THE ETHICS OF WAR AND PEACE:
COMPETING TRADITIONS

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Controversies on how best to deal with other groups of people, especially aggressive ones, have surely been with us nearly as long as people have been forming groups, and modern advances, both political and technological, have only complicated these matters. That moral agents must give some thought to our moral responsibility in this arena is a given, but what form such reasoning will take is not. Over time, a number of traditions regarding war have emerged, ranging from categorical rejection (pacifism) to a limited acceptance (just war tradition) to an enthusiastic acceptance (crusading tradition); others ultimately reject the notion that war is subject to moral strictures at all (realism).

As a first step to evaluating these views, I will work to more precisely define each, especially the two most popularly espoused (pacifism and just war theory), by way of a survey of their histories and scope. Building on this groundwork, I will then show how all four traditions relate to one another, by situating them along a continuum, arguing in particular that just war theory and pacifism have far more in common than
most realize. In the course of laying out this continuum, I will also show that the only coherent way to characterize these traditions is with reference to non-consequentialist moral reasoning.

I will then argue that pacifism and just war tradition, given their underlying principles, are morally preferable to the alternatives, and more specifically, that a strong form of pacifism (that takes active responsibility for nonviolently combating injustice), and a strict form of just war (that is willing forego war when it is unjust), are morally superior to other forms. Of the two, I will ultimately make the case for the former, while nonetheless showing why a dualist approach that accepts both is most appropriate for this moral domain.
For Melqui, Oliver, and Ivan
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CHAPTER 1

WAR OR PEACE – THE QUESTION

War is a constant, both historically, as a state of human relations, and here and now, in that we can scarcely avoid hearing about conflicts around the world on a daily basis. Wars themselves, as well as their individual facets, are framed by most in terms of good or evil, as moral matters: the use of child soldiers is wrong, an ongoing genocide should be stopped by arms if necessary, and so on. This framing is done by those who think of themselves, and their listeners, as moral agents. However, for most, the matter seems strictly, or at least primarily, theoretical: we are not soldiers, nor are we in a position to direct war. We think of ourselves as onlookers of conflicts in other parts of the world, responsible at most for the votes we cast for those who do make the decisions, and perhaps for staying informed and informing others of states of affairs to be concerned about.

The judgments we make are more significant than we think, however, for we are more than just onlookers. The actions we consciously take with regard to war are of greater consequence than we often suppose, and actions not regarded as relevant to the issue we may discover to be, as we deepen our understanding of the issues at hand. This universal moral engagement is due at least in part to the form of modern society:

The development in modern times of an organized bureaucratic state, ultimately answerable to an electorate of all competent adults, has brought the conduct of
war and the aim of limiting or abolishing war within the boundaries of possibility and, therefore, within the domain of active moral concern.¹

This point is made with reference to Christians, but there is no reason to suppose it does not apply to all moral agents. It is particularly relevant for those who are members of a powerful group (e.g., the United States), and/or the sort of group that all too easily slips into a mode of seeing itself as exclusively correct in its understanding of the world - the latter “is a short step removed from rationalising violence as itself a sacred act”² - (e.g., religions and ideologues of whatever stripe). Even the powerless should take care with regard to their moral positions; how much more cautious should those of us with power be, as we make judgments regarding matters of life and death, and take action on the basis of those judgments.

Even those who regard the matter as theoretical make moral judgments and thereby stake out positions, whether as pacifists or proponents of just war (or something else); we use these as viewpoints from which to critique conflicts around the world, even if there does not seem much call to act in these matters ourselves. What is more, we see ourselves as staking out these views collectively: we are part of the group of pacifists, or of just-warists, or of some other philosophical bent. In reality, however, the differences within each group is almost as great (and sometimes greater) than the differences between them; there are reasons it can be helpful to reduce the profusion of views to only a few large groups, but doing so can also help to disguise the genuine disagreements that fellow members within any one category may have, both in position held and in reasons


for holding it. Once we recognize our heightened responsibility to choose a position consciously and correctly, identifying and acknowledging (if not resolving) these disagreements becomes a matter of special import. We cannot understand these variations until we understand the broad categories, however: overgeneralization can be a hindrance to understanding an issue, but some generalization is necessary, if only to provide some initial traction in our quest for any confidence as to which views are more morally viable and why. Accordingly, we will be considering four different approaches (broadly speaking) to the question of the ethics of war: The just war tradition (JWT), pacifism, realism, and the crusade tradition (CT). The two most commonly-espoused of these are pacifism and JWT; each encompasses a wide range of views, but can – as an initial generality – be described respectively as the view that the violence of war is always immoral, and the view that the violence of war, while undesirable in itself, is sometimes morally acceptable in order to prevent some worse injustice. Both views have in common the belief that the force used in war as at least *prima facie* wrong; the other two take at least this form of violence to be amoral or even morally desirable. The first of these, realism, denies that there are ethics of war at all (while not (usually) at the same time refuting the possibility or even necessity of ethics at the individual level); the realist is usually defined simply as one “who says it is wrong or impossible to think morally about war” or international relations at all. The fourth view, that of the crusader, views

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3 I have taken some liberties in designating this last category; crusading does not have as clearly established a tradition as the other approaches to war and peace, but as I will demonstrate, it is a position worth considering in its own right, especially as it compares to its alternatives.

the violence of war neither as evil (necessary or otherwise) nor as morally neutral, but as potentially a positive thing, if done for the right cause and in the right way.

My primary focus here will be on the relationship between JWT and pacifism, the highest-profile of these alternatives, situating them relative to their alternatives, both in terms of definition and moral status. JWT and pacifism are often perceived as being polar extremes – pro-war vs. anti-war, but as most proponents of either are quick to point out, this is far from accurate. For example, John Howard Yoder, a prominent pacifist, states that “most of the time these positions will agree over against the others. In the face of most real moral choices, whether the ideological ‘wars of liberation’ or the world-threatening nuclear exchange, the two views, if held with integrity, would have the same impact.”

Duane Cady proposes a continuum as an organizing principle in order to make a very similar argument; he situates absolute pacifism at one endpoint and realism at the other, arranging increasingly less strict forms of pacifism, and then strict-ranging to less-strict forms of JWT, between the two (with some overlap in the middle, where strict JWT and looser varieties of pacifism shade into one another).

Simply put, the continuum moves from <war with no limits> at one extreme to <no war at all> at the other, with an array of forms of limits in the both the <war with limits> and <violence (but no war) with limits> center. We will spend the most time on pacifism and JWT, in all their permutations and motivations, but consideration of the other two views is important if for no other reason than that, as outliers, they help us to place the more popular views in

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context; examining the alternatives will also help us to construct a clearer form of taxonomy by illustrating the strengths and weaknesses of the concept of the continuum.

One potential weakness, for example, is that the crusade tradition (CT) has no obvious place on the spectrum. Cady does not attempt to fit CT into the spectrum of views at all, though he mentions crusading in the afterword, fitting it into the context of church history: “From the early church to the middle ages, Christian values on war had moved from extreme pacifism and non-participation through reluctant participation in just war to the eager and hearty participation in the crusades.”

Roland Bainton characterizes the crusade in this way: “it was fought not so much with God’s help as on God’s behalf, not for a human goal which God might bless but for a divine cause which God might command.”

Yoder also defines CT in terms of religion (those who hold this view believe “that with divine backing a war can be ‘holy’”), but goes on to characterize as “holy” war any war fought for some ideological cause (be it Marxism or “the defense of the free world”), where there is a “right” side to be on, regardless of the cost, and an “unchallengeable justification for anything that a government (or a rebel) claims a mandate to do.” Such a view thus does not fit neatly onto Cady’s continuum as it stands: it is not a form of JWT, even at its weakest, as the two hold very distinct (and often mutually exclusive) views on how and when to go to war; that it is nowhere on the pacifist continuum goes without saying, but neither is it really related to realism, as CT

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7 Cady, 132.
9 Yoder, *When War Is Unjust*, 1.
10 Yoder, *When War Is Unjust*, 27.
does ascribe morality to war. The most obvious solution is to extend it beyond realism (a solution suggested by Cady’s chronological description), but this solution raises other questions; we will return to this issue as we seek to define CT more clearly, with an eye to establishing its relationship to the other forms of war/peace ethics, in chapter 4.

One of the difficulties with placing CT on the continuum is that the view seems likely to overlap JWT in some significant ways, without “going through” realism to get there. This suggests another potential weakness with the continuum, the issue of overlap. On the one hand, any realistic account of applied ethics must take nuances into account – seldom is any range of ethical positions comprised of discrete, completely differentiated views, and this is at least as true for war/peace issues as it is anywhere else, given the sheer number of variations on the theme. Recognizing and acknowledging this fact is essential. On the other hand, if we are to make any headway in evaluating the various claims, or even to apply labels in any meaningful way, there must be some distinguishing lines somewhere – of course, a man is free to call himself anything he likes, but the label has meaning only if there is some bright line beyond which one cannot truly be said to belong to a particular group or hold a particular position. As things currently stand, there are just war theorists who are considerably more committed to peace than some nominal pacifists, just as there are nominal just war theorists who are not actually prepared to sacrifice anything in the service of the standards of just war (to say “the standards are great, but we’ll break them if we have to” is in no real way a just warist position). A part of my project here is to take a closer look at the variety of views Cady places along the continuum, in order to attempt to make a determination as to what it takes to be a “real” pacifist or just war theorist, and what sorts of positions are really in name only.
Even realism, presented for the most part as a singular point on the continuum, has more nuance, a spectrum of its own. Cady uses it to mark the endpoint, the point where JWT loses cohesion, where all semblance of ethical war-making, even lip service to rules, is lost, because of course, for a realist, there are no rules for war. In chapter 4, I will argue that this singular definition is not quite accurate; there are reasons even a realist leader could have, I would argue, for adhering to some rules in warfare, not out of some objective obligation toward those with whom he is fighting, but because of his obligation for the well-being of his own citizens. There are ways of fighting wars that leave a country vulnerable to sanctions (formal or informal) during the war, after the war, or even in future wars, and it seems that at least some forms of realism would take this into account. Other forms of realism might be less inclined to take those into account, instead following, for example, a “war is hell” philosophy that calls for the most extreme actions possible necessary in order to end war quickly. In addition to distinguishing the various forms of realism, we must examine the relation of the endpoints of this realism continuum to its neighboring continuum of JWT (and possibly CT), as well as the definitional question of whether one of these is more authentically realist than the other, and whether this is itself a position of equal legitimacy to JWT or pacifism.

In the chapters that follow, I will present an argument for the necessity of taking a stand that is more rigorous than not – that is, stricter forms of both JWT and pacifism seem to me to be both the most “real” of the forms, as well as the most morally correct. In order to formulate as precise a definition as possible for each of the positions in question, I will examine a selection of the broad variety of views under the headings of pacifism and JWT, explaining what they are, and drawing conclusions for each as to their
moral underpinnings, before attempting on those grounds to make a generalization in each case as to the essence shared by those variations at the heart of the view. As a further means of clarifying and comparing the alternatives, I will also be making the case for a re-conceptualization and expansion of Cady’s continuum. I will conclude by comparing what I take to be the most viable and authentic forms of the two central views in order to show that in many ways, pacifism and JWT are indistinguishable, but that insofar they differ, pacifism is the superior alternative. However, the form of pacifism that I think is best of all appeals to a dualist conception of ethics, making room for a (fairly strict) form of JWT as valid as well. I will account for my claim that pacifism is nonetheless preferable by arguing that it benefits the agent in ways that other approaches cannot. In the process, I will show why CT is a morally unacceptable position, and why realism, though in some ways more viable, is nonetheless insufficiently morally rigorous.

Despite the fact that my project itself consists in seeking precision with regard to issues of war and peace, the fact remains that ethics is famously an imprecise field, as Aristotle observes as he begins the *Nichomachean Ethics*. Thus, I wish to acknowledge from the outset the scope I have set for myself. For example, in order to clarify both the distinctions and commonalities among the various war-peace traditions, I will try to show which moral theory seems to be the primary motivation of each variation, as well as, ultimately, which moral code(s) underlie each of the broader forms. In doing so, I will be taking the liberty of reducing the great multiplicity of moral theory into somewhat broad strokes (eliminating some entirely): specifically, I will be identifying elements of consequentialism (primarily Utilitarianism), deontology (primarily Kantianism and divine
command theory\textsuperscript{11}, and virtue theory (primarily Aristotelianism). There are obviously other forms of moral theory, as well as finer gradations within the ones I will be using, but I believe that the more generalized approach can still yield useful information that will help in the refining of the views.

I must also be somewhat selective about the versions of each view that I choose to cover. I will be dealing primarily with western sources, though I will provide at least some representation of the many forms of eastern thought that address these issues. I will also be dealing primarily with religious views, though again I wish to do justice at least to some degree to more secular arguments for both pacifism and just war; despite philosophical similarities between the two approaches, I think this is a more substantial difference than that between east and west, and this distinction – particular religiously-based beliefs about justice and the soul, and the ways in which these might lead one to a different conclusion about war than someone operating from a different set of convictions – will play a role in my overall argument.

We will begin with fairly detailed accounts of JWT and pacifism before moving to briefer examinations of realism and CT, as well as an attempt to expand and clarify the concept of a continuum in a way that takes all views, in the way that I characterize them, into account. I will then attempt to make my argument for a dual-ethic position in which a fairly strict form of pacifism takes the privileged position over a strict form of JWT. We move, then, to a look at the Just War Tradition – its history, its variations and proponents, and its philosophical grounding.

\textsuperscript{11} The most obvious omission here is Natural Law Theory; NLT has clear connections to JWT in particular, but I have chosen Kantian ethics and Divine Command Theory as the two versions of deontological theory that I will deal with as underlying various elements in JWT and Pacifism.
CHAPTER 2

JUST WAR TRADITION

Although associated by many with its most prominent formulators, St. Thomas Aquinas and St. Augustine, and accordingly viewed as a religious position, the Just War Tradition (or Just War Theory) has its origins in pre-Christian antiquity, and continues to be developed today in secular forms. Furthermore, not all who adhere to or support its general ethical principles have religious reasons for doing so – in fact, some such adherents do not recognize themselves to be just-warists at all. Some may not consider themselves to hold any position on the matter, and others may consider themselves to be pacifists. Nonetheless, while the various forms of JWT may differ regarding which set of standards to hold and how strictly to hold them, the general ethical position remains the same: while war itself is an evil\textsuperscript{12}, it may or even ought to be engaged or participated in, within certain limits, when doing so is necessary to prevent a greater evil.

Determinations as to when such a state of affairs obtains, and what means are permissible to rectifying it, may vary, but the underlying principles are generally the same, and have for the most part maintained an impressive continuity over centuries or even millennia.

\textsuperscript{12} It is worth noting that while the general idea – that war is something best avoided – is not often challenged, notable theologians such as Francisco Suarez do argue explicitly that war is \textit{not} in itself evil. “Our first conclusion is that war, absolutely speaking, is not intrinsically evil, nor is it forbidden to Christians. This conclusion is a matter of faith and is laid down in the Scriptures, for in the Old Testament, wars waged by most holy men are praised (XIII.1.2)…even when war is aggressive, it is not an evil in itself, but may be right and necessary” (XIII.1.5) (from \textit{De Triplici Virtute Theologica, Fide, Spe, et Charitate}, translated by Gladys L. Williams (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1944). It should be noted that ascribing no intrinsic value (or even positive value) to war is more characteristic of Realism or CT.
Although just-war reasoning has been defended on numerous grounds and by
thinkers from a great variety of backgrounds, Christians – both Catholic and Protestant –
comprise one major group that almost universally subscribes to this view. As John
Howard Yoder points out, the “so-called just-war tradition” has been “the officially
dominant view of Christian writers since the early middle ages”:

…this teaching appears in encyclopedias and manuals as the view that most
Christians are supposed to hold. It is formally affirmed as binding confessional
definition in the official documents of Lutherans (Augsburg Confession, 1530),
Anglicans (Thirty-Nine Articles, 1571), and Presbyterians and Congregationalists
(Westminster Confession, 1648). It is affirmed as standard by thinkers in
denominations that have no creeds (e.g., Baptists).13

Consequently, the theological perspective provides a reasonable starting point for our
examination of the form and foundation of the just-war position. Beginning with
Aquinas, we will look both backwards and forwards, examining the roots of JWT as well
as its eventual development and codification, as it continues to be reexamined and refined
even today.

I. Just War: The Bare Bones

Although not the first in the Church to address the matter, St. Thomas Aquinas
develops an especially clear and enumerated early formulation for JWT in his discourse
“On War.”14 Here, Aquinas tells us that “In order for a war to be just, three things are
necessary. First, the authority of the sovereign by whose command the war is to be

13 Yoder, When War Is Unjust, 1. There are notable exceptions, of course, as both pacifism and to
an even greater extent, a crusading mentality, have deep roots in the church as well.

14 Summa Theologiae II-II 40. Note: All references herein to St. Thomas Aquinas’ Summa
Theologiae will be by traditional abbreviation (e.g., ST II-II.40.1 ad 3 would denote Aquinas’ response to
the third objection of the first article of the fortieth question in the second part of the second part of the
Summa). The translation is by Fathers of the English Dominican Province (London: Burns Oates &
Washbourne Ltd., 1929).
waged… Secondly, a just cause is required, namely that those who are attacked, should be attacked because they deserve it on account of some fault… Thirdly, it is necessary that the belligerents should have a rightful intention, so that they intend the advancement of good, or the avoidance of evil."15 In the same question, Aquinas addresses who may fight (neither clerics nor bishops), how they may fight (laying ambushes is acceptable) and when they may fight (even on holy days, if necessary).

These two sets of conditions demarcate the two types of considerations that arise when considering the justice of a given war: *jus ad bellum*, the justice of the war itself, of going to war in a given circumstance, and *jus in bello*, justice in war, the considerations of how to justly fight a war. The first three standards listed – legitimate authority, just cause, and rightful intention – are three key considerations of *jus ad bellum*. Aquinas tells us that only certain persons or groups are in a position to make the decision to go to war (specifically, those to whom “the care of the common weal is committed”16; being responsible for the care of those under them, those with legitimate authority have both the obligation and the proper perspective to decide when the community requires protection from internal or external threats)17, and then only for certain reasons (to avenge wrongs or to restore what was seized unjustly18, or to defend against an unprovoked attack), if

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15 *ST* II-II.40.1.

16 *ST* II-II.40.1.

17 There is an interesting corollary here: Augustine, at least, held that this requirement of authority applied to all levels of violence, which meant that “The private citizen may not defend himself because he cannot do so without passion, self-assertion, and a loss of love” – it is more moral to allow oneself to die than kill to defend oneself without proper authority (Bainton, *Christian Attitudes Toward War and Peace*, 97-98, citing Augustine). This view is something of an anomaly, in that most other JW thinkers hold killing in self-defense to be legitimate, subject to certain restraints; indeed, even many pacifists hold that this is the case, with Yoder’s overall argument on the dissimilarities between war and self-defense in *What Would You Do?* representing the clearest case for at least the potential legitimacy of this form of violence.

18 “*ST* II-II.40.1; here Aquinas is quoting St. Augustine.
properly motivated (by love and the desire for peace, rather than by base motives such as vengeance or greed).

Although these three conditions are the only three listed by Aquinas in his answer to the question of “whether it is always sinful to wage war,” further amplification of the tradition has yielded further *jus ad bellum* principles. In his review of the history of *JWT*, *When War Is Unjust: Being Honest in Just-War Thinking*, John Howard Yoder lists two additional *jus ad bellum* standards that are relevant in deciding whether going to war (however just the cause, intention, and authority) is the appropriate step to take: the war must be the last resort, with all other non-violent (e.g., diplomatic) options being exhausted, and success must be probable, so that the evils of war itself are not compounded with the evils attendant upon a loss to one’s unjust opponent (when the “good guys” lose, the original injustice occurs anyway, but is now accompanied by all the death and destruction that comes with war, in addition to other subtler problems (e.g., continuing effects on the morale of the defeated, an emboldened or angered enemy, etc.)). Proportionality is another consideration that is often included as both a *jus ad bellum* and a *jus in bello* condition; whether the war is likely to be “proportional” must be considered just as thoroughly before going to war at all, as it is when plans for specific actions during the prosecution of a war are being weighed. In the *jus ad bellum* context,

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19 *When War Is Unjust*, 2. Yoder notes that the list he gives is only a very general one; he finds that no source is currently regarded as being authoritative: “Years ago I randomly surveyed twenty-five lists offered by authors, each of whom assumed that he was describing the general consensus. Yet the lists differed significantly as to how the criteria were stated, how many there were, what exceptions and conditions they were qualified by, and what to do if they were not met. …It is noteworthy that, in contrast with matters the churches are very concerned about teaching correctly, there is no standard statement of just-war criteria by any ecclesiastical authority” (footnote 2, page 2). This list is essentially the same as that given in *The Challenge of Peace: God’s Promise and Our Response* (U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops: 1983), which adds only the standard of “comparative justice.” This criterion represents a genuinely new addition to the list, and as such, is addressed later in this chapter.
the “total scope” of the war is at issue: “If the price of the war is too high in terms of total costs to the people in whose name it is fought – the costs of total dislocation and suffering as well as in economic and human sacrifice – then the war cannot be justified morally.”

The remaining three articles that Aquinas includes under the rubric “Of War” deal with more specific rulings as to the conduct of war – *jus in bello* principles. They are rather more particular than those typically listed in modern lists of just-war principles, presumably because Aquinas was addressing concerns of those in the church, technical questions such as the permissibility of clergy fighting and of fighting on holy days (not permissible and permissible, respectively). Aquinas addresses these questions elsewhere as well, especially the issue of religious leaders taking a life, and his reasoning is instructive: in “On Murder,” he tells us that

> It is unlawful for clerics to kill, for two reasons. First, because they are chosen for the ministry of the altar…[and] ministers should imitate their master [viz., Christ, “Who, when He was struck did not strike” (I Peter 2:23)]… The other reason is because clerics are entrusted with the ministry of the New Law, wherein no punishment of death or of bodily maiming is appointed: wherefore they should abstain from such things in order that they may be fitting ministers of the New Testament.

In “On War,” he also speaks of following Christ’s example: “Wherefore it is unbecoming for them to slay or shed blood; and it is more fitting that they should be ready to shed their own blood for Christ, so as to imitate in deed what they portray in their own

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20 Cady, 27.

21 *Jus in bello* principles typically include (perhaps among others) the requirements that means used in fighting must be indispensable, discriminating, and proportional. These requirements will be discussed at greater length later in the chapter.

22 *ST* II-II.64.4.
ministry.\textsuperscript{23} This rule (not to kill even in the prosecution of a just war) applies only to clerics, however; this is because their essential pursuits, viz., contemplating and praising God, and praying for the people, will be hindered by participation in warlike pursuits, which are better left to those suited for them (as are commercial enterprises, for the same reason). Each person ought to serve God by doing what he is most suited for, and clerics are both better suited for divine service than military service, and unable to do both (properly) at once. Aquinas reminds us, however (and this is one of the things that distinguishes the just-war tradition from that of pacifism), that taking up arms is not a sin – clerics are merely forbidden from doing so “because such an occupation is unbecoming their personality”; an express part of a religious leader’s duty, however, is to “dispose and counsel other men to engage in just wars.”\textsuperscript{24} War, within proper limits, remains a moral pursuit for the layman, but clerics, though obligated to a certain level of involvement, are morally prohibited from killing.

However, although who may fight is parsed exclusively on grounds of official church position, when to fight is a different matter. Fighting on holy days, while to be avoided where possible, is not forbidden in those cases where it is to the detriment of the common good to refrain from fighting. Scripture tells us that even Christ worked (by healing) on the Sabbath, but this was permissible because “those things which are ordained to man’s safety” take precedence – and even more so, then, those things which protect the community in general (“whereby many are saved from being slain, and innumerable evils both temporal and spiritual prevented”).\textsuperscript{25} Like the proscription of

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{23} ST II-II.40.2.
\textsuperscript{24} ST II-II-40.2.
\textsuperscript{25} ST II-II.40.4.
\end{footnotesize}
clergy serving in the military, this principle seems to be based on fairly practical principles – who is best suited for a job ought to do it, and what serves the community best is what ought to be done.\textsuperscript{26}

Neither of these makes much reference to “the enemy,” however. Aquinas’s consideration of the lawfulness of ambushes shows most clearly his reasoning on treatment of the opponent (and also shows how directly even \textit{jus in bello} principles rely on the standard of rightful intention). In the third article of the question “On War,” we are told – in similarly practical terms – that while we may not break our promises, even those made to our enemies, we are not obligated to always declare our intentions to him. Accordingly, while rights of war must be observed, concealing one’s plans and strategies from the enemy is not only not forbidden as deceptive, but even advised as prudent: “…even in the Sacred Doctrine many things have to be concealed, especially from unbelievers, lest they deride it… Wherefore much more ought the plan of campaign to be hidden from the enemy.”\textsuperscript{27} Again, within certain limits (and this is a critical qualification for the just-war tradition), those fighting on the side of justice are allowed – even required – to do what best serves their cause.

The limits in fighting a just war are formulated much more generally in contemporary accounts, but the justification for these standards usually remains true to the spirit of Aquinas’s teachings. Yoder boils the variety of modern formulations down to three general \textit{jus in bello} principles: the means must be indispensable, the means must

\textsuperscript{26} Evidently, the need for clerics to retain their purity either trumps community need, \textit{or} the good of the community is always better served by having a properly-constituted religious leader (or perhaps it is just a practical judgment: perhaps no situation can be envisioned where the cleric, by taking up arms, is alone a determining factor in the community’s safety – either the fight is winnable without him, or unwinnable (and thus not properly fought) even with his help).

\textsuperscript{27} \textit{ST} II-II.40.3.
be discriminating (between combatants and non-combatants), and the means must respect the provisions of international law and treaties.\textsuperscript{28} Cady lists only two, adding to discrimination, proportionality.

The indispensability standard is hinted at in Aquinas’s treatment of the ambush issue: those things that are necessary to defeat the enemy are permitted, and given the \textit{jus ad bellum} requirement of loving intention, it would seem that the converse would apply as well – \textit{only} what is necessary for defeating the enemy is permitted. The concept of international law is quite different now than it would have been in Aquinas’s time (if it could be said to have existed then at all), but here too we find a common underlying principle: all should fight by the same rules. Aquinas explicitly states this as a (sub)condition, quoting Ambrose, as part of his response in the question of ambushes: “No one ought to deceive the enemy in this way [viz., by telling a falsehood or breaking a promise], for there are certain \textit{rights of war and covenants, which ought to be observed even among enemies}, as Ambrose states (\textit{De Offic.} i).”\textsuperscript{29}

The conditions of proportionality and discrimination spring from Aquinas as well, in his elucidation of what has come to be called the Principle (or Doctrine) of Double Effect (hereafter PDE). In the question “Of Murder,” specifically, “Whether it is lawful to kill a man in self-defense?,” Aquinas tells us that “Nothing hinders one act from having two effects, only one of which is intended, while the other is beside the intention. Now, moral acts take their species according to what is intended, and not according to what is beside the intention.”\textsuperscript{30} He goes on to describe the moral difference between

\textsuperscript{28} Yoder, \textit{When War Is Unjust}, 2.

\textsuperscript{29} \textit{ST} II-II.40.3.

\textsuperscript{30} \textit{ST} II-II.64.7.
intending to kill someone and killing someone only with the intention of saving one’s own life, a distinction that clearly extends to the field of war. The formal conditions of PDE are typically listed as follows:

1. The evil which happens must be less than the evil which is prevented.
2. The evil which happens must not be the direct cause of the good results.
3. The evil which happens must not be willed or intended.
4. The act itself may not be intrinsically wrong.

Clearly, intent is a critical consideration within war, not merely as a *jus ad bellum* principle that applies to the leader(s) deciding whether to go to war; in the context of *jus in bello*, however, right intention is judged by and subsumed under the application of the *jus in bello* standards. That is, whether a soldier of any rank is doing something morally right or wrong will depend at least in part on what his intention in acting is: is an individual soldier or a commander concerned to aid his ruler/country to do no more than is necessary to help reach the goal of restoring peace? If so, then his acts or the acts he commands must be both proportionate and discriminating. One could not claim that the intentional killing (see (3) above) of a non-combatant – someone who poses no threat – is necessary for saving one’s own life or furthering one’s own cause; in fact, the killing of innocents is almost always detrimental to the cause of peace (1), in addition to being unjust on its face (4). And not only must the soldier discriminate between combatants and non-combatants (this includes civilians, but also combatants who have surrendered or who are wounded), he must also avoid killing even active combatants whenever possible – any deaths he causes must be proportionate to the good to be gained by that killing (1). For killing is always an evil, (arguably) morally excusable only when necessary to prevent a greater evil, and the grounds for such a moral exception are set by the limits of proportionality and discrimination.
Yoder’s remaining standard, the requirement that actions taken in war conform to international law, is least clearly seen in Aquinas’s answers to the questions on war and murder. The most obvious link can be seen when he parses our responsibility to be truthful with the enemy, an issue we have already reviewed. Here he tells us that we need not declare all of our intentions in order to be considered truthful, but he precedes this with the reminder that we must not break our promises, even those made to our enemies. If some convention has been explicitly agreed to, then, we are obligated to conform to it, and this is at least an antecedent of the principle that Yoder proposes.

From Aquinas’s account of a just war (including as elaborated by later thinkers), then, we can derive a working list of just-war standards, six of which are *jus ad bellum* considerations (which delineate when going to war is morally acceptable), and four of which deal with *jus in bello* (how a war, once justly declared, may be fought).

*Jus ad bellum:*

1. Legitimate authority
2. Just cause
3. Rightful intention
4. Last resort
5. Probable success
6. Proportionality

*Jus in bello:*

7. Indispensable means
8. Discriminating means
9. Conformity to international law
10. Proportional means

As already noted, this list cannot be other than an approximation, as there is no absolute consensus on the standards of Just War Theory. Nonetheless, this is a reasonable starting point, as it seems to comprise the major components that have played a part in this line of thought throughout history. Let us now turn to pre-Thomistic tradition, to look for the roots of these standards.

II. Before Aquinas: Classical and Pre-Thomist Just War Traditions

Aquinas’s work was explicitly built on that of his predecessor, St. Augustine, whom he references often in his answers. Augustine’s views on war are thus in many ways similar to those of Aquinas, with regard to both the particular principles and the general perspective that underlies them, although Augustine’s views are not as concentrated as those of Aquinas. Augustine, like Aquinas, regarded fighting just wars as not merely permissible, but obligatory. It is our obligation to correct injustice that brings this regrettable duty upon us: “For it is the injustice of the opposing side that lays on the wise man the duty of waging wars; and this injustice is assuredly to be deplored by a human being, since it is the injustice of human beings.” Rulers are thus bound to go to war only for just cause – specifically, to vindicate justice. Proper authority is crucial;

31 For example, the following material – gathered and summarized by Roland H. Bainton – is taken from such diverse writings as Sermo Dom., Retract., De Vivitate Dei, In Joan. Ep., De Libero Arbitrio, and Quaest Hept., as well as from such secondary sources as Gustave Combes’ La charite d’apres Saint Augustin (c. 1934) and P. Gerosa’s “S. Agostino e l’imperialismo Romano,” Miscellanea Agostiniana II (Rome, 1931).


33 Bainton, Christian Attitudes Toward War and Peace, 96. Bainton point out that Augustine is somewhat vague on this point; on his view, an attack on the existence of the state may be just cause for war, though not always, while other potentially just causes may include “failure to make amends and refusal to grant passage.”
decisions with regard to declaring war are the sole prerogative of the ruler, while to the soldier and/or citizen remain only the duty to follow commands. As would Aquinas, Augustine regarded rightful intention as a key component to a just war: peace, he argued, is the “instinctive aim of all creatures,” and any fighting must be engaged in for the purpose of achieving greater peace; indeed, “it is an established fact that peace is the desired end of war.” Furthermore, the intent must be loving, a requirement that may sound at odds with an enterprise involving the killing of one’s enemies, but which Augustine reconciled by distinguishing between inward dispositions and outward actions: “Love does not preclude a benevolent severity, nor that correction which compassion itself dictates. No one indeed is fit to inflict punishment save the one who has first overcome hate in his heart. The love of enemies admits of no dispensation, but love does not exclude wars of mercy waged by the good.” There is a desired outcome for war (viz., justice for all involved), but the overriding consideration is how that end is reached; the end does not justify the means.

Like Aquinas, Augustine does not explicitly refer to the other three jus ad bellum standards we have listed (last resort, probable success, and proportionality). The first two

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34 Bainton, *Christian Attitudes Toward War and Peace*, 97.

35 Augustine, *City of God*, Bk. XIX, ch. 12. Note that Augustine regards this as descriptive rather than prescriptive. Augustine argues that “all men desire to be at peace with their own people, while wishing to impose their will upon those people’s lives. For even when they wage war on others, their wish is to make those opponents their own people, if they can – to subject them, and to impose on them their own conditions of peace”; the desire of any who disturbs the peace is “not that there should not be peace but that it should be the kind of peace they wish for.” The potential for people to seek peace in the wrong ways would make meeting the other standards all the more imperative.

36 Epist., 138, ii, 14.

37 Sermo Dom., I, xx, 63 and 70. Migne, *PL*, XXXVII, 1654.

38 Epist., 138, ii, 15. (Preceding quote compiled by Bainton, *Christian Attitudes Toward War and Peace*, 97.)
may perhaps be inferred from his discussion of the nature of human beings as desirous of peace: he tells us that “even when men wish a present state of peace to be disturbed they do so not because they hate peace, but because they desire the present peace to be exchanged for one that suits their wishes. Thus their desire is not that there should not be peace but that it should be the kind of peace they wish for.”39 While it is true that men can be – and often are – in error with regard to the nature of true peace and/or how to achieve it, if Augustine is right, they will go to war only if they feel there is no other way to achieve what they take to be peace. The trick is in judging whether one’s feelings or perceptions are correct, but Augustine believes that peace is in fact desired by all, by our natures. Given this, a good leader will naturally do what is in his power to accomplish peace without war (fulfilling the condition of last resort) and will avoid war where it is likely to result only in a more extreme departure from peace (fulfilling the condition of probable success as well as (at least with regard to one’s, or one’s own community’s, interests) proportionality). The fact that wars are often engaged in before all alternatives have been tried, and/or without the probability of success, may say more about our rational and perceptual shortcomings than it does about the principles we are trying to follow.

In addition to these jus ad bellum considerations (implicit or explicit), Augustine speaks to principles for just conduct in war. These draw on classical sources, for the most part, including such restrictions as that faith must be kept with one’s opponent; that no looting, massacre, or profanation is permitted; and that atrocities and reprisals must be

39 Augustine, City of God, Bk. XIX, ch. 12.
excluded. He notes with qualified approval the “great Roman, Marcus Marcellus,” who was said to have wept over the imminent downfall of his enemy, and to have “issued an edict that no violence should be done to the person of any free citizen.” Likewise, Fabius refrained from plundering religious images, and even the sack of Rome was conducted with some measure of civility when “the largest basilicas were selected and set aside to be filled with people to be spared by the enemy.” These (implied) rules seem to be matters of principle rather than of practical import; it is true that an offended or outraged enemy may be more difficult to deal with, even in defeat, than one who has been respected, but this is not always the case (sometimes outrages are done in a fashion calculated to demoralize and weaken an enemy) – what Augustine seems to have admired in these cases is the respect shown for fellow human beings (and the things they value) by the conqueror. Again, it is the act and the principle behind it that bears the moral weight, rather than simply the consequences. At any rate, links to at least some (and arguably, all) of the four *jus in bello* standards are clear: the principle of discrimination is explicitly praised, and the requirement that one keep faith with one’s opponent is arguably connected to respect for international law. We might infer from the requirement of loving intention that proportionality, and possibly even the indispensability of means, would be required as well, but these conditions do not seem to be addressed by Augustine, even indirectly.

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40 Bainton, *Christian Attitudes Toward War and Peace*, 97.
Augustine draws his *jus in bello* examples from a history that provides much other material for classical just-war tradition as well. The principle of discrimination, for example, is recorded as early as Plato: “And as Greeks, they won’t ravage Greece either, or burn homes, or conclude that the whole population of a given community – men, women, and children – is hostile to them, but only those few hostile people who were responsible for the dissension.” Plato’s reasoning for this and other standards (e.g., prohibitions against enslavement and defiling the dead) seems to be two-fold: as a practical consideration, avoiding serious mistreatment of one’s opponents (whether current or defeated) seems one of the best guarantees of one’s own future well-being, as well as a means of maintaining one’s own fighting force at peak efficiency; more idealistic concerns seem to be relevant as well, such as living up to a proper conception of oneself as rational (and masculine) or part of a larger (in this case, Greek)

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44 Plato, *The Republic*, translated by Robin Waterfield (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), 471a. As this quote indicates, Plato believed that different standards apply to war, depending on one’s opponent: the standards he lists apply explicitly or at least primarily only to Greeks fighting other Greeks. And according to Plato, such conflicts are not technically “war”: “When Greeks and non-Greeks fight, then, we’ll describe this as warfare, and claim that they are natural enemies and that the term ‘war’ should refer to this type of hostility. But when Greeks get involved in this type of thing with other Greeks, we’ll claim that they are natural friends, and that in a situation like this Greece is diseased and in conflict, and we’ll maintain that the term ‘conflict’ should refer to this type of hostility” (470c).

45 “…we won’t be taking arms and armour to our temples as trophies either, especially if they came from Greeks, if we’re the slightest bit interested in being on good terms with other Greeks. We’re more likely to be afraid of the possible pollution involved in robbing our kin of their weapons and taking them to a sacred site…” (470a).

46 “And what about the victors despoiling the dead? …I mean, doesn’t it provide an excuse for cowards not to advance against an enemy who is still fighting, because they can make out they’re doing their duty by poking around among the corpses? This sort of looting has often in the past been the ruin of armies” (469b)

47 “And treating the body of a dead person as an enemy, when the hostile element has flown off and only the instrument it once used for fighting remains, seems to indicate a womanly, petty mind” (469d-e)
community.48 We see represented here, then, all three of the major moral considerations in play: the practical consideration of what produces the best consequences (consequentialism), the sense of one’s duty or obligation to one’s community and oneself (deontology), and a keen sense of the best way to be in a war – how to be a good, compassionate, patriotic person, i.e., considerations of virtue theory.

The principle of non-combatant immunity was a feature of the Roman just-war tradition as well, and for many of the same reasons. Drawing a distinction between combatants and non-combatants was seen as critical, sometimes for practical purposes: “Cicero, like Plato, distinguished between the guilty and the innocent among the enemy, but he did not specify that noncombatants were to be spared. His greatest concern was with the treatment of the vanquished, because only a liberal peace was a sound basis for the building of an empire.”49 Such reasoning seems to call for discrimination for purely consequentialist purposes (albeit with the high-quality consequence of “liberal peace”). On the whole, however,

In war and peace the conduct of rulers and peoples should be guided by the principle of humanitas. …The concept was based upon that which is congruous with the nature of man, himself a being endowed with excellence and dignity inspiring reverence. … In his dealings with others he should exhibit benevolence, magnanimity, and mercy.50

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48 “I maintain that Greeks are bonded to one another by internal ties of blood and kinship, but interact with non-Greeks as people who are foreign and live outside their domain …imagine a community divided against itself …if each side devastates the other’s side’s land and burns their homes, conflict comes across as an abomination and neither side can be regarded as patriotic, since if they were, they would stop short of ravaging their nurse and their mother. …its members will be good, compassionate people …[who] feel warmth for their fellow Greeks” (470c-e). Plato also rejects enslavement of fellow Greeks on these grounds: “Shouldn’t [Greeks] do their best to prevent any other community from enslaving Greeks and make it the norm to spare anyone of Greek stock, for fear of themselves being enslaved by non-Greeks? …That should encourage them to concentrate on non-Greeks and leave one another alone” (469c).

49 Bainton, Christian Attitudes Toward War and Peace, 41-42.

50 Bainton, Christian Attitudes Toward War and Peace, 42.
Here, the Roman conception of those to whom respect is due seems to be more inclusive than those of Plato or Aristotle, both of whom draw the line between those who are by their nature deserving of humane treatment and those who by their nature are not,\textsuperscript{51} but the general principle of treatment in war, and its ethical foundations (for the relevant subject(s)), seems remarkably consistent. Something like the “international law” standard seems to have been taken into account by the Roman war ethic as well, in that certain formalities were required: “In all dealings with the enemy the code required that good faith be observed and every oath fulfilled, whether sworn by the citizen or by the state” – a college of priests, the Fetiales, were involved in a war’s initiation, as well as presiding over truces and treaties.\textsuperscript{52}

Proportionality and indispensability of means do not receive as much emphasis in Roman thought, although under the general principle of \textit{humanitas}, with its requirements of benevolence and mercy, these remaining standards seem to have been at least implicitly followed or at least admired. A classical example is that of Pompey, who settled pirates on islands where they could not harm others, rather than crucifying them – surely a case of doing what is necessary to prevent injustice, while inflicting the most minimal damage possible even on evildoers (i.e., avoiding the means of war and death where such means \textit{were} dispensable).

\textsuperscript{51} Aristotle, for example, says that war is “naturally just” when it is against “those human beings who are unwilling to be ruled, but naturally suited for it” (\textit{Politics}, translated by C.D.C. Reeve (Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Co., 1998), 1256b25). This is not to imply that thinkers after Aristotle were always more enlightened – similar reasoning is often employed within the Crusading Tradition, and was explicitly used by Church theologians such as Sepulveda to justify mistreatment of natives in the New World (Bainton, \textit{Christian Attitudes Toward War and Peace}, 166).

\textsuperscript{52} Bainton, \textit{Christian Attitudes Toward War and Peace}, 41. The classical example is that of Regulus, a Roman citizen released by Carthage, who returned as he had promised, to die of torture.
Precursors for *jus ad bellum* principles in antiquity can also be found. As Aquinas’s requirement for just cause is drawn directly from Augustine’s before him\(^{53}\), so can Augustine’s be traced to that of Plato, who argues that the goal of war must be to restore justice, typically interpreted as “rectification of injury to life and goods.”\(^{54}\) Aristotle obliquely defines what constitutes just cause for war as well: “Training in war should not be undertaken for the sake of reducing those who do not deserve it to slavery, but, first, to avoid becoming enslaved to others; second, to pursue a position of leadership in order to benefit the ruled, not to be masters of all of them; and, third, to be masters of those who deserve to be slaves.”\(^{55}\) The overriding concerns seem to be a sort of justice (albeit not as inclusively or objectively as the condition is ordinarily defined today) and benevolence – as with Plato, the primary goal is to avoid prevent or remedy harm to persons (at least, to citizens).

Both Plato and Aristotle recognize intention as morally significant, presumably at least as much in the martial arena as anywhere else. Plato seems to endorse something like the “right intention” standard: “…they won’t be motivated by hatred, but by wanting to bring their opponents to their senses. As disciplinarians, then, rather than enemies, they won’t punish their opponents with enslavement or death.”\(^{56}\) Love as a motivation (the theological requirement) is not explicitly mentioned, but hatred is certainly excluded.

\(^{53}\) “Wherefore Augustine says (Q X., super Jos.): *A just war is wont to be described as one that avenges wrongs, when a nation or state has to be punished, for refusing to make amends for the wrongs inflicted by its subjects, or to restore what it has seized unjustly*” (*ST* II-II.40)).

\(^{54}\) Bainton, *Christian Attitudes Toward War and Peace*, 41.

\(^{55}\) Aristotle, *Politics*, 1333b40. This standard is implicitly stated elsewhere as well, as all discussion of the military of the ideal state relates to defense of itself (1326b40-27a5, 27a20) and even possibly its neighbors (1327a42).

\(^{56}\) Plato, *Republic*, 471a.
And for Aristotle, of course, a proper state of mind is key to any agent’s act’s acting virtuously. 57 Aristotle tells us that bravery – the proper attitude toward the fear of death – is a true virtue only (or at least for the most part) with regard to war, since war is the “greatest and finest danger,”58 and the only proper motivation for facing death is the desire to “[choose and stand] firm because that is fine or because anything else is shameful” (dying to avoid pain is the act of a coward).59 And what is fine can in turn surely be tied to Aristotle’s conception of justice (“distributing good things and bad, both between himself and others and between others”60), wherein he states that “if someone illegally and willingly inflicts harm on another, not returning harm for harm, he does injustice”61 and furthermore, that “doing injustice is [morally] worse [than suffering it].”62 Aristotle’s ethical position is arguably consistent with a rightful intention standard: one should not die (or kill!) – or order such acts - except with the desire to do what is fine, which by definition cannot consist in intentionally doing harm where one has not oneself already been harmed – one must intend only to rectify previously-existing injustice.

Unlike cause and intention, the requirement for legitimate authority for just war is not often made explicit in classical literature, but clearly plays some role in consideration

57 His discussion of the virtues in the Nichomachean Ethics is concerned with the acts of the individual citizen (in any position), not with those of a ruler in particular, but his description of bravery seems relevant nonetheless, since the attitude required of the soldier must surely be all the more required of the ruler.


59 Aristotle, NE, 1116a13.

60 Aristotle, NE 1334a3.

61 Aristotle, NE 1138a7.

62 Aristotle, NE 1138a33.
of the morality of war. It was an issue for the Romans: Cicero tells us that to be just, “a war must be conducted by the state” (thus excluding the possibility of revolution against the state), and that one state “should not make war upon another without a formal declaration of hostilities.”63 Given the emphasis that Plato and Aristotle place on the nature and power of a community’s ruler (e.g., Plato’s philosopher-king), such a standard would likely have been acceptable or even desirable – perhaps, given a concept of justice in which each member of society sticks to his assigned role, such a condition would have seemed redundant (who else but a ruler could possibly declare a war?). Still, the criterion is far from prominent, and the remaining three principles are even less significant within the classical tradition, if they are present at all.

Many of the generally-accepted standards – especially those requiring just cause and discriminating means – for a just war have been present in philosophy and theology for centuries or more. Others are not so prominent, emerging only in the most nebulous forms if at all. Over time, however, these standards have cohered, and from the time of Aquinas onward, most of the items on modern lists have been present, remaining only to be fine-tuned.

III. After Aquinas: Later Christian and Secular Developments

According to Yoder, historical developments such as the Protestant Reformation and the Enlightenment have had a cumulatively weakening effect on the JWT. The power of the tradition at its height, he argues, was in its context, since its standards can most practically be adhered to only within a limited subset of political and historical

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63 In Bainton, Christian Attitudes Toward War and Peace, 41.
conditions, that held between most rivals in the case of both the medieval Italian and the ancient Greek city-states: viz., relative equality, sense of kinship, common language, and common culture – all qualities required for there to be any reasonable chance at a common consensus (among those in positions to consider the morality of war: the prince/king and the knights who fought) and a meaningful analysis of the facts of the potential war to be engaged in. In later wars between more diverse adversaries, meeting such requirements became less and less feasible. Augustine himself also acknowledges these practical limits: “For when men cannot communicate their thoughts to each other, simply because of difference of language, all the similarity of their common human nature is of no avail to unite them in fellowship.”

This sense of commonality does seem to be key to the likelihood of anyone’s being committed at least an initial development of something like a just war tradition: as Plato so clearly describes, the perception that the opponent is merely estranged kin will significantly limit the damage that is done during and after any conflict, and it is

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64 Yoder, *When War Is Unjust*, chapter 3. Yoder gives a complex analysis of shifting political realities: for example, JWT was at its most powerful when societies were ruled by princes (usually as a matter of inheritance), wars were fought by knights, and common citizens or subjects were expected to “renounce bloodshed and to accept suffering as part of the Christian way” (10). The Church’s role with regard to war was a limiting one: Bishops were actively involved in mediation, and the Church stressed limits on fighting (with regard to times, places, and persons). The onset of the Protestant Reformation changed the nature of citizenship, and the relationship between state and church: whereas once those who fought were the minority, state’s violence became the norm (21); the church became dependent upon the state, where it had previously enjoyed authoritative independence, so that clergy would be more unlikely to speak out against a ruler’s actions, however unjust (20). Furthermore, the religious strife of the time made religion itself a common cause for war. During the Enlightenment period the distance between church and state increased, and obligations between states shrank as obligations of ruler to citizens grew (24). The onset of “total war,” typified by the French Revolution and Napoleonic wars, brought about further changes in the nature of citizenship – discrimination in particular becomes less and less feasible as a standard when the line between combatant and non-combatant goes from being very clearly delineated (as in medieval times) to non-existent (when “every citizen is a partisan and there is no room for neutrality” (24)), a problem that has only heightened in our own age of guerilla warfare.

65 Bainton, *Christian Attitudes Toward War and Peace*, 33-34.

66 Augustine, *City of God*, Bk. XIX, ch. 7.
undeniable that a lack of shared language or culture will impede any attempts to correct an injustice without resorting to war, or indeed, any attempts to reach a consensus on whether an injustice has been committed at all – one culture’s justice may be another’s injustice.67 Relative equality is also likely to affect whether a nation or state thinks that JWT is a concern at all: after all, the lion does not arbitrate with the lamb. A theory of just war is only likely to arise in certain circumstances, then, viz., when those with whom one is in conflict are similar to oneself in power and circumstance.

That JWT was likely to originate only in such rarified circumstances seems irrelevant to its continued applicability, however. After all, ethicists and theologians have continued to insist on the importance of a war’s being just, long after the original context ceased to hold. Have they done this by working to continually re-tailor the theory to fit our changing times, or has the effort instead been put toward arguing that changing times do not change the underlying moral requirements? Or is it that, as Yoder argues, both have been tried but neither have been entirely successful?

When taken cumulatively, [historical changes] have hollowed out the tradition to little more than a shell. The words are still there, but the realities to which they apply escape almost entirely the discipline that used to be, if not effective, at least reasonably thinkable. The shell has been retained, while what goes on beneath is quite different from what the theologians who initially found the just-war tradition convincing could ever have meant or would ever have approved.68

Clearly, theologians like Hugo Grotius and Francesco Vittoria, as well as contemporary philosophers like Michael Walzer and Paul Ramsey, would disagree with this assessment, at least in part – it may be true that fewer people actually adhere to JWT requirements

67 Though this likely applies to all wars and conflicts – both sides surely do believe themselves in the right, if only because (as Aristotle believed) some see themselves as rightful conquerors of others who naturally need to be ruled over.

68 Yoder, When War Is Unjust, 30.
than claim to, but inattention to standards (and/or the progress of history) does not in itself entail their irrelevance.

Supposing that JW remains feasible as a standard, then – what modifications or elaborations (if any) should made to accommodate the changing times? Or (a better place to begin), which have in fact been made? There have been few true modifications – some archaic details have been dropped, and changes have been made to reflect increasing globalization (formalizing an “international law” condition, for example), but even these are primarily elaborations on pre-existing principles.

The most significant of truly new additions is that of “comparative justice,” which is first mentioned in *The Challenge of Peace*\(^\text{69}\) as one of seven *jus ad bellum* criteria. The change in thinking that this standard represents can be seen most clearly if we compare it to the expectation (by Augustine and those follow him, including Aquinas) that “justice should lie on one side only.”\(^\text{70}\) That is, a just war was originally conceived as one that had a clearly unjust aggressor and a clearly innocent defender – only in such a clear-cut case did the *jus ad bellum* requirement for just cause seem possible to meet. The modern addition acknowledges that such conditions might not always obtain: a nation or leader might have a duty to respond to aggression even if partially responsible for it in the first place, so long as the injustice on the part of the aggressor is still greater than that of the defender; furthermore, (ideally speaking) this condition instructs us that in most situations, “since each side thinks its cause is just, each is obligated to grant the other side’s possible good faith and to respect all the other rules, *even though* the adversary is


\(^{70}\) Bainton, *Christian Attitudes Toward War and Peace*, 98, citing Augustine.
very evil.”71 Even traditional thought held that means must always be limited to causing
the least amount of damage necessary, however evil an opponent might be; the new
criteria is designed to remind us that the opponent is usually not absolutely evil in the
first place.

Yoder notes, however, that this concept can be (and has been) applied in quite
different ways. The original intent of the author who added the term, Bryan Hehir, was
“to recognize the fact that both sides may think they have a just cause, and the obligation
to respect the entire set of just-war criteria should not depend on all the wrong being on
one side.”72 Ideally, the “comparative justice” modification can be thought of as
demanding that one be aware of “the imperfections in one’s own society, [making] it
more difficult to meet the criteria of cause or authority,”73 strengthening JW standards
and rendering war less likely. On the other hand, as Yoder notes, this standard is often
applied in a way that “tends to undercut concrete discrimination, as long as our cause is
(in our minds) ‘relatively’ better than the enemy’s,”74 creating a much looser version of
JWT and a greater likelihood for war.

Although the ethical underpinnings of this principle are not made explicit, it – like
most other JW conditions – is clearly not a consequentialist consideration, if for no other
reason than that it is linked tightly to concepts that have only secondary importance for

71 Yoder, When War Is Unjust, 90.
72 Yoder, When War Is Unjust, 154.
73 Yoder, When War Is Unjust, 153.
74 Yoder, When War Is Unjust, 154.
consequentialism, viz., intention and motivation (cause).\textsuperscript{75} The requirement to minimize damage wherever possible has a utilitarian ring to it, but the demand for respect for others, for the weighing of such abstract concepts as comparative justice, and the layering of these over the goal of preserving the lives of innocents, seem to demand a different foundation for this standard, beyond mere weighing of pains and pleasures.

A more openly utilitarian condition – or more properly, an exception to the traditional conditions – has been proposed by some authors, particularly Michael Walzer in his \textit{Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations},\textsuperscript{76} in what he calls the “Supreme Emergency” exception to the Indispensability criterion. The original standard, one that falls under \textit{jus in bello}, tells us that “unnecessary combat is to be avoided even in a just cause,” and that “during combat no unnecessary death or wanton destruction may be inflicted.”\textsuperscript{77} The traditional interpretation of this criterion is that it is bound by the other conditions – the means used must be indispensable within the context of right intention (which includes desire for future peace, motivation of love rather than hate, etc.), discrimination (non-combatant immunity), proportionality (the good to be accomplished must not be outweighed by the evil done), and so on. Some, however, argue that necessity should be seen as an exception: as Walzer puts it, “there is a fear beyond the ordinary fearfulness (and the frantic opportunism) of war, and a danger to which that fear corresponds, and…this fear and danger may well require exactly those

\textsuperscript{75} Yoder lists this standard as a subheading under “right intention”; \textit{Challenge} includes it as a separate standard in its own right, but here it actually seems like an elaboration on the standard of “just cause,” with a (stated) emphasis on linking that concept to the importance of \textit{jus in bello} standards.


\textsuperscript{77} Yoder, \textit{When War Is Unjust}, 156.
measures that the war convention bars.” 78 Such an extreme danger may constitute a “Supreme Emergency.” Walzer states that two key criteria must be met before such a justificatory emergency can be declared: the danger must be imminent, and it must be extreme in nature, “of an unusual and horrifying kind,” a threat to human values of an encompassing variety. He cites Nazism as an archetypal evil:

it is possible to live in a world where individuals are sometimes murdered, but a world where entire peoples are enslaved or massacred is literally unbearable. For the survival and freedom of political communities…are the highest values of international society. 79

If a danger is so extreme and far-reaching, and if the threat is imminent, such that no other more proportional and discriminating means remains available to counter it, then the situation is one of Supreme Emergency, and any means necessary may be used to eliminate the threat. Thus, the standard of necessity may be expanded, and given precedence over the requirements of proportionality and discrimination.

The ethical grounding for this criterion in relation to the others is complex. Walzer himself describes it as utilitarian: “Utilitarian calculation can force us to violate the rules of war only when we are face-to-face not merely with defeat but with a defeat likely to bring disaster to a political community.” 80 He is explicit that the rules of war are not in themselves utilitarian, however; exceptions to the rules can be made only to prevent the ultimate triumph of such dreadful evils, not just where such exceptions could conceivably shorten a war, or limit casualties: “Confronted by [human rights], we are not to calculate consequences, or figure relative risks, or compute probable casualties, but

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78 Walzer, 251.

79 Walzer, 254.

80 Walzer, 268.
simply to stop short and turn aside.”81 Still, exceptions can and presumably should be made in at least some cases.

Offsetting this call for loosening of JW standards in one department (indispensability), Walzer calls for the strengthening of the standards in another area (discrimination).82 More specifically, he makes an argument that the “good intention” criterion of the Principle of Double Effect does not go far enough. Soldiers must not merely avoid intending the deaths of civilians, he says; they must go further, making a positive commitment to saving civilian lives, up to and including at the risk of their own lives. Innocent bystanders deserve more than merely having their deaths be proportional to good of the militarily necessary goal at hand; the deaths of enemy soldiers must be proportional, but “civilians have a right to something more,” something more rigorous. Some (additional) risk to the justly-fighting soldier must be accepted in order to spare civilians – just how much risk is hard to specify, Walzer admits, before concluding that “It is best…to say simply that civilians have a right that ‘due care’ be taken.”83 Justice demands a negative-form intention (not to intend harm) but also, in the case of non-combatants, a positive one as well, the intention to actively prevent harm, even at personal risk.84 The anti-utilitarian reasoning cited in the previous paragraph seems to directly underlie this stringent call.

81 Walzer, 268.
82 At least in cases where a Supreme Emergency does not obtain.
83 Walzer, 156.
84 Onora O’Neill describes Kantian duties as similarly taking either a positive or negative form, with duties of justice telling us what we are forbidden from doing (viz., using others merely as means), and duties of beneficence telling us what we must at least sometimes do for others (viz., “seek to foster others’ plans and maxims by sharing some of their ends”). This sort of thinking seems to me to motivate Walzer’s account (at least it motivates my interpretation of it), in the way I describe. (Onora O’Neill, “Kant and
These modifications or refinements of JWT are the most notable that the theory has undergone since it was first articulated (in abbreviated form) in ancient Greek and Roman philosophy. The first two are also not widely regarded as genuine additions to the tradition: the Supreme Emergency exception is generally regarded as a departure from the spirit of JWT, for obvious reasons, and the Comparative Justice standard is regarded as, at most, a sub-criterion, and one that has not been added to the classical list by most ethicists.\footnote{Walzer’s strengthening of the discrimination requirement is also generally seen as just that: a clarification, a refinement, at most, a strengthening of what was already the substance of JWT, captured by \textit{ad bellum} intention requirements as well as a strict reading of the discrimination clause in its original form.}

Most of the changes to the JWT have been even more gradual, often reflecting the changing times rather than more dramatic shifts in the ethical position itself, though sometimes pulling the tradition toward either end of the JW continuum. Legitimate authority, for example, is a concept that has been fine-tuned over time. Aquinas speaks merely of legitimacy, linking it to responsibility for the people; this is actually a fairly useful generalization, but the particulars (and exceptions) have been detailed in many ways by others, often varying depending upon the political philosophy held – since authorities are designated in different ways (monarchies, democracies, etc.), different methods for achieving (and losing) legitimacy have been enumerated. Yoder addresses the shift in thinking regarding revolution, a matter clearly tied to that of legitimacy:

\footnote{Utilitarianism Contrasted,” in \textit{Morality and Moral Controversies} (5\textsuperscript{th} ed.), edited by John Arthur (New Jersey: Prentice, 1999), 49.}

\footnote{Yoder, \textit{When War Is Unjust}, 154: “No ethicist has followed the bishops in adding this criterion to the classical list. (The 1994 \textit{Catholic Encyclopedia} added it without taking into account its novelty.) It is in fact not a criterion … but rather one additional consideration … to keep in mind when thinking about just cause.”}
earlier thinkers tended to argue that citizens could never have just cause to overthrow their ruler, but over time the possibility of a just revolutionary war came to be accepted, entailing that a ruler must meet certain criteria (e.g., ruling justly) to be considered a legitimate authority. An additional requirement, for religious orthodoxy, arises during the crusading period of the Reformation as well; prior to the Reformation, heresy was grounds for excommunication or other clerical punishment, but “after 1573 the Huguenots (French Protestants) said this [‘that the ruler becomes illegitimate by persecuting true religion’] about Catholic kings. At the same time the Jesuits said it about the Queen of England.” The common thread to these assessments is that rulers can in at least some ways render themselves illegitimate with regards to waging a just war; all others (private citizens, bandits, unequal political units, and clergy, to name some specific examples) lack proper authority by definition. The justice of those fighting is often thought to depend on the legitimacy of, and relationship to, their leaders: mercenaries could only hire on for causes known to be just, and soldiers would be allowed to wage war only when bound by oath and under control of a (legitimate) sovereign. Interpretations of the particulars of authority to declare war have varied as views on authority itself have varied; the standards of intent and cause (previous

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86 Hugo Grotius, for example, argues at some length that, while ideally a leader will govern justly, failure to do so does not justify rebellion by his subjects; while an errant guardian can be removed by proper authorities, there is no other authority over a king than God, who—when faced with errant rulers—“either punishes their offences, should he deem it necessary; or permits them for the chastisement of his people” (The Rights of War and Peace, including the Law of Nature and of Nations, translated by A.C. Campbell (New York: M. Walter Dunne, Publisher, 1901), I.III.8).

87 Yoder, When War Is Unjust, 148.

88 Yoder, When War Is Unjust, 148.

89 Yoder, When War Is Unjust, 148.
modifications notwithstanding) seem to be less dependent upon such outside considerations.

Modern developments have obviously had even more effect on the details of *jus in bello* standards. Tactics such as nuclear deterrence and guerilla warfare in particular have posed serious challenges for those who subscribe to JWT. In the former case, we must consider whether just-war standards ban the threats of unjust actions (it is generally agreed that nuclear strikes are unjustly indiscriminate) as themselves unjust; in the latter, we must consider whether (and how) just rules of engagement, especially discrimination, are to be observed when one’s opponent deliberately blurs the lines between combatant and non-combatant. These cultural and technological modifications to warfare itself require that we move outside of what early thinkers could possibly have addressed directly.

What is at issue in the case of nuclear deterrence is whether a nation may protect itself from the threat of nuclear destruction by threatening such destruction in return. A nuclear strike would be problematic, under the rules of JWT, given the requirement for proportionality and even more importantly, the requirement for discrimination, for of course, nuclear weapons cause wide-spread destruction, and non-combatants will inevitably be hurt. Despite this, Paul Ramsey argues that both threat and actual strike are compatible in principle with JWT. Nuclear deterrence – possessing and threatening to use nuclear weapons – is an acceptable tactic under the principle of double effect, he says: certain types of threats are acceptable, because certain types of nuclear strikes would be acceptable, though obviously undesirable - viz., strikes (or threats) against nuclear installations, conventional military bases, and isolated objectives. First strikes
would be unacceptable (as that would violate the “just cause” criterion – a threat is a response proportional to a threat, a strike is proportional only in response to the aggression of a strike), as would be counter-city strikes (as such a strike would clearly be indiscriminate, a deliberate killing of civilians). Ramsey characterizes either type of strike as “both wicked and foolish.”\footnote{Paul Ramsey, \textit{The Just War: Force And Political Responsibility} (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1983), 249.} However, the use of nuclear weapons against the limited targets listed above is acceptable, if such use meets the criteria of proportionality and necessity.

The morality of deterrence – the explicit or implicit threat to use nuclear weapons – is a separate issue with at least some who hold any nuclear strike to be immoral still approving of threats to do so. Since Ramsey approves of the use of nuclear weapons, at least in principle, it is not surprising that he also believes that the threat to do so is within the realm of justice, provided that we do not intend to use the weapons unjustly (as a first strike or against cities) and that we make these intentions clear: “We should declare again and again, and give evidence by what we do, that our targets are his forces rather than his cities.”\footnote{Ramsey, 253.} The fact that the enemy cannot be sure whether we will use them improperly works in our favor, by deterring him, without incurring a moral deficit on our side. And if all else fails (again invoking something like the Supreme Emergency, though Ramsey does not use Walzer’s term), “an apparent resolution to wage war irrationally or at least an \textit{ambiguity} about our intentions may have to be our expressed
policy."  

So long as we do not actually intend to use them improperly, Ramsey says, deceit about our intentions is by far a lesser evil than intending to (or actually) doing so. 

Walzer disagrees with Ramsey’s interpretation of the situation, a dispute that hinges on both the limits of double effect (and proportionality), and the intrinsic nature of nuclear weapons. First, as Walzer points out (and as Ramsey himself acknowledges), the threat is a deterrent only if the opponent believes that the damage will be far-reaching: “the danger of collateral damage is unlikely to work as a deterrent unless the damage expected is radically disproportionate to the ends of the war or the value of this or that military target.”  

But because Ramsey’s proposed strategy depends so heavily on the prospect of a disproportionate number of (innocent) deaths, the claim that those deaths are collateral (and thus acceptable under the principle of double effect) becomes suspect: “if counter-force warfare had no collateral effects, or had minor and controllable effects, then it could play no part in Ramsey’s strategy. Given the effects it does have and the central part it is assigned, the word ‘collateral’ seems to have lost much of its meaning.”  

Thus, since the threat must by definition be against non-combatants (and an indefensibly large number of them), whether direct or indirect, it is a threat to do something that would be contrary to JW standards, and is thus itself contrary to them. 

Furthermore, it does no good to argue (as Ramsey does) that nuclear weapons are – like more conventional weapons – “ambiguous” (capable of being used against military

92 Ramsey, 254.

93 Ramsey, 255.

94 Walzer, 280; Ramsey argues that “the threat of something disproportionate is not always a disproportionate threat” (303) – i.e., a strike might be disproportionate with regards to the immediate results, but the threat to strike may be proportionate to the prospect of world peace.

95 Walzer, 280.
targets or against civilians); the possession of some “ambiguous” weapons may deter others but does not contain within itself any particular intent, but by its nature, a nuclear weapon demonstrates something about the nature of its possessor, since “it is designed to kill whole populations, and its deterrent value depends upon that fact (whether the killing is direct or indirect).” Walzer’s position on this matter is clearly related to (and consistent with) his refinement of the Principle of Double Effect – merely claiming that you did not intend civilian casualties is meaningless if those casualties are an unavoidable side effect. On the other hand, it is hard to see how Walzer would rule out such strikes in the case of a Supreme Emergency, where so much is at stake and there are no other options. Such a terrifying weapon would surely be an ideal solution to a Supreme Emergency. At any rate, these varying positions demonstrate just a few of the ways in which JWT might be said to extend along a continuum; in this case, for example, Ramsey’s view would seem to lie further along the continuum than Walzer’s, closer to realism and further from pacifism – until Walzer’s Supreme Emergency exception is factored in, at which point the two seem nearly equivalent.

Walzer and Yoder (to name only two) address the problem of guerilla warfare (and the related problem of terrorism) as well. The issue here relates directly to the criterion of discrimination (and indirectly to the law-and-treaties standard): how ought nations attempting to adhere to *jus in bello* criteria respond to opponents who clearly do not intend to do so, or whose tactics are designed to exploit the fact that the responders *do* feel bound to do so? Terrorism works by deliberately harming (or threatening to harm) non-combatants; guerilla warfare is deliberately structured in such a way that it seeks “to

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96 Walzer, 281.
place the onus of indiscriminate warfare on the opposing army… If civilians had no
rights at all, or were thought to have none, it would be a small benefit to hide among
them. In a sense, then, the advantages the guerrillas seek depend upon the scruples of
their enemies.97 The latter manipulates just-war standards, while the former ignores
them altogether. In both cases, groups who are committed to following just-war
standards face a quandary: adhering to those standards raises the likelihood of losing, or
at least puts the justly-fighting force at a serious disadvantage, yet JWT provides no
alternative – however just the cause, “if the only way not to lose a war is to commit a war
crime, it is morally right to lose that war.”98 This does not seem fair, but there seems to
be no way around it: the only course of action consistent with JWT is to fight as well as
possible within the restraints of JWT, and to be prepared to accept the outcome.99 Of
course, this has always been the case within the JWT: there should, at least in theory, be
any number of cases (at any point in history) where justice would prohibit us from
fighting a war that meets many criteria but not all of them – it will always seem to be
unfair, but this obligation is what separates JWT from realism.

One potential response to the “unfairness” of such situations is to suggest that
some groups deserve to be treated properly, and others do not. Of course, there are
stronger and weaker arguments for this point. Some such arguments clearly move us
from the realm of JWT to the realm of crusading tradition, and are most clearly made in a
historical context:

97 Walzer, 180, 186.

98 Yoder, When War Is Unjust, 63.

99 Though the standard requiring probability of success would seem to dictate that, if the set of
circumstances makes victory unlikely, then the ‘just’ side must capitulate to the unjust one.
Just-war standards are then thought of as something like the good manners that should exist among the citizens of civil society… The medieval limitations against illicit weapons or tactics forbade their use only against Christians, assuming that against the infidel the standards could be lower. Thus the conceptual wedge between the just war, properly so-called, and the holy war alternative begins to exist as a wedge between two kinds of adversaries as well. The infidel (or the barbarian), being beyond the pale of civility, did not possess even those rights the just-war tradition protected.¹⁰⁰

Such reasoning is not exclusive to medieval times, of course, but modern versions are seldom so blunt. Instead, modern exceptions to just-war rights generally hinge on the behavior of the opponent: rather than being ineligible on the basis of race or nationality, a force may “forfeit their right to be fought against fairly.”¹⁰¹ Established practices such as terrorism or deliberate blurring of lines between civilian and combatant might be thought to constitute such forfeiture, in that the opponent would have broken the law first, and therefore rendered itself an “outlaw” rather than a combatant; other factors might be seen as disqualifying as well, including failure (or refusal) to sign a given treaty.¹⁰²

Walzer at times seems to make such an argument with regard to guerilla warfare, saying of specific examples that guerillas captured by authorities should be treated as prisoners of war, provided that they themselves had observed war conventions,¹⁰³ that even guerillas that do, e.g., release prisoners, may not deserve prisoner-of-war status, or

¹⁰⁰ Yoder, When War Is Unjust, 55-56; we have seen that Aristotle and others also thought that only some types of people deserve ‘civilized’ treatment.

¹⁰¹ Yoder, When War Is Unjust, 56.

¹⁰² Yoder, When War Is Unjust, 56. For example, since in the Boer war, the Afrikaner nations had not been represented at the drafting of the Hague Conventions, the British who fought against them claimed that they therefore did not have legitimate authority, and thus did not consider their own war-making strategies to be bound by those conventions; likewise, the Japanese in World War II had not signed Geneva Conventions regarding the treatment of POW’s. Some treaties even “specify that they are not binding when fighting a non-signatory” (declarations of Paris (1856) and St. Petersburg (1868)) (160).

¹⁰³ Walzer, 179, emphasis mine.
even possess any war rights at all,\textsuperscript{104} and that eligibility for war rights hinges on certain behavior, viz., wearing uniforms or other distinctive signs, and openly carrying weapons.\textsuperscript{105} However, it is clear that the alternative treatment he envisions here is being treated (humanely, ethically, legally) as an ordinary prisoner or criminal, not being removed from the realm of ethical consideration entirely – this is not the distinction between JWT (with its limits) and realism (where anything goes), but between criminal court and a military tribunal. Walzer’s position is clarified in later analysis as well: much of the ethical (and legal) problem with guerilla warfare is connected to the fact that “Whereas soldiers are supposed to protect the civilians who stand behind them, guerrillas are protected by the civilians among whom they stand.”\textsuperscript{106} This fact, Walzer points out, is often taken to support an argument for the lessening of guerillas’ war rights, but he argues that the fact that civilians are supporting the guerrilla forces – assuming that they are doing so voluntarily – should strengthen the rights of the guerilla forces to be treated as just combatants, since the community support demonstrates that they have legitimate authority to speak for that community, against occupiers, the ruling regime, etc.\textsuperscript{107} At any rate, Walzer apparently continues to presuppose a principled duty of proper treatment of all, rather than a utilitarian calculation regarding the consequences of such a treatment. Yoder speaks to the issue of desert as well, and in similarly duty-based language: “It would seem natural that since all the values we talk about needing to respect are those of our enemies, it would hardly be fitting to distinguish between those enemies to whom

\textsuperscript{104} Walzer, 181.
\textsuperscript{105} Walzer, 183.
\textsuperscript{106} Walzer, 185.
\textsuperscript{107} Walzer, 185.
we do and those to whom we do not owe such restraint.”\textsuperscript{108} He goes on to acknowledge that this approach might not be as widely embraced as its ethical simplicity might suggest (as detailed above), but his own position is clear, with regard to JW standards in general as well as to various treaties and conventions.\textsuperscript{109} He describes the historical move from the position described above (that rules need not be followed when fighting against those who did not follow them themselves) to the more objective view: “Increasingly, however, the claim tended to gain ground that all nations, signatories or not, should respect the conventions, since they are mere clarifications and applications of general principles that were already valid for all before the treaties spelled them out.”\textsuperscript{110}

While this discussion certainly does not provide a comprehensive list of all the ways the JWT has developed and changed over time, it certainly demonstrates the complexity of the situation. The criterion of comparative justice has been proposed as an addition to the list; the criterion of supreme emergency has been proposed as an exception to it. And while war has always represented a complex interaction between peoples, modern strategies and capabilities have forced JWT to become ever more subtle in its distinctions, whether in the limits of double effect (with regard to nuclear deterrence and war, and the basic requirements for soldiers in relation to noncombatants) or methods of dealing with deliberate contravention or manipulation of the standards themselves (as

\textsuperscript{108} Yoder, \textit{When War Is Unjust}, 55.

\textsuperscript{109} “…morally, the bindingness of the rights at stake does not depend on whether texts were signed by all parties. The particular formulations were defined in particular texts, but the rules based in moral and customary laws apply to all” (Yoder, \textit{When War Is Unjust}, 160).

\textsuperscript{110} Yoder, \textit{When War Is Unjust}, 37.
in the case of terrorism and guerilla warfare). Respectable arguments have been made
with regard to each of these problems, often on opposing sides of the issue.\textsuperscript{111}

The further question must then be asked: is there some narrow range of views that
represent the essence of the just war tradition, with outlying views having changed so
much as to lie beyond those bounds? The concept of the spectrum remains useful in this
context; as we have already seen, some interpretations of the tradition, or elements within
it, point toward a stricter, almost pacifist interpretation, while others transform the
position into something more closely resembling realism. An analysis of the continuum,
in turn, can be usefully illuminated by a deeper look into the types of moral theory that
underlie each variation. Not all contributors to the tradition are working on the same
moral presuppositions, and the differences – in particular, that between the final appeal to
means vs. ends – will (I argue) help to clarify what distinguishes true JWT from its look-
(almost)alike variations.

IV. Narrowing the Field: Continuum and Foundations

Let me set the stage by way of a preliminary (and probably utterly non-
controversial) conclusion on the matter: I would argue that what distinguishes JWT from
realism lies in the commitment of the former to a means-based morality, and of the latter
to an ends-based morality. While it is true that realism is technically the rejection of any
morality in the realm of war, it need not (and often does not) reject morality in general. I
believe that for most, especially those in a position of political (and other types of)
leadership, the adoption of realism with regard to war is itself an ethically-informed

\textsuperscript{111} Many other arguments have been made about them as well, as we will see in the upcoming
chapter, just not within the framework of JWT.
choice, grounded most often in some form of consequentialism, wherein the leader concludes that he can best protect those who depend on him by entering into and fighting wars without the restrictions of something like a just war tradition. Any consideration of this choice will lead us into the realm of political philosophy, into a consideration of whether such a choice is in fact deontological, based (for example) on a duty of a leader to protect those who are under his protection, but I will defer this discussion until later, when I examine the position of realism in more detail. For the moment, I will focus simply on the task of where to draw the line between JWT and realism; I believe that we can do this by distinguishing between those who believe that we have a generalized obligation to follow a set of principles, even in war and even if it is at some (or even great) cost to ourselves and our countrymen, and those who believe that we have some such obligations but that they can be trumped by consequences, in cases where the potential outcome is sufficiently dreadful. In what follows, I will argue that only the former represent the real JWT.

But first, how do we know exactly what those principles are? On the one hand, all contributors to JWT assume from the outset that there is a consensus as to what moral views underlie the conversation. For example, a Yoder has noted, it is now a feature of war conventions that they are thought to apply to all nations, whether signatories or not, “since they are mere clarifications and applications of general principles that were already valid for all before the treaties spelled them out.”

Clearly, there are thought to be moral principles that underlie all human behavior; just as clearly, moreover, there is thought to be some widespread agreement as to what those principles are. On the other

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hand, anyone with any knowledge of the field of moral philosophy knows that any widespread degree of agreement is unlikely to be the case. Most, if not all, moral theories will agree regarding the broad strokes of JWT (e.g., almost everyone would agree that killing non-combatants should generally be avoided), but the theories do not always agree on why a given action is right or wrong, which often leads to a growing divide when it comes to the details of the matter.

*The Challenge of Peace* makes clear the role that both of these, in their way, can and do play in JWT. In examining the JW criteria, it first lays out “the presumption which binds all Christians: we should do no harm to our neighbors; how we treat our enemy is the key test of whether we love our neighbor; and the possibility of taking even one human life is a prospect we should consider in fear and trembling” (#80). To explain how killing could possibly be justified, given this as a starting point, we must appeal to something that sounds like consequentialism: if the innocent are threatened, love decrees that we restrain the enemy to protect those being threatened. That is, we can bring about bad consequences only when it is necessary to preventing worse ones, with harm to the innocent being regarded as worse than harm to an aggressor. This is regarded as a duty for all, for individuals as well as for nations, and most especially for those charged with the safety of all, the rulers: “in the name of the elementary requirement of justice, peoples have a right and even a duty to protect their existence and freedom by proportionate means against an unjust aggressor” (#78).

However, note that this pursuit of certain ends is constrained, by the conventions of JWT, or even more simply, by the duty that underlies this concept: love. We are to love the innocent and those who threaten them; our protection of the innocent is
motivated by both of these, in that it saves the innocent, and also prevents the aggressor from doing evil, which is a benefit to him. We are to protect, we are told, but only proportionately. Ultimately: “In simple terms, we are saying that good ends (defending one’s country, protecting freedom, etc.) cannot justify immoral means (the use of weapons which kill indiscriminately and threaten whole societies [i.e., nuclear weapons]” (#332). Clearly, though some aspects of JW thinking must refer to consequences, those are not determinate in the overall view. In what follows, we will examine this distinction; first, we will examine the role that consequentialism does play, before showing that this role is always a secondary one (and that exceptions in which ends trump means must as a consequence be removed from the realm of JW reasoning).

Our account of JWT begins with the *jus ad bellum* standards, which place as requirements such notions as justice (just cause) and love (good intention). These are more directly within the realm of duty than of consequences, for they do not appeal to numerical calculations, or to ends, in any clear way. Of course, consequentialism can certainly accommodate these notions as well, and would almost certainly emphasize them in any form of war conventions as well, for such values are certainly conducive to pleasure, happiness, or whatever else is designated as the overriding end sought. After all, part of right intention is the requirement that peace be an essential goal: “During the conflict, right intention means pursuit of peace and reconciliation, including avoiding unnecessarily destructive acts or imposing unreasonable conditions (e.g., unconditional surrender).”113 Going to war without sufficient cause or with ill intention would almost certainly bring about worse consequences than would their more principled alternatives,

113 *Challenge*, #95.
and as such, consequentialism would likely advise such guidelines as well, barring exceptional cases.

Nonetheless, there seems to be a direct correlation between stricter forms of JWT and a rejection of consequentialist calculations, perhaps most clearly born out in the different ways of interpreting the “comparative justice” addition to JWT. As noted earlier, the modern observation that few if any wars have a purely innocent party with the moral status to respond to aggression with pure justice of cause has tended to lead JWT in one of two directions. On the one hand, it can lead to the strengthening of criteria having to do with intention; after all, the conscious acknowledgement that there is at least some justice to/from the enemy’s perspective should serve only to further soften one’s heart, bringing about greater reluctance to go to war. Of course, on a strict enough reading this is required anyway, as we are supposed always to be motivated by love, but any push towards a further recognition of our own faults cannot go amiss. In this case, at least, an appeal to intention and duty correlates to strictness of JWT. On the other hand, the same observation regarding comparative justice can lead to a loosening of the standards, moving us from a firm commitment to having an undeniably just cause before entering into a war, to merely having a cause that is better than our enemy’s. This will clearly allow for more wars to meet the standards than would have otherwise, a loosening of the restriction, and on the grounds of calculations of who has already done worse things and who is likely to do so in the future.

This argument may already be open to a charge of question-begging: perhaps it is true that deontology grounds stricter forms of JWT and consequentialism grounds less strict forms, but who is to say that “strict” correlates with “right”? Perhaps strict grounds
are too strict, unjustly restricting the ability of moral leaders to fight on behalf of the innocent. Perhaps looser grounds are more appropriate to the way the world really is, to what needs to be done. Perhaps the insistence on perfect justice of cause by those who began the tradition is asking too much of us. But such arguments (plausible as they may be) do much to make my case. The progression is arguably chronological: the strict interpretation represents the older form, while the more relaxed accounts – at least as linked to JWT – appear more recently, matching more modern developments, like cultural relativism, that seek to relax moral restrictions as unrealistic or inadequately grounded. Whether such a relaxation is morally correct is a question we must still address, but as we evaluate JWT, it does seem most appropriate to assume that forms of JWT that adhere most closely to the original doctrines that emerged as JWT came together in an organized, coherent form, are those truest to the spirit of it. As Yoder characterizes the current state of affairs: “The shell has been retained, while what goes on beneath is quite different from what the theologians who initially found the just-war tradition convincing could ever have meant or would ever have approved.”

To argue that the modern form is more correct than the original is not the same as arguing that it is a better form of JWT, and at any rate, I would contend that neither argument works.

Consequentialism plays the same role in the remaining ad bellum criteria as it does above, viz., it would seem to conditionally recommend them as standards to follow, but does not provide the sort of foundation that would demand that they be applied categorically, in the way that JWT actually requires. It is true, for example, that because the consequences of war are typically worse than almost any alternatives,

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114 Yoder, When War Is Unjust, 30.
consequentialism would also generally advise that war be undertaken only as a last resort. This must be at most a conditional recommendation, however; there are clearly cases where war seems to be inevitable, at which point striking early, with the element of surprise, will more likely bring about better consequences than waiting for the highly unlikely possibility of another solution, and will thus be the morally correct thing to do.

Of all the standards, consequentialist reasoning can be seen the most clearly with regard to the *jus ad bellum* requirement for proportionality:

In terms of the *jus ad bellum* criteria, proportionality means that the damage to be inflicted and the costs incurred by war must be proportionate to the good expected by taking up arms. Nor should judgments concerning proportionality be limited to the temporal order without regard to a spiritual dimension in terms of "damage," "cost," and "the good expected." In today's interdependent world even a local conflict can affect people everywhere; this is particularly the case when the nuclear powers are involved. Hence a nation cannot justly go to war today without considering the effect of its action on others and on the international community.115

Consequences of one potential course of action are to be weighed against those of another, and only if the good outweighs the bad may the more drastic step be permitted. This element of JWT does appear to be ends- rather than means-based; nonetheless, the fact that it must be satisfied only in the context of other (non-consequentialist) standards leaves JWT, on balance, still on the non-consequentialist side.

*Jus in bello* standards stand in a similar relationship to consequentialism. Like the *jus ad bellum* requirement for proportionality, proportionality within war requires the weighing of potential consequences, as does the demand that means used be indispensable: is a given act necessary to achieve the goal of the war, and will its good results outweigh its bad ones (or the bad ones that would have otherwise resulted)? And

115 *Challenge*, #99.
recall Aquinas’s more particular judgments regarding the practice of warfare: fighting on holy days is permissible where it is necessary for the common good, clergy ought not to fight because others are more suited to that task, and so on. In the final analysis, however, it is not consequentialism that appears to ground Aquinas’s thinking on this point, but again, a specific view of duty – what duties belong to each person, and how duties should be ranked (here, the duty to respect holy days is trumped by the duty to protect and help others; in JWT as a whole, the duty to refrain from killing is trumped by the duty to protect innocents against aggressors). Furthermore, principled defense of life (as seen in the discrimination criterion) trumps standards like necessity or proportionality, despite the fact that all standards must be met for a war to be just. That is, the act that is proportional and/or necessary is nonetheless forbidden if it is not discriminating; it is also true that an act that is discriminating but not necessary/proportional is likewise forbidden, but in either case, innocent life is protected. The consequence-oriented standards tell us the ends we must aim for, but can always be overridden by what means we must not use, while the reverse does not hold true.

The morally justifiable exception to the duty to refrain from killing is generally thought to be enemy combatants, and even then, only those whose deaths are necessary and proportional with regard to the ultimate goal of peace. However, Walzer’s defense of the Supreme Emergency exception, the clearest example of pure consequentialism in connection to JWT, says that on some occasions, we may be morally obligated to violate the standards of discrimination, necessity, and proportionality. In his argument for the exception, he implies that we must think of just war standards as being grounded in something like deontology – duty, respect for individual human lives, and human rights.
more generally – and as something to be followed in almost all cases. However, when a supreme emergency arises (that is, when entire communities and ideologies are threatened with extinction, and no conventionally permissible means remains for protecting them), utilitarianism pulls rank on deontology (with the implication that it must in some sense have been the overriding standard all along, allowing only those rules that facilitate proper ends), and (a critical step) removes the acts of war from the sphere of morality entirely, leaving us to fight in the realm of moral realism. As Walzer himself puts it, “[threats like Nazism] bring us under the rule of necessity (and necessity knows no rules).”¹¹⁶ At this point, apparently, whatever action is necessary for winning the war may be taken, and it is inappropriate to try to assess the rightness of that action – the removal of rules has itself been deemed “right,” and the matter has been removed from adjudication. As we have seen, Walzer believes that soldiers have a duty to put the lives of civilians above their own, but in the face of a serious and imminent danger with unbearable consequences, the lives of some civilians may be deliberately taken if it is the only way to save a majority of innocent bystanders on either side. Walzer frames this very special (and presumably rare) exception as one that we must take when the need arises, though the rules of war would otherwise hold: “Utilitarian calculation can force us to violate the rules of war only when we are face-to-face not merely with defeat but with a defeat likely to bring disaster to a political community.”¹¹⁷ An interpretation of JWT containing such an exception would clearly be located on the spectrum somewhere very near to the position of realism – the ultimate reliance on consequentialist morality

¹¹⁶ Walzer, 254.

¹¹⁷ Walzer, 268; emphasis mine.
takes such a view far afield of the original position of JWT, notwithstanding the proviso that exceptions are to be made only in the most dire of cases.

I would argue that such a position is so far afield that it no longer qualifies as JWT. JWT has never been grounded in a consequentialist moral framework, at either the level of the individual standards, or the level of the tradition as a whole, both for the following reasons. While consequentialism can and probably would affirm the rightness of these standards, such an affirmation would always be conditional – just cause, right intention, proportionality, etc., must obtain unless adhering to them would lead to worse consequences. But each of the JW standards explicitly displays the opposite form of reasoning: we should strive for the best consequences within the boundaries of the requirements. Both love and justice dictate that we strive to protect the innocent (and secondarily, the aggressors from their own worst impulses), but not by any means necessary. To restate Yoder: “If the only way not to lose a war is to commit a war crime, it is morally right to lose that war.”\(^{118}\) This ethic informs the individual criteria, and the JW tradition as a whole: we may not do evil that good may come. This is why Walzer’s Supreme Emergency exception cannot be considered an element of JWT, and why Ramsey must work so hard to defend nuclear deterrence – the presumption is against war, and especially against the harming of innocents, so any approach which would, however indirectly or unintentionally, harm civilians, must bear the heaviest of scrutiny, and will seldom if ever be approved.

A useful method of organizing these positions, one which we have already referenced, is that of a continuum. If we imagine the war/peace positions we have

\(^{118}\) Yoder, *When War Is Unjust*, 63.
discussed as being placed along a line, with realism to the right and pacifism to the left, we see that JWT occupies the region in the middle, with some versions being far to the right, approaching realism, and others being far to the left. A view falls within the JW portion of the spectrum, I have argued, when it (a) holds that war is a possible, potentially morally necessary, alternative, when there is an injustice to be corrected and the various JW standards can be met in such a way that war is the lesser of the two evils at hand, and (b) places the duty to meet those standards higher than consequential considerations, such that there is at least the theoretical possibility of the moral requirement to refrain from war – if one or more standards is not met – even if fighting would be advantageous and/or failing to fight would result in some degree of harm. The main thrust of John Howard Yoder’s *When War Is Unjust: Being Honest in Just-War Thinking* is that the tradition can only be credible if it seriously allows for the possibility of not going to war: “If the tradition which claims that war may be justified does not also admit that in particular cases it may not be justified, the affirmation is not morally serious.”\(^{119}\) I agree with him.

The less likely a position is to rule out either going to war or using some particular tactic during a war, then, the further it deviates from true JWT. Reasons for this increasing willingness to go to war vary, from a serious consideration of evils so great that even a failure to follow some of the rules of war may result in less evil than the alternative, to a lack of epistemological rigorousness as to whether the standards have been met. Thus, I would argue that views like Ramsey’s, that allow for the use of nuclear weapons, even on a very limited basis, must fall toward the right end of JWT but still

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\(^{119}\) Yoder, *When War Is Unjust*, 80.
inside its boundaries; despite its willingness to use extreme methods, the view would still 
not be the furthest to the right, since Ramsey is careful to specify uses of nuclear 
weapons that are as discriminating as such weapons can be. Views that incorporate 
something like the Supreme Emergency exception trigger would fall to the right of the 
JW sector of the spectrum, though still very near the border of true JWT, as its standards 
would apply at all times except during the emergency in question.

The clearest and most typical reason for variation is the epistemological one, 
however: as Cady puts it, “One of the most telling indicators of one’s position along the 
just-warist segment of the proposed moral continuum is the level of confidence, the 
strength of knowledge, that is required for justifying war.”120 Thus, those who require 
only vague evidence as to the justice of the cause, who do not spend long investigating 
the alternatives before concluding that war is the last resort, and so on, are also very near 
– and sometimes enter – the region of realism. Lip service to JWT, if not supported by 
any real commitment to meeting the standards, is not itself sufficient to categorize a 
position as a just-war position; one can be a realist in fact despite claiming for whatever 
reason (political expedience, guilty conscience) to be a just-warist. Views at this end of 
the spectrum tend to be more consequence-oriented – if the case is dire enough, the threat 
great enough, then discrimination and other standards need not be met. Any position that 
holds that the ends (even really really important ones) justify the means, I would argue, is 
not a true JW position.

On this point of definition I differ slightly from Cady. Cady argues that what 
distinguishes pacifism and JWT are precisely the sort of issues addressed above, viz.,

120 Cady, 35.
their relative approaches to the question of means and ends; for Cady, however, the question is not “who elevates means?” v. “who elevates ends?”, but rather, “who presumes that the two can be separated at all?”

Once doing our duty regardless of results is distinguished from achieving certain results regardless of what must be done to succeed in attaining them, priorities are clarified at the expense of polarizing a difference in emphasis into a radical difference in kind. This clean, total separation between means and ends, this mutual exclusion of each by the other, appears to be both required by just-warists and rejected by the pacifist. It seems required to justify war because the just-warist grants the evil of the acts of war. Only if means and ends are totally separate can good consequences emerge from evil actions; otherwise the results would be spoiled by the evil means of achieving them.121

It is true that JWT regards even justified acts of war as evil, in that (historically speaking) penance must be done for them, though they are not moral sins.

Furthermore, the overall analysis of JWT’s moral foundations would seem to bear Cady’s analysis out, in that JWT clearly privileges means over ends (for the purposes of ethical debate), and thus must separate the two.

However, it is not entirely fair to say that, for JWT, good consequences can emerge from evil actions, as such a characterization has the unavoidable implication that JWT endorses an “ends justify the means” philosophy. As we have seen, a central tenet of JWT is that the ends do not justify the means – indiscriminate killing may not be used to achieve even the most just of results, for example. Ethical tools such as the Doctrine of Double Effect are designed to distinguish the intended result from the actual result; the overall thrust of the tradition lies in determining when the threat of evil justifies the doing of something that would otherwise not be permissible. The means of war are evil,

121 Cady, 44.
in that any killing, however justified, requires penance (historically, at least), but not just any evil is acceptable so long as it produces good results, only evils proportionate to the evil prevented. Various teachings on JWT acknowledge the strain between evil means and good ends; The Challenge of Peace, for example, reminds us of “the tension between ‘Peace of a sort’ preserved by [nuclear] deterrence and ‘genuine peace’ required for a stable international life; the contradiction between what is spent for destructive capacity and what is needed for constructive development” (#168). Only a very specific kind of consequence – justice – allows for even the possibility of a war-like means (and not often even that) and clearly, such an end will always be incompatible with a large subset of means, meaning that ends and means cannot be separated for strict just-war proponents any more than they can be for pacifists. This is because JWT proponents are committed primarily to justice as a duty-defining principle, rather than as an end that can be achieved in any way – only just means can yield a just end. Thus, I believe that the dividing line between JWT and pacifism, such as it is, should not be between (as we infer from Cady’s view) those who don’t care about the means and those who do. Rather, the distinction comes down to who believes violence (at least the violence of war) is morally permissible and why.

At the left end of the just-war spectrum (as I designate it), we find views that apply just-war standards so rigorously that they exclude most or even all wars. Such views differ from pacifism in that they acknowledge the possibility of moral war (which pacifism does not), but agree that in at least some cases (for the strictest JW views, all of them) that it would be immoral to go to war. Some just
war theorists hold that all contemporary wars are wrong, given the destructiveness of modern weapons and the advanced probability of escalation in today’s global climate, and are thus for all practical purposes pacifists. Others go even beyond this, to argue that while some kinds of violence can be justified in principle, still our knowledge is too limited to justify it in fact… We simply cannot know relevant factors with sufficient confidence to warrant irrevocable violent actions between nations. On this view war is never justified, not because violence between humans is inherently wrong but because of inevitable limitations in our understanding of the facts and circumstances involved between large groups of people, because of the impossibility of knowing that the conditions of justification in principle indeed hold in fact.\textsuperscript{122}

Cady includes these positions in the pacifist spectrum, labeling them technological or nuclear pacifism and fallibility or epistemological pacifism, respectively. I agree that these are far distant from realism, but would argue that they are in fact strict forms of JWT – pacifist in practice, but only conditionally, rather than opposed to war in principle. Cady’s characterization of the views is certainly helpful; he explains the difficulties with human ability to apply the standards of JWT (the underlying motivation for fallibility pacifism) as follows:

\begin{quote}
Given the subtlety and complexity of issues between nations, the history of tensions, the biases of involved parties, the propaganda, the vested interests, the manipulation of the news media and events, the economic, political, geographic, and demographic inequities, our knowledge cannot be sufficiently secure to justify war, even if it were conceded that war is theoretically possible.\textsuperscript{123}
\end{quote}

Such a view would clearly reject – not just modern wars, but all wars directed and fought by humans as we typically function. Even this view is conditional, however; one can imagine justifying a war of the crusade style, for example – what wiser judge could we

\textsuperscript{122} Cady, 64.

\textsuperscript{123} Cady, 64.
have than God, after all? Or perhaps a war in the future where sufficiently advanced computers could advise us with a great degree of certainty about probabilities of success, collateral damage, and the like. Many may (and probably would) take leave to doubt that either God or computers could or would give us this information, but the fact that it is possible shows that this view, while very near the border, still falls outside the bounds of pacifism, by any definition: it rejects war conditionally rather than categorically, and does not even seem to meet Cady’s own standard regarding the separation of means and ends (like nuclear/technological versions, it makes no claim linking the two, but rather applies just-war standards in very strict fashion).

Still, these examples show that – especially for strictly-principled forms of JWT – the just-warist and the pacifist have much in common. Except for the weakest forms of JWT (where restrictions are often so diluted as to be purely semantic), the two share similar values (commitment to peaceful resolution of problems, to justice, to respect for every human being) and practices (urging restraint, suggesting alternatives, self-sacrifice in the name of the greater good). As Cady says of JWT: “The moral strength of the tradition seems to rest in its persistent and generally accepted basic principles of fairness, restraint, and justice.”124 We will see that pacifism relies on fundamentally the same principles, but with a sufficiently different interpretation of them as to rule out war in every case, rather than only in those where the standards of just war are not met. And while not all pacifists have as their essence the means-ends linkage Cady argues

124 Cady, 33.
that they must, this connection does play a striking – and partially definitive – role in many of the positions we will be examining next.
CHAPTER 3

PACIFISM

In analyzing the history and essence of the Just War Tradition, I have described a selection of the wide variety of views that fall under this heading, variety that arises from exceptions, enhancements, and additions to the basic framework of JWT. The heart of the view, I have argued, is linked to principle, in particular the principle of justice, which governs who must be protected and what may be done to do so. Of course, this is a very general description of JWT; there is necessarily an even greater generality to any one characterization of pacifism, given the much broader variety of views that fall under that heading. After all, while JW accounts differ on some technical details, and to some degree in how they are grounded, the most major differences lie in the strictness required in applying the standards. Ultimately, though, there exists a broad-based agreement on the general nature of the standards themselves. Similar distinctions may be found among some types of pacifism, in the varying levels of violence allowed (ranging from none at all, even political coercion, to non-lethal or even lethal violence at the level of self-defense) and for what reasons. Some of these views fit neatly onto a continuum, ranging from strict to lenient, but other differences are hard to quantify in this way. In fact, some views that at first glance (or in the popular imagination) seem more aligned with pacifism actually better fit the definition of JWT.
Active adherence to (or even espousal of) pacifist standards by an entire culture/state, or even church, is comparatively rare, but some of the conditions necessary for such adherence are more common: viz., an idealized concept of peace, often connected to the myth of paradise (either past or future), and an active consideration (in philosophy, theology, and politics) of the value of peace and how it might be achieved, in abstract as well as practical terms. In certain times and places, these preconditions have led to the active embrace of pacifism, not simply as the end of war, but instead of war, and at any cost. Pacifism is most typically exemplified in the outstanding individual (e.g., Jesus Christ, Gandhi), but there are interesting historical cases of deliberate self-sacrificial pacifism on the part of groups as well.

To some extent, a general conception of peace as an ideal, a significant precondition of pacifism, seems to be a general feature of human culture (or even of the psychology of the individual human being) as well. Bainton notes that the cultures that form the bedrock of Western civilization were generally not pacifist but did view peace as an ideal, and war as something unpleasant, to be undertaken only as necessary (this is, of course, the position of the JWT). In the Hebrew tradition, peace was a positive concept, a state of well-being, linked with prosperity; the Greeks equated peace with order, the Romans, merely with the absence of war, yet for both of these as well, peace and prosperity were linked, and peace was the norm and/or the goal of whatever wars must be fought, even (or especially) the vast military endeavor that formed the Roman Empire. Bainton, *Christian Attitudes Toward War and Peace*, 17-20.
defend their citizens, or citizens to defend themselves, by force, the ideal remains one of victory through peaceful means, or sacrifice of self due to unwillingness to take a life.\footnote{Eastern cultures have also been more likely than Western ones, on the whole, to grant equal value to all forms of life, as opposed to giving precedence to human life, or perhaps even to the lives of the innocent, as JWT does.}\footnote{Bainton, \textit{Christian Attitudes Toward War and Peace}, 19: “The Assyrians and their forerunners, the Sumerians, were perhaps exceptions. Certainly they were ruthless in war and gloated over carnage. …But even they practiced war thus barbarously only in order to ward off attacks from without and to quell revolts from within their empire. In any case, they were exceptional.”} War has only rarely ever been valued for its own sake,\footnote{Bainton, \textit{Christian Attitudes Toward War and Peace}, 19.} and even those cultures that were war-focused (e.g., the Spartans) were willing to use any means to reach their objectives but would have preferred to reach those without war, had it been possible.\footnote{Scottdale, PA: Herald Press, 1971.}

The ideal was actually a peaceful “age of gold,” which recurs in almost all mythologies; this state, once lost, is potentially regainable, making peace something of practical import, for religion if not for civil government generally, though it often played a role there too (nearly all modern political philosophies aim at such a state of peace as well, though seldom with the underlying mythical origin theory). Peace as an ideal is nearly universal, as is the pursuit of peace as a practical matter – but for many, it is seldom regarded as a governing principle in its own right.

In what follows, I will review a selection of views that take nonviolence to be realistic as both an end and a means (though certainly not at all of them – in his book \textit{Nevertheless: Varieties of Religious Pacifism},\footnote{Scottdale, PA: Herald Press, 1971.} John Howard Yoder lists more than twenty separate varieties, and Cady lists at least eight separate variations along the pacifist continuum on his accounting, while acknowledging that there are many other variations). I will first examine a broad variety of religiously-based forms of pacifism, in
both Western and Eastern cultures, in order to identify important historical strands of pacifism. I will also look at a selection of secular forms of pacifism, mostly modern in origin. In both cases, I will begin to tease out the ethical basis of the various formulations, in order to see if any generalizations can be made with regard to the overall position. In the previous chapter, I made an argument with regard to what characterizes true JWT; I will conclude this chapter by doing the same with pacifism. Some types of pacifism are in clear opposition to some types of JWT (to say nothing of other positions like realism and CT), but as we approach the dividing line between the two on the continuum, we will see that identifying a precise distinction becomes difficult. We have seen what the two views have in common; now we must determine what characterizes pacifism as opposed to even strict JWT, and thinking of the views on a continuum will help with this process.

I. Religiously-Based Forms of Pacifism

Peace is something that almost all cultures find theoretically desirable; principled pacifism remains comparatively rare, however, because so many see peace as sometimes attainable only through bloodshed. The list of cultures that are prepared to use violence in pursuit of peace (among other goals) is a long one; examples of cultures, subcultures, or even individual leaders, who have eschewed violent means on principle is much shorter (though longer than contemporary suspicion of pacifism might indicate). In what follows, we will look at a selection of religious versions of such views, both western (viz., early Christianity, post-reformation peace churches, Judaism, and the special case
of Jesus Christ as exemplar)\textsuperscript{130} and eastern (viz., Buddhism, Jainism, and Hinduism, and the exemplar Gandhi).

\textit{A. Pacifism in Western Religions}

Pacifism is not connected as exclusively to Christianity as is JWT\textsuperscript{131}, but that belief system has certainly produced striking examples of the pacifist ethic. Accordingly, we will begin by examining the New Testament and the teachings and example of Jesus. (Such an approach is not quite chronologically accurate, of course; we will return to the Old Testament a bit later, in the context of Judaic examples of pacifism.) We will also review the position of the early church at this point, as an interesting case in its own regard, and as a fairly (though not absolutely) reliable indicator of what Christ may have actually meant by his teachings (“…the early church is frequently regarded as the best qualified to interpret the mind of the New Testament”\textsuperscript{132}). We will review the history in general terms, in order to provide a framework, before returning to review specific instances of pacifism (whether individual or communal) as we review the reasoning behind each view in detail.

In both His words and actions, Christ presents us with a radical conception of how to treat others. Indeed, some of the most striking passages of the New Testament with are

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{130} It is my understanding that Islam has strains of both Pacifism and JWT that parallel those of the other Western religions, but I am less familiar with this material, so given the constraints of time and space, I have chosen not to cover Islam.}

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{131} This is not to imply that JWT is exclusively Christian, but rather to observe that speaking of Just War conjures up thoughts of the early church fathers, while speaking of Pacifism conjures up images perhaps of Quakers, but also Buddhist monks and perhaps even hippies.}

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{132} Bainton, \textit{Christian Attitudes Toward War and Peace}, 66. Bainton notes that the early Church position should not be unquestioningly regarded as setting “the Christian position” with regard to morality – after all, Christians at the time tolerated slavery. Furthermore, the position taken by the early Church is not absolutist in practice, as “there were some Christians in the army and they were not on that account excluded from communion.” These discrepancies will be addressed presently.}
those that speak of the need to love one’s enemy, and to refrain from vengeance. Christ tells us to love our enemies, and specifies what this requires: viz., returning good for evil (blessings in the face of curses, prayers for those who treat you badly, non-resistance – indeed, active cooperation – in the face of physical violence and coercion) (Luke 6:27-29; Matt. 5:38-44). 133

Non-resistance as Christ taught is indeed a radical principle. He reminds his listeners of the traditional judicial attitude, but recommends that His followers break with this tradition. Specifically, we are to give up our legal rights, as represented in three contemporary examples: the formal insult of a slap to the cheek (not physically harmful, but a litigious offense nonetheless), the request for one’s outer garment (the one item that was regarded as a person’s inalienable right to retain), and the requirement of forced labor. 134 Christ tells us, not merely to refrain from fighting back, but to cooperate and go beyond the call of duty. Each example deals with a different sort of adversary (e.g., creditor, foreign military oppressor), but the advice is the same in each case: “In all three cases, then, the exhortation is to give up one’s legal right by responding to injustice by taking the provocative posture or action of being willing to endure a second abuse.” 135 Believers are to reject both legal and defensive vindication.

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133 The fact that I spend a great deal of time here examining Scripture directly, especially referring to the words of Christ, may seem odd in that it contrasts with my treatment of JWT – after all, the latter is also a Christian position, based on Biblical precepts. However, this sourcing – at least to some extent – reflects the ways in which the positions have been argued for: Anabaptists, as a breakaway Protestant sect, were famous for their direct appeal to the Scriptures for guidance, with far less reliance on church tradition, while the work of Aquinas, on the other hand, is comprised largely of references to earlier church fathers. There is also the fact that JWT is in some ways more established, in both the church and the culture, such that less, perhaps, must be said as to where it comes from. And perhaps I am also reflecting a certain amount of my own natural prejudices.


We are asked to do more than go through these (extreme) motions, however—we are asked to do it in a certain way. That is, we are to love and pray for those who harm or persecute us. Doing this shows that we as believers are something other than ordinary human beings: everyone is kind to people they like—the test lies in how we treat those who are difficult to deal with (Luke 6:32-34). If we treat such people mercifully, however, we will be shown mercy, and will “be the sons of the Most High, because he is kind to the ungrateful and the wicked” (Luke 6:35).\(^ {136}\)

The example Christ holds out in these passages is that of God the Father: “Be perfect, therefore, as your heavenly Father is perfect” (Matthew 5:48). But the Son of God provides an example by His actions as well. Not only does He preach against taking revenge, He actively stops His disciples from doing so:

And when his disciples James and John saw this, they said, Lord, wilt thou that we command fire to come down from heaven, and consume them, even as Elias did? But he turned, and rebuked them, and said, Ye know not what manner of spirit ye are of. For the Son of man is not come to destroy men’s lives, but to save them. (Luke 9:54-56, KJV).

In this tale (where the inhabitants of a village refused to “receive” Jesus), not only does Jesus refuse to retaliate; He does not even take the passive-aggressive route of continuing with an action He had every right to do (viz., traveling to a chosen location), but acquiesces to the wishes of the villagers, and goes to another village.\(^ {137}\) In Gethsemane, He likewise steps in to stop (and heal) bloodshed when Peter tries to defend Him by

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\(^ {136}\) Unless otherwise indicated, all direct quotes will be from the New International Version (NIV) of the Holy Bible (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan Publishing House, 1973).

\(^ {137}\) He gives (a slightly more aggressive version of) this advice to His disciples elsewhere, saying “But whatever city you enter and they do not receive you, go out into its streets and say, ‘Even the dust of your city which clings to our feet, we wipe off in protest against you; yet be sure of this, that the kingdom of God has come near’” (Luke 10:10-11, NASB). (Cities that are welcoming are also told about the kingdom of God, but are offered healing services as well, and individual householders are offered words of peace.)
force, telling him, “‘Put your sword back in its place,’ Jesus said to him, ‘for all who draw the sword will die by the sword’” (Matthew 26:52), and then healing the soldier who has come to take Him.\(^{138}\) As in the previous story, Christ then willingly cooperates with those making demands (however unjust) upon Him.

JW theorists generally interpret the non-retaliation teachings (and example) of Christ in the light of further Scriptural teachings with regard to the authority of the state (‘‘Render unto Caesar the things which are Caesar’s; and unto God the things that are God’s’’ (Matthew 22:21b (KJV))), concluding that believers may be called by the proper authority to kill, in order to defend themselves or others, with the somewhat surprising corollary (at least according to Augustine) that the ordinary individual may not kill in self-defense under ordinary circumstances.\(^{139}\) John Howard Yoder explains the reasoning clearly:

…by virtue of the divine institution of government as a part of God’s good creation, its mandate to wield the sword and the Christian’s duty to obey the state combine to place upon the Christian a moral obligation to support and participate in the state’s legal killing (death penalty, war), despite contrary duties which otherwise would seem to follow from Christ’s teaching or example.\(^{140}\)

Not surprisingly, pacifist theologians (including Yoder) challenge this line of reasoning.

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\(^{138}\) A word on comparative accounts: Peter is named only in the John account; Matthew and the other two gospels refer only to “one of them.” Also, only in Matthew does Jesus give a general warning against the use of retaliatory violence; Mark tells of no reprimand or healing at all (14:47-48), Luke tells of the healing but the only injunction against the vengeful disciple is to “suffer ye thus far” (22:51), and in John, Jesus commands Peter to put away his sword, in order that the (sacrificial and atoning) plan of God might proceed.

\(^{139}\) Aquinas, on the other hand, permits such killing if it is not intended, under the principles of Double Effect, “since one is bound to take more care of one’s own life than of another’s” (ST II-II.64.7).

In *The Politics of Jesus*, Yoder raises several caveats with regard to the scriptural command to “render unto Caesar” (and thus offers a response to the JW interpretation of the non-resistance commands). First, he notes that the gospels do not unquestioningly take government to be a reliable agent of God’s will:

“Romans 13 was written about pagan government, [and]…constitutes at best acquiescence in that government’s dominion, not the accrediting of a given state by God or the installation of a particular sovereign by providential disposition.”

He also points out the context of the verses: specifically, they are in a textual unit with commands to love, to suffer under the enemy, and to avoid conformity. The verses themselves are more complex than they at first appear to be as well, in that they require discrimination – we are commanded to give what is *due*, not to give everything, and the subsequent verse (Romans 13:8) tells us that “nothing is *due* to anyone except love,” which is further defined as “doing no harm” (v. 10).

Given these considerations, “…it therefore becomes impossible to maintain that


142 The complete text of Romans 13: 6-10 reads as follows: (6) This is also why you pay taxes, for the authorities are God’s servants, who give their full time to governing. (7) Give everyone what you owe him: If you owe taxes, pay taxes, pay taxes; if revenue, then revenue; if respect, then respect; if honor, then honor. (8) Let no debt remain outstanding, except the continuing debt to love one another, for he who loves his fellowman has fulfilled the law. (9) The commandments, ‘Do not commit adultery,’ ‘Do not murder,’ ‘Do not steal,’ ‘Do not covet,’ and whatever other commandment there may be, are summed up in this one rule: ‘Love your neighbor as yourself.’ (10) Love does no harm to its neighbor. Therefore love is the fulfillment of the law.

143 Yoder notes another set of practical problems. First, service in the military or even the police would never have been something required as a “due” of early Christians, generally slaves and Jews, since such service was “considered either as hereditary professions or as citizens’ privileges” (203). Furthermore, there are issues with regard to the subtleties of the translation of the word “sword” – viz., that *machaira* is a symbol of judicial authority, not of war or even capital punishment, but rather a badge of authority of a policeman. Yoder argues here and elsewhere that military force and police force are fundamentally different in nature, in that the latter are by definition capable of more discrimination, subject to review by higher authorities, unlikely to become caught up in escalating hostilities, bound by the same law that the offender recognizes as applying to him as well, and so on (*The Politics of Jesus*, 203-205; also
the subjection referred to in verses 1-7 can include a moral obligation under
certain circumstances to do harm to others at the behest of the government.”144

Of course, it is not surprising that a major theologian in the “peace church”
tradition would interpret the Bible in this way, but this view is not (necessarily) a case of
latter-day revisionism – there is evidence that the early church interpreted Christ’s
teachings this way as well. If the foregoing interpretation is correct, the Apostle Paul
(writing beginning about twenty years after the death of Christ) would have regarded
pacifism as a moral imperative. Yoder regards the fact that Paul is prepared to regard
“reconciliation,” up to and including that of the believer and his enemy, as a theologically
accepted concept, as proof of its practicality:

Paul is saying, somewhere toward the end of the evolution of apostolic
Christianity, what Jesus had said somewhere near the beginning. That he can still
say it now is proof that, at least to some modest degree, experience had confirmed
it. …it is par excellence with reference to enmity between peoples, the extension
of neighbor love to the enemy, and the renunciation of violence even in the most
righteous cause, that this promise [of a new humanity enabled and created by
God] takes on flesh in the most original…and therefore in the most evangelical
way.145

Paul sets out the ethical obligation of the believer: to love every individual,
whether innocent or aggressor, in a concrete and practical way.

While this is only one interpretation of Paul’s position, what evidence we
have indicates that believers of the first few centuries A.D. did indeed take this to
be their obligation; the Church retained this pacifist position (more or less
strictly), until the time of Constantine. Evidence for this claim includes


144 Yoder, The Politics of Jesus, 208.
archaeological evidence (inscriptions on tombs, for example) as well as the
writings of early church fathers; both point to a group that included soldiers quite
rarely, and more notably yielded a number of martyrs who died rather than take
up arms against others.

There is no evidence at all of Christians serving in the military before
A.D. 170-80, probably because “abstention was taken for granted.”¹⁴⁶ This is
likely due in large part to the fact that most early Christians would have been
from categories of people prohibited from joining the military in the first place
(Jews and slaves). Even those that would have been eligible would have been
unlikely to do so; there was no conscription, and believers would likely have
avoided the dangers of idolatry (greater in the army than in civilian life) as well as
the risk of excommunication on the grounds of bloodshed.¹⁴⁷ Later on, though
contemporaneous writings indicate that cases of Christian soldiers were the
exception rather than the norm, we do find examples of early Christians serving in
the military. For example, Tertullian refers to Christians serving in the army, with
instances of references both positive (as evidence against the charge of Christian
misanthropy) in A.D. 197, and negative (in a rebuke against voluntary enlistment)
in A.D. 211.¹⁴⁸ Bainton cites research by Leclercq and Cadoux, concluding that
there are at least eight uncontestable cases of Christian soldiers from the pre-
Constantinian era. This tells us not only that such cases existed, but also (and

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¹⁴⁶ Bainton, *Christian Attitudes Toward War and Peace*, 68.
¹⁴⁷ Bainton, *Christian Attitudes Toward War and Peace*, 68.
¹⁴⁸ Bainton, *Christian Attitudes Toward War and Peace*, 68.
more significantly) that “the Christian communities where these men were buried
did not prohibit the recording of the military profession upon their tombs.”

Despite this level of acceptance, however, the prevalent ethical stance
seems to have been pacifism, as there are reports of soldiers withdrawing from
service upon conversion, and soldiers executed as conscientious objectors for
failing to comply with military requirements deemed to be idolatrous. Even in
the church of the eastern empire, which seems to have been more tolerant of
military service, generally appears to have been motivated by practicality, in
contrast to the a idealistic view of the requirements of Christianity also common
at the time; as Bainton puts it, “we find there [on the eastern frontier] a protest
against [warfare] among groups tending to ascetic and monastic ideals.” All in
all, until Christianity became a state religion, the prevailing position with regard
to warfare seems to have been one of pacifism, of taking the words of Christ, to
love our enemies and turn the other cheek, literally.

As Christianity became the official state religion of the Roman Empire, an early
form of Just War theory became the dominant view of the Church, and continued to be
refined for centuries (as described in the previous chapter). Theologians of the time of

149 Bainton, Christian Attitudes Toward War and Peace, 69.

150 Bainton, Christian Attitudes Toward War and Peace, 70. Bainton cites Tertullian, Cyprian,
and others; we will cover specific examples later in this chapter.

151 For example, the Thundering Legion, which included Christian soldiers as early as A.D. 173,
was recruited in Armenia; Armenian Christians also engaged in an armed uprising in response to an
emperor’s attempt to impose idolatry (Bainton, Christian Attitudes Toward War and Peace, 70).

152 Bainton, Christian Attitudes Toward War and Peace, 71-72. Examples include Tatian (founder
of the Encratites), who wrote “I decline military command” as well as unnamed numbers of soldiers, who –
after being converted while on duty – “threw off the belt of military service.”
transition reconciled the previous stance of pacifism with the new stance by pointing to
the pacifying effect of the empire itself:

…the empire had pacified the world, established universal communication, and
made possible the proclamation of the gospel to all nations. …The Roman peace
and the Christian peace thus supported each other, and the prophecy that swords
should be beaten into plowshares had received fulfillment in the Pax Romana.\textsuperscript{153}

The ongoing concern, then, became how Christians should engage in warfare, and thus
the details of JWT were developed and refined.

We have already traced the development of JWT; let us then move ahead to the
return\textsuperscript{154} of pacifism, in notable subsets of Christianity if not to the Church as a whole.
The most notable of these are the historic peace churches (e.g., Anabaptists), which arose
during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, and which continue to this day, but there
were medieval pacifist movements as well. Sects such as the Waldensians and the
Franciscan Tertiaries remained in the church only on the condition that their demands of
non-participation in military service be met (and the exemption was indeed granted by
papal authorities).\textsuperscript{155} The pacifist branch of the Hussites, led by Peter Chelciky, held
views that would later resurface in various pacifist denominations of the Reformation,
viz., “…that the first age of the Church was the golden age and this age was pacifist; that
Christ’s law was the law of love which forbids killing; and that his weapon was spiritual

\textsuperscript{153} Bainton, \textit{Christian Attitudes Toward War and Peace}, 86-87. Theologians taking this position
included Jerome, Ambrose, Orosius, Eusebius of Caesarea, Diodor of Tarsus, and Chrysostom.

\textsuperscript{154} This is not to imply that there were \textit{no} instances of pacifism in the Church from the time of
Constantine onward – Bainton lists several tales of soldiers who refused to serve after conversion, and who
were saved from physical punishment for their stance only by divine intervention (88-89); the monastic
orders, as had been the case in the east even before this time, often embraced their separateness as a direct
response to the issue of war, fighting spiritual battles rather than physical ones, as they believed Christ had
commanded (this is consistent with JWT as well – we have already reviewed Aquinas’ argument against
clerics fighting).

\textsuperscript{155} Bainton, \textit{Christian Attitudes Toward War and Peace}, 119.
only and his mission to redeem souls, not to destroy bodies.”\textsuperscript{156} The state, they believed, is indeed ordained of God, but only for the control of sinners, by other sinners, with the corollary that Christians ought to avoid military service and even political office.\textsuperscript{157}

The first and most extreme of the historic peace churches (the others being the Brethren and the Quakers), Anabaptists (modern-day Mennonites and Hutterites) shared these views. They regarded the kingdom of God as radically separate from the kingdom of the world, and saw the duty of the Christian as one of obedience to and imitation of Christ, taking His teachings of non-violence literally. They recognized the reality of violence in the world, but believed that Christians were enjoined from violence in self-defense, or even in defense of others. The only protection available to believers when persecuted was the Sword of the Spirit; the only consolation, that all suffer, and that God’s plan will be worked out to provide justice in the long run. For Anabaptists, while life on this earth is indeed precious, it is not the most valuable thing of all; crucially, following the sacrificially loving example of Christ is more important than preserving even the (earthly) lives of innocents, where doing the latter entails failing to do the former.\textsuperscript{158} According to this pacifist ethic, taking a life (even of an aggressor) is an actual evil done to avoid a hypothetical evil (saving the life of another). What we are called to do is to love every person, and killing one to save another shows an unacceptable

\textsuperscript{156} Bainton, \textit{Christian Attitudes Toward War and Peace}, 120.

\textsuperscript{157} We will soon be discussing Yoder’s description of a dualist Christian view; this is the foundation of such a view – belief in a world where sinners are charged with taking care of themselves, meeting lower standards than those set for the saved, who keep themselves separate and are held (or hold themselves) to higher standards.

\textsuperscript{158} Yoder points to the way in which “The Christian’s understanding of the resurrection of the dead, of heaven and hell, and of eternal life…informs the approach to the…situation,” pointing out that according to this belief system, one reason killing in defense of a loved one is wrong is that “To keep out of heaven temporarily someone who wants to go there ultimately anyway, I would consign to hell immediately someone whom I am in the world to save” (Yoder, \textit{What Would You Do?}, 39-40).
preference, an unwarranted claim to discernment regarding who should live and who should die; on this basis, Anabaptists believe it is better to die than to kill, or even allow killing (by others) in their defense. One historical example illustrates the latter point clearly: a group of Hutterites were granted asylum from the Austrian government by Count Leonard of Lichtenstein, but when the Count prepared to defend them by force from extradition, the Hutterites refused this defense and chose instead to leave, taking all their families and goods to a nobleman “who would grant toleration without protection.”159 The Anabaptist way is one of loving non-resistance and often of living apart from the world.

For Anabaptists (historically speaking), there was no political solution, no such thing as a Christian ruler – by definition, Christians do not participate in political rule, but must simply abide, and flourish or not as God wills. Quakers, on the other hand, took a more positive view of the world and the possibilities for Christians to bring about change even of the state.160 One distinctive element of the Quaker belief system is the relatively heavy weight accorded to conscience, or “the light.” Bainton suggests that one reason that Quakers may have been more optimistic regarding the possibility of change even in the secular world is due to the fact that Quakers had served (prior to conversion) in the military and other walks of life with non-Quakers, and recognized that there were men of


160 Bainton suggests that these differing views of the world reflect the circumstances of the beginning of the respective groups: “The Anabaptists, being burned by Catholics and drowned by Protestants, saw no hope in man. The Quakers, able to use trials and imprisonments as instruments of propaganda, were more hopeful that their witness would affect the mind of all England” (*Christian Attitudes Toward War and Peace*, 153).
conscience everywhere. Nonetheless, Quakers regarded such moral stances as potentially correct only, and continued to reject war.

At least one reason given for doing so is that echoed by Cady: viz., “that war as a method is not appropriate for the achievement of peace.” Quakers also refused to fight out of deference to the conscience of the enemy, pointing out the great difference between attacking a man who believes that he is doing right, and one (e.g. an ordinary burglar) who knows full well he deserves punishment. Echoes of what Cady refers to as “fallibility pacifism” surface in yet another reason given by Quakers for refusing to fight, viz., ignorance – in this case, ignorance regarding whether our leaders are making the right decisions with regard to war. Bainton notes that this position differs from that of Aquinas, who allowed room for refusal according to conscience, but only in the case of positive knowledge of the injustice of a fight; Quakers, by contrast, denied the appropriateness of leaving such decisions up to a magistrate at all, but took a position reminiscent of the Anabaptist position above – a fundamental distrust of those in authority, for in a world with many authorities, who can be certain that his leader is in the right and the leader of his neighbor is not? The Quaker solution to this problem was not to withdraw as the Anabaptists did, however, but rather to be active in politics, and to offer advice and wisdom to those charged with protecting the innocent. The role of a

161 Bainton, Christian Attitudes Toward War and Peace, 157-158.
162 Bainton, Christian Attitudes Toward War and Peace, 159.
163 There are echoes here of the thinking behind the “comparative justice” consideration in JWT, which advises (with varying ramifications) that we recognize that both sides in a war may have some degree of justice on their side, and some degree of injustice, with the hope that this recognition will help to further the right attitudes in those fighting. Here, the observation is perhaps a useful one for all pacifists; even if pacifism (of whatever kind) is the morally correct attitude toward war, pacifists (and just-warists as well) ought to give at least some credit to those with deeply-held and well-thought-out opposing views.
164 Bainton, Christian Attitudes Toward War and Peace, 160-161.
Christian individual or community, they held, is not to strive for purity, leaving the secular world to its own devices (the pessimistic Anabaptist outlook), but rather, to work with the government, with the hope of using its power to spread peace far and wide.

Having established this historical selection of views, we move now to the task of analyzing them in terms of their ethical/moral foundations. Our survey thus far has covered roughly five sections (though these will overlap to a degree): the teachings of Jesus, Paul’s interpretation and application of those teachings, the early church, Anabaptists, and Quakers. Analysis of the first three of these will be a messy and inaccurate process, in that our approaches to them are necessarily mediated, with the result that human interpretation becomes a significant factor. We have the direct words of key sources (e.g. Jesus Christ and St. Paul), but even those are the result of translation and selection, and their meaning and context is the subject of centuries of debate.

Interpretations of the position of the early church likewise vary, with JW theorists and pacifists alike finding support for their views there. In all of these cases (and to a lesser extent with the Anabaptist and Quaker tradition), the matters of theology are too complex to resolve or even fully explicate here; instead, we will explore what elements of ethical foundation seem to be present in teachings of peace, without claim to certainty as to (for example) whether Jesus or Paul were, strictly speaking, pacifists at all. Sometimes, the differences in interpretation themselves will be helpful – seeing what nuances JW theorists and pacifists choose to read into the position of the early church can at least tell us something about the interpreters, if not as clearly about what is being interpreted. In the end, we will have at any rate taken some steps to understanding the linkage between general schools of ethical thought and the varieties of pacifism that we have before us.
Pacifist readings of the Gospels pay particular attention to Jesus’ teachings (in word and deed) to love all human beings (neighbor and enemy alike), to turn the other cheek, to repay evil with good. Two (related) questions must be addressed in order for us to be able to draw any connections to the various moral theories: viz., what reasons does Christ give for His commands and actions, and what reasons do believers have for obeying and/or imitating Him? In answering the former, I will (with all humility) attempt to draw tentative conclusions about the ethics of Christ; in answering the latter, conclusions about the ethics of (early) Christians (including Paul and other authors of the epistles).

The reasons Christ gives for his commands and exhortations seem to link, at one time or another, to each of the various broad categories of ethical thought, but I would argue that the primary consideration seems to be something like virtue theory, even over and above the apparently more appropriate divine command theory. That is, He appeals to consequences and to principles of fairness, but these seem to be important primarily because these are the ways by which we can imitate God the Father. Love and forgiveness are duties, to be sure, but not in some abstract and rational sense or because they allow us to bring about good consequences, or even because these are the things God tells us to do; rather, we are to do these things because they are the things God does, and only by imitating Him can we be truly happy, can we flourish, can we represent the very best that human beings – or free moral beings generally – can be. And this, of course, is the heart of virtue theory: a concern with character, with being whom and what you ought

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165 If Divine Command Theory is correct, and if Jesus Christ was God made man, then the imperatives He gives are morally obligatory simply on the basis of His having commanded them. The question that must be addressed here is whether Jesus Himself took His words to be authoritative merely for His having commanded them, or if He gave, implicitly or explicitly, other moral grounds on the basis of which His commands require our obedience.
to be, and only a secondary concern with rules and duties, because doing right follows naturally from being good.

What, in the words of Christ, are the reasons we should love, forgive, suffer – arguably, be pacifists? We begin with forgiveness, which of these three commands, has the least to do with pacifism. It is nonetheless relevant, and the commands to forgive provide a relatively explicit link to broader ethical theories. Specifically, the reasons given for forgiving those who harm us have the ring of both consequentialism and deontology:

‘I cancelled all that debt of yours because you begged me to. Shouldn’t you have had mercy on your fellow servant just as I had on you?’ (Matthew 18:32b-33)

Why forgive? For one reason, we should forgive because we have been forgiven, or would want to be forgiven. This reckoning, couched (implicitly) in terms of fairness and compassion, is reflected in the deontology of Kant and Rawls. Kant argues that we have a duty to help others, not because “each man should look out for himself” cannot be a universal law, but because we as limited and needy human beings cannot will such a law.

For a will which resolved in this way would contradict itself, inasmuch as cases might often arise in which one would have need of the love and sympathy of others and in which he would deprive himself, by such a law of nature springing from his own will, of all hope of the aid he wants for himself.\(^{166}\)

Or to think of the matter a different way:

Now humanity might indeed subsist if nobody contributed anything to the happiness of others, provided he did not intentionally impair their happiness. But this, after all, would harmonize only negatively and not positively with humanity

as an end in itself, if everyone does not also strive, as much as he can, to further the ends of others.\textsuperscript{167}

Now, Kant is speaking of benevolence rather than forgiveness, but even if the Kantian conception of justice might forbid forgiveness in some cases\textsuperscript{168}, or if the two views for other reasons do not agree that forgiveness is a duty, the form of reasoning is constant\textsuperscript{169}:

extend to others the treatment you would want for yourself – that is, \textit{forgive as you have been (rationally pleased to have been) forgiven}.

Another motivation for forgiving is more results-oriented: \textit{forgive so that you in turn will be forgiven}. Or in the words immediately following the Lord’s Prayer (in which we have just been told that we are to ask the Lord for forgiveness in the same measure as we have forgiven others):

For if you forgive men when they sin against you, your heavenly Father will also forgive you. But if you do not forgive men their sins, your Father will not forgive your sins. (Matthew 6:14-15, cf. Mark 11:25-26)

Presumably failure to forgive is wrong on some independent grounds, according to which the Father will withhold forgiveness, but - as a motivation, at least, if not the underlying reason - we are told that if we forgive, we will gain forgiveness in turn. Of course, the reasons God has for acting are not irrelevant (given that He is arguably a morally perfect agent), and though this does not tell us for certain what reasons God would have for

\textsuperscript{167} Kant, \textit{Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals}, 37.

\textsuperscript{168} The most obvious objection is that it is not just to forgive someone who is unrepentant, who will continue to offend; Christ teaches that at least the first of these considerations \textit{is} important: “…If your brother sins, rebuke him, and if he repents, forgive him. If he sins against you seven times in a day, and seven times comes back to you and says, ‘I repent,’ forgive him.” (Luke 17:3b-4).

\textsuperscript{169} Recall, after all, that our goal, at this point at least, is to discover why (e.g.) Christ believes that forgiving is the correct thing to do, not to see what Kantianism recommends.
forgiving us, it *does* imply that He will not do so if we refuse to forgive others (the fairness standard at work again).

These commands for forgiveness seem fairly routine, ethically speaking, but other commands regarding response to the ill-treatment of others seem to require more of us. It is in those commands to love indiscriminately that the true substance of the ethical position becomes clear. In a classic example, Christ tells us

You have heard that it was said, ‘Love your neighbor and hate your enemy.’ But I tell you: Love your enemies, bless those who curse you, do good to those who hate you, and pray for those who persecute you… (Matthew 5:43-44)

This is a powerful text, cited often by pacifists; if this is to be taken literally, violent reaction to aggressors does indeed seem to be proscribed. But for what reason are we to act in this radical way?

…that you may be sons of your Father in heaven. He causes his sun to rise on the evil and the good, and sends rain on the righteous and the unrighteous. If you love those who love you, what reward will you get? Are not even the tax collectors doing that? And if you greet only your brothers, what are you doing more than others? Do not even pagans do that? Be perfect, therefore, as your heavenly Father is perfect. (Matt. 5:45-48)

The parallel account in Luke gives a bit more detail in place of the last sentence above:

…But love your enemies, do good to them, and lend to them without expecting to get anything back. Then your reward will be great, and you will be sons of the Most High, because he is kind to the ungrateful and wicked. Be merciful, just as your Father is merciful. (Luke 6:34-36)

Yoder points out the difficulties with the “be perfect” formulation in Matthew, arguing that “the parallel in Matthew 5:45 and in Luke makes it clear that ‘perfect’ here means

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170 Specifically, the formulation “has for years been made the key to the whole Sermon on the Mount. Perfectionist preachers saw there the promise of an accessible sinlessness; mainstream ethicists turned it around as the proof that the Sermon’s intent is not at all to be obeyed but to prepare people for grace by crushing them under the demand of an attainable Godlikeness.” Yoder prefers the translation “You must therefore be all goodness, just as your heavenly Father is all good” (NEB), though he says even this does not make the point quite clearly (*The Politics Of Jesus*, 116-117).
‘indiscriminate’ or ‘unconditional’ – a quite conceivable, even attainable imperative…the gospel demand…is no more (and no less) than that because God does not discriminate, his disciples are called upon likewise not to discriminate in choosing the objects of their love.”171 This non-discriminating love, to the point of sacrificing ourselves and what is ours, is an ethical requirement because only in this way can we imitate God the Father. Imitation, following the example of the virtuous person (in this case, God the Father; elsewhere, as we will see, God the Son) is one hallmark of virtue theory, and it seems to be the primary reason given here for living a life of peace.

Just prior to this passage (in text cited earlier), Christ sets forth the radical commands for non-resistance – believers are to turn the other cheek, go the extra mile, etc. As already explained, these are cases where Christ commands something beyond the call of (legal, or even ordinary moral) duty: the law says we have the right to refuse and/or seek redress, and ordinary fairness would tell us the same thing. Nonetheless, we should give up the advantage that is rightfully ours, and willingly suffer. In this immediate passage (Matthew 5:38-42), Christ does not tell us why this is the correct course; the reasons given follow the subsequent commands to “love your enemies and pray for those who curse you,” and are those we have just reviewed. Gordon Zerbe suggest a potential range of reasons that might underlie the requirements to turn the other cheek, however, and the two most likely candidates reflect (respectively) virtue theory and consequentialism.

Two potential interpretations regarding motivation, respectively, are that this passage might reflect the resignation of a marginalized people, and that it might be

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171 Yoder, The Politics Of Jesus, 117 (emphasis mine).
eschatological in nature. That is, perhaps Christ is counseling His followers to accept their lot in life, to be pragmatic and realize that pursuing one’s legal right does not pay. On the other hand, maybe He is telling them not to bother because the end times are near, and such trivial things as law are meaningless in the long term.\footnote{Zerbe, 185.} Zerbe rejects these possibilities, however, in favor of two that seem much more likely given the context (viz., that this set of teachings seems to be addressed not only to the marginalized but to those with means as well (subsequent verses discuss what and how to give to the needy)).

The first of these potential interpretations is that

\[\text{[i]t is possible that the exhortation is aimed at modifying the attitude of the abused. Either the willingness to endure a second abuse is meant to destroy the self-consciousness, especially the self-pity, of the abused, or freely chosen action in the face of insurmountable injustice is meant to provide the abused with dignity and some control over the situation. That is, the exhortation ultimately implies the refusal to be subjugated to an oppressor, since the action is determined by the victim. The oppressed serve only their true master.}\footnote{Zerbe, 185.}

The emphasis here is on the person – on habits cultivated, on virtues developed, on becoming a better, stronger, and happier person. The interpretation as a whole has the ring of virtue theory; it is also strikingly similar to certain eastern philosophies, especially that of Gandhi (the destruction of self-pity, the refusal to be subjugated, the conscious selection of who we will serve). If this is a reasonable accounting of the ethical underpinnings of why we should be non-resistant, this is another instance of a virtue-style foundation.

Zerbe thinks that a second rationale is feasibly in play as well, one that is more consequentialist in nature. “It is possible that the provocative response enjoined is meant

\footnote{Zerbe, 185.}
as a protest to shock the abuser and to cause him to reflect, in order ultimately to change the situation.”¹⁷⁴ That is, the pacifist response might be the best one to give because it has the best chance of bringing about a good outcome for all concerned: to fight back would not solve matters, and would likely make them worse; to passively give in results in my harm and does no particular good to the oppressor; but to actively cooperate – such a response allows me to retain my own dignity and integrity (as seen above), and has (arguably) a better chance than any other alternative of changing my adversary’s mind, so that he will treat me better in the future, a result that is better for me and (presumably) for him as well. Thus we return to at least a possible consequentialist element of pacifism, i.e., some justification for pacifism that rests on the consequences of the position. This consequentialism is arguably in the service of, or secondary to, a more character-based ethic, but for the time being, it is enough to observe that to a greater or lesser extent, the teachings of Christ, especially as they relate to pacifism and love of the enemy, appeal to considerations of three major ethical theories: consequences, rules, and character.

The non-Gospel accounts in the New Testament, especially those of St. Paul, provide a good transition point between the Gospels and the beliefs of the early church. Some claim that Paul’s ethic is substantially different from that of Christ, noting that Paul (and other writers) seem to borrow from Stoic and other secular traditions, perhaps in order to make up for a shortcoming in terms of practicality when it comes to Christ’s teachings. Yoder argues that the Stoic-sounding teachings of the New Testament (“Wives, submit to your husbands…Husbands, love your wives” (Colossians 3:18-19)) differ from Stoic thinking in significant ways, and in fact, carry on the radicality of

¹⁷⁴ Zerbe, 185; this is also an important concept in Gandhi’s thinking.
Christ’s teachings. My project here is not one of theology, so I will not analyze these differing interpretations to any great degree; rather, I will present (or re-present) what later New Testament writers may have to say on issues of love and non-resistance, and pinpoint ethical considerations as best I can, making reference to theological interpretations where it seems helpful.175

On that note, I turn briefly to a secondary source, in this case, Yoder’s analysis of Paul’s “Stoic” teachings. These texts do not speak directly to the issue of pacifism, but insofar as the extreme non-resistance of Christ is grounded in the proper (i.e., self-sacrificial) relationships between persons, Paul’s take on this topic is instructive.176 The exhortations to classes of persons are phrased in pairs, telling wife and husband, child and parent, slave and master, how to relate. The teachings resemble Stoicism in that they view a person’s duties as being based on a person’s role. Yoder notes several key differences, however, with two seeming most critical (and relevant to our subject matter). First,

Stoicism addresses man in his dignity and calls upon him to live up the highest vision of himself. This call is addressed to the dominant man in society… The admonition of [New Testament teachings] is addressed first to the subject: to the slave before the master [and so on]…The subordinate person in the social order is addressed as a moral agent… Here we have a faith that assigns personal moral responsibility to those who had no legal or moral status in their culture, and makes of them decision makers.177

Second,

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175 Of course, we must keep in mind that such readings may tell us as much about the theologian’s ethical presuppositions as they do about the authors they are writing about.

176 It is significant, though perhaps not crucial to this project, to note that Paul’s writings do not, chronologically speaking, fall between the views of Christ and the early church. “The epistles clearly written by Paul are obviously the oldest writings we have. When Colossians, Ephesians, and I Peter were written is, just as with the Gospels, a matter of scholarly surmise” (Yoder, The Politics of Jesus, 188 (fn)).

177 Yoder, The Politics of Jesus, 171-172 (emphasis in the original).
Stoicism’s vision of what man truly is and should become is concentrated upon his dignity and detachment; his being free from bondage and obligation. … In New Testament teachings, on the other hand, the center of the [Christian] imperative is a call to willing subordination to one’s partner.178

The extremes required here reflect the extremes required of the believer as he relates to his enemy, whom (we have seen) he is to love and willingly serve – the most serious form of pacifism. Here, it becomes even clearer that this is not meant to dehumanize or minimize the “lesser” person in the relationship; instead, this view is one that empowers such persons, recognizes them as equally free moral agents. It is in this manner that the pacifist must consider himself: as one who willingly and freely acts out of love for his adversary.

The New Testament epistles also speak directly to the moral imperatives of forgiveness, non-violence, and non-retaliation.

To this you were called, because Christ suffered for you, leaving you an example, that you should follow in his steps. … When they hurled their insults at him, he did not retaliate; when he suffered, he made no threats. Instead, he entrusted himself to him who judges justly. (I Peter 2: 21, 23)

Get rid of all bitterness, rage and anger, brawling and slander, along with every form of malice. Be kind and compassionate to one another, forgiving each other, just as in Christ God forgave you. Be imitators of God, therefore, as dearly beloved children, and live a life of love, just as Christ loved us and gave himself up for us as a fragrant offering and sacrifice to God. (Ephesians 4:32-5:2)

These commands are (not surprisingly) the same as those given by Christ: love others, forgive others, sacrifice yourself for others, do not resist those who would harm you.

The reasons given are much the same as well, though even more heavily leaning toward concerns for character, to be achieved by imitation. Yoder points to several reasons given, which he calls “substantial” in the sense that they tell us not only what is

178 Yoder, The Politics of Jesus, 172 (emphasis in the original).
right to do, but why it is right. Concerns for virtue dominate, but consideration of consequences and of rules/fairness are again present. “[The reasons] are all related specifically to the person of Christ and the work of the Church. Sometimes the example of Jesus is specifically referred to,” as seen in the examples above. In addition to being told to follow Christ’s example, especially with regard to forgiveness and loving non-retaliation, we are told to obey the precepts because doing so is fitting to our position as followers of Christ (“as befits one in the Lord”). In both cases, character and imitation are being emphasized: classic Aristotelian concerns.

Consequentialism recurs in references to the witness that believers are to make to unbelievers (“so that some may be won without a word by the behavior of their wives” (I Peter 2:12, 15; 3:1)), and even to rewards that await those who obey (“that it may go well with you” (Ephesians 6:3), “knowing that from the Lord you will receive an inheritance” (Colossians 3:24)). The “what you do, you’ll receive” formulation is invoked here as well (Ephesians 6:8); as has already been discussed, this can be interpreted as consequentialist (if the proper motive for obeying is to be rewarded in turn), but something of the universal law of Kant is there as well: by our choice, we “create” or affirm a universal law by which we are judged as well.

Nonetheless, imitation remains the crucial ethical component with regard to New Testament pacifism, in Christ’s own words (as reported by the chroniclers of His life), and by those advising their own flocks in the aftermath of His time on earth. It is significant that this is in fact the only area in which believers are specifically called to imitate Christ, despite the venerable traditions the church now has of imitating the ascetic

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179 Yoder, The Politics of Jesus, 172.
lifestyle of Christ. Yoder argues that “there is no general concept of living like Jesus in the New Testament”\textsuperscript{180}; though believers throughout history have sought to imitate Christ by being celibate, retreating to the wilderness, leading a small close group of followers, teaching by parables, and so on (and though these practices may be morally acceptable or even commendable), Yoder points out that none of these were championed as important to imitate by Paul or other New Testament writers.

There is thus but one realm in which the concept of imitation holds – but there it holds in every strand of the New Testament literature and all the more strikingly by virtue of the absence of parallels in other realms. This is at the point of the concrete social meaning of the cross in its relation to enmity and power. Servanthood replaces dominion, forgiveness absorbs hostility. Thus – and only thus – are we bound by New Testament thought to ‘be like Jesus.’\textsuperscript{181}

That the life of Christ is regarded as having such importance tells us at least something about the ethical nature of Christianity at its inception.

Yoder is not the only theologian to remark upon this fact: Stanley Hauerwas, in \textit{The Peaceable Kingdom},\textsuperscript{182} points to this emphasis on the life of Christ as significant as well: “It is a startling fact, so obvious that its significance is missed time and time again, that when the early Christians began to witness to the significance of Jesus in their lives they necessarily resorted to a telling of his life.”\textsuperscript{183} Hauerwas grounds the NT ethic even more firmly in virtue ethics when he argues for a crucial relationship between being and doing, that learning to \textit{be} a certain way (viz., a follower of Jesus) is the only way to

\textsuperscript{180} Yoder, \textit{The Politics of Jesus}, 130.

\textsuperscript{181} Yoder, \textit{The Politics of Jesus}, 131.

\textsuperscript{182} London: University of Notre Dame Press, 1983.

\textsuperscript{183} Hauerwas, 73.
understand what being a citizen in the kingdom of God entails,\textsuperscript{184} and \textit{that} is essentially being agent of non-violent love in a violent world. We are to be like God, and (on Hauerwas’s interpretation) “God’s kingship and power consists not in coercion but in God’s willingness to forgive and have mercy on us,” qualities that we, in imitating him, must strive to acquire as well.\textsuperscript{185}

Immediately following the earthly ministry of Christ, then, His followers understood His teachings to mean that the love that believers were to have for all others committed them to non-violence.\textsuperscript{186} As described earlier, this interpretation would hold sway in the church for several centuries, until the rule of Constantine, during which Christianity became the state religion and (not coincidentally) Just War Theory became the norm. A second look at the transformation, and at the varying interpretations from a more modern standpoint as to why the early church was pacifist, is instructive.

Bainton describes the perceived authority of the early church in terms of purity:

…the early Church is frequently regarded as the best qualified to interpret the mind of the New Testament. The history of the Church is viewed by many as a progressive fall from a state of primitive purity, punctuated by reformations which seek a return to pristine excellence. The first church fathers are thus held to have been the best commentators, and if the early Church was pacifist then pacifism is the Christian position. … There is a sense…in which the thought of these fathers was closer to the New Testament than to that of succeeding periods, namely, that

\textsuperscript{184} Hauerwas, 74.

\textsuperscript{185} Hauerwas, 85.

\textsuperscript{186} Although it may appear that I am begging the question here as to the preeminence of pacifism in the New Testament by relying heavily on the interpretations of pacifist theologians, it must be noted that this is the chapter devoted to the roots of pacifism. As such, the understanding of modern theologians as to the Scriptural foundations of their views is clearly relevant. As for alternate interpretations of teachings of the relationship between love and violence, those are more properly located in the discussion of Just War Theory (chapter 2), although some mention of how such a doctrine has been derived from New Testament teachings has been made here as well, e.g., in the analysis of Paul’s teachings on the believer’s obligation to the state.
they operated almost exclusively with New Testament concepts without drawing so heavily as did later generations on classical and Old Testament themes.187

If this is true, then presumably pacifism was the position of the early church (if it indeed was), for one of two reasons: either because Christ was thought to have commanded it (thus reflecting a perception of an ethical obligation to follow such rules), or in imitation of His life (thus reflecting an attempt to be like Christ, to develop the same attitudes and qualities that He displayed).

Most clear examples of pacifism that come down to us from this era are ambiguous. In the story of Marcellus188 we are told of a “large body of captives” who are offered to the bishop Archaelaus; the bishop then takes the case to a pious and wealthy man, Marcellus, who without hesitation offers the required price, and ransoms the prisoners. The story is regarded as evidence of the pacifism of the early church, because the reaction of many of the soldiers, upon being paid the ransom, was to turn to God (“very many of them were added to the faith of our Lord Jesus Christ…”) with the evidently obvious corollary of renouncing violence (“…and threw off the belt of military service”).189 There is no explicit reference to the reason Marcellus acts as he does, or the reason faith in Christ is taken to entail leaving the military.

What evidence there is of ethical underpinnings there are to the lauded actions in this case points to something like virtue theory. Marcellus is described not as doing his duty, or as following any particular rule, or even as trying to maximize the good results;

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189 The remaining soldiers either withdraw to camp without taking their fair share of the ransom, or leave entirely, taking nothing at all.
the effective moral factors are said to be his piety, munificence, and pity. One might think that justice would require refusing to pay for those unlawfully detained, but Marcellus does it without hesitation, and even in a way that treats the soldiers well: he distributes the gifts in such a way “that they seemed to be presents rather than purchase-moneys.” He then goes on to feed and care for the erstwhile captives in grand style, and with his own hand, “in this imitating our father Abraham the patriarch.”

If we review Marcellus’s response to this instance of violence in light of New Testament teachings, we see that it is both obedient to the commands of Christ (protect the innocent, but love the aggressor as well) and a remarkable imitation of Christ’s example (smoothing the waters, making converts, bringing justice to an unjust situation by way of radically self-sacrificing actions).

Bainton (and most other historians) point to Tertullian as the most unambiguous from this period on the subject of war; part of the clarity of his position can be seen from his insistence on pacifism (for believers) on grounds of principle, not (merely) on practical grounds (e.g., the danger of idolatry). He acknowledges the presence of Christians in the military, arguing “that Christians serve in the army and that the courage of the martyrs proves that Christians would be good soldierly material, were it not that their rule of life requires them to be killed rather than to kill.” As many others of the time do, he points to the idolatry (sacrifices, etc.) connected to service in the military as

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190 Archelaus, 179. That the soldiers had acted unjustly is revealed in great detail: they had set upon a peaceable group that was worshipping, and without attempting to discover their ends (though arguably – the leader of the worshipers notes – taking them to be an ambush), killed or wounded almost two thousand, and brutally drove the rest – including women and children, and the elderly – on a death march, for three days without rest (180).

191 Archelaus, 180.

possibly problematic, but this concern is not his primary one, especially since such things were generally only required of officers. The central problem Tertullian noted was this: “The military oath cannot be reconciled with loyalty to God, the banner of Christ is unfurled against the banner of Satan, the camp of light is opposed to the camp of darkness. The Christian cannot serve two masters….A soldier must have a sword and Christ has taken away the Christian’s sword when he disarmed Peter.”

Tertullian is not the only pacifist among the early church theologians, though he is the clearest. Others, however, make similar arguments. Arnobius argues that the Pax Romana was the result of the peaceableness of Christians: “for since we in such numbers have learned from the precepts and laws of Christ not to repay evil with evil, to endure injury rather than inflict it, to shed our own blood rather than to stain our hands and conscience with the blood of another, the ungrateful world now long owes to Christ this [peace].” Lactantius points to the disconnect between what God requires and what is permissible by law: “God in prohibiting killing discountenances not only brigandage, which is contrary to human laws, but also that which men regard as legal. Participation in warfare therefore will not be legitimate to a just man whose military service is justice itself.” A number of ecclesiastical writers clearly object to killing rather than simply being in the military, advising (or even requiring, as circumstances dictate) that Christians take part (non-violent) police duty, but refuse to kill; the Canons of Hippolytus make this distinction, as does the Council of Arles, and Clement of Alexandria explains

193 Ryan, 18.


195 De Habitu Virginum XI [also from Bainton (ibid)]
the distinction by saying that “if a soldier is converted while in the army he may remain, but he becomes subject to a divine commander.”¹⁹⁶  (Perhaps unsurprisingly, Tertullian is one of the few who does not make this distinction, asking “How will a Christian take part in war, nay, how will he serve even in peace?”¹⁹⁷) Each of these assertions clearly goes beyond merely a just-war pacifism: the understanding is not that believers must not murder, or kill unjustly, but that we must not kill at all, somehow as a condition of our being believers – because God (in the person of Christ, presumably) has placed an absolute prohibition upon doing so, and/or because as followers of Christ, we are no longer the sorts of people who can bear the death of another human being, a potential (or actual) brother or sister in Christ.¹⁹⁸

Not all church fathers spoke in such absolute terms, of course, and it is clear from the data available to us that Christians did serve in the military before the time of Constantine, and not merely in a peaceable capacity. Some argue that pacifism is the minority position, or even a heretical one. At best, the evidence that we have of the early church’s position with regard to war is generally unclear; and of course, if it is hard to know what position was taken, it is even more difficult to understand why it was taken. We are left primarily with dueling interpretations of the facts: non-pacifists must account for the numerous cases in which Christians, upon conversion, retire from the military, or are asked to, or – in the most extreme cases – are martyred for their refusal to fight. Pacifists, on the other hand, must account for the fact that soldiers were members of the


¹⁹⁷ De Itolatria XIX.

¹⁹⁸ Minucius Felix says that Christians cannot bear to see a man killed (Bainton, “The Early Church and War,” 198-200).
early church, and that they were not excommunicated on those grounds. Either sort of explanation, while difficult to pinpoint with absolute certainty, is useful for highlighting the respective views of those who came later.

Bainton notes that explanations for the former (instances of pacifism) are generally explained in one of two ways. Catholics tend to introduce Thomistic considerations: “The fathers are said to have objected to military service because of the danger of idolatry in the army or because of aversion to Rome, the persecutor.” The perceived reason for refusing to fight on this interpretation, then, is not one of principled pacifism, i.e., non-violent love of the enemy, but adherence to some other standard that would be violated by being a member of the army, e.g., the command not to worship other gods. Any principled pacifism is attributed to heresy. Protestants explain early pacifism another way, as a result of the peculiar eschatology of the early church: if the world is ending soon, there is really nothing worth fighting for. On this account, presumably, fighting might be permissible if it is regarded as necessary for fulfilling long-term ethical objectives, such as displaying justice or compassion, and was avoided at the time only because such objectives were perceived as unreachable and/or non-existent. In either case (i.e., the Catholic or Protestant interpretation), the early church would be thought to be living under the rule of something like just war theory, but in such circumstances (real or perceived) that war was not just for believers at that time.

Modern-day (or more modern than the early church, at any rate) Christian pacifists take the early church’s position to be that of pacifism, and that it was properly so, rather than for heretical reasons. They explain the presence of practicing soldiers on

\[199\] Bainton, *Christian Attitudes Toward War and Peace*, 67.
the membership lists of the early church using reasoning similar to that of Yoder, as described above: viz., the soldiers in question are not bearers of the sword that kills as an instrument of war, but of the sword of the police, a non-violent civic role that can be held by even those who take Christ’s commands to love the enemy and turn the other cheek, literally. The emphasis here (at least as I have described it) was perceived to be, again, the influence of Christ, both His exemplary life and His words.

Discovering the underlying ethical presuppositions in Anabaptist and Quaker views is made at the same time easier and more complicated by the fact that more writings, and less ambiguous ones (having been written nearer to (and/or in) our own time), exist that lay out denomination creeds and so on, quite clearly. The two positions have much in common, including but not limited to their roles as historic peace churches, such roles resulting from their fairly literal interpretation of Christ’s words in the New Testament – the same interpretation, in fact, as has set forth in the preceding pages. On the other hand, as we have seen, the two groups do have not insignificant differences: for example, while Anabaptists have (at least historically) emphasized separation, Quakers emphasize conscience, with the corollary that since even secular leaders are capable of doing good, separation is not the appropriate action to take with regard to the violence of the world. Yoder describes at least one Mennonite take on Anabaptist pacifism as “The Nonpacifist Nonresistance of the Mennonite ‘Second Wind.’” I believe that Yoder’s own (critical) response to this “dualist” position, in connection with what he

200 In what follows, I will focus on the beliefs of Mennonites as a representation of the Anabaptist belief system in general, though other branches (e.g., the Brethren) remain active today as well.

201 Yoder, Nevertheless, 107-114. He lists at least two other versions of pacifism of which Mennonites might be considered prime examples (Pacifism of the Virtuous Minority and Pacifism of Cultural Isolation); these will be referred to briefly below, but this version is the most specifically Mennonite of the three.
writes elsewhere on the issues of pacifism and the teachings of Christ, constitutes an alternative Mennonite – or at least Anabaptist – pacifist position. Accordingly, we will next examine (albeit briefly) both views, as well as that of that of the Quakers, below.

Yoder describes the historical context of the Mennonite “Second Wind” as one of emergence and retreat: Mennonites, part of the old tradition of the Anabaptist pacifism, began to emerge from their cultural isolation (“began to seek to communicate to the English-speaking world around them”) around World War I, identified at first with the anti-war movement of the first part of the century, but – upon a “second look” – began to recognize the serious differences between their own form of pacifism and that espoused by the general pacifist movement of the time.202 These differences related to both the principles and the actions involved:

Some of the positions taken by those pacifists were not specifically Christian in their orientation. Some of them placed so much trust in the goodness of human nature that they had not faced the deep need for suffering in the cause of divine love. Some were not ready to pay the price for full consistency in the rejection of all war. Some were unjustifiably optimistic about the capacity of an unregenerate society to solve its problems without breakage.203

An analysis of what was being rejected reveals indirectly that at least two metaphysical presuppositions are being made: that human beings are fundamentally flawed (at both the personal and the community level), and that self-sacrifice is required in any attempt to offset or correct for these flaws. Yoder continues:

[These non-Mennonite peace groups] failed to recognize the moral compromise in their own willingness to resort to nonviolent types of coercion, or to make exceptions for an international “peace-keeping” army. In their optimism about

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202 Yoder, Nevertheless, 109. These movements included the Peace Pledge Union and the Fellowship of Reconciliation.

203 Yoder, Nevertheless, 109-110.
doing away with violence within a society, they failed to observe that that the threat of force is part of what keeps the peace.\textsuperscript{204}

The implication is that this form of pacifism prohibits not only force, but also the threat of force, or any other form of coercion. Cady refers to the view as “absolute pacifism of cultural stereotype”: “…the view that it is wrong always, everywhere, for anyone to use force against another human being. Here force is understood to mean an imposition of physical strength.”\textsuperscript{205} Cady mentions at least two potential grounds that one might have for holding such a view, viz., religious (he gives Tolstoy as an example, but Tolstoy’s words\textsuperscript{206} sound remarkably like the Anabaptist and Tertullian interpretations of the New Testament) and secular (for example, the Kantian dictum to treat one another as ends and not merely as means).\textsuperscript{207}

We will deal with the latter sort of position later; Mennonites, it is clear, had something more like (or exactly like) the former as grounds for their beliefs – but with one further elaboration. Mennonites adopted “a newly respectable systematic ethical dualism”: that is, they started referring to their position as one of “nonresistance” (as opposed to “pacifism”), and argued that there is a radical disconnect between the believer (or even more specifically, the Mennonite or “New Testament Christian” believer) and the state, such that what is wrong for one might be right for the other. Mennonite theologian Guy Hershberger, for example, rejects Tolstoy’s position as non-biblical on

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\item \textsuperscript{204} Yoder, \textit{Nevertheless}, 109-110.
\item \textsuperscript{205} Cady, 58.
\item \textsuperscript{206} Cady quotes Tolstoy’s “Address to the Swedish Peace Congress in 1909”: “[Christianity’s] fundamental teaching is the love of God and one’s neighbor...that is of all men without distinction. And therefore it would seem inevitable that we must repudiate one of the two, either Christianity with its love of God and one’s neighbors, or the State with its armies and wars” (\textit{The Kingdom of God Is Within You}, translated by Aylmer Maude (Oxford: Oxford UP, 1936; rpt. 1951), 586).
\item \textsuperscript{207} Cady, 58.
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the grounds that it is anarchist: “Biblical nonresistance declines to participate in the coercive functions of the state, but nevertheless regards coercion necessary for the maintenance of order in a sinful society, and is not anarchistic.”

Tolstoy, he felt, was too optimistic about the inherent goodness of man. The coercive state, Hershberger believed, was necessary, but Christians should not participate in it.

Yoder’s analysis of this dualist view gives some insight into his own position, at least by subtraction. That is, while he is clearly critical of the position, he does not take issue with the element of absolute pacifism, but instead objects to the dualist, or even more specifically, the isolationist, aspects of the position. Yoder characterizes as weaknesses of the view that it “implicitly denies both missionary and ecumenical concern”; that by making itself politically irrelevant, by extension it makes Christ “a cardboard figure outside the real world”; and that it “concedes to government…a mandate to wage war which goes far beyond the substance of the New Testament view of the state.”

The dualistic nature of this version of Anabaptist pacifism is clearly what Yoder is objecting to; he makes no criticism of the absolute pacifism of the view here, and explicitly endorses it elsewhere.

We have already seen this endorsement indirectly, in his interpretation of the NT teachings of Christ and St. Paul. He makes own view more explicit in *What Would You Do?*, in which he responds at some length to the question often posed for pacifists: what

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209 Hershberger rejected Gandhi’s ethics for other reasons: theologically, he disapproved of self-improved suffering to appease the gods (as opposed to accepted – but not sought-out – suffering by Christians who seek merely to be obedient to the example of Christ); and ethically, he considered Gandhi’s strategy of nonviolent pressure on the government, by strikes, press, and other means, to be a form of immoral coercion – “a new form of warfare” (190-192).

would you do if a family member was threatened? This is posed almost as a rhetorical question, where the “right” answer is supposed to be obvious: “I would kill to defend my wife/child.” Yoder’s response to the question is two-fold: he clarifies assumptions being made by the questioner, assumptions which artificially restrict the potential responses, and argues that with once corrections are made, the expected answer is not so obviously correct even in the personal case; he then goes on to point out the multitude of dissimilarities between the personal case and that of war, arguing that even if killing were justified in the personal case, it would not clearly follow that it is justified in the case of inter-state warfare.

In the course of his argument, he makes numerous points that have already been raised with regard to the words of Christ. Yoder argues first that the Christian is commanded to love his enemy, not merely out of self-interest (hoping to be treated well in return) or self-respect (as one who has the discipline to arise above simple retaliation), but as a test of whether we can love as God loves: “I seek to deal with the aggressor as God in Christ has dealt with me – or as I would wish to be dealt with….In fact, thinking through the options may make obedience harder. The simple, loving Christian may never have thought through the situation but still responds out of God’s love for oneself.”

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211 The presumed options are either to kill (the attacker) or to allow the death of the innocent victim; Yoder notes that there are both natural and providential alternatives (possible ways in which the tragedy may be averted with neither party dying), and observes that we should not take so easily for granted that my attempted lethal defense will be successful (if I try to kill the attacker and fail, I will probably make matters worse), nor that the victim would wish to be defended by lethal force.

212 Among the many differences that Yoder note are differences in guilt of the person being killed (virtually unquestionable in the person case; highly suspect in cases of war, where individual soldiers have likely had no hand in whatever injustice is being fought over), the likelihood of collateral damage and escalation (low in the personal case, high in the case of war), issues of jurisdiction and authority (fairly clear in personal cases, murky in cases of war), and so on (20-24).

Furthermore, the Christian is (or at least ought to be) primarily guided by the urge to live the proper kind of life: “Committed Christians…guide their lives not so much by ‘How can I avoid doing wrong?’ or even ‘How can I do the right?’ as by ‘How can I be a reconciling presence in the life of my neighbor?’ From this perspective, I might justify firm nonviolent restraint, but certainly never killing.”\textsuperscript{214} A third point of emphasis is the rejection of egoism: egocentric egoism, Yoder argues, is the “really refined temptation” of “good” people, in that such a view leads one to “claim oneself to be the incarnation of a good and righteous cause for which others may rightly be made to suffer. It is stating self-justification in the form of duty to others.”\textsuperscript{215} Yoder concludes his argument with another appeal to imitation: “What I should do would be illuminated by what God my Father did when his ‘only begotten Son’ was being threatened…. [M]y calling to respond to a threat with sacrificial love is founded in a confession: the Jesus who gave his life at our hands is at one and the same time the revelation of that true humanity which is God’s instrument in the world.”\textsuperscript{216}

The general ethical tenor of Yoder’s position is most clearly related to virtue theory: we ought not to be concerned with rules, with calculating who is owed what, but simply with being a particular kind of person, a good person, a loving person, who will in every instance act at the same time naturally and properly, if they are following the loving example of God. Alternately, the approach might be seen as an deontological commitment to a rule of unconditional love, but as Yoder points out, with rules there is the temptation to use one’s own reason with regard to exceptions and selecting among

\textsuperscript{214} Yoder, \textit{Nevertheless}, 40.

\textsuperscript{215} Yoder, \textit{Nevertheless}, 42.

\textsuperscript{216} Yoder, \textit{Nevertheless}, 42.
recipients – a strong enough “rule” could override such potential weaknesses, but Yoder clearly believes that the virtuous-exemplar route is the most appropriate.

The reasons for adding the additional dualist element of the alternative Mennonite position is less easy to pinpoint. In some ways, the issue seems to be a meta-ethical one, and/or one that points toward some form of relativism, in which ethical judgments are not regarded as objectively true or false. If it is absolutely wrong for me to kill, but right for you to do so, at least sometimes, then apparently the same moral code does not apply to both of us. Alternatively, however, we could be operating under a universal moral standard, but one which dictates different actions for us based on our positions in life; this is an ethical position that we see in Plato (the *Republic*), and Aristotle, as well as in other philosophies both ancient and modern. On this view, what is morally right depends upon one’s position in a community. As we have seen, JWT has its own version of this: almost since the beginning, clergy have been exempt from fighting, on the grounds that they had a different role to play in the community, one that was incompatible with fighting.217 This seems to more clearly match the dualist pacifist position: after all, they do not regard their own refusal to use violence or coercion as just an alternative, but as the most correct way to behave – whatever alternatives there are for those who do not practice it are necessary only because of some current inability to meet the higher standards, rendering it understandable, perhaps even acceptable, but certainly not ideal, for “others” to utilize violence in some cases.

Yoder himself specifies several versions of such a dualist pacifism, including “The Pacifism of the Virtuous Minority” and “The Pacifism of Cultural Isolation.” The

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217 On these grounds, Aquinas excludes clergy from his general allowance for Christians to fight in a just war; Eastern religions (e.g., Jainism) often make such exceptions as well.
former (of which the most obvious example is again Mennonites) has explicit virtue
theory underpinnings:

Only if we recognize that ethics is not generalizable are we free to use in a
wholesome way the concept of virtue, of good that is intrinsic in certain kinds of
action or character. This pattern of thought is demanded by biblical language
with its catalogs of virtues and vices. It is strongly supported, not only by the
tradition of monastic self-discipline, but also by the stoic naturalism of the
modern person’s self-cultivation. Violence is a vice to be avoided. Nonviolence
or meekness is a virtue and to be cultivated.\(^{218}\)

Of course, this virtue element relates again to the pacifism, not to the dualism or
relativism; this ethical exception seems to be grounded in either something like fairness
(on the grounds that Christians, in electing to believe, commit themselves to following
the Gospel, something that is difficult for those that “cannot equally draw upon the
resources of forgiveness and regeneration, the guidance of the Spirit, and the counsel of
fellow believers”\(^ {219}\)) or simple birthright, as in the case of Cultural Isolation (Mennonites
are once again cited as the prime example; pacifism is a cultural issue much like plain
dress – something regarded as correct for the “in-group,” but not at all expected of others,
even other Christians\(^ {220}\)).

The Quaker position is (and has always been) explicitly opposed to this dualist or
separationist view. As mentioned earlier, Bainton characterizes these views as
pessimistic (Mennonites) and optimistic (Quakers), and attributes these qualities to the
natures of the origin of the two groups – Mennonites under threat of death, Quakers
merely under threat of imprisonment. Accordingly, Quakers have historically been
committed not merely to being pacifists, but to pursuing peace as a real-world goal, and

\(^{218}\) Yoder, *Nevertheless*, 80.

\(^{219}\) Yoder, *Nevertheless*, 78.

\(^{220}\) Yoder, *Nevertheless*, 99-100.
to working with (secular) governments to bring this goal about. Yoder notes a number of qualities that all their work on this matter has in common, all of which point to the non-isolationist nature of their beliefs, and two of these qualities are of significance to our project. For one thing, although Quakers identify unapologetically with their heritage, they work to make their research and proposals accessible for those with different or even non-existent theological backgrounds:

This acceptance of the language of ‘the others’ or of ‘the authorities’ includes a theologically conscious adjustment to the awareness that one cannot directly impose gospel language and values on the wiser world; yet the Quakers refuse to grant that that recognition cuts them off from speaking.221

Clearly, whatever moral code is thought to be in play here is regarded as at least potentially applicable to anyone, rather than just to those of a certain cultural background or religious belief.

The second key element tells us more directly what moral code is thought to apply, viz., fairness. “The process is dictated by the conviction that both (or all) sides of a tense situation not only need to be heard, but have a right to have their concerns taken account of in any situation. This is the operational import of the old Quaker phrase, speaking to that of God in every man”222 (a feature of Quaker thought that we have already noted). Such a view – that every person should be treated as a rational individual, an end in himself and not merely a means – is clearly more Kantian than anything else, although other Quaker practices, such as waiting in silence for God to make His will known, and then acting upon what one feels He requires, regardless of the

221 Yoder, Nevertheless, 147.

222 Yoder, Nevertheless, 147.
sacrifice necessary, speak to the self-purification that is characteristic both of pacifism generally and virtue theory generally.

Pervading all of the forms of pacifism we have been discussing thus far – New Testament, Early Church, Anabaptist, Quaker – has been the additional element of Divine Command Theory. That is, to some extent all regard self-sacrificial love as morally obligatory because it is what Christ commanded. For the most part, however, this is linked with other considerations, viz., of why Christ commanded it – whether because doing so is the fairest way to act, or the way that best reflects the sort of person God calls us to be, or both. Still, the fact that (on one interpretation) the Bible tells us to be pacifist is regarded as an important reason to be so. Just War Theorists, as we have already noted, interpret the Bible differently, and one of the things that non-pacifist believers often point to in support of their position is the violent nature of the Old Testament, which records numerous wars and other acts of violence permitted, commanded, or led by God. We have already accounted for the (sometimes differing) Christian interpretation of these events; the question of the non-Christian (specifically, Jewish) interpretation of (what Christians call) the Old Testament remains – is there such a thing as Jewish pacifism, and if so, what grounds it (since it can at most be indirectly attributed to the teachings of Jesus Christ)?

One consistent element in all discussions of the Jewish war/peace tradition is the observation that the usual view of the Old Testament (the most common source of information for many with regard to early Jewish history) as an ongoing story of carnage and bloodshed, pursued at God’s command, is entirely inaccurate. Yoder addresses the matter early on in Politics, recognizing that we cannot understand the teachings of Jesus
to His fellow Jews without taking into account their common understanding of their history as a people of God. He points out that “[o]ne of the traits of the Old Testament story, sometimes linked with bloody battles but also sometimes notably free of violence, is the identification of YHWH as the God who saves his people without their needing to act.”²²³ What instances of “bloody battles” there are, are often characterized as “the outworking of the unwillingness of Israel, especially of the kings, to trust YHWH”²²⁴ – that is, they are not (at least as a rule) instances of divinely-sanctioned crusaders, wars willed and approved by God. Rather, the lesson in the Old Testament is the same as in the New: do not worry about your own life, but trust God for protection.

The teachings of non-retaliation are not new either, despite the typical interpretation of Jesus’ new teachings’ supplanting the diametrically opposed old laws of strict retaliation. Gordon M. Zerbe notes a number of instances of such pacifist teachings in the Jewish scripture, in such diverse writings as The Counsels of Wisdom (an Akkadian collection written around 700 BCE), the book of Proverbs, Joseph and Aseneth, ³ Maccabees, and the writings of Solomon: these writings advise non-retaliation at both the personal and socio-political level. Some sound remarkably like the New Testament texts we have already addressed; The Counsels of Wisdom, for example, exhorts:

Do not return evil to the man who disputes with you;
Requite with kindness your evil-doer,
Maintain justice to your enemy,
Smile on your adversary.²²⁵

²²³ Yoder, The Politics of Jesus, 76.
²²⁴ Yoder, The Politics of Jesus, 80 (with reference to 2 Chronicles 16).
The underpinnings for such recommendations vary according to the domain of the problem: reasons include the pragmatic/utilitarian, the aretaic, and the eschatological. At the local level, some say we should be kind to our enemies in order to “pacify” them, or to avoid more extensive legal problems (clearly a utilitarian consideration – i.e., being peaceful just gets the best results); others (especially Proverbs) say that, at least in the case of conflicts with those close to us, we ought to be motivated by love and forgiveness, because this is the best way to be, and the best way to maintain important relationships.\textsuperscript{226} Utilitarian reasons may apply at higher-level conflicts as well; in Proverbs (24:17-18, 25:21-22) and elsewhere, “the response of kindness in relation to one’s adversary is also related to the hope for mastery over one’s opponent.”\textsuperscript{227} The most common reason for sufferance of political oppression, however, is the “certainty of God’s deliverance and vengeance”\textsuperscript{228} – a desire for justice, perhaps, or an expectation or hope that the evil-doer will receive punishment more severe than the sufferer could hope to inflict himself. Zerbe does not characterize these views as pacifist when taken as a whole, however: “while favoring the policy of conciliation both [Philo and Joseph and Aseneth] acknowledge the legitimate role of the sword of the righteous to effect vengeance.”\textsuperscript{229}

Jewish arguments on behalf of pacifism have been made, however. For example, in addition to Yoder’s suggestion as to how violence in the ancient Hebrew world ought to be understood, as seen above, he elsewhere describes what he explicitly refers to as the

\textsuperscript{226} Zerbe, 34-105.
\textsuperscript{227} Zerbe, 48.
\textsuperscript{228} Zerbe, 104 (cf. 48, 105).
\textsuperscript{229} Zerbe, 104.
pacifism of second-century Judaism, “the Pacifism of the Rabbinic Monotheism.”

This form of pacifism has an explicitly religious basis: radical monotheism dictates the belief that God is in charge of the world, and can protect us if we allow Him to do so – trying to defend ourselves demonstrates a lack of trust. God’s control of the world as a whole, including other nations and leaders, means that all are used according to God’s plan, a plan that can include suffering both to chastise for sin and to demonstrate something about God’s nature. This point of view reflects the eschatological basis described above: we are to refrain from violence because God will (eventually) take care of everything. Furthermore, Jews of this time period recognize their status as a minority people amidst an often hostile majority; trust in, and obedience to, God, allows such a minority to be at peace and even prosper – a fairly utilitarian motivation. Divine Command Theory recurs as well, in the understanding of the nature of God’s covenant law: “God as moral legislator abhors bloodshed. The first social sin in Genesis (chap. 4) was fratricide; God condemned the sin but saved the killer’s life. The only social demand of the covenant with Noah (chap. 9) was to abstain from bloodshed.” Some (including other Jews) find this form of pacifism too subservient, too lacking in dignity, but it is undeniably present in Jewish tradition.

Other Jewish arguments for pacifism have been made. In “Nonviolence in the Talmud,” for example, Reuven Kimelman argues that nonviolence is the most appropriate response in each of three contexts – to enmity, to intent to inflict injury, and

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to persecution.\textsuperscript{232} In the opening sentences of his argument, he states that a nonviolent response will be more effective than a violent one: “not by force shall man prevail.”\textsuperscript{233} He makes similar consequentialist arguments elsewhere, pointing to scripture and scriptural commentary to make the case that showing love for your enemy will incite respect in him for you, that demonstrating concretely that you are not a threat will allow your assailant’s aggression to subside, and that “the means one chooses to respond to an assailant will largely determine his reaction.”\textsuperscript{234}

The overall thrust of his argument is explicitly non-consequentialist, however:

[In the story of Jacob and Esau], it could never be claimed that the end justifies the means. As long as there is no distinction in the means there is no distinction in the moral right to victory. One can claim no moral superiority as long as the same tactics are employed, even though there may be two disparate goals. By their means shall you judge them…\textsuperscript{235}

Nonviolence can be, and has been, an effective response to violence, but that is not why – at least not the only reason why – we should do it. He argues that “the means employed determine the end achieved”: the pacifist so abhors the evil of violence that he refuses to use that evil to obtain anything,\textsuperscript{236} even an end to that evil, because such an end is not actually attainable by means contrary to it, and, even more importantly, because using such means is immoral, on principle. To ground this argument, Kimelman appeals to such sources as the story of Jacob, in which even killing in self-defense was called murder; he also points to general precepts dealing with Israel’s identity as the people of


\textsuperscript{233} Kimelman, 20.

\textsuperscript{234} Kimelman, 21-24.

\textsuperscript{235} Kimelman, 26.

\textsuperscript{236} Kimelman, 24
God, viz., “that he not choose the way of violence even to overthrow his oppressors,” that “there can be no violence without sin,” and that “if physical suffering is to be inflicted he would rather be the inflicted rather than the inflictor” – the former is the only real way to retain one’s humanity. A critical item of Jewish faith is involved here: “God is always on the side of the persecuted even though he be pursued for his wickedness,” from which it follows that “it…[is] impossible for even righteous indignation to be a motive for inflicting suffering.” Ultimately, Kimelman’s interpretation yields what appears to be a duty-based form of nonviolence: one has a duty to refrain from violence, even in the face of injustice or other provocation, with the understanding that God desires such action, and will reward it accordingly.

Another element of this form of pacifism is the ideal of the hasid:

The hasid was not one who stood on his legal rights, but always sought a solution which would find favor in the eyes of God. He was a self-sufferer who avoided the remotest possibility of doing harm. He sought good and shunned evil. Quick to forgive, he was pacific in human relationships, basing his life on what he had learned. Valuing life above possessions, he never arrogated anything to himself. Above all he sought to prevent injury and acted lovingly toward his fellowman.

Kimelman describes David as a prototype of the hasid. As we will see, this character type recurs in many major religions and philosophies, with Jesus Christ as a prime example.

The man of peace is not limited to western religions, either: idealized historical figures in eastern religions also share these character traits, as does Gandhi’s description

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237 Kimelman, 22-25.
238 Kimelman, 25.
239 Kimelman, 25.
240 Kimelman, 25.
of the satyagrahi. Forms of pacifism found in eastern religions share other elements with those of western religions, but there are clear differences as well, ones that go beyond those points that distinguish western versions from one another. We move next to examining pacifism in eastern religions, in terms of history as well as moral grounding, in order to determine just what they do have in common with forms of pacifism we have already reviewed.

B. Pacifism in Eastern Religions

Eastern religions (at least those emphasizing nonviolence) display much of the same range of views with regard to war as do Western ones, although the overall trend is more heavily pacifist. Views are often also broader in scope concerning who (or what) has the right to be dealt with nonviolently. Underlying presuppositions about the nature of life, the afterlife, and the universe in general often lead to the same conclusions as western monotheism, but for different reasons – for example, one may derive equally firm principles of nonviolence from belief in reincarnation or belief in a just God, but the resulting philosophies will be significantly, though not necessarily wholly, different. In what follows, I will look at the differences (and similarities) between Jainism, Hinduism, and Buddhism, before concluding with an analysis of possibly the most famous of eastern(-influenced) pacifists, the Mahatma Gandhi.

Jainism provides a clear initial contrast with western pacifist views. The religion has a much more inclusive view of the relative values of the lives of living beings (and is accordingly more hesitant to take any life) than its western counterparts; whereas the latter tend to view the non-human elements of the world as secondary in value to human
beings$^{241}$, Jainism says that “every life unit (jīva) has equal value,”$^{242}$ and that almost everything is a life unit – a rock, a tree, a mountain, a drop of water, fire, and of course, animals and human beings. Such a belief proscribes the actions of human beings in a predictably serious way: all Jains are strict vegetarians (vegetables are only “one-sensed,” so it is less problematic to harm them than to harm multi-sensed beings), and monks limit food intake, renounce personal possessions, and may not dig, bathe, light or extinguish fires, or fan (the air), “in order to protect earth, water, fire, and air bodies, respectively.”$^{243}$ Not surprisingly, violence against human beings is strictly prohibited for those in religious orders, although laypersons are allowed to take life in some instances: “Jain householders may sweep their houses, grind their grain, and store water in jars. They may also protect their crops from pests and kill other persons in self-defense.”$^{244}$

As for Catholic just-war theorists, then, the permissibility of committing any violence towards persons (or for Jains, towards any living thing) varies according to one’s role in life, but in Jainism, a marked pacifist trend is evident even for laypersons. The ethical motivation for this view seems to be primarily consequential, almost a form of ethical egoism. It is based on a particular religious view with regard to life: the goal of life is to become detached, liberated from the passion and impurity of the world. In order

$^{241}$Some view animals, etc., as things that deserve respect and compassion, and to which are owed a duty of stewardship; others, of course, see all non-human elements of the world as having strictly utilitarian value. In other words, there is a continuum here as well.


$^{244}$ Gier, 29.
to escape this bondage of karma, the most important step is the vow of non-injury (\textit{ahimsā}). Nonviolence, then, is valued because of the valuable consequences that (potentially/eventually) attend it. There no attendant duty to compassion; since detachment is the goal, refusal to commit violence is by definition not motivated by love or rational duty, and furthermore, an agent’s intention has no bearing on whether karma accrues (negative consequences follow even in when the agent is unaware that he has caused the death of a living being, as when he crushes an insect while walking).\footnote{Gomez, Luis O., “Nonviolence and the Self in Early Buddhism,” in \textit{Inner Peace, World Peace}, edited by Kenneth Kraft (SUNY Press, Albany: 1992), 38-39.}

Clearly, neither Kantianism\footnote{There might be an argument to be made here on behalf of something like Kantianism, in that fairness seems to be an issue: ‘all lives are equal’ yields the conclusion ‘therefore no life should be taken [without strong reason]’ only if some principle of ‘equal lives \(\rightarrow\) equal treatment’ is presupposed. However, the fact that intention is regarded as morally secondary tells against this being a grounding principle of the view.} nor Aristotelianism nor anything like them is a motivating factor here.

Hinduism’s prohibition of violence is similarly utilitarian, and similarly (or even more) relative. “We … characterize Hindu nonviolence as relative for a number of reasons: (1) the prohibition against killing is relative to the person, yogis and Brahmins taking the vow most strictly; (2) it is also relative to the occasion, such as killing in war, in self-defense, and in sacrifice; and (3) it is relative to individual self-interest.”\footnote{Gier, 34.} Again, we see a clergy-laity divide, where killing is permitted by some people, at some times. Furthermore, the motive for whatever level of pacifism does exist is again consequentialist, rather than deontological or aretaic: “Ascetics may not have applied \textit{ahimsā} basically because of the good of other beings, but because of their own spiritual good. Violence, even when socially pragmatic, is an expression of bad or mixed motives
which harm the doer himself”248 – apparently, a form of egoism rather than a utilitarian form of consequentialism. Nonviolence for Hinduism is conceived of primarily in an instrumental way, rather than being a form of self-sacrifice for the good of the whole.249

As they have been described above, it may seem odd that Jainism and Hinduism have been included under the rubric of pacifism, when they seem in many ways to more closely resemble Just War Theory (or possibly some view even further down the spectrum, such as realism or CT): for both, violence is regrettable, but permitted when necessary for self-defense or defense of community. Nonetheless, I have included them here because of their association with more unambiguously pacifist views, with one practitioner in particular standing out, viz., M. K. Gandhi. Gandhi is often regarded as one of the most significant and influential pacifists of modern times, and his motivation is inextricably tied to both of these views, in that Hinduism was his own family religion, and Jainism had “a profound influence through his friendship with the Jain saint Raichandcharya.”250

Despite these associations, however, Nicholas Gier argues that Gandhi’s pacifism is most clearly based on a third major eastern religion, Buddhism: “…even though Gandhi uses the language of Vedānta, it is a Pāli Buddhist view of the self as a process rather than permanent substance that best suits his political activism and pragmatic concept of nonviolence.”251 I will conclude this account of religious forms of pacifism

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249 Gier, 35.

250 Gier, 29.

251 Gier, 3.
with a discussion of Buddhism and Gandhi, looking first at what Buddhism itself has to say about war and peace, and then at Gandhi’s own position on war, which has links to Buddhism and other religions.

To make any generalizations with regard to “the Buddhist position” is nearly as difficult as doing so for “the Christian position” – in both cases, there are numerous subgroups whose interpretations of the underlying “theology” differ at least to some degree, ranging from the strictest pacifism up to and including, in both cases, a set of requirements for just war. In fact, the historical progressions of Buddhism and of Christianity in this regard are also surprisingly similar: like the earliest Christian sects, early Buddhism was strictly pacifist, and like Christianity, Buddhism was later to bow to the practical concerns of protecting the homeland, establishing a form of JWT while still forbidding clerics to take a life. Despite such concessions, however, Buddhism is more identified with pacifism today than is Christianity, both in the popular imagination and in the way that adherents of each view themselves and their history.

Buddhist pacifism can be viewed as taking two forms: the pure pacifism of early Buddhism, and the modified pacifism, or pacifism held as ideal (though not strictly observed, for practical reasons), of more modern forms of Buddhism. Numerous examples can be found in Buddhist literature of both ordinary individuals and rulers committing acts of self-sacrifice, sometimes extreme, in order to avoid committing violence against other living beings (or even to prevent some being from committing violence against a third party).

The history of Buddhism is replete with stories of pacifist kings, kings who – due to their own convictions or upon the advice of Buddhist clergy – refused to fight, and
successfully maintained rule by pacifist means. Hajime Nakamura cites several examples, mythical and actual, found in Mahayana Buddhism. “Cakravartin, the ideal universal monarch, does not threaten people with force, he renounces weapons, and does not hurt people. So, kings and people under his rule do not move from their own abodes, for he does not deprive them of their peaceful abodes. All countries surrender to him without being forced by means of weapons.”252 King Suddhodana, father of Shakyamuni, is said to have defeated his enemies through good deeds rather than war, and advises that even direct aggression should be met by means other than violent resistance; the particular method must depend on the nature of the opponent, and the king in his wisdom must discern the most expedient method of response. There is also the story of a Chinese king who asked the advice of a visiting priest with regard to enemy invasion; the king was advised to “entertain a compassionate mind” rather than a violent one, and when he followed this advice, the enemy retreated.253

Donald K. Swearer points to further examples in Theravada Buddhism, in particular King Aśoka, calling him a “notable exemplar of nonviolence.” Aśoka converted to Buddhism as a result of the pity and remorse he felt upon observing the pain and suffering that war imposed on non-combatants: “He came to realize that genuine conquest cannot be achieved by force of arms but only by the power of truth and justice.”254 To this end, Aśoka both legislated nonviolence (negatively (proscribing the


253 Nakamura, 178.

taking of life) and positively (encouraging respect for sentient beings and all nature) and encouraged meditation and the cultivation of positive qualities such as “gentleness towards parents, liberality toward friends, self-master, purity of heart, gratitude, and fidelity (Rock Edicts III, VII),” in order to further the goal of a non-violent kingdom.

The ideals of generosity and restraint are especially revered in Buddhism, and can be seen in more personal or individual narratives, as is strikingly illustrated in the story of Prince Vessantara. The outline of the story is reminiscent of the Old Testament story of Job, except in this case the Prince voluntarily undergoes his privations, as a virtuously generous person: always one who gives away his possessions to any who asks, he one day gives away property valuable to the kingdom as a whole (a rain-making white elephant), and is banished to a distant forest. On his way out of town, he gives away his only remaining possessions, his horses and chariot; once in the forest, he gives away his children to a visiting Brahman as servants, and gives his wife to a god who comes to him disguised. Having proved the generosity of his nature, Vessantara is rewarded by the return of all he has willingly given up and more. Such total surrender is taken to even further extremes in other stories. Two instances are found in the Jātakas of Indian Buddhism, which detail previous incarnations of the Buddha. One tells of his incarnation as an ascetic who is falsely accused of a crime by the king; initially speaking in his own defense, the ascetic becomes silent upon realizing that the king, blinded by anger, cannot be swayed, and allows himself to be cut to pieces, feeling only grief for the king’s fall from virtue. In another incarnation, this time as a prince, the Buddha allows himself to

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255 Swearer, 65.
256 Swearer, 66-67.
be eaten by a starving tigress who is preparing to eat her own cubs; this act of self-sacrifice is motivated by compassion for both the cubs and their potential killer.  

These stories represent a wide array of Buddhist views, but they successfully capture the extremity to which the ideals of nonviolence, compassion, and self-sacrifice can – and ideally, do – extend. This very extremity points, at least to some extent, to a deontological grounding for the view, although the consideration of both consequences and the need to develop certain character traits can be seen in these stories as well. King Aśoka provides the clearest example of both of the latter, in that he observes the difficulty of attaining the desired consequence (“true conquest”) by violent means, and to the end of achieving the highest goal for his people, undertakes the Aristotelian project of setting up a society in which citizens – guided by both rules and other traditions and institutional structures – develop those qualities, or virtues, which most directly lead to the goal of harmony and nonviolence, and away from their opposites.

The adherence to the standard of nonviolence, at least in the ideal/classical context, seems so absolute as to require deontological grounding, however. The foundation does not seem to be anything like divine command theory, not least because Buddhism as a religion is not centered around a god or gods who give commands. In abstraction, at least, it resembles Kant in more ways than it does any other traditional western moral theory, especially insofar as it calls for absolute reverence for life, but the match is not perfect. For one thing, though it is not as extreme as Jainism, Buddhism is open to the theoretical possibility that all life is valuable as an end and not merely as a means, as is illustrated in the parable of the tigress. Even if this instance is dismissed as a

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Gómez, 32-33.
more figurative than literal moral ideal, though, Buddhism does seem to rank the life (or good) of the other above that of the self, which is a problem for the Kantian requirement to refrain from treating oneself as a means only: even excluding the story of the tigress, we see this self-negating tendency in stories like the ascetic and the generous prince, as well as in more concrete (and recent) cases. For example, while Nakamura notes that suicide is not encouraged in Buddhism, he points out that it is not forbidden either (for Kant, it is explicitly categorized as immoral); he points especially to cases in feudal Japan where defeated generals offered to commit ritual suicide on the condition that his subordinates and soldiers remain free and untouched, and such self-sacrifice was lauded as virtuous. As is the case with Christian pacifism, however, it might be argued that the greater good of the individual is served by willingly dying rather than committing the worse evil of taking life (or allowing it to be taken), so that one is still regarding oneself as an end, even in dying (such an interpretation might square the position of Kantianism after all), especially given the belief, shared by both religions, that the self continues on after this life. Ultimately, though, unlike Hinduism and Jainism, Buddhism forbids or discourages violence not merely because of how it harms the agent (although that is a factor), but also because of how it harms the other.

This, then – violence is to be avoided, and positive actions (compassion for and protection of other living beings) to be pursued – is the general Buddhist position, and the view to which Mahatma Gandhi subscribed. In *The Virtue of Nonviolence: From Gautama to Gandhi*, Nicholas Gier argues that Gandhi is best seen as a follower of Buddhism rather than of Jainism or Hinduism (although both of the latter influenced him

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258 Nakamura, 184-185.
as well). Gier goes on to argue that Gandhi’s principles of nonviolence are more
derivative of virtue theory than of any deontological theory, and are categorically distinct
from at least the utilitarian form of consequentialism.

Gier points to two elements of Gandhi’s worldview in particular that help to
clarify the manner in which Gandhi’s view of pacifism draws from his Buddhist
influences: first, his conception of the inviolability of the individual, and second, his
“equally strong sense of the unity of humanity and the social construction of personal
identity.”259 Gandhi did not conceive of the individual as having moral responsibility
only in the sense that each individual bears the consequences of his own actions, though
he believed in this as well (as opposed to views such as collective karma or “the Hindu
saviors’ forgiveness of human sins and the distribution of the Bodhisattvas’ excess
merit”260); he believed further, however, that the actions of each person must be
undertaken according to that person’s sense of the truth. As Gier puts it, “For Gandhi
individuals must act on their own truth regardless of the consequences and regardless of
whether others think they are in error.”261 Or as Gandhi himself puts it, “In this world,
we always have to act as judges for ourselves.”262 The differences between individuals
are not illusory, as Advaita Vedanta holds; rather, each person must take responsibility
for what he does, both in deciding what is the correct thing to do, and in bearing the
results of that action.

259 Gier, 27.

260 Gier, 12.

261 Gier, 12.

(Prospect Heights, IL: Waveland Press, Inc., 1990) [reprinted from The Moral and Political Writings of
This is not to say that Gandhi believed in any form of ethical relativism. Gier places Gandhi’s position with regard to moral truth in the context of his postmodern leanings: like the French postmodernists, he says, Gandhi believed that we can only attain relative truth, but unlike them, “he believed in an absolute truth behind our failed attempts to reach it,” and was thus not a deconstructivist.263 He believed (much like the Quakers) that while I may look to others for guidance, I am obligated ultimately to do what I myself believe to be right; still, this does not imply that what I believe to be right is right in fact. Gandhi appeals directly to this concept of the inviolability of the individual as a grounding of his pacifism:

[The fact that we always have to act as judges for ourselves] is why the satyagrahi does not strike his adversary with arms. If he has the Truth on his side, he will win, and if his thought is faulty, he will suffer the consequences of his fault.264

Thus, I must do what I believe to be right, but I must not resort to violence in the cause of my convictions, because (among other reasons) if I am ultimately mistaken, I must not compound my error by making others suffer for my mistake.

Not wishing to mistakenly harm someone is not the only reason for avoiding violence towards others, however. For by definition, Gandhi says, the truth and violence are always incompatible.

The way of peace is the way of truth. Truthfulness is even more important than peacefulness. Indeed, lying is the mother of violence. A truthful man cannot long remain violent. He will perceive in the course of his search that he has no need to be violent and he will further discover that so long as there is the slightest trace of violence in him, he will fail to find the truth he is searching.265

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263 Gier, 13.
Thus, as I search, as an individual, for the truth, for the correct thing to do, Gandhi thinks that it must become clear to me that violence can never be that correct thing.

Gandhi’s belief with regard to this can be traced at least in part to fundamental Buddhist teachings regarding how we are to treat others. For he says that “a satyagrahi does not inflict physical pain on the adversary; he does not seek his destruction…In the use of satyagraha, there is no ill-will whatever.”\footnote{Gandhi, “On Satyagraha,” 52.} In fact, “[a satyagrahi] does not wish for the destruction of his antagonist, he does not vent anger on him; but has only compassion for him.”\footnote{Gandhi, “On Satyagraha,” 53.} For Gandhi, the individual is of utmost importance — every individual, both the agent and the one who he acts upon.

Thus are the concepts of individuality and sociality linked for Gandhi. For this is the second notable element of Gandhi’s philosophy: the unity of humanity and social construction of the self. All of mankind is linked, and no agent is formed in isolation of the nature and reality of the world, of how human beings are and how they relate to one another.

We fulfill our human life when we see the atman, and when we do so we pass the test. …God-realization means seeing Him in all beings. Or, in other words, we should learn to become one with every creature. This is man’s privilege and that distinguishes him from the beasts. This can happen only when we voluntarily give up the use of physical force and when we develop the nonviolence which lies dormant in our hearts.\footnote{Gandhi, “On Satyagraha,” 54.} The development and pursuit of this nonviolence, founded upon a sense of the worth and value of every living being, will lead to this sense of unity within the individual, and eventually, to the reality of it in the world: “The attainment of freedom, whether for a
man, a nation or the world, must be in exact proportion to the attainment of non-violence by each.” Gandhi believed that the former was subordinate to the latter: that is, he was more concerned with effecting “universal this-worldly salvation” than with accomplishing “individual spiritual liberation.” “The goal of the devotee is seen as the relief of suffering humanity, not as personal release from bondage. The mood expressed is much closer to the Bodhisattva than to the arhat ideal.” We must recognize that mankind is a whole, and be concerned with it as such, and how we deal with these facts is what shapes us as moral and spiritual agents.

As simplified for our purposes, then, we see in Gandhi’s philosophy a complex understanding of mankind as possessing a fundamental unity, which must be understood and respected as such, yet as possessing, in each of its parts, an undeniable individuality as well. Each individual is morally responsible for seeking out the truth, and pacifism is necessarily attendant upon this pursuit in two ways: we must be peaceful as we pursue it, in order to avoid causing harm in our ignorance, and the truth we will ultimately find must consist in nonviolence. Furthermore, humanity is united, whether by violence or nonviolence: we have violence in common, because violence affects us all – those who perpetrate it, those who suffer it, and those who fail to respond to it – and true unity (among human beings and among the parts of each individual human being) lies in peace. We must act as individuals, but we must also have faith that we are not alone: “A satyagrahi does not wait for others, but throws himself into the fray, relying entirely on

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270 Gier, 60.

271 Chatterjee, Margaret. Gandhi’s Religious Thought (Notre Dame: Notre Dame University Press, 1983), 43, 105, 27; this is part of an argument for the Buddhist overtones of many of Gandhi’s statements.
his own resources. He trusts that when the time comes, others will do likewise.”

And we must be motivated, not by a simple pursuit for personal fulfillment or salvation, but by a concern and compassion for others.

Gandhi’s views are derived primarily from the Buddhist worldview, and consequently have the same heterogeneous moral foundation. Some of his statements sound Kantian: “The basic principle on which the practice of non-violence rests is that what holds good in respect of yourself holds good equally in respect of the whole universe. All mankind in essence are alike [sic].” That is, we ought to treat every person as we would wish to be treated, or as we could rationally affirm a universal law that all persons be treated. Elsewhere, he talks of the “sacred duty” that we have “to obey the laws of society intelligently and of [our] own free will,” which permits us to fulfill the duty we have to examine the validity of those laws, and respond to unjust laws with civil disobedience, bearing peacefully whatever punishments (however unjust) may follow such disobedience.

At other times, his arguments at times sound supremely consequentialist: for example, he believes that pacifism has value at least in part because it is ultimately the most effective way to respond to injustice. Speaking of responding to those who rule via unjust laws, he says:

We can similarly free ourselves of the unjust rule of the Government by defying the unjust rule and accepting the punishments that go with it. We do not bear malice towards the Government. When we set its fears at rest, when we do not desire to make armed assaults on the administrators, not to unseat them from

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power, but only to get rid of their injustice, *they will at once be subdued to our will.*

Elsewhere, he says more generally that “[n]on-violence is the mightiest force in the world capable of resisting the greatest imaginable temptation,” the temptation to respond to the gravest provocation with violence. Furthermore, Gandhi’s views on violence diverged from those of Buddhism, in that he allowed for exceptions to the general rule of non-violence. He thought that exceptions should be permitted where necessary to alleviate greater suffering: for example, he argued that a dying parent could and should euthanize his handicapped child if there would remain no one to care for her, that someone doomed to die could be euthanized to relieve his pain, and that an out-of-control person who threatens the lives of others should be killed. These exceptions suggest a consequentialist underpinning, in that the moral value of the action seems to be linked, in Gandhi’s mind, not to the action itself, but to its result – and nonviolence as a general rule (he believed) leads to the best results.

Overall, however, the fact that nonviolence is effective has generally the character of a side effect, rather than being Gandhi’s primary consideration – we are to avoid causing harm no matter what the ultimate outcome. And despite Gandhi’s concern for the personal dignity of every human being (which he thought would be best served by euthanasia or execution in certain cases), the very flexibility of his position, and his unwillingness to separate means and ends, supports Gier’s conclusion: the ethical

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277 Gier, 53-54.
presuppositions of Gandhi’s pacifism resemble Aristotelianism more than any other moral/ethical theory.

Indeed, the similarities between Gandhi’s views and those of Aristotle or Plato are numerous. There are differences as well: in some ways, classical Greek virtue ethics conflicts with the Asian (especially Buddhist) mindset. For example, neither Buddha nor Confucius would have accepted the idea that rationality is the essence of humanity, nor the elitist view that only certain types of people (viz., upper-class males) are capable of being virtuous (since Asian philosophy generally emphasizes egalitarianism). Also, like Christianity - and unlike Aristotle - Buddhism considers pride to be a vice, and humility a virtue.278

However, the similarities to virtue theory are more predominant, especially when Gandhi’s views are compared to more modern forms of virtue theory (which are also more inclined toward an egalitarian ethic). To name only two key elements, in his writings Gandhi consistently emphasizes character, virtues, ways of being, rather than rules that must be followed, and habituation and practice, rather than abstract intellectual conceptualization, as a route to moral perfection.

Gandhi speaks often of satyagraha, which he characterizes as pure soul-force, truthfulness, an active (rather than passive) response to injustice.279 Satyagraha and ahimsa (non-violence) must come from power, rather than weakness, or else they are morally meaningless: “there is no merit in being non-violent to the good and the gentle,”

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278 Gier, 67.

279 Gandhi, “On Satyagraha,” 52; Gier says “It is the thesis of this book that satyagraha can best be interpreted in terms of the power of the personal virtue” (2).
we are told – in fact, “using physical force is far superior to cowardice.” What we do is of less importance, ultimately, than the qualities of character from which those actions spring, although like Aristotle, Gandhi believes that the quality alone is not sufficient: it must be acted upon: “[Satyagraha] is not ‘passive’ resistance; indeed it calls for intense activity.” On the other hand, “…mere non-violent action without the thought behind it is of little value…Needless to say that here I am referring to the living thought which awaits translation into speech and action.” Being a virtuous person involves developing the right qualities, qualities which by definition will manifest themselves in action; a given action, though, is not truly virtuous unless it springs from virtue.

Gandhi also agrees with Aristotle with regard to how these qualities are to be developed – only through practice, he says, can we develop the proper habits.

The votary of non-violence has to cultivate the capacity for sacrifice of the highest type in order to be free from fear…This non-violence cannot be learnt by staying at home. It needs enterprise. In order to test ourselves we should learn to dare danger and death, mortify the flesh and acquire the capacity to endure all manner of hardships. He who trembles or takes to his heels the moment he sees two people fighting is not non-violent, but a coward. A non-violent person will lay down his life in preventing such quarrels.

We are to cultivate love, compassion, courage, and we cultivate them not by thinking about them, but by practicing them. Gandhi’s descriptions of the moral life coincide with the Buddhist concept of the uttama-purisa, or “ultimate” person,” who relies an evaluative knowledge, anumana (which sounds very similar to Aristotle’s phronesis), which is based on experience and induction. The uttama-purisa is defined as one “who acts with a

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clear goal in view and harms neither herself or others”; this person ““has attained freedom from the suffering and unhappiness in the world…[and] is not only happy by himself, but also makes other people happy by being pleasant and helpful to them.” Gandhi’s descriptions of the satyagrahi are consistent with such a concept; Gandhi even names a specific exemplar of a non-harmful person – Christ. Christ’s example, his “pure way of life,” has been ignorantly disregarded (by Europe), he argues; more such exemplars will have to sacrifice themselves in order for us to learn by their example, but among these, “Jesus will always be the first.”

Gier teases out some of the finer points of virtue ethics from among Gandhi’s viewpoints, among them a rejection of rules in favor of a more context-dependent ethic, and a refusal to separate means and ends. The two are tied together, of course, but loosely, as looking at these principles in the context of the euthanasia cases above will demonstrate.

On the one hand, Gandhi’s principle of nonviolence, or ahimsa, is “reactive and flexible, not passive and absolute” – something more characteristic of virtue theory than deontology. As noted earlier, Gandhi argued that not every instance of killing is an instance of violence, so that one’s practice of ahimsa does not preclude her selective killing; killing is acceptable, and even required, in (hopefully) rare instances where – to put it very generally – killing is better than not killing. Above I suggested that this judgment could possibly be made on consequentialist grounds (where ending a life

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284 Gier, 63; here, Gier is citing an unpublished paper by David Kalupahana, entitled “Buddhism and Chinese Humanism.”


286 Gier, 53.
prevents greater suffering, thus yielding the fewest bad consequences); Gier actually argues for a different interpretation of Gandhi’s conclusion, viz., that he is making the judgment on the grounds of something like virtue theory. Referring to Gandhi’s claim that ahimsa is not mechanical, but personal to everyone, Gier says:

This comment is strong evidence that the ethics of nonviolence cannot be rule based; rather, it must be based on the development of virtues that are formed within the context of the person, his spiritual stature, his vocation, and the various situations in which he finds himself. Human life is a constant ‘experiment in truth’ in which we all act out of distinctively personal behavioral styles that do not lend themselves to the mechanical application of rules.  

Even in those cases where Gandhi recommends or makes allowance for violence, he does so clearly in the context of concerns for the character of the agent: courage is important, and as a result, violent action is better than cowardly passivity; benevolence is important, and as a result, one should defend others from violence even if this action results in the death of the attacker.  Nonviolence ought to be characterized not merely by noninjury, but by the positive virtues of sympathy, love, and compassion as well.  

Such exceptions are very few, however, for Gandhi also subscribes to the corollary of the non-rule-bound flexibility of virtue theory, that the ends and the means cannot be separated. Gier describes this as Gandhi’s “most important philosophical principle: that good ends must always be matched with good means.” Clearly, any utilitarian elements within Gandhi’s philosophy must be, at best, secondary. Rigid moral rules are rejected as well, as we have seen; nonetheless, the rule of nonviolence and non-

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287 Gier, 54.
288 Gier, 54.
289 Gier, 31.
290 Gier, 24.
coerciveness, though flexible, remains fairly strong. After all, Gandhi is interested in the good of all rather than (merely) the development of the agent’s character, and given his ends/means principle, it would be unreasonable to suppose that the goal of peace and social justice could be attained by means antithetical to it, viz., violence. Thus he tells us that the attainment of freedom, for a person, nation, or world, is in proportion to his/its attainment of non-violence,\textsuperscript{291} for one cannot eliminate violence and oppression by violence.

This freedom, this peacefulness, is more important for Gandhi than the preservation of one’s own life: “life is not the highest value because people should sacrifice their lives in the face of an aggressor, especially if it is to preserve their honor.”\textsuperscript{292} Gandhi admires heroic self-sacrifice, remarking that “a \textit{satyagrahi} does not fear for his body.”\textsuperscript{293} Nonviolence is not merely either a means or an end – peacefulness is a means to the end of peace, and also (as a character trait) an end in itself. “A life of virtue is not the means to the good life; it \textit{is} the good life,” a life of the “virtues of honesty, sincerity, love, charity, integrity, and rectitude.”\textsuperscript{294} Mere preservation of life, at the expense of these things that make life valuable, is meaningless.\textsuperscript{295}

\textsuperscript{291} Gandhi, “On Satyagraha,” 56.

\textsuperscript{292} Gier, 34.

\textsuperscript{293} Gandhi, “On Satyagraha,” 53.

\textsuperscript{294} Gier, 143.

\textsuperscript{295} Some of Gandhi’s more controversial quotes are in this arena: about World War II, he said that the war was as justified as any could be, but that he couldn’t assess the pros and cons, since he didn’t approve of any war (in his letter in \textit{Harijan} (1938), he advised German Jews that their most moral course of action was to “[offer] themselves to the butcher’s knife” or to “[throw] themselves into the sea from cliffs,” as in the end many died anyway, and doing this would have awakened the world to Hitler’s true nature and plans; he advised something similar as a response to a potential Japanese invasion, arguing that doing so would potentially awaken something in the invader and thus ward off violence, though even if the nonviolent response were not to have this effect, it should still be undertaken, and would still “win the day” since the extermination would have been freely chosen (“Nonviolent Resistance” (1942). He also wrote a
Gandhi is a modern-day exemplar of courageous, active non-violence, and his advice to others generally reflects a firm, though not absolute, non-violent principle. In those exceptional cases where Gandhi deems violence permissible (generally involving the killing of dangerous animals, and rarely, persons, where no nonviolent alternative is available), it is still not required:

Gandhi admits that there will be times when one must commit violence in order not to be a coward, but these occasions will be few and, if one is a virtue theorist, this option carries no moral necessity. Gandhi’s policy was to discipline his satyagrahis to the point where they would have sufficient virtue to opt in most cases for self-suffering and active non-violence… Gandhi discovered that rational calculation and persuasion did not work for him; rather, he and his disciples required a transformation of their character before they could succeed at their goals.\textsuperscript{296}

Non-violence is preferable, ultimately more rewarding personally (in terms of developing the appropriate character), and more productive of the desired ends. It is not a “moral necessity,” but is nonetheless the most recommended course of action, in large part because it is the only one in which the ends sought by the moral agent can be matched by her means. Thus do the life and words of Mahatma Gandhi bear out the pacifist principles of Buddhism.

\textsuperscript{296} Gier, 143-144.
II. Secular Forms of Pacifism

While the most prominent forms of pacifism, especially historically, have been religious in nature, there have been numerous efforts to found similar forms on purely secular principles. Cady makes a non-religious argument for pacifism on grounds that closely resemble the ends/means linkage that was made explicit in Jewish and Buddhist forms of pacifism; in fact, he makes the case that this quality is what distinguishes just war theory from pacifism. Not surprisingly, his argument draws heavily from virtue theory, but this is not the only possible ground for pacifism. Kant himself argues for “perpetual peace” as the most rational position for human beings, although, like Rawls, he makes pragmatic allowances for something along the lines of Just War Theory in a non-ideal world. Robert L. Holmes also grounds his case for pacifism on rationality, arguing that war, especially in its nuclear deterrence incarnation, is absurd and irrational. William James suggests a substitute, a “moral equivalent of war,” that will accomplish the goods of war without the damage, implying consequentialist reasons for being opposed to it. These philosophers are only a few of those that make a moral argument for pacifism without appealing directly to religious presuppositions, but they represent a useful cross-section.

While most of the above-mentioned positions are contemporary, Bainton makes the case that such views have been coming to the fore since the intellectual move away from religion several centuries ago. Earlier views on war had generally been divided

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297 Though I did not make such a clear distinction between religious and secular forms of JWT, it is certainly true that both types exist in that tradition as well. In what follows I will characterize Kant as a sort of pacifist (albeit qualified), but his follower, John Rawls, is clearly a just-warist, arguing for the rights of well-ordered peoples to defend themselves and their values from unjust incursions in explicitly JWT terminology, citing Walzer in particular (Rawls, The Law of Peoples (Harvard : Harvard University Press, 1999), 94-97).
between the Just War Theory of the Catholic Church and the pacifism of the Anabaptist segment of the Protestant Church, with the former being more prominent. The modern age, beginning with the Enlightenment (in the 18th (or late 17th) century) has seen a revival of the themes of pity and humanity – pity for the victims of war (absent in the great literature from the Renaissance to the Enlightenment), and a feeling of fraternity, surpassing the mere sentiment of nationalism, among all human beings (at least in the west, but often even beyond the borders of Europe). These developments led at the time to a more pacific mood in general, at least among intellectuals, but the plans for peace laid out appealed to the natural law rather than the law of God, for two likely reasons. First, the peace envisaged was to be universal, “embracing the Turk and the Hindu. Plainly if non-Christians were to be included, the basis of the peace could not be exclusively Christian.” Second, Christians sects and denominations had proliferated to the extent that there was very little common ground to be found. Accordingly, calls for peace appealed to precepts of reason rather than of religion, not to principles on which there were (and still are) considerable differences of interpretation and belief, but to those to which all rational men could agree.

Kant was a Lutheran who nonetheless developed a moral theory founded upon purely rational principles. In “Perpetual Peace,” he extends the concepts of the

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298 Bainton, Christian Attitudes Toward War and Peace, 174-177.

299 Bainton, Christian Attitudes Toward War and Peace, 178.

300 While this – having the effect of potentially producing more pacifists – might seem like a good strategy, at least some have historically objected: many Mennonites have (at least historically) refused to join larger peace movements, out of the belief that such movements were not grounded enough (or at all) in Biblical principles of non-resistance (as opposed to merely peacefulness), and would compromise their own beliefs (presumably in the direction of being more open to the sort of coercive nonviolence that they objected to in pacifists like Gandhi) (War, Peace and Social Conscience: Guy F. Hershberger and Mennonite Ethics, by Theron F. Schlabach (Scottdale, PA: Herald Press, 2009), 45-48, 64, 88, etc.).
categorical imperative, the universal law, and the kingdom of ends, to a discussion of how nations ought to relate to one another. Ultimately, he believes, “reason, from its supreme throne of moral, lawgiving power, condemns war absolutely as a means of establishing right, and on the other hand makes the state of peace an immediate duty.”

That Kant believes that war does not – legally or morally – establish right is not surprising; this is a view that he (to some extent, at least) appears to share even with political realism. He defines war as “only the dire necessity of asserting one’s right by force in a primitive state of society where there is no court at hand to decide in accordance with right. In this state neither party can be declared an unjust enemy, for this presupposes a judicial decision.” Winning a war decides the issues at hand, because the winner gains power, but the victory does not prove that the winner is “right” in an objective sense, because the warring parties are not bound under any higher authority. By definition, each party (state, nation) is a moral person in its own right, comprised of free men who are bound only by the rule of the state itself, and thus, no state can ever claim moral grounds for invading or controlling another state – there can be no such grounds. Thus, each group of human beings is bound (internally) by contract, and has no obligation to any other group of persons, except to leave them alone.

Nonetheless, just as is the case with perfect and imperfect duties between persons, as Kant describes elsewhere, there are different sorts of duties between groups of persons. Groups are required to leave one another alone, but since war is man’s natural state, it

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303 Kant, *Perpetual Peace*, 6; cf 16-17.
behooves us not only to maintain a negative peace, but to actively pursue that state in order to guarantee everyone’s freedom and flourishing in the long run. For this purpose, Kant outlines rules that should be followed in war, in order that any given war have the possibility of peace as an outcome, rather than flaring into a war of extermination: for example, nations should not employ assassins or instigate treason against its opponent, for doing so will inevitably continue into peacetime, and undermine the free and honest relations that must hold between nations. 304 He also outlines what he takes to be the best method for guaranteeing a perpetual peace between states: that individual states should be republican in constitution, that states’ obligations to one another be defined by their membership in a federation of free states, and that human beings everywhere treat one another civilly, as world citizens with a right to universal hospitality.

Predictably, Kant’s description of each of these conditions is complex, but they are simple at heart. The republic is the best form of government in at least two senses: it best respects the autonomy of each human beings, and is thus the most moral form of government; and it is most conducive to the peace which benefits all, because it relies on the will of individuals within the state, who – knowing they will be the ones to suffer before, during, and after war – will be reluctant to assent to entering into it. 305 The practicability and benefits of a federation of free states will become obvious over time, Kant believes: any civilized group will be repelled by the preference of savages who prefer “incessant strife” to “a self-imposed restraint of law,” and “wild freedom to rational freedom,” and will thus seek to remove themselves as quickly as possible from

304 Kant, Perpetual Peace, 9-10.
305 Kant, Perpetual Peace, 11-12.
this condition, both as individuals (by joining by contract into a nation), and as a group.

The only rational and moral way to accomplish the latter is to arrange a federation of free states:

This federation would not be invested with a single power of a constituted state, but would secure simply the preservation and security of the freedom of a particular state and of others federated with it, without any of them having to submit themselves to public laws and to compulsion under them, as men do in a state of nature.\(^{306}\)

As states join this federation and are seen to benefit by doing so, more will join, until all nations of the world are joined in this ideal state of perpetual peace. Further, citizens of nations need not be limited to the physical locale of the nation, for each is also – by virtue of “the right of the common possession of the surface of the earth” – a citizen of the world, with a right to go where he pleases, and be treated, if not necessarily as a guest, then at least without hostility (he may even be expelled, so long as this is not destructive to him).\(^{307}\) In this way, every human being retains her autonomy, but under conditions such that every nation also retains its autonomy, thus allowing perpetual peace to flourish in the world.

The moral foundation of Kant’s position is fairly transparent, based as it is upon his deontological system of the rights and duties of the rational human being. As rational beings, we have certain duties to respect the persons of other rational beings, and these duties carry over to relations among nations. Of course, duties toward human beings in and of themselves also point toward the necessity for pacifism: it is immoral to treat any human being as merely a means toward some other end, and for this reason, standing

\(^{306}\) Kant, *Perpetual Peace*, 17.

armies should be abolished, since maintaining them tends both to provoke war, and to amass expenses that are best recouped by a (short) war, so that rulers may choose to expend lives merely to save money; it is also immoral to send troops into conflicts that are not for the purpose of defending the nation. Thus, because men must respect themselves and one another, at both the intra- and international level, war is judged immoral. As we have seen with Gandhi and other pacifists as well, Kant makes the reasons one has for refraining from violence central; violence is immoral, but Kant condemns “a peace of mere indolence” active peacemaking, rational activity (rather than mere inactivity) is the key to being a moral person.

William James, too, is concerned with something beyond mere abolition of war. As Kant draws a strong distinction between positive perpetual peace and its “peaceful” alternatives, temporary peace in preparation for further war, and the permanent “peace’ of the grave, so James, in “The Moral Equivalent of War,” concerns himself primarily what must take place instead of war. He appears to begin from a position similar to that of Kant, stating “It would seem as though common sense and reason ought to find a way to reach agreement in every conflict of honest interests. I myself think it our bounded duty to believe in such international rationality as possible.”

Unlike Kant, however, he does not believe that mankind is free to naturally evolve toward civilization and mutual consideration. War is expensive, irrational, and

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308 Kant, Perpetual Peace, 6-7.
309 Bainton, Christian Attitudes Toward War and Peace, 182.
311 James, 126.
horrible; mankind must continually rationalize legitimate causes for war to itself.\textsuperscript{312} Yet still we engage in it, whether actively fighting, or preparing to fight.\textsuperscript{313} James believes that the true obstacle in the way of peace can be found by examining why it is that we cling to the institution of war despite centuries, even millennia, of proof of how damaging it is. The benefits of war, he argues, lie in the emotions it incites and the form it gives to the sweep of human history, and the only way to solve the problem of war, to achieve the goal of peace, is to find away to provide these benefits in a context other than that of war.

The goods of war, as described by James, include patriotism, romance, and a strengthening of character: “Militarism is the great preserver of our ideals and hardihood, and human life with no use for hardihood would be contemptible.”\textsuperscript{314} Victory is equated with virtue, defeat with some lack thereof. Furthermore, war is the only way to truly test these virtues, though they are valuable in peacetime as well: “Fidelity, cohesiveness, tenacity, heroism, conscience, education, inventiveness, economy, wealth, physical health and vigor”\textsuperscript{315} are critical qualities in a person, and war (it is thought) is necessary to developing them. Pointing to the horrors of war is not sufficient for making the case for pacifism, if peace entails losing all of these benefits: war might be worth the evils that it brings, because “taking human nature as a whole, its wars are its best protection against

\textsuperscript{312} James, 125, 126.

\textsuperscript{313} “It may even reasonably be said that the intensely sharp competitive preparation for war by the nations is the real war, permanent, unceasing; and that the battles are only a sort of public verification of the mastery gained during the ‘peace’-interval” (126).

\textsuperscript{314} James, 127.

\textsuperscript{315} James, 128.
its weaker and more cowardly self, and … mankind cannot afford to adopt a peace-
economy.”

James’ argument, then, does not directly make the case for why we should be pacifists, but rather, how. The only way to combat this worldwide aesthetic/ethic in support of war is to show that the same benefits can be obtained by some peacetime pursuit as well. That is, we must provide agents with some other way of developing the “martial virtues” of “intrepidity, contempt of softness, surrender of private interest, obedience to command” – James agrees with defenders of war that these are critical to the moral character of man, and must be preserved. His suggestion for preserving them in a peaceful context serves a dual purpose of replacing war and correcting injustices in the world. The world as it is currently arranged is unjust, he argues, with some people condemned to unceasing labor, and others free to live a life of “unmanly ease.” Let us replace military conscription with conscription to work, James suggests, a conscription of the young into an army “against Nature”; youth would enter into the hard labor of mining of coal and iron, construction of roads and buildings, fishing “in December,” and washing of clothes, windows, and dishes, which would even out the disparities now found in the world, and provide the additional benefit of knocking the childishness out of “gilded youths,” so they return to society “with healthier sympathies and soberer ideas,” proud of their accomplishments and more ably prepared to work and lead. This civil service would develop the same virtues as war, but without the damage. And presumably, with injustices removed in this fashion, wars would be less likely to develop in any event.

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316 James, 128.
317 James, 129.
318 James, 130.
James makes no explicit argument as to why war is wrong, and/or pacifism right. The overall tenor, however, seems to be utilitarian in nature (although this may be attributable at least in part to the form his argument takes, viz., a pragmatic suggestion of an alternative to war). He refers often to the expense of war and the horror that results from it, and his general point is to express the calculus “if the alternatives are good results conjoined with bad ones (as in war), or the same good results without the bad ones, and with further good results (justice), isn’t the latter the better approach?” At times he is blunter, at one point referring to war as “absurd and impossible from its own monstrosity.”319 He is clearly convinced that war is evil, but although his solution is one that seeks to bring justice to the world, his primary motivation does not seem to be, as Kant’s is, the autonomy of the individual. He is concerned with the individual, but in the more concrete way that Aristotle is: concerned that the individual develop the proper virtues, those that make him an excellent human being and an excellent citizen, and concerned with the best way to accomplish this (in both cases, by way of direct action, which builds the proper habits and prepares one to take one’s place in the world).

Robert L. Holmes also believes that war is absurd as well as immoral. In “The Sleep of Reason Brings Forth Monsters,”320 he argues that “the belief that it can best be avoided by threatening to wage it – the rationale behind the theory of nuclear deterrence – is irrational.”321 In On War and Morality, concerned that preoccupation with the threat of nuclear war makes conventional warfare seem more acceptable by comparison, he

319 James, 129.


makes a broader argument against the morality of warfare in any form in the modern age.\footnote{Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1989.}

That nuclear deterrence is an irrational strategy follows from the fact that war as a whole is irrational; that the threat to use nuclear weapons is worse than the threat of ordinary war is so only by degree. Holmes paints a picture of how an outside observer would regard humanity’s consistent tendency toward war – not self-defensive war on a small scale, but the building and maintaining of institutions of war – and argues that this feature of the world has been entered into incrementally, but is essentially senseless:

[Humankind] has proven willing to abandon virtually everything worth living for, to do things all agree are abhorrent, for reasons few understand, and for ends (such as peace) that history shows cannot be secured by these means.\footnote{Holmes, “The Sleep of Reason Brings Forth Monsters,” 132.}

Nuclear war, because of its ability to wreak such complete and lasting destruction, is especially irrational, as is using the threat of such war in order to prevent it. The fact that there has not been nuclear war cannot be causally linked to the threat of it, or to the possession of nuclear weapons, by any country; even if the link could be proven, it could not be proven that such deterrence would continue to work (in fact, the opposite is more likely, since the more groups that acquire such weapons, the greater the likelihood of one being used); and most importantly, even if deterrence has and will continue to work, the thought process behind this form of “cold” warfare is deeply irrational:

If it is irrational to do something, then it cannot be rational both to threaten to do it \textit{and} to be willing to carry out that threat. For to be willing to do something is to \textit{do} it under the appropriate circumstances, if one is able. And in the case of nuclear war, carrying out the threat cannot (logically) prevent the irrational from happening because it constitutes the happening of the irrational. Thus if one wants above all to prevent the irrational from happening…one cannot rationally
seek to attain that objective by threatening the irrational and intending to carry out that threat. At best, only threatening but not actually intending to carry out the threat could do that.\footnote{324} Of course, if a country genuinely intends not to use such weapons, simply disarming publicly will be a more effective method of halting hostilities. The only reason to maintain these devastating weapons is if you are prepared to use them. And this is itself irrational.\footnote{325}

Holmes’ argument for why the threat of such destruction is itself irrational is more diffuse than the preceding argument, but it appears to have two components. The first is in evidence in the first quotation cited above: Holmes does not believe that the end of peace can be achieved by violence. This is a very common concept in pacifist thought: Holmes thinks both that experience shows us that, historically speaking, such means cannot achieve such a disparate end, and that reason must tell us that this is true, not just conditionally, but necessarily, by definition: “The aim should not be to end conflict… The aim should be to develop nondestructive ways of dealing with conflict. Violence by its nature cannot do that. Violence can.”\footnote{326} Thus, we must not act violently, because doing so will not achieve the end of nonviolence.

\footnote{324} Holmes, “The Sleep of Reason Brings Forth Monsters,” 134.

\footnote{325} Of course, arguments on behalf of nuclear deterrence, like that of Paul Ramsey, work on the assumption that your enemy will still believe that you might use such weapons, and more importantly, wants to prevent you from doing so. In a modern world where opponents might NOT be concerned about this factor, or at least less than the usual, such a strategy is less likely to work. Nonetheless, I agree with Holmes’s argument here: if there is truly no chance that your side will use such weapons, on the grounds that they are unacceptably destructive, then – whether the threat would work or not – the moral choice must be to divest of such weapons, since it might have a positive outcome. Keeping them indicates a willingness to use them.

\footnote{326} Holmes, “The Sleep of Reason Brings Forth Monsters,” 139.
The end of nonviolence – or more specifically, non-harm\textsuperscript{327} – he argues, is in turn morally necessary because of certain features of human beings. Harm can be caused both by violence and without it; both physical and psychological damage count as harm, and both can result from one’s actions and from one’s intentional inaction. Thus, Holmes argues – as do so many pacifists – that the true moral requirement with regard to one’s treatment of other human beings, is not mere nonviolence, but the active pursuit of justice and tranquility, through feeling and demonstration of concern and respect for others.\textsuperscript{328} This obligation arises because of the nature of the human being: “persons are preeminently worthy of respect and have claims upon those whose conduct may affect them to be treated in ways that do not diminish them.”\textsuperscript{329} Holmes characterizes this as merely a presumptive claim; for the purposes of his argument, he accepts the additional premise that other conditions may hold that render the killing of a person just (e.g., if he is a threat, under conditions such as those outlined in JWT). Accordingly, he builds his anti-war argument merely upon the premise that it is immoral to kill innocent persons (although he personally holds that “both sorts of wartime killing are wrong”), a claim that he believes that militarists and pacifists can for the most part agree to\textsuperscript{330}; he then argues that modern warfare inevitably kills innocent persons, and that therefore, modern warfare

\textsuperscript{327} Violence is not inherently wrong, in the normative sense, he argues, because animals and even forces of nature can be violent; the critical elements that involve wrongness in cases of violence are that a moral agent be the actor, and that the agent’s actions produce harm, i.e., if those he affects “have been made worse off as a result of what was done to them” (On War and Morality, 35). Harm can occur even if the agent does not intend to harm the victim (he must actively intend to benefit her), and even if the victim consents to being harmed - such harm is prima facie wrong (37). Furthermore, harm can occur without violence, especially when harm comes to others through the agent’s knowing failure to prevent it.

\textsuperscript{328} On War and Morality, 40-41.

\textsuperscript{329} On War and Morality, 40.

\textsuperscript{330} On War and Morality, 212.
is immoral. This argument, he explicitly argues, is deontological; “utilitarianism (and consequentialism generally) is inadequate as a basis for moral theory… [because] such theories presuppose that it is possible to make an antecedently nonmoral determination of consequences as a basis for making moral judgments.”

Like Yoder, James, and so many other pacifists, Holmes argues that the goal of peace can only be reached by, among other solutions, dismantling the institutions of warfare, which use resources that could be put to more productive use elsewhere, and which shape members of society in such a way that they are prepared for war, and thus more likely to engage in it. This is especially true for those actually in the military, who are in some real sense trained to disregard their inborn sense of morality, and worse, the principles that society itself instills in them: “[training soldiers to kill] requires overcoming their natural revulsion to killing and suspending in their minds the connection between some of the highest principles society tries to instill in them, such as respect for persons and the value of human life, and what they are asked to do for the state.” Accordingly, Holmes calls for an adjustment of perspective, for a recognition of what we share with all human beings, so that we come to perceive ourselves, not as arrayed against each other, but “against the deceit and arrogance of governments and the ways of thinking that have produced that deceit and arrogance.” In order to facilitate this new brotherly point of view, he says, we must develop “a new respect for the

331 *On War and Morality*, 213.

332 “Worse” because this process entails a peculiar contradiction: in order to defend the society, soldiers are asked to act contrary to the principles that are necessary for that society to flourish in the first place. Such reasoning (in training soldiers) is the very sort rejected by Kant’s first formulation of the categorical imperative.

333 Holmes, *On War and Morality*, 47.

334 “The Sleep of Reason Brings Forth Monsters,” 139.
precariousness and inviolability of the human person,” which must be recognized by anyone who rationally considers the link between the innate value of the human being and the merely instrumental value of all else: “if we don’t cherish the human person, there is no point to the many other activities and striving that consume our time; no point to saving the environment unless we value the beings that inhabit it; no virtue in self-sacrifice when at the expense of the lives and happiness of others.”335 The goal of the moral person, the moral society, the moral world, he says, must be to “develop nondestructive ways of dealing with conflict”336 – only in this way can we fulfill the duties we have towards all human persons to refrain from causing harm, and to show them respect as fellow human beings.

Secular forms of pacifism have many of the same concerns and features as religious forms: a concern for all human beings, attention to the intimate linkage of means and ends, a concern for principles of love and justice. However, JWT is also concerned with each of these. What, then, if anything, sets the two apart? What (beyond the above concerns) captures the essence of pacifism? I have already suggested that it is an unconditional commitment to avoiding violence and/or coercion; in what follows, I will support this (largely uncontroversial) characterization by returning to the concept of the continuum, attempting to see where the various views we have just examined fit, both with relation to one another and also with relation to the pacifist continuum as Cady has sketched it.

335 “The Sleep of Reason Brings Forth Monsters,” 139.

336 “The Sleep of Reason Brings Forth Monsters,” 139.
III. Narrowing the Field: Continuum and Foundation

When faced with the question of war, many reject pacifism out of hand as a moral alternative because they assume that pacifism means an absolute rejection of any form of defense whatsoever, and worse than that, an absolute refusal to act against or confront injustice or aggression at all. Taking a position of such inaction and passivity would be morally suspect; after all, as the old saying goes, all it takes for evil to prevail is for good men to do nothing.

We have already seen that nearly all forms of pacifism place a heavy emphasis on non-passivity, upon active and self-sacrificing combat with the evils of the world. We have also seen that not all forms of pacifism so strictly limit the use of violence or force; some, for example, permit non-lethal violence. But even the strictest form of pacifism is not wholly impractical, nor does it necessarily require practitioners to be passive in the face of evil.

Cady calls this form of pacifism, at the far left (as I am describing it) end of the continuum, “the absolute pacifism of the cultural stereotype,” and defines it in simplest terms as “the view that it is wrong, always, everywhere, for anyone to use force against another human being. Here, force is understood to mean an imposition of physical strength.”\(^{337}\) (Some take this even further; as we have seen, nonresistant Mennonites (for example) have been unwilling even to use economic or psychological force – i.e., no coercion of any type is morally permissible.) He observes that such a view can be, and has been, defended upon both religious (e.g., Tolstoy) and secular (e.g., Kantian) grounds. The extremity of this position is such that “persuading people to hold this view

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\(^{337}\) Cady, 58.
usually entails getting them to adopt a particular religious or metaphysical doctrine—presumably, special beliefs about the nature of man (as inviolable on the basis of having intrinsic worth), life after death (including beliefs about karma, heaven, the soul, etc.), the existence and role of God (how He wishes human beings and/or believers to behave and live, whether He has a hand in guiding world events (so that suffering is a consequence of previous behavior, or so that undeserved suffering can be instrumental in promoting justice for the sufferer and others in the long run)), the value of life in its various forms, and so on. The addition of these to ordinary moral assumptions about our duties toward others could then conceivably lead to this extreme version of pacifism.

This view may be extreme, but it is not indefensible. Cady quotes Martin Luther King, Jr., with regard to the power of absolute pacifism: King paints a picture of a wronged person turning to invite the persecution, saying of the impending punishment, “...because I do not deserve it, I will accept it so that the world will know that I am right and you are wrong.”; King then suggests that the outcome of this nonviolent response is defeat and shame on the part of the persecutor. Cady concludes by noting that this outcome is not merely theoretical: “Acts of King and his followers demonstrated that moral strength can defeat physical force.” We have seen such absolute pacifism presented by others as well. The stories of Buddha (in his various incarnations) giving up his own life to prevent a tigress from killing her hungry cubs, and allowing himself to be hacked to death by an (unjustifiably) angry king, his only response grief for the king’s fall from virtue, reflect this principled refusal to use any force at all, even when one’s

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338 Cady, 59.

339 Cady, 60; Cady is citing Martin Luther King, Jr., *Why We Can’t Wait* (New York: Mentor, 1964), 30.
position is just. Jesus Christ’s teachings, likewise, call for his followers to turn the other cheek, to go the extra mile, ultimately, to cooperate, even with an unjust oppressor, and even when the oppressed is not legally bound to do so; Jesus practices what he preaches, as well, allowing himself to be executed on unjust grounds. Some interpretations of Judaism also express this moral principle: Kimelman cites the teaching that God is always on the side of the persecuted, so that killing or attacking someone even on just grounds is impermissible. All of these views represent a distinctive view of the world, in particular, that life (even non-human life, on some views) is precious, but that the autonomy of human beings is also precious, and that our moral duties may include an obligation to cooperate and even die, but never to injure or kill, even when doing so would constitute legitimate self-defense. That absolute pacifism is rare is obvious; that it is immoral or absurd is less so.

Yoder’s embrace of his interpretation of the teachings of Jesus suggests that he (and by extension, Mennonites) might provide another example of absolute pacifism in the real world. On one school of Mennonite thought, this is demonstrably true. Historically, Mennonites have taken it as a moral imperative to not merely be peaceful, but to be non-resistant, going so far as to reject joining broader peace movements on the grounds that they were inappropriately coercive, albeit in nonviolent ways; Guy Hershberger rejects Gandhi’s approach, for example, as “a new form of warfare,” acting to force the British government’s hand in a spirit of combativeness rather than one of humility and love.340 At least at one time, within the church, there was a distinction

340 Hershberger, 191-192.
drawn between doing justice and demanding justice, with the former being judged morally preferable, as most faithful to Scripture.³⁴¹

This distinction has been, if not dropped by the church, at least modified, to a view of the complementarity of doing justice and speaking for justice (though perhaps still with an avoidance of demanding it, especially in a strident or coercive manner). For this reason, I believe that Yoder’s view, as well as that of many contemporary Mennonites, is more accurately located (at least) slightly to the right of Absolute Pacifism on the continuum. Cady describes this position but does not give it a name; I will refer to it as “strong pacifism.” This view agrees with Absolute Pacifism that the mass killing of war, and even the taking of a life on an individual (e.g. self-defensive basis) is categorically wrong. However, Strong Pacifism is slightly more flexible in terms of the use of force; whereas absolute pacifism rejects any use of force (even verbal) against fellow human beings, Strong Pacifism merely rejects the use of lethal force. Of course, even non-lethal force is only morally permissible/obligatory in some cases – for example, when it is necessary to defend oneself or innocent others against an unprovoked physical attack (i.e., when such a response meets (roughly) the same standards as JWT); the point is, the view accepts that “non-lethal force can be warranted in principle.”³⁴²

That Yoder belongs in this category rather than further to the left on the spectrum can be seen in one of his “other ways to respond” to the threat of violence: “If someone dear to me is attacked, I shouldn’t passively acquiesce. I should act – but act in love. In some circumstances that might mean putting myself between the attacker and the

³⁴¹ Schlabach, 206-207.
³⁴² Cady, 62.
intended victim. It could mean trying physically to restrain or even to disarm the attacker.” Elsewhere, he speaks of disarming an attacker emotionally, perhaps with “a loving gesture, a display of moral authority, or my undefensive harmlessness which would disarm him psychologically” (moves compatible with the most extreme forms of Absolute Pacifism), or of using nonlethal force or a ruse (incompatible with Absolute Pacifism, but compatible with Strong).

Motivations for such a view vary: generally, though, like most forms of pacifism, they are impelled to action in the name of justice, but restrained from the more violent forms of action by some conception of the requirements of love. Biblical principles can provide both motivations, predominated by a broad application of the command not to kill. More purely rational principles might be applied: e.g., some have argued that we simply have an obligation not to destroy what we cannot create. Yoder would probably agree with both approaches, but his concern is more closely based upon the Golden Rule of the New Testament commanding love of neighbor, incorporating principles of impartiality and respect for the dignity of all persons – importantly, even that of the attacker:

Christianity relativizes the value of self and survival as it affirms the dignity of the enemy and offender. True, the potential victim is my neighbor and thus deserving of my help. But the attacker also at that moment becomes a neighbor. It is also a form of egoism to make any attempt to distinguish between these two and say that the nearness of my family member as preferred neighbor takes precedence over that of my attacker. Again, this cannot be a sufficient basis for Christian ethical decision-making.

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343 Yoder, What Would You Do?, 80.
344 Yoder, What Would You Do?, 27.
345 Cady, 62; Cady here is citing Leo Szilard.
Clearly, a pacifist operating on the basis of such standards would rule out the admissibility of killing anyone, even a (potential) killer, and this is what Yoder does: killing is not a moral option, though some force – in the interests of justice – may be.

It is likely that the pacifist views of other peace churches (Quakers, Brethren) would fit somewhere here as well, in the Absolute- to Strong Pacifism range. Quakers, for example, have much the same ethical views about war that Mennonites do, and differ from them primarily with regard to what the pacifist’s obligations are to the state: where Mennonites have historically withdrawn from the state, Quakers have tried to work with it, developing concrete ways for changing the institutions that can lead to war and offering advice on these issues. The earliest Christians – if the pacifist interpretation of history is correct – would also fall along this range, probably toward the absolute end, given the number of stories of martyrdom, people willing to die rather than take up arms. Many of the classic Christian pacifist traditions are at this end of the spectrum, allowing no more than a minimal amount of force, and never intentional killing.

Cady suggests a third form of pacifism – “Collectivist Pacifism” – that fits neatly on the continuum next to Strong Pacifism. Collectivist Pacifism draws the line, not between lethal force and non-lethal force, but between lethal force on the individual level and lethal force on the collective level. Cady describes the view as “the position that it is possible in principle to justify even lethal violence while retaining the general pacifist

347 Of course, if the JWT interpretation of Christ’s teachings and the moral convictions of the early Church are correct, the same behavior (self-sacrifice, etc.) would indicate a position toward the stricter end of the JW spectrum. Either way, though, what we see is obviously not a half-hearted commitment!
objection to war.” As the most conditional view of the three we have examined thus far, the reasoning behind it is the most complex as well. Cady describes it in this way:

A defense of this position involves arguing that it is possible for a human to perform an act so heinous that in so doing she or he forgoes any legitimate expectation to be treated as human. …the argument would conclude that moral individuals are not required to treat sufficiently immoral persons by the ordinary standards of morality, that even the general principle requiring respect for human life might have exceptions. This would mean that in principle humans can somehow lose their right to life due to their own actions, that is, by doing something so evil that by doing it they give up their right to humane treatment.

Of course, this is essentially the same reasoning behind just war theory as well; it too holds that human beings ought not to be killed unless they have done something or are doing something that threatens that right in others. Restrictions are put upon both cases as well, of course: e.g., that there be no less lethal way of solving the problem, that there be certainty that the person has indeed done something to give up his right to humane treatment, etc.

Another clause is clearly necessary to establish the pacifist element, and this part hinges upon the last restriction mentioned. Collectivist pacifism regards lethal violence as permissible in individual cases, but impermissible in the case of war, because as difficult as it is to satisfy the condition of deserving less than moral treatment in the individual case, the difficulty of doing so is far greater, and arguably impossible, in the collective case. War is in principle unjustifiable because of its very nature, because of the fact that it involves too many people, many of whom, even by participating in the

348 Cady, 62.
349 Cady, 62-63.
350 Restrictions are put upon both cases as well, of course: e.g., that there be no less lethal way of solving the problem, that there be certainty that the person has indeed given up his right to humane treatment, etc.
war, cannot be said to have surrendered their basic rights, and many more whose rights to life and liberty are threatened by war despite their innocence. JWT is prepared to accept these casualties as sometimes the lesser of two evils; Collectivist Pacifism is pacifist because it is never prepared to do so.

While Yoder is arguably a Strong Pacifist, he also makes compelling arguments for this slightly weaker version of pacifism. In *What Would You Do?*, he details a number of presumptions against killing even on the individual level, but he goes on to show that these reasons apply even more strongly in the case of war. Differences are of at least four separate types: differences of the type noted above, viz., knowledge- and decision-related; differences with regard to the role of the “defender”; different levels of collateral damage; and differences between individual preparation and the institutions of war at the national level. In the individual case, my killing another is justified only if I make certain assumptions about the decision I might make: that it is the only one in question, that it will yield the result I wish, and that I am acting upon reliable information – in reality, though, whether the outcome is just (or “just”) will depend as much upon the other person’s decision as on my own, and I have little chance of knowing what the outcome of our combined actions will be. These problems are only multiplied in the case of war, where to fairly large groups are interacting with another, neither with perfect information, and for this reason, it is extremely unlikely – if not impossible – that war will have the desired result.351 The justice of my killing another also depends upon my ability to properly assess my own motivations, to control my own selfishness and tendency towards partiality. Such introspection is far less likely in the case of group

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decision-making, especially since the causes of war are far more complex than the causes of individual altercations, where at least sometimes one party is clearly the unjustified aggressor: “in war the isolated single act of unjust brutal attack is especially difficult to find.”\textsuperscript{352} The individual case is also fairly likely to result in collateral damage: war, on the other hand, almost inevitably results in the “collateral damage,” or deaths of innocent bystanders, especially since it is subject to “practically unavoidable” escalation.\textsuperscript{353} Yoder also challenges the issues of the institutions of war, noting that, while preparation on the individual level (e.g., keeping a gun in the house) creates a greater likelihood of violence, preparation for violence on the national level makes war far more likely, since commanders who have such means at their disposal are more likely to use them, and less likely to resort to more creative but less lethal methods of settling international disputes, \textit{and} since arms buildups tend to incite rather than deter aggression in others.\textsuperscript{354} A shortage of knowledge with regard to outcomes and justification is problematic for any form of violence, but it arguably makes violence on the collective level morally unjustifiable by definition.

Collective Pacifism is surprisingly common in the realm of pacifism. Many – including Gandhi and Kant – seem at least at times to be prepared to countenance as morally permissible killing on the individual level. We have seen Gandhi’s exceptions to the rule of nonviolence (mostly involving euthanasia or other killings designed to reduce innocent suffering); Jainism also makes exceptions (for laypersons) to the general rule of nonviolence when it is necessary for self-defense (the killing of both humans and other

\textsuperscript{352} Yoder, \textit{What Would You Do?}, 23.

\textsuperscript{353} Yoder, \textit{What Would You Do?}, 20, 23.

\textsuperscript{354} Yoder, \textit{What Would You Do?}, 21-22.
forms of life (e.g., crop-destroying insects) falls under this exception). Both positions remain clearly pacifistic, however, and Jainism (not unlike JWT) holds clerics to higher moral standards than laypersons. Kant, too, says that while standing armies should be abolished, as too conducive to injustice, he makes an exemption for volunteer forces acting in self-defense on a case-by-case basis. All these exceptions seem to be motivated by a recognition for the need to combat injustice on the individual level; the fact that wars – even nominally just ones – are regarded as wrong in principle seems to be a result of one of two sorts of reasoning. Collective acts of violence by their nature are either thought to fail to respect the individuals expected to kill (and risk violating moral codes, thus compromising personal purity), or to fail to grant full consideration to the very real risk of killing someone who has done nothing (or nothing severe enough) sufficient to be said to have given up his right to life. War is too complex, and damages all involved in it.

At this point, the views on Cady’s spectrum shift in nature, moving from arguments that say that war is wrong in principle (the three forms of pacifism above) to those that say it can be right in principle but is here and now, for whatever reason, wrong in fact. I have already discussed these views in the chapter on JWT, because I believe that they are really forms of JWT, just very strict ones. Fallibility Pacifism, for example, says that war is morally unacceptable because of human limitations as to when the standards for a just war have been met, and Nuclear and Technological Pacifisms argue that war is morally unacceptable now because of the capabilities of modern weapons. Each rejects war under the current circumstances, but this is always going to be true – at least sometimes – of even mildly committed just-warists. This is, after all, the definition
of a just-warist: he is someone who believes that, under certain conditions, war can be morally acceptable; he is not disqualified as a just-warist for failing to find a given war morally unacceptable. In fact, the only positions that would seem to place him outside the bounds of the tradition would be to say that NO wars are morally acceptable, or that ALL wars are morally acceptable. Fallibility, Nuclear, and Technological Pacifisms each at least imply that some wars would be morally acceptable, just not those before us. As such, these views are firmly within the JW tradition, and can only be classified as “pacifism” based on rejection of war now, or by us.355

Cady also includes in the spectrum two other forms of pacifism I will address in a moment, but before I move on, we must address the examples of pacifism that we’ve covered that have strong just-war components, making them difficult to locate on the war-peace continuum, or perhaps making them ineligible for inclusion in the pacifist section at all. I have already argued that having “peace” in its name does not necessarily make a view pacifist, if the peace demanded is only conditional. Three of the views covered above require special attention on this point: viz., Kant, Holmes, and Gandhi each make concessions that suggest that their views are more JWT than pacifist, but in the end, I will argue that each does warrant being classified as pacifist.

355 Capital punishment provides a very close parallel on this point. Among those opposed to capital punishment, there are those that disagree with it in principle, arguing that the deliberate killing of an individual by the state is never moral, that it is perhaps by definition inhumane or unjust. Others are opposed to capital punishment in the context of a modern society that has other ways to prevent a dangerous offender from being a threat (it is no longer a last resort); perhaps in the past, in order to protect the public, there may have been no alternative but, say, hanging such a criminal, but nowadays we have supermax prisons and the like, and thus capital punishment is now immoral. Yet others are opposed to capital punishment on the grounds that there are not enough safeguards built into the system to protect wrongly-convicted innocents (that is, the death penalty as applied here and now is not sufficiently discriminating), though such objectors might not be opposed to executions in very clear-cut cases. Other analogues to the JW standards apply as well (wrongful intentions, proportionality, etc.). The point is, though there may be a current agreement among all of these objectors, they clearly do not hold the same positions in principle.
I will start with Kant as the most potentially problematic. After all, Kant does not have the same role as pacifist in the popular imagination as does someone like Gandhi; he makes no special argument against war (that I am aware of) in his most famous works of moral philosophy, and one of his most famous contemporary representatives, John Rawls, argues explicitly for something like just-war standards. Rawls agrees with Kant’s views on intra- and interstate relationships (the perpetually peaceful state) as ideal, but takes non-ideal situations into account, developing an argument for the right of Well-Ordered Peoples to go to war: such states have a very limited right to go to war, not (merely) “in the rational pursuit of a state’s rational interests” but “only when they sincerely and reasonably believe that their safety and security are seriously endangered by the expansionist policies of outlaw states.” Rawls’s list of standards that must be met in the case of such a war is in line with traditional just war standards; Rawls – like any just-warist – views war as undesirable but moral if it is the lesser of the available evils. However, Kant too describes standards to be followed in the event of war (e.g., no use of assassins, poisoners, or incitement to treason), and while arguing for the abolishment (eventually) of standing armies because their maintenance is contrary to the inherent rights of mankind, he admits that “the case is entirely different where the citizens of a state voluntarily drill themselves at stated times in the practice of arms with a view of defending themselves and their fatherland against attacks from without.” Does this, then, mean that Kant is a just-warist as well?

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356 Rawls, 89-91.
I would argue that it does not, at least not clearly so. There are certainly grounds for arguing that Kant is a just-warist; at times, he even sounds like a realist: war, he tells us, is “only the dire necessity of asserting one’s right by force in a primitive state of society where there is no court at hand to decide in accordance with right…neither party can be declared an unjust enemy.” However, there are other elements in Kant’s account that indicate that he views war as categorically, rather than conditionally, wrong, based on the application of his own moral standard of reason as the legislator. That is, despite the fact that no state has natural authority over any other, states and those within them do answer to the authority of reason: “reason, from its supreme throne of moral, lawgiving power, condemns war absolutely as a means of establishing right, and on the other hand makes the state of peace an immediate duty, [even though this state] cannot be secured without a compact of the nations with each other.” Now it is arguable that Kant merely means that we have a duty to work for peace, and war (governed by standards themselves informed by what will yield the most peaceful ultimate outcome) is an acceptable means toward that end – essentially, the just-war stance. If nothing else, however, Kant’s reasoning certainly suggests some form of pacifism grounded purely in reason, a moral foundation of a Kantian variety, such a position could potentially fall anywhere between Absolute and Collectivist Pacifism on the spectrum yet still categorically reject war as a violation of a duty towards the peace that is the preferable state for any rational person.


360 Kant, *Perpetual Peace*, 17.

361 In other words, even if he doesn’t hold this view, *someone* certainly could, on the basis of this reasoning, and such a position is a useful representation of secular pacifism.
Holmes’s position seems likewise to be indicative of JW leanings, but in this case, the choice to move along the spectrum is merely strategic, and not fully reflective of Holmes’s own position. His primary concern, in both works examined here, is to address the modern development of nuclear weapons. He thus makes a limited argument – quite in line with Cady’s Nuclear Pacifism – in which he seeks to show that certain types of warfare (i.e., nuclear) are entirely immoral, in that they inevitably bring harm to the innocent. As we have seen, this is entirely compatible with, and in fact comprises, a relatively strict incarnation of JWT. Holmes himself, however, believes that “both sorts [innocent and non-innocent] of wartime killing are wrong.”

The “wartime killing” qualification suggests that Holmes might be a Collectivist Pacifist (allowing for the possible morality of non-wartime killing), but elsewhere he speaks out against violence or harm, both physical and psychological, committed against any human being, as immoral (though again, he only defends the weaker claim that violence against innocents is at least presumptively wrong), suggesting that he belongs at the stricter end of the spectrum, as a Strong Pacifist or even an Absolute one.

Gandhi’s position is similarly difficult to situate on the continuum. Famous for his belief that it is better to fight than to be peaceful because one is a coward, Gandhi himself served in the group of medics under the British in the Boer war, and argued for active military service being opened to Indian subjects of the British. As we have seen, he was not uniformly committed to nonviolence, accepting certain instances of euthanasia.

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362 Holmes, On War and Morality, 212-213.

363 Holmes, On War and Morality, 38-45.

and even capital punishment as morally permissible in certain cases (largely on consequentialist grounds) and even recommending suicide as at least a potential alternative when in a war against an implacable foe (when there is no other option than committing violence against one’s opponent, suicide avoids causing harm to another and has a fairly high shock (hopefully transformational) value as well).

However, though in many ways Gandhi took a unique approach to pacifism, he nonetheless clearly avoids even conditional approval of war; he was not a just warist. The fact that in his youth he was associated with a military campaign (assuming he did not have the same status while he espoused the pacifist views we’ve examined) is not clearly relevant to his long-term mature position. Based on his views as reviewed earlier in the chapter, taken as a whole, he clearly falls within the range of at least Collectivist Pacifism. This would account for his willingness to allow case-by-case violence while rejecting war. That he prized the means of courage above the end of peacefulness demonstrates that (whatever moral calculations he may have used in his thinking about euthanasia, etc.) for him, consequences were secondary to character and principles (though he argues often for the good consequences that do in fact tend to accompany a peaceful approach to unjust situations). And that he allows suicide as an option (allowing oneself to be killed is as extreme as most pacifists get; suicide is really an extreme option even for Gandhi himself) should make clear that he is genuinely opposed to doing harm to others, any others, no matter how unjust.

The first of the two remaining forms of pacifism on Cady’s continuum, Ecological Pacifism, differs from those that come before it in nature, not in degree, in a way that mirrors one of the major differences between eastern and western forms of
religious pacifism – specifically, with regard to how different forms of life are ranked in terms of moral value. One of the definitive features of any war-peace position is in the way it ranks life, or if it is willing to do so at all: to put it rather crudely, JWT is willing to give the life of a noncombatant priority over the life of a combatant, while pacifism is not; the realist, in the meantime, ranks the lives of “ours” over the those of “theirs.” Each of these, however, is generally making these calculations in terms of human lives; JWT (and pacifism, when it has chosen to speak about the particulars of war) has historically cautioned against the unnecessary destruction of agriculture and other forms of life useful to man, but primarily for that reason (their usefulness), rather than for any intrinsic value that those things have.

Ecological Pacifism, though, holds that life, or even more generally, entities other than human life do have intrinsic rather than merely instrumental value: “culture, other animal and plant species, perhaps life itself…the environment itself has value beyond its usefulness to humans.”365 This is not to say that religious and secular positions alike could (or do) not express concern for animals and other forms of life – Christians often take good stewardship of creation to be a divinely commanded duty, for example. Still, eastern religions are at least more likely to be working from different presuppositions on this point, rejecting a ranking in which human life has inherently greater value than other forms of life. Jainism in particular is quite explicit on this point, demanding respect for all of a broadly-defined set of life forms (including fire and water, in addition to organisms like bugs, plants, and animals), and it is hard to forget the story of Buddha dying for the tiger cubs.

365 Cady, 71-72.
Despite the eastern ring that Ecological Pacifism may have to it, though, I would argue that there are two problems with drawing such a connection. First, I believe that each of the eastern religions we reviewed – Jainism, Hinduism, Buddhism – can be located far more accurately within the leftward range of the continuum, somewhere between Absolute and Collectivist Pacifism. After all, these views are not (only) concerned with the extinction of species, something that (specifically) modern warfare is uniquely positioned to accomplish, but rather, with the destruction of any individual, and this destruction is something that any war, however limited and/or primitive, is virtually designed to bring about. For most forms of pacifism, war is seen as wrong because it destroys lives (or more accurately, it implicates one agent in the taking of the life of another agent, thereby harming both); for Ecological Pacifism, war is wrong because it destroys the possibility of the continuation of some collective thing (a species, a biosystem, a culture), less so because of its effects on individual lives.

Seen in this way, it becomes clear that this view is essentially a consequentialist one (Cady makes this explicit, saying “This is clearly a results-focused morality that regards modern technology as dangerously tinkering with a fragile and incredibly complex infrastructure”366), and one in which the loss of an individual human life is a lesser evil than some other types of losses: “It is bad enough that humans should kill one another; it is somehow worse that they should risk the extinction of the human species along with culture, other animal and plant species, perhaps life itself. …The worry is not merely that humans suffer when the environment is abused; it is that the environment

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366 Cady, 71.
itself has value beyond its usefulness to humans.\textsuperscript{367} As such, Ecological Pacifism differs only in subject of concern from Cady’s final, and weakest, listed form of pacifism, Pragmatic Pacifism, which argues simply that wars are wrong because they “tend to promote, not relieve human misery.”\textsuperscript{368} William James perhaps comes the closest to being a pragmatic pacifist, but this resemblance may be nothing more than an artifact of the pragmatic goal of his paper, which is to offer suggestions as to how to replace war as a social institution (with something that brings about the same good consequences as war, with none of its bad ones).

Whether or not James’s motivations toward pacifism are purely pragmatic ones, I do not believe that Pragmatic Pacifism, or its Ecological variation, can truly be characterized as forms of pacifism at all. After all, as consequentialist views, they remain open to the possibility of a war’s being moral if it did in fact relieve human (or ecological/cultural/planetary) misery in greater proportion than it promoted it. As a result, such views are no more pacifist in essence than are the views of anyone else who says that some particular instance of war is not a good thing – JWT is committed to saying this often, and even crusaders and realists must sometimes recognize the value of refraining from some conflicts. The other pacifists we have reviewed accurately represent pacifists in general, I think, in their belief that engaging in nonviolent behavior will probably have a more beneficial effect upon the world than engaging in violent behavior, but (and this is the key point for pacifism) even if it does not, the ends do not justify the means. Killing others, in any conditions or at least in the conditions of war, is

\textsuperscript{367} Cady, 71-72.
\textsuperscript{368} Cady, 73.
wrong in principle, and even if that killing would yield just results, something like the
greatest good for the greatest number, it would not thereby become morally correct to do
so. War is categorically, rather than conditionally, wrong.\textsuperscript{369}

In the end, I believe that only views clustered around the strongest three of Cady’s
forms of pacifism really represent a uniquely pacifist position, the one characterized by
this unconditional opposition to war. In the following chapter, I will develop this
definition further, by looking at other features that it shares with JWT, and in what areas
they differ. I will re-evaluate the concept of the continuum as I evaluate the relationship
between these views and those of realism and the crusading tradition. I will also try to
account for the positions of consequence-based positions, which I have generally rejected
as either pacifist or just-warist, but which by definition do not quite fit into the realist
spectrum either; I will argue that such views have a separate but roughly parallel
spectrum – separate, I will argue, because of the inherent difficulty in using such a
grounds for a war-peace position in the first place (this is one of the reasons that this
approach is explicitly rejected by many pacifists and just-warists). In the process, I will
develop an argument for the position that I believe is most morally defensible: a dualist
form of pacifism that allows for the morality of a relatively strict form of JWT, but which
holds pacifism out as the ideal.

\textsuperscript{369} A version of this argument also shows why these views are not part of JWT either. They are
not truly Pacifist, because they don’t reject war unconditionally; however, as consequentialist views, they
also do not unconditionally reject the intentional killing of non-combatants in war. As conditional views
placing value elsewhere, they must in principle be committed to doing whatever is necessary to bring about
the greatest good, whether that includes only human good or extends to other goods.
CHAPTER 4

WAR/PEACE - SETTING THE TERMS

More books and articles have been written on the subject of war and peace than I could hope to cover here, or even simply to read, some of them descriptive of a selection of the views people hold on the subject, others making normative claims as to which views are the most morally defensible. The sheer scope of views available for perusal is a good thing, in that it demonstrates the utter diversity the ways people have thought about this topic, and better, that so many have thought about it at all. On the other hand, this great variety can at times cloud the issue, leading to one of two quite disparate conclusions: (1) that despite all our differences we pretty much agree that war is a problem but one that the application of a little common sense can resolve, or (2) that our views on war are so utterly scattered that there can be no hope of even the beginnings of a categorization.

As we have already seen, neither of these options is very convincing on a closer look; at the very least, a cursory breakdown is often proposed, encompassing three main categories, pacifism, just war theory, and realism, which collectively reveal the first conclusion above as overly optimistic, and the second, overly pessimistic. However, while this classification does help to impose some order on the discussion, it is itself misleading. That there is more complexity then the three-way breakdown may at first imply is not a problem – those who set the categories do so explicitly in order to bring
order to the multitude, and doing so is, of course, part of my own project here. However, this common three-fold breakdown ignores a fourth category, the crusade, which is of more than merely historical interest, and significantly different from the other categories. Descriptive categorizations also fail to give enough attention to the true basis of these positions – there is something more to being a pacifist (or just-warist or realist) than merely choosing the label, especially if that choice is based on nothing beyond one’s immediate feelings about a single situation. A closer examination of the concept of a war-peace continuum will help to resolve both of these problems.

The solution to the second must follow a solution to the first, I believe: it difficult to pinpoint what range of beliefs must ground each of the broad categories (and the individual positions within them) without first a better sense of how the views are situated with relation to one another. I have been using the metaphor proposed by Duane Cady, that of a spectrum or continuum; I propose to refine Cady’s continuum to take a greater variety of views into account, adding the crusading tradition, expanding realism, and relocating the division between pacifism and JWT in the way I have already described in the preceding chapters. Philosophy is, by its nature, resistant to attempts to create bright sharp lines of division, so I undertake this task with the goal of bringing as much clarity to the situation as I can while acknowledging that no analysis can bring perfect clarity to such a subject.

I. A More Extensive Continuum

The concept of a continuum works fairly well just as Cady describes it, because it captures not merely the ways that pacifism and just war theory (in particular) can vary
internally, but also the way in which the two are so much more closely related than they first appear. Cady describes the continuum as extending from realism, at one extreme, to Absolute Pacifism at the other, with more moderate forms of pacifism and the entire spectrum of JWT falling in between the two. Picture the views on a line, with Absolute Pacifism to the far left. As we move to the right, we come to Strong Pacifism and Collectivist Pacifism, thus moving from the strictest form of pacifism (AP), which permits no force or coercion whatsoever, to SP, which permits force but no lethal force, to CP, which permits lethal force in the case of individual self-defense but not in the case of war. (Implicit in the latter views is that all uses of force, whether in SP or CP, would be bound by the sorts of considerations that apply in JWT: e.g., force is permitted provided there is just cause, that it is last resort, that it is proportional to the threat, and so on).

For Cady, the spectrum of pacifism continues to the right, encompassing Fallibility Pacifism (where war is permissible in theory but not in fact, given man’s intellectual failings, specifically his inability to tell when the proper conditions for war have been met), as well as Nuclear and Technological Pacifism (where war is permissible in theory and once was in fact, but is no longer permissible given the capability for destruction in modern warfare); I have argued that these are more properly included in the JW part of the spectrum, as they only conditionally reject warfare, and on an explicitly JW line of reasoning (no war where the conditions cannot be, or are not, met). Cady also includes (further removed from the endpoint of Absolute Pacifism) two views that situate themselves as pacifist on consequentialist grounds: Ecological Pacifism, which rejects war as inevitably too harmful to plants, animals, whole species, ecosystems,
and so on, and Pragmatic Pacifism, which judges war as inevitably more likely to bring about more harm than good, and thus wrong. I have argued that these fit under neither the heading of pacifism nor of JWT; to situate them in relation to the continuum will be one of the challenges ahead.

Before we address these outliers, however, let us continue with Cady’s continuum. After pacifism, we move fairly seamlessly into JWT. After all, the two agree that war is prima facie wrong, that we have obligations to our fellow human beings to act out of love while seeking justice. They disagree about whether war is ever theoretically morally permissible, with JWT arguing that justice sometimes requires taking a life, while pacifism argues that love requires refusing to do so. For JWT, war can be the moral choice, the lesser of two evils, as adjudged on the grounds of a complex system of standards that must be met before war can justly be entered into and fought. The strictest forms of JWT will hold that these standards are seldom if ever met, and will thus be equivalent to pacifism in practice. As we continue to move to the right on the continuum, however, we find weaker and weaker (or more and more pragmatic, depending on your perspective) forms of JWT; these apply the standards less stringently and are thus more likely to approve of a war in any given instance. Cady does not name the various forms of JWT, but characterizes the JW spectrum in terms of epistemology:

If [just-warists] are quick and eager to justify entering a war and loose in demanding moral restraint on how it is fought, and if they have only a casual interest in the presentation of evidence to satisfy some of the guiding principles for just war, then they fall closer to the war-realist extreme at the periphery of just-warism. If, on the other hand, they have scrupulous demands that each principle be considered and if they have high expectations for the evidence satisfying each just-war principle, then they would fall further away from the war-realist extreme toward the weak end of the scale. … One’s place along the just-
warist continuum seems to be a function of one’s knowledge of the justifiability of proposed acts.\textsuperscript{370}

A just-war theorist, then, is one who (unlike the pacifist) believes that war can be justified. He \textit{also} believes (unlike the realist) that war \textit{needs} to be justified.

Cady describes realism as the end of the continuum opposite Absolute Pacifism. This view holds that there are no principles at all that govern warfare:

According to the war realist, war cannot be called right or wrong in any meaningful way; war is simply a fact. It is neither good nor evil but a fundamental state of nature where survival itself is at stake and where people do what they must to save themselves. After a war is over, moral order is reestablished. But war itself is not an appropriate object of moral consideration.\textsuperscript{371}

This view thus lies beyond the very weakest form of JWT; the latter makes at least a token gesture toward the restraining principles of JWT, while realism denies that such principles are even applicable.

We have thus reached the end of Cady’s continuum, a spectrum that would seem to rank its members from least- to most-likely-to-go-to-war (or perhaps -to-commit-violence, since no point on the pacifist scale admits a right to go to war). Least Violent (at the far left) proceeds toward Most Violent (at the right) – this is the simplest interpretation of the continuum. It is clearly not quite accurate, however. Realism is not necessarily more likely to go to war than a loosely-bound just-warist outraged at some injustice, just (possibly) less likely to be restrained in the fighting of a war once it is entered into. What distinguishes these two portions on the continuum is not the level of commitment to violence, but rather what – if anything – can justify such violence. It is a

\textsuperscript{370} Cady, 35. I would categorize the forms of JWT further from realism, and closer to Pacifism, as strong JWT rather than “weak,” however.

\textsuperscript{371} Cady, 22.
matter of principle. This interpretation of the continuum is consistent with the way I have thus far distinguished between views (that is, between pacifism and JWT),\textsuperscript{372} and is the most useful way to distinguish between JWT and realism. It has the added benefits of allowing us to distinguish between (and place on the continuum) various forms of realism, and of more clearly providing a place for CT.

An even clearer way of describing the principles that span the continuum is to move away from talk about justification for violence; rather than negative proscriptions, each of the four positions can be classified according to (1) what we owe, and (2) who we owe it to. The emphasis in pacifism, speaking generally, is on love: we have a duty to love, and that duty extends toward every human being – excluding even the guilty from this duty would be contrary to reason, perhaps, or to the commands of God, as we are each equal members within the kingdom of reason and/or the kingdom of God, and are not qualified to take the life of a fellow citizen, no matter what he or she may have done. Justice is important, and must be pursued, but not at the expense of a life, even that of an unjust person. The emphasis in JWT is reversed: here, we have a duty to justice, to every human being, and such justice must be pursued and accomplished in the spirit of love, but it nonetheless does allow us to give preference to one set of human beings over another, viz., the innocent over the guilty. The domain of who deserves consideration narrows even more as we reach the realist position: here, the responsibility of those making the choices in war (or for war) is even narrower – not a careful discrimination between who

\textsuperscript{372} It is also largely consistent with the way Cady distinguishes between Pacifism and JWT, also on the grounds of at least a principle, viz., whether war can be a means to reach the end of peace (JWT) or whether a given means cannot be used to reach a diametrically opposed end (Pacifism). I will continue to argue that while these descriptions are to some degree accurate, JWT’s position can be framed in such a way as to simultaneously satisfy both descriptions – i.e., where a certain kind of war is NOT diametrically opposed to peace.
is unjust and who must be protected from the unjust, but rather, a simple assessment of “us” vs. “them,” since realism holds that, when at war, states need feel no moral restraint, and are allowed to do what they must to survive (this, presumably, is the only relevant moral duty).

Described this way, the continuum clearly makes room for, and leads directly from realism into, something like CT. In terms of the action-oriented continuum, we see that restraint continues to decrease, from the absolute restraint of pacifism to the limited restraint of JWT to the (virtual) non-restraint of realism; the positions so far have had a gradually diminishing set of standards to restrain violent behavior, crossing over into the CT range, where standards require a lack of restraint. In terms of restraint, then, the continuum is a single long slope. In terms of principle, however, realism represents a midpoint, with positions sloping from either side, moving from no principles in the middle to weakly-held principles and then onto strongly-held principles, yielding the most dramatic forms at either endpoint. The principles of JWT restrain, and thus weakly-held JWT is the least restrained; the principles of CT impel, and thus weakly-held CT is more restrained than the strongly-principled destruction-committed positions at the far right of the continuum. Or to put it in another way, for JWT, unrestrained war becomes more likely as the endpoint of realism nears, whereas for CT, this sort of war becomes more likely the further from this endpoint one goes.

More must be said about CT, to explain (1) why it is relevant even in non-religious arenas (i.e., why it is not just a religious-fanatic anomaly, unsusceptible to moral analysis), and (2) how exactly the principles of CT differ from those of JWT. By any definition, CT’s defining moral trait – and that which distinguishes it from both JWT
and pacifism – is that it regards war as (on occasion) a good thing. This clearly contrasts with even JW’s position, which holds that war is at best the lesser of two evils, one to be undertaken when necessarily, but with a “mournful mood.”

There is (unsurprisingly) not as much written in defense of the crusading mentality as there is of just war and pacifism, so I have drawn primarily upon the work of Roland Bainton (in terms of religious crusades) and John Howard Yoder (expanding this into an account of the parallel but no less “holy” pursuit of the secular ideological crusade).

The crusade is obviously most commonly known in the context of its religious incarnation. Given the commonality of the roots of this philosophy of war with those of JWT, the contrasts between the two are informative. For example, for the crusader, a war God has commanded not only may but should be fought without limits – concern for the niceties of just war are inappropriate in a divinely-ordained war, for such must be won at any cost. *Jus ad bellum* concerns (at least those of JWT) do not apply either, for God rather than man decides what wars are to be fought. The CT has clear roots in the Old Testament, and flourish at later points in history (during the crusades, as an obvious example, and as advocated by the Reformed Churches, especially those of Zwingli and Calvin, and by Oliver Cromwell during the Puritan Revolution). Bainton describes the guiding principles of traditional religious crusades: (1) the war must have a holy cause, (2) the war must be fought under God and with His help, (3) the crusaders must be godly,

373 Bainton, *Christian Attitudes Toward War and Peace*, 98; here, Bainton is characterizing Augustine’s position.

374 As Bainton points out, however, much of this interpretation was developed after the fact: under a monotheistic system, God must be responsible for war as well as for peace. “Yahweh bestows victory, and Yahweh may inflict defeat as a chastisement. Historically speaking, his warlike characteristics were magnified in the course of the descriptions of the conquest. Originally Yahweh appears to have been regarded as the deity of natural catastrophe…Later [he] acquired the characteristics of a man of war” (*Christian Attitudes Toward War and Peace*, 47-48). In other words, CT looks to the Old Testament, but the Old Testament doesn’t necessarily point toward CT.
and the enemy ungodly, and (4) “the war must be prosecuted unsparingly.” War is the only morally acceptable resort (as opposed to the last resort) in some circumstances (surrender or negotiation with the “infidel” being by far the worse choice, as it means compromising one’s basic commitments), and the probability of success is irrelevant as a standard (either because war is assured when God is on one’s side, or because it is better to die with honor than to surrender to an immoral foe). Clearly, this set of standards bears little relation to that of JWT, either in spirit or in letter: some points directly contradict it, and the underlying motivation differs as well – CT (at least traditionally) appeals directly to the divine, while JWT (although motivated in most instances by religious or spiritual considerations) makes no direct reference to anything other than natural facts about the world.

A crusader need not appeal to the divine in order for his behavior to have the characteristics of a “holy” war, however. Yoder gives such examples of secular “holy” causes as manifest destiny, Leninism, fascism, and “defense of the free world”376; though such causes are secular and thus theoretically more “rational” than religious ones, Yoder points out that the moral structure of the persecution of such wars is identical to that of more traditional holy wars. He gives a list that resembles Bainton’s, though tailored to accommodate the possible secular nature of the crusade. Though Yoder does not do so, this list can be divided into two sections paralleling JWT’s jus ad bellum and jus in bello standards (though “justice” is not obviously no longer quite the right term). The first standards also have to do with the decision to go to war. Like JWT, CT is concerned

375 Bainton, Christian Attitudes Toward War and Peace, 148.
376 Yoder, When War Is Unjust, 12, 27.
with the cause of war: (1) “the cause [must have] transcendent validation,” and (2) “this transcendent quality is known by revelation.” The value of the cause is such that it outweighs any (relatively) minor political concerns, so that proportionality – the balancing of competing goals – is no longer a concern. Political calculation is not necessary; instead, the cause can (and should) be pursued single-mindedly. Furthermore, perception of the cause does not arise from political, practical, or diplomatic consideration of the situation, but rather, from some outside or special source, whether person or institution (e.g., “a guru, a prophet, an ayatollah, or an oracle”).

The first two criteria of CT are similar though not identical to *jus ad bellum* considerations. The next two, however, are diametrically opposed: (3) war need not be a last resort, and (4) success need not be probable. Thus, no alternative means of resolution need be pursued – in fact, doing so is immoral in this context:

> The criterion of last resort does not apply. Other ways of working toward the same goal (accepting half a loaf as better than nothing, mediation, compromise, etc.) are dishonorable in the face of the transcendent duty to destroy.

Furthermore, given the nature of the opponent and the holiness of the cause, the uncompromising nature of the war being entered into rules out the need to calculate the odds of success as well. Religious crusades take as a premise the concept of an other-worldly success in the first place, insofar as those fighting “win” by going to heaven (or the afterlife of good reputation and/or eventual vindication), no matter the outcome of the...
physical battle, and Yoder points out that even secular crusades create their own “immortal” martyrs.\footnote{380}

The destruction of the unholy opposition is the only goal, and this defines the fifth standard, which pertains to conduct in war (\textit{jus in bello}): “The adversary has no rights, or at least no vested rights that have to be respected. …Restraint is no virtue; excess may be proof of devotion.”\footnote{381} Holy war is total war, and applies the above standard in place of the just-war standard of discrimination – there is no noncombatant immunity, or more precisely, there is no recognition of immunity for civilians, women, children, and so on, because – as members of the class of infidels – they are combatants, and thus deserve no immunity. The issue of desert is not linked to the physical threat, or injustice, posed by the opponent, but to something about his or her very nature: her race, her political ideology, her religion. Some crusades explicitly conceive of their opposition as non-human; others deny that they have the same rights as the “holy” warriors. And of course, the more extreme the views of the crusader, the fewer who are likely to agree with him, resulting in a widening pool of non-conforming enemies.

In both the preparation for war and the performance of it, CT holds its practitioners to certain standards, standards quite different, for the most part, from those of JWT. However, like JWT, those engaged in war can adhere with greater or less strictness to these standards, and this in turn (I argue) determines the position of the particular incarnation on the continuum, ranging from weakly-committed crusaders near

\footnote{380} Yoder, \textit{When War Is Unjust}, 13.

\footnote{381} Yoder, \textit{When War Is Unjust}, 13; see also pp. 55-56 for further discussion of the conceptions of the adversary.
the border of realism, to strongly-committed ones on the far right edge of the spectrum.\textsuperscript{382}

The better a crusader one is, or the more true, the greater will be one’s commitment to the
destruction of the opposition, and the less restraint one will have in war. The object of
duty varies, from religious (theist vs. non-theist, Christian vs. Muslim, Protestant vs.
Catholic) to political (democracy vs. communism vs. socialism), but the general duty in
the service of that object is a commitment to destruction of opposition. The domain of
fair targets may vary in size, depending on whether “us” is a country or a collection of
like-minded political entities, a broad religion or a tiny religious faction, but while there
is a parallel with JWT (just = right doctrine, unjust = wrong doctrine), much less care (in
the sense of discrimination) is required, as the ultimate goal is service of an ideology
rather than justice for individuals. Still, philosophically speaking, CT takes a form
similar to that of pacifism and JWT: a weakly- to strongly-bound sense of duty with
regard to how to treat some proscribed set of individuals.

This description of the three categories in question is very general, but it does
yield enough information to raise a question about realism, the fourth category: is this
view really a single point on the continuum, dividing JWT from CT, or does it too have
enough variety to present itself as a spectrum? I would argue that it does have sufficient
variation for the latter approach to make sense; like all the other views, it is demarcated
on the grounds of principle, but in practice, flows easily into the views on either side,
JWT and CT. The variation begins with the slightly different ways in which realism has

\textsuperscript{382} Yoder proposes a fifth form of war reasoning, beyond even CT, which perhaps is the true
endpoint of this spectrum: the “macho” or “Rambo” attitude regards war as a good in that it allows a man
to act out or achieve his manhood; opponents have no value in and of themselves, only insofar as they
contribute to the warrior’s own quest. “The warrior’s ‘manliness’ is self-validating.” If, as the continuum
moves to the right, restraint is lost and the list of who is actually deserving of consideration diminishes,
perhaps the Rambo viewpoint is the natural culmination – a purely war-oriented position with only the
warrior himself deserving of consideration. (\textit{When War Is Unjust}, 1; \textit{Nevertheless}, 153).
been defined: the definition we have been using is the most typical, describing a realist as one “who says it is wrong or impossible to think morally about war” or international relations at all.\textsuperscript{383} This version has thus far represented the principled midpoint between JWT and CT; it is more precise to call it simply the midpoint, of course, since it, alone of all the views we are examining, holds that there are no moral principles applicable to war. Such a view is often the outgrowth of particular views on political philosophy, viz., those that say there are no obligations between states, only between persons and the state they have consented to. This is the sort of view Kant describes in “Perpetual Peace,” for example, the state of nature that exists among states that have not formed a Federation of Free States; he says that the codes for warfare developed by the likes of Grotius, Pufendorf, and Vattel have no legal force,

because states as such are not under any common outward restraint… The method by which states prosecute their rights can not under present conditions be a process of law, since no court exists having jurisdiction over them, but only war. But through war, even if it result in victory, the question of right is not decided. The treaty of peace puts an end to the present war, not to the condition out of which a new pretext for war may arise. Nor can this pretext be declared out and out unjust, since in this condition every state is judge of its own cause.\textsuperscript{384}

He goes on to say that reason condemns war and makes peace a duty, but the view he describes is clearly the sort of view held by political realists – no state has any obligation to any other state.

Another form of realism takes this “no principles” view to apply to morality in general, holding that there are no moral rules for war because there are no moral rules for anything; it is sometimes referred to as moral nihilism.\textsuperscript{385} A distant relation of these is

\textsuperscript{383} Yoder, \textit{When War Is Unjust}, 1.
\textsuperscript{384} Kant, \textit{Perpetual Peace}, 16.
\textsuperscript{385} Holmes, \textit{On War and Morality}, 17.
the view, sometimes also called “realism,” that war is so evil that by making war, a person or state puts itself outside of any claim to moral treatment, and thus any means may be taken to stop the aggression of others; John Howard Yoder calls this approach the “war is hell” philosophy. This view differs slightly from the more typical account of realism in that it ascribes a moral value to war itself, rather than describing it as something like a force of nature; this view is still clearly distinct from Just War Theory, however, because it removes any moral onus from those responding to war-making on the part of others, and in fact, seems to require them to do whatever is necessary to end war as quickly as possible – that end justifies any means.

In fact, I believe that these three, in this order, do represent a kind of continuum for realism. The defining principle is the lack of principle, the denial that one must fight a war according to any moral code. The most purely unprincipled, moral nihilism, is located somewhere near the center of the spectrum; at this point, very little restrains the agent (person or state) except for self-interest, the recognition that especially unrestrained actions can bring about undesirable reactions. Realism in the ordinary sense, political realism, lies to the left, between the center point and JWT; though this type of realist recognizes no binding moral code in the pursuit of war, or perhaps even in the declaration of war, it is likely to be more restrained because it does recognize moral obligations in some arenas. After all, states have no obligation to one another, but they do have an obligation to their own members, their own citizens, on the grounds of an explicit or implicit contract, or divinely-ordained sovereignty, or whatever other political philosophy

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387 *Nevertheless*, 154.
grounds the view. Going to war hastily or on grounds weak enough to provoke an especially hostile reaction from other states, while not thought to be inherently wrong (as these acts would be thought on JWT grounds), would surely be problematic insofar as doing these things exposes citizens to unnecessary risk; the same would be true of unusually vicious fighting tactics and other in bello matters (Yoder calls this approach to war “Governmental Self-Interest”\textsuperscript{388}). This form of realism could easily transition to the weaker forms of JWT to its left; the two would likely be the same in practical terms, and would differ only in theory, with JWT holding that there are standards that apply unconditionally, and realism holding that such standards have only in instrumental value, and can be disregarded if, say, the acting state is sufficiently powerful that it need not fear reprisals or poor world opinion.

The less obligation a state feels toward its citizens, or its citizens toward one another (no form of realism, of course, feeling much (or any) obligation toward members of other states), the closer a view would come to the central point of moral nihilism. And once this point is passed, we come to the “war is hell” range, where war becomes less and less restrained, in the service of simply getting things over with. Some might argue that this is desirable in order to protect citizens; others might argue that ending the war is best for everyone, even the opposing side. Both have in common, however, a disregard for individual lives, and seek only an ending to war, which does have an intrinsic value, albeit a negative one. As this view moves to the right, nearing the CT boundary, restraint continues to diminish; in fact, the continuum may suffer some overlap here, in that milder

\textsuperscript{388} Yoder, \textit{Nevertheless}, 152. Yoder notes that while this view is now referred to as realism, “In ancient Greece it was held by people called Cynics and in Renaissance Italy it was exposited by Machiavelli. Clausewitz restated it in terms of the soldier’s profession” (ibid).
forms of CT might call for more restraint than stronger forms of “war is hell” realism. Either way, there is a clear dividing line here in terms of principle, in this case not a shifting account of whether the enemy has some inherent right to life, freedom, etc., but rather, a shifting account of whether war is something to be avoided/ended or something to be sought. For CT, after all, war is not hellish but glorious, something properly enjoyed when done in the service of the (perceived) good.

Philosophies about war, and actions relating to war, then, fall along a wide continuum. Actions range from completely restrained (die rather than commit violence towards anyone!) to completely unrestrained (violence toward everyone but me!). The principles leading towards these actions also vary widely, including perceived obligations to love, to do justice, and to destroy anything out of line with a certain cause. This even includes as a basis (for realism) a principled lack of principle; an obvious contradiction when framed this way, the view is perhaps better (though less flowing) expressed as “a perceived lack of obligation on the grounds of philosophical consideration,” opposed, of course, to a lack of principle and/or action on the less impressive grounds of laziness or lack of introspection.

These very qualities, however, do ground at least one view (if it can be called that) on war/peace that we have not yet evaluated, viz., the position of “passivism,” pacifism’s weaker counterpart. Whereas pacifism is strongly grounded in principle, and committed to working for justice in the spirit of love, prepared to sacrifice in order to fulfill this obligation, passivism is generally grounded in nothing more than a vague desire to avoid conflict, or to not get involved. When people object to pacifism as lazy or cowardly, it is the passivist they surely have in mind – the true pacifist, by definition, is
neither of those things. The question of where passivism is located on the continuum is more complicated than any of the sub-spectrums we have examined thus far, perhaps because of the very fact that the view is not based on principle, but on a lack of one, committed to nothing beyond “doing nothing.” This characterization suggests one possible location for passivism: in terms of action (specifically, restraint with regard to violence), it must be located at the far left of the spectrum, with Absolute Pacifism, though the two have little else in common (not even their actions auxiliary to restraint, for Absolute Pacifists are committed to positive actions in pursuit of peace and justice, while the passivist is bound by no such obligation – and indeed, it seems doubtful that the passivist would adhere to whatever principles of nonviolence might tenuously exist within her, in the face of a true life-or-death situation). In terms of principle, however, we must locate passivism elsewhere, near the center of the spectrum characterized by lack of principle; passivism does not have much else in common with any form of realism, either – it is not a nihilistic view, as it has a vague sense of principle (no violence) but this principle is seemingly unconnected to any other principles, giving rise to no obligation toward action, and thus the view remains a hollow one. Unlike every other view on the continuum, it fails to link action and principle, and is also – for this very reason – the one that the fewest people will actually profess to hold.

In my experience, most people profess to be either pacifists or just-warists (though not always in those terms). (A few take a realist position; no one I’ve ever spoken to has admitted to being a crusader (though clearly there are still those in the world who are proud to be so, and many more who hold such a view but prefer to think of it as a just-war position).) I have already made the point that philosophically and even
practically, pacifism and JWT are very similar, and this recognition is generally a pleasant surprise for those who have not realized it before: pacifists are pleased to learn that Just-warists are not (necessarily) gun-slinging hawks, while Just-warists are gratified to find that pacifists are not (necessarily) flower-waving hippies. Of course, both of these stereotypes are embodied too, but those who inhabit them are generally not truly just-warists or pacifists, but rather, crusaders or passivists, and usually, not very reflective about it into the bargain. After all, “we can’t just go around killing everyone” and “we can’t just let other people go around massacring us/innocent people” are superficially promising rhetorical positions; it is just when the details are spelled out that the difference between pacifist and passivist, just-warist and crusader, are revealed, and not everyone is willing to embrace the sacrifices attendant on holding the principles of true JWT and pacifism.

This is why thinking about the continuum in terms of principles, rather than simply in terms of action, is useful: it clarifies which position a person really holds, which allows him to either strengthen and clarify what he believes, or modify his views in the event that he does not really care for the principles required to support his erstwhile position. This is the project I have undertaken here, with a primary focus on pacifism and JWT, the two views that I believe are the most morally defensible of the alternatives available. The fact that the two are similar in so many ways is a good thing, for the reasons I describe above, but it also has the potential to confuse the issue: are the two similar enough that it doesn’t matter which you pick? Clearly this is not the case – after all, even though the strictest Just-warists will behave in the same ways as pacifists, they will do so for different reasons. Thus, except for those who believe that only actions, and
not motivations, have moral value, the full range of the differences between the two – and
the similarities as well – must be clarified as much as possible,

Of course, much of this paper up to this point has been spent developing the
contrast between the two; in addition to restating and explicitly comparing the two on a
number of the points already raised along the way (especially their perceptions of our
obligations with regard to love and justice), I will also try to pinpoint their respective
(and often competing) underlying presuppositions with regard to direct and indirect
actions, political philosophy, and religion/theology. Having looked at length at the
factors (especially perceived duties) that ground both JWT and pacifism, I will then say a
little about the role consequentialism plays (or does not play, as it were) in these theories,
and conclude by looking at the relative weight each gives to aretaic considerations.

II. Narrowing the Field: Common Principles

We began with the basics: pacifism and JWT agree that war is a bad thing, but
differ with regard to whether it might ever be the lesser of two evils, and thus the proper
thing to do (JWT says ‘yes,’ pacifism ‘no’). We have seen that each covers a spectrum of
views ranging from strictest to least strict, with “strictest” correlating with “most
restrained” and so on. And we have seen a number of different arguments for the various
positions: why it is morally acceptable to kill some people and when, or why it is never
morally acceptable to kill anyone. The “why,” all along the P/JWT continuum, is
grounded in the duties of love and justice. Since the two differ in essence, though, the
duties must be somehow weighted differently from one another, or applied differently, or
both.
Based as it is on an unconditional rejection of certain actions (viz., violent ones), pacifism clearly has at least some basis in deontology; among all the varieties we reviewed, the most common denominator was that of, if not always love, at least some positive form of regard directed towards all human beings. For the western religious forms of pacifism (Christian, Jewish), this took the form of a duty to love all mankind; for eastern religions such as Buddhism, especially on the interpretation of Gandhi, this duty was termed one of compassion, certainly similar to love, if not precisely the same. The secular forms we surveyed do not require such warm feelings, pointing instead to an obligation to respect all persons equally. Either way, though, whether respect or love, pacifism tends to place the most emphasis on the regard we are obligated to have for every person. This regard, in turn, is assumed to exclude violence toward others; the limits to this prohibition vary depending upon the form the pacifism takes – no violence at all for Absolute Pacifists, no lethal violence for Strong Pacifists, and so on. Pacifism is thus based on a duty to love and a corollary duty not to harm.

This refusal to harm is sometimes framed as an issue of justice (i.e., harm = injustice), but in reality, the duty of justice is mentioned far less frequently in the various forms of pacifism. The concept of justice is mentioned most often in the context of how one ought to respond to injustice to oneself, particularly for Christian and Jewish forms of pacifism; these teachings typically call for a radical response – we are to avoid what might be, in fact, justifiable violence in response to injustice, and respond instead lovingly, willingly accepting the injustice rather than responding with violence. This is

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389 Jainism and Hinduism have a stronger basis in consequentialism, where the most desirable consequence is detachment; compassion or any other form of attachment to anyone or anything is thus discouraged rather than required, as these pose a hindrance to detachment.
meant to be a concrete representation of the love or compassion the agent holds for the evildoer; it also (at least sometimes) has the additional consequence of highlighting the injustice and bringing about change, for the benefit of onlookers and even possibly the evildoer himself. Mennonites (including Yoder) have certainly made this point; they do hold that we have a duty to act justly, but some have argued that even to demand justice is problematic, and using coercion to achieve it is certainly off limits. Quakers too have renounced coercion, choosing instead to behave justly themselves and to give advice to those with the power to affect institutional forms of injustice, regarding the agent as having the moral responsibility to make his own assessment as to what is just, rather than accept the ruling of authorities. Justice is a moral goal, but always to be pursued within the boundaries of love, and thus by implication, without violence.

Ghandi teaches the benefits of the nonviolent response, the willing acceptance of suffering, as well, whether in response to an individual attacker or to institutional injustice; civil disobedience, he says, is the best response, though it must be done without malice:

We can similarly free ourselves of the unjust rule of the Government by defying the unjust rule and accepting the punishments that go with it. We do not bear malice towards the Government. When we set its fears at rest, when we do not desire to make armed assaults on the administrators, nor to unseat them from power, but only to get rid of their injustice, they will at once be subdued to our will.390

The last claim is far more optimistic than the expectations of Mennonites (who have historically not attempted to participate in or even influence governmental authority, and who have rejected the attempt to exert control even in individual cases) or even Quakers (who have worked to influence such authority, but not with the assumption of inevitable

control). (Gandhi does, of course, take into account that the attacker may not be morally or literally disarmed by the nonresistance of their victims, arguing that even in those cases, those who suffer at the hands of the unjust will still have the moral victory.)

Secular pacifists, those that focus on a duty of respect rather than one of love, do often point more explicitly to a duty to work for justice (James in particular bases his advice on an alternative to war on the need to set up new institutions that will work for justice but in a peaceful way), yet even these positions do not seem to have an expectation that pacifists will be in positions of institutional/societal control; Holmes, for example, says that “what is needed is a new perspective that sees the people of the world as arrayed, not basically against one another, but against the deceit and arrogance of governments and the ways of thinking that have produced the deceit and arrogance.”

This distinction is even more significant between JWT and pacifism – the two vary greatly in their preconceptions about the role of power and control. JWT makes sense only if one presupposes a significant level of institutional control, while pacifists are almost uniform in an assumption of a lack of (worldly/outward) power and control. Even Gandhi’s claim above is not framed as an attempt to take power, or an assumption of it, for he explicitly denies a desire to unseat those in power, but only to make them just. Yoder argues that individuals lack the knowledge and control to bring about justice by way of violence; he transforms this argument to show that governments, especially in the context of war, are even less well endowed with these necessary prerequisites:

“[In war,] with all the various parties making interlocking and contradictory decisions about how to act, each impinging on all the others, no one of them can

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391 The two are certainly compatible, of course, such that religiously-grounded pacifists can also speak in terms of respect, and secular-grounded ones, in terms of love.

392 Holmes, “The Sleep of Reason Brings Forth Monsters,” 139.
foresee what is sure to happen if one decides this way rather than that. Others are acting at the same time, changing the situation by their actions. … Failure to be successful is a serious possibility in every case of dramatic confrontation. That is all the more true when both parties to the conflict are acting in unfamiliar roles and under exceptional pressure. On the international level…many dimensions of war cannot be manipulated with certainty even by superior power. … The outcome of any kind of combat is unpredictable.”

The assumption is not (merely) that pacifists are not in a position of institutional authority, but that even such institutions lack what is necessary to undertake the decision to kill other human beings. Pacifists may differ on whether it is proper to become part of such institutions in the first place, but for the most part, they agree that human beings – individually and collectively – do not always have the power to stop injustice while still fulfilling a duty to love, where love is understood to entail refusal to kill, and that in such cases, the duty to love supersedes the duty to bring about justice. We are in those cases confined to behaving justly ourselves, and letting those events that are out of our control, carry out as they may.

This is perhaps the clearest distinction between JWT and pacifism, for JWT believes that justice obligates us to intervene in such events, when certain standards are met. Contrary to pacifism, JWT assumes that we can have sufficient control and knowledge to warrant our taking a life, if it is the life of someone unjustly threatening another and there is no other way to stop him. On this point, JWT also differs from pacifism in its interpretation of the requirements of love: pacifists believe that the proper regard for other human beings precludes lethal harm, while JWT does not. This is not merely a matter of emphasis, however, where (for JWT) justice is prized more highly than love. To the contrary, while pacifists frame their position in terms of love and/or

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respect yet often do not emphasize a duty to work for justice, just-warists (at least religious ones) speak often of the duty to love, often explicitly as the very thing that requires us to kill on occasion. Ramsey makes this connection especially clear:

For love’s sake (the very principle of the prohibition of killing), and not only for the sake of an abstract justice sovereign over the political realm in separation from the private, Christian thought and action was driven to posit this single “exception” (an exception only when externally viewed): that forces should be repelled and the bearers and close cooperators in military force should be directly repressed, by violent means if necessary, lest many more of God’s little ones should be irresponsibly forsaken and lest they suffer more harm than need be. This, then, was not really an “exception,” certainly not an arbitrary one; but a determinate expression of justice and mercy. It was an expression of the Christian understanding of political responsibility in terms of neighbor-regarding love.394

Nor is this duty of love limited to the innocent; JWT has held from the time of Augustine that we must be motivated by love even toward the attacker, the unjust party – “love should be the motive in war,” and even in the most justified of cases, killing should still be done in a mournful mood,395 out of regret for the need to kill a fellow human being. JWT perceives a duty of justice – and assumes that it is in our power to carry out. JWT also perceives a duty of love – and assumes that love can be compatible with killing.

Perhaps, then, it is more accurate to say that JWT and pacifism differ in their understanding of the principles of love and justice, rather than in their adherence to the separate principles themselves. They agree that love and justice are important. However, whether we may love a man yet kill him, work for justice yet take the life of another human being to achieve it, depends upon yet a further underlying difference in principle, this one with regard to the possibility/morality of discrimination. This practice is required as a standard for JWT: we must discriminate between the combatant and the

394 Ramsey, 150-151.

395 Bainton, *Christian Attitudes Toward War and Peace*, 98.
non-combatant, and having done so, we are morally permitted to treat them differently. Ramsey describes this obligation thus: “Out of neighbor-regarding love for one’s fellow men, preferential decision among one’s neighbors may and can and should be made.”

The reasoning here is fairly straightforward and is the very basis of JWT: the innocent and the guilty must be treated differently – we must stop the guilty even if we need not kill him, but killing is different only in severity, not in kind.

Pacifism, on the other hand, is almost uniformly grounded in the principle that we may not discriminate between human beings, at least in terms of the value of life. Even the guilty person, the violent person, the unjust person, has a right to life and love, and though we must try to stop his injustice, we cannot do so by killing him. Yoder grounds this conviction in Biblical principles: “because God does not discriminate, his disciples are called upon likewise not to discriminate in choosing the objects of their love.”

Holmes, a secular pacifist, says that “persons are preeminently worthy of respect and have claims upon those whose conduct may affect them to be treated in ways that do not diminish them,” and also that if we have any hope of eliminating war, we need “a new respect for the precariousness and inviolability of the human person.”

Gandhi says that we must learn to see God in all things, that “we should learn to become one with every creature.” In his discussion of the duty to truthfulness, Kant argues that “the duty of truthfulness … makes no distinction between persons to whom one has this duty and to

396 Ramsey, 150.
397 Yoder, The Politics of Jesus, 117.
398 Holmes, On War and Morality, 43.
399 Holmes, “The Sleep of Reason Brings Forth Monsters,” 139.
whom one can be excused from this duty; it is, rather, an unconditional duty which holds in all circumstances.” Kant is speaking here only of truth-telling, but it is easy to imagine a Kantian pacifist using similar reasoning to defend a categorical imperative along the lines of “Never treat humanity, yourself or others, with violence as a means to an end of justice.” This is clearly an underlying preconception of the pacifist: that we may not harm / kill another human being, no matter what he may have done or even may be doing. It is not our place to make this discrimination.

This sort of reasoning is often provocative: even if you have little power, a pacifist may be asked, even if you genuinely feel love for both attacker and victim, are you not violating your duty of love to the victim if you do not do something to stop the attacker? Even if you can’t stop him, can’t you admit that it would be theoretically moral to do so, and actually moral to attempt to do so? For we often think of the question of discrimination as “should innocent P die, or guilty Q?” Setting aside the question of whether this question is so simply answerable (Yoder does a much better job than I could in responding to this type of question in What Would You Do?), this reduction raises a question with broader moral implications: what is the comparative moral worth of doing something directly as compared to allowing it to happen? In some ways, it seems reasonable to assume that the direct action is more blame- or praise-worthy than the indirect action, but in others – especially in dramatic life-and-death cases – it seems equally blameworthy, or nearly so, for an agent to allow someone to die if she could have stopped this death, as for her to do the killing herself. The qualifiers in here are not insignificant, however. It is equally blameworthy, nearly as blameworthy, or not

blameworthy at all? And is the “if” clause really something we can take for granted? As Yoder points out, it is probably not, even in an immediate case involving only a small number of individuals, and far less so in cases of international conflict involving numerous actors over a long period of time.

For a just-warist, even in the complex case of war, if the “can we stop the injustice” question can even be answered “probably,” and assuming that the other standards are satisfied as well, then we have an obligation to act. JWT seems to be built on the assumption that allowing the injustice when we could prevent it is as blameworthy, or nearly so, as causing the injustice oneself. The attacker has done something morally wrong, clearly, but so has the one who stood by and allowed him to do it. The pacifist, on the other hand, draws the line a little differently. We do have an obligation to try to prevent violence, most pacifists will say, even including sacrificing our own lives, but given that we must love both parties equally, and given that love precludes lethal violence, allowing harm is categorically different than causing harm directly. To kill the attacker to prevent a hypothetical (albeit imminent) death is to violate the duty to the attacker; to fail to do whatever is within the realm of morality and thus allow the death, is also to violate duty, this time to the victim (and also to the attacker, for not trying to prevent him from harming himself in the doing of violence); but to do all that is morally permissible yet to fail to save the life is not to violate duty – the agent has done everything in his power to bring about love and justice, and whatever blame holds, accrues to the attacker.

For the just-warist (and often for the armchair critic), this is less than satisfactory: surely presuppositions that would justify allowing injustice to occur when it could be
prevented must be incorrect presuppositions. This is certainly a possibility, but first we
must factor in the existence of yet more presuppositions, ones that are bound to be even
more controversial, yet which – for those that accept them – make this resignation to the
occurrence of injustice more understandable. These presuppositions are clearest in the
case of religiously-grounded pacifists, and have to do with a presumed extra dimension to
justice: that is, the pacifist takes some comfort in knowing that God or Yahweh or fate
has a hand in events, and will bring about justice in the long run (whether yet in this life
or in the next). A companion belief in the immortal soul as something more valuable
than the physical body adds another dimension of relief from this concern for the
difficulty in achieving earthly justice. These concepts are available in some form in all of
the religions we have looked at here, and are almost always an explicit element in
religious pacifist systems. Even in Jainism and Hinduism, we see the belief that
refraining from violence leads to more desirable future results than does violence, even if
that goal is nothingness; Buddhism, of course, has a similar goal, though it speaks more
of compassion as a route than detachment. For these religious forms of pacifism, the
belief that this current earthly life is not the sum total of our existence mitigates the
concern over whether we can achieve justice here and now: we should work for it if we
can, and sacrifice for it, but we may also take comfort in knowing that the non-physical
soul (whether ours or the victim's) will endure and transcend any injustice.

This assumption is not available to secular pacifists, of course. These positions,
instead, maintain the general moral position of pacifism – that we should do the right
thing and accept whatever comes – and couple it simply with optimism that such a thing
as perpetual peace might be possible if enough people were to commit to working for the
end of justice. Holmes says that “The aim should not be to end conflict. That would be utopian and might not even be desirable. The aim should be to develop nondestructive ways of dealing with conflict. Violence by its nature cannot do that. Nonviolence can.”

James is more optimistic, arguing that “the amount of alteration in public opinion which my utopia postulates is vastly less than the difference between [primitive tribes and modern man]. History has seen the latter interval bridged over: the former one can be bridged over much more easily.” Some (e.g., traditional Mennonites and other Anabaptists) have disapproved of such optimism, taking a dimmer view of human nature, but it is difficult to see how the practice of true, sacrificial pacifism could be maintained without such optimism, in the absence of more supernatural considerations.

Two points must be made here about JWT with regard to these presuppositions. First, JWT has traditionally held the same presuppositions with regard to the afterlife as religious (especially Christian) pacifists do. These beliefs have even played an important justificatory role in the tradition, albeit one quite different from the one they play in pacifism: rather than act as a mitigation of the death of the innocent, they were seen to more easily justify the killing of the guilty in the paradoxical spirit of love. “Killing and love could the more readily be squared by Augustine because in his judgment life in the body is not of extreme importance. What matters is eternal salvation. The destruction of the body may actually be of benefit to the soul of the sinner.”

This belief in a soul and/or an afterlife is not as crucial to JWT in a secular sense, but it has certainly played a large role traditionally.

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403 James, 131.
404 Bainton, *Christian Attitudes Toward War and Peace*, 92.
In addition to this commonality, just-warists are to some degree open to the same objection of callousness as pacifism is; after all, just war too requires that we allow injustice to happen if we cannot justly stop it (“justly” here being defined in terms of the just war standards). It is not, after all, a consequentialist view, where the end (justice, in this case, or perhaps the preservation of the innocent) justifies the means; if we can save a lot of innocent people only by deliberately killing a few other innocent people, we may not do so. This is the same “better to allow indirect harm than to directly cause harm” principle that pacifism follows, though more is allowable before the “direct harm” prohibition kicks in.\(^\text{405}\) It is thus a looser standard than pacifism’s, but still a stricter standard than some would like.

In some ways, these sorts of objections are even stronger against JWT, or at least would be against a ruling power that adhered to a relatively strict form of JWT. The (potential) difficulty here is in the conjunction of a strict JWT (which would “reject an advantageous tactic or strategy on the grounds that it would have been against the rules\(^\text{406}\)) with authority/responsibility. We seldom see truly pacifist leaders, at least at the state level; Martin Luther King, Jr., and Gandhi were leaders of powerful nonviolent movements, but while each had numerous followers who looked to them for guidance, they were not directly responsible for their followers’ welfare in the same way a president or king is for his citizens or subjects. JWT, on the other hand, seems designed in some ways specifically to take such concerns into account. In both the Christian and to some

\(^{405}\) For pacifism, “direct harm” is done at the point of any violence toward even an unjustly-behaving person; for the just-warist, “direct harm” is not done until the point of intended harm to a non-combatant (unintentional, proportional (etc.) harm to the innocent, and even intentional, necessary harm to the guilty, do not violate duty in such a way as to rule out action.

\(^{406}\) Yoder, *When War Is Unjust*, 5.
extent the Buddhist traditions⁴⁰⁷, the pacifism that had held as the ethic of a minority group was transformed to an ethic of Just War once the practitioners were in a position that required them to make choices on the behalf of others; it is one thing to be willing to die for your beliefs, but quite another to expect those who rely on you for protection to die for your beliefs, beliefs they might not share. Thus, we often see a separation of roles, with “nonviolence as a personal vocation and just war as the state ethic,”⁴⁰⁸ paralleling in some ways the lay/cleric division of roles, where soldiers by profession are permitted the use of violence while those committed to the (direct) service of God are not. JWT has always made allowances for some to respond to injustice nonviolently, but has regarded defense of the innocent, by violence if necessary, to be a moral obligation for anyone in a position of responsibility for the common good. This includes leaders, of course, but also those who have chosen to serve society in armed capacity (military, police); taking a pacifist stance, even by those outside of these categories, is often regarded as irresponsible, on the grounds that those who are protected by violence ought to support those who do the protecting (where “support” is equated with “agreement”).

Pacifist responses to such charges have been varied. Some choose to retreat from society and live in relative isolation (e.g., the Amish). Others live in society but avoid any entanglement with politics or other coercive institutions (e.g., Mennonites, who (at

⁴⁰⁷Kenneth Kraft notes this dichotomy, noting that some Buddhist scriptures forbid even hate (killing “even in thought”), others say “that in order to protect the truth of Buddhism it may be necessary to bear arms and ignore the moral code” (5). We have seen examples of pacifist Buddhist kings in chapter three, but there are also “canonical sources [that] advise kings to mobilize their troops against invaders” (5). (Kenneth Kraft, editor, Inner Peace, World Peace: Essays on Buddhism and Nonviolence (Albany: SUNY Press, 1992))

⁴⁰⁸Drew Christiansen, S.J., United States Catholic Conference, in “A Roman Catholic Response,” an afterword in John Howard Yoder’s When War Is Unjust, 105. Christiansen here is characterizing the stance of the Church as stated in The Challenge of Peace, though he notes that this is a changing view: “Ten years later, the bishops are bolder in proposing that nonviolence has a public role” (105).
least historically) have refused to join unions, to register to vote, to serve on juries, or to join the police force; they (along with other pacifists) have also refused to serve in the military, even if drafted, choosing instead to submit to punishment or to serve in alternative service if permitted to do so.\textsuperscript{409} Pacifists (as opposed to passivists) however, are committed to working positively for peace, and would generally argue that they are taking responsibility by working in their own way to influence the world for the better. Some regard the witness of their nonviolent stance as an important way of influencing the world: “an alternative witness might be the most effective way for Christians to exert moral power, even for achieving justice and influencing the existing social order.”\textsuperscript{410} Others choose to work more directly: Quakers, for example, have a history of developing research documents which “present a \textit{practical alternative} [which is] clear and concrete… The path suggested is one which could really be taken, starting from here, if one wished.”\textsuperscript{411} Others, like Gandhi and Martin Luther King, Jr., engaged in sit-ins, strikes, protests, and other acts of civil disobedience, eschewing violence as a means but otherwise working tirelessly and at great cost to influence society in the direction of justice.\textsuperscript{412} To be a pacifist is not necessarily to avoid responsibility to the common good;

\textsuperscript{409} As we have seen, Yoder locates Mennonites in several pacifist traditions, that of cultural isolation (as with the Amish, above) and that of the “second wind,” a dualist ethic in which Mennonites recognize the inherently coercive nature of the state as something necessary for the control of nonbelievers but inappropriate for believers to participate in.

\textsuperscript{410} Schlabach, 227.

\textsuperscript{411} Yoder, \textit{Nevertheless}, 70; see also 145-150 for more information on Quaker social studies.

\textsuperscript{412} The last two examples do not deal with international armed conflict, but I think they are still relevant examples of pacifism taking responsibility; these were not trivial struggles, but conflicts in which people died and were prepared to die. When such examples are given, objectors may scoff “but that wouldn’t work against the Nazis” (the quintessential “bad guys”), but there \textit{are} in fact examples of effective nonviolent resistance to the Nazis in Norway and Poland, as described by Ernst Schwarcz (“Nonviolent Resistance Against the Nazis in Norway and Holland During World War II,” in \textit{Nonviolence in Theory and Practice}, edited by Robert L. Holmes (Prospect Heights, IL: Waveland Press Inc., 1990), 185-187). Schwarcz describes Norwegian teachers who were sent to labor camps rather than join the Nazi
in fact, being a true pacifist obligates one to actively take responsibility, in some way, but
by means judged to be morally correct.

Thus we see that the differences between JWT and pacifism are largely a matter
of differing presuppositions, differing interpretations of the concepts embedded in the
largely shared principles. We are obligated to love (or at least respect) fellow human
beings, to work for justice and peace, to protect the innocent – nearly all pacifists and
just-warists will agree on these. Where they differ is in what is permitted, or what is
required, in the defense of the innocent. *May* we use violence? *Must* we use violence?
Pacifists argue that we must not. JWT says that we must – it is our responsibility,
provided that violence is a last resort, proportional, discriminating, and so on. To fulfill
this responsibility, we must discriminate between the good and the wicked, the just and
the unjust. Pacifism argues that we must not make such a discrimination, or more
accurately, that we must not alter our behavior on the grounds of such discrimination –
we must not kill the innocent, and we must not kill the guilty, but must love/respect each
individual on the grounds of what we all have in common (whether that be rationality,
being children of God, or some other commonality). Thus we see between the two
significant differences, but significant similarities as well - similarities in principle, and
similarities in *having* principles.

One commonality underlying almost the entire continuum of views on war and
peace, including the crusading spectrum, and excluding only the purest forms of realism,
is a commitment to principles, duty, obligation, and a rejection of consequences as

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Union of Teachers (some died there, but not one gave in); the Nazis eventually reinstated the teachers. Churches resisted Nazi takeovers as well, and young athletes refused to participate in official Nazi sporting events, meeting in the mountains and woods instead.
morally primary. This is a matter of theoretical moral groundwork; there is much consideration of results – the desire to achieve peace and justice, or some ideological consequence in the realm of CT – and JWT explicitly rules some actions in or out on the grounds that they bring about better or worse consequences than the alternatives, but overall, all of these views reject an “ends justify the means” approach. A pacifist would never regard even the most certain and profound peace as justification for violent and hateful methods of achieving it; nor would a just-warist, if those methods violated *jus ad bellum* and *jus in bello* standards. Even a crusader, committed as he is to a given end, and as prepared as he might be to sacrifice the guilty and innocent alike – even his own people – to achieve it, regards a certain spirit in fighting as necessary; were the end to be achieved but at the expense of achieving it in an unfitting way, the crusader would likely reject it.

In refining Cady’s Pacifism-JWT-Realism-Crusade continuum, I have looked at two different (though complementary) ways of defining the respective positions along the spectrum. The range can be thought of in terms of restraint, with Absolute Pacifism being the most restrained with regard to violence, and the most extreme form of CT (Absolute Crusade?) as the least; in these terms we see pacifism naturally merge into the realm of strict JWT (a form of JWT so restrained it allows for virtually no violence), loose JWT into the realm of realism, and the “war is hell” variant of realism into restrained CT, with Absolute Crusade as an endpoint, a view that can in principle show no restraint. Looking at a person’s (or institution’s) presently-demonstrated restraint (or lack thereof) does not give enough information as to the position that person or institution holds, however – for that, we must look to the underlying principles. Is violence
condoned on a limited basis? Not condoned at all? Encouraged as a good in some cases? Judged to be outside the bounds of morality (in the case of war)? These principles direct us toward the appropriate category on the continuum, with details of the principles with regard to the role of restraint telling us where within that section the view is located.

Consequentialism has been largely excluded from this continuum. In our overall analysis of the various views in earlier chapters, we saw few if any instances of views guided primarily by a consideration of consequences. Clearly, though, there are consequentialists who think about war and peace; what can we say, then, about their views with respect to the continuum? I believe that consequentially-based views occupy a continuum that parallels the one I have described, but is not coexistent, as there can be no divisions on the basis of principle. Consequentialist views will vary along the continuum from something akin to Absolute Pacifism to something like the Absolute Crusade; there are at least conceivably consequence-based moral theories that correlate with views all along the scale. There are at least two distinguishing factors among them, I believe: beliefs about what ends are desirable and beliefs about our epistemological limitations. Thus, views that hold that individual lives are very valuable, and that we cannot have very certain knowledge about what results violence will have, will fall to the left end of the continuum, among pacifist beliefs; a growing confidence in our abilities to know the outcome of our action, and a weakening belief in the value of individual lives, as compared to the common good, will result in a slide to the right, ending eventually in a

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413 Some Eastern religious forms of pacifism fit into this category, I think; for reasons described in chapter three, Jainism and Hinduism are in some ways best understood as embracing pacifism for consequentialist reasons; given a metaphysical understanding of the world that freedom from attachment is the most desirable end, and that this end can best be attained by nonviolence, these views view nonviolence as the correct way to behave – not because of any sense of a better end for the world as a whole, as most consequentialist pacifists would hold, but for how it benefits them (en ethical egoist form of consequentialism).
kind of crusading mentality, where we have a firm belief in the good of a particular ideological point (and the limited good of any individual life) and a certainty that we know how to get it. Cady’s Pragmatic Pacifism, which judges that war is wrong because it always creates more misery than it alleviates, will be located fairly far to the left, for example.414

Each view, however, will be far more variable in location than will its pacifist or JWT counterparts, since any change in the certainty of the connection of ends to means will change the morality of the view.415 It may be objected that this is true of JWT as well; after all, new information may affect the status of almost all the standards, especially ones like proportionality, last resort, and discrimination. Despite this, however, JWT is clearly bound in ways that a Consequentialist, even a just-war consequentialist (JWT with a Supreme Emergency exception would seem to fit into this category), is not, in that the ends do not justify at least some means for the just-warist. Some means are permanently off limits; furthermore, the principles remain constant, with the state of information merely guiding how we should act with regard to them. The Consequentialist is freed from at least some sort of objections by not being bound in this

414 Ecological Pacifism has an interesting relationship to this spectrum; it is a consequentialist view, but one that – were we to drop the “pacifism” label, could be seen to range across the continuum from end to end. That is, Ecological Pacifism places weight on lives/entities in such a way that it regards war as wrong, since it has too much potential for damage; however, it is possible to imagine a sort of Ecological Just-warist, who would be willing to destroy individuals or even groups who pose a threat to more vulnerable and/or valuable entities, within certain boundaries, and even a sort of Ecological Crusader, who would happily take the lives of, say, loggers in order to save forests.

415 Suppose, for example, that I am a Pragmatic Pacifist who believes that war creates more bad than good, but learn from a reliable source that if I just wipe out, say, the entire country of North Korea, or Iran, or Israel (assuming that I have the power to do this), global relations will reach a level of peace unachievable by any other means. That is, imagine that the end is a highly desirable one, and one not reachable by any less damaging means; would I not be obligated, as a consequentialist, to push the button, so to speak, and destroy a nation full of mostly innocent people? This is surely an unlikely scenario (how could we know for certain that the good end would result? Wouldn’t there be a considerable blowback of bad consequences (fear, hatred, etc.)?), but if the consequences were all accounted for, and the end result were better than any of the alternatives, a consequentialist would be morally obligated to act.
way; worries about the deaths of innocents, in cases where the just-warist would be prevented by his standards from acting, could be satisfied by a view that looks only at the numbers, not at the principles. The death of innocents would certainly be an undesirable consequence, but if balanced by the survival of a greater number of innocents (all else being equal), would be acceptable, and for some, this sounds like the right answer. (Whether such permissiveness is regarded as positive or negative will ultimately reflect one’s original position as consequentialist or not.)

The main practical problem the application of something like Consequentialism (as opposed to meta-ethical differences between it and competing views like deontology) has to do with the difficulties in having any certainty about how war, or any state-level interactions, will carry out. This is a problem for JWT as well, but not such a decisive one, as JWT has more absolute standards that can help in the decision-making. Consequentialism, however, is based entirely on the ends expected to result, and many whose views we have reviewed here specifically reject it as an approach for this reason (though not generally this alone), given the often inscrutable complexity of the issues at hand. Yoder points out that

The outcome of any kind of combat is unpredictable [even on an individual level]. Even more is this true on the international level. When military planners use hypothetical circumstances, any such scenario makes untested, unverifiable assumptions about the psychology of the enemy. …As soon as a situation exists in which several persons are making decisions at the same time – all acting on the basis of what they think the others think and all at least partly trying to deceive the others – we can be quite sure of one thing: No one has sure knowledge of what will happen.416

Walzer, though he often appeals to consequentialist reasoning,\textsuperscript{417} acknowledges the difficulty of decisively defending a wartime choice by way of utilitarianism: “The paradigm as a whole is commonly defended in utilitarian terms: resistance to aggression is necessary to deter future aggressors. But in the context of international politics, an alternative utilitarian argument is almost always available [viz., appeasement].”\textsuperscript{418} Holmes, on the other hand, explicitly rejects consequentialism as a whole, by way of a meta-ethical argument in defense of deontology.\textsuperscript{419} For most pacifists and just-warists, consequentialism plays at most a secondary role.

Deontology, as we have seen, generally plays a primary role. But as we have also seen, it is not the only type of moral theory to play a significant part in the defining of these positions – virtue theory also runs strongly through both positions, though I would argue that it is more prominent in pacifism. Cady defines the distinction between JWT and pacifism by reference to means and ends, and though he doesn’t use the terminology of virtue himself, in the end his characterization of pacifism (and strict JWT, as I will argue – really, the entire left side of the continuum) is certainly complementary to the moral form. The question, he says, is whether means and ends can be separated:

This clean, total separation between means and ends, this mutual exclusion of each by the other, appears to be both \textit{required} by the just-warist and \textit{rejected} by the pacifist. It seems required to justify war because the just-warist grants the evil of the acts of war. Only if means and ends are totally separate can good

\textsuperscript{417} He concludes, in fact, that “political leaders can hardly help but choose the utilitarian side of the dilemma. That is what they are there for. They must opt for collective survival and override those rights that have suddenly loomed as obstacles to survival. …they can only prove their honor by accepting responsibility for those decisions and by living out the agony” (Walzer, 326).

\textsuperscript{418} Walzer, 67.

\textsuperscript{419} Holmes, \textit{On War and Morality}, 212-213. “Utilitarianism (and consequentialism generally) is inadequate as a basis for moral theory. …I believe it can be shown insofar as such theories presuppose that it is possible to make antecedently nonmoral determination of consequences as a basis for making moral judgments.”

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consequences emerge from evil actions; otherwise the results would be spoiled by the evil means of achieving them. …Peace is not a separate and isolated objective or end to achieve but a policy to live. Ends and means coalesce.  

By definition, on his view, JWT must separate means and ends, while pacifism must not.

To understand the implications of this characterization for the continuum as I have described it, we must first take a more in-depth look at Cady’s own position.

Though most of his book is descriptive rather than normative, he does ultimately draw some conclusions as to which type of view he believes is the correct one: a moderate form of pacifism, viz., Fallibility Pacifism (which I have argued is actually a strict form of JWT). He draws this conclusion on the grounds that FP best captures the mean between extremes on his interpretation of the continuum, one that reaches from purely rule-based to purely consequence-based (that is, his original Absolute Pacifism → realism continuum). Those near the realism extreme hold that the ends are of primary or even sole importance, those near the pacifist extreme hold that the means are of primary or sole importance, and those occupying the middle ground hold that the two cannot be separated in the ways embraced by those at the poles of the continuum.

One begins to move away from absolute pacifism as one begins to consider (to the slightest degree possible) the likely consequences of doing one’s duty; one begins to move away from more extreme forms of just-warism (that is, those nearer to war realism) toward the weaker end of the pacifist continuum as one begins to wonder whether any and all acts are justified by a good end. The middle ground Cady implies here, however, is not the broad middle ground of strict-JWT/mild-pacifism; the moderate view of those who hold that “means and ends…are not separate but are merely different aspects of the event in question, aspects distinct in our

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420 Cady, 44-45.

421 Cady, 44-45.
naming them separately, but related as features of one action”\textsuperscript{422} belongs strictly, and by
definition, to pacifists. “Real” pacifism, then, or at least the most morally defensible
form of it, on Cady’s view, is some form of moderate pacifism – not absolute pacifism
(which also embraces the “artificial, exaggerated dichotomy” between means and ends,
taking means to be the sole moral consideration), and not (apparently) even the strictest
JWT.

Cady’s greatest concern is with humankind’s epistemological limits: he agrees
with many of the pacifists that we have seen argue that we must recognize our ignorance
and refrain from causing harm in the midst of it. He recommends caution, consideration
of the factors of any given situation, and recognition of the fact that views about war fall
on a continuum rather than inhabiting a binary “war-is-good vs. war-is-bad” system, but
ultimately advises a judicious position approaching the mean:

\begin{quote}
…the point is to take a stand with caution after considering the range of views and
relevant factors as carefully as possible. The more one understands about the
relevant factors and competing perspectives on any particular war situation, the
more one respects the difficulty of confidence in our moral judgments of war.
\textit{This attitude seems to lead to a moral preference for views away from the
extremes, to the dismay of war realists and absolute pacifists alike.}\textsuperscript{423}
\end{quote}

Ultimately, he appears to advocate FP as the position that best fits this criterion:

\begin{quote}
If those at all points along the continuum are made to bear the burden of proof
equally without a cultural predisposition to warism, perhaps fallibility or
epistemological pacifism will emerge as we admit our ignorance. It is hard to
justify acts of death, obliteration, and domination that cannot be reversed; it is
impossible to do so without secure knowledge of the relevant factors.\textsuperscript{424}
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{422} Cady, 44.

\textsuperscript{423} Cady, 114, emphasis mine.

\textsuperscript{424} Cady, 123.
Thus, Cady – at least indirectly – advocates a moderate form of pacifism, or what I would characterize as a strict form of JWT, one that rejects war as a moral option because of its nature as inherently unjustifiable by, and thus for, human beings.

Cady ultimately rejects consequentialism, but he rejects deontology as well, as too rigid, not open enough to consequentialist considerations. Though I believe that his means/ends analysis is not the sole defining feature of pacifism (especially since, on his account, he excludes from the means/ends-conjoining high ground the set of views that I consider to be the only true forms of pacifism), I think it can be shown that his account draws heavily on elements of Virtue Theory, elements that I believe underlie even the most extreme forms of pacifism as well.

For example, Cady rejects both (what he considers) the extreme rule-boundedness of Absolute Pacifism and the extreme ends-focusedness of realism; Aristotle argues against over-reliance on either of these as well, as do many of the pacifists we have reviewed. Following rules too doggedly can lead us astray morally; this is especially true in the case of war, with all its complexities. We can counter this problem by being more context-sensitive, by being ready (as the virtuous man is) to make our moral judgments on a case-by-case basis: “Wars are complex and subtle events, not the sorts of things one must simply accept, believe in, and support for all time or reject out of hand in every conceivable form, time, and condition.”425 We can prepare ourselves to make these decisions by adopting a “policy of life,” as opposed to a set of rules that can never fully account for the complexities we are bound to encounter:

…our moral objectives are not independent, split off and separate from our decisions and activities. Rather than the achievement of certain isolated

425 Cady, 113; cf p. 53.
objectives, the moral life is a process of living, deciding, acting in ways compatible with and contributing to our vision of the good life … When we think of [particular moral acts like keeping promises and paying debts] as central to a moral life, it is not because they are mere means to some end or because they are required by some absolute principle(s) without consideration of their likely effects, but because they constitute the activity of a moral life, good in themselves, expressions of respect for kindred humans, as well as likely to be productive of good results.  

And what characterizes or informs this “moral life” is the concept of the mean: “the point is to take a stand with caution after considering the range of views and relevant factors as carefully as possible…This attitude seems to lead to a moral preference for views away from the extremes.”  

There are resemblances between Cady and Aristotle that go beyond the mean / context / whole-life philosophy as well.  Like Aristotle, Cady also pays significant attention to the importance of institutions: “the goal is a world where institutions and organizations are not used to manipulate people for the glory and gain of others.”  

Such a world is not merely ideal, he argues; the elements of peace-making are already embodied, so that “the challenge is to make the options obvious, attractive, increasingly successful, and even habitual.” If the same institutional and financial resources were dedicated to nonviolent solutions as are to violent ones, we can only imagine what might be the outcome:

It should be clear that the widespread belief that nonviolence ‘doesn’t work’ is a misconception grounded in ignorance or neglect of when and where nonviolent direct action has succeeded. Similarly, the widespread confidence in violent means of struggle rests on neglect of its many failures. It must be remembered

426 Cady, 43; cf p. 45.  
427 Cady, 114.  
428 Cady, 79.  
429 Cady, 81.
that nonviolence has succeeded with little preparation and virtually no public confidence. Meanwhile violence is systematically planned, of the highest priority when investing public resources, and widely supported, yet it frequently fails to be an effective means of achieving the peaceful ends in view. 430

Cady spends a great deal of time talking, not merely about what pacifists are opposed to, but what they are in favor of, viz., a world that focuses its efforts on correcting injustice without recourse to violence. This task is not impossible or even impractical; he notes that historically people have been able to do so, and with far fewer resources than those dedicated towards the generally ineffective attempt to solve those problems with violence. 431 Education is critical to the end of a world at peace, as well: he talks about the role of peace educators and scholars in other fields, and of the role that government and foundations ought to play in allocating resources for the positive pursuit of peace. 432

Education is important as a way to train people how to behave peacefully. Cady perceives a subtler role for it as well: making people consider the complexities of war, and how little we can know about how it will proceed. Knowledge, or the lack of it, and the effect of that ignorance upon our moral duties, is a theme common to pacifism and JWT alike, at both individual and group levels. The nature of war morally necessitates caution, Cady believes, because we cannot morally justify the violence of war without being certain that its outcome will be sufficiently beneficial to outweigh its negative effects. JWT acknowledges this need for knowledge in just this way, building it in with such standards as Last Resort, Proportionality, Discrimination, but Cady argues that either these standards are not observed strictly enough (in that more knowledge is

430 Cady, 104-105.
431 Cady, 104.
432 Cady, 121-122.
presumed than exists in actuality), resulting in weak JWT (approaching realism), or, if they are stringently followed, rationality dictates that JWT give way to pacifism. After all, in even the most certain and clear-cut of cases, war will result in death and destruction.

Since war is never justified except as a necessary evil whose bad is to be outweighed by the good achieved, pacifists not only point out the inconsistencies between means and ends (war to end war, kill for peace, conscription to defend freedom, armed coercion to foster peaceful cooperation, and so on); they also point out the certainty of the evils undertaken as means and the uncertainty of achieving the good ends.\textsuperscript{433}

Cady is (at least with regard to this project) less concerned than Aristotle about the role of the character of the individual, but clearly practical wisdom, the ability to apply general knowledge to the particulars and to recognize when one does not have enough information and must change one’s behavior accordingly, plays a significant role in his argument as a whole.

I have already argued that Fallibility Pacifism, roughly the position that Cady takes, is a form of JWT, and thus, though Cady takes himself to be a pacifist, I would argue that he is, in fact, a just-warist, albeit a strict one. Labels and lines on a continuum aside, I believe there are other reasons to suppose that this is Cady’s true position. Some of his supporting arguments have sound more like JWT than pacifism (by any definition); in addition, I would argue that JWT is not necessarily open to the problems that he problems he notes – or more precisely, it is more in alignment with the stronger moral framework he describes, in which means and ends must correspond, than he seems to realize. Thus, moving him into the JWT category, so to speak, is not contrary to his original chosen position – not a surprising result, of course, given the nature of his project

\textsuperscript{433} Cady, 49; cf p. 55.
as one that recognizes the imprecision of positioning views along a continuum. I will go on to argue, though, that his characterization of the stronger forms of pacifism (or as I characterize them, the primary forms of pacifism) as also insufficiently in alignment with the ends/means framework (being in their case too deontological), is also not entirely accurate, as these views also demonstrate at least some level of refusal to separate the two, and further, demonstrate a number of other Virtue Theory characteristics.

Some of the points Cady makes have a very clear JWT ring to them. In rejecting deontology, for example, he says “Wars are…not the sorts of things one must simply accept, believe in, and support for all time or reject out of hand in every conceivable form, time, and condition.”434 Pacifists, at least as I have defined them, are characterized by an unconditional rejection of war, if not all forms of violence, as a useful means to achieving the ends of peace (one way in which pacifism does conjoin means and ends, as we have seen); JWT, on the other hand, takes precisely the view that Cady takes here, that some wars (just ones) are to be supported, and others (unjust ones) are to be rejected – a conditional view, not a pacifist one. Only when interpreted as a form of JWT does Fallibility Pacifism accord with this description of the moral status of wars.

Cady also notes the importance of education, which is key to pacifism and a significant connection between the position and Virtue Theory. As I have already pointed out, Cady objects that whatever education can contribute to JWT is problematic: his worry is that education in areas like the application of the nuances of Discrimination will either be insufficient, resulting in an insufficiently strict form of JWT, or so exacting that it results in functional pacifism. Thus, by implication, education can only contribute

434 Cady, 113; cf p. 53.
to pacifism, and never to JWT. However, though the matter of striking a proper balance is a delicate one (a fact Aristotle recognizes to be true of ethics in general), I think that it can be done. After all, if this is not possible, JWT is not a viable moral theory at all, and I believe that it is. Fallibility Pacifism, whether construed as pacifist or as Just-warist, requires strong institutions, especially in the realm of education, in order to train as many human beings as possible with regard to the demands and hazards of war, the limits of our knowledge, and the standards that war ought to meet, whether or not we are capable of meeting them. Pacifism and JWT share this feature, as both require wisdom and sacrifice to implement, and thus a thorough knowledge of what and when these things are needed, as well as practice (beyond mere classroom instruction) to implement correctly and wisely. A proper education can help to impart all of these things. The two views have this in common, and owe both this and its related concepts to a strong aretaic undercurrent.

JWT thus matches more than one of Cady’s designated characteristics of a desirable moral peace-war position. I believe that it also corresponds much more closely with his ends-means requirement than it may at first appear, again a conclusion to be expected given that I have shown deep-seated similarities between JWT and pacifism. This is one of them. Cady describes JWT as a view that must, by definition, posit a “clean, total separation between means and ends…[such that] good consequences emerge from evil actions.” I agree that this description is fitting in one way; JWT does characterize war as “an evil, a harm, which in a special case may be admitted for the sake

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435 Cady, 44.
of some other value it defends. It is not a good in itself.”436 Thus war, which is a harmful thing, is used to bring about justice and peace, the goods for which it is fought—a bad means linked to a good end. However, though war as a whole is regarded as an evil (though sometimes a necessary one), and killing as a sin (at least historically) and something to be undertaken with somberness, it is not quite fair to say that the ethics of JWT is one that disconnects ends and means. After all, the position is very explicit in refuting a consequentialist grounding; the JW standards are meant to restrain us from doing any of a very large set of possible acts of war even if the end to be achieved by them is a noble one.

This is why JWT requires that all standards be met: a good end is necessary for a war to be just, but it is not sufficient, if the end is not achieved in the correct way. Thus, though the acts done in a just war are bad, in a *prima facie* sense, they are by definition legitimate, acts that have been adjudged explicitly to be in alignment with the end sought—and indeed, given the standard of necessity, the end sought can be achieved in no other way. Applying the standards in this strict way may result in very few just acts of war, it is true, but while we might interpret this to mean that ends and means are inherently disparate under JWT, we can more accurately interpret it to mean that JWT is working as a moral theory, in that it has standards that can be met yet can fail to be met (what use is a moral theory that forbids nothing?). It is strict, but within its bounds ends and means can indeed be matched. I believe that when any form of JWT begins to allow too wide a gap between the two, it is itself coming close to the end of the JW spectrum and edging into realist territory. On my account, at least, JWT and pacifism alike reject pure

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consequentialism, and are thus at least capable of living up to Cady’s ends-means characterization; this view, I believe, most accurately captures the spirit of both.

For the most part, I have portrayed this means-ends relationship as pointing towards a Virtue Theory grounding, and if my preceding argument is correct, it points toward at least some degree of such a grounding for the JWT. The tradition has other qualities that reflect Virtue Theory as well; we have already seen an accounting of the pieces of this foundation in chapter two, but a few key features bear repeating. As we have seen just above, institutions – whether education, government, church, and other military training – are all necessary for the development of moral agents who can properly carry out the requirements of JWT. Virtues like courage, wisdom, justice, and benevolence are indispensable within the tradition; no leader who does not have them can properly rule or make correct choices about the justice of entering into war, nor can soldiers who lack them have the fortitude to sacrifice themselves in war, since this sacrifice must go beyond mere foolhardiness or blind obedience to command – the soldier must be prepared, after all, to risk his life for noncombatants within enemy territory, to judge when even firing upon a combatant is necessary and proportional, and so on. These qualities cannot be taught in a moment, but must be instilled in young men and women and practiced over time if they are to be developed to the extent that the agents can be entrusted with decisions about life and death. Practical wisdom is especially important given the inherent flexibility of JWT; there are certain principles that remain true at all times, but to know, especially in the heat of battle or a tense build-up to war, whether and how those principles apply, requires the development of moral character, virtuous habits. And just as the system is flexible for those engaged in battle, it
is also flexible as to who is to is required to fight in the first place; each person has his or her own mean, the right thing to do and the right time to do it, and thus JWT historically excuses (for example) clerics from fighting physically, on the grounds that they are better suited to spiritual warfare. In these ways, JWT – though reflecting a strong deontological basis – also reflects the flexibility and character-developmental elements of Virtue Theory.

The same is true of pacifism. Though Cady rejects the stronger forms of pacifism as overly committed to a distinction between means and ends (an “artificial, exaggerated dichotomy”\textsuperscript{437}), I believe that here too, as with JWT, a proper interpretation of even the strongest forms of pacifism cannot support this claim. Cady says that extreme pacifists (presumably something along the line of Absolute Pacifism – perhaps the strict nonresistance of Anabaptists, for example) are too committed to certain means, paying too little attention to the ends that come with those means. A defense of JWT entailed showing that it was not purely consequentialist, which is a fairly simple matter; a defense of pacifism must show that the position is not purely deontological, a more complex matter given that it \textit{is} duty-based in significant ways. However, this is not the sum total of the view, as we saw in chapter three.

There are two (interconnected) ways of responding to Cady on this point. The first is to show that pacifism, even the most stringent forms, reject a means/ends split. This refusal to separate means and ends can be seen in most of the types of pacifism we have covered here, religious and secular alike. For example, Gier states (on several occasions) that Gandhi’s most important philosophical principle was “that good ends

\begin{footnote}
\textsuperscript{437} Cady, 44.
\end{footnote}
must always be matched with good means,” and that this was the reason Gandhi rejected utilitarianism. Holmes describes the ridiculousness of humanity’s using war to achieve peace, by saying “It [humanity] has proven willing to abandon virtually everything worth living for, to do things all agree are abhorrent, for reasons few understand, and for ends (such as peace) that history shows cannot be secured by these means”; here, he frames the connection as an empirical matter rather than one of principle, but elsewhere he gives a more detailed argument on this point, arguing that “one must justify the necessary means before one can justify pursuing the end, whereas the reverse is not the case.”

Kimelman states that “the means employed determine the end achieved,” and that nonviolence is “a stratagem that so abhors evil that it refuses to use evil to attain anything. This is based on the profound insight that the means employed determine the end achieved, for the means are actually ends in potentia.” And Yoder, in his argument that we cannot have sufficient knowledge of the ends of acts of war, points to the special difficulty of using violent means to attain positive results.

Pacifists of all varieties, not only the more moderate ones, thus can be seen to regard the ends of action as important. The appearance of being focused on the means (nonviolence or nonresistance) while unconcerned about the ends (death of the innocent, general injustice) can be misleading unless one recalls that the pacifist may have one of a variety of underlying preconceptions that explain this indifference: she may have specific religious beliefs about the soul and/or the afterlife, and about long-term justice, such that

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438 Gier, 24-25.
440 Holmes, On War and Morality, 178nn.
441 Kimelman, 24.
what we perceive as the end (bodily suffering or death) is not what she perceives as the end. She may have particular meta-ethical beliefs about the relative values of life, love, and/or justice; she may, in fact, be so committed to the very conjunction of means and ends that Cady argues for that she believes that “justice” gotten by unjust or unloving means is not justice at all – for her, love/respect is not only the means but the end sought. In other words, the “extreme” pacifist is not unconcerned with ends; rather, she has a different perception as to what ends are important. There is also the possibility, as with JWT, that someone overly committed to a single element to the exclusion of all others is not a true practitioner at all, but a passivist (or a crusader, in the case of JWT).

We can also pull even the strongest forms of pacifism away from a charge of overly-strict deontological leanings by showing that it – like JWT – relies in far from incidental ways on Virtue Theory. It does so in some of the same ways that JWT does: institutional support is less of a reality for pacifism than for JWT, but the training, education, think-tanks for alternatives to war – all of these would serve to make pacifism a much more live option than it is now for many. Pacifists as disparate as Yoder and James refer to the potential usefulness of such institutions, and many respond to charges of impracticality that we will never know if pacifism could “really work” in the world because it has never been tried, at least not with anything near the resources that have been dedicated to preparing for war.

More centrally than this, though, pacifist views of all stripes place great weight on the development of character, of virtues, as opposed to the simple following of rules. Learning how to behave by imitating a virtuous exemplar is a recurring theme, whether that exemplar is Christ, the hasid, or the satyagrahi; pacifists recognize the impossibility
of perfect imitation, but strive for purity and holiness, and perceive living a life of love
and peace to be a way of doing this. In fact, the focus of almost all forms of pacifism is
living a moral life, being the right kind of person, of refraining from violence in the right
ways and for the right reasons. Pacifism values virtually all of the virtues that JWT does
(courage, wisdom, justice, benevolence, generosity, restraint), virtues that must be gained
by habituation. And although pacifism is in some ways less flexible than JWT (for whom
acceptable behavior ranges from absolute non-violence to full-scale war), it too admits of
a mean – each virtue consists of its own mean, of course (e.g., the courage to face
personal harm in order to do the right thing, between the extremes of cowardice and
rashly entering harmful situations when another approach would be best, or even (what is
an extreme for the pacifist, at least) rashly responding with violence), and each pacifist
position in general sees itself as striking the appropriate balance between taking too weak
a stand against injustice, or for love, and taking too strong a stand. In a variety of ways,
pacifism relies on Virtue Theory, and thus cannot be said to exclusively rely on a duty-
based ethic.

The concept of the war-peace continuum is an extremely useful one; like every
subject of ethics, and perhaps more than some, the question of war and peace can be (and
has been) answered in an enormous variety of ways. I have altered the continuum
somewhat, adding a new spectrum (CT) and expanding that of realism, and have moved
the line, so to speak, that separates pacifism and JWT. I have argued that these positions,
especially pacifism and JWT, are delineated in deontological terms (though they have
extensive grounding in Virtue Theory as well), to the exclusion of consequentialism; I
have also suggested several different ways of dealing with the range of war-peace views that appeal to consequentialism.

In redefining the line between pacifism and JWT, I have rudely repositioned Cady as a just-warist rather than as the pacifist he had tentatively identified as, but I do not feel that this is as dramatic a change as it might seem. Many of his comments point towards his just-warist leanings, and I believe that I have accounted for his concerns with regard to JWT’s view of means and ends. There is also, as Cady notes himself, the fact that there is substantial overlap at the border between the two, at least in practical terms; in principle, pacifism and even the strictest JWT are not identical, but in practice, they are nearly (or even exactly) so.

I think it is important to retain the distinction as I have drawn it, for the purpose of clarity, but the two positions, at heart, have much in common. What differences there are, we have seen, are often more a matter of perception of roles (the role of a leader (and whether a Christian, say, should be a leader), the cleric, the believer and the nonbeliever, the soldier and the civilian, and whether these overlap (and how and whether this distinction comes into play for secular forms of pacifism)), of justice (especially whether there is some mechanism (God, fate, history, man’s natural goodness) that can provide solace in the face of intractable injustice in this world), of love/respect (who we must hold this regard for, what latitude we have in discriminating between persons) and so on.

In the final chapter, I will draw all of these considerations together to give an argument for my own position. My ongoing enterprise of finding the underlying moral elements for these respective positions will come into play as I examine both principles and the role that virtue theory plays. I believe that there is some margin for difference in
moral choices here, in part because of the remarkable similarities between JWT and pacifism; I will ultimately argue for a dualist ethic that allows for – and in a way expects – at least two ways of taking a moral stand on this subject. On the other hand, I believe that a wide range of positions must be excluded, on differing grounds; there are several ways of “doing it right,” but not just any response will do. In the end, I will argue that the preferable choice is a strong form of pacifism – a choice perhaps inevitable given my background and current constitution, but one that I believe is also rationally defensible on grounds of principle and character.
CHAPTER 5

WAR AND PEACE - CHOOSING PACIFISM

I was raised as a pacifist, and years of study have not changed my position, though they have given it a more firm and thoughtful grounding. What has changed is my view that such a position is the only correct position. This view was challenged (as it ought to have been) once I began to encounter dissenting views, but though I have come to believe that there is more than one right approach to thinking about war and peace, I have not widened my view so much that I take any alternative to be acceptable. Accordingly, I will begin by showing why I take realism and CT, in all their permutations, to be morally inadequate alternatives; having done so, I will move on to argue on behalf of what I take to be the best versions of both pacifism and JWT and discuss the role that deeply-held preconceptions about the world play in our choice between the two. Ultimately, I will try to demonstrate why pacifism is the most correct moral choice for me, and why a JWT alternative would be equally morally correct for at least some people at some times.

The first view I will address is probably the easiest to dispose of, so to speak. The crusading tradition as an ethical position is seldom presented as a cohort of JWT, pacifism, and realism, and even those who demonstrably hold this sort of view generally deny it, choosing instead to characterize themselves as just-warists – to be thought a
That there is a substantial difference between the two (rather than merely one of degree – they are widely separated on the continuum) has already been demonstrated. There are doubtless a number of problems, from a variety of moral perspectives, especially once we delve into the specific forms of CT, but I will list just a few of those that hold true – from a simple common-sense moral point of view – for everything within the spectrum, whether strong or weak, religious or secular.

Some of the problems with CT are highlighted once we compare its standards to those of JWT. The cause of a crusade need not be anything concrete (unlike the clearly delineated potential just causes laid out in JWT) but is rather something transcendent, known by revelation. Whereas JWT relies heavily on the principle of discrimination, non-combatant immunity, CT almost inevitably rejects this as a standard: everyone on the enemy side is fair game, because they are somehow positioned contrary to the transcendent goal being sought. Crusaders may thus refuse to discriminate on principle (out of commitment to their goal); other times they may frame their behavior as discriminating within an environment where anyone who belongs to the wrong group (politically, religiously, racially) is by definition a combatant. Either way, women, children, the wounded, those merely protecting themselves from attack – all may and even should be considered proper targets of violence. Such a view, once articulated this

442 This is true in matters of war, at least, conjuring up images of wholesale slaughter of civilian populations in a religious fervor; religious ethicists are likely to reject the connotation of indiscriminate killing, while secular ethicists are likely to reject the religious connotations (and the killing too, of course). To be called a “crusader” in other contexts is not usually so objectionable, of course; to call someone a crusader against pornography or abortion, or for free speech or civil rights, is generally a more positive attribution of the term, but has little in common with our technical account here, beyond a perceptible fervor for the cause. Nonetheless, few engaging in war would choose to call themselves “crusaders,” especially with the much more rational and appealing rubric of “just war” available – a pity (for them) it doesn’t necessarily fit just any form of self-righteous warfare.
way, is difficult to defend on moral grounds – the transcendent cause is not open to rational evaluation, and few moral theories would find it easy to justify wholesale indiscriminate killing in the service of any cause. The prescribed attitude makes such justification even more difficult – JWT expects whatever killing must be done, to be done regretfully, sorrowfully; CT, on the other hand, sees a positive attitude in fighting as necessary evidence of true commitment to the cause. An ethical view that requires its followers to kill indiscriminately is morally suspect; one that requires them to do it happily is surely wrong in some significant way.

Other problems with CT become evident when we apply to it standards that JWT and pacifism potentially struggle to meet. To be able to withstand objections that impede competitors can be a point in favor of a given view, but here too, we see CT falling short. The pacifist and the just-warist (at least strict ones) can be subject to charges of selfishness, of (wrongly) allowing harm to happen to others in order to maintain their own moral purity; whatever power this objection may have against these positions, it is much stronger against CT. After all, CT directly harms others in pursuit of its goals, rather than allowing harm to others as the other views do (at their worst). This problem is compounded when we consider the charge of irresponsibility: the charge against pacifism and strong JWT is that they sometimes fail to take sufficient responsibility for protecting the innocent; CT does not aim to take responsibility for protecting the innocent, but even in terms of its own perception of responsibility (to achieve the transcendent goal, whatever it may be), it arguably takes too much responsibility – whereas pacifism and JWT may be said to be too restrained by their principles, CT is too unrestrained, certainly unhampered by ordinary caution in the face of less than perfect knowledge. They do too
much, rather than not enough. CT can arguably defend itself within the bounds of its own conception of the world against all of these objections, but they fail to measure up to any common-sense moral standard for behavior, and would doubtless fail to find justification in any other major moral theory (those of Kant, Mill, Aristotle, etc.).

Realism is also problematic, although less clearly so. Realist views toward the right (bordering CT) end of the spectrum are open to more or less the same objections that CT is open to – being too indiscriminate, being too lacking in restraint, being irresponsible and selfish – and views toward the left side (bordering JWT), share many of the potential weaknesses of JWT (e.g., being perhaps insufficiently attentive to the value of life – being too willing to allow killing) with few of its redeeming factors (e.g., built-in restraints on such killing). The central point of the realism spectrum, nihilistic realism, represents the view that there is no objective morality at all (and thus none governing warfare); such a view (moral relativism and/or moral subjectivism) is perhaps a player within the broader confines of ethics, but again, has little support in the common-sense view of morality – surely, most would agree, there are at least some things that would count as morally wrong, even in the context of war, no matter who did them or for what reason (indiscriminate biological, chemical, or nuclear attacks; torture and rape).

To return to the left-ward region of the realism spectrum, we see the more ordinary form of political realism, the view that holds that moral codes hold for individuals within nation-states, but not among the states themselves, and thus there is no morality that governs war; the use of nuclear weapons, that is to say, or torture, are not ruled out as a matter of principle, because there are no principles to adjudicate between adversaries. There are still restraints, however, with regard to entry into war, given the
effects that the prospective war will have on the citizens themselves, and the fighting of the war, though bound by no objective standards as to the rights of those on the other side, may also be constrained by the same concern for one’s own citizens. Thus, we do see some restraint even in war, and the further to the left we move, the closer we come, at least, to what I take to be the ideal moral position (though Political Realism is still far from it). Nonetheless, in all of its incarnations, I believe that realism fails to present a view that is a viable one for the moral agent. If one is to hold that objective moral standards exist at any level, they must exist at the level of inter-state warfare as well – to suggest that at least the most basic of JW standards fail to apply during wartime is to abandon all pretense of being a moral agent at all.

Clearly, I am predisposed to favor of some form of restraint, at the very least; however, I think I am justified in selecting in favor of more- as opposed to less-restrained views, without too extensive of an argument favor of this weighting, simply on the grounds that this is a widespread, though not unanimous, moral bias. This does not necessarily prove it to be true, of course, but when common sense aligns with almost every major form of moral philosophy (I can think of no contrary examples) to select one type of behavior over another, I think the burden of proof lies on the side of the rejected positions. Thus, I agree with Cady when he says “Since war is not intrinsically good, and since the very existence of a range of views requiring moral restraint in war argues against war if it is possible to avoid or minimize it, the reasonable and moral thing for anyone confronting the prospects of war to do is to attempt backing away from war
And thus, we move to what I believe are the strongest contenders: JWT and pacifism.

Both of these encompass a range of views, of course; to describe even a selection of them has taken a large portion of this paper. The concept of the continuum continues to be helpful, however, as a way of visualizing the relationship between what I take to be the most morally sound views, and the two that best capture the spirit of their respective philosophies, and why I take them to be correct. These two lie near – but not adjacent to – one another on the spectrum; I believe that only a relatively narrow range is truly defensible (and for this reason they are close to one another), but I also believe that a genuinely dual account is required (and for this reason the two cannot be directly adjacent, since any two views in such close proximity on the continuum, especially I have characterized it, will be identical in practical terms). Furthermore, each is to the left, but not at the ultimate end, of its respective sector of the continuum; in both cases, I believe that strong restraint, or strong adherence to principle, is a defining feature of the purest form of the view, but that each position – to remain a viable candidate – must stop short of absolute restraint, or inflexible adherence to principle, as doing so runs the risk of shading into passivism (in the case of the pacifism continuum) or into outright pacifism (in the case of JWT – the latter is not a prima facie problem, but only one in

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443 Cady, 114, emphasis mine.

444 I have previously characterized Passivism as a somewhat unprincipled view, and as such suggested that it might in some ways best be placed near the Realist midpoint on the continuum, but this was paired with a suggestion to place it at the end of Pacifism, as whatever principle it had was a negative one of avoiding violence, and not, as is most critical for our project, positive principles of love and justice that necessarily propel the agent to action. As such, I think the worry that the most strenuous of Absolute Pacifisms would risk taking on the qualities of Passivism is a legitimate one.
light of the fact that I am setting up a dualist ethic, and must (as stated just previously) thus retain two distinct views).

In more particular terms, my goal in this chapter is to argue that, for myself, something in the area between Strong and Absolute Pacifism is the correct view, taking into consideration other (well-founded) preconceptions about justice, leadership, and so on. However, I believe that a place must be made for those that choose to fight, bound by strong moral principles. Accordingly, I will be making an argument for an ethical dualism, i.e., that a second alternative is morally valid as well, and that this alternative is a somewhat relaxed form of JWT, one that adheres to all standards of JWT in a meaningful and epistemically rigorous way, but not so strictly that war is in practice impermissible (as is the case with Cady’s chosen Fallibility Pacifism). Despite my characterization of the view as “relaxed,” however, this position is (and ought to be) morally demanding; the practitioners of such a view must remain always vigilant not to begin the slide into seeing the standards as irrelevant. I think the form is only morally viable if it is prepared to avoid all wars that do not meet JW standards – a seemingly tautological requirement, but one that many purported just-warists fail to meet – and thus be prepared to surrender, to bargain, to appease, to give up tactical advantage in order to make sure war is a last resort. To remain true to such standards is to open oneself up to charges of irresponsibility and impracticality (though not to the degree a pacifist is, as he refuses to fight at all), but such is just one of the sacrifices to be expected when one is committed to living a moral life, and not in itself a disqualifying feature.

The two views I am advocating have much in common. To live up to either standard – Strong Pacifism or strong JWT – requires wisdom and fortitude, and some
degree of institutional support (to effect habituation to the necessary virtues). In other words, they require a foundation in something like Virtue Theory. As I have argued in previous chapters, the views within this range do demonstrate such a foundation, at least in part; the two war-peace approaches I advocate have this in common, in addition to adherence to similar principles regarding love, peace, and justice. Virtue Theory offers a unique feature over and above such principles, however, in that it allows for, even requires, a flexibility, a delegation of duties and obligations according to one’s role, character, and other factors. Various types of JWT and pacifism have also allowed for this flexibility, whether the lay/cleric divide in Aquinas’s JW account or the believer/nonbeliever divide in historical Anabaptist dual-kingdom thought. I am proposing something similar to these, though identical to neither, something grounded in the concept of the mean varying according to person and situation.

With regard to principles, I have pointed to several that JWT and pacifism have in common (in particular, a commitment to love and justice), and the most significant one upon which they differ (that is, whether war is regarded as unconditionally wrong, or whether it may be morally required under certain conditions, and forbidden under others). For a dualist account to have any practical merit, both sides must be represented, and I have chosen accordingly. For the views to have full moral weight, I believe that they must each strike within themselves a balance with regard to the principles they have in common – a mean, if you will. Not all views manage this: some views at the far end of the pacifist spectrum err on the side of focusing on love exclusively, with little to no concern for justice, while views at the other end of the JWT spectrum err in the other direction, concerning themselves strictly with justice and straying too far from an
obligation to love / respect all persons. The former strays dangerously close to passivism, 
the latter, to realism. The well-balanced views described above each strike their own 
balance, with properly-formulated pacifism generally focusing on a duty to love (or 
respect) while still recognizing and acting on a duty to act justly as an inseparable part of 
our overall moral obligation, and properly-formulated JWT generally focusing on justice, 
but with a strong emphasis on a loving intent as well. In both cases, I believe, the well-
balanced forms are the truest representations of their respective positions: the essence of 
JWT lies in its loving fight for justice, and the essence of pacifism is its demonstrating 
love (at least partly) by way of working for justice.

A common objection to pacifism is that it is an impractical, or perhaps callous, as 
the pacifist does nothing (the extreme version of the objection) or not enough (the more 
charitable version) to help those suffering injustice – if you can only prevent the injustice 
by taking the life of the unjust oppressor/attacker, the objection seems to go, morality 
requires that you do so. Therefore, if you not kill in these cases, you have failed in your 
obligation. I have shown that this is an objection toward strong forms of JWT as well; 
the just-warist is prepared to kill sometimes to effect justice, but is bound in at least some 
cases (where some standards fail to be met) to refrain from killing, no matter how just the 
cause, and in those cases, the cry of irresponsibility, of facilitating death, surely arises as 
well. Thus, both of the views being discussed are thought to be impractical because they 
cannot stop evil.

There are several responses to this. The first is to address directly the question of 
whether evil can be stopped or prevented by nonviolence. The fact is, it can and it has 
been; we have seen a number of examples of this in previous chapters, ranging from the
well-known (Gandhi, King) to the obscure (Buddhist kings, Danish schoolteachers).

Nonviolence, or limited violence, can be effective. It is often argued that these sorts of cases worked out only because they were civil situations, against a civil enemy;

“nonviolent defense is no defense at all against tyrants or conquerors ready to adopt such [violent, targeted] measures.”445 It is true that such a response is not always effective at preventing evil – but neither is war, which will inevitably cause some degree of damage (including but not limited to lives lost and resources spent) and rarely solves the problem at hand completely (the state of affairs afterward may be more just, but is seldom if ever fully just). Furthermore, at least some of our examples have involved nonviolent and at least moderately effective responses to actual aggression on the part of determined enemies.

Pacifists in particular often make another point as well, regarding the lack of institutional support. As Yoder puts it,

…the decision that nonviolent means will not work for comparable ends is made without any comparable investment of time or creativity, without comparable readiness to sacrifice, and without serious projection of comparable costs. The American military forces would not “work” if we did not invest billions of dollars in equipping, planning, and training. Why should it be fair to measure moral claims of an alternative strategy by setting up the debate in such a way that that other strategy should have to promise equivalent results with far less financial investment and less planning on every level?446

Cady makes a similar point:

It must be remembered that nonviolence has succeeded with little preparation and virtually no public confidence. Meanwhile violence is systematically planned, of the highest priority when investing public resources, and widely supported, yet it frequently fails to be an effective means of achieving the peaceful ends in view. …It must be acknowledged that pacifism may or may not succeed at defeating

445 Walzer, 332.

446 Yoder, *When War Is Unjust*, 79.
unrestrained evil. But there is no guarantee that violence will prevail over unrestrained evil. …And sometimes the very fact that we engage in war allows our enemies to do greater evil than may have been possible for them had we refused to oblige them by fighting.⁴⁴⁷

Holmes also points out the unfairness of comparing “nonviolence in its present embryonic form…with a system of violence that is in an advanced stage of development, deeply entrenched in the socio-economic fabric of the major societies of the world.”⁴⁴⁸

James’s entire paper is devoted to the hypothetical prospect devoting the resources we now use for war, to peace. Those who claim that these approaches to violence are impractical may have their thumbs on the scale.

These arguments both respond to the charge of impracticality with a defense that the views (a) do work at least sometimes, and (b) might well work even better if given a fair chance. Another sort of response, however, is to the implied definition of “practicality” here; when the objector argues that pacifism does not do enough to correct injustice and is thus impractical, there is an implied equivalence between “practical” and “moral,” and a buried presupposition that morality requires that one be able to stop all injustice, at least sometimes through the use of violence / killing. Thus (it is assumed), in order for a view to be moral, it must condone killing in the name of justice; furthermore, this equivalence assumes a world in which justice can always be achieved, if one is prepared to use harsh enough measures. If we weaken the objection even a bit, to say that morality need not require killing (since even JWT does not require killing in all cases, and forbids it in some) but only some strong effort to achieve justice, then both views do live up to the standards, and are thus “practical.” If we maintain the


equivalence as it stands, we are left with a requirement to escalate violence in pursuit of justice, moving inexorably down a slippery slope that leads to a consequentialist approach to war, which is problematic (as we have already seen) for both practical and theoretical reasons.

On the account of neither JWT nor pacifism, though, can the latter approach be unqualifiedly affirmed as moral, because morality (they believe) tells us that the means must be in harmony with the ends, and neither believes that a just end can be achieved by way of unjust means. If the objection is altered to require only just means, then it must accept what JWT and pacifism already have: that the nature of evil in this world is such that it cannot all be stopped by just means. Our choice, then, is to stop it by unjust means, or accept that it cannot always be stopped and work otherwise to prevent it as much as possible; JWT and pacifism choose the latter course. The only other alternative is to embrace a consequentialist approach to war and injustice, to accept that “doing what you have to do to stop the evil” must entail doing evil (or what we would ordinarily call evil) to achieve it, even supposing that such an end is possible. Practicality, in the end, is either an empty charge (because both views are practical, on a less restrictive set of grounds) or its requirements are so restrictive as to rule out as impractical any response to injustice but that the most unrestrained – either we must be free to kill all bad guys without limits (a difficult claim to defend), or we acknowledge that some limits are required by justice, and compatible with practicality.

A related charge is that of irresponsibility, which focuses not on pacifists or just-warists in general, but upon those in positions of leadership. It is one thing to choose not to defend yourself, the objection goes, or to try to stop injustice through nonviolent or
minimally violent means in such a way that you meet the standard of “practicality,” but these approaches can only be moral if you do not have defined responsibilities – beyond the ordinary moral sense – to protect others. If you are a leader, you do have such responsibilities, and thus cannot indulge yourself with trying to protect others only within the boundaries of your own moral code – you have an obligation (nearly or even completely absolute) to protect those who depend on you. Thus, the moral standards that apply especially to leaders rule out pacifism, or even too restrictive an approach to JWT, as insufficiently responsible.

This tension can be resolved in a variety of ways. One solution is for pacifists not to have power, removing at least this type of responsibility from them. Pacifists have not, as a matter of fact, generally been in positions of power, a status sometimes voluntary and sometimes not. It might be argued that minority or disenfranchised groups were pacifist because they had no power, but our survey of forms of pacifism shows that this is clearly not the case: Gandhi taught that nonviolence must come from a place of courage and power, not weakness; Christ taught that we should consciously embrace nonresistance as its own form of power; any truly pacifist person or group is by (at least my) definition actively accepting of the role of nonviolence, not driven to it by the inability or lack of will do act (that would be passivism). However, some pacifists have also consciously, and conscientiously, rejected power, seeing the power of the state as necessarily coercive, and perhaps even recognizing the claims of responsibility as set forth in this objection (and thus choosing not to put themselves in situations where they would be obligated to violate their convictions); they have sometimes chosen to withdraw entirely, and at other times to advise but not assume authority.
Another solution to potential conflicts between the requirements of leadership and of morality might be to govern under the constraints of some form of realism. This allows the ruler to fulfill his obligations to those who depend on him with whatever force is necessary, since he has obligations only to his own citizens and not to those of other countries or states. Such an approach is obviously incompatible with JWT and pacifism, though, and we have already rejected realism as a viable alternative in its own right.

A third option, however, modifies the presumed view of the requirements of leadership: a principled ruler is not merely one who regards himself as having responsibilities for the physical welfare his own people (though this is a major feature, and one explicitly factored into JWT as early as Aquinas) – he must also be responsible for their moral welfare, and morality (at least those forms other than relativism) requires that we consider the rights and needs of all people equally, not merely those of our own family or tribe. Thus, the leader is limited in how he may respond to threats to his own people; the just-warist (at least) can respond to the charge of irresponsibility in the same way he responded to the charge of impracticality: of course we must defend others, but even the more stringent requirements of leadership cannot ask us to go beyond the bounds of justice, in that it is a duty in its own right, and also in that justice can never be achieved by unjust means.

To the dual question of whether one can live up to the standards of morality yet be sufficiently practical and/or politically responsible, Kant perhaps states the matter most clearly:

Morality, conceived as a system of unconditionally authoritative principles according to which we *ought* to act, has in its objective significance a necessary relation to practice. It is therefore a manifest absurdity, after granting the authority of this concept of duty, to still claim that it can not be carried out. For if
this were so, the concept would of itself cease to come within the scope of morals. *Ultra posse nemo obligatur.* Hence, between politics as a practical doctrine of right, and morality as a theoretical one, there can be no conflict. Consequently there can be no conflict between moral theory and practice. To make such a conflict possible, we should have to consider morality as a general *doctrine of prudence,* that is, a theory of the maxims in accordance with which one is to choose the means best fitted for the attainment of the ends dictated by self-interest. This would be to deny that there is such a thing as morality.

Politics says: “Be ye wise as serpents”; morality adds, as a limiting condition, “and guileless as doves.” If both precepts cannot stand together in the same command, then there is indeed a conflict of politics with morality. But if both injunctions are to be everywhere united, then the idea of any opposition between the two spheres is absurd, and the question how such a conflict is to be reconciled can not even be raised.449

The question of precisely which morality we ought to embrace may go unanswered in this quote; for our purposes, it is enough to note that there is no fundamental requirement that leadership requires operating outside the boundaries of morality. A leader may choose to ignore moral limits, but should not claim to be doing so in the name of moral responsibility.

So far, I have argued that a moral agent ought to be limited, in matters of war and peace, to no more violence than meets fairly strict JWT standards, and no less activity (not necessarily violence) than is necessary to do as much as he can justly do to work for peace and justice. These limits encompass both JWT and pacifism (except for perhaps the outer “edges” of each). Given the objections above, though, a possible objection to this is that it is too wide of a limit. That is, it seems that JWT can more satisfactorily resolve issues of practicality and responsibility - pacifism can also respond adequately to the objections, but if JWT can do it better, what do we have to gain by allowing for the pacifist option at all? At the very least, why not make JWT the preferred option, with pacifism a secondary, perhaps qualified, alternative?

449 Kant, *Perpetual Peace,* 31-32.
That I hold even this narrow of a range in the first place (rather than including views that are not susceptible to the problems of practicality and responsibility at all) is requires a bit more of an accounting than I have already given. To some degree, my general ethical convictions may be perhaps be deduced from what I have already said in defense of these positions over against their competitors. Quite simply, I believe that deontology (especially Kantianism) and Virtue Ethics (especially Aristotelianism) have the most to offer as moral theories. Both appeal to reason, and in much the same way, painting a picture of the world in which being moral is what most fully expresses our humanity and our freedom. Christine Korsgaard describes Kant’s view of moral choice in this way:

…a person who is motivated by duty is to an especial degree active and truly spontaneous. She is not reacting to nature’s proposals at all, but actively imposing on her own actions, and through them on the world, a kind of shape or form that is the dictate of her own mind. This is the fullest expression of autonomy, and it is this that gives her actions their own special moral worth.450

She then argues that Aristotle shares at least this feature with Kant, the view that choosing the good or noble is the clearest expression of reason, “a form of self-command, a capacity to give shape to our own characters and identities.”451 There is something appealing, something right, about moral theories that define living up to high standards as the thing that captures the essence of what we are as moral agents. Kant adds to this a useful way of determining what our duties are, the concept of the categorical imperative, while Aristotle provides the concept of the good life, a life of excellence, and the variety of features that I note as particularly apparent throughout pacifism – habituation, the


451 Korsgaard, 217.
virtuous exemplar, the development of moral character, and more. The two do not necessarily represent a unified moral foundation, of course, and my goal is not to argue that they are, or to defend them on objective grounds. Rather, my point is that JWT and pacifism draw most heavily from these, and these, in turn, (I believe) point us toward this side of the continuum, and away from the other alternatives.

But why prefer pacifism? Both JWT and pacifism can be formulated in such a way as to be followed as categorical imperatives, but given my other preconceptions, pacifism seems more respectful of all human beings as ends in themselves. I have just described how each view represents a mean in the Aristotelian sense, but again, pacifism seems to me to be more in line with the way a virtuous person would conduct herself. In both cases, the preconceptions that incline me toward the pacifist position are largely religious in nature. My respect for and agreement with Yoder’s position, including his interpretation of Christ’s teachings in Scripture is certainly an influential part of my foundation for pacifism. My theological and metaphysical preconceptions about the duties of a Christian, the role God plays in justice, the existence of souls, and so on – the sorts of presuppositions I discussed underlying most religious forms of pacifism in chapter 4 – point me toward the left, away from JWT, and toward a form of pacifism that rejects violence as a just means for achieving peace, and as something inherently at odds with the undiscriminating love that is our duty as human beings. I do believe that we have an obligation to work for justice, in love, and must be prepared to – in fact, expect to – sacrifice to fulfill these obligations, and being a principled pacifist is one way to do so.

I believe, however, that there may be more than one way to fulfill this obligation, that others with the same moral codes as I, but with slightly differing presuppositions
about the nature of reality and/or about theology, may be pushed in the other direction, to a point still within the area defined by the Kantian/Aristotelian foundation I have described. In other words, I believe that an ethical dualism is appropriate here. The concept of the mean in Virtue Theory provides one justification for this bifurcation: as Aristotle tells us, the mean is relative to us, and is not the same for everyone – having the feelings we have “at the right times, about the right things, towards the right people, for the right end, and in the right way, is the intermediate and best condition, and this is proper to virtue.”

What is appropriate to each of us may thus depend on our roles in life. It is on these grounds that Aquinas says that clerics should not fight, as they are properly devoted to duties that are incompatible with bloodshed. Anabaptists have also acknowledged the role of a dual ethic, split in this case between believers and non-believers, on the grounds that the state needs coercive power to function, given the sinful nature of its inhabitants, but believers do not require coercion to behave properly, are obligated by the words of Christ not to use coercion, and thus withdraw from society. As Yoder describes the thought process: “It was simpler to set the Old Testament-New Testament tension parallel to the world-church tension. Capital punishment and war are proper for the Israelites, and for the world, but not for New Testament Christians.” The exact limits for morality for the world are not mentioned here, though the division is explicitly between Christians and non-Christians. Aquinas, on the other hand, outlines the first

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452 *NE* 1106b20-24.

453 *ST* II-II.40.2.

454 Yoder, *Nevertheless*, 111.
principles of JWT before arguing that clerics must be more limited than others, but
(presumably) expects that agents on both sides of the line will be Christians.455

I have proposed a different, more diffuse line of demarcation, however, based on
wherever an agent’s unique set of presuppositions leads her; it is one that that can include
believers and nonbelievers on both sides. This may be problematic for religious forms on
both sides, especially those that exclude as improperly motivated anyone who does not
act on the basis Scriptural teachings; on the other hand, it may also be problematic for
those who regard religious beliefs in general as lacking proper warrant and thus being
inadequate guides to morality. In reviewing arguments from all sides, however, I cannot
deny that – while such groups may not share the precise views of each other – they can
easily be seen to fit near one another on the continuum.

I have argued that, depending on one’s presuppositions, one’s proper moral stance
may vary. This does not mean, however, that I am adopting a relativist stance. The
range of moral positions is limited to the JWT/pacifism spectrum as I have described; I
do not believe that views outside of this spectrum fit within the realm of the moral, but
are at best amoral (realism) or immoral (CT). Any viewpoint within the range can be
properly selected, though I would argue that there are ways to go wrong here as well,
viz., in the case that one chooses a view that is in conflict with her supplementary belief
system (e.g., if a person who believes that violence is incompatible with love chooses to
take up a JWT stance, or a person who believes that her position in society obliges her to
take (justifiedly) violent steps to protect her constituents, but chooses to be restricted by a
pacifist view); one may also be less than rigorous in application of the principles at hand,

455 It is worth restating here that several Eastern religions propose this cleric/lay dichotomy as
well.
failing to be sufficiently scrupulous in seeking justice or acting lovingly. We must each take a deeply reflective approach to matters as important as this, taking particular care to evaluate our presuppositions – after all, not all presuppositions are equally valid, and the rightness of the choice we make depends upon the ones who choose to maintain and live by. We are obligated to choose as wisely as we can the most moral course of action.

There are objections to the mechanism of a dual ethic itself. One objection – that it is too relativistic – I have already responded to. A second objection is that which has been leveled specifically at nonresistant groups who withdraw from society entirely, who do not participate in the political process, and who often reject even other pacifists as inappropriately motivated. Yoder notes (among other shortcomings) that such a view “implicitly denies both missionary and ecumenical concern, since in effect ‘Christ is Lord for us but not for them.’ … It concedes the government – though somehow seldom to other governments than our own – a mandate to wage war which goes far beyond the substance of the New Testament view of the state.”

A group that embraces nonviolence in imitation of a loving Christ is surely inconsistent if it fails to actively demonstrate that love, or allows others to violate it in their name.

I do not believe that the approach I have described is vulnerable to this objection either. I have excluded from the JWT/Pacifism range (and perhaps even from the range of pacifism at all) those forms of pacifism that do not place enough emphasis on active obligations to work for love and justice. Meeting such an obligation may take the form of direct interaction with societal institutions, as the Quakers (among others) choose to do. It may take a more indirect form as well. After all, nothing prevents even the

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\text{\textsuperscript{456}} \text{Yoder, } \text{Nevertheless, } 113.
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strictest pacifist from being a strong witness for an alternate way of life, while still being a visible member of society; Hershberger argues, for example, “that ultimately, a major purpose for preserving Mennonite communities was to offer the world a corporate, collective demonstration of Christian social and economic relationships – a corporate witness,”457 and elsewhere “that the church should communicate God’s way in human relations by demonstrating it.”458  Pacifists who withdraw so far from society that they cannot affect it at all, I would argue, do wrong by surrendering the field to those whom – at least on their view – need help the most.  The pacifist has an obligation to work, within the limits of his conscience, for justice; only in this way will his stance be moral one rather than a passivist one.  The problem is not with dualism, it is with inactive pacifism.

The exact form of the view on the other side of the duality is important as well – pacifists must not be too restrained, but just-warists must be restrained enough.  I believe that there must be, within the spectrum (though to the far edge) allowance made for the true possibility of violence, since otherwise the spectrum will be in its entirety functional pacifism, and my goal here is to accommodate those who truly believe that, as described by Augustine, one can truly kill with love in one’s heart.  This is clearly a high standard to meet; thus we find, according to Yoder, that most who claim to be just-warists are nothing of the sort:

Counter to the standard history, the just-war position is not the one which has been taken practically by most Christians since Constantine.  Most Christians (baptized people) in most wars since pacifism was forsaken have died and killed in light of thought patterns derived from the crusade or the national-interest [political realist] pattern.  Some have sought to cover and interpret this activity with the rhetoric of the just-war heritage; others have not bothered.  The just-war

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457 Schlabach, 174.

458 Schlabach, 143; this is in the context of CPS, an early form of an alternative to military service.
tradition remains prominent as a consensus of the stated best insights of a spiritual and intellectual elite, who used that language as a tool for moral leverage on sovereigns for whom the language of the gospel carried no conviction. Thus just-war rhetoric and consistent pacifism are on the same side of most debates. When honest, both will reject most wars, most causes, and most strategies being prepared and implemented.459

The limit of moral JWT, on my view, is the sort of position that allows for some wars but rejects most. There are two sorts of requirements, I think, in order to maintain this position. First, there must be a positive effort to acquire knowledge of the relevant factors of any warlike situation (though as we have noted, this is an extremely difficult task in the complex arena of international relations), as well as the wisdom and appropriate levels of confidence in using this knowledge to justify — or rule out — any given instance of war460; there must also be an ongoing dedication to developing the virtue necessary for working for justice, whether within war or outside of it. The other requirement is that there be a development of a properly negative attitude towards war:

“A Christian who prepares the case for a justifiable war without being equally prepared for the negative case has not soberly weighed the prima facie presumption that any violence is wrong until the case for the exception has been made.”461

I do believe that it is possible to be a sufficiently thoughtful just-warist. However, the difficulty in meeting the requirements above highlights a particular difficulty for JWT — having moved beyond an absolute prohibition on killing, but believing that many or


460 Cady is especially pessimistic about the possibility of having sufficient knowledge for justification: “Making war is doing massive, irreparable harm; doing such irreparable harm demands a very high degree of justification. But it is difficult to justify acts of such import without secure knowledge that they are warranted. And such knowledge eludes us in part due to the incompatibility of ends and means in war and due to tensions between principle and caring” (55).

461 Yoder, *When War Is Unjust*, 80.
even most instances of killing are wrong, it may easily find itself on a slippery slope, with
difficulty drawing a line at which to say “this and no more.” Yoder analyses this problem
at length, describing the ways in which JW standards have been relaxed over time, in
such a way that the tradition has become a hollow shell over time. Of the JW criteria, he
says:

Those criteria are supposed to guarantee that there is no carte blanche; there are
some things one would never do, even for a just cause. But then when we ask
about the firmness with which the criteria apply, we discover that they keep
sliding farther down the scale. With each concession the claim is renewed that
this still does not mean that “anything goes.” Indeed,
• The double-effect argument is still subject to criteria;
• Reprisals are still subject to proportionality;
• Relaxing some rules is done in order to safeguard the idea of law as such;
• The rule will never be met, but if we keep talking about them the
infractions will not be as bad as if we don’t;
• We have no common notion of what compliance would mean, or what
must never happen, but at least we have a common vocabulary.
The slippery slope pattern is obvious.462

To make the concession to practicality without going too far is a delicate balance; this
makes practicing JWT in a moral way more difficult than pacifism in some ways. On the
other hand, JWT appeals more directly to our ordinary intuitions about justice (though
this is part of the danger) than does pacifism, making pacifism’s struggle one of
overcoming our natural human tendency to respond in kind, to prefer some people to
others, to take matters into our own hands – all things forbidden by pacifism. Pacifism
must avoid being committed to unconditional love at the expense of justice; JWT must
avoid being committed to justice at the expense of unconditional love. To fulfill both
obligations is a delicate balancing act. The two views have a similarly difficult task,
really: to do enough for justice without going beyond the bounds of love.

462 Yoder, When War Is Unjust, 67.
I have argued that both sorts of views are fully moral alternatives, but also that, from my perspective at least, that pacifism is still the preferable of the two. There are a variety of reasons for this, most of which I have already discussed, but I would like to mention, or expand on, two more, one religiously neutral and one more specifically Christian. First, I believe that pacifism as a point of view subjects the agent to less internal discord: I have argued that JWT does not separate means and ends in quite the way Cady argues, but there does still remain, on that side of the spectrum, more explicitly conflicting obligations. JWT expects us to (at least sometimes) work for peace by means of war, it expects us to be able to kill while being motivated by love – both things that are difficult to imagine fitting easily into a harmonious way of life. Pacifism has its own difficulties, but I believe that this is a major one that it avoids. It is not necessarily a point in favor of a moral view that it is easier to adhere to; however, my argument is not that pacifism is easier, but that it seems most in accord with the flourishing of the human being. In individual cases there will be considerable conflict, of course; confronted with an immediate case of gross injustice, there will certainly be tension between the sense of obligation not to harm a human being, and the sense that one must stop – by any means – the harm being done to another human being.

However, I believe that killing (of anyone) is inherently at odds with at least some subset of persons, those with (as we have mentioned) certain sorts of preconceptions. I find myself, as a Christian, especially influenced by Aquinas’s reasons for clerics not to kill; I am not a cleric, but I believe that the special duties assigned to clerics on Aquinas’s account, apply (in my humble opinion) to me as well. Aquinas says that “certain occupations are so inconsistent with one another, that they cannot be fittingly exercised at
the same time,” going on to argue that “warlike pursuits are full of unrest, so that they hinder the mind very much from the contemplation of Divine things, the praise of God, and prayers for the people,” 463 and that “ministers should imitate their master [Who, when He was struck did not strike].” 464 I am not a minister, but as a Christian, I see it as my duty to imitate my master, to praise God and pray, and I agree with Aquinas that these things are incompatible with killing.

Moving toward pacifism at least in part because it requires less internal tension may seem like a selfish move: “This is part of a common objection that pacifists are concerned mainly about their own moral purity and do not really care much what happens to other, including innocent persons, so long as they personally keep their hands clean by refraining from violence.” 465 We have already provided some answers to such a charge in the responses given regarding impracticality and irresponsibility, but I believe there are other arguments that can be made as well. Holmes replies to the above charge by appealing to the principle of double effect: “If, that is, I may personally kill another person and not be held accountable, provided I did not intend to kill him but merely foresee that I will cause his death in my effort to incapacitate him as a combatant (as Ramsey puts it), why should I be held accountable if someone else kills that same person in circumstances in which I could foresee that by refusing to kill yet another person his death would result? In the one case I am absolved of responsibility, in the other I am held blameworthy, even though the killing was done by someone else.” 466 He does on to

463 ST II-II.40.2.
464 ST II-II.64.4.
465 Holmes, On War and Morality, 202.
466 Holmes, On War and Morality, 202-203.
directly refute the assumption that “in general killing and letting die are morally indistinguishable.”

Pacifists like Hershberger and other Mennonites (more properly called “nonresistant”) would likely agree with this analysis, but go on to challenge other assumptions made in such an argument as well. Accusations of selfishness, of abdication of social responsibility, fail to recognize that there can be other ways of being socially responsible. Such a definition does not “recognize being socially engaged by constructing alternative, demonstration systems. It [ignores] the idea that an alternative witness might be the most effective way for Christians to exert moral power, even for achieving justice and influencing the existing social order.”

We should not think of power only in terms of political or military power; there is “a different power in Jesus’ teachings…by exerting such power, Jesus’ followers might be socially responsible by a different definition.”

In fact, many pacifists – even non-Christian ones – argue (as we saw in chapter three) that the very radicalness and sacrificiality of a nonviolent response to violence can be very effective in its own way. Yoder pays special attention to this reality in his response to the question “What Would You Do,” pointing to a wide variety of meaningful responses to threatened violence beyond the oft-posed “kill or be killed” dichotomy. He discusses the ramifications of martyrdom, on the part of a third-party victim (in some cases, “such slaughter would bring about a renewed commitment to work for the kind of world in which such things do not happen”) or on the part of the pacifist.

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468 Schlabach, 227.
469 Schlabach, 227.
who can (and arguably ought to) “intervene in such a way that, without…destroying the aggressor, he would refocus his attack on [the pacifist] instead of his originally intended victim” – this would (hopefully) have the motivating effect of the first form of martyrdom, with the added factor that the martyr willingly chose his fate, with the belief that “death is not the greatest evil one can suffer.”\(^{470}\) In discussing “the natural way out,” he also discusses a variety of possible ways “to disarm the attacker emotionally,” including “a loving gesture, a display of moral authority, or my undefensive harmlessness which would disarm him psychologically.”\(^{471}\) Other forms of pacifism see their very practice of pacifism as something that can bring about change; Yoder describes this view as “the pacifism of redemptive suffering,” and describes several such accounts:

The willing acceptance of suffering is a part of the Gandhian method and of the Anabaptist and Mennonite nonresistant traditions. For the Gandhian, the suffering is conceived as instrumental. It contributes to an effect upon the powerful. It is the price of nonviolent resistance, or it is a way to touch the heart. For others, the suffering itself may be seen as bringing about a healing or purgative effect on society, or expiation in the mystical order of things.\(^{472}\)

Martin Luther King uses the terminology of redemptive suffering as well: “We must not return violence under any condition. I know this is difficult advice to follow, especially since we have been the victims of no less than ten bombings. But this is the way of Christ; it is the way of the cross. We must somehow believe that unearned suffering is redemptive.”\(^{473}\) He also appeals explicitly to the effect that the willing acceptance of this “uneearned suffering” can have on the oppressor, acknowledging the real and difficult


\(^{471}\) Yoder, *What Would You Do?*, 27.

\(^{472}\) Yoder, *Nevertheless*, 119.

possibility of jail and physical death, and then arguing that a collective nonresistant stance can itself bring about justice:

Faced with this dynamic unity, this amazing self-respect, this willingness to suffer, and this refusal to hit back, the oppressor will find, as oppressors have always found, that he is glutted with his own barbarity. Forced to stand before the world and his God splattered with the blood of his brother, he will call an end to his self-defeating massacre. 474

The very nature of nonviolence as counterintuitive can itself be an effective way of working towards loving justice.

And then there is the direct effectiveness of nonviolent pursuits of justice. Gene Sharp, for example, focuses specifically on developing an account of the wide variety of methods that can be used to work for justice,475 though he explicitly points out that such an approach is not necessarily the same as pacifism.476 The “pacifism of prophetic protest,” as Yoder describes it, actively refuses to cooperate with those things it takes to be immoral, a potentially effective tactic in “our age of verbal overload,” in which “the amplifier which the acted word becomes is the only way for some messages to be heard. …nonviolent demonstration seeks to communicate an affirmation of human dignity to the ones to whom it is addressed, and whom it inconveniences.”477 Pacifists (or

474 King, Stride Toward Freedom, 217.

475 He describes different classifications for such acts: they may involve acts of omission (such as strikes), acts of commission (such as protests), and combinations of the two. Some acts are largely symbolic, meant to persuade or even merely express disapproval (e.g., marches, parades, vigils); others, acts of noncooperation, are meant to more directly affect the targets of the action (e.g., boycotts, strikes); yet others are more direct still, involving acts of intervention (e.g., sit-ins, nonviolent obstruction, nonviolent invasion, parallel government) (“Nonviolent Action: An Active Technique of Struggle,” in Nonviolence in Theory and Practice, edited by Robert L. Holmes (Prospect Heights, IL: Waveland Press, Inc., 1990), 149-150.

476 Sharp, 149. “The motives for using nonviolent action instead of violent action differ widely. In some cases violence may have been rejected because of considerations of expediency, in others for religious, ethical, or moral reasons. Or there may be a mixture of motivations of various types. Nonviolent action is thus not synonymous with ‘pacifism.’”

477 Yoder, Nevertheless, 60-61.
nonresistants, especially Mennonites) have indeed rejected some nonviolent techniques (strikes, protests, some forms of civil disobedience) as too coercive, but clearly, such forms of action are not incompatible with many varieties of pacifism, and may constitute a valid way of fulfilling one’s obligations toward justice and love at the same time.

I have been utilizing examples of actions such as those above, and actors such as Gandhi, in my support of the ways in which nonviolence can be successful. Objections have been made to the use of examples like these by pacifism, on the grounds that they are not representative of instances of war; the only reason these tactics succeeded when used by activists like Gandhi and Martin Luther King, Jr., it is said, is that they were fighting relatively civilized opponents in a conflict exposed to the global public by way of mass media. Such tactics are bound to fail in the absence of either factor. I agree that these are advantageous to such struggles, but I do not believe that this fact negates the power of what movements like this accomplish. One reason that these situations do not seem properly “war-ish” is because one side of the conflict refused to make it so; it is easy to imagine civil wars arising in each of these cases, had the situation been handled differently. We cannot rule out all cases of potential violence in which one side adheres to pacifist standards and refuses to fight as instances of war, and then argue that wars have never been won by pacifist tactics – such an argument begs the question. Furthermore, we have seen that nonviolent tactics can be effective against the most prototypical of “bad guys,” the Nazis; the situation in Denmark was more a matter of civil policy than one of military conflict, but it could have easily transformed – again, we cannot rule out successful nonviolent responses simply on the grounds that the conflict
was not a war, if we simultaneously define “war” in such a way as to exclude conflicts of which one party acts nonviolently.

The fact is, the line between domestic or civil conflicts and actual war can be a hazy one. This is not a refutation of the application of nonviolence, however, but an affirmation of it. The pacifist and just-warist alike, as we have already noted, are bound to at least attempt to solve all conflicts nonviolently, to bring about justice by the most loving methods possible. This requires a commitment to justice at all levels of interaction, and moral agents of all varieties properly seek to address the root causes of war, rather than waiting to react to war itself. Hershberger argued that materialism, aggressive economic behavior, and a variety of unjust social attitudes are the root causes of war; therefore, to be truly nonresistant and consistent with their stand on war, Mennonites had better apply a standard of justice to their whole range of social attitudes and behaviors.\footnote{Hershberger}{478}

King also explicitly links the two forms of conflict, arguing that proper behavior in the smaller arena of the fight for civil rights may itself affect behavior on a broader scale:

\begin{quote}
It may even be possible for the Negro, through adherence to nonviolence, so to challenge the nations of the world that they will seriously seek an alternative to war and destruction. …Today the choice is no longer between violence and nonviolence. It is either nonviolence or nonexistence. … ‘All who take the sword will perish by the sword.’\footnote{King}{479}
\end{quote}

It is part of the duty of the pacifist – and the just-warist – to think not only about war, but about issues of civil rights, labor unions, education, and so on – justice and love requires that we seek moral solutions to these problems for their own sake, and as an indispensable component of the larger struggle for peace in general.

\footnotesize{478} Schlabach, 206.

\footnotesize{479} King, \textit{Stride Toward Freedom}, 224.
My recommendations here may not be easy to follow. Even if we accept the argument that there is a (limited) range of possible moral responses to issues of war and peace, there is necessarily still only the vaguest prescription as to which view within that is the correct one for any given agent. I have made much of the factor of underlying presuppositions, but these are problematic on their own, in that they are often accepted unreflectively, and the slightest understanding of history and human nature tells us that these thoughtlessly accepted preconceptions can often be wrong. We thus each have the difficult task of first identifying the full scope of such beliefs (the most deeply-held of which are often the most imperceptible), and then of analyzing the validity of each, a task made more difficult by the inherently unverifiable nature of beliefs concerning metaphysics, religion, and ethics. Still, this sort of reflection is necessary if we are to have any hope of being fully rational beings, fully moral beings.

I have already disclosed my own preconceptions (however incompletely), but one further has become clearer to me the more I examine this subject. To properly perform the duties within either pacifism or JWT is an unusually demanding process, so demanding, I think, that the special preconceptions available to the Christian seem almost to be required, if not to hold either view in a theoretical sense, then to practice it as sacrificially as we must. For to be either a pacifist or a just-warist is to accept at least the possibility of death of oneself, of loved ones, or of innocent others (to accept the death of a murderer is not quite so difficult to do), and this is something contrary to human nature. To have the strength to accept such a thing, while believing that this life is all we have, that justice has no mechanism but our own acts, is an almost unimaginable thing for me. Nonviolent sacrifice seems more psychologically possible if we hold Christian, or at least
some form of religious, conceptions about the afterlife and justice. As Yoder says, of the collection of stories of successful nonviolence in the face of grave danger in his book *What Would You Do*, that “such a response seems to rise naturally out of a religious perception of the world and of oneself as being in the hand of God.”⁴⁸⁰ I believe it is possible to accept death without such preconceptions, but only with the utmost difficulty.

This issue is bound to be a difficult one for any moral agent. I argued at the beginning of this paper that we are all obligated to take a thoughtful position on issues of war, making the case in the end for the views I think are the most morally viable. In doing so, however, I have also illustrated more fully why this is an important task for all of us, not only politicians and soldiers, because – whichever route we choose – much is required. We need not be fighting in wars to have obligations to treat others properly, yet those obligations are at the heart of thinking morally about war, and for most of us, as close to war as we will come. These obligations ought to challenge us, morally, epistemologically, and psychologically. They are what define us as human, as rational and virtuous moral agents – these obligations which ultimately, place us in a position to possibly forestall war, whether we know it or not.

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