POWER AND MOBILIZATION:
THE PROBLEM OF ALL-VOLUNTEER FORCE ENLISTMENT

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Abolishing the draft and moving to an All-Volunteer Force appears to some scholars including Levy (2014) to be a relinquishment of state power to the labor market for mobilizing recruits. This dissertation argues that state officials did not relinquish power over military recruitment after conscription ended. Transitioning from conscription to the All-Volunteer Force created a collective action problem for state officials: free-riding would be more rational than enlisting, since non-enlistees would receive the same national security benefits as enlistees without having to fight for them. State officials needed to leverage new, non-coercive forms of power to overcome this collective action problem and mobilize an All-Volunteer Force. These new mechanisms of power included offering a set of unparalleled selective incentives for enlistment, using expansive and highly targeted advertising campaigns to align recruitment messages with vulnerable groups, and strategically placing military recruiters in neighborhoods that were disproportionately structurally vulnerable. State officials also capitalized on welfare state retrenchment. In light of the decreasing provision of welfare benefits, incentives offered for military participation were considerable, especially for those most in need. This dissertation theorizes a relationship between mechanisms of state power and more vulnerable groups enlisting for military service. To test components of this relationship, this dissertation draws on data from
nationally representative data sets (e.g., PSID, NLSY, YATS, ACS, and CPS) and self-collected data (recruitment office locations and military advertisements), and analyzes the results with mixed methods. Notable findings include significant, positive relationships between increased structural vulnerability and military recruitment office locations, and increased biographical vulnerability and enlistments. A concluding study of intergenerational mobility for veterans and non-veterans finds improved income mobility for veterans over non-veterans working 40 hours per week or less, and for those in the lowest income quintile. By offering increased life chances to those who were most vulnerable, the military performed a social welfare function. In so doing, state officials continued to put those who were most vulnerable in the position of defending the nation.
In memory of Gail Lund Barwis
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CHAPTER 1

THE STATE, POWER, AND ENLISTMENT: THEORETICAL UNDERPINNINGS

To fight the major wars in US history, the US government relied on coercive power to conscript people into military service. Exerting state power in this undisguised manner bred resistance. Forcing young people, and primarily disadvantaged young people, into military servitude gained widespread disapproval during the Vietnam War (Foley 2003). The anti-war movement grew in response to growing perceptions of the unfairness of forced military service (Appy 1993). In response to the growing social upheaval over conscription, Richard Nixon made a campaign promise to shift the military to a voluntary enlistment model (Friedman 1967a; Rostker 2006). The problem with making good on this promise was how state officials would overcome the challenge of mobilizing volunteers who would be willing to accept the risks of military participation, when those same people could gain the collective security benefits procured by the military without having to enlist. This dissertation addresses this fundamental question: How did state officials overcome the collective action problem of mobilizing an All-Volunteer Force?

As this dissertation will argue, state officials who wanted to implement a voluntary enlistment model needed a way to overcome the collective action problem. Even with unparalleled resources at their disposal, by asking for volunteers, state officials faced a free-rider dilemma (Olson 1965; McCarthy and Zald 1977). This problem, in short, is that it was more rational for people to not volunteer for enlistment than to enlist, since non-volunteers would receive the same collective, national-security
benefits without having to incur the cost of service themselves. To overcome this problem and to mobilize a sufficient number of young recruits, top officials in the Nixon Administration initiated a multi-pronged mobilization effort that capitalized on a transition in the form of state power used to mobilize recruits, shifting to forms that were not based purely on coercion (US President’s Commission on An All-Volunteer Armed Force, 1970).

First, the All-Volunteer Force (AVF) would motivate young people to serve by offering them new economic and solidary incentives that would put the military on par with other workforce options, thereby helping to shift the balance of rational action in favor of enlistment. Second, these opportunities for advancement through military service would be offered in the context of an increasingly limited set of alternatives for receiving public benefits like health and child care, food and housing provision, and education benefits, as the welfare state was being retrenched (Pierson, 1996; Starke, 2006). Third, rather than coerce enlistments, a massive advertising campaign was employed to persuade the public that the military was an institution that had shared interests with those young people it was recruiting (Rostker, 2006; Bailey, 2007). Fourth, the military physically located recruiters in neighborhoods with more structurally vulnerable young people, where recruiters could capitalize on existing neighborhood networks and help build new relationships that prized military service. And fifth, state officials took advantage of the pre-existing biographical vulnerabilities of young people that offered conducive collective identities, social networks, and biographical availability that encouraged military enlistment.

The following analysis of this multi-pronged strategy to overcome the problem of mobilizing a volunteer military challenges a number of preconceptions about the shift from conscription to volunteers. Scholars including Levy (2014) argue that the state relinquished power to the labor market when the military transitioned to a voluntary enlistment model: “conscription is regulated by state coercion while recruitment to
a vocational military is regulated by the labor market” (Levy 2014, 219). First, this dissertation challenges the notion that the state relinquished power over recruitment to the labor market when it abolished the draft. Rather, this dissertation argues that the state continued to exercise power, but did so differently, by relying on the second and third dimensions of power instead of the first dimension, as conceptualized by Lukes (1974). As opposed to using coercive forms of power, state officials poured millions of dollars into advertising propaganda that could reconstruct the military as an opportunity-granting institution; erected barriers to receiving public benefits in the absence of military participation; and recruited more structurally and biographically vulnerable people to enlist.

Second, this dissertation challenges claims about the very intentions of the All-Volunteer Force, which in part, were to make a military that, “avoids the arbitrary discrimination that arises when upper class people can more easily get draft deferments” (Friedman 1967a, 13). By intentionally targeting vulnerable groups, groups that had difficulty otherwise obtaining the benefits that might be gained through military service, the cost-benefit calculus was shifted in favor of enlistment for specific groups of vulnerable people. This calculus shifted while at the same time, the welfare state that might have provided viable alternatives to military service for vulnerable groups, was being retrenched. While the motivations for the All-Volunteer Force were to make military service more equitable, the process by which recruits were mobilized to volunteer largely reproduced earlier inequalities in who bore the brunt of military service.

Finally, this dissertation investigates the extent to which military service actually produced the increased life-chances that were promised as part of the selective incentives package for enlistment (Rostker 2006). If the life chances of enlistees who were the worst off economically were improved by military service, then the military fulfilled its promises to enlistees. Yet, if state officials lived up to these promises and
provided improved economic mobility to those who were worst off, then at the same time that the military was serving a social welfare function, it was also reproducing the inequalities in who served during the draft era, in the All-Volunteer Force era. By providing improved economic mobility for those most in need, state officials were encouraging those who were most vulnerable to enlist, and those who were most vulnerable continued to incur the non-economic costs of military service.

1.1 Brief History of Conscription in the US

Breaking away from conscription and moving toward an all-volunteer military was a transition that only occurred after hundreds of years of successfully fighting wars with conscripted soldiers. Up until the 21st century, the US relied on coerced military participation to raise forces of sufficient size to fight all of its major wars [Rostker, 2006]. During the Revolutionary War, some of the newly formed states instituted compulsory service to meet quotas when insufficient numbers of volunteers came forward. “George Washington saw the draft as a ‘disagreeable,’ but necessary ‘alternative,’” and he pressured the Committee of Congress with the Army to institute a draft because, “Voluntary enlistments [sic] seem to be totally out of the question; all the allurements of the most exorbitant bounties and every other inducement, that could be thought of, have been tried in vain...” [Rostker, 2006, 19].

The Civil War saw the first national conscription effort [Geary, 1986]. The Confederate Congress instituted a policy whereby every able-bodied white male between 18 and 35 had to serve in the Confederate Army for a minimum of three years. Abraham Lincoln instituted the first national draft law, which gave the federal government the power to draft Americans into service, and ultimately drafted 162,000 men to fight for the Union by the close of the Civil War [Rostker, 2006]. Woodrow

\footnote{Major wars include the Revolutionary War, Civil War, WWI, WWII, Korean War, and Vietnam War. The Indian War and Spanish-American War were staffed solely with volunteers.}
Wilson signed the Selective Service Act of 1917, reinstituting the draft to staff up
the military for World War I, which drafted nearly 3 million men to fight (Chambers
1999). The draft was ended in 1918, but it was reinstated by President Roosevelt in
1940, just prior to the outset of World War II. The draft remained in place until 1947,
bringing nearly 10 million men into military service until it expired under President
Truman. Yet Truman reinstated the draft in 1948, where it was used to staff up the
military for the Korean and Vietnam Wars. The draft remained in place from 1948
to 1973, conscripting over 2.2 million men during the Vietnam period, until it was
challenged by Richard Nixon (Rostker 2006).

In the early 1960s, Congress began raising concerns about the fairness of the draft,
which eventually resulted in President Johnson calling for a study of the feasibility of
moving to a force comprised entirely of volunteers. Director of the Selective Service,
Lewis Hershey, was called before Congress to address what it would take to abolish
conscription. Hershey argued that it was not possible so long as the military re-
quired a current staffing level of over 1 million troops (Rostker 2006). Then-Senator
Barry Goldwater threatened that he would push to end the draft, but President
Johnson squelched the threat by demanding that the Department of Defense perform
an independent study to determine the budgetary cost and feasibility of abolishing
conscription. Under Robert McNamara, the DoD commissioned the “Pentagon Draft
Study” in 1964 (Rostker 2006). It was led by prominent economist Dr. Walter Oi
to determine the financial cost of moving to a voluntary enlistment model. The study
concluded that moving to an All-Volunteer Force would amount to a costly, but not
insurmountable, $5.5 billion per year (Rostker 2006).

Most military and political elites in the mid to late 1960s believed that a shift
to a volunteer force would be too costly and would undermine the ability of the
military to win wars. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower and Reserve
Affairs, Thomas D. Morris, suppressed the results of Oi’s 1964 study, believing that
the results might actually look too favorable to abolishing the draft (Warner and Hogan 2016). Mitrisin (1968) summarizes Oi’s (1964) findings:

Oi has estimated that with the longer terms of service and the higher reenlistment rate, the number of recruits needed each year would fall 20 per cent [sic]. This would mean 166 thousand fewer new recruits each year for a 2.65 million-man force, and 225 thousand fewer for a 3-million-man body. The annual saving [sic] would be $1 billion to $1.3 billion. With men better trained and with higher morale, maintenance costs due to the misuse of equipment would be reduced. Tax losses, presently incurred by the drafting of men who would otherwise earn high civilian salaries on which they paid taxes, would be avoided (Mitrisin 1968, 90)

The results of the study only became public after Congress forced Morris to testify under oath. President Johnson established a commission in 1966 to review the draft abolition position again. The House Armed Services Committee formed their own study at the same time to study the same issue (Rostker 2006). Shortly thereafter in 1967, Johnson formed a task force to again look at the same issue (Marshall et al. 1967). In all of these cases, the commissions rejected the idea of moving to a volunteer force, arguing that it would be too expensive. In 1967, then-Congressman Donald Rumsfeld argued for a move to all volunteers, but Congress soundly rejected this notion and extended the Selective Service Act for another four years (Rostker 2006).

The year 1967 saw much resistance to volunteerism from military and political elites, but it also saw a push from free-market economists and an electoral candidate to abolish the draft (Friedman 1967b, Bailey 2007). Professor Milton Friedman argued extensively in favor of a volunteer military, and then-presidential candidate Richard Nixon and his business school “research director” Martin Anderson, agreed with Friedman’s position. Anderson sided with Oi, the economist who led the first feasibility study, arguing that the additional expenditure needed for the transition was budgetable. Anderson wrote a paper called An Analysis of the Factors Involved in Moving to an All-Volunteer Force that was circulated by Nixon to Alan Greenspan, who responded by assigning a team of 30 economists to review the paper (Anderson
Anderson received support from economists Milton Friedman, Walter Oi, and Stuart Altman, and he shared corroborating documents with Nixon who was then on the campaign trail. Very shortly thereafter, in Madison, WI, Nixon explained to “the Student Bar Association that ‘What is needed is not a broad based draft, but a professional military corps. The nation must move toward a volunteer army by compensating those who go into the military on a basis comparable to those in civilian careers” (Rostker 2006, 35). One year later, the pro volunteer force position had been adopted by the Republican Party, and by 1971, Nixon and a handful of top US economists engineered the transition from conscription to an All-Volunteer Force (Rostker 2006).

1.2 Who Controls the State?

Understanding why the administration of Richard Nixon impelled such sweeping changes to military staffing, even in the face of elite opposition, requires placing this administration in the broader context of who controls the state in a democratic society. The question of who controls the state has a long history and a continuing debate in sociology. Pluralist, Marxist, and state-centered theories have all tackled this question. As the dust settles, state-centered theories offer some of the most useful ways for understanding why the Nixon administration, and all subsequent state administrations, have successfully staffed an All-Volunteer Force. The following discussion of theories of the state steers us away from the notion that states are either wielded by competing interest groups or by the power elite, and instead, encourages a state-centered view where states are multifaceted institutions with their own interests, which can at times be opposed to the interests of the economic elite.
1.2.1 Pluralist Theories

Pluralist theory, often the straw-man for more recent political power theories, suggests that the emergence and development of modern state policies are outcomes of competitive political processes (Dahl 1961; Lipset 1960). Dahl (1961) presents a picture of how power works that largely contests the arguments made by power elite theorists like Mills (1956). Dahl (1961) argues that power is not concentrated only in the hands of a few elite, connected, individuals. Rather, power is distributed among different groups who are in competition with each other. The political process, in this view, is an arena where a multitude of competing categories of people and groups with competing or similar interests engage each other to maximize their interests. Competing or allied categories of people and groups may include interest groups, political parties, business organizations, individual voters, blocks of voting constituencies, etc. Utilization of the state, in this view, requires political officials to negotiate and compromise with competing interest groups to consolidate power and take action, but such consolidation is part of a fluid balance of power that arises in competition among many interested parties.

1.2.2 Marxist Theories

The pluralist notion of competitively and fluidly exercised state power through competing interest groups is rejected by Marxist theories for ignoring the influence of elites. According to Marx, social systems are organized on the basis of economic class (Marx 1867). The power of the capitalist class is organized in the interests of dominating the working class, and a primary way that capitalists ensure their domination and advance their interests is by leveraging the power of the state. The foremost reason that state power is exercised is to perpetuate existing power relations. The state, according to Marx, is a tool used to advance the organizational power of the bourgeoisie.
Each step in the development of the bourgeoisie was accompanied by a corresponding political advance of that class...The bourgeoisie has at last, since the establishment of Modern Industry and of the world-market, conquered for itself, in the modern representative State, exclusive political sway. The executive of the modern State is but a committee for managing the common affairs of the whole bourgeoisie (Tucker, 1978, 475).

Marx argues in *The German Ideology* that the state is not an apparatus composed of the bourgeoisie, but rather, the state is separate from but remains a tool of the capitalist class:

> The State has become a separate entity, beside and outside civil society; but it is nothing more than the form of organization which the bourgeoisie necessarily adopt both for internal and external purposes, for the mutual guarantee of their property and interests...The state is the form in which the individuals of a ruling class assert their common interests... (Tucker, 1978, 187).

Miliband (1969) contributed to the progression of Marxist-based theory by theorizing how power is exercised and who is actually exercising it. He argues that the state is not simply the government. Rather, the state is a complex of institutions including government, administration, police, military, judiciary, and local authorities. The government is the institution that speaks on behalf of the state and is allowed to exercise the power of the state. Yet the government does not actually control the power of the state. The institutions of government each have power, and the power in them is leveraged by those people who are in the leading positions within each institution. Miliband calls the people in high leadership positions within the state system the “state elite.” The state belong to the ruling class and have interests that are at odds with people from lower classes. Their interests lie in consolidating and perpetuating their power. While the power that can be exercised by administrators and officials varies between and within state institutions, in every case according to Miliband, occupiers of these positions actively exercise state power (Miliband, 1969).
Scholarship in the Marxist tradition in the past fifty years (Domhoff, 1967, 1971, 1990) affirms that power-holders exercise state power intentionally to maximize their interests. Domhoff’s (1967) *Who Rules America?* argues that only the very top of the upper class retains a highly disproportionate degree of control over the economy and even politics. This “governing class” operates with high levels of class consciousness. Class consciousness is visible in overcoming the high costs of entry needed to break into this elite group, requiring not only great amounts of wealth but also the adoption of old wealth values (Domhoff, 1967). Domhoff argues that political power is not nearly as diffuse as pluralist theorists might suppose. Rather, political power is exercised by corporate elites who maintain both interlocking directorates and strong representation across varying political institutions.

Not all Marxist theorists agree that corporate elites actually understand how to act in the best interests of their class. Block’s (1977) article “The Ruling Class Does Not Rule,” takes a different tack on how the state contributes to the maintenance of the ruling class. Block argues that ruling elite need the state to understand and act in favor of the class as a whole, because individual elites do not have sufficient class and political consciousness to uphold the interests of the group. The structural conditions that shape the state operate, “behind the backs’ of the actors (including the ruling class actors)” (Block, 1977, 27). According to Block, state managers need to uphold business confidence, limit class conflict, and recognize that with the right reforms, they can increase the power of the state. Success on these levels ensures capitalist rationality. Thus, state power is exercised without the full understanding and agreement of the ruling class, but even so, the ruling class benefits from the exercise of state power that facilitates capitalism.
1.2.3 State-centered Theories

In contrast to pluralist and Marxist theories, state-centered theorists help us understand why state actors might not always act in the interests of the ruling class, but might instead act to bolster the state at the expense of the corporate elite. State-centered theory uses the state as an explanatory function of political and social behavior. In the foundational volume “Bringing the State Back In,” Skocpol (1985) criticized pluralist and Marxist theories of the state for relegating the state to being just another kind of political organization, lacking complexity and autonomy. Pluralists and Marxist theorists saw the state as a location for political conflicts, and Marxists even argued that the state was just another power wielding apparatus held by capitalists (Dahl, 1961; Domhoff, 1967). These theories rarely acknowledged the complexity of the state that differentiates it from all other political organizations, and these theories may not have taken seriously the fact that actors within the state could act in favor of the state and at the expense of elite interests (Skocpol, 1985). Skocpol suggests that scholars should adopt a more Weberian approach to the understanding of political power as centralized in states.

Weber’s notion of the state helps explain why people in high leadership positions in the state, even if they are not in the upper echelon with respect to wealth or income, would work to advance the interests of the state, possibly at the expense of elite interests. Weber offers a definition of the state as “a human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory” (Weber, 1991, 78) and a conception of the state as “a compulsory association which organizes domination” (Weber, 1991, 82). Weber distinguishes the notion of domination from that of power by explaining that domination is a more precise term than the more amorphous idea of power. Weber offers a definition of power as “the chance of a man or a number of men to realize their own will in a social action even against the resistance of others who are participating in the action,”
but his notion of domination revolves around the probability that a given command will be obeyed (Weber 1991: 82). Weber suggests that domination is legitimized in three forms. These three forms include rational-legal rule, traditional rule, and charismatic rule. Rational-legal rule is rule legitimized in the authority of the codified legal process, traditional rule is legitimized on appeals to tradition, and charismatic rule is legitimized on the charm and personality of the individual authority figure. These legitimized forms of domination can be used by status groups to oppress other status groups, but they can also be used by states to oppress citizens.

Skocpol (1979), using a Weberian approach, brought attention to the organizational form and complexity of states that had often gone ignored by competing theories. Calling attention to the diverse set of functions that states must perform and the wide array of offices, responsibilities, and roles that must be upheld, state-centered theory challenged the notion that states were mere tools of the ruling elite. Political behavior such as state building, state failure, and revolutions now had a theoretical foothold. States themselves, and their structures, had a causal impact on the economic, social, and political landscapes. For instance, Skocpol argues that political and social structures make revolutions possible, or preclude them entirely. Skocpol argues that social revolutions arise when the state undergoes a crisis. A crisis occurs when a state is no longer able to retain the position it aspires to vis-

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2In the “Class, Status, Party” section of Economy and Society, Weber discusses the distribution of power in society through its constituent parts of class situations, status groups, and political parties, which in various configurations motivate communal action. Class situations are rooted in economic conditions that bifurcate classes into those with property and those with lack of property. These classes are distinct from the more important status group (i.e., community) form of social organization that is organized on the basis of status honor and may even include members from both class situations. The status honor of a status group is expressed through the “style of life” associated with membership in the status group, mechanisms of which produce group closure and social stratification through the usurpation of the status honor of other status groups. In the face of unique ethnic social divisions, status groups may forge castes but more often they generate a “positively privileged” and “negatively privileged” separation between social strata. This separation defines the conditions for which status groups will either celebrate “the present by exploiting their great past” or toil tirelessly for rewards believed to come in the hereafter. Class and status situations influence the formation of political parties that are organized for the communal gain of unequally distributed social power.

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vis other states, which often occurs in the face of international economic or security competition. Such crises put the state in a vulnerable position as elites split over how to resolve the issue. Such splits provide evidence that the state is not only a tool of elite power (Skocpol 1979).

This dissertation employs a Weberian definition of the state as offered by state-centered theorists Evans, Rueschemeyer, and Skocpol (1985). These scholars offer a definition of the state as being comprised of individual groups who have varying interests, but who collectively have the power to make decisions for the people living within the territory governed by the state: “We consider the state to be a set of organizations invested with the authority to make binding decisions for people and organizations juridically located in a particular territory and to implement these decisions using, if necessary, force” (Skocpol 1985 46-47). In this view, the state is a bureaucracy, but one that is not always entirely consistent: “although our definition of the state is cast in formal terms of authority and enforcement...the state tends to be an expression of pacts of domination, to act coherently as a corporate unit, to become an arena of social conflict, and to present itself as the guardian of universal interests” (Skocpol 1985 47).

Skocpol is not the only scholar to make sense of why states may act in their own interests, and not always in the interests of elites. Tilly’s (1985) argument in “War Making and State Making as Organized Crime” contends that states arose, in part, to generate and thwart external threats. War making, state-making, protection, and extraction processes, in this argument, shaped the formation of European states. Just as organized crime syndicates produce an external threat and then offer costly protection services to those now threatened, power-holders in early Europe engaged in warfare with neighboring power-holders, and then demanded the extraction of local resources to pay for that war effort. As more internal resources were extracted, power-holders could engage in more warfare, thereby offering more ”protection” to local
populations. The process of extracting resources produced systems of organization for extraction, namely taxation, police, and judicial systems, which led to state-making. Coupled with this process was the concurrent increase in the size and power of militaries, requiring supportive bureaucratic structures, which also contributed to state-building. This interactive process did not always proceed without resistance. When local populations did resist extraction, power-holders were forced to grant concessions, including “guarantees of rights, representative institutions, [and] courts of appeal” (Tilly, 1985). Granting concessions such as these shaped future efforts to build states and make war.

1.3 Crisis of Legitimacy

Understanding why the state might act in ways that do not align perfectly with the interests of the ruling elite can help us make sense of the shift from conscription to an all-volunteer Force, which did not wholly benefit the capitalist elite. In fact, military and political elites were divided and at odds over the abolition of the draft (Rostker, 2006). The move to a volunteer force offered market incentives to compel participation, and in so doing, put the military in direct competition with businesses owned by the corporate elite. The All-Volunteer Force shift was not arrived at principally through pluralist negotiation between interested parties. Rather, the final decision to move to a volunteer force emerged during the 1968 presidential race, and was orchestrated by top-level administrators in the Nixon campaign with assistance from a group of neoliberal economists, in spite of opposition from military and political leaders (Rostker, 2006).

Nixon capitalized on the ideas and rationalizations of top free-market economists including Milton Friedman, to at first persuade, and then to order, military leaders including the secretary of defense, Melvin Laird, to move the military to a voluntary enlistment model. In spite of his personal objections, Laird established the Gates
commission in March of 1969 to develop an implementation plan for the AVF that included Thomas Gates who was the former secretary of defense, two retired governors who had served as generals, and three top economists: Friedman, Greenspan, and Wallis. The consensus of this commission was to end the draft on July 1, 1971 (Bailey 2008). To implement the actual transformation of the military to all volunteers, General Westmoreland, commander of the Vietnam War, was tasked the job. After running internal feasibility studies, Westmoreland tasked General Foresythe, the 1st Cavalry commanding general in Vietnam, with the project manager position of this transformation. Westmoreland and Foresythe realized that they needed a compelling way to make the military an advantageous option for young people at a time when most young people were caught up in the cultural revolution of the 1960s. Out of this need came the solution of offering solidary incentives that made military service more enjoyable, providing new monetary incentives that increased the wages of enlisted service members, and utilized better ways of advertising the new military to appeal to the consumer desires of young people (Bailey 2008). As this dissertation will attempt to make clear, these public incentives were coupled with an exercise of state power to retrench the welfare state, and with a recruitment effort that targeted the most vulnerable people with strategically aligned appeals.

By the late 1960's, the US state was nearing a legitimation crisis (Friedrichs 1980). The local populations in the US that were coerced into supplying the Vietnam War with troops had rebelled. The coerciveness of the draft was thought to be needed to supply a sufficient number troops for the war effort, but this coercion bred widespread resistance. The year of 1968 experienced the height of the fighting in Vietnam and the deadliest year of the war to date, as well as high-profile assassinations in the US and a country embroiled in civil unrest (Bailey 2007). The year began with Vietnamese soldiers violating a New Year’s truce that was brokered by the Pope. Broadcasted images of the fighting horrified the American public. In January, the Viet Cong
and North Vietnamese Army launched the surprise Tet Offensive, which resulted in 543 US deaths and 2,542 wounded, and set the record for the highest US casualty toll in one week (Ball, 2000). At home, Martin Luther King Jr. was assassinated, followed shortly thereafter by Robert Kennedy. By the time the Democratic national convention came around in August, military leaders were ordering armored personnel carriers to drive through the streets of Chicago to a staging area at Soldier Field in an effort to quell unrest (Bailey, 2007). At the time when Nixon first offered his campaign promise that he would move the US military to an All-Volunteer Force, the US state was approaching a crisis of legitimacy.

According to Weber, legitimacy is the belief that an order is binding and therefore is just and needs to be obeyed. Legitimacy creates a situation where the belief that an order should be obeyed is internalized by the individual. States need legitimacy to make it more likely that they will survive moments of crisis when forcible coercion is not possible, when economic incentives may not be available, or if they can no longer afford the cost of securing obedience. According to Weber, the state can handle brief periods of a legitimacy crisis by providing strong evidence that it is willing to secure obedience through violence (Weber, 1964, 1978, 1991). The state attempted just such an effort in the mid to late 1960s by violently repressing demonstrations and resistance organizations, but as resistance rose through the late 1960s, the state considered employing a different strategy that did not rely solely on exercising coercive force on civilians (Bailey, 2007). A different type of power was needed to fill the ranks of the military without generating backlash.

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3 Weber classifies legitimacy in three ways: legal/rational, charismatic, and traditional. Legal/rational legitimacy involves bureaucracy and rule-making. Charismatic legitimacy concerns assertions that individual leaders have unique or extraordinary powers. Traditional authority is located in the belief that what has been, is right and just.
1.4 Dimensions of Power

Power, as discussed in this dissertation, is grounded in state-centered theories, but the definition of the term refers principally to the three dimensions of power discussed by Lukes (1974) and characterized vis-à-vis quiescence and rebellion by Gaventa (1982) (Gaventa 1982; Lukes 1974). Luke’s notion of power involves a relation between two or more actors that occurs when one actor affects another, “in a manner contrary to [the other’s] interests” (Lukes 1974). Lukes argues that power can be characterized as having three dimensions or faces. The first dimension is a traditionally Weberian notion of power wherein one entity can compel a different entity to behave in a way that they would prefer not to. The realization of power in modern society, Weber argues, can be achieved through class organization, status honor organization, and party organization. Yet, power is not only “power over” another entity. Power is also relational. Weber defines power as “the chance of a man or a number of men to realize their own will in a communal action even against the resistance of others who are participating in the action” (Weber 1991, 82).

More recently, Piven and Cloward (2006) draw on Weber’s conception of power to theorize that rule-breaking by suppressed groups is an exercise in power. These authors argue that Weber’s view of power is a “zero sum” approach, where “what an actor on one side of a power relationship achieves is at the expense of another actor” (Piven and Cloward 2006). Accordingly, the exercise of power is not simply an exercise of class power. The motivations and outcomes of rule-breaking are not limited to class but are also targeted at other forms of authority including, “wealth, prestige, and all the instruments of physical coercion [that] are all reliable bases for dominating others” (Piven and Cloward 2006, 36).

The second dimension of power according to Lukes borrows from Bachrach and Baratz (1970), which involves not just whether or not an entity can be compelled to behave against their own interests, but whether that entity is disallowed the oppor-
tunity to publicly make a claim or air a grievance. In effect, one entity erects barriers that impedes another entity’s ability to act. Bachrach and Baratz explain:

Of course power is exercised when A participates in the making of decisions that affect B. Power is also exercised when A devotes his energies to creating or reinforcing social and political values and institutional practices that limit the scope of the political process to public consideration of only those issues which are comparatively innocuous to A. To the extent that A succeeds in doing this, B is prevented, for all practical purposes, from bringing to the fore any issues that might in their resolution be seriously detrimental to A’s set of preferences (Bachrach and Baratz 1970).

The third and final dimension appears when an entity exercises power by “influencing, shaping or determining his very wants” (Gaventa 1982). As Gaventa explains, “Not only might A exercise power over B by prevailing in the resolution of key issues or by preventing B from effectively raising those issues, but also through affecting B’s conceptions of the issues altogether” (Gaventa 1982). This may happen in the absence of observable conflict, which may have been successfully averted, though there must be latent conflict, which consists, Lukes argues, “in contradiction between the interests of those exercising power and the real interests of those they exclude” (Lukes 1974).

This third dimension of power, argues Gaventa, is “the least developed and least understood” mechanism whereby power is exercised. Just as this dimension of power is of critical importance when understanding why coal miners in a county in West Virginia appeared quiescent at the expense of their own interests (Gaventa 1982), this dimension, as will be demonstrated in this text, is critical to understanding how the state overcame the collective action problem of mobilizing young people into military service. The third dimension of power concerns the way in which the powerful construct reality for the powerless, conditioning the way the powerless see the world and act on it. Understanding this dimension of power, as Gaventa writes,

...may include the study of social myths, language, and symbols, and how
they are shared or manipulated in power processes. It may involve the study of communication of information—both of what is communicated and how it is done. It may involve a focus upon the means by which social legitimations are developed around the dominant, and instilled as beliefs or roles in the dominated. It may involve, in short, locating the power processes behind the social construction of meanings and patterns that serve to get B to act and believe in a manner in which B otherwise might not, to A’s benefit and B’s detriment (Gaventa, 1982, 15).

The way that the powerful shape the very understanding and consciousness of the weak does not need to occur in obvious ways. “One does not have to go to the lengths of talking about Brave New World, or the world of B.F. Skinner to see this: thought control takes many less total and more mundane forms, through control of information, through the mass media, and through the process of socialization” (Lukes, 1974, 27). The mass media, according to Gaventa, legitimates dominant values, and he speculates that what the media covers and how they cover it can influence how subgroups view themselves and what they tend to think about. “What a society sees of itself on television may provide its mainstream with a kind of collective self-image, by which individuals and subgroups evaluate themselves and others” (Gaventa, 1982, 221).

Gaventa’s theorizing about how power can be leveraged through changing ideas and ideologies finds some parallels in Gramsci’s thinking on hegemony. Gramsci’s (1971) notion of cultural hegemony advances a similar notion of how dominant classes in society leverage power and can achieve and maintain domination. According to Gramsci, domination is achieved by winning subordinated groups’ consent for their own cultural domination. In this view, power is held in the realm of ideas and there is a constant struggle over ways of thinking about reality. Yet the dominant ideology is typically the one offered by the powerful, it is adopted with consent, and it squelches alternative ways of thinking about reality.

State officials moved the US public to a new way of thinking about military participation by actively manipulating the views the public maintained toward military
participation. Huge amounts of state resources were diverted into advertising campaigns in an effort to instill new beliefs about the very nature of military service in the US. The state’s agenda was clear: no longer would the US military be thought of as an institution that only demanded service and sacrifice. Rather, the new All-Volunteer Force would offer increased life chances for those who did not otherwise have a means to afford college or learn advanced job skills. By reconstructing how people conceived of military service, the state exchanged the use of coercion to compel enlistments for a modification of belief structures to obtain recruits.

1.5 Collective Action Problem

While the timing of the shift from conscription to volunteerism was born out of a looming legitimacy crisis, the character of the shift (from the first dimension of power to the second and third dimensions of power) was born out of the need to generate consensual military participation. This newly proposed recruitment model asked for volunteers to join the military of their own accord. History shows that asking young people to risk their lives for their country without providing them the opportunity to say no, as well as without providing something of value in return, can breed resistance (Bailey 2007). Combine this with trying to recruit volunteers at a time in American history when much of youth culture was increasingly at odds with what the military represented, including authority, discipline, and patriarchy, and the result was that the state faced a tall hurdle to all-volunteerism: the state faced a collective action problem.

Conceptualized by Olson (1965), the collective action problem states that individuals will not participate in collective action to pursue a common good unless there are sufficient selective incentives to shift the cost/benefit balance to where the benefits of participation outweigh the costs (Olson 1965). Since public goods are distributed regardless of whether a recipient actually participated (a function called nonexclud-
ability) it is more rational to not incur the costs of participation and receive the goods anyway (a practice known as free-riding). Public goods also generally have a high jointness of supply, meaning that the costs of delivering a public good do not increase linearly with the number of people receiving the good. Marwell and Oliver (1993) argue that nonexcludability and jointness of supply render group size unimportant for the delivery of a public good. These authors find that as long as a critical mass of people are willing to pay the cost, the number of people bearing the cost is irrelevant [Marwell and Oliver 1993]. Only a small segment of the youth population was needed to provide the critical mass of recruits willing to bear the cost of military service, allowing the rest of the civilian population to free-ride.

How was the All-Volunteer Force going to mobilize a critical mass of compliant troops to fight a war and staff the strongest military in the world with volunteers? The Nixon administration overcame this problem by using state power to target specific selective incentives at different groups of more vulnerable people using vast advertising and recruitment resources. The government had at its disposal a set of material resources that were unparalleled by any social movement, but the need to exchange those material resources for human resources proved to be the same challenge faced by social movement organizers. For social movements to overcome this challenge, Olson (1965) argues that selective incentives need to be provided. Selective incentives could help overcome the otherwise rational choice to refuse military service, because free-riders could reap the collective security benefits that were procured by other volunteers without having to incur the cost themselves. State officials devised a set of selective incentives that offered increased life chances for those that enlisted in order to push the cost/benefit calculus in favor of enlistment [US President’s Commission on An All-Volunteer Armed Force 1970]. The Nixon administration exercised the state’s power to align those selective incentives by targeting specific groups of young people through elaborate media campaigns that influenced how people conceived of
military participation (Bailey, 2007). Additionally, as this dissertation will show, state power was exercised to physically locate military recruiters in communities where they could capitalize on neighborhood relationships to compel young people to enlist.

The new material incentives that the state offered included paid-for educational opportunities, job training opportunities, monetary bonuses, and changes to the working conditions within the military itself (US President’s Commission on An All-Volunteer Armed Force, 1970). These changes amounted to tangible increases in pay scales and benefits that brought compensation to levels on par with the rest of the labor market, as well as training and educational benefits that could be useful after military separation. Changes to working conditions within the military itself included subcontracting out cooking and kitchen cleaning tasks to civilians, renovating barracks to look more like young persons’ apartments, and eliminating many of the make-work jobs that occupied time that could have been granted as off-post passes. New solidary incentives included changes in the extent to which the military provided enlistees with the means to make their voices heard through the chain of command, as well as making allowances for certain individual tastes including the loosening of restrictions on hair styles (Bailey, 2007). Though, the provision of material incentives was necessary but not sufficient on its own to mobilize the large number of volunteers that were willing to risk their lives.

The volunteer military also needed the new public perception of the military to be a vehicle for personal advancement and lifetime achievement. Accomplishing this task required shifting from the coercive power of conscription to the manipulation of the potential recruits’ view of the military: an exercise of the third dimension of power. To socially reconstruct the popular notion of the military as a great opportunity provider instead of a mere service institution, the Nixon Administration and the military mounted a massive advertising campaign (Rostker, 2006). Advertising agen-
cies began making appeals to both the economic rationality of potential enlistees and to the consumer desires of young people, while downplaying the service and sacrifice aspects of enlistment that constituted earlier campaigns (Bailey, 2007). The intent was to move the military to an advertising position that capitalized on free market principles. To put the military in competition with existing employers, the state needed to use labor recruitment tools that were relied on by other employers, namely cutting-edge advertising, marketing strategies, and market research analysis. New advertising strategies tailor-fit a new recruitment campaign to young people. This new recruitment campaign was used to deliver the shiny new material and solidary incentives to the eyes and ears of potential recruits. Military advertising campaigns helped push the balance in favor of enlistment for groups of people who could not otherwise gain these types rewards without volunteering their lives for their country (Bailey, 2007).

State-managed advertising campaigns for the Army changed shape markedly during the transition to the AVF. The advertising budget soared from $3 million to $18.1 million in 1970 (Bailey, 2007). The initial marketing campaign made the leap for viewers from the service and sacrifice approach and slogan, “If not you, who?” to a slogan that appealed directly to the more individualistic proclivities of young people, “Today’s Army Wants to Join You.” Such appeals played up the military’s compatibility with young people’s worldviews. State-funded advertising campaigns also seized on the shortcomings in labor market opportunities available to young people. Follow-up advertising campaigns asked young people, “When was the last time you got promoted?” Questions such as these problematized dead-end positions in the civilian workforce and challenged them with the argument that joining the military would provide market incentives that were difficult to gain elsewhere. An excerpt from one of these advertisements reads:

When the only jobs you can get are the jobs anyone can do, they’re
not very likely to get you anywhere. Like delivering the office mail, or waiting tables at the local pizza parlor. Jobs with a future take skill and experience. Today’s Army can give you both. We have over 400 jobs in fields that offer you a future in the Army or in civilian life. Data processing, intelligence, air operations support, medical, communications, administration, to name a few. They’re jobs we’ll pay you to learn. And if you would like to continue your education while in the Army, we’ll help you. Then help you again after you’re out with up to 36 months of financial assistance at the college of your choice (Bailey, 2009).

From the military’s perspective, only a small fraction of the full population of military-age young people needed to enlist. Marwell and Oliver (1993) show that the size of a group that is necessary to produce a public good, otherwise known as critical mass, can be relatively small in situations where a group is heterogeneous and the public good has a high jointness of supply. Since the ability to secure the national defense does not increase linearly with the number of enlistees, only a relatively small number of enlistees were actually needed. The state only needed to establish a framework that could attract a certain number of people who were interested in what the military could offer them. Since the military was offering selective incentives that only certain members of the public needed, the state could tailor-fit the targeting of the incentives to specific groups.

The appeals made by military advertisements were targeted at specific groups of people for whom the risk of dying could be potentially outweighed by the incentives gained through military service, such as the opportunity to attend college or to receive advanced job training. Young people who did not need additional money for education, or who already had a good paying job, did not need the incentives provided by the military. Thus, appeals aimed at vulnerable young people with little or no opportunity for promotion or for attending college could be ignored by people who had jobs with advancement opportunities or who had sufficient funding for college. Privileged individuals could simply free-ride on the backs of those who were targeted and who volunteered to serve. This was not a change of orientation from conscription,
when the children of the privileged were more likely to receive draft deferrals than the children of the powerless (Rostker, 2006). But this division became more pronounced after the shift to the AVF, when privileged children and their parents no longer needed to give enlisted service much consideration. The burden of military service was shifted onto the backs of more vulnerable volunteers, who could be later blamed for volunteering if at some point in the future they became dissatisfied with their decision to enlist.

The most important alternative to military service that vulnerable groups have to obtain increased life chances is social welfare. However, since the 1960s, the welfare state in the US has been actively retrenched, which serves an important role in the history of the mobilization of an all-volunteer military. State and military officials worked to change the public’s perceptions of military service, and they did so in the context of an increasingly limited set of alternatives to military service for members of more vulnerable groups. In this view, it was not only the provision of selective incentives, coupled with the use of state power to target those incentives at more vulnerable groups. It was also that access to public benefits without military participation was being eliminated, which made the incentives offered for enlistment that much more compelling. The following chapter discusses the history of welfare in the United States, including its rise and retrenchment, and how much of that history goes hand-in-hand with the history of military participation.

1.6 Alternative Explanations

In the chapters that follow, this dissertation makes the argument that, to overcome the collective action problem of voluntary military participation, state officials leveraged state power differently, in part by offering new selective incentives to shift the calculus in favor of military participation for more vulnerable groups. However, this dissertation does not argue that state officials relied purely on a rational ac-
tor model, hinging the staffing of the military only on sufficient incentivization to generate enough enlistments. Rather, the overarching argument in this dissertation is that state officials exercised power to compel enlistments, but they did so differently than during conscription. Selective incentives were but one of a number of non-coercive mechanisms of power that state officials relied on to motivate young people to enlist. The second lever that facilitated the transition to the all-volunteer military was the welfare retrenchment context that accompanied the shift to the AVF. Welfare retrenchment erected barriers to receiving public benefits that could not be readily obtained without labor force participation or volunteering for military service. The third mechanism of power that state officials relied on was the deployment of an expensive advertising campaign that would attempt to help the military better-reasonate with targeted populations. The fourth non-coercive mechanism state officials used was to locate military recruiters in close proximity to groups of people who were more structurally vulnerable to appeals for enlistment. Recruiters could build relationships with young people and their parents, and they could tap into existing community networks in the neighborhoods where they were assigned.

These non-coercive forms of state power, this dissertation argues, were largely responsible for moving a new generation of young people into military service after conscription was ended. Yet, alternative explanations arise for explaining voluntary military enlistment that do not depend solely on the exercise of state power, for why young people enlisted after conscription was terminated. These explanations include longstanding family traditions that could have created the expectation and motivation for young people to enlist; social networks that created momentum for individual young people to enlist out of solidarity with their friends who wanted to enlist or at the behest of family members who believed enlistment was a good career choice; or collective identities that synced with military values. Although state officials did not actively manipulate these reasons for enlisting, powerholders still
benefited from them. To the extent possible with the available data, this dissertation integrates these alternative explanations into the overall picture of why young people volunteer for military service. The biographical vulnerability of young people, which is investigated in Chapter 5 as an explanation for individuals’ decisions to volunteer, tests the extent that young people’s collective identities, social networks, biographical availability, and willingness to serve aligned or failed to align with the demands of enlistment. As for the power of family tradition and socialization as a factor in the decision to enlist, Chapter 4 tests the extent that young people from the South, which has a longstanding tradition of military service and history of socializing young people in accordance with military values, were more likely to be targeted by recruiters and were more likely to consider themselves to be likely to enlist. The following chapters tackle the mechanisms of state power along with the alternative explanations to state power, to explain how the state was able to overcome the collective action problem of voluntary military enlistment.

1.7 Empirical Research Questions

1.7.1 Chapter 2

The second chapter lays down an historical analysis of the retrenchment of the welfare state in the United States as it coincides with increased military spending on recruitment and advertising. At the same time that the state was pouring millions of dollars into new advertising campaigns to change the perspective that vulnerable people had toward military service, power-holders were also cutting millions of dollars from social programs. These social programs might have provided alternative means for vulnerable people to gain some economic advantage. Instead, more vulnerable people were put in a better position to be incentivized by the benefits offered for military enlistment. Welfare retrenchment was successful at moving more people
into poverty, and people who needed social benefits were provided the opportunity to gain much needed benefits by volunteering for military service. By exchanging welfare entitlements for incentives and opportunities to work, the state gave people more freedom from state-interference and less social safety net. The end result was a system that withheld benefits from people in need and encouraged people who needed those benefits to enlist in military service to receive them.

1.7.2 Chapter 3

The third chapter investigates how advertising was used to sell the military to potential volunteers. This chapter examines military recruitment advertising that reframed what the military was offering, and aligned those frames with the problems of more vulnerable people. The challenge during the All-Volunteer Force era was to develop advertising recruitment campaigns that could effectively target groups that would be receptive to military values and to the selective incentives offered in exchange for military enlistment. To do so required developing culturally resonant recruitment frames that were aligned with the identity and interests of those being recruited. Framing processes were used to target more vulnerable groups through recruitment advertisements. Frame alignment processes were used to present specific types of selective incentives to different groups of more vulnerable people. A content analysis of “Army of One” recruitment commercials shows how certain incentives were targeted at certain groups. The analysis shows how the four frame alignment processes (bridging, amplification, extension, and transformation) were employed to strategically match diagnostic frames with the values of potential military recruits.

1.7.3 Chapter 4

The fourth chapter investigates how state officials targeted specific neighborhoods for enlistment. This chapter asks whether more structurally vulnerable neighbor-
hoods were targeted more often for military recruitment office locations. More structurally vulnerable groups have reduced access to information and fewer economic opportunities that might make them less attractive as recruiting targets. Situating recruitment offices in areas with few other economic opportunities reduces recruiting costs by capitalizing on the lack of alternatives to enlistment and the structural disadvantage of the local population. This chapter uses a database of all US recruiting offices and American Community Survey (ACS) census tract data to assess whether more structurally vulnerable neighborhoods are targeted more often for a military recruitment office. Findings from this chapter support the general hypothesis that more structurally vulnerable neighborhoods are targeted more often for recruitment office locations. Chapter 4 also addresses a complementary micro-level question of whether more structurally vulnerable young people reported higher propensities to enlist. To answer this question, this chapter uses survey data from the 1991 Youth Attitude Tracking Survey (YATS III). Results show that young people’s reported propensity to enlist is explained, in part, by their structural vulnerability.

1.7.4 Chapter 5

Chapter 5 examines whether biographical vulnerability influences individuals’ decisions to enlist. Biographical vulnerability may explain the ways that individuals are more or less susceptible to recruitment efforts. This form of vulnerability offers a way to group explanatory factors of differential participation together to predict enlistment decisions. Theories of differential participation suggest that functions such as biographical availability, stages of participation, recruitment attempts, collective identity, and generalized action preparedness explain differential participation. Chapter 5 tests these theories as they might explain the collective action outcome of military enlistment. The analysis uses panel data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979 (NLSY79), and finds some support for the notion that theories
of biographical vulnerability can help us understand military enlistment. Evidence suggests that the theories under the umbrella of biographical vulnerability can help us explain why some people, compared to others, choose to enlist, and it sheds light on alternative explanations with respect to factors outside state officials’ control that motivate individuals to enlist.

1.7.5 Chapter 6

In Chapter 6, the analysis moves from asking why certain groups and individuals enlist to asking whether or not enlistment actually improved the life chances of those who volunteered, compared to those who did not volunteer. Did people who enlisted during the All-Volunteer Force era gain improved intergenerational mobility compared to their non-veteran peers? If enlisting actually improved enlistees’ economic mobility relative to their non-enlisted peers, then the targeting of vulnerable groups ultimately benefited those groups. If so, military service moved young people from less advantaged positions to more advantage. Then, both the costs and the rewards of service were placed on enlistees who may have had difficulty finding opportunities for advancement elsewhere. And if enlisting helped increase enlistees’ life chances, then the military is performing a welfare function in light of a retrenched welfare state. This chapter uses Intergenerational Elasticities (IGE) regression models and Transition Probability matrices run on data from the Panel Study on Income Dynamics (PSID) to test whether or not sons experienced improved income mobility when compared to their fathers. Results show that veterans who started in the worst economic position received an economic boost from military service compared to non-veterans.

1.8 Contribution

The research questions in this dissertation, big and small, have rarely been asked by sociologists, and have not been approached from a collective action and state power
perspective. Conceptualizing recruitment efforts as the use of the second and third faces of power, used to target vulnerable populations, problematizes why people enlist in the military. By considering the exercise of state power as a means to motivate the collective action of enlistment, this dissertation intends to stretch our conceptions of collective action. Opening new areas of social life to study with theories of collective action can contribute to how we understand new and interesting cases.
CHAPTER 2

ENTITLEMENTS OR ENLISTMENTS? WELFARE STATE RETRENCHMENT
AND THE ALL-VOLUNTEER FORCE

The preceding chapter theorized that state officials turned to non-coercive forms of power to mobilize sufficient numbers of military volunteers after conscription was terminated. These new forms of power were characterized by either establishing barriers to alternative forms of action, like the retrenchment of the welfare state, or by influencing the ideas held by the powerless, like military recruitment advertising campaigns. The former is conceptualized by Luke’s (1974) as the second face of power, while the latter Lukes characterized as the third face of power. This chapter investigates how state officials relied on the second face of power to capitalize on policy barriers for vulnerable people who needed public assistance. The retrenchment of the welfare state put more people into economically disadvantaged positions, and those disadvantaged and vulnerable people were then in a better position to be incentivized by the benefits offered to military volunteers.

State officials, in concert with neoliberal economists, shifted the US military to a volunteer model shortly before they rolled back the welfare state. Benefits that were being increasingly denied to the American public were being offered in much higher quality to those whose chose to enlist in the volunteer military. Welfare retrenchment efforts were successful at moving more people into poverty, as this chapter will show. People who needed social benefits like health care, housing, and child care were provided the opportunity to gain all of these immediately on one condition: they volunteer for military service. Benefits included fully paid health services,
child care, room and board, pension, life insurance, and cost of living adjustments (Gifford 2006). Benefits also included educational payments in the form of the GI Bill that paid servicemembers monthly installments to cover all college tuition and fees (Skocpol 1996). These were benefits that were difficult to obtain by those in positions of economic disadvantage. State officials in multiple presidential administrations adopted and carried forward the neoliberal position that to get such benefits, people should earn them, either by working for them in the labor market or by taking on the risks involved with volunteering for military service.

The neoliberal position, quite generally, was that the government should impose itself as little as possible on the people (Cowen 2006; Gifford 2006; MacLeavy and Peoples 2009). The logic of the market, in their estimation, could replace more coercive and unjust instruments of power for motivating people to work harder and to participate willingly in the national defense. By exchanging the coercive power of the draft with economic incentives to enlist, and by exchanging welfare entitlements for incentives and opportunities to work, the state gave people more freedom and less social safety net. As the theory, arguments, and data in this chapter will show, welfare state benefits including housing, child care, and cash payments for needy families were reduced or even eliminated while incentives for military service encouraged more people from disadvantaged groups to apply for service. The result was a system that withheld benefits from people who needed them and encouraged people who needed those benefits to enlist in military service to receive them.

2.1 Rise of Neoliberalism

The structural economic and social conditions of the 1960s and early 1970s deteriorated as the post-war economic boom slowed (Drazen and Grilli 1990). Neoliberal ideas that had competed with but were losing to Keynesianist economic solutions started to gain momentum. The widely adopted Keynesianist model of state inter-
vention in capitalist economies contributed, in the decades prior, to a large expansion in the size of governments and their economic influence (Ruggie 1982). The Bretton Woods Accord of 1944 created a coordinated global economic strategy for managing international trade and limiting development efforts that had the potential to compromise public sector protections and welfare states (Centeno and Cohen 2012). But in the 1960s, economic growth began to slow as the post-WWI economic boom came to an end (Tomaskovic-Devey and Lin 2011). Manufacturing states, including the US, came to face new market competition from northern Europe and Japan. And the consumer and worker protections that had been implemented since WWII made it difficult for companies to take action that would increase profits at the expense of social protections (Tomaskovic-Devey and Lin 2011). Trade deficits began to rise, and the coordinated global market interventions that had been made possible through the Bretton Woods Accord began to disintegrate (Centeno and Cohen 2012). In 1971, the US took the dollar off of the gold standard that had been the basis of the Bretton Woods Accord, effectively floating all participating countries’ currencies and putting an end to the Bretton Woods system (Fourcade-Gourinchas and Babb 2002). This constellation of global economic pressures put Keynesianism in the crosshairs.

As economies slowed, prices continued to rise, along with unemployment rates. This ran contrary to the Keynesianist theory that inflation was a result of economies growing too fast (Helliwell 1988). Keynesianism appeared to be unable to explain or correct the impending economic slowdown (Tomaskovic-Devey and Lin 2011). As growth rates fell and unemployment rates rose through the 1960s and early 1970s, Keynesian solutions that promoted increased government intervention and spending failed to right the ship (Appleby 2011). Capitalists and neoliberal thinkers blamed Keynesianist policies for the economic slowdown. States with faltering economies experienced growing social unrest in the form of social protest and labor disputes (Centeno and Cohen 2012). In 1973, growing inflation and faltering profits hit its
apex. Stagflation, or suffering from inflation and high unemployment rates concurrently, peaked as oil prices shot up and increased manufacturing costs (Olson 1982). Powerholders, capitalists, and neoliberal economists shifted the blame onto the policies that had over the previous decades been prescribed to solve or reduce global economic problems:

Policy makers increasingly adopted the view that government interference was the main culprit and that the solution involved reforming the economy in ways that privileged markets’ economic influence over that of the state. Their various views were ultimately crystallized as a set of liberalization policies called the Washington Consensus: fiscal austerity, market-determined interest and exchange rates, free trade, inward investment deregulation, privatization, market deregulation, and a commitment to protecting private property (Williamson 1990). Although no country perfectly adhered to this policy paradigm and practice was often mixed, it still served to define the general direction and intention of neoliberal reforms (Centeno and Cohen 2012, 319).

Back in the 1920s, the notion of neoliberalism emerged, born out of classical-liberal doctrine that promoted competition and entrepreneurism, and rejected socialism (Mirowski and Plehwe 2009). In the 1930s, neoliberalism gained momentum as a political movement, particularly in France and in the London School of Economics, where economists worked on competing solutions to the problems that were being addressed with Keynesian solutions (Mirowski and Plehwe 2009). Walter Lippman’s (1938) *The Good Society* gave neoliberal economists in Europe and the US a set of principles that would later become doctrine: “in a free society the state does not administer the affairs of men. It administers justice among men who conduct their own affairs” (Lippmann, 1938, 267). In 1938, the French philosopher Louis Rougier organized a conference to honor Lippman, and out of which arose a formal set of principles that would come to define neoliberalism (Mirowski and Plehwe 2009). World War II imposed a moratorium on the neoliberal project, but it restarted in the late

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1 Stagflation was universal among the major economies during the period 1973 to 1982 (Helliwell 1988, 1).
1940s when a group of international neoliberal intellectuals met at Mont Pelerin in the Swiss Alps. Out of that meeting arose the Mont Pelerin Society (MPS), which gained size and ascended in influence to become the thought-leadership of neoliberalism in the latter half of the 20th century (Mirowski and Plehwe, 2009). Leading members and presidents of the Mont Pelerin society included US economists from the Chicago School of Economics (e.g., Milton Friedman and George Stigler) who were tapped by future US presidents like Nixon to inform social, economic, and military policy-making (Mirowski and Plehwe, 2009).

Out of the economic and social turmoil of the 1960s, and beginning with President Nixon, powerholders and policy makers in the US gravitated toward neoliberal solutions for social and economic problems. They increasingly disavowed the Keynesian policies that had contributed to the expansion of the welfare state since the Great Depression. Nixon adopted the neoliberal solution promoted by Friedman (1962), Oi (1967), and others for ending the draft and converting the US military to an All-Volunteer Force. Nixon adopted other neoliberal ideas with similarly widespread consequences including floating the dollar (Fourcade-Gourinchas and Babb, 2002) and allowing states to experiment with social welfare programs (Piven and Cloward, 1993). President Reagan was elected on a neoliberalist platform. He proceeded to roll-back social welfare programs (Soule and Zylan, 1997) and introduced supply-side economics, which gave wealthy people more money in the theory that those dollars would “trickle-down” to the people who really needed them (Treas, 1983). President Bush continued the aggressive attack to roll back social welfare entitlements, and President Clinton ended Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) (Zylan and Soule, 2000). The neoliberal ideas that were implemented as public policy both created a military participation model that required volunteers, and it rolled back social welfare entitlements that could have served as a disincentive for disadvantaged people to volunteer for service.
2.2 Neoliberalism and Conscription

Neoliberalism rejected Keynesian ideas, like those that insisted that government intervention in markets and in social life was necessary because market economics can produce inefficient and harmful outcomes. Government intervention was deemed unnecessary in all but very few sectors, one of which included the national defense. Instead, neoliberalists argued that economic rationality, resting on cost-benefit analysis, could be used to make the most efficient economic and government policies (Cowen 2006; Gifford 2006). It was cost-benefit analysis that could free individuals from inefficient state policies and interventions, and it was state intervention that became the target of these ideas.

The Vietnam War draft became the first major target of neoliberal ideas. Conscription was considered to be one of the most intrusive forms of state intervention in individuals’ lives, as the state had granted itself the right to cost its citizens their lives. To add insult to the likely possibility of injury or death, military service offered no inherent value to the individual, according to economists including Friedman (Friedman 1962, 1967b). The way to correct this inefficiency, according to neoliberal economists, was to quantify the amount of money it would take to motivate individuals to serve voluntarily. The difference between this amount and the amount with which the state was currently compensating servicemembers was what Friedman called the “conscription tax” (Friedman 1962).

The real cost of conscripting a soldier who would not voluntarily serve on present terms is not his pay and the cost of his keep. It is the amount for which he would be willing to serve. He is paying the difference. This is the extra cost to him that must be added to the cost borne by the rest of us...This implicit tax in kind should be added to the explicit taxes imposed on the rest of us to get the real cost of our Armed Forces (Friedman 1967a, 204)

Riding on the notion that economic efficiency was akin to freedom, neoliberals went to work freeing people from the state intervention of conscription by develop-
ing a framework for military service that was economically rational (Cowen 2006). Friedman (1967) called conscription, “inequitable, wasteful, and inconsistent with a free society” (Friedman 1967a 202). He argued in favor of a volunteer army on the following principles:

1. A volunteer army is more effective, because the people in it want to be there, resulting in lower turnover, higher morale, less training time, and more skill;
2. A volunteer army limits defections;
3. A volunteer army preserves the freedom of those who choose to and those who choose not to serve;
4. A volunteer army avoids the arbitrary discrimination that arises when upper class people can more easily get draft deferments;
5. A volunteer army removes uncertainty for those who were subject to the draft;
6. And a volunteer army helps the community by avoiding unwanted early marriages to escape the draft and by allowing young people to decide to attend college on its own merits (Friedman 1967a 13).

President Nixon was the first president to adopt such neoliberal ideas. He formed the Gates Commission in 1969 to “develop a comprehensive plan for eliminating conscription and moving to an All-Volunteer Force.” (US President’s Commission on An All-Volunteer Armed Force 1970 vii). Thomas Gates was a former Secretary of Defense who assembled a diverse committee to represent many interests, but many of the key ideas that underpinned the report came from Friedman’s (1967) “The Case for a Voluntary Army.” Key ideas found in the Gates Report include the following: the understanding that volunteers would have more passion for service than conscripts; forcing young people to serve violates fundamental principles of freedom; the conditions of the military would only improve if it had to compete with the market for participants; competition would foster skill and efficiency in the military; and a volunteer military would be affordable and cost-effective in the long term (US President’s Commission on An All-Volunteer Armed Force 1970).
The Commission recommended that an All-Volunteer Force be instituted, and more specifically:

1. Raise the average level of basic pay for military personnel in the first two years of service from $180 a month to $315 a month, the increase to become effective on July 1, 1970. This involves an increase in total compensation (including the value of food, lodging, clothing and fringe benefits) from $301 a month to $437 a month...

2. Make comprehensive improvements in conditions of military service and in recruiting as set forth elsewhere in the Report.

3. Establish a standby draft\textsuperscript{2} system by June 30th, 1971 to be activated by joint resolution of Congress upon request of the President. (US President’s Commission on An All-Volunteer Armed Force, 1970, 10).

The improvements to the conditions of military service that the Report recommended amounted to the following:

Elimination of the present system of obligated terms of service so that enlisted personnel would be recruited and retained on the same basis as commissioned officers... expansion of the current program whereby enlistees are permitted to specify their choice of occupation as a condition of enlistment... [and] entitlement to reimbursement of family travel expense and dislocation allowance. (US President’s Commission on An All-Volunteer Armed Force, 1970, 64-67)

The three recommendations made by the Commission (to raise military pay, to improve the conditions of military service, and to establish a standby draft) were communicated to President Nixon on February 21, 1970 (Rostker, 2006).

President Nixon received some resistance to the recommendations from the Gates Commission Report from his Secretary of Defense, Melvin Laird. While Laird agreed

\textsuperscript{2} The standby draft, according to the Gates Commission, was a prerequisite for a volunteer force, because it would allow the government to act quickly and urgently if the need for massive military mobilization became necessary (US President’s Commission on An All-Volunteer Armed Force, 1970, 60). However, the Commission was concerned that having a readily mobilized conscription-based force might encourage “adventurism” on the part of top state officials. To protect against the possible misuse of the standby draft, the Commission included a provision that would require congressional approval to invoke such a draft.
with the general findings of the report, he was unconvinced that congress would provide the additional funds needed to move to an entirely volunteer force, and he thought there was no way that the transition could be made by the middle of 1971 (Rostker 2006). In spite of the public resistance put up by Laird and by the President’s adviser on military staffing, General Hershey, President Nixon pushed forward with the All-Volunteer Force policy transition and addressed congress. Nixon adopted Laird’s concern that the transition could not be accomplished by Jun 30th, 1970, but he advocated for implementing the rest of the recommendations provided in the Gates Commission Report. In the fall of 1971, congress voted to transition to a volunteer military, and increased the military compensation package well beyond even what the Gates Report had recommended (Rostker 2006). Whereas the Nixon administration had requested a compensation package for the All-Volunteer Force of $1.0 billion dollars for fiscal year 1971, the House Armed Services Committee wrote their own compensation package into their conference report that offered $2.4 billion for compensation. In September of 1971, both the House and the Senate approved the compensation report, and President Nixon signed it into law on September 28, 1971 (Rostker 2006).

2.3 Conceptualizations of Social Welfare

Shortly after Nixon’s signature shifted the military to a volunteer model, state officials begin implementing cuts to the welfare state. What constitutes social welfare? Not all scholars agree, but the most common definition of the welfare state is state policies that provide benefits to people who may be sick, old, unemployed, or otherwise unable to assist themselves in some substantial economic way (Green-Pedersen 2004). Wilensky’s (1975) oft-cited definition explains that “the essence of the welfare state is government-protected minimum standards of income, nutrition, health, housing and education, assured to every citizen as a political right, not
as charity” (Wilensky Harald 1975, 1). Schwartz (2001) argues in favor of an instrumental economic view of the welfare state, where it, “...was about sheltering all income streams, not simply wages, from market pressures” (Schwartz 2001, 17-18). Cox (1998) favors a more discursive conception of the welfare state, where social rights are impacted by policy changes that erode the original “solidaristic principles” of welfare, in a shift to more “achievement-oriented” outcomes (Cox 1998). Korpi (2003) offers a power resources theoretic approach as including either social transfers or social services that are moderated by levels of unemployment. With respect to power resources, the primary resource that citizens have is their labor power. The lower the amount of unemployment, the more power citizens have, which serves as a preventative measure against expanding welfare states (Korpi and Palme 2003). Orloff (1993) defines the welfare state as “interventions by the state in civil society to alter social and market forces” (Orloff 1993, 303). These definitions are but a few of the many that are offered in welfare state scholarship.

As Green-Pederson argues, different theoretical approaches to the welfare state necessitate different conceptualizations of the welfare state that coordinate with their respective approaches (Green-Pederson 2004). The definitions above correspond to the theoretical approach taken by each author, and the same approach holds in this chapter. This chapter proceeds with a focus on the role that the state itself plays in welfare provision (Skocpol 1985, 1992). Skocpol (1985) suggests that states do not simply mirror the interests of whichever interest groups are presently in power. Rather, states themselves can be autonomous actors. However, the present arrangement of organizations and their actions can and do impact the political environment. According to Skocpol (1992), the US adopted a “maternalist” welfare state, compared to European nations who pursued a more paternalist approach. Unlike European countries who were progressing in their provision of a social safety net for male workers, after the Civil War, the United States moved more toward a maternalistic
welfare state that saw regulations and public benefits enacted to help women who were either mothers or were anticipated to be so. The maternalistic welfare state distinguishes between people who are “deserving poor” or not, who through no fault of their own are unable to provide for themselves. In contrast, more “paternalist” welfare states, like those in Europe, offer programs specifically to help workers and their dependents (Skocpol, 1992).

2.4 Military Origins of Social Welfare

The US has long been a country that hinges much of its social welfare provision on military participation. Many of the provisions of modern social welfare in the US came out of coping with the aftermath of the Civil War (Skocpol, 1992). The first major efforts to provide some social support came not in an effort to support disadvantaged people generally, but rather, with the purposes of rewarding soldiers and their families who fought for the North in the Civil War. As Skocpol (1992) explains, Union soldiers and their dependents were granted disability and old-age pensions on a surprisingly large scale.

Between 1880 and 1910, the U.S. federal government devoted over a quarter of its expenditures to pensions distributed among the populace...such expenditures exceeded or nearly equaled other major categories of federal spending. By 1910, about 28 percent of all American men aged 65 or more, more than half a million of them, received federal benefits averaging $189 a year. Over three hundred thousand widows, orphans, and other dependents were also receiving payments...[and] thousands of elderly men and a few hundred women were also residents of special homes maintained by the federal government or their respective states (Skocpol, 1992, 65)

What began as a way to compensate Union soldiers and their dependents grew into massive disability and old-age system for many Americans. Skocpol continues,

Civil War pensions evolved from a restricted program to compensate disabled veterans and the dependents of those killed or injured in military service into an open-ended system of disability, old-age, and survivors’
benefits for anyone who could claim minimal service time on the northern side of the Civil War...Ultimately, the system became a kind of precocious social security system for those U.S. citizens of a certain generation and region who were deemed “morally worthy” of enjoying generous and honorable public aid (Skocpol 1992 102).

An important part of the reason why this program became so expansive was due to the very nature of the Civil War itself. The Civil War produced massive numbers of causalities, far more than any war the US has participated in before or since, resulting in a death rate for northerners that was nearly 6 times greater than that during WWII (Skocpol 1992) The sheer scale of the Civil War created a problem so grand that only an enormous system of social provision could meet it. The war left huge numbers of dependents without support, and it produced an entire generation of former soldiers who needed or would soon need support for wide-ranging disabilities. The young age of most surviving soldiers during the war meant that many in this group would not need support for at least two decades after the war. In 1890, more than two decades after the war had ended, only 17% of the veteran population had enrolled for pension benefits, but by 1910, over 90% of veterans had enrolled (Skocpol 1992). The pension system had no choice but to expand over time, and Congress voted multiple times to ease the eligibility restrictions, until old-age alone was sufficient to earn a Civil War Pension (Skocpol 1992 129).

This early pensioner system differed in important ways from other European disability and old-age systems. Early European social welfare systems were set up to protect workers, and especially low-wage and elderly workers, against calamities like sickness and the inability to work due to old-age (Skocpol 1992). Similar to European nations, the US pensioner system offered insurance coverage for old-age and disability. Skocpol (1992) estimates that as much as 28.5% of elderly men and

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3.18 per thousand in the population

4.3.14 per thousand in the population
8% of elderly women were covered by the pensioner system (Skocpol 1992, 132) in 1910. These numbers are much lower than the coverage rates for England, but they are comparable to Germany and the Netherlands, in spite of the fact that eligibility requirements were much stiffer for German and Dutch workers (Skocpol 1992).

European social programs were conceptualized in economic terms, and benefits were insurance for working and elderly men (Skocpol 1992, 148). But unlike European social programs, US Civil War pensions were heavily politicized. US pensions were believed to be righteous compensation for self-sacrifice for a just and worthy cause.

Here, finally, is the heart of the contrast between Europe’s fledgling welfare-state programs and the United States of America’s often equally extensive-and sometimes more financially generous-Civil War pensions. Europe’s early social insurance and pension programs reached out symbolically and materially to do modest amounts for whole categories of workers and the less economically privileged. State help was being more or less uniformly offered to those who economically needed it, if not the most, then certainly a lot. In the United States, however, the nation’s help was lavished on a selected subset of the working- and middle-class people, citizens of both races, who by their own choices and efforts as young men had earned aid-for themselves and their dependents, and even for their communities. (Skocpol 1992, 151)

As Skocpol (1992) argues, pensions were issued only to those presumed to be “morally deserving.” Those northerners who did not serve in the War were disallowed a pension. Southern soldiers who participated in earlier US wars were struck from the rolls for their traitorous service to the Confederacy. Black slaves during the War were also refused a pension. Thus, benefits were restricted to a select group of “morally deserving” recipients. Skocpol emphasizes this moral nature of the history of social welfare provision in the US: “Institutional and cultural oppositions between the morally ‘deserving’ and the less deserving run like fault lines through the entire history of American social provision” (Skocpol 1992, 149). This trajectory would remain consistent after the Civil War as the pension system transitioned into the
modern restricted social welfare system in the US.

2.5 Welfare Retrenchment

In the late 1970s and early 1980s, the welfare states in certain advanced democratic counties, specifically the United States and Great Britain, came into reproach from new administrations. Beginning with the election of Margret Thatcher in 1979 and Ronald Reagan in 1981, the welfare state was re-conceptualized as a social problem instead of a social solution (Starke 2006). Both of these officials made painstaking efforts to roll back entitlements. Thatcher’s election in 1979 marked the beginning of a concerted effort by conservatives to roll back the welfare state in Great Britain. By the time Thatcher was elected, Britain had developed a welfare state that was slightly larger in size than that found in Germany and the US, but somewhat smaller as a percent of GDP than Sweden (Pierson 1996). Britain’s welfare state consisted of relatively low income transfer but fairly high provision of public housing and health care. Thatcher’s efforts to initiate retrenchment in Britain’s welfare state revolved principally around housing and pension reforms. The state liquidated 1.5 million homes in private sales that had previously provided public housing, and the state cutback the pension system known as SERPS (State Earnings-Related Pension Scheme) (Pierson 1996).

Ronald Reagan’s election to US President in 1981 brought with it an administration that encouraged individual states to begin experimenting with social welfare administration (Zylan and Soule 2000). Reagan’s administration blamed the government deficit on heavy handed taxation and unwarranted social entitlements (Tobin 1988). Reagan pushed policy implementation and funding down to the state level when possible, which keyed states in on the possibility of experimenting with Title IV programs, and most specifically, with Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) (Soule and Zylan 1997). State-level experiments with AFDC used federal
programs as a frameworks, and these federal programs concentrated on moving recipients into the workforce: “it set in place a structure that states began to build upon in their subsequent efforts to push poor women into private sector employment and out of the public assistance system” (Zylan and Soule, 2000, 629). George Bush followed Reagan’s lead by streamlining the waiver submission and approval process that allowed states to experiment with AFDC. When Clinton was elected, the push to enable reforms was intensified. (Zylan and Soule, 2000). The end to what was ADFC arrived in 1996 when President Clinton signed the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunities Reconciliation Act (PRWORA). This instituted a set of policy reforms that permanently ended the entitlements of AFDC (Zylan and Soule, 2000).

2.5.1 Theories of Welfare Retrenchment

Pierson (1996) argues that theories of welfare state expansion cannot just be inverted to explain this retrenchment of the welfare state. Rather, a “new politics” theory of the welfare state that concentrates on how institutional configurations impact the welfare state best explains the phenomenon. He explains that the resilience of welfare states, in spite of recent powerholders’ best intentions to eliminate them, is attributable to public support and institutional history. Public support is traditionally high for social welfare programs, which makes it difficult for elected officials to both retain their office and scale back social entitlements. Institutional history

5 Pierson’s (1996) heavily-cited approach to welfare retrenchment, asks why, when top state officials were so motivated to institute wide-ranging welfare reforms, did actual reforms not go as far as they intended? As Zylan and Soule (2000) discuss, although President Reagan was elected on a platform that rested on rolling back social welfare, his early attempts to retrench social insurance programs failed, and so he shifted his focus to the more vulnerable AFDC program.

6 In Pierson’s view, in spite of the big promises and minor successes of US and British conservative governments at rolling back welfare entitlements, many social programs were left standing. In Britain, Child Benefit, Sickness Pay, and much of the pension system remained intact (Pierson, 1996). In the US, food stamps, Medicaid, and Social Security came away with only minor cuts (Pierson, 1996). Pierson claims that the attack on the welfare state in the US, Great Britain, Germany, and Sweden cannot be fully explained by theories of welfare state expansion. Rather, the trajectory of welfare state retrenchment requires an explanation that treats it as a new and distinct

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is slow to change and typically only does so incrementally and within the existing framework of the institution. Seen in this way, it is remarkable that change in welfare systems occurs at all. The way that policy makers are able to accomplish welfare reforms in the face of popular and institutional constraints is to avoid blame: “retrenchment advocates were able to successfully pursue strategies of obfuscation, division, and compensation only where institutional structures and existing policy designs were favorable” (Pierson 1995, 50).

Zylan and Soule (2000) suggest that Pierson’s “new politics” theory can be reconciled with existing state-centered theories of the state. These authors question whether retrenchment in the AFDC program in the late 1980s and 1990s was the result of a new type of electoral politics, or if it could be explained as institutional change, similar to earlier waves of AFDC reform. The authors find that the same factors that contributed to earlier efforts to reform AFDC also explained the movements in the late 1980s and 1990s: “partisan politics, racial conflict, and rapid diffusion of the reforms once they begin to be pursued” (Zylan and Soule 2000, 644). They find that states that were Republican and states that had high AFDC payments were the fastest to submit waivers to the federal government for permission to change how AFDC was administered in their states. They also find that states that were suffering from financial crises were more likely to submit waivers (Zylan and Soule 2000). State-centered theory can facilitate our understanding of welfare retrenchment by focusing our attention on how state institutions and their powerholders adopt certain ideas (e.g., neoliberalism) and implement associated reforms at the expense of competing ideas (e.g., Keynesianism).

process. Pierson argues that reforms are constrained by voters and interest groups, which makes it difficult and risky for politicians to implement (Pierson 1996). Succeeding at welfare reform is largely a result of policy makers’ successes at avoiding the wrath of the public for implementing such reforms.
2.5.2 Evidence for Welfare Retrenchment

Piven and Cloward’s (1993) *Regulating the Poor* argues that state-sponsored relief for the public is used for two purposes. It is either used as a tool to placate the public during periods of social upheaval, or it used to discipline the workforce during periods of social stability (Piven and Cloward, 1993). The authors explain how the welfare state in the US was used to discipline workers since the 1970s: the state cut benefits, cut welfare rolls, and converted entitlement programs to work programs. As the recession of the early 1970s set in, wages fell and AFDC payments were allowed to fall with them, to deter the possibility that relief would provide a disincentive to go to work. “The result was that benefits lost 42 percent of their purchasing power between 1970 and 1990” (Piven and Cloward, 1993, 372). Welfare reformers were able to find ways to cut back the number of people receiving benefits. “Nixon recruited top people from Governor Reagan’s California welfare department, who were known for their innovative administrative tactics designed to keep people off the rolls” (Piven and Cloward, 1993, 374). One of their most effective tactics was to add excessive bureaucracy to the welfare application process, to make it more difficult and more time-consuming to apply, and to make it more likely that eligible people would go without receiving benefits:

In reports published by the Center on Social Welfare Policy and Law, Casey and Mannix estimated that “there were about one million more procedural denials” in 1984 than in 1972, and that in 1984 “two thirds or more of procedural denials (which represented about one-third of all denials) were denials to eligible families” –which meant that over two million children and one million adults were denied benefits for which they were eligible in that year alone. The result was called “churning” –a process in which “eligible families have their applications rejected or their cases closed...and then reapply to gain or regain benefits.” –and it converted the welfare system into a revolving door (Piven and Cloward, 1993, 376).
The figures that follow show trends in welfare state provision over time from the 1970s to the present, where data are available. In spite of Pierson’s (1996) notion that the welfare state is “resilient,” these trends show that many social welfare instruments were reduced over time. The first figure shows two plots of AFDC welfare benefits from 1970 to 1995.7 Figure 2.1 shows the average monthly AFDC benefit per person, after adjusting earlier years’ benefits to a 1995 level. The value of these payments declined at a marginal rate from 1970 to 1980, but after President Reagan came into office, the value of the benefit fell dramatically. The dramatic decline continued until President Clinton put an end to the program in 1996. The second plot shows the average monthly AFDC benefit per family in 1995 dollars. The value of this benefit declined more dramatically than the value of the individual recipient benefit, falling in a downward trajectory from 1970 to 1995, with one upward bump in 1985. Overall, the value of the AFDC benefit that provided financial assistance to needy families fell consistently over the period of the All-Volunteer Force.

Figure 2.2 shows the number of Section 8 housing vouchers and certificates that were issued over time, from 1981 to 1994.8 The trajectory of this benefit is slightly more varied than AFDC benefits, but the overall trend is clear. The combined number of vouchers and certificates has fallen over time, making it more difficult to obtain government-sponsored housing at the same time that the US population continues to grow. The Fiscal Year 1995 Rescissions Act passed by Congress ended the provision of “incremental tenant-based assistance,” though the program was restarted in 1999 when Congress allocated 50,000 new vouchers (U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, 2000). The provision of Section 8 housing has been in decline and inconsistently available during the period of the All-Volunteer Force.

7 Data were pulled from the Table 8-16 in the US Green Book (1996). Congress (1996).
8 Data were pulled from U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (2000).
Figure 2.1. Trends in Average Monthly AFDC Benefit
Figure 2.2. Trends in Number of Section 8 Vouchers and Certificates
Figure 2.3 shows four plots: the percentage of women in the workforce who have at least one minor child, the percentage of children needing daycare services from 1977 to 1995, the percentage of children under 6 in poverty, and the Head Start program enrollment percentage out of the number of children under 6 who are in poverty. These four plots present a picture of the need for and supply of government-sponsored child care. Women with children have entered the workforce in greater numbers over time, and subsequently, they have needed more childcare services. The number of children living in poverty who need some government assistance to cover their costs of care has risen and fallen over time, but the overall trend from 1969 to 2009 shows an increasing number of children under 6 living in poverty. The Head Start program provides care and education for children under 6 years old. Relative to the number of children who are in poverty, Head Start provided a decreasing percentage of needy children with services from 1969 to 1983. But from 1983 until 2001, the provision of Head Start increased against the percentage of children in poverty. In 2001, this trend began to slide downward again. However, at its peak, Head Start only serviced about 22% of the children under 6 who lived in poverty. This left nearly 80% of children in poverty in a questionable childcare arrangement at the same time that mothers were entering the workforce in record numbers.

Figure 2.4 shows trends in Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) (formerly the Food Stamp Program) benefits from 1969 to 2015. The upper plot shows the average SNAP benefit per person over time in 2015 dollars. The lower plot shows the percent of Americans receiving SNAP benefits in each year. Both plots show similar trends, where benefits rose from 1969 to around 1977, and from 1977

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9Women employment and child care data were pulled from Tables 9-1 and 9-8 from Congress (2000) historical Head Start Data were pulled from US Department of Health and Human Services, and child poverty data were pulled from Table 20 in the Census Historical Poverty Tables US Census Bureau

10Data pulled from US Department of Agriculture
Figure 2.3. Trends in Women in Workforce and Number of Children in Poverty
until the US recession in 2008 benefits remain fairly consistent. During the recession in the late 2000s, benefit amounts and people receiving them, spiked. SNAP benefits are one of the types of welfare provisions for poor people in the US that were not retrenched during the All-Volunteer Force period.

Figure 2.5 shows the percent of Americans who were on Medicaid and the percent who were uninsured from 1987 to 2014. The percent of Americans on Medicaid has increase substantially from 1987 to 2014, from around 8% to over 20%. This suggests that more people are being covered by government-sponsored health care than ever before. However, the lower plot shows that the number of Americans who do not have any form of health insurance increased over time as well. The percent of uninsured Americans dipped in 2000, and then dove in 2014 due to President Obama’s Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act. These competing trends suggest that more poor Americans are being provided with government-sponsored health care recently, but many Americans have also gone without health care entirely during the period of the All-Volunteer Force.

Welfare reformers like President Nixon, and later Presidents Reagan, Bush, and Clinton, had visible success rolling back the amount of benefits and the numbers of people on the welfare rolls. These reformers did not stop with entitlements, however, and also initiated efforts to retrench welfare through welfare-to-work programs (Piven and Cloward, 1993; Zylan and Soule, 2000). Such programs were implemented under the neoliberal theory that the market provides when the state no longer interferes (Cowen, 2006). Welfare-to-work programs came in all shapes, sizes, and clever names. Program names were acronyms that relayed how reliance on a social program was self-limiting, whereas even menial employment meant freedom for the individual. Acronyms were names like, “Employing and Moving People Off Welfare (EMPOWER)” and “Avenues to Self-Sufficiency Through Employment and Training”

\[\text{Data drawn from Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (2015)}\]
Figure 2.4. Trends in SNAP Benefits
Figure 2.5. Trends in Medicaid and Uninsured
Services (ASSETS)” (Zylan and Soule, 2000, 629). Work incentive programs provided benefits if people worked for them. “Workfare” programs made recipients work off their benefits by working for non-profit, labor, or government agencies without pay. Job search programs provided recipients with benefits if they continually applied for work (Piven and Cloward, 1993).

Since Reagan was elected, the social policy of elected government executives in the US followed a largely neoliberal social agenda that pushed for a reduction in state benefits and incentivized putting people to work (MacLeavy and Peoples, 2009). The economic recession in the early 1970s made this easier for top state officials to implement. Job stability for low skilled workers, and especially those who were most disadvantaged, became increasingly threatened. This drove people to look for new solutions to their economic problems that the Keynesian social democratic welfare state policies that characterized earlier welfare state expansion periods appeared to have left unsolved (O’Connor, 2002). The new position that incoming administrations adopted was the neoliberal one that government intervention in people’s lives interfered with their liberty, and that all problems, including social ones, were best approached through a cost-benefit framework (Cowen, 2006). By manipulating incentive structures, the state tried to solve not only economic problems, but social ones.

2.6 Guns versus Butter

The turn toward neoliberalism in US public policy informed both the retrenchment in the welfare state and the turn toward military volunteerism, which affected both who could be most readily incentivized to enlist and who would be withheld the benefits offered by earlier welfare policies. Scholars including Kamlet and Mowery (1987), Pampel and Williamson (1988), Domke et al. (1983), and Mintz and Huang (1991) tested the hypothesis that there is a trade-off between military spending and
social spending, or as a debate between “guns and butter,” where large military budgets soak up resources that might otherwise have been put into social programs. These studies struggle to paint a coherent and universal picture of this relationship, in part, because military spending itself provides a form of social welfare.

One approach taken by scholars to the guns vs butter debate is to theorize the relationship between military and social spending in a pluralistic fashion, where interest groups and polity members compete over a finite set of resources (Kamlet and Mowery, 1987; Pampel and Williamson, 1988; Domke et al., 1983; Mintz and Huang, 1991). Resources allocated for one group’s interests come at the expense of the interests of a competing group. Therefore, resources allocated to military spending must come at the expense of resources allocated to social expenditures and entitlements. Some studies do find evidence of a trade-off between defense spending and other budget priorities (Kamlet and Mowery, 1987; Pampel and Williamson, 1988). In the case of Pampel and Williamson (1988), the authors find a negative coefficient for defense spending as it predicts social welfare spending in advanced industrialized countries from 1950-1980. However, the authors note that, “given that defense spending is as much a consequence as a determinant of welfare spending (and we are not in this paper able to separate out the simultaneous effects), we continue to estimate models without defense spending” (Pampel and Williamson, 1988, 1444). Mintz and Huang (1991) find no short term effects of arms expenditures on education spending, but they do find indirect long-term effects of military spending via investment and growth on education expenditures (Mintz and Huang, 1991). Similarly, Domke et. al. (1983) find no short-term relationship between welfare spending and defense expenditures, but they do find longer-term relationships, which are attributable in part, to wartime spending. The authors suggest that this trade-off is largely unnecessary, because governments can increase their overall spending by raising taxes or increasing the deficit (Domke et al., 1983). More recent work by DiGiuseppe (2015)
corroborates this conclusion with cross-national data up to the Great Recession finding that, “leaders of creditworthy states can minimize or delay the political costs imposed by the alternatives to borrowing and thus have greater autonomy to increase and maintain military expenditure” (DiGiuseppe 2015 680).

Other scholars find no significant effects for defense spending on welfare expenditures, suggesting that any relationship between welfare spending is more nuanced and complex than a linear coefficient can describe (Hicks and Misra 1993; Huber et al. 1993; Huber and Stephens 2001; Russett 1982). To formally test the “guns for butter” theory, Huber et. al. (1993, 2001) hypothesize that military spending has a positive effect on total public sector spending, and a negative association to transfer and social welfare expenditures. These authors find that military spending is positively associated with total state expenditure, but they find no significant relationship between military spending and social welfare expenditures (Huber et al. 1993; Huber and Stephens 2001). Hicks and Misra (1993) also formally test the hypothesis that “military spending efforts ‘crowds out’ and reduces welfare spending effort.” The only variable in their model that performs “unexpectedly” is ‘military share,’ which is not a significant predictor of welfare effort (i.e., “welfare spending as a share of the gross domestic product”) (Hicks and Misra 1993 692). Russett (1982) tests for the presence of an association between defense spending and “federal expenditures and education from 1941 through 1979” (Russett 1982 767). Like the aforementioned scholars, He finds no evidence of a trade-off in these types of spending. As Montero (2014) points out, the question is not so much whether we should have guns or butter, but rather, how much guns and butter can we get?

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12Data are from 1981-2007 from 143 countries
Since the Civil War Pension era, the United States has reserved some of its most thorough and exhaustive social benefits programs for military veterans and their families. As discussed earlier, Civil War pensions were the first set of entitlements offered to large numbers of Americans, and these entitlements outweighed those provided by other western industrialized democracies:

In terms of the large share of the federal budget spent, the hefty proportion of citizens covered, and the relative generosity of the disability and old-age benefits offered, the United States had become a precocious social spending state. Its post-Civil War system of social provision in many respects exceeded what early programs of “workingmen’s insurance” were giving needy old people or superannuated industrial wage earners in fledgling Western welfare states around the turn of the century (Skocpol 1992: 1-2).

During periods of welfare state expansion in the US including the New Deal programs under Roosevelt and Great Society programs under Johnson, veterans received special consideration for social programs. Veterans were provided preferences for jobs in the Works Progress Administration (WPA), and veterans received housing and educational benefits for fighting in WWII (Amenta and Skocpol 1988). In the post-Vietnam era, the US government started to provide additional social benefits packages not just for veterans, but also for those currently volunteering for military service. These benefits included housing, health services, family maintenance, food, child care, education, retirement, etc., and these benefits greatly exceeded their social welfare entitlement counterparts.

With respect to housing, active duty servicemembers are provided with different types of housing depending on their rank and number of dependents. Unmarried, lower-ranking servicemembers typically inhabit a room in a barracks that resembles an apartment. Married servicemembers with dependents may receive family housing on the military installation, or they may receive a benefit called Basic Allowance
for Housing (BAH). BAH is a tax-free subsidy that is provided to servicemembers with families who live off of military installations, and it provides compensation to cover all reasonable housing costs based on the local housing market, number of dependents, and pay grade (Goldich, 2005). Servicemembers living in high rent areas receive a Variable Housing Allowance (VHA), which provides them additional subsidies to offset unusually high rents (Twiss and Martin, 1999). On-installation housing typically includes paid-for utilities including electricity, water, sewer, and garbage removal. This kind of housing compensation benefit well exceeds Section 8 rental assistance for qualifying Americans. Section 8 housing requires that a recipient locate a rental unit that is at or below the Fair Market Rent (FMR), which is a price ceiling that accounts for the size, age, condition, and local of the unit. The most a Section 8 recipient can receive is the FMR minus 30% of their adjusted family income (Cutts and Olsen, 2002).

In the case of health care provision, the US military outshines its provision as a public good. All active-duty servicemembers receive fully paid medical care. This medical care is provided at military-run and staffed hospitals under the Department of Defense. Servicemembers’ dependents can elect to receive Tricare, which provides them with health insurance that covers nearly all medical expenses, and can also be used to pay private medical facilities for care as well. Unlike most private and public health care provision, Tricare does not require a monthly premium or co-payments. Public programs usually require that participants pay 15% or 20% of their treatment costs out-of-pocket. Programs like Medicaid and Children’s Health Insurance Program (CHIP) also require that recipients be uninsured children, pregnant women, or meet strict low income requirements (Gifford, 2006).

A third area where military provision of a public benefit dwarfs that of its civilian counterpart is in the area of food security. The US military provides Basic Allowance for Subsistence (BAS) subsidies to servicemembers that offset the price of meals that
are not provided directly by the military. This subsidy is only intended to offset the cost of meals for the servicemember and not their dependents. It is increased each year based on cost-of-living price adjustments. In 2016, the BAS for enlisted servicemembers was $357.55/month (US Department of Defense). Alternatively, the individual US Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) benefit (formerly Food Stamp Program) in 2016 averaged around $160/month per person (Bolen et al., 2016). Making it difficult to obtain food benefits are SNAP program requirements that only offer benefits to those who have very low asset and income levels. Additionally, SNAP limits benefits to 3 months in 3 years for those adults who are unemployed and who are not parents or disabled (Bolen et al., 2016).

In addition to housing, health, and food benefits, the US military also offers benefits that many servicemembers can elect into. These benefits include on-installation consumer facilities, child care, educational payments, retirement pensions, and life insurance. Nearly all US military installations provide non-profit grocery stores called commissaries and Base/Post Exchanges (BX or PX) that offer sales-tax-free department-store goods (Gifford, 2006). Early child care in the US military is provided by Child Development Centers that look after children from six weeks to five years old and provide fee-for-service daycare at rates that are lower than private sector daycares (Zellman et al., 1992). Additionally, extensive education benefits are a primary incentive for recruiting efforts. First introduced as the “Serviceman’s Readjustment Act of 1944,” the GI Bill is the primary education program benefit for servicemembers that originally provided veterans returning from WWII with educational opportunities (Skocpol, 1996). Over time, the benefit amount has increased, from a subsidy for tuition and college fees of $500 per month for up to 48 months in 1944 to a benefit in 2016 that pays for all tuition and fees for in-state students and up to $21,970 per year for students attending private or out-of-state schools (Mettler, 2002; US Department of Veterans Affairs). In addition to these benefits, the military
offers many other benefits that are increasingly rare in the private sector, and virtually unheard of as public benefits, including retirement pensions that pay out after only 20 years of service and VA-sponsored life insurance policies with payouts up to $400,000 (in 2016).

Being eligible for these benefits that are paid for by the state is largely a function of family status and number of dependents, in addition to actually being a service-member. These benefits are not easily obtained by disadvantaged people who need them but who do not enlist. Offering these kinds of benefits only to those who participate in military service can lessen the demand for social programs more generally, since a portion of the needy who enlist are then covered under military social spending (Gifford 2006). Providing social welfare through the military reduces the need for the state to provide welfare benefits to the general population. A neoliberal position provides the logical incentives for this effort, where, in order for people to get benefits such as housing or food allowances, they should work for them. One of the quickest ways to gain expansive benefits is to forego working a low-paying job in the labor market and enlist instead. “In the context of the broader restructuring of work and welfare, neoliberal ‘social’ policy is increasingly militarized, targeted towards socially and spatially marginal soldiers who work for their welfare” (Cowen 2006 167).

2.8 Compositional Changes in Military Service

A number of scholars (Cowen 2006; Gifford 2006; MacLeavy and Peoples 2009; Waddell 2001) argue that powerholders wielding neoliberal theories were behind the transition to a volunteer military force that incentivized people to enlist with benefits that were being actively retrenched at the same time. Retrenching social welfare meant that people had a reduced set of options for meeting their own needs. Neoliberal economists argued that working low-paying jobs instead of receiving government handouts offered people freedom from government intervention. Social entitlements
were seen as a disincentive for people to find and maintain jobs. Top state officials moved to end the disincentivizing social programs that would otherwise provide an alternative set of benefits to those that could be earned through military service (MacLeavy and Peoples 2009). This effort arose just after the Nixon administration spearheaded the move to a volunteer military. The timing of the switch to a volunteer military came along right at the moment where the same sort of benefits that were being reduced in social welfare policies were being offered as incentives to enlist in the military (Cowen 2006; Gifford 2006).

The last two figures (2.6 and 2.7) show trends in enlistments, unemployment, and racial composition. These plots demonstrate that the number of people wanting to volunteer to join the military rises during periods of economic contraction, when more people are economically vulnerable. Figure 2.6 shows trend lines for the number of military applicants over time, the number of enlisted accessions over time, and the US unemployment rate. The line representing applicants, more-so than the line representing accessions rises when the unemployment rate spikes. Military applications rose during the recession of 1982, rose again slightly before the early 1990s recession, rose during the 2002 recession, and spiked upward during the 2008 recession.

Figure 2.7 shows percentages of enlistees versus civilians for different racial groups. The upper plot shows a comparison of percentages in enlistees who are white against white civilians. The civilian data in these plots are drawn from the Bureau of Labor Statistics Current Population Survey (CPS). The middle plot shows black enlistees’ percentage compared to the civilian black percentage, and the lower plot shows the same comparison for Hispanics. In 2003, the Department of Defense changed how it measured white and Hispanic categories, hence what appears to be a spike in percent

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13The unemployment data are drawn from the U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) as reported in Appendix D of Military data from DMDC: Historical Data Tables. The accessions data are provided by the DMDC.
Figure 2.6. Trends in Accessions and Unemployment
white composition. In the white enlisted versus civilian plot, it is clear that in most years of the volunteer military, a lower proportion of whites enlisted than were present in the civilian population. Only in the early 1990s did whites enlist at a higher rate than their civilian proportion. Alternatively, blacks enlist at rates that are much higher than their civilian proportion. This has narrowed somewhat over time, but for most of the period of the All-Volunteer Force, blacks composed a far greater share of military volunteers than their civilian population rate. The lower plot shows that the Hispanic civilian and military populations have risen dramatically over the period of the volunteer military. While the rate of Hispanic enlistments has not yet exceeded the proportion of Hispanics in the general population, the increase from 5% to nearly 20% in a span of thirty years is remarkable. These plots show a trend in military volunteers over time that moves a disproportionate number of people from minority racial and ethnic groups into military service.

As a whole, the figures in this chapter demonstrate that welfare provisions decreased over time, while enlistment rates increased as a function of group disadvantage. Disadvantaged groups, specifically blacks, enlist at a much higher rate than their civilian percentage, and applications for military service follow spikes in unemployment. On the welfare provision side, the figures show decreases in AFDC welfare benefits, increases of mothers in the workforce and need for affordable child care, middling amounts of SNAP (food stamp) benefits, and decreasing numbers of Section 8 housing vouchers issued.

2.9 Conclusion

The theory and data presented in this chapter support the argument that a volunteer military, spawned by neoliberal ideas, was in a position to capitalize on a weakened welfare state. Additionally, the transition to the All-Volunteer Force pushed the military into playing a greater role as a provider of social welfare. As Cowen (2006)
Figure 2.7. Trends in Accessions by Race
dramatizes, the volunteer military and social welfare retrenchment share a symbiotic relationship:

Gradually the military became an employer of last resort for the middle classes, although it continued to be a great source of upward mobility for working class Americans. With the AVF, the numbers of women, people of color, and working class people in the military skyrocketed. This combined with the early dismantling of Keynesian policies based on redistribution and full employment, and the economic recession of the 1970s and made more people more desperate for any source of stable employment, particularly people of color and youth. The neoliberalization of the economy was thus promising to dovetail quite nicely with the AVF (Cowen, 2006, 176).

State powerholders acted on neoliberal theories and shifted the US military to a volunteer model shortly before the shift to retrench the welfare state. After the state moved to this new enlistment model, powerholders made efforts to roll back welfare provision. Welfare provision might have worked to disincentivize people, specifically disadvantaged people, from enlisting in the volunteer military. But the volunteer force and welfare retrenchment helped to reinforce one another. The military offered incentives for enlistment that were simultaneously being withdrawn as public entitlements. To get state-provided social benefits during the All-Volunteer Force era including assistance with housing, child care, health care, and even cash payments for having more children, disadvantaged people came to rely less on state handouts and more on work programs, or alternatively, on enlisting to receive the full complement of high-quality benefits that were not available as entitlements.
CHAPTER 3

FRAME ALIGNMENT: MILITARY RECRUITMENT ADVERTISING

As evidenced by the prior chapter, the alignment of welfare state retrenchment with the All-Volunteer Force belies the use of the second face of power by state officials, who urged a pull-back on public assistance while offering retrenched benefits to military volunteers. State officials used the second face of power to initiate barriers to obtaining much-needed benefits, and as this chapter demonstrates, they also used forms of the third face of power in an attempt to socially reconstruct the perceptions young people had of the military. Gaventa (1982) explains that the third dimension of power involves the “means through which power influences, shapes or determines conceptions of the necessities, possibilities, and strategies of challenge in situations of latent conflict” (Gaventa 1982, 17). The military needed to be perceived as an alternative to the labor market and as a provider of long-term opportunity for enlistees, as opposed to the historical notion of the military as a service-oriented institution that took more from its participants than it gave to them. By reframing the military in this way, state officials could capitalize on the pairing of specific opportunities and values of military service with the needs and values of potential recruits.

To motivate people to volunteer for service during the All-Volunteer Force era, the popular understanding of the military as a service institution needed to be reconstructed as an engine of opportunity. To accomplish this, state officials undertook a massive advertising effort to sell the military to young potential recruits (Bailey 2007; Rostker 2006). The US Army alone spent approximately $80 million dollars
per year in the 1980s, and closer to $100 million dollars per year since then, on military recruitment advertising (Dertouzos et al., 1989; Dertouzos and Garber, 2006). New military advertising appealed to the economic needs and consumer desires of potential enlistees, and at the same time, deemphasized the service requirements of enlistment. By communicating the opportunities and new incentives that were available to enlistees, military advertising was used to reframe public perceptions of the military and alter how people conceived of military enlistment (Bailey, 2007).

Military advertising did not need to convince everyone that enlisting in the military service was for a good idea for them. As the first chapter of this dissertation explained, the military only needed a critical mass of people to enlist (Marwell and Oliver, 1993). As this chapter suggests, military advertising campaigns were structured in a way that targeted specific groups of more vulnerable people to obtain a critical mass of recruits. Furthermore, more vulnerable people who were targeted were also appealed to with the selective incentives that would best motivate them to enlist. This chapter tests the notion that military advertising recruitment campaigns disproportionately targeted more vulnerable groups of people that would be most receptive to the incentives that were being offered in exchange for military enlistment. This chapter also looks for evidence that military advertising employed diagnostic recruitment frames that identified problems held by groups who were more vulnerable.

Military reports made public reveal that recruitment advertising is, in fact, strategically targeted and reassessed for its return on investment (Baker, 1990; Dertouzos et al., 1989; Ackerman et al., 1971). The military launches surveys, performs analysis, and drafts lengthy reports to assess the impact of advertising campaigns on military recruitment in order to better inform future recruitment efforts (Baker, 1990). The

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1The cost is estimated at $6,000 in advertising to recruit one additional high-quality enlisted soldier (Dertouzos et al., 1989).
introduction to one of these reports makes it clear that military advertising is goal-oriented, strategic, and is constructed in a way to maximize the number of enlistments for the investment:

In order to attract qualified individuals, the Army invests in economic incentives (i.e., enlistment and educational bonuses) based on market research that identifies the needs and characteristics of individuals in the Army’s prime market, as well as their exposure to Army advertising. One way the Army collects market research data is through survey administration and analysis. Examples of these surveys include the New Recruit Survey (NRS), the Recruit Experience Tracking Survey (RETS), and the Army Communications Objectives Measurement System (ACOMS). These surveys collect information about the attitudes and perceptions that individuals have about the Army. Survey items directly related to advertising may ask individuals if they can recall Army commercials or to assess an opportunity that the Army offers. Responses to the advertising-related survey items provide the Army with information concerning the effectiveness of past advertising campaigns and information for developing new ones that may improve the recruitment of high quality individuals (Baker, 1990, 1).

One set of findings from this particular report reveals the amount of attention that the military pays to the effectiveness of the selective incentives offered for enlistment:

Comparisons between the military services and civilian work samples found that youth perceived greater opportunities in the military than in civilian work. The Army was seen to offer greater opportunities for physical challenge, working with high-tech equipment, money for education, leadership skills, and an advantage over going right from high school to college than civilian work. These differences reflected the success of Army Advertising for the attributes whose means were found to be greater than civilian work (Baker, 1990, 30).

The effectiveness of particular selective incentives is so powerful that the Army suggests that it may merit some better expectation setting:

Future research should examine the RJP’s [Realistic Job Previews] being utilized to lower new soldiers initial expectations of the Army. Their expectations need to be lowered to better match the perceptions of more experienced soldiers. More realistic perceptions may improve satisfaction, retention, and self-selection (Baker, 1990, 31).
This chapter investigates how framing processes were used in military recruitment advertising to target more vulnerable groups. It also examines how frame alignment processes were used to present specific types of selective incentives to different groups of more vulnerable people. To understand the kinds of appeals that were made and who they were targeted at in the years following the shift to the AVF, this chapter offers an analysis of Army recruiting commercials. This analysis intends to reveal answers to two questions: first, who was targeted with military advertising, and second, how were these groups targeted? Knowing who was targeted with what kinds of appeals may inform the following chapters that examine who was targeted with recruiters, who was receptive to recruitment targeting, who enlisted, and whether enlistment provided improved life chances compared to non-enlistees.

3.1 Frame Analysis

To make sense of who was targeted and how they were targeted with military advertising, this chapter situates the analysis in frame theory from social movement scholarship. Framing processes involve the production of ideas and meanings to help to render events meaningful, and to organize collective action (Snow et al., 1986; Snow and Benford, 1988; Cress and Snow, 2000). The framing perspective considers social movements to be not only vehicles for communicating extant ideas, but movements also engage in constructing and reproducing meaning for those involved in and in proximity to them. Borrowing the concept of frames from Goffman’s (1974) “Frame Analysis,” framing theorists suggest that meanings are not simply accidental outputs from otherwise natural social processes, but rather, emerge through interpretive processes that are fashioned and channeled by culture (Goffman, 1974). This line of thinking suggests that meanings are constructed and malleable. They can be challenged, and they can be refashioned. Manipulating frames is both an agentic and evolving process. Frame manipulation requires an effort on the part of a social group
to actively construct or reconstruct particular meanings, and this process is not a static, one-off occurrence, but rather relies on the unfolding of time (Snow 2004).

The active process of manipulating frames encompasses the effort to reconstruct how the public viewed military service.

Certain frames perform specific types of roles, and those who construct these frames have intentions about the sorts of outcomes each type of frame will produce. Framing research generally focuses on the content of frames, on the resonance with outside observers, and on the constraints within political opportunity structures and wider culture (Cress and Snow 2000). The three types of frames include diagnostic, prognostic, and motivation frames (Benford 1993). Diagnostic frames produce a diagnosis of an existing or newly constructed problem. Prognostic frames provide recommendations for how identified problems can be overcome and what needs to be done to be a part of the solution. Motivational frames are those ways of actively shaping the interpretation of meaning to produce the greatest resonance with the greatest number of people, effectively moving them to action. The construction of motivational frames relies heavily on aligning diagnostic and prognostic frames with the intended audience.

Diagnostic frames identify problems and establish responsibility for those problems (Benford 1993). The effort to reconstruct the military as an engine of opportunity involved the development of diagnostic frames that problematized specific issues, which could then be solved with the selective incentives offered by the prognostic frame of military enlistment. State officials had already decided on a set of selective incentives to motivate young people to volunteer, and these selective incentives addressed the very problems that were diagnosed by recruitment advertising (Baker 1990). These problems also happened to be problems that are characteristic of more vulnerable groups.

Vulnerability, as conceptualized in this dissertation, is the extent to which an in-
individual or group is at risk of being exploited by powerholders because of a resource or opportunity-poor social position (Grady, 2009; Mechanic and Tanner, 2007). People or groups can be more or less vulnerable. Groups that are more vulnerable have fewer alternatives that can compete with the selective incentives offered for military enlistment. Selective incentives for enlistment could be advertised as solutions to problems such as not having money to pay for college, not having job or leadership skills, or not being sufficiently challenged.

In the first set of analyses in this chapter, diagnostic frames in military advertisements are used to answer the question of who is being targeted with military advertising. The diagnosis of the particular problems that are represented in military recruiting advertisements can help us identify the groups being targeted for recruitment. Groups of people who do not have the problems that are diagnosed in military advertisements are not likely to be receptive or motivated by those recruitment messages. However, people who do have those problems and could be motivated by the advertisements are likely to be members of groups that are being targeted for recruitment. The problems that are diagnosed may help reveal the target population, and that target population includes those groups being offered the prognostic frame of enlistment as a solution to their problems.

Beyond problematizing young people’s lives and offering incentives to solve those problems, military advertising also needs to resonate with targeted groups. Producing frames that resonate with their intended audience is a process called frame alignment (Snow et al., 1986). Frame alignment, in social movement scholarship, means that there needs to be a certain amount of agreement between individuals’ values and a movement’s goals for people to take action (Snow et al., 1986). Snow et al. (1986) distinguish between micromobilization and frame alignment by suggesting that frame alignment addresses the linkages between individuals and movements, while micromobilization addresses the processes that affect frame alignment. The
authors present a typology for frame alignment that segment it into four distinct processes: bridging, amplification, extension, and transformation. Bridging refers to two value-similar but as of yet, unconnected frames. These are most often discussed as connecting a social movement with a group of sympathetic participants. Frame amplification involves the reestablishment and intensification of a particular frame relating to values and/or beliefs. Frame extension is the process of widening a frame to include issues or values that are particularly salient for potential sympathizers beyond what was originally included in the frame. Finally, frame transformation is a systemic change of parts of a frame, typically in “domain-specific” frames (which are smaller changes) or in “global frames” (which are much larger changes) (Snow et al., 1986).

To match up diagnostic and prognostic frames with potential recruits, military advertising frames need to be aligned with their intended audiences. The four frame alignment processes (bridging, amplification, extension, and transformation) may be evident in AVF advertising materials. The process of frame bridging involves connecting one frame with the people who already agree with the tenets of that frame (Snow et al., 1986). Gerhards and Rucht (1992) find evidence for the effectiveness of frame bridging in their study of the mobilization against Ronald Reagan’s visit to Berlin in 1987 and mobilization against the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in 1988. The authors find that wide-scale mobilization was possible because small groups were able to connect their often single-issue focus to the master frame of the protest. Master frames begin as collective action frames that grow in scope and impact until they become boundaries of collective action (Snow and Benford, 1992). The bridging during the Reagan and IMF protests facilitated the organization of different groups to mobilize for the same event. In the case of recruitment advertisements, bridging might be accomplished with a similar process, by first manufacturing broad master frames for military recruitment. Then, people in many different groups, with somewhat
different interests and values, may be able to connect with that master frame. For example, the incentive the Army offers of being able to pick from between 200 careers upon enlistment may bridge the gap between people who are sympathetic to military service, but who want to follow divergent career paths.

Frame amplification, or making an existing frame resonate more strongly with the audience, needs to do more than simply bridge across matched values. The audience’s existing values and beliefs may need to be stressed, reinforced, or reminded in order for their frames to align with military goals (Snow et al., 1986). Morrison and Isaac (2012) develop the concept of “visual frame amplification,” whereby the use of striking, humorous, and revealing imagery increased the resonance of the framing used by the Industrial Workers of the World (IWW). Recruiting advertising might also capitalize on the frame amplification process, by employing powerful, patriotic visual frames that invigorate the audiences’ loyalty to country, hero worship, etc. The use of rousing music, heroic language, and a concentration on patriotic values might reinforce these values in an audience that is sympathetic but unconvinced they should enlist. Amplifying the visual imagery in these advertisements may also contribute to an increased alignment of people’s values with military goals, as patriotic imagery is shown alongside powerful narratives of military service and opportunity.

Frame extension is a processes that widens the limits of the framing effort to incorporate values that are the most salient to the audience (Snow et al., 1986). A study by Cornfield and Fletcher (1998) of the changing legislative agenda of the American Federation of Labor (AFL) finds that pressures in the institutional environment pushed the movement to expand its policy agenda over time to advance social welfare policies and employment for all workers, not just those who were unionized. The frame extension processes for military recruiting might also be subject to institutional pressures. The two decades-long “Be All You Can Be” Army recruiting campaign came to an end in 2000, when the military was facing a difficult recruiting
environment and shortfalls in enlistments (Wong 2006). The campaign that followed is the campaign that is analyzed in this chapter, the “Army of One” campaign. This campaign heralds individualism. The “An Army of One” slogan strives to make individualism appear to be a value of the Army. This is quite a stretch considering that the “basic training” program for new recruits is designed to strip newly enlisted soldiers of their individuality and make them part of the same unit. New enlistees wear the same uniform, eat the same food, shave their heads the same, shout cadence in unison, run together, eat together, live together, etc. When one enlistee misbehaves, the rest of the unit is punished (Bailey 2007). This advertising campaign in particular, extends the frame of military values well beyond the reality of actual military service. Extending the advertising frame in this way may help align recruitment frames with the values of people who otherwise might not consider enlistment.

Frame transformation is the most sweeping type of frame alignment process (Snow et al. 1986). Snow et al. (1986) draw on Goffman’s (1974) notion of transformation, which,

redefines activities, events, and biographies that are already meaningful from the standpoint of some primary framework, in terms of another framework, such that they are now ‘seen by the participants to be something quite else.’ What is involved is a ‘systematic alteration’ that radically reconstitutes what it is for participants that is going on (Goffman, 1974:45) (Snow et al. 1986 474).

With respect to military advertising, the fundamental notion of what military service meant to the public required frame transformation. Recruitment advertising took on the task of transforming the way that people viewed military service, to be less a service-based institution, and more an engine of individual opportunity for enlistees. To accomplish this, this chapter suggests that military advertising used framing processes to strategically communicate recruitment messages and align selective incentives with the values of more vulnerable groups.

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3.2 Who Was Targeted in the “Army of One” Campaign?

To answer the questions of who was targeted with military advertising and how were those specific groups targeted, the qualitative analyses in this chapter rely on content analysis of military recruitment commercials for one Army recruitment campaign. The primary documents include all English-speaking television commercials produced during the “Army of One” advertising campaign. This campaign ran from 2001 through 2006. It provides a valuable population of recruiting commercials for a few reasons. First, this campaign replaced the longstanding “Be All You Can Be” campaign in 2001. The recruiting context that followed after September 11, 2001, saw a surge of young people looking to defend their country. But by 2005, the US military was incurring its highest number of active duty causalities since Vietnam (Rostker, 2006). Those few years post 9/11 saw the popular desire to enlist peak and then fall as casualty numbers rose, and as Active Army, National Guard, and Army Reserve units were deployed multiple times in rapid succession (Bailey, 2007). This period of time covered the years from the most enthusiastic recruitment environment to the least enthusiastic recruitment environment. The same recruitment campaign was used to appeal to a public that changed from most to least sympathetic (Bailey, 2007). Additionally, this campaign was designed to build on the “Be All You Can Be” campaign’s appeal to the desires of each individual recruit (Wong, 2006). The new slogan suggests that each applicant is unique and that these individual attributes are prized by the military. This campaign, possibly even more than its predecessor, is well suited to matching specific selective incentives with the individuals that would be most receptive to them.

Content analysis is often used to identify particular characteristics within a set of messages (Singleton Jr et al., 1993). This technique provides a method for qualitatively analyzing of a large set of texts and identifying patterns that arise among words, concepts, and themes. Such a focus on specific elements of text does come
with some limitations. Most commonly, it requires a simplification of ideas within the
texts themselves and creates a reliance on them to reveal patterns, as well as coping
with potential bias in the availability and representativeness of available documents
(Carley, 1993). Bias in the content of “Army of One” recruitment commercials will
become important to this analysis. Content analysis is a technique that counts the
number of times, or the presence or absence, of particular concepts across a set of
texts.

To content code the recruitment commercials, I transcribed both the audio and
the video text of each commercial. In all, 99 unique English-speaking commercials
were produced in either 30 second or 60 second lengths. After transcribing each
commercial, I coded each one for the most prominent diagnostic frame that was used
to motivate the solution of military enlistment. When there are numerous problems
diagnosed in a recruitment commercial, the prominent diagnostic frame is the one
mentioned more than once or mentioned the most number of times. Diagnostic
frames emerged during the coding of the narrative in each commercial. Many of the
diagnostic frames were implicit in the narrative and needed to be inferred from the
advertisement. Recruiting commercials are not so straightforward as to formalize
a problem by asking the audience a question like, “Do you lack technical skills?”
Rather, commercials have a narrative that often problematizes the target audience’s
lives by revealing an opportunity in military service, and contrasting it with what
their lives would be without military service. Here is one example:

Some things never change.... Look at this kid! What’s going on?! How’s
the Army treating you?! It’s good, it’s real good. What do they have you
doing, like jumping out of planes? [Laughter] No, I’m working with com-
puters. You could have done that here, right? Not really. See how Army
training gives you strength for now, strength for later, at goarmy.com.

From this narrative, the problem emerges that the “kid” did not have computer skills
and could not have gained them back at home. The diagnostic frame for this case
was coded as “Lacks skills or education.” Another example of a diagnostic frame drawn from a commercial narrative that does not formalize a problem in a question is the following advertisement. This commercial is coded with a diagnostic frame of, “Lacks courage:”

You’re duty today is... personal courage. [My] biggest fear is... climbing down. That’s like a scary thing for me. You’re gonna execute the tower with no problem... whooah! Tower is gonna be a rope, and me. And I have to come down on my own. Today Richard climbs victory tower. It’s 45 feet high. Once you get to the top, the view, breathtaking... especially if you’re terrified of heights. I know I can climb up, it’s the way down that’s the problem. Log on and see if courage conquers fear. This is the only day you do this in Basic Training, so enjoy the ride! Only at goarmy.com.

In this narrative, lacking courage is a problem that joining the Army and completing an obstacle course may solve. Another example shows the prominent diagnostic frame of “Lacking confidence:”

As we’re making our way up the hill entering the rifle range I could hear gunshots echoing in the distance. Let’s go soldiers, you will not have a whole lot of time! I hear the drill sergeant explaining the safety procedures over the loudspeaker. I’m a little bit nervous because I’ve never done this before. I’m hearing my heart racing. I’m trying to concentrate on steadying my breathing. We spend a lot of time on marksmanship training. It’s all about precision and confidence. If I hit 36 out of 40 targets today I’ll be an expert. That’s what I want to do. Log on. Watch Michelle hit the mark. Only at goarmy.com.

In this commercial, the diagnostic frame is coded as a lack of confidence, which can be overcome by enlisting in the Army and qualifying successfully at the rifle range.

Table 3.1 shows the frequency of the diagnostic frames that emerged from the Army of One commercials, sorted in descending order. The top three diagnostic frames that emerged are (1) Lacking skills or education, (2) Lacking courage, and (3) Lacking challenge. The diagnostic frames that occur the least are (15) Lack of physical fitness, (14) Lack of a career, and (13) Lack of individuality. Nine of the 99 commercials did not have a narrative, and could not be assigned a diagnostic frame.
The most important finding from the emergent diagnostic frames coding is that these diagnostic frames appear to be primarily problems that are associated with more vulnerable groups. Individuals who lack skills or education, lack a career, lack job opportunities, or need money for college, may be at a greater disadvantage in the labor market and have more limited alternatives that could match the incentives of military service. People who lack courage, strength, confidence, individuality, or physical fitness may be more likely to be resource-poor, especially in their perceptions of self-worth. Those who do not feel challenged enough, accomplished enough, lack responsibility, or who feel they do not make a difference may be in social positions where they feel they are being undervalued or underutilized.

What is important to note about the list of diagnostic frames in Army of One recruiting commercials is not only what diagnostic frames appear, but also what diagnostic frames do not appear. The types of frames that do not appear in the list are frames that might offer military service as a solution to a set of problems for people who are less vulnerable. For example, military advertising could problematize the lack of service to one’s country for those who have job opportunities and are more resource-rich. Recruiting commercials could problematize having graduated from college with a large student loan debt, targeting those who are more educated but less potentially less economically stable. Military advertisements could focus attention on the difficulty of providing for a large family, offering economic incentives to people who have more responsibilities but are more financially needy. Furthermore, military advertisements could problematize the universal need for security and for individual participation to ensure it, which could appeal to any American. While these diagnostic frames are not the prominent diagnostic frames in “Army of One” commercial advertisements, they do appear occasionally, but not in a dominant fashion. By offering multiple diagnostic frames in some commercials, military recruitment advertising may be extending the message of a single commercial to groups that are not the
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Diagnostic Frame</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lack skills or education</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack courage</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack challenge</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack making a difference</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No diagnosed problem</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack money for college</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack strength</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack accomplishment</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack community</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack job opportunities</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack confidence</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack responsibility</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack individuality</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack career</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack physical fitness</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The fact that the primary diagnostic frames in Army of One commercials are limited to problems that are more often associated with more vulnerable groups means that an analysis of the material within these commercials is primarily capable of explaining the targeting within or between groups that are already more vulnerable. Groups that are less vulnerable can be pointed at as being largely excluded from the content and targeting of these recruiting commercials. This selection effect can help us understand the types of people being targeted by these recruiting commercials. This bias in the content also means that assessing how military advertising strategically aligned selective incentives with different groups is a process that occurs within the category of groups that are already more vulnerable. Since vulnerability lies on a spectrum from less to more vulnerable, it may be possible to assess how somewhat or substantially more vulnerable groups are targeted by military advertisements. The remaining analysis in this chapter attempts to disentangle how military advertisements are framed and aligned differently for groups who are on the more vulnerable side of the spectrum. It may be that different groups of vulnerable people are all targeted with the same set of selective incentives, or it may be that different subgroups are approached differently with recruitment advertising. Finding different frame alignment processes for subgroups of the larger, more vulnerable, population might provide further evidence that military advertising is a strategic process that aligns particular incentives with groups that are the most receptive and most vulnerable.

3.3 How Were Groups Targeted by the “Army of One” Campaign?

A careful study of the narratives and selective incentives offered in Army of One commercials reveals that the most meaningful and measurable differences in frame alignment processes by group arise between racial and ethnic categories. From the
military’s own advertising surveys and reports, it is clear that there are differences in how people from different racial groups respond to military advertising (Wilson et al., 2000). From the Youth Attitude Tracking Survey (YATS1998) report, the authors explain differences in why racial groups report that they enlist:

White men and women are somewhat more likely than minorities to mention money for education (as noted in Chapter 2, they are somewhat more likely to go to college). Black men seem somewhat less likely to mention job training or duty to country; somewhat more likely to mention pay. Hispanic men seem somewhat more likely to mention self-esteem...Whites are more likely than minorities to mention other career interests and to object to the long commitment required for military service. As might be expected among a population that has witnessed violence, Blacks are more likely to mention hazards associated with military service. Black men are less likely to mention family obligations, more likely to say military service is against their beliefs. (Wilson et al., 2000, 4-5,4-13).

With respect to awareness of advertising, this same study reports differences in how members of different racial and ethnic groups perceive military recruitment advertising:

Young White men are more likely to recall active service advertising than Blacks and Hispanics. As noted above, recall of active advertising increases with education. Since educational achievement among Blacks and Hispanics is lower than among Whites, one might suspect that race and ethnic differences are simply the result of educational differences. To evaluate this, we examine race/ethnic differences among high school seniors....White male high school seniors have higher recall rates toward active advertising than Black and Hispanic male high school seniors. This suggests that race/ethnic differences in recall are not dependent solely on educational differences (Wilson et al., 2000 5-8).

A logical extension of the understanding of racial differences in response to advertising, and reasons for joining, would be that recruitment advertising is designed to target racial groups differently. If this differential targeting is uncovered, it could suggest that the military does not only target more vulnerable groups generally, but it also targets more vulnerable subgroups differently. This hypothesis is also made by the US Army Research Institute’s report on “Targeting the Delivery of Army
Advertisements on Television:"

The quantification of audiences by race/ethnic groups and the quantification of priority groups within race/ethnic groups can contribute to the selection of programs for the Army’s minority recruitment advertising efforts (Ellig, 1988, ix). Statistically significant differences are shown in the composition of TV audiences in terms of priority groupings for Army advertising. Many of these differences are consistent within race/ethnic groups and thus do not result just from differential TV viewing by race/ethnicity (Ellig, 1988, 20).

Findings from this study by Ellig (1988) suggest that the type of television program selected for running military recruitment commercials can be more or less productive for certain racial and ethnic groups. Military recruitment advertising has methods beyond just selecting programs for advertisements. The content of the advertisements themselves may also be used to differentially target different racial and ethnic groups of more vulnerable people. Methods for targeting vulnerable subgroups differently might involve offering different diagnostic frames to each group, diagnosing the most widespread problem in each group, and offering solutions through enlistment. Military advertising might also offer certain subgroups a distinct set of selective incentives for enlistment, specifically, incentives that are believed to best resonate with and encourage members of subgroups to enlist.

To answer the question of how the military aligns advertising with more vulnerable groups, the following analysis assesses how military advertising aligns selective incentives by race and ethnicity. The analysis proceeds by identifying the leading character (protagonist) in each commercial, adjudicating a race/ethnicity to that person, and then assessing which selective incentives were offered in commercials with the same race/ethnicity protagonist. Research by Greenberg (1972), Berry (1982), and Eastman and Liss (1980) finds that the more important race and ethnicity is to a young person’s self-concept, the more they identify with same-race television characters. Greenberg (1972) found that, when asked what television character they would most
like to be like, 75% of African American children chose an African American character. Berry (1982) found that African American young people are over three times more likely to identify with an African American television character. This evidence suggests that people, especially in racial minority groups, who view military recruitment advertisements are more likely than not to identify with protagonists of their same race.

To identify the target audience for each advertisement, I adjudicated a race or ethnicity to the protagonist in each commercial, and infer from the research on race identification with television characters (Greenberg, 1972; Berry, 1982; Eastman and Liss, 1980) that the targeted group shares the race/ethnicity of the protagonist. I coded the race or ethnicity of the protagonist if it could be adjudicated, as well as the selective incentives offered for enlistment in each commercial. Many advertisements had a single protagonist who delivered most of the lines. One-third of the commercials did not have a single protagonist that could be adjudicated a race. Of the 64 commercials with a protagonist, 44% were white, 25% were black, 30% were Hispanic, and 3% were foreign immigrants (born in the Soviet Union). After adjudicating race to each protagonist, I coded each commercial according to the types of selective incentives that each commercial offered. The categories that emerged during the coding include the following: work with an elite unit, experience an unsurpassed challenge, serve your country, receive valuable job training, gain unspecified opportunities that only the Army can provide, receive education opportunities, get an enlistment bonus, get free gear in the mail, and/or learn a skill.

The following analysis presents the results of a Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) that predicts the race of each commercial’s protagonist with configurations of military selective incentives. Said differently, the QCA models attempt to predict the race of each commercial’s protagonist using only the selective incentives being offered. The use of certain configurations of selective incentives may influence the
type of protagonist selected to appeal to a certain racial or ethnic group. If specific configurations of selective incentives for enlistment are more predictive of certain racial categories, then we may see some evidence that military recruitment advertising aligns the content and incentives with particular racial and ethnic subgroups.

Initially developed by Ragin (1994), Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) utilizes Boolean algebra to reveal complex causal configurations across larger sets of cases than is possible with most qualitative research. QCA offers an alternative to the Generalized Linear Model (GLM) for making sense of larger numbers of cases. Ragin argues that quantitative methods like GLM suffer from pre-defined populations, variable-centeredness, and linear/additive causality. To overcome these shortcomings, Ragin’s QCA method offers the following differences: analysis of set relations as opposed to correlations, use of calibrated sets as opposed to measured variables, discovery of causal configurations of as opposed to tests of independent variables, and revealing causal complexity as opposed to identifying net effects (Rihoux and Ragin, 2009). QCA’s logic assumes that the causes of a particular outcome occur in configurations, not independently. Particular causes are analyzed as having causal influence in conjunction with the presence or absence of other causes. Treating causal attributes and conditions in configurations rather than as individual variables ensures that the full context and heterogeneity of the causes of a particular outcome are retained and analyzed (Rihoux and Ragin, 2009).

QCA has been used effectively by sociologists to tease out the combinations of attributes and conditions that result in social movement mobilization and outcomes (Amenta and Halfmann, 2000; Amenta and Poulsen, 1994; Caren and Panofsky, 2005; Cress and Snow, 1996, 2000; Goertz and Mahoney, 2005; Hicks, 1994; Hicks et al., 1995; McVeigh et al., 2006; Rihoux and Hodson, 2004). However, some scholars have criticized QCA for its reliance on arbitrary dichotomizations of continuous variables and QCA’s inability to offer
measures for the relative importance of predictive variables (Goldthorpe 1997). Since QCA is an increasingly popular alternative to the General Linear Model (GLM) but is still in its infancy when compared to GLM, the methods section in Appendix A explains the theory behind the Qualitative Comparative Method as it compares to GLM.

The quality and specification of QCA models are most often measured by “consistency” (or inclusion) and “coverage.” Consistency is a measure of the degree to which cases with the same configuration share the same outcomes (Ragin 2008). Coverage is a measure of how many instances of a particular outcome are explained by a particular causal configuration. Consistency and coverage may at times compete for explanatory power, as complex theoretic sets with extremely high consistency may have very low coverage. High levels of consistency with causal configurations that explain very few instances of an outcomes do not necessarily provide very helpful information. Often times, configurations that are consistent with an outcome but have low coverage can be logically reduced to generate a more parsimonious set of configurations, which also increases the coverage of the configurations. In QCA, the researcher uses Boolean algebra to logically reduce the configurations. As the notion of causal complexity assumes, rarely is a single cause either necessary or sufficient for a particular outcome. More often, a configuration of causes is either necessary and/or sufficient. In larger datasets where the potential number of causal configurations can grow exceedingly large, reducing the number of configurations is critical to a parsimonious understanding of causal complexity. (Ragin 2008, 299).

3.3.1 Results

If it is possible to use the selective incentives that are offered in each advertisement to successfully predict the race of the protagonist in the commercial, then we may find evidence that recruitment advertising aligns selective incentives with certain types of
racial groups. The final path configurations are reduced using an optimized Quine-McCluskey algorithm to produce the final configuration, consistency and associated coverage figures. Consistency reduction is performed with the QCA package in the R statistical package. Truth tables are presented alongside the configurations with the highest consistency and coverage scores. The categories of selective incentives that are used to predict the race of the protagonist in the commercial include the following: work with an elite unit (elite), serve your country (serv), receive valuable job training (train), gain opportunities only the Army can provide (oppr), receive opportunities to pursue education (educ), and get a big enlistment bonus (bonus). The additional categories including experiencing an unsurpassed challenge (challenge), getting free promotional items in the mail (swag), and learning a skill (skill) were not included in the final QCA models due to their lowering of the consistency and coverage scores in the final configurations.

For selective incentives by racial category of the protagonist, commercials with black protagonists, the selective incentives of challenge, service, training, opportunity, and education are offered more often. Training and challenge occur in the highest frequency for black protagonists. Foreign protagonists have only the selective incentive of service offered. Hispanic protagonists offer elite units, challenge, service, training, opportunity, education, and skills, but do not offer bonus or swag. For Hispanic protagonists, challenge and training occur in the highest frequency. Commercials with white protagonists offer elite units, challenge, service, training, education, swag, and skills. White protagonists offer elite units in a higher percentage than any other racial category.

The first QCA Table (3.2) shows the actual truth table of values for each configuration of selective incentives, as well as the consistency score for each type of selective incentive. The consistency values represent the proportion of observations for a particular configuration having the same value of the outcome. This combination of the
The absence of the six selective incentives is most consistent for commercials with white protagonists. The consistency values in Table 3.2 will sum to approximately 1 for each row, because, with the exception of the two commercials with foreign protagonists, all of the variance in the dependent variable is captured by the four race category outcomes. The race category with the highest consistency score is the category that is best explained by that particular configuration of selective incentives. For instance, the first row of Table 3.2 shows zeros for every selective incentive and a 13 for the n. This means that 13 commercials did not offer any of the six selective incentives in the table. Looking down the same table, the row where train equals 1 and all other selective incentives equal 0 shows an n of 32. The consistency values for black, Hispanic, and multiple protagonists are all well higher than for white protagonists. The row where elite equals 1 and all other selective incentives equal 0 shows an n of 6, which is entirely accounted for by white protagonists.

The second QCA Table 3.3 shows the reduced configurations from the earlier truth table using an optimized Quine-McCluskey algorithm for each race and the predictive selective incentive sets. To interpret the incentive configurations, upper case names represent the presence of the selective incentive in the commercial, while lower case names represent the absence of the selective incentive in the commercial. Patterns appear quite readily in these results. For commercials with black protagonists, it is clear that training is highly consistent with the outcome. Training (TRAIN) appears in each of the three configurations that best predict a black protagonist in the commercial. This often occurs together with an absence of elite units (elite), and educational opportunities (oppr).

Commercials with Hispanic protagonists offer a slightly more complex picture of how selective incentives impact the protagonist selection. The configuration for Hispanic protagonists that is most consistent and has the highest coverage of cases occurs
TABLE 3.2

TRUTH TABLE: PREDICTING RACE CATEGORY OF PROTAGONIST WITH SELECTIVE INCENTIVES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ELITE SERVE</th>
<th>TRAIN</th>
<th>OPPR</th>
<th>EDUC</th>
<th>BONUS</th>
<th>n</th>
<th>BLACK</th>
<th>HISP</th>
<th>MULT</th>
<th>WHITE</th>
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<td>0.000</td>
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<td>1.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
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</tr>
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<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
when opportunity (OPPR) is present, but not elite units (elite), service to country (serv), education (educ), or bonus (bonus). Configurations that are also somewhat consistent for Hispanic protagonists include the presence of training (TRAIN) and opportunity (OPPR), but not service (serv), education (educ), or bonus (bonus); or the presence of education (EDUC), but not elite units (elite), service (serv), training (train), opportunity (oppr) and bonus (bonus).

The configurations for white protagonists differ from both of the other racial categories. White protagonists are typically offered elite units (ELITE) or education (EDUC). The configuration with the highest coverage for white protagonists includes the presence of elite units (ELITE) but not service (serv), opportunity (oppr), education (educ), or bonus (bonus). The configuration with the highest consistency for white protagonists offers the presence of elite units (ELITE) and training (TRAIN), but not service (serv), opportunity (oppr), or bonus (bonus). The configuration for whites with minimal consistency and coverage contains the presence of education (EDUC), and the absence of elite units (elite), service (serv), training (train), opportunity (oppr), and bonus (bonus).

Since variation arises between the QCA models for different racial categories, the analysis offers some support for the notion that different types of configurations of selective incentives are offered to particular racial groups. Job training and little else is offered as selective incentives in commercials with black protagonists. The incentives of nonspecific opportunity and job training are offered in commercials with Hispanic protagonists. A wider configuration of selective incentives arises in commercials with white protagonists, including joining elite units, earning money for education, and receiving job training. The fact that these models are somewhat predictive of the race of the protagonist supports the hypothesis that recruitment advertising targets certain types of more vulnerable groups with particular types of selective incentives.
TABLE 3.3
CONFIGURATIONS AND INCLUSION SCORES: PREDICTING RACE CATEGORIES OF PROTAGONIST WITH SELECTIVE INCENTIVES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Race</th>
<th>Incentive Configuration</th>
<th>Consistency</th>
<th>Coverage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Black</td>
<td>elite<em>serv</em>TRAIN<em>educ</em>bonus</td>
<td>0.324</td>
<td>0.688</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black</td>
<td>elite<em>serv</em>TRAIN<em>oppr</em>bonus</td>
<td>0.343</td>
<td>0.750</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black</td>
<td>elite<em>TRAIN</em>oppr<em>educ</em>bonus</td>
<td>0.324</td>
<td>0.750</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hispanic</td>
<td>elite<em>serv</em>OPPR<em>educ</em>bonus</td>
<td>0.750</td>
<td>0.150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hispanic</td>
<td>serv<em>TRAIN</em>OPPR<em>educ</em>bonus</td>
<td>0.667</td>
<td>0.100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hispanic</td>
<td>elite<em>serv</em>train<em>oppr</em>EDUC*bonus</td>
<td>0.500</td>
<td>0.100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White</td>
<td>ELITE<em>serv</em>oppr<em>educ</em>bonus</td>
<td>0.636</td>
<td>0.250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White</td>
<td>ELITE<em>serv</em>TRAIN<em>oppr</em>bonus</td>
<td>0.714</td>
<td>0.179</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White</td>
<td>elite<em>serv</em>train<em>oppr</em>EDUC*bonus</td>
<td>0.500</td>
<td>0.071</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3.4 Discussion

As the analysis of diagnostic frames in “Army of One” advertisements revealed, these recruiting commercials are targeted primarily at more vulnerable people. More vulnerable people have more of the problems that are diagnosed and solved by these commercials, and more vulnerable people would likely be more receptive to these messages than less vulnerable people. People with job skills or a solid employment opportunity are probably much less likely to be swayed to enlist based on a diagnostic frame of lacking skills or education. Similarly, people who have decided on a career path and may have already taken concrete steps toward realizing it are probably less likely to be convinced to enlist based on problems like lacking courage, strength, challenge, or accomplishment. Less vulnerable people are not represented in the advertisements as protagonists, and less vulnerable people’s problems are not diagnosed
by commercials, either. The content of these recruiting commercials appears to be targeted at groups of people who are more likely to be responsive to the selective incentives offered for enlistment, and these selective incentives are likely to be more attractive to people with fewer economic alternatives.

3.4.1 Vulnerable African Americans

As is evident from the QCA results, recruitment advertising targeted more vulnerable African American’s with a particular set of selective incentives. Those incentives were primarily job training. The plotlines from “Army of One” commercials may help illustrate, more specifically, how advertisements aligned the incentive of job training with African American recruits. One advertisement presents Craig, a recent African American Army enlistee, who is back home and looking for a haircut. In spite of the patrons and owner giving him grief, Craig explains that his choice to join the Army was a good one, because the Army was providing him with advanced computer training that he could use to start his own computer consulting company. In another commercial, an African American son tries to win over his mother at the dinner table about enlisting in the Army. He explains that the Army offers training in virtually any field he would want to pursue, and such a decision would help make him a man.

Unlike other potential employers, the military has something to offer to young African Americans that few other employers can offer, which is the ability to pick from a wide range of job specialties and receive training that can help them in the job market later in life. This type of incentive would be important to a subgroup with more limited job opportunities. The QCA models also support this by showing that the three different configurations that have the greatest consistency show the presence of the selective incentive of job training along with the absence of a set of other incentives, including being part of an elite unit, service to country, educational opportunities, and earning an enlistment bonus.
The importance of the military offering African Americans job training opportunities is paramount in the context of the selective incentives that are overlooked when training specifically is pushed first. Job training is important for groups of people who are not sufficiently skilled and need more opportunities for work. However, job training is not the opportunity to go to school and advance one’s education. It is not the opportunity to join an elite unit and become the best. It is not the opportunity to give back to one’s country. Job training is useful for people with limited existing skills and little opportunity to be hired with the skills they currently have. By offering job training in the absence of other selective incentives, this analysis reveals that military recruitment advertising during the “Army of One” campaign aligned specific diagnostic, prognostic, and motivational frames (i.e., a person doesn’t have job training, job training is necessary to succeed, the Army provides job training) with this specific vulnerable subgroup.

3.4.2 Vulnerable Hispanics

Military recruitment advertising not only targeted vulnerable blacks. Evidence in this chapter suggests that selective incentives within advertisements were targeted specifically at Hispanics, as well. An “Army of One” recruitment commercial presents a conversation between a young Hispanic son and his mother. The son explains to his mother, who appears to have a great deal of reticence about the idea of her son joining the Army, that the Army would be a wise decision. The choice is a good one though, because, according to the son, the Army maintains the same values as his mother, which is “knowing right from wrong, and believing in myself, [and] wanting to go to college.” The Army, the son claims, provides the opportunity to act on these values, to act on behalf of what is right, to achieve your goals by believing in oneself, and to earn money for college.

The QCA analysis reveals similar selective incentives being targeted specifically
at vulnerable Hispanics. The QCA models show that the presence of the general notion of opportunity is present in two of the three configurations with the highest consistency scores. In the third configuration for Hispanic, education is present, and in one of the two configurations with opportunity present, training is present. What is not present in these configurations is the opportunity to serve in an elite unit, service to country, and enlistment bonuses.

In “Army of One” commercials, selective incentives for vulnerable Hispanics include the prospect of becoming something that they knew they could become, but did not have the opportunity to do so on their own. Hispanic enlistees can earn money for their college education, and they can realize a wider range of life course options in the Army than they could elsewhere. By framing enlistment in these terms and by using a Hispanic protagonist who often speaks in Spanish to the audience, recruitment advertising employs the diagnostic, prognostic, and motivational frames of service (i.e., a person doesn’t have opportunity or money for college, people need the chance to realize these dreams, the Army provides both opportunity and money for college) with a vulnerable Hispanic audience.

3.4.3 Vulnerable Whites

Not only are vulnerable African Americans and vulnerable Hispanics targeted within military recruitment commercials, but the analyses in this chapter reveal that vulnerable whites are targeted as well. However, the selective incentives that are built into the commercials are presented more subtly than they are by black and Hispanic protagonists. Two “Army of One” commercials with white protagonists present a son and a daughter trying to convince their respective fathers that the choice to enlist is a good one. The first commercial shows a discussion between a daughter and father in a diner. The daughter explains to her father that she wants to help people and be successful, and by helping other people be successful, that makes her successful. The
second commercial shows a conversation between a father and his son who looks like he is just home from basic training. The father notes that his son is a changed man, because his son shook his hand and looked him in the eye.

These commercials frame incentives subtly, and much more so than commercials explicitly claiming that the Army provides this or that type of selective incentive. Rather, these son/daughter and father commercials perform two primary tasks. One is to explain to potential white recruits how they can approach a conversation like this with their parents and convince them that joining the Army is a good idea. The second is to reveal the qualities that soldiers have, and that potential recruits would aspire to, which they would gain by enlisting. The Army provides a rite of passage function that turns boys into men, an incentive which is revealed by the son, suddenly acting like a man, around his father. The Army also provides a vague facilitation function, one similar to the function of expressing values that are “right.” This function works in an indirect way by suggesting that enlisting helps other people.

A third “Army of One” commercial with a white protagonist shows a 10th Mountain Division soldier climbing up a snow-covered mountain all alone. He narrates his own climb and talks about how he “is his own force.” In addition to the value of individualism that this commercial suggests the Army really appreciates, the commercial shows that white people can be part of elite fighting units who have the opportunity to accomplish extraordinarily feats, like climbing a mountain in winter by oneself. The opportunity to be the best at something, to be elite, is something that “Army of One” commercials principally target using white protagonists. The QCA models provide some evidence that white recruits are targeted with the incentive of being able to join elite fighting units like the Army Rangers or Special Forces. Two of the three configurations for white respondents show elite units as being present.
3.5 Conclusion

A massive advertising effort advanced the idea of the military as a provider of opportunity by appealing to the economic needs and consumer desires of potential recruits. To effectively target groups that would be receptive to selective incentives, military recruitment advertisements deployed specific recruitment frames that aligned with the identity and interests of those being recruited. The analysis in this chapter shows the kinds of selective incentives that were aligned with particular types of more vulnerable groups, specifically by race and ethnicity. Understanding which groups were targeted with what kinds of appeals may inform the following chapters that examine not just who was targeted, but who actually enlisted, why they enlisted, and whether enlistment provided them with improved life chances.
CHAPTER 4
STRUCTURAL VULNERABILITY: MACRO AND MICRO LEVEL
RECRUITMENT

Given the preceding discussion of trends in welfare state retrenchment and the shift to a volunteer military, we might expect to find that military volunteers were disproportionately drawn from vulnerable groups. From that discussion we know that the process of generating military volunteers, often disproportionately vulnerable ones, did not occur in a power vacuum. During and after the transition to the All-Volunteer Force, state officials used new forms of the second and third dimensions power that did not rely on coercion, including targeted recruitment advertising and new selective incentives, to mobilize young people into military service. Yet, the mobilization of a critical mass of young people to serve in the military did not rest on the power of advertising alone. The US military also leveraged state resources to physically locate military recruitment offices in prime recruitment areas to gain neighborhood-level access to potential recruits. This exercise of the third face of power integrated military opportunities and values in a physically tangible, accessible, and enterprising form in targeted communities.

This chapter tests the argument that state officials located military recruitment offices disproportionately in neighborhoods with more structurally vulnerable groups. This analysis draws on data at the Census tract level from The American Community Survey (ACS) from 2008-2012 to predict military recruitment office presence. A complementary analysis then addresses the micro-level question of whether more structurally vulnerable young people had higher reported propensities to enlist. This
second analysis draws on survey data from the 1991 Youth Attitude Tracking Survey (YATS III). Military recruitment efforts intentionally used framing and alignment strategies to direct selective incentives toward particular groups. As this chapter demonstrates, military recruitment efforts also used physical location to recruit blocs of structurally vulnerable volunteers in disproportionately greater numbers. These recruitment efforts may have contributed to more structurally vulnerable young people reporting that they were more likely to enlist.

Recruiting for military service was not an invention of the All-Volunteer Force, but it was greatly expanded over this period. Recruiting began in 1776 to find sufficient numbers of Continental soldiers to fight in the Revolutionary War. Conscription was used to staff up most of the Army’s needs from World War II until the end of the Vietnam War, but the US Army Recruiting Command, as it is currently known, began in 1965 with six recruiting districts, 70 Military Entrance Stations (MEPS), and just over 1,000 individual recruiting stations (U.S. Army Recruiting Command G-5 Public Affairs Office 2004). During the All-Volunteer Era, the recruiting effort was expanded to include seven recruiting brigades, 65 Military Entrance Processing Stations, and approximately 3,000 recruiting office locations. This dramatic increase in recruiting offices nationwide begs the question about where these new offices were located.

The elaborate network of recruitment offices situated military recruiters close to those groups that were targeted for enlistment. Recruitment stations gave military recruiters immediate access to local neighborhoods. Offices provided the military with a means to make public, in a venue other than media, their advertising, by using storefronts and signage to promote their presence. At the same time, these recruitment stations provided the opportunity for those who were intrigued by the prospect of military service to stop in and talk to someone who could offer them the pitch for enlistment. And most importantly, these recruitment offices gave mil-
itary recruiters neighborhood-level access to groups of people who might be more structurally vulnerable to appeals for enlistment.

4.1 Structural Vulnerability

The meaning of the term “structural vulnerability” varies across social science disciplines. This dissertation avoids disparate and sub-discipline-specific definitions and grounds the term in Schwartz’s (1976) discussion of structural ignorance. Structural ignorance suggests that people from different social positions have access to different types and qualities of information (Schwartz, 1976). Structural vulnerability extends the conceptualization beyond just those groups that have limited access to information to those groups that have limited access to information and few actual economic opportunities. Economic opportunities could offer people viable alternatives that can compete with the extensive benefits and incentives that the state can offer for enlistment. When the military locates a recruitment office in an area with few other economic opportunities for residents, the opportunities offered for military service have little or no immediate competition.

Figure 4.1 shows a two-by-two table of the opportunity and information dimensions that distinguish groups who are more or less structurally vulnerable. Groups that have high economic opportunity and high access to information are not structurally vulnerable to recruitment attempts. These groups have, and are aware of, alternatives to enlistment, and they obtain access to comparable benefits without the costs that accompany military service. Groups that have high access to information

1 Anthropologists have equated structural vulnerability with Galtung’s (1969) notion of structural violence, defining the term as, “a product of class-based economic exploitation and cultural, gender/sexual, and racialized discrimination, as well as complementary processes of depreciated subjectivity formation” (Quesada et al., 2011). Criminologists have associated structural vulnerability with network vulnerability, meaning “people who act in a bridging capacity between subgroups,” to explain how cracking down on people who serve as bridges can disrupt criminal networks (Malm and Bichler, 2011, 275). Gerontologists have operationalized structural vulnerability as, “childlessness, de facto childlessness and being an elderly man without a wife” (Indrizal et al., 2009).
Figure 4.1. Structural Vulnerability 2 x 2 Table

- High access to information:
  - High economic opportunity: High information offsets low opportunity
  - Low economic opportunity: Structurally vulnerable
- Low access to information:
  - High economic opportunity: Not vulnerable
  - Low economic opportunity: High opportunity offsets low information
but low economic opportunity may struggle to find immediate economic alternatives to the benefits offered to military servicemembers. However, their high access to information might provide perspective that encourages weighing the costs of military service with the benefits. Or it may reveal educational or economic opportunities that are not immediately evident, like financial aid options for college or economic opportunities that require commuting or relocating. Alternatively, groups that have high economic opportunity but low access to information may live in areas where local industry provides a lot of jobs, but there may be less collective knowledge about alternatives to this kind of work. These groups have an obvious career path established that offers a ready alternative to military enlistment. These two cells in the two-by-two table identify groups that are somewhat more vulnerable to enlistment than those in the high opportunity/high information cell, but they retain some built-in resistance to recruitment attempts. The final cell in the table, low-information and low economic opportunity, characterizes the groups that are the most structurally vulnerable. These groups have few economic alternatives that can compete with the benefits of military service, and they have little access to information that could help contextualize the costs of military service or provide a wider picture of opportunities that are not immediately evident.

People in more structurally vulnerable positions are likely to be more receptive to the claims of economic opportunity and advancement as trade-offs for military participation. Such claims insist that enlistment will help solve individuals’ problems or help get them where they want to go in life. To help young people come to this realization, state officials rely on the third dimension of power to re-frame the military as an opportunity provider rather than a service-based institution. Gaventa (1982) explains how this can alter the consciousness of the vulnerable:

The consciousness of the relatively powerless, even as it emerges, may be malleable, i.e. especially vulnerable to the manipulation of the power field around it. Through the invocation of myths or symbols, the use
of threat or rumors, or other mechanisms of power, the powerful may be able to ensure that certain beliefs and actions emerge in one context while apparently contradictory grievances may be expressed in another. From this perspective, a consistently expressed consensus is not required for the maintenance of dominant interests, only a consistency that certain potentially key issues remain latent issues and that certain interests remain unrecognized—at certain times more than at others (Gaventa 1982).

Groups with insufficient economic opportunity and information are likely to be more persuaded by the state’s appeals to the opportunities and advantages that come with enlistment. People who are structurally vulnerable have less access to information about how to apply for financial aid, whether to apply to more or less selective colleges, or how to get a good paying job without a college degree (De La Rosa 2006; Hoxby and Avery 2012). The information they do have, as explained in the previous chapter, includes targeted diagnostic and prognostic frames that are aligned by highly-produced television advertisements that show the military offering increased life chances. Those who are in more economically advantaged positions are in less receptive structural positions to receive these arguments and are therefore more likely to ignore them. With economic privilege comes privileged information that might serve as a defensive measure against these appeals. But for those without such information and opportunity, the option to enlist looks more attractive.

4.1.1 Bloc Recruitment

Just as the use of military advertising is strategically targeted, so too is the placement of recruiting offices. Other forms of recruiting for mobilizing collective action are not deployed randomly, and as this chapter argues, neither is the military’s recruitment of volunteers. As social movement scholars point out, it can require fewer resources and be more cost-effective to mobilize groups of people at the same time, as opposed to trying to target them one-by-one. First coined by Oberschall (1973), “bloc recruitment” occurs when entire groups of people who are already organized
for some other purpose are mobilized at the same time. Recruiting people in blocs lowers the cost of the recruitment effort considerably, since the recruiting effort can capitalize on the trust and relationships already established in the group. Scholars like Xu (2013) and Edwards (2004) find that bloc recruitment strategies contributed to successful mobilization efforts. Xu (2013) investigates why Communism was adopted by the May Fourth Movement. He finds that the Chinese Communist Movement (CVM) was most successful when it co-opted preexisting organizations. Edwards and McCarthy (2004) studied Mothers Against Drunk Driving (MADD) groups and examined the factors that contributed to the persistence of these organizations. The authors find that bloc recruitment was effective at cutting the costs of mobilization, but it came with a potential risk. By cutting corners and adopting a pre-existing social movement organization, groups were less likely to survive over time.

Bloc recruitment is usually theorized in the context of social networks, where existing strong and/or weak ties between group members lower the costs of the recruitment process. With respect to military recruitment, locating recruiters in communities that are generally more susceptible to being recruited is a strategy that increases the return on that investment. As Marwell and Oliver (1988, 1993) argue, participants in collective action are often recruited through their social networks, and the character of those networks influences how costly and successful the organizing effort will be. The capacity of recruiters to be successful depends largely on the number and frequency of social ties in a targeted group, as well as on the centrality of the people to their network who are successfully recruited. Klandermans and Oegema (1987) are concerned with the types of network ties themselves and their influence. They find support for Granovetter’s (1973) argument that having a wide range of weak ties provides greater access to information and resources than a small range of strong ties, considering that the strong ties typically are overlapping and redundant. Klandermans and Oegema (1987) find that informal networks were more important
than formal networks for shaping mobilization and participation in the Dutch peace movement.

Neighborhoods can contain formal and informal organizations that can explain neighborhood network behavior (Swaroop and Morenoff 2006), but scholarship on neighborhoods and social networks also finds that neighborhoods themselves can influence the flow of information, homophily, and potential for mobilization (Topa 2001; Dawkins 2006). Topa (2001) argues that adjacent census tracts share information, which has an impact on the character of nearby neighborhoods. He finds that information sharing from high unemployment neighborhoods has an impact on the unemployment rates in adjacent neighborhoods. Dawkins (2006) finds that the geographic mobility of neighborhood residents is partly shaped by the social networks of children in those neighborhoods. Close ties of children within neighborhoods constrain their parents’ decisions to move to different neighborhoods. Opp and Gern (1993) argue that just being neighbors can provide a context for mobilization: “Networks of friends, colleagues, or neighbors constitute micro-contexts for mobilizing citizens...even in authoritarian regimes, politically homogenous networks whose members trust each other and communicate in a relatively uninhibited way may be established” (Opp and Gern 1993, 662).

While neighborhood ties may be important, proximity to, and contact with, recruiters is another important factor for mobilization. Military recruiters are responsible for being physically available for potential enlistees for everything from transporting them to take entrance exams to explaining to a potential recruits’ parents why enlistment is a good idea. Recruitment efforts can capitalize on sheer physical proximity to people who share a greater mobilization potential. Snow et al. (1980) and McAdam (1986) both find evidence that contact with recruiters is a necessary precondition for being mobilized. Snow et al. (1980) find that differential participation in social movements is “influenced by structural proximity, availability, and
affective interaction with movement members.” In order to move from being symp-
pathetic to a movement to being an actual participant, contact with a recruiter is
necessary. McAdam and Paulsen (1993) argue that individuals need to be the target
of a recruitment effort that succeeds in establishing a link between the movement
and the individual’s identity. Once this is achieved, the individual can bring this
information to members with similar identities and seek confirmation that partici-
pating is a good idea. If the individual receives confirmation, she or he then needs to
match the demands of participation up against other competing identities. During
Freedom Summer, McAdam finds that contact by a recruiter and structural location
best predicted participation (McAdam 1986; McAdam and Paulsen 1993).

Social movement scholars including Hedström (1994), and Zhao (1998) find that
space and distance are important factors in mobilization. Military recruiters may
capitalize on these same effects by locating recruiting centers close to, or on, college
campuses and in other neighborhoods where young people live who are likely to be
more receptive to their message. Hedström (1994) finds that people who are more
proximate to recruiters are more likely to be recruited. He investigates how spatial
distance and network relations affect the growth of social movements and finds that
diffusion processes were extremely important in the development and growth of the
Swedish trade union movement. Social movement participants were motivated to
join based on their social environment and on the prior decisions of other individu-
als. Similarly, Zhao’s (1998) study of the spatial ecology of the 1989 Beijing student
movement finds that one of the most important factors in the spread of the move-
ment was the spatial proximity of Beijing’s 67 universities to each other. The fact
that the campuses were close and insulated helped to foster collective action. These
studies, while using social movements as their cases, provide an understanding of
how collective action is shaped and structured by physical proximity and presence of
recruiters. From this, it follows that bloc recruiting of neighborhoods with recruiting
offices may increase the odds of collectively joining the military for residents in those neighborhoods.

4.2 Structural Vulnerability and Recruitment Office Location Analysis

Two analyses are presented in the following sections. The first analysis tests the hypothesis that military recruiting offices are located more often in neighborhoods that are more structurally vulnerable. State officials have an interest in reducing recruiting costs, and they may do so by spending more of their resources on those people who are most vulnerable for enlistment. The second analysis tests the hypothesis that more structurally vulnerable young people will report that they have a greater propensity to enlist. Finding support for this hypothesis would suggest that structurally vulnerable young people acknowledge that they are more susceptible to appeals to enlist. As stated in the introduction, and as elaborated on in the Data and Methods section below, this analysis draws on data at the Census tract level from The American Community Survey (ACS) from 2008-2012 to predict military recruitment office presence. The second analysis draws on survey data from the Youth Attitude Tracking Survey (YATS III), fielded in 1991, and makes nationally representative estimates of individuals’ attitudes and behaviors concerning military service.

The first analysis tests the theory that recruitment offices are located disproportionately in neighborhoods with more structurally vulnerable groups. The measure for economic opportunity is included as the unemployment rate in a census tract for the civilian population in the labor force 16 years of age and older. Those people who occupy more vulnerable economic positions are those who lose their employment first during periods of expanding unemployment (Smith et al., 1992). These people may be more likely to enlist due to the lack of available, competing alternatives to the benefits offered by military service.

The measure that indicates access to information is the percentage of adults 25
and older in a census tract with a bachelor’s degree. As Schwartz (1976) explains, structured ignorance arises when,

the structure of an ongoing social organization is masked from the individuals enmeshed in it. Each person sees only a small part of the system...The structure, because of its compartmentalized complexity, creates and maintains ignorance... Structured ignorance is easily reduced by pooling different individuals’ experiences, by careful study of the system (Schwartz, 1976, 151).

Neighborhoods with high levels of educational attainment may provide the information necessary to younger residents to find viable and attractive alternatives to military service. As Garner and Raudenbush (1991) find, neighborhoods have an independent impact on the amount of education people from that neighborhood will attain. The neighborhood can provide an environment that “pools” residents’ experiences and provides a knowledge set that can open up opportunities that may be able to out-compete the benefits offered by military service.

Control measures for the first analysis include residing in the South percent African American, and the percent of people aged 20-24. The South is theorized to have a longstanding military tradition that may not be shared by the other regions in the US (Bonner, 1955; Huntington, 1957; Skelton, 1996). As Bonner (1955) writes, “From a statistical point of view, there is irrefutable evidence of the fact that, throughout American history, no other section of the country has sent its picked youth into battle so freely and so heedlessly as has the South” (Bonner, 1955, 74). Even in 2011, the South provided more than 40% of the military enlistees, while no other region offered more than 25% (Department of Defense, 2014). Bonner (1955) argues that the Southern military tradition has its roots in frontier spirit, slavery, and the plantation system. The proximity of the South to the frontier generated a spirit of fighting and defense against hostile forces. Plantations were “small mili-

2Tennessee, Alabama, Arkansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Georgia, Florida, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, Texas, Virginia, and West Virginia
tary establishments,” where “the master exercised over his slaves all the rights that a warrior could exercise over a vanquished foe” (Bonner, 1955, 80). Over time, this tradition evolved into state-run military prep schools and colleges, family traditions of military service, and a “penchant for soldiering” for both officer and enlisted classes. This tradition may result in Southern states being more attractive and productive locations for recruitment offices.

African Americans often suffer discrimination across aspects of social and economic life, which can make them more vulnerable. Blacks face discriminatory practices in housing (Pager and Shepherd, 2008) and policing (Meehan and Ponder, 2002). “African Americans were as segregated from whites in 1990 as they had been at the start of the twentieth century, and levels of segregation appear unaffected by rising socioeconomic status” (Pager and Shepherd, 2008, 188). Discrimination in housing may compel blacks to move to more segregated neighborhoods that can be more readily bloc recruited. However, discrimination in policing might have the opposite effect on the location of recruitment offices. Meehan and Ponder (2002) argue that race and neighborhood context matter for how people are policed, and the authors find support for this contention in vehicle surveillance and police stopping behavior. Neighborhoods that are more heavily policed may offer less attractive locations for store fronts as the perception of high crime by disproportionate police presence may deter business, regardless of the reality. Such neighborhoods may be targeted less often for recruitment centers.

Emerging adults are also more likely to suffer from a lack of economic opportunities than are older adults. This trend is evident in research on coresidence among parents and their adult children. Over the latter half of the twentieth century and the beginning of the twenty-first, young adults have grown in their financial dependence on their parents, while their parents have gained less financial dependence on their adult children (Kahn et al., 2013). Khan and colleagues (2013) find that,
younger adults have become increasingly needy over time, as reflected in their likelihood of intergenerational coresidence. Our results suggest that the needs of the older generation played a much larger role in coresidence decisions in 1960 than in 2010, when these decisions were clearly driven more by the economic needs of the younger generation (Kahn et al., 2013, 1472).

Accordingly, this analysis includes the percent of people in the primary age range for enlistment (20-24) in the regression models.

4.2.1 Data and Methods

To collect the dependent variable of military recruitment office presence, I web-scraped a database of all recruiting offices in the United States. This web-scraping of recruiting stations was performed in December of 2012, and as such, the cross-sectional representation of recruiting offices is reflective of this particular time. The online database provided by the US Army Recruiting Command offers an ID number for each station, the station name, and the phone number of the station. To obtain the physical locations of these offices, I parsed the phone number for each station and joined the area code and prefix of each recruiting office with an online database that provides geocoded coordinates for each area code and prefix (http://www.areacodes.com/). I then overlaid these geocoded locations onto 2010 Census tracts. To provide the individual measures of structural vulnerability, I use 2008-2012 American Community Survey (ACS) data that are attached to the recruiting stations at the census tract level. The models that follow predict the presence or absence of a recruiting station in each census tract using logistic regression models with fixed effects by state. Fixed effects at the state level control for observed and unobserved effects

\[ \text{Left margin citation} \]
that explain between-state differences in recruitment office location. Allison (2009) explains fixed effects in the context of having repeated measurements for individuals:

In the classic view, a fixed effects model treats unobserved differences between individuals as a set of fixed parameters that can either be directly estimated or partialed out of the estimating equations. In a fixed effects model, the unobserved variables are allowed to have any associations whatever with the observed variables (which turns out to be equivalent to treating the unobserved variables as fixed parameters). Unless you allow for such associations in a random effects model, you haven’t really controlled for the effects of the unobserved variables. This is what makes the fixed effects approach so attractive. (Allison, 2009, 2-3).

The census tract is the unit of analysis, because census tracts are designed to contain small and similar groups of people with boundaries that are largely consistent over time:

Census tracts are small, relatively permanent geographic entities within counties (or the statistical equivalents of counties) delineated by a committee of local data users. Generally, census tracts have between 2,500 and 8,000 residents and boundaries that follow visible features. When first established, census tracts are to be as homogeneous as possible with respect to population characteristics, economic status, and living conditions (Census Bureau, US, 1994, 10-1).

The size and homogeneity of census tracts is important for testing the argument that military recruiting offices target neighborhoods with greater structural vulnerability. The model is nonlinear in that the model takes the natural logarithm of the odds of the outcome, a function called the logit transformation. The logit transforms the dichotomous outcome into a continuous metric that is bounded by zero and one. The logit of the outcome is fit to the independent variables in a linear fashion, and the predicted values are transformed into predicted odds using the inverse of the logit function, the exponential function. Raw coefficients are produced in log-odds, but to ease interpretation (in terms of odds rather than log-odds), the models presented in this chapter exponentiate the log-odds coefficients and provide Taylor series-based standard errors using the delta method. Significant coefficients greater than 1 have a positive effect on the outcome, while significant coefficients less than 1 have a negative effect on the outcome. Goodness of fit measures provided in the following models include the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC), which is a fit measure that indicates the amount of information that is lost in the process of fitting the specified model to the data. The lower the AIC, the better the model fit. The second goodness of fit test is a pseudo $R^2$ measure that is calculated by taking 1 minus the residual deviance of the model divided by the null deviance. This is only analogous to the actual $R^2$ produced by linear models, because GLM models like logistic regression rely on deviance instead of variance.
If the unit selected was larger and more heterogeneous, effects would be more difficult to discern and the homophily of those people most proximate to the recruiting office and with similar levels of structural vulnerability might be lost.

The American Community Survey from 2008-2012 has some missing data. The type of this missingness has consequences for the type of missing data strategy that can be used in an analysis. Missing data are generally categorized into Missing Completely at Random (MCAR), Missing at Random (MAR), or Missing Not at Random (MNAR) \cite{allison2001missing}. Data that are Missing Completely at Random (MCAR) occur when missing data are not a function of the observed or unobserved values in the data set. Essentially, missing data are a random sample of the data set. Data that are Missing at Random (MAR) are not missing as a function of the unobserved data in the data set. In this case, missing data in a variable depend, in part, on the values of that same variable, but do not depend on the values of other variables. Data that are Missing Not at Random (MNAR) are missing as a function of the unobserved values in the data set. The only way to know whether the data are MNAR is if additional information reveals that the missing data were explained by a biased sample.

To determine the type of missing data for this analyses, I first ruled out MNAR. I have no reason to believe the missing data in the American Community Survey are due to biased data collection. Second, I ran Little’s (1988) test to assess whether the data are Missing Completely at Random. Little’s test overcomes the multiple-comparison problem that occurs when running multiple mean comparison tests on the same data set. Effectively, this test compares the means of each variable against indicators for missing data for the other variables, and produces a global test statistic for whether the data are Missing Completely at Random (null hypothesis). Results of this test show a chi-square value of 15,772 for 59 degrees of freedom and a p-value.

\footnote{Little’s test tests the null hypothesis that the data are missing completely at random.}
< 0.001, causing a rejection of the hypothesis that the data are Missing Completely at Random. Unlike listwise deletion, modern missing data imputation algorithms are capable of handling data that are either MCAR or MAR. The most popular of these approaches is multiple imputation. The missing values in this section’s logistic regression models are handled using multiple imputation using the mice R package.

4.2.2 Results

Figure 4.2 shows the national distribution and density of recruitment offices across the country. This figure shows a point and density distribution of all recruiting offices in 2012. The black points show the point locations of the offices and the grey lines reflect the density of the points. The more closely packed the lines are, the more dense recruitment offices are in that area. In Figure 4.2, a number of regional clusters appear in the point distribution. Areas with the most tightly packed grey

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6Listwise deletion is the most commonly used missing data strategy. Its popularity is due primarily to its simplicity, but also to its estimation properties in the face of data that are Missing Completely at Random (MCAR). Listwise deletion omits every observation that contains a missing value on one or more of the variables included in a regression model. Listwise deletion produces point estimates that are unbiased when missing data are MCAR, but may produce point estimates that are biased if missing data are Missing at Random (MAR). When data are MCAR, standard errors and statistical tests are largely appropriate, but the standard errors will be slightly underestimated, and test statistics will be slightly overestimated.

7See Appendix B for the missing data patterns.

8Multiple imputation treats missing data similarly to single imputation while adding a few more steps to adjust the standard errors. Multiple imputation uses regression modeling to predict the values for each of the independent variables in the model. This is accomplished by generating predicted values for the variable X and then randomly sampling from the residual distribution of X and adding those residual values to the predicted values. This technique continues by performing this same set of steps multiple times, hence the “multiple” in “multiple imputation,” each time generating a different data set. Depending on the processing power of the computer, multiple imputation may be used to create 5 to 20, and possibly even more, datasets. Once these datasets are computed and loaded into memory, modeling approaches take account of the variation between these datasets to inflate the standard errors of the estimates. The resulting standard errors are asymptotically efficient (as the sample size approaches infinity, the standard errors are no different from any other efficient modeling strategy), and the point estimates are asymptotically consistent (as the sample size approaches infinity, the sample estimates converge on the population parameters).

9 This map is produced using the ggmap R package (Kahle and Wickham, 2013). All subsequent figures in this dissertation are created using the ggplot2 R package (Wickham, 2009).
lines include the Northeast, the Appalachian region including southern states, Texas, southern California, and the Midwest. Areas with many fewer offices, which largely reflect lower population densities in the United States, include Colorado, Nevada, Montana, Wyoming, and North and South Dakota. This is instructive, knowing that recruiting offices are located more often in cities, and more often in bigger cities.

The three regression models in this section are included in Table 4.1. Coefficients are presented in odds ratios. The nested models begin by adding controls for logged population density, Southern, percent black, and percent 20-24 year olds in Model 1. Model 1 shows, while controlling for population density, coefficients for Southern and
TABLE 4.1

PREDICTING PRESENCE OF RECRUITMENT OFFICE IN CENSUS TRACTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(Intercept)</td>
<td>0.002***</td>
<td>0.002***</td>
<td>0.002***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population Density (log)</td>
<td>1.282***</td>
<td>1.306***</td>
<td>1.295***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.022)</td>
<td>(0.023)</td>
<td>(0.022)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southern</td>
<td>2.135**</td>
<td>2.074*</td>
<td>2.102*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.615)</td>
<td>(0.598)</td>
<td>(0.607)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent Black</td>
<td>0.997*</td>
<td>0.995***</td>
<td>0.993***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent Aged 20-24</td>
<td>1.046***</td>
<td>1.048***</td>
<td>1.046***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.002)</td>
<td>(0.002)</td>
<td>(0.002)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent w Bachelors Degree (25+)</td>
<td>0.993***</td>
<td>0.996*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.002)</td>
<td>(0.002)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment Rate</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1.025***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.005)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AIC</td>
<td>14514.637</td>
<td>14494.802</td>
<td>14470.982</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo R²</td>
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<td>0.054</td>
<td>0.055</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Num. obs.</td>
<td>60290</td>
<td>60290</td>
<td>60290</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05
percent of 20 to 24 year olds are both positive and significant predictors of the odds of there being a recruitment office located in a census tract. These findings support the notion that Southern census tracts and tracts with relatively more young people in prime enlistment age (20-24), are more likely to have a military recruitment office. The coefficient for percent black in a tract is negative and significant. This finding persists across all three models, which suggests that the greater percentage of people in a census tract that are African American, the less likely it is that a recruitment office will be located in the tract, controlling for the other variables in the model. The significant negative coefficient finding is discussed further in the Discussion section.

In Model 2 in Table 4.1, the percent of people with bachelor’s degrees in a census tract is added to the model. This measure of structural vulnerability indicates the presence of relatively more college-educated adults in the tract, which is theorized to reduce the likelihood of the tract being targeted for recruitment. The negative and significant coefficient for percent with bachelor’s degrees supports the notion that when a higher percentage of people in a neighborhood have a college education, the military is less likely to target that neighborhood for military recruitment office.

In Model 3, the unemployment rate in the census tract is added to the model. The coefficient for unemployment rate is positive and significant, supporting the contention that neighborhoods with higher unemployment rates are more likely to be home to a recruitment office. Percent with a bachelor’s degree continues to stay negative and significant, although it drops from $p < 0.001$ to $p < 0.05$. Together, these two measures capture the economic opportunity and access to information dimensions of structural vulnerability. Significant net effects for both coefficients suggests that more structurally vulnerable neighborhoods are targeted disproportionately more often for recruitment offices.

This analysis demonstrates that recruitment offices are disproportionately located in a way that targets more structurally vulnerable neighborhoods for enlistment. Con-
versely, neighborhoods with both greater economic opportunity and greater access to information are targeted less often for recruitment. The discussion section following the next analysis attempts to link these empirical findings up with the theoretical motivations, but first, the second analysis moves forward with the understanding that the military does not randomly locate its recruitment offices. The following section assesses whether more structurally vulnerable individuals are more likely to consider themselves to be likely to enlist. The micro-level analysis will provide an individual-level counterpoint to the tract-level findings.

4.3 Structural Vulnerability and Attitudes Toward Enlistment Analysis

This complementary micro-level analysis asks whether more structurally vulnerable people respond that they have a higher propensity to enlist. Regression analysis assesses whether individuals who have greater or lesser access to information and economic opportunities are more likely to self-report that they are probably going to enlist in the military. These regression models are run on data from the Youth Attitude Tracking Study III (YATS III), which is a nationally representative, computer-assisted telephone interview (CATI) survey that investigates the attitudes of young people (ages 16-24) toward the military. The target population was sampled using Waksberg random digit dialing. The sample has a longitudinal component where half of the respondents had been interviewed in one of two previous YATS surveys. The Interuniversity Consortium for Political and Social Research (ICPSR) houses four consecutive years of the study for research (1991-1994). Results from each year are substantively similar, so this analysis randomly selected one year of the survey (1991) for the following analysis. These data were collected approximately 20 years prior to the tract-level analysis and are reflective of the time period during and shortly after Operation Desert Shield and Operation Desert Storm (8/2/1990-2/28/1991). This time slice falls in the middle of the period of the All-Volunteer Force (1973 - present),
but like the previous structural analysis, it is not longitudinal and can only represent the years in which the data are drawn.

4.3.1 Data and Methods

As in the previous set of models, logistic regression is used to predict a dichotomous outcome: binary coding of the question, “Now, I’d like to ask you how likely it is that you will be serving in the military in the next few years. Would you say ... [Definitely, Probably, Probably Not, or Definitely Not]?” Responses of “Definitely” and “Probably” are coded 1, while “Probably Not” and “Definitely Not” are coded as 0. To predict this outcome, the models include indicators of higher structural vulnerability including whether the youth is female, the race of the youth, and the age at the time of the survey. Whether the youth lives in the South is included as a measure for the alternative explanation that a longstanding military tradition and socialization that prizes military values explains the self-reported propensity of young people to enlist. The measure of access to education is included as mother’s educational attainment and is measured as a continuous variable (“What is the highest grade or year of school or college that your mother completed?”). Mother’s contribute to their children’s educational outcomes through their human capital (knowledge and skills), social capital (network ties), and cultural capital (preferences) (Harding et al., 2015). Their social capital links mothers’ and their children to networks of people with comparable levels of education, insight, and awareness. The measure for economic opportunity is whether the youth is unemployed and is looking for work (“Employment status: Employed, Unemployed and Looking, or Unemployed and Not Looking”). Youths who are looking for employment but who have not found it are likely to be in position of economic deprivation and in a position where opportunities have not arisen to meet that deprivation.

Coefficients in the regression models are presented in the tables as odds ratios.
The unit of analysis is the individual survey respondent. To determine whether the data for this analyses were MCAR or MAR, I ran Little’s (1988) test. Results of this test show a chi-square value of 129 for 20 degrees of freedom and a p-value < 0.001, causing me to reject the null that the data are Missing Completely at Random. I use multiple imputation to handle the missing data that are Missing at Random. See Appendix B for missing data patterns. Data are multiply imputed using the R mice package.

YATS III includes a set of 51 jackknife replication weights that group together sampled residential clusters. These replicate weights are applied and logistic regression models are estimated using the R survey package. The YATS data also include a total sampling weight. [Winship and Radbill (1994)] offer some advice for determining whether to include sampling weights in survey models. Though these authors focus on Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) models rather than on the Generalized Linear Model (GLM) of which logistic regression is a link function, their advice can be generalized to GLM. The authors recommend estimating one model with and one model without sampling weights. Then the two models are compared to see if they are significantly different. If they are not different, the authors recommend using the unweighted data. Their argument is that when specifying a model on survey data, the sampling weights may be a function of the independent variables, in which case, weighted estimates would be inefficient. I ran the full models with and without the total sampling weight variable and calculated a chi-square test statistic, which is appropriate for binomial distributions. The deviance was tiny (0.019) and the degrees of freedom were the same in both models, so the p-value for the chi-square test approached 1. The models are not significantly different, so I move forward with regression models that exclude the sampling weight.
**TABLE 4.2**

**PREDICTING A SELF-REPORTED PROBABILITY OF SERVING IN THE MILITARY**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<td>(Intercept)</td>
<td>25.300***</td>
<td>152.082***</td>
<td>91.263***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.664)</td>
<td>(1.868)</td>
<td>(1.965)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female (male omitted)</td>
<td>0.350***</td>
<td>0.339***</td>
<td>0.341***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.173)</td>
<td>(1.168)</td>
<td>(1.166)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southern</td>
<td>1.278*</td>
<td>1.242</td>
<td>1.255</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.118)</td>
<td>(1.121)</td>
<td>(1.121)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black (white omitted)</td>
<td>2.723***</td>
<td>2.692***</td>
<td>2.470***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.157)</td>
<td>(1.157)</td>
<td>(1.156)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian/PI (white omitted)</td>
<td>1.254</td>
<td>1.360</td>
<td>1.338</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.446)</td>
<td>(1.454)</td>
<td>(1.446)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indian/Alaskan (white omitted)</td>
<td>3.025***</td>
<td>2.787**</td>
<td>2.717**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.351)</td>
<td>(1.344)</td>
<td>(1.339)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Race (white omitted)</td>
<td>2.189***</td>
<td>1.685*</td>
<td>1.613</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.237)</td>
<td>(1.279)</td>
<td>(1.283)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>0.762***</td>
<td>0.756***</td>
<td>0.769***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.025)</td>
<td>(1.026)</td>
<td>(1.027)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mother’s Education (continuous)</td>
<td>0.883***</td>
<td>0.888***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.029)</td>
<td>(1.030)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployed and Looking for Work</td>
<td>1.551***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(1.130)</td>
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<tr>
<td>AIC</td>
<td>16.000</td>
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<td>20.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo R²</td>
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<td>0.120</td>
<td>0.125</td>
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<td>Num. obs.</td>
<td>4893</td>
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***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05
4.3.2 Results

The models in Table 4.2 show the results of regressing whether young people self-report being likely to enlist in the military on structural vulnerability measures and controls. Model 1 includes a control for female; Southern indicators for black, Asian, Indian/Alaskan, and other race; and the age of the respondent at the time of the survey. In Model 1, females are significantly less likely than males to report that they are likely to enlist, when controlling for the other variables in the model. The coefficient for Southern is significant in the first model, but is not significant in the second and third models. This finding generally fails to support the alternative explanation that young people from the South, when compared to other regions, consider themselves to be more likely to join the military, after controlling for other variables in the model. The dummy variable for black when compared to white shows that blacks are significantly more likely to report a higher enlistment propensity after controlling for the other measures in the model. This result appears to conflict with the finding in the prior analysis where percent black was significant and negatively predictive of recruitment office location. Even though the military locates recruitment offices in black neighborhoods less often, young blacks are still more likely than young whites to self-report that they are likely to enlist. This finding is discussed further in the Discussion section that follows. The coefficient for age is significant and negative, suggesting that younger adolescents are more likely to self-report being likely to enlist than older adolescents. Older adolescents and young adults may have already made their decision whether or not to enlist, while younger adolescents still have the opportunity to entertain the decision, which may help explain this difference.

The second model builds in mother’s education as a continuous measure to the

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10 Southern is defined by YATS III as Alabama, Arkansas, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Mississippi, North Carolina, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, Washington D.C., and West Virginia
model. This measures the access to information dimension of structural vulnerability. The odds ratio for Mother’s education being less than 1 with a p-value < 0.001 means it is a significant and negative predictor of whether their child is likely to self-report that they are likely to enlist. This model supports the contention that the measure of access to information is important for influencing young people’s intentions to enlist.

The third model contributes both the measure for mother’s education and unemployed and looking for work in the model to capture both dimensions of structural vulnerability. This adds the economic opportunity dimension of structural vulnerability. Both coefficients are significant, and mother’s education remains a negative predictor. The net effect of being unemployed and looking for work is positive and significant on the self-reported propensity to enlist. The same goes for mother’s education, where the net effect of access to information is negatively associated with the self-reported propensity to enlist, after controlling for being unemployed and looking for work. These findings support the hypothesis that more structurally vulnerable young people consider themselves to be more likely to enlist.

4.4 Discussion

The analyses in this chapter find that neighborhood composition and structural vulnerability are important factors in the military mobilization effort. Evidence presented in this chapter suggests that military recruitment offices are located disproportionately in more vulnerable neighborhoods. The tract-level analysis shows that recruitment office locations are non-random and disproportionately target more structurally vulnerable neighborhoods for enlistment. And as the individual-level analysis shows, more structurally vulnerable people also consider themselves to be more likely to enlist. The two analyses in this chapter demonstrate that the state locates recruitment offices disproportionately by neighborhood access to information and economic opportunity, and those young people with less access to education and less economic
opportunity consider themselves more likely to enlist. The alternative explanation that tradition and socialization might better explain why certain young people have higher self-reported propensities to enlist goes largely unsupported.

The notion of structural vulnerability employed in this chapter suggests that people from different social positions have access to different types and qualities of information and different opportunity structures (Schwartz, 1976). At the individual level, the models in Table 4.2 demonstrate that economic opportunities may be able offer young people viable alternatives that can compete with their motivation to enlist. As the availability of employment to young people who want it increases, their self-reported propensity to enlist decreases, possibly because the benefits and incentives that the state can offer for enlistment struggle to overcome the risks when a different economic opportunity presents itself. Similarly, ready access to increasing amounts of information at the individual level, as shown in Table 4.2, also appears to serve as a mitigating factor for young people’s self-reported propensity to enlist.

Increased access to information about educational alternatives to military service could include how to apply for college, how to apply for financial aid, or what colleges one should apply to, all of which lessen the costs of entry to college. Additionally, increased information about the risks and costs of military service, knowledge about other economic opportunities out of high school, or exposure to ethics that conflict with those that can or cannot be exercised in the military might also serve to diminish the individual propensity to enlist.

Neighborhood-level findings from Table 4.1 support the contention that military recruiting offices are not located randomly. Oberschall’s (1973) theory of “bloc recruitment” helps explain why more military recruiting offices would be located disproportionately in neighborhoods with greater structurally vulnerability. The costs of recruiting randomly would be considerably higher if military recruiters did not capitalize on the evidence presented in the first analysis. Instead, it requires fewer
resources in the way of recruiting offices to mobilize groups of more structurally vulnerable people at the same time, instead of trying to target young people with different levels of vulnerability, individually. Whole groups of more structurally vulnerable people can be approached at the same time, relying on the location and proximity of recruiting offices to people who are more susceptible to messaging about benefits and enticements. This finding aligns with those of [Snow et al. (1980)](10.1007/978-1-4612-8528-6_8) and [McAdam (1986)](10.1007/978-1-4612-8528-6_8) concerning the need for contact with recruiters as a necessary precondition for being mobilized. Individual recruiters can only target those people in their proximity, so it behooves recruiters to be as proximate as possible to those who are most likely to be recruited.

The recruiting effort capitalizes on the intersection of lower economic opportunity and lower access to information. The unemployment rate as a measure of economic opportunity in a neighborhood is significantly related to the location of a recruiting office. Neighborhoods that have depressed employment prospects provide more attractive real estate where economic opportunities that might otherwise compete with military benefits are largely nonexistent. The percentage of people in the tract with at least a bachelor’s degree is also predictive of recruitment office location, and it appears to serve an attenuating function. More highly-educated neighborhoods are more resistant to recruitment office locations. This chapter suggests that this effect is due to increased access to information, but an alternative explanation could be that this is due to higher education contributing to higher earnings, which in turn contributes to higher rents. Higher rents make it less attractive economically to afford a recruitment office in those locations. Yet the models in Table 4.1 control for the economic opportunity in the neighborhood, and access to information remains significant, which suggests that information is important net of economy. In spite of how well-to-do a neighborhood is, its level of higher education matters.

This study finds a seemingly conflicting finding between the results of percent
black in Table 4.1 and the individual-level indicator for black in the survey models in Table 4.2. Percent black in the neighborhood models is negatively associated with recruiter presence, but the indicator for blacks compared to whites in the individual-level model has a positive relationship with the reported propensity to enlist. African Americans are more likely to consider themselves likely to enlist, and they are more likely to actually enlist in the military relative to the size of their civilian population. However, the structural location of recruitment offices does not necessarily facilitate this process, considering that recruitment offices are located less often in areas with higher percentages of African Americans. The disproportionate enlistment of blacks appears to be attributable to a process that is not captured by the structural location of recruitment offices.

4.5 Conclusion

More structurally vulnerable groups have less access to information and fewer economic opportunities. This deprivation makes these groups prime candidates for military recruitment. Having economic opportunities or better access to information could help recruited groups withstand recruitment processes. But when a recruitment office is located in area with few other economic opportunities or social welfare options, the prospect of having access to the resources the military provides is compelling. As this chapter demonstrates, the military chooses to locate its recruitment offices non-randomly, and it does so disproportionately in areas with more structurally vulnerable people. These areas include those with higher unemployment and fewer people with higher education degrees. Recruitment offices are disproportionately located in more structurally vulnerable neighborhoods, and more structurally vulnerable people are more likely to consider themselves to be likely candidates for enlistment.

The analyses in this chapter support the contention that people in more struc-
urally vulnerable positions are likely to be more receptive to the claims of economic opportunity and advancement as trade-offs for military participation. Gaventa’s (1982) argument that the “consciousness of the relatively powerless, even as it emerges, may be malleable...” finds some grounding in the finding that more vulnerable people are more likely to be targeted for recruitment, and they are also more likely to consider themselves to be likely candidates for serving the military interests of the powerful (Gaventa, 1982, 19).
CHAPTER 5

BIOGRAPHICAL VULNERABILITY: DIFFERENTIAL ENLISTMENT

As shown in the two previous chapters, state officials leverage different forms of power to mobilize volunteers for military service. Whether it be the manipulation of advertisements to align specific incentives for participation with more vulnerable demographic subgroups, or be it the targeting of more vulnerable neighborhoods for recruitment offices, state officials rely on the use of non-coercive forms of power to mobilize the All-Volunteer Force. State officials might also benefit from motivations for military participation that don’t rely on the exercise of state power for mobilizing volunteers. Factors like conducive social networks, collective identities, and biographical availability might also explain why young people volunteer for military service. This chapter examines the effects of these alternative explanations, along with the influence of military recruitment, to explain All-Volunteer Force mobilization. I offer the concept of biographical vulnerability, which assembles explanations for mobilization in social movement scholarship that help overcome the collective action problem, to increase to our understanding of why certain individuals decide to enlist.

Biographical vulnerability, as conceptualized in this chapter, is an extension of the notion of biographical availability from the differential participation approach to social movement scholarship. Biographical availability indicates the absence of personal constraints that might inhibit a person from participating in collective action [McAdam 1986]. Biographical vulnerability indicates the absence of personal constraints, combined with the motivation to participate, contact with recruiters, and supportive social referents, in the context of a high-risk form of collective action.
with few alternatives to participation. Together, these conditions may make it more likely that individuals will participate in high-risk, high-commitment, all-consuming collective action, where there are limited alternatives. Using survey data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979 (NLSY79), this chapter tests the concept of biographical vulnerability as it might explain why some individuals and not others joined the military.

As the previous chapter showed, structural vulnerability helps explain why certain groups are more or less susceptible to military recruitment. The evidence suggests that the targeting of neighborhoods and individuals for enlistment does not occur randomly. Groups that are more structurally vulnerable have less access to information and fewer economic opportunities, and this makes them more attractive targets for recruitment. However, being targeted for recruitment and actually enlisting are two different processes. This chapter investigates the question of why certain individuals and not others decided to serve in the volunteer military. Research on micro-level questions in differential participation scholarship reveals important differences between those who participate in social movements and those who do not. This chapter suggests that these theories might also be applied to collective behavior that is high-risk, but is not protest. Theories that contribute to our understanding of why some people participate, but not others, include biographical availability, generalized action preparedness, recruiter contact, and collective identity. This chapter applies these specific theories of differential participation to explain differential military enlistment.

What distinguishes being biographically available from being biographically vulnerable? Biographical availability is limited in scope and theory to the factors that make individual potential participants in social movements more or less available to protest. Biographical vulnerability, on the other hand, extends this notion to include not only individual availability measures, but also other measures of differential par-
ticipation including being motivated to participate, having contact with recruiters, and having social referents that are supportive of the decision to participate. These factors are likely to increase an individual’s receptiveness to recruitment. As the prior chapter discussed, the number of alternatives to military enlistment may be fewer for some people, while the risks are much higher for military participation than they are for most social movement participation in democratic societies. On one hand, military service may be one of only a few options for those with little economic opportunity, which leaves vulnerable groups without a set of alternatives that could help them withstand recruitment processes.

When compared to the protest dependent variables that are typically used in differential participation studies, the enlistment outcome explained in this study is qualitatively different. Military service involves a long-term commitment with no opportunity to change one’s mind or leave early. The standard number of years in an enlistment contract is 8, which is a considerable time commitment when many adolescents who enlist are only twice that number of years old. The cost of receiving the opportunities that accompany enlistment include the requirement that the volunteers place their body in harm’s way on command. Protest participation, on the other hand, often does not require an all-consuming life course change. Protest participation does not come with a contractual obligation, and participants will probably not be jailed for their failure to continue participating once they have made their initial decision to participate.

While protest can result in dangerous situations, it is rare (though not unprecedented) in democracies for protesters to either fire or be fired upon with live ammunition, unlike warfighting which is defined by armed conflict. Should a protester involved in violent conflagration quit a protest, they probably will not face harsh penalties, unlike the penalties associated with desertion during wartime. The measures that help explain differential participation in social movements might also be
useful for explaining enlistment behavior. However, the subtext of those measures is different considering the level of risk and commitment, and often lack of competing alternatives to military service, hence the use of the term vulnerability. In fact, social movement recruitment contexts where movement recruits have limited alternatives to not participate and have no opportunities to exit once they begin participating may be better understood through a lens of biographical vulnerability as opposed to biographical availability.

5.1 Biographical Availability

Differential participation in social movements, according to Snow et al. (1980), is “influenced by structural proximity, availability, and affective interaction with movement members” (Snow et al., 1980, 787). To better understand why certain individuals protest, Snow et al. (1980) examine the avenues of microstructural recruitment, the differential availability of recruits, structural characteristics, and how recruitment affects movement growth. With respect to availability, the authors find that individuals with more discretionary time will be more likely to participate in protest activities. Similarly, individuals with fewer time commitments may also be more likely to join the military. Military enlistment requires all of an individual’s time for the initial training period following enlistment. Subsequently, military service will often require most of an enlistees’ time, even in the absence of deployment or field training exercises. These time pressures increase the difficulty of serving for people with many or important non-military time commitments.

Biographical availability is a term first used by McAdam (1986) to explain the immediate conditions surrounding an individual that either prevent that individual from participating in a social movement or enable that individual to participate (McAdam, 1986). Biographical availability is often operationalized according to various demographic characteristics, such as age, employment, marriage, educational
status, parenthood, etc. Arguably, if an individual experiences more demands on her or himself through such statuses as being married, having children, being a full-time student, working a job with regular hours, or if they are at a midpoint in life when they are likely to have the most demands placed on them, then they are presumed to be less likely to protest. Depending on the type of social movement, the same forms of biographical availability may have different impacts on participation.

The effect of biographical availability is not always found to encourage participation. Discrepant findings arise between hypothesized relationships between biographical statuses and participation. In his Freedom Summer research, McAdam (1986) examines applicants to the Freedom Summer program, which he explains is “high-risk” activism, because the potential for physical, psychological, and legal danger is high. McAdam splits applicants to this program into two groups: participants/volunteers and noshows/withdrawals. Participants completed the Freedom Summer program, while noshows failed to report and did not participate. When looking at the differences between those who participated and noshows, McAdam finds that in some instances, those applicants who were less biographically available were actually more likely to participate. Those who were employed and those who were married were surprisingly more likely to participate than those who did not show. Similarly, Nepstad and Smith (2001), in their study of the U.S. Central America peace movement, found that people who chose to participate in a form of high-risk peace activism were likely to be employed in jobs that offered less flexible work hours, and those participants were also more likely to be middle-aged, as opposed to very young or very old.

The complexity of the findings of the impact of biographical availability on participation may depend largely on the movement context, and it may be further complicated by using the theory to explain military enlistment. While additional time commitments for reasons like being married or having children may make it more dif-
ficult to be away from home during periods of deployment or training, the additional responsibility of providing for a family may instead motivate individuals to serve. After all, many of the incentives offered for enlistment revolve around providing for enlistees’ families. Biographical availability may provide a push toward enlistment for individuals with few commitments, or the lack of availability may also push an individual toward enlistment if individuals need military benefits to provide for their families.

5.1.1 Stages of Participation

Individuals need more than to simply be available in order to participate in a social movement, or in all likelihood, to serve in the military. Klandermans and Oegema (1987) make the argument that there are four stages to becoming a participant in a social movement. These processes include “becoming part of the mobilization potential, becoming target of mobilization attempts, becoming motivated to participate, and overcoming barriers to participation” (Klandermans and Oegema, 1987, 519). These are individual level processes. The first two stages are necessary conditions for motivation to arise. Once motivation arises, it interacts with barriers to participation to influence whether or not an individual participates. The authors argue that motivation is a rational outcome of weighing perceived costs and benefits. Motivation alone is a necessary but not sufficient condition for participation as actors must overcome barriers; the higher the motivation, the greater the barriers that can be overcome.

In a later study, Oegema and Klandermans (1994) build on the four steps of mobilization by adding the processes of generalized action preparedness, specific action preparedness, and action participation. Generalized action preparedness involves participants’ willingness to participate in movement activity. Specific action preparedness involves participants’ willingness to participate in a specific movement activity,
arguably a function of specific grievances. Action participation is actual movement mobilization.

Oegema and Klandermans (1994) also ask why people with movement sympathies might not participate in that movement. The answer lies in paths to nonparticipation, including nonconversion and erosion. Nonconversion describes the process whereby sympathizers are not converted into participants, while erosion describes the process where sympathetic people lose their sympathy. Nonconversion, the authors theorize, results from specific circumstantial factors like political opportunities, strength of networks, mobilization techniques, and strategies. Erosion results from changing circumstances such as “movement decline, changes in public opinion, and issue attention cycles” (Oegema and Klandermans, 1994, 706). The authors find that erosion results from declined action preparedness (i.e., willingness to participate) and lessening community support over the course of a campaign. Nonconversion, the authors theorize, results from specific circumstantial factors like political opportunities, strength of networks, mobilization techniques, and strategies.

Like social movement participation, military volunteers likely need to become available for enlistment, be recruited, and become willing and motivated to volunteer in order to be in a position to enlist. People who do not meet age, test score, weight, and/or health requirements are not available for enlistment and cannot enlist. Recruiters are necessary for transporting potential enlistees to take military entrance exams and to be administratively processed. Recruiters communicate the benefits of military service to recruits’ parents, and most importantly, recruiters provide the bridge between the notion of joining the military and actually joining. Once an individual is available for enlistment and has been recruited, that person needs the motivation to enlist in order to do so. If before individuals enlist they lose their sympathetic position towards the military, or if conditions change to where they are no longer available, then they are no longer likely to serve.
Beyerlein and Hipp (2006) draw on Klandermans and Oegema’s (1987) model of participation to attempt to make sense of the conflicting findings surrounding the effects of biographical availability on participation. These authors simplify the four stages into a sympathy stage and a participation stage. Using a two-stage model, the authors start to make sense of the contradictory results, finding that availability matters to whether or not individuals become sympathetic to the movement, but not to whether or not the individual actually participates. Biographical availability probably serves to remove people from the recruitment pool. In the context of military recruitment, biographical availability may work in the way Beyerlein and Hipp (2006) suggest. Being available to enlist is likely to be only a precursor to having the motivation to enlist, but it likely has an impact on whether people are even in a position to take the action of enlisting.

5.1.2 Collective Identity and Recruitment

Unlike the conflicting findings surrounding biographical availability, scholars generally agree that collective identity and being recruited are important to who joins a social movement (McAdam and Paulsen, 1993; Beyerlein and Sikkink, 2008; Jasper, 1997; Nepstad and Smith, 2001; Klandermans, 2002; Stürmer and Simon, 2004). McAdam and Paulsen (1993) examine how various dimensions of social ties and competing networks affect the likelihood to participate. The authors argue that whether or not a potential participant’s identity salience matched well with a recruitment attempt, and with important others’ conceptions of whether or not that individual ought to participate. McAdam and Paulsen (1993) suggest that the decision to participate in a movement requires a recruitment attempt by someone in the movement that successfully links the movement’s values and goals to the individual’s identity, or feeling of “we-ness.” Because individuals have more than one identity, those identities may compete with one another. An individual who is the target of the recruitment
attempt needs to bounce the idea of participating off of other people who shore up that particular identity for that individual. If the individual being recruited receives sufficient support and receives insufficient deterrence from that social referent, then that individual will participate. Snow et al. (1980) also argue that in order to move from being sympathetic to a movement to being an actual participant, contact with a recruiter is necessary. The authors suggest that two dimensions of recruitment are present: face to face interaction or mediated interaction, and along public channels or along private channels. Sympathizers who are linked to a movement member are more likely to be recruited.

Other scholars also find that identity is central to explaining participation. Jasper (1997) contends that there are three kinds of identity: personal, collective, and movement. Personal identities provide a sense of who one is. Collective identities provide perceptions of group distinctiveness. Movement identities occur when a group sees themselves as potential agents for change. Nepstad and Smith (2001) suggest that moral outrage can be a rational and essential motivating factor for mobilizing social movement participants. Emotional reactions can be generated out of a context that incorporates identity, structure, and information. Beyerlein and Sikkink (2008), in their study of volunteers to help in 9/11 relief efforts, find that individuals who identified strongly with victims or people who were threatened on 9/11 were most likely to participate (Beyerlein and Sikkink 2008). Identification with the victims was born out of having a family member or friend at risk that day, or by being moved to feel sorry for the victims. In this study, sorrow, which indicated a stronger identification with the victims, was a much more powerful motivator of participation than the emotion of anger. Similarly to Beyerlein and Sikkink (2008), Klandermans (2002) finds that the extent to which an individual identifies affectively with a group that she or he perceives is being treated unjustly is powerful predictor of whether or not the individual will participate in a protest movement. Group identity influ-
ences participation in a movement while participation in a movement influences ones identity.

Collective identity and recruitment may work similarly for military enlistment as they do for social movement participation. Individuals who are available for enlistment may need both contact from a recruiter and positive feedback about the possibility of their enlistment from someone important to them. That positive feedback could reinforce the identity for that individual, supporting the decision to enlist and shoring up the salience of the identity that sympathizes with the goals of the military.

5.1.3 Biographical Vulnerability

Being biographically vulnerable is the notion that in addition to being biographically available for recruitment, individuals are willing and motivated to participate, are targeted for recruitment, and have social referents that approve of participation and can shore up the identity salience of a person’s sympathy toward the military. These processes, in combination with a type of collective behavior where the level of risk and commitment is extremely high, puts some people in more vulnerable positions than others. What this means for the following analysis is that the measures used to predict differential participation in the military resemble measures that might be used to predict protest differential participation. But the nature of the outcome is commitment and risk heavy, and is often presented in a context of a limited set of alternatives to participation. Military service requires an all-consuming life course change. Often, it is one of very few opportunities for those with very little economic opportunity. These conditions suggest that potential enlistees may be serving more as instruments of powerholders than they are themselves acting as challengers.

For similar reasons as social movement participants, individuals with higher biographical availability, higher motivation to enlist, having contact with recruiters,
and having a supportive social referent may contribute to a higher likelihood that an individual will enlist. People who have more commitments at home, like a spouse and/or children, may be less likely to risk uprooting their entire family and being away from them for months or years, to serve. Those individuals who might be available for enlistment but who have no motivation to do so, are probably not going to enlist. Conversely, individuals who are highly motivated to enlist are probably much more likely to do so. If someone has never been exposed to a recruitment attempt by a military recruiter, the likelihood of that person reaching out to a recruiter on her or his own is much lower. People who do not have the social referents to reinforce military values or the intention to enlist may not have sufficient support for that identity for it to outweigh competing identities. When the most influential person in someone’s life has strong negative feelings toward the military and enlistment, that person will probably not receive the necessary support and encouragement to volunteer. The factors included in the subsequent analysis can be conceptualized together as a set of measures of biographical vulnerability.

Six hypotheses are tested in the following analyses. A full description of the operationalization of the measures included in the analysis follows in the Data and Methods section. The first two hypotheses test components of the biographical availability theory of differential enlistment. Individuals can be available in more ways than one, or conversely, can be time-constrained in different ways. Biographical availability is assessed with measures for being married or not in each year of the survey, and the number of children the person has in each year of survey. If an individual is married, they may have more time and relationship commitments, and may be less likely to enlist. The same approach is taken for the number of children a person has. If a person has more children at home, they may be less interested in being away from them for extended periods of time. It is possible that these two types of availability work differently, where some people do not mind being detached from their spouse
but do mind being detached from their children for extended time periods, or vice versa, so both measures are included in the model.

The next three hypotheses involve motivation, recruiter contact, and social referents’ opinions. If a person believes that they are definitely or probably going to try to enlist, then they are considered willing and motivated to do so, and are probably more likely to enlist than someone who reports that they are probably or definitely not going to enlist. Contact with a recruiter is also thought to influence enlistment decisions, so whether or not someone has been in contact with a recruiter is likely to be predictive of whether that person will enlist. If the most influential person in a respondent’s life would somewhat or strongly approve of the respondent’s decision to enlist, that respondent may be more likely to enlist than if that influential person somewhat or strongly disapproved. Finally, if the most influential person in a respondent’s life is supportive of enlistment, and that person has been a target of a recruitment attempt in the same year, that person may be more likely to enlist. These six hypotheses are tested in the subsequent analysis.

5.2 Data and Methods

Data used in this chapter are collected by the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979 (NLSY79) [Zagorsky 1997]. The NLSY79 is a nationally representative panel survey of 12,686 youth aged 14 to 22 years old when they were first surveyed in 1979. Respondents were interviewed yearly from 1979 to 1994, and then biennially from 1994 to the present. The survey began by collecting a large oversample of servicemen and women, but the survey ran into funding cutbacks in 1985, which reduced the military sample size. However, questions about military service continued throughout the remaining years of the survey. The primary focus of the NLSY79 is to capture the labor force behavior of American youth in this cohort, but the survey collects much more information including military service data, educational
attainment, and a variety of psychometric measurements.

The panel data structure of the NLSY79 produces repeated measurements on individuals over time. The dependent variable is coded as whether or not a respondent was enlisted in each year, lagged by one year. Respondents are coded 1 in $X_{t+1}$ years they are enlisted and 0 in $X_{t+1}$ years they are not enlisted. The dependent variable is lagged by one year to avoid the endogeneity problem that might arise if the enlistment outcome influenced a change in an independent variable prior to its measurement. Additionally, analyses with this type of data structure should account for the fact that data are correlated within subject over time. When these type of data are pooled in regression models, the estimates are less efficient than they are when the within-subject correlation is incorporated into the estimates (Diggle et al., 2002). Generalized Estimating Equations (GEE) is a method that can incorporate the within-subject correlations. GEE is born out of quasi-likelihood estimation and is an extension of the Generalized Linear Model (GLM). GEE assumes that observations are not independent of each other, it is capable of predicting categorical dependent variables, and it does not require a balanced data structure (Zorn, 2001). Balanced data structures occur when every subject is measured at the same points in time. In the NSLY79, the respondents were not all the same age when they were first interviewed, so each of them reaches enlistment age and ineligible-for-enlistment age in different years. Therefore, both the unbalanced panel design, and the dichotomous dependent variable, encourage the use of GEE. GEE is designed to adapt to different correlation structures of repeated-measures within-subjects data. The interpretation of GEE model estimates is the same as the interpretation of maximum likelihood logistic regression models (Zorn, 2001).

The GEE approach was developed by Liang and Zeger (1986) and Zeger and Liang (1986) to produce more efficient and unbiased regression estimates for use in analyzing longitudinal or repeated measures research designs with nonnormal response variables (Ballinger, 2004, 128).
To test the hypotheses presented in the prior section, logistic regression estimated using Generalized Estimating Equations (GEE) is used to assess the relationships between individual measures of biographical vulnerability and whether or not people enlist in the military. The unit of analysis is the individual respondent at each survey year from 1979 until they turned 35, which is the last year that respondents could enlist in the Army during the time of the study. This study uses the geepack R statistical package for estimating the logistic regression models on NLSY79 data. With R’s geepack package, researchers can select a correlation structure to fit the model to the working within-subject correlation structure of the data. “The goal of selecting a working correlation structure is to estimate $\beta$ more efficiently” (Pan, 2001, 122). GEE models are robust to misspecification of the correlation structure (Zorn, 2001). Since the panel data in this study involve repeated measurements over time on the same individuals, subsequent values depend, in large part, on the prior year’s responses. To account for this type of time-dependent, within-subject, correlation structure, I use a first-order serial autocorrelation structure (AR-1).

Most of the survey questions used in this analysis are measured at more than one point in time, considering the panel structure of the survey. However, some questions are asked in some years and not in others. Some respondents exhibit nonresponse on some questions and not others. To further complicate the data structure, people can enlist from the time they turn 18 until they turn 35. Independent variables in this study are coded in all survey years from the first time the respondent was sampled in 1979, until each respondent turns 35.

To measure biographical availability, the regression models include whether or not the respondent was married during the year, and the number of children that a respondent was a parent of during the year. Being married or having more children increases the number of commitments to home and family, which may decrease the

1This time span is specific to enlisting in the US Army
likelihood of enlisting. To measure respondents’ motivations toward military enlistment, the regression models include respondents’ expectations of their own likelihood of enlistment. The question is asked, “Do you think, in the future, you will: definitely try to enlist, probably try to enlist, probably not try to enlist, definitely not try to enlist?” Responses of definitely or probably try to enlist are coded 1, and definitely or probably not try to enlist are coded 0 in each year for each respondent.

To test the notion of whether contact with a recruiter increases the likelihood that an individual will enlist, the independent variable is drawn from a question that asks: “Since our last interview, have you talked to a military recruiter to get information about a branch of the military?” If a respondent answered yes to this question, they are coded as 1 in that year, while those who did not are coded 0. To test the hypothesis that people who have an important reference person who approves of military service are more likely to enlist, the models include an influential person measure. If respondents listed a person as the most influential person in their life, they are then posed with a vignette: “You decided to join the Armed Forces. What is the attitude of your most influential person: strongly disapprove, somewhat disapprove, somewhat approve, strongly approve?” Responses of strongly or somewhat approve are coded 1, and strongly or somewhat disapprove are coded 0. The models also control for age and period effects by including control measures for how old the respondent is in each wave of the survey, and for the year that each wave the survey was administered.

Missing data are present in some variables in the model. The patterns for these missing data are shown in Appendix B. This study imputes missing values using the “last observation carried forward” (LOCF) approach. The LOCF approach is often used in repeated measurements designs where future values are partly conditional on preceding values. Simulations by Overall et al. (2009) find that LOCF imputation does not increase Type I error, and should be the preferred approach when imputing
repeated measurements data:

We considered it important to comparatively evaluate results from the simpler methods of analysis [LOCF] with those provided by the more complex generalized linear mixed model (GLMM) procedures that are widely recommended for analysis of repeated measurements with non-homogeneous correlation structures and missing data due to dropouts. Our results confirm that, even under conditions designed to favor the more mathematically complex solutions, the simpler more parsimonious techniques should be preferred (Overall et al., 2009, 500).

This approach for imputing missing data is applied for missing values in married, parent, expects to enlist, spoke with a recruiter, and influential person’s opinion. Data are imputed using the LOCF approach with functionality from the zoo and dplyr R packages.

The NLSY79 offers customized sampling weights that adjust for the probability of selection, differential response, and undercoverage. Winship and Radbill (1994) suggests that sampling weights should be approached with caution in survey-based regression models. The authors recommend estimating one model with and one model without sampling weights. Then the two models should be compared with an appropriate test statistic. If they are not different, they recommend using the unweighted data. The argument for doing this is that, when specifying a model on survey data, the sampling weights may be a function of the independent variables, in which case, weighted estimates would be inefficient. I ran the full models with and without the total sampling weight variable and calculated a chi-square test statistic, which is appropriate for binomial distributions. The p-value for the chi-square test approaches 1. The models are not significantly different, so I move forward with regression models that exclude the sampling weight.
5.3 Results

Descriptive statistics for the independent variables in the logistic regression models are shown in Table 5.1. The descriptive statistics show the mean within year, adjusted for customized sampling weights. Since respondents are between the ages of 14 and 22 in 1979, the marriage rate was fairly low, but over time, the rate rose from around 10% to 60% by 1994. The same trend holds for parents, where the average number of children within year rose from .1 to 1.3 over the time period from 1979 to 1994. The measure for probably or definitely going to enlist falls from .17 to .09 over the same time period. The number of people who spoke to recruiters in each year fell from 22% to 6.5%. The influence measure was only collected in 1979, so that measure is time invariant. Finally, the enlistment measure shows the proportion of respondents in each year that were enlisted. The number rose from around 2% in 1979 to a peak of 4% in 1984, and to a low of .8% in 1994.

Table 5.2 includes two models that include measures of biographical vulnerability to test the hypotheses in this chapter. Coefficients are presented as odds ratios to ease their interpretation. The first model in Table 5.2 includes the biographical availability components of biographical vulnerability. The two biographical availability measures include whether or not individuals are married in each measurement period, and the number of children that respondents have at each measurement period. The non-significant coefficient for being married runs contrary to the hypothesis that marriage would decrease the likelihood that an individual would enlist. For married people, joining the military might provide some attractive incentives, but those incentives may come into conflict with the commitments that accompany the institution of marriage. It is possible that the benefits of military service are equally weighted against the family responsibilities that must go unfulfilled while deployed.

\[^{2}\text{Standard errors are Taylor series-based standard errors using the delta method (Oehlert, 1992; Rice, 2006).}\]
or “in the field” for extended periods of time. The significant and negative coefficient for number of children provides some support for the biographical availability hypothesis. The more children that individuals have, the less likely they are to enlist in the military, when compared to individuals who have fewer children, controlling for the other variables in the model.

The first model also includes the expectations that people have of the likelihood of their own enlistment. The significant and positive odds ratio for those who expect to enlist offers some support for the notion that those individuals who believe they are likely to enlist are significantly more likely to enlist, compared to individuals who do not believe they are likely to enlist. This finding suggests that people’s expectations about their own motivation and willingness to join the military are important in whether people ultimately serve in the military.

The next variable that is included in Model 1 in Table 5.2 is the measure for whether a person spoke to a recruiter in the current year. This measure tests the hypothesis that people who are the target of a recruitment attempt are more likely to enlist. The coefficient for having spoken with a recruiter is positive and significant. Having spoken with a recruiter increases the odds of enlisting, compared to not have spoken to a recruiter, and controlling for the other variables in the model. These results support the hypothesis that recruitment attempts matter positively to enlistment.

The final variable included in Model 1 is the opinion of an influential person on the hypothetical decision to enlist. This tests the hypothesis that people who have a reference person who approves of enlistment are more likely to enlist. The coefficient for influential persons is significant and positive. This suggests that the attitude of an influential reference person toward the respondent’s hypothetical decision to enlist contributes to an increased likelihood of that individual enlisting for military service, compared to people whose reference person would not approve of this decision, and
controlling for the other variables in the model. Accordingly, this model finds support for the effect of the opinion of influential people on the likelihood of enlisting.

The second model in Table 5.2 tests the hypothesis that the effect of the opinion of an influential person on the hypothetical decision to enlist is conditional on whether the person is also the target of a recruitment attempt. Model 2 includes an interaction term for having spoken with a recruiter in a year and what an influential person’s opinion of enlistment is likely to be. The interaction term in Model 2 is statistically significant and positive. This model finds support for the theory that individuals who are the target of recruitment attempts bounce the idea of recruitment off of their influential social referents, which would influence their likelihood of enlisting. Individuals who were in contact with a recruiter and who had an influential social referent’s approval for joining the military were significantly more likely to enlist.

The results of the regression models in Table 5.2 support some of the hypotheses presented in this chapter: people who are motivated to enlist are more likely to enlist; people who are the target of a recruitment attempt are more likely to enlist; and people who have a reference person who approves are more likely to enlist. However, these results also show some conflicting or null effects for biographical availability.

5.4 Discussion

Biographical vulnerability is a theoretical concept that extends the notion of biographical availability to explain military enlistment. As stated earlier, biographical availability includes the immediate conditions surrounding an individual that either constrain that individual from participating or enable that individual to participate (McAdam 1986). Presumably, the more available an individual is to engage in collective action, the more likely that individual will be to participate. In the models in this chapter, measures for the availability of potential military enlistees include whether a person was married and the number of children a person was a parent of.
in each year.

The fact that neither coefficient is in the expected direction fails to provide evidence that the biographical availability theory can help explain non-participation, as it is applied to the high-risk, high-commitment outcome of military enlistment. It may be that the responsibility a person has for increasing numbers of children does not outweigh the economic benefits for military service, even at the expense of decreased ability to deliver on family commitments. The notion that greater commitments at home may make it harder to leave home for long periods of time, for deployment or training, go unsupported in this analysis. The opposite finding for the effect parenthood suggests that this factor may work differently for influencing military participation compared to what we might expect. The increased commitments involved with having to care for many children, when compared to having no or few children, may help explain the different effects. Being married may not be a sufficiently large daily commitment to deter enlistment, and the benefits of military service may be an attractive option for people with the greater economic burden that accompanies having more children.

Oegema and Klandermans (1994), in their pursuit of answering why people sympathetic to a movement would fail to participate, build on the four steps of mobilization by adding the processes of generalized action preparedness, specific action preparedness, and action participation. Generalized action preparedness involves participants’ willingness to participate in any movement activity, while specific action preparedness involves participants’ willingness to participate in a specific movement activity. The regression models in Table \ref{table:5.2} include whether or not an individual expects to enlist to test for whether becoming motivated to participate, or having generalized action preparedness, matters in military recruitment as it does in social movement participation.

The models show a significant and strong effect for expecting to enlist, which
provides some support for the notion of generalized action preparedness as it is applied to military participation. Having the motivation or willingness to participate is an important, albeit unsurprising, preceding factor in whether or not someone will enlist, as explicated by Oegema and Klandermans (1994):

Generalized action preparedness describes an individual’s willingness to support a movement, to take part in different types of collective action the movement might stage...A movement’s mobilization potential in a society can be thought of as the proportion of individuals within that society that is inclined to support the movement...The mobilization potential of a movement, then, theoretically encompasses those individuals with a generalized action preparedness greater than zero (Oegema and Klandermans, 1994, 704).

For someone to actually enlist, this analysis finds some support for Oegema and Klandermans’ (1994) contention that people are likely to have at least a modicum of expressed willingness to participate before they actually do so.

Snow et al. (1980) in their study of the Nichiren Shoshu Buddhist movement, find that in order to move from being sympathetic to a movement, to actually becoming a participant, potential participants need to come in contact with a recruiter (Snow et al., 1980). Additionally, being the target of a recruitment attempt is a critical step in the recruitment process according to Klandermans and Oegema (1987). Being contacted by a recruiter is the second stage in the process of participation (Oegema and Klandermans, 1994; Klandermans and Oegema, 1987). This study tests the hypothesis that people who are the target of a recruitment attempt are more likely to enlist, using the measure of whether or not a person has spoken with a recruiter. The results of this test find a positive and significant coefficient, suggesting that having been in contact with a recruiter increases the odds of enlisting.

Recruiters perform a wide range of services for potential recruits that increase the opportunity and likelihood for a person to enlist. Recruiters are not mere military salespersons. They increase the opportunity to apply and qualify for enlistment by
driving young people from their homes to testing locations for the Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery (ASVAB), and by transporting them to Military Entrance Processing Stations (MEPS) for physical entrance exams. Recruiters build solidarity with recruits and help increase the identity salience of a pro-military identity in young recruits by offering military-style physical training sessions early in the morning for groups of young people who show interest in military service. And recruiters visit schools and after school programs dressed in military uniforms that impress young people with the discipline and physical presence that accompanies a soldier in uniform.

McAdam and Paulsen (1993) make the argument that differential participation can be partly explained by whether or not a person’s identity salience matches with a recruitment attempt, and with important others’ attitudes about whether or not that individual ought to participate (McAdam and Paulsen, 1993). McAdam and Paulsen’s (1993) theory requires a recruitment attempt by someone in the movement that successfully links the movement’s values and goals to the individual’s identity. But people have multiple identities, and these identities can come into competition with each other. An individual who was the target of the recruitment attempt needs other important people in their life to shore up that particular identity. If the person who is recruited receives enough support from that important social referent, and does not receive overwhelming deterrence, then that individual will likely participate.

To test the notion that the opinion of an influential person matters to whether or not someone participates, this analysis includes the attitude of the most influential person in the life of the respondent. Her or his attitude toward the respondent’s decision to serve in the Armed Forces either leans positively or negatively. The full model in Table 5.2 offers some support for the hypothesis that people who have an influential reference person who approves of military service, are more likely to enlist. The attitude of the most influential person in these people’s lives toward enlistment
may either reinforce the sympathy that the person already has for the military, or it might contribute to a collective identity that incorporates the values of military service. If the attitude is negative, the attitude of their influential person may negate a pro-military collective identity and deter the person from enlisting. The evidence suggests that this may work the same way for enlistment behavior as it does for social movement participation.

Theory suggests that in order to participate, people need to be the target of a recruitment effort that succeeds in establishing a link between the movement and the individual’s identity. The likelihood of enlisting is further increased when the person continues this discussion with influential people in their lives, seeking confirmation of the validity of this linkage. If the person receives confirmation, then the individual’s likelihood of participating increases (McAdam and Paulsen, 1993). The test for an interaction between being the target of a recruitment attempt and having a social referent with a positive opinion about serving in the military shows a significant effect. Accordingly, McAdam and Paulsen’s (1993) theory appears to be capable of contributing to how we make sense of why some potential military recruits and not others decide to enlist.

5.5 Conclusion

This chapter tests theories of differential social movement participation as they might help explain why individuals do or do not enlist. The theories of differential participation, with respect to military volunteers, can be subsumed under the umbrella of biographical vulnerability. Biographical vulnerability expresses the reasons why particular individuals are more or less susceptible to military recruitment. This chapter finds evidence to suggest that the theories under the umbrella of biographical vulnerability including biographical availability, generalized action preparedness and motivation to participate, contact with recruiters, and collective identity confirmed
by influential social referents, can help explain differential enlistment. However, bio-
ographical availability appears to work differently than expected for some types of availability.

The findings in this study also provide some evidence to support the idea that military enlistment can be explained with mechanisms that can overcome the collective action problem, but that do not require the exercise of state power. Whether someone expects to enlist is a highly significant and powerful indicator of whether or not someone actually will enlist. Having an influential person in one’s life who would approve of enlistment increases the odds of that person enlisting. However, being the target of a recruitment attempt is also highly predictive of the final decision of whether or not to volunteer. The following chapter will move us from a study of who enlists and why to whether or not enlistment actually helps those who decide to volunteer.
**TABLE 5.1**

DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR SAMPLE WEIGHTED BIOGRAPHICAL AVAILABILITY MEASURES BY ENLISTMENT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Married</th>
<th>Parent</th>
<th>Expect</th>
<th>Recruiter</th>
<th>Influence</th>
<th>Enlistment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>0.095</td>
<td>0.108</td>
<td>0.170</td>
<td>0.222</td>
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## TABLE 5.2

### PREDICTING ENLISTMENT WITH BIOGRAPHIC VULNERABILITY MEASURES USING GENERALIZED ESTIMATING EQUATIONS

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<tr>
<td>(Intercept)</td>
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<td>Expects to Enlist</td>
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<td>Recruiter * Influence</td>
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*** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05
CHAPTER 6

INTERGENERATIONAL MOBILITY: MILITARY ENLISTMENT AND LIFE CHANCES

Earlier chapters in this dissertation showed that state officials used the second and third dimensions of power to target certain groups for enlistment, specifically groups that were more structurally and biographically vulnerable. These groups were targeted because they had fewer alternatives to military service. But this strategic targeting of more vulnerable groups begs the question whether those who went on to enlist ultimately gained long-term advantage from their service. If the military helped people who were disadvantaged by improving their economic situation, compared to their peers who did not enlist, then the military was acting as an extension of the welfare state. As [Bennett et al. 2013] theorize, the benefits of military service may interrupt the cycle of cumulative disadvantage for people who are more vulnerable.

However, if the more vulnerable groups that were targeted for recruitment went on to enlist, but were left with no discernible advantage over their non-enlisted peers, then claims of increased opportunity by way of military service were disingenuous with respect to the long-term effects of enlistment. To determine whether the claims of increased opportunity made to enlistees lived up to their expectations, this chapter asks whether young people who volunteered for military service during the All-Volunteer Force era gained improved economic intergenerational mobility compared to their non-veteran peers. An analysis of the Panel Study on Income Dynamics (PSID) in this chapter finds some evidence to support the notion that enlisting in
the All-Volunteer Force improved the life chances for enlistees who were the economically worst off.

6.1 Intergenerational Mobility

Much groundbreaking sociological work in intergenerational mobility research focuses on occupational mobility (Blau and Duncan 1967; Breen 2000; Featherman and Hauser 1978; Grusky and Hauser 1984; Hout 2004; Mare and Maralani 2006), but this chapter focuses instead on measures of income mobility (Solon 1992, 2000; Massey and Denton 2000; Morris and Western 2000; Zimmerman 1992). Income mobility provides a fine-grained lens for examining changes in mobility between the generations just prior to and during the All-Volunteer Force era. Military recruitment advertising suggests that enlistment may increase enlistees’ life chances in ways well-beyond finding a new occupation. Job training in a new profession is only one of a number of opportunities offered to incoming enlistees. Recruitment advertising suggests that military service may to be able to affect “success tomorrow” through the provision of various selective incentives, including enlistment bonuses, money to further one’s education, savings plans, and work/leadership experience. To illustrate, here are three commercial narratives from the “Army of One” advertising campaign that elude to future economic success by way of Army enlistment:

What are you setting your sights on? And when you see it, will you be ready? All you have to do is pick up the phone and call in your coordinates. Dial 1-800-438-5756 and learn why the Army is a great place to prepare for your future. You could get enlistment bonuses for a strong start. You’ll also get help in setting up a savings plan today. Plus get money for college and gain valuable experience and a firm financial footing you’ll need to succeed tomorrow. Call 1-800-438-5756 for a free DVD and hear from soldiers who have already prepared for their future. You’ll also get a free boonie hat. Whatever you’re looking for, the benefits that come from serving in the US Army can help you find it.

Learn why the Army is a great place to prepare for your future. You could
get up to $40,000 in enlistment bonuses. Plus up to $70,000 for education. Gain valuable experience and a firm financial footing for tomorrow. Call 1-800-403-9990 for a free DVD and boonie hat. Whatever you’re looking for, the US Army can help you find it.

We are the men and women of the United States Army Reserve. We are people just like you, with civilian careers, families, and a desire to serve. We stand ready. Find out how the Army Reserve can help you with enlistment bonuses and money to continue your education while you train near home. You will also get a savings plan and valuable experience that will benefit you far into the future. Call 1-800-235-3219 to get this free DVD and sports watch. Stand ready in the Army Reserve.

In the United States, children typically inherent and retain their parents’ economic class position. Bowles and Gintis (2001) find the extent of the inheritance of parents’ class position to be at levels even they find surprising: “...the extent of intergenerational economic status transmission is considerably greater than was thought to be the case a generation ago” (Bowles and Gintis, 2001). Stratification researchers including Solon (1992) and Zimmerman (1992), using well respected longitudinal datasets (PSID and NLSY), find that much of the explanation for son’s income levels can be attributed to their father’s earnings (Solon, 1992; Zimmerman, 1992). Breen and Jonsson (2005) confirm this finding by pointing out that cross-national studies of intergenerational mobility show that the United States provides considerably less intergenerational income mobility than comparable countries:

The most obvious reason for this is that the correlation between education and/or occupation and income is higher in the United States than in the more equal European countries (disregarding England), so even if Americans live in a fairly open society, the prevailing inequalities are more “costly” for a disadvantaged American and more profitable for someone privileged (Breen and Jonsson, 2005, 233).

Conveying privileges and earnings opportunities from one generation to another is theorized to occur through a number of different pathways, but one of the most common transmission pathways is through educational attainment (Goldthorpe, 2014).
Breen and Jonsson (2005). Four different theories can explain how educational attainment can help transmit economic position from parents to children: human capital theory, signaling theory, job competition theory, and incentive-enhancing preference theory (Goldthorpe 2014). Human capital theory suggests that individuals do not simply take the privileges they were given from birth and apply them in the labor market. Rather, rationally acting people make investments in themselves to increase their earnings power to the fullest extent that they are able. Making investments in opportunities like education enable people to maximize their lifetime earnings capacity. Researchers including Becker and Tomes (1994) theorize how parents might contribute to the investments that their children make. Specifically, parents invest on behalf of their children by taking some of the resources they would otherwise spend on themselves and transmit it to their children, often for their children’s pursuit of education (Becker and Tomes 1994). This functionalist perspective suggests that although more privileged parents can offer their children more money for education, more impoverished parents can offer the same opportunities for education to their children as more well-off parents by simply borrowing money. This theory comes under attack by many sociologists for its reliance on the notion that all parents and youth can act purely rationally when it comes to making investments in themselves (Manski 1993).

While human capital theory suggests that the investments that parents and children make in themselves determine the employability and earnings capabilities they will have, a competing theory calling signaling suggests that it is not the skills and capacities that people earn through education that get people hired and earning money. Rather, education provides a signal to employers, who otherwise have very little information about the people they might hire, that the person has been vetted by another institution (Arrow 1973; Stiglitz 1975; Spence 1973). Higher educational attainment indicates that a person is trainable and has sufficient discipline to
perform a job well. This screening and signaling process improves the odds for employers that individuals they hire will have the capacity to be trained and will behave in positive ways that ultimately benefit the employer. Educational attainment, in the eyes of this theory, is actually a means by which individuals can signal to potential employers that they have the potential to become productive employees.

Also in contrast to human capital theory, job competition theory reconceptualizes how workers are positioned against employers in the labor market. In human capital theory, workers invest in themselves outside of the labor market and receive training and skills that can they can then sell to an employer. But according to job competition theory, most of the training that workers need to accomplish their jobs can only be obtained after workers have been hired and while a worker is actually on the job (Thurow 1975). In this sense, workers are not competing against each other with the skills and capacities they have earned outside of the labor market, but rather, workers are competing against each other for the training opportunities they will earn while on the job. According to this theory, the labor market has two “queues.” One queue contains the list of available jobs, sorted from highest to lowest with respect to the rewards of the job, and the other queue contains the list of available workers, sorted from highest to lowest with respect to the level of appeal each worker has to employers. This level of appeal refers specifically to the probable costs of training each employee to perform a job effectively. To match workers with jobs, employers, according to Thurow (1975), rely on a version of signaling where employers assess workers in the queue with respect to a set of characteristics that indicate how much training the worker will require to perform a job. Since educational attainment is viewed as a good indicator of how easily a worker can be trained, educational attainment is awarded more influence in the matching process by employers than other characteristics.
The last theory in the list is incentive-enhancing preference theory. This theory, like signaling and job competition theories, is a reaction to the functionalism embedded in the human capital theory. Bowles and Gintis (2000) agree with other theorists that increases in educational attainment result in increases in lifetime earnings. But these authors suggest that the reasons for why this is the case differ from those of human capital proponents. According to these authors, education is less about gaining skills that can be sold in the marketplace and more about being socialized to be good workers. Education provides a socializing function for employers in that it helps to shape the norms and values of people in ways that are useful for employers (Bowles and Gintis, 2000). Education inculcates people with the belief that having more money is better than having less money, giving more effort is better than giving less effort, and thinking about the future is preferable to concentrating on the present. All of these values, the authors contend, contribute to making compliant workers who are more responsive to the rewards and punishments that can be leveraged by employers. All of the aforementioned theories agree that increased educational attainment contributes heavily to increases in people’s lifetime earnings. In part, this is why offering selective incentives that provide for increases in educational attainment has the potential to heavily influence veteran’s lifetime earnings. And from the human capital perspective, receiving job training from the military could provide a valuable skill set that employers might want.

6.2 Intergenerational Mobility for Veterans

Providing disadvantaged populations selective incentives such as money for education could provide the means for enlistees to break upward in class position. Some studies of the early AVF suggest that the military provides just such a service to particular racial and ethnic groups (Browning et al., 1973; Lopreato and Poston, 1977). Browning et al. (1973) find that disadvantaged racial and ethnic groups,
specifically black and Chicano males from the American Southwest, gained income positions from enlisting in the military. For these two racial and ethnic groups, being a veteran compared to being a non-veteran provided a significant income advantage. The authors argue that these advantages are a result of the “bridging environment” that the military offers. In such an environment, disadvantaged groups have the opportunity to acquire new skills and education, gain experience managing workers, as well as being immersed in a corporatized environment. Lopreato and Poston (1977) find a similar finding for blacks nationwide. According to these authors, black veterans compared to black non-veterans maintain an income advantage. This is due to black veterans being better equipped to turn their educational attainment into real earnings. Lopreato and Poston (1977) argue that this is due to black veterans being immersed in the bridging environment of the military, which exposes them to how large bureaucracies function.

Other veteran mobility research finds that certain disadvantaged groups view military enlistment as a vehicle for mobility. Segal et. al. (1978) finds that both women and blacks view military service as a means to increase their income advantage and occupational advancement (Segal et al. 1978). In fact, these authors are so enthusiastic about the prospects for increased social mobility for disadvantaged groups that they claim that the military is correcting the national economic imbalance between races:

Further recruitment of black males will increase the already existing over-representation of blacks in the All-Volunteer Force. However, we feel that by thus providing a mobility channel for a disadvantaged segment of the population, the armed forces can contribute to the solution of a social ill. Scholars and policy makers who are concerned that our armed forces personnel be broadly representative of the American population, on the other hand, should be pleased to note that female content in the armed forces can be increased by about 850% without producing a disproportionate overrepresentation of this majority segment of the population (Segal et al. 1978, 133).
Researchers including Teachman and Tedrow (2007) and Bailey (2008) have more closely examined the link between veteran status and future earnings. Teachman and Tedrow are interested in what they term the income trajectories of male service members. They are less concerned with the intergenerational aspect of mobility and are more concerned with the effects on military service on earnings during and after military service. The authors find that while in service, disadvantaged young males earn more than their non-military peers. However, after these young men exit military service, the “income premium” associated with their service disappears, and for some groups including white veterans with a high school degree, they actually find themselves at an earnings disadvantage (Teachman and Tedrow, 2007).

Bailey (2008) more closely examines the link between veteran status and future earnings. She asks a question about intergenerational income mobility of veterans more directly. This author as well as Teachman and Tedrow (2007) use the National Longitudinal Study of Youth (NLSY) to examine both occupational and income intergenerational mobility. Bailey finds that veteran status is not a significant predictor of intergenerational occupational mobility or of earned income. However, the author relies on some questionable assumptions in her methods, including calculating son’s income by summing across all available years of income data rather than taking a measure of central tendency across years. Bailey admits that “...because of the probability that earned income measures are not missing at random, the results relating to income should be interpreted cautiously” (Bailey, 2008, 32). The following analysis builds on the work of this military stratification research by applying some additional rigor in data selection and in operationalizing the dependent variable. This analysis tests the following hypotheses:

1. Enlisting in the military significantly increased son’s permanent income relative to their father’s income, when compared to those who did not enlist in the military.

2. Enlisted sons of fathers in each income quintile experienced greater upward income mobility relative to those who did not enlist.
6.3 Data and Methods

This chapter tests the two aforementioned hypotheses using Panel Study on Income Dynamics (PSID) data. The PSID is a panel study that was initiated in 1968 and continues to the present day. More than 5,000 families and over 18,000 respondents were sampled initially, and these respondents were asked successively about their income, marital status, education, work history, and much more. The PSID is one of the longest running and most extensive panel surveys in the United States.

Only father and son pairs were selected for this analysis. This is partly a limitation imposed by the PSID question wording of the veteran status variable that is collected only on the head of household, which is considered to be the father. However, researchers have found that the difficulty in controlling for heterogeneity in daughters earnings is reason enough to omit them from the analysis of intergenerational mobility (Ganjeboom et al. 1991; Blau and Duncan 1967). Some mobility researchers (Solon 1992; Zimmerman 1992) have found that permanent earnings calculated as an average of yearly earnings reports reduces bias imposed by yearly fluctuations. Accordingly, this analysis averages across years of adult income earnings for sons. Additionally, the PSID collected information in their initial years on sons who lived at home and on their father’s income at the time. This analysis treats father’s permanent income as an average of earnings in the years when sons were still living at home. Father’s and son’s permanent incomes from the PSID are adjusted for inflation using the Consumer Price Index as discussed below.

The subsample used in this analysis for the PSID is comprised of father-son pairs from the 1968-2009 waves. To ensure that this analysis only captures sons who had the opportunity to enlist in the All-Volunteer Force, only sons who were under the age of 13 in 1968 and living at home are included in the analysis. This ensures that all of the children in the PSID who were likely conscripted during Vietnam are excluded from the analysis, since the oldest children in the analysis would have
turned 18 in 1974, the year after the draft ended. Fathers who did not have a son younger than 13 living at home in 1968 are also dropped. Sons who never became head of household or who died before 2009 are dropped from the sample. Fathers who did not have at least three years of income information from 1968-1972 are dropped. Father’s and son’s incomes are adjusted yearly for inflation to 2009 values using the Bureau of Labor Statistics’ (BLS) Consumer Price Index Research Series Using Current Methods (CPI-U-RS) adjustment values. Father’s permanent income was calculated as their average yearly income from 1968-1972. Sons who did not have at least two years of income information from when they left their father’s household until 2009 were dropped. Son’s permanent income was calculated as the average yearly income from when they became head of household until 2009. Only fathers and sons who had a permanent income of greater than $3,000 (in 2009 dollars) were included in the analysis, as it is unlikely that fathers or sons earning less than an average $3,000 had a full-time commitment to the labor force.

Veteran status is calculated by assessing each yearly veteran status response from 1973-2009. The question most often asked of respondents was “Have you ever been in the United States military service?” If a son answered “yes” in at least one year when he was head of household, the respondent was coded as being a veteran. Additional variables that are included in the analysis include race, the highest grade attained, maximum family size, marital status, average weeks unemployed, and average number of hours worked. Race is coded as having three categories: black, white, and other. Marital status is treated as an indicator for whether a respondent ever married from 1968-2009. Weeks unemployed and hours worked last year are averaged across each year where a non-missing value was reported.

The methodology used in this chapter to test the hypotheses follows the approach suggested by Hertz (2004), which combines the strengths of two different methods of intergenerational mobility research: Intergenerational elasticities (IGE) regression
and transition matrices (Hertz, 2004). Intergenerational elasticities are equipped to predict the expected income of a child, given his parental income. IGE models, used by scholars including (Solon, 1992; Zimmerman, 1992), are based on the Galton-Becker-Solon (GBS) regression model:

\[ y_s = \alpha + \beta y_f + \mu_s \quad (6.1) \]

This model predicts logged son’s permanent income \( (y_s) \) with logged father’s permanent income \( (y_f) \). The lower the \( \beta \), the less association between father and son’s income, and the more intergenerational mobility is expected. The higher the \( \beta \), the more father’s income explains son’s income, and the less intergenerational mobility is expected. However, IGE models are unable to speak to the probability of moving into a different income bracket. The transition matrices that follow the IGE models reveal the likelihood of a son making a move from one income bracket to another.

6.4 IGE Results

The descriptive statistics located in Tables 6.1 and 6.2 present summary statistics that are suited to the continuous or nominal type of variables in the analysis. Son’s income ranges from $3,010 (exponentiation of 8.01) to $503,833 (exponentiation of 13.13) in 2009 dollars. Father’s income ranges from $3,081 (exponentiation of 8.033) to $474,492 (exponentiation of 13.07) in 2009 dollars. The nearly normal distribution of logged father and son permanent income is visible in the distributions provided in Figures 6.1 and 6.2.
Figure 6.1. PSID Son’s Logged Permanent Income Histogram
Figure 6.2. PSID Father’s Logged Permanent Income Histogram
TABLE 6.1

DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR CONTINUOUS VARIABLES IN IGE MODELS

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<th>Variable</th>
<th>n</th>
<th>Min</th>
<th>Max</th>
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<th>$\bar{x}$</th>
<th>s</th>
<th>#NA</th>
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</thead>
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<tr>
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<td>1822</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>13.1</td>
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<td>10.4</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Permanent Father’s Income (log)</td>
<td>1822</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>13.1</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>10.4</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Highest Grade Achieved</td>
<td>1822</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>18.0</td>
<td>14.0</td>
<td>14.1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Family Size (Maximum)</td>
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<td>10.0</td>
<td>3.0</td>
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<td>Weeks Unemployed (Average)</td>
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<td>0.0</td>
<td>16.9</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hours Worked (Average)</td>
<td>1822</td>
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<td>86.9</td>
<td>39.1</td>
<td>36.2</td>
<td>12.2</td>
<td>0</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

The descriptive statistics in Table 6.3 show the breakdown in continuous variables by veteran status. The “Levels” indicator in the table indicates veteran status. Rows where “Levels” = 0 show statistics for non-veterans, while “Levels” = 1 show statistics for veterans. Sons who are veterans earn a slightly higher average permanent income of 10.52 logged income ($37,049) compared to 10.34 for non-veterans ($30,946). Veteran sons work more average hours per week, 38.7 hours per week average compared to 35.9 hours per week for non-veterans. Veteran sons also spend more time on average unemployed, at 1.2 weeks per year compared to 1.0 weeks for non-veterans. Veteran sons achieve less education than their non-veteran peers, 13.6 years on average compared to 14.1 years for non-veterans. And veteran sons also have larger families than non-veterans, 3.8 family members compared to 3.4 family members for non-veterans. Descriptive statistics for the nominal variables are shown in Table 6.4. In this table, The “Levels” breakdown in veteran status proceeds horizontally. The column for $n_0$ holds the statistics for non-veterans, while the column for $n_1$ shows statistics for veterans. Greater numbers of black sons are veterans com-
TABLE 6.2

DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR NOMINAL VARIABLES IN IGE MODELS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Levels</th>
<th>n</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>∑ %</th>
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<td>1608</td>
<td>88.2</td>
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<td>1</td>
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<td>11.8</td>
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</tr>
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<td>100.0</td>
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</tr>
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<td>26.5</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>all</td>
<td>1822</td>
<td>100.0</td>
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pared to white sons, from 38.8% to 37.9% for non-veterans. Greater numbers of white sons are non-veterans (60.0%) compared to 59.8% for veterans. Veteran sons also get married in higher numbers than non-veterans, from 71.7% for non-veterans to 86.9% for veterans.

In Table 6.5, a set of nested IGE models test the hypothesis that enlisting in the military significantly increases son’s permanent income, when holding father’s permanent income and demographic controls constant. The nested models begin with a bivariate model that regresses logged father’s permanent income on logged son’s permanent income. This model provides a validity check against similar models found in the literature that assess intergenerational elasticities. Respected studies
find IGE estimates using the PSID of approximately 0.4 (Solon, 1992; Zimmerman, 1992). As Table 6.5 shows, the bivariate Model 1 produces an IGE of 0.39, which very closely approximates the findings by other mobility scholars. An IGE of 0.39 suggests that for each 10% increase in father’s permanent income, we expect that son’s income will increase by 3.9%.

Model 2 of Table 6.5 tests whether, after controlling for father’s permanent income, adding veteran status to the bivariate IGE model significantly increases a son’s permanent income. Including the indicator for veteran status reveals that, without additional control variables, veteran status is a significant predictor of son’s permanent income, controlling for father’s permanent income. Veteran status in Model 2 has a coefficient of 0.26 and a standard error 0.06, which suggests that veterans are likely to earn, on lifetime average, 26% more than non-veterans. Although the coefficient for veteran status is significant, adding it to the model does not significantly increase the explanatory power of the model. An F-test comparing Model 1 to Model 2 gives a test statistic value of 1.01 and a p-value of p = .82. The adjusted $R^2$ in Model 2 is only .01 greater than model 1. The significance of veteran status as a significant predictor of son’s permanent income diminishes as additional demographic and labor force participation control variables are added.

Additional demographic control variables added in Model 3 include race, the highest grade attained, maximum family size, marital status. When these variables are added in Model 3, veteran status remains a statistically significant predictor of son’s permanent income at p < .001. However, the coefficient size drops somewhat, from .26 to .20, suggesting that Model 3 expects veterans to earn 20% more in permanent income when compared to non-veterans, controlling for the other variables in the model. An F test statistic value of 1.20 at p < .001 indicates that adding these additional demographic controls to the model significantly increases the explanatory
power of the model.

Model 4 includes the final two control variables that provide measures for son’s labor force participation. These two variables are average number of weeks spent unemployed and the average number of hours worked across years. Adding these two variables to the model greatly increases the explanatory power of the model. The $R^2$ of the model leaps from 0.28 to 0.61. The F test statistic of 1.85 is significant at $p < 0.001$. Adding hours worked and unemployment to the model more than doubles the amount of variation in son’s permanent income that is explained by this model. The most striking finding in this model is that, after controlling for son’s workforce participation, veteran status is no longer a statistically significant predictor of son’s permanent income at $p < 0.05$.

The other control variables, with the exception of race and weeks unemployed, are significant predictors of a son’s permanent income. After controlling for labor force participation and demographic variables, sons who are black are not significantly more likely to earn more or less than white sons. Each additional year of education increases a son’s income by about 8%, holding the other variables constant. For every additional member in the family, a son’s permanent income is expected to increase by 5%, controlling for the other independent variables in the model. If a son ever married, we expect that son’s income to be approximately 28% higher than sons who did not get married. And as expected, the more hours worked per week on average, the higher their permanent income, controlling for the other variables in Model 3.

The results of the nested models in Table 6.5 demonstrate that with or without additional demographic control variables, veteran status is a statistically significant predictor of son’s permanent income. However, once labor force participation variables that are predictive of a son’s income are also accounted for, veteran status appears to lose its significant effect on a son’s permanent income. According to these models, the effect that veteran status has on permanent income is explained better
by the labor force participation control variables in the model. The picture that
the models and descriptive statistics show is that when veteran status is looked at
in isolation, veterans earn slightly higher amounts of permanent income than non-
veterans. But once additional demographic and labor force participation factors are
accounted for, the effect of veteran status is confounded by those factors. Veterans
work more hours, but they spend more time unemployed, have bigger families to
support, and are doing so on the foundations of less education. The following section
unpacks some alternative explanations for why veteran status might be confounded
by the labor force participation measures.

6.5 Testing Alternative Explanations

The nested models in Table 6.5 test the hypotheses offered earlier in this chapter,
but a number of alternative explanations could account for the findings in Model 4.
The first alternative explanation for why veteran status might not be a significant
predictor of son’s permanent incomes in the full model is that earning the G.I. Bill,
or gaining other educational opportunities provided through military service, could
enable a veteran to achieve higher levels of education than their non-veteran peers. If
the effect of education is contingent on being a veteran, then Model 4 might not pick
up that effect. The second alternative explanation for why veteran status might not
significantly increase a son’s permanent income is, if military service helps veterans
secure more full time work, or to generally work more hours than non-veterans, then
controlling for hours worked might be suppressing the significance of veteran status.
If the effect size of hours worked is contingent on being a veteran, then Model 4
could be mis-specified. Third, if military service provides veterans with a set of skills
that keep them employed at higher rates than non-veterans, then controlling for
unemployment might be capturing the variance that would otherwise be explained
by veteran status.
To test the alternative explanations for a contingent relationship between veteran status and permanent income, Table 6.6 offers tests of interactions between veteran status and educational attainment, hours worked, and weeks unemployed. Model 1 provides the full model, plus an interaction between education and veteran status. The interaction term for “veteran x grade” as well as the main effect for veteran status are not significant predictors of a son’s permanent income. This test fails to support the argument that military service provides an education that puts veterans on a different income slope than non-veterans. Model 2 provides similar results for a test of the interaction between veteran status and unemployment. The interaction term for “veteran x unemployment” and the main effect for veteran status are not significant predictors of a son’s permanent income in Model 2. This model also finds little evidence to support the argument that the military provides veterans with a set of skills that make them harder to lay-off than non-veterans.

Model 3 includes the full model again, but this time, it interacts work hours with veteran status. This interaction tests the notion that military service secures veterans more work hours than non-veterans, and that each additional hour worked on average provides increased income for veterans as compared to non-veterans. This model shows a statistically significant interaction term and main effect for veteran status and hours worked. The main effect for veteran status is positive and significant. However, the direction of the coefficient for the interaction effect is opposite that of the alternative explanation being tested. For the main effect of veteran status that is now significant in Model 3, the interpretation changes from being the amount of additional logged income that veterans are likely to earn when compared to non-veterans (controlling for the other variables in the model), to the amount of logged income that a veteran is predicted to receive compared to a non-veteran if both veterans and non-veterans worked zero hours. Model 3 shows that veterans would earn 50% more than non-veterans if they both worked zero hours.
The explanation becomes more intelligible when the interaction term itself is interpreted. The coefficient for the interaction term is significant and negative, which means that the more hours a veteran works, the less permanent income they are likely to receive, compared to non-veterans. Figure 6.3 shows how predicted son’s permanent income changes depending on the number of hours worked, contingent on veteran status. Looking at the lowest line in the graph, which shows the difference between veterans and non-veterans who work zero hours a month. Veterans receive more money. But looking up across the lines shows that this difference changes from positive to negative, the more hours that a veteran works. A veteran who works around forty hours a week is predicted to earn slightly more than a non-veteran, but veterans who work above 40 hours a week are predicted to earn less than a non-veteran who works more than 40 hours a week. In this model, veterans have an edge in earnings against non-veterans when both groups work 40 hours or less per week.
Figure 6.3. Son’s Permanent Income by Hours Worked and Veteran Status
### TABLE 6.3

**DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS BY VETERAN STATUS FOR CONTINUOUS VARIABLES IN IGE MODELS**

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<th>Variable</th>
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<th>Max</th>
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<th>$\bar{x}$</th>
<th>s</th>
<th>#NA</th>
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### TABLE 6.4

DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS BY VETERAN STATUS FOR NOMINAL VARIABLES IN IGE MODELS

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<th>∑%all</th>
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*** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.02)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Veteran x Weeks Unemployed</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Veteran x Hours Worked (Average Across Years)</td>
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<td>0.62</td>
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<tr>
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***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05
6.6 Transition Probability Matrices Results

Shifting now to the income quintile transition probabilities analysis, such an analysis offers a useful way of looking at the likelihood that a son will move out of the income bracket of his father and into a higher or lower income bracket. This analysis categorizes father’s and son’s permanent incomes into quintiles. Quintiles provide a theoretical way of examining whether sons make a sizable categorical shift in earned income, as well as providing a good balance between the numbers of respondents available and the number of cells needed to hold those respondents. Cells with too few respondents could produce unreliable representations of the population. The probabilities of moving from one quintile to another are represented in 5x5 matrices. A father’s income bracket (i.e., a son’s originating income bracket), are represented as rows in the matrix, while the son’s earned income bracket are represented as columns. For instance, looking at the first row and first column of a transition probability matrix shows the proportion of sons who originate from the lowest income bracket and also end up in the lowest income bracket. Looking at the first row and fourth column of such a matrix shows the proportion of sons who originate from the lowest income bracket but ascend all the way to the fourth highest quintile.

The following analysis offers a set of two transition matrices. One matrix is generated for sons who joined the military, and one for sons who did not become veterans. A third matrix shows the difference between the veteran matrix and non-veteran matrix. Taking the difference between the two transition matrices shows the relative difference in mobility between veterans and non-veterans. Finally, a goodness of fit test is provided that indicates whether a statistically significant difference is present between the veteran and non-veteran transition matrices. Testing for such a difference shows whether across quintiles, veterans are more upwardly mobile than non-veterans.
The first transition probability matrix for non-veterans is shown in Table 6.7. Looking at row 1 and column 1 (i.e., the bottom quintile for father’s income and bottom quintile for son’s income), the matrix shows that .43 or 43% of son’s who begin in the bottom income quintile, thanks to their fathers, also end up in the bottom quintile. Moving one cell to the right, in row 1 and column 2, the value of .28 indicates that 28% of sons that begin the lowest income quintile are able to move to the second quintile. The two highest values are in the lowest quintile pair and highest quintile pair. Non-veteran sons who start in the lowest quintile are most likely to end up there, while sons who start in the highest quintile (row 5, column 5) are also likely to stay there (42%). There is a low probability of moving from the lowest to the highest income quintile (5%), just as there is a low probability of starting off in the highest quintile and ending up in the lowest (6%).

The second transition probability matrix in Table 6.8 shows the transition probabilities for only those sons who are veterans. Unlike the non-veteran matrix, sons who begin in the lowest income quintile do not tend to stay there. Only 6% of sons starting in the lowest income quintile end up staying in that quintile. A few more of those sons starting in the lowest quintile are able to move to the highest quintile.
(12% compared to 5% for non-veterans), while a few less of those sons who start in the highest quintile are able to stay there (35% compared to 42% for non-veterans).

### TABLE 6.8

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<td>0.13</td>
<td>0.39</td>
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The most revealing matrix is located in Table 6.9. This matrix subtracts the non-veteran matrix from the veteran matrix. If a cell contains a negative value, this indicates that there is less mobility into that cell for veterans as compared to non-veterans. Positive values show greater mobility for veterans than non-veterans. Starting with row 1 and column 1, the value of -.37 indicates that there is 37% fewer veteran sons staying in the lowest income quintile for life. Row 1 and column 2 shows that it is 6% more likely for veterans to move into the 2nd quintile than for non-veterans. Looking down column 1, all values are negative, which means that it is less likely that veterans will fall from a higher income bracket to the lowest income bracket. Looking down column 5, values for quintiles 1, 2, and 3 are positive but 4 and 5 are negative. This suggests that it is more likely that veteran sons from
the bottom three quintiles will ascend into the highest income quintile than it is for non-veteran sons. However, it is less likely for veteran sons from the highest two income quintiles to stay or move up to the highest income quintiles than it is for non-veterans.

**TABLE 6.9**

<table>
<thead>
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<td>-0.01</td>
<td>-0.07</td>
<td>0.17</td>
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This analysis takes the comparison of transition matrices one step beyond Hertz (2004) by offering a goodness of fit test against the two independent transition matrices to determine if they differ significantly in transition probabilities. The test statistic is a $\chi^2$ goodness of fit test employing the following equation (Anderson and Goodman, 1957):

$$Q^* = \sum_{i=1}^{N} \frac{(p_{ij} - p_{ij}^0)^2}{p_{ij}^0}$$

(6.2)
The value of this $\chi^2$ test of the two transition matrices is 20.8. The critical value for this test at 16 degrees of freedom and $p < .05$ is 26.3. Thus, the statistical test of differences in transition matrices fails to support the hypothesis that enlisted sons from fathers in each quintile experienced greater upward mobility relative to their fathers when compared to the sons of fathers who did not enlist. At the lowest levels of father’s income, joining the military appears to have an elevating effect on increasing the probability of transitioning to a higher income quintile. Yet taking the full distributions of father’s and son’s incomes into consideration, the process driving intergenerational mobility for veterans is not conclusively different from the process driving mobility for non-veterans.

6.7 Discussion

The preceding analyses test whether enlisting in the AVF significantly increased a son’s permanent income, when holding their father’s permanent income, demographic controls, and labor force participation constant. The results show that when demographic variables are controlled for, veteran status is a significant predictor of son’s permanent income. Once labor force participation is accounted for, veteran’s status loses its significance at predicting son’s permanent income. But when hours worked is interacted with veteran status, the main effect for veteran status becomes significant and positive while the interaction term becomes negative and significant. This suggests that veterans who work 40 hours a week or less are likely to earn more than non-veterans working 40 hours a week or less.

Second, this chapter tests whether enlisted sons beginning in each quintile experienced more upward mobility relative to their fathers when compared to their non-enlisted peers. The transition matrices reveal that veteran sons who begin in the lowest quintile are more likely than non-veteran sons to move out of the lowest permanent income quintile. Veteran sons are also less likely than non-veteran sons to
move downward from their father’s permanent income quintile. The chi-square test of differences between the veteran and non-veteran transition probability matrices fails to provide statistical evidence of a significant difference in the overall distribution of probabilities between the two groups.

Although the findings on their surface may not appear to be entirely consistent, a coherent explanation for these findings appears when the nuances are included. Military service in the AVF era appears to benefit those enlistees who are the worst off. These sons are born into the lowest income quintile. After serving, they often are able to at least move into the second quintile or move even higher. Yet, military service may not ultimately confer the same advantages it provides to those from the lowest quintile to everyone else. On average, veterans achieve less education than non-veterans, even with the selective incentive benefits gained from military service like the G.I. Bill. Additionally, on average, veterans work more hours than non-veterans but also spend more time unemployed. Veterans appear to be able to secure more hours of work, to a positive effect working 40 hours a week or less. Though, the results of the regression models do show that hours worked above 40 result in a lower return to veterans than to non-veterans. While veterans can secure more hours of work, additional hours above 40 per week appear to pay less.

6.7.1 Non-economic Costs of Service

These findings show that military service provides economic benefits for those who are most vulnerable. Unfortunately, these benefits can come at a cost that is not visible when looking only at lifetime earnings. Veterans stand a greater chance of falling victim to a number of social ills when compared to non-veterans. These social ills include an increased risk of homelessness, suicide, PTSD, and injury or death. A study published by Gamache et. al. (2003) found that female veterans were heavily overrepresented among homeless women. This finding held up across age cohorts of
homeless women. Women veterans were between 2 and 4 times more likely to be homeless than non-veteran women, a risk that is substantially higher than for male veterans, whose odds of being homeless are at 1.38 times those of non-veteran males (Gamache et al., 2003). A more recent study on outcomes from military service by Bouffard (2005) found that military service had a increasing effect on future violent behavior by veterans, contingent on the individual-level characteristics of veterans. Those people who served in the military have a higher likelihood of violent offending than non-veteran peers, most specifically, those veterans from disadvantaged groups including Hispanics, the lower-class, and those with a history of offending.

Not only are veterans at higher risk of becoming homeless or violent offenders, but veterans are also at a higher risk of committing suicide. The Department of Veterans Affairs Suicide Data Report, 2012 estimates that the number of veteran suicides per day has increased from 1999 to 2010 from approximately 20 per day to 22 per day (Kemp and Bossarte, 2012). This number is likely to underreport veteran suicide deaths, because estimates are made with only 21 states worth of data and the data that are available are not systematically reported. The Department of Veterans Affairs also estimates that 21% of suicides in the US were veterans in 2010. This finding is striking when compared to the US Census estimate that only 9.1% of Americans over 18 are veterans (Lee and Beckhusen, 2011). Veterans who commit suicide are more likely to have been married at some time and are likely to be older than those non-veterans who commit suicide. However, the Department of Veterans Affairs found no difference in the distributions of suicide for veterans compared to non-veterans by racial category or level of education (Kemp and Bossarte, 2012).

Enlistment comes with long time commitment: an eight-year commitment to military service. Those who enlist at the age of 18 agree to give an additional 45% of the years they have currently been alive to military service. Beyond the time commitment, the job the military is asking service personnel to perform is to support
or actively engage in killing other people. With this job comes the possibility of being wounded or killed, which is a possibility that has recently become much more likely since the US became engaged in two simultaneous wars. Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), the war fought in Afghanistan, had 2,286 military deaths and 19,480 wounded in action as of November 14, 2013. Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) had 4,410 military deaths and 31,941 wounded in action as of November 14, 2013. This amounts to 58,117 deaths or wounded between October 2001 and November of 2013 (Defense Casualty Analysis System, 2013). A study of death and injury rates in the OIF of the first 6.5 years of war provides figures that can be used to calculate the odds of injury or death for soldiers in Iraq (Goldberg, 2010). The total person-years of exposure in Iraq amount to 721,220, the number of total killed in action was 3,001, and the number of total wounded in action was 22,834. Therefore, the odds of being killed in action per-person year in Iraq is approximately 1:240. The odds of being wounded in action per-person year in Iraq is approximately 1:32. These odds show a substantial risk to life or limb for the soldiers deployed to Iraq. However, the breakdown in deaths and wounded in Iraq and Afghanistan by racial category are not substantially different from those in the non-veteran population (Defense Casualty Analysis System, 2013).

Military personnel who go to war are at an increased risk of developing post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). PTSD is an anxiety disorder that develops after a traumatic experience, typically involving the threat of death or actual experience of physical harm. Anxiety, disassociation, and/or flashbacks to the event are common symptoms of those with PTSD, and these symptoms often reoccur more than once per month (K.Wiederhold and Wiederhold, 2005). From 2002 through 2012, the Congressional Research Service reports that 103,792 new cases of PTSD were diagnosed across all branches of military service in veterans who were deployed (Fischer, 2013). Across the same time period, the report reveals a far smaller but still sub-
stantial number of service personnel who were not deployed who were also diagnosed with PTSD: 24,245 to be precise. The results of this analysis, contrasted with non-economic outcomes of military service, show that although economic benefits may be had by enlistees who are most in need of economic relief, enlistees trade those benefits for an increased likelihood of homelessness, violent offending, suicide, being wounded or killed, and developing anxiety disorders.

6.8 Conclusion

The findings in this chapter support the notion that the All-Volunteer Force is performing a social welfare function, which is to provide benefits to people who are unable to assist themselves, otherwise, in some substantial economic way. As Gifford (2006) suggests, state policies that offer considerable benefits only to those who volunteer for military service might lessen the demand for social programs more broadly. When a portion of the needy enlist, they are then covered under the military’s social spending. This provision of social benefits to those who work for them and take the associated risks is a plank in the neoliberal platform. That platform insists that in order for people to get basic economic security, such as housing or food allowances, they need to work for it. When other economic opportunities are in short supply, and when social welfare benefits are taken away, the obvious way to gain economic security is to volunteer for military service. The All-Volunteer Force moves people who have few alternatives into military service, which is not so far removed from the function of conscription, which also moved people with few or no alternatives into military service.

As the preceding analysis shows, IGE models and transition matrices run on data collected by the PSID show some evidence to support the notion that volunteering for military service contributes positively to enlistees’ lifetime earnings. Upon closer inspection, veteran status is related to permanent income after interacting veteran
status with hours worked. The analysis reveals that veterans who work 40 or fewer
hours per week gain some advantage, even though the more a veteran works over
40 hours, the less they appear to make relative to their non-veteran peers. Trans-
ition matrices, when closely inspected, reveal that those veterans from the lowest
income quintile are likely to benefit some from military service. Though, the evidence
does not show much effect for military participation across higher income quintiles.
Earnings are only one measure of how military service shapes a veteran’s life course.
Non-economic outcomes like homelessness, violent offending, suicide, being wounded
or dying in combat, and posttraumatic stress disorder all increase in likelihood for
those who enter military service. Military service appears to provide some economic
relief for those who are worst off, but with that relief comes a set of substantial
short-term and long-term risks.
7.1 Summary and Conclusions

With the transition from conscription to the All-Volunteer Force in the early 1970’s came a decided change in the form of power used to staff the US military. The new voluntary enlistment model relied on generating new motivations to enlist, as coercion was no longer an option. With help from neoliberal economists, top state officials developed a new set of selective incentives and strategically implemented non-coercive mechanisms of power to mobilize volunteers. This dissertation argues that this shift in the state’s strategy to move from coercion to volunteers was not a relinquishment of power to the labor market for compelling recruits. Instead, the new forms of power relied on highly targeted advertising and recruiting campaigns to target structurally and biographically vulnerable people for enlistment. In so doing, the All-Volunteer Force overcame the collective action problem of mobilizing a new military comprised of only volunteers. The All-Volunteer Force moved people who had diminished alternatives into military service, a function which was not dissimilar to the function of conscription, which also compelled people with few or no alternatives into military service. This concluding chapter offers a brief overview of the each chapter and identifies the characteristics of most important groups that were targeted with advertising and recruiting. Finally, since this dissertation has carved out only a small slice of what needs to be explained with respect to how power is used to meet the needs of the military, this chapter concludes with an agenda for future research in this area.
7.2 Chapter Highlights

7.2.1 Chapter 1

Chapter 1 opened by posing the question of how state officials were able to overcome the collective action problem of mobilizing a sufficient number of young volunteers for service in an institution that was under protest. The answer, as the first chapter eluded to, involved the use of the second and third dimensions of power. Power, according to Lukes (1974), can be exercised in three dimensions. The first dimension is the most overt form, where one entity is forced to act contrary to its own interests. The second way power is exercised is that an entity is not even allowed a forum to express its grievances, where barriers are imposed to restrict the opportunities of the less-powerful. The third dimension of power is exercised by affecting the very way another entity conceptualizes its own problems. Gaventa (1982) argues that the study and use of symbols and communication can enable an entity to control how another entity actually conceives of its own problems.

State officials used the second and third dimensions of power to constrain alternatives to enlistment, to reconstruct the popular image of the US military as a provider of life chances, rather than a service institution requiring sacrifice, and to target more structurally and biographically vulnerable young people. New and improved selective incentives were offered for military enlistment and these incentives were aligned with the needs of particular groups of people. The new image of military service was a vehicle for opportunity and advancement. Without relying on any overt form of coercion or power manipulation, military advertising and recruitment persuaded a vulnerable subset of society to think of military service as a provider of economic opportunities and an avenue to success, rather than as an institution that demands sacrifice from its members. Framing military service in these terms, and targeting more vulnerable groups of people with these messages, contributed to the mobiliza-
tion of a critical mass of recruits. In leveraging power in these new ways, state officials did not relinquish power over military recruitment. Rather, they exchanged one form of power for another, by using non-coercive means to compel enlistments instead of threatening young people into service with legal prosecution.

7.2.2 Chapter 2

The second chapter in this dissertation explained how state officials capitalized on a retrenched welfare state to facilitate the voluntary enlistment model. Top ranking state officials, in conjunction with neoliberal theories and economists, shifted the US military to a volunteer model shortly before the welfare state was retrenched. The retrenchment of the welfare state put more people into economically disadvantaged positions. Vulnerable and disadvantaged people were then in a more receptive position to be incentivized by the benefits offered for military enlistment. The volunteer enlistment model offered benefits to enlistees that were being increasingly denied to the American public. Out of this arose a circular process that was capable of moving more disadvantaged people into military service. The weight of military service was shifted onto volunteers, while at same time, young people were incentivized to volunteer with benefits that were better than what disadvantaged people could receive in public entitlements. After moving to the voluntary enlistment model, state officials moved to roll back welfare entitlements that could have otherwise served as a disincentive for people to enlist. These intertwined processes helped to reinforce each other. When combined, they produced a system that made more vulnerable people, and those people could then be more readily incentivized to enlist.

People who needed social benefits like health care, housing, and child care were provided the opportunity to gain all of those by volunteering for military service. Such benefits were not easy to obtain by those in positions of economic disadvantage. State powerholders in multiple presidential administrations adopted and carried forward
the neoliberal position that to get such benefits, people should earn them, by working for them in the labor market or by taking on the risks involved with volunteering for military service. Welfare state benefits including housing, child care, and cash payments for needy families were reduced or even eliminated while incentives for military service encouraged more people from disadvantaged groups to enlist. By exchanging the coercive power of the draft with economic incentives to enlist, and by exchanging welfare entitlements for incentives and opportunities to work, the state gave people more freedom and less social safety net. The result was a system of economic incentives that withheld benefits from people who needed them and encouraged people who needed those benefits to enlist in military service to receive them.

7.2.3 Chapter 3

The third chapter argued that state officials used the third face of power to reconstruct the popular notion of the military as an engine of opportunity. Military recruitment advertising reframed what the military had to offer enlistees, and aligned those frames with the problems of more vulnerable people. This chapter investigated how framing processes were used in military recruitment advertising to target more vulnerable groups. It also examined how frame alignment processes were used to present specific types of selective incentives to different groups of more vulnerable people. The challenge during the All-Volunteer Force era was to develop advertising recruitment campaigns that could effectively target groups that would be receptive to the selective incentives offered in exchange for military enlistment. To do so required developing culturally resonant recruitment frames that were aligned with the identity and interests of those being recruited. This chapter’s qualitative analyses employed content analysis of primary documents of recruiting commercials. The subset of documents used in this analysis included all televised recruitment commercials produced
during the “Army of One” campaign.

The qualitative analysis of recruitment commercials showed how the four frame alignment processes (bridging, amplification, extension, and transformation) were employed in military recruitment advertising to match diagnostic frames with the values of potential military recruits. The analysis found that the primary diagnostic frames in “Army of One” commercials are limited to problems that are more often associated with more vulnerable groups. This finding suggests that these commercials are targeting more vulnerable groups, generally. Groups that are less vulnerable can be pointed at as being largely excluded from the content and targeting of these recruiting commercials. The content analysis of Army of One advertisements takes advantage of this selection effect, where there is only variation in recruitment content within groups that already more vulnerable. This selection effect can help us understand the types of groups being targeted by recruiting commercials.

The bias in the content means that the alignment of selective incentives is a process that targets groups that are already more vulnerable. A second analysis assessed whether different groups of vulnerable people were targeted with the same set of selective incentives, or if different subgroups were approached differently with recruitment advertising. This analysis provided a set of Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) models that predicted different types of race-ethnic categories using selective incentives as predictors. The results of these models found that African Americans were offered job training, Hispanics were offered job training and nonspecific opportunities, and whites were offered jobs in elite units and the opportunity to earn money for college education. The fact that these selective incentives break down along racial lines indicates that certain types of more vulnerable groups were targeted with particular selective incentives that would appeal to those specific groups.
The fourth chapter argues that state officials targeted more structurally vulnerable neighborhoods more often for recruitment office locations. The reason for why more structurally vulnerable people would be targeted rests with the idea that more structurally vulnerable groups have reduced access to information and fewer economic opportunities that could make them less attractive targets for recruitment attempts. Locating recruitment offices in areas with few other economic opportunities capitalizes on the lack of alternatives to enlistment and the structural disadvantage of the local population. This chapter uses a database of all US recruiting offices and American Community Survey (ACS) census tract data to assess whether more structurally vulnerable neighborhoods were targeted more often for a military recruitment office. This chapter finds that more structurally vulnerable neighborhoods are targeted more often. These areas include census tracts with a higher percent of individuals of prime enlistment age (20-24), lower percent of people over the age of 25 with a bachelor’s degree or higher, and a higher unemployment rate. Neighborhoods in the Southern US, conceptualized as areas with greater military tradition and socialization, also receive a disproportionate share of recruitment offices. Surprisingly, the percent black population in a neighborhood reduces the likelihood that a recruitment office will be located in that neighborhood.

Second, this chapter addresses the micro-level question of whether more structurally vulnerable young people have higher reported propensities to enlist. To determine whether more structurally vulnerable young people report higher propensities to enlist, this chapter tested whether individuals who were more structurally vulnerable were more likely to self report that they were likely to enlist. This analysis relied on survey data from the 1991 Youth Attitude Tracking Survey (YATS III). Results show that young people’s reported propensity to enlist is to a fair degree explained by structural vulnerability measures. Young people who are located in the Southern
US or who are black are more likely to report a higher propensity to enlist. Younger adolescents and females are less likely to report higher enlistment propensities. Importantly, the more education a young person’s mother has, the less likely they are to report a high enlistment propensity. And finally, if young people are unemployed and looking for work, they are significantly more likely to report a high enlistment likelihood.

Structurally vulnerable groups have low access to information and few economic opportunities that could compete with the incentives offered for enlisting. Vulnerability increases their candidacy for military recruitment. When economic opportunities or access to information is high, neighborhoods and individuals appear to be less attractive subjects for recruitment targeting. However, areas with few economic opportunities or social welfare options provide more attractive options for recruitment center locations. This chapter finds evidence that the military selects its recruitment office locations non-randomly, and it does so disproportionately in areas with more structurally vulnerable groups. These neighborhoods generally have higher unemployment and fewer people with higher education degrees.

7.2.5 Chapter 5

Chapter 5 argues that biographical vulnerability influences individuals’ decisions to enlist. Where structural vulnerability explains the ways that certain groups are susceptible to recruitment, biographical vulnerability explains the ways that individuals may be susceptible to enlist. Biographical vulnerability is a theoretical way to group explanatory factors of differential participation together to predict enlistment decisions. These factors, with the exception of being targeted by a recruitment attempt, are factors outside the mechanisms of power that are used by state officials to mobilize recruits, and constitute alternative, but complementary, explanations to the state power argument. This chapter examined the extent to which theories of
differential collective action participation also explain military enlistment. Measures of biographical vulnerability reveal the ways that an individual is more or less receptive to and available for recruitment. Theories of differential participation suggest that functions such as biographical availability, stages of participation, recruitment attempts, collective identity, and generalized action preparedness explain differential participation. Chapter 5 used these theories to explain the non-social movement, collective action outcome of military enlistment.

This chapter tests the hypothesis that more biographically vulnerable people are more likely to enlist when compared to less biographically vulnerable people. The analysis uses panel data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979 (NLSY79) data and Generalized Estimating Equations to test the hypothesis. This chapter finds support for the notion that theories of biographical vulnerability can help us understand military enlistment. Evidence suggests that the theories under the umbrella of biographical vulnerability including biographical availability, generalized action preparedness, motivation to participate, contact with recruiters, and collective identity confirmed by influential social referents, can help explain differential enlistment. Whether someone expects to enlist is a highly significant and powerful indicator of whether or not someone actually will enlist. Being the target of a recruitment attempt is also predictive of the final decision to serve or not. Having an influential person in one’s life who would approve of enlistment increases the odds of that person enlisting, and interactions between collective identity and recruitment attempts do appear to significantly explain enlistment decisions. However, biographical availability appears to work differently than expected.

7.2.6 Chapter 6

In Chapter 6, the discussion turns to asking about the outcomes of people who actually enlisted. State officials offered a set of selective incentives in a highly strate-
gic fashion to structurally and biographically vulnerable groups. Did individuals in those groups end up gaining long-term improvements in earnings as a result of enlisting, compared to those who did not enlist? If the military helped people who were disadvantaged by improving their economic situation, compared to their peers who did not enlist, then the military acted as an extension of the welfare state. But if enlistees who were motivated by new selective incentives or strategic targeting were left with no identifiable advantage over their non-enlisted peers, then state officials made false claims of increased opportunity by way of military service. Did the people who enlisted during the All-Volunteer Force era gain improved intergenerational income mobility when compared to their non-enlisted peers?

In this chapter, I ran Intergenerational Elasticities (IGE) regression models and provided Markov Transition Probabilities using Panel Study on Income Dynamics (PSID) data to test whether or not sons experienced improved economic mobility when compared to their fathers, for enlisted compared to non-enlisted people. Findings suggest that enlistment for vulnerable groups actually helped improve the economic advantage of those who were in the worst starting position. Veteran status significantly predicts permanent income after interacting veteran status with the number of hours worked per week. Results show that veterans who work 40 or fewer hours per week gain some economic advantage compared to non-veterans. Although, the more veterans work over 40 hours per week, the less they appear to make relative to non-veterans. Transition matrices show that veterans from the lowest income quintile receive a substantial upward boost from volunteering for military service. However, lifetime earnings are only one measure of how military service contributes to veterans’ long term well-being. Military service comes with a set of non-economic costs. Veterans are at greater risk of becoming homeless, violent offending, committing suicide, being wounded or dying in combat, and experiencing posttraumatic stress disorder. Even though the evidence suggests that military service provides
economic relief for those who are most in need, that relief comes with an additional set of risks.

7.3 Vulnerable Group Conclusions

Broadly speaking, this dissertation finds that particular vulnerable groups were targeted for enlistment and specific strategies were applied for different groups. The evidence suggests that a highly strategic exercise of Lukes’ (1974) and Gaventa’s (1982) third face of power in recruitment campaigns during the AVF. Not only did state officials strategically shift the form of power used to compel people into service, but they intentionally constructed different narratives, framed and aligned different incentive structures, and allocated recruiting resources in such a way as to motivate specific vulnerable groups and people to enlist. One of the most vulnerable groups the state targets specifically is vulnerable blacks. Vulnerable blacks were targeted by tailoring recruitment commercials to offer them job training programs. The results of these efforts are highly productive for obtaining black enlistees. Blacks enlist at a rate that is far higher than their presence in the civilian population.

Vulnerable blacks are not the only group singled out for recruitment targeting. Vulnerable whites are also targeted in a specific way. Special narratives, enlistment frames, and offers of different incentive structures are targeted for vulnerable whites just as they are for vulnerable blacks. Of course, whites make up a majority of the military population, even though they are recruited at lower rates than their presence in the civilian population might predict. Since whites as a racial category are less disadvantaged than blacks on the whole, different methods are used to appeal to this group. For this group, education benefits and the opportunity to be a part of an elite unit are offered most often. The education benefits are likely to appeal more to a group of people that demand more from the selective incentives for enlistment than getting specialized job training.
A final group of people that are strategically targeted for enlistment are those who are unemployed. As the analyses in this dissertation show, recruiting offices are concentrated more often in neighborhoods that have higher unemployment rates. The national unemployment rate is also a fairly good predictor of the number of people applying for military service, at least during peace time. For this group, selective incentives like enlistment bonuses appeal to those who need some immediate economic relief. The military is serving in a welfare-state capacity by giving them the opportunity to enlist and receive social benefits that may not otherwise be available. The intergenerational mobility analysis shows that for those people who are the absolutely the worst off economically, joining the military actually elevates their long-term earning potential compared to their peers. The military offers a paycheck and a steady, reliable income stream, which is something that can greatly assist not only the unemployed who enlist but their families as well. Having a secure steady job, even if it is low paying, and that offers good benefits, is something that is out of reach for many in poverty. Such a job teaches people how to manage their money, gives them the resources they need to buy a vehicle, and puts them in a position when they get out of the service to move forward with a basic set of resources from which to find new opportunities.

7.4 Alternative Explanations

This dissertation explains why young people enlisted in the All-Volunteer Force with mechanisms of state power, as well as hypothesizing and testing non-state power factors including tradition/socialization, social networks, collective identities, and biographical availability. But one alternative explanation for volunteering for military service that has not been addressed is the power that emotion plays in motivating individuals to action. In social movements research, the power of emotion at mobilizing protest is well established. Beyerlein and Sikkink (2008) studied volunteers for 9/11
relief efforts and found that sorrow, which indicated a stronger identification with the victims, was a much more powerful motivator of participation than the emotion of anger. Jasper and Paulsen’s (1995) study of the animal rights movement found that even when social networks are absent, the emotion of moral shock can gain salience when it is condensed, and can serve as a powerful mobilization device. In the case of animal rights protesters, it was often images of brutality that motivated them to join the movement rather than recruitment by family or friends. Nepstad and Smith’s (2001) study found that moral outrage can be a rational and essential motivating factor for mobilizing social movement participants. Emotional reactions are generated out of a context that incorporates identity, structure, and information. The authors found that, in the case of US peace activists, their moral outrage and likelihood to participate in high risk activism could be linked in part to network ties created between churches and refugees. Ties provided the grounding necessary for moral outrage to generate movement participation.

Unlike social movement scholarship, little research in military sociology has explicitly theorized or tested the relationship between emotion and enlistment, but some research addresses attitudes and beliefs that have strong emotional components. Griffith’s (2008) 2002-2006 study of reservists hypothesizes that, “as [war-time] demands on reservists increased, fewer soldiers would join and stay for material benefit and more soldiers would join and stay for obligation and service to others, the military, and the country” (Griffith, 2008, 227). He finds that “service to country” was one of the most-cited reasons for joining; however, this reason fell well-behind education benefits, and was followed closely by money. The feeling of obligation of service to country might be construed as an emotional attachment to country. Other reasons for joining that fell closer to the bottom of the list of reasons for joining including camaraderie, which could be construed as emotional attachment to others, and adventure, which could be the pursuit of a certain kind of emotional experience. Additionally, a
study by Woodruff et al. (2006) finds the following ordering of self-reported reasons to join the military from most frequent to least frequent: adventure/challenge, serve country, money for college, patriotism, desired to be a soldier, entry bonus, lack of better options, support family, best employment available, crisis, and money to repay student loans. This study finds that the most emotional reasons to join the military (adventure and serve country) also are the ones cited most often by enlistees. In both studies, patriotic emotions appear to play a role in enlistment decisions. While this dissertation does not explicitly test the theory that emotion can help explain why people enlist in the All-Volunteer Force, it cannot be discounted without consideration, and should be included in future research in this area.

7.5 Contributions

This dissertation contributes to what we know about social movement theory, state power, military advertising, military recruitment, and the payoffs from military service. Social movement theory can benefit from this study by having a new case, which is not a social movement, that can be explained with social movement theory. Structural theories like bloc recruitment and differential participation theories like stages of participation, recruitment attempts, and collective identity are effective at motivating hypotheses that find some support on a case that is not at all a traditional social movement. This dissertation also demonstrates that military enlistment can be considered a form of collective action. Whereas enlistment could be viewed as a set of isolated events by young individuals acting in their own interests, this study suggests that enlistment should instead be viewed as an outcome of the strategic use of state power to mobilize people to behave in ways that may or may not be in their interests.

We also know from this study that military advertising breaks down along racial and ethnic categories. Each of these groups is strategically targeted with a particular
diagnostic frame and set of selective incentives. Much of the time, blacks and Hispanics are targeted with selective incentives that are training related, while whites are targeted with selective incentives that set them apart from other groups, particularly with respect to education and elite group status.

This dissertation also reveals that military resources are pumped into communities that are suffering economically and that have fewer opportunities for their residents when compared to non-targeted areas. Structural and biographical vulnerabilities are seized on to fulfill the staffing needs of the volunteer military, but the state delivers for those who are the worst off, putting the military in the role of the welfare state. By compelling people with limited alternatives to military participation to enlist, the All-Volunteer Force behaves in ways similar to conscription, albeit without the power of coercion, by moving people with diminished alternatives into military service.

7.6 Future Research

This study of power and mobilization of structurally and biographically vulnerable people motivates a number of additional questions that I would like pursue with future research. First, I am interested in interrogating the inverse of more vulnerability as a motivation for enlistment, which is to explain why people who are not considered vulnerable would choose to enlist. Why do people from wealthy families, or people with no familial military experience, or people who are in their mid-30’s, or people who already have received a paid-for college education decide to enlist? This group is a fraction of all enlistees, but shedding on light on what motivates these individuals could reinforce or help refine why more vulnerable people also choose to enlist.

Second, this dissertation has not discussed the officer corps, but this is an important group who manages the entire enlisted contingent of the Armed Forces. The officer corps is often more privileged than enlistees. Many officers come out of the Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC), and the rest go through Officer Candidate
School (OCS). These people have all spent at least some time in college. Are people motivated to become officers for similar reasons as most enlisted people are, or are officers motivated by different factors, such as the desire to serve their country or for more emotional reasons? How similar or different are these two groups in motivations?

Third, this study focused primarily on the Army when discussing branch-specific phenomena, due principally to the size of the Army relative to the other branches of service. But it is possible that the motivations to join the Army are different in some respects than the motivations to join the Marines, Air Force, Navy, or Coast Guard. It would be interesting and revealing to perform a comparative analysis by branch of service on the motivations for enlistment. The branch of service that an individual is most attracted to may speak volumes about what compels that individual to serve.

Finally, I am interested in how the state is able to overcome obstacles to enlistment other than the collective action problem. Even though it may be rational to enlist for an individual who is offered a sufficient number of selective incentives, there are likely to be a host of other barriers to enlistment that the must be overcome. Some of these barriers might include the presence of social movement organizations that protest recruitment efforts, the presence of a set of new economic opportunities that compete with the military for new recruits (such as accessible civilian job training programs), or the presence of community identities that conflict with the values of military participation. I hope to investigate these questions and others that are motivated by this dissertation.
APPENDIX A

QCA METHODS

Ragin (2008) explains that quantitative methods rely on a set of assumptions that limit a researcher’s ability to make sense of cases [Ragin, 2008]. The first assumption is that quantitative analysis is strictly reliant on cases that were selected before analysis. Cases selected for analysis in a quantitative study are often identified using a probability-based sample of a larger population, which enables the making of inferences from the sampled cases to the larger population. Ragin suggests that having to fix the number of cases prior to analysis overlooks the theoretical nature of populations. Some populations used by researchers, such as the non-institutionalized adult population of the United States, are conventionally defined and require little theoretical justification, but most other populations are theoretically defined (e.g., race riots, bureaucracies, etc.), and require substantive and theoretical justification.

When defining a population theoretically, a researcher assumes that cases are relatively homogeneous across a theoretical category. Actual heterogeneity among cases, especially large-N studies where cases are not always considered individually, can be incorrectly assumed to be random error, when in fact, the heterogeneity is real diversity among cases. Instead of treating the heterogeneous cases as separate populations, the random error is incorrectly captured in the regression model error term. [Ragin 2008, 50]. In quantitative analysis and in GLM more specifically, once the population is defined, no adjustments can be made or findings from different analyses using the same sample of the population are rendered incomparable and meaningless. In qualitative analysis, if during the analysis certain cases are found to be constitutive
of a different population, those cases can be excluded for theoretical reasons without jeopardizing the validity of earlier findings.

Quantitative methods that use the Generalized Linear Model (GLM) are also limited in the respect that their capacity for discovery is constrained to explaining average effects of variables rather than understanding particular cases. In quantitative analysis, “the cases become more or less invisible, and the variables take center stage” (Ragin, 2008, 31). Ignoring cases in favor of a variable-centered analysis, GLM focuses on isolating the average net effects (i.e., beta coefficients) specific to particular variables when holding all the other variables in the model constant. GLM’s variable-centric orientation even potentially mistreats variables according to Ragin (2008). Numeric variables in GLM are not theoretically calibrated. Rather, they are mathematically transformed into normal-looking distributions and included in the regression model. Such a practice does not account for different interpretations of a particular value of a variable, and it also cannot identify unimportant differences between values. GLM handles variation between values as random error, when in fact, the cases and their respective configurations of causes might need to be considered separately. Ragin suggests that qualitative research needs to incorporate the full context of cases in the analysis, a suggestion that can be achieved only by examining the configurations of attributes for a case all at once, instead of isolating them individually as GLM does (Ragin, 2008).

GLM is limited by the linear and additive way that causality is assumed to operate, an assumption which is violated by the complexity of most causal processes. More commonly than a single additive and linear pathway to an outcome, different pathways often lead to the same outcome. By understanding causality in a linear and additive fashion, GLM identifies the effect of a particular variable on an outcome after all the other effects in the model are added together and controlled for. GLM assumes a consistent or average effect of a measured value across cases on an
outcome, while there may actually be important differences among cases that only in certain combinations affect the outcome. Ragin argues that causal modeling needs to not just average the effect of a variable across all cases, but rather, it must explain different configurations of attributes across cases that result in the same outcome. Combinations of attributes can reveal necessary and/or sufficient conditions for a particular condition, even if different sets of attributes combine to cause that same condition (Ragin 2008).

According to Ragin, QCA outperforms GLM in four important ways. First, where GLM uses correlations to identify causal relationships, QCA uses set-theoretic relations. A quantitative correlation is a statistical association between two variables, often measured with the Pearson product-moment correlation coefficient that describes the strength and direction of the linear relationship between two continuous variables (Knoke et al. 2002). In contrast, qualitative set-theoretic relations involve the relations of subsets with outcomes (Ragin 2008). Second, whereas GLM uses measured variables, QCA uses calibrated sets. Measured variables in quantitative GLM, if continuous in type, have a determinant and consistent distance between each interval. “Continuous variables, can, at least in theory, take on all possible numerical values in a given interval” (Knoke et al., 2002, 19). In contrast, QCA has crisp sets where qualitative set membership is either 1 if the case is a member or 0 if the case is a nonmember. Third, whereas GLM analyzes independent variables, QCA analyzes configurations of causes. An independent variable in a quantitative analysis is a predictor of an outcome or dependent variable (Knoke et al., 2002). Independent variables are generally included in sets in regression models and are analyzed and interpreted as separate predictors of a dependent variable. In contrast, QCA assumes that causes of a particular outcome occur in configurations, and they are analyzed as having causal influence in conjunction with the presence or absence of other causes. Treating causal attributes and conditions in configurations rather than as individual
variables ensures that the full context and heterogeneity of the causes of a particular outcome are retained and analyzed (Ragin, 2008).

Finally, whereas GLM explains additive net effects, QCA explains causal complexity. Additive net effects, or the beta coefficients in a conventional GLM linear regression model, presume a certain type of causality. That type of causality is additive, meaning that causality is simplified to the amount of variation that a set of independent variables added together can explain in an outcome variable. QCA, in contrast, seeks to identify configurations of causes that are either necessary or sufficient conditions for a particular outcome. A necessary cause is identified when a cause is present in all cases where the outcome of interest is present (the outcome is a theoretical subset of the cause), and the outcome does not occur when the cause is absent (Ragin, 2008).
APPENDIX B

MISSING DATA PATTERNS IN NLSY79 AND YATSIII

TABLE B.1

MISSING DATA PATTERN IN NLSY79

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