build upon. For more on these linkages see Hechter (2013); Gerring et al. (2011).

\textsuperscript{15}Similarly, Edelstein (2008, 3-4) argues that the intention of a military occupier to not include the territory in their home territory helps define a military occupation. However, given this focus on intention is a unit-level consideration, I use the observed imposed relationship as the means to define the concept.

\textsuperscript{16}It is important to note that territories like Puerto Rico, Guam, and other United States islands and overseas territories are considered a part of the United States federal government, and their
as a case of foreign rule, as they were made defined parts of the Soviet Union’s home territory and thus fall under domestic rule of the Soviet Union. The Soviets ruled over the Baltic states for a similar-length period, but the fact that the Baltic states became independent states following the breakup of the Soviet Union does not retroactively make these cases of foreign rule, given their status as domestic territories of the Soviet Union. This also illustrates why pre-mandate colonial rule is not covered by my definition of foreign rule. While it is difficult to determine the intentions of colonial states in terms of their plans for future sovereignty of their colonies, there was often no explicit intentions among pre-20th century colonizing powers to see colonies cease to be an extension of the metropole (especially in colonies ruled directly rather than indirectly).\textsuperscript{17} By 1900, and certainly after World War I, new forms of colonization (mandates) included an explicit provision that stated the mandatory power must move the territory towards independence, and not maintain a permanent presence there, which was a definitive break from previous thinking on colonial rule and marked a unique presence for foreign rule (Pedersen, 2015). While there are many commonalities between colonial and foreign rule (and they certainly sit next to each other on the hierarchy spectrum), the temporary rather than permanent nature of foreign rule is what separates itself from colonial rule.

On the right end of the international hierarchy continuum are actions not included in foreign rule because the foreign territory retains sovereign authority. While annexation, conquest, and colonization are left out of my definition of foreign rule due to the expansive goals of the power imposing these actions on others, on the other end of the spectrum there exists covert regime change operations, conditionality programs, citizens are United States citizens. Thus, these are not cases of foreign rule but rather a unique domestic political relationship.

\textsuperscript{17}However, given the research by MacDonald (2013), Gerring et al. (2011), Lange (2009), and others, there is evidence that my theory could be easily adapted to cover colonial periods as well. However, given the different international conditions and views of sovereignty during this period, this is beyond the scope of this project.
and certain UNPKOs which are also omitted from this definition (albeit they are very close on the international hierarchy continuum). Covert regime change operations, akin to American covert operations in Chile to support the overthrow of the Allende regime in 1973, fall outside of the scope conditions of foreign rule, given the lack of military presence. While the goals of the major power carrying out the covert regime change operation are often similar to many cases of foreign rule, the relationship actually imposed fails to meet the definition. In this case, while the major power is seeking some policy goal, sovereign authority is never surrendered by force.

Similarly, UN peace operations where the UN is invited by the host government and does not take control over the sovereignty of the nation are adjacent to foreign rule on the international hierarchy continuum, but do not qualify as such. For instance, the UN mission in Burundi (ONUB) presents a case where the peacekeepers were invited by the government of Burundi, and they were only tasked with military missions, rather than working to impinge the sovereign authority of the government in Bujumbura. Finally, some view relationships of conditionality, whether through NATO, the EU, the IMF, or other international organizations, to represent a form of foreign rule whereby foreign rulers dictate their policy goals and force change through withholding policy goods. However, while also a form of international hierarchy, without a militarized component there is not a relationship of foreign rule. Sovereign authority still exists in the foreign territory and there is no forceful takeover of the sovereign authority in the foreign capital; rather, the options available to the foreign state are made more and less attractive by the larger powers dictating the conditional policies.

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18O’Rourke (2013, 17) defines covert regime change as “an operation to replace the leadership of another state, where the intervening state does not acknowledge its role publicly. These actions include assassinating foreign leaders; sponsoring coups d’état; manipulating electoral results; and aiding, funding, and arming dissident groups.” Each of these actions constitute a place on the international hierarchy continuum, but without an armed military presence prior to the action, these are often seen as policy substitutes to the choice to engage in intervention, rather than policy options for the post-intervention period.
Fourth, after conceptualizing my definition of foreign rule as a subset of the international hierarchy continuum, understanding how foreign rule exists as a separate concept from military intervention is essential. I argue that the choice to engage in military intervention and imposing a hierarchical authority relationship through foreign rule are separate policy options that, while interrelated, are distinct and follow each other. Foreign rule is an authority relationship and policy option that is only made possible following the actual landing of troops on a territory. The decision to impose this relationship is a separate choice from the decision to intervene in the first place, one which is made after the intervention decision, whereas intervention decisions are the choice to launch troops into a foreign territory to begin with. As Figure 2.2 illustrates, it is only following the decision to engage in foreign rule that the foreign ruler can decide which strategy to utilize in the foreign rule mission.

I contend that there is a distinction between the choice to intervene and the choice to impose foreign rule. While the likelihood of carrying out a foreign rule mission could impact the choice to intervene initially, I argue that states typically make decisions to use military force abroad without consideration for the post-conflict period. Empirically, military planners and foreign rulers conceive of foreign rule and intervention as separate phases and choices. Often conceptualized by military leaders as postwar, Phase IV, or non-combat operations, they are considered to be separate phenomena than interventions, regardless of the practicality of doing so (Rapport, 2015). In practice, while some planning does go on for post-combat operations during the pre-intervention period, there is largely a reticence to think about the authority relationship to impose until after the intervention decision is made. In general, as argued in the next chapter, it is hard to know what strategy a foreign ruler will need to achieve their goals until they are actually in the foreign territory. Admittedly,

\[\text{In Chapter 3, I go into more depth about my theory as to why foreign rulers are reticent to plan for foreign rule missions prior to intervention.}\]
Figure 2.2. Relationship Between Intervention, Foreign Rule, and Strategy

this clean separation of different phases of choice and decision-making is slightly caricatured, however the conceptualization of each choice as a separate one is close to reality, and allows for improved analysis of the decision-making process behind the choice of foreign rule strategies.

Finally, after conceptualizing my definition of foreign rule as a unified concept of international hierarchy via domination, it is worth illustrating why there is a compelling reason to create a unified concept, rather than maintain these many forms of foreign rule as unique types of international hierarchy. If a unified concept of foreign rule is an improvement over current conceptualizations, why have other scholars not adopted it previously? To answer this question, one must understand why the fragmented conceptual landscape surrounding foreign rule emerged in the first place, before evaluating whether this partition of concepts is useful. Throughout many different literatures, there exist numerous approaches to the various forms of hierarchal domination and foreign rule. Usually, this takes the form of focusing on one distinct form of foreign rule and theorizing the causes and effects of that specific type of foreign rule relationship, fragmenting the concept away from other similar-type forms of foreign rule. This fragmentation often causes many discrete concepts to emerge, and encourages a focus on unique trees rather than the forest of foreign rule.
This happens, problematically, because in much of the foreign rule literature, formal international legal definitions often serve as the basis to separate different subtypes of foreign rule into distinct categories. This leads to unit-level characteristics serving as delineation between foreign rule subtypes, rather than focusing on the relational aspects that unite them.\(^{20}\) Legal definitions of this sort allow governments and scholars to claim that the unit-level characteristics of today make current actions unique from historical predecessors. Usually, the identity of the foreign actor, the foreign actor’s legal status, and the foreign actor’s intentions are used to claim that their actions constitute a new concept in international law, and this trickles down to international relations scholarship, where formal legal definitions are used to code different concepts. Lake (2009) criticizes this trend when he argues that using formal legal definitions to define the structure of the international relations system, while formally accurate, misses the more practical relationships between states. Rather, the relationship between states defines their actions more than the formal legal status of their relations (Lake, 2007). Waltz (1979) correctly states that unit-level characteristics should not be used to define a system, but Lake updates this claim by removing Waltz’s focus on the formal legal definition of relationships in the system, looking instead at the relationships as they exist. In the various branches of foreign rule literature, legal definitions have been the preferred means to distinguish and define different concepts relating to foreign rule, rather than the relationship and uniting and defining the various conceptualization.\(^{21}\)

Once we accept that foreign rule is a relationship of hierarchical domination, the legal definitions that separate occupation, mandates, territorial administration, and

\(^{20}\)In fact, Anghie (2004), Benton (2010), and Pitts (2018) all argue that the international law of sovereignty was purposefully constructed to justify various forms of foreign rule and delineate who counts as a sovereign state, all based on unit-level characteristics, for centuries.

\(^{21}\)The reason for the reliance on legal definitions is not the focus of this chapter, but this tendency largely seems to come from international law, where different concepts proliferate based on formal legal categorization.
peacekeeping from each other break down. Take, for instance, the legal definition of military occupation by Benvenisti (Benvenisti 2004, 4) where he defines military occupation as “the effective control of a power...over a territory to which that power has no sovereign title, without the volition of the sovereign of that territory.” In this definition, there is nothing to separate occupation from other forms of foreign rule such as mandates, territorial administration, armed statebuilding, or others who also focus on the relationship of a power maintaining sovereignty over a foreign territory. For example, this makes sense in defining and explaining the German occupation of the Netherlands, but also accurately describes the British military mission in Sierra Leone and other modern UN missions. While legal definitions behind mandates, territorial administration, peacebuilding, and other legal concepts vary based on claimed intentions and identities of the powerful actor, a united definition remains focused on the relationship between the powerful actor and the foreign territory that they rule over, forcing scholars to examine the commonalities across time and space between various types of foreign rule.\(^{22}\)

\(^{22}\)If this definition of occupation is similar to my definition of foreign rule, why do I not use the concept military occupation and condense other forms of foreign rule into the former for this dissertation? First and foremost, the word occupation has been bandied about by many groups to advance various political purposes throughout the past 100 years, making the common understanding of what occupation is and is not muddled and controversial. Using the term foreign rule conveys a more complete understanding of the relationship defined by Benvenisti’s definition, while also removing the conceptual baggage that the term occupation carries with it. Second, some forms of foreign rule are not neatly covered with the conventional understanding of occupation, which requires armed military presence at all times inside the occupied territory. Often cases of foreign regime change, or other leadership strategies, as mentioned below, are the result of quick military strikes or threats to change or preserve leaders, which effectively remove the sovereign ability of the state to choose its own leadership, but without long standing foreign ruler troop presence. As discussed later in this dissertation, the international legal definitions actually preclude different occupation strategies from occurring, thus making it difficult to use this as a concept for studying foreign rule strategy.
Once unit-level factors are stripped away from formal legal definitions of various forms of foreign rule, the concepts that I argue are all forms of foreign rule appear much more similar than dissimilar. There are still important variations in the various cases that are largely based on unit-level factors, but those differences serve to explain various outcomes rather than operate as justification for partitioning actions as different concepts. Instead of utilizing definitions that exist in international law as a way to justify government behavior, focusing on the relational dynamics that unite these concepts produces more useful analysis. A unified conceptualization of foreign rule improves our understanding of international hierarchy and international politics. Beyond the conceptual clarity it introduces into our understanding of international
hierarchy and international relations, a unified concept of foreign rule improves the ability to make causal inferences about various aspects of foreign rule missions, especially what makes them more or less likely to succeed. By increasing the universe of cases for study, scholars are able to more accurately test their predictions over whether different types of foreign rule missions, different goals, different strategies, or even different foreign rulers themselves produce different outcomes. Throughout the rest of this dissertation, I take advantage of this expanded concept to explore in more depth the determinants of foreign rule strategy. Only once one utilizes a unified concept of foreign rule can one more completely understand the dynamics of foreign rule across time and space and the enduring political realities that it highlights. To illustrate the full universe of cases of foreign rule, Figure 2.3 above features a map of the over 160 cases of foreign rule across five continents that have occurred since 1898.

2.3 Foreign Rule Strategy

After defining the universe of cases of foreign rule that are of the most interest in this dissertation, and discussing the benefits of an unified concept of foreign rule, it is important to define the key dependent variable in this dissertation. What is foreign rule strategy, or what means do foreign rulers use to achieve their goals in their foreign ruled territories? In this section, I define foreign rule strategy and discuss the ideal types of foreign rule strategy most utilized by foreign rulers. To do this, I focus on both what a foreign rule strategy is and what it is not, as well as lay out how foreign rule strategies exist independent of preferences, goals, intentions, and outcomes of the foreign rule mission. Explicitly defining foreign rule strategy entails discussing the differences between strategy and other related concepts, and is a crucial step before exploring my theoretical argument and empirical analysis. Finally, I conclude this section by discussing the ideal types of foreign rule strategy and variations that
exist for foreign rulers to implement.

Before I define foreign rule strategy specifically, it is important to define strategy in general. Gray (1999, 17) defines strategy as “the bridge that relates military power to political purpose,” or “the use that is made of force and the threat of force for the ends of policy.” More broadly, Frieden (1999) argues that, strategies are particular means to an end, or “ways to achieve goals given the anticipated actions of others...and knowledge and information” of the preferences of the actor. Strategies are the means that states use to reach their preferred political ends, and are conceptually separate from the political ends they wish to achieve. While ends and political goals of states are important for thinking about strategy, as strategy depends on a state actually having ends that they are attempting to achieve, maintaining the mental barrier between the two concepts is crucial to promoting a more accurate analysis. Strategy is always in relation to some policy end, but the strategy itself is independent of the ends, in as much as strategies are not simply re-stating the goals. Absent strategy, political ends do not materialize.

Thus, when thinking about strategy in the context of foreign rule, foreign rule strategy is the means that foreign rulers use to achieve their political ends. I define a state’s foreign rule strategy as the means by which a foreign ruler attempts to achieve their policy goals when acting as the de facto sovereign of a foreign ruled territory. It is the manner in which foreign rulers employ their military power to control areas and local actors in an attempt to achieve their policy goals in the territory under foreign rule. Specifically, foreign rule strategy is the means through which the foreign ruler structures their relationship with the foreign ruled territory to achieve their political ends. In the context of foreign rule, foreign rule strategy relates to the form of relationship imposed under foreign rule, and how the foreign ruler employs its military power to impose hierarchical domination. Once a territory is placed under foreign rule, the foreign ruler can decide how best to structure the
relationship between their military and local actors to achieve the outcomes they wish to achieve. Thus, the decision as to how to employ military force to achieve one’s goal in the foreign ruled territory is the direct translation of foreign rule strategy into a process of strategic decision-making. The means and the relationship are the variable of focus, not the political goals or the actors attempting them. Maintaining this conceptual distinction between strategy and goals is crucial, and below I highlight the differences between them.

While the definition of strategy and foreign rule strategy falls in line with other common definitions, often those focused on strategy mistake ends for means when discussing the implementation of military force. I argue that the clean delineation of goals, preferences, intentions, and ends from strategy is crucial for understanding the importance of foreign rule strategy and what my definition logically implies. To briefly elucidate, this definition maintains that strategy is a separate concept from goals and preferences through its reference to how goals and preferences exist prior to and outside the strategy implemented. Goals are the political ends that states and foreign actors are interested in achieving through their imposition of foreign rule. The foreign ruler’s goals are the ends that the means (strategy) are selected to achieve. In other words, strategies are the choices made by foreign rulers to achieve their goals, whereas goals are what foreign rulers seek to achieve through the strategy they are employing. For example, if a state wants to take possession of a piece of territory, territorial gain is the goal of the state. How the state attempts to take possession of the territory, either through military force or diplomatic negotiation, is the strategy of state. Keeping this distinction in mind, foreign rule strategies are the possible means that states can utilize to achieve the goals of the foreign rule operation. These goals can be strategic, economic, humanitarian, or even purely nefarious. However, for all of these different goals, the foreign rule strategy is how the foreign ruler will employ their force and impose their will to achieve them. And it is often the case
that similar foreign rule strategies are used to achieve a variety of different goals. If certain strategies are more likely to succeed, regardless of the political goals the foreign ruler seeks to achieve, then foreign rulers will use similar strategies to achieve various goals. Once a state decides to engage in foreign rule in pursuit of some policy goal, the foreign rule strategy is the means by which the foreign power attempts to achieve this goal.

Similar to the distinction between foreign rule strategy and goals, foreign rule strategy is also distinct from preferences. Frieden (1999, 42) defines preferences as “the way” an actor “orders the possible outcomes of an interaction.” Preferences are the highest valued possible outcomes of a foreign rule when involved in an interstate interaction. This is distinct from strategy, as the strategy of a state is how a state seeks to obtain its preferred outcomes. The preferences of a foreign rule are a ranking of the preferred outcomes of the foreign ruler. Foreign rule strategy is the use of military force to attempt to achieve the foreign ruler’s preferred outcome as defined by the preferences of the foreign ruler. Following an armed intervention, a foreign ruler might prefer a less belligerent client state, a more robust local economy, or increased stability in the region. However, the means the foreign ruler uses to attempt to reach those preferred end states are distinct from those preferred outcomes. The strategy to attempt to ensure more stability in a region following armed intervention is not the same thing as actually producing more regional stability. Instead, the foreign ruler must seek the means, or foreign rule strategy, for ensuring that enhanced regional stability does occur.

Finally, strategy is distinct from, and not defined by, the intentions of a foreign ruler. Beyond intended outcomes or goals, intended strategy refers to the “the actions that a state plans to take under certain circumstances” (Rosato, 2015, 52), whereas strategy is the actual action taken under those circumstances to achieve the foreign ruler’s goals. This distinction is important, because although some might
look to pre-intervention discussions to gauge what strategy was utilized certain for-

eign rulers, this proves to be an inaccurate approach. While a foreign ruler might

intend to act in a certain way prior to an armed intervention, or envision themselves

as only possibly using one foreign rule strategy following armed intervention, these

intentions do not define the actual strategy employed. Rather, they are only in-
dicative of the possible preferred strategies *ex ante*, prior to intervention. Intended

strategy is a worthy variable to note, but as von Moltke the Elder famously quipped

“no plan of operations extends with any certainty beyond...first contact,” and the

actual strategy used is a more consequential variable to note (von Moltke, 1993, 92).

Because circumstances on the ground define the range of possible strategies a mil-
itary can undertake, the strategy cannot be defined by the intended strategy prior
to invasion. The range of possible options only becomes apparent once a military
actually launches its operation. Thus, the strategy employed is a distinct concept
from intended strategy.

In fact, as I show later in this dissertation, it is often quite common for foreign
rulers to reverse their pre-intervention intentions, and declare missions of foreign
rule or engage in strategies they never intended. For example, if a foreign ruler
initially intends to simply place a new leader in power and leave the country they
have intervened in after a short military mission, this is not relevant for defining the
actual strategy imposed if they end up occupying the territory and rebuilding new
institutions in a ten-year long foreign rule mission. This exact situation occurred
when Nasser and the Egyptian military intervened in Yemen, intending to simply
place a new leader in power and leave quickly. They were so confident of the short
mission that the military did not bring maps of Yemen with them as they landed in
Sana’a (Witty, 2001; Dawisha, 1975). Thus, defining strategy based on the *ex ante*
intentions, rather than the actual actions taken, only obfuscates what strategy was
actually implemented. Keeping this in mind, strategy is the actual means utilized by
the foreign ruler, rather than their preferred actions prior to armed intervention. The choice to engage in foreign rule, the goal the foreign ruler is trying to achieve, and the strategy the foreign ruler uses to achieve this goal are all distinct and important variables to study. However in this dissertation, I focus on the latter, and attempt to identify the local determinants of the means foreign rulers use to achieve their goals.

Beyond the distinction of strategy from goals, intentions, and preferences, it is important to specify how to identify and define different strategies. Just as the broad concept of foreign rule is not defined based on unit-level characteristics, is not correct to define a foreign rule strategy based on the identity or other characteristics of the foreign ruler itself. It could be the case that unit-level characteristics impact the choice of strategy (such as domestic political system, military biases, or leadership preferences), but the foreign rule strategy is not defined by these characteristics. In this analysis, a focus on the content of strategy, and not on unit-level characteristics of the foreign ruler, is the main identifying feature that separates different foreign rule strategies. Foreign rule strategy is defined by the means through which a foreign ruler may realize their goals. The identity of the foreign ruler, whether it is an international organization, unilateral state, or another actor, does not define a foreign rule strategy because identities of foreign rulers does not impact the means to achieve their political goals. However, the identity of a foreign ruler could still act as an important causal variable of foreign rule strategy, even if not a defining characteristic. Certain foreign rulers may be more or less likely than others to use certain means to achieve their ends, and hence they are more or less likely to utilize different foreign rule strategies. But that is a causal explanation and a new variable to study, not a unique category of strategy. For instance, there can not be a defined UN strategy of foreign rule, a communist strategy of foreign rule, a democratic strategy of foreign rule etc. Rather, the UN, communist states, or democratic powers are more likely to use certain types of
strategies that are available for all actors to opt for if they so choose. However, the identity of a foreign ruler could still act as an important causal variable of foreign rule strategy, even if not a defining characteristic, rather than a defining characteristic.

Thus just like how preferences, intentions, and goals of the foreign rule all exist independent and logically prior to the choice of foreign rule strategy, the identity of the foreign ruler is a distinct concept that can affect the choice of strategy, but does not define it. Each theoretically can impact the choice of a foreign ruler’s strategy and the likelihood of the chosen strategy’s success, but keeping strategy itself logically distinct as a concept is crucial for proper analysis of why certain strategies are selected. While it could be the case that certain types of states are less likely to engage in some forms of foreign rule or use different strategies than other states, the strategy itself is not defined by the identity of the actor carrying it out. For instance, arguing certain strategies can only be carried about by the United Nations, or by democracies, or by communist states, unnecessarily delimits the meaningful analysis of those strategies as there is nothing limiting other non-UN, non-democratic, or non-communist actors from using similar means to achieve different ends. While different identities can in fact identify different goals and preferences as unique to those actors, actors of all types can use similar means to achieve a whole host of ends. When defining strategies as unique to certain identities, a conflation of means and ends occurs, and there can be no meaningful analysis of the origins of foreign rule strategy. By defining strategies based upon the identities of the actors who

23 Indeed, it is the variation in strategies utilized by UN missions, Soviet missions of foreign rule, and even foreign rule missions under Nazi Germany that is remarkable. Almost all foreign rulers use a variety of means when engaging in foreign rule, making this variation interesting to study.

24 It is important to emphasize again that using unit-level characteristics, such as identities of foreign rulers, as variables in our analyses is a worth-while endeavor when done appropriately. Using the identity of the foreign ruler as a variable (as I do as a control variable later in this dissertation) is an important piece of analysis to test both the success of foreign rule missions and the choice of strategy. Indeed it could be the case that certain foreign rulers, by their nature, prefer certain types of strategies over others. However, this then means that the identity of the foreign ruler is a variable affecting the choice of strategy, and not something that differentiates distinct strategies.
use them, we diminish the analytical leverage we can gain by studying what factors make those strategies more attractive to the foreign rulers who employ them.

Next, I argue that the means foreign rulers can employ to achieve their political goals are what defines the types of foreign rule strategies available. Building on my relational focus, I argue that the relationship utilized to impose foreign rule is what defines the foreign rule strategy employed. The strategy implemented in the foreign rule mission is the means through which the foreign ruler attempts to impose its goals on the local territory. There are two main strategies of foreign rule that exist across various time periods of foreign rule. I argue, following Saunders (2009, 2011), Downes and Monten (2013), and Downes and O’Rourke (2016), that the two main varieties of foreign rule strategy are first, those focused on political leaders, and second, those focused on political institutions. These ideal types of strategies, what Saunders (2009, 2011) calls transformative and non-transformative strategies and Downes and Monten (2013) call leadership FIRCs and institutional FIRCs, map onto what I call leadership and institutional strategies as identified below. While this distinction between two types of strategy is not new, the view of each of these kinds of missions as strategies rather than goals or intervention aims is an important modification. Thus, institutional and leadership strategies are ideal types of foreign rule strategies that help provide a sound conceptual map for understanding the importance of strategy.

Beyond this modern focus on intervention and FIRC strategy, the distinction between leadership and institutional strategies is similar to another distinction between strategy types when imposing international hierarchy, namely colonial rule. In the literature of colonial rule, separating different colonial strategies into two ideal types

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The major conceptual difference between Saunders (2011) and this definition is that Saunders focuses on military interventions rather than foreign rule that occurs following an intervention. However, across these two related concepts the same trend of strategies focused on leaders and strategies focused on institutions holds.
has proven a useful theoretical scheme that holds much promise for understanding foreign rule strategy. In the preponderance of the literature on colonial rule and its impacts on modern political phenomena, scholars have taken the variety of strategies utilized by colonial powers to manage their colonial territories and conceptualized them into two ideal types: indirect rule and direct rule. Indirect rule is typically conceptualized as the incorporation of local indigenous institutions and leaders into the colonial administration, and granting local institutions more autonomy under supervision of the colonial power (Fisher, 1998, 6-7). Direct rule, on the other hand, focuses on establishing new colonial administrative institutions to replace and supersede any indigenous institutions; while local populations might help staff the institutions, they are largely created and maintained by the colonial power (Lange, 2004, 906-907). Remarkably, this distinction between indirect rule and direct rule maps decently well onto the distinction between institutional and leadership strategies, albeit with some differences.\(^{26}\) However, what is most notable is how useful this ideal type partition of colonial strategy has proven in discussing the outcomes of colonial periods and the long-term effects of colonization (Hechter, 2013; Iyer, 2010). While I assess the relevance of this literature below in my discussion of why foreign rule strategy is an important variable to study, the fact that a partition between two ideal types of strategies has been an effective path for studying the effects of colonial rule and colonial strategy provide a sound justification for my focus on two ideal types of foreign rule strategy as a useful method for understanding the politics of foreign rule.

Thus, while leadership and institutional strategies do not map exactly onto colonial strategies of indirect and direct rule, the usefulness of this conceptual schema shows the benefits for focusing on ideal types of foreign rule strategy. Combined with the FIRC and military intervention literature, this provides good evidence that the

\(^{26}\)Interestingly, Mazower (2008, 1-8) argues that using this colonial frame for understanding the variation in Nazi Germany’s occupation strategy during World War II is useful for understanding the governance differences in the Nazi Empire.
decision to code foreign rule strategies as institutional or leadership is theoretically justified and empirically sound. This is not to say that there are not variations in the particulars of each strategy among the different cases of foreign rule. However, these two ideal types categorize the full gamut of cases of foreign rule strategies examined in this dissertation. Just as Lange (2009) argues that one could have strategies that vary in the level of direct rule-ness in colonial territories, there can also be variations in how many institutions an institutional strategy touches. Nonetheless, while one foreign rule mission might feature a higher level of institutional change than another, the decision to use an institutional strategy instead of a leadership strategy is an important choice. Thus, while scholars have developed new flavors, twists, and terminology to describe the two ideal types of strategy, the variations that foreign rulers choose continue to fall into these two categories. Of course, there is some overlap between these two ideal types. But the distinction between leadership and institutional strategies is critical to examine. In the next sections, I define each strategy and lay out the key differences that delineate leadership and institutional strategies.

2.3.1 Leadership Strategies

After discussing the definition of a foreign rule strategy, we can move to define the differences between a leadership and institutional strategy. Leadership strategies are foreign rule strategies that emphasize changing or maintaining a specific leader in power while maintaining current political institutions. I define leadership strategies as foreign rule strategies where the foreign ruler governs the local territory by appointing preferred leaders to rule through current governmental institutions, and ensuring the preferred leader remains in power. This includes strategies where the foreign ruler replaces non-preferred leadership with new leaders, reimposes recently deposed leaders who the foreign ruler preferred, and maintains leaders in power that would otherwise be deposed. This definition is akin to Saunders’ (2009) definition of
non-transformative strategies, which she defines as strategies “without the explicit intention to alter domestic institutions at any level.” Similarly, Downes and Monten (2013) define what they call leadership strategies as strategies where “the intervener removes a state’s primary leader, but leaves the main political institutions and selection procedures that make up the regime intact.” Leadership strategies are more focused on the agent in control of the foreign ruled territory than the institutions in the territory. The foreign ruler is content to have local institutions manage the foreign rule mission, and works to achieve their goals through local leaders. Leadership strategies come in many varieties and operate through various forms of military action. In all cases, however, the foreign ruler relies upon the existing local political institutions to govern and focus their influence upon the leadership of the dependent territory. To be clear, a leadership strategy can manifest itself in many different ways over time and in different contexts. The foreign ruler may support, replace, return to power, or use local elites as proxies. However the key to identifying a leadership change strategy is the reliance of the foreign ruler on imposing leaders and controlling individuals rather than a desire to build new institutions. In a leadership strategy, the foreign ruler cares more about who is managing the territory than how it is managed.

Under the colonial strategy schema described above, leadership strategies are most similar to indirect rule strategies by colonial powers where colonial administrators left local leaders and institutions in power and worked with them in order to achieve their goals. Most commonly associated with British colonial practices, indirect rule strategies were embraced as missions where colonial administrations worked with local institutions to further British or other colonial power interests in the colonized territory. In practice, indirect rule usually referred to tribal leaders or practices maintained by colonial authorities, and cooperation of local leaders in pursuing their colonial goals. As Mamdani (1996) and others point out, however,
this form of “decentralized despotism” was not a simple benign co-optation of existing institutions, but often focused on privileging one set of local institutions over another, and maintaining certain leaders and tribal institutions in power – even extending them, to achieve their goals. A leadership strategy can similarly privilege certain groups against others while maintaining the local institutional architecture of the territory. While foreign rule strategy differs from the colonial strategy of indirect rule, it is important to recognize the similarity in that privileging one group of local institutions, and certain leaders against others, is how a leadership strategy of foreign rule often takes shape. It is not in the simple selection of existing leaders, but a selection of certain groups of elites and institutions that can achieve the foreign ruler’s goal.

While recognizing this similarity between indirect rule strategies and leadership foreign rule strategies, leadership strategies tend to focus on the very top echelon of the governing structure of a territory, and usually only the main leader of the territory. A typical example of a leadership strategy is the Japanese foreign rule mission in Thailand starting 1941, where after a brief invasion by the Japanese military, the Thai government surrendered to the Japanese forces and were eventually integrated into the Japanese Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. However, the Japanese maintained Major General Plaek Phibunsongkhram in power as Prime Minister of Thailand and worked with existing Thai institutions to help their war efforts in Burma and Malaya. While the Japanese only directly imposed their rule over Thailand to achieve their desired foreign policy goals in the region, the fact that they forced the Thai government to cede their sovereign authority while ensuring the sympathetic Phibun regime maintained power and purged anti-Japanese factions in its ranks, is emblematic of a leadership strategy.27 In other typical cases, such

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27For more on the Japanese case of foreign rule in Thailand see Suwannathat-Pian (1995); Reynolds (1994); Swan (1996).
as the Italian occupation of Montenegro, existing institutions are kept in place, but leaders are replaced with administrators from the foreign ruler and the rest of the local bureaucrats continue with their normal functions (Tomasevich, 2001, 138-148). In practice, a leadership strategy can include imposing new leaders, maintaining a sympathetic leader in power, and replacing leaders with a governor from the foreign ruler; however, similar to indirect rule strategies, the existing local institutions are maintained. While the act of removing leaders typically has the effect of also removing elites, that is, purging the top echelon supporters of the previous leader and replacing them with elites that support the current leader in power, this is still considered a change in leadership rather than a change in institutions.

It is also important to note that the existence of some institutional change accompanying the new leadership does not axiomatically imply that the strategy is no longer of the leadership variety. When using a leadership strategy, the foreign ruler often chooses a leader that promises to reform the economy, military, or some other government policy to their wishes. While this might appear as some form of institutional change, the fact that the foreign ruler chooses a specific leader to carry out reforms, and does not impose institutional reforms themselves, defines a leadership strategy. Further, often a foreign ruler selects a leader to engage in the foreign ruler’s desired political reforms and appoints a leader that can carry out the reforms deemed necessary. If the reforms are carried out with the installed leader, this is considered a leadership strategy. The key determination is whether the foreign ruler is directly controlling the leader in power, rather than controlling the political institutions or institutional reforms themselves. For instance if the foreign ruler directs a local leader to engage in reforms in their territory and the carry them out, that is largely a leadership strategy. Additionally, the length of military operations and military presence by the foreign ruler is not an indicator of the strategy utilized. While many leadership strategies follow from short military campaigns and short use
of direct military force, they can also entail long-standing military presence to ensure the preferred leadership stays in power.

For example, in 1975 the Soviet Union and Cuba helped to impose the MPLA government in Angola with Cuban troops remaining in Angola for over 16 years.\textsuperscript{28} In so doing, their focus was to ensure that the South African supported UNITA forces did not take over leadership of the country, thereby maintaining the leadership strategy predicated on ensuring MPLA-maintained power, instead of focusing on imposing new communist institutions in the territory. While the mission was long lasting, the constant focus on leaders is what defines this as a leadership strategy. Leadership strategies have been attempted in various different contexts of foreign rule, and were especially popular in the early 20th century and the middle to late Cold War period. During the mandatory period, mandate powers used leadership strategies when working with local elites and local institutions to ensure the material interests of the foreign ruler were met. The British imposing King Faisal as leader of their mandate over the newly independent Kingdom of Iraq is a prototypical example of the prevalence of this strategy during that time period (Fieldhouse, 2006, 69-117). During the military occupations of European states following interstate wars in the 19th and early 20th century, the foreign ruler often kept the local leaders in place to advance their goals. Italy deposing the leadership of Albania during World War I and the Vichy France regime during World War II are also prototypical examples of this strategy.\textsuperscript{29} During the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union often looked to promote local leaders that supported their interests, either by supporting coups that placed them in power, or by providing resources to ensure they maintained power. Emblematic of this time period, the United States imposition of Joaquín

\textsuperscript{28}See Durch (1978); George (2005); De Oliveira (2011).

\textsuperscript{29}On the Italian mission in Albania, see Fried (2012); Swire (1929); Guy (2012). On Vichy France see Jackson (2003); Burrin (1997); Laub (2010).
Balaguer in the Dominican Republic in 1965 and the Soviet reimposition of János Kádár are typical examples of leadership strategies. Today, leadership strategies often involve working through local proxies, such as Russia’s actions in Eastern Ukraine (Bowen, 2017).

2.3.2 Institutional Strategies

Institutional strategies, on the other hand, are foreign rule strategies where the foreign ruler replaces and reshapes local political institutions as distinct from the current local institutions in the targeted territory. Institutional strategies emphasize building, maintaining, and ruling through political institutions. What I call institutional strategies are similar to Saunders’ (2009) definition of transformative strategies, which she defines as a strategy that “explicitly aims to interfere in or actively determine the target state’s domestic institutions.” Similarly, Downes and Monten (2013) argue that institutional strategies occur when the foreign ruler “overthrows and replaces a state’s political institutions.” Institutional strategies, then, are defined by the foreign ruler creating and managing an expansive bureaucracy that pursues the foreign ruler’s goals, rather than the foreign ruler choosing a specific leader to pursue the former’s goals through existing local institutions. Institutional strategies focus on creating and developing political institutions that ensure the foreign ruler can achieve their goals and promote their interests. While institutional strategies often include changes in leadership as a byproduct of the new institutional structure, the focus of an institutional strategy remains on the political institutions of the local territory. New leaders as a byproduct of new political institutions are consistent with an institutional strategy. Thus, institutional strategies are foreign rule strategies where the focus is on changing government structures, rather than

30 For the 1965 Dominican Republic case, see Lowenthal (1972); Palmer Jr. (1989). For the 1956 Hungary case, see Gati (2006); Borhi (2004).
changing government personnel in the foreign territory.

Returning the colonial rule schema, an institutional foreign rule strategy is similar to a direct rule colonial strategy. Under direct rule, colonial territories found their existing tribal leaders and institutions discarded by their new colonial rulers, who imposed new centralized institutions. This form of colonial rule is typically associated with French colonial territories, but just as with indirect rule strategies and the British colonial empire, there was wide variation in this strategy’s use across colonial empires (Burbank and Cooper, 2010). In practice, colonial territories under direct rule strategies saw colonial powers often creating their own new institutional bureaucracies that either forced the colonial territories to have similar institutions to those of the colonial power, or a new type of colonial institution which they deemed would allow for the best resource extraction. This created what Mamdani (1996) called “centralized despotism” with new institutions imposed in the colonial territories that were designed to increase the efficiency of their administration and to maximize the ends the colonial ruler was seeking to achieve. Once the decision is made to centralize authority, take power away from local institutions, and impose new forms of bureaucratic governance on a territory, this indicates that a direct rule strategy was utilized. Modernizing this strategy to apply it to cases of foreign rule, institutional strategies are similarly focused not on the content of the new institutions imposed, but rather the imposition of new bureaucracies and state institutions that did not exist previously. Institutional strategies then remain similar in form to direct rule colonial rule strategies, with their focus on how the central political and administrative bureaucracy of the territory is managed.

Institutional strategies focus on the national or sub-national political institutions that determine government selection, rule of law, bureaucratic effectiveness, and other governance functions. A prototypical example of an institutional strategy is the Soviet Union’s occupation of Afghanistan, where the Soviets deposed Hafizullah Amin
and tried to install a more efficient communist state during their decade long occupation of the Central Asian state. Rather than working to simply install a new government in power and work with the pre-existing communist party in Afghanistan, the Soviets sought to build a stronger central state apparatus during their occupation mission in order to allow for a more robust communist governing authority to manage the entire territory.\textsuperscript{31} Beyond the example of Afghanistan, other specific actions designate an institutional strategy when engaging in foreign rule. Imposing democratic institutions, removing democratic institutions and imposing authoritarian institutions, replacing public works bureaucracies, imposing new civil administrators, and new layers of bureaucracy are all examples of how institutional strategies of foreign rule occur in practice. In effect, for an institutional strategy to exist, one should see foreign rulers building forms of government institutions that replace the existing ones, or creating new versions of institutions that had not previously existed.

It is important to note here that institutional strategies of foreign rule are distinct from aid programs and other relationships designed to improve the economic development of various territories, without surrendering the territory’s sovereign authority. If there is no relationship of foreign rule, or the aid program does not exist as a result of foreign rule, then it cannot be indicative of a foreign rule strategy. Economic development programs and military assistance can help when building new political institutions, but are separate policies that are outside the scope of foreign rule. Economic development programs do often occur simultaneously with institution building in foreign territories, as many believe strong state institutions are necessary for economic development (Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson, 2005; Rodrik, 2000; Acemoglu, 2005). However, institutional strategies remain conceptually distinct from economic development programs, as the presence of a development program does not

\footnote{For more on the Soviet foreign rule mission in Afghanistan see Hammond (1984); Kakar (1995); Braithwaite (2011).}
indicate an institutional strategy. Rather, tracking how the economic development program is administered in the foreign ruled territory helps illustrate the foreign ruler’s strategy.

Similarly, military assistance is not indicative of an institutional strategy, as military assistance can occur without a relationship of foreign rule. By itself, offering aid to help train and improve a local military does not indicate an institution building strategy.\textsuperscript{32} For example, foreign rulers often provide military aid prior to or following their use of leadership strategies. Frequently, a newly imposed leader might need to reform the military to prevent a coup and cement their control over the political system of the local territory. However, military aid often accompanies institutional strategies as well. If the foreign ruler promotes military reform to ensure the military does not threaten the nascent political institutions they imposed, it indicates a broader institutional strategy. For both military assistance and development aid programs, how the foreign ruler administers the aid is an important indicator of the strategy employed. Only if the foreign ruler is directly administering the assistance programs, or using their newly imposed institutions to administer the development and assistance programs, is this indicative of an institutional strategy. Overall, institutional strategies focus on transforming the governance structures and ruling through political institutions inside the local territory.

Comparable to leadership strategies, foreign rulers have used institutional strategies regularly throughout history. During the mandatory period, certain foreign rulers utilized institutional strategies to transform areas into institutional structures that allowed for easier resource extraction. The French operations of foreign rule in governing their mandate for Syria and Lebanon during the 1920s were emblematic of the period. Transformational occupations were popular with foreign rulers in the

\textsuperscript{32}For more on military assistance and development programs focused on building new institutions see Finkel, Pérez-Liñán and Seligson (2007); Rowe (1974); Scott and Steele (2011); Moss, Pettersson and Van de Walle (2006).
Caribbean during the early 20th century to promote more stable trading partners.
This played out during the United States occupation of Nicaragua in 1927, which
focused on defeating Augusto C. Sandino’s rebellion and stabilizing the Nicaraguan
state through electoral reform.\textsuperscript{33} The early Cold War saw the United States and
the Soviet Union seeking to impose new institutions across Europe and Asia, in-
cluding both working to create a state on the Korean peninsula with their preferred
institutional structures.\textsuperscript{34} Today, international organizations regularly engage in in-
stitution building when imposing foreign rule in order to improve the stability and
governance of the territory. The UN mission to East Timor following the cessation of
hostilities with Indonesia is an oft-cited case that shows this modern manifestation of
institutional strategies.\textsuperscript{35} In all cases of foreign rule that use institutional strategies,
the foreign ruler remains focused on managing the governance functions in the local
territory and remaking the institutions to promote their interests.

After laying out the differences between the two ideal types of strategies, it is im-
portant to note that strategies of foreign rule exist in practice more as a continuum
than distinct types. Much like how foreign rule exists as part of the international
hierarchy continuum, leadership and institutional strategies sit at distinct ends of
the foreign rule strategy continuum. Only changing the leaders at the top of the
institutional pyramid is one extreme, while changing the entire political-institutional
pyramid exists at the other extreme. Decapitating the leaders and replacing with new
leadership largely maintains the political institutions of the state. However, when re-
moving political institutions, the leaders often fall as well. In practice, foreign rulers
often use elements of both leadership and institutional strategies in most cases of for-
eign rule. In an ideal world, foreign rulers would have a territory with their preferred

\textsuperscript{33}For more see Langley (1983, 175-198) and Gobat (2005).

\textsuperscript{34}See McCune (1947); Van Ree (1989); Lankov (2002).

\textsuperscript{35}See Martin and Mayer-Rieckh (2005); Sahin (2007); Lemay-Hebert (2011).
political institutions and a preferred leader, allowing them to accomplish their goals quickly. For example, when a new leader is imposed, often the new leader modifies a few local institutions at the foreign ruler’s behest. But the foreign ruler’s focus remains on imposing a pliant leader rather than building the institutional capacity of the territory. Additionally, institutional strategies almost always include a change in leadership as well. When foreign rulers change the structure of political institutions, the new structure of the institutions leads to leadership change. However, focusing on which ideal type the foreign ruler is the most similar to remains beneficial, as both leadership and institutional strategies remain logically distinct. Focusing on two ideal type strategies serves to show two distinct forms of foreign rule, and how foreign rulers make choices concerning how to attempt to advance their interests in their dependencies.

2.4 The Importance of Foreign Rule Strategy

After understanding more completely the concepts of foreign rule and foreign rule strategy, it is important to understanding why examining the choice of foreign rule strategy an important endeavor. Studying foreign rule strategy is integral to understanding the success and failure of foreign rule missions and the long-term effects of engaging in foreign rule. In this section, I discuss how various literatures have argued that foreign rule strategy matters for various political outcomes, and in doing so they illustrate why understanding the determinants of foreign rule strategy and how that choice is made is of crucial importance. Understanding the origins of a foreign ruler’s strategic choices is useful for identifying long-term trends throughout history, and allows for a better analysis of why certain foreign rule missions succeed and others fail. Only once we understand why certain strategies are utilized can we understand why those strategies produce certain effects and how the strategic choices of foreign rulers are crucial for understanding future political and economic
developments. It is precisely because the following literature highlights the various ways in which strategy can matter for success, failure, and other future outcomes that it is important to understand the origins of foreign rule strategy. Illustrating this importance, the colonial rule literature and the various literatures on the sub-components of my definition of foreign rule have examined, in depth, the effects that are produced when colonial and foreign rulers use distinct strategies. Throughout these literatures, the variation of strategy by the colonizer or foreign ruler often serves as an important explanatory variable in determining various outcomes such as war proneness, democracy, economic growth, foreign policy behavior, and more. This illustrates why understanding the origins of foreign rule strategy is crucial for sound evaluation of foreign rule missions and their effects in the future. In this section, I briefly review this literature to highlight the importance foreign rule strategy and the impact it can have on future political and economic outcomes in foreign ruled territories, and thereby understanding the process through which foreign rule strategy emerges is essential. Thus by examining how various literatures related to sub-types of foreign rule think about strategy, we can understand the relevance of studying the origin and variation of foreign rule strategy more completely.

First, as stated above, the distinction between foreign rule strategies is similar to the distinction in the colonial rule literature between indirect and direct colonial rule strategies, and can help clarify the importance of understanding the long-term effects of strategy. As previously noted, a common trend in the colonial rule literature focuses on the differences between direct and indirect rule strategies and the consequences each strategy can have on various political and economic outcomes. Variation in colonial strategy has been shown to impact economic development (Lange, 2004; Lange, Mahoney and Vom Hau, 2006), public goods provision (Iyer, 2010), state capacity (Lange, 2009), modern democratic political institutions (Olsson, 2009; Bollen and Jackman, 1985; Lipset, 1994) and other various political and economic factors.
Scholars continually illustrate that the colonial strategy used by the colonizer has led to long standing consequences in the colonial territory, promoting other positive future outcomes or problems that have continued until today. As an example, Iyer’s (2010) work on variation in indirect and direct rule strategies in India under British colonial rule has provided sound evidence that areas where the British utilized direct rule strategies have fewer roads, worse public health infrastructure, and fewer schools in the post-colonial period. The evidence of the long-run effects of the colonial strategy utilized across various territories in India is one example of the importance that the strategy of colonial rule can have on long-term outcomes. Mamdani (1996) also highlights the impact of colonial strategy in his analysis of late colonial rule in Africa, and he argues that indirect rule strategies served to create further ethnic divisions and categories that privileged one group of local rulers against others, thereby leading to the ethnic divisions that exist to this day. If strategy imposed during colonial periods has profound effects on future development of colonized territories, this provides sound evidence that the effect of strategy during periods of foreign rule will have similar long-term consequences.

Beyond the impact that colonial strategy can produce over the long term, many scholars have also examined the origins of different colonial strategies, and why certain colonizers used certain colonial strategies, Hechter (2013) argues that throughout history, rudimentary communication technology made indirect rule the preferred

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36 In earlier studies, the type of colonial strategy implemented was often proxied simply by the identity of the colonial power. However as data availability has improved, this literature has become much more nuanced and shown how different colonial powers varied in strategy and produced unique outcomes across colonial territories based on the strategy utilized.

37 Lange (2009), however, argues that among British colonies indirect rule has not been beneficial for long-term development, and colonies with direct rule are better off today.

38 For an extreme case to illustrate how these ethnic divisions reinforced and heightened through indirect rule in Africa still matter today, look no further than Mamdani’s (2014) discussion of the colonial origins of the Rwandan genocide. The colonial strategy utilized by the Belgians during their rule of Rwanda, according to Mamdani (2014), had the direct effect of creating the ethnic divisions in Rwanda that persisted to the tragic events of the 1990s.
strategy due to the difficulties managing an extensive direct rule bureaucracy without constant communication with the metropole. However, he argues that once communication technology and the costs to maintain constant communication were lessened, a historical switch occurred where direct rule strategies became more popular as the metropole could now manage the colonial mission. Once it became less costly to create new institutions, the preference for local indirect rule was removed. Gerring et al. (2011) differ in their argument and hypothesize that the level of existing institutional development in a colonial territory forces a colonial power to use an indirect or direct rule strategy. When facing stronger institutions that require a bargain over the governance of the colonial territory, local leaders will want to show themselves to be useful to the colonial administrators and the colonial administrators do not want to alienate communities with strong social ties and political bureaucracies. Thus, the social bargain between powerful local leaders and institutions and the colonial metropole creates an impulse to utilize an indirect rule strategy. Where these local institutions and leaders do not exist, direct rule is imposed. While noting that local factors and technological change can matter for the imposition of colonial rule and the means through which colonial rulers manage their colonial territories, this can still provide some initial thoughts as to whether similar dynamics extend to strategic choices surrounding foreign rule strategy.

Scholars of colonialism have also found that success and failure in colonial rule is largely dependent upon the strategy used. MacDonald (2014) argues that local network ties in colonial territories creates conditions that allow for easier colonial conquest and more successful rule. While the claim that local collaborators help explain the success of colonial empires has been upheld by many scholars of colonial empires (Robinson, 1972; Newbury, 2003; Burbank and Cooper, 2010), MacDonald specifically examines the variation of success in what he calls peripheral conquest, and argues that the availability of local collaborators and social fragmentation helps
determine the strategy the colonial power uses. This, in turn, helps to explain the variation in the success of colonial conquest generally speaking, as local collaboration reduces resistance to colonial rule. Local political networks can allow for the colonial power to use more successful strategies. Similar arguments about variation in resistance to colonial rule have also been offered in various literatures. Furthermore, MacDonald also extends the previous arguments about social fragmentation making conquest easier for colonial empires (Doyle, 1986; Rosen, 1996; Abernathy, 2000); he argues that social ties between local elites and the foreign metropole, as well as ties among elites, determine the availability of successful strategies and likelihood of maintaining colonial rule.

Additionally, Hechter (2013) argues that that indirect rule has been the more successful colonial strategy over time, as it reduces nationalist backlash against the foreign ruler. Hechter argues that utilizing indirect rule strategies can help satiate nationalist demands for more autonomy and put pressure on local leaders to govern well, leading to more successful colonial rule. Building on this, when examining variation in strategies of colonial and imperial rule, many note that successful cases of colonial rule almost always involve indirect rule strategies with local elites aiding the colonial power. In cases where foreign powers were not able to, or chose not to work with local elites, failure usually followed. When using direct rule strategies, failure to govern successfully was more common than success. Combined, it is clear after examining the vast literature on colonial rule that the strategy utilized during colonial periods is a major factor in determining both the short-term likelihood of success, and the long-term effects of the colonial mission. In recognizing the vast importance that colonial strategy has on various effects for the colonial territories, below I also illustrate that various literatures on foreign rule missions can find similar trends with the effects of foreign rule strategy.

Beyond examining colonial strategy, foreign rule strategy has also be shown to be
a key variable in various literatures focused on the sub-components of my definition of foreign rule. A major exemplar of the focus on foreign rule strategy and its effects can be found in the literature on foreign-imposed regime change missions. Scholars who have examined the effects of FIRCs have largely focused on the effects that FIRCs have on future political outcomes following the completion of the FIRC missions. Much like in the literature on colonial rule, the FIRC strategy utilized by the foreign power has been shown to be a key variable in determining success of FIRCs and stability of post-FIRC states. For example, Peic and Reiter (2011) illustrate that there are distinct dynamics in leadership and institutional FIRCs, and argue that the reduced state capacity following institutional FIRCs leads to an increased probability of civil war in the territory. They argue that the specific FIRC strategy utilized during a FIRC operation leads to an increased chance of civil war in the post-FIRC state. Similarly, the strategy for a FIRC operation can impact the effectiveness of regime stability in the future. Downes and Monten (2013) argue that a FIRC democratization strategy is only successful when the institutional prerequisites for democracy exist prior to the intervention. When the strategy focuses on changing institutions without the preexisting conditions for success, the new institutions, they argue, will largely fail. Similarly, Downes and O'Rourke (2016) argue that the FIRC strategy utilized by a major power can impact the likelihood of improved bilateral relations in the future. Through a disaggregation of FIRC operations by strategy and by whether they were successful, they find that the strategy utilized by a major power makes future relations between the two states more likely to be peaceful or conflictual.

In all three of these studies, the choice of FIRC strategy plays a large role in the explanation of the post-FIRC political dynamics. While the labels used are different across the various studies, the broad distinction between leadership FIRCs and institutional FIRCs threads throughout, which illustrates how variation in foreign rule
strategy matters. The preponderance of evidence indicates that institutional FIRCs are the FIRCs most associated with negative externalities, and are most prone to outright failure. Less examined than the effects of the FIRC strategy used by a certain intervening power is what drives the choice to use a leadership or institution FIRC strategy in the first place. To the extent that a discussion over the choice of FIRC strategy does exist, it is largely directed towards unit-level characteristics such as the interests, domestic institutions, or regime type of the state carrying out the FIRC mission (Paris, 2015). However, in the data reported by all of the studies listed above, leadership FIRCs and institutional FIRCs are carried out by both democratic and non-democratic great powers, consistently throughout history, with no apparent pattern between the strategy and the identity of the major power. In fact, Easterly, Satyanath and Berger (2008) find that, regardless of the identity of the major power carrying out the FIRC operation, the regime type of the post-FIRC state is largely the same, and all states push similar strategies in their FIRC missions. Owen IV (2002) finds that states of a variety of regime types since the 16th century all carry out similar FIRC strategies, making it clear that FIRC strategies largely exist independent of certain regime types. Thus given the deep effects FIRC strategy can have on the long-term effects of FIRC missions, variation in FIRC strategy remains of paramount importance when discussing outcomes of regime change operations. Yet the determinants of the choice of strategy remain under examined, given the vast importance of this choice.

The literature on military occupations often does not explicitly focus on defined types of strategies used by military occupiers. However, a close reading of the literature illustrates that the strategy of military occupiers is a crucial factor in explaining success and failure of military occupations. The lack of codified discussion of strategy is largely due to the fact that under international law and the formal legal definition of military occupation, military occupiers are limited to only one type of occupation
strategy, called ‘belligerent occupation’ (Graber, 1949; Dinstein, 2009). The transformation of institutions during periods of occupation is technically against international law and thus limited the types of military occupation strategies that could be considered legitimate forms of occupation under international law. However following the Cold War, as the United States and the United Nations began engaging in more projects of intervention, many legal scholars began discussing the changing role of military occupation and called for a new definition of legitimate occupation strategies that moved beyond simply belligerent occupation and towards the inclusion of transformative and humanitarian occupation in international law (Fox, 2008; Chesterman, 2005). These new types of occupation strategy attempted to codify the practice of transforming institutions to promote peace and stability in post-conflict military occupations as legitimate strategies under international law. The key difference in this modern strategy of transformative or humanitarian occupation, versus traditional belligerent occupation, is that transformative occupations are focused on changing political institutions in the occupied area, whereas belligerent occupation explicitly forbade any institutional change and was tasked with maintaining and working with local institutions already in place. However, while this new focus on institutional change during occupation periods is a welcome development in the international law of military occupation, major powers were able to get around the international legal requirements by having a puppet leader formally invite an occupation by the occupying power, in order to give them the authority to change institutions as they saw fit (Benvenisti, 2004). Thus, throughout the 20th century, while military occupiers only had one legitimate strategy under international law, in practice military occupiers often had different strategies for different territories, leading to different outcomes.

39 This facet of the international law of military occupation was a key factor in American reluctance to calling their foreign rule mission in Iraq a military occupation (Roberts, 2005). It also provides further evidence that a more expansive definition of foreign rule is merited, given the way international law and definitions of concepts has become intertwined.
Beyond the simple presence of differences in occupation strategies, as expected, these differences have affected the success or failure of occupations through the level of resistance that the occupation strategy encourages. Edelstein (2008) argues that, in addition to the international threat environment, the occupation strategy utilized by a great power can explain variation in local resistance to an occupation mission through the occupier’s ability to credibly commit to leave the territory. How occupation strategy is interpreted by the local population, according to Edelstein, is key when determining the level of local resistance. Marcum (2015) largely rejects Edelstein’s argument, but continues to focus on the strategy taken by occupiers. Marcum claims that the success of military occupations is largely driven by how occupation strategy interacts with local elites and their preferences. Additionally, Collard-Wexler (2013) argues that trust and political dislocation help determine whether there is resistance to military occupation. Crucially, he argues that military occupiers who utilize transformative occupation strategies dislocates various members of society and creates more opportunities for resistance. Maintaining local institutions reduces the chances of resistance to the occupation. Finally, Ferwerda and Miller (2014) illustrate through the case of Nazi occupied France that the occupation strategy in Vichy France, that emphasized working with local leaders, reduced levels of resistance to the occupation forces. Where French local institutions were allowed to have more independent control from the Nazi regime, resistance was lessen. Thus, where Nazi Germany used a strategy of local rule vs. imposed Nazi rule, resistance was lower. Throughout all of these studies, there is a consistent finding that maintaining local institutions reduced resistance to the occupier’s presence. When the occupiers in de facto control of a territory maintained local institutions, the occupation was more likely to achieve its goals. Throughout the literature on military occupation, then, a common theme recurs. When occupiers used a strategy that included institutional change, more resistance occurred, and the likelihood that a military occupation
would succeed was greatly reduced. However, understanding why a certain strategy was utilized, given the propensity for resistance, is something that has received less systematic attention, even with the large impact that the choice of occupation strategy can have on the occupation’s outcome.

While the literature on armed statebuilding focuses mostly on the use of one type of foreign rule strategy, its discussion of institutional foreign rule strategies through armed statebuilding has provided many interesting arguments as to how this strategy can lead to various outcomes in different states. Dobbins (2003) argues that armed statebuilding to promote democracy is most likely to succeed when the preconditions for democracy are present in the local territory, but also, most importantly, when the major power invests enough resources in the mission to ensure that it can take the time needed to achieve its goals. Reacting against this view of successful statebuilding, in recent years many scholars have argued the process of armed statebuilding is usually difficult and rife with drawbacks, regardless of the time and resources invested in the strategy. Most recently, Lake (2016) has argued that there are pronounced problems inherent in a strategy of armed statebuilding, and argues that statebuilding rarely succeeds due to the tradeoff between the interests of the foreign statebuilder and the local legitimacy of the new local institutions. However, major powers continue to attempt armed statebuilding missions, even after recognizing the poor track record of these missions, hoping that new strategies of statebuilding might prove more successful.

In some cases, the literature on statebuilding claims that only certain statebuilding strategies taken by a foreign power may allow for modest success. For example, Miller (2013) argues that statebuilders can choose among various strategies to attempt to achieve their goals that vary in both the statebuilder’s pervasiveness inside the local territory and the emphasis of the statebuilder. Hence, Miller argues that if the strategy of the foreign ruler does not correspond to the type of state failure in the
local territory, the mission will fail. Beyond this, Lake and Fariss (2014) argue that different political incentives among statebuilders and local political elites can drive divergent outcomes under statebuilding, and more focus should be given to strategies that align the interests of politicians in a major power and those of the local territory they are intervening in. Similarly, Pickering and Kisangani (2014) argue the incentives created by various characteristics of the local territory or the major power leads to different strategies and relationships imposed during statebuilding, leaving certain strategies and relationships more effective than others. While the specific strategies that are most successful are not well defined in much of this literature, and it seems that statebuilding failures are more likely than successes, the focus on armed statebuilding as a strategy provides a key fact that helps our understanding of how foreign rulers approach the choice to attempt institutional strategies.

Finally, the literature on modern peacebuilding and peacekeeping operations has focused on what strategies are most likely to produce durable peace and successful peacekeeping missions. While this literature has produced many interesting findings about the conditions for successful peacekeeping operations, international legal scholars and others have begun to focus on what they argue are the strategies most likely to produce successful outcomes. Specifically, United Nations-led international territorial administration following the Cold War has prompted international lawyers and international organizations to re-evaluate their beliefs over of the most effective strategies of peacekeeping and peacebuilding (Stahn, 2008). International legal scholars have claimed that the cases of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, Eastern Slavonia, and East Timor challenged the standard UN strategic repertoire in post-conflict and weak state environments, and made strategies that focused on establishing stable institutions in post-conflict territories essential (Caplan, 2005; Matheson, 2001; Van Willigen, 2013). The new strategy instituted international governance and administration over these territories until new liberal institutions were created and deemed stable (Krasner,
Proponents argued that this strategy, based on international institution building and transitional governance, substantially differed from earlier peacekeeping missions where the UN strategy did not call for engaging in any governance functions. Thus, they argued, the new style of UN missions is more likely to succeed, given their focus on providing good governance.

Beyond this, Fox (2008); Zaum (2007) and Bain (2003) all contend that these new missions challenge our understanding of how state sovereignty and peacebuilding interact, and how the international legal community should deal with questions of effective strategy in peacebuilding operations. Fox (2008) notes that UN missions now regularly use strategies focused on installing democratic governance and responsive institutions. Thus, Fox argues that in peacebuilding environments the international community is committed to using strategies that promote democratic institutions and push the local territory towards more responsible governance. While the proponents of this new strategy of peacekeeping promote its effectiveness, others have argued that this strategy, focused on administration and institution building, is not as new as some claim. Marten (2004), for instance, highlights how the goals and broad strategies of modern multilateral peacekeeping missions are similar to the strategies of liberal colonizers in the early 20th century. Similarly, Wilde (2010) has illustrated that the strategies utilized by modern peacekeeping missions are similar to the international mandates issued following World War I and there is a long international history of similar strategies being used in international peacekeeping missions. For instance, the relationship between the United Nations and a modern territory under its administration consists of a similar relationship as the trusteeship operation run by the League of Nations in Danzig and the Saarland.

40Problematically, however, these missions have not been completely successful in the sense of moving towards independent liberal government institutions, with the international community still exercising de facto sovereignty in Bosnia, Kosovo and East Timor.

41The arguments for calling modern peacekeeping missions unique, as Wilde (2010) points out,
elty of this strategy of peacebuilding, the literature discussing modern peacebuilding operations engages with questions of strategy, and helps illustrate the importance of strategy when thinking about success and failure in peacekeeping operations. While I have not examined in depth the full contours of the literature on peacekeeping, and only focused on the small sliver that focuses on unique modern strategies, there is a vast and well-informed literature that examines peacekeeping effectiveness that is well worth reading more deeply. However, what is important to note from the mere tip of this literature is that strategy can be thought of as an important variable that can help determine the effectiveness of different peacekeeping missions.

A combined examination of the importance of strategy in understanding the conditions for success and failure, as well as for understanding the long-term effects, of colonial rule, FIRC missions, military occupations, armed statebuilding programs, and peacekeeping operations, shows that it is clear that foreign rule strategy is of great consequence, and merits examination. Given the clear importance of the strategy employed by a foreign ruler in explaining various different political events and outcomes, exploring how foreign rulers determine their strategy remains essential. However, throughout the various strands of literature that focus on the effects of strategy, there is scant discussion of the origins of foreign rule strategy. While there is limited discussion about the origins of indirect and direct rule strategies in colonial territories, it is important to extend this focus to periods of foreign rule, and to understand more completely the origins of foreign rule strategies, before discussing the effects they can have on different territories.

largely rest on the identity of the actor engaging in the peacekeeping missions and their intentions, not on the actual actions carried out or any new form of international governance rest. Once examining the actual relationship between the international organization (or other actor) and the local territory, these missions are clearly forms of foreign rule as argued above.

42For more on various aspects of peacekeeping effectiveness, see Howard (2008); Fortna and Howard (2008); Doyle and Sambanis (2006); Autesserre (2014); Fortna (2008); Hultman, Kathman and Shannon (2014).
Overall, it is clear that strategy matters for understanding the effects of foreign rule missions, and it is an important variable to more completely understand, as decisions to engage in armed intervention abroad continually occur. The strategy implemented during foreign rule missions affects not only the likelihood of achieving the goals of the foreign ruler, but also the long-term political and economic functioning of the local territory. In the next chapter, I move to explore the local origins of foreign rule strategies and the strategic choices foreign rulers make when deciding to engage in foreign rule. Only once we have a compelling theory of the determinants of foreign rule strategy, and the evidence to support it, can we better understand what choices and strategic options lead to the outcomes we see associated with various foreign rule missions.
“When states that are annexed have been accustomed to living under their own laws and in freedom, as has been said, there are three ways of holding them: the first, to destroy their political institutions; the second, to go to live there yourself; the third, to let them continue to live under their own laws, exacting tribute and setting up an oligarchical government that will keep the state friendly towards you. Since the government has been set up by that ruler, it knows that it will be dependent upon his goodwill and power, and will be very concerned to maintain the status quo. If one wants to preserve a city that is accustomed to being independent and having free institutions, it is more easily held by using its citizens to govern it than in any other way.” – Niccoló Machiavelli

3.1 Introduction

In this chapter, I outline my theory of foreign rule strategy. As I noted in Chapter 2, the strategy a foreign ruler utilizes is a consequential choice for the likelihood of success of the foreign rule mission, and can also have long-term political and economic consequences for the foreign territory. Noting this, my theory of foreign rule strategy seeks to explain two puzzling, but interrelated, empirical observations. Given the growing scholarly consensus of the difficulties associated with foreign institution-building, why do foreign rulers ever attempt institutional strategies? Secondly, why


2For more on the difficulties and downsides to foreign institution-building see Lake (2016); Downes and Monten (2013); Peic and Reiter (2011); Simpson (2010); Downes and O’Rourke (2016); Miller (2013); Kisangani and Pickering (2017).
do foreign rulers only select their strategy after armed intervention has taken place, rather than selecting a strategy well in advance of the foreign rule mission? And perhaps most importantly, how are both of these empirical puzzles related?

My theory of foreign rule strategy argues that a foreign rule strategy materializes through two distinct stages that can help explain the interrelated nature of the timing of the foreign ruler’s choice of strategy and the content of the foreign rule strategy. I argue that foreign rulers largely base their choice of strategy on the strength of local political institutions in the territory over which they possess sovereign authority. However, uncertainty prior to armed intervention over the true capacities of those local institutions can inhibit the emergence of strategy until after armed intervention. Thus, when the decision to engage in armed intervention into a foreign territory occurs, a fog of intervention often prevents the foreign ruler from defining a foreign rule strategy for the post-intervention period. Only after the foreign ruler’s military arrives in the local territory does the military begin to assess the strength of the local institutions, and help select a foreign rule strategy. Therefore, the suitability of local institutions for meeting the foreign ruler’s goals becomes paramount in determining the choice of strategy. Prior to intervention, the foreign ruler might have a preferred strategy that he or she would like to utilize in the territory, but only once the fog of intervention has been lifted can they truly assess what strategy is required in the foreign rule mission.

Before I discuss my theory of foreign rule strategy in more depth, I make one key assumption that undergirds my theoretical claims below. I assume that foreign rulers operate under a baseline level of rationality, meaning they seek to obtain their goals in a cost-efficient manner. This is not to say that foreign rulers always carry out the optimal strategy and maximize their interests in practice, but rather that foreign rulers have goals, whether they are actually beneficial for themselves or not, and they seek to achieve those goals in the way they believe is most cost-effective. I follow
in the vein of Kirshner (2015) who argues that rationality in international relations does not mandate axiomatically a belief in hyperrationality, or a mechanistic view of the state as a rational actor. Rather he argues that rationality based on “realistic expectations” and “relatively stable and ordered preferences” is how rationality is actually expressed by units in the international system (Kirshner, 2015, 169). In the rest of this dissertation, when I speak of rational actors, I am referring to this form of rationality whereby I assume that international actors simply prefer to achieve their goals in a relatively cost-effective manner.

Building this assumption of rationality, it remains puzzling as to why foreign rulers ever attempt costly institutional strategies and do not decide upon strategies before military action. Rational states, even powerful actors engaging in foreign rule, prefer to use fewer resources to extend their domination when possible. Foreign rulers, like all other powerful actors, also prefer to achieve their goals by expending less blood and treasure, if possible, and will seek strategies that produce larger benefits with less investment. However, I argue that if the local context requires a larger investment to achieve their political goals, the foreign ruler will feel compelled to use a costlier strategy. Unfortunately, the nature of local institutions is largely unknown prior to intervention, I contend, and uncertainty about the strength of local institutions leads to a preference for relegating strategic decisions until after armed intervention.

Kirshner is reacting against the turn within studies of international conflict towards a program he terms the rationalist explanations for war, or REW. He argues that the view of hyperrationality that is required to make the REW program function fails both empirically and logically, as it requires all actors in the international system to not only share full information, but also the same underlying view of how the world operates. This explains why, even eighty years later, it is unclear exactly what was the deciding factor in the fall of France to Nazi Germany in 1941 (Kirshner, 2015, 173-174).

Similar to how war appears as a puzzle to rationalists like Fearon (1995), given the costly nature of war and the benefits of pre-conflict bargaining, it is a puzzle here why rational states would seek to expend the amount of blood and treasure that an institutional strategy usually requires, when the probability of success or a better future outcome is unlikely, given the poor side-effects that institutional strategies typically bring. Thus, some explanation is required as to why foreign rulers would ever consider institutional strategies as an optimal strategy.

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This argument builds on insights from the literatures on principal-agent problems, regime change, and uncertainty and conflict. The goals of the foreign ruler are filtered through local conditions on the ground, making decisions on strategy appear late in the military operation. Only after the military has landed does the foreign ruler fully engage in the strategic decision-making process and develop a final foreign rule strategy.

This chapter proceeds in three parts. First, I lay out the ways in which uncertainty inhibits strategic decision-making ex ante, and how foreign rulers only decide on a foreign rule strategy after armed intervention. Only once the fog of intervention is lifted do choices over strategy come into consideration. Second, I demonstrate the crucial role that the strength of local institutions plays in decisions of strategy. I illustrate how the strength of local institutions impacts foreign rule strategy through two causal mechanisms: agent capacity and armed resistance. Finally, I discuss the alternative theories that make contrasting predictions about what drives variation in the choice of foreign rule strategies. Overall, my theory illustrates the crucial importance that local institutions and local conditions have in determining the strategies of foreign rulers, showing how local conditions are an underappreciated constraint of major powers’ foreign policy goals.

3.2 Uncertainty, the Fog of Intervention, and Strategy

Traditional views assume that, both during and after armed intervention, the highest echelons of power in the foreign ruler’s capital have well-defined strategies prior to any armed action.\(^5\) While this could be the case for the initial military

\(^5\)Saunders (2011) is one example of this formulation based on the ways in which national leaders interpret threats and have preferred strategies for dealing with those threats. However, it is common, especially in most rationalist formulations of intervention and war, that strategy is determined by national leaders in advance of the military mission. Rapport (2015) provides an important exception that focuses on how militaries and national leaders think about the phases of armed action.
strike, I argue that for foreign rule missions specifically, this traditional view is often incorrect, and uncertainty over local contexts leads foreign rulers to relegate strategic decisions until after armed intervention occurs. Instead, I contend that the strength of local institutions is the key determinant in the choice between leadership and institutional strategies when imposing foreign rule. Later in this chapter, I lay out precisely the mechanisms behind the importance of local institutions and the key role they play in determining strategy. In this section, I make the case that prior to an armed intervention, the foreign ruler’s fundamental uncertainty over local contexts prevents decisions of strategy until after the intervention occurs. A fog of intervention exists that prevents concrete strategic decision-making and consolidation around a set strategy. As a result of this uncertainty, militaries and foreign rulers relegate the choice over foreign rule strategy until after the armed intervention.

While a foreign ruler might like to concoct a defined foreign rule strategy to implement prior to armed intervention, the information-poor environment often precludes agreement over a cohesive strategy. Enhanced by preferences in military organizations, foreign policy bureaucracies, and information from the local territories themselves, the existing uncertainty over local institutional strength relegates final decisions on strategy until after armed intervention has occurred. Thus, my theory of foreign rule strategy first seeks to show how uncertainty over local contexts drives the relegation of strategic decision-making. Uncertainty itself is driven by various factors in the foreign ruler’s capital and governing bodies, as well as in the foreign territory itself. In the remainder of this section, I define the concept of uncertainty, make a claim as to why uncertainty over local institutions and post-intervention contexts exists, and hypothesize as to why uncertainty hampers foreign rule strategy.

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6While outside the bounds of this dissertation, how major powers respond to uncertainty can also contribute to the decisions to engage in armed intervention in the first place. It can contribute to overconfidence and misplaced certainty in the ability to achieve political goals through armed force without much consideration of the follow-on effects.
3.2.1 Uncertainty and Its Origins

Before a foreign ruler can engage in foreign rule, the foreign ruler must decide to undertake an armed intervention that sets the stage for the foreign rule mission. What makes major powers decide to engage in armed intervention is outside the focus of this dissertation. However, throughout history major powers have had a variety of different reasons for imposing their will on other actors, usually to support an economic, security, humanitarian, or other type of goal. Yet, when preparing to intervene in a foreign territory, the focus of the major power and their military is on the military operation needed to carry out the armed intervention, which relegates the choices of foreign rule strategy until after the have actually placed the territory under their sovereign authority. However, while foreign rulers do prepare for armed intervention in terms of the initial operations needed to win the initial military objective, militaries usually launch their operations while they are not fully prepared, and do not possess plans for the post-intervention period. Instead, crisis moments emerge that propel intervention forward, leading to foreign rulers and their militaries to focus on the initial military mission, and setting aside the planning of the foreign rule period. This makes sense, as the planning leading up to the crisis moment and after the intervention decision is made focuses on military factors that the major power can control; discussions of foreign rule strategy are relegated as concerns over taking territory, protecting troops, and logistical support take precedence. Foreign rulers and their militaries respond to fundamental uncertainty by embracing organizational preferences which focus on the factors that they can control. Thus, I argue that uncertainty hampers the initial planning for the foreign rule period, and relegates any definite decision-making over foreign rule strategy until after the initial crisis and the military has already launched an armed intervention.
Prior to examining the effect uncertainty can have of foreign rule missions and strategic decision-making, we must understand what uncertainty is and why foreign rulers face uncertainty. Uncertainty occurs, as Keynes (1937) claims, when something is unknowable rather than something being able to be known with a certain probability. As Kirshner (2015, 178) elucidates it, “uncertainty describes a world characterized by crucial unknowns and unknowables.” Knight (1971, 268), in his original formulation of the difference between risk and uncertainty, further contends that uncertainty drives decision-makers to recognize that they face the “necessity of acting upon opinion rather than knowledge.” This is in contrast to the concept of risk, which is something that has a defined probability distribution of occurring and that probability distribution can be ascertained if given enough information. Under uncertainty, there is no ability to obtain perfect information, and even if information flows improve, it still faces subjective interpretation that leads to problems of assessment. As Knight (1971, 268) argues again, “the task of what to do and how to do it takes the ascendancy over that of execution” when faced with uncertainty. Uncertainty forces actors to focus much more on decision-making rules and new processes of decision-making in their attempts to make sound judgments, while recognizing that there is no ability to gain more information or a better understanding that allows for better execution.

In the context of foreign rule missions, I argue that uncertainty refers to the inability to have sound information about foreign local institutional contexts, given the difficulties in assessing the capacity of institutions from afar, and especially knowing what those local institutions will look like following armed intervention. I contend that uncertainty over local contexts means that foreign rulers lack the information to

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7Rathbun (2007) illustrates that within various theories of international relations, there are implicit differences in how the theories conceptualize and think about uncertainty. I conceptualize uncertainty as similar to Mitzen and Schweller’s (2011) definition of fundamental uncertainty that claims information is unknowable if it is related to future outcomes.
assess local contexts prior to landing their troops in the territory. It is not a matter of gathering more information, but rather that information is difficult to ascertain regardless of the desires of the foreign ruler. Since uncertainty pervades the ability to assess institutions, this prevents decision making over foreign rule strategies based on goals and preferences, as there is not sufficient information for what means are available to reach the ends required. As I argue below, uncertainty pushes foreign rulers to defer their decisions about strategy until after landing in the foreign territory and completing the initial military missions. While foreign rulers may gather information on the territory from intelligence agencies, diplomatic corps members, or other sources, they do not possess a clear, unbiased view of the strength of the political institutions inside the foreign territory. I contend it is difficult to ascertain how well a state is governed, the relative strength of a state’s bureaucracy and institutions, and how much the local populace supports the current governing institutions from afar.

While understanding what uncertainty over local institutions entails, recognizing where uncertainty over local institutions originates from is an important next step. Uncertainty over local conditions prior to the foreign rule mission can originate from a variety of sources. I argue, however, the two main sources are, first, the military organizations and foreign policy bureaucracies of the foreign ruler and, second, local actors from the local territory itself. Examining all of the factors working against the accurate assessment of local contexts and institutions makes one realize that uncertainty pervades throughout the pre-intervention assessment period, and makes it difficult to have accurate knowledge of local contexts. It is no surprise that uncertainty over local contexts is prevalent, and therefore a feature of foreign rule strategizing, given how many factors are working against producing certain assessments.

I contend both the foreign ruler’s military and foreign policy bureaucracy possess uncertainty over local political institutions prior to armed intervention, and this is
evidenced and enhanced by the organizational biases of these institutions. As the main organization tasked with carrying out the armed intervention and beginning the foreign rule operation, militaries are often where uncertainty over local contexts is reflected most noticeably. This is largely due to their organizational interests, and how they often approach uncertainty when strategizing for armed missions. Militaries have long recognized the impact that uncertainty plays in making strategic choices contingent. Military organizations do not completely pre-plan foreign rule strategies for a variety of reasons, but chief among them are their views towards uncertainty and a reticence to focus on the post-conflict period. From Clausewitz onward, military strategists have noted that “war is the realm of the uncertainty” (Clausewitz, 1976, 101), where military strategists must be willing to update their plans based on new information as they receive it. As Morgenthau (1946, 138-140) argues, military campaigns are unpredictable given the multitude of uncertain factors that cannot be planned for prior to the launching of the operation, given that “no plan of operations extends with any certainty beyond...first contact” (von Moltke, 1993, 92). Gilpin (1981, 74, 202) further states that militaries do not get the armed interventions “they want or expect; they fail to recognize the pent-up forces they are unleashing or the larger historical significance of the decisions they are taking.” Rather, militaries “seldom can predict the train of events they set in motion, and they frequently lose control over social and political forces.”

Organizational theories posit that militaries and other foreign policy organizations will approach uncertainty based on the beliefs of the organizations they are a part of and the organization interests they seek to maintain. For military organizations specifically, I contend the organizational preferences push the military

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8This builds on the organizational politics model of Allison (1969). Organizational politics have been shown to be important in explaining military doctrine, nuclear proliferation, crisis behavior, and other forms of foreign policy decision making, and thus makes sense to apply to understanding how organizational interests can enhance uncertainty. For more see Halperin (1974); Sagan (1994, 1995); Posen (1984).
to focus on the initial intervention phase, while planning for foreign rule operations presents vast opportunity costs. While militaries have long recognized the role that uncertainty plays in their planning, and how it can interact with strategy, there is also a natural organization bias in militaries against post-conflict planning, and thus planning for a foreign rule period that heightens the inherent uncertainty already present. Specifically, they see planning for the post-intervention phase as outside their purview and treat it as something that can lead to sub-optimal performance in the initial armed intervention. Thus, military organizations prefer to focus on the initial planning for the armed intervention mission because there they can have more control on the initial outcome. This is similar to how Posen (1984, 47-50) argues that uncertainty reduction is a key reason militaries often prefer offensive military doctrines. When faced with uncertainty on the battlefield, militaries often use offensive doctrines that will allow them to take initiative in the military engagement and structure the operation according to their terms. In terms of armed intervention and foreign rule, this can often mean that militaries only plan for successful offensive operations at the onset of the armed intervention mission, rather than planning for contingent missions once the foreign rule period begins.\footnote{See also Snyder (1984, 119-120) and Van Evera (1997) for additional evidence on how uncertainty can create a military preference for offensive military doctrines and planning.} Militaries are also very reticent to plan foreign rule operations prior to achieving total military victory, or finishing the initial intervention phase. Given the inherent uncertainty in the initial combat phase of any operation or intervention, delegating resources for planning for post-conflict operations, such as foreign rule operations, is not a priority.

Militaries are less likely to plan for postwar periods because they are concerned with the intervention phase due to their organizational interests. Those tasked with thinking about the postwar phase are relegated to lower importance, and often not involved in the initial decision-making. This manifests itself in military organiza-
tions, where civil affairs divisions and post-conflict operation planning is treated as a tertiary interest at best.\(^\text{10}\) The natural preference in militaries is to focus on defined conflict tasks, and invest their resources on winning the conflict rather than on determining strategy for imposing foreign rule. Maj. Gen. John Hilldring summed it up best in 1943 when in writing to Secretary of State Dean Acheson he stated “the Army is not a welfare organization. It is a military machine whose mission is to defeat the enemy on the field of battle” (Carafano, 2002, 12). This leaves few resources for focusing on and training for the post-intervention period and the implementation of the foreign rule operation, as the military waits to assess the local context. This makes logical sense, as a military cannot reach the post-conflict period without achieving success in the initial military operation. Thus, militaries insist upon waiting until they have intervened into the territory before they make defined judgments on the strategy necessary to accomplish to goals given to them by their commanders.

Strategic planning prior to armed intervention is based on uncertainty and not crucial to the military mission until after the intervention has occurred.\(^\text{11}\) Militaries and intelligence organizations recognize that information over local political conditions are harder to obtain than estimates of military capabilities and information for the initial intervention phase. Understanding what is required to obtain sovereign authority with military force is an easier planning and intelligence task than understanding the conditions that are present after obtaining sovereign authority. Thus, they focus their planning for the period in which they can be more confident in

\(^{10}\) As Thompson (2004, 264) says regarding the U.S. Army and its views on foreign rule operations: “Train for war adapt for peace, with just enough and just in time!” See also Wilson III (2007).

\(^{11}\) Even further, it is sometimes that case that the decision to engage in foreign rule itself comes fairly late, once a conflict approaches termination. Planning for the foreign rule mission does not occur until there is recognition that the foreign ruler has decided to engage and implement foreign rule. For example, the US/Allied Forces did not plan an occupation of Japan, and the occupation decision and plan only began to crystallize as the war reached its crescendo. Even once it was agreed among the allies that occupying Japan was the plan for the postwar period, the initial plans and decisions agreed to among the allies drastically changed after Japan surrendered and MacArthur assumed command of the occupying force (Dower, 2000).
possessing accurate intelligence. This creates a problem in military organizations, where attempts to deal with the uncertainty they face obscures the issues of post-conflict planning. There is a recursive process that enhances these organizational pathologies. Not only do militaries respond to the inherent uncertainty by focusing on the initial intervention, but they can help heighten it by only focusing on the tasks required by the armed intervention.

Beyond the focus in military organizations on planning for the initial intervention phase and preferences for eschewing thinking on foreign rule strategies and local contexts, the broader foreign policy bureaucracy, the intelligence community, and other decision-making bodies inside the foreign ruler also contribute to uncertainty over local institutions and contexts exists. While militaries have a clear preference for focusing on the initial conflict stage of military operations, rather than on understanding local conditions that affect the post-conflict stage and foreign rule missions, the foreign ruler’s foreign policy bureaucracy could conceivably have a larger role in assessing foreign local institutions and helping to determine strategies for foreign rule missions. However, I argue that foreign policy bureaucracies and decision-makers in a foreign ruler’s capital also have various personal and organization factors that enhance the uncertainty in assessing local institutional contexts. For instance, in terms of general decision-making, both Rapport (2015) and George (1969) argue that foreign policy officials and leaders tend to view war and military operations in terms of distinct phases, and this affects how leaders and top officials think about risk and potential problems in military operations. There is a natural preference to focus on the short-term possibilities of military operations, and a reticence to plan for longer periods beyond the immediate next steps of a military operation. This is not to say that there is never any planning for post-intervention periods by the foreign ruler. Indeed while militaries do not like to invest in planning, various groups in organizations often do get tasked with imagining the post-intervention dynamics and begin to cre-
ate a host of possible plans. However, what is noticeable about the pre-intervention or pre-foreign rule period is how the planning is stopped when the military operation faces difficulty in securing victory, and how the plans are never completed or taken up by the military planners. Rather, while there is debate over a future strategy, it often turns into an exercise of establishing possibilities that requires more local knowledge in order to understand which strategy is required once the initial armed intervention has succeeded.

Exemplifying this, Mazower (2008) highlights that even as Nazi Germany launched military operations into new territories and achieved initial success, the debates over the proper postwar organization and strategy for managing the foreign rule period largely lagged behind. Debates over the proper form of foreign administration – be it what the Nazi administrative state termed associate, supervisory, or colonial administration – or which branch of the German state should manage the foreign rule mission raged for months until Hitler demanded all postwar planning end in 1943 (Mazower, 2008, 211, 236). Even with the extensive planning, dedicated resources, and powerful elites interested in the postwar planning process, a cohesive and defined foreign rule strategy did not emerge and instead required assessment of local conditions throughout Europe, which lead to the variation in Nazi foreign rule strategy. Even in instances where elites and decision-makers actively wanted to plan for foreign rule periods in advance of military campaigns, the uncertainty that is inherent in assessing local conditions prohibited sound assessment and the ability to strategize. This is evidence that is not just a mere unwillingness to plan for the foreign rule period, but rather the uncertainty surrounding local contexts that is actively driving the reticence to select foreign rule strategies until after the military lands in the foreign territory.

Organizational preferences in the broader foreign policy bureaucracy can also lead to specific biases and uncertainty over assessing local institutions in a variety of
ways. Differences between intelligence agencies and politicians in the foreign ruler’s capital has been shown to lead to problems for assessing institutions from afar in other contexts as well. Yarhi-Milo (2014) argues that political leaders are selectively attentive to different signals when assessing adversaries’ intentions and political behavior. Political leaders pay attention to vivid signals of behavior that fit with their own pre-existing world views, whereas intelligence organizations often focus on more material factors and capabilities. This implies that different institutions inside the foreign ruler will look for different signals, and may disagree about where to gather information about the foreign territory. The disconnect between the world view and cognitive biases of political leaders and the reliance on capabilities of intelligence organizations can make assessment of the foreign territory complicated and disconnected among the foreign ruler’s foreign policy bureaucracy. Instead of knowing where to look in order to divine the exact strength of political institutions, the biases of the different assessment organizations creates a cloudy picture that does not aid assessment prior to armed intervention. Brooks (2008) further argues that certain combinations of civil-military relations can make strategic assessment more or less effective. When civilians and the military have different preferences, or compete over political domination of the state, strategic assessment becomes worse. In this scenario, the different assessment agencies in the foreign ruler do not communicate with each other and fail to accurately assess the target state, harming the ability of the former to accomplish its goals. While these studies do not discuss the assessment of foreign political institutions or the likelihood of resistance, the same logics that apply to assessing state intentions from afar would apply to assessing state institutional strength from afar. Organization interests contribute to fundamental uncertainty by making it more difficult for the assessment institutions.

Finally, one other institution that is often tasked with assessing overseas contexts is the intelligence community and intelligence assessment institutions. However, in-
telligence agencies also recognize the fact that they cannot eliminate uncertainty, and realize that embracing uncertainty and what it means for decision-making is a natural aspect of their mission. Rovner (2011, 12) illuminates this perfectly when he claims “that intelligence is inherently ambiguous” leading intelligence agencies to “attach caveats to their conclusions and loathe making exact predictions.” Similarly, Friedman and Zeckhauser (2012, 825) note that “intelligence often focuses on issues that are impossible to address with certainty” and “also deals with questions where certain answers are possible in principle, but infeasible in practice.” In other words, intelligence agencies fundamentally recognize that intelligence assessments are inherently uncertain. This is true for a variety of intelligence estimates that intelligence agencies are tasked with, including assessing military capabilities and intentions of foreign adversaries. Even more, Friedman and Zeckhauser (2012) argue that assessing uncertainty, determining what remains uncertain and what is known, and not seeking to reduce and minimize uncertainty are the goals of intelligence when operating properly. Intelligence agencies should embrace uncertainty to highlight the contingent nature of the many choices that decision-makers may have. While scholars of intelligence and intelligence agencies normally think of intelligence regarding military capabilities and adversary intentions, intelligence agencies can also be tasked with assessing local institutions and contexts prior to armed missions. Intelligence agencies will often track and monitor changes in local contexts and institutions, but tracking the strength of local institutions and the efficacy of potential agents in foreign rule missions is yet again surrounded by uncertainty. Thus, even when the intelligence community is performing as it should, it is difficult to remove the uncertainty in understanding local contexts.

However, even while noting that when military, intelligence, and other foreign policy institutions operate properly they cannot overcome uncertainty in assessing foreign institutional strength, there are also many organizational pathologies that can
heighten uncertainty. At times, foreign rulers feel compelled to reduce uncertainty, but this heightens various pathologies across different institutions. It is more difficult to reduce uncertainty than many leaders realize, and this often leads to sub-optimal decision-making. Rovner (2011) argues that politicians often turn to the intelligence community to provide certain assessments so as to sell their preferred foreign policy goals to domestic audiences. However, in so doing, politicians seek to remove the uncertainty in their assessments and to force the intelligence institutions to portray judgments as definite, creating false sense of certainty in the intelligence assessment and politicizing the assessment of foreign territories. This makes the ability of intelligence agencies to be better prepared for alternative outcomes even more of a problem. As Betts (2009) and Jervis (2010) contend, politicization of the intelligence agencies can only lead to sub-optimal decision-making when embarking on military operations and carrying out foreign rule missions. In general, these pathologies in assessment institutions and foreign policy bureaucracies only serve to heighten the inherent uncertainty that exists and prevents strategy for foreign rule missions. Uncertainty, and the pathologies that heighten it, hinders the ability of the foreign ruler to assess institutional strength prior to intervention.

Second, in addition to the foreign ruler’s own foreign policy institutions and military organizations, local actors from the local territory can contribute to the uncertainty faced by the foreign ruler, as well. In almost every prospective case of foreign rule, as described below, the foreign ruler seeks to find a suitable agent to work with in order to establish their rule. This means that prior to intervention, the foreign ruler is often looking for indications that there is an agent on the ground in

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12This provides yet another pathway for future research moving forward, focusing on how uncertainty and the willingness of leaders to overlook the uncertain estimates can increase the likelihood of armed intervention.

13Thus, while I contend that fundamental uncertainty, using the language of Mitzen and Schweller (2011), exists over local contexts, at the very least militaries and broader foreign policy bureaucracies enhance uncertainty through their organizational biases.
the foreign territory that can provide support and assist in the foreign rule mission. Foreign rulers look for local agents who can give information on the territory, or support their intuitions. Knowing this, however, potential agents in local territories can misrepresent basic features about their territory to make themselves appear to be more or less appealing agents, and can also portray inaccurate information to the potential foreign ruler prior to intervention in attempts to change the foreign ruler’s policy.

Local actors from the foreign territory can enhance uncertainty through attempts to influence the appearance of their institutions and local conditions towards their preferred policy action. While local actors facing prospective intervention might have fewer incentives to hide the strength of their local institutions as they do their military capabilities, political actors in the local territory do have some incentives to misrepresent the true nature of local institutions, therefore making accurate assessment difficult. For instance, the foreign ruler could seek out favorable elements inside the state to report back with their impressions of the nature of their local institutions, but there is an incentive for opponents of the current regime, exiled dissidents, or others who do not favor the current regime to misrepresent the strength of political institutions inside the state for various reasons. This can occur with both the current local government and the local political opposition inside the foreign ruled territory in two distinct ways. First, local actors might have incentives to misrepresent the strength of state institutions and the capacity of the bureaucracy to enact reforms to try and manipulate the foreign ruler’s decision calculus. Depending on their preferences towards the foreign ruler, the local regime might possess an incentive to appear weaker than they are in order to make the potential mission look more costly if the foreign ruler is seeking to avoid an institution-building mission. Their goal may be to deter a potential foreign ruler’s intervention through raising the prospective costs of the mission. Conversely, if the current local regime in power would like to remain
in power during the foreign rule mission, then they have incentives to make the institutional strength of the state appear stronger than it is to make the potential foreign ruler interested in possibly keeping the regime in power to carry out the goals of the foreign ruler.

Alternatively, the opposition or other political factions also have incentives to make the bureaucrats and political institutions appear strong for the opposite reason, to make an intervention and foreign rule operation appear less costly so they can be placed into power. Opposition elements are incentivized to portray the local bureaucratic institutions as strong so as to ensure that if they are placed in power, they will have a less invasive foreign rule strategy to work with. However, if the opposition is completely against the ideology or organizing principles of the current political system, they could also have an incentive to make the institutions appear weaker than they are, to encourage foreign rulers to scrap and rebuild the state political institutions in the political opposition’s image. Using the 2003 US invasion of Iraq as an example, the Shia political opposition in Iraq had an incentive to make the Ba’athist-led political structure appear weak, in order to completely restructure the political landscape to allow for Shia domination (Phillips, 2006, 67-76). On the other hand, the Ba’athist bureaucracy also had an incentive to portray their institutions as strong and necessary to maintain to make themselves appear indispensable to the foreign ruler (Allawi, 2008, 85-89). Determining which of these conflicting signals to believe makes pre-intervention assessment difficult for the foreign ruler.

Local elites and leaders can also enhance uncertainty by making armed resistance appear more or less likely prior to the decision to engage in foreign rule. Both the current regime and any faction of political opposition inside the territory also have incentives to misrepresent the likelihood of armed resistance to foreign rule. Depending on their preferred outcome, both actors could make resistance to foreign rule appear more or less likely, regardless of the actual likelihood of resistance. The
current regime in power often has an incentive to make it appear that the foreign ruler will incur high levels of resistance to a foreign rule mission in order to deter invasion. This could make the foreign ruler less inclined to depose the current regime in power and makes the foreign rule operation appear more costly and therefore less likely to occur. The political opposition, on the other hand, often has incentives to make the probability of resistance appear quite low. This makes the prospect of an extended operation of foreign rule more enticing for a foreign ruler, and also makes it much more likely that the foreign ruler can place the political opposition in power as the surrogate for the foreign power.

Ahmed Chalibi and other Iraqi exiles provide an example of this behavior. They incessantly argued that the Saddam Hussein regime was weak, and thus the bureaucrats would gladly welcome regime change, while the local population would welcome the Americans with open arms (Ricks, 2006, 56-57). This could also be reversed. It is perfectly reasonable to think that instances exist where the opposition would want to threaten resistance and the current regime would want to make resistance appear low. For example, political opposition within the state may claim that the local population will resist the foreign ruler as a means to deter the foreign ruler from selecting their preferred leaders. The Belgian experience under German rule provides an example where certain portions of the local population offered cooperation in exchange for local political rule (Geller, 1999). With multiple political actors inside a state who have incentives to make resistance appear more or less likely simultaneously, the foreign ruler’s ability to accurately assess the likely level of resistance is minimal. Discerning which elements inside a state to trust and why is extremely difficult and can often lead to mixed messages to the foreign ruler over what strategy to enact.

Thus, given military interests in focusing their planning on the initial combat tasks and not on the following foreign rule operations that are required, the role uncertainty plays in intelligence communities, how civil-military relations effects strategic assess-
ment, and local actors sending mixed signals, it is no surprise that foreign rulers possess uncertainty about local contexts prior to armed intervention. With this difficulty in assessing foreign policy behavior from afar, it is just as, if not more, difficult to assess the strength of foreign local institutions and the local factors that will change following armed intervention. Combined, uncertainty over local contexts is high due to the inherent difficulties in assessing institutions from afar. The means and institutions that are designed to help plan for uncertainty often have their own pathologies that enhance the inherent difficulties. This should not be surprising given the general difficulty in assessing the capacity and strength of local institutions. Even in city and country governments, newly elected members to town councils, school boards, and other administrative positions are often commenting that the institutional constraints and capacity are different than they had known about prior to taking office. It is of no surprise that this level of uncertainty and surprise is heightened when examining post-conflict institutional environments abroad.

3.2.2 The Fog of Intervention and Lack of Pre-Planned Strategy

Above, I have argued that uncertainty exists over local institutional contexts due to the difficulty in assessment, which is driven by both fundamental uncertainty and organizational biases and responses. After understanding that foreign rulers possess uncertainty over local institutions, it is important to discuss why uncertainty over local contexts matters for understanding foreign rule strategy formation and the tangible effects uncertainty can have on strategic decision-making. I argue that rational foreign rulers respond to uncertainty by, at best, only tentatively planning for foreign rule periods, and often delegate the decision-making to local military commanders once the military mission ends. As noted previously, military commanders prefer to focus on the initial intervention operation and the military factors they can control. Given this natural focus on operational factors during the initial phases of an armed
intervention, it is important to also understand why foreign rulers do not design their strategies for the foreign rule period prior to launching their intervention. I argue that uncertainty over local conditions prevents consolidated strategic decision-making and can contribute to overconfidence or misplaced certainty. Strategy requires understanding the constraints and capabilities of the environment the foreign ruler will be facing. In this section, I discuss how rational foreign rulers might respond to the presence of uncertainty and how that impacts the choice of foreign rule strategy.

Initially, scholars have shown that uncertainty has vast impacts on conflict behavior, including it as a crucial piece of the puzzle in the rationalist explanations of war research program. In the bargaining theory of war literature, uncertainty (or imperfect information as it is sometimes called) creates an inability to agree on a prewar bargain that both states would agree to, and thus uncertainty removes the ability to avoid war through a diplomatic bargain. Using a rationalist framework, this literature seeks to understand how war occurs if pre-war bargains would produce more efficient outcomes. One major argument in this vein is that imperfect information (uncertainty) about material power, bargaining ranges, and battlefield outcomes makes various forms of war more or less likely to occur. In the canonical formulation, Fearon (1995) argues that imperfect information due to private information can lead to an increased probability of war occurrence. To Fearon, incentives to misrepresent military capabilities and resolve leads to uncertainty over what an acceptable diplomatic bargain would look like. Thus, even though two rational parties would both prefer a diplomatic bargain, war can occur because the bargaining range is obscured by imperfect information. While others have expanded this claim and investigated various implications of this model, the key fact is that uncertainty can produce conflict outcomes that neither party planned for initially.\textsuperscript{14} Uncertainty, then, has the

\textsuperscript{14}For a more complete examination of this literature see Debs and Monteiro (2014); Meirowitz and Sartori (2008); Powell (2002); Reed (2003); Slantchev and Tarar (2011); Lake (2010b); Gartzke (1999); Arena and Wolford (2012); Walter (2009).
unintentional effect of making war more likely to occur even with rational states.

Kirshner (2015, 2000) argues that this formulation of rationality does not go far enough in showing the permissive effect uncertainty can have on conflict. He points out that simply revealing more information is not a solution to problems created by uncertainty, as even to this day historians cannot agree on what caused the quick defeat of France in World War II, despite the archives and historical material available. Rather this illustrates that in complex interactions in the international system, uncertainty cannot be overcome through revealing more information; as a result, planning based on guesswork is more likely than planning based on actual information. Thus, uncertainty can have large effects on various outcomes and makes divining intentions difficult.

In terms of foreign rule strategy, rational foreign rulers should invest time and resources into planning for the postwar period, given that they know the political goals they wish to achieve. Determining the means necessary to achieve them would be the logical step, and yet we have evidence they often do not. However, analogous to the role uncertainty plays in the rationalist theory of war literature, I argue that uncertainty over local institutional contexts precludes the opportunity for rational foreign rulers to agree on a strategy prior to an armed intervention. The information needed to determine what the best means are for achieving the foreign ruler’s goals does not exist prior to armed intervention. Uncertainty inhibits the accurate assessment of local political institutions, pushing foreign rulers to wait to select a complete strategy. I argue that only after the foreign ruler’s military intervenes in a territory can the foreign ruler begin to assess the current institutional environment and likelihood of armed resistance to their extended presence. Foreign rulers only decide on what foreign rule strategy to use after this assessment period occurs. While the leaders and elites inside the foreign ruler’s government may have distinct preferences and goals they wish to pursue, the strategies themselves only emerge after the
military can assess the local status quo. Thus, the foreign ruler waits to formulate complete strategy until they can assess local contexts following armed intervention.

Conceivably, foreign rulers could decide upon a comprehensive foreign rule strategy at any time prior to an intervention, but this is rationally inefficient as there are no guarantees that it would comport with the realities on the ground. Much like other aspects of military planning, assessing local conditions prior to the implementation of foreign rule is rife with uncertainty. While foreign rulers do spend resources thinking about the broad contours of post-intervention strategy and how to implement foreign rule, they generally only make tentative plans and establish decision making structures for determining the strategy following intervention. Yet, the uncertainty inherent to the implementation of strategy ultimately leaves civilian and military planners resistant to focusing on a defined, consistent strategy until they have landed in the territory. Uncertainty prior to armed interventions abroad implies that there is not only insufficient/inadequate knowledge of local institutions and contexts in the territory, but also inadequate knowledge of how the intervention will play out and the military factors that might change the way the territory operates during the armed mission. This is not to say that planning for foreign rule missions does not occur at all. Rather, the planning that does go on is contingent, and a consolidated strategy does not emerge until after intervention has occurred.

Foreign rulers recognize that uncertainty over local conditions hampers their ability to simply choose strategies, as it is not clear which strategies would allow them to achieve their goals. Foreign rulers who rely too much on their goals and preferences prior to an intervention may be able to create a comprehensive strategy for placing the territory under foreign rule, but would find that their strategy is inappropriate and ineffective as soon as they land in the territory. And while foreign rulers do spend resources thinking about the broad contours of post-intervention strategy and how to implement foreign rule, they only ever come up with tentative plans and decision
making structures for determining the strategy following intervention. As Keynes
admits, when faced with uncertainty, human nature compels actors to attempt to
calculate and assess the most likely outcomes of the future based on present knowl-
edge (Keynes, 1937, 214). Yet, the uncertainty inherent to the implementation of
strategy ultimately leaves civilian and military planners resistant to focusing on a
defined, unwavering strategy until they have landed in the territory. Instead, they
plan for multiple contingencies, and a selection of strategy is delayed.

Uncertainty can also affect the strategic planning process, producing a few unique
effects that can create an appearance of strategy formation, but does not amount to
actually selecting one. First, certain biases that discussed in the political psychology
literature can often emerge. Foreign rulers may focus on the long-term goals they
seek to achieve through the foreign rule mission, rather than thinking about the
means. As Rapport (2015, 2) states “military operations that policymakers believe
will take place in the more distant future will be evaluated largely on the desirability
of the goals they are meant to achieve.” Foreign rulers focused on goals and ends fail
to consider the means that it will take to achieve their goals. As goal “desirability
becomes more salient, decision makers are prone to underestimate the costs and risks
of future actions” (Rapport, 2015, 2). I build on this to argue that uncertainty
centered around local political contexts produces a focus on goals rather than on the
means to achieve them; unfortunately, that bias is a natural byproduct of the inherent
uncertainty and cannot be ameliorated. Once foreign rule becomes a viable policy
option, political goals can be debated but the strategy requires more information.
The only available option is to make contingency plans for various scenarios, but
even then foreign rulers are often focused on debating between goals rather than
debating strategies.

This can lead to another interrelated problem caused by uncertainty: overconfi-
dence, or as Mitzen and Schweller (2011) name it, misplaced certainty. Politicians
often seek out intelligence assessments from their intelligence agencies to reduce uncertainty. Overconfidence has often been identified as a possible leading cause behind the decision to engage in international conflict.\textsuperscript{15} Politicians, given their desire to achieve political goals, often ignore the uncertainty that intelligence agencies report, and become overconfident in their convictions on how certain military actions will play out. As Schub (2015) and Johnson (2004) point out, however, overconfidence in their ability to ameliorate uncertainty can lead to leaders having overconfidence in their ability to manage all aspects of an armed intervention. This prevents foreign rulers from fully ascertaining the uncertainty they are facing. Instead, they are confident in their ability to get to their ideal goals, and “typically do not believe they are making errors” (Schub, 2015, 13). Mitzen and Schweller (2011, 21) explain that “with misplaced certainty a decision maker places a bet without really acknowledging it is only a bet. The evidence is indeterminate,” but the decision maker continues to assume they have the correct answer.\textsuperscript{16}

Intervention decisions and decisions to engage in foreign rule then can occur in periods when there are problems with overconfidence and misplaced certainty in their ability to achieve goals. Together this leads to a possible problem of what others have deemed imperial hubris, where foreign rulers become overconfident in their ability to achieve their political goals in far away territories without real analysis of what uncertainty might portend (Recchia, 2007). Hence, overconfidence when faced with uncertainty could provide a sound answer for why foreign rulers launch

\textsuperscript{15}Both Blainey (1988, 35) and Van Evera (1997, 14-34) have argued that false optimism in military success, or overconfidence in Johnson and Tierney’s (2011) words, promotes the likelihood that a military power will start an international conflict. Further, Johnson and Tierney (2011) argue that as politicians and military leaders approach the decision to engage in armed intervention, they possess even higher levels of overconfidence.

\textsuperscript{16}Mitzen and Schweller (2011, 29) argue that in the presence of uncertainty, decision makers can often face ontological insecurity, whereby the identity of the decision maker is under attack when they do not feel certain. Hence, decision makers will turn to misplaced certainty to allow for decision-making to occur.
armed interventions in the first place when they do not possess sound information about local contexts. If uncertainty can increase the amount of overconfidence in the foreign ruler’s ability to achieve their political goals, this can push the foreign ruler to launch an armed intervention regardless of the existing uncertainty around local contexts.¹⁷

Still, some may argue that certain goals and preferences of foreign rulers can push them to have defined foreign rule strategies that disregard local institutions to achieve their goals. If goals and preferences prior to an intervention did determine foreign rule strategies, we should see foreign rulers discussing and promoting the existence of a comprehensive strategy prior to the intervention; also, we should not see foreign rulers changing the strategy once on the ground. In fact, we do see some aspiring foreign rulers attempt to think through how the initial foreign rule period will operate and how best to implement a successful strategy. Working groups, civil administration training staffs, and policy planning organs can emerge, yet the uncertainty inherent in planning for foreign rule prevents development of a well-defined strategy. Various proposals and ideas may emerge, but the decision of strategy remains contingent upon the military actually being on the ground so it can assess the local institutional environment. The presence of working groups and strategy documents does not indicate a consolidated strategy, but rather simply indications of planning for the beginning of a foreign rule mission. Instead of a well-articulated strategy, different strategic operations and guiding documents emerge, and different groups of elites in the foreign ruler’s decision-making organs debate over which is best to implement. This is an indication that the foreign ruler has not selected a coherent foreign rule

¹⁷While not the focus of this chapter, Johnson (2004) largely argues that this can explain the process for the initial decision to invade Iraq in 2003. Expanded from his discussion and this discussion above, it could be the case that future certain leaders are more or less likely to be overconfident in their ability to achieve their political goals quickly in a foreign rule mission even without knowledge of local conditions. However, I argue that regardless of this level of overconfidence, uncertainty over all cases of foreign rule remains present until after the armed intervention initially occurs.
strategy, but rather is waiting to determine which of the strategic documents or principles they have discussed can be successfully implemented. Uncertainty does not prevent the ability to plan, but rather prevents the ability to discern what plans and means will actually be required.

In addition, there is consistent evidence that foreign rulers frequently disregard the planning documents and pre-intervention preferences once initiating the foreign rule operation. Instead of dogmatically forcing troops to implement a pre-planned strategy, foreign rulers often push the pre-planned documents aside and instead formulate a new strategy with the fresh information they have gathered. Even after major wars that involved many years of high-level strategic planning and intelligence operations, such as the American occupation of West Germany following World War II, the American foreign rule strategy did not coalesce until the troops arrived and the commanders began reporting on the ability of various local governments to aid their administration (Eisenberg, 1998; Coles and Weinberg, 1964). While many plans for postwar Germany were discussed throughout the war, including the infamous Morgenthau Plan to de-industrialize Germany, the newly imposed military governors largely assessed their local environments and pushed Washington to finalize a strategy that comported to the environment they found themselves in.\(^{18}\) Rather than dogmatically imposing the strictest interpretation of de-Nazification and de-industrialization of the Morgenthau Plan, the local commanders came up with a different strategy that would suit the particular circumstances and local conditions in West Germany. More local bureaucrats were utilized than initially planned for, and different economic strategies emerged after assessing the postwar local context of the foreign territory. The goals and preferences of the United States did not create a pre-ordained policy that was then imposed in Germany. Rather, the local conditions discovered after invasion led

\(^{18}\)For illustration of this point, see Ziemke (1975); Hudson (2015); Coles and Weinberg (1964); Eisenberg (1998); Taylor (2011).
to a re-evaluation and the creation of new guiding strategic principles.

The lack of reliable information about the strength of various local institutions leads foreign rulers to have preferences and goals for their foreign ruled territory, but leaves strategy decisions until after receiving more concrete information on the conditions of the local institutions. This is not an atypical response when placing a territory under control of a foreign power. During colonial periods, both the French and British had preferred types of colonial structures when imposing their rule on territories and accomplishing their goals. However, there are many cases where the British utilized more directly ruled, institutional-type strategies, and the French used more indirectly ruled, leadership-type strategies once they arrived in the territories (Fieldhouse, 1966; Abernathy, 2000; Charrad, 2001). Lange (2004); Lange, Mahoney and Vom Hau (2006) and Gerring et al. (2011) all point out that British colonial rulers had to adapt their level of direct vs indirect rule in different colonial missions based on the condition and strength of local institutions. MacDonald (2014) argues that across various contexts, colonial strategies were conditioned by the presence of local support networks, and these local conditions impacted the goals that major powers had when launching colonial missions. The capital preferred an outcome, and the colonial administration decided to administer rule based on the best way to achieve the outcome, rather than an inherent preference for a particular strategy. This, I contend, is the role uncertainty plays in decisions of strategy. Once the latent strength of institutions is revealed, the foreign ruler coalesces around a strategy that can best take advantage of those institutions and achieve their goals.

In sum, uncertainty can have the pernicious effect of delaying consideration of strategy, which can also lead to the choice to engage in armed intervention in the first place. Poor decisions to engage in foreign rule missions emerge directly from the uncertainty prior to armed intervention. Strategy emerges not from the goals and preferences of the foreign ruler. Rather strategy emerges once uncertainty is reduced.
This means that foreign rulers can end up in lengthy institution-building missions when they have little intention of engaging in one in the first place. This leads to one defined hypothesis on the effect of uncertainty on foreign rule strategy:

\[ H_1: \text{Uncertainty about local contexts prevents strategic decisions from emerging until after intervention occurs.} \]

3.2.3 Uncertainty and Foreign Rule Strategy

Finally while uncertainty makes assessment from afar difficult, there is no axiomatic guarantee that once intervention occurs, military leaders will accurately assess state institutional strength. However, evidence that uncertainty can be ameliorated after military forces arrive on the ground is common in many theories of international conflict. Discussions about war and war termination center on the arguments that forces on the battlefield can solve information problems and make bargaining for a solution more likely (Wagner, 2000; Blainey, 1988). Similarly, some arguments about state motivations and intentions contend that motivations are revealed on the battlefield, and the once difficult problem of assessing the intentions and motivations of other states is resolved. In offense-defense theory, some have argued that the offense-defense balance is difficult to measure ex ante, but after forces meet in battle it is possible to ascertain the balance (Van Evera, 1998). Thus, similar to these various theories that posit difficulties in assessment prior to militarized action, the inherent information problems that makes assessment difficult are possibly resolved once military intervention occurs.\(^{19}\)

\(^{19}\)It is important to note that while other theories of strategic assessment do not deal with state institutional strength, the concepts that theories of assessment deal with are often more nebulous and less tangible than state institutional strength. For example, Press (2005); Fearon (1997), and Weeks (2008) have illustrated how states can assess credibility and how states can attempt to send signals to illustrate their credibility. Yarhi-Milo (2014); Edelstein (2002), and others have argued it’s possible to assess state intentions, whereas Kydd (2005) has argued that states can assess other states as trustworthy or non-trustworthy. Owen IV (2010) argues that assessment of adversaries’ ideology is possible and has tangible effects on interstate outcomes. Given how credibility, intentions, trust, and ideology are less tangible than institutional strength, and yet we have confidence that
Unfortunately, previous studies focused on choices made in response to institutional strength of various territories by states, rebel groups, or other actors do not explicitly lay out how assessment of institutions occurs (Gerring et al., 2011; Arjona, 2010; McKoy, 2012; Ferwerda and Miller, 2014). Instead, they all focus on the response of the political actor after arriving in the new territory, giving credence to my claim that assessment occurs upon arrival in the territory, rather than happening prior. This is not to say that states do not make assessments of institutional strength prior to intervention, as it is clear diplomats, intelligence officers, and others gather information on the territory. However, this is just used as a baseline to assess the situation on the ground once the foreign ruler arrives, and any prior information is heavily discounted once the true nature of institutional strength is revealed following intervention. However, more accurate assessments, with higher confidence, are made only once arriving in the territory. Once intervention occurs and assessment can happen, any pre-existing information is pushed aside by new facts on the ground that then shapes the strategy chosen.

Empirically determining how major powers obtain, process, and assess information is difficult, as one cannot measure the level of information or the certainty of information the major power possesses. What evidence can be mustered to be sure that my argument regarding uncertainty holds? I contend that if my argument regarding the importance of uncertainty in determining foreign rule strategy holds true, we should see a few observable implications in cases of foreign rule to confirm my theory. First and foremost, uncertainty over local contexts means that we should see many foreign rule missions failing to achieve their political objectives. If foreign rulers cannot ascertain local contexts prior to armed intervention, then foreign rulers should often find themselves in sub-optimal intervention decisions and foreign rule not only do states assess these concepts but can do so relatively accurately, we should also have confidence that military commanders and state leaders can accurately assess the relative strength of local political institutions.
missions that cannot succeed. Second, decision makers in the foreign ruler’s capital should clearly remark about the uncertainty over the foreign context and state how uncertain they are about what conditions are in the foreign territory. Third, in terms of the planning for the armed intervention and possible foreign rule mission, there should only be tentative planning done, and an explicit recognition that any plans are tentative. Fourth, there should be evidence of foreign rulers looking to find local actors who can serve as their agents in order to attempt to learn more information from and assess whether the current local institutions are suitable for the territory. Fifth, local military commanders should be tasked with assessment of local contexts and transmit information back to the decision makers in the foreign ruler’s capital. Sixth, the same military commanders should discuss their confusion over what the strategy is following their initiation of the foreign rule mission. Finally, the actual choice of strategy should explicitly occur only after the military mission has landed in the territory and there is clear-cut discussion of assessment following the intervention.

3.3 Local Political Institutions and Foreign Rule Strategy

After understanding why uncertainty is crucial for explaining why foreign rulers do not have defined foreign rule strategies prior to armed intervention, we can inquire about the role local institutional strength may play in determining foreign rule strategy. When foreign rulers arrive in a foreign territory, they are not arriving in a location with a blank slate. Local institutions and a form of local government will already exist in the territory, providing some level of institutional strength. Foreign rulers, however, are required to decide if they will maintain current institutions or change them to suit their political goals. I contend, based on a conceptualization of a rational foreign ruler discussed above, that foreign rulers will typically prefer leadership strategies where they can replace leaders and use local institutions to achieve their goals, as it is more cost effective. That being said, this rational preference is
conditioned by the local institutions and the local conditions in the territory, and foreign rulers must navigate this institutional context in order to achieve their political goals. Using a minimalist definition of institutional strength, I argue that local institutional strength merely sets the stage for the factors that can push a foreign ruler towards using a leadership or institutional strategy, and makes the choice of strategy contingent on local factors present in the territory, more so than the goals and desires of the foreign ruler.

In this section, I argue that the importance of local institutional strength operates through two main causal mechanisms: agent capacity and armed resistance. Local political institutions determine whether the local territory has agents with sufficient capacity to achieve the foreign ruler’s goals and also the level of armed resistance the foreign ruler is likely to face. First, agent capacity refers to the capacity and level of institutional strength required to allow local agents to achieve the demands of the foreign ruler. Agent capacity informs whether the foreign ruler can achieve their goals through delegation. I assume that rational foreign rulers always prefer to use local agents as an extension of the rational preference for ruling in a cost-effective manner, with delegation to local institutions being the cheapest option. Noting this, evidence shows foreign rulers usually seek reliable local agents to pursue their goals and maintain their influence over a territory. Problematically, the ability to achieve this form of cheap foreign rule is predicated on the availability of effective agents. The foreign ruler, like any state, looks to secure their interests cost-effectively to save resources for future contingencies. The drive for cost-efficient agents leads states to always prefer to utilize existing institutions and simply substitute new leaders when possible, rather than building new institutions. Without strong institutions that allow for the effective use of agents in the local territory, some form of institution building needs to take place.

Second, local institutional strength matters in helping to determine the probabil-
ity of armed resistance against the foreign ruler. I argue that higher levels of local institutional strength makes replacing those institutions more costly by increasing the likelihood of armed resistance. Replacing institutions reduces aggregate infrastructural power, making resistance against state control easier, especially if the deposed institutions retain their organization ties and capacity. Additionally, maintaining institutions in place makes the operation of foreign rule less costly, as less resistance requires a smaller military footprint. This creates an even larger incentive to utilize local institutions, if available, and a greater need to assess the institutional strength of a state in order to determine what potential for resistance exists. If local institutions are relatively strong, replacing them with new institutions engenders stronger resistance against foreign ruler. The residual capacity inside the pre-existing political institutions is transferred to the resistance movement, and the new institutions often do not possess enough capacity to defeat these resistance movements. Thus, political institutional strength and the assessment of this strength by the foreign ruler is crucial in determining the strategy chosen for the operation. To carry out their goals and maintain their rule, foreign rulers must identify whether local institutions can produce capable agents, and whether replacing institutions would create armed resistance in the territory. In the rest of this section, I first define local institutional strength, before highlighting the logic of these two mechanisms that drive the selection of foreign rule strategy.

3.3.1 What is Local Institutional Strength?

Prior to discussing the causal mechanisms that drive the impact of political institutional strength, precisely defining what I refer to as the strength of political institutions is of crucial importance. I use a minimalist definition of local institutional strength that largely refers to whether local institutions can carry out the policies and goals of the central sovereign authority when tasked. This view of institutional
strength is most similar to Mann’s (1984) conceptualization of infrastructural power. As Mann (1984, 189) defines it, institutional strength refers to “the capacity of the state to actually penetrate civil society, and to implement logistically political decisions throughout the realm.” Using a minimalist conceptualization, I argue that the actual ability of local institutions to implement policies dictated by the sovereign authority is the key feature of local institutional strength. The type of local institutions, their organization, and their political attributes are of no consequence to this conceptualization. Rather, only whether they can “implement logistically political decisions throughout the” territory defines the strength of local institutions. This conceptualization makes no claim as to the preferred type of institutions in a territory, and only focuses on the capacity to carry out the wishes of the national sovereign power.

While Mann’s conceptualization is not the only definition of state power, and recognizing that state capacity is a contested concept in political science, in this conceptualization I merely refer to the capacity of state institutions to carry out the mandate of the sovereign authority of the territory, regardless of what that mandate requires of the institutions. If local political institutions can, for instance, impose and collect a new tax on the population, then they possess institutional capacity. However if the local government calls for mandatory public schooling, and no children actually go to school, then the territory lacks institutional strength. Even less coercive activities, such as building national infrastructure, promoting a public health project, or changing the national debt level are all indicators of the capacity of political institutions to carry out their mandate. If they cannot administer these projects, at least in terms of carrying out the type of project they are charged with, then they lack institutional capacity. It is important to note that many of the programs institutions are charged with carrying out lead to negative outcomes, but that is not an indication of weak local institutions. Rather, failure to complete the policy mandated is sign of
weak local institutions.

Finally, local institutional strength does not only exist in national-level political institutions, but can refer to sub-national and regional institutions as well. Whatever political environment the foreign ruler finds themselves in after landing in the foreign territory defines the local context they assess to determine their strategy. In some cases, foreign rulers rely upon national-level political institutions, while in others they seek out the remnants of previous regimes to administer the territory. In other cases, local institutions constructed during a civil conflict might present the foreign ruler with a local institutional base to utilize. The foreign rule mission also might only occur in one part of a foreign territory, and so it is only how institutions respond in that sub-part of the foreign territory that matters for the foreign ruler. Whatever the local institutions are in the foreign ruled territory, it is the strength of those institutions that set the local context.

3.3.2 Agent Capacity

After discussing how local institutional strength refers to the infrastructural power of foreign institutions, we can move to discuss how political institutional strength matters for foreign rule strategy. The first mechanism through which local institutional strength operates and impacts foreign rule strategy is what I term agent capacity. When foreign rulers intervene abroad, they initially attempt to work with local officials to manage the foreign rule mission and carry out their preferred policy goals. Rephrased, foreign rulers always seek local agents to work with and to help govern the territory. Projecting sovereign authority from afar is a difficult and costly prospect, and utilizing existing agents in the foreign territory provides an attractive option for foreign rulers. However, while some local agents almost always exist in the territory who are willing to work with the foreign ruler to help achieve the latter’s goals, it is the capacity of these agents, driven by local institutional strength, that
defines the ability of foreign rulers to actually delegate to these agents.

The agent capacity mechanism builds on principal-agent dynamics, although with an important modification.\textsuperscript{20} Traditionally, principal-agent problems focus on how to ensure that agents follow the wishes of a principal, and these formulations assume that agents often have their own preferences that work against the principal's wishes. I argue that the capacity of potential agents whom the principal might delegate to is an under examined extension of principal-agent problems. It is the capacity of potential agents that determines whether there are agents available to advance the principal’s wishes. Principal-agent problems are normally conceptualized as issues that arise when when a principal delegates to an agent to carry out a specific policy. Problems emerge when agents have goals independent from those of the principal, and these incentives lead the agent to resist following the principal’s wishes.\textsuperscript{21}

However, in foreign rule missions a different problem emerges prior to any consideration of agents having divergent goals with their foreign rule principals.\textsuperscript{22} Prior to considerations of divergent goals of agents, agents have to actually possess the capacity to carry out their goals. Without a baseline level of capacity, agents cannot

\textsuperscript{20}For background on principal-agent problems see: (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Ross, 1973; Calvert, McCubbins and Weingast, 1989; Kiewiet and McCubbins, 1991; Epstein and O’Halloran, 1999)

\textsuperscript{21}Feaver (1996) identifies this problem in his understanding of the civil-military relations problematique, where states create strong militaries to defend against external threats, but a strong military is also capable of ignoring civilian control and pursuing their own interests. Foreign rulers can face similar dilemmas when considering delegating authority to a local leader, but they also have the ability to consistently change their agent until they find an acceptable one. The problematique, however, which Feaver argues emerges from Huntington’s (1957) theory of civil-military relations, concerns situations where a capable military already exists and thus foreign rulers require capable agents to exist already. Lake (2016) and Lake and Fariss (2014) also highlight the dilemma where finding agents strong enough to follow the foreign ruler’s wishes, and also possessing the legitimacy to rule over a foreign populace, is difficult. For more on principal-agent problems in civil-military relations see: Feaver (1996, 2003) and Avant (1996, 1998, 1994). Similarly, Byman (2006) extends this principal-agent framework to counterinsurgency.

\textsuperscript{22}This is not to say that foreign ruler missions do not face standard principal-agent problems as well. Lake and Fariss (2014) and Lake (2016) both highlight the inherent dilemma between finding agents that can be subservient to foreign rulers, but also possess the capacity and legitimacy to rule effectively at home.
carry out their own or the foreign ruler’s wishes, making them a poor agent not due to divergent interests, but rather a lack of capacity. In this case, changing agents (local leaders) or better monitoring is unlikely to make the principal (the foreign ruler) more likely to achieve their goals; instead the principal must build agent capacity. Agents do not have the opportunity to shirk if they do not have the capacity to do otherwise. Interestingly, most applications of principal-agent problems assume that the agent capacity required by the principal already exists. How to build capable agents with the capacity to carry out the principal’s goals is an a priori consideration. While considerations of how to ensure the agent remains under the principal’s control are important, the existence of a capable agent is a necessary consideration before a problematique can emerge. Hence, various solutions meant to mitigate possible principal-agent problems across literatures, whether encouraging principals to select agents that have similar goals, enact extensive monitoring policies, or other solutions all presuppose the existence of effective agents (Miller, 2005). In general, while principal-agent theories might explain choice of agents in the foreign rule territory, how the availability of sufficiently capable agents affects choices in strategy is underdeveloped throughout different theoretical specifications.

Rationally then, if principal-agent dynamics in foreign rule missions operated as typically conceptualized, this would always lead foreign rulers to use leadership-type strategies, where the foreign ruler could continue to cycle through local agents in order to find a suitable agent that would carry out the mission and achieve the foreign ruler’s goals. If capacity was not important, then a foreign ruler would need to simply find the correct agent and incentive structure for that agent. However, throughout history there is a clear empirical pattern where many foreign rulers go beyond simply

\[23\] There are many different proposed solutions to principal-agent problems in various fields. On principals selecting agents with similar goals, see Brehm and Gates (1993). On principals creating more effective monitoring strategies see Hölstrom (1979). Finally, for operating on outcome based contracts see Downs and Rocke (1994).
changing leaders when installing local agents and seek to build institutions as well, a costly endeavor that does not rationally make sense. If the standard principal-agent story was sufficient to explain the dynamics of foreign rule strategies, we would not see the abundance of institutional strategies across various instances of foreign rule. Without focusing on agent capacity, principal-agent theories fail to recognize the importance that the availability and capacity of potential agents play in determining the principal’s strategy. Thus, I argue we must look beyond the principal’s calculus of delegation, and instead look towards the capacity of possible agents to carry out the foreign ruler’s goals in the local territory. Accounting for a foreign ruler’s desire for capable agents is essential for a complete understanding of foreign rule strategy.

Even more, we know that foreign rulers always prefer to delegate to local agents when possible. This originates from a rational preference to achieve goals through a cost effective manner. When foreign rulers capture the sovereign authority of a foreign territory, there are significant benefits to utilizing local institutions and working with local agents to manage the foreign rule mission. This is the case for two major reasons. First, maintaining local institutions allows the foreign ruler’s military to leave the foreign territory quickly, and rely on local institutions to carry out the foreign ruler’s mission. As a result, this the military can achieve the foreign ruler’s goals more cheaply. Utilizing current political institutions also allows foreign rulers to focus on the political goals they wish to seek, rather than spending costly resources on creating new infrastructure. Second, the destruction of current institutions to create new ones incurs large costs in terms of resources, and requires lengthy military presence to maintain and rebuild the Weberian bureaucracy inside the foreign territory. The destruction of local institutions to allow the foreign ruler to build new institutions produces strong negative externalities that foreign rulers have a rational preference to avoid, if possible. Reduced capacity of institutions creates conditions for long periods of high investment and replacement of bureaucratic capital that is difficult.
As Gerring et al. (2011, 385) explain, “the benefits of preserving preexisting political institutions are considerable, while the opportunity costs of destroying them may be quite high.”

Empirically, we also have evidence that foreign rulers clearly prefer to use local elements, when possible, to achieve their political goals. When examining the history of cases of foreign rule, foreign rulers almost always initially seek to work with local proxies, regardless of the strategy ultimately utilized. During the pre-intervention phase, foreign rulers seek out possible agents to take over sovereign authority of the local territory, and then initially seek local agents to work with once they establish the foreign rule mission. Given that armed intervention usually occurs in response to a crisis period that changes the planning schedule, intervention and foreign rule missions are often hastily planned, so delegation to local agents happens quickly in order to ensure that the military can continue its mission. For example, while the Soviet Union often had major political ends they wished to achieve, they still looked to local agents to attempt to administer the foreign rule mission. In Bulgaria and Romania, for instance, the Soviet Union initially turned to the local communist parties that already existed prior to World War II in order to administer the territories as they began the foreign rule mission while also continuing the push to Germany. While the Soviet military has usurped the sovereign authority of the territories, the local communist parties used the local institutions still remaining in both countries to begin their foreign rule missions (Kramer, 2010; Dimitrov, 2008). Once the Soviets arrived, they were able to assess whether those local communist parties could utilize the institutional infrastructures in the territory to carry out and fully achieve the Soviets’ political goals.

Thus, the foreign ruler must first determine whether the local territory has the capacity to permit agents to serve the foreign ruler’s interests before they have the luxury of worrying about how to control their installed agents. When major powers
engage in foreign rule, they always want to install a pliant agent, but, more importantly, the agent requires the capacity to actually carry out the foreign ruler’s preferred policies.\textsuperscript{24} Hence, foreign rulers will always naturally prefer leadership strategies, when possible, where they can impose pliant leaders that possess the capacity to carry out the foreign ruler’s goals. This preference allows for complete delegation to local agents while also allowing the foreign ruler to hold the threat of decapitation over the newly imposed leader, moving the foreign ruler to the traditional realm of principal-agent problems concerning control of their local agents. However, capable local agents are not always available. Often the existing political institutions do not possess the capacity required and this precludes the availability of local agents that can achieve the goals of the foreign ruler. Thus, the determination of agent capacity overrides the foreign ruler’s natural preference for leadership strategies. Instead of focusing on the preferences of the foreign ruler, understanding decisions of foreign rule strategies requires examining the capacity of local agents to carry out the foreign ruler’s interests.

In their desire to delegate through a leadership strategy, foreign rulers look towards a variety of agents to delegate to, and, importantly, the types of agents that foreign rulers can use varies widely across different contexts. The key to selection, as noted above, is often local groups making themselves appear to be ideologically aligned with the foreign ruler, and thus making them attractive for the foreign ruler to place into power. Sometimes this appeal is earnest, and at others the local group manipulates their views to hopefully place themselves into power. Either way, foreign rulers look through various groups to find potential agents. Typically, foreign rulers look to existing government elites, local bureaucrats, opposition political parties,

\textsuperscript{24}Bueno De Mesquita and Downs (2006) argue this point when discussing third party intervention by democratic regimes. They argue that democratic regimes prefer to install authoritarian leaders because they are more likely to be pliant to their wishes and enact their preferred policies. Similarly, regimes of all types engaging in foreign rule will have the same preference for pliant agents.
rebel groups, or even overseas dissidents. Any group that can convince the foreign ruler that they can serve as a legitimate leader that will control local institutions in order to achieve the foreign ruler’s wishes can appear viable in the foreign ruler’s mind. The process of foreign rulers seeking potential rebel groups of opposition parties is relatively common, as foreign rulers seek potential agents who would most align with their wishes prior to intervention. Regardless, whether the foreign ruler is an overseas dissident, rebel group, or existing government elite, they all are required to appear as if they could meet the foreign ruler’s wishes and achieve their goals in order to be delegated to. As Gerring et al. (2011, 385-387) further note, local elites can also attempt to insert themselves early in the armed mission, to insist on creating a bargain that will allow them to have the delegated authority of the foreign ruler. However, regardless of the actual agent chosen by the foreign ruler, it is the institutional capacity of the territory that matters for foreign rule strategy, not the identity of the local agent.

While understanding how agent capacity helps determine foreign rule strategy, it is important to illustrate how stronger local institutions can translate their institutional strength into agent capacity. With a reminder that institutional strength is similar to the idea of infrastructural power, agent capacity refers to the ability to carry out the foreign ruler’s political goals or promote the actions the foreign ruler wishes to see. As the foreign ruler has taken over as the sovereign authority in the local territory, they seek agents with the capacity to carry out this mission. We know the foreign ruler’s goal is to have a capable agent who can carry out their desired tasks, but this requires a strong institutional base in the local territory. For a local agent to carry out the foreign ruler’s wishes, local institutions must have the capacity to put the foreign ruler’s commands into action. If the foreign ruler installs a new leader, but the local institutions do not allow the leader to accomplish the foreign ruler’s wishes, then whether the leader is amenable to the foreign ruler’s wishes is irrelevant. Strong
local institutions are required for local territories to implement many of the projects that foreign rulers emphasize, including new public health programs, tax reforms, infrastructure projects, police reform, creation of public education systems and more. Without institutions that can carry out these new policies through normal political means, the new leader cannot accomplish the foreign ruler’s goals. Strong local institutions allow for foreign rulers to reduce their military presence and rely upon the existing local institutions to carry out their goals. Conversely, weak local institutions, require foreign rulers to first build up local institutional capacity through maintaining their presence in the territory. Hence, the strength of local political institutions determines the capacity of local agents. Agent capacity is critically important for foreign rulers to determine their strategy of foreign rule, and moves us beyond a simplistic version of principal-agent theory. Foreign rulers attempt to determine the strength of political institutions in the foreign territory when deciding on which strategy to pursue.

The process through which foreign rulers institute a foreign rule mission highlights the role of local institutions and agent capacity. First, upon initiating the foreign rule mission, foreign rulers typically embrace a temporary leadership strategy to determine whether local institutions possess the capacity required to delegate fully to them. As the foreign ruler works with local agents, they will assess whether they are able to carry out the political goals given to them by the foreign ruler. If the foreign ruler finds that the local territory already possesses relatively strong local institutions, then there are capable agents in the territory and the foreign ruler will employ a leadership strategy, which is the rationally preferred strategy. The foreign ruler recognizes that the territory’s current political institutions will allow for their installed agent to carry out their wishes, and the foreign ruler only needs to depose the recalcitrant leader and install a pliant leader to achieve their goals. With such a leader in place, the foreign ruler moves the territory towards their preferred outcome.
Emblematic of this process is the British and Soviet mission of foreign rule in Iran starting in 1941. The British and Soviets both deployed troops in Iran and instituted a foreign rule mission where they demanded control of the oil fields and the removal of all German elements from the country. As part of the foreign rule mission, the Soviets and British forced Reza Shah Pahlavi to abdicate the Sun Throne and go into exile. They installed his son, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, as the ruler in Iran so they could work with him to achieve their goals (Kuniholm, 1980). The British and Soviets were both initially focused on seeing if leadership strategies would work, as they wanted an Iranian administration run by Iranians (Eshraghi, 1984). As the British and Soviets entered their occupation zones, they were able to determine whether Mohammad Reza Shah was able to maintain the transit lines, uphold the oil concessions, and truly expel the German presence from the country, thereby allowing the Soviets and British to rely upon a leadership strategy (McFarland, 1980). Once the British and Soviet Union saw Mohammad Reza Shah was capable and Iranian institutions had the capacity to carry out their goals, the leadership strategy was vindicated, and they maintained the newly installed Shah in power, and working with him to achieve their goals. Local institutional strength mattered for the foreign rule mission in Iran, due to the role that agent capacity played in allowing the Soviets and British to work through the new Shah to achieve their goals.

On the other hand, if the foreign ruler finds the territory possesses relatively weak local institutions, then a leadership strategy is not available to them. After foreign rulers arrive in the territory, they will scan the landscape and look to potential agents to see if they possess the capacity to carry out their missions. This often includes an initial attempt to work with local agents and monitor how they respond to the foreign ruler’s commands. Often this involves initial programs involving public goods provision to meet crisis needs, which also tests bureaucratic capacity. However, if the local territory possess weak institutions, then the political ends the foreign ruler is
seeking will not be attainable with the current institutions in place, and they will be forced to create new and stronger ones. The foreign ruler will recognize that imposing a new leader will not accomplish the mission, and instead the foreign ruler needs to engage in institution building. The local institutional bureaucracy will have to be strengthened, reformed, and rebuilt to create the conditions for the foreign ruler to succeed. Foreign rulers are reluctant to engage in institutional strategies when there are local institutions present they can utilize to meet their needs. Thus, even though foreign rulers prefer to simply install new leaders, weak institutions compel institutional strategies, often against the pre-intervention preferences of the foreign ruler.

Egypt’s foreign rule mission in Yemen is emblematic of how local institutions and their agent capacity matters for foreign rule strategy. Following the developments in the Yemeni crisis, Nasser initially ordered the Egyptian military to intervene in the Yemeni civil war after the newly instituted Yemen Arab Republic was facing resistance following the overthrow of the royalist regime. Given the relative military weakness of Yemen, Nasser and the Egyptian military initially believe that they would be able to quickly establish a foreign rule mission in North Yemen, re-install and bolster their preferred leaders in Sana’a, and establish a leadership strategy that allowed a small amount of resources to be used in order to achieve their political goals in Yemen (Dawisha, 1975). The military leaders were so confident in their mission to Sana’a that they did not even bring maps of the full Yemen Arab Republic with them (Witty, 2001, 409). Upon arrival in the capital, however, the Egyptian military quickly recognized that the republican government instituted in the capital did not have the capacity to carry out their political goals. Reforms to the institutions of Yemen to create a more capable Arab state were not occurring, and the newly created republican government was not able to establish unified political institutions that could achieve the government’s political policies beyond a very limited geographic
range (Witty, 2001, 419-420). The infrastructural power of the Yemeni state was non-existant, to the surprise of the Egyptian military and Nasser (Dawisha, 1977). Facing this prospect, the Egyptians quickly attempted to turned to an institutional strategy, pushing to rebuild Yemeni local institutions in an attempt to create a strong institutional basis on which to win the civil war against the royalist factions. Agent capacity had to be built before the Egyptians could achieve their goal in Yemen. Egypt, initially planning for a simple military mission of a few weeks to bolster the republican regime in Yemen, ended up engaged in a five year institutional mission when they had no intention of engaging in one in the first place.\footnote{In fact, some have argued that Egypt’s actions in this foreign rule operation directly contributed to their weak performance in the 1967 war with Israel (Ferris, 2013).}

Agent capacity is thus a key mechanism driving foreign rule strategy, as capable agents and the institutional strength they require is a pre-requisite to setting up a typical principal-agent relationship. Further, the agent capacity mechanism reinforces that it is not the intentions, goals, or preferences of the foreign ruler that determines the foreign rule strategy. Is is only through the capacity of local institutions that the foreign ruler can achieve their political goals. The choice of strategy requires knowledge of the local political context and how institutional strength effects the foreign ruler’s goals. Rather, while foreign rulers may guess at the context before landing in the new territory, often those assumptions are wrong. Only once foreign rule is established can the foreign ruler take stock of the the local institutional context, determine whether capable agents exist, and which strategy to implement.

3.3.3 Armed Resistance

The second causal mechanism of local institutional strength is the likelihood of armed resistance. Just as agent capacity can constrain foreign rulers, only allowing for institutional foreign rule strategies in some cases, armed resistance can often
work in the opposite direction to bind foreign rulers to certain strategies due to preferences to avoid costly missions when possible. When territories placed under foreign rule possess stronger local institutions, replacing those institutions increases the probability that the foreign ruler will face armed resistance against the military operation. However, if local political institutions are weak, the current institutions in place cannot suppress insurrections, and thus foreign rulers are required to build new institutions.

It is not surprising that armed resistance and local political institutions are linked, given the existing literature on military occupations. Evidence of the relationship between resistance to foreign rule and institutional strength is a common theme in this literature, where armed resistance to foreign rule is largely a function of either nationalism, external security threats, political opportunity, or trust. However, each of these identified mechanisms that can lead to increased armed resistance feature an argument for the impact of changing local institutions, as well as highlighting arguments for the natural preference for local rule. In different ways, Ferwerda and Miller (2014) and Collard-Wexler (2013) illustrate that armed political resistance to foreign rule is less of a threat when local institutions are maintained. Ferwerda and Miller (2014) examine Nazi occupied France and found that with more self-rule and local institutions in Vichy France, there were fewer attacks on the German troops stationed in the area. Similarly, Collard-Wexler (2013) argues that maintaining local political institutions is one factor that helps create trust among the occupied population and makes armed resistance less likely. In general, much of the literature on resistance to occupation has focused on the interaction between self-rule and political resistance. There is less examination of how the likelihood of resistance impacts the ability of the foreign ruler to keep local institutions in place. Hechter (2013), for one, argues that keeping local institutions in place helps reduce resistance to foreign rule due to a natural preference for local rule. Similarly, (Edelstein, 2008) implicitly
argues that keeping local institutions in place makes resistance less likely, as it serves as a signal that the foreign ruler is not intending to permanently control the territory. In general, there is strong evidence that local institutions and resistance are linked, and maintaining local institutions helps reduce resistance to foreign rule. While this relationship is well defined, I argue that the key is how current institutional strength impacts the capacity to organize resistance, and the effects this prospective capacity has on the foreign ruler’s strategy.

Local institutional strength helps determine the likely level of post-intervention armed resistance by illustrating the likely residual organization strength in current state institutions to resist the imposition of new institutions. As Hegre et al. (2001) and Peic and Reiter (2011) illustrate, replacing political institutions in a state reduces state power and state strength as new institutional capacity is rebuilt over time. However, the organizational strength of the previous institutions rarely dissipates, but can often be held together and transferred to armed resistance movements. For instance, MacDonald (2014) examines colonial expansion, and illustrates how the network and organization ties of units inside a foreign territory can resist foreign rulers quite successfully due to the capacity of the local elites and institutions. Deposing institutions would reallocate the institutional strength away from local institutions and towards resistance movements and actors who are predisposed to dislike the foreign ruler. While the nascent political institutions are being created by the foreign ruler, the residual organization strength that is held together by organization ties will still exist, just now held in organizations against the state rather than working for the state.

Further, in order to maintain the legitimate monopoly of violence over the territory and defeat resistance movements, foreign rulers and their proxies require sufficient institutional strength to ensure that rebellions are defeated. When the state does not possess the capacity with its institutions to quash resistance to their rule,
rebellion and insurgency are more likely to occur (Fearon and Laitin, 2003; Goodwin, 2001). If replacing institutions leads to a temporary reduction in institutional strength, then resistance movements that possess sufficient organizational strength will frequently flourish, due to the social ties forged inside local institutions that are maintained. Foreign rulers, recognizing this fact and fearful of the cost that defeating resistance movements would impose, push to work with local institutions that are sufficiently strong through leadership strategies. The likelihood of armed resistance affects the cost calculus that foreign rulers operate under when determining their foreign rule strategies. It leads foreign rulers to prefer leadership strategies when it becomes clear that replacing local institutions will make the cost unbearable.

Additionally, foreign rulers have to consider what will happen to the deposed institutions when they use an institutional strategy. As Gerring et al. (2011, 384) discuss, building new institutions “requires the destruction, or at the very least, the neutralization of the existing political order. There cannot be two governments side by side...Thus, the destruction of political order is a cosmic event, with repercussions that are often far-reaching and always difficult to anticipate; spillover is common, for such events are difficult to contain.” The destruction of the current local institutions requires foreign rulers to ascertain what will happen to those who are deposed. If they retain the organizational ties that held them together inside the government’s bureaucracy, then armed resistance capacity is higher. Stronger institutions will naturally have stronger organizational ties, and produce stronger potential for armed resistance to foreign rule. On the other hand, destroying weak institutions does not meaningfully create additional capacities to rebel, and make it more likely that armed resistance will emerge. If current institutions have difficulty using the coercive power of the state to hold back resistance, they will not have an easier time when they no longer have the backing of state institutions to assert their authority. Thus, local institutional strength can crucially determine resistance capacity and contribute...
to the foreign ruler’s calculation of how best to achieve their goals with minimum resistance.

I contend that this leads foreign rulers to assess the local institutions and work to determine the resistance capacity of local territories, given the cost of imposing new institutions with weakened capacity. If the foreign ruler assesses that local institutional strength is sufficiently high, and fears armed resistance to foreign rule would be dramatically increased if deposing local institutions, the probability that the foreign ruler will look to engage in institution-building is substantially less likely. This is true even if the foreign ruler has an initial preference for replacing the current institutions and institutional strategies more broadly. Creating new resistance movements to the foreign ruler will only make accomplishing the foreign ruler’s goals more costly. Leadership strategies appear much more attractive when the cost of suppressing rebellion against the foreign ruler is factored into the cost of the foreign rule mission.\(^{26}\) Additionally, the foreign ruler can work with their newly imposed leaders to push for domestic institutional change, directed by the foreign ruler and carried out through the current institutional architecture.

Alternatively, if the foreign ruler assesses the situation and sees relatively weak local institutions, then it is often the case that organized resistance can already operate against current local institutions. Reducing state institutional strength is not a concern, as there is no current capacity to fight resistance movements at this moment, and the foreign ruler must build new institutional strength in order to combat the rebellion. The foreign ruler is compelled to engage in institution building to quash any prospective resistance against political rule in the state. Replacing the current leadership through leadership strategies will simply allow the resistance movement to

\(^{26}\)Conceptually, one could reduce the resistance capacity of a territory by engaging in a war of attrition, where you seek to kill everyone who could possibly join the rebellion. Beyond the dubious effectiveness of this strategy (Downes, 2008, 2007), given the political goals that foreign rulers seek, attrition would not result in a territory that is able to achieve the political goals desired.
continue unaffected by the change in leadership. Additionally, the existence of weak local institutions largely implies that deposing current institutions will not contribute to higher levels of armed resistance, as there is not much organizational capacity to transfer. Without sufficient pre-existing capacity, it is unlikely that the current local institutions will turn into strong, cohesive resistance movements. This mechanism can intertwine with the agent capacity mechanism if the foreign ruler is inclined to impose a rebel group or resistance movement as the new leaders of the foreign ruled territory.\textsuperscript{27} Here, the rebels are deemed as capable agents, and often have created their own institutions or captured strong state institutions through rebellion. Hence they possess strong political institutions, even though they are initially rebels prior to the foreign rule mission. Attempting to change their institutions as the foreign ruler installs them as leaders can increase their resistance against the foreign ruler’s goals. This dynamic process makes assessing the agent’s capability and ability to resist a crucial mechanism driving the choice of strategy.\textsuperscript{28}

In practice, as with the agent capacity mechanism, upon arriving in the foreign territory the foreign ruler’s military endeavors to assess the strength of current local institutions and the likelihood of armed resistance emerging to pressure the military mission. They also assess other actors present in the territory, and try to gauge their ability to resist and harm the foreign rule operation. An assessment that armed resistance is more likely to emerge indicates that strong institutions exist in the territory, and pushes foreign rulers to carry out leadership strategies rather than risking an institutional strategy that would encourage greater armed resistance. Armed resistance capacity, driven by local institutional strength, decreases the likelihood that

\textsuperscript{27}For instance, if the foreign ruler observes one side of a ongoing civil conflict as more beneficial to their interests, they may impose that group of rebels as the new leaders in a foreign rule mission.

\textsuperscript{28}Arjona (2016) provides one example of how rebels groups can form and capture local institutions that transition into government institutions following the cessation of hostilities. While not a case involving foreign rule, the logic of wartime (or intervention time) institution building transferring to the post-conflict order is consistent with my argument.
the foreign ruler can achieve its goals through institutional strategies. Combined with the natural preference of militaries to use leadership strategies, foreign rulers naturally gravitate towards them when resistance capacity is high. Even when goals are initially for specific types of institutions, they can turn to delegation and leadership strategies out of concern over increased resistance.

The German foreign rule mission in Norway perfectly encapsulates how this mechanism plays out. Recognizing the importance of Norway for controlling access to the North Atlantic and preventing Allied forces access to the natural resources nearby, Germany invaded Norway and imposed foreign rule. While Germany had used a successful leadership strategy in Denmark and the Netherlands, in Norway the Nazi-imposed regime faced higher levels of armed resistance that expected, in large part due to a few initial institutional changes foisted upon them by the new German commissioner in charge of Norway, Josef Terboven (Lemkin, 1944, 208-213). After dissolving the parliament and attempting to force the King to abdicate and abolish the monarchy, Terboven soon found that Norway’s strong local institutional capacity produced a higher level of armed resistance than he expected (Dahl, 1999, 229-250). Recognizing this, Terboven decided, even against his initial preferences, instead to delegate power to a new Norwegian government governed by Vidkun Quisling and the fascist Nasjonal Samling party, using a leadership strategy to prevent further resistance that would harm the ability for the Germans to achieve their political goals. Terboven recognized that appointing Quisling would facilitate a smoother transition to foreign rule, as was seen in the Netherlands and Denmark, thereby allowing German troops to focus on the broader political goals of of their mission (Mazower, 2008, 104-105). Rather than continuing with the initial brief attempt to change local institutions, Terboven and the German foreign rulers in Norway decided that maintaining current institutions in Norway with a leadership strategy was the best way to decrease the level of prospective armed resistance and work towards consolidating
Conversely, when institutions are already weak, the probability of meaningfully increasing the likelihood of armed resistance is not a factor. In most cases where foreign rulers find weak local institutions, some form of armed resistance is already occurring, as the local government cannot project itself as a legitimate monopoly of violence across its territory when infrastructural power is low. Thus replacing and destroying current institutions will not meaningfully increase the likelihood of armed resistance, since that likelihood is already high. Indeed, the foreign ruler is required to build a stronger centralized apparatus that can quell future armed rebellion against the authority of local institutions. One example of this is in British Mandatory Palestine, where the British served as foreign rulers dealing with the legacy of rebellions under previous Ottoman rule, and thus there was not much institutional architecture to maintain once they arrived (Sherman, 1998). Upon instituting the foreign rule mission, the current institutions in place were not aiding in increasing the infrastructural power of the territories’ institutions, and therefore infrastructural power needed to be created, since the capacity to quell a rebellion did not exist (Shepherd, 1999).

Given the shifting nature of institutions with the withdrawal of Ottoman control, the British were faced with a situation where nationalists and Zionists were already predisposed to engage in armed resistance against various centralized state actors. As a result institutions needed to be constructed by the British if they wanted to achieve their political goals (Fieldhouse, 2006, 151-219). Low levels of local institutional strength meant that armed resistance to British rule in mandatory Palestine was less likely to be enhanced due to the destruction of current institutions. British rulers were free to undertake an institutional strategy and recognized that they needed to build stronger institutions to combat the resistance movements already present.

Thus, the second causal mechanism central to the relationship of local institutional strength and foreign rule strategy is the threat of armed resistance. When a local
territory possesses strong political institutions, the high resistance capacity makes foreign rulers wary of engaging in institutional strategies, as institutional strategies will encourage higher levels of armed resistance and make the mission much more costly. Foreign rulers will be concerned about the prospective resistance they could face, and will consider whether they can achieve their goals with leadership strategies instead. When the local territory possesses weak political institutions, its resistance capacity is less than in the areas with strong political institutions. Thus, institutional strategies are easier to implement in these territories, as the armed resistance will not be as large and overwhelming for the nascent political institutions set up by the foreign ruler. Overall, my theory predicts that local institutional strength is the main driver of foreign rule strategy through two distinct mechanisms: agent capacity and armed resistance. However, prior to these mechanisms operating on the decision of foreign rule strategy, its goals are filtered through uncertainty and assessment institutions before the choice occurs. The full theory is presented graphically in Figure 3.1. Combining both mechanisms with the emphasis on local institutional strength creates two distinct hypotheses:

\[ H_2 \]: If the territory under foreign rule has relatively strong local political institutions, foreign rulers are more likely to use leadership strategies.

\[ H_3 \]: If the territory under foreign rule has relatively weak local political institutions, foreign rulers are more likely to use institutional strategies.

Overall, this theory lays out the effect of local institutional strength, and the uncertainty foreign rulers have over it, on the choice of a foreign rule strategy. I argue that local institutions set the stage for what foreign rule strategy is required for a foreign ruler to achieve its political goals following armed intervention. However, uncertainty, and the organization biases of militaries in face of uncertainty, prevents foreign rulers from assessing the strength of local institutions. Thus, foreign rulers do not know what strategy is required to use prior to armed intervention. Organizational
biases, signals from the local territory, and the fundamental uncertainty surrounding the assessment of local contexts combine to create a perverse effect where foreign rulers often engage in armed intervention abroad without being clear on what the mission requirements are to achieve their political goals. Only after arriving in the local territory and assessing the local context for agent capacity and armed resistance does the foreign ruler understand what strategy is required to achieve their political goals. Regardless of whether a foreign ruler might prefer a certain strategy, or only intend to engage in a limited military mission, local conditions that are obscured from the planning stage will dictate the actual strategy that is required.

3.4 Alternative Arguments

My theory predicts that the strength of local political institutions largely helps to determine the strategy that the foreign ruler implements following armed intervention. However, there are a few important alternative arguments that produce contrasting empirical and causal process predictions. While there are a variety of po-
tential alternative arguments, three broad groups present the most compelling cases. These are broadly grouped together as: the goals of the foreign ruler, features of the foreign ruler, and features of the foreign territory. I should also be clear that while my theory makes strong claims at times, it is a probabilistic theory. It focuses on how local institutions constrain the strategic choices of the foreign ruler, but there can be other factors that might, in some cases, affect the strategic choices. It is also the case that the alternative hypotheses identified here can augment and conditions certain cases of foreign rule and work with my theory to produce unique outcomes. In general, however, these alternative arguments produce contrasting hypothesis that should highlight different empirical observations if my theory is incorrect.

3.4.1 Content of Foreign Ruler’s Goals

The first alternative argument centers on the goals of the initial armed intervention. Some have argued that the reasons for initial intervention influence the subsequent choice of foreign rule strategy (Sullivan, 2007). The general argument is that armed interventions undertaken for economic, humanitarian, or security reasons will produce different strategies of foreign rule that correspond to the goals the foreign ruler wishes to achieve. As the goals of foreign rule missions have been changing over time, there may be different strategies that develop over time to suit these goals (Finnemore, 2004). If a foreign ruler intervened to create a buffer state, their foreign rule strategy may differ from a foreign ruler who intervened to help with refugee flows, which in turn may differ from a foreign rule strategy following an intervention to obtain control over a territory’s natural resource wealth. Below, using three examples of possible intervention goals, I illustrate how each could affect the strategy used by the foreign ruler.

First, a common motive in many cases of foreign rule is the economic concerns of the foreign ruler. Whether this includes expropriation of natural resource wealth,
sovereign debt, protection of overseas business interests, or other economic concerns, foreign rulers often decide to engage in foreign rule when a foreign territory involves their economic interests\textsuperscript{29} This argument holds that foreign rulers do not care about the domestic conditions of the foreign territory as long as their economic interests are satisfied. Frieden (1994) lays out an example of this argument, arguing that colonial rulers intervene in the most cost-effective manner to ensure their economic interests remain taken care of.\textsuperscript{30} Thus, when engaging in foreign rule for economic reasons, the foreign ruler could deem the costs of institution building too high, so the foreign ruler will use leadership changes to extract their rents.

Another common goal in many foreign rule missions is a desire for enhanced security or other security interests. Foreign rulers can engage in foreign rule to ensure a previously hostile threat will no longer threaten them, to create a buffer state between the foreign ruler and a potential peer competitor, or to provide basing to extend their power into new regions and suppress potential adversaries. In all of these cases, however, the foreign ruler is interested in engaging in foreign rule to promote their security. For example, Bueno De Mesquita and Downs (2006) argue that those who intervene for security reasons prefer to install new leaders, as they are easier to control and can be pushed to support the security interests of the foreign rule. When concerned about security of the state, foreign rulers prefer to install pliant agents from the beginning and save their resources for other contingencies and security threats. Hence, it could be the case that when foreign rule is undertaken for security reasons, leadership strategies ought to be used by the foreign ruler.

One final typical goal of a foreign ruler mission could be for humanitarian reasons. This commonly includes engaging in foreign rule to prevent the re-emergence

\textsuperscript{29}Importantly, this remains distinct from claims that free trade and great power economic interests in general lead to imperial-like rule as in Gallagher and Robinson (1953).

\textsuperscript{30}Yoon (1997) also provides an example of this form of argument.
of civil wars, to protect civilian populations from mass atrocities, or to engage other humanitarian missions. When these goals emerge, foreign rulers might look to impose new (usually democratic) institutions and utilize institutional strategies that allow for stronger institutions to exist in order to help prevent future humanitarian crises. For instance, we see this logic at play in Barnett’s (2011) argument that humanitarian goals have origins in imperial mindsets in which imperial rulers sought to build institutions when it would foster the development of human rights of the local population.\footnote{This is similar to the liberal imperialism literature that argues imperial conquest by Britain and others was driven by liberal impulses. For more on this see Pitts (2009).} Chesterman (2005) and Fox (2008) also argue that modern humanitarian missions of foreign rule, often carried out by the UN, include institutional strategies to ensure strong institutions emerge that the foreign ruler can rely upon to prevent humanitarian crises. Thus, humanitarian foreign rule operations, under this logic, should mostly use an institutional strategies.

Overall, if the argument that the goals of the armed intervention drive the choice of foreign rule strategy are true, then we should see foreign rule missions with similar goals using the same foreign rule strategy. Additionally, we should see more consensus over what strategy to use in the foreign rule mission once the intervention decision is made, and few cases of foreign rule where the strategy only emerges following the intervention. Plans for the foreign rule period following the armed intervention should largely coalesce at the same time as the decision to intervene, since it is the pre-intervention goals that are determining the choice of strategy. If this argument is true, then two hypotheses should follow:

\[ H_4: \text{Foreign Rule missions undertaken for similar goals should have similar foreign rule strategies.} \]

\[ H_5: \text{Once the goals of the armed intervention are known, the strategy for foreign rule should be selected.} \]
While this argument might make initial sense, if there is variation in foreign rule strategies among cases with similar intervention goals, I contend that the goals of the foreign rule mission are not sufficient to explain the selection of strategy. Rather, I would contend that intervention goals are an important part of the story that setup the initial intervention decision, and can set the stage for how foreign rulers think about the political goals necessary for success. Foreign rulers with vastly different goals determine which strategy will allow them to achieve those goals given the local constraints, rather than inferring a strategy directly from the goal. Both leadership and institutional strategies can produce local agents that serve economic, security, humanitarian, or other goals. None of this is to say that the goals of armed intervention are not important. In fact, the goals of the armed intervention set the political goals that the foreign rule mission will attempt to achieve and the political ends that the strategy needs to fulfill. However, if my hypotheses about local institutional strength are true, then I contend that the intervention goals themselves cannot predict the strategy that the foreign ruler will implement, as local conditions help determine what strategy is necessary to achieve the political goals.

3.4.2 Features of the Foreign Ruler

The next set of alternative explanations focus broadly on the institutional, leadership, and organizational features of the foreign ruler. Arguments of this sort focus on the domestic political institutions of the foreign ruler, rather than the institutional structure of the local territory in determining the foreign ruler’s strategy. These arguments hold that the domestic political system of the foreign ruler determines the strategy the foreign ruler will utilize. Problematically, these arguments largely assume that the domestic political character of the foreign ruler leads to consistent strategies across different types of foreign rule. But given the wide variety of foreign rule strategies that we see among the same foreign ruler, these arguments are
not compelling. Nevertheless, it could still be possible that the domestic political structure of the foreign ruler may impact choices of strategy.

3.4.2.1 Regime Type

Regime type arguments posit that democratic or authoritarian regimes will have consistent preferences for foreign rule strategies over time, regardless of the situation they find in the local territory. However, much more is predicted about the behavior of democratic regimes than authoritarian regimes. For example, some strands of the democratic peace literature posit that democratic powers are more likely to engage in institutional strategies of foreign rule, as they attempt to build strong democratic institutions to promote their interests (Kegley and Hermann, 1995, 1996). Doyle (2005) argues that the liberal peace Kant proposes emerges from expanding the democratic community, and that liberal states will seek to expand this community by force. Additionally, the illiberal liberalism literature argues liberal (democratic) states who look to impose liberal institutions via illiberal means. Desch (2007) points to the United States to illustrate how liberal values compel it to engage in illiberal interventions to promote similar liberal institutions and values across the world. Both strands emerge from the liberal imperialism tradition, which argues that the liberal values and desire for good institutions and civilizing culture lead to democratic and liberal nations embarking in intervention and institution-building projects (Pitts, 2009; Burke and Bromwich, 2000; Mehta, 1999). Following this literature, we should expect that liberal and democratic regimes should prefer institutional strategies, whereas authoritarian regimes prefer to pursue leadership strategies. Finally, Owen IV (2010) argues that foreign rulers are more likely to impose institutions in territories that have institutions that are dissimilar to their own. Thus more democratic foreign rulers should use leadership strategies in more democratic territories, whereas more authoritarian foreign rulers should use institutional strategies in more democratic territories. The
converse is could also be true. Overall, three main hypotheses emerge from these arguments.

$H_6$: If foreign ruler is a democracy, then the foreign ruler will always prefer institutional strategies.

$H_7$: If the foreign ruler is an autocracy, then the foreign ruler will always prefer leadership strategies.

$H_8$: If the territory under foreign rule has similar institutions to the foreign ruler prior to the imposition of foreign rule, the likelihood that a foreign ruler would use an institutional strategy decreases.

3.4.2.2 National Leaders

Another strand of this argument focuses on the leadership style and preferences of individual leaders when carrying out foreign rule. The most developed of these arguments is the argument about US presidents and their threat perceptions. Saunders argues that leaders who perceive threats emanating from local institutions will follow ‘transformative’ intervention strategies, whereas leaders who perceive threats emanating from external behavior of states prefer ‘non-transformative’ strategies. Her argument indicates that leaders should consistently prefer one form of foreign rule strategy, whether that is institution building or leadership change, based on their perception of where threats emanate. Additionally, this arguments holds that changes in leadership of the foreign ruler should be correlated with shifts in foreign rule strategy. When externally focused leaders come to power, we should see shifts to leadership strategies from institutional strategies. Conversely, when internally focused leaders come to power, we should see shifts to institution building strategies.

$H_9$: If a particular national leader engages in multiple cases of foreign rule, then they will utilize the same strategies of foreign rule.
3.4.2.3 Organizational Learning

Finally, the last type of alternative argument features the previous history between the foreign ruler and the local territory. It could be the case that military organizations that have recently engaged in foreign rule in a similar or the same territory have better information about the territory, and are more likely to choose strategies quickly based on that prior knowledge. Some have argued that military organizations and foreign policy bureaucracies can learn from prior experiences to implement better policies in the future (Levy, 1994; Etheredge, 1985). Thus, when the military has engaged in similar foreign rule missions in recent periods, or have previously intervened in the territory that is now under foreign rule, it could mean that the previous assessment of and learning about the local territory can carry over to future time periods, due to organizational learning processes. This would reduce the level of uncertainty over the local institutional context and allow for the foreign ruler to be more likely to have a defined foreign rule strategy prior to the decision to engage in armed intervention. This leads to one hypothesis about the process of determining the foreign rule strategy:

\[ H_{10}: \text{If the foreign ruler has engaged in foreign rule in the same territory previously, the reduction of uncertainty should make the choice of strategy appear prior to intervention.} \]

3.4.3 Features of the Foreign Territory

Finally, there are a few features of the local territory itself that could impact the choice of foreign rule strategy beyond the local institutional context. First, the size of the local territory could make it more difficult and costly to engage in institution

\[ ^{32}\text{This type of argument is popular and contentious in discussions of counterinsurgency and how military organizations learn from previous experiences to update organizational practices. For some arguments and critiques in this vein, see Jackson (2008); Nagl (2002); Kiszely (2006); Catignani (2014).} \]
building, making leadership strategies appear more attractive. As Herbst (2000) has illustrated in the context of Africa, it is more difficult and costly to extend infrastructural power across larger territories. If a foreign ruler is seeking to achieve political goals following armed intervention, obtaining those goals through institution-building might be infeasible due to the vastness of the territory. Similarly, the ruggedness of the territory might also contribute to the difficulty of directing institutional power to all parts of the foreign ruled territory. As Fearon and Laitin (2003) discuss regarding specifically mountainous terrain, when terrain is more rugged it becomes difficult for centralized institutions to project power into those territories, and resistance becomes most likely to emerge. Thus, institutional strategies might prove more difficult to carry out in territories that are more rugged, in addition to being larger.

Beyond the geography of local institutions, the type of local institutions that the local territory possesses might also matter. Some have argued that democracy requires a strong level of state bureaucracy to exist before democracy can occur (Bäck and Hadenius, 2008). Thus if democracy is present in a territory, the foreign ruler might be less likely to depose the democratic institutions and use an institutional strategy. These lead to three hypotheses related directly to features of the local territory under foreign rule.

$H_{11}$: If the territory under foreign rule becomes larger, the likelihood that a foreign ruler will use an institutional strategy is decreased.

$H_{12}$: If the territory under foreign rule becomes rugged, the likelihood that a foreign ruler will use an institutional strategy is decreased.

$H_{13}$: If the territory under foreign rule has democratic institutions prior to the imposition of foreign rule, the likelihood that a foreign ruler would use an institutional strategy decreases.
3.5 Conclusion

In this chapter, I laid out in detail my theory of foreign rule strategy that highlights the impact that local institutional strength, and the uncertainty surrounding it, plays in determining foreign rule strategy. I argued that the uncertainty over local institutional strength prior to armed intervention leads to the emergence of foreign rule strategies only after armed intervention occurs. The strength of local institutions then drives the content of the foreign rule strategy after this assessment process and the uncertainty is lifted. Only after assessment can foreign rulers look to agent capacity and armed resistance to determine which foreign rule strategy would best suit the pursuit of their political goals in the foreign rule mission. I concluded the chapter by highlighting some alternative arguments that make contrasting hypotheses related to the empirical observations of foreign rule strategies across time, and the decision-processes that lead to the selection of strategy. In the next chapter, I lay out my research design to test this theory and describe the research strategy I use to make causal inferences about this hypothesized relationship, as well as litigate among alternative arguments. In addition, I move to test my theory quantitatively and see if the hypotheses laid out above hold across time and space. This will provide the empirical tests and backbone that tries to confirm the theoretical claims made above.
CHAPTER 4

RESEARCH DESIGN AND QUANTITATIVE TESTING

“My position is that once Mussolini and the fascists are gone, I will deal with any Italian authority which can deliver the goods. I am not the least afraid for this purpose of seeming to recognize the House of Savoy or Badoglio, provided they are the ones who can make the Italians do what we need for our war purposes.” – Winston Churchill\(^1\)

4.1 Introduction

After outlining my theory of foreign rule strategy in Chapter 3, I move forward to the empirical testing that provides evidence to help confirm my theoretical claims. In this chapter, I outline the research design that tests my theory about the importance of local institutional strength in explaining the content and timing of foreign rule strategies across different time periods and in various contexts. If my theory is valid, I should find evidence of a robust relationship between local institutional strength and foreign rule strategy. When local institutional strength of a territory is higher, I should find evidence that foreign rulers are more likely to use leadership strategies. Conversely, when local institutional strength is low, I should find that foreign rulers are more likely to use institutional strategies. And if foreign rulers determine their foreign rule strategy based upon local conditions on the ground, then we should see consistent results across time and space in supporting these hypothesis, regardless of the model specification and control variables included.

\(^1\)Churchill (1951, 64)
Quantitative testing of this sort is important to establish the consistency of the relationship in broad strokes, which then allows us to use comparative case studies to examine whether foreign rulers actually discuss uncertainty over local contexts, and if militaries truly consider local institutional strength when determining the strategy for a foreign rule mission. If my theory is correct, not only should a quantitative relationship exist, but I should find evidence of foreign rulers explicitly discussing uncertainty over local contexts and highlighting the contingent effect it can have on foreign rule strategy. It is only by examining the breadth of this relationship in tandem with more in-depth examinations of the mechanisms through cross-case comparisons that I can validate my theory’s claims, while also eliminating the plausibility of various alternative arguments.²

Reflecting the need for testing my theory against alternative arguments, this chapter proceeds as follows. First, I present the integrative multimethod research design that I employ in the rest of this dissertation. Second, I discuss the original data collection process that is the backbone for the quantitative analysis that follows. I describe the process for identifying the complete set of cases of foreign rule under consideration in this dissertation, the coding of foreign rule strategy as my dependent variable, and the different methods I used to construct my independent variable of interest, local institutional strength. Third, I discuss and present the results of the quantitative analysis utilized to test Hypotheses 2 and 3, as presented in Chapter 3. This includes multiple quantitative models and robustness checks to confirm my results. Finally, I discuss the case selection process that builds on the quantitative results presented in this chapter. The case selection procedure bridges my empirical results with the next chapter, where I continue my multimethod research design

²Recall from the previous chapter that certain alternative arguments can be controlled in quantitative models while others are best tested for and controlled through structured comparative case studies. This chapter illustrates how using both of these methods in a unified research design can help provide more evidence for the veracity of my theory of foreign rule strategy.
through a comparative case study. In all, this chapter acts as a guide for how I confirm my theory as presented in Chapter 3, while also providing the initial evidence that confirms my broad theoretical claims.

4.2 Research Design

After outlining my theory, discussing my testable hypotheses, and highlighting alternative plausible arguments in Chapter 3, the rest of this dissertation provides empirical evidence that will test my arguments about the origins of foreign rule strategies, and explore, in depth, the dynamics of strategic decision-making when imposing foreign rule. To do this, I utilize a multimethod research design that builds on Seawright’s (2016) call for integrative multimethod research, in which the quantitative results build initial causal claims that confirm my broad theoretical story, and then are refined and challenged by comparative case studies based upon the quantitative results. Seawright (2016, 47) defines integrative multimethod research designs as “multimethod designs in which two or more methods are carefully combined to support a single, unified causal inference. With such a design, additional methods are used to test or reframe the assumptions behind the central causal inference – potentially opening the door to an improved overall causal inference.” This implies that multimethod research designs should feature multiple methods that support the specific causal claims in a theory that the various methods are best suited to illuminate. In my multimethod research design, I combine quantitative and qualitative analysis to create an integrative multimethod research design that can effectively test the various propositions of my theory, and employ the different methods to complement each other’s strengths. Rather than simply re-confirming the same propositions through multiple methods, an integrative multimethod design tasks each different method to answer and test unique propositions that complement and build on each other, making each method necessary in confirming the entire theoretical story. My
theory combines wide-ranging hypotheses that are best tested quantitatively, with other hypotheses that involve decision-making processes and are best tested through process tracing and causal process observations (Brady, 2004; George and Bennett, 2005; Bennett and Checkel, 2014). Only by combining these two methods in a unified multimethod research design can I fully test my theory and adjudicate among various alternative arguments. This makes a multimethod research design the perfect research design for my theory to both integrate the various testable claims into one framework, and provide beneficial evidence for all of the aspects in my theory.

This integrative multimethod research design builds on what Lieberman (2005) calls nested analysis. Nested analysis provides a means to integrate quantitative analysis and case study research together into one coherent framework. Nested analysis has two distinct steps: first quantitatively testing the broad contours of the argument (e.g. testing Hypothesis 2 and Hypothesis 3 in the previous chapter), before, second, selecting cases that the regression model predicts accurately, also known as on-the-line cases. I carry out comparative case studies with these on-the-line cases and test the additional hypotheses and causal mechanisms of my theoretical story. On-the-line cases in this instance refer to the cases of foreign that are correctly predicted by the regression model to be more or less likely to feature an institutional strategies based on the actual strategy employed by the foreign ruler.\(^3\) I can then use process tracing with the on-the-line cases to determine whether the quantitative results are actually driven by the hypothesized causal variables, which fits with Goertz’s (2017) call to select cases in multimethod research that focus on causal mechanisms. As he argues, this is “the idea behind multimethod research to begin with: combining different causal inference strategies that can provide independent support for a causal mechanism” (Goertz, 2017, 58). An integrative multimethod research design, utiliz-

\(^3\)Given I use logistic regression below with a binary dependent variable, the idea of a regression line is transformed to imply higher and lower probabilities of one outcome of the binary variable.
ing nested analysis, combines the complementary benefits of both quantitative and qualitative methodologies in order to confirm different aspects of my causal story, while working together to find unified support for the complete theory.

My theory, which features two distinct aspects (local institutional strength and the uncertainty over it) that both have various alternative arguments that contrast its predictions, has two aspects that are best tested with different distinct methods. Quantitative testing is well suited for determining the correlation between foreign rulers’ choices of strategy and local institutional strength across various contexts. In my research, I use various forms of regression analysis to examine the general relationship between local institutional strength and the selection of foreign rule strategies over time and across different geographic locales. Given that I am interested in explaining how local contexts, rather than features of foreign rulers, matter for explaining the foreign rule strategy employed, cross-case analysis that uses as wide of a sample as possible is the most useful. This allows me to truly see how well the relationship between institutional strength and foreign rule strategy holds across context. Below, I discuss the specifics of my quantitative testing strategy, but the focus is on using as large of a sample as possible to increase the inferences I can make across time and space.\textsuperscript{4} However, for testing my claims that uncertainty prior to intervention inhibits decisions over strategy, and that strategies are only determined following armed intervention and a subsequent survey of local institutions, qualitative comparative case studies are the best tool. This allows both methodologies to complement each other, rather than simply replicating the same analysis through different methods. Thus, I combine quantitative analysis to test Hypotheses 2 and 3 across time and space to confirm that my theory is not contingent on a particular region or time period, while also testing Hypothesis 1 and my causal mechanisms to ensure that my argument comports with the historical processes that actually

\textsuperscript{4}This follows the recommendations of King, Keohane and Verba (1994, 208-230).
unfolded. Combined, my research design presents a relatively complete picture of the dynamics foreign rulers face when selecting the strategy to implement following armed intervention abroad.

Additionally, I enhance my multimethod research design by using a structured paired comparison of two on-the-line cases, rather than an undertaking a single nested case study for my qualitative component. To increase my claims of causal inference, I select a pair of cases using qualitative matching (Gerring, 2007; Nielsen, 2016) to carry out a structured paired comparison that aids in broadening my causal claims. Structured paired comparisons are comparative case studies that approach quasi-experimental status, as they are cases that attempt to control for most confounding factors, allowing a deep dive into the causal mechanisms that may be at play and driving the results of a quantitative model. As Tarrow (2010, 244) explains, “paired comparison does have an analytical baseline, eliminating the possibility that the dependent variable can have occurred even in the absence of the independent variable, thus significantly increasing the inferential power of the design over the single-case study.” When using matching, the structured paired comparison is akin to Mill’s (1872) method of difference or Przeworski and Teune’s (1970) most-similar design. Here I select two cases that are similar in almost all respects except for my key independent variable, local institutional strength. This includes matching cases on time period, goals, region, foreign ruler, and security environment to control for alternative explanations and test my hypothesized causal mechanisms. In both of the matched cases selected, I use process tracing, or what Tarrow (2010) calls dual-process tracing, to test the causal mechanisms that are driving the importance of institutional strength and foreign rule strategy. Once I combine this structured paired comparison, built with matched on-the-line cases, with the quantitative results, the integration of these methods and evidence provides strong confirmation of my theoretical argument.
4.3 Data Collection

4.3.1 Universe of Cases

For the first step in my research design, I test Hypotheses 2 and 3 quantitatively using multivariate regression analysis. However, before engaging in quantitative testing of my theory presented in Chapter 3, I needed to collect data on foreign rule missions and their strategies from 1898 onward. To do this, I constructed an original dataset that identifies the universe of foreign rule cases from 1898 to 2015, 160 in all, whereby I also code the foreign ruler’s strategy for each case. Initially, I identified all possible cases of foreign rule from a variety of sources that focused on topics along the international hierarchy spectrum presented in Chapter 2. This included all cases of military occupation listed by Edelstein (2008); Lemkin (1944); Marcum (2015) and Collard-Wexler (2013), all FIRCs listed by Downes and Monten (2013); Peic and Reiter (2011); Downes and O’Rourke (2016) and Lo, Hashimoto and Reiter (2008), all regime impositions by Gunitsky (2017) and Owen IV (2010), all trusteeships and international territorial administrations highlighted by Chesterman (2005) and Wilde (2010), all mandates and trusts issued by the United Nations and League of Nations, and many other sources of original research.5

After collecting a list of potential cases of foreign rule from these sources, I examined each case in depth to ensure they met my definition of foreign rule, namely whether the foreign ruler use military force to assume sovereign authority over the territory, and did not intend or attempt to incorporate the territory into their existing domestic state. This eliminated some of the cases others have coded as similar concepts. The majority of eliminated cases were one of three distinct types. These cases were FIRCs where the major power did not deploy military force to the local territory, certain cases of military occupation that were actually annexations, and

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5 Additional sources, among others, include Miller (2013); Dobbins (2003); Dobbins et al. (2001); Stahn (2008); Fox (2008); Coles and Weinberg (1964).
finally some peacekeeping operations where the peacekeeping forces never sought to or became the sovereign authority in the local territory.\textsuperscript{6} For instance, coups where foreign powers supported rebels monetarily and ideologically but did not deploy any overt military force, such as the US support for the 1953 coup in Iran, are not treated as cases of foreign rule. However, on the spectrum of hierarchical relationships in international politics, they are closely related to leadership strategies of foreign rule.\textsuperscript{7}

In addition, simple deployment of military force does not axiomatically mean an actor was engaging in foreign rule. Cases where the UN deployed military force but did

\textsuperscript{6}The cases that were potential cases of foreign rule but did not meet the full definition provide interesting future research possibilities. These include: exploring when and why major powers use forms of international hierarchy other than foreign rule, including when major powers annex territory vs. simply occupy, and why covert action and electoral manipulation become more attractive instead of armed intervention.

\textsuperscript{7}Supporting a coup abroad could be a distinct policy option instead of an armed intervention, thus this decision occurs before the foreign rule mission is put into practice.
not possess sovereign authority or governed over any local governmental institutions were not treated as cases of foreign rule. Finally, any cases where the military power annexed the territory or incorporated the territory into their existing domestic government structure, such as the Soviet annexation of the Baltic States, were removed as cases of foreign rule. The remaining 160 cases that fit the definition of foreign rule are listed in Appendix A. Figure 4.1 graphically presents the distribution of cases across time. The histogram shows a steady trend of foreign rule across all time periods since 1898, with large punctuated spikes where we would expect them, namely the World War periods and a small rise during the post-Cold War years.

4.3.2 Dependent Variable

After creating the complete list of foreign rule cases, I moved to construct my dependent variable of interest and coded the foreign rule strategy in every case identified. To do this, I created a dichotomous variable coded zero (0) for a leadership strategy, and one (1) for an institutional strategy. I then applied this systematic coding of the strategy utilized by the foreign ruler to all cases identified above. While some of the pre-existing datasets and case lists described above did give initial hints at the strategy for each case, I largely turned to my own original research to examine the actual strategies implemented by the various foreign rulers across all cases.\(^8\) In the codebook, I have listed every source consulted to help code the strategy for each case. For every case, I relied upon a minimum of three distinct sources to confirm my coding. In some cases, determining the actual strategy implemented was difficult, as the intended or preferred strategy \textit{ex ante} was different than the strategy imposed. Thus, I followed a coding rule of only examining the actual actions of the foreign ruler.

\(^8\)For instance, Downes and O’Rourke (2016) code FIRC cases as leadership, restoration, or institutional in their work on regime change operations and foreign policy affinity. However, rather than simply taking their coding rules, I use their coding for the FIRC cases that qualify as foreign rule and undertake my own research to validate or change their coding of various cases.
on the ground, highlighting the characteristics of both leadership and institutional strategies defined in Chapter 2. The discussions of the strategy in historical memory, and even in policy meetings in the foreign ruler’s capital, matter much less than the foreign military’s actual actions on the ground.

Figure 4.2. Distribution of Foreign Rule Strategies Across Time

To illustrate how this coding procedure took place, the French foreign rule mission in Chad in 1968 provides a good example. After identifying that the French mission in Chad in 1968 was a case of foreign rule, various sources were used to observe the strategy utilized in the foreign rule mission.⁹ The case sources revealed that as rebels

⁹Sources used to validate and code this case included DeVore (2013); Debos (2016); Nolutshungu (1996), and Powell (2016).
in northern Chad continued to revolt against the rule of François Tombalbaye, the
French government under De Gaulle was convinced that without their intervention,
Tombalbaye would be overthrown and the French government would no longer have
their preferred leader in N’Djamena (Nolutshungu, 1996, 72). Given the threat to
French interests in Chad, De Gaulle ordered an initial armed intervention in 1968 to
aid the existing Chadian government in repelling uprisings and rebel groups in its
Northern territories (DeVore, 2013, 180-181). The initial goals of the intervention
appeared to simply focus on maintaining the Tombalbaye regime in power, but soon
after their initial intervention France determined that an expanded intervention was
needed to meet their goals. In 1969, France responded with Opération Bison in Chad,
whereby the French military mission was followed with what they termed a Mission
of Administrative Reform to promote institution building in various regions within
Chad, but specifically to reform the administration of the northern territories under
revolt.

As De Gaulle noted, with “incompetent and prevaricating” local administrators
in Chad, the only way to maintain the Tombalbaye regime in power was to commit
significant French resources to reorganize and rebuild the local institutions that the
citizens of Chad were revolting against (Powell, 2016, 24). The Mission of Admin-
istrative Reform that De Gaulle authorized attempted to build new and stronger
institutions that would allow for a more robust response to the governance challenges
in Chad. These focused on three pillars, where the “first consisted of improving the
capacity and responsiveness of Chadian administrators. The second involved restor-
ing a degree of political authority to local chiefs and sultans. The third involved
the creation and expansion of local militias” (Powell, 2016, 31-32). The Mission of
Administrative Reform sought to imposing direct French control and reorganization
in northern Chad to combat the FROLINAT and other rebels in the area, while
restructuring the local administrative practices away from the government’s previ-
ous structure. This focused on re-organizing the control over the northern areas in Chad while also building new tax extraction and public works institutions to improve the capacity of the government. The imposed restructuring of relations with local authorities and building of new capacity indicates that France was using an institutional strategy even when they initially intended a simple leadership mission. Thus while the French foreign rule mission initially had a preference a leadership strategy of foreign rule in order to maintain the Tombalbaye regime, the actual strategy implemented focused on imposing administrative reforms that they deemed necessary to allow for Tombalbaye to maintain his rule. Given the French foreign rule mission’s actual implementation and imposition of institution-building reforms, I code this case as featuring an institutional strategy.\(^{10}\)

Similar analysis was undertaken for every case of foreign rule and every source consulted is documented in the codebook. Cases where the foreign ruler directly imposed new institutions were coded as institutional strategies regardless of the foreign ruler’s initial goals. Similarly, where the foreign ruler directly imposed new leaders and did not impose new institutions then the strategy was coded as leadership. Figure 4.2 above highlights the distribution of foreign rule strategies across time, with noticeable spikes during the World War periods and the post-Cold War period as noted above. The solid bars represent institutional strategies, while the outlines represent institutional strategies. The largest spike of leadership strategies, perhaps predictably, occurs during the World War II and Post-World War II period. This could indicate that there is a unique World War II effect at play, but throughout the rest of the time period, the most utilized strategies changed over time.\(^{11}\)

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\(^{10}\)While this case of French foreign rule was largely seen as a failure and the institutional aspects of the strategy were removed as they ended their foreign rule mission, the fact that the strategy they attempted to achieve their political goals was of the institutional variety makes the coding institutional.

\(^{11}\)Noting this, I look to isolate the World War II period as a robustness check below to make sure there is not a unique effect driving my results. I discuss the challenges of measuring institutional
ever, the distribution of strategies over time indicates each type largely waxes and wanes throughout different periods, with leadership strategies less common since the mid-Cold War period.

4.3.3 Independent Variables

After coding my dependent variable, I move to construct my main independent variable of interest, local institutional strength. Recognizing the difficulties in defining local institutional strength as I discussed in Chapter 3, I code local institutional strength using Mann’s (1984) concept of infrastructural power. Further, it is important to note that neither infrastructural power nor local institutional strength is directly observable. Local territories and foreign rulers do not have a set indicator for how strong their local institutions are and the bureaucratic capacity they possess. While many have argued that strong local institutions are an important facet of politics and governance, there is not one defined measure that is accepted to directly correspond to the capacity of local institutions. Depending on one’s conception, different measures might correspond to different aspects of local institutional strength or capacity.\textsuperscript{12} In addition, many existing measures of local institutional capacity are only coded for the post-Cold War era and do not code institutional capacity beyond 1960 at the earliest, and most measures only go back to the 1990s. Given my interest in the power and capacity of local institutions to carry out the missions they are given from their sovereign authority, I employ two distinct strategies to rectify this deficiency and estimate values of local institutional strength. This includes both employing to a portfolio of proxy variables and then using latent variable modeling to confirm results that local institutional strength is driving my results and not the

\textsuperscript{12}Hendrix (2010) convincingly shows how different conceptions of state capacity can lead to different indicators and meanings of the concept. His use of factor analysis to test these different assumptions and measure the latent characteristics of capacity is a good approach to follow.
choice of measure for the concept.

First, I code and utilize five possible proxy variables for local institutional strength that extend back to 1898: tax ratios, primary education rates, urbanization, railroad length, and state antiquity. Different scholars have argued that each of these variables can serve as a proxy for local institutional capacity, and represent the capacity of local institutions to carry out various goals of the centralized power in the territory. Recognizing that local institutional strength is not directly observable, there have been debates about which observable variables the best proxy for state capacity or local institutional strength. This has produced a vast array of variables and indexes over the years that seek to gauge local institutional strength, infrastructural power, or a similar concept. Unsurprisingly, the proliferation of many potential proxy variables for this concept has also produced many critiques of each possible proxy variable. Rather than trying to take a defined stance in the debate over which variables are the best proxy for local institutional strength, I instead opt for a portfolio approach, where I look to use a host of variables to help provide stronger evidence that local institutional strength predicts foreign rule strategy, regardless of the proxy variable chosen. This should provide good evidence that my results are not driven by the selection of a specific proxy variable, but by the underlying local institutional strength in a territory.

Before moving on, it is important to discuss how these proxy variables indicate higher levels of local institutional strength and what precisely the variables measure in my dataset. First, the tax ratio variable measures the ratio of a territory’s tax revenue to its gross domestic product (GDP), with higher ratios indicating higher extractive capacity of local governments and institutions (Thies, 2005). The logic behind using tax revenues as a measure for local institutional strength is that the tax ratio indicates the capacity of local institutions in extracting resources from their populations. Low tax ratios indicate an inability to administer a tax extraction bureaucracy effectively,
which many argue is essentially a proxy for weak institutional capacity (Lieberman, 2002). In addition, extracting taxes from local residents requires the ability to track revenues across their populace and to administer a collection organization, both of which require stronger institutions to manage the operation. When the tax extraction capacity of a territory increases, then I argue that the local institutions that manage that extraction are stronger. As Hendrix (2010, 283) states, “revenue generation is not simply correlated with state capacity, it is its *sine qua non*: that which the state must be able to do if any other goals are to be pursued.” The data for this measure primarily comes from the Macmillan (2013) and *Global Financial Data* (2010) databases with other individual sources as necessary.\(^{13}\)

Before moving on to describe the other proxy variables of interest, I must note that gathering tax ratio (and other) data posed a special challenge for certain countries that experienced foreign rule in the immediate aftermath of World War II. Due to the nature of total war experienced by the defeated powers, the institutional environments encountered by foreign rulers after victory were often vastly different from the pre-war and even pre-defeat periods. In these local territories, the economic, industrial, and governmental institutions were all suffering from the collapse of the defeated regimes in both Europe and Asia and the devastation of the local territory.\(^{14}\) For the most part, indicators and data for this period either reflect the last gasp of the major powers mobilizing their forces to push for victory, or the data is missing until the foreign rule mission is in place and can begin reporting economic statistics once again. This poses an analytical problem, as the indicators from the period prior to the beginning of the foreign rule mission does not accurately reflect the on the

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\(^{13}\)For earlier cases, this process was more difficult as both revenue data and GDP data were difficult to find. As noted later, this was rectified using multiple imputation to increase the number of cases used in my quantitative models.

\(^{14}\)Edelstein (2008, 37-39) notes that, especially in the World War II period, the total destruction of the territories under armed occupation changed the environment that the occupiers were facing.
ground realities of the post-defeat period. The act of defeating a hostile power in a total war can drastically reduce the institutional strength present. However, revenue and other statistics reported after the initiation of the foreign rule mission might not be accurate, because the foreign ruler has already had time to begin building up the capacity of local institutions. Thus a problem emerges wherein determining the exact time period in which to code the proxy variables is complicated. In the case of the post-World War II missions, I have decided that the statistics from 1946 are usually more accurate than the pre-foreign rule tax revenue numbers, given the drastic changes the defeat and bombing of Europe and Asia had on the local institutions present.\textsuperscript{15} Given the evidence we have that economic recovery of the defeated Axis powers in World War II took much longer to produce results (Judt, 2006, 63-99), this should not bias my result in theory. However, to ensure this does not bias my results in practice, I analyze additional quantitative models that exclude the World War II and postwar cases to make sure this period and coding decision is not biasing my results in any manner.

Second, the primary education rate, or the percentage of primary-aged children attending primary school, provides an additional proxy for local institutional strength. Managing a primary education infrastructure requires an expansive bureaucracy and managerial capacity to not only administer the education policy of the state, but also create the capacity to ensure children do in fact attend school. Indeed, “mass education is a large-scale, administratively challenging task, involving the creation of extensive physical infrastructure, the training and allocation of teachers, and the ability to reach a population” that is scattered across the territory (Kurtz, 2013, 12). The establishment of compulsory schooling indicates the bureaucracy and administration of local institutions possess the capacity to compel these choices and manage

\textsuperscript{15}I use the data from the UN’s economic report on postwar Europe to capture this unique period (United Nations, 1949).
a successful organization. As Soifer (2009, 174) explains, “the role of local bureau
crats in educational development is one facet of their broader role in various aspects
of the development of the state’s infrastructural power its ability to penetrate society
throughout the national territory and effectively implement policy.” As the primary
school rate increases, this corresponds to an increase in a territory’s education infra-
structure and bureaucracy, indicating the current strength of local institutions and
the level of infrastructural power in the local territory. The measure I utilize for
primary education builds on Barro and Lee (1996) and UNESCO (2016) data, and is
imputed in the V-Dem dataset (Coppedge et al., 2017a). It is supplemented where
the data is missing by other sources as needed.

Third, many argue GDP per capita can serve as a useful proxy for development
and strength of a territory’s economy, and by proxy, governing institutions. This mat-
ters for local institutional strength, as many have argued strong local institutions,
particularly rule of law institutions protecting private property, are necessary for ur-
ban centers and economies to grow. If institutions are strong, then economic growth
is more likely to occur due to the protection of business interests and private prop-
erty rights.\textsuperscript{16} However, GDP measures are often not calculated for territories under
foreign rule and rarely before 1945.\textsuperscript{17} Given the limitations in coverage for the GDP
per capita measure, I instead turn to use the urbanization measure in the V-Dem
dataset that is highly correlated with GDP per capita (Coppedge et al., 2017a).\textsuperscript{18}

\textsuperscript{16}For an overview of this argument see: North (1989, 1991); Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson
(2005); Rodrik (2000) and Acemoglu (2005).

\textsuperscript{17}The exception is the widely cited Maddison (2005) dataset, but even in this case, the data rarely
exists for territories under foreign rule. In any case, I use the Maddison (2005) GDP per capita
measure as an additional control variable in Table B6 in Appendix B to ensure this decision has not
biased my results.

\textsuperscript{18}A correlation coefficient of over eighty percent in comparing both indicators in the full V-Dem
sample of all countries since 1900. This provides sound evidence that urbanization and GDP per
capita are highly correlated and urbanization serves as a sound means to measure economic capacity
of a territory.
Urbanization is the ratio of population living in urban centers to a territory’s overall population. If a territory possesses a large urban population, the urbanization measure is high. This largely corresponds to the economic development of the territory, as areas with higher levels of rural population are often more agricultural and less economically developed. Thus, the urbanization variable largely corresponds to the local territory’s level of development prior to foreign rule and institutional strength that contributed to that development.\footnote{Facing the same problem with coverage, Downes and Monten (2013) use a measure of energy production as a proxy for economic development. Unfortunately, this is not coded for territories under foreign rule, so it omits many cases from analysis. However in Table B3 in Appendix B, I have included energy production as another potential proxy variable.}

Fourth, railroad length is another common metric some that some have used as a proxy for state capacity and state-led infrastructural development (Goodwin, 2001). There are a few different logics behind using railroad length as proxy for local institutional strength. A large railway infrastructure can indicate a local government’s ability to extend their rule across their territory and reach and control various far outposts of their territory (Herbst, 2000). As a territory possesses more rail infrastructure, the sovereign authority can extend their rule and ensure that their edicts are carried out in all corners of their territory. This was crucial as “railways permitted the central state to effectively project force throughout the national territory” (Kurtz, 2013, 15). In addition, more rail infrastructure is indicative of higher levels of private investment, development, and industrialization, all factors that are associated with stronger local institutions. As Kurtz (2013, 15) claims “creating a national railway grid entailed creating a state strong and credible enough to obtain either massive direct foreign investment or credit on a similar scale.” Rail infrastructure development requires a local bureaucracy to manage the construction, management, and maintenance of a transportation infrastructure. Given railroads’ historic relevance in transportation and commerce across the world, it remains a vital piece of
data on infrastructure to compare across time periods. Thus, rail infrastructure can serve as a proxy for the current development of local institution strength and the bureaucracy necessary to create and manage transportation infrastructure. To measure total rail infrastructure, I rely upon the CHAT database from Comin and Hobijn (2009) supplemented with records from Macmillan (2013) and my own research as needed. I then use the ratio of rail length to total land area as bigger territories have more opportunities for larger rail infrastructure. However, I also include the raw total length of railroads in the robustness checks in Appendix 2.

Finally state antiquity, that is the presence of ancient kingdoms, empires, and nation-states over the previous two thousand years of history, might correspond to stronger local institutions. If a territory possesses state-like governmental institutions throughout their history, they may have stronger local institutions in the present period. Bockstette, Chanda and Puttermann (2002) have examined the antiquity of certain states in depth in their StateHist database where they code the presence of state-like institutions, or above tribal-level institutions, in territories back to 1 AD. The StateHist database codes 39 half centuries and covers whether state-like institutions existed in the territory, penalizes the score if the institutions were lead from abroad (for example colonial institutions), and if the modern territory corresponded with the controlled area of institutions of the past. I use their normalized measure which places the scores on a scale of 0 to 1, where 1 is the constant presence of local institutions above tribal level since 1 AD and 0 is a complete absence. However, I approach using this measure with caution, as its relation to current institutional strength might not be strong given the relatively high value for the first state in the database, Afghanistan. Regardless, the argument that the legacy of governmental institutions may correspond to modern institutional strength does remain plausible.

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20 The database also provides the same normalized variable with a penalty function, where institutions further back in time count progressively less. I include these measures in robustness tests in the appendix but the results never change with the penalized measures.
Table 4.1 presents the summary statistics of the portfolio of proxy variables I use to measure local institutional strength. It is important to note that there are many other possible variables that some scholars have posited might proxy local institutional strength. This includes both proxy variables, such as military expenditures as a percentage of GDP or postal deliveries, and indexes, such as the relative political capacity dataset or the ICRG bureaucratic quality index. The problem, however, is that many of these sources only have data beginning after 1960 at best, and often only start in the 1980s. Given my interest in explaining foreign rule strategy in a wide variety of cases across time, I was not able to use these variables, as they would eliminate most cases of foreign rule from the dataset. Thus, this portfolio approach attempts to capture many of the same types of dynamics these modern indexes of institutional strength and other variables attempt to proxy.

Second, in addition to the proxy variables listed above, I turn to another strategy for capturing local institutional strength to ensure that I am accurately measuring

21See Hendrix (2010) and Hanson and Sigman (2013) for an extensive list of possible data sources that do not cover the period of interest of this study.
the concept. After collecting the data on these five possible indicators of local institutional strength, I use latent variable modeling to construct an index of local institutional strength that can capture the underlying latent variable based on the values of the proxies. This is not an unusual step. Treier and Jackman (2008) argue that for many variables of interest in political science, direct measures of political concepts are impossible to create as their social nature makes direct measurement difficult. Instead, latent variable models are useful as they use proxy variables to construct indexes of these social concepts, and can illuminate measures of the underlying latent variable. Indeed, many scholars have previously used different types of latent variable models to construct indexes of state capacity, institutional strength, political capacity, and other related concepts (Hendrix, 2010; Hanson and Sigman, 2013; Arbetman-Rabinowitz and Johnson, 2008). However, the most expansive of these latent variables that could align with my conceptualization of local institutional strength only extends back to 1960. While more limited in number, the set of proxies I do have extends back to 1898, and makes latent modeling capable of capturing a broader range of time. While, due to data limitation, this latent variable modeling procedure will have fewer inputs than the other latent variables listed above, it will have a more expansive temporal reach. Therefore, this latent variable index is another way to capture my main independent variable of interest, and can help confirm my hypotheses more broadly before moving to detailed tracing of the argument through case studies. To construct my latent variable measure, I use exploratory factor analysis (Fabrigar and Wegener, 2011) to create an index of local institutional strength, combining the portfolio of proxy variables to capture the dimensions in which they are similar. Exploratory factor analysis (EFA) assumes that the indicators are the product of some underlying common factor and uses the shared variance of these indicators to construct a measure that approximates the underlying common factor and latent variable that generates the values in the indicators. In
this case, I use EFA with principal components factors on the tax ratio, primary education rate, railroad, state antiquity, and urbanization variables to create a new index of local institutional strength.\textsuperscript{22}

After using EFA on the five proxy variables listed above, two factors had a eigenvalue over 1, with an eigenvalues of 2.55 and 1.13 respectively. After using orthogonal varimax rotation, the variance of the components was 2.49 and 1.22. Table 4.2 presents the rotated component scores, and illustrates the loadings that comprise my latent local institutional strength index. Looking at the components, Component 1 is largely comprised of loadings from the tax ratio, primary school enrollment, and urbanization variables, indicating it is a component comprised of bureaucratic and institutional strength. The second component, on the other hand, is largely comprised of loadings from the state antiquity and railroad length measures, indicating a component of long state history, rather than institutional strength. Thus, I argue that component 1 largely corresponds to institutional strength, my main independent variable of interest, and component 2 corresponds to state legacy and history.\textsuperscript{23} Table 4.3 below describes the two resulting latent variables and the summary statistics to illustrate the distribution throughout the data.

\textsuperscript{22}One other benefit of using EFA or latent variable modeling is the resulting variables are not bounded by any value, and range theoretically infinitely. This allows for easier modeling and interpretation where increases in the value of the resulting latent variable can be easily interpreted in the regression models.

\textsuperscript{23}After examining the empirical analysis below, this makes even more sense as the three variables that comprise component 1 are more frequently significant in models than the other two measures. While at this point I am not confident in the link between railroad infrastructure and state history, given the weak relationship in the resulting regression models these results are not surprising.
### TABLE 4.2

EXPLORATORY FACTOR ANALYSIS, ROTATED FACTORS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Component 1</th>
<th>Component 2</th>
<th>Uniqueness</th>
<th>KMO Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tax Ratio</td>
<td>0.6265</td>
<td>-0.5385</td>
<td>0.3176</td>
<td>0.7408</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary School Enrollment</td>
<td>0.8692</td>
<td>0.0398</td>
<td>0.2430</td>
<td>0.7483</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urbanization</td>
<td>0.8535</td>
<td>0.1225</td>
<td>0.2566</td>
<td>0.7410</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Railroad Length (% of Area)</td>
<td>0.7557</td>
<td>0.4319</td>
<td>0.2424</td>
<td>0.7344</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State Antiquity</td>
<td>0.1978</td>
<td>0.8536</td>
<td>0.2322</td>
<td>0.6017</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### TABLE 4.3

SUMMARY OF FACTORS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factor</th>
<th>Eigenvalue</th>
<th>Proportion</th>
<th>Cumulative</th>
<th>Minimum</th>
<th>Maximum</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Factor 1</td>
<td>2.5528</td>
<td>0.5106</td>
<td>0.5106</td>
<td>-1.6684</td>
<td>2.7327</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Factor 2</td>
<td>1.1306</td>
<td>0.2311</td>
<td>0.7416</td>
<td>-3.3705</td>
<td>1.7212</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
4.3.4 Control Variables

In addition to my independent variables of interest, I also collected data on alternative indicators and control variables that could conceivably impact the choice of foreign rule strategy as discussed in the alternative arguments section in the previous chapter. These variables are clustered into three main types: characteristics of the local territory, characteristics of the foreign ruler, and the context of the foreign rule mission. First, a few geographic characteristics of the territory might make utilizing certain strategies of foreign rule more complicated, or alternatively, make it more difficult to build strong local institutions. These include the area of the territory and the ruggedness of the terrain. Area of the local territory is simply the total size of the territory controlled by the foreign ruler (Haber and Menaldo, 2011). If the area is of the territory is bigger, it requires more infrastructure and organization to control, and presents more difficulties in controlling all aspects of the territory (Herbst, 2000). To control for the size of the territory, I use the total square kilometers (measured in thousands of square kilometers). Ruggedness is a measure of how inhospitable the territory under foreign rule may be. Ruggedness could affect the foreign rule strategy and the existing level of institutional strength by making it more difficult for the foreign ruler or local government to extend their domination into the harsh environment.24 While traditionally the level of mountainous terrain in a territory has been the preferred variable to proxy geographically inhospitable territories, I use the ruggedness measure from Shaver, Carter and Shawa (2016), which measures the elevation change in every 1 kilometer grid in the territory to illuminate how inhospitable the local terrain is. Following their practice, I use the standard deviation of their ruggedness measure for the local territory to proxy how inhospitable the area

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24See Fearon and Laitin (2003) for the canonical study discussing this relationship. Additionally Shaver, Carter and Shawa (2016) provides a good literature review of the various effects rugged terrain has on local capacity.
is for both the local government and the foreign ruler’s troops.\textsuperscript{25}

In addition to geographic factors, I also control for the local territory’s level of
democracy to test whether pre-existing levels of democracy in the territory affect
the strategy implemented. Given that many existing measures of democracy do not
include periods of foreign rule in their data, I use the innovative V-Dem measure of
electoral democracy that codes for all periods of limited sovereignty for all territories
since 1900 (Coppedge et al., 2017a).\textsuperscript{26} Other measures of democracy often do not
code periods of limited sovereignty to determine how democratic a territory’s local
institutions are. Their reasoning is that since the local community is not in control of
their own political institutions, they do not qualify as an independent state to code.
For instance, the widely cited Polity dataset formally omits occupied territories or
areas with limited sovereignty from their dataset (Marshall, Gurr and Jaggers, 2016).
However, V-Dem data does code for all periods, strictly asking how democratic the
institutions are in the territory, regardless of the status of who is the sovereign au-
thority of the territory. The level of local democracy could matter for the foreign
ruler and make the foreign ruler more or less likely to use certain strategies to change
or maintain democratic institutions. Some have also argued that democracy requires
stronger state institutions, so its inclusion along with the measures of local institu-
tional strength can also check to see which of these measures is truly driving the
relationship between foreign rule strategy and local institutional strength (Bäck and
Hadenius, 2008)

Second, I include multiple control variables that are unit-level factors affecting the
foreign ruler itself. Noting that institutional strategies often require higher levels of
military force and cost, it might mean only relatively stronger foreign rulers have the

\textsuperscript{25}See Shaver, Carter and Shawa’s (2016) replication of Miguel, Satyanath and Sergenti (2004) to
see the benefits of using this ruggedness measure.

\textsuperscript{26}Coppedge et al. (2017b) list all of the time periods and territories coded by the V-Dem measures
of electoral democracy.
TABLE 4.4

CONTROL VARIABLE SUMMARY STATISTICS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std. Dev.</th>
<th>Min.</th>
<th>Max.</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Area (1000s of Sq. Kilometers)</td>
<td>767.465</td>
<td>2676.569</td>
<td>0.021</td>
<td>22100</td>
<td>160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ruggedness</td>
<td>133.366</td>
<td>80.008</td>
<td>9.343</td>
<td>365.54</td>
<td>159</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy (V-Dem)</td>
<td>0.231</td>
<td>0.195</td>
<td>0.012</td>
<td>0.883</td>
<td>148</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy (Foreign Ruler)</td>
<td>0.482</td>
<td>0.292</td>
<td>0.071</td>
<td>0.959</td>
<td>160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy Difference</td>
<td>0.339</td>
<td>0.255</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.848</td>
<td>148</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CINC (Foreign Ruler)</td>
<td>0.113</td>
<td>0.104</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.381</td>
<td>158</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distance (km)</td>
<td>3374.456</td>
<td>3202.618</td>
<td>136</td>
<td>14478</td>
<td>149</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

opportunity to attempt institutional strategies. To control for this possibility, I include the Correlates of War national material capabilities index, also known as CINC, where higher CINC scores indicate higher levels of material strength (Singer, 1988).\(^{27}\) If strong foreign rulers prefer to use institutional strategies (or if only strong foreign rulers use institutional strategies), then the coefficient in the models below should be positive. Utilizing the same V-Dem measure above, I also include the democracy level of the foreign ruler to test whether more democratic foreign rulers have different preferences for foreign rule strategy than less-democratic foreign rulers.\(^{28}\) In addition, I also include the absolute value of the difference between the foreign ruler’s and local territories level of democracy to test Owen IV’s (2010) proposition that foreign rulers

\(^{27}\)Given that the CINC data does not include measures for most territories when under foreign rule, I am not able to construct a CINC-ratio to measure difference in levels of power between local territories and the foreign ruler.

\(^{28}\)Since including both the foreign ruler’s level of democracy and the democracy difference between the foreign ruler and local territory is co-linear, I can only include one as a control in the models at a time. Thus, in Appendix 2 I include multiple models where the level of democracy of the foreign ruler replaces the democracy difference variable.
prefer institutional strategies when the difference in governing ideology is high.\textsuperscript{29} In some models I include dummy variables for certain great powers throughout history, namely the United States and the Soviet Union, along with a dummy variable for a UN-led operation. This is to test whether there are certain effect specific to foreign ruler characteristics.

Lastly, I include a few control variables that contextualize the foreign rule mission. Noting that a time trend might exist in the prevalence of certain foreign rule strategies, I include the year the foreign rule mission started as a control variable.\textsuperscript{30} This could also help control for historical trends in terms of what strong institutions looks like in 1905 compared to 1995. It also could correspond to trends in foreign ruler preferences where certain strategies are preferred in different time periods. I also include regional dummy variables in certain models to test whether there are any regional effects in the strategies that foreign rulers employ. In addition, this can also control for any region-wide effects in the development of institutional strength. Finally, I include the distance between the foreign ruler and the local territory as another possible context that impacts the foreign rule mission. Distance could conceivably affect the ability of the foreign ruler to project force, limiting the potential strategies available.\textsuperscript{31} This data largely comes from the Gleditsch and Ward (2001) database of geographic distance.

Before moving to the analysis, a final note on how I coded various control variables is necessary. A challenging issue during the coding process concerned what to do with cases of foreign rule primarily carried out by the United Nations or other international

\begin{itemize}
\item[\textsuperscript{29}] Owen IV (2010) argues that foreign regime change (or institutional strategies) occur when there is a transnational struggle over the proper way to govern and organize governments. Hence, if he is correct, we should see democratic foreign rulers and autocratic foreign rulers using institutional strategies when the difference in democracy level is high.
\item[\textsuperscript{30}] I normalize this variable to 0 at 1898 and 117 at 2015 to keep the coefficients intelligible.
\item[\textsuperscript{31}] However, I suspect this has a much larger effect on the choice to intervene in the first place, rather than the strategy implemented.
\end{itemize}
organizations. Coding the democracy level or the CINC score of the UN does not have any meaningful interpretation. For some cases with UN involvement, such as in Bosnia and Kosovo, or ECOWAS cases in Sierra Leone, it makes sense to use the United States or Nigeria as the main foreign ruler, given their role in the actual mission. In other cases, this is not possible and so these cases are often omitted from the analyses that include these control variables. In some cases, I use the data from the primary troop contributor for the UN mission, but this is not a perfect solution and so I ensure that my results are robust to various specifications as a way to mitigate this issue with the control variables. Table 4.4 presents the summary statistics for the non-categorical control variables included in the following models and quantitative tests. Overall, these control variables provide ways to test some of the alternative arguments presented in Chapter 3, while also ensuring that the relationship between local institutional strength and foreign rule strategy is robust across all time periods and geographic locations.

4.4 Empirical Testing

After completing the construction of my database, I turn to the research design laid out above and begin the first part of my analysis, quantitative testing. Because my dependent variable is binary, I rely on logistic regression with robust standard errors to test my hypotheses discussed in the previous chapter (Long, 1997). Given that I have fewer than 500 cases of foreign rule, I also run ordinary least squares regression as a robustness check in Tables B1 and B2 in Appendix B. These models use the linear probability model to ensure my results are robust and not the result of sub-optimal likelihood maximization. Sub-optimal likelihood maximization can occur when the MLE process does not have enough cases to maximize the log likelihood function. However, given the relatively low number of iterations utilized for my models, this is probably not an issue. While OLS regressions are likely to give good point predictions, they can produce probability predictions outside the 0-1 range, and thus the logistic regression model is preferred for this analysis. Hellevik (2009) provides an argument as to why OLS regression can function as well as logistic regression in this setting, with more intelligible coefficient estimates.

32Given that I have fewer than 500 cases of foreign rule, I also run ordinary least squares regression as a robustness check in Tables B1 and B2 in Appendix B. These models use the linear probability model to ensure my results are robust and not the result of sub-optimal likelihood maximization. Sub-optimal likelihood maximization can occur when the MLE process does not have enough cases to maximize the log likelihood function. However, given the relatively low number of iterations utilized for my models, this is probably not an issue. While OLS regressions are likely to give good point predictions, they can produce probability predictions outside the 0-1 range, and thus the logistic regression model is preferred for this analysis. Hellevik (2009) provides an argument as to why OLS regression can function as well as logistic regression in this setting, with more intelligible coefficient estimates.
to test my argument, before turning to the constructed latent variable index of local institutional strength as described above. The results are reported in the subsequent tables in this section. Since my main dependent variable is coded 0 for leadership strategies and 1 for institutional strategies, the coefficients in the following regression tables indicate whether changes in the values of the independent variables increase or decrease the likelihood of an institutional strategy. Positive coefficients indicate that an increase in the value of the variable make leadership strategies less likely and institutional strategies more likely. Negative coefficients, conversely, indicate that increases in the variable make leadership strategies more likely and institutional strategies less likely. If my hypotheses are true, the coefficients for the portfolio of proxy variables and the latent variable index for local institutional strength should be significant and negative. Negative coefficients indicate that as the level of local institutional strength increases, then the probability a foreign ruler would use an institutional strategy decreases and makes leadership strategies more likely to occur. As the models below illustrate, I find strong evidence across a variety of model specifications that the relationship between local institutional strength and foreign rule strategy is robust. I confirm this relationship with both the portfolio of proxy variables and the latent local institutional strength index using a variety of model specifications. I then confirm these results with various robustness checks to help deal with data availability and other modeling issues.

I initially use logistic regression with the portfolio of local institutional strength proxy variables to see whether each variable can accurately predict the likely foreign rule strategy for a local territory. I then use a model where I include all five of the variables in the portfolio to determine which variable seems to best predict foreign rule strategy, and what that might mean for local institutional strength as a causal variable more broadly.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
<th>Model 4</th>
<th>Model 5</th>
<th>Model 6</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tax Ratio</td>
<td>-0.1314**</td>
<td>-0.1487***</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0504)</td>
<td>(0.0433)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Railroad Length</td>
<td>0.0069</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>-0.1210</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0904)</td>
<td>(0.0656)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary Education</td>
<td>-0.0110</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>-0.0278**</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0146)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0096)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Urbanization</td>
<td>-1.4960</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>-3.0767*</td>
<td>–</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2.5117)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(1.5457)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Historical Stateness</td>
<td>-0.6830</td>
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<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>-1.1866</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(1.3008)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>(0.8628)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Democracy (V-Dem)</td>
<td>-0.6131</td>
<td>-1.8302</td>
<td>-1.7466</td>
<td>0.1462</td>
<td>-1.3720</td>
<td>-1.9921</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.9394)</td>
<td>(1.2315)</td>
<td>(1.2373)</td>
<td>(1.4338)</td>
<td>(1.2662)</td>
<td>(1.1695)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Democracy Difference</td>
<td>-1.4506</td>
<td>-0.5542</td>
<td>-1.4540</td>
<td>-1.7502</td>
<td>-0.9591</td>
<td>-1.6383</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
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<td>(1.0672)</td>
<td>(0.9075)</td>
<td>(1.0324)</td>
<td>(0.9291)</td>
<td>(0.9165)</td>
</tr>
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<td>Ruggedness</td>
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<td>0.0031</td>
<td>0.0020</td>
<td>0.0032</td>
<td>0.0023</td>
<td>0.0048</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0044)</td>
<td>(0.0029)</td>
<td>(0.0024)</td>
<td>(0.0026)</td>
<td>(0.0025)</td>
<td>(0.0026)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CINC (Foreign Ruler)</td>
<td>0.1638</td>
<td>-1.5077</td>
<td>-2.6112</td>
<td>-1.1176</td>
<td>-2.7987</td>
<td>-4.0709</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2.9357)</td>
<td>(2.3999)</td>
<td>(2.3239)</td>
<td>(2.5428)</td>
<td>(2.5780)</td>
<td>(2.2700)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>0.0149</td>
<td>0.0107</td>
<td>-0.0031</td>
<td>0.0135</td>
<td>0.0034</td>
<td>-0.0036</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0144)</td>
<td>(0.0104)</td>
<td>(0.0082)</td>
<td>(0.0097)</td>
<td>(0.0090)</td>
<td>(0.0092)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Area</td>
<td>-0.0002</td>
<td>-0.0002</td>
<td>-0.0001</td>
<td>-0.0001</td>
<td>-0.0001</td>
<td>-0.0001</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 5 presents the first six logistic regression models, including each of the five possible proxy variables for local institutional strength alone, as well as the horse race model. Initially, I find strong support that tax ratios, primary school enrollment, and urbanization all confirm my hypotheses that the foreign rule strategy implemented by the foreign ruler is correlated with local institutional strength in Model 2, Model 4, and Model 5. The coefficients of these three proxy variables is significant and negative in their stand-alone models, indicating that higher values in each all contribute to a smaller likelihood of a foreign ruler using an institutional strategy. This implies that when tax revenue capacity, primary education infrastructure, and the level of urbanization are low, then the probability that a foreign ruler will use an institutional strategy is greatly increased. Conversely, when the tax revenue capacity, the primary education bureaucracy, and level of urbanization is higher, foreign rulers are much
more likely to turn to use leadership strategies. The railroad length and state antiquity variables were not significant in any of the models, indicating that the legacy of state-like organizations in a territory and the length of railroad infrastructure in a country were not predictors of foreign rule strategy, compared to other indicators of local institutional strength in the modern era.

When including all of the proxy variables in Model 1, only the tax ratio variable retained its significance, indicating that tax revenue capacity might be the best proxy for local institutional strength and can effectively predict the likelihood of using an institutional strategy. These results confirm that as tax revenue capacity increases, the probability of a foreign rule engaging in an institutional strategy is greatly reduced. This makes sense when thinking about what tax revenue extraction requires of local institutions. As mentioned above, the ability to extract tax revenue requires a state to have an effective bureaucracy, and responds to Mann’s idea of infrastructural power. As Lieberman (2002, 92) describes, tax revenue is the ideal proxy of local institutional strength as “tax collection is ultimately the product of policy making, the monitoring of economic activity, the administration of complex laws, and judicial and punitive enforcement. For scholars, varied levels of tax revenues reflect variations in these state processes.” If foreign rulers are seeking local institutions that possess agent capacity to carry out their edicts and pursue their political objectives, tax revenue capacity is both a necessary and good indication of the capacity to carry out the foreign ruler’s wishes. It makes logical sense that a variable that can proxy the bureaucratic capacity of local territories best predicts how foreign rulers will look at local institutions and make their strategic decisions. However, the results might

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33 When I included the limited GDP per capita measure in the models run in Table B6 (Appendix B), the results for urbanization no longer hold. However, GDP per capita itself was never a significant predictor of foreign rule strategy.

34 In Appendix 2, I use the gross railroad length variable rather than railroad length as a percentage of total area to see if there are any different results. I find there are none.
also indicate that the primary school enrollment and urbanization variables might be correlated tax ratios, thus reducing their statistical significance in the full model.

Looking at the control variables in this set of models, it is interesting that the ruggedness of the local terrain, the size of the territory, and the material power of the foreign ruler are not significant in almost every model. Ruggedness is not significant in any model. Given the traditional argument about the impact rugged terrain can have on the development of strong institutions and infrastructural power, this result is unsurprising. Rather, while rugged terrain might impact the development of stronger institutions, ruggedness itself is not a determinant of foreign rule strategy. In this sense, ruggedness might have a roundabout relationship with foreign rule strategy, but there is not a direct link to local institutional strength and foreign rule strategy, and only operates through its effect on institutional capacity. Similarly, the total area of the local territory is not significant in any model. This indicates that the larger territories placed under foreign rule are not more or less likely to have an institutional strategy used in their territory. Combined with the ruggedness result above, this presents good evidence that institutional factors rather than geographic factors drive strategic considerations of foreign rule strategy. Recalling Hypotheses 11 and 12 from the alternative arguments section in the previous chapter, these results provide sound evidence that local geographic features are not driving the foreign rulers’ choice of strategy.

Moving to the democracy control variables, the level of democracy in the local territory and the difference between the foreign ruler’s and local territory’s level of democracy is not significant in any of the models. This implies that the level of democracy in a foreign territory does not impact the choice of foreign rule strategy when controlling for institutional strength. Some have argued that democracies require rel-

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35 For versions of the argument that rugged terrain impedes institutional development see Herbst (1996); Fearon and Laitin (2003); Goodwin (2001).
atively capable local institutions (Bäck and Hadenius, 2008), and thus it could be the case that the level of democracy does illustrate the capacity of local institutions. However the element of democracy that affects foreign rule strategy is this capacity and is captured by the local institutional strength proxies. Additionally, the difference in the democracy variable indicates that when non-democracies place democracies under foreign rule, or conversely with democracies placing non-democracies under foreign rule, there is not a clear pattern for leadership or institutional strategies. Instead the choice of strategy is built on the capacity of institutions, regardless of their type, to produce the foreign ruler’s political goals. Table B4 (Appendix B) also presents similar results that feature just the foreign ruler’s level of democracy, instead of the difference in level of democracy. The results are largely the same and the foreign ruler’s level of democracy is never significant. This means that foreign rulers of all regime types are just as likely to use leadership and institutional strategies. This provides initial evidence that we can reject Hypotheses 6, 7, 8 and 13 from Chapter 3, and show that neither the levels of democracy in the foreign territory nor in the foreign ruler are driving the foreign ruler’s strategic decisions. Not only do these results show that democratic territories under foreign rule do not produce difference strategic outcomes, it also provides evidence against the alternative argument that difference in governmental institutional type should make democracies more likely to use institutional strategies to push non-democracies towards democracy. Rather it seems like the capacity of institutions and not the content of those institutions is driving the results.

The foreign ruler’s material power (the CINC variable) is similarly insignificant in every model. It could be the case that more powerful foreign rulers are more likely to use institutional strategies, given the resources that are required to build institutions abroad. Armed institution-building is a costly and difficult project, and requires large material power to carry out (Dobbins et al., 2007). However, the results...
indicate that the material power of the foreign ruler does not drive the foreign rule strategy as expected. Instead, this is initial evidence that the level of material power a foreign ruler possesses does not make the foreign ruler more or less likely to attempt a certain foreign rule strategy. Additionally, the year variable is not significant in the models, indicating there is no defined time trend in these results. Given the clear historical ebbs and flows of foreign rule missions and foreign rule strategies presented in Figures 4.1 and 4.2, it is conceivable that there could be trends where certain strategies are more common in certain time periods. However, these results indicate that there is not a defined time trend, and foreign rulers are just as likely at all time periods to use institutional or leadership strategies depending on the local institutional context.

The one control variable that is significant in every model above is the distance between the foreign ruler and the local territory. In all six of the models, the coefficient for distance between the foreign ruler and the local territory is positive and significant, indicating that as the distance increases between the two, foreign rulers are more likely to use institutional strategies. Interestingly, this is the opposite of the initial predictions of this control variable. One would expect that, given the cost and difficulty of institution-building, foreign rulers would be more likely to attempt institutional strategies in territories that are close, as it is easier to maintain logistics and supply lines that are necessary for the missions. Rather, these results indicate the exact opposite. Foreign rulers are more likely to use leadership strategies in territories in their near abroad, whereas they are more likely to use institutional strategies in their far away missions. One possible interpretation of this result is that it indicates the foreign ruler’s ability to carry out foreign rule missions far from home, which implies a higher level of power projection capacity. The amount of resources it takes to undertake an armed intervention at great distance from home is quite high, indicating that this could be a good proxy for military power and perhaps only
powerful states are more capable of carrying out institutional strategies. While above I indicated that the CINC score of the foreign ruler is not a significant predictor of foreign rule strategy, it could be that the distance variable is the better proxy for power projection capacity, and therefore can capture this dynamic. However, as this is not a crucial piece of my theoretical story, this interpretation is open to further discussion.

While the results of these models are interesting, the coefficients themselves are largely meaningless without illustrating the tangible effects they have on foreign rule strategy. While looking at regression coefficients can broadly illuminate whether institutional strength does play some role in determining foreign rule strategy, the substantive effects it leads to are more interesting. If changes in institutional strength only lead to small changes in the probability of a foreign ruler employing institutional strategies, then its impact is not substantively interesting. To test the substantive effects of the variables above, I calculate the marginal effects of the variables and plot the changes in the probability of using an institutional strategy based on changes in local institutional strength.36 In Figure 4.3, I present the marginal effects of the portfolio of proxy variables. The results indicate that, as we expect, changes in the local institutional strength proxy variables greatly impacts the probability of engaging in an institutional strategy. Looking at Model 2 for instance, in a local territory that has a tax ratio of 5%, there is an over 60 percent probability of a foreign ruler using an institutional strategy, but when the tax ratio is 20 percent, the probability drops to 20 percent. In a territory with only a 5 percent urbanization rate, the probability of using an institutional strategy is above 70 percent, whereas once the urbanization rate hits 50 percent, the probability of using an institutional strategy drops to below 25 percent. Similar results hold for primary school enrollment.

36These are calculated using the margins package in Stata and hold all other variables at their means when testing the marginal effect of each variable included in the plots below.
Meanwhile, railroad length and state antiquity provide more evidence that they do not meaningfully predict the probability of a foreign ruler using a certain strategy. The
marginal effects plot for Model 1 uses the tax revenue variable to illustrate that when all proxy variables are included the tax revenue variable still has similar marginal effects on the probability of foreign rule strategy. It is important to note, however, that even when the tax ratio and local institutional strength is high, there is still a 10 to 20 percent probability that a foreign ruler might use an institutional strategy. This is a reminder that my theory is probabilistic, and even when a certain strategy is most likely to occur, other factors might cause a foreign ruler to select a different strategy. Even when institutional strength is quite low, there is at least a 20 percent chance that the foreign ruler will still use a leadership strategy. In general, however, these results show that the relationship between local institutional strength and foreign rule strategy has a tangible and meaningful impact on strategy formation.

Given the strong initial results between the portfolio of proxy variables and foreign rule strategy, next I examine the local institutional strength index that was the product of the EFA model described above. I use this local institutional strength index as the main independent variable of interest in the next set of models. As noted above, the EFA model produced two factor indexes, one largely comprised of the tax revenue, primary education rate, and urbanization variables, and one that features more of the railroad infrastructure and state antiquity variables. I argue this first index largely captures the latent local institutional strength variable that I contend underlies the portfolio of proxy variables. The second factor, instead, largely captures what I call state legacy. I include both in the subsequent regression models while removing the five proxy variables to test the index’s effect on foreign rule strategy. Table 4.6 presents the results of similar logistic regression models, along with results from a variety of additional specifications that help confirm the impact of institutional strength on foreign rule strategy. In all five of the models presented, the institutional strength index is strongly significant and heavily negative. This indicates that as the level of institutional strength increases, the likelihood of
enacting an institutional strategy decreases. The marginal effects plots in Figure 4.4 confirm this. For instance, moving from an institutional strength level of -1 to 1 would reduce the probability of engaging in an institutional strategy from over 80 percent to under 20 percent, a 75 percent reduction in probability. Taken together, this indicates that local institutional strength is a good predictor of foreign rule strategy. State legacy, the second component from my EFA model, is not significant in any model specification, as expected. This indicates that legacy of state institutions in a territory is less important than the capacity of those institutions at the time of the foreign rule mission.

Additionally, as Figure 4.1 and Figure 4.2 indicate, a large proportion of the cases in my dataset come from the World War II period. Given the number of cases that come from this period, it makes good sense to test whether World War II involved a unique set of circumstances that are impacting my results. Beyond the sheer number of cases, these foreign rule missions posed distinct data collection issues as noted in the previous section. Specifically, the World War II period of foreign rule cases provided a special challenge in determining the proper time period to code the proxy variables to use in measuring the strength of institutions at the end of the fighting and the defeat of axis powers. Given the difficulty in capturing exact data from the moment of initiation in the foreign rule missions and after five years of devastation, I decided to run a version of the model in which I separated all cases from the World War II period and its immediate aftermath. I then have two models, one that includes all World War II cases of foreign rule (Model 10), and one with all of the non-World War II cases (Model 11). Both Model 10 and Model 11 use the factor analysis variables and largely confirm my previous results. The results remain stable and confirm that the relationship between local institutional strength and foreign rule strategy is robust across time periods and regions. In both models, the significant and positive coefficient for the institutional strength latent variable index means that
foreign rulers were more likely to use institutional strategies when the level of local institutional strength was low, and more likely to use leadership strategies when local institutional strength was high for both the World War II period and in all other time periods since 1898. The World War II era was unique in the large number of foreign rule missions carried out in a short period of time, yet the relationship between institutional strength and the foreign rule strategy used before, during, and after this period remains robust. This is evidence that the World War II period is not unique, and my theory can help explain cases of foreign rule during this period as well as the cases in different time periods and locales. More importantly, this is evidence that my quantitative results are not solely driven by the World War II period. There is not a unique effect of the destruction of institutions following the total war of World War II and this confirms that the dynamics undertaken during this period largely correspond to trends that hold across other periods.

The control variables in these five models have some interesting differences from those in the previous models with the portfolio of proxy variables. In addition to the control variables from before, I also included a few regional and foreign ruler specific dummy variables, to see if there is a direct effect of the region in which the foreign rule mission took place, or a foreign ruler specific effect. Distance was not included as a control in these models, as region and foreign ruler dummies are collinear with distance, and I did not want to impact the estimation of the effect of any of these variables. Similar to the previous models, ruggedness and the area of the local territory continue to not have any significant predictive effect on foreign rule strategy. Second, in this set of models, we continue to find that the level of democracy of the local territory is not significant in any of them. The democracy difference variable remains insignificant in this set of models as well. Interestingly, this confirms that the lack of impact of democracy on foreign rule strategy is not unique to any time period or regional location, with the results holding for both the
World War II period and the non-World War II cases.\textsuperscript{37}

**TABLE 4.6**

**EFA LOGISTIC REGRESSION RESULTS (ROBUST STANDARD ERRORS)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 7</th>
<th>Model 8</th>
<th>Model 9</th>
<th>Model 10 (Non-WWII)</th>
<th>Model 11 (WWII)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Institutional Strength</td>
<td>-1.5876***</td>
<td>-1.967***</td>
<td>-2.0001**</td>
<td>-1.7861***</td>
<td>-1.7550**</td>
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<td>(Factor 1)</td>
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<td>(0.5109)</td>
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<td>(0.6334)</td>
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</tr>
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<td>(Factor 2)</td>
<td>(0.2809)</td>
<td>(0.4475)</td>
<td>(0.4936)</td>
<td>(0.3342)</td>
<td>(0.8313)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy (V-Dem)</td>
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<td>(1.2138)</td>
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<td>(1.9142)</td>
<td>(2.2698)</td>
<td>(2.2146)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy Difference</td>
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<td>-0.3080</td>
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<td>-3.0499</td>
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<td>(1.5877)</td>
<td>(1.3836)</td>
<td>(1.9183)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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<td>(0.0046)</td>
<td>(0.0052)</td>
<td>(0.0045)</td>
<td>(0.0072)</td>
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<td>CINC (Foreign Ruler)</td>
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<td>2.7110</td>
<td>-0.5519</td>
<td>8.4299*</td>
<td>-0.3202</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2.3458)</td>
<td>(3.3698)</td>
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<td>(3.8489)</td>
<td>(4.7485)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>0.0289**</td>
<td>0.0396**</td>
<td>0.0209</td>
<td>0.0308**</td>
<td>0.4826</td>
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<tr>
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<td>(0.0103)</td>
<td>(0.3138)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Area</td>
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<td>-0.0003</td>
<td>-0.0001</td>
<td>0.0009</td>
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<tr>
<td>(0.0001)</td>
<td>(0.0003)</td>
<td>(0.0003)</td>
<td>(0.0001)</td>
<td>(0.0012)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin America</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>0.8332</td>
<td>-0.6031</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textsuperscript{37}Table B3 (Appendix B) shows that the same is true when including the democracy level of the foreign ruler, even in the World War II period.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 7</th>
<th>Model 8</th>
<th>Model 9</th>
<th>Model 10</th>
<th>Model 11</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.1321)</td>
<td>(1.6365)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
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<td>-1.7960</td>
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<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.6552)</td>
<td>(1.7565)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle East</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-2.3490*</td>
<td>-1.5510</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.1765)</td>
<td>(1.2124)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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<td>Asia</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2.7325</td>
<td>2.8759</td>
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<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>US</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2.1765</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>(1.3402)</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soviet</td>
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<td>0.6900</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(1.0054)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2.4698*</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(1.0235)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-2.3215*</td>
<td>-1.7266</td>
<td>-0.7286</td>
<td>-4.1269**</td>
<td>-20.3424</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.9091)</td>
<td>(1.1230)</td>
<td>(1.1372)</td>
<td>(1.4070)</td>
<td>(14.1443)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo $R^2$</td>
<td>0.242</td>
<td>0.366</td>
<td>0.421</td>
<td>0.277</td>
<td>0.395</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$
Figure 4.4. Marginal Effects of Local Institutional Strength Index- EFA Models
One major difference in this set of models is that the material power of the foreign ruler is a significant predictor in two of the models, presenting weak evidence that institutional strategies are more likely to occur when there are powerful states present. This holds for Model 7 and Model 10, where the large positive coefficient means that as foreign rulers gain more material capability, they are more likely to use institutional strategies. When regional and foreign ruler specific dummies are included, however, this result goes away and only remains in the non-World War II model. The lack of consistency makes it less likely that this is a meaningful and robust result. However, since distance between the foreign ruler and local territory is not included in this set of models, this could provide more evidence that power projection capability creates more opportunities to engage in institutional strategies when the foreign ruler possesses higher levels of power.

Similarly, a major difference in the previous models and this set of models is the year variable. It is positive and significant in three of the models included here, indicating that as foreign rule missions occur more closely to the modern period, they are more likely to use institutional strategies. While the relationship between institutional strength and foreign rule strategy is still robust in these models, the significant coefficient on the year variable might indicate that foreign rulers are more likely to launch foreign rule missions in weak institutional environments in more modern eras. It is not significant in the World War II period, but it is in the non-World War II cases, which makes sense as there is a longer time series included in the non-World War II cases. More importantly, however, it is not significant when including a UN dummy variable in the model. This could mean that as UN missions become more common in the modern period, they are more likely to use institutional strategies and thus make institutional strategies more likely in modern periods. While it is not clear why the year variable was not as significant when using the proxy variables in previous models, this suggests interesting avenues for an
extension of this project to determine when foreign rulers are more likely to engage in foreign rule throughout different historical periods.

Looking to the new set of dummy control variables included in this set of models, a few interesting results emerge. Initially, I include dummy variables for the region of the world where the foreign rule mission occurred, with Europe serving as the reference category. We can interpret the coefficients here as which regions produce statistically significant differences from Europe in terms of foreign rule strategy. While the Latin America, Africa, and Asia regional variables are insignificant, the variable for the Middle East is positive and significant. This has two implications. First, this means that cases of foreign rule in Latin America, Asia, and Africa have largely had the same probability of a foreign ruler using a leadership or institutional strategy as European missions of foreign rule. For the Middle East however, the positive and significant coefficient indicates that compared to other regions, foreign rule missions in the Middle East were more likely to feature institutional strategies. Foreign rulers seem to have used institutional strategies in the Middle East much more frequently than in other regions. Given historical arguments about the level of state weakness in the Middle East, this makes good sense according to my theory (Lu and Thies, 2013; Lustick, 1997; Anderson, 1987). However, when I include the foreign ruler specific dummy variables in the next model this effect no longer appears, casting doubt on whether this result is meaningful and robust.

Finally, I include dummy variables for the three types of foreign rulers that are common in the dataset and might have unique effects on foreign rule strategy. Specifically, I use dummy variables for all US, Soviet Union/Russia, and UN foreign rule missions, as they are more likely to produce unique results. Interestingly the United States and Soviet Union are not more or less likely than other countries to use institutional strategies. This makes sense as the material power variable is rarely significant in the previous models, but it serves as good confirmation that both great powers
are not more or less likely to use a certain strategy than other states. On the other hand, the results here indicate that UN missions are much more likely to use institutional strategies than other foreign rule missions. This is not surprising, given UN interventions typically target explicitly weak institution environments in the modern era when they do engage in foreign rule. However, since the institutional strength index remains significant in this model, it gives me confidence that there is not a UN selection effect driving the overall results of the model. Interestingly, in this model the year variable is not as significant as it is in the other non-World War II models. This could indicate that the finding presented earlier, that modern periods are more likely to feature institutional strategies, is largely the result of the increased number of UN missions.

Combined, the results of both the proxy variable models and the factor analysis models using the latent variable index confirm that no matter what model is used, the relationship between local institutional strength and foreign rule strategy holds across a variety of geographic and temporal contexts. While there seems to be a weak possibility of a few time specific and actor specific effects, in general, regardless of the control variables included, the effect of local institutional strength remains robust. This provides strong initial evidence to help confirm Hypotheses 2 and 3, and helps validate the strong relationship between foreign rule strategy and local institutional strength.

\[38\] Fortna (2004) argues that modern UN peacekeeping missions often explicitly target difficult environments to work in, so perhaps this is an important constraint on my theoretical story. Once the UN decides to engage in foreign rule in the modern period, institutional strategies are their only option. It could also be the case, as Hironaka (2009) argues, that in this modern UN era, there are more weak states that present opportunities to engage in foreign rule missions, requiring more institutional strategies in this period.
4.5 Robustness and Extensions

After examining these results and observing the clear relationship between foreign rule strategy and local institutional strength, it is important to note that in each of the models above, data availability has curtailed utilizing all of the cases of foreign rule I have coded. Depending on the variables included, over twenty percent of the full universe of cases is excluded in my analysis. For instance, the tax revenue data for Mongolia in 1919, the British mandate of Tanganyika, the Trust Territory of the Pacific, or Ethiopia in 1940 do not exist and cause each of these cases to be dropped from my analysis when including the tax ratio variable. Table 4.7 below illustrates the extent of the missing data for each of the portfolio of proxy variables, and shows that, especially for the primary school enrollment, state antiquity, and tax ratio variables, over 10 percent of all cases are deleted through listwise deletion in each model above.

TABLE 4.7
EXTENT OF MISSING DATA

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Total Missing</th>
<th>Missing Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tax Ratio</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>18.12 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary School Enrollment</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>11.25 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urbanization</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2.50 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Railroad Length</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.25 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State Antiquity</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>11.88 %</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
To determine whether these cases through listwise deletion change my analysis, I undertook two strategies to replace the missing data and re-test my hypotheses to ensure they remain robust. First, some have made the convincing argument that missing data is itself an indication of weak local institutions (Lemke, 2003; Coggins, 2016; Hanson and Sigman, 2013). The argument largely holds that states that have the weakest institutions are not able to monitor their economic and political institutions sufficiently to report data to their government data agencies or international institutions. Recognizing this possibility, I first attempted to solve the missing data problem by replacing each instance of missing data in the five main proxy variables with the minimum value of each. This means that for each case that was previously deleted in the regression analysis, they are now included in my analysis at the minimum values of that variable. In addition, some UN cases as noted above were dropped from my analyses when using the distance, CINC, or democracy difference control variables, as including a measure for UN democracy or distance from the UN to the local territory is a conceptual stretch. To ensure these cases are not dropped in this set of analyses, I included the mean value of each of the control variables when they are missing, to make sure all cases of foreign rule are included in my analysis. By doing so, we can see if including the previously excluded cases changes my results. The results in Table 4.8 and Figure 4.5 clearly indicate that including these cases only helps strengthen my argument. The results for the local institutional strength variables remain highly significant and robust in this new specification. In this set of cases, the level of democracy and the material power of the foreign ruler are also significant in some of the models. However, given the inclusion of the means of these values, the robustness of this result is questionable. The significant relationship between distance and institutional strategies, however, remains robust.

39While this is an imperfect solution, it does allow me to make sure that local institutional strength remains an important explanatory variable when including these cases.
## Table 4.8

**MISSING CORRECTED LOGISTIC REGRESSION RESULTS (ROBUST STANDARD ERRORS)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 12</th>
<th>Model 13</th>
<th>Model 14</th>
<th>Model 15</th>
<th>Model 16</th>
<th>Model 17</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tax Ratio</td>
<td>-0.1202***</td>
<td>-0.1369***</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0356)</td>
<td>(0.0320)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Railroad Length</td>
<td>-0.0059</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>-0.0842</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0628)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0544)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary Education</td>
<td>-0.0081</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>-0.0245**</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0096)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0080)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urbanization</td>
<td>-0.8688</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>-1.8735</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.5455)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(1.2905)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Historical Stateness</td>
<td>-0.5877</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>-0.9690</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.8474)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.6897)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy (V-Dem)</td>
<td>-1.5249</td>
<td>-2.3360*</td>
<td>-1.6026</td>
<td>-0.6065</td>
<td>-1.3345</td>
<td>-2.2326*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.2941)</td>
<td>(1.0179)</td>
<td>(0.9774)</td>
<td>(1.1917)</td>
<td>(1.0002)</td>
<td>(0.9340)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ruggedness</td>
<td>0.0045</td>
<td>0.0044</td>
<td>0.0018</td>
<td>0.0029</td>
<td>0.0019</td>
<td>0.0039</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0028)</td>
<td>(0.0023)</td>
<td>(0.0022)</td>
<td>(0.0022)</td>
<td>(0.0022)</td>
<td>(0.0022)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CINC (Foreign Ruler)</td>
<td>-2.9981</td>
<td>-4.7289*</td>
<td>-4.7955*</td>
<td>-2.5925</td>
<td>-4.6895</td>
<td>-5.9142**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2.3038)</td>
<td>(2.0812)</td>
<td>(2.2738)</td>
<td>(2.1905)</td>
<td>(2.4051)</td>
<td>(2.0782)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>0.0178</td>
<td>0.0143</td>
<td>-0.0015</td>
<td>0.0132</td>
<td>0.0034</td>
<td>-0.0012</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0094)</td>
<td>(0.0084)</td>
<td>(0.0065)</td>
<td>(0.0073)</td>
<td>(0.0070)</td>
<td>(0.0067)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Area</td>
<td>-0.0001</td>
<td>-0.0001</td>
<td>-0.0001</td>
<td>-0.0001</td>
<td>-0.0001</td>
<td>-0.0001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0001)</td>
<td>(0.0001)</td>
<td>(0.0001)</td>
<td>(0.0001)</td>
<td>(0.0001)</td>
<td>(0.0001)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
However, simply substituting minimum values for missing data in my dataset is imprecise. It is not clear if state weakness is always producing the missing data. However, granting that listwise deletion causes many cases of foreign rule to be deleted from my analyses, I use multiple imputation to help with the missing data in my dataset and to re-examine my analyses. As Lall (2016, 414) explains, “multiple imputation, which involves replacing each missing cell with multiple values based on information in the observed portion of the dataset, not only generates considerably more efficient inferences than listwise deletion but also is unbiased under more realistic distributions of missing data.” To do this, I impute the data for the five institutional strength proxy variables (tax ratios, railroad length, urbanization, primary school enrollment, and state history) using 100 draws of a Markov chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) method to impute the missing values. After imputation, I re-run each of the models with the imputed data and find that the results remain largely the same. The results are presented in Table 4.9.\footnote{Given the relatively few cases and variables I have to impute from, the imputation process...}

---

**TABLE 4.8 (CONTINUED)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model</th>
<th>Model</th>
<th>Model</th>
<th>Model</th>
<th>Model</th>
<th>Model</th>
<th>Model</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>17</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Distance (km)</th>
<th>0.0002*</th>
<th>0.0002**</th>
<th>0.0002**</th>
<th>0.0002**</th>
<th>0.0002***</th>
<th>0.0003***</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0001)</td>
<td>(0.0001)</td>
<td>(0.0001)</td>
<td>(0.0001)</td>
<td>(0.0001)</td>
<td>(0.0001)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Constant</th>
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<th>0.2909</th>
<th>0.1951</th>
<th>-0.1599</th>
<th>0.1707</th>
<th>0.1750</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.7460)</td>
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<td>(0.5950)</td>
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<td>(0.6067)</td>
<td>(0.6161)</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Observations</th>
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<th>160</th>
<th>160</th>
<th>160</th>
<th>160</th>
<th>160</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pseudo $R^2$</th>
<th>0.273</th>
<th>0.259</th>
<th>0.153</th>
<th>0.199</th>
<th>0.152</th>
<th>0.150</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$
could be vastly improved upon. Using a larger time-series and cross-sectional dataset would greatly improve the imputation procedure. However, given that the results confirm my earlier tests, using the imputed sample gives me confidence that my results are robust to many different samples and model specifications, even if the multiple imputation procedure is not perfect.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 18</th>
<th>Model 19</th>
<th>Model 20</th>
<th>Model 21</th>
<th>Model 22</th>
<th>Model 23</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tax Ratio</td>
<td>-0.0947*</td>
<td>-0.0981**</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0379)</td>
<td>(0.0341)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Railroad Length</td>
<td>0.0044</td>
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<td>-0.0829</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0686)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0553)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary Education</td>
<td>-0.0046</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>-0.0174*</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0113)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0080)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urbanization</td>
<td>-0.8381</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>-2.5212</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.7648)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(1.3822)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Historical Stateness</td>
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<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>-0.8062</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.9823)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.7922)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy (V-Dem)</td>
<td>-1.3686</td>
<td>-1.9644</td>
<td>-1.2996</td>
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<td>(1.0221)</td>
<td>(0.9526)</td>
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<td>0.0018</td>
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<td>0.0017</td>
<td>0.0038</td>
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<td>(0.0022)</td>
<td>(0.0021)</td>
<td>(0.0022)</td>
<td>(0.0022)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CINC (Foreign Ruler)</td>
<td>-4.5138</td>
<td>-5.4678**</td>
<td>-4.8526*</td>
<td>-4.5236*</td>
<td>-4.3292</td>
<td>-6.1032**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2.4867)</td>
<td>(2.1019)</td>
<td>(2.3236)</td>
<td>(2.2393)</td>
<td>(2.4403)</td>
<td>(2.1092)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>0.0080</td>
<td>0.0054</td>
<td>-0.0017</td>
<td>0.0071</td>
<td>0.0044</td>
<td>-0.0009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0093)</td>
<td>(0.0077)</td>
<td>(0.0065)</td>
<td>(0.0072)</td>
<td>(0.0072)</td>
<td>(0.0067)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Area</td>
<td>-0.0001</td>
<td>-0.0001</td>
<td>-0.0001</td>
<td>-0.0001</td>
<td>-0.0001</td>
<td>-0.0001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0001)</td>
<td>(0.0001)</td>
<td>(0.0001)</td>
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<td>(0.0001)</td>
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TABLE 4.9 (CONTINUED)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 18</th>
<th>Model 19</th>
<th>Model 20</th>
<th>Model 21</th>
<th>Model 22</th>
<th>Model 23</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Distance (km)</td>
<td>0.0002**</td>
<td>0.0002**</td>
<td>0.0002**</td>
<td>0.0002**</td>
<td>0.0002**</td>
<td>0.0003***</td>
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<tr>
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<td>(0.0001)</td>
<td>(0.0001)</td>
<td>(0.0001)</td>
<td>(0.0001)</td>
<td>(0.0001)</td>
<td>(0.0001)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>0.1285</td>
<td>0.1119</td>
<td>0.2318</td>
<td>0.0766</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.8103)</td>
<td>(0.6916)</td>
<td>(0.5855)</td>
<td>(0.5829)</td>
<td>(0.6016)</td>
<td>(0.6407)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>160</td>
<td>160</td>
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<td>160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo $R^2$</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

The results show that when using imputed data, the tax ratio and primary education variables remain significant and negative, confirming the previous results. Urbanization is no longer significant as we include more cases of foreign rule. While perhaps an imperfect imputation procedure, this provides more evidence that even when including the full range of foreign rule cases, the results discussed above remain consistent. The most notable change here is the significance of the material power of the foreign ruler as a control variable, however it is unclear how the substitution of value in the UN cases listed above plays a role in this result.

The presence of missing data could also conceivably impact the EFA procedure. If the data is missing for one of the variables that went into making the latent variable index, then that case is not included in the EFA procedure and eliminated from subsequent analyses. To ensure this is not biasing my results in any manner, I use a similar EFA procedure after imputing the data for the missing cases. Since state antiquity was not significant in any version of any model I have tested, I did not include it in this version of the EFA procedure.
Figure 4.6. Marginal Effects of Local Institutional Strength Proxies - Multiple Imputation
### Table 4.10

**Exploratory Factor Analysis with Multiple Imputation, Rotated Factors**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Component 1</th>
<th>Uniqueness</th>
<th>KMO Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tax Ratio</td>
<td>0.4244</td>
<td>0.8199</td>
<td>0.7949</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary School Enrollment</td>
<td>0.8070</td>
<td>0.3488</td>
<td>0.7224</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urbanization</td>
<td>0.8239</td>
<td>0.3212</td>
<td>0.7025</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Railroad Length (% of Area)</td>
<td>0.6838</td>
<td>0.5325</td>
<td>0.7819</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 4.11

**Summary of Factors with Multiple Imputation**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factor</th>
<th>Eigenvalue</th>
<th>Difference</th>
<th>Minimum</th>
<th>Maximum</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>St. Dev</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Factor 1</td>
<td>1.9777</td>
<td>1.8920</td>
<td>-0.6048</td>
<td>4.8017</td>
<td>1.2825</td>
<td>0.9666</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 4.10 and Table 4.11 present the results from the EFA procedure that only produced one significant factor, local institutional strength. When I replicate the earlier analyses with the new index of institutional strength following multiple imputation, I get similar results. Table 4.12 illustrates the results. In all five models shown, institutional strength remains significant and negative. In this set of models, I included the distance variable instead of regional dummies to see if any different results emerged. Interestingly, when the distance variable is included, both the United States and the United Nations dummy variables are significant. Additionally, in certain models the CINC, year, and area variables are significant, but they are unstable across different specifications, and thus it is unclear if these are reliable estimates. Overall, these models provide sound evidence that the results listed above regarding the local institutional strength index remain robust when including the previously eliminated cases with multiple imputation.

Finally, there are a few additional model specifications that I have discussed that are included in Appendix 2 of this chapter to provide even more robustness checks. These include OLS regressions of the initial models, different multiple imputation schemes, and different control variables included. However, these results largely show that regardless of the model chosen, the relationship between local institutional strength and foreign rule strategy is robust across all contexts. Whether it is using logistic regression or OLS, using the portfolio of proxy variables or a latent variable model, whether data is missing or imputed, and regardless of the control variables included, this relationship is robust and stable across all variations of quantitative testing. Additionally, the appendix includes the models that test whether the level of democracy of the foreign ruler predicts foreign rule strategy. In only one of the eleven models is the democracy level of the foreign ruler significant, giving us confidence that it is not a major predictor of foreign rule strategy. Foreign rulers of all regime types are just as likely to use leadership and institutional strategies. Finally,
certain models in the appendix use energy consumption instead of urbanization as a proxy for economic growth. However, energy consumption is not significant in any of the models.

TABLE 4.12

EFA LOGISTIC REGRESSION RESULTS - MULTIPLE IMPUTATION

(ROBUST STANDARD ERRORS)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 24</th>
<th>Model 25</th>
<th>Model 26</th>
<th>Model 27</th>
<th>Model 28</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Institutional Strength</td>
<td>-0.9622**</td>
<td>-0.7883*</td>
<td>-0.7258*</td>
<td>-0.7619*</td>
<td>-1.5312*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Factor)</td>
<td>(0.3113)</td>
<td>(0.3360)</td>
<td>(0.3640)</td>
<td>(0.3572)</td>
<td>(0.7720)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy (V-Dem)</td>
<td>-1.3532</td>
<td>-0.8051</td>
<td>-1.1678</td>
<td>-1.9836</td>
<td>-0.1692</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.0044)</td>
<td>(1.0703)</td>
<td>(1.1517)</td>
<td>(1.3785)</td>
<td>(2.0857)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ruggedness</td>
<td>0.0009</td>
<td>0.0013</td>
<td>0.0008</td>
<td>0.0020</td>
<td>-0.0023</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0022)</td>
<td>(0.0022)</td>
<td>(0.0025)</td>
<td>(0.0032)</td>
<td>(0.0042)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CINC (Foreign Ruler)</td>
<td>-0.0744</td>
<td>-3.4169</td>
<td>-8.4538**</td>
<td>1.6176</td>
<td>-1.7917</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2.0930)</td>
<td>(2.4071)</td>
<td>(3.1956)</td>
<td>(2.6875)</td>
<td>(3.8483)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>0.0137*</td>
<td>0.0068</td>
<td>-0.0070</td>
<td>0.0122</td>
<td>0.5875</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0066)</td>
<td>(0.0070)</td>
<td>(0.0083)</td>
<td>(0.0066)</td>
<td>(0.3641)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Area</td>
<td>-0.0001</td>
<td>-0.0001</td>
<td>-0.0002</td>
<td>-0.0001*</td>
<td>0.0005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0001)</td>
<td>(0.0001)</td>
<td>(0.0003)</td>
<td>(0.0001)</td>
<td>(0.0009)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distance (km)</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>0.0002**</td>
<td>0.0002*</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0001)</td>
<td>(0.0001)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>1.6761*</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.6909)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soviet</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>0.5172</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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Taken together, these results indicate that with different model specifications, different proxy variables for local institutional strength, different methods for dealing with missing data, and throughout different time periods since 1898, there is a strong, robust relationship between local institutional strength and foreign rule strategy. This presents solid evidence that Hypothesis 2 and Hypothesis 3 from Chapter 3 hold true. However, simply noting this relationship is robust across time and place is only the first step in confirming my overarching theoretical story. The role uncertainty plays in the strategic decision-making process, a crucial element of my theory, cannot be tested quantitatively. Thus, I integrate these results with case studies selected based upon them. Doing so will not only confirm the results presented here, but bolster my causal argument.
Figure 4.7. Marginal Effects of Local Institutional Strength Index - Multiple Imputation
4.6 Case Selection

After examining and testing the general relationship between local institutional strength and foreign rule strategy above, I have confirmed the broad relationship between local conditions and foreign rule strategy. However, in order to test the rest of my argument relating to uncertainty over institutional strength and the timing of foreign rule strategy formation, case studies that examine the strategic decision-making process are required. In order to confirm my complete theoretical story, the case studies selected must complement the quantitative results to advance my claims about the role uncertainty plays in determining foreign rule strategy. Thus, I move to the next step of my multimethod research design and select a pair of on-the-line cases. These cases can highlight and test my additional claims involving uncertainty and strategic decision-making, while also controlling for alternative arguments. As noted above, on-the-line cases are useful as they confirm the broad relationship while also allowing me to test the veracity of the causal mechanisms. In particular, after showing how the relationship between local institutional strength and foreign rule strategy is robust, they offer the best means to trace how the agent capacity and armed resistance mechanisms drive strategic decision-making. In addition, these on-the-line cases are useful as they help illustrate the other hypotheses that emerge from my theory, which deal with the impact that uncertainty has on a foreign ruler’s strategic decision-making.

What do on-the-line cases refer to in a logistic regression model? In this case, it is whether the logistic regression model correctly predicted that a certain case was more likely to use an institutional strategy when the foreign ruler actually did employ an institutional strategy, and vice versa. To do this, following the regression results, I examined the predicted likelihoods of a foreign ruler using an institutional strategy for every case in the model and compared this predicted likelihood to the actual strategy chosen by the foreign ruler. The predicted likelihoods are the model’s estimation of
the likelihood of a foreign ruler selecting an institutional strategy. If the predicted likelihood is less than .5, then the logistic regression model predicts that it is more likely that the foreign ruler would utilize a leadership strategy.\footnote{Logistical regression models constrain the predicted probabilities to the range between 0-1. OLS regression allows the predicted probability to be negative or above 1, hence why the linear probability model is often eschewed when modeling binary choice data.} Alternatively, if the predicted likelihood is greater than .5, then the model predicts that the foreign ruler will use an institution building strategy. Cases that are correctly predicted by my model constitute the pool of on-the-line cases to choose from for the paired set of cases I will select.\footnote{The models predict on average over 80 percent of the cases correctly, with some shifting depending on which model you use.} Predicted likelihoods present a useful guide to help aid the process of case selection. Since we only possess proxy variables for state institutional strength, and the complex mechanisms behind the importance of state institutional strength in determining strategy, case studies provide an ideal opportunity to test the mechanisms laid out above and determine if my argument holds. The predicted likelihoods from the logistic regressions provide a useful mechanism for selecting cases that are correctly predicted by my logistic regression model.

To select these on-the-line cases, I employ a qualitative matching process that helps to control for alternative arguments by selecting cases with similar values on the other competing hypotheses, but different values on the main independent variable of interest, akin to a most-similar case design (Mill, 1872; Przeworski and Teune, 1970). A most-similar case design allows for all other confounding variables to be held constant as they take place in the same areas by the same actor. In this case, I select a pair of cases that control for a host of confounding arguments using a matching case selection procedure that allows me to control for the alternative arguments about mission goals, leadership preferences, and foreign ruler’s domestic political system. Given previous research on the effects of presidential preferences, regime
type, and domestic political systems, controlling for each in the quantitative analysis and matching for each in the case study research allows for more confidence in the causal processes that I hypothesize are occurring. This supports my claim of causal inference by placing harder conditions on my selection process. I highlight the benefits of this case selection design below.

Most-similar case designs are matched on confounding variables and are similar in almost all respects except for my key independent variable, state institutional strength. To do the matching, I look for cases that are correctly predicted to carry out different strategies in the quantitative model above, but are similar in most respects beyond my main independent variables of interest. This implies selecting cases of foreign rule carried out by the same foreign ruler, in the same region, during the same time period, and ideally pursuing similar goals, with only variance in the level of local institutional strength remaining. Noting this, I selected two cases of American foreign rule that were correctly predicted in the same time period and region. The two cases of American foreign rule I selected both featured American foreign rule in Latin America during the 1910s under President Woodrow Wilson: The US invasion of Mexico in 1914 and the US occupation of the Dominican Republic in 1916. Both cases fit the criteria above, with the same foreign ruler, President, region, foreign interests, and time period involved in each case. Even the distance between the countries, the only other consistently strong control variable, was quite similar between Santo Domingo and Mexico City. The only variation between the two cases was the main independent variables of interest, namely state institutional strength. While the US intervened in the Dominican Republic and attempted to build new local institutions, in Mexico they used a leadership strategy to depose the Huerta regime and promote Carranza’s Constitutionalists.
### TABLE 4.13

**MOST-SIMILAR CASE SELECTION METRICS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Mexico</th>
<th>Dominican Republic</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Region</td>
<td>Latin America</td>
<td>Latin America</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time Period</td>
<td>1910s</td>
<td>1910s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leader</td>
<td>Woodrow Wilson</td>
<td>Woodrow Wilson</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distance</td>
<td>3024 km</td>
<td>2358 km</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security Environment</td>
<td>Near Abroad with German Influence</td>
<td>Near Abroad with German Influence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goals</td>
<td>Domestic Stability</td>
<td>Domestic Stability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Economic Interests</td>
<td>Economic Interests</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Resist German Influence</td>
<td>Resist German Influence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Railroad Length</td>
<td>20447 km</td>
<td>241 km</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tax Ratio</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary School Enrollment</td>
<td>34.994 %</td>
<td>12.58%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urbanization</td>
<td>26.03 %</td>
<td>17.39%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institutional Strength (EFA)</td>
<td>1.0231</td>
<td>-0.5557</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Given the similarity in the international situations of the cases, time period, and domestic politics of the United States, only the local institutional strength remains as a plausible explanatory variable that can explain the difference in strategy. The predicted probabilities of the logistic regression model predict that Mexico has under a 40 percent probability of using an institutional strategy, while for the Dominican Republic the probability of the US using an institutional change strategy was much higher at over 60 percent. The actual prediction varies based on the model used. This probability is much closer together due to the generally weaker nature of local institutions in the pre-World War II period, and the overall time trend towards stronger institutions. For instance, when restricting the sample to just pre-World War II cases of foreign rule, the probability that the United States would use an institutional strategy in the Dominican Republic is predicted to be over 90 percent, while the probability of the United States using a leadership strategy in Mexico is around 30 percent. Time and regional trends in what is an urban territory, a high level of tax revenue, and a high level of education infrastructure also matter in this overall predicted probability. This is unsurprising, as all of the proxy variables for state strength indicated that Mexico possessed a larger amount of institutional strength than the Dominican Republic, even with it’s much larger size.

Beyond the variables used in the regression models, there is confirmatory evidence of the stronger level of institutional capacity from the new measure of state fiscal extraction capacity from the historical V-Dem project (Coppedge et al., 2018). In the Dominican Republic, from 1900 onwards, the level of state fiscal extraction is measured at -1.517 from 1900 until 1916 when the American foreign rule mission begins, whereas in Mexico it is .9419 under Diaz in 1900, .3823 as the Mexican Revolution begins, and -.4442 in 1914 during the tumultuous period leading to the American foreign rule mission. This provides additional evidence of the historic strength of Mexican institutions compared to Dominican institutions and shows the variance
in institutional strength present among the two territories. In addition, given both
countries were facing internal revolts and instability, the level of institutional infra-
structure present greatly varied, and provides interesting analysis on how different
institutional environments respond to these revolutionary challenges. There was also
variation in the length of railroads, tax revenue, and primary school enrollment in
each case. Table 4.13 below lists the full case selection metrics used to match the
pair of cases with the most-similar variables I control for at the top and the local
institutional strength variables below.

In the next chapter, I go into more detail about the background factors that make
this pair of cases an ideal test for the causal mechanisms and features of uncertainty
that drive my theory. Most importantly, these cases together aim to control for con-
founding alternative explanations and trace the strategic decision-making process to
illustrate the causal story in my theoretical argument. After confirming the long term
trend of the relationship between local institutional strength and the strategies im-
plemented by foreign ruler, engaging in structured paired comparisons in this pair of
cases to test the full dynamics of my argument, as well as the timing and uncertainty
hypotheses, enriches my causal story and my empirical foundations. In the next
chapter, I turn to use process tracing (Bennett and Checkel, 2015; Bennett, 2008)
in both cases of the structured paired comparison to trace and test the causal logics
behind my argument and determine whether local factors do in fact drive strategic
decision-making as I predict.

4.7 Conclusion

In this chapter, I have described the integrative multimethod research design and
presented the first stage of my empirical analysis. I have also described the data
collection procedure that allowed me to undertake this analysis. This has provided
initial evidence through quantitative analysis that there is a robust and consistent
relationship between local institutional strength and foreign rule strategy. This relationship is robust across a variety of different quantitative models, and shows how different proxies and strategies to capture the underlying concept of local institutional strength all confirm the impact it has on the choice of foreign rule strategy. This provides good evidence that, rather than factors in the foreign ruler leading to choices of foreign rule strategy, it is local conditions that drive the actual strategy implemented over various time periods and geographic locales. In the next chapter, I build on these quantitative results by undertaking the paired case comparison highlighted above to trace my causal mechanisms and confirm my broader theoretical story.
CHAPTER 5

WILSONIAN FOREIGN RULE IN MEXICO AND THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

“Americans are not your enemies, but the enemies for a time of the men who...misgoverned you.” – Winfield Scott

5.1 Wilsonian Foreign Policy and Foreign Rule

Since his time in office, Woodrow Wilson has been both championed and derided for his foreign policy, which focused on spreading democratic domestic institutions and multilateral international institutions across the globe. Traditional views of Woodrow Wilson and Wilsonian foreign policy have portrayed the President as a leader determined to utilize American power to promote democratic institutions and multilateralism abroad in service of his moral and political beliefs. While not always consistent in his application of these moral beliefs, the fact that a form of foreign policy behavior can be termed Wilsonianism is evidence that many think Wilson pursued a consistent foreign policy theme throughout his tenure. Reflecting this traditional view of Wilson’s foreign policy and preferences for foreign intervention, Wilson was often seen as exporting democratic political institutions abroad through armed force

1Published in Smith (1920, 105)

2In the 100 years since the end of his Presidency, Wilsonianism has been cited as a defining feature of American foreign policy and identified by scholars as a key feature of the 20th and 21st century. For more on the definition and application of Wilsonianism see Cox (2017); Ninkovich (1999); Ambrosius (2002); Mead (2001); Ikenberry et al. (2009); Smith (2017, 1994).
or other means as both a moral imperative and beneficial to American security interests (Saunders, 2011, 189-191). As Smith (2017, 16-22) argues, Wilson believed that “America’s mission was therefore to sponsor the expansion of democracy as best it could” and that democracy promotion was the defining element of Wilson’s foreign policy beliefs. Within the scholarly literature today, Wilsonian foreign policy has often come to represent a preference for exporting democracy, working through multilateral institutions, and encouraging the installation of democratic systems and values to promote American security abroad. When applied to foreign rule, discussions of Wilsonian foreign policy usually center on institutional strategies that are used to reshape foreign ruled territories through the creation and strengthening of democratic institutions.

Given this historic view of Wilsonian foreign policy as uniquely interested in exporting democracy, and Wilson’s purported preference for institution-building, logically we should see Woodrow Wilson push to use institutional strategies when engaging in foreign rule. Yet, in the data presented in Chapter Four, we see that during Wilson’s presidency the United States did not always use institutional strategies when engaging in foreign rule. There are cases where Wilson did utilize institutional strategies, and other cases where he opted for leadership strategies. The Wilson administration’s decision to use both institutional and leadership strategies in different

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3 Many have also argued that this preference for enhanced American security through democracy promotion abroad has become a defining feature of American foreign policy. In particular, some argue that this became especially prevalent among the George W. Bush administration, who had shown a deep preference for democracy promotion through justifications that were nominally about national security. For a sample of these arguments see Desch (2007); Jervis (2003); Ambrosius (2006); Monten (2005).

4 Importantly, Slaughter disagrees with this assessment and contends that the multilateralism inherent in Wilson’s thought, and how that promotes the liberal international order, defines modern Wilsonian foreign policy (Ikenberry et al., 2009, 89-118).

5 Some have argued that this focus in Wilsonianism on democracy promotion and institutional foreign rule is a caricature of Wilson’s beliefs; rather, he was committed to collective security and international institutions above pure democracy promotion by force. For more on this argument see Ikenberry et al. (2009); Fromkin (1994) and Thompson (2010).
cases provides an opportunity to test whether local institutions helped to condition Wilson’s preferences and goals for his foreign rule missions, as my theory predicts. If Wilson and Wilsonian foreign policy produces strong preferences for institutional strategies, understanding why Wilson did not use institutional strategies when engaging in some cases of foreign rule provides important evidence in confirming my theory. If Wilsonian goals and preferences could not override local institutional features when selecting a foreign rule strategy, this presents compelling evidence that local institutions condition the strategic decision-making process, as argued in Chapter Three.

In this chapter, I add to my quantitative results through the next stage of my integrative research design. While the quantitative results broadly confirmed my hypotheses across time and space, in order to understand the mechanisms driving the quantitative results, and the crucial role uncertainty plays in the lack of pre-intervention strategy formation, qualitative comparative case studies are best employed. Through the use of structured paired comparison and exploring the causal process observations that are necessary to confirm my theory’s expectations, I examine how local contexts and institutions condition the Wilson administration’s response to armed intervention and the imposition of foreign rule, even in light of Wilson’s natural preference for institutional strategies. To do this, I turn to the paired most-similar case studies identified in the case selection section in Chapter Four, namely the United States occupations of Veracruz and Santo Domingo. As discussed in the case selection section of the previous chapter, most-similar case studies allow one to control for alternative explanations of the origins of foreign rule strategy and to test whether my main variables of interest do lead to the causal process I hypothesize. In this paired comparison, these cases control for the foreign ruler’s goals, identity, time period, region, and other alternative hypotheses.⁶ Both cases feature the same

⁶The foreign ruler’s goals are an important control to include in this paired case comparison,
president, largely the same political goals, and the same region, but have different foreign rule strategies. By tracing my argument through the initial armed intervention and the imposition of foreign rule, I illustrate how local institutional strength drives the choice of foreign rule strategy, rather than the alternative arguments controlled for by the method of case selection. In addition, I test my claims concerning how uncertainty relegates decision-making over strategy to after armed intervention occurs.

Given the similarities in the political goals, presidential interests, and regional dynamics during this period, carrying out a structured paired comparison of two cases is a fruitful way to track the specific causal dynamics presented in Chapter 3 (Slater and Ziblatt, 2013; Tarrow, 2010). By focusing on two cases from this time period, namely the U.S. foreign rule missions in Mexico and the Dominican Republic during the 1910s, I can hold constant many of the factors thought to play a role in selecting a foreign rule strategy and determine what drove the variation during this finite time period. If my argument about the role of local institutional strength and uncertainty is true, there are a few observable implications we should see in the strategic decision-making process for each case. These breakdown into two sets of observable implications: mission features and decision-maker discussions. First, regarding features of the foreign rule missions: initially, if uncertainty over local institutions existed, then we should not see a pre-existing strategy for imposing foreign rule in Mexico or in the Dominican Republic. Second, if local conditions are important for strategy formation, we should see delegation to the American military commanders in control of the intervention forces. Third, we should see the American military commanders initially attempt leadership-type strategies while they assess so as to ensure that the goals are not driving variation in strategy and provide a means to test Hypotheses 4 and 5 presented in Chapter 3. However, as this is just one set of goals, in future work it may be necessary to expand the cases to look at different types of goals which might provide additional evidence.
current institutional strength, as it is the cheaper option and allows institutions to be maintained while under assessment. Fourth, Washington should only decide upon a final strategy after the assessment period concludes and after an initial attempt of a leadership strategy.

The second set of observable implications focuses on the discussions held by policymakers while determining strategy, instead of the process of strategy formation itself. If my theory is correct, we should see explicit remarks about uncertainty in the foreign ruled territory prior to the intervention period. Second, we should see little confidence or discussions of defined strategies prior to landing in the local territory, and prior to intervention Wilson and his administration should speak more about goals instead of strategies. Following intervention, the American military commanders should discuss the lack of strategic guidance they received and their confusion over what steps they should take following the initial imposition of foreign rule. Finally, after the assessment period, we should also see surprised reactions in Washington over the newly observed facts on the ground that confound initial preferences and goals for the foreign rule mission. Table 5.1 below presents the predictions and observable implications we should in both cases of Wilsonian foreign rule to ensure the causal process operates as I hypothesize. In both cases, I find that regardless of Wilson’s political goals, uncertainty largely hampered him from mandating a defined foreign rule strategy prior to intervention. The complete foreign rule strategies emerged only after initial interventions occurred and the military commanders and diplomatic staffs assessed the local political context on the ground. This indicates that local institutional strength led to the differences in strategy between the foreign rule missions in Mexico and the Dominican Republic.

The rest of this chapter will unfold as follows. First, I will lay out the background conditions of American foreign rule in Latin America during the early 20th century. I will next trace my argument through the first case of foreign rule in Mexico and
### TABLE 5.1

**THEORY PREDICTIONS AND OBSERVABLE IMPLICATIONS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Mexico</th>
<th>Dominican Republic</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No Pre-Existing Strategy</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delegation to Military</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Initial Leadership Strategy</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assessment Period</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discussion of Uncertainty</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discussions Focused on Goals</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of Strategic Guidance</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Surprise at Local Conditions</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
the occupation of Veracruz, before then turning to the American occupation of the Dominican Republic. In each case, I develop my argument in three ways. First, I examine the conflicting signals, coming from both Mexico and the Dominican Republic, that confounded officials in Washington, fostering uncertainty among Wilson and others over local conditions in both territories prior to each intervention. In both cases, I show that this uncertainty made the United States hesitant to endorse a defined plan for controlling each territory, and relegated the decision over strategy until after intervention. Second, I walk through the initial steps of both interventions and impositions of foreign rule to illustrate how the American military commanders assessed the local territories and determined the appropriate strategy to employ. This process helped remove the uncertainty over the local institutional strength of both Mexico and the Dominican Republic in Washington, and allowed the United States to arrive at a decision over which foreign rule strategy to utilize. Finally, through the lens of both the agent capacity and armed resistance causal mechanisms, I examine the United States’ strategic decision-making as they began their foreign rule mission immediately following both interventions. In each case I show how, through both causal mechanisms, the local institutional context was the key driver behind the strategic decisions of the United States, and caused the United States to end up employing a leadership strategy in Mexico and an institutional strategy in the Dominican Republic in order to meet Wilson’s goals.

5.2 Wilsonianism and Foreign Rule in Latin America

Following its victory in the Spanish-American War, the United States increased its assertive behavior throughout Latin America as it fully embraced its status as a regional power. While this assertive behavior included a variety of foreign policy tools, American decision-makers found foreign rule to be an especially attractive foreign policy option. Throughout the first three decades of the 1900s, the United
States placed territories as diverse as Cuba, Honduras, Nicaragua, El Salvador, Costa Rica, and Haiti under their sovereign authority for differing economic and strategic reasons. Under Presidents McKinley, Roosevelt, and Taft, American foreign policy behavior in the region evolved to become concerned with the growing potential of European expansion into the Caribbean, potentially threatening American security interests. In particular, British and German actions in the Venezuela Crisis of 1902-1903 prompted President Roosevelt to issue the Roosevelt Corollary, in which he augmented the Monroe Doctrine to claim the United States would intervene in Latin American states if chronic debt or unrest was present. This could ensure that European powers could not use instability as justification for intervention and gain a foothold in the United States’ near abroad (Maass, 2009). These concerns grew out of natural fears of German and British power in the region and their interest in establishing strategic outposts that would harm total American freedom of navigation in the region (Desch, 1993, 25-28).

The establishment and announcement of the Roosevelt Corollary directly related to concerns over German and British economic and strategic expansion in the region due to the economic instability of many Latin American states. The economic instability of the strategically located territories in the United States’ near abroad concerned American policymakers, as they posed strategic threats due to the clear evidence of both German and British attempts at using foreign debt as justification for armed incursion in Latin America (Mitchener and Weidenmier, 2005, 660-663). Additionally, competition from British and German firms threatened American financial investments in Central America and the Caribbean, leading both the Roosevelt and Taft administrations to focus on this issue as Woodrow Wilson assumed the presidency. Thus, the strategic interests of the United States, coupled with concerns

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7For more on each of these cases of foreign rule, see Baker (1965); Schmidt (1971); Gobat (2005); Healy (1963); Munro (1964).
for economic instability in the surrounding areas, made foreign rule an attractive policy option for the early 20th century American administrations. Prior to Woodrow Wilson taking office, the United States had already undertaken missions of foreign rule in Cuba, Honduras, and Nicaragua, with Presidents Roosevelt and Taft utilizing their unique forms of foreign policy, ‘big stick’ and ‘dollar diplomacy’ respectively, to justify foreign rule in each territory. However, while the United States extended their domination across the region with great success, the foreign rule strategies the Americans utilized when imposing their sovereign authority varied immensely. While in some cases the United States use leadership strategies that sought to replace leaders they deemed illegitimate or harmful to their, as they tried in Honduras, the United States also embarked on lengthy occupations that carried out projects of institution-building during this period, as in Cuba.

Upon his election, Wilson was adamant that he would no longer support policies of ‘Big Stick’ and ‘Dollar Diplomacy’ in the region, claiming he would break away from the previous two decades of American foreign policy in Latin America (Link, 1956, 277). However after the election, the United States still had the same strategic and economic concerns in Latin America, and Wilson did end up turning to foreign rule missions in Latin America to achieve his policy preferences, just as his predecessors. In particular, two ongoing Latin American crises were of key importance to Wilson’s Latin America policy. Both the Mexican Revolution and the unsettled Dominican state following the Dominican civil war existed prior to Wilson’s

8For more on Roosevelt’s “Big Stick” view of foreign policy see Ricard (2006) and Marks (1979). For more on Taft’s “Dollar Diplomacy” see Munro (1964, 160-268) and Rosenberg (2003, 61-77).

9See Healy (1963) for more on the US foreign rule mission in Cuba and Munro (1964, 217-235) for more on the US foreign rule mission in Honduras.

10Link (1956, 277) notes: “In contrast to Roosevelt’s policy of ‘realism’ and Taft’s use of ‘Dollar Diplomacy’ in the Caribbean and the Far East, Wilson and Bryan promised a New Freedom abroad as well as at home – a foreign policy of friendship based upon altruism rather than upon sheer considerations of national and material interests.”
election, but the instability in each state, and the threats emanating from European states, presented strategic problems for the administration. Wilson was presented with continuing concerns over the ongoing Mexican Revolution to his south, and continuing concerns about Dominican debt and German influence in the Caribbean. Hence, when Woodrow Wilson was elected to the Presidency, an American tradition of intervention and foreign rule in Latin America was already present, and the same concerns over strategic rivals and economic instability pervaded the region. Thus even though Wilson entered the White House deriding the previous two decades of American foreign policy in Latin America and claiming he possessed different goals for the region, he largely returned to similar tools of statecraft, such as foreign rule, to achieve his strategic goals. Rather than imposing the same foreign rule strategy in both the Mexican and Dominican cases, however, Wilson opted to use different strategies in each case. Even though the administration had similar political concerns and political goals for the foreign rule missions in both territories, different strategies were deemed necessary to achieve those goals. Given these background conditions, we can now turn to examine the strategic decision-making process in both cases, where we can test what drove Wilson’s decision to utilize different foreign rule strategies in his different foreign rule missions in Latin America.

5.3 Mexico

5.3.1 Background – Setting the Stage

Since the beginning of the Mexican revolution in 1910, the United States followed events on their southern border closely, monitoring how the growing instability affected their security and economic interests. Beyond the instability on its border, the United States was also concerned with growing British and German economic and strategic interests interfering in the domestic politics of their southerly neighbor:
Figure 5.1. American Foreign Rule in Latin America 1898-1934
American policymakers were worried about the implications of a regime in Mexico City that supported European interests over American interests. Specifically, British oil interests in Mexico worried American policymakers, due to their support for counter-revolutionaries and interest in restoring the old conservative government that was biased, or so Washington thought, against American oil companies. British aims at restoring the stability of the *Porfiriato* by aiding counter-revolutionaries and aiding the resistance against revolutionary factions directly threatened American economic interests (Katz, 1981, 171-195).\textsuperscript{11} Beyond apprehensions about British economic interests, American policymakers were more seriously concerned about the rising German influence in Mexico, largely due to Germany’s consistent pattern of seeking influence in the Caribbean and Central America during this period (Desch, 1993, 25-28). While German economic interests had played a major role in Mexican politics leading up to the revolution, and also drove many German political considerations, the strategic interests Germany had in Mexico presented the largest threat to American interests. Reflecting this unease, Washington’s primary interest in the outcome of the Mexican revolution was a stable Mexico free from European influence.

American hopes for restored order were enhanced in 1911 when Porfirio Diaz was forced from power and the liberal reformer Francisco Madero assumed the Presidency of Mexico. As Smith (2017, 78) points out, Madero was the kind of liberal reformer that Woodrow Wilson saw as beneficial in growing democratic institutions abroad, and while not yet President of the United States, Wilson saw Madero’s small moves towards constitutionalism and democratic rule as a positive sign for Mexican stability. Madero’s initial reforms in Mexico City included modest land reform, new

\textsuperscript{11}Katz (1981, 189-195) does note however that determining exactly what was official British government policy and what policy was driven by the British minister in Mexico City, Sir Lionel Carden, is difficult at times. Given Carden’s history of pursuing anti-American economic interests and viewing British economic interests in Mexico as a zero-sum game against the Americans, at times it is not clear whether his actions to support counter-revolutionaries and Huerta represent the true position of British foreign policy preferences.
labor protections, protections for a free press, new infrastructure projects, and other liberalizing reforms. Although Madero did promote liberalizing reforms focused on integrating the middle class into the political process through democratic reforms, many of his fellow revolutionaries felt that Madero did not go far enough with his reforms (Katz, 1981, 41-43). In fact, Madero decided to retain many of Diaz’s supporters in their existing cabinet posts in order to maintain stability and promote consensus building (Katz, 1981, 92). His goal was to work with the old Diaz system to push consensus-building reforms through.

For Madero, this program of moderate reforms created problems on both sides, as he faced complaints from revolutionaries because he was not liberalizing fast enough, while the counter-revolutionaries claimed he was liberalizing too fast and harming their interests. While Wilson saw this focus on democratic expansion as useful and positive, for many in the Taft administration, Madero’s rule was not the positive outcome for American interests they were looking for (Katz, 1981, 46-49). Instability continued, and Madero’s attempt to integrate the various factions into his new conception of the state did not win many friends in Washington. Beyond stability concerns, American business interests also were not enamored with Madero and his unwillingness to help American oil and business interests. They pushed for the Taft Administration to express disappointment in Madero. Katz (1981, 47) cites the German diplomatic corps in Mexico City, claiming the Taft administration’s resentment with Madero was his reluctance to give preferential treatment to American oil claims and not turn over oil production in Mexico to American companies. Thus, as the Taft administration was ending, Madero was still pursuing his liberalizing reforms,

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12See Ross (1955, 241-245) and Cumberland (1952, 211-212) for more on the disillusionment and revolt against Madero from his fellow revolutionaries.

13Katz (1981, 46-59) also notes that the U.S. Ambassador to Mexico Henry Lane Wilson could have resented Madero for ending his bribe payments he received from Diaz or a host of a number of other options.
but faced increased push back from counter-revolutionaries, and even some in Washington due to his refusal to promote American economic interests over all others.

Ten days prior to Woodrow Wilson’s presidential inauguration, counter-revolutionary disfavor with Madero came to a final conclusion. Retired General Victoriano Huerta and his conservative co-conspirators launched a military uprising against Madero, known in Mexico as the *La decena trágica*, and usurped power from Madero.¹⁴ While initially the coup-plotters only intended to force Madero to flee the country, Madero and his vice president were eventually assassinated by Huerta and he took control of the Mexican government with the backing of the Mexican military elite (Grieb, 1972, 21-30). However, Huerta and his co-conspirators did not work alone, but gained tacit approval from U.S. Ambassador to Mexico, Henry Lane Wilson. Upon hearing of the coup in Mexico City, President Wilson sent an envoy to determine whether Ambassador Wilson played a role in the events (Blaisdell, 1962).¹⁵ President Wilson’s envoy William Baynard Hale discovered Ambassador Wilson’s role, and wrote to President Wilson indicating his complicity. Hale called the act “treason, perfidy and assassination in an assault on constitutional government” (Schoultz, 1998, 240).

While it was traditional for all American Presidents to recognize foreign governments regardless of how they came to power, President Wilson broke diplomatic protocol and refused to recognize Huerta as the legitimate ruler of Mexico. Even after the Department of State warned Wilson that this action had no precedent, Wilson claimed the United States had the right to “inquire fully into whether the new government was complying with its own national constitution and to even go behind its existence to scrutinize whether it had come to power because its leaders were

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¹⁴For more on the *La decena trágica*, see Ross (1955, 276-329), Hidalgo (2007), Blasier (1972), and Katz (1981, 95-115).

¹⁵Ambassador Wilson subsequently tried to set the record straight and contrast himself with the broader Wilson Administration’s view towards Mexico after Wilson refused to recognize Huerta as the lawful President of Mexico (Wilson, 1914).
motivated by personal interests and ambitions” (Cline, 1963, 142).^{16} As he explained in a circular to all the European powers, “Usurpation like that of General Huerta menaces the peace and development of America as nothing else could. They not only render the development of ordered self-government impossible: they also tend to set law entirely aside...It is the purpose of the United States, therefore, to discredit and defeat such usurpations whenever they occur” (U.S. Department of State, 1922l).

Rather than consenting to his legitimacy as a ruler, President Wilson was committed to never having the United States government recognize President Huerta as the legitimate ruler of Mexico, and to hopefully find a way to help remove him from power (Wilson, 1979b, 4).

Thus as President Wilson entered the first term of his Presidency, he was already certain that he wished to oust Huerta and replace him with some form of stable constitutional leadership. Wilson, however, did not have a plan on how to replace Huerta, know who he would replace him with, or what role he should play in the continuing Mexican revolution. Wilson was only certain that the United States should remain committed to ensuring that Huerta did not remain in power. Wilson took up a strategy of “watchful waiting” to buy time and consider what next steps would be required to ensure Huerta was removed (Link, 1956, 379). With various revolutionary factions in Mexico already committed to removing Huerta from power, including the Constitutionalists who rose in the north to rebel against the usurpation of Madero’s rule, it seemed that the situation would either resolve itself, or otherwise American action might be required. This set the stage for Wilson’s actions over the next two years, and led him to begin discussions of whether foreign rule in Mexico was a viable option to ensure Mexican stability.

^{16}This upset many European diplomats in Mexico as they saw this a break of diplomatic tradition, but Wilson was determined to not allow Huerta to remain in power. See Katz (1981, 212) and Henderson (1984).
5.3.2 Uncertainty and Lack of Strategy

Given Wilson’s professed intention to oust Huerta from the Mexican presidency, that fact that the United States ended up engaging in a foreign rule mission in Mexico is unsurprising. However, the fact that Wilson utilized a leadership strategy was not pre-determined. In fact, given the traditional views of Wilsonian foreign policy and democracy promotion, it is surprising that a leadership strategy was ultimately used. In this section, I highlight how Wilson’s lack of pre-ordained strategy for ousting Huerta defined his early Mexican policy, and the crucial role that uncertainty over local institutions played in repressing the final selection of a strategy. From his inauguration forward, President Wilson did not hide that removing Huerta was the prime goal of his Mexico policy, and there was large bipartisan support in Washington for a more interventionist policy in Mexico (Grieb, 1972, 83-84). The conventional wisdom would argue that given this interest in interventionist foreign policy in Mexico, we should see policymakers in Washington working to consolidate around a leadership strategy to pursue regime change in Mexico City. Instead, President Wilson consistently fretted over the situation in Mexico and claimed that how to best handle the situation and achieve his political goals perplexed him. Rather than definite plans being drawn up, the uncertainty over the state of play in Mexico led President Wilson to attempt to find more clarity over local conditions.

Beyond a preference for regime change, Wilson and his administration did not have a clear idea on what the end state in Mexico would look like beyond some notion of stable constitutional government.17 Throughout his early tenure in office, uncertainty over local conditions in Mexico dominated Wilson’s thinking as he plotted how best to oust Huerta. Reflecting this uncertainty, no defined plans were discussed

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17 Similar to Rapport’s (2015) argument about post-conflict operations, Wilson’s focus on goals at times severely limited his interest in thinking about the means by which to best achieve those goals.
among administration officials while they attempted to understand local conditions. The inherent uncertainty in trying to ascertain the current local conditions of Mexico was heightened during this revolutionary period. During this time, Wilson openly lamented that “the trouble is that we don’t know what is going on in Mexico” (Wilson, 1979c) and further admitted in many private letters and statements that getting a grasp on the tenuous situation in Mexico was difficult. To his wife, he similarly complained about the difficulties in Mexico claiming that, “Mexico is sui generis. I do not know what to make of it. The apparent situation changes like quicksilver” (Wilson, 1979d). As cited in Link (1956, 360), he similarly lamented in other private correspondence that “Every day the news from Mexico City unsettles the news of the day before....Any hour of the day or night I may have to revise my judgment as to what it is best to do.\textsuperscript{18}

Recognizing this uncertainty, Wilson sought to obtain better information by sending envoys to Mexico City and the various revolutionary factions to attempt to ascertain their intentions, capabilities, and interests.\textsuperscript{19} In particular, Wilson sought to gain a better understanding of Huerta’s grasp on power by sending a liaison, former Minnesota Governor John Lind, to act as his eyes and ears in Mexico City (Eisenhower, 1993, 37).\textsuperscript{20} Governor Lind was tasked with determining the level of support

\textsuperscript{18}The revolutionary period saw Venustiano Carranza and Pancho Villa controlling territory in Northern Mexico, parts of Southern Mexico under the command of Emiliano Zapata. This made for three groupings of revolutionary actors in opposition to the Huerta regime, all of which had differing levels of pro-American sentiment, political ideology, military capability, and governing capacity. See Katz (1981, 119-155) for an overview of these different revolutionary factions.

\textsuperscript{19}Further highlighting this uncertainty, Link (1956, 372) notes that into late October of 1913, Wilson was convinced through second- and third-hand reports that the British government under Lord Cowdray was propping up Huerta to maintain their oil interests, and the British were “the sinister power behind Huerta.” Later, these rumors were proven false and as exaggerations of the uninformed and competing business interests. Eventually, there was a minor rapprochement of American and British interests in Mexico with Edward Grey tentatively supporting Wilson’s program against Huerta, albeit concerned about future stability if he was taken from power Link (1956, 376-377).

\textsuperscript{20}Lind, while possessing business interests in Mexico, was not selected for this mission for his diplomatic acumen nor his knowledge of Mexican political affairs. Rather, as a former Democratic
for Huerta in Mexico City and the relative state of play with the other revolutionary factions. Rather than replying back to Washington with the definitive state of play in Mexico, Lind sent contrasting reports, at times signaling that Huerta was losing control of the populace while at others informing President Wilson that Huerta was maintaining strong control of his position. This confusion extended to the revolutionary factions in northern and southern Mexico, as well. In particular, attempting to understand the relationship between local bureaucrats in northern Mexico, and Carranza’s constitutionalists who had *de facto* control of the territory, made Lind’s job even more difficult, resulting in many contrasting and conflicting opinions sent back to Washington.

Uncertainty pushed the administration to consider many different plans for how to oust Huerta, ranging from diplomatic negotiations to marching to Mexico City to impose entirely new liberal institutions. At different points in this period, Wilson considered a full scale invasion of Mexico City, a negotiated replacement with another President sympathetic to the conservative elite, and/or materially supporting one of the revolutionary factions (Katz, 1981, 183-184). Each policy option had different benefits and drawbacks, but all required certain conditions to exist in order to meet American goals. While various options appealed in different Washington circles, knowing what strategy would succeed in Mexico was impossible *ex ante*. There was no pre-ordained decision for intervention, and no off-the-shelf strategy for how to impose US wishes on Mexico following any armed invasion. Instead, the strategic options

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21 Wilson’s personal advisor Edward House illustrates this point in his diary entries cited in Link (1956, 379). House notes that in October of 1913 he thinks Wilson has decided to declare war on Mexico, blockade their major ports, and send troops into Northern Mexico. However by November 1st, Wilson continues to negotiate with Huerta over future plans.

22 There was however a general war plan, called War Plan Green, that had been outlined, main-
and choices were left open as Wilson continued to seek more information about local conditions. With the current conditions on the ground uncertain, the United States never adopted a single policy, and all options were kept open as President Wilson waited for more information to present itself.

Contrary to traditional thinking on Wilson, however, he was initially very reluctant to intervene militarily to oust President Huerta. As Lind continued to offer contrasting reports about Huerta and the stability of Mexico, many of Wilson’s confidants urged him towards armed intervention. Wilson resisted calls for armed action and stayed committed to the idea that there was a diplomatic solution available. As Wilson himself said, “intervention must be avoided until a time comes when it is inevitable, which God forbid!” (Wilson, 1979h, 190). Even with Lind’s continuing to report directly to President Wilson, Wilson could not ascertain the true level of support that Huerta retained in Mexico City. It was difficult to accurately assess from Washington what the various factions and government forces were thinking and planning. While the press, congress, friends, and political foes all pressured Wilson with different proposals for peace and intervention, Wilson still clamored for a solution he found acceptable.

However, Huerta’s continued angering of Wilson, through breaking negotiations and promises, enshrined in Wilson a commitment to find an armed solution. Wilson’s

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23 Throughout this period, Wilson negotiated with Huerta’s representatives, only to have Huerta and his government balk at various deals and change their minds at the last second. These upheavals and changes in Huerta’s willingness to make a deal clouded Wilson’s view of the current situation in Mexico.
commitment to use armed force emerged once Huerta turned his back on a proposed agreement to allow for interim elections, and instead purged the Mexican congress and declared himself ruler again. This act angered Wilson more than most, leading him to say in his private letters that “our friend Huerta is a diverting brute” who is “so full of bravado, the bravado of ignorance.” He went on to admit that “one moment you long for his blood, and the next you find yourself entertaining a sneaking admiration for his nerve” (Wilson, 1979e). After completely turning Mexico towards his own despotic rule, Wilson became confident a peaceful solution could not be reached and propelled his assessment that the situation mandated an armed solution.

As Huerta cemented Wilson’s commitment to armed intervention and regime change, Wilson looked for local opposition movements that might be able to support his goals in Mexico. As expected, Wilson sought to learn if opposition movements existed that they could place in power and achieve their goals. He wanted to determine the suitability and capacity of the opposition for managing the country before committing to aid their cause and pursuing armed intervention to place them in power. Recognizing that they did not know the true state of play in Mexico, and could benefit from partnering with one of the revolutionary factions, Wilson sought to treat with General Venustiano Carranza to see if supporting the Constitutionalist cause might prove fruitful for American interests. Wilson instructed his advisers

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24 The proposed accord was structured such that Huerta would resign the presidency and hold new elections where he could not run, but he could propose another candidate and return to private life. While Wilson thought this was a satisfactory solution to the crisis, and admitted he would recognize the next Mexican government, Huerta abandoned this agreement by closing parliament and consolidating power in a despotic manner, deeply angering Wilson (Link, 1956, 365-366).

25 Under the Díaz regime, Carranza was a municipal president in the state of Coahuila and a senator in the Mexican legislature. He was largely predicted to become governor of Coahuila in 1909 until Díaz unexpectedly did not support him in final race, contributing to Carranza’s move to support Madero in his uprising against the Díaz regime (Richmond, 1983). Following Madero taking power from Díaz, Carranza did become Governor of Coahuila and moved to enact differing liberalizing reforms than Madero in the Federal capital. Eventually Carranza and Madero had a falling out due to Carranza feeling Madero was compromising his reforms too much, and allowing counter-revolutionaries and conservatives to regain too much power (Katz, 1981, 128-134). Once Madero was assassinated and Huerta installed himself as President, Carranza moved to have Coahuila engage in
to treat with the Constitutionalist leader Carranza in an attempt to ascertain his motives and views of American action, and to see whether he could clarify the current local conditions in Mexico. Wilson and his advisers proposed to Carranza that coordinating a intervention with Carranza’s faction of revolutionaries could prove a useful endeavor for both parties. Some even went so far as to propose to partitioning Northern Mexico to Carranza (Katz, 1981, 195). When Carranza refused to endorse any plan for American intervention, Wilson and his administration rethought the plan, so as to not anger both the revolutionaries and the current regime simultaneously.\(^{26}\) The Constitutionalists never sent clear signals about their intentions and goals, worrying Wilson and leading him to send a message to the Constitutionalists explaining that any potential future intervention was out of friendship, not against Constitutionalist interests (Wilson, 1979f).\(^{27}\)

This left Wilson wondering whether Carranza could serve as a suitable agent in Mexico and would work with the United States on reforming the Mexican states, or whether he would work against American interests. By April 1914, after not being able to exercise the desired level of control over the revolutionaries, conservative land owners, or any real player in Mexico, Wilson committed to using US military action to influence events on the ground. He just needed an excuse to launch his intervention (Katz, 1981, 196). However, with the uncertainty surrounding current and future events in Mexico, the strategy the American forces would implement following armed intervention was unknown.

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open rebellion against the Huerta regime, and eventually became the head of the Constitutionalist Army (Gilderhus, 1977, 3-4).

\(^{26}\)The only agreement reached was for the US to remove the arms embargo on the Constitutionalists, allowing legal arms sales from the United States with the intention of making the Constitutionalists a threat to Huerta (Wilson, 1979g).

\(^{27}\)As Wilson said in his dispatch to Carranza on the prospective likelihood of an American armed intervention, “the Constitutionalists would not question the good faith or motives of the President if he should so act. They would know that he had done so because he deemed it an imperative duty” (Wilson, 1979f).
As my theory predicts, even though the choice to engage in regime change was decided upon early in the Wilson administration, uncertainty prohibited Wilson from ever deciding upon a consolidated strategy for foreign rule during the post-regime change period. At different times, Wilson advocated peaceful diplomatic solutions, leadership strategies and institutional strategies, all based on what his view of local Mexican institutions were at that specific time. Also, in accordance with my theory, while the goals of regime change were present, the strategic decisions on what to do to achieve those goals after armed intervention were still undecided when a crisis emerged and armed intervention was launched to respond to the developing crisis. The focus remained on removing Huerta from power, but understanding what strategy would best serve this political goal was unknown. Thus uncertainty over local contexts hampered the Wilson administration in planning for post-intervention period and relegated those decisions to a later date.

5.3.3 The Fog of Intervention and Initial Assessment

While the Wilson administration was committed to regime change in Mexico, it was not committed to any defined date to launch an armed intervention. Preference for armed action grew nearly every day, as Wilson could not ameliorate the uncertain assessments of Mexican institutions and revolutionary bands coming from Mexico. Finally, a crisis emerged that propelled US towards armed action. In 1914, a small incident in Tampico gave Wilson and the Americans an excuse to escalate their military pressure and compel the end of the Huerta regime. Wilson’s justification for intervention reads at times as farce, further highlighting his prior conviction to carrying out a regime change. On April 9th, 1914, eight crew members of the American naval cruiser *Dolphin* went ashore at Tampico to secure fuel for their vessel, whereby they were mistakenly arrested by the local detachment of the Mexican government military
police. After the Mexican general in command of the local Mexican forces realized the mistake two hours later, he promptly released the Americans and apologized. The American admiral in command of the *Dolphin*, Henry Mayo, was not satisfied with this response and demanded further restitution: a formal apology, the arrest of the officer who accosted the American crew members, and most contentiously, a 21-gun salute to the American flag (U.S. Department of State, 1922a). The Mexican general arranged for the apology and arrest of the officer in Tampico, but could not fire the 21-gun salute without approval from President Huerta. Insulted by Mexican refusal, Wilson and Secretary of State Bryan derided this event as a sign of disrespect to the United States and demanded the Mexican government respect the American flag in a sign of contrition.  

The next two weeks found the American *Chargé D’Affairs* in Mexico City, Nelson O’Shaughnessy, furiously sending proposals back and forth between Secretary of State Bryan and General Huerta, with Huerta and his advisers seeking to find alternative means of restitution, which President Wilson promptly rejected (U.S. Department of State, 1922b). Huerta’s refusal of an unconditional salute of the American flag lead to Wilson to obtain congressional approval for armed intervention

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28 Tampico was under martial law at the time, unbeknownst to the American landing party, which is why the military officers were detained. The controversial part of the arrest, however, was that the local Mexican military commander forced two of the landing party who were still in the American vessel to disembark and come with them. According to international law at the time, the American vessel was technically American sovereign soil, thus making the incident an act of war. This fact was latched onto as a deep affront to the United States, even though technically it was a minor mishap (Sweetman, 1968, 32-35).

29 At the same time, Wilson also latched on to two other insignificant events to bolster his claims of intentional offense against the United States, namely the temporary arrest of a U.S. mail orderly who was mistaken for a Mexican Army deserter, and the delay of one telegram to the embassy in Mexico City. Both events were inconsequential, but were utilized by Wilson to bolster his claims to the American public that Huerta was insulting the United States (Wilson, 1979a). For more information of how presidents use deceitful justifications to boost support for armed conflict, see Schuessler (2015).

30 O’Shaughnessy was the main diplomatic presence in Mexico City following the departure of Ambassador Henry Lane Wilson. For more on O’Shaughnessy and his experiences in Mexico see O’Shaughnessy (1916).
against Mexico on April 20th. Planning began immediately for an incursion to occupy the Tampico custom house as an initial armed intervention. While Wilson came to power protesting against President Taft’s ‘Dollar Diplomacy’ and President Roosevelt’s ‘Big Stick’ diplomacy, the initial plans for intervention in Mexico ironically echoed their actions and built on justifications given in the Roosevelt Corollary. The plans for intervention, however, were escalated and modified once intelligence confirmed that the German ship Ypiranga, laden with arms headed for Huerta’s troops, was bound for the important port Veracruz on April 21st (U.S. Department of State, 1922c).31 Determined to prevent Huerta from receiving the arms, Wilson gave the order to accelerate the invasion plan and switch invasion sites to Veracruz. Early the next day, Rear Admiral Fletcher launched his operation against Veracruz where the US first moved to occupy the customs house to prevent the weapons from being delivered (U.S. Department of State, 1922m). As one expects, given the hasty planning, shifting landing sites, and quick decision-making, the foreign rule strategy was not under consideration and it was left largely undecided until after the American forces occupied the customhouses and Veracruz.

By April 22nd, Fletcher’s forces had completely occupied Veracruz.32 However, after completing the invasion, Fletcher and the American forces had no plan for the

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31 Veracruz was a strategic location that would be the logical landing point to launch a march to Mexico City. Once the city was captured, naval bombardment from the coast would force Mexican defenders back to the city, and the invader would have a clear drive to the capital. Hernan Cortes landed and founded the settlement at Veracruz in 1519, setting the stage for future invasions being coordinated from the coastal city (Langley, 1983, 91-93). Beyond the American forces in 1848 using Veracruz as a landing site prior to marching to Mexico City, Veracruz was also the landing point for the French intervention in Mexico in 1862 and the arrival of Emperor Maximilian in 1864 (The New York Times, 1864).

32 While the landing force occupied the city quickly, there was still some fighting and loss of life during the landing. While many of Huerta’s military units did retreat to Mexico City prior to the invasion, perhaps to prepare for a prospective American invasion to the capital, the residents of Veracruz did resist the landing. Cadets from the local Naval academy joined with local volunteers to defend the city, including several snipers that terrorized the landing American forces. Eventually, the Americans were able to complete their mission and take the city with only 19 American deaths and 126 Mexican defenders killed (Katz, 1981, 197).
next stage of operations after landing and taking the city, largely unsure of what foreign rule strategy to follow (Langley, 1983, 102). As described above, beyond a commitment to use the invasion as a means to compel Huerta from power, there was no plan in Washington as to the next steps the invasion should take. The landing force possessed much confusion as they complained they had no clear guidance for the next steps they should take. Highlighting this lack of strategic planning and information prior to intervention, the experiences of Ensign Paul Foster exemplified the initial response of the American landing force and the role the intervention force played in instituting foreign rule in Veracruz. Upon landing in Veracruz, Ensign Foster decided to investigate the Municipal Palace of Veracruz and gathered as many local maps as he could find, noting that prior to their arrival in Veracruz, “none of us on the Utah had ever seen a map of Veracruz” (Sweetman, 1968, 125). Even with no previous knowledge of the city, nor ideas over how to carry out the foreign rule mission, Ensign Foster’s presence inside the Municipal Palace was taken as a sign by locals that Americans had taken over sovereign authority of the city. Local residents continued to walk to the Municipal Palace to ask for marriage licenses and death certificates, among other municipal functions, treating Ensign Foster and the American foreign rulers as the de facto sovereign authority of the territory. Soon, Ensign Foster began working with the pre-existing bureaucrats of the city to manage the municipal functions, and found ways to maintain the existing bureaucracy in the city while working to reform some of its practices (Sweetman, 1968, 126). Given the lack of plans and orders from Washington, Fletcher was required to decide how best to continue the occupation of the city. Content for now to make their base in Veracruz and wait for further instructions, Fletcher imposed military government in the city and the American forces began to assess the strength of current institutions in the surrounding area.

Once Fletcher controlled Veracruz, as my theory predicts, he showed an initial
preference for maintaining local institutions and using a leadership strategy as they further assessed the local conditions in Veracruz. Immediately upon occupying the city, Fletcher announced that he wished that “the civil officials of Vera Cruz continue in the peaceful pursuit of their occupations” and that the occupying force had no intention “to interfere with the administration of the civil affairs of Vera Cruz” (U.S. Department of State, 1922d, 480-481). Fletcher was left alone to decide how best to manage the occupation and provide assessments of how the situation was unfolding. Indeed, in first days following the invasion, Fletcher informed the municipal government of Veracruz that if “they failed to establish a government themselves, I would be obliged to establish one for them” (Sweetman, 1968, 139). And Fletcher was pleased to see the Mayor of Veracruz and the rest of the city’s civil administration agreeing to stay in their posts and not have to rely on his troops governing the city (Sweetman, 1968, 139-140).33

Indicative of his free hand is his first choice of the head of civil administration of the city, Robert J. Kerr, who Sweetman (1968, 156) described as a “persona non grata” in Washington due to his statements on the President’s Mexico policy.34 While eventually forced to change due to political pressure from Washington, the fact that Fletcher’s natural inclination was to maintain the current political institutions, manage the occupation of the city using local bureaucrats, and rely on an expert of Mexican civil law while waiting for the overall strategy to coalesce illustrates that lack of strategy and assessment of local institutions is a key feature of the post-

33 Sweetman (1968, 154-155) notes further that the management of the city under American control and the maintenance of order in the city by the municipal government was quite boring for the American authors dispatched to chronicle the invasion. American author Jack London was quite disappointed when there was not much more fighting in the city, and the governing of the city was well maintained.

34 Kerr was an American lawyer who worked in Mexico and understood Mexican constitutional law, making him a valuable asset to the American foreign rulers. However, he was also a staunch Republican and critic of Wilson’s Mexico policy, leading Washington to vociferously oppose his appointment when they learned of it (Eisenhower, 1993, 136).
intervention period. As I argue, the American foreign rulers followed their initial preference for achieving their goals by maintaining local institutions in place while assessment is carried out, and this lead to strategic decision-making emphasizing the ability of Mexican bureaucrats to work with the American foreign rulers.

Outside of Veracruz, other military leaders and policymakers used the initial intervention to justify their preferences for an expanded invasion. Building on prior preferences to engage in a full-scale invasion of Mexico to protect business and oil interests, many saw the successful landing and immediately pushed to expand the occupation and press the advantage of the American force. A few military commanders felt that the landing in Veracruz should be the beginning for a larger march and invasion to the Mexico City, pushing to depose Huerta once and for all (Katz, 1981, 198). This group, including the Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army Leonard Wood, the head of the insular affairs bureau in the War Department General Frank MacIntyre, and Secretary of War Lindley Garrison, all felt that the best policy to promote American interests would be a march to Mexico City to place an American stamp on the revolution and ensure American interests were maintained through expansive means. 35 Their argument to President Wilson centered on the claim that Mexico could never achieve constitutional governance, which was articulated by General MacIntyre: “We preach to the crowed that we must guarantee legal election and order in our sister republic, knowing full well that in the half-civilized Latin American countries almost every change of government is achieved not through election by through revolution” (Katz, 1981, 198).

Those who sought an expanded foreign rule mission in Mexico, including a march from Veracruz to Mexico City, felt there was no evidence that Mexico could carry out

35 In fact, at the time of the Veracruz landing, Secretary of War Garrison had started to place National Guard units on alert to be mobilized for a broader Mexican war, and had started planning for a general campaign marching from Tampico and Veracruz to capture Mexico City (Link, 1956, 401).
the form of governance that Wilson claimed Mexico needed to achieve his goals, and thus American interests could only be achieved through an expanded institutional strategy. Prior to assessment on the ground, this presents evidence that even back in Washington concerns over institutional capacity and the strength of institutions to carry out constitutional rule drove much of the strategic discussions in both the foreign policy institutions and among military elite. Calls for a larger invasion and institutional-type strategies resonated at home, and among this group of military elites following the success of the initial landing. Many in Washington continued to demand a larger occupation that would follow through on Wilson’s claim of wanting to teach the Mexicans “to elect good men,” and finally reach a settlement of the dysfunction to the south. And while Wilson was not initially in favor of an expanded invasion prior to the Veracruz landing, he watched in earnest to see how things played out with the intervention force. Before deploying more troops and making a final push, however, Wilson and his advisers sought to assess how local actors and institutions were responding to the limited intervention.

While initial reports of the landing and occupation that Washington received were positive, the invasion did not go as smoothly as Wilson anticipated. Resistance in Veracruz was not overwhelming, but Huerta’s forces did muster some opposition and protected their retreat back to defend the capital. American forces were able to occupy the city in short order, but the resistance of the city did leave an impact. Beyond Huerta’s forces, the revolutionary bands reacted negatively to Wilson’s intervention, although they stopped promoting armed action against American forces if they did not enter the territory controlled by them. Carranza himself announced to the American invasion force that “the invasion of our territory, the station of American troops in the port of Veracruz, the violation of our rights as a sovereign, free, and independent state could provoke us to an unequal by just war, which we wish to

36Cited in Link (1956, 375).
avoid” (Katz, 1981, 197). Wilson had not consulted Carranza before launching his intervention against Huerta, but he had hoped Carranza and others would welcome his invasion and support his mission against Huerta.\footnote{Beyond Mexican opinion, it is worth noting that some American groups turned against Wilson, as well as church associations, civil society groups, and others who protested the action in America’s southern neighbor (Link, 1956, 404-405)} While Mexican opinion was turning against Wilson’s action, greater information about the capacity of Mexican bureaucrats and revolutionary bands were being communicated to both Wilson and the American forces present in Veracruz. As the fog of intervention began to clear, the effectiveness of the bureaucrats in Veracruz and the information communicated by Carranza caused Wilson to continue with the leadership strategy that proved successful in the city and focus on implementing that strategy in his mission to oust Huerta.

Following the intervention, the lack of a pre-existing foreign rule strategy manifested itself through an initial imposition of a leadership strategy until the local assessment process could lift the fog of intervention. It was clear that no pre-defined plan or strategy existed following the successful capture of the city, even though it was as successful as initially conceived. Instead of seeking to install new institutions however, the landing force took it upon themselves to install and work with the local municipal government and attempt to see how they were able to help American goals. Rather than following the wishes of some in Washington, the military commanders on the ground assessed local conditions and continued to monitor the strength of institutions to allow for strategic decision-making to occur. As my theory expects, their natural inclination was to attempt a leadership strategy and monitor how it performed, in order to maintain readiness for a larger mission if required. However, how locals responded to this initial landing largely drove the strategic decision-making process, as it revealed more information to the administration about the next best steps and the ability of local institutions to cooperate and rebel against American...
5.3.4 Local Institutional Strength and Strategic Decision-Making

After the initial intervention in Veracruz, Wilson and his administration eventually determined that local conditions mandated employing a leadership strategy to carry out this foreign rule mission. They determined that working to oust Huerta and replacing him with Carranza would best serve American interests and follow through on their initial intentions. Given the surprising choice of a leadership strategy, because of the conventional wisdom about Wilson’s preferences, we ask how local institutional strength led to the selection of strategy, and how might the agent capacity and armed resistance mechanisms have contributed to this strategic choice. In this section, I highlight how the assessment of local institutions occurred by walking through the implementation of the leadership strategy in Mexico.

Initially, the American landing party in Veracruz focused on assessing the quality of the local bureaucrats and determined that they were capable of working towards American political goals. This assessment process, they argued, illustrated the local bureaucrats’ capacity to work with American forces to achieve the occupation force’s goals. From the onset of military government in Veracruz, military forces monitored the effectiveness of local institutions and the responses of the various revolutionary factions. In each report back to Washington, the American military commanders on the ground constantly commended the local bureaucrats as to their ability to carry out the goals, even as Huerta’s forces abandoned the city (Sweetman, 1968, 156). While the American military government took de facto control of many governance functions in the city, most of the bureaucrats in the city helped the military forces to open schools, deliver mail, and enforce health codes, among other functions (Langley, 1983, 102-103). As is often the case when foreign rule is initialized, the assessment process focused on a few infrastructure projects that helped determine the capacity of
local institutions to carry out American edicts. In this case, the Veracruz bureaucrats and military government collaborated on a few sanitation and health code projects to help improve the public health infrastructure of the city. In each of these projects, the military government reported success back to Washington and commended the local elites for their efforts and ability to work with American goals, indicating an ability to use local institutions to benefit American plans for Mexico.

At the same time in Washington, Mexico’s capacity for armed resistance was also on the mind. Upon instituting foreign rule in Veracruz, Washington was most interested in learning how Carranza and the Constitutionalists would view their actions in Veracruz. Some in Washington had hoped Carranza would welcome the landing at Veracruz and encourage a further US military push towards Mexico City. Their hopes were for Carranza to want to work with American forces to depose Huerta and rebuild Mexico in America’s image. To this faction’s dismay, however, Carranza and all other Mexican revolutionary factions resoundingly condemned the American foreign rule mission as an affront to Mexican sovereignty (U.S. Department of State, 1922i). Hopes for coordinated military action quickly faded as local factions dismissed American actions. Fortunately for the American occupiers, Carranza and the Constitutionalists announced that they would not interfere or resist any American action in Veracruz, but could not agree to work with the American mission if they decided to march towards Mexico City.

Contemporaneously, Carranza and the Constitutionalists were starting to achieve battlefield success against Huerta as they marched from their strongholds in northern Mexico towards Mexico City (U.S. Department of State, 1922p). This showed Washington the capacity for the Constitutionalists to effectively resist an institutional strategy, but also illustrated their capacity for ruling effectively in Mexico City. This should not surprise us, given Carranza’s history serving as a bureaucrat and governor of Coahuila; still, the increased evidence of Carranza’s ability to serve as a capable
agent, coupled with his capacity for resistance, painted a stark picture for the Wilson administration. Washington recognized that Mexican bureaucrats were capable enough to carry out their edicts. In addition, while it was feasible to land a larger force and march to Mexico City, that would not guarantee a quick and successful outcome. Rather, Wilson recognized that Carranza could act as a suitable agent in accomplishing American goals, namely stabilizing Mexico and honoring fair American business interests.\footnote{John Lind’s counsel to Wilson was for full support of Carranza and a refusal to back any ceasefires that would aid Huerta in rebuilding his strength. As quoted in Grieb (1972, 163), Lind reminded Wilson that “in dealing with Huerta it must not be lost sight of for a moment that we are dealing with a Frankenstein devoid of all moral judgment, ruled by appetite and passion, and guided by cunning.” Additionally, Lind maintained his contacts with the Constitutionalists during this period and became known as the Constitutionalists’ “most loyal and most important friend among the Americans” (Grieb, 1972, 163).}

While Carranza might not serve as an absolutely reliable American agent in terms of every goal of the Washington elite, his willingness to work with broad American interests made him suitable, and the institutions made him a capable agent. Thus, Wilson decided upon continuing to think of ways to work with the Constitutionalists to ensure that Huerta was defeated, even in light of their condemnation, and eventually turned to ensuring Carranza replaced Huerta in power.

Given the assessment and decisions to use a leadership strategy in this period, how was it implemented? Much like the odd confluence of events that led to the invasion of Veracruz, Wilson took advantage of another set of events to enact his leadership strategy in Mexico and install Carranza as President. This possibility emerged when the foreign ministers of Argentina, Brazil and Chile (henceforth the mediators) proposed holding a conference to negotiate the dispute over Veracruz and the Tampico incident between Mexico and the United States.\footnote{Wilson quickly agreed to the mediation, to be held at Niagara Falls, where representatives from the United States, Huerta’s government, and eventually the Constitutionalists were invited (U.S. Department of State, 1922a). In the end, the Constitutionalists refused to take part in the official negotiations, but were an ever looming presence over the proceedings.}
negotiations, Wilson utilized the occupation of Veracruz and the threat of a Mexico City invasion as a means to depose Huerta and install Carranza. The United States unequivocally stated that Huerta must step down and a new non-neutral regime must take power to undertake the necessary political and economic reforms in Mexico before they ended the occupation. Secretary of State Bryan directly confirmed to the mediators that the United States would only remove the occupation troops when “this Government is finally and fully satisfied that the programme contemplated will be carried out in full respects,” implying that the occupation would only end with a change of leadership in Mexico City (U.S. Department of State, 1922q, 509). The threat of further invasion hung heavy over the negotiations with Secretary Bryan, suggesting “the success of the Constitutionalists is now inevitable. The only question we can now answer without armed intervention on the part of the United States is this: Can the result be moderated; how can it be brought about without further bloodshed...If we do not successfully answer these question, the settlement must come by arms, either ours of those of the Constitutionalists” (U.S. Department of State, 1922q, 509-510).

Huerta and the mediators continually tried to propose alternative agreements to the Americans that would allow him to retain political influence, but the Americans harshly pointed out that “we can deal only with the facts in Mexico as they now stand” (U.S. Department of State, 1922r, 506), implying that Huerta’s wishes of retaining power were irrelevant. The facts on the ground, as Wilson and Bryan called them, determined how American military coercion could produce regime change, focusing solely on how to place Carranza’s Constitutionalists in power, an agent Wilson felt could enact reforms and would suit American interests. Eventually

40Link (1956, 411) quotes Wilson as reporting to the mediators and Huerta’s negotiators during this period “that unless the United States is to intervene with arms and practically conquer Mexico, which nobody desires, the only alternative to such a plan as we propose is the armed entrance of Carranza into Mexico City and the assumption of the provisional presidency by Carranza himself.” At this point, it was clear that Carranza was going to be the next leader in Mexico City, and it was
Huerta recognized his predicament and relented. Huerta and the Americans reached an agreement where the Americans would vacate Veracruz after ensuring all local citizens were protected, and Huerta agreed to leave office. Huerta agreed to step down as President on July 15th, less than three months after Wilson gave the order to land in Veracruz (U.S. Department of State, 1922j).

To ensure that there was a smooth transition to the Carranza regime and that American interests were protected, Wilson and the United States refused to end the occupation of Veracruz until after Huerta’s resignation and a successful implementation of the new Carranza regime. Consistent with the view that foreign rulers constantly assess the capacity of the agents they have installed, Wilson maintained the occupation as a threat to ensure the transfer of Carranza occurred quickly and appropriately. It also served as a way to assess whether the Constitutionalists could effectively hold the reins of power in Mexico City. Once Carranza took power, Secretary of State Bryan relayed that the United States would continue to assess the progress of the Constitutionalists and track the transition. He intimated that “every step taken by the Constitutionalist leaders from this moment on...must of necessity, therefore, play a very important part in determining whether it will be possible for the United States to recognize the government” (U.S. Department of State, 1922s, 568-569).

Wilson and his advisers continued to assess whether Carranza and his institutions were fulfilling the goals of the United States before committing to removing the American military presence from the country. Secretary Bryan subtly intimated to the Constitutionalists that “the success or failure of the Constitutionalist cause is just a determination of what tactics it would take to make him leader.

Huerta stepped down and left his Minister of Foreign Affairs to negotiate the transfer of control of the government to the Constitutionalists. Huerta, instead of seeing Carranza march into Mexico City, fled the country and ended up dying two years later in Texas. In a grand irony, Huerta evacuated the country through US occupied Veracruz (Grieb, 1972, 172).
to be determined now,” (U.S. Department of State, 1922t, 577), using the military occupation to threaten non-recognition of the government if Carranza did not have the ability to meet the political goals of the Americans. The implicit threat offered by Secretary Bryan and others was that if Carranza did not appear to have sufficient control over Mexican institutions and reforms, an institutional strategy was still possible to enact. By August 22nd, however, Carranza was fully in control of the Mexican government and the Americans were sufficiently pleased with Carranza’s ability to manage Mexico’s governmental institutions so as to promote stability and modest reforms. Carranza publicly praised President Wilson for his policy in Mexico, thanked Secretary of State Bryan for his help, and generally seemed appreciative of American support and receptive to American suggestions on how to transition to a stable government (U.S. Department of State, 1922k). Thus three months after Carranza’s march to Mexico City and the imposition of his new regime, the American occupation force withdrew from Veracruz, pleased with Carranza’s policies and his control of government, and successfully completed the foreign rule operation. Wilson, fully pleased with the leadership strategy that was implemented, continued to support Carranza throughout the next years of tumultuous Mexican history, even when crises and clear policy differences emerged in subsequent years.

In the end, how did local institutions and conditions push the United States to pursue a leadership strategy centered around installing Carranza in power? First with

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42This culminated on the official celebration of Mexican independence with a cheer for Wilson. “In the name of Hidalgo, of Morelos, of Guerrero, of Juarez, of Madero, and of Bolivar and of Washington, in the name of all these rich crystallizations of the ages, in the name of all those men whose features will remain engraved on ineffaceable medallions forever, let us give a hearty cheer for Professor Woodrow Wilson, President of the United States of America” (Vice Consul Silliman to the Secretary of State, 1922).

43While this marked the end of the American foreign rule mission in Mexico, Wilson and Carranza’s relationship would strain in subsequent years, particularly in 1917 after the adoption of a new Mexican constitution and the emergence of the Zimmerman Telegram. For more on this relationship breaking down see Katz (1981, 493-503); Gilderhus (1977, 53-71); Richmond (1983, 189-218).
regards to agent capacity: both upon landing in Veracruz and after deposing Huerta, officials in Washington and commanders in Veracruz needed to ascertain whether local bureaucrats and leaders in the capital could help enact the policies that Washington deemed necessary. Wilson recognized that local institutions in Mexico were sufficiently strong, so as to not require the United States to implement a program of institution building in order to impose their preferred policy changes. The Americans could work with local bureaucrats and achieve their goals, making for a more cost-effective mission. When it was clear that the bureaucrats in Veracruz could enact the military government’s new sanitation and public health policies, and Carranza could ensure he would aid in propelling American reforms and interests forward, only then was the United States confident that a leadership strategy would prove successful. Wilson was able to achieve his political goals with fewer resources spent, due to the capacity of local institutions in Mexico and Carranza as an agent of American foreign rule. Carranza’s ability to maintain a level of stability upon taking control in Mexico City and the capacity he showed for governing the northern regions of Mexico under his control provided evidence that he could serve as a capable agent to promote American interests. Coupled with the evidence from Veracruz itself, Mexican institutions were deemed capable, and a leadership strategy was utilized.

Second, after landing in Veracruz the assessment of the likelihood of armed resistance to further American action was a key deterrent preventing the United States from marching into Mexico City. The likelihood of future resistance from current bureaucrats, revolutionary factions, and other elements in the state played a large role in helping the United States determine that deposing current institutions would be a mistake. Throughout the cables between Veracruz, Mexico City, and Washington, the possibility of increased resistance if the Americans were to take a more active institutional approach worried many officials. Given the desire for increased stability in Mexico, an institutional strategy would have made American political goals harder
to achieve. The condemnation and rebukes Wilson and the Americans faced from different factions within Mexico made Wilson reassess his plans and reaffirmed his belief in what he called a Mexican solution for Mexico, namely a leadership style strategy. Prospective resistance pushed Wilson to scrap any idea of marching to Mexico City and conducting a full invasion of Mexico as productive means of deposing Huerta. The reaction against the American occupation and realization of the strength of the possible resistance made Wilson consider all other possible strategies to place Carranza in power (U.S. Department of State, 1922). The presence and strength of various revolutionary bands competing for state power made the threat of strong resistance tangible, and thus this assessment placed paramount importance on not dislocating the current institutions in place. Replacing relatively strong state institutions with weaker new institutions that could not compete with the capacity of the Constitutionalists and other rebel groups would have made American goals harder to obtain.

Combined, the realization of an increased likelihood of resistance and a high probability that the Americans could install a functional leader in Mexico City lead to Wilson’s choice for a leadership strategy in Mexico. In contrast to traditional thinking on Wilson, utilizing a leadership strategy in Mexico became the preference due to local conditions that became evident only following intervention. While the situation in Mexico continued to unfold with threats of renewed American intervention and the re-establishment of foreign rule in subsequent years as the revolutionary period continued, for the next imposition of foreign rule in Latin America, Wilson’s administration turned to the island of Hispaniola.\footnote{For more on the period after the conclusion of the occupation of Veracruz and Mexican and American relations, see Richmond (1983, 189-203), Link (1960, 629-644), and Gilderhus (1977)}
5.4 Dominican Republic

5.4.1 Background – Setting the Stage

The tension between the United States’ interests and the sovereignty of the Dominican Republic was a recurring theme for American-Dominican relations in both the 19th and 20th centuries. This included a period in the 19th century where there were prospective attempts by Secretary of State William Seward and others to negotiate American naval basing rights on the island, or alternatively, full annexation of the island to the United States (Calder, 1984, 2).\(^{45}\) In the early 20th century, American concerns about the Dominican Republic focused on rising levels of Dominican debt owed to German banks, and the strategic threat posed by prospective German intervention (Calder, 1984, xii). As noted previously, Germany had great interest in obtaining a Caribbean naval base to project their growing naval forces into the Western hemisphere. The United States and President Roosevelt were eager to prevent this possibility, and thus became intimately concerned with Dominican debt to German banks being used as a prospective justification for Germany to seize a port or the entire island.\(^{46}\) German control over the island would allow for Germany to limit America’s strategic sea lanes of communication, and challenge American freedom of movement and hegemony in the region. Thus, in 1905 the United States, under President Roosevelt, reached an agreement with the Dominican government to create a customs receivership for the country, under which the United States would

\(^{45}\)While American business interests seemed to largely drive the push for Dominican annexation, some elites in Santo Domingo did fear prospective aggression from their Haitian neighbors, and felt this was one solution for the problem. The proposal for annexation went so far as to receive a senate vote, but was defeated. For a good overview of this period, see Fazal (2011, 132-140).

\(^{46}\)As Fazal (2011, 140-143) synthesizes, contemporaneous accounts of American actions in the Dominican Republic consistently reported that Germany did not accept the Monroe Doctrine and would continue to seek port facilities and expanded interests in the Caribbean. Unlike Seward however, Roosevelt was not interested in annexing the Dominican Republic. Instead, President Roosevelt stated he had “about the same desire to annex it as a gorged boa constrictor might have to swallow a porcupine wrong-end-to” (Welles, 1928, 918).
take control of collecting customs taxes and ensure they were used to pay back foreign creditors, ameliorating the justification for German intervention (Langley, 1983; Welles, 1928). With the receivership agreement in place, the United States collected customs revenues and also had authority to help the Dominican Republic reduce its debt. Both were important measures to help Dominican economic vitality and reduce German influence over the island. Decreasing the Dominican Republic’s debt level would make a German intervention harder to justify.

Germany’s interest in Caribbean expansion remained when President Wilson was elected, and the 1907 treaty and customs receivership remained as relevant as the day the United States signed it. However, prior to Wilson’s arrival in the White House, events would continue to unfold in the Dominican Republic that threatened Dominican stability and American interests. After the initial customs receivership agreement in 1906, the Dominican people elected a new President, Ramón Cáceres. Cáceres was roundly praised in Washington for his plans to grow the country’s economy, modernize the state’s bureaucracy, and produce the stability that Washington was looking for (Calder, 1984, 4-5). As evidence of his unique stability, Cáceres served as President for twice as many years as the next longest tenured President of the Dominican Republic since the establishment of the Second Republic in 1865, promoting a period of economic stability and growth. Serv ing for close to six years, he

47 The customs receivership was ratified as a treaty in 1907, where its first steps included having the United States issue a loan to the Dominican government to pay the totality of their foreign loans and make the United States their only creditor.

48 The United States explicitly invoked the Roosevelt Corollary when signing the treaty in order to justify their increased involvement with Santo Domingo (Gilderhus, 2000, 30). While the Roosevelt Corollary was issued in response to German and British action in Venezuela, Veeser (2003) argues that the European interests in the Dominican Republic was one of the major catalysts that drove the need for Roosevelt to issue his corollary in 1904. Ricard (2006) argues that the Roosevelt Corollary was explicitly created during this period to limit the influence of Germany in the region and deter their machinations over reducing American control of the Caribbean.

49 As Smith (1994, 76) notes, the leadership tenure of Dominican presidents was often less than one year and “between 1844 and 1916, the Dominican Republic had nineteen constitutions and twenty-three successful coups; only three of its forty-two presidents actually completed a term in
more than tripled the average length of a Dominican presidential term. However, in 1911 Cáceres was assassinated by a rival faction, leading to the outbreak of rebellion and civil war.\textsuperscript{50} This outbreak of violence greatly troubled the Taft administration, and the six years of stability and economic growth were largely lost in the resulting chaos and power vacuum (Tillman, 2015, 288-291). The crisis was resolved with American aid, largely through coercive ‘dollar diplomacy,’ whereby Taft threatened to withhold the customs the receivership had collected from the Dominican government and military Maurer (2013, 96). The implicit threat of future force did lead to the appointment of Archbishop of Santo Domingo Adolfo Alejandro Nouel as the interim president to hold new peaceful elections and hopefully usher in a new period of stability. Eventually, due to further threat of rebellion and ineffectiveness, Nouel stepped down and a Dominican senator, José Bordas, became the caretaker at the time that President Wilson was inaugurated into the Presidency (Maurer, 2013, 98).

Thus, as President Wilson emerged on the scene to deal with various crises in the Dominican Republic, the United States already possessed a history with the country and government to try and work towards stability and economic growth. However, constant internal rebellion and instability severely hampered the Dominican Republic’s ability to manage the country’s debt. During the civil war period, the progress towards economic stability was severely hampered by new debt taken on by the Dominican state. Multiple Dominican presidents and administrations petitioned the receivership and the American government to allow the Dominican government to increase its debt through loans and pay advances to the military in order to finance various projects and end a multitude of rebellions (U.S. Department of State, 1922\textsuperscript{e}, 198). As a direct result, Wilson and Washington initially had little confidence in their new status as guarantor of stability.

\textsuperscript{50}See Welles (1928, 676-699) for a comprehensive account of the assassination and associated fallout for the stability of the Dominican Republic.
that the Dominicans could control their financial expenditures. While the concern for Dominican economic viability remained, Wilson turned his head to focus on the political situation and its effect on Dominican finances (Link, 1960, 512-514). The United States and President Wilson felt that domestic stability would allow for higher economic activity, customs receipts, and reduction of the strain on the financial system, all of which would decrease the Dominican Republic’s current level of debt. Following from his belief in the power and necessity necessary of democratic institutions, Wilson believed a more stable Dominican state, with fewer rebellions, would produce a more stable domestic environment and economy (Link, 1960, 497-498). As he assumed the presidency, Wilson was tasked with the puzzle over how to get a more stable Dominican government that would work with the United States to achieve economic stability, while also resisting German advances. While at times Wilson said Santo Domingo needed a democratically-elected government of the people, America preferred a financially solvent and non-rebellious Dominican Republic above all else (Link, 1960, 500-501).\textsuperscript{51} Wilson recognized that curtailing Dominican debt and reducing German influence were essential in order to provide stability and financial protection. Under this backdrop, Wilson began considering his options to promote Dominican stability, and began tracking how best to promote these American goals in Santo Domingo.

5.4.2 Uncertainty and the Lack of Strategy

Throughout Wilson’s first two years in office, his administration continually sought to find a way to ensure that a stable and peaceful Dominican Republic emerged with a President who was committed to lowering the debt of the nation. As crises continued

\textsuperscript{51}Welles (1928, 752-754) and (Link, 1960, 541-542) outline the general thinking of the Wilson administration towards the Dominican Republic prior to the outbreak of the crisis. The focus remained on aiding Dominican Officials in increasing revenues and settling the high levels of Dominican debt, while improving domestic stability.
to erupt in Haiti and other neighboring countries, the Dominican Republic remained unable to contain its spending and constrain the rebellions across the island. Finding a president who was committed to and capable of lowering the debt, ending revolts, and creating a unified government was difficult. While the United States maintained a diplomatic presence in Santo Domingo, accounting for the various political factions and their effect on domestic stability was troublesome. Multiple Dominican Presidents recognized their fate was tied to the debt situation and stability throughout the country, which gave an incentive for Dominican presidents to assure the American diplomatic presence on the island that they could pay back their loans and control the debt situation, regardless of the willingness to do so (U.S. Department of State, 1922f, 211). There was a clear preference in Washington for the United States to find a President who could both work to control spending in the Dominican Republic and work with American interests in cutting Dominican debt. However, finding that President and determining how best to achieve Dominican stability became a difficult problem for the Wilson administration.

Try as they might, the Wilson administration could not figure out the best President to place in power in Santo Domingo, nor could it decide how best to stabilize a system they did not understand. Put simply, the United States’ was highly uncertain about the current situation, and information about the current institutional dynamics in the Dominican Republic was sorely lacking. The ability to accurately assess who could manage Dominican institutions to achieve American goals was not present. As Link (1960, 510) describes it, the Wilson administration was “lost in bewilderment and ready to adopt any expedient that offered some hope of solution.” The fate of interim President José Bordas in 1914 illustrates the uncertainty the United States was operating under, and how they responded. When President Bordas asked for increased monetary support from the American customs receivership to help quash a rebellion by General Arias, the American envoy to Santo Domingo James Sullivan
praised Bordas’ government profusely in his cables to Washington, claiming he was the correct man to solve the woes in Santo Domingo.\footnote{General Desiderio Arias was a frequent revolutionary against the Dominican Government. The United States consistently argued that anyone was preferable to lead the Dominican Republic than Arias, and yet each new President had to deal with and worry about Arias and his supporters. The United States was committed to preventing Arias from gaining power, given how much he had hampered American goals on the island (U.S. Department of State, 1922n). Additionally, there is evidence that Arias and his supporters were close with or had contacted German officials, making the U.S. even more concerned with ensuring Arias did not gain power in the Dominican Republic (Munro, 1964, 313).} Sullivan stated that with Bordas taking power “there has been a wonderful improvement in matters governmental here” and claimed the regime was the most liberal in Dominican history (U.S. Department of State, 1922g). However, only a short month and a half later, the reaction in the United States changed as revolts from Arias and other factions in the Dominican Republic compelled the United States to tell the Dominican government they “can not remain passive any longer in the face of the unsettled state of affairs” (U.S. Department of State, 1922h).

By August of 1914, the United States was pushing to replace Bordas and actively urging other candidates to take power and restore stability across the island. The disconnect between praising a politician for their ability to restore order one day, then deplored the instability in the islands two months later is emblematic of the uncertainty the United States faced while assessing Dominican political institutions from afar. The uncertainty continued to plague American assessments of the Dominican Republic the following year after the election of President Jiménes, where the United States enthusiastically welcomed his election and offered to aid him in any way they could. Months later, Jiménes was facing rebellions across the country and a threat of impeachment from the Dominican legislature dominated by Arias and other rebel faction leaders. Faced with yet more contradictory signals, Wilson and Secretary of State Lansing regularly discussed imposing a dictatorship if the Dominican legislature impeached Jiménes (U.S. Department of State, 1924, 288). Threats

\footnote{General Desiderio Arias was a frequent revolutionary against the Dominican Government. The United States consistently argued that anyone was preferable to lead the Dominican Republic than Arias, and yet each new President had to deal with and worry about Arias and his supporters. The United States was committed to preventing Arias from gaining power, given how much he had hampered American goals on the island (U.S. Department of State, 1922n). Additionally, there is evidence that Arias and his supporters were close with or had contacted German officials, making the U.S. even more concerned with ensuring Arias did not gain power in the Dominican Republic (Munro, 1964, 313).}
of resignations, impeachment, and further armed rebellion made Jiménes’ presidency
difficult to assess during this period.

One source of the uncertainty emanating from Santo Domingo was the new diplo-
matic staff in the Dominican Republic. Rather than maintaining William Russell, the
Minister to the Dominican Republic who had been in the Foreign Service since 1898,
Secretary of State William Jennings Bryan appointed James Sullivan to the post
to appease local democratic party friends (Link, 1956, 107-108). As Welles (1928,
718-720) notes, Sullivan was a particularly bad choice, as he was someone who was
well versed in state-level democratic party politics, but had no experience in foreign
policy, diplomacy, or Latin American affairs. As the main diplomatic presence on the
island, Sullivan was tasked with updating President Wilson and the administration
on Bordas and Dominican stability, leading to many mistaken assumptions, reports,
and information. As noted above, it was Sullivan who reported to Bryan and Wil-
son that Bordas was improving conditions in the Dominican Republic. Pleased by
these reports, Wilson assumed his policies and the financial receivership were work-
ing to achieve American goals.53 Uncertainty in Washington was thus increased by
the faulty diplomatic presence in Santo Domingo, preventing the United States from
seriously considering additional plans beyond their continued goal to find a Presi-
dent committed to lowering debt and producing stability. In the end, Sullivan was
terminated from his position after it became clear he was working with Dominican
banks and others in a corruption scheme aimed at enriching his coffers, rather than
ensuring financial stability returned to Santo Domingo (Link, 1956, 109-110).

The continued threat of rebellion, economic malaise, and increased debt would
make one expect the Wilson administration to formulate a sound plan for military
intervention and foreign rule during this period, especially given the recent occupation

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53 Eventually it became clear after a thorough investigation that Bordas and Sullivan were not
as interested in creating stable constitutional democracy as Wilson assumed, but rather sought
personal economic gain for each (Welles, 1928, 752).
of Haiti in 1915. Yet, throughout the Jiménes presidency, the Wilson administration never began formulating a strategy for foreign rule in Santo Domingo beyond the continued focus on finding a suitable leader to run the country. Kelsey (1922), writing contemporaneously as the Dominican occupation unfolded, recounted that he was similarly stunned to learn that no prior strategy was formulated during this period. He notes “under such circumstances one would naturally assume that the officials in the Dominican Republic would be given a policy to be carried out. No trace of any such policy can be found. Seemingly Washington has drifted along in a hopeful attitude, settling problems as they have arisen but holding no clear vision of what it wants to do” (Kelsey, 1922, 178). Despite plans and competition between the Departments of War (and their Bureau of Insular Affairs), the Department of the Navy, and Department of State over what strategy to use in a prospective foreign rule mission in the Dominican Republic, “there is no evidence that Washington had at the outset, or...developed...any well-thought out policy or program” (Kelsey, 1922, 178). Instead competition over who would manage the post-intervention period, rather than any serious strategic consultation, took precedence in Washington.

Given the strategic interests that drove the United States to become interested in Dominican affairs, it is surprising that there was not much initial discussion of what a foreign rule strategy following the intervention would look like for the Dominican Republic. Once accounting for the uncertainty over the true nature of domestic conditions in the Dominican Republic, it becomes clear how this uncertainty actually inhibited this kind of strategic thinking, pushing Wilson to focus on his own goals for constitutional government and a community of American states built in the region. Wilson’s belief in the desirability of his goals and the lack of sound information about local conditions led him to believe a militarized entrance into Dominican politics was required and could achieve a quick solution. There was no need to develop a strategy for foreign rule if he could simply find the correct person to run the country and place
them in power.

5.4.3 The Fog of Intervention and Initial Assessment

Faced with continued instability and rising debt levels during the Jiménes presidency, American policymakers began considering armed intervention to finally place a true reformer into power. A justification for intervention came soon thereafter. In May of 1916, following months of political instability, interim presidents, and mini-revolts, a large-scale crisis emerged when General Arias orchestrated an attempted ousting of President Jiménes through a sham impeachment proceeding in the Dominican legislature (Link, 1960, 543). This featured the legislature attempting to force a presidential resignation while Jiménes was out of the capital. After marching his troops into Santo Domingo, Arias effectively controlled the capital with his revolutionary forces, demanding that the House of Deputies impeach President Jiménes and force him to resign. Upon hearing this news, President Jiménes mustered what forces he could and began a march towards the capital to take back control of the city (Welles, 1928, 766-768). Secretary of State Lansing informed all factions, including Arias, that the United States would support President Jiménes and the United States would refused to accept his resignation and impeachment (U.S. Department of State, 1925m, 225). Jiménes was receptive of American aid and initially requested the United State send arms and provisions to help break Arias’ hold over Santo Domingo. Instead, the United States landed a group of 150 American marines to meet with President Jiménes and help him create a plan for retaking the city (Fuller and Cosmas, 1974, 7). While Jiménes requested the Americans only provide arms and logistical support, the American Marines, under the command of Admiral Caperton, denied the request and retook the city on their own.54

54Interestingly, Admiral Caperton had previously served as the commander of US Naval forces in Veracruz (Langley, 1983, 120-124).
This crisis emerged quickly, and while conditions leading towards armed intervention had been building over many years, no formal plans for what would happen after armed intervention were made in Washington. The American forces took this opportunity to assert themselves more forcefully, and drove to Santo Domingo to force Arias out themselves. Upon approaching Santo Domingo, the Marines demanded that Arias surrender, leading Arias to retreat during the night, abandoning the city to a marine occupation force (U.S. Department of State, 1925d, 227). Under the command of Admiral Caperton, the Marine force took control of the city and began to seek out where Arias and his rebels had retreated. With the capture of Santo Domingo, the United States took the first step in the eight year long foreign rule operation that would eventually involve the entire country.

After landing in Santo Domingo, the American marines and occupation force began assessing local conditions and the reactions of local institutions in the Dominican Republic to guide strategic decision-making back in Washington. A key concern was how the Dominicans would respond to American intervention, and how the institutions in Santo Domingo could operate within American interests. However, there was not clear guidance from Washington on how the invasion force should proceed. The Wilson administration, the State Department, and the Department of the Navy largely left Captain Harry Knapp and Minister Russell to develop the initial policy on their own and report back after consolidating a set policy (Calder, 1984, 23). While this assessment process went along, Admiral Caperton, Captain Knapp, and Minister Russell all initially preferred utilizing a leadership strategy to hopefully allow for the Americans’ political goals to be met quickly. The initial focus remained on pacification operations and finishing the armed intervention, before fully focusing

55 Captain Harry Knapp was eventually appointed the military governor of the Dominican Republic, after the proclamation of military government was issued following Admiral Caperton’s successful completion of the armed intervention. From that moment he was the de facto head of state of the Dominican Republic (Brown, 1917). Minister Russell was the chief diplomatic presence on the island after Minister Sullivan was recalled as discussed earlier (Link, 1960, 541).
on the foreign rule mission. While eventually an institutional strategy was imposed in Santo Domingo, as Calder (1984, 10) notes, “no one, not even U.S. officials realized in May and June of 1916 that intervention would expand” into a foreign rule mission with an institutional strategy.

From May 14th onward, the United States military was effectively in control of the Dominican capital and began expanding its occupation to other towns that were hotbeds for rebellion and safe havens for Arias’ supporters. While doing so, the marines and the occupation force assessed to the local environment. Throughout this period of military action, Admiral Caperton and Minister Russell continued to uphold and work through the current Dominican government. Caperton proclaimed in his occupation announcement to Santo Domingo that he wished “all public officials...to remain at their posts and cooperate with me and my representatives in maintaining order” (U.S. Department of State, 1925a, 228). On July 5th, Arias surrendered to Caperton’s forces and the American Marines began their total consolidation of control over the Dominican Republic. However, while they maintained military control over the island, they continued to hope that a leadership-style strategy would prove effective. Caperton delivered this intention to the Dominican people when he publicly proclaimed “it is not the intention of the United States Government to acquire by conquest any territory in the Dominican Republic nor to attack its sovereignty, but our troops will remain here until...such reforms as are deemed necessary to insure the future welfare of the country have been initiated” (U.S. Department of State, 1925e, 231-232). Trying to work with the current government allowed Caperton’s forces to focus on eliminating other revolutionary bands, while assessing the institutional strength of the Dominican Republic. As my theory predicts, Washington’s default preference was to allow the current government to attempt to make the reforms they deemed necessary through an initial attempt at imposing a leadership strategy. While the Dominican government responded to the intervention by attempting to select a
new President and crafting a new constitution, the United States continued to monitor how local institutions operated in order to assess if a leadership strategy, their preferred type, could succeed.

After Caperton captured Arias and secured effective military control over the island, he and Russell continued to work with the existing national government, having the Dominicans call for new elections and encourage drafting a new and more stable constitution. On July 31st, 1916 Francisco Henríquez y Carvajal was installed as a negotiated caretaker president until future elections could take place (Welles, 1928, 776-781). However, as part of the negotiation to bring Henríquez y Carvajal to power, the government also agreed to hold a constitutional convention to reform the 1908 constitution and to set new electoral rules for elections to be held in five months in November. If the reforms were not passed, then the election would be held with the outdated electoral rule (Welles, 1928, 783-784, 789). Upon the election of Henríquez y Carvajal, Minister Russell and Secretary of State Lansing frequently cabled to discuss the constitutional reforms, and the next steps that would lead to ensuring a reliable and favorable leader who could force the Americans’ preferred policies through (U.S. Department of State, 1925). Both were worried that candidates supported by Arias and other revolutionaries would win any elections held under the current Dominican constitution and, more seriously, no matter who won the Presidency, the current constitution would not allow for the reforms Washington deemed necessary. While this indicates there was still an American preference for a leadership strategy in the Dominican Republic, events in Santo Domingo continued to increase concerns over the capacity for future leaders to reform the Dominican state. Knapp and Russell used these five months to monitor, as the actors in Santo Domingo and Washington waited for their assessment before they could fully consolidate around one strategy to implement.

By August, it was clear that President Henríquez y Carvajal, who tried to meet
the United States halfway in his efforts to get Dominican political forces to agree to American goals and reforms, could not deliver the reforms and debt reduction the Americans were looking for.\textsuperscript{56} During this period, Minister Russell reported back to Secretary of State Lansing about meeting with the provisional President and ascertaining whether he would be able to enact the reforms desired, as well as whether Arias’ supporters could be controlled. Recognizing that the interim President, like all other prospective leaders in Santo Domingo, could not deliver the constitutional reforms Washington demanded, the Wilson administration deemed the interim president ineffective and Dominican institutions lacked the capacity to produce change (Link, 1960, 546-547). However, given the preference for a leadership strategy, even with more information that indicated the local institutions could not produce the political goals of the American foreign rulers, Wilson was reticent to commit to an institutional strategy. Caperton and other military commanders on the ground complained as they remained unclear about what the official strategy was and how to implement the foreign rule mission. The legation in Santo Domingo went so far as to cable Secretary Lansing to clarify policy, as they wanted guidance “so that our entire policy here may be understood and the machinery of the whole country placed in working order” (U.S. Department of State, 1925\textsuperscript{b}, 245-246).

Thus, as it became clear that a new Dominican constitution with an updated electoral law was not going to pass in time for new elections, the possibility of an Arias electoral victory looked more certain (Calder, 1984, 16). Further debates over potential presidents, governmental control, and the lack of necessary reforms led both Captain Knapp and Minister Russell to conclude in their assessment process that a leadership strategy would not succeed, and so they recommended that the U.S.

\textsuperscript{56}Looking back, however, it is clear that no candidate could have gotten the reforms the United States demanded past current Dominican factions. Even after selecting new constitutional convention delegates, certain factions refused to show up for the meetings, dooming the reforms to failure before meaningful discussions could be had (Munro, 1964, 311).
military contingent declare martial law and impose military government. Wilson approved this course on November 26th (U.S. Department of State, 1925i, 242) and by November 29th, the United States’ formal occupation of the Dominican Republic was underway (U.S. Department of State, 1925c, 243). Even with President Wilson preferring a leadership strategy for the Dominican Republic, he was convinced that local conditions mandated an institutional strategy, instead. He noted that “it is with the deepest reluctance that I approve and authorize the course here proposed, but I am convinced that it is the least of the evils” (Welles, 1928, 792). This provides strong evidence that instead of Wilson’s personal preferences and goals, local conditions mandated his choice of strategy.

From Wilson’s order, the Dominican Republic was placed under full American military government and Captain Henry Knapp was placed in de facto control of all organs of Dominican government, serving as the sovereign authority of the territory. From his first day as the head of the military government, however, Knapp reiterated the desire of American forces to not destroy the sovereignty of the Dominican Republic, and noted that “Dominican statutes therefore will continue in effect...and their lawful administration will continue in the hands of such duly authorized Dominican officials” (U.S. Department of State, 1925i, 246-247). Knapp appeared committed to working with Dominican institutions and, to the extent possible, maintaining local institutions to achieve Wilson’s goals. However, the existing Dominican officials did not seem as interested in maintaining Dominican institutions and working with the American foreign rulers. Throughout December and early January, Captain Knapp and Minister Russell continued to assess the viability of transitioning back to a civilian Dominican government, but in their final assessment it was clear that a short-term occupation was not possible and they would need to fully implement an institutional strategy. Local conditions mandated that in order for the United States to achieve its political goals, they would need to implement and use an expansive institutional
strategy. Washington agreed with this assessment, and asked for the military government to continue, providing solid evidence that strategy for the foreign rule mission was not considered until ground commanders could assess what Wilson called a “very perplexing situation” (U.S. Department of State, 1925l). Captain Knapp and the occupation authorities fully implemented an institutional strategy that continued until the end of the foreign rule mission.

From the time the Marine force first occupied Santo Domingo until American forces fully coalesced around a strategy, the marines and naval commanders on the ground continually sought to gauge the local conditions, and how they could achieve their political goals. In fact, Captain Knapp admitted that while he knew some about local conditions “before leaving Washington,...after arriving” in Santo Domingo he “learned much more about it” (U.S. Department of State, 1925k, 709). It was the reduction of uncertainty through the assessment of local conditions that led to the choice of an institutional strategy, an assessment process determined largely by the reports of local military commanders. Pre-existing plans and preferences from Washington did not impact the final strategy in the Dominican Republic. Only after the uncertainty around local conditions was resolved did an institutional foreign rule strategy emerge.

5.4.4 Local Institutional Strength and Strategic Decision-Making

After assessing the level of local institutional strength, the American Marine detachment in Santo Domingo opted to impose an institutional strategy for the rest of the foreign rule mission. How did the lack local institutional strength in the Dominican Republic propel the foreign rule mission towards using an institutional strategy? First, in examining the agent capacity mechanism, the assessments made by Caperton and Knapp in Santo Domingo concentrated on the capacity of local bureaucrats and institutions to carry out the reforms and policies demanded by the United States.
Following the initial intervention, the assessment process fixated on the proposed constitutional reforms and the ability of bureaucrats to accomplish electoral reforms prior to the November election date. As military and diplomatic leaders assessed the institutions in Santo Domingo, the focus was on the institutional capacity and ability of the local bureaucrats to carry out the reforms Washington demanded. Prior to the full onset of the military government in November, the American mission in Santo Domingo and the military commanders present attempted to work with the provisional president, Henriquez y Carvajal, to see if he could enact reforms. Agent capacity was a major concern from the moment US troops landed in the Dominican Republic and caused Knapp and others to devote their initial months on the island assessing how well institutions performed, and particularly how they operated while trying to pass constitutional reforms. As Knapp explicitly reported back to Washington: “I made such study of the conditions here as were proper in [Rear Admiral Pond’s] presence, and immediately after relieving him, I pursued my investigation of the conditions and the attitude of the Provisional Government” (U.S. Department of State, 1925k, 709). As my theory predicts, Knapp fully admits that after his arrival and prior to the imposition of an institutional strategy, he fully committed to studying and assessing the capability of the current Dominican administration.

However, while Knapp undertook the assessment of local Dominican institutions, he watched as they proved unresponsive and unable to push through Washington’s reforms for a variety of constitutional, institutional, and popular opinion reasons, much to the chagrin of American policymakers. As Knapp reported bluntly, he found the Dominican government simply “could not undertake the measures of reform desired by the United States Government” (U.S. Department of State, 1925k, 710). Instead of discussions over how to compromise on reforms, Washington insisted that the President rule by decree and get their reforms passed (U.S. Department of State, 1925f, 234). The United States withheld recognition of the government until they deter-
mained if the provisional government could accomplish the reforms they desired (U.S. Department of State, 1925n, 235). The lack of recognition led to the provisional government pleading with the Americans in Washington, stating that the reforms were impossible to complete and that withholding recognition, which had the effect of withholding receivership revenues, only made the situation more tense. Washington did not care about the logistical or constitutional arguments presented by the Dominicans. Instead Washington was only concerned with whether the president was able to accomplish the reforms the Americans wanted, or they would move to ensure that someone suitable and pliant to US was in power. Eventually, the State Department and President Wilson determined that the provisional regime in power did not possess the capacity to carry out the reforms and the current set of incapable agents in power could not meet Washington’s goals (Welles, 1928, 789-792). This set the stage for Wilson to authorize the declaration of military government and implement an institutional strategy.

Next, upon the imposition of military government Captain Knapp still attempted to maintain as much continuity with current Dominican institutions as he could, but while he wanted to maintain Dominicans in positions of high office, their institutions continually failed to perform adequately (Kelsey, 1922, 178). This preference was unsurprising, given the pre-intervention desire to use a leadership strategy and the maintenance of local institutions. Yet, Knapp consistently reported that finding qualified Dominican locals to work with the American foreign rulers was difficult. In his first military government annual report, Knapp noted “This action was forced upon me by the attitude of the members of the Dominican Government. It did not appear possible to get Dominicans of the proper caliber who would accept these high administrative offices” (U.S. Department of State, 1925k, 712). He further lamented that:

“After the issuance of the Proclamation of Military Government, I waited
for some days to see if the members of the Provisional Government would in any way cooperate with the Military Government in carrying on the ordinary administration of affairs. The hope that I had in this direction proved to be unfounded; and I was assured by persons most familiar with conditions here that I could expect no assistance of the kind. I established the offices of the Military Government in the Government Palace. Upon taking possession, it was found that the President and all of the members of the Cabinet had come to their offices after the Proclamation of Military Government, had cleaned out their desks, and had not since appeared in the Government Palace. It was an evident case of desertion. Under the circumstances, as the affairs of government had to go on under intelligent administration, I placed the several Departments of the Dominican Government in charge of officers under my command” (U.S. Department of State, 1925k, 711).

With this realization, Knapp’s actions prevented the utter collapse of all governmental administration, and his hope to avoid implementing an institutional strategy was finally abandoned. Only once it became clear that the capacity of current institutions in the Dominican Republic precluded the ability for capable agents to reform the country in the manner the United States saw fit did Knapp and the military government fully embrace an institutional strategy. When it became clear that local institutions in the Dominican Republic prevented capable agents from emerging to impose the reforms the Americans demanded, the military government decided that imposing new institutions was the only way forward.

While there was no immediate decision to purge or dissolve the Dominican congress or other political institutions, the lack of agent capacity in Santo Domingo obligated the military government to completely overhaul much of the Dominican bureaucracy. On December 9th after the imposition of martial law, Henriquez y Carvajal fled Santo Domingo and headed for Cuba while all other cabinet ministers refused to work. The Dominican government ceased to operate and the American military government stepped into the power vacuum, installing military officers as ministers of the state, now operating as the government of the Dominican Republic (Welles, 1928, 797-798). This was not the initial intent of the military government, nor its preference. The
main goal of the American military government was to take control of the Dominican military and establish a constabulary force to help rebuild their ability to police rebellions. Once Knapp determined in his mind that ‘intelligent administration was needed,’ he argued it did not appear possible to find Dominicans of the proper caliber to run these offices (U.S. Department of State, 1925k, 711). Thus, concerns over the ability for Dominican bureaucrats to carry out American edicts provides clear evidence that that considerations of agent capacity were at work in the Dominican Republic.

It is apparent that agent capacity clearly mattered for the strategic choices made in the Dominican Republic. As the United States began imposing the military government in earnest, they coalesced around the choice for an institutional strategy, as local institutions were deemed lacking. Given few of the American military officers in Santo Domingo spoke Spanish or had any background in Dominican (or even Latin American) affairs, the military governors of the country lacked basic knowledge of Dominican institutions (Munro, 1964, 320). As the military government took over, the severe lack of capacity in Dominican institutions became evident. Calder (1984, 26) notes, “Knapp, as he became more familiar with the Dominican situation, noted areas of Dominican life which he believed needed improvement, in particular education and transportation.” Beyond the establishment of a constabulary force of Dominicans, which is discussed below, the three main institutional features first reformed were the tax revenue capacity, education, and public infrastructure of the Dominican state. While the U.S. military government did engage in development programs in each of these areas, what is most notable in the American action is the focus on the lack of governmental institutions that allowed for the, as Knapp called it, “deplorable” situation in the country U.S. Department of State (1925k, 714).

First, Knapp recognized that the public debt in the country was the immediate cause of the Dominican intervention, and upon instituting military government, he
focused on improving the internal revenue of the state to help with public debt. In December of 1916, the military government instituted Executive Order No. 9 which sidestepped the existing Dominican Ministry of Treasury and Commerce to set up new auditing procedures and to reform the revenue collection process (*Minister Russell to the Secretary of State*, 1925). This process resulted in an entirely reformed bureaucratic structure and new “systems of audit and accountability” that allowed for greater tax revenue collection and management (Calder, 1984, 72).\(^{57}\) While consistent with the goals of the initial intervention, focus on the national debt and revenue of the state were of crucial importance for the military government, as it allowed for the funding necessary to build new institutions and carry out the reform policies necessary to successfully achieve American political goals. He further admitted that this was largely the result of the new institutional governance that existed upon taking control, arguing that “Such a showing would have been impossible under old conditions, but it goes to show the possibilities under conditions of tranquillity and honest and economical administration” (U.S. Department of State, 1925\(k\), 714).

Beyond the focus on tax revenues, a larger revelation to Knapp and the American occupiers was the poor state of Dominican public education and public schooling. Upon arrival in Santo Domingo, the American military government became concerned once they learned that most of the population remained illiterate. Quickly, the military government authorized a commission to propose reforms to improve the public education system of the government. Knapp and others believed that “the solution of the problem of good government will be found in the better education of the people. There is no accurate census showing the proportion of illiteracy in the country, but I have had it variously estimated from eighty-five to ninety-five per cent; at any

\(^{57}\)As evidence of this focus, Captain Knapp reported in his annual report on the military government that tax revenues rose from $23,687.64 in May of 1916 to $125,312.40 in June of 1917, a five-fold increase (U.S. Department of State, 1925\(k\), 713).
rate it is very high” (U.S. Department of State, 1925k, 714). Upon completion of the analysis of Dominican education, the military government instituted new laws governing primary education that had a remarkable effect of increasing the number of rural schools from 30 in 1916 to 647 in 1920 (Calder, 1984, 35). While economic crises in later years of the occupation hampered continued progress with the public education system in the Dominican Republic, the process through which the decision was made to improve Dominican education illustrates how agent capacity drove the choice of an institutional strategy.

Finally, and perhaps most important to future Dominican development, the United States looked at the infrastructure and public works throughout the country to assess the capacity of local agents to aid in American reforms. Upon arrival in Santo Domingo, Knapp recognized that the Dominican Public Works Department was largely at a standstill (as one would expect given the rebellions of the previous years), and similar to the education system he ordered a review and audit of the entire department (U.S. Department of State, 1925k, 714-715). Upon review, he found a lack of competent administration of public works and a lack of capable bureaucrats to institute public work projects that were deemed necessary (Calder, 1984, 51-52). These included road, railroad, and public sanitation projects at the outset, which were deemed most essential (Kelsey, 1922, 182-184). Knapp undertook an effort to rebuild a Department of Public Works, which could motivate public works programs in the country in order to start the process of reforming these institutions and create a greater ability to meet the infrastructure needs of the Dominican people. To be clear, although Knapp identified these deficits with Dominican institutions and attempted

58Beyond these three areas, Knapp was also shocked to discover the lack of censuses and geological surveys undertaken by the Dominican government and called for them to be undertaken as soon as possible. This provides more evidence that the current institutions of the state did not produce the capacity to carry out the reforms of the American foreign rulers (U.S. Department of State, 1925k).
to reform them, often the remedies did not fully succeed.\textsuperscript{59} However, the emphasis on the need for these programs are evidence that agent capacity lead Knapp and the United States towards an institutional strategy. Institutional strength mattered for American strategic decision-making as it presented clear limitations on American goals and agents with sufficient capacity did not exist in their minds.

Local institutional strength in the Dominican Republic also affected the possibility of armed resistance and the imposition of an institutional strategy. Armed resistance is an important constraint on strategic decision-making, given the hope of all foreign rulers to reduce armed resistance as much as possible in order to lower costs for the foreign rule mission. In the Dominican case, what was the role between assessment of local institutions and continued armed resistance? As with assessing agent capacity, Knapp and others were very cognizant of the importance of monitoring possible resistance in Santo Domingo and elsewhere, and took great care to anticipate whether different factions were willing, or more importantly, possessed the capacity to revolt against an American military government. During their initial military campaign and especially after capturing Arias, the American foreign rulers were concerned that Dominican population might resist, given the rebellious nature of Dominican politics over the previous few years. Yet during this period of initial observation, no resistance materialized and any threat of significant resistance to American rule seemed unlikely.\textsuperscript{60}

While armed resistance to the previous Dominican governments was a major reason for the Americans intervening in Santo Domingo in the first place, it was surprising that the level of resistance against the US military government never truly

\textsuperscript{59}Calder (1984, 32-64) analyzes each of these program areas and outlines the short and long term effects American institutional reforms had in each area.

\textsuperscript{60}Fazal (2011, 143-144) notes that “Dominican resistance was practically non-existent,” and to the extent there was any resistance, it only emerged much later in the occupation period and in remote areas.
threatened the initial American forces on the island. While worried about Arias and other factions rising up against American rule, Arias remained largely docile upon surrendering to American forces and tranquility fell over the country. To the extent that there was resistance against American rule, Knapp and Caperton noted that some elites and media outlets were opposed to American military government. For instance, upon initial intervention Calder (1984, 12-13) notes that the American forces did face condemnations in newspapers and published protests in other outlets, but “the resistance to the intervention...was to be a war of words.” Beyond newspapers, there were theater actors and writers organizing to perform and protest against American intervention, and elites wrote various letters and pleas to Washington and European capitals. Given that no concrete armed action followed from these pleas, Knapp took this as a sign that weak institutional backing existed for any prospective armed revolt.

Once the American imposition of military government was declared, the level of resistance was even lower than what faced the initial intervention. While larger numbers of American troops, as well as harsher censorship policies, accounted for some of this stability, few previously rebellious actors challenged American authority in Santo Domingo. Rather than increasing the level of armed rebellion in the territory, the assessment process revealed that American intervention helped quell much of the resistance that had previously plagued the island. Much of the local Dominican population welcomed US administration and only well-known dissidents and rebels tried to lead resistance against the American military government. The general sentiment gathered by Knapp and Russell confirmed this sense that many in the Dominican

61 The American military government eventually passed censorship ordinances to limit the anti-American sentiment being shared in the press, so it is possible that higher levels of resistance sentiment did exist in the initial period. This became one of the more controversial aspects of the occupation, especially one that was premised on creating liberal governance in the country. At one point, the Americans justified this action as counter-acting both anti-American sentiment and German subversion efforts on the island (Tillman, 2016, 92).
Republic did not revolt against the imposition of foreign rule. Russell reported that he had “been impressed with the manner in which the people have accepted the new order of things. Disappointed petty politicians are the only people dissatisfied” (U.S. Department of State, 1925g, 249). While Russell was seeking to make American policy appear successful, the fact that even the formerly rebellious politicians were largely abstaining from uprising against American rule was noticeable and led many native Dominicans to appreciate the sense of security that did fall over the island.

As evidence of this trend, Knapp reported that he had “been asked, almost begged, by Dominicans not to disturb the existing order of things for a long period; not to think of putting Dominicans in these offices, but to continue the administration of affairs through the American officers” (U.S. Department of State, 1925k, 712). Continued reports from Captain Knapp back to Washington indicated that the level of resistance was quite low in the initial days after he declared the occupation, and he was generally surprised by the number of citizens who were in favor of the US continuing their rule. Minister Russell noted “the people have accepted the Military Government with remarkably good grace, and throughout the Republic a feeling of security obtains not experienced for some time” (U.S. Department of State, 1925h).

The initial months of American foreign rule in Santo Domingo went by with little resistance beyond what the Dominican Republic was already facing, and with the local population showing, at worst, indifference to the American military forces. In other words, armed resistance was quite low. As the occupation continued, certain rebellious bands and leaders tried to rise up, but never fully threatened the mission of the American government.62 The welcome from Dominican locals gave the US military government confidence that their institutional approach was the correct one,

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62 This is not to say there were no individual or small scale acts of revolt. Rather, no organized rebellion against American foreign rule materialized. The largest sustained resistance to American rule over the eight years of Military government was in the Eastern provinces of the Dominican Republic, but the resistance never grew to threaten American control over the territory. See Calder (1984, 133-156) for a discussion of resistance in the eastern part of the island.
and helped illustrate the weakness of prior Dominican institutions. If prior institutions did possess strength, the ties that held the bureaucrats together should have produced bands of resistance and civilian hostility to the imposition of American rule. The acquiescence of locals illustrates *ex post* the low strength of local institutions, and the rebel bands constantly attacking Dominican institutions were merely a symptom of the weak institutions present in the country. Instead, active cooperation in public health, sanitation, public works, infrastructure, and police reform projects helped strengthen Dominican institutions.

Key to a reduced level of armed resistance was the security provided for the first time in many years by American policy. One of the first actions taken by the military government to this end was to disband the Dominican military and mandate the turnover of all guns to the American forces on the island in an effort to prevent any potential uprising (Tillman, 2016, 1). Tracking this activity, Knapp reported that the disbanding and disarmament of the population was quite successful and popular, reporting back to Washington that many Dominicans remarked “that the disarming of the populace was one of the best things that ever occurred in Santo Domingo” (U.S. Department of State, 1925k). Dominican families directly felt the impact of the reduced number of guns in their communities as it helped reduce the homicide rate in the Dominican Republic from over 300 homicides each year to just 50 following the initiation of military government (Kelsey, 1922, 179). In addition, the disbanding of the existing Dominican military and the subsequent removal of arms from the former military members was a key feature in lowering resistance capacity. Arrival in Santo Domingo led Knapp and others to comment on the even worse state of the Dominican military as an even more ill-prepared and corrupt institution than previously thought. Given this lack of capacity to police the country effectively, upon disbanding the Dominican military they could not maintain organizational capacity, and thus did not have the latent capability to meaningfully resist American sovereign
authority.

Beyond this, the most substantial institutional reform established by the American military government was to create a new national constabulary force. The goal of the Americans was to create a new professional military force free of the political leanings that they had deemed created the previously weak and corrupt force they had disbanded. In 1917 Knapp authorized the creation of this new force, named the Guardia Nacional Dominicana. Over the eight years of the foreign rule mission, training this new force would occupy a substantial amount of the military government’s time and money (Calder, 1984, 54-55). Rather than seeking to reform the Dominican military to meet the goals of the American military government, it was important to create a force through a completely new organization comprised of sound Dominicans to organize and operate it. It also provides convincing evidence that the capacity for pre-existing military elements to retain their capacity to engage in revolts was quite low, given the need to scrap and rebuild an entirely new military institution.\(^{63}\) While much has been written on the effects and effectiveness of the constabulary force program of the American military government, its quick implementation and the lack of resistance against it is once again illustrative of the institutional weakness in the Dominican Republic.\(^{64}\)

Thus, as the armed resistance mechanism predicts, assessment of the level of resistance capacity led the Americans in Santo Domingo to push forward with an institutional strategy. Without any indication that deposed institutions possessed

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\(^{63}\) One unfortunate legacy of the Guardia Nacional Dominicana was its increasing control over Dominican politics following American withdrawal. As Rafael Trujillo took control of the organization following American withdrawal, he eventually took control of the Dominican Republic in 1930 during another period of unrest and imposed a brutal dictatorship (Calder, 1984, 61). The Trujillo regime was finally overthrown in 1965 through another American intervention and foreign rule mission. For more on the 1965 mission of American foreign rule in the Dominican Republic see Yates (1988); Greenberg (1987) and Palmer Jr. (1989).

\(^{64}\) For more on the effectiveness of the constabulary program and its long-term effects on the future Dominican regime, see Goldwert (1962); Calder (1978); Rittinger (2015); Pulley (1965); Tillman (2015); Tillman (2016, 169-198); Roorda (1998, 6-62); Millett (2010, 78-96).
enough residual organizational ties and strength to challenge the implementation of an institutional strategy, the American military government fully implemented an institutional strategy and began an institution-building mission. That the establishment of a new constabulary and the destruction of the former military organization did not create a sustained revolt against American foreign rule provides evidence that the institutions in the Dominican Republic lacked the capacity to rebel. While it was clear to the American foreign rulers that the local military lacked the capacity to end the continuous revolts present on the island for many years, it was only once the military government undertook an assessment process, one which revealed organizational weakness inhibiting local reform efforts to depoliticize the military, that they decided to scrap the military bureaucracy and build a new institution.

When combining both the agent capacity and armed resistance mechanisms presented above, it is clear that the assessment of local institutions in the Dominican Republic led the American foreign rulers to use an institutional strategy in Santo Domingo. The Dominican Republic had both low levels of agent capacity and armed resistance, creating an impetus for the United States to utilize an institutional strategy, even though it ran counter to Wilson’s *ex ante* policy preferences. Once the United States fully committed to this strategy, the American military government in Santo Domingo began working on many public works projects, reforming government schools, railroad, budgets, and government institutions to help develop the Dominican Republic and reform its political institutions to suit American political goals. These factors provide convincing evidence that local institutions drove the strategic decision-making of the American foreign rule mission in the Dominican Republic, and uncertainty over these institutions relegated this choice of strategy until after the intervention in Santo Domingo. This highlights how the local institutional context ultimately determined the strategy implemented, as my theory predicts, rather than the goals, preferences, or other characteristics at play in Washington.
After the decision to implement an institutional strategy, the American occupation continued for eight years until 1924. Having spent eight years attempting to rebuild new Dominican institutions, the United States turned control over to the newly constitutional elected President of the Dominican Republic, Horacio Vásquez, who was elected under the newly imposed constitution and electoral law (Welles, 1928, 894-899). While the Americans hoped that their institution building strategy would ensure constitutional and liberal democratic governance in Santo Domingo, it was the newly rebuilt military that ended up being the most successful institution. Sadly, following additional crises on the island, in 1930 the leader of the American created Guardia Nacional Dominicana, Trujillo, imposed a 35-year long dictatorship in the Dominican Republic, destroying the dream for democratic governance which Wilson originally had intended to bequeath to Santo Domingo.65

After comparing the two cases of Wilsonian foreign rule in this period, I find convincing evidence that local institutions drove the strategic decision-making process in Washington. Rather than simply following initial plans and goals based on Wilsonian ideals or interests, local military commanders assessed the response to interventions taken during crisis moments and determined the strategy required to achieve American objectives. Uncertainty inhibited decisions concerning strategy until after armed intervention commenced, and strategy was not driven by pre-existing goals and preferences. During the initial intervention, local military commanders in Veracruz and Santo Domingo attempted to maintain current institutions and monitor how well local bureaucrats were responding to American demands. They reported back their views on the capacity of local bureaucrats and the levels of resistance they were facing. Only after removing the fog of intervention through assessing local institutions regarding both agent capacity and armed resistance did Washington decide to con-

65 For more on the legacy of the Guardia Nacional Dominicana and the Trujillo regime see Pulley (1965); Roorda (1998); Crassweller (1966) and Atkins and Wilson (1972).
continue with a leadership strategy in Mexico, but impose an institutional strategy in the Dominican Republic. Table 5.2 illustrates that both cases had the observable implications that come from the theory and causal mechanisms presented in Chapter 3. In both the Mexican and Dominican cases, the causal process observations focus on the mission features and decision-maker discussion that occurred in each case, giving us confidence that my theory is confirmed in these two cases.

5.5 Alternative Explanations

While the two cases presented in this chapter help to confirm the validity of my argument, it is important to trace how the alternative explanations compare to the observations that support my theory in each case. The case selection strategy that was built from, and reinforced by, the quantitative results in Chapter 4 served to hold constant many of the competing hypotheses by selecting two cases that were correctly predicted, but also similar on many other relevant variables. However, there are still some possible alternative explanations to consider and determine if they impacted the causal story. Specifically, it could be the case that the alternative arguments might posit some different predictions even with similar contexts. In this section, I highlight to what extent these cases serve as evidence against alternative arguments.

First, these cases cast doubt on the national leader alternative argument and $H_9$. Given that Wilson is traditionally treated as having a uniform preference for institutional-type strategies, these two cases provide strong evidence that those preferences were not uniform. Even if they were, the cases show the limits of extending preferences to strategic decision-making on the ground. As to the claim that Wilson’s personality or personal preferences drove a desire for institutional strategies, these two cases combined illustrate that while Wilson’s personal preferences for liberal democratic institutions drove many foreign policy decisions, they did not impact strategic decision-making following the imposition of foreign rule. In Mexico, after determining
### TABLE 5.2
THEORY PREDICTIONS AND OBSERVABLE IMPLICATIONS - CONCLUSION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Mexico</th>
<th>Dominican Republic</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No Pre-Existing Strategy</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delegation to Military</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Initial Leadership Strategy</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assessment Period</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discussion of Uncertainty</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discussions Focused on Goals</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of Strategic Guidance</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Surprise at Local Conditions</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

✓ = Prediction was Observed
armed intervention was necessary at Huerta, Wilson initially considered an expansive intervention to continue the armed invasion to capture Mexico City and eventually use an institutional strategy to guide the revolution. However, the assessment process after landing in Veracruz constrained this decision, and pushed President Wilson to turn towards a leadership strategy by working to impose Carranza as President of Mexico. In the case of the Dominican Republic, President Wilson was initially reluctant to utilize an institutional strategy, contrary to the traditional view of President Wilson and Wilsonianism. As my theory predicts, he instead waited for local Dominican institutions to work towards his goals following intervention, and only after assessing conditions did he move to impose new institutions with an institutional strategy. While this is often treated as an exemplary case of Wilsonianism in action, Wilson’s reluctance to immediately impose an institutional strategy and his reliance on assessment of local institutions provides evidence that such institutions matter for the strategic decision-making process. While national leader preferences might set goals for armed intervention and help predict what armed interventions might be launched, these two cases show clear evidence that the preferences of national leaders do not determine strategies for the foreign rule period.

Second, the evidence presented in this chapter shows that the goals of the intervention are also not sufficient to explain the variation in foreign rule strategy imposed following the armed interventions in Mexico and the Dominican Republic. These cases present initial evidence against $H_4$ and $H_5$, and illustrate how the alternative argument concerning intervention goals does not fully explain the choice of strategy, as the similar goals in each case lead to divergent outcomes. In both the Mexican and Dominican cases, revolts and rebellion had created unstable situations in America’s near abroad, and Wilson wanted to impose more sound leadership in these cases to both prevent greater financial instability and resist European exploitation. While America’s goals varied slightly due to the unique circumstances of the
crises in both Mexico City and Santo Domingo, his objectives to impose American interests on the government selection process in both countries was similar enough to say that if goals truly mattered, then we should have seen similar type strategies imposed in each case.

In addition, when assessing the process of strategy formulation, if goals of the intervention mattered, we should have seen more concrete discussion of the post-intervention phase and the role foreign rule would play in pursuing foreign policy goals before military operations were launched. The goals of the armed intervention should provoke discussions prior to intervention, and decisions over strategy should be settled as the goals are known ahead of time. Instead, we have evidence that in both cases strategy determination was left to ground commanders, to whom Washington delegated decisions concerning how best to achieve the goals laid out by the Wilson administration. Beyond this, ground commanders often did not have these goals clearly articulated to them. Instead they had to cable Washington to ask for clarification on what exactly the goals of the invasion were and what steps to take after imposing foreign rule. This provides evidence that the uncertainty prior to intervention inhibits strategic decision-making, rather than the goals pre-emptively determining the content of foreign rule strategy. To be clear, this is not evidence that intervention goals are not important for understanding foreign rule. Without having intervention goals focused on regime change and stability in both Mexico and the Dominican Republic, the United States would not have launched the initial interventions. Rather I argue, and these cases illustrate, that goals matter for the decision to engage in foreign rule in the first place, while local conditions drive the strategy chosen to implement those goals. However, recognizing that this paired set of cases only features economic/strategic goals, it could be the case that different types of goals could have different impacts on strategy, and this presents only initial evidence against the importance of goals for determining strategy.
These cases also provide initial evidence against the alternative argument focused on organization learning and $H_{13}$. This argument contends that given the previous experience of the United States in Mexico and the Dominican Republic in earlier years, in addition to the earlier American foreign rule missions in the Caribbean overall, that the American military could have had less uncertainty over the condition of local institutions and that could have driven the strategic decision-making as they landed. Some could also argue that the strained relationship between Carranza’s Mexico and Wilson following the conclusion of the American foreign rule mission in Veracruz taught the Wilson administration that they needed to engage in institutional strategies to achieve their goals more effectively. These present an attractive argument, as many of the same sailors and marines who were initially in Veracruz, and earlier foreign rule missions in Haiti, Cuba, and elsewhere, ended up on the beaches of the Dominican Republic, as well. We also have good evidence that in the Dominican Republic, the military government sought out those with experience during America’s administration of Cuba, the Philippines, and other territories since they had developed strategies for American military government and institution building. However, I argue that this is evidence for seeking how to best implement and succeed with an institutional strategy once the strategic decision is made, and not what informs choices of strategy. Prior to intervention, there is scant discussion of how Mexico and other missions of foreign rule reflect on the future strategic choices facing the United States in the Dominican Republic.\textsuperscript{66} If prior experiences and organizational learning guided assessment of institutional strength and the selection of strategy, the military commanders in Veracruz and Santo Domingo should not have needed to consistently ask for the strategy from Washington and should not have 

\textsuperscript{66}The experiences in these foreign rule missions, however, did help develop new doctrines for the Marines Corps for understanding how best to engage in armed intervention, and gave new organizational routines for thinking about similar type missions (Bickel, 2001). Nonetheless, this is evidence of how the military can learn from previous missions to think more about conditional tactical and operational details, rather than being about broader strategic decisions.
had to undergo an assessment process. Rather, only once the decision was made to implement military government and an institutional strategy in the Dominican Republic do we find discussions of learning from previous missions. This indicates that learning goes towards implementation, not strategic choices.

Finally, the alternative arguments focusing on the geographic features of the two territories and $H_{10}$ do not find evidence in these two cases. Some might argue that Mexico’s larger size contributed to the decision to only use a leadership strategy, as the amount of military troops needed to occupy Mexico would have been larger than the Dominican Republic. While Mexico is indeed a larger country than the Dominican Republic, the functional distance that American foreign rulers considered for carrying out an institutional strategy was around 390 kilometers, the distance from Veracruz to Mexico City. This was the distance American troops covered to capture Mexico City in the 1848 Mexican-American War, and this was largely the distance they would have needed to control in order to carry out an institutional strategy. Interestingly, the length of the Dominican Republic, where the Marines occupied different outposts across the entire island, is also around 390 kilometers, making the size of the territory necessary to control to carry out an institutional strategy similar. Thus, there were not concerns over the size of Mexico as something that inhibited the decision over strategy, as the quantitative results have illustrated.

It should also be noted, based on the quantitative results that showed foreign rulers are more likely to use institutional strategies in foreign rule missions further from their territory, that the distance between Houston and Veracruz is larger than the distance between Miami and Santo Domingo. Both missions required amphibious landings and U.S. Navy deployments largely of the same distance. This is evidence that it was not the geographic features of the two territories driving strategy, but considerations of institutional environments and how those constrained the ability to achieve their political goals.
Examining these alternative hypotheses, it becomes clear that while they may help provide evidence for certain observable outcomes in each of the two cases, none of them can adequately explain why the same foreign ruler pursued two different strategies in two different locations, given their similar timing, region, and goals. Rather, only local institutional strength can explain both the differing outcomes for each mission of foreign rule and the process by which the Wilson Administration reached their conclusions over which strategy to utilize. Some of the alternative arguments above can explain certain observations or outcomes in one case, but cannot explain the variation between the two cases. Only my theory of institutional strength can explain the outcome in both the Dominican Republic and Mexico across all observable implications. This is not to say that alternative explanations do not explain other facets of American foreign policy in the region at this time period. To be clear, in both the Dominican and Mexican cases, other factors beyond local institutional strength impacted the strategic decision-making process that led to the strategies imposed in each case. In particular, the initial decision to use military force and intervene were driven by the preferences, goals, personalities, and interests of the Wilson White House. However, as this chapter illustrates, relying solely on theories focused on factors in the United States and Wilson’s preferences, goals, or characteristics does not explain the variation in strategy during this period. Once military commanders are forced to decide how best to achieve goals that Wilson laid out, local conditions and contexts matter greatly and inhibit the choices available to foreign rulers.

5.6 Conclusion

After examining the Mexico and Dominican Republic cases, it is clear that the uncertainty the United States faced prior to the imposition of foreign rule forced their strategy to coalesce only after their ground forces assessed the strength of current in-
stitutions. In both cases, the importance of agent capacity and armed resistance had tangible impacts on the strategy the Wilson administration selected. Combined with the quantitative results in Chapter 4, the evidence for the importance of local institutional strength and the role of uncertainty in choices over strategy following armed intervention is striking. We have solid evidence that across regions and time periods, the relationship of institutional strength and foreign rule strategy is robust, and we confirmed the key role that institutional strength plays in determining strategy in both of the present cases. However, this chapter also integrates with the previous chapter by illustrating how uncertainty prior to intervention over institutional strength helped drive the strategic decision-making process, as well. Both chapters provide good evidence for my theory, and help show how the variation in these two cases and their associated causal process observations cannot be explained by the alternative arguments. Overall, my argument shows that once the foreign rule has begun, it is difficult to guide the foreign rule mission on preferences and goals alone. Instead, local conditions constrain the choices of a foreign ruler concerning how to best achieve their political goals. This illustrates that while foreign rulers can plan tentatively at best for post-intervention periods and the strategies they would prefer to use in the foreign rule period, it is a gamble as to what strategy the local conditions will mandate once the territory is under the sovereign authority of the foreign ruler.
CHAPTER 6

UNDERSTANDING FOREIGN RULE STRATEGY, RELEVANCE, AND FUTURE RESEARCH

“That's a lesson that I now apply every time I ask the question, ‘Should we intervene, militarily? Do we have an answer [for] the day after?’”
– Barack Obama

6.1 The Importance of Local Institutions and Foreign Rule Strategy

Fifteen years after the decision to launch an armed invasion of Iraq and initiate a foreign rule mission, the United States and its military are still dealing with the repercussions. Discussions over the choices made and the strategy ultimately implemented in Iraq continue to have salience in national elections, foreign policy debates, and reflections on the challenges and missed opportunities of the previous fifteen years. The war has had a major impact on Middle Eastern politics and American foreign policy for an entire generation. While many continue to critique the

1Quote from Friedman (2014).

2Today, following the defeat of the Islamic State (ISIS) in Iraq, there are still debates over continued American presence in Iraq. Resources are still being committed, with Garamone (2017) noting 5200 U.S. forces were still on the ground in Iraq, and according to the Department of Defense (N.d.), the U.S. has committed over $14.3 billion dollars and carried out over 13,331 airstrikes in support of the anti-ISIS mission from 2014 onwards. For more on the debate over the continued American commitment to Iraq following the defeat of ISIS see Sky (2017); Jeffrey et al. (2017); Geltzer (2017); McLeary and De Luce (2017).

3See Fawcett (2013) and Wehrey et al. (2010) for more on the effects of the Iraq war on the region. See Lynch (2016) and Walt (2016) for more on how the Trump administration views the previous legacies of American actions in Iraq, and how these choices are still salient to the decisions being made by the current administration and voters.
institution-building strategy that followed from Bremer’s de-Ba’athification edict as an improper strategy for Iraq, there is still a failure to focus on the local institutional context that was present in Iraq.\textsuperscript{4} Specifically, these critics have argued that for Iraq, the institutional strategy employed has drastically changed the structure of the previously Ba’athist state, has contributed to the rise of the Islamic State, and lead to greater dysfunction in the region.\textsuperscript{5} In other words, the effect of the foreign rule strategy chosen for Iraq has been deeply consequential for both the region and American foreign policy going forward. However, while the institutional strategy used by the American foreign rulers might have been implemented in different ways, as some have suggested, the local conditions of Iraq were such that the only means to attempt to achieve the political goals of the American mission was to engage in an institutional strategy that required a lengthy investment.

Even as the foreign rule mission in Iraq continues to prove a consequential moment for American foreign policy, the memoirs, public reflections, and histories of those who were at the helm of the decisions over the foreign rule mission in Iraq continue to pass the blame for the poor decisions to others. In so doing they unfortunately continue to overlook local institutional context as a way to argue for how a better possible strategy could have produced a better outcome.\textsuperscript{6} In particular, this public blaming focuses on

\textsuperscript{4}For a sample of the critiques against the De-Ba’athification process see Diamond (2004); Terrill (2012); Pfiffler (2010); Chandrasekaran (2006); Dodge (2006); Zeren (2017).

\textsuperscript{5}See Terrill (2014); Tønnessen (2015); Reuter (2015) for more on the link between de-Ba’athification and the rise of ISIS.

\textsuperscript{6}Bush (2010, 258-260) notes that Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld assured him the early signs of dysfunction was not evidence that more troops were needed and that training a new Iraqi police force and military could be handled quickly. He further notes he should have questioned Bremer’s plans for de-Ba’athification more concretely. Rumsfeld (2011, 511), while casting blame even more widely, notes that Bremer never discussed with him that he was moving away from the initial plan of a quick turnover to Iraqi leadership and interim authority. Feith (2008) and Bremer (2006) also pointed to others in the bureaucracy for the failures in Iraq, indicting the bureaucracy of the NSC under Condelezza Rica, or pointing out that the orders for instituting de-Ba’athification did not come from them. Rather, they merely instituted the desires of the principals. In all, this is a sample of the large number of memoirs by the decision-makers present in 2003 that only serve to shift blame away from the actors and show the salience of this political decision in future years.
the lack of planning and the failure to recognize what local conditions would actually be present once they arrived in Baghdad. And while Bremer’s decision to engage in de-Ba’athification and a large-scale institution-building mission has been panned and continuously blamed for the poor outcomes, this dissertation argues that it was the local conditions that ultimately drove much of the strategic decisions, as well as the genesis of the poor outcomes the United States has faced. By failing to focus on local conditions and how they drove these sub-optimal strategic choices, the policymakers miss the overarching point that the decision to invade Iraq in the first place was the problem.

While inspired by the American decisions over the foreign rule mission in Iraq, this dissertation centered on the important question of the determinants of foreign rule strategy. As the Iraq case highlights, foreign rule strategy is a crucially important variable that impacts not only the success and failure of a foreign rule mission, but also the long-term impact that foreign rule strategy can have on local territories in future years. This dissertation examined foreign rule missions broadly, highlighted the importance of local contexts and their impact on foreign rule strategy formation, and illustrated how the strength of local institutions conditions the strategic choices available to prospective foreign rulers. Finally, this dissertation analyzed why uncertainty over local conditions leads to a delay in strategy formation and the sub-optimal decisions that can lead to. Overall, it argues for the importance of local institutions and the effect they can have on the strategies available to foreign rulers by emphasizing how strategic choices are more contingent on local conditions than traditionally considered.

To conclude this dissertation, the final chapter proceeds as follows: first, I summarize the findings and contributions of the previous four chapters and highlight the conceptual, theoretical, and empirical contributions of this dissertation. Next, I highlight the scholarly and policy implications of this research and how this dissertation
situates itself in the middle of various policy and scholarly debates. I conclude by discussing future avenues of research and extensions to this project.

6.2 Summary of Findings

Building off the experiences of the American foreign rule mission in Iraq, this dissertation addressed two empirical and theoretical puzzles surrounding foreign rule more broadly. Specifically, this dissertation asked: what determines a major power’s choice of strategy when engaging in foreign rule following armed intervention? And given the importance of the post-intervention period for future stability and achieving political goals, why do foreign rulers rarely decide upon a strategy prior to the decision to intervene? In its attempt to answer these puzzles, this dissertation has presented a new conceptualization of foreign rule and foreign rule strategy, an innovative theory of foreign rule strategy formation, an original database of 160 cases of foreign rule and their local institutional context, quantitative testing of the relationship between foreign rule strategies and local institutional strength, and a set of paired case studies that highlight the causal processes behind the importance of local institutional strength. Combined, the conceptualization, theory building, and empirical testing contribute new insights into the nature of foreign rule, and post-intervention strategic decision-making more broadly. Below, I highlight the contributions of this project and summarize the findings of each chapter.

Initially, in Chapter 2 I defined my new conceptualization of foreign rule and laid out my definition of foreign rule strategy, while also highlighting the importance of foreign rule strategy throughout many different scholarly literatures. This included a new conceptualization of foreign rule that presents how a unified conception of international hierarchy via domination provides more analytical leverage when discussing foreign rule strategy. An expansive definition of foreign rule allows for improved analysis, as it focuses on relationships as they are rather than relationships as they are
construed by formal legal definitions. This permits us to analyze the ways in which foreign rulers administer their foreign dependencies across distinct time periods and different contexts. I then articulated a definition of foreign rule strategy that focused on the relationship imposed by the foreign ruler and the means through which they attempted to achieve their political goals. While showing that foreign rule strategy is a crucially important variable that can impact long-term political and economic stability, I also discussed how leadership and institutional strategies differ as ideal types of foreign rule strategies across a variety of different contexts and time periods. This conceptualization of foreign rule strategy presents a useful way to think about international hierarchical relationships of domination, and opens up future avenues of research that focus on continuities across time periods rather than separating conceptualizations of hierarchy and producing narrower research. Understanding how different foreign rule strategies are important in a variety of time periods and contexts allows for a comprehensive understanding of political decisions in the past and for a more refined analysis of future foreign rule missions.

In Chapter 3, I presented my theory of foreign rule strategy, and highlighted how local institutions, and the fundamental uncertainty around them, impact the strategic decision-making process following armed intervention. This theory of foreign rule strategy provides new insights into the crucial importance of local institutions for foreign rule missions, as well as how agent capacity and armed resistance help constrain choices on strategy when seeking to achieve political goals through foreign rule. Initially, my theory argues that foreign rulers possess fundamental uncertainty over local institution strength for a variety of reasons, which concern the foreign ruler’s own military and foreign policy organizations, as well as domestic sources in the local territory. This prevents strategic decision-making from occurring prior to armed intervention, and relegates the decision-making over foreign rule strategy until after the intervention. However, once on the ground, military commanders assess the
local institutional strength of the local territory and determine which foreign rule strategy would be most effective in securing their goals, as local institutional strength determines the context through which a foreign ruler can achieve their political ends. I argued that this assessment process operates through two mechanisms, agent capacity and armed resistance. The agent capacity mechanism, which builds on traditional principal-agent concerns, illustrates how military commanders assess the strength of local institutions and determine if they will be able to use them effectively to achieve their political goals. The armed resistance mechanism, on the other hand, highlights the impact local institutions can have on the propensity for armed resistance and the capacity to resist newly imposed institutions. Combined, both the agent capacity and armed resistance mechanisms help drive the importance of local institutional strength by conditioning the means through which foreign rulers can achieve their political goals.

Following the conceptualization and theorizing of the determinants of foreign rule strategy, Chapter 4 presented the research design used to test the theoretical claims made in Chapter 3. Using an integrative multimethod research design, I utilized both quantitative analysis and a nested pair of qualitative case studies to test my empirical claims. In the chapter, I highlight the original data collection procedure that served as the backbone for the empirical analysis of my theoretical argument. In this data collection process, I identified and coded 160 cases for foreign rule since 1898 and coded the strategy utilized by the foreign ruler based on the actual actions carried out by the military forces on the ground. Next, using various measurement strategies to proxy local institutional strength, I carried out different models to test whether there is a robust relationship between institutional strength and foreign rule strategy. The results indicated that, in a variety of different model specifications, they are consistent and confirm my main hypotheses that higher levels of institutional strength are associated with higher probabilities of using leadership strategies; while
conversely, low levels of institutional strength are associated with institutional strategies. This is true for different model specifications, ways of measuring institutional strength, correcting for missing data problems, and also controlling for the World War II period. Additionally, plotting the marginal effects of local institutional strength also shows a meaningful decrease in probability of using institutional strategies as the level of local institutional strength increases. This provides strong evidence in support of Hypotheses 2 and 3 and confirms the main theoretical argument about the relationship between local institutional strength and foreign rule strategy.

In addition to the confirmation of Hypotheses 2 and 3, the quantitative analysis also provided a few other intriguing results outside of my main theoretical interest, which I want to highlight once again. The most consistent result that held across all model specifications is that the larger the distance between the foreign ruler and the local territory, the more likely it is that a foreign ruler will use an institutional strategy. I interpreted this result to mean that states with higher levels of power projection capability are more capable of carrying out institutional strategies, and thus might be more willing to use these strategies. Launching an armed intervention in a territory far from a foreign ruler’s home territory takes a large amount of power projection capacity and material power, as do institutional strategies in general, and thus more powerful states might be more capable of launching these missions. In some model specifications where I do not include the distance variable, I find that the CINC variable that measures material capability is significant, however this result is not consistent in all models. This helps to confirm my intuition that the distance variable is capturing the ability to engage in power projection, and that institutional strategies are most readily available to the most powerful states.\footnote{Importantly though, there are still other regional powers that have tried institutional strategies, although it is important to think about the constraints they have, given the costlier nature of this strategy.}

Second, some models indicate that foreign rulers are more likely to use insti-
tutional strategies when engaging in foreign rule in the Middle East. Given some arguments over the historical weakness of Middle Eastern political institutions, this might not be surprising (Anderson, 1987; Lustick, 1997; Lu and Thies, 2013). However this is an important result to take note of, especially when there are continued discussions of prospective Middle Eastern interventions, and various states are currently involved in foreign rule missions in the region. While not all missions of foreign rule in the Middle East featured institutional strategies, it is still notable that there is a strong and consistent effect predicting a high probability of using an institutional strategy after initiating a foreign rule mission. However, as noted previously, modern policymakers often still believe in the ability to carry out quick armed interventions and use leadership strategies – even in the Middle East, making this result especially notable. For all other regions, there was no specific effect present, indicating that the variation in local conditions inside of those regions is consequential for understanding foreign rule strategy.

Finally, there is a consistent UN effect in the data, whereby missions the UN carries out, or which are carried out under the UN banner, are more likely to use institutional strategies. This could be good evidence that in order to gain legitimacy from the UN for a foreign rule mission, a prospective foreign rule mission needs to use an institutional strategy. Or rather, cases where institutional strategies would

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8 For instance, in Syria alone we have evidence that Russia, Iran, Turkey, and the United States are all involved in some form of armed intervention in the region. Russia, Iran, and Turkey are already involved in, or are becoming likely to have a foreign rule mission in the country. See Souleimanov (2016); Wastnidge (2017); Phillips (2016); Stein (2017); Crabapple (2018); Antonopoulos (2018).

9 This result is particularly troubling, given how often in recent years temptations for armed intervention in Yemen and Syria, as well as certain calls for armed action against Iran, are prevalent. For instance see Mendelsohn (2015); Joseph and Stacey (2016); Exum (2017); Nasr (2018).

10 This result disappears, however, when including proxy variables for the United States, the Soviet Union, and the United Nations. This could indicate that it is a result of great power intervention in the region, but it is unclear.
be required are more likely to have the UN legitimate the foreign rule mission.\footnote{This is similar to the argument made by Collard-Wexler (2013), whereby he argues that military occupations carried out under the UN flag are more likely to be seen as legitimate, and face less armed resistance. Edelstein (2008, 136-152) provides a contrasting view, claiming that UN-based military occupations do not shown meaningful evidence as to less resistance.} This is an intriguing result that requires further explanation.\footnote{This result, and the associated year result discussed below, could indicate changing international norms as Finnemore (2004) suggests, or some other UN specific effect, or even indicate a post-Cold War period of focusing on the threat of weak states in the period of American unipolarity. However, while this finding needs more evidence to figure out the true causal mechanism, it poses some opportunities for future extensions of this research regarding the changing types of armed intervention and foreign rule missions over time.} In some models, the year variable is also significant, meaning that institutional strategies are becoming more common in the modern era. This offers some evidence that there could be a legitimation effect or a normative change in what types of armed interventions are acceptable. However, as we reach a period of changing norms and power in the international system, it will be interesting to track whether this is a consistent result that unfolds in future armed interventions and foreign rule missions with new emerging powers. Other control variables are not significant in the quantitative models. This includes variables about the size of the territory, ruggedness of the terrain, democracy level of the foreign ruler and local territory, the difference in democracy level, and other foreign ruler and geographic specific effects. This indicates that while other factors might contribute to strategic decision-making for foreign rule missions, local institutional strength is a vital variable in explaining the choice of strategy for foreign rule periods.

After carrying out the quantitative analysis, Chapter 5 utilized a nested, most-similar case comparison strategy to test the veracity of my quantitative results in two paired case studies. Using two cases of Wilsonian foreign rule allowed me to control for various alternative arguments and test for Hypothesis 1, regarding uncertainty, that was difficult to test for with quantitative measures. The paired set of cases further allowed me to ensure that the hypothesized causal process is actually
going on and features the mechanisms I identified. The cases illustrate that when controlling for intervention goals, time period, region, national leaders, and other variables, the United States still used different foreign rule strategies due to the varying strength of local institutions present. Using a structured paired analysis of the American cases of foreign rule in Mexico and the Dominican Republic, I observed the crucial role that uncertainty played in driving the strategic options. Specifically, the cases highlight how in both Mexico and the Dominican Republic, uncertainty prior to armed intervention created an environment that precluded the consideration of strategy. After crisis moments emerged and armed intervention occurred, American military commanders initially sought to engage in leadership strategies while assessing the capacity of local agents to carry out their edicts and their ability to engage in armed resistance. In Mexico, faced with higher levels of institutional strength that produced more capable agents with Carranza and the Constitutionalists, the United States occupation force opted for a leadership strategy to achieve their political goals. In the Dominican Republic, by comparison, assessment of local institutions after extensive institutional audits led to the conclusions that agent capacity did not exist and required an institutional strategy to achieve the goals of the American foreign rulers. This provides evidence for Hypothesis 1 and additional evidence for Hypotheses 2 and 3 when coupled with the quantitative results. The case selection procedure also provides evidence against some of the alternative arguments, such as intervention goals and national leader preferences. The causal process observations provide evidence against others, such as organizational learning. However, as this is just one paired case study, future research as highlighted below can enhance my claims against these alternative arguments, and more specifically against arguments regarding intervention goals.

Combined, Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 provide convincing empirical evidence for my theory of foreign rule strategy, that not only do local institutions affect the choice of
strategy by foreign rulers, but they also constrain the ability of foreign rulers to make strategic decisions prior to armed intervention. The integrative research design that featured both quantitative testing and a pair of matched, on-the-line cases allows me to confirm the various scholarly propositions that emerge from my theory of foreign rule strategy. It also allows me to control for various alternative explanations, highlighting how variation in Wilsonian foreign rule missions requires explanation beyond features of the foreign ruler and the intervention goals. This provides sound evidence for Hypotheses 1, 2, and 3, while there is no evidence for Hypotheses 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, or 13. Regarding Hypotheses 4 and 5, these case studies do not provide any evidence as to the impact of strategic or economic goals, but there is more work to be done to fully remove them as a possible alternative arguments.

Overall, this dissertation has presented a new conceptualization of foreign rule and foreign rule strategy, a novel theory on the determinants of foreign rule strategy and strategic decision-making, an original dataset of foreign rule strategies, and a pair of matched case studies that highlight the causal process of foreign rule strategy formation.

6.3 The Significance of Foreign Rule Strategy

6.3.1 Relevance for Theory

As this dissertation has attempted to highlight, foreign rule strategy matters for understanding various theoretical debates in the international relations literature more broadly. While examining both various types of foreign rule missions and the effect of local institutional strength on international politics are not new as separate research topics, this dissertation provides a novel way to think about the intersection of these two areas and opens a lens on some broader implications for the study of international relations. I contend that this project has implications for broader
scholarly debates in three main areas: how local conditions matter even for great powers, the role of uncertainty in post-intervention periods, and the growing literature on international hierarchy.

First, this dissertation provides new evidence that local conditions can constrain the efficacy of military power in achieving political goals, even for major powers. This project helps reinforce the lessons from literatures on asymmetric conflict, counterinsurgency, military occupation, and other associated areas in which local conditions and institutions can inhibit the ability of major powers to use their material advantages in achieving their political goals. While many theories of international security focus on major power goals and interests, this dissertation illustrates that local institutional environments can and do stifle great powers and their aspirations. Failure to recognize this fundamental fact of international politics can lead to mistaken assessments of major power military operations abroad and their realistic ability to assert power. This opens up many questions about the utility of power in international affairs, and how agency is constrained by the limits of political order. While interests may push certain powers to attempt to achieve wide-reaching political goals, they are inhibited by the local environments through which they must implement those goals.\textsuperscript{13}

Moving beyond studies of asymmetric war and how weaker states can win interstate wars (Mack, 1975; Arreguin-Toft, 2001; Arreguín-Toft, 2012; Sullivan, 2007; Taliaferro, 2004), this dissertation provides evidence that major powers can be constrained by the local conditions of the territories in which they use their military force. Not all territories and conditions allow for major powers to achieve their political goals, at least at the level of military force they are comfortable committing. I am

\textsuperscript{13}This argument is common in the literature on state formation, where powerful groups can have difficulty carrying out their preferred policies given the local institutional context of the territories they are trying to centralize or incorporate. For more on this argument as related to state formation see Tilly (1993); Ziblatt (2006); North, Wallis and Weingast (2009); Møller (2014).
not the first to highlight this point, however, it is important to reinforce the observation as we theorize about the limits of power in international politics.\textsuperscript{14} Thinking more broadly about the utility of power and how to translate force into political outcomes is crucial for a better understanding of how power matters in international politics, and to what extent power can or cannot overcome structural or institutional conditions that may hamper certain political aspirations.\textsuperscript{15} Without a sound understanding of how local conditions can help or hamper major powers from achieving their political objectives, trying to predict how major powers can approach their political goals in the future and their likelihood of success in those missions is difficult. This provides additional evidence about the need to rethink the role of power in international relations, specifically highlighting both how material power interacts with other institutional constraints, the broader difficulty in controlling territories from afar, and the impact local actors can have on the efficacy of power.\textsuperscript{16} Thus this dissertation emphasizes how local conditions structure the ability of major powers to translate their material power into political outcomes and goals.

Second, this project contributes to our understanding of the effect uncertainty has in not just the origins of international conflict, but in the post-conflict period as well. In Lake’s (2010\textsuperscript{b}) analysis of the applicability of bargaining theories of war to the 2003 Iraq invasion, he notes that future work will have to take into account the uncertainty of post-conflict periods for understanding international conflict outcomes. This dissertation builds on this call to think about how rational foreign rulers that possess uncertainty over local contexts can end up using certain foreign rule strategies that

\textsuperscript{14}In particular, Sullivan (2007) highlights how, depending on the political goals of a major power, the cost they are willing to commit to achieve that goal is sometimes insufficient given the local conditions following armed invasion. See also Mack (1975); Lake (2016); Schadlow (2017).

\textsuperscript{15}This builds on Goddard and Nexon’s (2015) call for taking power and power politics seriously in order to understand the true utility of power in international relations.

\textsuperscript{16}This is similar to how some have thought about the difficulties of imperial governance. See MacDonald (2014); Hechter (2013); Naseemullah and Staniland (2016); Robinson (1972).
they did not intend, due to the uncertainty that existed prior to the initial intervention period. Further, this dissertation provides more evidence that uncertainty over post-war periods and local conditions is an important factor in explaining seemingly sub-optimal armed intervention outcomes, beyond the traditional conceptions of uncertainty in the initial conflict stage. I particularly emphasized how uncertainty over the constraints of local institutions in foreign territories pushes foreign rulers to wait to select a strategy until after the decision to engage in foreign rule is made. While uncertainty over intentions, resolve, and capabilities are traditionally thought of as constraints and drivers of sub-optimal outcomes in international politics, I highlight how uncertainty over local institutions is an additional factor that can also lead to poor outcomes following armed intervention.

In addition, this project melds nicely with a burgeoning research program focused on political psychology and international conflict that has begun thinking about how uncertainty over postwar periods can produce various outcomes and pathologies in international politics. Specifically, this literature focuses on how uncertainty is expressed and how leaders use different psychological short-cuts to help manage this period of uncertainty (Mitzen and Schweller, 2011; Schub, 2015; Rapport, 2015; Johnson, 2004). As discussed in Chapter 3, uncertainty can lead to overconfidence or misplaced certainty in the ability of the foreign ruler to achieve their goals, despite the unknown nature of institutions from afar. While this literature does not focus on uncertainty over local institutions, but rather over the probability of success, costs, and other factors, this project highlights how the effects of uncertainty they discuss can extend to local institutions and similarly contribute to sub-optimal decision-making. It pushes scholars to think more deeply about the role that uncertainty over local contexts plays in strategic decision-making, and illustrates how uncertainty can obscure the baseline conditions needed to achieve political goals. Further, this project emphasizes how uncertainty over local institutions can often cause organizational and
personal biases to creep into the policymaking process, which further leads to poor outcomes among rational states. Consideration of uncertainty in the postwar phase is a necessary extension to many models of international conflict and intervention, and it highlights how we should think about and assess decisions made in various armed interventions, and their successes and failures. Understanding uncertainty over post-war costs is a crucial missing piece to explaining puzzling decisions and makes it more clear why major powers think they can achieve their political goals with force more frequently than reality indicates.\textsuperscript{17}

Finally, in a different vein, this dissertation contributes to a flourishing literature on international hierarchy that focuses on the determinants and effects of hierarchical relationships in international politics. While this literature examining international hierarchy continues to grow, this project contributes to an understanding of one way that states structure their coercive hierarchical relationships, and pushes scholars to think more about the construction of hierarchical relationships and their continuities across time. Specifically, this project makes a contribution by focusing on how coercive forms of international hierarchy exist across a variety of different time periods and illustrating that similar strategies are utilized throughout different time periods. In short, different forms of international hierarchy are comparable, rather than existing in unique moments.\textsuperscript{18} Coercive forms of international hierarchy are not new phenomena, nor are they outdated features of the international system. Rather, thinking about how modern states use different strategies to impose international

\textsuperscript{17}Sullivan (2007) notes that when certain major powers have expansive war aims, they are often uncertain about the actual level of commitment of blood and treasure it will take to make the other side capitulate to their political goals. This dissertation provides more evidence that uncertainty over local contexts creates uncertainty over post-intervention periods, including both the strategy that will be required and the costs associated.

\textsuperscript{18}Moving to think about how different forms on international hierarchy can be constructed and change over time is becoming more common, and allows one to think about how a continuum of international hierarchy offers an important way to view many relationships of sovereign authority. See Butcher and Griffiths (2017) and McConaughy, Musgrave and Nexon (Forthcoming) for initial examples of exploring change and construction in international hierarchy.
hierarchy creates a new understanding in this research program about how shifts in the imposition of coercive hierarchy can be contingent. Understanding how relationships of sovereign authority can shift over time to construct new forms of hierarchy presents an interesting extension to the literature on international hierarchy and how it can unite other literatures often seen as separate and distinct.

Additionally, linking to the previous other two implications for international relations theory, this study contributes to our understanding of international hierarchy by making it more clear that impositions of international hierarchy are often more contingent and more fraught by uncertainty than typically considered. While many discussions of international hierarchy focus on the impact of these hierarchies as they exist, this study pushes our understandings of coercive international hierarchy to focus on the contingent nature of many direct forms of hierarchy, and how policy options can be shaped by both the dominant power in the hierarchical relationship as well as the local conditions in the weaker territory. It also highlights how hierarchy is not determinant and power in hierarchy can be constrained. Anarchy still matters, as weaker territories have agency in hierarchy and can constrain the options of a major power. If power is constrained even in hierarchic orders, this highlights how hegemony and hierarchy can still allow for overstretch and limit the ability of major powers to achieve their goals. This then can help scholars think more about how hegemonic or powerful actors can engage in hegemonic overstretch, and to examine how choices to engage in foreign rule can help contribute to major power decline in the future.\(^{19}\) Overall, how these hierarchical relationships can evolve over time, and how they may be created and destroyed against the intentions of certain actors is worth tracking and understanding more completely.

\(^{19}\)This can build on the discussion of offensive dominance strategies under unipolarity by Monteiro (2014, 75) and the ability of extensive offensive military operations to curtail the period of unipolarity that a hegemon enjoys. This is also similar to ideas of imperial overstretch or hegemonic overreach in Kennedy (1987, 515) and Florig (2010).
6.3.2 Relevance for Policy

Beyond a focus on the scholarly literature discussed above, this dissertation also has clear relevance for modern policy debates about armed intervention, modern foreign rule missions, and coercive foreign policy more broadly. As international crises continue to emerge, and as China, Russia, and other powers continue to act more assertively in addition to the United States, the possibility of new foreign rule missions increases – as does the relevance of studying foreign rule for modern policy debates. Understanding how local conditions structure strategic choices is important for policy discussions in three main ways: local conditions, local proxies, and the utility of armed force.

First, as discussions over Syria, Iran, North Korea, and Yemen policy illustrate, it is clear that call for armed intervention are not going away.\(^{20}\) However, the policy discussions about these prospective missions often fail to attend to the post-intervention period and the feasibility of achieving political goals based on local conditions. This study prompts policymakers to think more about whether armed intervention and foreign rule missions have defined political goals that are achievable using armed force.\(^{21}\) It further pushes policymakers to think more completely about their inherent uncertainty over what armed intervention will bring, and to think whether the potentiality of a lengthy institution-building mission is worth the possibility of a successful leadership strategy. It calls for more thinking about implementing a more prudent foreign policy that focuses on how local conditions can structure the strategic choices available. Often American policymakers think that military inter-

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\(^{20}\) As noted above, there are continued calls for armed force in a variety on contexts in modern policy debates, and armed force is being used more than ever around the world. Torreon (2017) notes that, since 1989, the United States has committed armed troops to more foreign military missions than the previous 190 years combined.

\(^{21}\) This is not to say that there should be a full retreat from attempting to achieve policy goals abroad, but rather an honest discussion of whether armed intervention is the best means to achieve these goals.
vention, if applied properly, can achieve the desired goals (Cohen, 2016). However, this study provides evidence that local conditions can structure the opportunities for proper means to be applied. Thinking more about what strategies will be required and taking a more prudent view towards what can realistically be achieved through armed intervention and foreign rule is merited.

Another implication for policymakers from this dissertation is that more care needs to be taken before assuming that local proxies will be able to rule effectively. Often when thinking about armed intervention abroad, proponents focus on local actors on the ground and assume that they can be useful proxies. Indeed, in discussions of prospective operations in Iran, Iraq, and Syria, policymakers have increasingly discussed and thought about local proxies and their ability to serve as capable agents in foreign rule missions following armed intervention. While there is a traditional view that local partners can aid in building the capacity to engage in effective overseas operations, it does have important limits. While having some local partners are preferable to no local partners when engaging in armed intervention, care needs to be taken to think about the capacity of these local actors and their ability to work within current institutional environments to achieve the political goals of the foreign ruler.

This project should provide evidence that the capability of local agents is not always clear prior to intervention and cannot be ascertained outside of the local in-

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22For example, in calls for regime change in Iran, certain government officials have looked to the Mojahedin-e Khalq, or the MEK, as possible partners and local actors that Americans can work with in Iran. After convincing many administration officials and other foreign policy actors of their ability to rule in accordance with American wishes, this becomes a more attractive option for certain policymakers. See Rubin (2011); Dubin and De Luce (2018); Tharoor (2018) for more on Washington and the MEK.

23This is true going back to the colonial literature cited above Robinson (1972) and MacDonald (2013). Marcum (2015) and Rittinger (2017) further note that in that in occupations and other foreign rule missions, understanding how to find local proxies to carry out your bidding is seen as crucial for success. However they both note that there is extensive variation in the effectiveness of these said proxies. See Grynaviski (2015) and Byman (2006) for more.
institutional architecture. Thinking about how local institutions create conditions that allow viable proxies to operate and achieve the political goals is common. There is increasing evidence that local proxies often have their own interests, separate from the foreign ruler, and traditional principal-agent problems make it complicated for policymakers to truly control foreign agents. However, changing the focus to capacity, rather than the ability to control local proxies presents a more useful frame, as this is a more crucially important feature for foreign rulers. Recognizing that local institutions matters more than affinity for the United States or its interests for successful implementation of a foreign rule strategy provides an important view on how policymakers should think about local proxies. While there are some rebel groups or outsiders who would like to be placed into power, whether or not they can effectively govern the territory is a more important question than simple affinity for American goals.

Finally, this dissertation contributes to policy debates about the utility of military force to achieve political goals, and especially the utility of military force to achieve goals that are internal to foreign territories. Specifically, it focuses on the limits of power in achieving success in institution-building missions abroad. In this dissertation, I highlight the difficulties inherent in the post-intervention period, and the perverse selection effect whereby once institution-building is required, failure is more likely than success due to weak institutions. In territories where weak institutions exist, short-term military missions to build stronger institutions have a low probability of success, regardless of the time and effort put into them. Some American policymakers believe that the correct strategy, or the correct application of force, can produce the political outcomes they want (Dobbins et al., 2007). This dissertation hopes to provide more evidence that American interests are embedded in various international structures, and the application of armed force is constrained by other

24See Byman (2006); Lake (2016); Marcum (2015); Biddle (2017).
institutions and conditions that American policymakers cannot unilaterally control.

Overall, this project helps move beyond the focus on success and failure of foreign rule operations, or how to improve the probability of success, and instead seeks understanding of the local determinants of foreign rulers’ strategic choices and how strategy can reflect the inherent probability of success or failure. I illustrated that states pursuing their interests can often fall into the state-building trap against their wishes. More troubling, the inability to plan accordingly is hardwired into the system. Thus, only after understanding how foreign rulers make their strategic choices in practice can we understand the conditions that promote successful foreign rule operations, and also take stock of what foreign rulers can honestly expect modern foreign rule missions to accomplish. It not necessarily the case that certain strategies, or more effort, or more time could produce better outcomes. Rather, it is more likely that in certain institutional environments, success or failure or more or less likely to occur.

6.4 Avenues of Future Research

In the wake of this dissertation, there are a few different avenues of future research I am interested in pursuing that are directly related to empirical and theoretical observations made in this project. These include continuing this project and refining it into a book manuscript, in addition to pursuing three broader extensions as new scholarly projects.

Initially, I will continue with developing this project into a book manuscript, complete with theoretical and empirical refinement. This will include additional case studies that can provide more evidence from different time periods, and different case selection strategies to provide more direct evidence for my theory against the alternative arguments. This will most likely include a pair of most-different cases, such as the United States and Soviet Union in Western and Eastern Austria, and
a sub-national case design, such as the NATO IFOR/SFOR mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina, to provide different types of evidence to support my causal inferences. A pair of most-different cases would focus on different foreign rulers with different goals and interests using the same strategy in the same territory to illustrate how local conditions matter more than the specific goals of the foreign rulers. The sub-national case design would seek to extend and challenge my argument, in which the evidence I present only tests at the broadly national level. At the sub-national level, we could see if different sub-national territories with variation in institutional strength can impact strategy for those sub-national territories. These additional case studies would also hopefully be paired with different types of goals of the foreign ruler, to provide additional evidence that the goals of the foreign rule mission are important for understanding the decision to engage in foreign rule, but that local conditions impact the strategy the foreign ruler selects. Cases that bring humanitarian and other goals, in contrast to the economic and strategic goals of the paired cases in Chapter 5, would be a welcome improvement. In general, the goal of these additional cases will be to provide new evidence and refinement to make a stronger argument for the book manuscript.

Second, the focus on uncertainty in this dissertation has opened up some interesting research questions directly related to the issue of armed intervention. Thinking more about how leaders approach uncertainty, and whether they are more risk-acceptant or risk-adverse when facing uncertainty over local conditions, might produce some interesting variation to explore in the decision to engage in armed intervention in the first place, prior to foreign rule. While foreign rule missions follow from armed intervention, it could be the case that fear of the unknown and the possibility of ending up in a lengthy foreign rule mission prevents certain leaders or states from engaging in armed intervention in the first place. There is evidence that following the 2011 Libya foreign rule mission, President Obama became very risk adverse
when thinking about foreign rule missions because of the fear of being caught in costly institution-building missions, given America’s recent history of being involved in foreign rule missions that did not achieve the political goals set out for them.\textsuperscript{25} As he stated near the end of his second term:

“Any president who was thoughtful, I believe, would recognize that after over a decade of war, with obligations that are still to this day requiring great amounts of resources and attention in Afghanistan, with the experience of Iraq, with the strains that it’s placed on our military any thoughtful president would hesitate about making a renewed commitment in the exact same region of the world with some of the exact same dynamics and the same probability of an unsatisfactory outcome.”\textsuperscript{26}

This highlights how previous experiences or interpretations of postwar periods and foreign rule missions might affect the risk-acceptance of certain leaders. Future research into this issue can approach this question in a myriad of different ways. For instance, there is an opportunity to highlight the intersection of the growing literature on leadership biases towards overconfidence and misplaced certainty, and leadership preferences concerning certain goals or risky behavior.\textsuperscript{27} Thus we can integrate this into our thinking about how prospective foreign rulers of all types might approach intervention decisions.

Building on this, in future work I will also think more about how intervention goals and political goals of prospective foreign rule missions can condition the acceptable level of risk that foreign rulers are willing to take on, given the uncertainty

\textsuperscript{25}See Friedman (2014) for a broader discussion of President Obama’s views on how Libya affected his thinking on armed intervention into Syria.

\textsuperscript{26}Quote from Goldberg (2016).

\textsuperscript{27}For instance, while this dissertation has pushed back on Saunders’s (2011) theory of armed intervention strategy as driven by leadership preferences, integrating this view with insights on overconfidence and misplaced certainty from works highlighted in Chapter 3 can illustrate how certain prospective foreign rulers might approach armed intervention, given the uncertainty present. Johnson (2004), Rapport (2015), Schub (2015), and Mitzen and Schweller (2011) all use individual level theories to illustrate how certain leaders might approach uncertainty in different manners, meaning that local conditions and the uncertainty around them may impact different choices for armed intervention.
of local conditions. It can also help to think more about how goals condition initial intervention decisions, and whether certain intervention goals require more risk acceptant or risk adverse foreign rulers to allow for armed intervention in the first place. Conceivably, foreign rulers might be more willing to risk being in a lengthy institution-building mission if the goals, whether humanitarian, security, or economic, are valuable enough to them. In general, thinking more about the effects of uncertainty of post-intervention periods and how that affects initial intervention decisions is a fruitful extension of this work that can provide a comprehensive understanding of how local institutions and their uncertainty impact broader foreign policy decisions beyond foreign rule strategy. Understanding how certain foreign rulers approach uncertainty in local contexts, and whether their expectations lead them to prefer to engage in armed intervention at all, is an important extension to this project. While the United States has had leaders that vary in their level of risk acceptance, it could also be the case that the level of risk acceptance can correlate with status in the international system, such as if a major power is rising or declining. It could also be the case that the position in the system might matter for explaining the level of risk acceptance needed to engage in armed intervention in the first place. Thus, it becomes important to examine this more completely, as a resurgent Russia and rising China begin to act more assertively. For instance, as China expands its assertive behavior, understanding how its goals and preferences might interact to make them more or less risk-acceptant is an important extension of my research on foreign rule strategy formation.\textsuperscript{28} Understanding what makes certain states more or less risk-acceptant when thinking about post-intervention costs is an important extension to

\textsuperscript{28}For more on growing Chinese assertiveness and how to assess this behavior, see Scobell and Harold (2013); Mastro (2014); Friedberg (2014); He and Feng (2012); Chen, Pu and Johnston (2014); Johnston (2013); Edelstein (2018). In addition, Griffiths (2016) presents an interesting view as to what rising Chinese power might mean for future armed intervention norms. For more on how China views armed intervention, and norms more broadly, see Richardson (2011); Fung (2016, 2015).
this project’s focus on uncertainty.

Third, building on my expansive definition of foreign rule, in future research I would like to think more about foreign rule in terms of a broader conceptualization of coercive international hierarchy that includes colonization, electoral interference, arming rebel groups, and covert operations as a continuum of coercive foreign policy options. Thinking more broadly about the types of foreign policy options that major powers have available to them when interested in changing the behavior of weaker states in the international system provides interesting ways to conceptualize international hierarchy and foreign policy more broadly. Building on the work of O’Rourke (2013), Levin (2016, Forthcoming), Carson (2016), and others, understanding the types of behavior that are available to states when interested in imposing domestic hierarchy, but without overt armed force, presents interesting foreign policy options for major powers. If states become more hesitant to engage in armed intervention, as they might with risk-adverse leaders, understanding what policy options are available to them and whether these policy options change over time due to structural or material shifts is intriguing. Integrating this with the focus named above on the effects of uncertainty and risk-acceptance on armed intervention decisions can open up alternative ways to think about the policy options available, given then level of risk acceptance major powers might have when wanting to affect the domestic politics of a foreign territory. This would provide another way to think about coercive international hierarchy and a broader option of foreign policy decisions available.

Finally, in a vastly different avenue, much of the research for the 160 cases of foreign rule in my dataset lead to reading about various cases of foreign rule that I did not initially know much about, but which have turned out to be integral to how future generations think about their nation and historical identity in those territories. Legacies of foreign rule periods and how they affect nationalism and militant behavior in the future is a natural extension to many of the cases in my dataset and an
intriguing future project. Specifically, many of these foreign territories today have museums that focus on and commemorate the periods of foreign rule they suffered, while trying to construct narratives of occupation, resistance, and collaboration to further various instrumental political goals today. While often scholars and foreign rulers think about the impacts of foreign rule operations in terms of shortish-term economic and political outcomes, how foreign rule missions affect future identity and nationalism might be important, as well. This prompts many questions about the long-term effects of foreign rule missions that are not often considered by the foreign rulers themselves, and the long-term legacies these periods might have on future political goals, military operations, and domestic politics of the local territory, as well as the other unintended consequences of nationalism. In future research, understanding how states that were formally under foreign rule instrumentalize their occupation, resistance museums, and memory for political purposes and conflictual behavior is an important avenue to understand why these military missions have longer effects than initially believed. Overall, while this project has the potential to grow into a robust book manuscript, it also provides a sound springboard for a robust and diverse research agenda I will pursue in the near future.

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29 To the extent that this has been studied, it is largely focused in the critical and cultural studies fields, where they analyze how these museums help construct identities and cultural responses. See Wight and Lennon (2007); Wight (2014, 2016); Radonić (2014, 2017).

30 War and other museums, as features of a contested history, have already been theorized and empirically used to understand how they can produce tangible effects such as reconciliation after civil war (Balcells, Palanza and Voytas, 2018). A continued focus on the long-term effects of foreign rule periods through understanding how memory and war museums effect nationalize and other behaviors is an important extension of this work.
APPENDIX A

FOREIGN RULE CASE LIST 1989-2015

TABLE A.1

CASE LIST OF FOREIGN RULE SINCE 1898

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Foreign Ruler</th>
<th>Territory under Foreign Rule</th>
<th>Start</th>
<th>End</th>
<th>Strategy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>Cuba</td>
<td>1898</td>
<td>1902</td>
<td>Institutional</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>Phillipines</td>
<td>1898</td>
<td>1945</td>
<td>Institutional</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>Orange Free State and Transvaal</td>
<td>1900</td>
<td>1961</td>
<td>Institutional</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>Korea</td>
<td>1905</td>
<td>1945</td>
<td>Institutional</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>Cuba</td>
<td>1906</td>
<td>1909</td>
<td>Institutional</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nicaragua</td>
<td>Honduras</td>
<td>1907</td>
<td>1907</td>
<td>Leadership</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>Nicaragua</td>
<td>1909</td>
<td>1925</td>
<td>Leadership</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>Honduras</td>
<td>1911</td>
<td>1911</td>
<td>Leadership</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>1914</td>
<td>1914</td>
<td>Leadership</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>1914</td>
<td>1918</td>
<td>Leadership</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td>1914</td>
<td>1918</td>
<td>Leadership</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>Russia (Ober Ost)</td>
<td>1914</td>
<td>1918</td>
<td>Leadership</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>1915</td>
<td>1918</td>
<td>Leadership</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>Haiti</td>
<td>1915</td>
<td>1934</td>
<td>Institutional</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria-Hungary</td>
<td>Serbia</td>
<td>1914</td>
<td>1918</td>
<td>Institutional</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>Serbia</td>
<td>1914</td>
<td>1918</td>
<td>Institutional</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>China (Shandong)</td>
<td>1914</td>
<td>1922</td>
<td>Leadership</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>Dominican Republic</td>
<td>1916</td>
<td>1924</td>
<td>Institutional</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy/Austria-Hungary</td>
<td>Albania</td>
<td>1916</td>
<td>1920</td>
<td>Leadership</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign Ruler</td>
<td>Territory under Foreign Rule</td>
<td>Start</td>
<td>End</td>
<td>Strategy</td>
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<td>-------------------------</td>
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### APPENDIX B

**ALTERNATIVE QUANTITATIVE MODELS**

**TABLE B.1**

**OLS REGRESSION RESULTS (ROBUST STANDARD ERRORS)**

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Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$
Figure B.1. Marginal Effects of Local Institutional Strength Factors - OLS Regression
## TABLE B.2

EFA OLS REGRESSION RESULTS (ROBUST STANDARD ERRORS)

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Standard errors in parentheses
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$
Figure B.2. Marginal Effects of EFA Local Institutional Strength Index - OLS
TABLE B.3
LOGISTIC REGRESSION RESULTS WITH ALTERNATIVE INDICATORS (ROBUST STANDARD ERRORS)

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Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$
TABLE B.4

FOREIGN RULER’S DEMOCRACY LEVEL LOGISTIC REGRESSION

RESULTS

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Robust standard errors in parentheses

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Robust standard errors in parentheses

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Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$
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