BREAKING THE ORGANIZATIONAL MOLD:
WHY THE INSTITUTIONAL U.S. ARMY HAS CHANGED DESPITE ITSELF
SINCE THE END OF THE COLD WAR

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by

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Why has the institutional U.S. Army changed since the end of the Cold War? There is evidence that supports existing scholarly arguments that the civilian leaders caused important changes, which authors like Barry Posen (1984) and Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow (1999) expect. While analyzing changes in Army officers’ personnel, education, and training systems, however, the preponderance of the evidence strongly suggests that the Army is changing itself—when it does change—providing further support to Stephen Peter Rosen (1991) and Williamson Murray and Allan Millett (1996). However, evidence suggests there are limits to what the Army will change itself, absent a change in its culture or priorities of its elite. Both shifts occurred during this study’s time period: While evolving gradually throughout the 1990s, after experiencing difficulties in Iraq, the institutional Army transformed itself in ways that fundamentally changed the experiences for those involved.

This dissertation primarily tests four internal, three external, two U.S. Army specific cultural, and three organizational theory explanations for why organizations in
general, and the U.S. Army specifically, has and has not changed from 1991-2007. I focus specifically on changes in the Officer Personnel Management System and the Officer Evaluation Report; the three Army combat training centers California, Louisiana, and Germany; and the U.S. Military Academy at West Point and the U.S. Army War College at Carlisle Barracks.

The evidence supports six important and cross-cutting findings. First, civilians are not fixing the military, even when problems arose. Second, despite its hierarchical structure, leadership priority and consensus were both critical in the Army making voluntary changes. Third, despite the oft-repeated claim by Posen (1984) and Allison and Zelikow (1999), there was overwhelming evidence that the Army changed itself without first failing. Fourth, evidence was less supportive of the institutional Army’s willingness to incorporate experiential lessons that countered its culture. During this time period, it consistently prioritized changing itself in expectation of future threats. Fifth, major changes often occurred outside of bureaucratic constraints, in part because these changes to the formal systems were so difficult to make. Finally, there were real limits to the changes the Army could voluntarily make.

This dissertation concludes with specific institutional recommendations for civilian and military leaders and scholars to help continue the major changes being implemented since 2005-06.
This is dedicated to Prof. George Lopez.

Without him, I never would have attempted—much less finished—this lifelong aspiration of earning my doctorate while still serving in the active duty military.
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The ideas and mistakes presented in this dissertation are solely those of the author’s. They do not necessarily represent the positions of the U.S. Army, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.
CHAPTER 1:
INTRODUCTION

1.1 Introduction

Our military success has been spectacular. Key phases of the campaign, such as the fall of Baghdad, came even more swiftly than the most optimistic observers believed possible. But sudden victories bring sudden dilemmas.

After several days of liberating additional cities with hardly a shot fired and taking the surrender of an entire Iraqi army corps, our forces are in the position of the dog that caught the fire truck.

What do we do now?...

The most important thing is to remain calm and stay on course when faced with disappointments and complaining headlines. We’ve caught the fire truck. The men and women in uniform will figure out how to drive it soon enough. Trust them.


Why has the U.S. Army changed since the end of the Cold War? Unlike journalist Ralph Peters’ appeal, scholars generally rely upon the wisdom and foresight of civilian leaders to break the uniformed Army’s organizational stranglehold constraining change. Most argue that the Army will continue to fight the last war, progressing only on peripheral matters that increase its budget, resources, or autonomy from meddling civilians. After experiencing catastrophic failure or inter-service competition for resources, the Army can change itself. In essence, they would conclude that since the end of the Cold War, the U.S. Army has become the predominant land force—the twenty-first

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century’s paradigm Army\textsuperscript{2}— despite the uniformed Army’s culture and bureaucratic resistant to change.

There is evidence that since the end of the Cold War that the civilian leaders caused important changes, which authors like Barry Posen (1984)\textsuperscript{3} and Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow (1999)\textsuperscript{4} expect. Since the Soviet Union’s demise, however, evidence strongly supports a very different cause of change: the Army itself. While evolving gradually throughout the 1990s, after the turn of the century, the institutional Army has transformed itself in major ways that have fundamentally changed the experiences for those involved.

The evidence upon which this dissertation draws is from three of the institutional Army’s systems—personnel, training, and education—evaluated from 1991-2007. Evidence shows that these three systems changed primarily by the Army’s initiative, and in response to a new strategic environment. Being able to break this organizational mold provides additional support for arguments of Stephen Peter Rosen (1991)\textsuperscript{5} and Williamson Murray and Allan R. Millett (1996)\textsuperscript{6} that the Army can and does change itself in significant ways. While still observed in my cases, civilian directives, changing technology, budgetary decisions, experiential learning (“lessons learned”), and

\footnotesize


competition with other military services (Navy, Air Force, Marines) provided much less of a causal influence.

I analyze my cases from an institutional, or structural, perspective. I start with Deborah Avant’s (1993) focus on the structures within the organization that determine the organization’s, and individuals’ within the organization, normal responses. This includes the formal rules, structures, incentives, and processes that define or change the status quo, rather than emphasizing the organization’s culture or personalities of individuals or sub-units within the organization. Political scientists, organizational theorists, and civilian and military practitioners have long recognized the importance of the organization’s strategic culture to explain why it reacts differently than other organizations in response to the same stimuli. The systems I analyze, however, help create and change the organization’s culture by defining what the elites and masses value, prioritize, and think. As organizational theorist James Q. Wilson (2000) underscores, the organization’s structure also provides better leverage than culture for those trying to make organizational change. Since this research also aims to provide substantive analysis for both military and civilian audiences to be better able to respond to current and future challenges, my recommendations are institutionally-focused to help set the conditions for long-term change.

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8 Just a few of the works that prioritize the organization’s culture to explain change include John Nagl (Lt. Col.), *Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press), 2005.

Why did civilian leadership not cause more dramatic change in these areas, as most scholars expect? Civilians were very active in matters with which they readily had knowledge, those which were financially costly (to include jobs in Congressional districts), or subjects that had more immediate (and politically-advantageous) effects.\(^{10}\) As Robert Worley (2006) stated when explaining why research, development, procurement, and maintenance of weapons systems were Congress’ focus: “Weapons are built in Congressional districts, missions are not.”\(^{11}\) For instance, societal matters (i.e. homosexuals in the military), sexual harassment cases, integrating technology for precision warfare, base realignments, and care for wounded warriors elicited significant response and action. On matters shaping the Army’s culture, beliefs, and long-term personnel composition, however, civilians rarely demanded specific actions. Even when directed to change, the Army was also typically allowed—and proactively worked—to determine its own way to fulfill its civilians’ mandates, making civilian-only decisions rare.\(^{12}\)

While internal change is possible, evidence shows that for cultural and bureaucratic reasons, there are real limits to what the Army can and is willing to change. These include two constraints on why changes occurred and two on how changes were

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\(^{10}\) While not all of the Army’s civilian leadership are publicly elected or appointed officials, the overwhelming majority are. As a result, members in the executive and legislature often have shorter time horizons when trying to affect change. In discussions with Congressional political staffers, members of Congress are so inundated with requests for assistance that they usually must choose not only worthwhile cases but most often those for which they can also gain political capital with the constituents.


\(^{12}\) The main exception to this is the Congressional mandate in the 1993 National Defense Authorization Act to increase the proportion of civilian professors at USMA from about five per cent to twenty, which had less support initially from the Army. Ricky Lynn Waddell also arrived at this same conclusion when analyzing U.S. Army low intensity doctrinal changes from 1961-93, “The Army and Peacetime Low Intensity Conflict, 1961-1993,” (Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, Columbia University), 1993.
institutionalized. First, internally-driven changes could not counter the Army’s foundational “muddy boots” cultural attributes. Second and closely related, the proposed changes could not undermine the organizational elite—the maneuver branches (primarily infantry and armor)—or their relative power within the organization. Third, despite its mechanistic, hierarchical structure, an overwhelming proportion of senior officers with vested interests in that aspect of the organization needed to reach consensus on the need for and type of change, and be socialized to the potential modification. Finally, since organizational change is extremely difficult even when all agree it is needed, the Army’s senior officer, the Chief of Staff of the Army (CSA), needed to prioritize centralized changes very early in his tenure (most likely in the first year) and remain personally involved throughout the process to make them happen. The CSA’s involvement was necessary but not sufficient for change to occur from within. While theoretically possible for him to minimize the effects of the first two constraints, there was not evidence of this in the post-Cold War period.

If all four of these constraints were met, evidence shows that internal change could and would occur, despite the pessimism that most political science scholars have. However, as the result of these constraints, there was less reason for optimism than Ralph Peters’ opening quote suggests that the Army could be trusted to change itself as needed. In essence, there were categories of changes that were effectively too difficult for the Army to change itself without an external stimulus requiring change. Thus, scholars’ claims that the Army is fighting the last war and the Army’s claim it is a learning institution are both flawed, as the institutional organization was willing to change
proactively and reactively only if the proposed changes did not counter these four constraints.

Why was there such dissonance between scholarly wisdom and my findings? There were two primary reasons for this variance: the time period and the topics analyzed. First, most analyses focus on previous eras: the Interwar Period, Cold War, and Vietnam War being the most common.\textsuperscript{13} Much has changed since the end of the Cold War, including a markedly different strategic environment, recurrent U.S. Army interventions,\textsuperscript{14} decrease in military veterans in public office, and visible changes being made within the organization. Other scholars researching the contemporary time period, not only focusing on the U.S. but also on Europe, have begun reaching similar conclusions.\textsuperscript{15} These changes provide sufficient evidence and theoretical and national security imperatives to more thoroughly research whether existing scholarly arguments remain consistent.

The second reason for this divergence was the cases I analyzed. Most scholars who analyze questions during the time period focus on changes in doctrine, the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA), or transformation of the organization’s structure and equipment. Doctrine is commonly considered the driver of change for the U.S.

\textsuperscript{13} Williamson Murray and Allan R. Millett (1996) focus on learning and innovation in the Interwar Period, with Stephen Peter Rosen (1991) also citing critical examples from this period; Kimberley Marten Zisk (1993) and Matthew Evangelista (1991) discuss innovation within the U.S.-USSR arms race; and John Nagl (2005) discusses U.S. innovation during Vietnam and British innovation during its Malaya counterinsurgency.

\textsuperscript{14} Our country’s efforts in interventions are clearly not just by the Army nor unilateral; however, in this dissertation I only examine changes in the Army, of which lessons and interactions with other military services can and do affect change.

Army,\textsuperscript{16} and it does play a critical role in solidifying consensus across the organization, which then promotes even more change. However, doctrine is not the only force for change, which this research helps highlight. For instance, the Army’s primary manual discussing how to prosecute major operations, Field Manual (FM) 100-5/3-0 \textit{Operations}, was only published three times during this period: 1993, 2001, and 2008.\textsuperscript{17} The lauded “Counterinsurgency” (COIN) manual (FM 3-24), which the Army began implementing along with Gen.\textsuperscript{18} David Petraeus and the U.S. “surge” in Iraq, was published in December 2006. While an analysis of these manuals is outside the scope of this dissertation, it is important to highlight that there were substantial changes implemented in all three of my cases—personnel, education, and training—which preceded doctrinal publication, most prominently in 2005-06. Those writing doctrine are also engaged in changing other parts of the institution, while some level of consensus is also needed before making major doctrinal changes. In consequence, conceptually it is not surprising that other parts of the organization can and will change at times before doctrine. Thus, it is important to also problematize why these three areas change, in addition to current efforts studying doctrine.

The other subject areas on which most scholars focus make equally as compelling cases for study. It is surprising, though, how little has been researched about those areas that directly shape this organization’s culture: analyzing the organization’s “software” in

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{16} As just one example, Posen’s 1984 \textit{The Sources of Military Doctrine}, which many consider to be one of the foundational books on this subject, even entitles his first chapter “The Importance of Military Doctrine.”
  \item \textsuperscript{17} Field Manual (FM) 100-5 was published in Jun. 14, 1993; FM 3-0, Jun. 14, 2001; and FM 3-0, Feb. 27, 2008. The FM changed series numbers in 2001 to align numerically with Joint Publications.
  \item \textsuperscript{18} Except where specifically annotated, all military ranks within this dissertation refer to leaders within the U.S. Army.
\end{itemize}
addition to its “hardware,” despite many scholars identifying their importance. Since 1989 the Army identified six core institutional systems, or “imperatives,” which cumulatively guided its efforts: quality soldiers (personnel), war-fighting doctrine, force mix (different types of organizational units), tough and realistic training, modernization, and leader development (includes institutional education, operational experience, and self-development). Likewise, when distinguishing organizational (as opposed to individual leader) learning, John Lovell argued in 1984 that organizations learn from experience “to the extent that policy experiences become assimilated into organizational doctrine, structures, decision-making procedures, personnel systems, and organizational commitments.”

These systems have unique foci; however, changes in one will affect the others. As organizational theorist Peter Senge (1990) argued, in order to understand an organization, one must evaluate its systems holistically, while realizing that the ability to leverage change often lies at places where the systems interact. For instance, the Army decided after an internal review in 2001 to provide education for all mid-career Majors instead of using this as a professional discriminator that had previously been provided to

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20 John P. Lovell, “‘Lessons’ of U.S. Military Involvement: Preliminary Conceptualization,” in Donald A. Sylvan and Steve Chan (eds), *Foreign Policy Decision Making* (New York: Praeger), 1984, p. 135. The Army also uses a similar metric for analyzing processes and changes, which it calls DOTMLPF for doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities.

21 In an interview (2007), former Army G-1 Lt. Gen. (Ret.) Theodore Stroup described these six systems as a spider web, in which one could not change a system without purposefully or inadvertently affecting the others.

only the best half of each year group’s officers. By 2006, officers were attempting to avoid this education while in residence, which by then was seen as a distraction from combat deployments. In addition, this change made officers’ evaluation reports from even earlier in their careers the *de facto* discriminators for promotions and prestigious assignments, thus creating even more pressure for junior officers to succeed.

Why are these three cases important? In addition to being much less examined despite scholars’ recognized importance, these three systems help define and shape what the Army’s elite think and know, how they act, and what qualities and competencies they prioritize. These systems help determine and reinforce cultural attributes, while also institutionalizing promotion paths for success. Since Congress’ 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act, the Army’s mandate is also largely restricted to these three institutional processes, as the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and his subordinate combatant commanders have the mission to employ the equipment and trained personnel worldwide. Finally, after U.S. governmental difficulties responding to events such as 9/11 and Hurricane Katrina, in 2007 the Bush administration created the requirement to develop national security professionals across the departments and agencies. The three specific areas on which they focused implementation requirements were education, training, and professional experience (which included career development). By conducting longitudinal case studies over seventeen years for just these three U.S. Army systems, I

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23 This was one of the primary recommendations of the U.S. Army’s “Army Training and Leader Development Panel (ATLDP), Officer Study Report to the Army,” May 2001, pp. OS-10-13.


can better control for external influences and help explain not only change but the lack thereof.

In addition, there are specific reasons to analyze each of these systems. If the Army can change itself in any respect, ideally it should be capable of shaping its officer corps’ composition. As civil-military relations scholars since Samuel Huntington (1957) have discussed, the Army jealously protects its right to promote, evaluate, and retain its own leaders. 26 Except for specialty branches, such as doctors and lawyers, all officers must to enter the organization as junior lieutenants, with the ability to attain the rank of colonel (usually at year twenty-two) no earlier than three years before their peers. Officers at each rank must successfully complete specific assignments and schools, excelling more than their peers at tasks that the organization values. Only those deemed worthy by their seniors are asked to continue within the profession or be permitted to serve in the coveted assignments needed to reach the pinnacles of organizational power. 27

If evidence supports these expectations, this could have significant implications due to the long-term importance of this system. In his 1991 *Winning the Next War: Innovation and the Modern Military*, Stephen Peter Rosen lauded an Army’s personnel system as the primary area that could have the most leverage when trying to change the organization. Rosen argued that if the Army wanted innovative leaders capable of

26 I only focus on active duty, commissioned officers. While non-commissioned officers and warrant officers are critical to the Army, with the former rightly being described as the backbone of the Army, the commissioned officers are the primary leaders of the institutional Army. I also focus just on active duty officers since the reserve and national guard systems have fundamental distinctions, thus allowing me to narrow my focus, while the Army also historically changes its active duty officer systems first and adapts these systems to other parts of the Army.

27 There are of course external checks on the Army’s personnel system. Congress does approve all officer promotion lists and by-name selections of generals and commanders, although they either approve or disapprove what the Army decides, as opposed to being capable of actively nominating officers. The Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and the Joint Staff also have oversight on this process, yet both have been historically resistant to imposing personnel changes on the services outside of equity standards and total end-strength numbers.
producing change, the Army needed a system that encouraged and promoted wise risk-taking, ingenuity, and thinking outside the box.\textsuperscript{28} Junior leaders not imbued with bureaucratic tendencies needed avenues to progress while pursuing inventive paths to meet new challenges. Senior leaders and scholars frequently cite Rosen’s argument for the Army’s potential path for change in our new strategic environment, although little empirical research has been completed on this topic since Rosen wrote.

The institutional training installations are also foundational to the Army’s culture, making this a valuable case to research. Following Vietnam, the Army’s new all-volunteer force catapulted from a broken, defeated Army through a deliberate process founded on training. Rosen (1991) discusses the importance of simulations during peacetime to allow the Army to envision its next war, while these exercises also allow leaders to attempt new and different techniques without risking their soldiers’ lives if they fail. For instance, Gen. Wesley Clark decided to request Apache helicopters and Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS) to serve in a non-doctrinal role in support of the Kosovo air campaign four days before it began, based on their successful use in a computer simulation exercise in Germany.\textsuperscript{29} Leaders also treat these simulations and training exercises extremely seriously, as they are the only real “report card” of combat effectiveness that they have outside of an operational deployment.

Finally, scholars and military leaders have repeatedly discussed the importance of officer education in creating a thinking Army capable of changing itself. Michael McNerney (2005) specifically highlighted that dynamic, forward-looking education was

\textsuperscript{28} Rosen, pp. 20-21.

\textsuperscript{29} Interview with four mid-level Apache helicopter pilots deployed to Task Force Hawk, Albania, in June 1999, who had participated in the computer exercise in which the Army used Apaches and MLRS for deep attack operations. Doctrinally, Apaches require infantry or armor support due to their vulnerability to small arms and anti-aircraft weapons.
“vital to ensure that military organizations can exploit the innovative atmosphere cultivated by their leadership.”30 Scholars such as Allan Millett (2001) and John Nagl (2005) have also discussed the importance of officer education in prompting military change.31 With respect to education and training, Williamson Murray (1996) argued that professional military education served a critical role in the innovation process throughout the Interwar Period, while “the ‘muddy boots’ business of exercises and realists war games lay at the heart of effective innovation.”32 And yet, there is limited scholarly research conducted on why change happens within these three systems.33 This dissertation thus aims to help fill this hole in the literature.

In addition, this dissertation also provides a clearer causal mechanism of how the Army changes, and as a consequence, the limits of what it can change itself. Despite being a hierarchical organization, achieving consensus is critical for the Army to change itself, as emphasized by Millet (1996) and Watts and Murray (1996).34 Through research and interviews of senior and mid-level Army leaders, I present new evidence showing the


31 Allan R. Millett, “Patterns of Military Innovation,” in Murray and Millett, p. 359; and Nagl, p. 222.


33 Two scholars who have completed extensive research on this time frame are Dr. Janine Davidson (now Director, Consortium for Complex Operations, OSD-Policy) and Dr. Tammy Schultz (now at Center for a New American Security), both who have been tremendously helpful in advice and information. Davidson (2005) provided a comprehensive overview of the U.S. Army’s and Marine’s efforts in stability and reconstruction efforts throughout the country’s history, with a contemporary analysis of the U.S. Army’s doctrine, officers’ mid-career education at Fort Leavenworth, training, and organizational initiatives to help integrate lessons learned. Schultz focused on changes in the Army’s and Marine’s doctrine and force structure.

34 Allan R. Millet, and Barry Watts and Williamson Murray include this concept within their variable of “military organizational politics.” While their focus is broader, analyzing bureaucratic tactics supporting or inhibiting innovation (to include inter-service rivalries), Watts and Williamson argue (p. 409) that there is an “unavoidable necessity of bureaucratic acceptance to successful peacetime innovation.” Allan R. Millet, “Patterns of Military Innovation,” especially pp. 349-59; and Barry Watts and Williamson Murray, “Military Innovation in Peacetime,” pp. 369-415; both in Murray and Millet (1996).
impact on change of the system’s centralization and number of leaders with vested interests, which affect senior leaders’ abilities to create consensus. Extraordinary individuals, including the CSA, do help facilitate change, although cultural and bureaucratic factors severely constrain even the top leader’s priorities to selecting only a few. The window of opportunity to initiate change usually occurs in the first year of the CSA’s four-year tenure, due to the required momentum and time needed to institutionalize the change.

In addition to scholarly impact, there is also policy significance to why and how the Army changes. With fluid, complex challenges and fewer civilian leaders having knowledge of or experience with the Army, there is an opportunity and need for the Army not to wait on external demands to change. If one can empirically determine the areas in which the Army can and cannot break its organizational mold, one can help military leaders more efficiently and effectively develop methods and incentives that create consensus in areas of feasible change. Simultaneously, one can help better inform civilian leaders of the areas in which they must intervene if they are not satisfied with the status quo. Civilian oversight and control of the military remain critical, especially given their decreasing knowledge of this institution. Civilian leadership must not only ensure the organization continues to innovate, but also guarantee the Army best supports the country’s national security strategy. In an era with many competing demands of national strategic importance, by better discerning these areas, I hope to help maximize

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35 Michael Desch (1999) discusses this situation in detail, highlighting the civilian-military tensions that result in part from fewer veterans in political office. I focus on these constraints as part of the change-resistant institutional structure rather than the cause of a certain type of relationship. See especially pp. 30-31 in Michael C. Desch, *Civilian Control of the Military: The Changing Security Environment* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press), 1999.

the impact that internal and external attention can bring to best prepare the Army for the
next challenges our country expects of it.

The Army is far from the only organization wrestling with the issue of change,
especially in the aftermath of the 2003 Iraq War, with which this research could have
additional implications. Scholars and practitioners interested in changing individual
agencies and the entire government’s structure are actively working to affect change,
both within the current presidential administration and in preparation for the new
administration in 2009. For instance, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice announced her
“Transformational Diplomacy” initiative in January 2006 to work with foreign
governments as partners, while meeting resistance from many to shift the diplomatic
efforts from high tea socials to engagements in Birkenstocks.37 RAND scholar Nora
Bensahel analyzed different countries’ efforts to deal with nation building missions,
concluding by identifying the critical importance of aligning institutional incentives to
facilitate cooperation across or within bureaucracies.38 Efforts such as those by the
Project for National Security Reform39 are advocating major interagency reform,
including the potential for a “Beyond Goldwater-Nichols” act for the interagency, to
better prepare the U.S. for its twenty-first century national security challenges. Think

37 Interview with Michael Coulter, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for the Bureau of Political-
Military Affairs, identified the primary resisters of change in the State Department were those only with
experiences in Washington, D.C. (2007). For Sec. Rice’s speech on this initiative, see
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2006/59339.htm. The “Birkenstock” rubric was repeated to me by my
State Department colleagues throughout my time in the Political-Military Bureau, Summer 2007.

38 Nora Bensahel, “Organising for Nation Building,” Survival, 49:2, pp. 43–76; and remarks at the

39 The Project for National Security Reform is a non-partisan initiative sponsored by the non-profit
Center for the Study of the Presidency (CSP) to provide recommendations for improving the U.S.
Government’s ability to provide national security in the twenty-first century. While still developing its
recommendations, most in PNSR argue for “comprehensive reform of the regulatory, statutory, and
Congressional oversight authorities that govern the interagency system…(m)odeled on the historic effort
that led to the Goldwater-Nichols legislation.” PNSR website, http://www.pnsr.org/
tanks and well-respected individuals\textsuperscript{40} are also preparing position papers to help the next administration more effectively and efficiently move forward in a time of uncertainty, mounting deficits, and an entrenched government system still based in the National Security Act of 1947. While these other organizations have additional and different challenges than the Army, the process of shaping organizational elites’ minds and professional priorities undoubtedly will have parallel implications.

The remainder of this chapter is organized in two sections. First, I outline my research methodology, as well as discuss my case selection for testing my nine primary hypotheses. I then conclude with an overview of the succeeding five chapters of the dissertation.

1.2 Research methodology

In this dissertation, I test existing political science arguments on why and how the Army changes. Most work on this topic analyzes changes in major doctrine, technology, or weaponry under the “innovation” heading, with scholars widely varying on what constitutes an innovation.\textsuperscript{41} Rather than selecting specific examples of innovative

\textsuperscript{40} For instance, Fred Kaplan (Slate.com, Atlantic Monthly) is working with many colleagues in Washington, D.C., to create a ten-area focus for the next administration, on which he will be providing advice on defense-related matters. Interview (2008).

\textsuperscript{41} Scholars widely vary on what they define and justify studying under the rubric innovation. For instance, Thompson, p. 5, defines innovation as “the generation, acceptance, and implementation of new ideas, processes, and products or services...(that) implies the capacity to change and adapt”; Posen, p. 29, describes it in opposition to stagnation or stability; Evangelista (1988), p. 12, defines it as “major restructuring of military organizations, significant changes in strategy, or both,” while dealing with “technological” innovations in weaponry; Wilson, p. 222, defines it as new programs or technology “that involve the performance of new tasks or a significant alteration in the way in which existing tasks are performed”; Rosen, p. 7, defines a “major” innovation as “a change in one of the primary combat arms of a service in the way it fights or alternatively, as the creation of a new combat arm”; Zisk, p. 4, defines “doctrinal” innovation as “a major change in how military planners conceptualize and prepare for future war,” and “reactive” innovation as “a major change in thinking about and preparation for future war that occurs because of a change in war thinking or preparation made by a potential opponent”; and Murray and Millett, p. 2. define it as “fundamental, basic changes in the context within which war takes place” (italics in original).
changes *a priori*, instead I provide evidence for what changes occurred and why, which could result in innovation. While gradual reform and adaptation are theoretically and practically less interesting than revolutionary changes in an organization, evolutionary changes still cause real change, as William Grimsley (2001)\textsuperscript{42} highlights. My intent is therefore to identify and explain changes that occurred and did not occur during this time period, regardless of whether they meet an arbitrary threshold of innovation.

For comparative purposes in this dissertation, I use three categories of changes. First, the most dramatic changes are “major,” which alter the institution so that those participating before and after this change would have had fundamentally different experiences, perspectives, and/or skills and attributes. Second, “important” changes have a considerable effect on those in the institution, but do not meet the threshold of a major change. Finally, within the case studies I mention “notable” changes that have theoretical implications, but are much more limited and evolutionary in nature.

Using the primary literature arguments, I operationalize four externally-imposed and three internally-driven reasons why the Army changes. My external variables are civilian knowledge, new technology, budgetary reasons, and input from defense industries, all which vary directly with the expected probability of change. For instance, the more knowledge civilians have about an institution, the more likely I expect this factor to cause change. The internal variables, which also vary directly with the expected probability of change, are proximity to battlefield experiences (proxy for experiential learning), intra- (i.e. infantry, armor, engineer, etc.) or inter-service (Army, Navy, Air

Force, Marines) competition, and time and effort devoted to reflect on and analyze the future strategic environment.

Since I am analyzing just the U.S. Army, I analyze two of the Army’s specific attributes to determine their effect on organizational change. First, I expect the Army will not voluntarily change in ways that undermine its culture, which prioritizes “muddy boots,” high intensity war. Second, I expect that the Army will not voluntarily change in ways that erode the organizational elites’ relative power. These elite are primarily within the infantry and armor branches, who largely comprise the organization’s most senior ranks.

To help explain how the Army implements a change voluntarily, I also analyze three organizational factors. First, I expect that the Army’s most senior officer, the Chief of Staff of the Army (CSA), must prioritize and consistently work to implement a major change, if the Army is able to change itself. If a system (or a part of it) is more decentralized away from the Army headquarters, the institution’s or system’s senior leader must prioritize and actively lead the change. I also analyze two factors in the Army being capable of creating consensus for change: how centralized is the decision making process within the Army, and how many people throughout the Army have a strongly vested interest, what I call stakeholders, in the system changing that process. I expect both variables to vary inversely to the probability of the Army changing itself. If the Army can create consensus on the need for and type of change within these constraints, I expect the Army will be more likely to change itself. Without consensus in the need for and type of change, however, I expect either a more decentralized change (i.e. change in an academic department instead of the entire college) or a weaker
**Why**

H1. The greater the civilian knowledge of the subject, the more likely they are to cause change.

H2. The closer in time and intensity an institution is to battlefield experiences, the more likely the Army is to change itself due to lessons.

H3. The more time leaders in an institution have to reflect on the future, the more likely the Army is to change itself when a new strategic environment is anticipated.

H4. The Army will not voluntarily implement major changes that undermine its “muddy boots” culture.

H5. The Army will not voluntarily implement changes that decrease the relative power of its organizational elite (i.e. infantry and armor).

**How**

H6. The Army’s senior leader (or the system’s leader, in a decentralized system) must prioritize a major change for the Army to change itself.

H7. The greater centralized (nearer the Department of Army) the decision making process for that institution, the less likely the Army is to change itself.

H8. The greater the number of Army stakeholders for that institution, the less likely the Army is to change itself.

H9. The greater the recognized need for change but not agreed direction of change, the more likely even more decentralized changes or weaker centralized changes (thus less important institutionally) will occur.

Figure 1.1 Primary Research Hypotheses, Why and How the Army Changes
(Unless otherwise noted, all tables and figures are constructed by the author)

centralized change to occur, thus making the impact much weaker on the institution. Due to the cases I am researching, my primary hypotheses are listed in Figure 1.1.

While there are many ways to analyze why and how the Army changes, in this paper I test my arguments by examining foundational aspects of the U.S. Army’s officer personnel system, officer educational system, and its main training installations from 1991-2007. Specifically, within the personnel case study I examine the Officer Personnel Management System (OPMS) and Officer Evaluation Report (OER). For education, I analyze the U.S. Military Academy (USMA) at West Point, New York, and the U.S. Army War College (USAWC) at Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. Finally, for training I evaluate the National Training Center (NTC) at Fort Irwin, California; the Joint
Readiness Training Center (JRTC) at Fort Polk, Louisiana; and the Joint Multinational Readiness Center (JMRC, formerly the Combined Maneuver Training Center, or CMTC) at Hohenfels, Germany.

Of all the Army’s institutional systems, these should be the easiest cases for the Army to change itself. The Army has the requirement to grow and develop its own leaders throughout their careers (except in specialty branches, such as medical, legal, and religion), making these processes fundamental to fulfilling its core missions. Civilians also have relatively much less knowledge within these areas than equipment, organizational structure, or even doctrine, in part due to the inaccessibility of information and more delayed impact on national military strategy and decision making. There are variances among the cases, though, providing the opportunity to expect that change would occur at different rates and different times. My causal factors and their expected probability of causing change by case study are summarized in Table 1.1.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Causal Factor</th>
<th>External Factors (Directly related)</th>
<th>Internal Factors (Directly related)</th>
<th>Internal – Consensus Req’d (Inversely related)</th>
<th>Expected Sources and Types of Change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Army System</td>
<td>Civilian Knowledge</td>
<td>Technology Impact</td>
<td>Budget Impact</td>
<td>Defense Industry</td>
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<tr>
<td>Officer Personnel Management</td>
<td>Med</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Low-Med</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education (U.S. Army War College)</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Low-Med</td>
<td>Med</td>
<td>Low</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
I expect the officer personnel system to be a difficult case for change for external and internal reasons. Externally, I would expect technology, budgetary, and defense industry inputs to have relatively less impact, although the first two could promote or retard change if substantial shifts occurred. Even though civilians are familiar with large organizations and leadership needs, they are less knowledgeable on the nuances of Army branches, ranks, important jobs, etc., in part because the military jealously guards its prerogatives to decide these matters.\textsuperscript{43} Internally, since Vietnam, the Army has used a centralized promotion board, held for each rank at least annually in Alexandria, Virginia, making this one of the most centralized systems in the institutional Army. As such, if the Army can change itself as the result of learning or adapting to a new strategic environment—as opposed to being required to change by civilians, new technology, or as the result of budgetary decisions—\textit{ceteris paribus} this should be one of the easiest cases for change.

As Table 1.1 predicts, however, the obstacles against developing consensus among needed changes for the personnel system are predicted to be very high. The Army personnel system is highly centralized, with all initiatives led by the CSA, his deputy for personnel issues (G-1), and the G-1’s subordinate Human Resource Command, all based in the greater Washington, D.C. area. In addition, there is a fierce degree of interest among officers of all ranks of any prospective changes, due to the personal and professional implications for each officer. I do not expect to see much inter-service competition in this area, as there are statistically insignificant numbers of officers who switch between services and Congressional requirements to maintain parity among each

\textsuperscript{43} Scholars since Samuel Huntington (1957) have made this case, especially with the military’s preference for objective control.
service’s officer personnel systems. As a result, I expect most changes in this system to originate from the Army, although creating internal consensus for major changes should be very difficult. These changes are likely to be incremental unless leaders can reach a high degree of consensus on type and direction of change. Civilian involvement causing change is possible, but most likely it will only be periodic. With much less expected external prodding, this system therefore seems the most likely to stagnant or make much more limited changes regardless of the need.

As the Army’s cornerstone for war preparations and major officer evaluation events during peacetime, I expect the combat training centers (CTCs) to be the easiest case for the Army to change itself. I analyze the primary three training installations, including the Army’s premier training center, the National Training Center (NTC) at Fort Irwin, California, and the other major maneuver training centers at Fort Polk, Louisiana (Joint Readiness Training Center, or JRTC), and Hohenfels, Germany (Joint Multinational Readiness Center, or JMRC, formerly the Combined Maneuver Training Center, or CMTC). Civilians have relatively little knowledge of these installations, as there is no comparable civilian equivalent of these “dirt” combat centers. Among my cases, new technologies would have the greatest external expected causal effect in training. To change training, however, these changes would need to affect tactical (as opposed to strategic) operations, due to the type of training conducted. For instance, new missile defense technology would be much less likely to affect the CTCs than technology that counters improvised explosive devices. Budget changes could affect training,

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45 The Army’s fourth training center is the digital war-gaming efforts spearheaded by the Battle Command Training Program at Fort Leavenworth, Ks.
especially when coupled with an external or internal emphasis to make change, while the
defense industry could have some (albeit limited) effect on change occurring.

Internally, the CTCs should have fewer constraints to change, making change
more likely. They are more decentralized, even though the Army staff, the U.S. Army
Training and Doctrine Command, and the U.S. Army Combined Arms Center play
critical roles in deciding changes. There is no peer training installation for the other
services,46 while significant joint training occurs at the CTCs, so I do not expect inter-
service competition to cause change. The primary constraint derives from the Army’s
stakeholders, who prioritize the muddy-boots culture and high-intensity, maneuver
(vehicular) combat focus. Created in the wake of Vietnam to better prepare for the Soviet
threat, senior leaders’ performances at the CTCs often define their evaluation success and
professional reputation.47 With Army officers having the predominant say in who
receives prestigious assignments, success at the CTC—and thus the interest in what is
being tested—is very high throughout the Army. I would expect this to be a greater
constraint for change at the NTC, since it is the only center that focuses on medium-to-
high intensity conflict (“big war”) that the Army itself prioritizes.48 In sum, I would
expect the Army can make major changes itself to the CTCs, although I would expect
change to be incremental until there is general consensus on direction of change.

46 The U.S. Marine Corps conducts much of its training at Twenty-Nine Palms in southern
California; however, this is relatively a small training installation that primarily permits Marines to train on
foot or in light vehicles.

47 This distinction was made by Col. Toby Green, who served as an Observer/Controller at JMRC
in Germany from 2002-04. He said that even if an officer received the highest rating in his evaluation, if he
performed badly within the CTC this officer would be perceived as a less competent officer by his peers,
affecting his future potential for select assignments. Interview (2008).

48 The Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) at Fort Polk focuses on low-to-medium level
conflict, the Joint Multinational Readiness Center (JMRC, formerly the Combined Maneuver Training
Center, CMTC)) at Hohenfels focuses on low-to-high intensity, and the BCTPs focus on computer-based
training for commanders and staffs. CTC Overview website.
Technological advances and budgetary shifts will also affect change, if these shifts are dramatic, given the importance of both in this system.

Finally, for the education system, I expect similarities and differences with causes of change at USMA and USAWC. While only two parts of the Army’s military and civilian-based education, these educational institutions bookend the formal officer education system (OES), in addition to being the only OES schools (for officers below the rank of general) who admit students by competitive acceptance only. The civilian knowledge of both degree-granting institutions is relatively high, making this an expected cause of major change. Technology and budgetary influences have a lesser expected degree of influence, although they could cause change (especially the latter) since both institutions by law receive formal funding only from the government. I do not expect the defense industry impact to be significant.

I anticipate different causes for internally-driven changes at USMA and USAWC, although both are steeped in their own traditions and bureaucracies, making change for any reason less likely. I expect more internally-driven changes at USMA, in part due to its greater decentralization. USMA is one of three commissioning sources that prospective officers attend before joining the Army, while USAWC is the Army’s sole final, formal professional military education for senior officers. As a result, the Army and military leadership can expect more and a greater detail of requirements from the

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49 For an excellent analysis of changes at the mid-career OES, Command and General Staff College (CGSC) at Fort Leavenworth, Ks., see Davidson (2005).

50 The other two commissioning sources are the Reserve Officer Training Corps, which are programs integrated at civilian universities throughout the country, and the Officer Candidate School, which selects enlisted soldiers from within the Army to become officers.

51 Senior Army officers can also attend other services’ equivalent war college or one of the National Defense University schools; however, USAWC is the only one that focuses on Army processes, strategies, etc.
USAWC, and the Army also has a relatively higher interest in the education of its colonels than cadets. Therefore, I expect decision making to be more decentralized and thus easier for USMA than USAWC. I expect inter-service competition to play some role in changes at both institutions, since both attempt to attract very similar students as the other armed service schools. Finally, USMA and USAWC have relatively fewer stakeholders they must convince to be permitted to change, since their graduates—those most likely to vocalize their support for or opposition to change—comprise only a small proportion of the Army. Consequently, for USMA I expect the Army to lead its own change periodically, with some inter-service effect, while civilians will cause periodic but significant changes. For USAWC, I expect civilians to cause a greater proportion of significant changes, while still intervening periodically, and internal changes will be more incremental, with some inter-service role in this process.

It is also important to address areas within the Army on which I do not focus. I do not analyze changing combat tactics or even all institutional changes (such as doctrine, organizational structure, materiel, or facilities). I do not explore strategies within and between interventions, since increasingly most interventions are multi-service, or joint, which also vary by political strategies and goals, level of violence, strategic context, etc. Consequently, controlling for all but the Army causes of change would be problematic and less accurate.\footnote{Suggestions from a senior colonel during an interview in Baghdad, Summer 2006.} I do not create separate variables for executive versus legislative civilian oversight (executive), as done by Deborah Avant (1993). My case studies examine in detail these questions, although when testing arguments, I group all external agencies (to include the Joint Staff) as external, “civilian” causes of change. I expect the
Army to resist external requirements, regardless of their source. I also expect civilians to be limited more by the law and less knowledge to cause change, whereas the Joint Staff would be limited more by law and fewer imposed requirements as the result of less informed civilians. In later works, I intend to analyze other institutional Army processes, compare the Army to its sister services, and the Army to other U.S. Departments to determine the generalizability of my arguments. I would not, however, necessarily expect my argument to extend to matters involving multiple organizations or other levels (tactical, operational) within the organization.

1.3 Chapters Preview

The remainder of this dissertation is organized in five chapters. Chapter 2 provides the theoretical foundation for this dissertation, focusing on the main literature debates for why and how organizations, and specifically the Army, change. I begin with an overview from the organizational theory literature on how organizations learn and change, and then spend the majority of the chapter focusing on political science scholars’ application of these ideas. I discuss the main arguments in political science why the Army has changed, including my four external and three internal causes of change. I then discuss of the U.S. Army’s culture to contextualize my analysis, and I conclude the chapter with a description of how I operationalize the theoretical arguments.

Chapters 3, 4, and 5 are my Personnel, Training, and Education case studies, respectively. Each chapter follows a similar structure, beginning with a general discussion of the system and its importance to the Army. I then outline major strategic events, directives, or studies primarily occurring during the post-Cold War time period that had a significant effect on the case. While these are distinct cases, as discussed in
the previous section, there are overlapping and cumulative effects of events and requirements across the cases. As a result, once I discuss a strategic event in a chapter, I do not repeat the information in succeeding chapters but only mention additional, critical external stimuli. In each chapter, I then outline what changed to the respective system during that time period, followed by the chapter’s most crucial discussion of why and how the changes happened. I conclude each chapter with a section discussing why more changes did not occur and what I think should be done to promote greater innovation and change in that area.

Given its foundational importance to Army officers and future prospects for change, I begin the case studies by examining the Officer Personnel Management Systems (OPMS). I first provide a basic overview of the rank structure and expected promotion timelines for this organization, whose leaders only come from within its own ranks. I then discuss four categories of events having fundamental effects on the personnel system, including the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 (the primary event outside my time period); the collapse of the Soviet threat in 1991 and massive Army downsizing (1991-96); the main Army interventions throughout the 1990s (1991 Gulf War, Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo); and Transformation, September 11th, and the Global War on Terrorism. Next, I briefly describe all OPMS systems existing since Vietnam: OPMS I (1974), OPMS II (1985), OPMS XXI (1997), and OPMS (2006). I then explain why the two post-Cold War changes in 1997 and 2006 happened, and more importantly, why they took so long despite the massive strategic changes occurring simultaneously. I then explore one specific part of OPMS, the Officer Evaluation Report (OER), and analyze its one important change throughout this time, despite the fact most
officers strongly dislike the OER. Finally, I argue why more changes have not occurred to OPMS and the OER, and what can and should be done.

I then turn to the Army’s foundation—training—to determine why and how changes have occurred since the end of the Cold War. Chapter 4 begins with an overview of the Army’s three primary combat training centers (CTCs) in California, Louisiana, and Germany. I then briefly address the internally-driven Army Training and Leader Development Panel’s (ATLDP) Officer Study Report, focusing in this chapter just on training, and the events in Iraq and Afghanistan between 2003-07. Next, I discuss the changes that occurred to the CTCs during this time period. Although the CTCs are constantly evolving, I specifically discuss one major change and four important changes in the training system since the end of the Cold War. The major change occurred at all three CTCs in 2005, as they fully incorporated counterinsurgency and stability operations within their primary evaluated missions. The four important changes were the addition of limited stability operations (such as nation building tasks) in 1993 and 1995 at the JMRC in Germany and the JRTC in Louisiana, respectively; the CTCs updating their Opposition Forces and technology in 2000; and the JMRC in Germany formally adding multi-national training within its mission (and name) in 2005. As with the personnel chapter, I then focus on why these changes happened in magnitude and timing, while others did not, and conclude with recommended changes to the training system.

My final case study chapter, officer education, examines why and how changes have occurred at USMA and USAWC. I begin with a discussion of the Army’s officer professional military education, of which these two schools are fundamental parts. I then briefly discuss four additional topics affecting these educational institutions: Middle
States Commission on Higher Education (MSCHE) accreditation, National Defense Authorization Acts (NDAA) of 1993 and 2005, and the leader development aspect of the 2001 ATLDPane. Next, I turn to USMA, providing a brief overview of its academic program, its two major and one important change in the post-Cold War period, and an analysis why and how these occurred. The USMA changes included increasing the civilian professor composition from five to twenty-one percent, beginning in 1993; adjusting its required core engineering sequence and adding a second required information technology course in 2001; and prioritizing language and culture immersion opportunities for all cadets in 2006. Then, I provide the same analysis for the War College, with its one major and three important events since the end of the Cold War. These events are the restructured curriculum in 1993 to provide much greater time for electives; its increase in civilian professors from 1995-2001; its decision in 1996 to apply for academic accreditation; and its fundamental overhaul of its core curriculum, regional studies program, and faculty and student composition in 2005. I conclude with suggestions for change across both institutions and also specific to each.

My conclusion synthesizes the changes across the cases, discussing the six most important and cross-cutting findings. First, civilians are not fixing the military, even when problems arose. Second, for the Army to voluntarily make major changes, the senior leader needed to prioritize and lead this change, while there also needed to be consensus across the system’s stakeholders for the change. Even though the Army is a hierarchical organization, no military leader—military maverick or otherwise—was able make changes that did not resonate with others at least throughout that system. Third, despite the oft-repeated claim, there was overwhelming evidence that the Army changed
itself without suffering defeat. Fourth, evidence was less supportive of the institutional Army’s willingness to incorporate experiential lessons that countered its culture. Fifth, major changes often occurred outside of bureaucratic constraints, in part because these changes to the formal system are so difficult to make. Finally, there were real limits to the changes the Army could voluntarily make. I conclude with an analysis across the cases why more changes did not occur, and provide categories of suggestions for the Army to change to better meet its future challenges. These four include first, create peacetime institutional incentives to innovate; second, adjust the prerequisites for general officers; third, prioritize quality versus quantity of mid-career officers by realigning promotion ceilings with Congressional goals and increasing the lateral commissions for mid-career officers; and fourth, fiercely protect the Army’s “personnel R&D budget,” or graduate school opportunities, for mid-career officers.

These are challenging times for the U.S. and its Army. With current political analysis suggesting the U.S. is in an era of persistent conflict, it seems unlikely that the Army will be given time to analyze, learn, and apply its lessons in peacetime in the near future. This is not a dissertation about failure, however, as evidence has shown that the Army is capable of at least some change as the result of learning and adapting to a new environment. There are Army leaders in critical positions who are setting the climate for major changes, while generations of younger officers are pressing for change based on their repeated deployments since the Balkans. Unfortunately, organizational impediments and parochial protections still exist, while civilian knowledge and intervention within these three processes has remained sporadic and less focused. By providing a more attenuated theoretical and substantive analysis of why and how the
Army changes and does not, this work aims to help better institutionalize initiatives—even after active war—in order to make everyone’s future a more stable and peaceful one.
2.1 Introduction

In this chapter, I provide in four subsequent sections the conceptual and theoretical foundation to help answer the questions of why and how the institutional U.S. Army has changed since the end of the Cold War. I begin by examining the literature on organizational theory, discussing explanations and prescriptions about how any organization can change. The five main components these scholars highlight are the organization’s behavior or culture, its design or structure, the environment in which it must compete and the strategic tasks it must accomplish to survive, its leader and top team, and the people within the organization, which includes how they are recruited and promoted. I finish this section with ways that organizational theorists and political scientists have identified how the Army changes.

Next, and most critical to my research, I outline the main political science arguments that help explain why the Army as an organization changes, which include four external and five internal causes of change. The expected external causes include civilians requiring the Army to change, new technology, budgetary impacts, and input from defense industries. Internally, the five reasons are experiential learning, procedural learning, a new strategic environment, inter- and intra-service competition, and the organizational culture. I then describe some of the relevant cultural attributes of the U.S. Army as an organization, both to present a general context of this research and also to
preview an important component of why and how change is possible. I conclude by discussing how I operationalize the arguments within this research.

2.2 Theoretical Arguments on How Organizations Change

By their nature, organizations resist change. The way they are designed and managed, how they define their employees’ jobs, and in particular how people have been taught to think and interact—not only within organizations but also more broadly—create individual and organizational learning disabilities. Often, the harder organizations try to learn, the worse results they get.53 As one of the original scholars studying organizations, Max Weber claimed that by their nature, bureaucracies demanded routines, repetition, and orderly action.54 Others, such as Barry Posen (1984), Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow (1999), and James Q. Wilson (2000) argued by their nature bureaucracies were not supposed to innovate, since they were designed to help create stability, predictability, and certainty.55 Many accept that organizations voluntarily evolve gradually, but usually these changes enhance the organization’s perceived core functions, while external or new leaders to the organization are usually credited with forcing the organization to implement major, or fundamental, changes.

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54 As just one example, Weber argued that like patriarchalism (even though antagonistic in many ways), bureaucracies are permanent structures designed to handle “ongoing, routine demands.” Bureaucracies specifically encompass a “system of rational rules, oriented toward the satisfaction of calculable needs with ordinary, everyday means.” Max Weber, *Economy and Society* (Berkeley: University of California Press), 1978, p. 1111.

Organizational scholars have identified five important factors that help shape any organization’s behavior.\(^{56}\) These factors, shown in Figure 2.1, are 1) the organizational behavior or culture; 2) the organizational design or structure; 3) the environment in which the organization must compete and needed strategic tasks it must accomplish to survive; 4) the organization’s leader and top team; and 5) the people within the organization, which includes how they are recruited and promoted. I discuss these five factors in turn, and I conclude this section with expected ways how the Army as an organization would change.

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\(^{56}\) These components are identified in Michael Beer, “Lead Organizational Change by Creating Dissatisfaction and Realigning the Organization with New Competitive Realities,” in Edwin Locke (ed), *Handbook of Principles of Organizational Behavior* (Malden, Ma.: Blackwell Publishing Ltd.), 2004, Ch. 26, pp. 370-86. The other authors within Locke’s *Handbook of Principles of Organizational Behavior* use these factors to structure their own arguments.
2.2.1 Factors Shaping an Organization’s Behavior

First, the organizational culture has a tremendous effect on how the organization behaves. Every organization has a culture, which Wilson (2000) describes as “a persistent, patterned way of thinking about the central tasks of and human relationships within an organization.” Michael Beer (2004) adds that culture is the assumptions, beliefs, and behaviors that leaders teach to new members as the appropriate way to perceive, think, and act in order to solve problems. Like human culture in general, organizational cultures get passed onto succeeding generations, and they change slowly, if at all. A culture is to an organization what a personality is to an individual, and understanding an organization’s culture can help explain why different organizations facing the same stimuli can react in very different ways.

Organizations will typically resist tasks that seem to threaten their core culture. There are advantages of having a clear sense of mission, including to help focus training, equipment, emphasis, and allocation of resources. There are also distinct drawbacks as well, as tasks that an organization does not define as central, even if they are in reality critical, are often performed poorly or without sufficient resources. Subordinate cultures can develop around peripheral tasks, although opportunities for promotion within these paths may be so restrictive that people avoid these assignments.

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57 Wilson, p. 91.
58 Beer, pp. 372-3.
59 Wilson, p. 93.
60 Wilson, p. 93; and Allison and Zelikow, pp 153-58.
61 Wilson, p. 107.
62 Wilson, p. 110.
missions can also blind the organization to a changed strategic environment, causing the organization to behave not as the circumstances demand but as the culture expects.63

The importance of a specific organizational ethos is clearest as its strength begins to erode. This can happen as new groups or younger generations with different occupational or professional cultures start competing consciously or unconsciously with the existing culture, or when decisions of new leaders accidentally or purposefully attempt to destroy or change the old sense of mission. Not only will the organization be less likely to learn and adapt, as the cultural disparities result in individuals and groups interpreting reality differently, but the organization’s overall productivity and effectiveness will likely suffer.

While culture plays a critical role in shaping an organization’s behavior, there is a real danger with placing too much emphasis on just this factor. Wilson (2000) argues that focusing on culture and people alone can analytically distort the truth for two reasons. First, employees are the products not only of their biology, family, and education, but also their organizational position helps shape their perspective and skills. Second, what people are capable of accomplishing depends on their authority and access to resources. As a result, he strongly advocates that changing the organization’s structure provides better leverage than the culture for those trying to make organizational change.64 Peter Senge (1990) also highlights the importance of an organization’s structure, since it subtly determines how people make decisions and relate with others over time, even without them realizing this.65

63 Wilson, p. 110.
64 Wilson, p. 24.
65 Senge, pp. 40, 44.
The structure of an organization, which is the second factor affecting an organization’s behavior, can have a critical effect on an organization’s ability to effectively learn from its experiences and execute its chosen strategy. Lex Donaldson (2004) conceptualizes organizational structures along a linear continuum, with the one extreme being highly mechanistic and hierarchical, and the other being highly organic and decentralized. A mechanistic structure is more effective if the organization primarily completes tasks of medium uncertainty, if its members agree on who will complete which tasks and when, and if there are established rules and standard operating procedures (SOPs) covering what should occur in each specified situation. An organic structure is more effective if the organization must complete tasks of high uncertainty and if innovation is valued and required for continued success. Unlike in a hierarchical structure, in an organic structure the decision making is made throughout the organization and not just centrally. Because information is diffused throughout the organization, interdependence among departments is needed in an organic structure.66

The third factor that affects an organization’s behavior is the environment in which it operates and the strategic tasks that the organization believes it must complete in order to succeed and/or survive (government organizations will usually still survive even if they are not successful, although businesses must succeed in order to survive). Posen (1984) identifies the environment as one of the three causal factors for why organizations act as they do, with “purpose” (strategic tasks) and “people” as his other factors.67 He claims that the environment is critical, since it creates the justification for the

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67 Posen, pp. 43-44.
organization’s existence, supplies the needed workers and material, and sells or trades the organization’s product or services in exchange for more resources.

The environment also creates significant uncertainty, which increases the costs for coordination, control, and rationality. To better manage internal uncertainty, organizations (especially mechanistic ones) create and use SOPs. To minimize environmental uncertainties, organizations try to decrease their dependence on externally-supplied resources, including creating their own stockpiles, hoarding information, and developing internally-sustaining capabilities. Military organizations often seek autonomy from their civilian leadership, and there are many historical examples of the military preferring autonomy and decreased budgets to greater oversight and more resources.68

Wilson (2000) argues that all else being equal, organizations prefer bigger budgets over smaller ones. However, he emphasizes that simplicity and consistency of new tasks, and especially autonomy, are frequently higher organizational priorities.69 Organizations also pursue alliances and form agreements with other organizations in order to preserve their roles, power, etc., such as the military services (Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marines) working together despite the rivalries among them.70

Wilson (2000) is one of the most vocal proponents of focusing on strategic, or what he calls “critical,” tasks when trying to understanding why organizations behave as they do. He says that “People matter, but organizations matter also, and [the critical] tasks matter most of all.”71 It is imperative that an organization can correctly identify

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68 Posen, p. 45.
69 Wilson, p. 182. Posen, pp. 45-46, 49-50, also argues the same point.
70 Posen, p. 46.
71 Wilson, p. 173.
these tasks, which fundamentally define the organization’s raison d’être. A correct evaluation of these fundamental duties allows the organization to respond to needed changes and ensure that the organization has the correct structure to effectively and efficiently complete these tasks. This is not an automatic, easy, or static process, as it requires constant coordination, planning, and supervision if the tasks have any chance of remaining accurate. As a result, changes that are consistent with existing task definitions are typically accepted, while those requiring tasks to be redefined are often resisted.\footnote{Wilson, p. 222.}

How accurately an organization defines its strategic tasks will also have an effect on how well it can function and learn when placed in new environments, as required due to changing technologies, new initiatives, or when working or competing in different geographical regions. For instance, Wilson (2000) argues that the critical tasks of defending Western Europe against a Soviet armored attack could not work when applied to the jungle warfare needed in Vietnam, although the majority of the Army units that deployed to Vietnam were organized and trained to counter the Soviets. Even with resulting quagmire that ensued, the Army still remained strategically focused on the Soviet threat, thus limiting the organizational learning and change that was possible despite the tremendous experiential lessons available.\footnote{Wilson, p. 44.}

The fourth factor that helps to determine an organization’s behavior is the organization’s leader and top management team. Beer (2004) argues that for organizational change to occur, senior leaders must define the organization’s new strategic direction and then develop the needed institutional behaviors. The leadership’s efforts must include creating employee dissatisfaction with the status quo and then
leading a process that realigns the entire organization with the new environmental realities. Leading change is the responsibility of unit leaders at every level, but major change requires the senior leadership to lead change within the top management while also encouraging leaders in each of the sub-units to lead their own process of change. Change can start anywhere within an organization, either naturally or as peripheral changes. It will be slow to spread, however, unless the top management actively advances the initiatives, creates a context that encourages change across and within sub-units, and promotes the managers who inspired the innovations.

For major changes to happen, there must also be a sense of urgency among the top leaders that the status quo must change for the organization to succeed or survive. “Change leaders,” as labeled by Beer (2004), possess the capabilities to confront difficult issues needed for organizational change. Successful, new leaders typically develop a top management team that is like minded about the need for and direction of change, which can then facilitate consistent action across all parts of the organization. Lower-level leaders will then believe the change will sustain—a process parallel to Thomas Kuhn’s paradigmatic shift in normal science—at which time individuals and the organizational culture can more likely incorporate the change.

Many efforts to change an organization, and its culture specifically, do not succeed, since the underlying assumptions and beliefs are not confronted during the

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74 Beer, p. 370.
75 Beer, p. 381.
76 Beer, pp. 383, 385.
77 Beer, p. 375.
79 Beer, p. 375.
process. Change efforts are often characterized by wave after wave of initiatives, including required training and educational programs for all employees, continuous adjustments to the organization’s structure, total quality management initiatives, and new mission or values statements. Most efforts fail to produce real change, especially when promoting the change is delegated to assistants or consultants. Beer (2004) emphasized the pivotal role of leadership in developing a commitment to learning and change, including the unavoidable requirement to replace people who cannot or will not change and are preventing change from occurring.\(^{80}\)

Organizations resist change, but it is important to remember that an organization learns only when its individuals learn.\(^{81}\) As Ilene Hochberg discussed in *Who Stole My Cheese*\(^{82}\) and Senge (1990) succinctly posited, “People don’t resist change. They resist being changed.”\(^{83}\) Although individual learning is not a sufficient cause for organizational learning, it is a necessary condition. Learning in this context does not necessarily mean acquiring more information, but instead expanding the ability to produce the results that one wants.\(^{84}\) This includes change among both the senior leadership, described previously, and also the people within the organization, which is the final factor shaping an organization’s behavior.

The people in an organization are the fifth and final factor that must be considered when explaining organization’s behavior. Wilson (2000) emphasizes that an organization

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\(^{80}\) Beer, p. 375.


\(^{83}\) Senge, p. 155.

\(^{84}\) Senge, p. 142.
is more than a sum of its parts, as the ethos and group dynamics can both complement and contradict what top management, the environment, the structure, and the primary culture support. Citing an army at war, Wilson argues that “the rationally, self-interested behavior for soldiers facing the prospect of imminent death or injury is to break and run,” yet peer expectations and the organizational ethos typically prevents this from happening.\(^\text{85}\)

Individuals resist change for several reasons, including for psychological and status rationales. Unconsciously, people resist change because they rely on what Senge (1990) calls “mental models,” which are simplification devices that all people use to help more quickly make sense of incoming information. These are deeply held images of how people think the world works, and they are extremely powerful in affecting what people do because they help determine what people see.\(^\text{86}\) Senge argues that the difficulties are not that people use mental models or even whether they are correct; rather, problems arise when people do not realize they are using them, reality changes, and people do not update their mental model. When this happens, it can cause individuals increasingly to act in counterproductive ways, including preventing needed learning and changing as the result of experiences.\(^\text{87}\) Chris Argyris (1999) describes this phenomenon as “skilled incompetence,” which he argued most adults develop in order to protect themselves from threat, embarrassment, or pain that learning situations present. Consequently, they fail to learn how to produce the results they really want.\(^\text{88}\)

\(^{85}\) Wilson, p. 45.

\(^{86}\) Senge, p. 175.

\(^{87}\) Senge, pp. 176-77.

Even if individuals understand the new realities, they may also resist change for personal and professional status reasons. People often fear that new objectives and strategic tasks will demand new skills, power, competence, self-esteem, career, and sense of identity. This fear results in defensiveness and people’s inability to consider different alternatives or discover what must be changed.\textsuperscript{89} Beer (2004) argued that it takes enormous amounts of human energy to confront entrenched assumptions and practices, even if everyone recognizes and agrees there are severe problems.\textsuperscript{90} In the end, all attempts to change organizations must overcome the defensiveness of individuals or groups, or replace those unwilling or unable to learn and change. However, effective change will maximize the amount of learning and minimize the need for replacement, in order to retain as much knowledge and experience as possible.\textsuperscript{91}

2.2.2 How the Army Changes

Organizational theory provides important insights for how the U.S. Army changes, which political scientists have also incorporated within their own literature. A primary way in which civilians require change is through informal or formal laws or directives. Civilians and military “mavericks” can work together to jointly cause changes that the civilians want. Internally, change can also happen through innovative senior leaders, consensus among leaders, or a new generation of leaders. I discuss these five methods in turn.

First, the Army can be required to change when civilian leadership from the legislative or executive branches passes legislation or issues directives. While the Army

\textsuperscript{89} Beer, pp. 374, 384.
\textsuperscript{90} Beer, p. 375.
\textsuperscript{91} Beer, p. 374.
has significant abilities to delay or thwart externally-requested change, which will be discussed in the next section, once decisions are codified, resisting change is much more difficult. In addition to the annual National Defense Authorization Acts by which Congress (among other things) allocates resources to the Department of Defense (DoD), other notable legislation and directives that have helped shape the Army since the end of the Cold War include the 1980 Defense Officer Personnel Management Act (DOPMA), the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols DoD Reorganization Act, and the 2005 DoD Directive 3000.05, “Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations” (all discussed throughout the dissertation). Civilian leadership can also persuade or encourage the Army to change through informal directives or requests for information. Especially when used repeatedly, pointedly, or in response to a known problem, these informal proddings can be an effective method of demanding change. They allow the Army to choose a preferred way of adjusting, knowing that otherwise, an external actor may require its own—and likely to be perceived suboptimal—solution.

Second, scholars have argued that the Army can change when those who Posen (1984) calls “mavericks,” or those within the organization who ally with civilians, implement the civilians’ ideas. These individuals are able to inject civilians’ wishes while appearing more favorable to the military, since these are “internal” demands or

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95 Posen specifically used this term on p. 174, with respect to innovation within the British air defenses by Air Chief Marshall Sir Hugh Dowding’s alliance with civilian leaders in the Interwar Period. Subsequent scholars cite this term much more frequently than Posen, even though Posen more fully incorporated the concept’s intent within his research.
requests for change. Wilson (2000) claims that mavericks can also promote change more easily if they can convince others that the changes are only peripheral and will not threaten the Army’s main functions. He adds, however, that if these changes are in fact peripheral, they are also easily reversed.\(^{96}\)

There are theoretical and empirical problems with mavericks requiring change. Theoretically, this argument is underspecified, with Posen providing few details about these undercover agents for the civilians. Stephen Peter Rosen (1991) elaborates upon the concept by further defining mavericks as officers rejecting, and being rejected by, their peers and the system. He then asserts that these officers would thus not be in a position to implement organizational changes, since promotion and leadership jobs in most cases require at least some internal acceptance.\(^{97}\)

Drawing a clear distinction between Army elites and civilians is also troublesome, as Peter J. Roman and David W. Tarr (2001) identify an entire group of military officers assigned to interact with civilian policymakers. They argue that these “national security” (military) professionals in the State Department, National Security Council, White House, etc., work very well with their civilian counterparts and do not display evidence of a civil-military gap that many claim.\(^{98}\) In discussions with civilians from the most senior levels of DoD, the term “partnership” is frequently used, citing continuous give-and-take among civilian and military leaders.

\(^{96}\) Wilson, pp. 225-26.


Empirically, the question of who is a maverick would also be extremely difficult to discern, as it would almost be inconceivable for a senior military officer to admit such dealings even after retirement, while “obvious” cases are never that clear. For instance, Gen. Peter Schoomaker—the Army Chief of Staff (CSA) who was Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld’s (at least) third choice to take the job and was finally convinced in 2003 to take the position out of retirement—could be a candidate for designation as a maverick. Evidence does not at least uniformly support this classification, as Gen. Schoomaker has been lauded by others as being the personal initiator of real change post-9/11 that countered Secretary Rumsfeld’s priorities.\(^9^9\)

One of the clearest methods for how the Army changes, which stems from the organizational literature, is through the efforts of its senior leader. Former CSA Gen. Sullivan (1991-95) emphasized that for major changes to occur, the leader and his or her top management must spend significant time and effort to continuously communicate, clarify, and get others excited about the changes.\(^1^0^0\) While analyzing military innovations during the Interwar Period, Barry Watts and Williamson Murray (2001) consistently found that leaders had to develop a vision of the future. They also noted the good and ill long-term consequences that an organization endured after committing to any leader’s particular institutional vision.\(^1^0^1\) Several current and former Army general officers have


\(^1^0^1\) They specifically cited German General Hans von Seeckt’s vision he created during World War I of completing mobile warfare with a highly-professional, well-trained, and well-led Army, which he spent his six years as chief of the *Triuppenamt* (successor to the imperial general staff) and the command of the postwar German Army (1920-26) imposing. Barry Watts and Williamson Murray, “Military Innovation in Peacetime,” in Williamson Murray and Allan R. Millett (eds), *Military Innovation in the Interwar Period* (New York: Cambridge University Press), 1996, pp. 406-7.
also stressed that for a major change to occur, this change must be one of the CSA’s top three-to-four priorities that he solidifies during his first year in office, if the change has the potential to occur.102

Not only are the senior leaders important for change, but Rosen (1991) argues that it is critical for the most senior leaders to provide opportunities for, and create a promotion system that allows, innovative leaders from a younger generation to continue advancing to the highest ranks.103 Chaim Kaufmann (1992) argued that Rosen in fact understated the importance of this idea, since “One of the most important motivations for military resistance to innovations is that they create requirements for new professional skills and devalue the skills of officers trained in the old doctrine, damaging their prospects for promotion.”104 Watts and Murray (2001) and Michael McNerney (2005) concurred, stating that recruiting and promoting bright junior officers who possess organizational and developmental skills were necessary for military innovation to occur.105 Wilson (2000) added that while these recommendations to create pathways for innovative leaders did not provide a simple theory of innovation, “they have the advantage of being true.”106

The second way in which the Army is able to change itself is by creating consensus for change among the senior leaders with a vested interest in the change. This argument directly challenges Posen’s (1984) claim that military mavericks can

103 Rosen, pp. 20-21.
106 Wilson, p. 221.
subversively implement civilians’ wishes against the will of those in uniform. Watts and Murray (2001) identified “the unavoidable necessity of bureaucratic acceptance” for militaries to innovate during peacetime, arguing that even the most visionary leaders have little chance of forcing the institution to adopt major changes without the bureaucracy’s acceptance or grudging cooperation.\textsuperscript{107} Former CSA Gen. Sullivan also agreed that consensus was important. In his book 1996 book, \textit{Hope is Not a Method}, the first myth he disputed was that “In the military, getting results is as easy as giving orders.”\textsuperscript{108} He argued that just as in any organization, despite the Army’s hierarchy, the senior leaders had to work with their subordinates if they wanted to lead change.\textsuperscript{109}

The third method by which scholars argue that the Army can change itself is through generational change, or what Jack Levy (1994) calls “turnover.”\textsuperscript{110} Robert Jervis (1976) articulates its main premise, which is that people’s shared experiences, and their interpretations of these experiences, at critical phases of their development have an influential and lasting effect on their beliefs.\textsuperscript{111} As a result, different generations learn different lessons, and a new generation of leaders can change the organization collectively.

\begin{itemize}
\item They argued that a corollary of this bureaucratic acceptance was that “the potential for civilian or outside leadership to impose a new vision of future war on a reluctant military service whose heart remains committed to existing ways of fighting is, at best, limited.” Watts and Murray, pp. 409-10.
\item He was specifically discussing the difference between leaders of civilian versus military organizations requiring change. Sullivan and Harper, p. xviii.
\item Sullivan and Harper, p. xviii.
\item Some scholars disagree whether generation change and learning should be clustered into one reason that organizations change their policies. For instance, Matthew Evangelista (1991) argues that generation change and learning are distinct models of (foreign) policy change, since the timing of the change can be a critical distinction between these two. Jack Levy (1994), disagrees, arguing that distinguishing these two concepts is useful only if one is concerned with identifying learning that is temporarily proximate to the behavior change. Matthew Evangelista, “Sources of Moderation in Soviet Security Policy,” in Philip E. Tetlock, Jo L. Husbands, and Robert Jervis (eds), \textit{Behavior, Society, and Nuclear War} (New York: Oxford University Press), 1991, pp. 321-23; Levy, pp. 303-4.
\item Jervis, pp. 253-57.
\end{itemize}
Scholars discuss turnover in different manners, including through the role of analogies and with respect to specific events. Yuen Foong Khong (1992) asserted that generational analogies are a critical source from where leaders derive historical lessons to help guide change. While generational and personal analogies can complement or contradict each other, the effects of historical lessons, with reinforcing generational and personal effects, can be extremely difficult to counter and will likely shape what leaders prioritize once serving as the top management.112 Leslie H. Gelb with Richard K. Betts (1979) also discussed the effect of the domino theory on two generations of civilian and military leaders.113 Finally, Leonard Wong (2000, 2002, 2004) discussed difficulties the Army experiences today due to generational disparities and different lessons learned among its leaders (Baby Boomers versus Generation X versus the Millennial Generation114). Wong argued that these difficulties stemmed in part from the generations’ dissimilar experiences, as the senior leaders matured with predictable, top-down guidance provided during within the Cold War. However, junior lieutenants and captains are now required to thrive on unpredictability and minimal-to-no guidance. Generational difficulties also arise from their different perspectives from personal, familial, political, and economic events from their formative years.115


115 While not overly optimistic that the Army can incorporate these generational lessons, Wong writes explicitly to bring attention to these issues with the intent of helping prompt this change.
2.3 Theoretical Arguments on Why the Army Changes

Political science scholars have long discussed ways that militaries change, with Thucydides highlighting Athenian and Spartan innovations throughout *The Peloponnesian War*, including a rudimentary flame-thrower the Boetians used to defeat Athens in a battle in 424 B.C.\(^{116}\) While political science scholars continued this analysis, in 1984 Barry Posen’s *The Sources of Military Doctrine* placed the existing historical narratives into a social science study of why and how military organizations innovate. Scholars such as Adam Grissom (2006) credit Posen for pioneering the emergence of a new military innovation studies field, with most scholars discussed in this dissertation specifically referring to Posen’s work.

My research builds upon this literature, testing different causes why the U.S. Army has changed since the end of the Cold War. In this section, I first present existing reasons why the Army would not change. I then discuss four externally-imposed and five internally-driven reasons why the Army could change. The external causes of change are civilians requiring change, new technology, budgetary impacts, and input from defense industries. The internal causes of change I discuss are experiential learning, procedural learning, a new strategic environment, inter- and intra-service competition, and the organizational culture. I conclude with reasons that some scholars argue organizational change is too unpredictable to generalize, along with a table summarizing the main theoretical arguments.

While presented as distinct causes for conceptual clarity, it is important to note that there is overlap and complementary reasons why changes occur. For instance, the

organizational culture will help determine whether or not the Army is likely to change for any internal reason. Technological innovations may occur, but unless civilians know about and understand how to apply them or the Army thinks they will help counter future threats, these innovations may not cause any changes. Throughout the case studies, I evaluate the relative impact of the various changes to capture this overlap, with no change resulting from just one cause.

2.3.1 The Army’s Organizational Resistance to Change

For decades, scholars focusing on the Army as an organization have overwhelmingly argued that the Army will not change without civilian intervention, especially during what Clausewitz dubbed the “fog of war.” Internal competition, group think, the desire to reduce uncertainty, and decisions by Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) perpetuate its bureaucratic culture of stagnation, which is very difficult or impossible to change. Many scholars accept that organizations can learn and change slowly, but the strictures of organizational behavior persist. Civilian leadership, from either the executive or legislative branches, is usually credited with imposing the most important changes.


\footnote{Allison and Zelikow, p. 171.}

\footnote{I do not theoretically distinguish between types of civilian oversight (executive versus legislative), as done by Deborah Avant, “The Institutional Sources of Military Doctrine: Hegemons in Peripheral Wars,” \textit{International Studies Quarterly}, Vol. 37, No. 4, Dec. 1993, pp. 409-430. Instead, I theoretically expect the uniformed members of the Army to resist both. My case studies examine in detail these questions, although when generalizing here I group all external agencies (to include the Joint Staff) as external, “civilian” causes of change. I expect civilians to be limited more by the law and less knowledge
The Army has long been considered one of the most intractable bureaucracies, with a British colonel concluding in 1839, “In no profession is the dread of innovation so great as in the army.”120 In addition to its extensive payroll and rigid hierarchy, most officers enter immediately after college, learning from an early age the cultural values of consistency and hesitancy to challenge the status quo. By only promoting from within its own ranks, the organization can ensure its leaders are experienced and knowledgeable of the Army’s critical tasks. However, this also limits the opportunity available to other organizations for drastically different ideas to surface from within. There is Congressional oversight in promotions and command selections, although this is focused only at the most senior levels, and only after Army leaders have already refined the field to those who fit the organizationally approved definition of success.

Learning and change can occur incrementally over time, although both are influenced by existing organizational capabilities. The SOPs that allow the Army to deal with ambiguous, dynamic contingencies while remaining a large, unwieldy bureaucracy, also constrain the organization’s ability to adjust to new circumstances. For instance, Allison and Zelikow (1999) demonstrated with respect to the Soviets’ arrangement of nuclear weapons in Cuba in 1961 that militaries attempt to avoid uncertainty and overcome complex situations efficiently by relying on existing programs and SOPs, even when the environment or situation logically dictates otherwise.121 Wilson (2000) argued that militaries can change at the tactical level during war, since this level of the

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121 Allison and Zelikow, Chapters 3-4.
organization sees the disconnection between doctrine and SOPs with the missions they face. However, few operational, strategic (divisional or higher units), or institutional changes happen as a result, since the more senior leaders are far from the scene of battle and do not experience the same intensity for change.\textsuperscript{122}

The institutional structure of the Army has other constraining factors on its ability to change. Because of the complexity of warfare, the Army has become very reliant on process to help manage uncertainty. Relying on established processes can optimize the current systems, although this hierarchical, mechanistic structure also works against innovations, as expected by Donaldson (2004). For instance, the Army’s “Planning, Programming, Budgeting, Execution System” works well to allocate the Army’s resources, but it also is unresponsive to new ideas or emergent needs. While the military has more planners than the State Department has foreign service officers,\textsuperscript{123} the military rarely deals with issues other than those in the short-term.\textsuperscript{124} In addition, its hierarchy and SOPs place limits on the military’s ability to make drastic changes to the status quo.

The military is also very adept at purposefully avoiding change it does not want to implement. Michael Desch (1999) analyzed the U.S. civil-military relations since the end of World War (WW) II, arguing that the military imbalance of power on both social and operational issues since the end of the Cold War was troublesome. Whether through shirking, making token concessions, or allying with powerful members of Congress, the military was in danger of becoming a less-than model example of stable civilian

\textsuperscript{122} Wilson, p. 164 argued this point with respect to Vietnam, although there are very clear examples of this today as well.

\textsuperscript{123} A statement I frequently heard at the State Department in summer 2007 to explain one disparity in the resources available for the two organizations to plan for contingencies.

\textsuperscript{124} March and Simon, p. 185.
control. Richard Kohn (2002) also argued that since military policy in the 1990s was so stagnant, Congress tried at least four different times with legislation to force the Pentagon to re-evaluate its national security policy, strategy, and force structure. At the time of his writing, however, there had been no significant change as a result.

There are at least three ways the Army is able to thwart the attempts at change. First, it delays making the change by citing bureaucratic hurdles, competing demands, insufficient funding, etc. This is a similar method that James Scott (1985) described in *Weapons of the Weak*, in which peasants passively resist the bourgeoisie in order to get their way without having to openly counter them. Second, with fewer veterans serving in Congress and the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the military is able to cite technical, tactical, and operational reasons against incorporating the change, which fewer civilian leaders are confident enough to overrule. Finally, the Army benefits from strong supporters in various parts of Congress. With the Constitution distributing oversight of the military to both the executive and legislative branches, in some cases the Army can and does play the two branches of government against each other to get the decision—or least one much closer—that it desires.

While retarding change can be detrimental to innovation, the fact that changes take effect gradually in this mammoth organization can be extremely helpful. Due to the interlocking institutional systems—the Army’s doctrine, organizational structure, training, materiel, leader development and education, personnel, and facilities—many

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second- and third-order effects often cannot be predicted. As one example, since shortly after the U.S. Civil War, the top mid-grade officers were selected to attend the U.S. Army’s Command and General Staff College (CGSC) at Ft. Leavenworth, Ks., to educate and better prepare these officers for leadership and staff positions at the Army’s more senior levels. This was a critical selection, since the half of the cohort not selected would be effectively ineligible for premier assignments throughout the remainder of his or her career. As the result of the 2001 Army Training and Leader Development Panels (ATLDP), in 2005 the Army began requiring all majors to attend the course, arguing that all officers needed this educational opportunity. While delinking education from promotions had real merits, by 2007 the Army was still struggling to deal with the unintended consequences, only magnified by the frequent deployments of all officers. By taking several years to implement, officers responsible for personnel and education opportunities had greater time to adjust and minimize career-debilitating consequences for entire year groups.

2.3.2 External Cause 1: Civilians Requiring Change

While the Army has many ways of thwarting change, even a cursory scan of its history shows that it is not a stagnant organization. To help explain why these changes


129 The Commanding General of the Army, William T. Sherman, originally established this school in 1881, called the “School for Infantry and Cavalry,” after officers for years argued the Army needed an institution to improve the “poor state of professional training in the officer corps.” The school’s history and annual reports from 1882-1936 can be found at website (in works cited).


131 Just two of the consequences include that the traditional strict timeline for advancement could no longer be continued, as an enormous back-log of attendance occurred even after Leavenworth initiated two courses per year, and a captain’s success in company command (before making major) became the Army’s defacto discriminator for who was succeeding.
occurred, I discuss the theoretical reasons that scholars have made to explain the revolutionary and evolutionary changes within the Army. The most common scholarly argument why the Army as an organization changes is that civilians require change. These civilian leaders come from organizations within the executive or legislative branches, which both have Constitutional oversight and control of the military. These leaders, who prioritize strategic national security and political requirements rather than organizational predictability and stability, can make reactive or proactive demands that require the Army to change.

For instance, one of Posen’s (1984) central claims is that “Most propositions about military innovation are negative…(although) Civilian intervention can cause military innovation.” Wilson (2000) states that the military has made many important changes due to political demands, since “Outside forces—academic scientists, industrial engineers, civilian theorists, members of Congress, and presidential aides—all helped induce the military to embrace programs that initially seemed irrelevant to (or at odds with) their core tasks.” Finally, Allison and Zelikow (1999) say that while civilians may not have much success changing an organization’s goals or SOPs, “many important issues of governmental action require that these [civilians] leaders decide” what the organization does.

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132 While the Department of Defense (DoD) has over 650,000 civilians employees, for this research only those 1,500 employees with the most senior Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) are considered civilian leaders within DoD who are capable of requiring change. U.S. Department of Defense Personnel & Procurement Statistics, “Civilian Employment Statistics,” Apr. 2008. Other expected executive (civilian) agencies requiring change would be within the White House and National Security Council.

133 Posen, p. 59.

134 Wilson, p. 225

135 Allison and Zelikow, p. 174.
While scholars in this literature generally assume that civilian decisions on important changes improve the organization, this is not always so. For example, then CSA Gen. Eric Shinseki testified before Congress in February 2003 that the Army would need 300,000 to 400,000 soldiers to prevent disorder in Iraq after toppling Saddam Hussein, based on his experiences in the Balkans and analyses completed by the U.S. Army War College.\textsuperscript{136} Former Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld disagreed,\textsuperscript{137} and just over 200,000 soldiers entered Iraq the following month. Many blame the massive looting and disorder that quickly followed the invasion on the lack of sufficient forces, who proved incapable of preventing the chaos that ended spiraling into an insurgency. Additionally, many of Secretary Rumsfeld’s efforts to transform the Army into a more agile, quickly deployable force had to be scaled back as the mobile (and lightly armored) vehicles provided little protection against improvised explosive devices and other insurgent tactics in Iraq.\textsuperscript{138}

2.3.3 External Cause 2: Technological Improvements

A second external source of change comes from new technology, which prompts militaries to innovate to remain competitive globally. Rosen (1991) classifies this as one of only three sources of innovation, with the other two—peacetime and wartime innovation—analyzing social (rather than technical) changes in the way that people


\textsuperscript{137} James Fallows of the Atlantic Monthly argued in a PBS interview that Rumsfeld disagreed for three reasons: “Number one, this had worked in Afghanistan. A very different kind of battlefield, but [that] kind of innovative special forces-intensive approach had won with low U.S. [troop] levels in Afghanistan. Second, it was part of his overall philosophy for a streamlined Pentagon. Third, it was a sense that the Army was just too much like the Gen. George McClellan army in the Civil War—too cautious, too ponderous, too unwilling to take risks.” Fallows, 2004.

Williamson Murray and Allan Millett (1996) analyze three factors—technological, operational, and organizational—that helped give rise to fundamental changes in how wars were fought during the Interwar Period. They argue that “the fusion of technology and potent management skills that mobilize mass organizations make military change inevitable.” Chris Demchak (2003) argues that uncertainties in three factors—technology, security, and political-economy—are what cause organizations, when viewed as rational actors, to change. Terry Pierce (2004) also analyzes how both old and new technologies, primarily within naval organizations, have been integrated into the overall framework of change in the manner that wars are conducted.

There are various methods by which technology can cause the military to change. Scholars such as Martin van Crevald (1989) argue there is a “technology push” for organizational change. Rather than the military demanding technology to implement its doctrine, Crevald argued that every important twentieth century technological advancement—the airplane, tank, jet engine, radar, helicopter, atomic bomb, or computer—preceded the military’s doctrinal requirements. The U.S. Department of Defense (DoD), in its 1963-67 “Project HINDSIGHT,” provided evidence for a “demand pull” cause of change. Analyzing U.S. research and exploratory development events

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139 Rosen, p. 40; see also pp. 39-52.
from 1946-63, the report found that ninety-five per cent of all of DoD’s utilized knowledge resulted from projects it had previously requested.\footnote{This included sixty-one per cent of the events had a specific systems requirement and over eight-five per cent of the technological events resulted from a problems application group first defining the problem. U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Director of Defense and Research Engineering, “Project HINDSIGHT, Final Report,” Oct. 1969, p. iv.} Rosen (1991) argued that a more useful approach, used in the study of arms races, was to investigate how military intelligence shapes technological innovation. Just a few of his examples included advances in the British \textit{Dreadnought} battleships before WWI and the U.S. \textit{North Carolina} battleships before WWII, in response to intelligence on German and Japanese capabilities, respectively.\footnote{Rosen, pp. 44-45.}

Organizational theorist Wilson (2000) contended that changes in the U.S. Army since the end of WWII were essentially limited to the organization finding methods of exploiting new technologies that either the U.S. or its adversaries might use in Germany.\footnote{Wilson, p. 220, cited Kevin Patrick Sheehan’s 1988 Harvard Ph.D. dissertation, “Preparing for an Imaginary War? Examining Peacetime Functions and Changes of Army Doctrine,” as supporting evidence.} Since the end of WWII, there were almost continuous changes in the U.S. Army’s doctrine and organization, with the latter changing at least five times.\footnote{Wilson, pp. 218-19, discusses the first four: first, in 1958 into pentomic divisions for dispersed battle, due to the nuclear threat; second, in the early 1960s back to the three brigades per division, described as the Reorganization Objectives Army Division (ROAD); third, in early 1970s into an Active Defense focus that allowed for rapidly mobility to engage attacking forces, following the withdrawal from Vietnam; fourth, in the early 1980s to AirLand Battle to return to an offensive doctrine but including counterstrikes deep behind enemy lines; and fifth, the current transformation to change from a divisional-based force to brigade combat teams and which are primarily based in the U.S. but have a much greater force projection ability.} Wilson (2000) counteracted that despite these reorganizations, little in fact had changed. Every alteration was founded upon the assumption that the Army was preparing to fight a traditional (and conventional) war across the open plains, and no actual or likely conflict...
created the same degree of new thinking or experimentation that the potential war in Europe produced.  

Advances in technology are not sufficient to cause organizational change, however, in part due to technology’s complex nature. As Demchak (2003) highlighted, advanced technology can shift control away from civilian leaders and even senior military officers, which can further magnify the military’s bias for autonomy. Technical advances can also mire senior civilian and military leaders from understanding the resulting consequences of their decisions. Demchak concluded that only with “extraordinary efforts, technical expertise, and self-confidence” were political leaders able to capably incorporate these advances in ways they intended.

2.3.4 External Cause 3: Budgetary Impacts

The third external cause of Army change that I analyze derives from the actual decreasing or increasing of the organization’s budget. As many practitioners in Washington, D.C., quickly recount, if one wants to know what matters, “follow the money.” Congress is authorized by the Constitution to raise and support armies, while the Army, as a government organization, is largely prohibited from private fund raising.  

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148 Wilson, p. 220.
149 Demchak, p. 341.
151 The Army is authorized only four types of fundraising activities: for the Combined Federal Campaign (CFC), which supports voluntary health, welfare, and philanthropic organizations; the Army
agency that wants to shrink than on one that seeks to grow.\textsuperscript{152} Since \textit{ceteris paribus} the Army wants more resources, especially while it can maintain or improve its autonomy,\textsuperscript{153} the Army will often need to or be able to change as the result of a substantial change in its financial resources.

Worley (2006) identifies a decreased budget as one of two most obvious causes of military change, since services must continually convince Congress that they remain relevant for the country’s current needs.\textsuperscript{154} Posen (1984) identifies the desire for more money as one of the three reasons militaries change, since they wish to expand to better control environmental uncertainties and reward their members.\textsuperscript{155} Congressional budget cycles also require changes to be considered two to three years before implementation, while contracts for major equipment exist on a ten-to-twenty year time line.\textsuperscript{156} Similarly, scholars also argue that organizations can change themselves once they have substantial uncommitted resources, or “slack.”\textsuperscript{157}

Most scholars include budgetary impacts within the civilian-military relationship (my external cause #1) or inter- and intra-service competition (my internal cause #4).

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\textsuperscript{152} Wilson, p. 214.

\textsuperscript{153} Wilson especially emphasizes this second phrase on autonomy, citing specific examples of military organizations accepting budget cuts to avoid tasks that differ significantly from their main mission or that would require inter-organization cooperation or additional oversight. Wilson, pp. 182-83, 188-192.

\textsuperscript{154} The other cause, which will be discussed later, is a new strategic environment. By the Constitution, Army appropriations can be no longer than in two-year terms. Worley, p. 4, 32.

\textsuperscript{155} Posen, p. 46.


Budgetary impacts are a sub-set of civilians requiring change, and civilians can indirectly use budgetary changes to induce inter- and intra-service competition. I include this as a separate explanatory cause, however, to more clearly isolate why the changes occur. This explanation focuses on changes that result from changing budgets or sources of income, in which civilian leadership did not necessarily require the corresponding type or magnitude of change. This type of change would not include civilians requiring change for other than monetary motives, nor the Army changing itself as the result of competition in order to receive more funds. Since my analysis identifies causes of change in varying degrees, I expect there will be overlap of a changing budget with other factors, while also expecting that civilian demands and inter- and intra-service competition can occur for other than monetary reasons.

2.3.5 External Cause 4: Defense Industry Persuasion

A final external cause of change can result from defense industries’ pressure on both civilian and military leadership. An argument with great popularity in the 1960s and 1970s, this factor argues that the congruent and self-reinforcing interests of the military hierarchy, members of Congress, and defense contractors collectively drive change within the organization. While scholars within this literature disagreed which side of this “iron triangle” drove policies, scholars such as Charles Moskos (1974) highlighted how interests other than a country’s strategic ones could drive decisions. For instance,

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158 Posen, p. 57.

159 While government agencies are not permitted to fund-raise, private organizations associated with the military—such as the U.S. Military Academy’s Association of Graduates—are allowed to fund-raise under a different set of regulations.

those espousing a Marxist ideology argued that “the corporate economic elite controls those aspects of the governmental and military machinery essential to capital interests,” with the government and military “playing only a minor part in American Cold War and imperialist decision making.”

More recent scholars have again focused on the critical role of defense industries, which now include an emphasis on technology and globalization. Judith Reppy (2000) identified an even broader network driving these changes, including government laboratories, university researchers, federally-funded research and development centers, and the multitude of consulting firms advising the military and Congress. Ann Markusen (2000) argued in the same volume that this network had collectively created great pressure on U.S. export policy and expensive new weapons innovation, attempting to make higher profits throughout the 1990s despite the significant cuts in the U.S. defense budget. Lora Lumpe (1996) even highlighted that Lockheed justified the need for Congress to fund the F-22 fighter aircraft by citing the (U.S.’s) extensive proliferation of aircraft, such as American-made F-15 and F-16, to Third World countries. Chris Demchak (2003) also discussed defense industries’ “sociotechnical pull” on political and military organizations, which created intense requirements for the organization to continue purchasing more elements of these complex systems to maintain their

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161 Moskos, p. 507.


effectiveness. In sum, this external pressure can require the organization (and the country) to change and pursue paths it would otherwise not have done, usually with respect to new equipment and technology.

2.3.6 Internal Cause 1: Experiential Learning

While many scholars argue that the Army must rely on external forces to require change, others argue there are various reasons why the Army may choose to change itself. The first cause of voluntary change I discuss is experiential learning, which has its foundation in the organizational theory literature. In the 1980s, globalization, the evolving industrial society, and generational changes prompted the study of why and how organizations could overcome their inherent learning disabilities. Vast literature targeting public and private organizations prescribed ways for them to become “learning organizations,” suggesting the need to “focus on continuous improvement, competence acquisition, experimentation, and boundary spanning.” Authors differentiated among nuanced types of learning, arguing that it was, at a minimum, necessary for an organization to be capable of “survival learning,” or what was sometimes called “adaptive learning.”

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165 Demchak, p. 331.
166 Senge, pp. 4-5.
167 Senge defined learning organizations as “organizations that continually expand their capacity to create their own futures rather than merely adapting to the environment.” Senge, p. 14.
169 Senge also argued that to be a “learning organization,” this learning had to be accompanied by “generative learning,” which enhanced the organization’s capacity to create its future. Senge, p. 14.
For this research, I use Jack Levy’s (1994) two-stage learning model\textsuperscript{170} shown in Figure 2.2, to explain how experiential learning can lead the Army to change itself. Levy’s model requires that first, individuals change their beliefs (or their degree of confidence in their beliefs) or develop new beliefs, skills, or procedures through observation and interpretation of experiences. Levy calls this process experiential learning.\textsuperscript{171} Second, experiential learning can influence (or cause) a change in the organization’s subsequent behavior, but only if the organization was “willing and able to apply the information to create change in procedures, organization, training, and thinking about conflict.”\textsuperscript{172} This cycle can be broken at any stage. Consequently, the model highlights that individual learning is necessary, but not sufficient, for organizational change to occur as the result of experiential learning.\textsuperscript{173} This model also fits well with Richard Downie’s description of organizational learning, which is often cited within the literature and I use as my conceptual definition: “A process by which an organization [such as the U.S. Army] uses new knowledge or understanding gained from its experience or study to adjust institutional norms, doctrine, and procedures in ways designed to minimize previous gaps in performance and maximize future successes.”\textsuperscript{174}

To help differentiate this type of learning from procedural learning, I refer to these changes in the organization as being caused by experiential learning.

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item[\textsuperscript{170}] Levy was primarily concerned with learning and foreign policy, although most of his typologies and arguments were interchangeable with organizational learning, which he considered a simpler process to analyze. Levy, p. 289.
\item[\textsuperscript{171}] Levy, p. 283.
\item[\textsuperscript{172}] Nagl, p. 10.
\item[\textsuperscript{173}] Levy, pp. 288-90.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
Figure 2.2 The Two-Stage Experiential Learning Model
Source: Levy, 1994

Army scholars have also embraced the need for the Army to incorporate its experiential lessons. Brig. Gen. David Fastabend and Col. Robert Simpson (2004) argued in “Adapt or Die” that the Army had to develop a culture of innovation, allowing it to continually learn from its experiences, in order to succeed in the U.S.’s current efforts.\footnote{175} Fastabend and Simpson agreed historically with Rosen (1991) and Zisk (1993), who contended that the Army changes usually during peacetime only, based on a Clausewitzian argument and evidence of the “fog of war.” During the Cold War, the Army had time after learning about new missions to react, deploy, adjust, and adapt the forces, before they had to again participate in combat. The current strategic environment...
and technological capabilities, however, made the denoted “Shock and Awe” campaigns of Iraq 2003 much more likely. As a result, there was minimal time between the Army deploying and engaging the enemy, making the Army’s deliberate planning culture both obsolete and dangerous. Even though they agreed it was counterintuitive for any organization at the height of success—which they argued the U.S. Army was in 2004—to change, they argued the Army had no choice but to better learn and incorporate these lessons.\footnote{Fastabend and Simpson, 2004. Clayton Christensen also applied this same argument to businesses in \textit{The Innovator’s Dilemma: The Revolutionary Book that Will Change the Way You Do Business} (Collins Business Essentials), 2003.}

Other U.S. Army leaders claim that the organization is already a “learning organization.” While commander of the Combined Armed Center (CAC) at Ft. Leavenworth, Ks., before departing to lead the U.S.-led military coalition efforts in Iraq, then Lt. Gen. David Petraeus graphically depicted how the Army learned. As shown in Figure 2.3, the Army’s “Engine of Change” was driven by experiential lessons from collective training (primarily at the combat training centers) and combat or contingency operations. The Army used these lessons to help improve doctrine, leader development (that includes education), collective training, and combat or contingency operations. The CAC served as the “knowledge management” for this learning process, helping the Army to remain a “learning organization.”\footnote{Briefed to the Department of Social Sciences in Mar. 2006; available at U.S. Army Combined Arms Center, “Combined Arms Center (CAC) - An Engine of Change,” Ft. Leavenworth, Ks., 2006, \url{http://usacac.army.mil/CAC/dynamics.asp#}.}
Army Doctrine: Doctrine is applied theory—theory derived from systematically analyzing patterns of recurring results of similar circumstances and events on various battlefields. Doctrine is based on careful observation and analysis of lessons learned through battlefield experience and simulated battlefield exercises. It does not attempt to outline an index of canned solutions. It aims to teach Soldiers how to think rather than what to think.

Leader Development: With the principal mission of leader development, the Center for Army Leadership (CAL) develops leaders prepared to execute full-spectrum, joint, interagency, and multinational operations; advances military art and science; and supports many other operational requirements.

Collective Training: The mission of the CAC-T is to manage the development, resourcing, and integration of the Army’s combined arms training efforts and programs to train units and leaders in conduct of the full range of military operations in the contemporary operational environment. CAC-T identifies, gathers, and supports the field’s training requirements. It supports Army Transformation, but its primary focus is on supporting the field’s readiness and leader development requirements.

Lessons Learned: As an agent for change in the Army, the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) disseminates and integrates new concepts, tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs), and other critical solutions throughout the Army. To reach out to other agencies, Soldiers, as well as to inform the general public, CALL provides extensive publications both in print and online.

Figure 2.3 How the Army Explains that It Learns

Source: U.S. Army Combined Arms Center, Ft. Leavenworth, Ks., 2006
Among most political science and organizational theory scholars, however, the analysis of “organizational learning” remains highly skeptical.\textsuperscript{178} As discussed in the beginning of this section, the Army as a government bureaucracy has redundant capabilities and entrenched motivations to thwart internal and external change, irrespective of the organization’s ability to learn. Robert Jervis (1976) and Jack Snyder (1984) questioned whether this organization even had the capacity to learn, as Bayesian probability updating expected that its members only assimilated new data into their pre-existing beliefs. For instance, individual and organizational biases that militaries form due to past wars, early training, or doctrinal simplification, standardization, and dogmatization created organizational and thought patterns that were extremely resistant to change.\textsuperscript{179} Irving Janis’ (1982) work on groupthink,\textsuperscript{180} in which groups within bureaucracies developed a strong desire for consensus, was another way that organizations would not learn from their experiences. Lawrence Yates (1997) argued that military officers used underdeveloped historical analogies in an unsystematic, superficial, and limited manner, relying either on personal lessons or those from one or two sources from which to implement “lessons learned.”\textsuperscript{181} Finally, Matthew Evangelista (1991) claimed that some conflated learning with politics, arguing that “Learning metaphors obscure what is fundamentally a political process.”\textsuperscript{182}

\textsuperscript{178} Distinction made by Argyris, p. 1.
\textsuperscript{179} See Jervis, Chapter 4; Snyder, pp. 26-30.
\textsuperscript{180} Janis, 1982; also discussed in Allison and Zelikow, pp. 283-87.
There are other scholars who argue that the Army can learn and change in exceptional circumstances. For instance, the otherwise pessimistic founder of the current debate on why the Army changes, Barry Posen, argued that the Army can learn and change itself when it has experienced catastrophic failure. Posen (1984) and Allison and Zelikow (1999) argued that extraordinary change only happened in response to extraordinary failure, which could be initiated from either civilian or military leaders.¹⁸³

As Allison and Zelikow (1999) argued, “Dramatic change occurs usually in response to dramatic failure.”¹⁸⁴ Posen credited the Germans’ spectacular reversal of fate from the end of WWI to the beginning of WWII for this reason, crediting the military generals for assuming an offensive doctrine since they were unconstrained by distracted civilian leadership. These scholars also generalized that military commanders remaining in the defeated organization would seek change, while senior, status-quo leaders would be replaced by those committed to change.

Posen’s claims are not without skeptics. Including the theoretical and empirical holes that Kier (1993) illustrated, there are also empirical limitations on expecting defeated militaries to learn the correct lessons. Drawing potential parallel lessons from Vietnam for the future of the U.S. Army post-Iraq, Nora Bensahel (2007) noted that after leaving Vietnam, the Army chose not to incorporate counterinsurgency lessons but instead to change their focus back to their major combat operations in Europe. While admitting the parallel was inexact, she concluded that at a minimum, this showed that armies did not always respond to failures by deciding to improve on that task next.

¹⁸³ Posen, pp. 57, 59; Allison and Zelikow, p. 172.

¹⁸⁴ Allison and Zelikow, p. 172; See also Posen, pp. 57, 59. These scholars also argue that civilians intervene as a result from dramatic failure, although they argue that after a defeat, existing personnel in the organization seek change while important leaders will be replaced by those committed to change.
time.  

Rosen (1991) also suggested that defeat only signaled that previous preparations were inadequate, while junior leaders rising afterwards would still be trained in the prewar methods. Consequently, he asserted that failure in war was neither necessary nor sufficient to produce major change.  

Wilson (2000) added that both the German and French drew lessons from WWI, although the Germans derived the correct ones. Claiming that it was not possible for anyone to know ahead of time what the correct lessons would be, he concluded that “some people guess better than others.”

2.3.7 Internal Cause 2: Procedural Learning

While experiential learning is a prevalent scholarly argument about why the Army changes, it is not the only type of learning that can occur. Organizational theorists, such as Daniel Kim (1997) and Thomas Shuell (1990), also discuss the distinct role of procedural learning in organizational change. Contrasting this with conceptual learning, Kim defined procedural learning as “where one learns the steps in order to complete a particular task.” While usually expecting evolutionary (vice revolutionary) changes to occur as a result, this type of learning can independently help an organization create new, or alter existing, methods for handling challenges related to processes and systems.

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186 Rosen, pp. 8-9.
187 Wilson, pp. 14, 43.
190 Kim, p. 46.
2.3.8 Internal Cause 3: New Strategic Environment

The third reason that the Army can change itself is the result of new international threats. In what Levy (1994) called the structural adjustment model (in contrast to the previously discussed learning model), individuals within organizations can learn, but this new knowledge would not explain why changes occurred within the organization. Just as Kenneth Waltz (1979) expected that states rationally and efficiently would adjust to changing structural incentives, the perception (or reality) of changing strategic threats would demand organizational transformation that superseded any lessons that individuals or the organization may have previously learned. Williamson Murray (2001) contended that “Nothing could be farther from the truth” in historians’ claim that military organizations repeat mistakes after studying the past, since few militaries studied even their own recent history. Instead, military organizations “tend to build up a picture of future war that fits their own preconceptions and assumptions. If they use the past at all, it is to validate those assumptions.”

Scholars analyzing military transformation cite changes in a new strategic environment as helping drive change. For instance, Robert Worley (2006) discussed the critical role of German and British officers transforming their navies prior to WWI, while noting that it took the U.S. Army until 2003 to begin adapting to the new strategic environment of small wars. Owen Cote (2003) also argued that during the Cold War,

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191 Levy, pp. 289, 297.
194 Murray, p. 7.
195 Worley, pp. 16-18, 93.
especially between 1950-60, the U.S. Navy substantially improved its own antisubmarine warfare capabilities to counter the increasing Soviet submarine threat.\footnote{Owen R. Cote, Jr., “The Third Battle: Innovation in the U.S. Navy's Silent Cold War Struggle with Soviet Submarines,” Naval War College Newport Paper 16 (Newport, RI: Center for Naval Warfare Studies), 2003, p. 40.} He supported this conclusion by providing evidence that civilian intervention, inter-service competition, and intra-service competition could not explain these peacetime innovations.\footnote{Cote, p. 90.} Cote further contended that today’s new strategic environment will continue prompting the military to innovate. Since much of the military’s structure, which was designed to defeat the Soviets, was no longer relevant, he concluded that the military would in fact have to change in major ways to respond to the new environment. The military was now “struggling to adapt to the demands of the new security environment, and in many cases, success in this struggle \textit{will demand} fairly radical innovation.”\footnote{Cote, p. 3 (italics added).}

Scholars’ arguments for this type of change are not limited only to the U.S. For example, Kimberly Marten Zisk (1993) argued that the Soviet military developed innovative doctrine in part in response to foreign doctrinal changes, not due to civilians requiring change. While the Soviet military first concerned itself with increasing its autonomy and organizational well-being, this organization was primarily responsible for the timing and content of its own changes between 1955-91.\footnote{Kimberly Marten Zisk, \textit{Engaging the Enemy: Organization Theory and Soviet Military Innovation, 1955-1991} (Princeton: Princeton University Press), 1993, pp. 5, 26-28.}

Changing in order to counter new strategic threats is not negative in any sense, as military and civilian leaders must be able to proactively predict future threats and not just
reactively respond to experiential or procedural lessons they learned. If the military or civilian leadership could correctly foresee and plan for all future threats, and future threats did not resemble those of the past, one would only want changes derived from a new strategic environment. Of course this is an unrealistic expectation, especially with the continuous learning of the U.S.’s adversaries and allies. Considering most adversaries will not capitulate because the U.S. is too formidable, or be as kind as Saddam Hussein in 1991 to match his weaknesses against U.S. strengths, the Army must scrupulously balance proactive and reactive change. Unfortunately, this is much easier to analyze *post hoc*. For instance, after Vietnam the Army adjusted to face its strategic Soviet threat, although many now counter it ignored its lessons learned. Had the Army reorganized into a counterinsurgency force and then faced the Russian hordes barreling through the Fulda Gap, pundits would have charged that the Army was still fighting its last war. This research remains neutral as to which type of change the organization should prefer; instead, this is treated as an empirical question to discern.

2.3.9 Internal Cause 4: Inter- and Intra-Service Competition

The fourth cause of military change I discuss is inter- and intra-service competition. Inter-service competition focuses on the struggles among military services (Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps) causing changes, while intra-service competition centers on the rivalry among Army branches (i.e. infantry, armor, aviation, engineers, etc.) prompting change. Both changes usually derive from the military adjusting to a new strategic environment while dealing with a constrained budget, with

\[\text{200} \text{ Just one examples of the U.S.'s learning adversaries is that at least by 2007, examples of al-Qaeda-like tactics and explosives perfected in Iraq emerging on the streets of Morocco, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Indonesia, and even Scotland.}\]
the two differing based upon the primary focus of contention. This competition can also constrain change, especially when those in charge expect relative losses. While scholars often focus on one or the other, due to their similar motivations of competition causing change, I combine these two sources of change into one. I discuss the two in turn.

Inter-service competition occurs when the military services battle for additional resources and/or autonomy, including budget, personnel, and desirable missions that will maximize their resources and/or autonomy. As Grissom (2006) explained, periodically a new mission will emerge over which no service has an expected advantage, or an existing mission re-surfaces that may possibly reallocate responsibilities. As the services compete to be awarded this duty and corresponding resources, innovation can occur. Wilson (2000) described these as “turf wars,” arguing this quarreling, which has become “a fact of life,” was not limited to competition solely among the military services. Organizational tasks overlap with other agencies within or outside the executive branch, resulting in inter-departmental competition as well. Posen (1984) identified inter-service rivalry as an indirect way for civilians to prompt change, whether through shifting resources to a more favored service or “aggrandizement at the expense of another service.”

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201 Not all scholars agree on this final point, as Allison and Zelikow (1999) argue organizations will attempt to maximize their resources. I accept Morton Halperin’s (1974) and Wilson’s (2000) argument that only one of a government bureaucracy’s preferences is to maximize its budget, with an even higher priority being autonomy from meddling civilians. Therefore, “it should not be surprising to find government agencies that actually refuse to take on new tasks or try to give up tasks they now perform.” Wilson, pp. xviii, 182-83; Morton H. Halperin, Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution), 1974, p. 51.


203 Wilson, pp. 185, 187-88.

204 Posen, p. 57.
Many literature examples discussing inter-service rivalry focus on implementing technological and organizational innovations throughout the Cold War. Harvey Sapolsky (1972) analyzed the U.S. Air Force-Navy rivalry in the late 1950s for improved nuclear deterrence, which led to the Navy’s creation of the Polaris submarine-launched ballistic missile system.\footnote{Harvey M. Sapolsky, \textit{Polaris System Development: Bureaucratic and Programmatic Success in Government} (Cambridge, Ma.: Harvard University Press), 1972.} Andrew Bacevich (1986) examined the Army-Air Force competition in the 1950s for budget share and status with the development of nuclear weapons and associated national strategies, which caused the Army to change its doctrine, organizational structure, and add new tactical nuclear equipment.\footnote{Andrew J. Bacevich, \textit{The Pentomic Era: The U.S. Army between Korea and Vietnam} (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press), 1986.} Jon Giese (1999) argued that the Special Operations Forces have continued to innovate throughout their formal existence since 1952, in part due to their lack of unique military niche and constant struggle to acquire missions.\footnote{Giese specifically argued that this lack of unique organizational mission led to a culture of flexibility, allowing its leaders to constantly seek out new missions. Jon F. Giese, “Military Innovation: Sources of Change for United States Special Operations Forces (SOF),” thesis for the Naval Postgraduate School (Monterey, Ca.), Dec. 1999, pp. 26-27, 88.} Susan Marquis (1997) also explained the contentious inter-service and civilian-military battles for Special Operations Forces to be institutionalized into their own Special Operations Command, finally activated in 1987.\footnote{Marquis was a senior DoD official, and the main cleavage she identified was between the conventional military members and everyone else (civilian and military). Susan L. Marquis, \textit{Unconventional Warfare: Rebuilding U.S. Special Operations Forces} (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution Press), 1997.}

Intra-service competition looks within a military service for the source of change, arguing that rivalry among (for instance) Army branches for resources and status prompts
Rather than being monolithic, each organization consists of multiple and often competing sub-organizations, which at times compete for cultural and resource primacy. Rosen (1991) equated this competition with that of any political community, as various groups vied to determine “who should rule, and how the ‘citizens’ should live.” The victors not only design the organization’s strategies, but most importantly they determine the organization’s promotion paths to become a general officer, since this is the main source of organizational power. As a result, Rosen argued that for the military to innovate, military leaders—possibly supported by their civilian leadership—may need to create new pathways for innovative officers to be protected. Instead of being eliminated or sidelined by the senior, status-quo leaders who want their successors to mirror themselves, these junior innovators could help prompt generational change less constrained by the traditional intra-service boundaries.

Most research on intra-service competition causing or preventing change also focuses on Cold War cases. For instance, W. Blair Haworth (1999) argued that the Army’s current infantry fighting vehicle developed throughout the twentieth century in a sub-optimal manner due to the competing demands and inability for different Army branches to agree on its new tasks and capabilities. Rod Coffey (2000) discussed the damaging organizational competition within the Army throughout the twentieth century as well, as branches (especially armor and infantry) and sub-branches (especially within

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209 Allison and Zelikow, pp. 162-81.
210 Wilson, pp. 105-06; Rosen, pp. 18-19.
211 Rosen, p. 19.
212 Rosen, pp. 20-21.
the infantry) lobbied to improve their own position within the existing “supported-versus-supporting” balance of power.\textsuperscript{214} Pierce (2004) also concluded that intense intra-service rivalry was present in all seventeen successful cases of U.S. Navy and Marine Corps innovation from 1899-2003, although only two cases occurred after the Cold War.\textsuperscript{215}

2.3.10 Internal Cause 5: Organizational Culture

The final source of Army change this research analyzes is the organizational culture, on which scholars such as Victor Thompson (1969), Elizabeth Kier (1993), and John Nagl (2005) focus. By organizational culture, I use Kier’s (1993) definition, which refers to the collectively held beliefs within a military organization, rather than the beliefs espoused by civilian leaders and policy makers.\textsuperscript{216} These scholars do not discount the importance of large bureaucratic structures causing or inhibiting internal change; however, they focus on the beliefs and norms within the organization as a primary cause or inhibitor of change.

Armies have varying cultures, which help account for their different responses to external demands. For instance, in some armies, new ideas are perceived as threatening,\textsuperscript{217} there is overwhelming pressure to conform to the status quo, loyalty to superiors and the organization is prioritized above all else, or the culture emphasizes a

\textsuperscript{214} He argued this competition for the dominant military capability (the “supported”) came at the expense of combined arms capabilities, which was designed to synthesize and maximize the entire organization’s effectiveness. Rod A. Coffey, “Doctrinal Orphan or Active Partner? A History of U.S. Army Mechanized Infantry Doctrine,” thesis for U.S. Army Command and General Staff College (Ft. Leavenworth, Ks.), 2000, pp. 139-40.

\textsuperscript{215} These two were the Marine Corps’ “architectural innovation,” with its maneuver warfare between 1988-99; and the Navy’s “radical technologies supporting disruptive innovations,” with its Tactical Component Network (TCN\textsuperscript{®}) between 1996-2003. Pierce, p. 18.


\textsuperscript{217} Thompson, p. 22.
zero-sum mentality. Stagnant cultures also play a decisive role in constraining proposed external or internal changes, which are organizationally buttressed by systems that promote like-minded, risk-averse officers from within. While addressing his normal accidents theory, Scott Sagan (1993) articulated this cultural constraint phenomenon:

In any “total institution” (whether it is a military command or a mental hospital) the official goal of the organization…coexists with a set of more parochial, self-serving organizational objectives…This can encourage excessive loyalty and secrecy, disdain for outside expertise, and in some cases even cover-ups of safety problems, in order to protect the reputation of the institution.

The culture of an army can be extremely resistant to change, while the culture also has a critical role in how it perceives experiences, new missions, and even lessons. For example, military and civilian leaders can try to alter the organization’s mission, doctrine, structure, equipment, etc. However, if these ideas counter the organization’s culture, there is significantly less probability that the idea will be formally or informally accepted. One prominent example since the end of the Cold War is Bill Clinton’s promise during his 1992 presidential campaign to allow homosexuals to openly serve in the military. Another example includes Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld’s pressing to transform the army into a quickly-deployable force with minimal heavy armored vehicles, beginning in 2002. And yet, the Army bureaucracy strongly (and successfully) resisted these changes that countered its culture.

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218 Nagl, 2005.

219 Zisk (p. 25) argues that military innovators “can be newcomers to the organization, who have not yet internalized the organization’s goal structure (i.e., “young turks”); or they can be oldtimers, who have already accomplished so much in their careers that they are willing to risk disapproval and loss.”


221 Worley, pp. 4-5.
An organization’s unique culture will help determine the degree to which its professionalism facilitates or retards change at certain times. Samuel Huntington introduced the concept of military professionalism in 1957, about which Rosen (1991), Don Snider and Lloyd Matthews (2005), and Grissom (2006) more recently have written. As argued, this professionalism can help a military organization occasionally escape its normal bureaucratic constraints. It enables officers to make progressive changes as part of their duties to the organization and country, without requiring civilians or other external sources to demand change. This is especially the case when there is consensus within the organization on a certain topic and the agreed upon solution. Scholars such as Williamson Murray (2001) emphasized that especially in periods of uncertainty, a profession such as the military must be willing to openly and fiercely debate its differences if it wished to change itself in major ways.

The organization’s capability to voluntarily make these changes can and often will be affected by its professional (vice bureaucratic) culture, which qualitative analysis can help isolate. The first three types of internally-driven changes I discussed—experiential lessons, procedural lessons, and a new strategic environment—do draw upon the professionalism argument. However, professionalism is not a dichotomous or constant variable, making its effect more difficult to measure as a cause of change. In addition, discerning whether professionalism is a cause for change is significantly more


224 Point also made specifically in interview with Nagl (2007); see also Nagl, 2005.

225 Murray added that “The current [2001] lack of debate within the Army is indeed a worrisome trend.” Murray, p. 18-19.
complicated when members of (or generations in) the profession fundamentally disagree on what expert knowledge the organization must prioritize.\textsuperscript{226} As a result, I do not include this as an independent cause of change, but instead incorporate it within the cultural argument more broadly.

\textbf{2.3.11 Organizational Changes Defy Generalization}

Finally, there are also scholars who argue that the reasons that the Army has changed over time are too dependent on chance and individual personalities that the causes cannot be generalized. Analyzing the various case studies at the conclusion of Williamson Murray and Allan Millett’s \textit{Military Innovation in the Interwar Period}, Barry Watts and Murray (1996) argued that “much of the more successful innovation that occurred was the result of ad hoc improvisation, bedeviled by changing or uncertain political priorities.”\textsuperscript{227} The authors are historians and readily admitted they were reluctant to provide theoretical generalizations for military innovation. Instead, they concluded with specific actions, bureaucratic tactics, and strategies to help militaries continue to change.\textsuperscript{228} Wilson (2000) furthered this argument, comparing an attempt to generalize causes of organizational change with an attempt to discover one medical theory to explain every disease. He reasoned that innovations were so reliant upon top leadership interests and beliefs that the unpredictable assignment of a change-oriented personality could have the deciding role in explaining change. As a result, this minimized the

\textsuperscript{226} Argument made by John Nagl, interview with author (2007).
\textsuperscript{227} Watts and Murray, p. 372.
\textsuperscript{228} Specific suggestions included a leadership vision that is balanced and connected with reality; bureaucratic acceptance of changes; institutional processes to explore, test, and refine conceptions of future war; and creating institutional paths for innovative leaders to rise and incorporate changes into the institutional process. Watts and Murray, pp. 3, 381, 406-15.
relative importance of studying organizational theory reasons for change.\textsuperscript{229} While these perspectives are not definitive, they remind scholars how critical evidentiary support is of one’s findings, as well as the limitations in generalizing when prescribing change in this necessarily human, probabilistic endeavor. The literature arguments I test are found in Table 2.1.

Table 2.1 SUMMARY OF LITERATURE ARGUMENTS, WHY AND HOW THE ARMY CHANGES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Why</th>
<th>Internal</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Civilian intervention</td>
<td>• Experiential learning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Technology</td>
<td>• Procedural learning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Budget</td>
<td>• New strategic environment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Defense industry</td>
<td>• Inter-/intra-service competition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Organizational culture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Law or directive (formal &amp; informal)</td>
<td>• Innovative senior leaders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Consensus among leaders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• New generation of leaders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Military mavericks ally with civilians</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2.4 The U.S. Army’s Organizational Culture

As discussed last section, culture is one important aspect that can inhibit or promote change within the Army. Since my research focuses solely on changes in the U.S. Army from 1991-2007, it is important to first understand some of its main cultural characteristics that bear relevance to the questions of why and how the Army changes. There are many important sub-cultures in the Army, which scholars such as Wilson (2000)\textsuperscript{230} and Worley (2006)\textsuperscript{231} discussed. Since I am analyzing changes at the

\textsuperscript{229} Wilson, p. 227.
\textsuperscript{230} Wilson, Ch. 6; see especially pp. 92-93, 105-106.
institutional level of the organization, I focus on three primary cultural characteristics common across the U.S. Army, rather than investigate differences among Army branches (infantry, armor, engineers, signal corps, etc.).

First, the Army has a “can-do” attitude. One of the seven “Army values” all soldiers must memorize is “duty,” which the Army defines as fulfilling one’s obligation. The official Army poster for “duty” quotes Gen. George S. Patton: “I am a Soldier, I fight where I am told, and I win where I fight.”

While it will not voluntarily seek out all types of missions and will frequently delay in accepting those missions contrary to its warrior culture (explained below), once the Army accepts a mission, its personnel (especially in tactical units) will typically complete the mission whole-heartedly.

This can-do attitude is especially pertinent to change as the result of learning. During the post-Cold War time period, the Army has been involved in over one hundred nation building and humanitarian missions that it did not necessarily seek (see Appendix A for a list of the thirty-three named conventional national security, and one hundred twenty-four named nation building/humanitarian military operations since the end of the Cold War). As a result, key individuals and several generations of leaders learned lessons in nation building interventions, which at least could be incorporated into the organization at some time.

Second, the Army prioritizes a “muddy boots,” mechanized, equipment-centric Army. Worley (2006) proposed at least four reasons that the Army prefers major war

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231 Worley, pp. 73-77.
232 The other six values are loyalty, respect, selfless service, honor, integrity, and personal courage, which create the acronym LDRSHIP. U.S. Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, G-1, “Army Values.”
over smaller conflicts. These four reasons are first, having the ability to overwhelm the potential adversary; second, fighting wars with “front lines” and “rear areas” that delineate combat versus support efforts; third, fighting a near peer with symmetrical warfare techniques; and fourth, historically believing that major war was the most complex warfare for soldiers to master. I elaborate on these four reasons in sequence.

First, large wars are fought by large, mechanized armies. By delimiting its mission to winning large wars, the Army would continue receiving the needed resources to overwhelm the potential adversary. Not only is this a rational interest for power and influence purposes within the highly competitive budget process, but this is also essential for the U.S. to remain successful in a major war. As the U.S. Army’s comparative advantage will almost never be in the number of ground soldiers participating in a conflict, its culture emphasized that more advanced equipment was critical for success.

Second, large wars are assumed to be traditional wars, where combat warriors are on the front lines and support (e.g. logistic, administrative, medical) soldiers are in the rear areas. In traditional wars, there is a clear demarcation of which soldiers do what jobs, and all are able to focus their training and execution on a finite number of tasks for their specialization. In non-traditional conflict, which includes nation building and humanitarian missions, there is no front line and all soldiers are required to complete a much wider variety of tasks. Leaders cannot prepare for non-traditional conflict by perusing their personal libraries of field manuals to determine the handful of tasks on

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233 Worley, pp. 70-71 proposes these four topics why the Army prefers large wars over smaller engagements.

234 The entire active duty U.S. military includes 1.4 million soldiers, which in 2008 were stationed in over 150 countries. While not all adversaries, other countries’ militaries in 2005 were China, 3.8 million; India, 3.1 million; EU members, 2.4 million; Russia, 1.5 million; and North Korea, 1.3 million troops. Progressive Policy Institute, “Number of American Servicemen and Women Stationed Overseas: 289,000,” May 28, 2008.
which their units should focus, as they once did during the Cold War. While Army soldiers are used to preparing for a wide variety of tasks, no soldier or unit can maintain competencies needed to successfully counter challenges across the entire spectrum of potential missions they may encounter. As a result, preparing just for traditional war is a strong preference of most within the Army.

The third reason the Army culture prefers major war over smaller ones is that large wars are fought against near-peers, since symmetrical warfare is expected and the enemy is defeated by destroying the enemy’s front combat forces. The Army states that it is adjusting to the asymmetric warfare it now faces by emphasizing the need for “strategically minded corporals” and officer “pentathletes,” who are flexible thinkers who consider second- and third-order effects of their actions. It is unclear whether any real or lasting changes will accompany these words. For instance, acquiring perceived warrior competencies, such as a Ranger Tab or the new Combat Action Badge, are still valued more than fluently speaking a foreign language or having an advanced degree. Most in the Army do not deem “winning the peace” to be an appropriate concern for the organization, although a growing proportion counters that the Army must be prepared for these missions regardless. As long as the culture stresses that other development and diplomacy organizations are responsible to “win hearts and minds” to restore the society and government back to a functioning level, the organization will likely prioritize major, symmetrical warfare.

235 Comment made by Brig. Gen. David Fastabend during an interview in 2006, describing the changed complexity of training from when he was a junior officer.

236 Observation made by a senior year USMA cadet in May 2007, which has resonated with every audience to which I have mentioned.
Finally, there is a general belief in the Army that major wars are difficult and smaller conflicts are similar yet easier, arguing that units prepared for high-intensity combat can simply translate these same skills to lower-intensity conflicts. As just one example, Maj. Gen. S.L. Arnold, commander of U.S.-led UN mission to Somalia from December 1992 to May 1993, wrote in *Military Review* that well-trained, combat-ready, disciplined soldiers can easily adapt to peacekeeping or peace enforcement missions.\(^{237}\)

Since the Army is most concerned about conflicts with catastrophic consequences, it places its priority on what it considers the more difficult, deadly mission. The terrible failures of the Army’s original engagement in the Korean War, notoriously named Task Force Smith, in which the Army withdrew and lost over 150 of 540 soldiers, still reminds Army leaders of the consequences of being unprepared for major war.

As a result of these cultural proclivities, the Army’s seven primary institutional systems—its doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leader development and education, personnel, and facilities—concentrate on preparing its generals to succeed within this context. For instance, except for medical, legal, and religious personnel, the Army requires all leaders to begin as junior lieutenants in tactical, “muddy boots” specialties. The Army only promotes leaders from within its own ranks, despite scholars like Zisk (1993) highlighting that this institutionally constrains innovation to only those so junior they have not yet been indoctrinated or those culminating their careers and not vying for future organizational rewards.\(^{238}\) Success during peacetime is based largely on training exercises and acceptance to competitive Army schools. Except for the Congressionally-


\(^{238}\) Zisk, p. 25.
mandated 1986 Goldwater-Nichols requirement for general officers to have joint service experience, the Army selects its 301 general officers largely based on whether they succeeded in tactical battalion and brigade commands. This reinforces the existing elite—infantry (especially mechanized) and armor—while also creating a zero-sum game if the organizational Army wanted to add officers with specialized technical and/or strategic skills to its most senior ranks.

The Army also frequently reiterates that its mission is “to fight and win the nation’s wars.” While this phrase is well known, with many in the Army and the U.S. thinking the Army’s official purpose is only to triumph in major combat operations, the ironic part is that the Army wrote it into its doctrine in the early 1990s without having any historical precedent or future prospect that this could or would be its primary focus. Some have even argued that this statement was created as a faintly veiled message that the Army does not serve as an American social laboratory, with the hope of avoiding gays and lesbians openly serving in the military. As scholars like Lawrence Yates

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239 This is a Congressionally mandated limit, enacted as part of the 1980 Defense Officer Personnel Management Act (DOPMA).

240 Most scholars also include Field Artillery within this group of elite branches, due to their historical advancement to the most senior Army ranks as well. During the time period I study, however, leaders have prioritized precision warfare and minimizing enemy casualties. As a result, during deployments most Field Artillery units serve with reduced or none of their artillery weapons, and instead serve in non-artillery roles, such as base camp mayors, battlefield effects centers, or serving in traditional infantry or military police roles. Since at least Feb. 2005, Field Artillery officers have been vocalizing this concern, and Chief of Staff of the Army, Gen. George W. Casey, Jr., also addressed this concern during an address at the Senior Conference on the Professional Military Ethic in an Era of Persistent Conflict at the U.S. Military Academy at West Point on Jun. 6, 2008. See Roy Sevalia (Maj.), Titus Brown (Maj.), Mark P. Krieger, Jr. (Maj.), and John P. Calhoun (Maj.), The NTC Fire Support Team, “From Stability and Support Operations to High Intensity Conflict, The Training Challenges for FA [Field Artillery] Battalions,” in U.S. Army, Center for Army Lessons Learned, “CTC Quarterly Bulletin 04-25,” Feb. 2005.


242 Argument by Dr. Ty Seidule during a lecture at the U.S. Military Academy, Jan. 16, 2007. Dr. Seidule is also a colonel in the U.S. Army and permanent professor in the History Department at the U.S. Military Academy.
Table 2.2 OPERATIONS OF A TRADITIONAL VERSUS NON-TRADITIONAL NATURE BY THE UNITED STATES MILITARY, 1775-1991

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Traditional Warfare Operations</th>
<th>Non-traditional Military Operations (Nation Building, Humanitarian, etc.)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total War</td>
<td>Whiskey Rebellion, 1791-94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. Revolution</td>
<td>Lewis and Clark Exploration, 1804-06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil War</td>
<td>Reconstruction in the U.S. South, 1865-77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World War I</td>
<td>Pullman Strike, Illinois, 1894</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World War II</td>
<td>Nation Building, Philippines, 1899-1904</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Nation Building, Cuba, 1899-1902, 1906-09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>San Francisco Earthquake Relief, 1906</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Occupation of Haiti, 1915-34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Occupation of Dominican Republic, 1916-24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Expeditions/Contingency Operations</strong></td>
<td>The Sandino Affair in Nicaragua, 1927-33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Undeclared Naval War with France, 1798-1800</td>
<td>Civilian Conservation Corps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barbary Pirates, 1801-15</td>
<td>Greek Civil War, 1947-49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mormon War, 1844-46</td>
<td>Huk Insurrection in the Philippines, 1946-54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second Seminole War, 1835-42</td>
<td>Peace Operations in Lebanon, 1958</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indian Wars, 1775-1917</td>
<td>Nation Building in Vietnam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boxer Rebellion, 1900-01</td>
<td>Stability Operations in Dominican Republic, 1965-66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intervention in Cuba, 1906</td>
<td>U.S. Civil Disturbances, 1960s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intervention in Mexico, 1914, 1916</td>
<td>Counterinsurgency in Latin America, 1960s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intervention in Russia, 1918-20</td>
<td>Mayaguez Incident, 1975</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operation Blue Bat, Lebanon, 1958</td>
<td>Peacekeeping in Beirut, 1982-84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operation Power Pack, Dominican Republic, 1965</td>
<td>Peacekeeping in the Sinai, since 1982</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operation Just Cause, Panama, 1989</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: adapted from Yates, p. 52

(1997), Janine Davidson (2005), William Flavin (2007), and Nadia Schadlow (2007) have argued, the Army’s mission never has been, nor likely ever will be, only to fight and win wars. In addition to the military’s many “non-traditional” missions in the post-Cold War era (Appendix A), Table 2.2 depicts that the U.S. military has been used for myriad missions throughout the country’s history. While this stated mission is only fifteen years
old, it neatly codifies the prevailing Army culture and reinforces the existing doctrine, organizational structure, technology, and equipment designed to triumph in major wars.

There is currently an internal struggle within the Army about what the Army’s future mission and critical tasks—and as a result, its culture—should be. Two notable cleavages are developing among the officers. First, one cleavage is developing within branches that are changing or losing their traditional missions within stability and counterinsurgency operations, such as field artillery, armor, and within the infantry. A second, and more overt, cleavage is also deepening along generational lines, due to the officers’ different experiences. Only officers commissioned before 1992 actually served during the Cold War, with most junior officers today not even remembering the U.S.S.R. (most new lieutenants entering the Army in 2008 were born in the mid-1980s). In addition, since the end of the 1991 Gulf War, most of the younger officers (ranked lieutenant colonel and below) have spent most of their careers participating in missions of all types, including repeated humanitarian and nation building interventions (e.g. Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Kosovo).

By 2007, younger generations had begun openly blaming the Army’s senior leaders for the organization’s difficulties in and as a result of Iraq. One of the most visible examples include Lt. Col. Paul Yingling’s article entitled “A Failure in Generalship” in the May 2007 edition of Armed Forces Journal, in which he argued that a private was punished more for losing a rifle than a general was for losing a war. Maj. Daniel Davis wrote an op-ed in the Washington Times the following month entitled “To

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243 While serving as an assistant professor at the U.S. Military Academy from 2005-08, every semester in their biographical information sheet, I asked cadets (Classes 2006-10) what were their earliest international relation memories. At most one-third of the cadets remembered the 1991 Gulf War, while most recalled events beginning with the 1999 Kosovo conflict or later.

America's Generals: Be courageous and step forward,”245 and military correspondent Greg Jaffe published a June 2007 article entitled “Critiques of Iraq War Reveal Rifts Among Army Officers” in the *Wall Street Journal*.246 Not all agree with Yingling’s argument, including many of the organization’s more senior leaders. Regardless, readers accessed his article on-line over twenty thousand times (not including the versions widely circulated by email) in the first two months of its posting, while almost two hundred responses were posted on the journal’s website during this time as well.

Simultaneously, there has also been increasing pressure from the civilian leadership and private organizations for the Army to include nation building and other non-traditional missions as part of its critical organizational tasks.247 For instance, in November 2005, the Department of Defense issued a directive (DoDD 3000.05) that formally declared that the military would give stability operations the priority comparable to that of combat operations.248 In February 2008, the Army likewise codified this within its *Operations* manual.249 These were changes some had been advocating for over two decades, which many scholars and civilians lauded as an unprecedented sign of progress.250


247 Worley, p. 5.

248 It specifically mandated that the military would make changes across all parts of the organization, to include specifying changes within its doctrine, organizations, training, education, exercises, materiel, leadership, personnel, facilities, and planning. U.S. Department of Defense Directive 3000.05, 2005.


The U.S. Army’s resistance to organizational change for any reason is deeply ingrained within its culture and institutional structure. As organizational theory would expect, changing the Army is not simple, even if everyone agrees there are problems, but especially if everyone does not agree on the needed solution. As just one metric of this resistance, despite DoD’s 2005 directive to fully integrate stability operations, by 2007 few outside of Washington, D.C., had even heard of this policy. Reinforcing their persuasive worst-case scenario retorts are the vast majority of Army doctrine, structure, training, education, paths for promotion, technology, and SOPs, which focus on defeating U.S. enemies vigorously on foreign soil rather than conducting “softer,” and perceived weaker, forms of engagement. It is still too early to know if the Army will shift in the future, institutionalizing these new experiences and lessons, or remaining wedded to its large war mentality. At a minimum, there is a window of opportunity now, due to the current struggles in Iraq, for this debate on the future of the Army’s culture to finally happen.

2.5 Operationalizing the Theoretical Arguments

In this final section, I summarize the primary variables and hypotheses that guide my research. To help determine why the institutional Army has changed since the end of the Cold War, I primarily analyze seven causes for change. Four causes are external stimuli: civilian knowledge, technological improvements, budgetary impacts, and defense industry persuasion. With my case studies focusing much less on equipment and materiel factors, I expect the primary external influence to come from civilian intervention, with changes in technology and the budget to have supporting influence. Three additional causes come from internal stimuli: the proximity (in time and space) of the system to
battlefield lessons, the role of intra- or inter-service competition, and the time and effort that those within each system have to reflect on a new strategic environment.

To predict the likelihood of external causes of change, the only explanation that requires a proxy variable is civilians requiring changes. For this explanation, I use the variable of civilian knowledge of each case study (the officer personnel management system, the officer education system, and the training system). As Posen (1984) highlighted, due to functional specialization of the Army, there is an intense division of labor and knowledge between civilians and the military. Additionally, in their quest to maximize autonomy, the military exacerbates this problem by obscuring or withholding information from their civilian leaders. As a result, Posen argues that “civil intervention is dependent on finding sources of military knowledge.”251

To predict the likelihood of internal causes of change, I use two proxy variables. First, I use the proximity in time and location to battlefield experiences as a proxy for expected experiential learning. Second, I use the time and effort devoted to reflecting on and analyzing the future strategic environment as a proxy for expected reactions to a new strategic environment. If there is evidence of catastrophic failure causing change, I will capture evidence of this argument within my experiential learning variable. I expect all internal and external changes to vary directly with each of these variables, i.e. the greater knowledge civilians have with respect to an institutional area, the more likely they are to cause change within that sub-institution.

Since I am analyzing just the U.S. Army and not comparing this to another organization, I do not include organizational culture as an independent cause for change.

251 Posen, pp. 57-58.
Instead, I analyze the effect of the organization’s culture on change by hypothesizing two constraints to the Army voluntarily being capable of making any changes. First, I expect that internally-driven changes will not counter the organization’s fundamental warrior cultural attributes. Second and closely related, I expect the proposed changes will not undermine the organizational elite (primarily infantry and armor), or their relative power within the organization. Avoiding these constraints are necessary conditions for change, although the organizational elite deciding to make a change within these conditions is not sufficient to ensure that a change will occur.

To understand why the Army would want to change itself, one must look at the process by which the Army changes (the how). As a result, throughout the research I focus on priorities and actions of the Army’s Chief of Staff (CSA) and subordinate leaders responsible for more frequent changes within each institutional system. Since organizational change is extremely difficult even when all agree it is needed, the CSA (or the institution’s leader, in a more decentralized system) must prioritize this change very early in his tenure (most likely in the first year). The leader must also remain personally involved throughout the process to implement the change. The CSA’s involvement is necessary but not sufficient for change to occur from within. While it is theoretically possible for him to minimize the effects of the two cultural constraints, I do not expect to find empirical evidence to support this claim.

I also analyze the organization’s institutional ability to reach consensus within each system. In order to predict this likelihood, I evaluate two factors. First, how centralized is the decision making process within the Army; and second, how many people throughout the Army have a strongly vested interest, what I call stakeholders, in
the institution changing that process. The number and rank of stakeholders varies based on the system, with formal Army processes usually incorporating interested representatives at the rank of colonel and higher in decision making. Due to the critical role of consensus in the Army making internal change despite the organization’s hierarchical structure, emphasized by Millet (1996) and Watts and Murray (1996),\(^{252}\) I also disaggregate the need for and direction of change when predicting the probability of change. If there is consensus on the need for and direction of change, I expect that the Army will be able to change itself. However, without consensus in both areas, I expect either a more decentralized change (i.e. change in an academic department instead of the entire college) or a weaker centralized change to occur, thus making the impact much less on the institution. Due to the overwhelming need for consensus despite its strict hierarchical structure, I expect the Army to postpone major initiatives until it collects overwhelming evidence and can mobilize resounding support for its adjustments through idea socialization and/or personal events. These mind-stretching experiences can come from a wide host of events, including deployments, civilian education, or working with those other than the U.S. Army and military. Whether these experiences are relatively greater from past experiences or a believed understanding of future enemies, the preponderance of changed thoughts will determine whether the Army changes reactively, proactively, or a combination of both.

\(^{252}\) Allan R. Millett and Barry Watts and Williamson Murray include this concept within their variable of “military organizational politics.” While their focus is more general, concentrating on bureaucratic tactics supporting or inhibiting innovation, to include inter-service rivalries, they argue that there is an “unavoidable necessity of bureaucratic acceptance to successful peacetime innovation.” (p. 409). The book’s main question was “What kinds of technological, operational, and organizational factors have, during times of peace, given rise to fundamental changes in how wars are fought?” (p. 405) Allan R. Millet, “Patterns of Military Innovation,” especially pp. 349-59; and Watts and Murray, pp. 369-415; both in Murray and Millet, 1996.
Those serving as the Army’s senior leaders have a very slow turnover. For instance, in 2007, the most senior leaders (four-star generals) had served on average thirty-six years in the Army, being commissioned between 1969 and 1974. Due to the short time span of my cases relative to the slow turnover of senior leaders, with most general officers having served for three decades (as Table 2.3 shows), I do not specifically test for evidence of generational change.

Table 2.3 YEARS THAT THE GENERAL OFFICERS IN 2007 HAD SERVED IN THE ARMY: Constraints on Identifying Generational Learning since the End of the Cold War

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Average Years in the Army</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Years to Make: Captain, 3; Major, 10; Lieutenant Colonel, 16; Colonel, 22

Source: Official biographies, U.S. Army

If the Army can overcome its cultural and organizational constraints, I expect internal changes can and will happen, despite the pessimism that most political science scholars have. However, as the result of these constraints, I expect there will be categories of changes that are effectively too difficult for the Army to change itself. Without an external stimulus requiring change, if the cultural constraints exist, I would not expect a fundamental change to occur in this area. As discussed in the introduction, these expectations form my primary nine research hypotheses. By better understanding what the Army is capable of changing and why, the Army, civilian leadership, and scholars can better work together to determine what changes—if any—can help
institutionalize the Army’s ability to innovate without needing to actively engage in combat.

In conclusion, it is clear that no scholar considers organizational change, whether focusing on a generic organization or the U.S. Army, will be simple, easy, or automatic. The culture, structure, environment and strategic tasks, top leaders and people will affect what the organization learns and even perceives reality to be, and any of these factors can constrain the organization’s ability to change. For instance, even when all leaders and employees—or in the Army’s case, officers and soldiers—agree that the organization needs to change and in what direction it must change, there are still structural and environmental reasons that this adjustment may not happen. Change as the result of experiential learning in the U.S. Army today will be even more difficult, since there is not a consensus about whether change is even needed. This comes at a time, however, that leaders of all ranks within the military, civilian leaders in the executive and legislature, and scholars are insisting that organization change must happen. My research provides empirical evidence that tests these varied explanations, while helping to update the long-outdated answers of why and how the institutional U.S. Army has changed since the end of the Cold War.
3.1 Introduction

Officers are not born sycophants, idiots or liars; they are men of normal intelligence and morals who quickly figure out where the carrots and sticks of the Army’s personnel system lie and adjust their behavior accordingly.  

In this chapter, I use the U.S. Army officer personnel management systems (OPMS), including a specific focus on the officer evaluation report (OER), to test why and how changes in the Army’s officer personnel management system have and have not happened since 1991. During this tumultuous period, the Army personnel system was not changed in major ways by internal or external stimulus. However, that the Army did voluntarily generate important changes—even without significant external requirements—makes this an interesting and important case to analyze.

Since the end of the Cold War, evidence overwhelming supports the conclusion that the Army changed its personnel system primarily due its leaders prioritizing expected requirements for the new strategic environment. As hypothesized, due to the limited degree of civilian knowledge of the personnel system, fewer direct links with technology, and the lower budget requirements for personnel actions (except indirectly as the Army downsized and applied lessons after the 1991 Gulf War), these factors provided only

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253 Christopher Bassford (Lt. Col. (Ret.)), The Spit-Shine Syndrome: Organizational Irrationality in the American Field Army (Greenwood Press), 1988, p. 89.

254 As mentioned in Chapter 1, I define a major change as something that alters the organization so that those participating before and after this change would have had fundamentally different experiences, perspectives, and/or skills and attributes. Important changes have a considerable effect on those in the organization but do not meet the threshold of a major change.
indirect stimuli for change during this period (summarized in Table 3.1). As the result, the Army had significant latitude to change its officer personnel system as it chose. Future-oriented threats were almost exclusively the motivation for changes during the 1990s. However, after difficulties in Iraq after 2003, the Army was able to create consensus that it needed to incorporate both the expected future and experiential lessons to guide officer personnel changes.

Table 3.1 WHEN, WHY, AND HOW IMPORTANT CHANGES OCCURRED IN THE U.S. ARMY OFFICER PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT SYSTEM, 1991-2007
(Note: no major changes, all listed are important)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cause of Change</th>
<th>Change Made</th>
<th>1997 OPMS</th>
<th>1997 OER</th>
<th>2006 OPMS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>External (Why)</td>
<td>Civilians</td>
<td>Low-Med</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Technology</td>
<td>Low-Med</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Budget</td>
<td>Med</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Industry</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internal (Why)</td>
<td>Experiential Learning</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Procedural Learning</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Inter-/intra-service Competition</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Strategic Environment</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(How)</td>
<td>Leader Priority</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Evidence from the case study suggests that the Army is not inherently a forward-looking versus lessons learned organization. Instead, during this time, its leaders were more easily able to create consensus on the need for change as the result of a new strategic environment. The expected future reinforced existing cultural and organizational predilections of the organization’s elite—infantry and armor—for prosecuting muddy-boots, high-intensity combat. Despite significant changes at the time,
tactical learning from the Army’s nation building interventions did occur throughout the 1990s. These lessons then allowed the Army to more rapidly institutionalize the changes when they also occurred during combat several years into the 2003 Iraq War. Until this time, the experiential lessons countered these tendencies; as a result, the organization resisted making these changes.

Why examine the OPMS? Scholars and practitioners have long recognized the ultimate importance of this system’s incentives in shaping behaviors. As discussed in Chapter 1, if the Army can change itself in any respect, it should be capable of shaping its officer corps’ composition. The Army jealously protects its right to promote, evaluate, and retain its own leaders. Only those deemed worthy by their seniors are asked to continue within the profession or be permitted to serve in the coveted assignments needed to reach the pinnacles of organizational power. Stephen Peter Rosen (1991) lauded an Army’s (officer) personnel system as the area of greatest leverage when trying to change the organization, since the organization could institutionalize promotional incentives to encourage and promote wise risk-taking, ingenuity, and thinking “outside the box.”255

Senior leaders and pundits also frequently cite this argument for the Army’s potential path for change within the new strategic environment, although little empirical research has been completed on this topic since Rosen wrote in 1991.

Army leaders only come from within the organization. Except for specialty branches, such as doctors and lawyers, all officers must enter the organization as junior lieutenants, with the ability to attain the rank of colonel (usually at year 22) no earlier

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than three years before one’s peers (see Table 3.2).\textsuperscript{256} Officers at each rank must successfully complete specific assignments and schools, excelling more than one’s peers at tasks that the organization values. Since Vietnam, the Army has used a centralized promotion board, held for each rank at least annually in Alexandria, Virginia, making this one of the most centralized systems in the institutional Army.

As a result of its institutional design, as this chapter’s opening quote cheekily asserted, what the Army prioritizes within its promotion system will have a direct effect on what paths that aspiring individuals choose to pursue. Most personnel changes are gradual and may take a generation for the effects to be felt, since officers usually remain within each of the middle to senior ranks for at least four to six years. And yet, personnel changes can have both short- and long-term effects on who remains, who excels, and who leads. For example, in January 2005, as the Army was beginning to be strained for officer volunteers after being involved in Afghanistan and Iraq for over two years, the Army’s Human Resource Command (HRC), which handles all personnel assignments and promotions, announced that it would prioritize officers who had deployed for leading those units preparing to deploy.\textsuperscript{257} Because wartime promotions prioritize successful commands in combat, by changing deployment incentives, the Army ensured that its most competent and rising leaders would volunteer to serve in Iraq and Afghanistan.

\textsuperscript{256} Officers’ records appear before promotion boards by their commissioning year group. One can be selected “below-the-zone,” or with the year group one senior, to the ranks of major, lieutenant colonel, and colonel. There are Congressional limits on the number that can be promoted early, based on how many officers there are in the year group, and the total number of below-the-zone selectees for any year is usually (much) less than five per cent of the whole list.

Table 3.2 RANKS AND AVERAGE YEARS OF SERVICE FOR PROMOTION FOR U.S. ARMY OFFICERS, AS OF 2007

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Symbol</th>
<th>Color</th>
<th>Years to be promoted (total)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Second Lieutenant</td>
<td>2Lt.</td>
<td></td>
<td>Gold</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First Lieutenant</td>
<td>1Lt.</td>
<td></td>
<td>Silver</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Captain</td>
<td>Capt.</td>
<td></td>
<td>Silver</td>
<td>3.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major</td>
<td>Maj.</td>
<td></td>
<td>Gold</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lieutenant Colonel</td>
<td>Lt. Col.</td>
<td></td>
<td>Silver</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colonel</td>
<td>Col.</td>
<td></td>
<td>Silver</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brigadier General</td>
<td>Brig. Gen.</td>
<td>★</td>
<td>Silver</td>
<td>varies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major General</td>
<td>Maj. Gen.</td>
<td>★★</td>
<td>Silver</td>
<td>varies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lieutenant General</td>
<td>Lt. Gen.</td>
<td>★★★</td>
<td>Silver</td>
<td>varies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General</td>
<td>Gen.</td>
<td>★★★★</td>
<td>Silver</td>
<td>varies</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Despite this autonomy and the monumental strategic and experiential changes since 1991, evidence suggests that the Army has only made three important changes to its personnel system. In addition, it made only one change primarily as the result of experiential learning, with the others made to respond to a new strategic environment and procedural learning. Due to its sole focus on mid-career officers within the OPMS changes and a procedural change to require better equity with the OER, evidence does not support the conclusion that the Army made any major changes in its officer personnel practices during this time. The three changes are significant and worth analyzing, however, considering the effect they have on the promotion potential for 99.5% of the
commissioned officers, who are ranked lieutenant through colonel. As a result, the three changes I examine are first, the Officer Personnel Management System (OPMS) XXI, implemented in 1997, which allowed all officers—not just those remaining in operational career fields—a reasonable opportunity to earn the rank of colonel and attain retirement status by serving at least twenty years. Second, I research the new OPMS implemented in 2006, which required all officers—even operational—to obtain experiential and educational breadth outside of Army operations. Third, I analyze the senior rater quota system, instituted with the OER in 1997, which prevented senior officers from over-inflating the percentage of top ratings they give.

The rest of this chapter includes five sections. In section 3.2, I highlight the major strategic events immediately prior to and during this time that either should have or did affect changes in the Army’s personnel systems. In section 3.3, I briefly describe the OPMS systems existing since Vietnam: OPMS I (1974), OPMS II (1985), OPMS XXI (1997), and OPMS (2006). In section 3.4, and most importantly, I explain why and how the system changed only twice during this tumultuous time. In section 3.5, I explore one specific part of the officer personnel management system, the Officer Evaluation Report (OER), and analyze its one important change throughout this time, despite the fact most officers strongly dislike the result. Finally, in section 3.6, I argue why more changes

258 DOPMA limited the number of general officers (GOs) that the Army could have. As a result, in 2008 the Army had 301 GOs, and just over 64,500 commissioned officers, totaling 0.46% of the officer personnel.

259 While Army jobs have continued to adjust, which this paper will help address, there is a fundamental difference in the Army with those remaining in their basic branch, or operational career field (e.g., infantry, armor, engineer, artillery, aviation, etc.), and those who at some time later in their career specialize into a functional area (e.g., strategic plans and policy, operational research, space operations, foreign area officer, acquisition, etc.). There are some basic branches (e.g. ordnance, transportation, military intelligence, signal, etc.) whose officers rarely specialize, although this paper will only refer to officers as being within the operational career field if they remain in their basic branch within the Maneuver, Fires, and Effect career field. See Appendix 3.1 for the current OPMS career fields.
have not occurred, and what can and should be done with respect to the Army’s officer personnel management system.

3.2 Critical Strategic Events

Before examining the personnel systems, it is critical to first understand the historical context, or environment, in which these changes were taking place. From a military perspective, this time was extremely tumultuous: the U.S.’s peer rival dissolved, while complex and convoluted challenges quickly emerged; the Army underwent an imposed, agonizing downsizing while completing less desirable missions; and the Army was forced to fight several difficult wars while transforming and growing. These changes, even in real budget cuts and how many people could remain in the Army, did not mandate changes in the personnel system. However, they created stress in the organization to the point that it was much easier to rally support for change once attempted. As such, I briefly highlight four categories of events that happened soon before and throughout this time period that should have had some effect on the Army’s personnel systems: the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986, the collapse of the Soviet threat in 1991 and massive Army downsizing (1991-96), the main Army interventions throughout the 1990s (1991 Gulf War, Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo), and Transformation, September 11th, and the Global War on Terrorism.

3.2.1 The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986

While Congress enacted this legislation outside of the time period under analysis, the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986\(^{260}\) has had a significant effect on the Army’s officer

corps. It is also the main example from 1986 through the end of my analyzed time period of Congress requiring personnel changes that determined the eligibility of those capable of making general officers. Senator Barry Goldwater and Representative Bill Nichols sponsored this legislation, which required the most dramatic defense reorganization since the National Security Act of 1947. Of primary interest to this research, it required the services to improve their joint officer management policies. It mandated specific educational and experiential requirements for officers prior to being assigned in a joint billet and before officers were selected for general officer ranks. It also required that officers with joint assignments would continue to be promoted at least on par with their service-only peers during the transition period.

Despite the recommendation originating from the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Army Chief of Staff in 1982, Goldwater-Nichols created serious angst within the Army for many years. CSA Gen. Carl Vuono, whose tenure went from 1987-91, repeatedly discussed the importance of supporting this policy while trying to minimize the disturbance it created within a personnel management system not designed to accommodate this demand. In June 1990, four years after its enactment, he even wrote a letter to all Army general officers saying as an organization the Army had to comply

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This led to the 1990 creation of the Army Acquisition Corps (AAC), and the Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvements Act of 1990 (DAWIA) placed additional requirements on Acquisition Corps officers, including to stay within the acquisition field for the remainder of their career. U.S. Army, How the Army Runs, Section 13-33.

with the law, highlighting Congress’s willingness to provide waivers to make the transition more manageable.²⁶²

3.2.2 The Soviet Union Collapse (1991) and Massive Army Downsizing (1991-96)

With one peer opponent for forty-five years, the U.S. Army designed its force structure, doctrinal, educational, training, and personnel systems to counter and defeat a Soviet invasion across the Fulda Gap. By 1986, as Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev announced policies of glasnost and perestroika, cumulative evidence began surfacing that the USSR was shifting policies. The countries’ relations gradually improved for the next five years, assisted by such decisions as the Soviets unilaterally withdrawing and disbanding entire divisions from Eastern Europe as early as February 1989.

Despite the thawing of political relations, the U.S. Army made very few voluntary changes throughout the late 1980s and early 1990s in response to these Soviet actions. Its predilection for conservative, pessimistic, and worst-case scenario planning led the Army to remain focused on the Soviet’s comparative advantage in conventional forces and equipment.²⁶³ In April 1989, CSA Vuono told the Infantry Commander’s Conference that although the Soviet rhetoric may be a precursor of peace, the U.S. Army had to “leave the talking to those who do not have an obligation to defend this nation.”²⁶⁴ That September, which was only two months before the fall of the Berlin Wall, he even said in a brief that “It’s evident that the Soviet military has taken a page from our book,” saying it was

²⁶² Carl Vuono, “Letter to Army General Officers,” Jun. 29, 1990. This waiver said that officers could get joint credit while working on the Army staff, through 1994, as long as they worked with other services.

²⁶³ For example, even after the withdrawals and downsizing, the Soviets in 1989 had a 2.5:1 advantage in tanks and artillery and a 1.8:1 advantage in aircraft. Carl Vuono, “Address to the Infantry Commander’s Conference,” Apr. 11, 1989.

becoming leaner, better prepared, developing more quality soldiers, and conducting
tougher training.\textsuperscript{265} In retrospect, these ideas seem comical, even though in 1990 a
Soviet official had been heard touting that the Soviet Army still had more tanks in its
inventory than the rest of the world combined.\textsuperscript{266} Not until October 1990 did the CSA
publicly acknowledge the dissolution of the USSR and Warsaw Pact was likely, although
Gen. Vuono reiterated the U.S.’s primary military threat still emanated from the Soviet
military.\textsuperscript{267}

The United States did not wait, however, to begin changing its Army. Reinforced
by a growing belief in the waning Soviet threat and in an attempt to curb the growing
deficit, Congress began imposing real budget cuts in 1986.\textsuperscript{268} Although the Soviet
implosion quickly resulted in Congress imposing colossal budgetary gashes, in 1987 the
Army leadership also chose to begin gradually reducing forces rather than having fewer
resources for readiness, training, research and development.\textsuperscript{269} While supporting some
“right-sizing,” even once it was clear the post-Cold War era had begun, CSA Vuono was
adamantly against completing drastic cuts to the Army’s personnel, based on national
security reasons. He concluded to Congress that “The Army of the mid-1990s will be a
perilously small land force [if remaining at the then-expected twenty divisions] for a

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{265} Vuono, “Address to the National Guard Association of the US Convention,” Sep. 22, 1989.
\item \textsuperscript{266} Vuono, “Address to the Veterans of Foreign Wars National Security Committee,” Mar. 4, 1990.
\item \textsuperscript{268} Steven Kosiak, “Historical and Projected Funding for Defense: Presentation of the FY 2007
Request in Tables and Charts,” \textit{Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments Update}, Apr. 7, 2006,
Table 2.
\item \textsuperscript{269} Richard Halloran, “Army is Speeding up Discharges to Limit Costs in Budget Squeeze,” \textit{New
\end{itemize}
nation with the United States’ superpower responsibilities.”\textsuperscript{270} The civilian leadership disagreed,\textsuperscript{271} and as Figure 3.1 displays, in only five years (1991-96) the Army reduced its active forces from 710,000 to 491,000, with 100,000 soldiers departing just in 1991.

\textbf{Figure 3.1 Active Duty U.S. Army Personnel, Total versus Officers, 1987-2012 (2008-12, Projections)}

Source Data: U.S. Department of Defense (DoD), “Selected Manpower Statistics,” Fiscal Year 2005, Defense Manpower Data Center, Statistical Information Analysis Division, Table 2-12, p. 53; and 1986, 2006 and 2007 figures from DoD website \url{http://siadapp.dmdc.osd.mil/personnel/MILITARY/Miltop.htm}

\textsuperscript{270} Vuono, “Statement before the Committee on Army Services, U.S. House of Representatives,” Feb. 20, 1991. The Secretary of Defense’s Bottom Up Review in Oct. 1993 recommended decreasing the number of divisions to eighteen—ten active and eight national guard—to stabilize the 495,000 soldier Army by 1996. Downsizing deliberately was a central focus of CSA Vuono, as he repeatedly discussed how personnel reductions following WWII, Korea, and Vietnam failed so badly because they did not try to shape or build down the Army, but rather to reduce it as quickly as possible. Vuono, \textit{Army 1990-91 Green Book}, Oct. 1990, in \textit{Collected Works}, p. 312.

\textsuperscript{271} Worley, p. 72.
3.2.3 Army Interventions throughout the 1990s

In addition to losing its main enemy and almost one-third of its personnel, the 1990s also involved the Army in many missions about which it was less than enthusiastic. The Army heralded its 1991 Gulf War victory, in which Iraq’s Saddam Hussein incredibly matched his weaknesses against the U.S.’s strengths. Learning both valuable and distorting lessons, most concluded from this ninety-six hour war that the Army had to continue modernizing with greater technology and precision warfare to remain relevant. This is also despite the fact that all of its other main interventions—including Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Kosovo—focused much more on nation building and humanitarian missions than high-intensity combat missions.

With the Army now much smaller than it had been previously, soldiers were deploying to the Balkans for (what seemed at the time to be) extended tours of six months. RAND determined that between 1994 and 1999, the number of soldier-days in which Army personnel were deployed to major operations and exercises doubled. They argued that this factor served as a metric for the total (and real) burden on the Army.272 While the operational tempo was straining, these deployments also provided valuable experiences for those within the Army. While not incorporated within the personnel system during the 1990s, the lessons officers learned while participating in these interventions foreshadowed and provided the foundation to meet many of the challenges the Army would face in the next decade. This happened despite the fact that many saw

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272 Ronald E. Sortor and J. Michael Polich, “Deployments and Army Personnel Tempo,” RAND Monograph 1417, 2001, p. xi. This report concluded that these deployments were not by themselves overstressing the force, as few entire units were redeploying, although they were exacerbating the personnel shortages, cross-leveling units, and continue to train and complete existing peacetime missions.
these deployments as training distractions from their real mission of fighting high-intensity combat.  

3.2.4 Transformation, 9/11, and the Global War on Terrorism

Even as the USSR was dissolving, Army leaders predicted that the country’s future challenges—citing international drug trafficking, terrorism, insurgency, and subversion of legitimate democratic regimes—would remain complex and span the full military spectrum. Under CSA Gen. Eric Shinseki’s tenure from 1999-2003, the Army began a transformation, known as modularity, into a lighter, more deployable force. Along with increased application of digital technology, the organization’s primary structure would shift from the division to the brigade. This transformation gained additional momentum and an increased digitization focus once President George W. Bush and Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld assumed office. The attacks on September 11, 2001, only reinforced the need for the Army to grow and change to meet the additional requirements in the Global War on Terrorism. As Figure 3.1 also highlights, the officer demands have also increased significantly since 2001. The Army is expected to increase through 2012, eventually totaling 547,400 in the active duty.

By Fall 2007, as the country was in its sixth year of combat in Afghanistan and fourth year in Iraq, the Army’s overstretched personnel situation was common knowledge to all. Media reports of rising rates of suicide, post-traumatic stress disorder, domestic

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275 U.S. Army divisions are typically comprised of three or more brigades and 10,000-20,000 soldiers, whereas brigades have 4,000-5,000 soldiers.
violence, family hardships, “stop loss” (involuntary extension of one’s service), and soldiers going jail after refusing to redeploy were no longer front page news, due to their more common occurrences. The once dreaded year-long move to Korea now seemed short, as combat tours lasted for fifteen months; and twelve months after returning home, the unit would return back to combat. Simultaneously, the officer promotions rates hovered in the high ninety percentile for mid-career officers, despite reports that officer retention remained fairly constant with retention rates prior to 9/11.

The reason for this seeming promotion-retention disconnect is the increased demand for mid-grade officers, largely representing the upward slope in the latter years in Figure 3.1. While reports of young officers fleeing the Army due to repeated deployments had become common, even by August 2007 data showed that this “exodus” had so far remained consistent with the relatively high departure rates of young officers over the past decade.276 Even Secretary of the Army Pete Geren and CSA Gen. George Casey (2007-present) acknowledged in 2007 that the future retention of young officers was “troublesome” due to the repeated, extended combat deployments.277 They also emphasized in their 2008 “U.S. Army Posture Statement” that six years of war had led to an Army “out of balance.”278

This demand-imbalance stemmed only in part from more officers needed in Iraq and Afghanistan. While at war, the Army also transformed from the division- to the

276 Interview with Dr. Leonard Wong, U.S. Army War College, and Col. Steven Galling, Col. Knudsen, Maj. Bubba Williams, and Maj. Jake LaPorte, Army G-1, Aug. 8, 2007. The G-1 personnel showed me the actual data, which supported this argument, although they admitted they were surprised with the results and were “waiting for the other shoe to drop” from the deployments.


brigade-based structure. The larger and more numerous brigade organizations increased
their personnel requirements without the division organization decreasing theirs.  
As a consequence, the Army grew its demands for officers by over 6,500 between January
2004 and September 2007, two-thirds being mid-grade officers (captains and majors).
The Army is projected to increase its demand by another 5,000 officers by September
2012, as the entire Army is expected to increase in size, with over half of these new
officer billets being mid-career captains and majors.  Meanwhile, over ninety per cent
of the Army’s officers enter at the most junior rank of second lieutenant.  As a result,
with existing practices the Army must assess more lieutenants, promote at a higher rate,
and/or attempt to retain more officers to meet this increase demand.

3.3 The U.S. Army Officer Personnel Management System (OPMS)

Despite the monumental change in the international system, repeated
interventions, and diminishing personnel in the Army, the Army’s Officer Personnel
Management System (OPMS) did not fundamentally change after the Soviet Union
collapsed until 1997. OPMS II, as it was called, was implemented in 1985 even before
Goldwater-Nichols, replacing the 1974 OPMS designed to shift the Army’s officer corps

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279 The active Army modularity growth from 2007-13 increased the brigade combat teams from thirty-five to forty-eight, the Multi-Functional Support Brigades from twenty-one to thirty-nine, the Functional Support Brigades from thirty-four to forty-one, and increased the Corps and Division headquarters’ size. U.S. Army G-1, “FY09 Program Review & Selected Manpower Topics, Briefing to Dr. David S. C. Chu (Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness),” Jul. 11, 2007.


281 Branches allowing direct commissioning to first lieutenant through colonel are Chaplain, Judge Advocate General (lawyers), Dental Corps, Medical Corps, Veterinary Corps, Army Nurse Corps, Medical Service Corps, and Army Medical Specialist. Between 2001-06, the Army averaged just over 750 total direct commissions between 1Lt. and Col. for all these branches. As a result of modularity, the Army’s needs for these specialists increased between 2004-12 by an additional 950 officers. U.S. Army G-1, 2007.
in response to the drastic post-Vietnam reductions and all-volunteer force.\textsuperscript{282} It also took almost another decade (2006), despite transformation, 9/11, and two combat interventions for the Army to make its second change in two decades. What took so long, and why did the Army change its OPMS when it did?

In this section, I first briefly highlight the four OPMSs since Vietnam—OPMS I (1974), OPMS II (1985), OPMS XXI (1997), OPMS (2006)—to describe the more important changes within each system (summarized in Table 3.4 at the end of this section). This helps provide the foundation for the next section that explains why changes took so long and how the changes finally happened when they did.

3.3.1 OPMS I (1974-85)

In 1970, as the Vietnam War was on-going, the U.S. Army War College conducted a study that led the CSA to direct a study on the officer personnel management system. The study started in 1971 and implemented the recommendations by 1974, with the U.S. Army’s \textit{Historical Summary} describing the new OPMS as “the most comprehensive study of officer personnel management since the Officer Personnel Act of 1947.”\textsuperscript{283} The 1974 OPMS’s focus was primarily designed to reorganize the greatly reduced Army and officer corps to prepare the Army to defeat the Soviet conventional threat in Europe, rather than learning from recently experiences in Southeast Asia.\textsuperscript{284} The officer corps composition drastically needed to shift, as half of its officers departed, while

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{283} Willian Gardner Bell and Karl E. Cocke (eds), \textit{Department of the Army Historical Summary Fiscal Year 1973} (Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History, United States Army), 1977, p. 72.
\item \textsuperscript{284} U.S. Army, “OPMS Study Group After Action Report, October 1984,” p. 3.
\end{itemize}
many combat support and combat service support units shifted to the reserve component due to their large operating expenses.

As a result of OPMS (I), the Army completed three main changes. First, it centralized all command selections for battalion commanders and higher, providing greater equity and standards to the Army’s middle leadership. Second, mid-career officers gained a second specialty in their eighth year, eliminating the pre-OPMS practice of assigning officers in many unrelated specialties throughout their careers. This way, officers could develop expertise and better apply these skills based on their experiences. Third, the Army also began coding some jobs as “branch immaterial,” allowing greater flexibility and expectations for officers filling more general positions.

3.3.2 OPMS II (1985-97)

OPMS II was primarily aimed at creating a branch-focused, “dual-track” system for only those officers who wanted to specialize outside of their basic branch. It relaxed the requirements for all officers to have two specialties, requiring officers to have only one branch, while allowing some officers to also have one “functional area” (see Appendix B for the current list of branches versus functional areas). OPMS II consolidated multiple specialties, previously totaling over 150, while making changes in specific functional areas. For example, it deleted “Community Activities Management,” but added permanent specialties for “Force Development,” “Combat Development,” and “USMA Permanent Faculty.” A pivotal requirement for promotion, however, was that all officers wanting to command at the next higher rank had to serve in “branch qualifying” jobs within their primary branch at each rank. An officer could still be promoted one higher rank without this ticket punched, but this also ensured it would be his or her final
promotion, if fortunate enough to happen. This allowed the Army to have more technicians it needed, considering the advances in technology, while still retaining its warriors and war fighting capabilities at all ranks.\textsuperscript{285}

OPMS II also implemented five additional changes to help fix problems identified in the officer corps. First, it established immaterial position codes by rank,\textsuperscript{286} since almost one-third of officers surveyed at the time responded that their current job was not directly related to any branch or specialty.\textsuperscript{287} Second, it required branch and functional area representatives, known as proponents and located in the greater Washington, D.C. area, to concur or non-concur with relevant changes that units made to their organizational structure, in an attempt to centralize personnel requirements. Third, the Army headquarters (HQDA) became the approving authority of all branch, functional area, and rank-based changes. Fourth, HQDA required all major commands and branch proponents to recode their jobs to include “branch immaterial” (could be filled by anyone) positions. Finally, HQDA coded all staff officer positions (battalion and higher) by their function. As a result, intelligence officers in all battalions, brigades, etc., would be intelligence officers, a unit’s chemical officer would be a trained chemical officer, etc. The OPMS II changes are summarized in Table 3.3.


\textsuperscript{286} The three codes it created were branch immaterial (01A), combat arms immaterial (02A), and logistics immaterial (03A).

Table 3.3 MAIN OPMS II CHANGES, Aimed to Streamline the U.S. Army’s Officer Classification System, From OPMS (1974) yo OPMS II (1985)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Branch</td>
<td>Branch</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Specialty</td>
<td>[deleted]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accession Specialty</td>
<td>[deleted]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Initial Specialty</td>
<td>[deleted]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Additional Specialty</td>
<td>[deleted]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Accession Specialty</td>
<td>Functional Area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special Skill Identifier (SSI)</td>
<td>Area of Concentration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Additional Skill Identified (ASI)</td>
<td>Skill</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


3.3.3 OPMS XXI (1997-2006)\(^{288}\)

By the mid-1990s, the Army was experiencing a serious disparity in officer requirements versus inventory, primarily at the field grade (major through colonel) level, which was having negative effects on the Army’s operational readiness. This demand-supply mismatch was largely caused by the post-Cold War downsizing, new operational demands, and legislative requirements.\(^{289}\) As a result, there were 3,400 more field grade officer jobs than officers, and the existing officers’ skills were out of proportion for the Army’s needs.

Other officer personnel management problems also intensified. Officers rotated jobs quickly, many serving only twelve months in their required, or “branch qualifying,”

\(^{288}\) In 2002, the Army G–1 changed the name to OPMS III (from OPMS XXI) to reflect that the system was progressive and evolving to support the emerging needs of the twenty-first century. For consistency, I continue to refer to it as OPMS XXI.

jobs as a major. Few officers chose to gain a functional area to remain competitive for promotion, while those who chose this “dual track” averaged eight-to-ten years between the specialized, functional area assignments. Those who did specialize, including those who spent time earning advanced degrees and important technical skills, were consistently skipped, or “passed over,” for promotion by their command-focused peers.

These problems also escalated as the world was shifting from the industrial to the information age. Requirements were no longer repetitive and predictable, as tasks were more complex, dynamic, and technologically-intense. This also required increased education for the Army to succeed in its strategic tasks. As a consequence, exactly when the Army needed more technical experts—a point highlighted by the 1991 Gulf War—the Army was removing or dissuading these officers from remaining within its ranks.

OPMS XXI’s main focus was to encourage specialists to remain in the Army while allowing operational (those remaining in their branch at accession) officers more time to gain experience in their branch. To accomplish this, OPMS XXI aligned officer branches and functional areas into four “career fields,” providing the Army competencies it thought it would need in the year 2010. Rather than having one path to make colonel, which the organizational leaders defined as professional success, OPMS XXI created four paths to allow all officers a reasonable opportunity to earn the rank of colonel and be eligible to retire (shown in Figure 3.2).

This change also aimed to shift the Army’s mindset with respect to non-operational careers. By allowing technical and strategic specialists to attain professional

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success, the Army recognized that other-than-operational functions were legitimate and valued parts of the organization. However, as organizational theory would expect, this formal change did not immediately adjust the Army’s culture. Many senior leaders in the Army—including a senior commander responsible for personnel assignments and management after OPMS XXI was implemented—openly argued that officers who chose to work in a functional area did so because they could not succeed within operational branches.292

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292 Repeated in multiple interviews with personnel from both the Pentagon’s Army G-1 (Personnel) and HRC, Summer 2007.
3.3.4 OPMS (2006 to present)

By the middle of the first decade of the twenty-first century, the unchanged Army personnel system was again severely strained. The Army was actively engaged in combat in Iraq and Afghanistan, while it was also transforming into and growing because of modularity (the shift to brigade-based units). OPMS XXI accomplished much of what it had intended, including attracting educated, specialized officers to serve within functional areas. Additionally by 2006, officers remaining in their basic branch were serving an average of two-to-three times longer in their critical development jobs as
majors, averaging almost three years, as one-third of the officers no longer had to compete for these positions.\footnote{U.S. Army Human Resource Command, “OPMS Update 2005-2006,” p. 1. This increase in time shows an independent effect of the policy change, as the total number of officers increased since 2001 (expecting ceteris paribus more competition for jobs, see Figure 3.1), while the increase in available jobs from modularity did not begin to occur in various units throughout the Army until 2004. Maj. Dave Lyle, Office of Economic and Manpower Analysis, suggested that I needed to account for these alternative explanations (Interview 2007).}

The problem, however, largely resulted from OPMS XXI working too well at dividing the educated specialists and operational generalists. Officers remaining in their basic branches were no longer receiving the breadth of assignments and education. Instead, these officers followed a very narrow career path, while functional area officers (one-third of all officers) were allotted most of these mind-stretching opportunities. As a result, those most eligible to attain the senior management levels (operational officers overwhelmingly make general officers) of the country’s largest organization had relatively little formal strategic preparation for their mission. In addition, there had also been vast strategic changes from when the senior leaders had developed their primary mental models during the Cold War. Simultaneously, repeated deployments and the 2004 decision to require all majors to attend the year-long military education at Ft. Leavenworth, Ks,\footnote{This school was previously known as Command and General Staff College (CGSC), which previously officers had to be selected to attend and served as a critical promotion and assignment discriminator. Following recommendations from the 2001 Army Training and Leader Development Panel (ATLDP), in 2004 the Army required all officers commissioned in 1994 and later to complete this course in residence.} made unrealistic demands on operational officers’ strict timelines to remain most competitive for promotion. Finally, the four promotion pyramids, which were originally grouped largely for numerical reasons despite significant consternation,\footnote{Interview with Lt. Col. Mark Lukens, former officer in HRC and the Army G-1 (2007). As a result, one of the four career fields included Foreign Area Officers (the Army’s soldier statesmen,} were not aligned by their battlefield position or function.
As a result, the Army implemented a new OPMS (without numbering) in 2006 to balance the Army’s need for both “generalist” (within the operations branches) and specialists, as depicted in Figure 3.3. OPMS adjusted OPMS XXI in four primary ways. First, it focused on growing multi-skilled leaders, or what it called officer “pentathletes,” throughout their career by broadening their experience, exposure, and education. An officer would follow an “axis with boundaries” rather than one prescriptive path.\textsuperscript{296} OPMS also reclassified certain jobs to allow officers with relevant competencies to compete for an assignment, rather than the position only being filled by those in a pre-determined branch or functional area. Second, it reorganized the four career fields into three functionally aligned groups for promotion and management (see Appendix B). Third, it established the first Army officer retention branch within HRC and created a task force devoted solely to evolving the OPMS. Finally, OPMS changed the definition of command\textsuperscript{297} and revised the command select categories for battalion command, brigade command, and those designated as “key” assignments.

In sum, OPMS is attempting to move away from the strict time-driven, promotion-centric system. Officers are supposed to be afforded a greater breadth of opportunities, which both maximize the officer’s competencies and develop better strategic thinkers throughout its ranks. In addition to greater opportunities, officers can decide whether or not to compete in command selection boards, allowing them to take


\textsuperscript{297} The new definition added leadership, accountability, and unit readiness to the definition of command, eliminating what had been called Acquisition Corps commands. These leaders are now called product managers and project managers. U.S. Army Human Resource Command, “The Officer Personnel Management System, Commander/Trainer package,” Version 2A, Alexandria, Va., 2006, pp. 37-41.
greater ownership of their career, and OPMS relaxes the strict time windows in which officers must complete key assignments. Finally, OPMS also eliminated the OPMS numbering, signaling the intent that the personnel management system would continually evolve to meet new challenges, rather than wait another decade to make important changes. The OPMS Task Force would help ensure it continually evolved rather than waiting another decade to change.298

![Diagram showing the balance between Generalist and Specialist that OPMS (2006) was designed to attain in the U.S. Army Officer Corps.](image)


In conclusion, the U.S. Army officer personnel management system has undergone four discrete changes since the end of Vietnam, approximately every decade (summarized in Table 3.4). These changes have primarily focused on mid-career officers (major to colonel, or those with ten to thirty years experience), aiming to improve the processes responsible for developing the Army’s future operational and institutional leaders. Changes from 1974-97 increasingly allowed (and required) officers to specialize; OPMS (2006) reversed this trend to develop officers with a greater breadth of

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expertise. The reasons for these changes, and why other changes did not happen, are discussed in the following section.

Table 3.4 SUMMARY OF THE MAJOR CHANGES TO THE OFFICER PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT SYSTEM (OPMS), U.S. Army, Post-Vietnam OPMS (1974) to OPMS (2006)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Focus of Change</th>
<th>Major changes</th>
<th>Main factors addressing</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>OPMS (I)</td>
<td>1974</td>
<td>Company &amp; Field Grade Officers (captain-colonel)</td>
<td>Dual specialties (versus an unlimited number); Restructure force mix; Centralized selection for command</td>
<td>1) Adjust for Post-Vietnam downsizing; 2) Reorganize to fix over-strength Company Grade Combat Arms; 3) Minimize type of jobs done outside primary branch to only two; 4) Fill branch immaterial jobs with appropriately skilled officers; 5) Centralized to HQDA all battalion and higher commands’ selection boards</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPMS II</td>
<td>1985</td>
<td>Field Grades (major-colonel)</td>
<td>Dual-track careers for most officers</td>
<td>1) Created two-track careers for most officers; 2) Coded branch immaterial jobs for any officer; 3) Created more centralized decision making for branches; 4) Made Operations-only path to colonel (and general officer)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPMS XXI</td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>Field Grades (major-colonel)</td>
<td>Create senior specialists; Non-Operational can make colonel</td>
<td>1) Eliminated de facto Operations-only path to colonel by creating four career fields able to make colonel; 2) Created promotion incentives to retain officers with advanced education and technical skills</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPMS</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>Field Grades (major-colonel)</td>
<td>Focus on creating “Pentathletes”</td>
<td>1) Balanced functional specialization and generalization since all officers (especially Operations) needed education and breadth; 2) Institutionalized evolving process of OPMS updates</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(2006)
3.4 Why the Officer Personnel Management Systems Changed When It Did

Having described the strategic environment, critical events, and what changes the Army made in its personnel system from 1991-2007, I finally focus on why these changes took place when they did. With the extraordinary amount of change external to the Army occurring relative to that happening within the personnel system, it would seem to provide overwhelming support to schools of thought that argue the Army is incapable of changing itself. And yet, the Army did make important changes to its personnel system in both 1997 and 2006, while institutionalizing a permanent task force to update the personnel system with the latest OPMS.

As shown in Table 3.5, most causal factors of change for OPMS lower the probability of major changes occurring. Externally, civilian leaders have a general level of knowledge of human resource systems, although they have less specific understanding of the Army’s personnel intricacies. New technology and the defense industry play minimal, if any, role in system-wide changes, while most budgetary impacts affect either macro decisions (such as the total number of officers) or programs that reward or provide incentives for indirect personnel matters (such as advanced education to help with retention and prepare for promotions).
Internally there are four important, hypothesized constraints to change. This is critical, especially considering the lack of external pressure for change and the fact that the Army jealously protects its ability to change its officer corps. First, personnel officers make decisions far from the battlefield, even though they continuously have career discussions with officers throughout the Army. Second, the Army cannot promote more officers nor more quickly promote officers than the other military services, and there is little competition for promotion or retention among the services once officers are commissioned. Third, those responsible for making personnel changes do not have significant time to reflect on a new strategic environment, as they have many other responsibilities for active duty soldiers and those mobilized onto active duty. For instance, Army personnel officers are responsible for warrant officer and enlisted manpower management, all human resource functions, recruitment, promotions,

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300 This is as the result of the 1980 Defense Officer Personnel Management Act (DOPMA).
transition to retirement, personnel assignments, oversight on civilian education, equal opportunity, and casualty notification and assistance.  

Finally, the likelihood of creating consensus for change is also extremely low. Institutionally, the Army centralizes its officer personnel management decisions in two main offices: the CSA himself, as the senior officer in the organization; and the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel (DCSPER), later called the Army G-1\(^\text{302}\) (in the Pentagon), and its subordinate Human Resource Command (closely located in Alexandria, Virginia; see Appendix C). As a result, for an important OPMS change to occur, these three leaders—especially the CSA—would need to prioritize the change. Most officers would also be intensely interested in potential OPMS changes, since these directly determine how the organization defines professional success. Culturally, the likelihood of acceptance is largely dependent on whether potential changes support or undermine the organization’s fundamental warrior cultural attributes or the maneuver branches’ relative organizational power. Creating positive sum changes, in which all officers would be “winners” within the promotion system, are extremely difficult. In addition, the Army’s leadership can only prioritize a few major factors simultaneously. Consequently, changes will most likely be gradual and evolutionary until the system is so stressed that the Army leaders can create overwhelming consensus on the need for and direction of change.  

Especially in a centralized system, organizational theorists expect the organization’s leader and top team to have a determining effect on change. My analysis of why and how OPMS changes occurred thus concentrates on the CSAs, the Army G-1s, the

\(^{301}\) These are just a few examples. See U.S. Army, “Military Human Resource Management,” *How the Army Runs*, Ch. 13, pp. 287-316.  

\(^{302}\) While this was their historical nomenclature, the Army reinstituted the calling of the DCSPER as the Army G-1 in Dec. 2001. Gary Sheftick, “Army realigns headquarters, centralizes base operations,” Army News Service, Dec. 18, 2001.
and HRC. Since Army CSAs serve four years terms, there have only been six CSAs since the end of the Cold War, if one includes Gen. Carl Vuono whose tenure ended in June 1991 (see Table 3.6).

Table 3.6 CHIEFS OF STAFF (CSA), U.S. ARMY, SINCE THE END OF THE COLD WAR (1991-2008)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Dates</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dennis J. Reimer:</td>
<td>Jun. 20, 1995-Jun. 21, 1999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>George W. Casey, Jr.:</td>
<td>Apr. 10, 2007-present</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Army made two main changes to its OPMS during my time period. To explain these, I divide the remainder of this section into two parts: why changes to OPMS II, and then to OPMS XXI, took so long. While addressing the motivation for changing and not changing the personnel systems, I also explore how the systems were organizationally able to change once the decision was made that change was needed. Evidence suggests that the Army can change itself as the result of learning lessons and adapting to a new strategic environment, with the greater number of officers and their intensity of their experiences directly related with the probability of institutionalization occurring. There is a preponderance of evidence, however, that many prospective changes did not meet these thresholds. There is clear evidence that CSAs drive change in the Army, and on what they chose to focus largely explained why so little happened with the personnel system during this time.
3.4.1 Why Changes to Officer Personnel Management System II Took So Long

Evidence strongly suggests that the motivation for changing the Army officer personnel system in 1997 was largely caused by its own perceived need to adapt to the new post-Cold War strategic environment. The Army leadership realized that the future would be more complex, requiring more specialists and capabilities across the spectrum of war-fighting and humanitarian operations. The OPMS remained focused on promoting those with traditional combat functions to the most senior leadership roles. However, by allowing specialists to have a reasonable chance of attaining the rank of colonel, the Army was shifting to better align its internal capabilities with the competencies it thought would be needed. Its lessons from the 1991 Gulf War reinforced this need, although more of the technology-based changes played only an indirect role in the Army’s personnel changes, while little evidence for this reason explains the timing. In addition, while lessons from the repeated interventions were not ignored, justification for the 1997 changes did not explicitly recognize the need to develop officers for these types of missions.

The timing of OPMS XXI was primarily driven by organizational process delays, focus on other priorities, and expected civilian-imposed changes rather than other events throughout the mid-1990s. In addition to prioritizing other macro-level changes needed to reduce the active Army by one-third, the Army’s penchant for providing overwhelming, substantive evidence to convince its leaders across the organization delayed this change. In addition, many in the Army believed that the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and/or Congress were going to make additional budget cuts
in 1996 or 1997, and did not want to adjust the system before these changes (that did not materialize) occurred.\textsuperscript{303}

There is little evidence that the civilians in the executive branch or Congress put much pressure on the Army leadership to make specific officer personnel changes, except to get smaller. As a result, the civilian-imposed argument for change is less persuasive. In fact, Congress was amiable to Army suggestions of changing job requirements, it provided funding to make the voluntary separations easier, and Congress waived certain DOPMA constraints to allow the Army to continue bringing in a sufficient number of officers.\textsuperscript{304} While obviously biased, as a senior staffer from the House Armed Services Committee said, “Congress gave the services a lot of flexibility and resources and simply asked to be kept up to date on how they were going to downsize and what groups they were going to target.”\textsuperscript{305}

The Army leadership did spend significant time and effort beginning in January 1993 transitioning to the new Clinton Administration, as happens with all administration turnovers, although it is not clear this process resulted in any specific personnel policy recommendations. The Army provided analysis for the new Secretary of Defense Les Aspin’s “Bottom Up Review” to analyze the military’s needed posture and capabilities. The administration’s early proposals to relax the military’s homosexual policies also created “considerable controversy and diverted even more of the leadership’s attention


\textsuperscript{305} McCormick, p. 102.
and energy.”306 In addition, the (civilian) Secretary of the Army position went unfilled for over a year. As a result, the influence from the civilian leadership was at most a distraction or reason for delay, as opposed to causing the specific changes.

Gen. Vuono spent his tenure as CSA (1987-91) focused on strengthening what he dubbed the six Army imperatives, which included quality people and leader development.307 Efforts to make progress were also strongly balanced by the need to make significant budget cuts, personnel draw downs, and fewer available recruits in society from which to draw throughout most of his tenure. The early Reagan years had been financial feasts for the military, although the constraining budgetary effects and lowering of the Soviet threat made CSA Vuono’s challenges much different than his predecessors.

In addition, the Army was still removing large numbers of competent officers from its ranks to remain in compliance with DOPMA. When discussing the OPMS changes in 1984, the Army specifically stated that Army officers needed to “be aware of reality…[that they may not be able to get promoted, since] there just wasn’t room to promote all who were fully qualified.”308 Officer promotion rates in the 1980s to captain were ninety-two per cent; with only eighty per cent of those remaining selected to major, seventy per cent of those selected to lieutenant colonel, and only fifty per cent of those earned colonel.309 In speeches, CSA Vuono (1987-91) focused overwhelmingly on

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enlisted soldiers when discussing quality people, since at the time, only they posed real challenges in recruiting and retention.\textsuperscript{310}

Due to all of these urgent needs, the Army did not prioritize changing its officer personnel management system. CSA Vuono and his senior leaders understood the interdependence of the six imperatives, in line with what organizational theorist Charles Perrow called interactive complexity, of these systems. As Perrow explains, complex interactions (in contrast to linear interactions) have unfamiliar, unexpected, or unplanned sequences, which are either not immediately visible or comprehensible.\textsuperscript{311} In interviews with Lt. Gen.(Ret.) Theodore Stroup, who served in critical resource and personnel management positions throughout the 1980s and early 1990s before serving as DCSPER from 1994-97,\textsuperscript{312} he described the linkage among the personnel, leader development, training, and education systems as resembling bubble lamps and spider webs: All parts are constantly in motion and intricately weaved together in different ways over time. As a result, he advocated the need to continually evolve the personnel system since it was not possible to create the perfect personnel system for time immemorial.\textsuperscript{313} In light of the other events happening at this time, updating OPMS II was not prioritized.

\textsuperscript{310} U.S. Army, \textit{Collected Works}, 1992. In the entire 475 page book, there were only two mentions of quality officers (pp. 48, 68), which the CSA described as critical although not appearing to be a primary concern of his. Discussions of quality (enlisted) soldiers appeared on twenty-two pages, with soldier recruiting and retention issues included on another twenty-six pages.

\textsuperscript{311} Charles Perrow, \textit{Normal Accidents: Living with High-Risk Technologies} (Ny.: Basic Books), 1984, p. 78.

\textsuperscript{312} Lt. Gen.(Ret.) Stroup spent significant time throughout his career in critical Army institutional jobs, including to serve as engineer personnel management officer, U.S. Army Military Personnel Center (1973-76); manpower analyst in the Office of the Chief of Staff (1976-78); executive officer to the Army Vice Chief of Staff (1985-86), deputy director of the Headquarters Reorganization Study, Army Reorganization Commission, under the Office of the Secretary of the Army; Deputy Chief of Staff for Resource Management, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command; Director for Military Personnel Management in the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel; and Director for Program Analysis and Evaluation in the Office of the Chief of Staff.

\textsuperscript{313} Interview with Lt. Gen.(Ret.) Stroup (2007).
Gen. Gordon Sullivan assumed the CSA position in June 1991, nine days after Boris Yeltsin was popularly elected president of Russia. Budget cuts continued, forces were relocating back to the U.S. after the 1991 Gulf War, and the Army was massively downsizing. Just in 1991, 100,000 active duty soldiers departed, and the military closed seven hundred bases by 1998. CSA Sullivan was a great force for change in the Army, although his priority was to change the organizational processes and begin to change people’s mindsets, which would then allow the Army to change itself following the end of the Cold War. He thought the Army as an organization was too inflexible and purposely slow, which would prevent it from adjusting to its new environment. However, he also believed that “the Army could absorb only so many changes at any one time without losing its ability to respond to crises.” As a consequence, maintaining readiness and modernizing, while massively downsizing the Army, became his two central foci. He concentrated on updating organizational concepts and equipment, largely by using simulations, scheduled maneuvers, and exercises, in order to test the new systems and concepts, in a process he dubbed the Louisiana Maneuvers (LAM).

Despite what now seems to be clear reasons for change, CSA Sullivan’s ideas created significant dissent from even the highest levels. Even as the leader of a

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314 The USSR officially dissolved between Dec. 25-31, 1991, as Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev resigned and ceded all power on the 25th to the Russian president and all Soviet institutions stopped functioning by the end of the year.


316 Yarrison, p. v.

317 Yarrison, p. 18.

318 Department of the Army Military History Information Paper, “General Officers as Special Assistants to the Chief of Staff of the Army,” Jul. 21, 2007, p. 5. LAM was named after Gen. George C. Marshall’s pre-WWII General Headquarters exercise in Louisiana, Texas, and the Carolinas, in which they conducted experiments that became the basis for designing new WWII units and battlefield processes. Yarrison, pp. 1-3.
hierarchical organization, he realized he could not mandate unilateral change or expect others to simply follow his verbal guidance to implement this change.\textsuperscript{319} For instance, the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and later Vice Chief of Staff of the Army (VCSA), Lt. Gen. J.H. Binford Peay III, strongly opposed LAM, thinking the current processes—for which he was directly responsible—could adequately manage the needed changes.\textsuperscript{320} While incorporating some of Peay’s suggestions, the CSA proceeded with his plan. Gen. Sullivan did, however, begin regular meetings among the fully involved senior Army generals, which he called the “Board of Directors,” (BoD) to include them within all strategic issues and needed changes. They also added a subordinate General Officers Working Group (GOWC) to recommend issues and develop the agenda for the BoD, increasing the number of general officers within the change process. The CSA also created the LAM Task Force, whose daily job was to guide this process for the CSA and his project deputy, the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine (TRADOC) commander, while also working with both the BoD and GOWC.\textsuperscript{321}

With nine months remaining as CSA, Gen. Sullivan appointed Lt. Gen. Stroup as DCSPER to begin focusing on needed officer personnel changes. Not a stranger to helping change the institutional Army, Stroup had been the main architect of the plan to downsize the Army, which was almost complete by his assignment in September 1994. While he had been involved in proposing updates to OPMS II and the existing Officer Evaluation Report (OER) to the VCSA and CSA since 1989, once the planning for the

\textsuperscript{319} This book identified this as an organizational strength, since blindly following “would have been dangerous for him and the organization.” Yarrison, p. 17.

\textsuperscript{320} Yarrison, pp. 17-19.

\textsuperscript{321} The LAM Task Force presented its ideas to and received recommendations from the CSA, the LAM deputy, the BoD, and the GOWC. Yarrison, pp. 20-21.
1991 Gulf War began, potential changes to the officer personnel system had been placed on hold.\footnote{Interview with Lt. Gen.(Ret.) Stroup (2007).} In addition to reestablishing stability in the officer management process and adjusting to a significantly smaller active duty Army,\footnote{McCormick, p. 100.} the leaders recognized that Army assignments needed to finally reflect the smaller population.\footnote{This included the Congressional Title VII (1992) and XI (1993) Legislation requirements that mandated active duty component officers help advise reserve component units (known as AC/RC advisors).}

Approximately one year into his tenure, in early 1996 CSA Gen. Dennis Reimer (1995-99) convened the Precursor Study Group, led by Stroup, to determine whether or not a formal study of the OPMS was needed. Considering the magnitude of strategic and organizational changes since OPMS II was enacted in 1985, it is not surprising that they found the entire management system needed to be changed to create officers for the twenty-first century.\footnote{As stated by DCSPER Maj. Gen. David Ohle in Mary Blake French, “OPMS XXI—and integrated strategy,” \textit{Army}, Feb 1997.} In a 2007 interview, Stroup specifically stated that his focus in recommending changes was to project forward to what competencies would be needed in future engagements, rather than consider the lessons the Army had learned. He argued that his position allowed—and required—him to think about the future rather than just survive in the present,\footnote{Interview with Lt. Gen.(Ret.) Stroup (2007).} which is understandable considering the magnanimity of geostrategic change occurring during his tenure in senior advisory positions. Looking at sixty issues within OPMS II, the study identified that fifty-seven had problems (synthesized in the previous section). With this evidence, in May 1996, Stroup
recommended that the CSA initiate a formal study to determine what was needed to change with OPMS II.\textsuperscript{327}

CSA Reimer convened the OPMS XXI Task Force, led by Maj. Gen. David Ohle, in July 1996. For one year, thirty-one officers from various branches and specialties worked with people throughout the Army, private consultants, and other military services to determine what needed to be changed. Interestingly, twenty-five of the thirty-one officers selected for this task force did not have personnel assignment nor human resource management experience. The lack of personnel job experience included Ohle, who was preparing to take an infantry command in Georgia.\textsuperscript{328} What these officers did bring, though, was a wide array of experiences and perspectives of the Army and leadership, while also providing requisite legitimacy with leaders throughout the organization for their recommendations. This proved critical when trying to change the system that personally affected all officers, which is why personnel changes are so difficult for the Army to conduct internally. From their final report, the OPMS XXI Task Force identified an astonishing twenty-one categories of people or organizations as their important stakeholders to incorporate and socialize (see Table 3.7).\textsuperscript{329} This did not include the OPMS XXI Task Force Council of Colonels, which included over seventy-five colonels from all major commands and major subordinate commands, which the task force briefed quarterly for feedback and ideas.


\textsuperscript{328} French, 1997.

Table 3.7 CATEGORIES OF IMPORTANT STAKEHOLDERS FOR THE U.S.
ARMY’S OPMS XXI CHANGES, 1995-96 (Note: Does not include permanent members
of the OPMS XXI Task Force [n = 30] and the OPMS XXI Task Force Council of
Colonels [n > 75])

1. Chief of Staff of the Army
2. Directors of key Army implementation
   agencies (TRADOC, DCSOPS, 
   DCSPER, and PERSCOM)
3. Chief of Staff of the Army’s Board of
   Directors (his four-star general 
   advisors)
4. Selected members of Congress
5. Secretary of Defense & Office of the 
   Secretary of Defense
6. Secretary of the Army
7. Joint Staff
8. Vice Chief of Staff of the Army
9. Asst. Secretary of the Army for 
   Manpower & Reserve Affairs
10. Asst. Secretary of the Army of 
    Financial Management
11. Asst. Secretary of the Army for
    Research Development and
    Acquisition
12. Major command (MACOM) 
    commanders
13. Asst. Vice Chief of Staff of the 
    Army
14. Chief of National Guard Bureau
15. Corps commanders
16. Inspector General of the Army
17. Deputy Under Secretary of the 
    Army for Operations Research 
    (DUSA/OR)
18. Judge Advocate General
19. Division commanders
20. Army branch school commandants
21. Army functional area proponents


Despite the overwhelming need for change, Army leaders felt compelled to create
a detailed justification for the plan before enacting changes. OPMS XXI began to be
implemented in October 1997, and its changes were designed to gradually take effect
over the following five years.330 By February 1997, however, the Army leadership was
already actively informing the officer corps for its reasons for change and what these
changes would mean, in order to counter the widespread angst and potential turbulence.
With the new Officer Evaluation Report being implemented at the same time (by design,
explained in more detail next section), each officer was required to attend a briefing and
have the opportunity to ask questions of their senior leaders about these changes.

330 Donna L. Coffman, “OPMS to OPMS XXI: Then, Now and the Future – What does it mean to
While lessons from the Army’s interventions throughout the early 1990s—Somalia, Haiti, and Bosnia—can be implied from some of the changes, evidence does not support that these interventions provided the pivotal direction for personnel changes. In the OPMS XXI Task Force’s final report’s “case for change,” they identified three main components to which the new OPMS had to be able to respond: power projection, organizing around information, and complexity and operational tempo on the future battlefield. They clearly prioritized the ability to understand and apply technology, which the 1991 Gulf War helped reinforce. During this decade, the Army created the mission that its job was “to fight and win the nation’s wars”; and the task force explicitly stated that it was not creating a system to undermine this war-fighting focus. As a result, evidence strongly suggests that adapting to the future—as opposed to learning from the past—played the critical role in the 1997 officer personnel management system changes.

While there were mixed reactions to the changes, evidence suggests there are at least four main reasons why the Army was able to make this internally-driven change. First, there was an obvious change in the strategic environment, providing overwhelming professional justifications for change. Second, there was a significant strain on the officers personally and professionally, due to the frequent job (and location) changes, and

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332 In reviewing all of CSA Gen. Carl Vuono’s (1987-91) main speeches, he did not once make reference to or imply this concept. Collected Works for the 31st Chief of Staff, U.S. Army: Carl E. Vuono, Jun. 1987-Jun. 1991 (U.S. Army Publications). U.S. Army Historian and USMA Professor Col. Ty Seidule credits this motto’s origination with the expected addition of gays and lesbians in the military with President Bill Clinton. The intent was that the Army was a fighting organization rather than an organization to promote social agendas. Interview (2007).

difficulty in officers being assigned in critical jobs needed for promotion. Both of these factors made achieving consensus for change even easier.

Third, the designers created a win-win change for the operational officers and specialists, by creating four paths, or promotion pyramids, to earn the rank of colonel (see Figure 3.2). Now, successful officers who specialized had a better probability of making colonel without having to compete for and excel in operations-type jobs. This allowed the Army to retain those with advanced degrees while gaining a greater depth of knowledge and experience in this specialization, which the organization needed in this more technologically-based, complex security environment. Even more important to the organization, though, was the fact that one-third fewer officers would now be competing for these critical “command-track” positions, providing the maneuver officers more time and less competition to professionally develop as war-fighters. With DOPMA’s requirement for the Army to continue its “get promoted or depart the Army (up-or-out)” policy, in addition to the structural imbalance of jobs to personnel, by the mid-1990s most majors were only serving one year in these key jobs when most senior leaders argued they needed at least two.

Finally, the CSA prioritized this change and led a rigorous information campaign to explain these changes, first through the Council of Colonels and twenty-one categories of senior stakeholders; and second, to the officers across the organization. Only by changing based on extensive research, a clear need, making changes that did not undermine the maneuver branches, and with the recognized need for collaboration was

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334 For example, key operational jobs include operations (S-3) officer, executive officer (XO), and battalion/brigade commander.

335 U.S. Army, “OPMS XXI Final Report,” pp. 4-10 to 4-11.
the system able to change as and when it did. The Army did not change the requirements for selecting general officers, which overwhelmingly was based on those colonels succeeding in (operational) brigade commands, and officers still had to serve in operations assignments before switching into functional areas. As a result, evidence does not support that this was a major change that fundamentally altered the muddy-boots culture\textsuperscript{336} or composition of those leading the Army.\textsuperscript{337}

3.4.2 Why Changes to Officer Personnel Management System XXI Took So Long

After taking a decade to make changes to the officer personnel system while identifying itself as a learning organization, those optimistic of the Army’s ability to change itself would be less enthusiastic that it took the Army nine more years before making significant changes again to its officer personnel system. This delay is despite the fact that the OPMS XXI Task Force identifying this lack of a review mechanism, or “way to look at the future,”\textsuperscript{338} in OPMS II. Why did the system change in 2006, and more importantly, why did it not change earlier?

There were few substantial civilian requirements placed on the Army personnel system between 1997 and 2006, with the main exception being the requirement to increase in size after 9/11. Congress did not pass any major relevant legislation to the personnel system, and the executive branch did not recommend or require any significant changes in the Army personnel system. There was public dissonance between former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and the senior Army leadership, especially CSA Shinseki, and OSD strongly supported the Army’s structural and technological

\textsuperscript{337} Repeated in interviews with G-1 and HRC personnel (2007).
\textsuperscript{338} French, 1997.
advancements. The war in Iraq, however, provided overwhelming evidence (through personal experience) to those throughout the Army that their lessons throughout the 1990s with peace keeping were more consistent with their future requirements than most had hoped. With extremely intense deployments, the motivation for change at all levels also dramatically rose during this time, culminating with the changes in 2006.

Gen. Shinseki became CSA in June 1999, arriving with significant experience in Europe and nation building deployments. He was extremely concerned about transforming and modernizing the Army into an organization capable of deploying strategically into urban areas, which he thought were the most likely challenges the Army would face in the twenty-first century.\textsuperscript{339} The Army’s Transformation Campaign Plan, which the Army began implementing well before Secretary Rumsfeld intensified and publicized the efforts, focused on updating the Army’s main doctrine,\textsuperscript{340} organization,\textsuperscript{341} and materiel.\textsuperscript{342} Once beginning the transformation project, CSA Shinseki was also concerned by the intense and unhealthy competition that surfaced to control the process between the major Army commands and the Army staff. As a result, in October 2000 he also created a task force, which he dubbed the Objective Force Task Force, to focus and lead this operation. Their job was to focus primarily on the major equipment, structural and technological changes that the Army needed.\textsuperscript{343}

\textsuperscript{339} Department of the Army Military History Information Paper, “General Officers as Special Assistants to the Chief of Staff of the Army,” Jul. 21, 2007, pp. 5-6.

\textsuperscript{340} Especially Field Manual (FM) 1, \textit{The Army}, and FM 3-0 (former 100-5), \textit{Operations}.

\textsuperscript{341} The main focus was on fielding the Initial Brigade Combat Team (IBCT) and developing concepts for the interim division (IDIV) and Objective Force.

\textsuperscript{342} The main focus with respect to materiel modernization was—and remains in 2008—on the Future Combat Systems (FCS).

\textsuperscript{343} Department of the Army Military History Information Paper, p. 6. The task force was led by Maj. Gen. Joseph M. Cosumano, Jr. and then Lt. Gen. Johnny M. Riggs.
The OPMS XXI Task Force had recommended in 1997 to the DCSPER and CSA that the personnel system continually needed to be assessed rather than wait for significant organizational strain. Not only did they combine the officer development processes into one system to more easily permit this, but they also began an annual review and update to the CSA of the entire system to permit the decision making to be proactive rather than reactive. While these updates continued through 2001, after 9/11 they quickly lost their priority. When Lt. Gen. F.L. Hagenbeck became the senior Army personnel officer (then called the G-1 rather than DCSPER) in November 2003, he estimated it had been at least eighteen months since the G-1 and CSA had discussed in detail any changes needed to OPMS XXI.

In addition to having other organizational foci, including initiating and prosecuting operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, it is also important to remember that CSA Shinseki spent much of his tenure implementing OPMS XXI. OPMS XXI was designed to be fully in place by September 2002, only nine months before the end of CSA Shinseki’s tenure. Just as creating the system could not be accomplished by fiat, the time and attention needed to ensure these adjustments worked took time, from altering promotion and selection boards, changing the organizational systems, and recoding and assigning new personnel requirements. In addition, as previously mentioned, the G-1 has many other responsibilities for active duty soldiers and those mobilized onto active duty. As one example, even during the 2003 Iraq War, the

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Army G-1 remained responsible for annually recruiting 170,000 soldiers, which is the total amount of marines in the U.S. Marine Corps.\textsuperscript{348} The Army’s personnel command, known as PERSCOM, also reorganized to the Human Resources Command (HRC) in October 2003, adding internal bureaucratic demands to the organization responsible for recommending and managing these changes.

Another reason that change was delayed was that Gen. Shinseki initiated several critical information-gathering studies. As with previous changes, having existing evidence that the organization needed to change how it prepared its leaders to think was critical to create consensus for change among leaders. Unfortunately for rapid change, compiling the information takes time. One of the most important projects was the Army Training and Leader Development Panels (ATLDP), which focused on the Army’s cultural, educational, training, and leader developmental processes for commissioned officers, warrant officers, non-commissioned officers, and civilians. Initiated in June 2000, it assembled leaders from the military, business, and academia to help analyze the current system and identify needs for the future, while also conducting more than 13,500 surveys and interviews of Army leaders and spouses throughout the world.

The panel concluded its work five months later, providing to CSA Shinseki a scathing assessment of the Army’s willingness to change in training and leader development despite the monumental strategic changes and new missions in the post-Cold War era. They found a pervasive belief in micro-management, distrust in the 1997 Officer Evaluation Report (OER) despite the increase in promotion rates (by then up to

\footnote{\textsuperscript{348} This includes annually recruiting 80,000 into the active duty force and another 90,000 into the national guard and reserve, which the Army continued to do despite the difficulties of seeking volunteers for war. Point made by Secretary of the Army Pete Geren during his visit to the National Training Center on May 1, 2008. U.S. Army, National Training Center’s High Desert Warrior staff, “Army Secretary visits NTC,” \url{http://www.irwin.army.mil/Army+Secretary+visits+NTC.htm}.}
ninety-eight per cent to captain and ninety-two per cent to major \(^{349}\), and the belief that
the Army had an “excessive operational pace.” \(^{350}\) Each of these factors led to a decreased
morale, higher attrition rates from lieutenants to colonels, and the sense that the Army
culture was out of balance. \(^{351}\) While primarily recommending changes with the Army’s
education and training systems, they did recommend a review of the OER based on the
controversial 1997 requirement that senior raters had to limit their highest ratings \(^{352}\) to
less than fifty per cent of all officers they rated.

Along with a very public controversy with Gen. Shinseki, Secretary Rumsfeld’s
caucustic relationship with the Army and desire to send an unambiguous signal of the
organization’s need for change led him to select Gen. Peter Schoomaker to serve as the
succeeding CSA from 2003-07, who had been retired from the Army since 2000. \(^{353}\) As
this recommendation came the day CSA Shinseki left office to retire, which still required
Senate confirmation, the Army was without a chief of staff for seven weeks. This was
the first time since 1904 that this position had been vacant for longer than a month. \(^{354}\) By
the time CSA Schoomaker assumed his position on Aug. 1, 2003, the early signs of
problems in Iraq were already surfacing, while the Army was also fully engaged in
operations in Afghanistan.

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\(^{349}\) U.S. Army, “Army Training and Leader Development Panel (ATLDP), Officer Study Report to


\(^{352}\) The categories of ratings in descending order are “Above Center of Mass,” “Center of Mass,”
“Below Center of Mass-Retain,” and “Below Center of Mass-Do Not Retain.” The only constrained rating
is the highest.

\(^{353}\) Thom Shanker, “Retired Commando Chief Is Chosen to Lead the Army,” New York Times,

\(^{354}\) There were seven months between the first and second ever CSA.
It did not take long for CSA Schoomaker to begin the process to again change the officer personnel management system, which I find is the only post-Cold War personnel process that prioritized the Army’s lessons within the proposed changes. First suggested by the new Army G-1, Lt. Gen. F.L. Hagenbeck, in March 2004, the CSA directed that a permanent OPMS task force be institutionalized. With HRC as the lead agent, this select group was originally comprised of twelve elite, hand-selected field grade officers and one senior non-commissioned officer. Its only job was to create and maintain an adaptive system capable of managing the needed short- and long-term personnel changes, which organizationally was a significant change. Relatively, however, with the Army only expending approximately $1 million annually on this change, evidence is still inconclusive whether this qualifies as an important (much less major) change. Its effectiveness over time may prove otherwise.

The CSA’s intent for what became OPMS (2006) was that all officers—and especially those remaining in operational career fields—needed to gain much greater experiential and educational breadth throughout their careers to serve as the organization’s senior leaders. Whether folklore or fact, senior officers throughout the Pentagon repeatedly mentioned in Summer 2007 that this system was initiated when CSA Schoomaker commented early in his tenure that the senior leaders on the Army staff were experientially ill-prepared to lead such a large organization. In what they termed an officer “pentathlete,” the Army leadership realized its leaders needed to have expertise

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355 This includes one colonel, six lieutenant colonels, four majors, one chief warrant officer five (CW5), and one sergeant major. The Task Force decreased to seven (six officers, one non-commissioned officer) by Summer 2007 once the major changes had been implemented.


357 Estimated by approximating twelve incomes, each at an average of $75,000.

across a wide array of competencies and capabilities to deal with the full spectrum of operations, about which it had been speaking since the time of CSA Vuono. As CSA Gen. George Casey told senior commanders in 2007, “As a division commander I kind of operated on the premise that if you could do high end [combat missions] you could do anything. You get a lot wiser as you grow up. As you know and as we’ve seen, it’s not that simple.”

Acknowledging its 1990s experiences dealing with non-combat missions were its greatest challenges within counterinsurgencies, the Army leadership realized that only by gaining exposure to things other than Army operations would its officers be prepared to lead in the twenty-first century.

This need for greater breadth became poignantly obvious as the result of Iraq. However, it did not require Barry Posen’s (1984, 2003) or Allison and Zelikow’s (1999) arguments for catastrophic failure for the Army to realize this need. Despite experiencing difficulties much greater than expected, the Army began changes to its personnel system to avoid failure rather than because of it. As just one example of the Army’s perspective of its capabilities, Brig. Gen. David Fastabend and Col. Robert Simpson argued in 2004 that the Army was at the height of its success. While advocating change, they claimed this was in order to remain successful. The change came when Army leaders finally accepted that nation building efforts had to accompany combat


360 Repeated in interviews with senior leaders throughout the Army, retired officers, and civilian scholars in Baghdad (Summer 2006), the U.S. Army War College (Spring 2007), and Pentagon (Summer 2007).


efforts in hostile environments and counterinsurgency operations, and when combined, they were much more challenging and complex than previously assumed. As another example, in my interview with a primary researcher for *On Point*\textsuperscript{363} (the Army’s analysis of the 2003 invasion of Iraq), one senior officer noted that all eleven brigade commanders who fought the war, regardless of their career paths, did well. He argued the Army trains for that type of fight, and massing forces at the decisive point is not really complex. The difference came when the mission shifted to fighting an insurgency, which was very complex and mentally demanding. He concluded that “this is a thinking man’s job. The difference between leaders who get it and those who don’t are those who’ve intellectually prepared themselves over the years.”\textsuperscript{364} Applying this logic to its personnel system, the CSA led changes in OPMS.

OPMS made some critical changes, which were outlined in the previous section, although some of its more important changes were in its vision rather than substance. The realization that experienced war-fighting could not produce the next generation of Generals David Petraeus or Peter Chiarelli, warriors who clearly understood the importance of and were able to leverage the Army’s and country’s soft power to help rebuild societies, should not be understated. While maneuver leaders were still premier, the Army, led by the CSA, realized that these leaders would also have to be able to help win the peace, a task at which they had balked throughout the 1990s. For the first time, OPMS recognized the existence and importance of encouraging interagency coordination, while also providing multiple venues for operational officers to attend graduate school.


\textsuperscript{364} Interview with a U.S. Army colonel, completing his year in the Multi-National Security Transition Command - Iraq (MNSTC-I), in Baghdad, Summer 2006.
No longer was training—the bedrock since Vietnam, which centers on teaching people what to think and how to operate—the only focus. Instead, education and self-development became commonly mentioned, which centered on how to think and process information.365

It is not yet possible to determine whether or not OPMS (2006) will make a real change in the officer corps’ composition. In fairness, the system is still so new that by early 2008 only two general officer selection boards had been held, and HRC was still in the early stages of implementing the system. For example, while OPMS purported that interagency, international, and multinational (in addition to joint) positions were important, HRC first published how to credit officers working in these jobs in Fall 2007. Officers will not likely know for several years how important a role these will play with promotions. The promotion board guidance has changed to expect officers to have a “breadth of experiences” in order to remain competitive. However, even leaders within HRC acknowledge that the wording is currently so broad that different types of operational assignments—e.g. jobs in light, mechanized, airborne, etc., infantry—could count as experiential breadth to some on the promotion boards.366 Still, the precedent for real change has been set. It is plausible, although unclear how probable considering the frequent combat deployments and lucrative job prospects outside the military, that officer “pentathletes” could thrive in this system.

There is no doubt that many of the changes within the personnel system are being driven by the frantic deployment pace of the Army and the inability to keep all officers

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365 As just one example, see Brig. Gen. Patrick Finnegan’s “Dean’s Letter,” Assembly (Sep./Oct. 2007), p. 12, showing this shift in education at the U.S. Military Academy.

366 Interviews with HRC personnel (2007).
on a narrow path to success. In addition, other unrelated changes due to transformation and Army reviews made personnel management even more difficult. Providing greater windows to complete needed jobs and education can account for changes such as required education for all majors; however, it does not explain the additional expectation of other-than operational assignments expected by OPMS (2006). By 2007, most of the externally-demanded positions (such as advising the reserve component units) had been eliminated, and only in June 2008 were Military Transition Team (MiTT) advisors in Iraq uniformly recognized as career-enhancing. Budget constraints were temporarily not an issue due to Congressional supplementals, with the Army allocating more funds to provide additional graduate education opportunities for both retention and development purposes. As a result, I argue that the experiential lessons, complemented with a better understanding of the strategic environment, primarily caused the OPMS changes in 2006.

Despite what evidence suggests is an important change for the Army officer personnel system, since it could change over time the intellectual composition of the senior leaders, there has been very little organizational reaction to the 2006 OPMS changes. Some personnel managers think this is for three primary reasons. First, the current operational tempo involved with fighting two wars has distracted the Army away from understanding the system’s details. Few people have had the time or energy to consider the changes for their personal long-term future, although in concept most are exceptionally supportive of the system changing.

Second, the promotion rates are so high, largely due to the increased demand for officers as the result of transformation, that few have yet been negatively affected by it.

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367 Interview with Army G-1 and HRC personnel (2007).
The Army is still largely promotion-centric, and there has not yet been too much reaction to other aspects of this new system. Since OPMS XXI, the promotion rates of former battalion commanders to colonel have declined, although the system also provides more operational officers the opportunity to become battalion commanders, as they are no longer competing with specialists for these assignments. A senior personnel manager said he had been told if the promotion rate for former brigade commanders to general ever dropped below eighty per cent, that senior leaders would revert OPMS back to its earlier design.368 To date, however, this issue has not come to fruition. Finally, the third expected reason there has been little resistance to the 2006 OPMS changes is that the system is not even two years old. As a result, many of its effects, including those of second- and third-order, have not yet had time to affect many people.369 Some changes have already been made, including the October 2007 announcement that officers choosing to specialize into a functional area may again compete for certain pre-designated battalion and brigade commands, beginning in late 2008 and early 2009.370 While this is not a complete reverse to OPMS II, when technical specialists had to compete for operational jobs, it will be interesting to see how this change is implemented and received.

While CSA Schoomaker’s and the Army’s motivation for making the changes is clearer, the process for how this change was made again defies what would be expected in a hierarchical organization. The CSA was personally involved from the beginning of

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368 Interview with an Army personnel officer who had been assigned for an extended time in Washington, D.C. (2007).

369 Repeated in multiple interviews with personnel from both the Pentagon’s Army G-1 (Personnel) and HRC (2007).

this change, to include mandating in March 2004 that a permanent group would manage this process; and yet, the hard work had only begun. In addition to the task force (within HRC, which assigns officers into jobs) not being completely established until March 2005, due to needed time for authorizing and manning implementations, HRC also adopted the existing and extensive stakeholder processes used since at least Gen. Sullivan’s efforts with the Louisiana Maneuvers. To socialize proposed changes and receive feedback from senior leaders throughout the Army, they used the Council of Colonels and two General Officer Steering Committees (GOSC). The Council, which included fifty-five permanent voting members at the colonel (and civilian equivalent) rank from throughout the institutional Army, began meeting quarterly in April 2005. The first GOSC included fifty-six one- and two-star generals (and civilian equivalent) as permanent voting members; the second, thirty-four three-star generals (and civilian equivalent) as permanent voting members, both from throughout the institutional Army. Each GOSC meets annually in the alternate six-month window of the other to review Council input and identify new initiatives. Ideas from these 145 individuals, each with personal and parochial interests, are then presented bi-annually to the Army G-1, VCSA, and CSA in separate updates.

To someone outside the organization, this process epitomizes organizational theorists’ claim about the grinding power of bureaucracies to prevent change. While no one in the Council or GOSC has veto-power per se, the groups rely on collaboration and rarely proceed with an initiative if major stakeholders remained opposed to the idea.372

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371 Their missions were to review the current process and progress, provide input from their organizations that might impact changes in OPMS, and create, develop, and synchronize the personnel plans (dubbed Officer Development Action Plans, or ODAPs) to implement the initiatives.

While tremendously decelerating change, as with the OPMS XXI Task Force, this process ensured leaders throughout the Army had knowledge, a sense of legitimacy, and ownership of the plan before it was presented to the most senior Army leaders. As a consequence, the CSA could be more comfortable that the varied stakeholders had already identified the most likely potential problems, while his decision to support the plan already had overwhelming support across the organization.

This also suggests two important points from organizational theory. First, if major changes occur from within, the Army’s leadership must provide significant “political capital” to help convince potential allies and naysayers to at least minimize their dissent. Without committed leadership from the top, change will not happen if the default bureaucratic decision is to do nothing.\(^{373}\) Second, this provides evidence that Posen’s (1984) idea of a maverick—someone in uniform that is able to change the Army by serving as a civilian puppet—is even less likely to provide a causal explanation for change. Despite the organization’s hierarchy, even senior leaders must create consensus throughout the organization among those vying for more senior positions and those protecting their sub-organization. The leader must remain personally dedicated to an important institutional change throughout the process, and it must also be an idea that at least has the potential to be well received throughout the senior ranks of the Army.

3.5 The Change-Repellent Officer Evaluation Report (OER)

The story of change in the officer’s evaluation reports (OER) is a very simple one, reflecting almost stagnation since 1979. This change-repellent document has pride-of-

\(^{373}\) Repeated in multiple interviews, dealing with a variety of subjects, throughout interviews with current and former Army level staff officers (2007).
place among all officers, since it is the one standard evaluation that requires the officer’s boss and senior boss at least annually to measure the officer’s performance and potential for advancement within the organization. Selection boards use only three items to pick the institution’s winners: the OER; the officer record brief, which portrays the officer’s previous assignments, military and civilian schools, awards, and other specialty information; and the officer’s official photo, to ensure the officer presents a professional appearance. There are no interviews, written or oral examinations, or other tools for the board to use, except if an officer is known personally or by reputation by those on the selection board. Thus, the OER is the one performance tool that senior leaders use to determine who gets promoted, who gets the prestigious assignments, and ultimately who remains in the organization.

As a result of this enormous importance to all officers, however, there has been little agreement on how best to change it. Consequently, the Army has made only one important—and I find not major—change during this tumultuous post-Cold War time period, which aligned with OPMS XXI in 1997. The new OER created a process that did not permit inflation of top ratings, a flaw all versions since at least 1968 had. And yet, this OER still did not facilitate the rise of fundamentally different types of officers from previous OERs, which was precisely what Stephen Peter Rosen (1991) argued was needed to help promote innovation within the organization. With respect to why the Army changed its evaluation, there is no evidence that this change was instigated by

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anyone other than those within the Army, who were institutionalizing procedural lessons learned over decades. The real story, though, is why more has not changed, despite the fact that almost all officers (except those sitting on selection boards) dislike the OER with varying degrees of hostility.

In this section, I highlight the changes that have and have not occurred in the four OER versions since the end of the Cold War: September 1979, October 1997, December 2004, and March 2006 (the forms and identified changes are also found in Appendix D). That the Army has changed its OER three times in the last decade may appear to be a success story; however, one must look closely to even differentiate between these three versions. I then very briefly discuss why more has not changed, and finish with suggestions of varying degrees of pragmatism that people have made to make this intransigent system better.

3.5.1 The Cold War Officer Evaluation Reports

While the Army’s written officer evaluation report has been in existence since 1890, the version used at the end of the Cold War had been in existence since 1979. This sixteenth revision since its inception, Department of the Army Form 67-8 OER, replaced only one previous post-Vietnam version. Its 1973 predecessor, DA Form 67-7, was instituted along with the first centralized command selection process by the recently

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375 This was prompted by a directive by the Secretary of War, Redfield Proctor, requiring the Army to keep record of all officers’ services, efficiency, special qualifications, condition of their commands, and percentages of desertions. Between 1895-1917, the report increased in size to as many as twenty-four pages. During WWI, the report converted to a two-page document for greater efficiency, and it has remained this size since. David P. Kite (Maj.), “The U.S. Army Officer Evaluation Report; Why are We Writing to Someone Who Isn’t Reading?,” Research Report for the Air Command and Staff College, Air University (Maxwell Air Force Base, Al.), Apr. 1998, p. 7.
established U.S. Army Military Personnel Center.\footnote{376}{The Military Personnel Center was designed to “manage the Army personnel system worldwide more efficiently. Its creation reduced the number of offices through which personnel actions flow; centralized the control of activities with similar functions; and grouped some activities to deal with career management, design and maintenance of the over-all personnel management system, and the various support elements required to operate the system…(Its) Major accomplishments included the centralized selection of colonels for troop command, development of forty-seven specialties, identification of specialty requirements in Army authorization documents, and expansion of the command selection for colonels to include logistics commands and district engineers.” William Gardner Bell and Karl E. Cocke (eds), \textit{Department of the Army Historical Summary Fiscal Year 1973} (Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History, U.S. Army), 1977, pp. 70, 72.} Previously each commanding general had the prerogative to select commanders within his command, which provided much greater flexibility, but also created a system prone to abuse and that was less meritocracy-based.\footnote{377}{Williams, p. 12, and U.S. Army, “OPMS Study Group After Action Report, October 1984.”} By the final phases of Vietnam, interest grew in developing greater transparency and fairness for the promotions and prestigious assignments. Based on a comprehensive internal study completed in 1969 and after several years of creating new designs, staffing, and testing, the Army finally implemented the 67-7 in January 1973, along with the new OPMS.\footnote{378}{“The study recommended restructuring management information requirements to acquire more useful data concerning character, job performance, and aptitude; furnishing a copy of the evaluation to the rated officer; restoring numerical scoring and recording it on the form; designing the form to permit conversion of selected data to ADP; periodically publishing average scores by grade as bench marks for rating and endorsing officers; and identifying special skills on the evaluation form.” Bell and Cocke (eds), pp. 72-73.} By the late 1970s, however, the massive post-Vietnam drawdown reduced opportunities for and increased the timeline of promotion, resulting in significant morale problems as officers had been accustomed to receiving perfect evaluations during the war.\footnote{379}{McCormick, p. 104.} Within two years of its implementation, the DA Form 67-7 was experiencing rampant rating inflation, with the average evaluation score for captains rising from 117/200 in January 1973 to 191/200 by May 1975.\footnote{380}{Williams, p. 12.}
The Army instituted the DA Form 67-8 in September 1979 to update the evaluation with current business management practices and counter this evaluation inflation. The Army leadership had embraced the importance of feedback after Vietnam in an attempt to learn lessons, which was visible within its training centers and its use of the After Action Review (AAR). The 67-8 OER also required raters to counsel their subordinates in writing throughout the evaluation period, adopting the then-popular civilian industries’ “Management by Objective” principles on the DA Form 67-8-1. This form provided the first opportunity for rated officers to give input to their evaluations, as they completed the reverse side of the 67-8-1 that their bosses and senior bosses used when completing the evaluation. Since the 67-8 was not linked with an OPMS change, its modifications were not radical, although its new requirement for counseling created a significant precedent that still exists today.

In order to combat the rating inflation, the 67-8 also included a new senior rater profile block, as seen in Figure 3.4 (for the entire OER, see Appendix D). The “senior rater” is the officer’s boss’s boss, who was responsible for evaluating the officer compared to all other officers in that rank that he or she evaluated at that time. The lines in the middle represent 100 officers, and the senior rater was supposed to mark one box on the left hand side that corresponded with the performance of that officer relative to other officers subordinate to the senior rater, as if the senior rater evaluated 100 officers. The Army’s personnel command, or PERSCOM, would fill in the right hand column with

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382 MBO was designed not only to establish a flexible “contract” between the rated officer and his or her boss, which was supposed to be renegotiated during quarterly counseling sessions throughout the rated period, but it also connected the more senior leaders with their subordinates.
383 Point made by Williams, p. 13.
the senior rater’s profile of ratings, showing selection boards how close to the approved
distribution the senior rater remained. At least initially, PERSCOM sent letters to senior
raters who ignored the proper proportions, advising them to adjust their profiles.384 With
the massive officer drawdown in the mid-1990s, few commanders attempted to maintain
this profile in order to protect their subordinates from the reduction in force and, as with
the tragedy of the commons, nothing prevented them from giving all their officers the
highest ratings.385 As just one example, in 1999 the Engineer captain’s branch
representative at Ft. Leonard Wood, Missouri, evaluated the ratings of my husband and
me as we were preparing for our next assignment. While using the 67-8, my husband’s
senior rater had evaluated over ninety per cent of his officers in the top block, while my
senior rater had evaluated only one-third in the top block. As a result, the branch
representative said it was almost impossible for a promotion board to compare our first
two years’ evaluations, before the new 67-9 was implemented in 1997.

384 Reported by Williams, p. 15, that Lt. Col. John Thomson received a letter from the U.S. Army
Total Army Personnel Agency about his errant senior rater profile, which Thomson shared with the officers
of the 407th Support and Services Battalion, 82d Airborne Division, in the summer of 1980.
385 Discussed in Williams, p. 15; and McCormick, p. 145.
Although an updated version of the OER existed throughout the early to mid 1990s, the Army Chiefs of Staff at the time, Generals Vuono and Sullivan, deliberately chose not to introduce it.\textsuperscript{386} In a speech to the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College in 1994, CSA Sullivan said he had consciously decided not to change the 67-8 until the drawdown was complete, expecting the results otherwise to have been disastrous.\textsuperscript{387} As with the officer personnel management system in general, CSA Sullivan believed the Army could only incur so much change simultaneously.\textsuperscript{388} With the Army’s leadership all personally experienced with the difficult and clumsy downsizing after Vietnam, their lessons directly drove the more deliberate adjustments then needed.\textsuperscript{389}

\textsuperscript{386} McCormick, p. 105.
\textsuperscript{387} Reported by Williams, p. 15.
\textsuperscript{388} Yarrison, p. 18.
\textsuperscript{389} McCormick, p. 106.
With no external force requiring change, the OER repelled any replacements until the entire OPMS was updated in 1997.

3.5.2 The OPMS XXI Officer Evaluation Report Change

As had happened with OPMS (I) in 1973-74, the Army implemented a new OER along with OPMS XXI in 1997. In his initial guidance to the OPMS XXI Task Force in 1996, then CSA Reimer (1995-99) directed that the group create a more holistic approach to officer development by integrating the officer personnel management system, character and leader development, and the new OER.\(^{390}\) As a result, the new DA Form 67-9 included a requirement for all lieutenants and Warrant Officer Ones (WO1) to be counseled in writing on the Junior Officer Development Support Form (JODSF). In addition, the rater and senior rater had to list which career field and functional area the officer (in the rank of captain to lieutenant colonel) would best serve the Army, supporting the four career pyramids institutionalized in OPMS XXI. In its guidance to the field, the Army’s leadership stated that the raters and senior raters should “consider the ‘whole person’” when recommending future roles, specifically with respect to “demonstrated performance, educational background, technical or unique expertise, military experience or training, and personal preference of the officer.”\(^{391}\)

While these are notable adjustments, the Army leadership used this opportunity to make the one important change to the OER since Vietnam.\(^{392}\) Instead of relying on senior raters to voluntarily remain in compliance with the distribution system, the 67-9


\(^{392}\) It was the first-ever quota system for a senior rater’s top ratings, known as “above center of mass” or ACOM report (see Figure 3.5; also see Appendices 3.4a and 3.4b for the entire form).
permitted senior raters to assign no more than forty-nine per cent of their officers the highest rating, an above center of mass (ACOM), while HRC recommended officers limit their ACOMs to thirty-three per cent (see Figure 3.5). If a senior rater purposefully or inadvertently awarded a higher proportion, HRC automatically changed the rating to a Center of Mass (COM) report in that officer’s file and required the senior rater’s senior rater to counsel the offending senior rater in writing. While this change was not driven by experiential lessons, this was a positive and constructive—albeit unpopular—internally-driven change as the result of procedural learning over time.

Figure 3.5 The New Officer Evaluation Report Senior Rater Profile Block, DA Form 67-9, 1996
As expected, this system caused significant consternation among officers. Brigade commanders described the new system to their subordinates, declaring that all officers—including themselves—were now center of mass officers and could be successful despite this negative connotation. Officers were told that to remain competitive for promotion they at least needed to “spike,” or receive an ACOM, in their branch qualification or key developmental positions. While senior raters could not inflate their blocks, their wording became even more important, as many senior raters quickly began rationing their top blocks primarily to those in critical positions or officers receiving their final report from them. As found during periods of inflated ratings, writing skills and the person’s assignments made tangible differences in officers’ evaluations, thus decreasing the fairness and comparability of this all-important document.

There are some strong supporters of the OER changes since 1997. Selection boards have overwhelmingly supported this change, claiming it makes comparing officers with the greatest leadership potential much simpler. The OER is also one of the few, if not only, documents that has legal standing in a courtroom when attempting to remove an officer from the Army. While the latter provides a negative purpose rather than helping with its purported developmental and evaluation purposes, the OER does serve this extremely important function, even if dealing in rare cases, which also makes

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393 Briefing by the 130th Engineer Brigade commander to the 94th Engineer Battalion officers in 1997, attended by the author.
changing—or as some propose, eliminating—this evaluation report even more difficult.\footnote{Point made by a lieutenant colonel who had served on OPMS XXI Task Force, blogged on “The Specter Haunting the Perfumed Princes of Versailles on the Potomac (II),” Dec 7, 1999.}

In general, officers have only grown more frustrated with this system over time. The OPMS XXI Task Force created the 67-9 to help correct a “zero-defects” mentality, which multiple internally- and externally-conducted officer surveys attributed to the OER.\footnote{OPMS XXI Survey, as stated in the “OPMS XXI Final Report,” p. 4-5; and McCormick (1998), pp. 145-46 (based on interviews conducted before OPMS XXI was implemented).} As one captain at Fort Hood, Tx., stated in 1997, “As a result, we do what the boss wants, instead of doing what we think is right as bosses. It is a survival technique.”\footnote{McCormick (1998), p. 145.} But even three years after the 67-9 was implemented, the Army Training and Leader Development Panel (ATLDP) Officer Study, commissioned by CSA Shinseki, concluded that “(t)he OER is a source of mistrust and anxiety.”\footnote{ATLDP (2000), p. OS-9.} Surveys found serious concern over the COM ratings, with many considering these to be career ending when received in branch-qualifying jobs. The ATLDP also found many junior officers did not trust the OER system or what their leaders were telling them about it. This is even more significant due to the very high promotion rates to captain and major—ninety-eight and ninety-two per cent, respectively\footnote{ATLDP (2000), p. OS-9.}—since officers were not in fact being held back by these ratings.

### 3.5.3 Post 9/11 Officer Evaluation Report Updates

From 2002 to 2006, the Army changed its OER several times in relatively small ways. These changes came for many reasons: in response to the ATLDP’s findings and
subsequent Review of Education, Training, and Assignments for Leaders (RETAL) studies,\textsuperscript{400} the rising promotion rates as transformation increased the demand for officers, the concern over consistently high rates of junior officers departing at the end of their initial four-to-five year commitment, the need for a heightened focus on the developmental aspect of the OER, and with the increased deployment tempo causing an additional strain on junior officers. In 2002, the Army “masked,” or moved to the officer’s restricted file, all lieutenant OERs once the officer became a captain, in order to address the ATLDP’s findings.\textsuperscript{401} The Army officially justified this change by arguing it provided junior officers greater latitude to grow, minimized the perception of zero-defects, and effectively eliminated comments from the most junior officers’ files that could merely reflect his or her initial learning.\textsuperscript{402}

The second post-9/11 OER adjustment came in Fall 2004, when the Army eliminated the senior rater evaluation (ACOMs, COMs, etc.) for all lieutenants and captains. This change was followed quickly by the updated December 2004 OER, requiring all captains and Chief Warrant Officers Two (CW2) to be counseled in writing (the JODSF became the ODSF, eliminating the “junior”, see Appendix D). The Army officially said they made these changes “in keeping with the Army’s spirit of transformation—we are truly focusing on leader development,”\textsuperscript{403} rather than reacting to retain more lieutenants and captains in the Army. In a 2007 interview with the Army G-1 responsible for leading this policy, Lt. Gen. F.L. Hagenbeck acknowledged this change

was in part due to the Army’s concern with unnecessarily prompting officers to depart the Army, if they only or primarily received COM reports as junior officers. Promotions rates were high because the Army needed more captains and majors; however, the OER system was still designed to help sequentially eliminate those who were not the top performers. In addition, since majors were no longer centrally selected to attend the mid-career school at Ft. Leavenworth, captains’ OERs (particularly those as company commander) became exponentially more important, especially when the officer received a mediocre or negative assessment.⁴⁰⁴ By eliminating this comparison block, the hope was that officers would delay a decision to depart, at least if the calculation were based on the conclusion that one was unlikely to reach the top ranks due to early mediocre ratings. By this time, the repeated deployments to Iraq and Afghanistan were also creating an even greater strain on this system. Senior commanders were still required to evaluate their subordinates using these same proportions, whether doing little in the U.S. or deployed in combat for over a year.⁴⁰⁵

In March 2006, the Army implemented its most current version of the 67-9, primarily due to logistical lessons from deployments (see Appendix D). While monumental for those in the personnel field, the new OER’s main differences allow it to be digitally signed and emailed, whereas previous versions were required to be processed through the laborious postal system regardless of the unit’s location. The new OER also adjusted the requirement for bosses to recommend a career field and functional area only for captains, since sufficient time had elapsed since the OPMS XXI changes to allow standardized accession of officers into the specialty jobs.

3.5.4 Unresolved Officer Evaluation Report Problems and Suggestions for Change

One problem not yet addressed by any OER change is the evaluation’s reliance on subjective information and nuanced writing styles, unlike those used in the 1813 efficiency reports in Figure 3.6. The last OER that required much quantifiable data existed prior to Vietnam, and while not prohibited to include specific metrics, the OERs today do not demand the raters to do so. In addition, many raters and senior raters avoid writing or verbalizing negatively candid evaluations, similar to most other organizations, and assume the selection boards will filter their positive but mediocre verbage correctly. Without frank counseling, having the rare opportunity to see others’ evaluations, or understanding code words (such as “superb” or “superior” convey a prioritized connotation over “excellent” or “outstanding”), many struggling officers believe their evaluations reinforce competence. As an extreme example, Capt. James Yee, the U.S. Army Muslim chaplain arrested on suspicion of espionage and possibly treason for his actions in Guantanamo, reported in an interview that “Two days before my arrest, I received the best officer evaluation report [of my] fourteen years as a commissioned officer.”406 While OERs cannot nor should not excuse leaders from avoiding the truth, one can institutionalize measures to make this a better quality and useful developmental and evaluative tool. Also, while the 67-9 requires a rating quota, it is no longer possible (as with the 67-8) for selection boards to know whether the senior rater abides by the suggested one-third, or the mandated one-half, ACOM proportion, which is a significant difference for rated officers.

EFFICIENCY REPORTS—VINTAGE 1813

Reprinted below are excerpts from an efficiency report which has been gathering dust these many years. Names of the officers have been changed; and any similarity to persons living or dead is coincidental.

Sir:

I forward a list of the officers of the—th Regt. of Infty. arranged agreeable to rank. Annexed thereto you will find all the observations I deem necessary to make.

Respectfully, I am, Sir,

Yo. Obt. Sev’t.,

Lewis Cass”

—th Regt. Infantry

Alexander Brown—Lt. Col., Comdg.—A good natured man.
Clark Crowell—First Major—A good man, but no officer.
Jenn B. Wordsworth—2nd Major—An excellent officer.
Captain Shaw—A man of whom all unite in speaking ill—A knave despised by all.
Captain Thomas Lord—Indifferent, but promises well.
Captain Rockwell—An officer of capacity, but imprudent and a man of violent passions.

Captain Dan I. Ware

Captain Parker

1st Lt. Jas. Kearns

1st Lt. Thomas Dearfoot

1st Lt. Will. Herring

1st Lt. Danl. Land

1st Lt. Jas. I. Bryan

1st Lt. Robert McKewell

1st Lt. Robert Cross—Willing enough—has much to learn—with small capacity.

2nd Lt. Nicholas Farmer—A good officer, but drinks hard and disgraces himself and the Service.

2nd Lt. Stewart Berry—An ignorant unoffending fellow.

2nd Lt. Harrow—Just joined the Regiment—of fair appearance.

2nd Lt. Pierce

2nd Lt. Thos. G. Slicer

2nd Lt. Oliver Warren

2nd Lt. Royal Gore

2nd Lt. Means

2nd Lt. Clew

2nd Lt. McLear

2nd Lt. John G. Sheaffer

2nd Lt. Francis T. Whelan

Ensign Behan—The very dregs of the earth. Unfit for anything under heaven.

God only knows how the poor thing got an appointment.

Ensign John Green

Ensign Eyor

Ensign North—From the ranks. A good young man who does well.

Extracted from the Adjutant General’s School Bulletin, April 1942.

Figure 3.6 U.S. Army Regimental Officer’s Evaluation Report, 1813

Source: Kite, p. 8
There have been a plethora of ideas from those inside (and recently departing) the Army about how to change the OER, although most have little probability of gaining traction with senior leaders due to the organizational and cultural constraints. Along with deviating from tradition and the process by which these senior leaders emerged, many fear these changes would undermine the muddy boots culture or would decrease the power of the organization’s elite. One of the more frequent suggestions is a “360-degree” evaluation, in which one’s peers and subordinates would also evaluate each officer. Most opposed to this change usually counter this process would undermine the current unit discipline. In the mid-1990s, some in PERSCOM suggested eliminating the formal OER system and retaining only the developmental counseling portion (DA Form 67-9-1), arguing the Germans in WWII had almost won without evaluation reports. An officer serving in PERSCOM later explained their foil for change was the head of the OER branch, a retired officer who had designed the existing system, and thus not interested in promoting change. Others have advocated quantifiable metrics or functional assessments, in order to create more objective comparisons or promote specific competencies. More recent suggestions have been for HRC to again annotate the senior rater’s profile on the 67-9, or readjust the ACOM-COM-BCOM (Below Center of

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410 See Williams, p. 44.
Mass) proportions to 25-50-25 so that COM reports were in fact normal for successful officers to receive.411

Unfortunately, the possibility of reaching consensus on a fundamentally new evaluation report does not yet look promising. The permanent OPMS Task Force and G-1 have the mandate to continue advising changes in the OER,412 although interviews with the former conveyed less optimism that significant changes were possible.413 Lt. Gen. Hagenbeck said he thought real change was theoretically possible in the OER, although he was not able to facilitate important OER changes throughout his almost three years’ tenure as G-1.414

And so, the analysis of change in the OER throughout this otherwise tumultuous post-Cold War time remains short. This system has changed even less than the officer personnel management system, not because there is not a recognized need for change or that the document is not important. On the contrary, due to the fundamental importance of the OER, there is no consensus among the officer corps on what can be used as a different metric. With no external pressure to adjust this evaluation report from Congress or the Department of Defense, there is not much hope that major changes driven from within will happen until a Chief of Staff makes it a top priority from origin through to conclusion.

413 Interviews with HRC, Summer 2007.
3.6 Why Haven’t There Been More Important Changes? What Can Be Done About This?

I have presented evidence in this chapter that the Army completed three important changes to its officer personnel management system since the end of the Cold War, with a new strategic environment largely driving the OPMS change in 1997, procedural learning prompting the OER change in 1997, and experiential learning playing a pivotal role in the 2006 OPMS changes. It is critical to note, however, that all internal Army changes in the officer personnel system since Vietnam have been focused on the mid-career officers. Minimal changes have affected the lieutenant and early captain years, with direct commissions being granted for only medical, religious, and legal-type branches, and officers can specialize only after working in the “muddy boots” Army. Similarly, the Army has not directly attempted to affect the composition of its general officer population, with Congress’ 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act that required joint experience and education being the only real (and externally-driven) change enacted nearer the post-Cold War time.

In the years following the 2003 invasion of Iraq, some vocal dissension has surfaced from junior and mid-career officers against the most senior leaders. Lt. Col. Paul Yingling’s article, “A failure in generalship,” prompted serious discussion within and outside of the Army, after he claimed the Army’s leadership failed to prepare the Army or properly advise the civilian leadership for Iraq in 2003. Charging that “a private who loses a rifle suffers far greater consequences than a general who loses a war,” he promoted Rosen’s (1991) ideas to rectify these problems by changing the officer personnel system. He called on Congress to force the military to change its officer personnel system.  

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promotion system in order to reward intelligence, creativity, and moral courage, including specific adjustments to the process for selecting general officers. These suggestions did not go unnoticed, as Congressional staffers visited with groups at various military academic institutions in Fall 2007 to determine what, if anything, should be done. Despite these suggestions, why did the Army not make major changes on its own?

I argue there are at least four reasons why internally-driven personnel changes are no more frequent than they are. First, the generals are products of the current system. Second, due to the lag-time in promotions, most major personnel changes take a generation to take effect. Third, the Army leadership has not yet made making major changes a priority. Finally, the prerequisite for consensus essentially prohibits change that undermines the existing power holders. I describe these four in turn.

First, since the most senior leaders were created within and by the current system, most believe that if it were good enough to create them, it cannot need a complete overhaul. For instance, CSA Vuono said that when he was taking his job in 1987, someone asked him what revolutionary changes he was going to implement. He replied that since no one assumes that position without spending decades in the organization, the CSA is a product of that environment. Hopefully the person has contributed to varied programs the Army is already conducting, and “For me to come in and say everything is wrong in the Army and we are going to change it would not only be unprofessional, but irresponsible because I was a part of a lot of those decisions.”

own image—is extremely common and is being recognized as a problem with the drastically changed environment from a decade ago.  

Second, as Table 3.8 suggests, since officers are only promoted from within their own ranks, the time required for the organization to experience the effects of any change is extensive. Most generals today were already colonels when OPMS XXI went into effect in 1997, making these (and the 2006) changes not directly relevant to them. As such, changing to meet a new strategic environment plays an important role when the Army considers changing its officer personnel management system.

Table 3.8 YEARS OF SERVICE FOR THE CURRENT ARMY GENERALS: Why Changes in OPMS Do Not Affect the Officer Corps Quickly, as of 2007

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Average Number of Years in the Army at OPMS XXI (1997)</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average Number of Years in the Army at OPMS (2006)</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Years to Make: Captain, 3; Major, 10; Lieutenant Colonel, 16; Colonel, 22

Data source: official biographies, U.S. Army

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418 Agreed upon by leaders of all ranks in various interviews at HRC, Summer 2007; also concluded by N. DiMarco and R.M. Tate, “A Cross-cultural Comparison of Superior-Subordinate MBTI Preferences and Their Relationship with Performance Ratings,” in Catherine Fitzgerald (ed), Proceedings from the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator and Leadership: An International Research Conference (College Park, MD: University of Maryland University College National Leadership Institute), 1994, pp. 61-71.
The third reason the Army has not made more significant personnel changes is that the leadership has not yet made this a priority. One of the nine guiding “concepts of operations” for the OPMS II Study Group in 1984 was “Be evolutionary; not revolutionary,” while then adding that there were no constraints and nothing was sacred.419 For the OPMS XXI Task Force in 1996, one of their ten guiding assumptions was that “Recommendations for changing Department of Defense (DoD) policies and Congressional laws governing officer management may not be implemented in the near-term, however, they may be in the mid-term to long-term (e.g., 10 to 20 years).”420 Finally, of the nine explicit directives that CSA Schoomaker gave to the G-1 in September 2004 when initiating the OPMS XXI review, one was “Don’t do anything so radical it has to go to the Hill.”421 While it is less clear from these three examples whether senior Army leaders thought that major changes were needed, it is very clear that they were against trying, for which there is a very reasonable argument of the practical constraints. This provides even a greater argument, however, for external actors to be more knowledgeable about what the Army can and will even attempt to change.

Finally, considering the collaborative nature of all officer personnel changes, there is little probability that an internally requested change could dramatically undermine the existing elites. If an organization is good at anything, it thrives at delaying issues with which it does not want to deal. In addition, reputational leadership is the cornerstone of this organization, in which one’s peers and superiors have the ability to determine the fate of their own. As Rosen (1991) expressed, officers determine in

420 Ohle et al, p. 3648.
“wartime who will live and die, and how, who will be honored, and who will sit on the
sidelines.” With Congressional limits on the number of generals per service, for every
specialty general position added, one operational general position would have to be
eliminated. With its proclivity for conservative, worst-case scenario thinking, in large
part because it is the only organization with society’s permission to employ deadly force
overseas on its behalf, it is unlikely to imagine that the Army leadership would
voluntarily make changes to its most senior members against what resemble
themselves.

In every interview with Army leadership responsible for personnel issues, from
majors to three-star generals, all strongly emphasized that changes have been internally
driven. Looking across the post-Cold War time period, it was clear that an involved
Chief of Staff of the Army was a necessary condition for changing the personnel system,
and only when this leader made this a priority in his first year in office and maintained
personal commitment to change was the system able to make changes greater than
cosmetic. However, even with CSA oversight, there was so much vested interest
throughout all levels, functions, and organizations within the Army that no change was
likely without most officers agreeing with the need for and direction of change. Officers
could be socialized to ideas, although for practical purposes, combat arms branches, in
particular infantry and armor, retained the trump card, and vociferously protected their
relative power and prestige. As a consequence, the Army leadership only attempted to
change items that it thought were feasible—primarily at the middle ranks—while

422 Rosen, p. 19.
presuming the other systems worked well or that no amount of internal effort would overcome the bureaucratic stranglehold.

Based on this analysis, I conclude that this Army system can learn and change as the result of its experiences and a new strategic environment as long as the modifications do not undermine the muddy boots culture, erode the relative power of the maneuver leaders, there is consensus among the senior leaders, and the CSA remains personally committed to the change. Despite these obstacles, the Army was able to affect some important issues within its officer personnel management system, which bodes well since there was scant evidence the civilian leadership was interested in prompting change in this area.

During this time period, more changes were as the result of a new strategic environment that did not require any mind-stretching experiences for most to agree upon the change. Considering the mantra that armies always fight the last war, these voluntary changes should give scholars and practitioners hope that the Army has actively been working to remain proactive. However, lessons learned played much less of a role for the officer personnel changes over these seventeen years than the U.S. Army’s mantra “Army as a Learning Organization” should expect. As the entire Army became immersed in Iraq, the quantity and quality of lessons helped overcome bureaucratic hurdles to permit the CSA to at least articulate a new personnel vision based on these experiential lessons, although it is too soon to know whether substantive changes will follow.

The real challenges, however, will be whether the new leadership maintains this momentum to make real changes and continue changing itself when fewer leaders are

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learning new lessons. The range of opportunities to incorporate lessons learned expanded directly with both the number and intensity of the mind-extending experiences its leaders had, which during this time period were primarily operational deployments after 9/11. Graduate school or time with other governmental agencies, industries, or countries should be able to provide comparable opportunities. These experiences require officers to develop mental agility and creativity, which are needed to counteract thinking or evolving adversaries. This follows whether the adversary is one with improvised explosive devices in Iraq or in reaction to a tsunami and earthquake in South East Asia.

Once there is a collective agreement that organizational change is needed that does not contradict—even if it does not directly support—the Army’s muddy boot culture or undermine the maneuver leaders, changing this massive organization is possible. Lt. Gen. Hagenbeck argued that with deliberate planning, socialization, and oversight, the CSA could gradually implement a change to the selection boards’ criteria for choosing general officers. However, this change would require significant political capital to ensure its implementation. Without this shared understanding, or if the change too closely cuts across the warrior mentality, at least since Vietnam there is little evidence that the Army will voluntarily attempt changes in this too-hard-to-attempt category.

In addition to not being easy to attain, consensus must also be created on the need for and type of change. Evidence supports my hypotheses that consensus on the need for change helps increase its likelihood; however, consensus on the type of change is critical for the magnitude, direction, and rate of the change. As an example, by 1997 there was

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overwhelming support among officers that their personnel management system was becoming dysfunctional. To create an opportunity for technical specialists to advance to the rank of colonel while providing combat specialists (i.e. infantry, armor, artillery) more time in their critical jobs, the combat specialties agreed to decrease their proportion of colonel authorizations and the technicians agreed not to compete for the operational jobs. The combat specialists did not agree to give up their control of the most senior leadership positions, however, so this change did not fundamentally alter those leading the organization.

Largely because attaining consensus is so difficult, one of my major findings from researching why changes occurred in the institutional Army from 1991-2007 was that there are real limits to what the Army can voluntarily change. Not only are certain topics effectively in the “too hard to try” category, but top-down driven changes are exceptionally difficult. For example, the only two times the officer personnel system changed in important ways during this period (1997 and 2006) were because the CSA at the time made this one of his top priorities in the first year of his four-year tenure. While the 1997 update was a major change for the 99.5% of the Army’s commissioned officers, who rank lieutenant through colonel, since Vietnam the Army has not tried to make personnel changes that directly affected the composition of its general officers.

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427 As just one example, by the mid-1990s there were 3,400 more field grade officer jobs than officers.


429 The 1980 Defense Officer Personnel Management Act (DOPMA) limited the number of general officers (GOs) that the Army could have. As a result, in 2007 the Army had 301 GOs and just over 64,500 commissioned officers, with the GOs totaling 0.46% of the officer personnel.

430 Congress’ 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act that requires joint experience and education to make general officer is the only real (and externally-driven) change enacted nearer the post-Cold War time.
Army leaders have found some ways to circumvent these obstacles by working outside of the organizational constraints. For example, one of the most important changes to the personnel system in 2006 was the Army providing substantially more opportunities for mid-career officers to attend graduate school. However, by early 2008 there was no corresponding change in promotion policies or additional requirements established for officers to have advanced degrees in order to receive prestigious assignments. Instead, this change was possible because it aligned with CSA Gen. Peter Schoomaker’s vision of creating officer “pentathletes,” or officers who are flexible and adaptable to change, while also assisting with the difficult retention issues exacerbated by repeated combat deployments to Iraq and Afghanistan. The long-term effects of this policy could be tremendous, as future generations of successful officers will no longer have to rely on teaching assignments at USMA to be given opportunities to attend graduate school full-time. However, it is too early to judge its success in altering the competencies of the Army’s most senior leaders.

3.6.1 Changes that Can and Should be Done to OPMS and the OER

What should be done to improve the officer personnel management system, including about the intractable OER? I am less confident that any suggestions (as

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431 Lt. Gen. F.L. Hagenbeck, Army G-1 at the time these changes were implemented, stated that the graduate school programs had initially been created, along with helpful insights from USMA’s OEMA, as a retention tool for junior and mid-career officers. In a 2007 interview, Lt. Gen. Hagenbeck said that this reason was less convincing for then CSA Gen. Schoomaker; however, when Lt. Gen. Hagenbeck included the longer-term developmental benefit of educating strategic leaders within his analysis, CSA Schoomaker quickly became an avid advocate of the program.

432 For budgetary reasons, the number of full-time graduate school opportunities for mid-career Army officers gradually eroded until 2005. In an interview with Lt. Gen. Hagenbeck (2007), he stated that there were between 5,000-7,000 (he had varying reports) graduate school “slots” per year when he was commissioned in 1971; by 2003 when he became Army G-1, there were only 412. The majority of these are for those preparing to teach at USMA, although functional specialists and the Corps of Engineers also have a smaller number of advanced schooling opportunities.
opposed to requirements mandating change) emanating from external sources are helpful, not only because they are less likely to be accepted, but also because many seemingly good ideas have wisely been avoided due to their second- and third-order effects. The 360-degree evaluation has real merits, and the Army should gradually implement a process that requires all officers to complete these evaluations to allow time for consensus and familiarity to develop. At first, these evaluations should be used for developmental purposes, annotating completion also on the front side of the OER.\footnote{I would add a Yes/No box, similar to the one required for the Officer Development Support Form. For more information on the Army’s 360-degree assessments, see \url{http://www.benchworks.army.mil/}.} Within five-to-six years, the Army should be required to determine how best to substantively incorporate this feedback within the OER, providing time for consensus and to minimize unintended consequences.\footnote{In an email interview (2008), Lt. Col. Mark Lukens, who has served extended time in the U.S. Army Human Resource Command (HRC), Army G-1, and Office of the Secretary of Defense, specifically recommended one option: Once a year an officer would receive a normalized score based on three (1 to x) rankings: senior rater, peers and senior non-commissioned officer (NCO), with the senior NCO being the senior rater’s command sergeant major. This quantifiable data could then be compared regardless of the unit size. Another option would be to just include fellow officers’ evaluations and rankings.} Along with improving organizational communication, this feedback helps capture innovative ideas from those most likely to experience change—the junior officers—and promote officers who do not just resemble their more senior counterparts.\footnote{Specifically discussed in interviews with Lt. Col. Yingling (2008), Lt. Col. Lukens (2008), and Col. John Agoglia, director of the U.S. Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute (2008).}

The Army should also formalize and increase the opportunity for officers of all ranks to work in other-than military jobs. In Fall 2008, the mid-career officer school at Ft. Leavenworth began an initiative to host mid-career interagency civilians as students, in exchange for an equivalent number of Army officers to substitute this schooling for a year internship at those agencies. While fewer than a dozen exchanges are currently
planned, the Army needs to formalize this program and find additional occasions for these immersions. Additionally, extended (such as a year) interagency or industry internships, training other militaries, and/or graduate school, in addition to joint education and experience within our own military, should be required to make general officer. Periodic assignments in headquarters jobs at the Pentagon and combatant command headquarters—quite far from any muddy boots—should be prestigious assignments and career-enhancers, providing macro-perspectives to better prepare Army officers to lead the organization and serve in critical Joint Staff positions. The OER should also include a portion for personal intellectual development during the rating period, such graduate school classes, language improvement, professional reading, staff rides, publishing, etc. Aspiring officers will complete what the organization values, and the Army should leverage its existing tools to encourage its leaders to become the strategic thinkers it understands that it needs.

What does this portend for the future? The OPMS changes of 2006 provide a possibility for real change, while there is also sufficient internal support at the junior and mid-career ranks and external support in OSD and Congress for change. If HRC is able to provide real promotion incentives for combat arms branches to embrace the importance of officer “pentathletes,” and general officer promotion boards begin prioritizing broadening experiences other than brigade command, OPMS will be a significant shift in the personnel system. This may happen without oversight; however,

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as echoed in CSA Sullivan’s book, *Hope is Not a Method*, this is too important of a long-term shift for our country to hope it works.

Although still too early to tell, there are some reasons to be concerned. In the 2007 general officer board, of the thirty-seven officers selected to brigadier general, thirty-four were successful operational brigade commanders. In an effort to reward innovation, Army Secretary Peter Geren intervened to require Gen. David Petraeus to return from Iraq for the 2008 brigadier general board. While the results are still pending, many are hopeful that the results will show a shift in what qualities the Army prioritizes.

If the Army is resistant to making real changes its personnel system, I agree with Yingling (2007) that the Secretary of Defense or Congress can and should intervene. Civilian leaders can pass new legislation or issue Department of Defense directives, thus dictating policies. However, at a minimum they should expect regular updates on the Army’s substantive officer personnel changes and/or expect the Army to present and update its metrics showing these changes. OPMS (2006) provided an excellent vision for change, although it is unclear that there exists a forcing function to turn this vision into reality. By requiring the Army to determine quantifiable ways it will grow strategic officers needed for future challenges, civilians could compel change while still allowing those most knowledgeable to recommend the direction and specifics.

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438 The other three selected to be brigadier general included two foreign area officers and one who served his command equivalent on a military transition team in Iraq.

increased awareness of the need, the greater number of officers with this knowledge, and the desire to continuously improve, this prompting may be enough. If it is not, the civilian leaders would then have sufficient information and justification to do what scholars like Posen, Allison, and Zelikow already assume they are doing: fix the Army themselves.
4.1 Introduction

Standards-based training has been the strength of Army preparedness since the end of the Vietnam War. – *The Army Training and Leader Development Panel (ATLDP) Officer Study Report to The Army, May 2001*

In this chapter, I test my seven causes of change—civilians intervention, new technology, budgetary reasons, defense industries, experiential learning, inter- or intra-service competition, and a new strategic environment—to determine why and how changes occurred within the U.S. Army’s institutional training system since the end of the Cold War. Specifically, I analyze changes at the three Combat Training Centers (CTCs): the National Training Center (NTC) at Fort Irwin, California; the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) at Fort Polk, Louisiana; and the Joint Multinational Readiness Center (JMRC, formerly the Combined Maneuver Training Center, or CMTC) at Hohenfels, Germany. The Army also has a fourth institutional training program, the Battle Command Training Program (BCTP), although its training is completely computer simulated.440 In this chapter, I only focus on the training installations with actual maneuver sites, not only since most information on the BCTP is not for public release,

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440 BCTP trains commanders and their staffs, including active and reserve duty divisions and corps, national guard battalions and brigades, and the Army component of joint task forces. U.S. Army Combined Arms Center, “Combat Training Center Overview Brief.”
but also due to the comparability of the three centers that involve military equipment and entire units.441

The causes of expected change in this case are the most theoretically ambiguous, as there is no clear cause propelling change. Civilians have the least depth of knowledge of this system of my three cases. The CTCs do employ and test the latest technology, making them susceptible to the externally-driven technology and budgetary demands. Internally, this institution should be most closely affected by experiential lessons, as units use this training to prepare for combat and pending deployments. In addition, the limited time between ten exercises annually, each lasting up to a month,442 should provide the CTCs much less time to contemplate and adjust to future, prospective threats. Finally, relative to the officer personnel system, there should be fewer internal constraints to change, as the CTCs are more decentralized from the Army headquarters. However, most officers are still very interested in changes, due to the relation between success at a CTC and career success, so creating consensus for change is expected before major changes would occur.

The evidence I present throughout this chapter supports the varied explanations for change, with one primary exception. From 1991-2003, experiential lessons served much less of an expected cause for change, despite the Army’s myriad deployments,

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441 Along with the obvious comparisons of the physical maneuver versus headquarters’ battles simulated only on computers, there is also some disagreement about the relative benefit of the BCTP. As a senior defense analyst conducting research for the Senate Budget Committee in 1997 argued: “No one I spoke with believed these simulated command post exercises came close to the value of the live exercises in the field with troops.” Winslow Wheeler, “Memorandum to Bill Hoagland, Staff Director, Senate Budget Committee: Report on Staff Trip to Army Training Facilities,” Dec. 11, 1997. An OPFOR commander at NTC also argued that “If experience gained at the NTC is questionable [since it is a simulation], then the value, credibility, and relevance of virtual simulation is probably more suspect. James Zanol (Lt. Col.), “Battle Command Insights,” in U.S. Army, Center for Army Lessons Learned, “CTC Quarterly Bulletin 99-14,” Apr.-Jun. 1999.

442 Prior to 1990, fourteen exercises per year were held at each CTC. Wheeler, 1997.
while a change in the strategic environment continuously played an important role.

While this would initially seem to be two exceptions, the first major change in the training systems did not occur until 2005 when Iraq lessons, facilitated by hundreds of billions of dollars in Congressional supplementals, began causing rapid and continuous change. Despite the successive nation building deployments during the 1990s, the CTCs made only gradual changes, which evidence suggests was due to the cultural proclivity of muddy boots and more limited opportunities for the organizational elite (infantry and armor) to excel in these missions. Since other factors expect the Army to be able to make evolutionary changes in training, the puzzle is why this reactive system would relatively favor proactive lessons. The factors’ proportional influence is summarized in Table 4.1.

Table 4.1 WHEN, WHY, AND HOW IMPORTANT CHANGES OCCURRED, U.S. Army Combat Training Centers, 1991-2007 (Note: major change in green; important changes, white)
Why examine the combat training centers? This case is valuable due to existing scholarly arguments, the organization’s culture, and institutional incentive reasons. First, scholars have recognized the importance of training and simulations for armies to be capable of changing during peacetime. Even if the conclusions from training are full of uncertainties, these exercises allow leaders to attempt new and different techniques without risking their soldiers’ lives when they fail. Stephen Peter Rosen (1991) argues simulations are the best method during peacetime for the Army to envision and prepare for its next war. Steven Metz and James Klevit (1994) also discuss the capability to advance the Revolution in Military Affairs within medium-to-high intensity conflict by training with electronic simulations, virtual reality devices, and field exercises.

Evidence supports the Army’s priority of training to test concepts and techniques prior to using them in battle. As just two examples, Tim Lenoir (2000) chronicles the U.S. military’s increasing use of simulations for the past thirty years, highlighting that the 1998 Department of Defense (DoD) modeling and simulation budget exceeded $2.5 billion. Gen. Wesley Clark also decided to request Apache helicopters and Multiple Launch Rocket System to serve in a non-doctrinal role in support of the 1999 Kosovo air campaign four days before it began, based on their successful use in a computer simulation exercise in Germany.

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446 Interview with four mid-level Apache helicopter pilots deployed to Task Force Hawk, Tirana, Albania, in June 1999, who had participated in the computer exercise in which the Army used Apaches and MLRS for deep attack operations. Doctrinally, Apaches require infantry or armor support due to their vulnerability to small arms and anti-aircraft weapons.
Second, training and the CTCs are foundational to the Army’s organizational culture, as the opening quote suggested. After the Vietnam War, the Army’s new all-volunteer force catapulted from a broken, defeated Army through a deliberate process founded on training. The Army viewed training—repetitive practice to know what to think, what the answers should be, and how better to perform clearly definable and assessable tasks—as its basis to defeat the Soviet military masses. While the Soviets had a much larger army, the U.S. knew the Soviet military’s location, capabilities, and weaknesses, while even knowing its culture largely prohibited junior leaders from seizing the initiative. The U.S. Army could create “tasks, conditions, and standards” for virtually every conceivable scenario. Through deliberate, repetitive, and disciplined practice, Army leaders felt confident of success. Officers maintained their own small doctrinal libraries, and when scheduling unit training and preparing for evaluations, they could peruse their manuals to determine on which skills they needed to again refresh. The NTC served as the capstone unit training exercise, with some crediting its incorporation as “the fundamental shift in training strategy that revolutionized our Army in the 1980s.”

The Army’s strategically-defined post-Cold War challenges did not remain within this simple model. While few in the Army believed Francis Fukuyama’s argument that

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449 In addition to living this experience from 1996-99 during my lieutenant years in Germany, Brig. Gen. Dave Fastabend made this point during an interview (2006).

the end of history had arrived, the 1990s required the Army to complete missions other than high intensity conflict. Larger interventions to Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo—even if not warmly embraced by the Army—introduced generations of leaders to missions and tasks that often appeared diametrically opposed to those used in the 1991 Gulf War and force-on-force battles at the CTCs. Ironically, as Janine Davidson (2005) and others have argued, it was precisely these missions that prepared the Army for its post-9/11 missions. However, until difficulties in Iraq in 2004, changes in the Army’s institutional training centers only happened gradually and were primarily aimed at preparing units to deploy.

The third reason to examine why and how changes occurred within the Army’s institutional training system are the professional incentives derived from these exercises. Leaders treat these simulations and training exercises extremely seriously, not only because they are an opportunity to simulate combat, but also since they are the only real “report card” of combat effectiveness that they have outside of an operational deployment. In peacetime, performance at a CTC serves as a discriminator for one’s evaluation as well as one’s professional reputation. As the Army assigns prestigious

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452 The Army has always completed these other missions; however, the Army prefers to concentrate just on major wars. See Max Boot, *The Savage Wars of Peace: Small Wars and the Rise of American Power* (New York: Basic Books), 2002; Davidson, 2005.


455 Success at a CTC does not inherently nor necessarily equate to success on one’s evaluation. In an interview with Maj. Gen. Mark Hertling (2008), who served as the Commander of the Operations Group at NTC and later the Training Command responsible for the JMRC, he said the best commander he ever
assignments and promotes only from those within the organization, the incentives during peacetime to succeed in a CTC exercise are very high.

The rest of this chapter is organized in four sections. First, I briefly address two critical strategic events that helped create change in the CTCs: the internally-driven Army Training and Leader Development Panel’s (ATLDP) Officer Study Report, and the events in Iraq and Afghanistan between 2003-07. Next, I provide an overview of the Army’s institutional CTCs and discuss the changes that occurred to them during this time period. Although the CTCs are constantly evolving, I specifically discuss the addition of limited stability operations (such as nation building tasks) in 1993 and 1995 at the JMRC in Germany and the JRTC in Louisiana, respectively; adjustments to the training centers’ Opposition Forces (OPFOR) and technological changes in 2000; the full integration of counterinsurgency and stability operations challenges by 2005; and the formal and increased focus on multi-national operations at the JMRC in 2005. Third, I analyze why these changes happened in magnitude and timing. Finally, I conclude with reasons why more changes did not occur and recommendations for the Army training system.

4.2 Critical Strategic Events

In the last chapter, I discussed the strategic impact of four categories of events on the U.S. Army officer personnel system, which had important effects on the Army’s training systems as well: Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986, the collapse of the Soviet threat

saw at a CTC was one who lost every battle. The difference was that his focus was on training—vice winning—and was willing to experiment and challenge his unit. Maj. Gen. Hertling said this was not common, in part due to the Army’s culture of winning and commanders’ usual intent to “prove” their competency within the exercise.

Col. Toby Green pointed out the even greater importance of one’s reputation than the actual evaluation that one receives from a CTC rotation, considering the prestigious, nominative positions are almost always based on one’s reputation. Interview (2008).
in 1991 and massive Army downsizing (1991-96), the main Army interventions throughout the 1990s (1991 Gulf War, Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo), and Transformation, September 11th, and the Global War on Terrorism. In this section, I briefly discuss two additional, critical strategic events for changes in the U.S. Army institutional training: the Army Training and Leader Development Panel’s (ATLDP) Officer Study Report, and events in Iraq and Afghanistan between 2003-07.

4.2.1 Army Training and Leader Development Panel’s (ATLDP) Officer Study Report

By the end of his first year as Army Chief of Staff (CSA), Gen. Eric Shinseki had begun doctrinal, organizational, and materiel changes within the Army’s Transformation Campaign Plan.457 In March 2000, CSA Shinseki then chartered the Army Training and Leader Development Panel’s (ATLDP) Officer Study Report to evaluate the Army’s training and leader development processes. Based on data from 13,500 leaders, the Panel completed its officer report458 in May 2001, assessing and suggesting ways to improve the culture, education, and training of the Army to overcome its existing and future strategic requirements. In this chapter, I discuss just the training recommendations.

While interviews revealed that officers consistently valued the CTC exercises, the ATLDP was very critical of the Army’s slow progress to adapt its training since 1989. It found that the training standards in 2000-01—which defined what success was during training—were outdated, that the Army was not implementing its training doctrine, and

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457 Major changes included doctrinally updating FM 1, The Army, in Nov. 2000, and FM 3-0 (100-5), Operations, in Jun. 2001; organizationally fielding the Initial Brigade Combat Team (IBCT) while developing the organizational and operational concepts for the Interim Division (IDIV) and Objective Force; and making materiel changes in the fielding of the Future Combat Systems. U.S. Army, “The ATLDP Officer Study Report to the Army,” May 2001, p. OS-1.

458 The Army Training and Leader Development Panel completed subsequent reports on Non-Commissioned Officers, Warrant Officers, and Department of the Army Civilians.
that the strategic environment was changing faster than the Army.\textsuperscript{459} The training did “not reflect the significance of being a learning organization and of learning from educational and operational experiences,”\textsuperscript{460} although the panel recognized that the CTC experience still served a valuable role.\textsuperscript{461} It concluded that the Army needed to modernize, update, and better resource (people and money) the CTCs to appropriately train units for all environments and missions of all types. Interestingly, it also recommended that units should not be permitted to train for nation building or other small scale missions more than three months prior to deploying overseas.\textsuperscript{462} Despite these mixed messages, the CSA’s embracing of these recommendations prepared the Army to more fully incorporate within its CTCs the lessons it learned throughout the 1990s.

4.2.2 Events in Iraq and Afghanistan between 2003-07

Despite the belief that restoring order after Saddam Hussein’s removal would be simple, events in Iraq after President George W. Bush’s infamous “mission complete” speech on May 1, 2003,\textsuperscript{463} proved otherwise. By his evening address to the nation in April 2004 about the situation in Iraq, President Bush was already answering reporters’ questions about the parallel with the quagmire in Vietnam.\textsuperscript{464} Inter- and intra-sectarian violence gradually increased, accompanied by increasingly lethal improvised explosive

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item \textsuperscript{459} “The ATLDP Officer Study Report to the Army,” May 2001, p. OS-6.
\item \textsuperscript{460} “The ATLDP Officer Study Report to the Army,” May 2001, p. OS-6.
\item \textsuperscript{461} “The ATLDP Officer Study Report to the Army,” May 2001, p. OS-14.
\item \textsuperscript{462} “The ATLDP Officer Study Report to the Army,” May 2001, p. OS-15.
\item \textsuperscript{463} While President Bush stated that “Major combat operations in Iraq have ended. In the battle of Iraq, the United States and our allies have prevailed.” Due to the “Mission Complete” poster hanging behind him, however, this speech is remembered for this latter message. The speech, “President Bush Announces Major Combat Operations in Iraq Have Ended,” may be found at \url{http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/05/20030501-15.html}.
\item \textsuperscript{464} George W. Bush, “President Addresses the Nation in Prime Time Press Conference (‘about the situation in Iraq’),” Apr. 13, 2004. \url{http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/04/20040413-20.html}
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
devices and suicide attacks. The February 2006 attack on the Shi’ite shrine north of Baghdad spiraled violence to new levels, and by April 2007 there were over one hundred Iraqi civilian casualties per day.\textsuperscript{465} After President Bush announced his plan to “surge” an additional 20,000 soldiers to Iraq in January 2007, he also assigned Ambassador Ryan Crocker and Gen. David Petraeus as the senior U.S. civilian and military leaders, respectively, in Iraq.\textsuperscript{466} This began a critical shift in military strategy, as units switched focus from fighting to primarily supporting the Iraqis, in addition to prioritizing nation building efforts within what was finally recognized as counterinsurgency operations. By September 2007, civilian deaths had decreased to levels before 2006, which continued to decline through the end of the year.\textsuperscript{467}

4.3 The U.S. Army Training System

The Army has three maneuver, or “dirt,”\textsuperscript{468} combat training centers (CTCs), located in California, Louisiana, and Germany, which comprise its institutional training system. Unlike individual soldier training that the Army completes on a regular basis, the CTCs provide the opportunity for units to focus solely on training and learning, while being challenged by a formidable adversary and continuously receiving structured feedback.\textsuperscript{469} Due to the geographical location and available area of land, the CTCs have


\textsuperscript{468} This is an Army colloquialism to differentiate the maneuver CTCs from the computer simulated Battle Command Training Program (BCTP). See the U.S. Army Joint Readiness Training Center website, \url{http://www.jrtc-polk.army.mil/AboutJRTC.htm}.

\textsuperscript{469} Gordon R. Sullivan (Gen., CSA, Ret.) and Michael V. Harper, \textit{Hope is Not a Method} (Broadway Publishers), 1997, p. 17.
overlapping yet distinct training goals for the Army. While this section primarily focuses on changes at the CTCs that have occurred since the end of the Cold War, I first provide a short overview of the CTC program and describe the three CTCs to provide a context for understanding the rate and magnitude of training changes, including variance among the three installations. I then discuss changes at the CTCs within three approximately equal time periods: 1991-96, 1997-2002, and 2003-07. It is important to note, however, that most changes between 1991-2002 were evolutionary, including the three important changes implemented in 1993, 1995, and 2000: the JMRC in Germany focusing on stability operations (such as nation building tasks) for units preparing to deploy to the Balkans, the JRTC in Louisiana adopting and improving upon these pre-deployment practices, and the CTCs updating their Opposition Forces (OPFOR) and technology. Only during the 2003 Iraq War were CTC changes revolutionary, justifying the classification of a major change. The JMRC’s 2005 formal addition of multi-national training for emerging NATO countries and other coalition allies was an important change for the U.S. Army, since most U.S. units had similar experiences before and after. However, the change did not fundamentally alter the experience of those attending, although its significance was likely more dramatic for our allies’ militaries.

The CTC program is designed to provide realistic and stressful joint (Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marines) and combined arms (i.e. infantry, armor, engineer, logistics, etc.) training that is based on Army and joint doctrine.\footnote{U.S. Army Combined Arms Center, “Combat Training Center Overview Brief.”} The CTCs have five primary goals that are connected to other aspects of the institutional and operational Army. First, they aim to increase units’ preparedness to deploy and fight wars. Second,
they help to create confident, innovative leaders through stressful tactical and operational exercises. Third, the CTCs help embed doctrine throughout the Army. Fourth, they provide feedback to the participants. Finally, the CTCs provide lessons learned, especially during peacetime, to help cause change across all institutional systems.471

The Army has identified five foundational components, or pillars, to accomplish these goals. As shown in Figure 4.1, the CTCs must first have Army units arriving that are prepared to train. The Army’s goal in peacetime is for every combat battalion (approximately five hundred soldiers) to complete a CTC exercise at least every other year.472 Second, the Operations Group contains the observer/controllers (O/Cs), who provide guidance and oversight for the evaluated unit. Third, the CTCs have a doctrinally informed, realistic Opposing Force (OPFOR), who serve as the evaluated unit’s adversaries. Fourth, the CTCs use technology to help simulate warfare and record the experience, which it calls “Instrumentation, Training Aids, Devices, Simulations and Simulators, or I-TADSS.” Since After Action Reviews (AARs) are one of the most critical parts of the training, during which units receive and contribute candid analyses of their actions, I-TADSS also allow commanders and the evaluators to re-play any event from the exercise to facilitate feedback during the AARs. Finally, the fifth pillar is the

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471 U.S. Army Combined Arms Support Command (CASCOM), “CTC Program Overview.” The Army classifies its institutional elements as doctrine, organizations, training, materiel, leader development and education, personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF). CASCOM is one of six subordinate commands of TRADOC, with the others being Accessions Command and the Army Capabilities Integration Center (Ft. Monroe, Va.); Combined Arms Center, TRADOC Analysis Center, and the Center for Army Lessons Learned (Ft. Leavenworth, Ks.); the Combined Arms Support Center (Ft. Lee, Va.); and the thirty-three Army schools.

facilities themselves, to include the training environment and structures, which help replicate the environments in which the Army operates.\textsuperscript{473}

Figure 4.1 The Five U.S. Army Pillars of the Combat Training Centers
Source: U.S. Army Combined Arms Center, “Combat Training Center Overview Brief”

An important component of the training is the selection of the scenario the unit fights. Historically, CTC exercises have been designed largely by the unit being evaluated, in coordination with the CTC leadership. Depending upon a unit’s critical tasks,\textsuperscript{474} expected missions, and the commander’s preferences, units have wide latitude to design the battles on which they will be evaluated.\textsuperscript{475} In 2008 there was a U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) initiative to end this practice and instead


\textsuperscript{474} The Army refers to these as the unit’s Mission Essential Task List (METL).

\textsuperscript{475} The senior CTC O/Cs typically meet with the evaluated unit’s leadership 180 days before the exercise to determine the scenario and tasks to be evaluated. The O/Cs often coach units through this process. Interview with Maj. Gen. Hertling (2008).
require units to train and be evaluated on missions of all types during the exercise. Units would have some flexibility to adapt the scenario, but commanders would no longer be permitted to select the battle at which they know they can succeed. While not all commanders aim only to win, most prioritize winning—as opposed to training—at the CTCs, which the Army’s culture strongly reinforces. While still in its early stages, if accepted this initiative could significantly alter this tendency.

The National Training Center (NTC) at Ft. Irwin, Ca., is the oldest, largest, and premier CTC. It specializes in medium-to-high intensity combat (see Figure 4.2 for a graphical depiction). This “maneuver” warfare is fought with large vehicles moving across vast areas, which the Army considers its traditional and culturally preferred mission. The inspiration for the NTC came in 1977, as the TRADOC Commander, Gen. William DePuy, thought the Army’s training weakness was its inability to train units as they expected to fight. In addition, its Vietnam experiences and lessons from the 1973 Arab-Israeli War prompted the Army to create opportunities for unit training. The idea to incorporate an opposition force within training came from an initiative at Fort Hood, Tx. By the late 1970s, the Armor Commander recommended to the TRADOC Commander that Fort Irwin—the current location of the NTC—was suitable for such a maneuver training center. Opened in 1982, these 1,000 square miles of desert and

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476 Interview with SES-2 and Col.(Ret.) Max McFarlane, TRADOC G-2, who is spearheading this initiative (Mar. 2008).


478 William Wallace (Gen.), “TRADOC Commander’s Address at the NTC 25th Year Birthday Celebration,” Fort Irwin, Ca., Apr. 13, 2007.

479 The training at Ft. Hood was called Red Thrust. Hertling and Boisselle, pp. 64-65.
mountain terrain—which is as large as Rhode Island\textsuperscript{480} and twice the size of Mexico City\textsuperscript{481}—have since hosted brigade-based, large vehicle exercises.

![Figure 4.2 Depiction of the Spectrum of Intensity Conflicts, U.S. Army](image)

Source: adapted from the U.S. Army, Field Manual 3-0, “Operations,” Feb. 27, 2008, Fig. 2-2

The Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) at Fort Polk, La., focuses its training on low-to-medium intensity conflict. The JRTC was created in 1987 to train the relatively new light infantry battalions and Special Forces teams\textsuperscript{482} and it now specializes in counterinsurgency operations and small scale contingency missions\textsuperscript{483}.


\textsuperscript{481} Leonhard, 2003.

\textsuperscript{482} Davidson, 2005.

\textsuperscript{483} Small scale contingencies are the Army’s doctrinal term for missions less intense than major theater wars. Examples include a non-combatant evacuation operation, show of force, counter-proliferation and counter-terrorism, lines of communication, no-fly zone enforcement, direct intervention, peace support operations, and humanitarian relief operations. U.S. Army JRTC, “The Contemporary Operational Environment: Assessment & Implementation Timeline,” PowerPoint presentation, 2002.
Originally located in Fort Chaffee, Ar., the JRTC relocated to its current location in March 1993, although it was not equipped with technological instrumentation until 1996. Its total area is 310 sq. mi.; however, with an urban training area only 21 sq. mi., units at the JRTC are trained and evaluated in much smaller groups while primarily moving on foot, in small vehicles, or by helicopter (“dismounted maneuver”).

The third “dirt” CTC is the Joint Multinational Readiness Center (JMRC), which is located in Hohenfels, Germany, and was called the Combined Maneuver Training Center (CMTC) until 2005. This training area was established in 1938 for the German Army, with U.S. forces controlling and using the area since April 22, 1945. The 62.5 sq. mi. maneuver training area at JMRC complements the 8,800 sq. mi. area in which units are able to coordinate military movements, including the firing ranges in nearby Grafenwoehr. As the primary combat and pre-deployment training installation for all U.S. Army forces stationed throughout Europe, in addition to helping train NATO and other international forces, JMRC has traditionally focused on vehicle-based maneuver missions throughout the entire low-to-high intensity spectrum.

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484 Davidson, 2005.
486 Davidson, 2005.
487 Up to two battalions can train at JRTC simultaneously, although much of the training is at squad, platoon, and company level.
An important institutional difference between JMRC in Germany and the other CTCs is the headquarters that each serves directly. The NTC and JRTC are overseen by the Pentagon (Army G-3); Ft. Monroe, Va. (TRADOC); and Ft. Leavenworth, Ks. (Combined Arms Center).491 This provides the NTC and JRTC with a distinctive training focus, which also helps test and shape doctrinal and educational decisions. The JMRC in Germany, however, primarily receives its guidance from the European Command (EUCOM) and U.S. Army Europe (USAREUR), while still being accountable to the other training headquarters.492 As EUCOM and USAREUR primarily plan for and complete operational missions throughout Europe, most of Africa, and parts of the Middle East,493 throughout this entire post-Cold War period, the JMRC has had a uniquely operational focus.494

4.3.1 CTC Changes From 1991-96

Changes at the CTCs in the early wake of the Cold War’s conclusion were very gradual, with all three retaining the focus on seeing, tracking, attacking, and killing the

491 At the Pentagon, the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations (DCSOPS) Army G-3; at Ft Monroe the Training and Doctrine Command, including their G-2 responsible for the OPFOR; and at Ft Leavenworth, the Combined Arms Center, which includes the Combat Training Center Directorate, serves as the extended staff for the DA G-3 and the DA Responsible Official (TRADOC DCG, Combined Arms) to facilitate validation, administration, and integration of the Combat Training Center (CTC) Program. U.S. Army Combat Training Centers website, http://usacac.army.mil/CAC/cae-t/etc/

492 See the JMRC’s headquarters, the Joint Multinational Training Command, website, http://www.hqjmtc.army.mil/.


494 Point made in separate interviews with Col. Toby Green and Maj. Gen. Hertling (both 2008).
Two notable changes common to all three CTCs occurred in 1993-94. First, TRADOC published its first standardized Opposing Forces (OPFOR) model to establish consistent guidelines and a common basis among the CTCs. The Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) published two organizational guides for the CTCs in September 1993, and CALL published operational and tactical handbooks in 1994 and 1995, respectively, for the rest of the Army. These training “packages” required the OPFOR to “fight fair” and incorporate a wide range of doctrinally-based challenges, although it still allowed them to be creative, unpredictable, and adapt to new training requirements.

By September 1994, all CTC training exercises also required units to

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498 Moore, p. 42.
begin with an “emergency” deployment from the unit’s home location, rather than the administrative move previously completed.499

The NTC changed most gradually of the CTCs from 1991-96. Its OPFOR—dubbed the Krasnovians—continued to be modeled on Soviet doctrine and tactics, supplemented with more creative techniques. It evaluated units fighting a peer competitor in symmetrical, medium-to-high intensity battles, as armored tanks and infantry fighting vehicles moved across the wide desert and steep mountain passes.500 In 1995, the NTC proudly completed its fielding of the T-80 Soviet tanks while continuing to increase its use of the Soviet UMZ mine-laying system.501 Evaluated units’ administrative and logistics areas—or the “rear area” of the battlefield—also remained outside of the fighting, replicating conditions in Kuwait. Arguing this was wasting a training opportunity and did not resemble the Army’s future threats, one mid-career O/C argued that this practice should change.502 Still, when the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) researched the Army’s incorporation of peace building training in late 1995, it bypassed the NTC to interview officials and personnel only from the other two CTCs.503


The JMRC\textsuperscript{504} in Germany also remained a maneuver training center with its OPFOR structured as a Soviet regiment; however, by 1993 it had already integrated a much wider repertoire of missions that deliberately included tasks and scenarios for nation building, or stability, operations. While the NTC remained focused on defeating the enemy, the JMRC incorporated civilian actors and agencies within parts of its training, especially those preparing to deploy to the Balkans and other peacekeeping and enforcement missions. In 1993, the JMRC required all U.S. units to complete a two-to-five day peace operations training module within its twenty-one day exercise.\textsuperscript{505} In 1993, the JMRC also helped train the Royal Netherland Marines preparing to deploy with the United Nations to Cambodia,\textsuperscript{506} as well as helping train British and French units.\textsuperscript{507} Senior O/Cs at JMRC in 1994 discussed in a matter-of-fact manner that units needed to improve their ability to interact with non-traditional actors they encountered within the exercises. Specifically, they argued that units needed to better incorporate linguists to gather human intelligence and be more prepared to interact with those role playing local authorities and non-governmental organizations.\textsuperscript{508}

\textsuperscript{504} The JMRC was known as the CMTC until 2005, but for consistency I refer to it as the JMRC.

\textsuperscript{505} This training replicated two separate UN mandates: peacekeeping and peace enforcement. The evaluated peacekeeping tasks included establishing, operating, and reinforcing observation posts and checkpoints and securing convoy operations. The peace enforcement missions included such tasks as monitoring the separation zone between belligerent parties, attacking and defending. By Oct. 1994, twenty U.S. infantry and armor battalions had completed these modules at least once. U.S. GAO, 1995, Ch.2:3.1.1.


The JRTC, which relocated to Louisiana in 1993 as a result of the 1991 Base Realignment and Closure, also completed an important training change during this time period. Its OPFOR—the Cortina Liberation Front—replicated capabilities of armies from sixteen “Third World” countries, ranging from insurgents to a traditional Soviet regiment. Like the JMRC, changes also began in 1993, as the JRTC made permanent its “civilians on the battlefield.” In 1993 and 1994, the JRTC also conducted two training exercises focused on peace enforcement missions. By 1995, nation building tasks had been institutionalized for most units conducting training at the JRTC, justifying the classification of an important change. While the JRTC primarily trained U.S. forces in dismounted low-to-medium intensity combat, in 1995 it also hosted the first U.S.-based Partnership for Peace exercise. For sixteen days, the U.S. led the peacekeeping exercise that included over 4,000 soldiers from three NATO and twelve NATO-aspirant countries. By August 1996, units at the JRTC began training in a complex designed to replicate urban battles, which included an airfield, village with twenty-seven multi-story


buildings, and a mock enemy military compound.\textsuperscript{514} CSA Gen. Sullivan even highlighted these developments in his 1996 book, including the JRTC’s inclusion of governmental and non-governmental groups.\textsuperscript{515} He said the exercises included “the most complex battlefield dynamics” at the time, integrating “multiple antagonists,” civilians, international agencies, and the media.\textsuperscript{516} Another Army leader researching changes across the CTCs in 1995 also credited the JRTC with leading the Army’s changes with respect to stability operations and a complex security environment.\textsuperscript{517}

While changes at the JMRC and the JRTC were important, these did not qualify as “major” changes since both CTCs retained a strong focus on destroying the enemy throughout this time. Units training for stability operations at the JMRC continued to approach missions with a traditional, high-intensity mindset.\textsuperscript{518} Even while discussing the significant changes at the JRTC in 1996, leaders still treated the enemy and civilians as two distinct categories, with the latter maintaining a passive role. In addition to focusing on violently engaging enemies, even in 2000, a fifteen-page article discussing “street fighting” at the JRTC did not mention non-hostile civilians, while the author noted that “fighting to the last man in the room is commonplace.”\textsuperscript{519}

4.3.2 CTC Changes From 1997-2002

\textsuperscript{514} A second phase of construction was completed from 1997-2001, further improving the urban environment.
\textsuperscript{515} Sullivan and Harper, p. 18.
\textsuperscript{516} Sullivan and Harper, p. 17.
\textsuperscript{517} Swartz, 1995.
\textsuperscript{518} Jones, 1998.
While changes at the CTCs from 1997-2002 were primarily evolutionary in nature, all three CTCs underwent important changes to their Opposition Forces (OPFORs) from 1997-2002. TRADOC finalized a new definition of the current and expected future environment, calling it the “contemporary operational environment (COE).” The COE required the CTCs to more fully integrate the media, civilian actors, and non-military organizations within their scenarios. It also prompted the OPFOR to use new tactics, publish new training doctrine, and allowed them to use any existing equipment and technology found worldwide.\textsuperscript{520} Whereas the OPFOR had previously been a fairly predictable, Soviet-based, large unit enemy, by 2000 the OPFORs were comprised of different sized and “free-thinking” groups that were supposed to exploit any weakness they could find or create. The evaluated units were also required to fight continuously against the OPFOR during the exercise, whereas previously the “fight” would be complete after one battle and a new enemy would appear at the rear of the OPFOR’s initial location.\textsuperscript{521}

The JRTC in Louisiana continued to enhance changes it made in the previous period. It remained focused on training U.S.-based units before they deployed to stability operations, including officially assuming the pre-deployment training mission of U.S.-based units deploying to the Balkans. The JRTC also continued to train light infantry and

\textsuperscript{520} Specifically, the link between the COE and the OPFOR is: “This COE takes a future threat assessment and translates it into new OPFOR doctrine, tactics, units, and equipment which, when implemented, will portray a credible and lethal threat that ensures our units train against a relevant enemy.” Statement by Brig. Gen. James D. (J.D.) Thurman, Commanding General, National Training Center and Fort Irwin, “Military Training Capabilities/Shortfalls Impact on Military Readiness,” to the U.S. House of Representatives Armed Services Committee, Mar. 8, 2002. For a good discussion of the new COE OPFOR, see W. Wayne Ingalls (Maj.), “Fires TTP [Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures] to Defeat the COE OPFOR,” \textit{Field Artillery}, Jan.-Feb. 2003, pp. 25-28.

Special Forces after they returned from war fighting missions. In 1998, the JRTC began aggressively including simulated terrorist chemical attacks within its scenarios, while the OPFOR also began attacking the evaluated unit in what had previously been the “safe” administrative and logistical “rear area.” By 2001, the OPFOR was also using evaluated units’ own internet websites to gather intelligence on them. While the JRTC was primarily helping prepare units for nation building missions, the prioritized tasks were still combat-related. For instance, leaders still argued that with proper planning and guidance, four-to six trained Civil Affairs soldiers could appropriately deal with “difficult situations in the civilian arena” and allow the commander “to manage his battle space with minimal civilian interference.”

The JMRC in Germany also continued training units deploying to the Balkans and those trying to regain their “traditional” combat skills upon return. Like the JRTC, it also intensified its inclusion of urban fighting. Unlike the JRTC’s previously mentioned emphasis of “fighting to the last man,” however, average infantry units in Europe now trained on complex situations that integrated those role-playing combatants and non-combatants, working within restrictive rules of engagement.

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522 Nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) scenarios are normal training scenarios within the Army; however, JRTC’s deliberate and frequent inclusion within the exercises was a significant change from their previous use. Chuck McArthur (Maj.), “NBC and the JRTC Experience,” in U.S. Army, Center for Army Lessons Learned, “CTC Quarterly Bulletin 98-12,” Apr.-Jun. 1998.


524 Michael Eyre (Maj.), David Albanese (Capt.), John Stockton (Sgt. 1st Class), and Colleen Burrows (Sgt. 1st Class), “Civil Affairs (CA) Integration at the JRTC,” in U.S. Army, Center for Army Lessons Learned, “CTC Quarterly Bulletin 98-12,” Apr.-Jun. 1998.

conducted training and evaluations of other allies’ militaries, including a 1998 exercise by a German Panzer Battalion, jointly evaluated by U.S. and German O/Cs.  

The NTC continued to focus on aggressive and “violently executed” maneuver combat, without including tasks or conditions that units would face in missions other than conventional war. An OPFOR commander in 1999 recommended that to succeed at the NTC, “every element in any maneuver-oriented formation is to find and attack the enemy.” He also advised that units preparing for an enemy attack should build their defenses “until the last moment before being whisked away” to a location safely outside of the battle. It was still possible to know the direction from which the enemy was arriving, in addition to the NTC maintaining a general degree of predictability within the scenarios.

The impact of incorporating a creative OPFOR was the greatest at the NTC, however, as this CTC had previously changed the least since the end of the Cold War. The civilians on the battlefield began playing a much more prominent role in the exercises, completing up to forty events with follow-on repercussions based on the unit’s responses. The OPFOR also institutionalized a forty-person guerrilla group to disrupt the evaluated unit, attempting to destroy as many significant capabilities as possible. Each exercise included four urban training events, although these facilities remained very

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528 Luong, p. 72.
530 Zanol, 1999.
rudimentary. By 2002, the NTC was the only CTC without urban warfare training facilities, although its leadership formally requested funds from Congress to create an urban site.\textsuperscript{532} The NTC also coordinated with major universities to send journalism students to work as embedded reporters for the western “International News Network.”\textsuperscript{533}

An additional important change, occurring primarily at the NTC in 2000-01, was its use of advanced technology. Units at the NTC used and had to defend against twenty-two new systems, including tactical unmanned aerial vehicles, Joint Surveillance and Target Attack Radar System, and precision-guided munitions. The units also had to synchronize their efforts during the exercise with simulated units fighting outside of the maneuver area, which greatly increased the responsibilities of the evaluated unit.\textsuperscript{534}

Writing just before 9/11 as the NTC was celebrating its twentieth year, OPFOR Commander Col. Mark Hertling wrote with obvious pride about the changes made during the NTC’s twenty year existence.\textsuperscript{535} Looking back these changes seem very minor. For instance, although evaluated units had to respond to media reports by the “International News Network,” most units were able to successfully deal with this issue by requiring one junior officer or senior non-commissioned officer to add this duty to others he or she was already performing.\textsuperscript{536} At the time, however, they were “out-of-the-box,” dramatic changes, which (now) Maj. Gen. Hertling emphasized in a 2008 interview.\textsuperscript{537}

\textsuperscript{532} Statement by Thurman, 2002.
\textsuperscript{533} Hertling and Boisselle, p. 68.
\textsuperscript{534} The NTC worked with the National Simulations Center at Ft. Leavenworth to accomplish this. Hertling and Boisselle, pp. 67, 69. UAVs and JSTARS were first used in Aug 00 at NTC.
\textsuperscript{535} Hertling and Boisselle, pp. 65-71.
\textsuperscript{537} Interview with Maj. Gen. Hertling (2008).
time, though, there was a disconnect between missions that most of the Army had participated in for a decade and what the Army was still convinced was its primary mission: preparing for the next big war. In the article, Col. Hertling seemed to discount this difference, saying that “Although focused at the upper end of the conflict spectrum, units training at the NTC find training conditions characteristic of today’s operational environment.” 538

4.3.3 CTC Changes From 2003-07

This final period within my analysis witnessed the only major change in the Army’s institutional training since the end of the Cold War. The rate and magnitude of change increased from late 2002, and by summer 2003, writers in the CTC Quarterly Bulletins seemed to accept without question that the Army had to be prepared to deploy anywhere to accomplish all types of missions against a wide variety of threats. 539 Interestingly, with units already in Iraq and Afghanistan, in 2003 many believed that the Army would not be involved in extended battles. As two authors wrote, “there is no guarantee that today’s real-world operations will be of the two-week, combat training center (CTC) rotation variety,” so units needed to prepare for “an extended conflict, such as [the six month] Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM.” 540 Although the “profound

538 Hertling and Boisselle, pp. 64-71.


and almost continuous change” began in January 2004. I credit the Army with making
the major change in 2005. By summer 2005, all three CTCs had changed so dramatically
that those attending had fundamentally different experiences than in previous years. Not
only is this apparent from the specific changes I discuss below, but this is also evident
from the paradigm shift of the CTC Quarterly Bulletins beginning with the July-
September 2005 edition. Previous editions discussed best practices at the CTCs, with the
February 2005 edition discussing such topics as the negative impact of stability
operations on a unit’s ability to complete its traditional combat missions. The
succeeding July-September 2005 edition, however, reads as if it were a completely
different document, focusing almost exclusively on Iraq and Afghanistan and their
parallels with the CTCs. It abruptly shifted to discussing methods of overcoming the
complexity of stability operations, working with civilian actors and agencies, and
providing other lessons learned from Iraq and Afghanistan.

The CTC changes were both institutional and cultural in nature. The CTCs’
training focus changed so that units were required to work with and protect the society’s
population, demanding leaders think and act strategically to succeed in this complex
environment that had become the Army’s norm. By summer 2005, all three CTCs
required units to help repair the local infrastructure—referred to as sewage, water,

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542 Roy Sevalia (Maj.), Titus Brown (Maj.), Mark P. Krieger, Jr. (Maj.), and John P. Calhoun
(Maj.), The NTC Fire Support Team, “From Stability and Support Operations to High Intensity Conflict,
The Training Challenges for FA [Field Artillery] Battalions,” in U.S. Army, Center for Army Lessons
2005.
2005.
electricity, academics, and telecommunications (SWEAT)—while also completing their combat missions. By summer 2007, soldiers—many who were preparing for their third deployment to Iraq or Afghanistan—were speaking Arabic without interpreters when interacting with the role players. Evaluated units also relied upon those acting as Iraqi Army and Iraqi Police to help quell simulated uprisings and demonstrations. In addition, the JMRC in Germany also made an additional change in 2005 to more explicitly and formally train NATO and other coalition partners.

While the JRTC in Louisiana had been training soldiers in stability operations for almost a decade, from 2003-07 it formally incorporated counterinsurgency missions as well. The distinction between the enemy and passive civilians blurred, with evaluated units succeeding only if they could actively engage the people. In 2007, the JRTC Commander, Col. Daniel Bolger, stated that the main lessons that soldiers learned at the JRTC were “that it’s not all black and white,” but instead the training required them to adapt quickly to the situations they were facing. Commanders of evaluated units were expected to conduct full radio interviews with the “local” Arab media, and the training also began quickly incorporating tactical changes made by the enemy in Iraq. For


instance, within days of insurgents using new tactics in Iraq, such as blowing up bridges, the JRTC trainers incorporated these within the exercises.  

The JMRC in Germany rapidly changed in fundamental ways as well during this time period. In September 2004, the JMRC completed a $544,000 cave training complex through urban and mountainous terrain that replicated Afghanistan,551 and in Fall 2005, the JMRC conducted simultaneous training exercises in Bulgaria and Romania for U.S., Bulgarian, and Romanian units.552 By Spring 2006, the JMRC was training units on equipment and tactics to help counter the Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) used in Iraq, and by mid-2007, it was teaching a close-quarters battle course to teach leaders how to deal with the complexity of counterinsurgency.553

During this period, the JMRC also made an important change to formally integrate multi-national training as a primary mission. This transformation was begun by Gen. Burwell B. Bell III while commander of USAREUR from 2002-05. In the first year of his command of the subordinate 7th Army Training Command (7ATC), Brig. Gen. Mark Hertling helped complete and formalize this process. In 2005, the 7ATC changed to the Joint Multinational Training Command, and the CMTC was renamed to the Joint Multinational Readiness Center (JMRC).554

554 Interview with Hertling (2008); See also the U.S. Army, JMRC Transformation Video at http://www.jmrc.hqjmtc.army.mil/JMRC/Transition.htm
Becoming the JMRC was far from a change in name only. As a comparison of how quickly this shift occurred, in June 2003, it was significant that the JMRC added twelve Polish soldiers to its junior leader training course.\footnote{This was an initiative that ultimately stemmed from then Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld to help prepare for the transformation of US-Europe military relationship. Chuck Gordon, “Polish Forces Ready for Battle,” \textit{Training Journal} (for 7th Army Training Command), Fall 2004, pp. 11-13.} By 2006, the JMRC was regularly integrating units and senior staffs from Azerbaijan, Republic of Georgia, Germany, Great Britain, Romania, and Russia as they prepared for missions in Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq.\footnote{U.S. Army, Seventh (7th) Army Training Command, \textit{Training Journal}, Winter 2007.} In December 2006, the JMRC chief of training commented that the training had “turned into a mini-NATO type school,” with a Slovenian soldier even earning top recognition.\footnote{Quote by Sgt. 1st Class Leigh Perry. German soldiers still do not attend the training courses, although US and German units frequently partner for training events. Jerry Wilson, “World Class Training for Soldiers Worldwide,” \textit{Training Journal} (for 7th Army Training Command), Winter 2007, pp. 23.} In 2006 and 2007, multinational units also trained alongside every U.S.-led exercise at the JMRC.\footnote{The non-U.S. units ranged from platoon to company-sized forces. U.S. Army, Joint Multinational Readiness Center, “Multinational and Coalition Training: Unique Opportunities at the Joint Multinational Readiness Center,” in U.S. Army, Center for Army Lessons Learned, “CTC Quarterly Bulletin 07-32,” Apr.-Jun. 2007.}

The NTC changed the most dramatically, considering its lagged progress in previously incorporating most of the Army’s experiential lessons. Even though later changes were more significant, by late 2002 and 2003, OPFOR company commanders and junior staff officers were already inventing new techniques and improving guerrilla-type capabilities to further disrupt and confuse units.\footnote{This required evaluated units to fight from all directions against quickly-adapting enemies not adhering to doctrine. Interview with Byrom (2007).} Recognizing the relevance of such initiatives, the new OPFOR commander, Col. Joseph Moore, codified and provided additional resources to support these initiatives. The NTC also tripled the number of urban training sites—mini-cities in the middle of the California desert with populations...
up to 250 people—from four to twelve, built to-scale tunnel complexes throughout the training area, and created a series of caves to resemble those already found in Afghanistan. Units were required to live on semi-permanent base camps instead of living and fighting in arbitrarily designated zones. Units also had to process and lead detainee facilities, occupy guard towers, and react to constant mortar attacks.560

The rate and degree of change at the NTC since the end of 2003 has only intensified, with some of the examples listed in Table 4.2. The $12 million originally requested long before 9/11 for urban training facilities was finally granted in 2005, and within two years the site incorporated forty-one main buildings, including a government complex, a consulate, and twenty-four smaller structures, such as guard towers. By 2006, the NTC was training units continuously on counterinsurgency, detainee, humanitarian, and high-intensity combat operations, in which “success” was no longer defined as destroying the enemy. Units were evaluated on working with and collecting intelligence from various tribal, religious, ethnic, and business leaders, while responsible for economic and rule of law development. Civilians played a central role, aided by Hollywood and artificial intelligence software assistance, with 1,600 civilians—including those coming from Iraq—participating in each exercise. Not only were units required to respond to the Western media, but Iraqi Americans representing an Al Jazeera affiliate reported continuously. Units also had to respond to over 120 terrorist attacks, 300 information “threads,” and over 1,000 pieces of intelligence in the twenty-one day exercise. Units were also allowed to design their own scenarios, based on their expected mission overseas, rather than selecting from an existing menu of options. By the end of

2007, the NTC was continuing to refine scenarios and construct improved urban training sites, with the current plan consisting of almost five hundred buildings.\textsuperscript{561}

Table 4.2 SIGNIFICANT CHANGES TO THE FOURTEEN-DAY TRAINING ROTATION, U.S. Army, National Training Center, 2002-06

- Train on continuous missions that focus on counterinsurgency, detainee, humanitarian, and high-intensity combat operations, in which “success” is no longer defined as destroying the enemy.
- Evaluated on working with and extracting intelligence from various tribal, religious, ethnic, and business leaders.
- Responsible for contracting, public works projects, and working with the mock Central Criminal Court of Iraq.
- 1,600 Civilians on the Battlefield (COBs) participate, 250 of whom are Iraqi-Americans, with only 100 being suspected insurgents. Each has his/her own complex role, designed by a network-modeling and artificial intelligence software program, which increases realism and injects second- and third-order effects of soldiers’ actions into the scenario.
- Hollywood producers have advised how to make cultural role playing and scenarios more realistic.
- Iraqi-Americans playing reporters of an Al Jazeera affiliate now augment those acting as Western “International News Network” reporters to produce written and television propaganda throughout the training.
- No longer restricted to a limited selection of scenarios but units now determine and design their own scenarios to best prepare for their upcoming combat deployments.
- Respond to over 120 terrorists attacks, 300 information threads, and over 1,000 pieces of intelligence

Source: Cone, 2006

\textsuperscript{561} The project had originally been delayed for funding, but the contract was awarded in 2005 “to meet an increased training demand.” Army News Service, “NTC Opening New Urban Training Site,” DefenceTalk.com, Dec 7, 2007.
While many of the CTC changes between 2003-07 have brought training more in line with existing threats, not all changes have been optimal. For most of 2005, the Army’s elite OPFOR at the NTC was replaced by a National Guard unit, while many of the OPFOR served as a military transition team in Afghanistan. With little time between deployments to update one’s knowledge of current conditions, the NTC trainers commented in 2006 that some of the most difficult people to train were those who had served in Iraq in 2003 or 2004 who were deploying on their second rotation. In addition to many having a lower morale, many junior leaders had less trust in the improved technology and were more resistant to suggestions unless proven otherwise, since they had been in theater so recently.

By Spring 2007, many units deploying to Iraq and Afghanistan also did not first complete the entire CTC exercise as training preparation. For the first time an entire JRTC team traveled to the state of Washington and an NTC team traveled to Georgia to help prepare deploying brigade combat teams from Ft. Lewis, Wa., and Ft. Stewart, Ga. Neither of these Army bases has large maneuver areas or facilities to fully support the normal pre-deployment training. While the CTC teams were large—1,200 soldiers, 289 railcars and fifty-five trucks hauling equipment went to Ft. Stewart—these were still only about one-half the trainers and less equipment to prepare soldiers deploying to the difficult environments in Iraq and Afghanistan. In addition, the JRTC simultaneously conducted another training rotation at Ft. Polk, meaning neither unit received the

563 Comment from a senior NTC officer during a “Combat to Training Integration” Video Teleconference, Camp Victory, Baghdad, Iraq (2006).
emphasis usually provided during a training rotation.\textsuperscript{565} By 2007, the Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) was proactively creating initiatives to take its capabilities to units, allowing units to continue using these institutional Army capabilities and expertise between deployments.\textsuperscript{566} There was little disagreement throughout the Army, however, that even the Army’s focus on training was suffering due to the pace with which it was being required to conduct missions. As CSA Gen. George Casey told senior commanders in September 2007, until units could remain at home for at least eighteen months between deployments, versus the current twelve months home after deploying for twelve to fifteen months, unfortunately the Army could not afford to train on high-intensity, “traditional” combat missions.\textsuperscript{567}

4.4 Why the Institutional Training System Changed When It Did

Having described the critical strategic events and what changes occurred at the CTCs from 1991-2007, this section focuses on why these changes took place when they did. As discussed with respect to the officer personnel system, this time period involved tremendous strategic changes and exposed the Army to many new experiential lessons. Unlike the personnel system, though, the CTCs were able to make one major (2005) and four important (1993, 1995, 2000, and 2005) changes. What explains this difference?


\textsuperscript{567} George W. Casey, Jr., (Gen., CSA) “Address to the Combined/Joint Force Land Component Commander (C/JFLCC) Conference,” Sep. 4, 2007. In an address at the Senior Conference on the Professional Military Ethic in an Era of Persistent Conflict at the U.S. Military Academy at West Point on Jun. 6, 2008, CSA Casey also said that his sense was that the Army could “bounce back” to its high-intensity mission because it was a “seasoned conventional force…that knows how to fight and operate.” He thought that the Army could fight a major conventional operation, even if not as quickly as people would like, despite the current focus on counterinsurgency. He expected the Army could regain these competencies within thirty days.
The primary hypothesized differences are internal to the organization. Externally, as Table 4.3 highlights, new technologies and the budget do have a higher expected impact on training changes, although still not expected to be determinate. With the civilian knowledge of the CTCs being very low, however, there should be less external influence to require the Army to make specific changes. Internally, the CTCs are proximate in time and information to deployments, as units train there immediately before deploying in addition to their regularly-scheduled training evaluations. Those at the CTCs have less time to reflect on new threats and the future environment than those in the personnel system, while the CTCs also do not have peer training centers anywhere with which to compete.\textsuperscript{568} Since the CTCs are more decentralized from the Army’s leadership than the personnel system, the training centers need less consensus before being capable of changing on their own. Like the personnel system, though, the high degree of stakeholders constrains the organization in creating consensus for the direction and magnitude of change. Army officers care not only because training is foundational to the Army’s culture, but also the CTC evaluations serve as the only real “report card” of combat effectiveness outside of an operational deployment. In an organization that promotes only from within its own ranks and has an understandable penchant for winning, considering the ramification of failure in real missions, internal change is possible but expected to be gradual and reactive to known threats. These expected causes of change are summarized in Table 4.3.

\textsuperscript{568} The U.S. Marine Corps primarily trains at the Twenty-Nine Palms in southern California, although this is a much smaller training installation that is designed to focus on dismounted, or travelling by foot, combat.
Evidence generally supports the hypothesized reasons for change, with the preponderance of change coming from within the organization. Evidence also suggests that the unexpected result, the Army prioritizing proactive changes during the 1990s to favor future threats over those existing, is due to its organizational cultural constraints. Earlier and greater change occurred at the less prestigious CTCs (Louisiana and Germany) largely due to the Army’s cultural proclivity of muddy boots, high-intensity conflict and fewer opportunities for the organization’s elite (infantry and armor) to excel in nation building missions. Once most officers agreed that the Iraq and Afghanistan insurgencies were in fact more intense, complex, expected to reoccur, and provided the potential for threat, embarrassment, and even organizational failure, it rapidly began to incorporate these intense experiential lessons. This rest of this section discusses the process of and motivation for the changes again in three time periods: 1991-96, 1997-2002, and 2003-07.
4.4.1 Effects of the End of the Cold War (1991-96)

After the end of the Cold War and success in the 1991 Gulf War, changing the CTCs in major ways were not the priority. While CSA Gen. Gordon Sullivan (1991-95) remained committed to a focus on training, he prioritized recovering from the 1991 Gulf War, demobilizing over 600,000 soldiers, redeploying units from Europe, and creating evidence that major changes across the organization were possible and needed. For the first three years of his tenure, CSA Sullivan focused on testing and experimenting with new ideas—dubbed the Louisiana Maneuvers—to demonstrate significant change was necessary but also possible to meet twenty-first century challenges.

As a result, while changes did occur at the CTCs, these were evolutionary in nature to create conditions expected in the future. CSA Sullivan wrote that it was so important to keep a focus on training since “An organization must look to the future, not to the past.” In a 1993 article by officers working at the Ft. Leavenworth headquarters designing the CTC threats, the authors argued that once future enemies became better defined, the NTC would adapt to these challenges. “Until then,” they continued, “NTC will continue to present its current [Cold War] OPFOR.” Designers of the JRTC OPFOR intended to include within their capabilities those of at least some post-Cold War enemies, thus selecting attributes from sixteen “Third World” countries’ armies.

Since the training institutions have different headquarters with different purposes, the decentralization provided additional opportunities for an inconsistent progression of

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changes than if it were a more centralized system.\textsuperscript{574} Not only are different headquarters responsible for different parts of the training, such as TRADOC being responsible for the OPFOR and training scenarios while the Forces Command (FORSCOM) is responsible for Observer/Controllers (O/Cs) and the evaluated units, but also there are multiple headquarters responsible for making changes within each of these areas. This creates overlap and redundancy; however, as the 1993 “stay the course” quote from leaders at Leavenworth shows, the different focuses of units also allows progress along multiple paths.

TRADOC’s first effort was to publish a standardized Opposing Forces (OPFOR) model to establish consistent guidelines and a common basis among the CTCs between 1993-95. Although units performed admirably in the 1991 Gulf War, the Army wanted to ensure all three CTCs were reinforcing the current and new doctrine, especially due to the unclear strategic future and as the JRTC was relocating to Louisiana.\textsuperscript{575} As all three CTCs were still focused on evaluating units preparing for traditional combat, those regulating the OPFOR’s tactics also wanted to make sure this “enemy” was tough and creative, but realistic. The CTCs had to broaden their challenges across the spectrum of traditional combat, while still remaining able to adapt to new training requirements.\textsuperscript{576}

Experiential lessons also helped cause notable changes across the CTCs and important ones at the two less prestigious CTCs (the JRTC and JMRC). The 1991 Gulf War emphasized the Army’s need to improve on deploying rapidly, which nation building missions helped reinforce as well. As a result, over the next few years the

\textsuperscript{574} Argument made by the TRADOC G-2, Max McFarlane, in an interview (Mar. 2008).
\textsuperscript{575} Oberst et al, 1994.
\textsuperscript{576} Moore, p. 42.
institutional Army initiated processes to help require the Army to improve in emergency deployments. Doctrinally, the Army updated its “Operations” Field Manual, FM 100-5, in June 1993, which included for the first time an entire chapter on “Force Projection.”\textsuperscript{577} By late 1994, most Army units still did not include deploying as one of their critical tasks, which then Col. Russel Honoré, known today for his “John Wayne” leadership style commanding relief efforts in New Orleans after Hurricane Katrina,\textsuperscript{578} noted that the CTCs’ emphasis should help fix.\textsuperscript{579} By September 1994, all CTC training exercises also required units to begin with an “emergency” deployment from the unit’s home location, rather than the administrative move previously completed.\textsuperscript{580}

Even the creation of the CTC Quarterly Bulletins in 1993 was designed to provide “current, useful, warfighting information,” to help integrate experiential lessons being learned, at the time primarily at the CTCs.\textsuperscript{581} Then Brig. Gen. William Nash, who had been an armored cavalry platoon leader in Vietnam and an armored brigade commander in Operation DESERT STORM, was serving as the Deputy Commanding General for Training. He created this publication, which in 2008 was still published four times annually. In addition to publicizing lessons throughout the Army and helping incorporate them back into the institutional Army, these bulletins also provide superb chronologies and motivations for the CTCs’ changes.\textsuperscript{582}

\textsuperscript{577} This is chapter 3 of FM 100-5, Jun. 14, 1993.
\textsuperscript{579} Honoré, 1994.
\textsuperscript{580} Honoré, 1994.
\textsuperscript{582} All of these reports were originally classified as “For Official Use Only (FOUO),” meaning they are unclassified but not to be distributed among the general public. At least one annual version of
While high-intensity combat was considered more complex, even by the mid-1990s there was recognition that units preparing for nation building missions needed additional training. A 1995 GAO report cited DoD, non-DoD, and their own research as evidence that the military needed additional training for peace operations, especially on the restrained use of force and sensitivity to local conditions, cultures, and laws. While the report found wide divergence in training for these missions, all Army units were at least training for some of these tasks prior to deploying, except in cases of deployments with minimal notice.

After interviewing Army units in Europe and Hawaii, the GAO also concluded that some voluntarily integrated these skills within their normal training for three reasons. First, the units had already completed these missions and expected to do so again in the future. Second, based on their previous experiences, the units considered that training on some nation building tasks saved time once they were informed they would deploy, allowing them more time before deploying to focus on specific tasks for that mission. Finally, some units voluntarily added nation building training since their commanders believed, as the result of their experiences, that they would interact with the media, refugees, and civilians during future missions. Even those units that did not integrate nation building tasks within their standard training, such as the 10th Mountain Division

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583 U.S. GAO, 1995, Ch.2:2.
584 U.S. GAO, 1995, Ch.2:3.
585 U.S. GAO, 1995, Ch.2:3.
from Ft. Drum, Ny., found that they relied on previous experiences in Somalia when they were told they had to deploy in 1994 in three weeks to Haiti.\textsuperscript{586}

Changes at the JMRC in Germany primarily came as the result of a new strategic environment, in which former Soviet satellites became emerging NATO allies, and lessons learned from the UN and NATO-led missions.\textsuperscript{587} As a JMRC commander stated in 1995, we are “trying to stay relevant so that you are training your forces, not for the last war, but you have broken that mind-set and mold, and you are now preparing your soldiers for a future war, activity, or mission that they might have to do tomorrow.”\textsuperscript{588} As the JMRC is Europe’s largest and well-developed training center, after the end of the Cold War it quickly began to help U.S. and UN forces prepare for nation building missions in the Balkans and Africa.\textsuperscript{589} Its peace enforcement preparation of U.S. units stationed in Germany began in March 1993, since many thought they would soon be deployed to support the UN mission in the Former Republic of Yugoslavia.\textsuperscript{590} It also helped prepare NATO allies for their own UN missions. With little personal experiences from which to draw, JMRC personnel attended UN training centers and schools in Austria, Canada, Finland, Ireland, Poland, Sweden, and Switzerland, from which they were able to incorporate others’ lessons. While historically only those preparing to deploy on UN missions were allowed to attend, the U.S.’s participation in the Partnership for Peace exercises, created in 1995, allowed them to attend as well.\textsuperscript{591}

\begin{footnotes}
\textsuperscript{586} U.S. GAO, 1995, Ch.2:3.2.1.
\textsuperscript{587} U.S. GAO, 1995, Ch.2:3.1.1.
\textsuperscript{588} Quote from an unnamed JMRC senior leader, in Swartz, 1995.
\textsuperscript{589} Jones, 2008.
\textsuperscript{590} Jones, 2008.
\textsuperscript{591} Jones, 2008.
\end{footnotes}
As the U.S.’s involvement in the Balkans became even more likely, senior USAREUR leaders also began requiring change at the JMRC. Gen. William Crouch, USAREUR’s commander from December 1994 to August 1997, contacted a former British commander of the UN Protection Force, the first UN mission in the Balkans, for training suggestions.\(^{592}\) Realizing the Balkans mission would require different skills, Gen. Crouch oversaw the implementation of a new training package at the JMRC and within unit training to prepare them for nation building tasks. In 1995, the JMRC began evaluating units on conflict resolution and negotiation, working with civilians, and dealing with hostile and friendly media. It also included role players as mayors, paramilitary and military leaders, governmental and non-governmental leaders, and the media to create training that would be more challenging than the actual experience.\(^{593}\) Expecting that the Balkan missions would include combat, the training continued emphasizing a “high-intensity conflict” mindset.\(^{594}\)

Once the units trained at the JMRC deployed, the JMRC immediately began incorporating these experiential lessons within succeeding exercises. From U.S. forces deployed to Bosnia-Herzegovina, the JMRC incorporate specific suggestions, such as increasing the intensity and complexity of negotiation sessions, as well as general suggestions to continue updating the scenarios as the Balkan mission evolved.\(^{595}\) After training Dutch soldiers for their UN mission in Cambodia in 1993, the JMRC also invited their key leaders back to help the training center “find out just how accurate we were, to


\(^{593}\) Olsen and Davis, p. 3.

\(^{594}\) Jones, 2008.

\(^{595}\) Olsen and Davis, p. 3.
see what we could do better to make our training and scenario development even more relevant.”

The JRTC in Louisiana likewise made an important change to incorporate stability operations during this period. The training center’s leaders originally decided in 1993 to run an experimental exercise for peacekeeping operations. The second unit training with this scenario in 1994 deployed to Haiti several months afterwards, during which it used many of these skills. As a result, the JRTC continued to evolve these scenarios, including with help from the Center for Army Lessons Learned and the 7th Army Training Command in Germany. By 1995, the JRTC had institutionalized these tasks within their standard training scenario.

The JRTC’s mission has also helped it change more rapidly throughout the mid-1990s than the other two CTCs. Unlike the NTC and CMTC, it does not focus on vehicles moving throughout the training area, but rather those primarily travelling by foot. This focus lends itself to training soldiers to better interact with people (and the enemy) in close proximity. Since the Army’s culture and conception of traditional combat prioritizes intense battles fought with large vehicles, this “lesser” CTC was able to more quickly integrate experiential lessons from Somalia, Haiti, and the Balkans with relatively less institutional resistance. As one JRTC commander stated, after watching

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596 Quote from an unnamed JMRC senior leader, in Swartz, 1995.
599 Luong, p. 36.
Somalis shoot at helicopters with machine guns, “we started playing with that...[so that our OPFOR] started shooting at helicopters with Vipers [weapons].”601

Finally, the JRTC also has a geographical advantage over the JMRC when implementing changes, in particular when hiring and incorporating civilians for different stability operations scenarios. While the JRTC could hire local Louisianans to serve a multitude of civilian roles, as well as more easily incorporate U.S.-based governmental agencies and members of the media, the German-based JMRC had to rely on soldiers and retired military to role play their civilians.602 As a result, by the end of this period, leaders up to the Army Chief of Staff credited the JRTC as best replicating the complex environment that soldiers were facing.603

4.4.2 Effects of Nation Building and 9/11 (1997-2002)

As the Army increased the frequency of its nation building deployments throughout the late 1990s, and without a clearly identified new threat, changing the CTCs in major ways was still not the Army’s institutional priority. CSA Gen. Dennis Reimer (1995-99) had prioritized completing the personnel drawdown (1991-98),604 the important yet difficult change in the officer personnel system (1997), and modernizing the equipment and force structure to prepare for future, long-term threats while the Army

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601 Quote from an unnamed JRTC senior leader, in Swartz, 1995.
602 Interview with Paul Ahern (2008), former captain who completed seven CMTC (1997-99), one NTC (2000), and one JRTC (2001) rotations. The majority of the employees working as “civilians on the battlefield” are retired Army personnel, many with combat experience, who were augmented with soldiers from other units or those from visiting reserve component units. GlobalSecurity.org, “Hohenfels Combat Maneuver Training Center, Hohenfels Training Area, Hohenfels, Germany.”
604 As discussed in Chapter 3, from 1991-98 the Army decreased its personnel by almost 650,000 while its budget was reduced by almost forty per cent. Dennis J. Reimer (Gen., CSA), “Statement before the Committee on Armed Services on Readiness,” U.S. Senate, 2nd Session, 105th Congress, Sep. 29, 1998.
was still experiencing real budget cuts. Along with helping to implement the new personnel policies, his successor, Gen. Eric Shinseki (1999-2003), expanded this modernization effort. His main efforts focused on updating doctrine, the organizational structure, and technology-based materiel within the Army’s Transformation Campaign Plan.

In consequence, while CSA Shinseki was very interested in promoting changes at the CTCs to prepare the Army for its future threats, he did not focus on transforming them. By chartering the March 2000 Army Training and Leader Development Panel’s (ATLDP) Officer Study Report, he helped document evidence that the CTCs’ training methods, standards, and threats were outdated. Along with highlighting the needed changes, this report also resulted in the CTCs receiving more money from other Army accounts to implement changes.

CSA Shinseki’s leadership also helped implement initiatives from those within the organization. One leader who has been instrumental in creating ideas for institutional initiatives since 1999 is TRADOC’s intelligence officer, G-2, and now retired colonel, Max McFarlane. After returning from a six-month deployment to Bosnia-Herzegovina

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606 Major changes included doctrinally updating FM 1, The Army, and FM 3-0 (100-5), Operations; organizationally fielding the Initial Brigade Combat Team (IBCT) while developing the organizational and operational concepts for the Interim Division (IDIV) and Objective Force; and making materiel changes in the fielding of the Future Combat Systems. “The ATLDP Officer Study Report to the Army,” May 2001, p. OS-1.
610 In an address at the Senior Conference on the Professional Military Ethic in an Era of Persistent Conflict at the U.S. Military Academy at West Point on Jun. 6, 2008, CSA Gen. Casey singled out Max
as USAREUR Commander Gen. Meigs’ executive officer, McFarlane was given significant latitude as the TRADOC G-2 to improve the Army’s understanding of and response to the strategic environment and threats. As a result of travelling around the world and his personal studies, he concluded that one of the most important weaknesses was that the Army was still training at the CTCs against the Soviet model. To help address this shortcoming, he created the concept of the Contemporary Operating Environment (COE) and developed its application for the CTCs. While the idea was not initially endorsed by TRADOC, McFarlane had the unexpected opportunity to brief CSA Shinseki at a simulation exercise at the U.S. Army War College. Soon afterwards, the TRADOC commander became a strong advocate of implementing the COE within the training system.

This directive initiated the important Opposing Forces (OPFOR) changes that began in 2000. The new COE stressed the importance of an adaptable, creative OPFOR, which did not take administrative breaks, fight from an expected direction, or just use Soviet equipment and tactics. The new COE challenged units in a wide variety of

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611 McFarlane had just returned from a different six-month rotation while assigned in Europe as the V Corps G-2 Intelligence Officer. As the V Corps G-2, he had helped the JMRC plan their exercises that incorporated a six-month in the future threat. Interview (2008)

612 Interview with McFarlane (2008). The official title for this job is the Deputy Chief of Staff, G-2 (Intelligence), and its primary mission is “the development, maintenance and the application of the Operational Environment (OE) and Threat in support of the Command’s core competencies – recruiting, training and educating The Army’s Soldiers; developing leaders; supporting training in units; developing doctrine; establishing standards; and building the future Army…. [and] The G-2 is the threat approval authority for the command and the executive agent for the Army’s Opposing Forces programs and has overall Army responsibility for developing, publishing and training the Contemporary Operational Environment (COE) and OPFOR doctrine and TTP in support of Army and Joint training, analysis and experimentation needs.” For a more complete job description, see http://www.tradoc.army.mil/dcsint/.

613 Interview with McFarlane (2008).

ways in addition to the “traditional” enemies, to include a more central focus on civilian role players and the media. This also prompted the CTCs to incorporate better communications technology and more sophisticated structures to better replicate urban settings.

These changes did not enjoy consensus of Army leaders before they were implemented. McFarlane stated in 2008 that there was fierce resistance against the COE changes among many senior generals, who argued (in 1999-2000) that the Army did not “mess with” civilians on the battlefield and the media. Since the decision making for CTC changes is more decentralized, with TRADOC responsible for the OPFOR and FORSCOM (which is the much larger, operational and deployable part of the Army) responsible for those evaluating the units, the TRADOC commander was able to more easily create changes within his area of responsibility. Since the CSA also supported the initiative, the warfare-focused CTCs—especially the lagging NTC—was able to gradually implement changes that incorporated lessons learned along with expected threats.

Innovative leaders at the CTCs also helped ensure these changes occurred. The NTC OPFOR Commander from June 00-July 01, Col. Mark Hertling, was given wide latitude to advance the OPFOR’s scenarios as long as the evaluated units agreed. He continued to base the OPFOR on a high-intensity, Soviet model, since at the time this was thought to be the most difficult, complex maneuver enemy against which the Army

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615 Interview with McFarlane (2008).
616 Interview with McFarlane (2008)
617 The leaders at NTC typically first meet with the leaders of the unit preparing to be evaluated 180 days before the exercise. While units always have their preferences, Maj. Gen. Hertling said the NTC leadership often coached the units through tasks and scenarios, which allowed the OPFOR to be even more creative than otherwise. Interview with Hertling (2008).
would have to fight.\textsuperscript{618} In addition, many adversaries with maneuver forces still used this model as their tactical and operational foundation.\textsuperscript{619} Still, Col. Hertling supported initiatives from both superiors and his subordinates to proactively incorporate new threats based on TRADOC’s COE. These included attacks from the forty-person guerrilla groups, an active and ubiquitous Western media news network, and up to forty civilian-focused incidents per exercise.\textsuperscript{620}

Successive leaders continued improving upon and increasing the magnitude of these changes. By the end of 2002, with the likelihood of the war in Iraq mounting and the lukewarm ATLDp evaluation of the NTC’s training focus, the NTC leaders at all levels began evaluating processes to better prepare arriving units for their future. Junior leaders within the OPFOR, whose culture demands they learn and create new paths for the OPFOR’s success,\textsuperscript{621} began inventing new techniques and improving guerrilla-type capabilities to disrupt and confuse units, requiring the evaluated units to fight from all directions against quickly-adapting enemies that did not adhere to doctrine. Recognizing the relevance of such initiatives, new OPFOR commander Col. Joseph Moore codified and provided additional resources to support these initiatives. Additionally, due to his leadership and explicit intent to prepare units for Iraq, Col. Moore continued to change

\textsuperscript{618} In an interview with a former NTC OPFOR company commander, Maj. Jonathan Byrom (2007), he clarified that while the OPFOR was based on the Soviet model and they received some Soviet-style training, at least from 1999-2003 the OPFOR did not use Russian tactics. Instead, the OPFOR used whatever tactics worked, emphasizing learning and adapting in order to win. Since most units expected the OPFOR to only use Russian tactics, this made the OPFOR even more successful.

\textsuperscript{619} Interview with Hertling (2008).

\textsuperscript{620} Hertling and Boisselle, p. 68.

\textsuperscript{621} While the Army attracts and reinforces a competitive culture, making success against the relentless OPFOR an earnest struggle for all units throughout its existence, few units defeat the OPFOR during their rotations. OPFOR leaders credit their intense and continuous training, the frankness and seriousness with which they conduct after action reviews to learn from and incorporate positive and negative lessons, and the culture that they are and will remain winners. Davidson, 2005 and interview with Byrom (2007).
the NTC experience. He tripled the number of urban training sites—mini-cities in the middle of the California desert with populations up to 250 people—from four to twelve, built to-scale tunnel complexes throughout the training area, and created a series of caves to resemble those already found in Afghanistan. To better replicate conditions expected in Iraq, he required units to live on semi-permanent base camps instead of living and fighting in arbitrarily designated zones, and process and administer detainee facilities, occupy guard towers, and react to constant mortar attacks.622 His methods of organizational learning have been recognized even outside of the military, including being published in Harvard Business Review’s 2005 special edition, The High-Performance Organization.623

Technology also facilitated many of changes at the CTCs from 1997-2002.624 Many of the projects initiated throughout the 1990s, including those based on the successful experiences from the 1991 Gulf War, were able to be tested and used at the CTCs. Due to its large geographical size and relative priority, the NTC was able to incorporate the most dramatic, technology-based changes to add simulated warfare to actual units’ battles, provide current intelligence throughout the exercise, and allow units to use precision weapons.625 While these OPFOR and technology-based changes in retrospect look evolutionary, compared to the scenarios before, the NTC experience for evaluated units after 2000 was dramatically different than in years prior.626

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624 Hertling and Boisselle, p. 68.
625 Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) and Joint Surveillance and Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS) were first used in Aug. 00 at NTC. Hertling and Boisselle, p. 69.
626 Interview with Hertling (2008).
Changes at the JRTC in Louisiana and the JMRC in Germany continued throughout this time, primarily based on lessons learned from units deploying to the Balkans. In 1998 the Army decided to transition the Bosnia-Herzegovina missions from German-based to U.S.-based forces, and in 1999 the European units again led the effort into Kosovo. Since units needed to be trained before deploying to the Balkans but only the JMRC had an institutionalized program designed for this, the JRTC officially assumed this responsibility for U.S. based units. Building upon its initial, voluntary efforts of nation building training, the JRTC commander in Louisiana exported much of the existing program from Germany. In fact, much of the early instruction at the JRTC was even presented by trainers from the JMRC. As a result, both of these CTCs were much closer to battlefield lessons, and were able to more quickly adapt to challenges faced by the units they were evaluating.

These changes were also facilitated by the decentralized training headquarters that allowed individual CTCs to adapt to their unique missions. Despite the delayed lack of institutional support, including that it was not equipped with technological instrumentation until 1996, the JRTC transformed to replicate lessons from Haiti, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Kosovo primarily through its own initiative and assistance from the Center for Army Lessons Learned. In addition to receiving guidance from different training- or mission-focused bosses, the CTCs were also encouraged to share their initiatives and lessons learned both informally and formally in the semi-annual training conferences hosted by the Army G-3 and TRADOC. For instance, the JRTC’s

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627 Olsen and Davis, p. 4.
628 Davidson, 2005.
629 Interview with Hertling (2008).
emphasis in 1998 of recurring terrorist chemical attacks and raids coming from the previously “safe” logistical “rear area” were internal commander initiatives. With the increasing coalition deployments and lessons learned from NATO partners, the JMRC also increasingly conducted training with and evaluations of other allies’ militaries.

Even though few Balkan rotations required urban fighting, by 1998 both the JMRC and JRTC also chose to increasingly incorporate these challenges, interactions with civilians, and restrictive rules of engagement. As the JMRC officer responsible for urban training explained, “There is no dispute that, given the current trends toward peace support operations and the global political situation, deployment into an urban combat scenario is inevitable and the Army must focus some of its training in a MOUT [military operations in urban terrain] environment.”

Even with the advances at the JRTC and JMRC, all three CTCs remained focused on training units on their war fighting missions. Nation building missions were considered to be training distracters, requiring up to six months for the unit to “recover” and be ready for combat.

As a result, the JRTC and JMRC treated the pre-deployment nation building and post-deployment war-fighting exercises as distinct, which precludes the classification of this being a major training change during this time period.

Finally, it is important to note the lack of immediate impact that 9/11 had on the Army’s training systems. While this was a critical strategic event for the country, there is little evidence that this attack proved to be the catalyst for U.S. Army change—and at a

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633 This was a GAO conclusion, although it also found that the “extent of the degradation depends on a number of factors, such as the type of peace operation, the type of unit participating, the length of the participation, and the opportunities available for training in theater.” U.S. GAO, 1995, Ch.0.3, 0:6.
minimum within the training system—that might otherwise be expected. In addition to senior military leaders explicitly arguing this, 634 not until Summer 2005, which was several years after both Iraq and Afghanistan conflicts commenced, did the CTC Quarterly Bulletins reflect noticeable changes or articles begin chronicling changes at the CTCs. 635 With the initial efforts into Afghanistan led by special operations soldiers and only a half dozen brigades deployed to Afghanistan by the end of 2002, the Army had yet to learn its poignant lessons that prompted such dramatic, major change.

4.4.3 Effects of the 2003 Iraq War

Since the late 1990s, changes at the CTCs gradually occurred. Even before 9/11 the altering strategic environment was apparent, prompting momentum for change that was mentioned last section. While the pending and on-going large-scale efforts in Iraq left no doubt that some changes had to be made, it is difficult to identify a date that the Army embraced this major change. The realization that major changes were needed did not come from the initial efforts into Iraq, as the previously mentioned June 2003 quote from two mid-career leaders at the NTC that there was no guarantee that future operations would only take two weeks. 636 Even as late as 2005, “from less progressive generals on down to the most gung-ho privates, many in the military figured the insurgency was, as Vice-President Dick Cheney declared in June 2005, ‘in its last throes.’ So-called irregular warfare was only taking the military on a detour, and ultimately it

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would return to its conventional warfare roots." By 2003-04, though, as the initial signs of an insurgency developing and casualties increasing, many leaders began realizing that the Soviet model was no longer the U.S. Army’s most complex enemy that a maneuver unit might fight. As a result, consensus began shifting that all parts of the Army “had to do more than move and kill things” and “all soldiers are nation builders.”

Evidence shows that these changes were not being driven by civilian leaders. The primary training emphasis for the civilian leadership was to prioritize joint training that incorporated new technology, arguing this was critical to deal with a continuously changing environment. The Department of Defense (DoD) and Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld included this mantra within the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review, and in 2004 established a Training Transformation Implementation Plan to increase this joint emphasis—based in the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act—by 2009. DoD also began a process to accredit all training centers on joint tasks, although the Army was already accomplishing most of these requirements. Other than this joint emphasis, most

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638 Interview with Hertling (2008).
640 Interview with Hertling (2008).
643 Interview with Hertling (2008), who helped create this program while serving as Vice Director and Director of the J-7, Joint Staff from Aug. 2001- Aug. 2003, immediately after leaving command of the OPFOR at the NTC.
civilian leaders were not informed enough about the CTCs to make specific requirements or recommendations.644

Evidence does suggest that changes at the CTCs have increased exponentially since 2003 for three primary reasons. First, guidance and vision from the Army’s and the training center’s senior leaders that the Army had to integrate counterinsurgency and stability operations within its training have forced top-down change. Second, the amount of lessons the Army was learning—especially by the lower level leaders facing complex, violent challenges on a daily basis—provided additional momentum and suggestions from the bottom-up to support and expedite the changes.645 Third, due to the active war efforts, the CTCs have benefited significantly from the multi-hundred billion dollar Congressional supplementals, which have also minimized the time required to transform innovative concepts into tangible products. I discuss these three ideas in turn, and then finish with specific changes that occurred at the individual CTCs from 2003-07.

The first reason that the CTCs were able to make a major change by 2005 was the emphasis from its senior leaders. In a concept Brig. Gen. David Fastabend and Col. Robert Simpson dubbed “adapt or die” in 2004,646 which CSA Gen. Peter Schoomaker formally endorsed in May 2005,647 the article and subsequent video said Army leaders had to incorporate experiential lessons while anticipating future strategic challenges to

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644 Interview with Hertling (2008).
645 T.X. Hammes, a retired Marine colonel and writer on the subject of irregular warfare, has credited the military’s evolving mind-set on a similar three factors: multiple deployments of units to Iraq, improved training, and putting the right people in the right places – such as putting Gen. David Petraeus in Iraq. Lubold, 2007.
counter the quickly evolving and learning adversaries. Along with documenting all of the changes at the NTC in June 2006, Brig. Gen. Cone wrote that “Because many training units have done multiple combat deployments, there is an increasing requirement for realistic, sophisticated training to adequately challenge veteran units.” In 2007, Brig. Gen. Robert Cone also stated, “Our training audience is typically on their way to Iraq for the third time…we can’t give them the basics and expect them to learn the rest in theater.” The TRADOC Commander, Gen. William Wallace, said in April 2007 at the NTC’s twenty-fifth year birthday celebration, “Current operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have changed the way we think, the way we go about our day-to-day business, and especially how we approach warfighting.” Finally, while addressing senior commanders in September 2007, CSA George Casey stated that “As a division commander I kind of operated from the premise that if you could do high end [intensity conflict] you could do anything. You get a lot wiser as you grow up. As you all know and as we’ve seen, it’s not that simple.”

Second, leaders at all levels with repeated nation building deployments throughout the 1990s and multiple combat deployments since 2002 were changing the system from the bottom-up. As Jack Levy’s (1994) Two-Stage Learning Model describes, there can be a time lapse between individuals learning and the organization changing. Even though there was little institutional change, as the nation building

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648 Cone, 2006.
lessons countered the Army’s muddy boots culture and primacy of the organization’s elite combat forces, individual leaders retained this new knowledge.

By 2007, many scholars and practitioners argued that these experiences in the 1990s allowed the changes to be institutionalized much easier the next decade. Not only did the 2003 Iraq War reinforce the salience of these lessons, but consensus began to develop that the 1990s experiences were much more representative of the future strategic challenges that the muddy boots Army would face. With the lessons and conception of a new strategic environment intersecting, the Army spearheaded significant changes across the institution that helped expedite a paradigm shift away from a “big war” mentality.

As one example of this bottom-up prompted change, the director of civil affairs and civil military integration at the U.S. Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute recalled in 2007 about the greater incorporation of private security contractors within the NTC scenarios. At one meeting at the NTC, all of the senior leaders dismissed the contractors’ influence in “real” battles, and argued that the contractors did not need to take a prominent role in the training. A (mid-career) Major adamantly disagreed, articulating how as a company commander in Iraq, he spent over half of his time trying to coordinate with these contractors for movement, missions, etc. As a result, the NTC decided that they needed to adjust their scenarios accordingly.

The much closer in time proximity of the CTCs to combat lessons during this period created a critical impetus to and direction for change. Until the Feb. 2007 surge of

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troops into Baghdad, all units still rotated through a CTC prior to deploying to combat.\footnote{The Associated Press, “Lewis Brigade to go to Iraq 2 months early,” \textit{ArmyTimes}, Jan. 12, 2007. The article also reported that the Army was considering bringing in trainers from JRTC, which—if successful—might be the beginning of a new training method as well.} As a result, those responsible for designing, conducting, and evaluating the training felt compelled to provide as realistic and intense of training as possible. This enabled units that were often rotating for their second or third deployment to learn the latest principles, while also updating the training centers with helpful scenarios and training techniques. In addition to his own emphasis, Brig. Gen. Cone credited the almost continuous changes throughout his tenure at the NTC largely from the candid assessments from Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) veterans evaluating their training and helping incorporate lessons they learned.\footnote{Cone, 2006.} This bottom-up initiative, motivation, and expertise required the OPFOR to keep improving, while those serving as the OPFOR and O/Cs were recent combat veterans themselves. Once the NTC began integrating these experiential lessons, which had been previously protracted due to its emphasis on high-intensity warfare, the NTC very quickly underwent a major change that provided a fundamentally different experience for evaluated soldiers and leaders.

The JRTC’s and JMRC’s shifts were major as well, even though they had been adjusting more rapidly throughout this time. Already having training foci that included walking (“dismounted maneuver”) and low-to-medium intensity conflict allowed these CTCs to more easily adapt to conditions in Iraq and Afghanistan. The major change during this time, however, was that counterinsurgency and stability operations became the focus of the exercises, rather than distinct parts of the traditionally-focused
training. Units succeeded by dealing with and protecting a variety of civilian actors instead of being treated as obstacles to avoid. Again, these were largely caused by their temporal proximity to the experiential lessons, which began to replicate conditions in Iraq and Afghanistan as closely as possible. Those acting as Iraqi police and Army units began playing a central training role, while tactical lessons were used against the soldiers being trained within days of first occurring on the battlefield.

Third, the CTCs have benefited significantly from part of almost $800 billion Iraq and Afghanistan Supplementals (as of Fiscal Year 2008), including the multi-billion dollar efforts to help defeat the improvised explosive devices (IED) that kill the majority of soldiers in Iraq. A large source of money for the training changes has been in connection with DoD’s Joint IED Defeat Organization (JIEDDO), first led by retired Army Gen. Montgomery Meigs. This organization was originally requested by then Central Command (CENTCOM) Commander Gen. John Abizaid in October 2003 to address the growing IED problem. By June 2006 the organization had grown to over three hundred specialists and already spent over $6 billion, with Gen. Meigs able to authorize projects less than $25 million. As a comparison to existing funding, the

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659 From the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation website, as of Feb. 20, 2008.

660 Gen. Abizaid sent the request to then Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz to create what Abizaid called a “mini-Manhattan Project” (referring to the secret WWII project to create the atom bomb) to address the IED problem. Bryan Bender, “Panel on Iraq bombings grows to $3b effort,” The Boston Globe, June 25, 2006.


NTC’s annual operating budget in 2001 was approximately $612 million, which included the ten annual unit rotations costing a total of $300 million.\(^{663}\)

Technology also helped minimize the time and distance of the CTCs from the battlefield, allowing experiential lessons to be incorporated very quickly within the training. While the majority of the new technology and equipment was sent to the deployed theaters, by 2006 each of the CTCs had IED Defeat Training Complexes that included hands-on training with robots, sensors, tracking devices, and other technological improvements. The CTC officers were able to pre-visit the area to which the training unit would deploy to keep the training current.\(^{664}\) In addition, video teleconferencing (VTC) and virtual meetings allowed lessons learned to be immediately incorporated into programs of instruction and training scenarios. Bi-monthly VTCs with U.S. military training, education, and lessons learned centers around the world discussed the latest IED tactics and strategies and how best to overcome them, allowing Army colonels and generals to collectively determine how best to train and prepare units before they deployed to combat.\(^{665}\)

\(^{663}\) In 2001, Ft. Irwin had an annual operating budget of $84.6 million for its active duty personnel, with an additional $300 million for the ten unit rotations, $123.274 million for leases and contracts, and $104.2 million for civilian workers, travel, transportation, supplies, equipment. John Sullivan (M. Sgt.), “Military exercise in the desert to cost about $30 million,” U.S. Army Public Affairs, Jun. 21, 2001.

\(^{664}\) Interview with Col. Toby Green, who served as the senior observer controller (O/C) at the Joint Multinational Readiness Center in between deployments to Iraq in 2003 and 2007-08 (2008). He thought O/Cs from Europe (like himself) were able to visit Iraq and Afghanistan more frequently due to proximity, but he was aware that the other installations had similar practices.

\(^{665}\) I attended one of the “Combat to Training Integration” Video Teleconference meetings on Jun. 19, 2006, in Baghdad while serving as a liaison to the Multi-National Corps-Iraq for the Center for Army Lessons Learned. These meetings were used to share lessons across Army leaders responsible for training, doctrine, and education, allowing the CTCs to integrate battlefield lessons as quickly as within 24 hours. That meeting’s participants included senior leaders from the Combat Training Center Directorate (CTCD, including the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL)), Ft. Leavenworth, Ks.; NTC; JRTC; JMRC; Task Force Troy, Baghdad, Iraq; Combined Forces Land Component Command, Camp Arifjan, Kuwait; Afghanistan; Maneuver Support Center, Ft. Leonard Wood, Mo.; Artillery School House, Ft. Sill, Ok.; and Ft. Bragg, Nc. (soon deploying to Iraq).
In addition to changing its name and focus as the result of the European transformation and global force realignment, Army leaders at the JMRC have implemented structural, operational, and strategic changes. These changes have been driven from external and internal forces. Externally, the U.S. has been strategically supportive of assisting former Soviet satellites in their efforts to become NATO allies.\footnote{Rice (2008).} Internally, specific changes and initiatives have resulted from lessons from the new missions in Afghanistan in Iraq, including deployed operations with other countries, as well as available funds. For instance, in September 2004, JMRC completed a $544,000 cave training complex through urban and mountainous terrain as part of the U.S. Army Europe commander’s guidance “to better prepare Soldiers for upcoming deployments like Afghanistan.”\footnote{Gen. B.B. Bell, Commanding General of USAREUR, issued this guidance to allow soldiers to experience situations in a training environment prior to seeing it while deployed. Anderson, p. 10.}

Maj. Gen. Mark Hertling, who has commanded at and worked with all three CTCs and TRADOC, contended that having an operational-focused headquarters also made a significant difference in the JMRC being able to change and innovate more quickly than the other two CTCs.\footnote{Interview (2008). Col. Toby Green, a senior O/C in 2003-04 in JMRC, made this same point in a 2008 interview.} EUCOM has led a variety of operations throughout the end of the Cold War, including nation building deployments, for which it had to prepare U.S. and other countries’ units. As the primary training center for Europe-based U.S. units preparing to deploy, the JMRC had the mission and resources available to incorporate experiential lessons and expected future challenges. With the increase in NATO deployments throughout this time period and in preparation for NATO enlargement, the
JMRC had the opportunity and need to help train U.S. allies. In addition, this training center is geographically much closer to most deployment locations, allowing its leaders to more easily visit the deployment sites and incorporate these lessons immediately within the exercises.

Equally as important for understanding organizational change at all three CTCs, though, was the declining relative importance of success at the training centers versus one’s expected actions on and reputation from combat. In peacetime, performance at a CTC typically serves as a discriminator for one’s evaluation and professional reputation, which directly determine promotions and prestigious assignments. In addition, commanders select the scenario their unit will fight at the CTC, providing further deterrence in peacetime to innovate and experiment with new approaches. Some units deploying to the NTC as late as October 2002 still fought the traditional, high-intensity Cold War scenario, despite leaders at all levels widely presuming they would encounter inner-city fighting in their scheduled Iraq deployment.

Once the Iraq war started, however, senior commanders were much more likely to provide subordinates time for their own training and initiatives, based on recent techniques and lessons from the battlefield. Before OIF, senior commanders’ careers

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671 Point made in an interview with Col. Toby Green, who served as the senior observer controller at the Joint Multinational Readiness Center in between deployments to Iraq in 2003 and 2007-08 (2008).

672 Col. Toby Green pointed out the even greater importance of one’s reputation from a CTC rotation. Interview (2008).

673 Interview with Maj. Todd Brown (2008), who was in 2002-03 a company commander in the 4th Infantry Division, in their NTC rotation preparing to deploy to Iraq as the follow-on force.

674 Interview with Maj. Matthew Zais (2008), who was in 2005-06 a company commander in the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault), in their JRTC rotation preparing to deploy to Iraq; and Green (2008).
were often affected by their combat success at a CTC, even after completing a successful six-month Balkans rotation, creating an imperative to succeed. By 2006, units arriving at a CTC were usually within one-to-six months of deploying to Iraq or Afghanistan, providing a qualitatively different motivation to learn and succeed than repercussions of a negative training evaluation or an undefined future mission.

While lessons from Iraq and Afghanistan have helped prompt major CTC changes between 2003-07, these deployments were also eroding the Army’s ability to train as it once did. With rapid and sometimes unexpected deployments, in particular connected to the 2007 surge, all units could not complete the formal CTC exercise prior to deploying. In an attempt to provide at least some preparation, the Army developed the ability to deploy the CTCs to other locations. For logistical and operational reasons, though, the teams have fewer trainers and the training units have less area in which to train.

TRADOC is also proactively creating initiatives to take its schools, courses, and training to redeploying units, allowing soldiers to live at home while continuing to benefit from the Army’s capabilities and expertise. There is little disagreement throughout the Army, however, that even the Army’s central focus on training is suffering due to the pace with which it is being required to conduct missions.

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675 Cone, 2006.
677 In 2007-08, units were deployed for fifteen or twelve months, home for twelve months, and then would redeploy for fifteen or twelve. Since individuals and units usually travel to TRADOC schools and courses when not deployed, TRADOC was trying to allow them to receive the education and training while living at home with their families. Interview with Lt. Gen. Metz (2007).
4.5 Why Haven’t There Been More Changes? What Can Be Done About This?

Unlike the officer personnel system, the Army has consistently and voluntarily evolved its training system from 1991-2007, in addition to making a major change in 2005. The two CTCs focusing on lower-intensity conflicts increasingly integrated stability operations throughout the 1990s, and the Army voluntarily updated its Soviet-modeled enemy first in 2000. These changes were often delayed and not universally supported; however, it was not the civilian leadership demanding changes to better reflect the need to succeed in nation building and counterinsurgency tasks. Barry Posen’s causal sequence that “Soldiers fail; civilians get angry and scared; pressure is put on the military”\textsuperscript{679} does not help explain change in this case. That change of this magnitude can happen without the organization first experiencing catastrophic failure is also an important scholarly and substantive finding that should not be dismissed.

In addition, it is important to recognize the interconnectedness of these institutional systems that collectively drive Army changes. While doctrine has traditionally been viewed by scholars as the driver of change, the CTCs have served a critical role for this as well. Not only did the CTCs allow new concepts to be tested and re-tested before becoming doctrine, but the CTCs also provided the opportunity to test new equipment and organizational structures before the Army implemented them across the institution and while deployed. CSA Gen. Sullivan tested the first “digital task force” in April 1994 at the NTC to determine whether military and commercial technology could digitally exchange information horizontally.\textsuperscript{680} Gen. Wesley Clark planned to use


\textsuperscript{680} Sullivan and Harper, pp. 15-16.
Apache helicopters in Albania in 1999 after they were successfully used in a simulated exercise in Germany.\textsuperscript{681} Brig. Gen. James D. Thurman and Col. Mark Hertling helped test space-based technology in 2000-01, connecting the NTC with simulated battlefields and joint service capabilities as far away as Kansas.\textsuperscript{682} As an Army speech also argued, “The NTC brought the Army out of the static, ‘Ready on the left; ready on the right; ready on the [weapon] firing line,’ mind-set to the fast-moving, fluid, force-on-force engagements that have come to define the modern battlefield…We’ve reaped the benefits with victories from Desert Storm, to Afghanistan, to Iraqi Freedom.”\textsuperscript{683}

Finally, the Army leadership has repeatedly shown its willingness to promote organizational learning by repeatedly assigning leaders to jobs that allowed them to help institutionalize their individual lessons. The Army’s senior leader, the Chief of Staff, helped provide support for training initiatives, although subordinate leaders in this more decentralized system were also able to lead significant changes based on their own learning. For instance, Gen. Bell, who helped transform the German-based training system to a formal multi-national focus in 2005, spent over a decade of his career in Germany, with only three and one-half years between 1993-2005 not being assigned in Europe. After serving as the Special Assistant to the TRADOC commander and leading important changes as the OPFOR commander at the NTC (among other jobs), Maj. Gen. Hertling was assigned as the commander of the German-based Joint Multinational

\textsuperscript{681} Interview with four mid-level Apache helicopter pilots deployed to Task Force Hawk, Tirana, Albania, Jun. 1999, who had participated in the computer exercise at Grafenwoehr, Germany (then part of the 7th Army Training Command), in which the Army successfully simulated the use of Apaches and Multiple Launch Rocket System for deep attack operations.

\textsuperscript{682} Hertling and Boisselle, p. 69.

Training Command (responsible for the JMRC). Max McFarlane, who originally created the idea of the Contemporary Operating Environment in 1999 while serving as a colonel and TRADOC G-2, was still creating the Army’s leading concepts in 2008 as a senior civil servant.684

The challenge, though, is that the revolutionary change in the training system did not occur until the Army was learning from combat. A generation of Army leaders learned critical lessons from peace keeping interventions throughout the 1990s; however, these were only partially integrated within the two smaller CTCs. The Army’s leadership since at least CSA Gen. Carl Vuono (1987-91) recognized the country’s future challenges would remain complex and span the full military spectrum, citing international drug trafficking, terrorism, insurgency, and subversion of legitimate democratic regimes as main sources of international stability.685 Why did the Army take so long to embrace this new strategic reality and institutionalize the changes within the training system? Evidence supports that the Army’s resistance to transition individual learning to institutional learning was primarily due to organizational cultural reasons, which were enhanced by budgetary constraints.

There have been fewer experiential-based changes than expected from this otherwise reactive system primarily due the Army’s cultural proclivities to remain a muddy-boots, high-intensity Army. With understandable reasoning, the Army is concerned about being able to defeat the most complex, dangerous enemies it will

684 In an address at the Senior Conference on the Professional Military Ethic in an Era of Persistent Conflict at the U.S. Military Academy at West Point on Jun. 6, 2008, CSA Gen. Casey singled out Max McFarlane as the “grandfather of [concept of] persistent conflict,” and his long-time contribution to the Army’s thinking about future threats. Attended by author.

The war against Iraq in 1991 allowed the Army to learn the lessons that it wanted: that large formations of tanks streaming across the open desert with superior technology could win quickly, decisively, and almost bloodlessly in their battle of choice. After visiting the CTCs in December 1997, one Congressional staffer wrote that he feared more changes had not occurred “from an arrogance born of the apparent U.S. success in Desert Storm: why fix it if you think it’s not broken.” Arguing that TRADOC may have placed itself in a “mental isolation chamber” with respect to the CTCs, he hoped the U.S.’s future enemies were equally as heedless at adapting to new challenges and learning to improve their capabilities. He concluded by saying that “Wishful thinking, however, has not been a particularly successful approach in the past to saving soldiers’ lives and guaranteeing success.”

In addition to strongly preferring this traditional, high-intensity maneuver warfare, the Army also strongly detested stability operations of any sort. Not only were nation building lessons devoid of significant (or any) violence, but leaders knew that nation building and counterinsurgency work took years, if not decades, to complete. These missions required a wide range of expertise in addition to military force, making these protracted, political and society-focused efforts difficult for the action-oriented, short-term outlook of those in the military. Nation building missions required the infantry to complete the mundane tasks of guarding base camp perimeters and escorting

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690 Argued in an interview with Amy Frumin, former member of a Provincial Reconstruction Team in Afghanistan, working for the U.S. Agency for International Development, and then Council on Foreign Relations fellow (2008).
children to kindergarten, for which Condoleezza Rice famously chided the Clinton Administration in 2000.\textsuperscript{691} These missions were ultimately considered to be training distracters, requiring units redeploying to spend months “recovering,” re-training, and being evaluated at a CTC on traditional tasks to be ready for combat.\textsuperscript{692} Without civilians requiring the change, as one military scholar explained:

> Although events in Somalia, Bosnia, Rwanda, and Haiti served as clear examples of the unconventional and uncertain challenges the United States would face in the new century, defense planners disregarded their significance...Emerging threats to American interests posed by ethnic and tribal rivalries, religious zealotry, transnational terrorism, and illegitimate or brutal governments were seen as nuisances, and humanitarian operations, peacekeeping, and “nation building” were considered as “lesser included” missions.\textsuperscript{693}

A second reason why the training system was more limited in its change before 2003 was the decreasing budget for the Army. While the Army still had sufficient funds to complete smaller initiatives\textsuperscript{694} and the thirty CTC exercises per year, the CTCs did not have funds to complete major initiatives or modernize the aging equipment and facilities during the late 1990s.\textsuperscript{695} Budgetary constraints were not the primary reason the Army did not better integrate nation building and counterinsurgency factors within the CTCs; however, without additional funding to create infrastructures and incorporate technology

\begin{footnotesize}
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  \item \textsuperscript{691} Condoleezza Rice, “Campaign 2000: Promoting the National Interest,” \textit{Foreign Affairs}, Jan.-Feb. 2000. In a speech at the Council on Foreign Relations in Jun. 2008, she said she still agreed that the military should not be doing this; however, “someone had to.” Rice (2008).
  \item \textsuperscript{692} U.S. GAO, 1995, Ch.0:3.
  \item \textsuperscript{693} Melillo, p. 23.
  \item \textsuperscript{694} In an interview with then Maj. Gen. Hertling, he said while at NTC and JRTC he thought they were both well funded and were able to support any initiatives they presented. While at NTC, his boss, Brig. Gen. Thurman, did testify before Congress after he left (Mar. 2002) that NTC needed significant additional funding (the \$700M later approved) to complete major construction and modernization projects. Thurman, 2002.
  \item \textsuperscript{695} U.S. Army, “2003 Army Posture Statement,” p. 16.
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to help simulate and record the training, the commanders were less able to replicate urban environments on which soldiers in 2008 were fighting.

Budgetary constraints throughout the Army, and specifically at the CTCs, increased throughout the 1990s through the turn of the century. To continue allowing units to train at the CTCs, which by 2001 cost up to $30 million per exercise, many units throughout the Army were provided inadequate training funds at their home station to properly prepare for what was intended to be the culminating exercise. As one Congressional Staffer concluded in December 1997, “It is possible, therefore, that units leave the training centers at a lower level of proficiency than was the case, for example, before Desert Storm. It may be that a second rotation would be needed to bring units up to that level, but with the reduced numbers of rotations per year that is not currently possible.” While funding to sustain, restore, and modernize the CTCs continued through 1998, for the next three years these funds decreased by almost forty-five percent. The TRADOC G-2, Max McFarlane, had also proposed in 1999 a plan to implement a holistic, technologically and future-oriented system to help better train and evaluate units on the full spectrum of challenges. It was considered too expensive, and this plan was diluted to primarily an OPFOR-centric change. In 2002, even though the NTC had an approved plan to create a large city within the training center, it still had

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697 This was the cost of an NTC rotation, which were the most expensive due to the higher quantity of equipment and soldiers involved in these exercises. Sullivan, 2001.


699 The account is the Sustainment, Restoration and Modernization Account (SRMA). Statement by Thurman, 2002.

700 Interview with McFarlane (2008).
only rudimentary structures since no funding had yet been approved. The training leaders recognized this deficiency, arguing that “Not having urban training sites is no longer acceptable in a world where cities are inevitable battlegrounds, as demonstrated by Panama, Somalia, Bosnia, Kosovo and Afghanistan.” By 2003, though, both Congress and the Army leadership had begun addressing these problems, with the Army investing nearly $700 million over six years to modernize the CTCs.

By 2003, though, both Congress and the Army leadership had begun addressing these problems, with the Army investing nearly $700 million over six years to modernize the CTCs.

It is important to reiterate that changes in the Army’s training system, especially since 2004, are overall a story of success. Even though the Army approached the Iraq invasion in 2003 as fighting a Soviet-style enemy and Vice President Cheney stated as late as mid-2005 that the insurgency was in its last throws, the Army was able to rapidly change its own training. While its lessons in Vietnam were incorporated too little too late, by 2004-05 experiential lessons in Iraq were quickly integrated within the CTCs. Leaders also realized that success was not possible without protecting and working with the local people, and they adjusted the CTC evaluation criteria accordingly. Technology and significant budgetary increases greatly expedited the rate of change, although many of the changes were culturally based and required relatively minimal funds. The question, then, is whether the Army can learn lessons from this process to institutionally encourage its leaders to innovate within training, or do major changes require violent, battlefield lessons for the Army to change its own training?

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Based on the Army’s culture and requirement to be capable of protecting the country against all potential enemies, evidence is less supportive that the Army can or should make additional major changes at the CTCs without some evidence that future warfare would be fundamentally different.\(^{705}\) The CTCs provide a unique opportunity for leaders and units to practice the complex art of battle, and recent changes are critical at better replicating the complexity of current warfare. Until the U.S. can better resource civilian agencies to complete nation building tasks, history has also repeatedly shown that the Army will continue completing these missions whether or not they have practiced or are competent at them.

There are, however, two main changes that the Army can and should make with respect to training to continue promoting innovation, although both of these recommendations should only be implemented once units are allowed to remain at home for eighteen to twenty-four months between deployments. First, the Army should return the CTC exercise to an educational focus, requiring leaders to be challenged with unknown, unexpected threats.\(^{706}\) One method of accomplishing this would be to implement TRADOC’s 2008 initiative that commanders would no longer be permitted to select what battle they fight. Instead of fighting the battle at which they are trained and more confident they can “win,” units should be required to train and be evaluated on missions of all types during the exercise. While still providing some flexibility to adapt the scenario,\(^{707}\) this would eliminate the expectation that commanders had to defeat the

\(^{705}\) Also argued by Hertling in an interview (2008).

\(^{706}\) McFarlane specifically argued this in an interview (2008), on which he said at least the JMRC in Germany was focused while he served as USAREUR’s G-2 in the mid-1990s.

\(^{707}\) Interview with SES-2 and Col.(Ret.) Max McFarlane, TRADOC G-2, who is spearheading this initiative (Mar. 2008).
OPFOR to be successful. While not all commanders aim only to win, the training experiences are valuable, as political scientists such Rosen (1991) and Steven Metz and James Klevit (1994) discuss, because the Army can test and experiment with new ideas. With an emphasis on working through difficult, complex problems as a synchronized team rather than prioritizing winning, the Army could continue to make progress itself without needing battlefield lessons from which to learn.

The second institutional change the Army should make to help promote training innovations is to create alternative methods for commanders to prepare their units, and on which they could be evaluated, to prepare for the wide variety of missions they will be expected to complete. Senior commanders should be given wide latitude to create methods or encourage their subordinates to design their own, but these initiatives could provide ways—in addition to one’s combat performance at a CTC—for commanders to be evaluated. By expanding the tasks and opportunities for commanders to be rewarded for innovating to meet current and future challenges, the Army could reward ingenuity without eliminating the need to also be capable of destroying one’s enemies.

There are many existing models of training outside the CTCs, currently completed on an ad hoc basis and without clear professional rewards. One possible option would be for units to create partnerships with local city or state governments. For example, prior to deploying his division to Iraq in 2004, 1st Cavalry Division commander (then) Maj. Gen.

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709 This was one of Maj. Gen. Hertling’s main suggestions for improving the Army’s training, in addition to a more deliberate focus on preparing senior leaders for their strategic challenges. Interview (2008).
Peter Chiarelli paired all captains and above with the city council from Austin, Tx.\textsuperscript{710} Units could work with multi-ethnic populations to better understand their perspectives, similar to the U.S. Military Academy’s “Winning the Peace” course immersion trip to Jersey City, Nj. For three days, the cadets interact with Egyptian Coptic, Egyptian and Pakistani Muslim, Indian Hindu, Jewish, various Christian communities, and the city’s administrative and elected officials, also spending two nights in a local mosque. Along with reinforcing classroom material, this immersion allows these future Army officers to interact with diverse groups in a positive setting and better understand how the ethnic and religious communities have worked to solve problems collectively.\textsuperscript{711}

Unit leaders could also meet with scholars from nearby colleges or universities to intellectually advance each others’ perspectives and knowledge. This is already being done by some in the military, as in the early 1990s the TRADOC commander met with different scholars around the country every month to remain abreast of new ideas.\textsuperscript{712}

Officers assigned as Strategic Planners (Functional Area 59), who must have at least a Master’s Degree in a political science or public policy discipline, are expected to remain active in academic organizations and discussions to integrate current intellectual developments within the military’s thinking.\textsuperscript{713} In June 2008, Defense Secretary Robert

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\textsuperscript{710} Interview with Maj. Matt Skaggs, Officer Personnel Management System Task Force, who participated as a captain (2007).


\textsuperscript{712} Interview with Hertling (2008), who was Gen. Fred Franks’ Special Assistant from 1991-93.

\textsuperscript{713} As discussed in the Army’s manual describing the personnel specialties, “All FA [Functional Area] 59 [Strategist] officers should seek developmental opportunities (education, seminars, symposia, speaking engagements, writing for publication) to enrich their personal and professional knowledge of the development of plans and policy at the national strategic and theater strategic level.” U.S. Army, Pamphlet
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Gates also began a $50 million program over five years—dubbed Minerva, after the Roman goddess of wisdom and warriors—to better integrate evolutionary psychologists, demographers, sociologists, historians and anthropologists in DoD’s security research.\(^{714}\)

Civilian and military leaders at the University of Notre Dame also informally meet on a monthly basis. Officers in the university’s Reserve Officer Training Corps unit and scholars in the Joan B. Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies take turns selecting a current article on various topics, and then spend about an hour discussing and debating the issue.\(^{715}\) Along with better understanding others’ perspectives, this also provides the military with valuable insights on better ways to approach issues that traditional training methods would not likely highlight.

In conclusion, the future of the Army’s training system is not clear. The civilian leadership has not proven willing to or capable of requiring substantial changes outside of increased interactions with fellow military services. Evidence also shows that the Army—both its senior leaders and those more junior—can help prompt change on their own. The challenges in Iraq after 2003 have more clearly delineated the complexity that the Army will face for some time; however, these challenges have also demonstrated the real need for the Army to constantly challenge itself through training to more capably overcome the unexpected. By creating professional incentives for leaders to innovate in peacetime, rather than simply win, the Army can prepare itself for what will assuredly be an uncertain future.


\(^{715}\) I was able to attend most of the meetings while I was a resident graduate student from 2003-05, and most meetings included about a dozen attendees.
CHAPTER 5:
THE INSTITUTIONAL OFFICER EDUCATION SYSTEM

5.1 Introduction

In this final case study chapter, I test my seven causes of change—civilian intervention, new technology, budgetary reasons, defense industries, experiential learning, inter- or intra-service competition, and a new strategic environment—on part of the U.S. Army’s officer educational system. Specifically, I analyze changes at the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, New York (USMA), and the U.S. Army War College at Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania (USAWC), to test why and how changes have and have not happened since 1991. Due to the relative civilian knowledge of the educational system and the double bureaucracy of both the Army and the school’s own traditions and cultures, theoretically most institution-wide changes should be civilian-directed. Since USAWC is more centralized within the Army than USMA, it should complete relatively fewer and less dramatic internally-driven changes than USMA.

The evidence I present throughout this chapter in general supports these expectations, although there are two unanticipated findings. First, it is surprising how infrequently civilian-only decisions led to changes at either academic institution, with the 1993 Congressional mandate for USMA to increase its civilian professor proportion from four to twenty per cent the only major example during this time period. The bureaucratic strangleholds of the organization and academia made major, internally-driven changes difficult; however, by pairing civilians’ general guidance with the Army’s specific
implementation plans, USMA and USAWC were able to work outside of their bureaucratic strangleholds to implement major and important changes. Second, in large part due to these significant constraints, most changes happened outside of the actual curricula. Both of USMA’s major changes had little curriculum impact, and only USAWC’s major change made fundamental changes to its curriculum, after four years of internal study. Budgetary decisions, new technology, inter-service competition, intra-academy and intra-Army competition, and lessons learned (primarily after 9/11) also facilitated changes, although relatively these factors exhibited less of a causal role (summarized in Table 5.1).

Table 5.1 WHEN, WHY, AND HOW IMPORTANT CHANGES OCCURRED, U.S. ARMY OFFICER EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM: U.S. Military Academy, U.S. Army War College, 1991-2007 (Note: major changes in green; important changes, white)

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<td>Internally (Why)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Inter-/intra-service Competition</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Strategic Environment</td>
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Why examine the officer educational system (OES)? Many scholars and military leaders identify education—learning how to think about problems, generalized and abstract knowledge, and issues without right-wrong solutions— as the Army’s best course to promote its ability to learn and change as a result. Others identify OES as the key to fostering Army innovation. Even avid proponents of technological transformation promote education alongside “hardware” changes, with then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (also an Army officer) Gen. Henry Shelton arguing in 2001:

Military transformation of our forces is, therefore, an imperative if we are to be ready for the challenges of this new century. But transformation is first and foremost an intellectual exercise, requiring the brightest minds actively engaged in taking our armed forces to new and higher levels of effectiveness. Therefore, the road to transformation begins with a strong program of education and leader development.

Despite this vocal support from senior leaders, there is a general cultural resistance to prioritizing education in the Army. This can largely be explained by the Army’s muddy boots culture that trained to fight one predictable enemy for several generations. Time spent in graduate school meant time away from tactically or operationally difficult assignments, while experience in the school of hard knocks—whether at a training installation or deployed—was seen as the best preparation for

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719 Shelton, p. 7.
combat. This resistance is evident both in Army doctrine and also in mentoring about and accepting assignments to teach at military education installations.

Often, in Army doctrine and other documents, the two terms “training” and “education” are used interchangeably. For instance, USAWC publishes a document entitled *How the Army Runs*, specifically for its faculty and students, but which it also posts on the internet to be accessible to all training and educational institutions. This document, currently in its twenty-fifth edition, aims to better inform its readers of the Army’s organizations, systems, and processes. In the almost five hundred page update from 2005-06, Chapter 15 is “Army Training,” in which Section V (of VIII) discusses in only seven pages “The Army school system (TASS).” The “Officer education system (OES)” section comprises just one and one-half pages plus a figure (see Figure 5.1), describing Army schools by officers’ ranks: “pre-commissioning,” which includes USMA; “company grade training,” which includes OES for lieutenants and captains; “field grade training” for majors, lieutenant colonels, and colonels, which includes USAWC; and “general officer training.” Finally, to illustrate how much intertwined this manual links education and training, the first paragraph in the “education” section reads:

> Training in schools is individual or collective training in the training base which uses approved programs of instruction and includes education/training which is structured, developed, and supported by a Service school, Service training center, or any educational institution under DOD sanction. TASS, through centers and schools, must provide recruits, NCO [non-commissioned officers], and officers with a solid foundation of individual tasks and standards with which they can become fully effective members of units. The peacetime mobilization training base is part of an overall system that produces a well-trained, modern, mission-capable Army.

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720 U.S. Army War College, *How the Army Runs*, 25th ed., update 2005-06. Chapter 15 (pp. 333-65) is “Army Training,” in which Section V (of VIII) discusses “The Army school system” (pp. 342-49), within which is the “Officer education system” section ([one] para. 15-20, p. 347-49.)

721 *How the Army Runs*, p. 342 (italics added).
Whereas the Army thrives on training (as discussed in Chapter 4), many senior Army leaders—often whose graduate degrees were earned while students at a military war college—are also less supportive of officers pursuing civilian graduate degrees. While most officers earn bachelor’s degrees before being commissioned as lieutenants, not until 1995 did the Army mandate that officers could not progress past the rank of lieutenant without a baccalaureate degree. In addition, as full-time graduate school opportunities have continued to decrease for budgetary reasons—5,000-7,000 graduate
school opportunities annually in the early 1970s to 412 opportunities in 2003—fewer senior officers encourage their subordinates to pursue paths other than the one they followed. Most officers are told that they will ruin their careers if they teach at USMA, since this assignment typically means the officer will spend five years away from the muddy boots, operational Army: two years in graduate school; three years, teaching. This warning of career suicide is not new, as a senior general told me in 2006 that he was told the same thing as a captain while teaching at USMA.

An unbalanced priority of training over education could still keep the Army successful when countering a deliberate, stationary, inflexible Soviet enemy. It did not take 9/11, however, for the Army to realize its OES was not aptly preparing officers of all ranks for the challenges they were regularly facing throughout the 1990s. Decisions with operational and strategic consequences were no longer reserved just for leaders at the senior ranks, even though the OES was still teaching its junior officers only tactical level information. Likewise, senior leaders were not being educated on commanding in the increasingly complex strategic environment, where uncertainty and change had become the norm.

As just one example, as a brand new Captain serving in Kosovo in 1999 on my third Balkans deployment, one of my additional duties was serving as the battalion’s Public Affairs Officer. Due to the destruction of many schools, which we were helping repair as construction engineers, I thought corporations throughout the U.S. would like to

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723 Interview with former Army G-1, Lt. Gen. F.L. Hagenbeck (2007). He said he had conflicting reports of the numbers in the 1970s, although this was the range of reported numbers. He actively worked to increase this number during his tenure as G-1.

724 Repeated by most of my peers while serving as an Assistant Professor at USMA from 2005-08; I was personally told this as well by several former bosses.

725 McCausland and Martin, pp. 22-24.
provide school supplies and other materiel to support us. Emailing as a member of a deployed U.S. Army unit trying to help Kosovar kids, I solicited corporations, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and other groups for donations. Not until after sending the emails did I learn from the division’s (our headquarters, two levels higher) Civil Affairs Officer that these requests were completely illegal, which thankfully the businesses knew. When I asked him how I was supposed to know this, he said the Army trained all battalion commanders on these rules before they took command, an education I was not even eligible to receive for almost fifteen years. My unit still sponsored and housed an NGO for several weeks in the base camp as the result of my emails, likely because I did not realize the permissions needed to request the help that I did.

Even if examining the OES is valid, why just examine USMA and USAWC? As Figure 5.1 depicts, USMA is only one of three commissioning sources, while the Army offers educational opportunities throughout officers’ careers. I selected these cases primarily due to two structural similarities, making them methodologically more appropriate to compare, as well as two substantive reasons. First, USMA and USAWC are the only Army schools that also award academic degrees, a Bachelor’s of Science and Master’s of Strategic Studies respectively, and the only Army schools receiving external academic accreditations. Second, USMA and USAWC are the last remaining Army schools for which students must compete to attend. The mid-career Army officer school held at the Fort Leavenworth, Ks., the Intermediate Level Education (ILE, formerly the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, CGSC), used to be highly-competitive

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726 The mid-career Army officer school held at the Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, the Intermediate Level Education (formerly the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College), is the only mid-grade U.S. military school that does not award a master’s degree for all attendees. Students can compete to attend an additional year in the SAMS program, which awards a Master’s in Military Arts and Sciences Degree; however, only fifteen to twenty per cent of each graduating class participates.
as well. Resident attendance at CGSC used to determine whether a Major would be assigned in key positions for the remainder of his or her career, effectively ending one’s career progression without attendance, except in exceptional cases.\textsuperscript{727} By 2005, largely in response to the Army Training and Leader Development Panel (ATLDP) study\textsuperscript{728} to delink education opportunities from promotion likelihood,\textsuperscript{729} attendance at ILE became mandatory for all Army Majors. Third, these institutions form the professional military educational bookends for many officers, as few officers receive any additional formal education for the remainder of their careers. Finally, significant research has recently been completed on the Leavenworth education,\textsuperscript{730} so I provide new information to further progress the existing literature.

In addition to Army cultural constraints, changes at USMA and USAWC have been even slower than other educational institutions for two primary reasons. Institutionally, their dogmatic traditions and bureaucratic processes, which have been developing since their establishment in 1802 and 1901, respectively, are entrenched against change. The vast oversight from civilian and military organizations and engaged alumni further constrain the institutions’ abilities to change. These two educational institutions also experience an appreciably reduced intensity for change due to their separation from battlefield lessons, as their professors rarely come immediately from

\textsuperscript{727} In an interview with Gen(Ret.) Montgomery Meigs (2007), he stated that when he attended CGSC, this was actually more competitive than being assigned to USMA. By 2007, many officers were actively trying to avoid attendance except those wanting a year’s break from deployments or time with their families.


\textsuperscript{729} This change also had significant support throughout many senior leaders, which came up repeatedly in interviews with Lt. Gen.(Ret.) David Ohle (2007), Lt. Gen.(Ret.) Theodore Stroup (2007), and Maj. Gen.(Ret.) Robert Scales (2008).

 battlefield assignments and only periodically deploy during their teaching assignment.\textsuperscript{731} As the system is farthest from experiential lessons of all my cases, theoretically this should help inhibit voluntary changes from occurring.

Despite these constraints, the institutional incentives for change are not all negative, with the OES having four institutional advantages promoting change. First, the OES is the least centralized system I examine. The Secretary of the Army and Chief of Staff of the Army (CSA) must approve most institutional changes, to include any change to the core curricula; however, Army leadership has generally been supportive of educational initiatives. Second, despite active alumni and civilian oversight, the number of Army stakeholders for change is drastically fewer, as professional success does not hinge on the content within these academic programs. Third, USMA competes with the Air Force Academy and Naval Academy for the best high school students interested in attending a military academy, and USAWC competes with the Air Force, Navy, and the Marine Corps senior service colleges (SSC) and the National Defense University schools for the best mid-career officers. Many prospective high school students apply to more than one academy, while Congress now mandates that the SSCs must enroll at least forty per cent of their students not from their own service.\textsuperscript{732} As a result, not only do the schools learn from each other and copy best practices, but they must constantly work to

\textsuperscript{731} Rotating faculty members at USMA usually spend two years at graduate school before teaching, while USMA permanent professors only periodically rotate to operational assignments (typically every seven years). Due to the much more senior students at the USAWC, most rotating professors are completing their career, so they do not periodically deploy, and they are institutional (as opposed to operational) subject matter experts who have most recent experience in Dept. Army assignments.

\textsuperscript{732} Beginning in 1996, Congress (see also the Mar. 1, 1996 Officer Professional Military Education Policy (OPMEP), CJCS Instruction 1800.01, p. B-2) mandated that SSCs had to have at least 20\% non-service students. The Aug. 30, 2004 OPMEP (CJCSI 1800.01B, p. 3) increased this requirement to 25\%, with the 2005 NDAA (and corresponding Dec. 22, 2005 OPMEP, CJCSI 1800.01C, p. 3) increasing the requirement to 40\%.}
improve their educational opportunities to attract the highest quality students. Finally, the educational institutions relatively spend the most time reflecting on changes to the new strategic environment, even though (as with most academic institutions that prioritize teaching) there is never enough time to research and pontificate on future realities and how the Army can and should change to meet them.

The remainder of this chapter includes four sections. In section 5.2, I highlight three strategic events and reviews that shaped the context in which the officer educational system changed during this period. Specifically, I describe the Middle States Commission on Higher Education (MSCHE) accreditation, National Defense Authorization Acts (NDAA) of 1993 and 2005, and the educational component of the U.S. Army Training and Leader Development Panel (ATLDP) Officer Study Report. In sections 5.3 and 5.4, I then discuss USMA and USAWC, respectively, first describing what changed academically within each institution and then explaining why and how the changes occurred. Finally, in section 5.5, I argue why more changes have not occurred and what can and should be done with respect to the Army’s officer educational system.

5.2 Critical Strategic Studies, Laws, and Reviews

In previous chapters, I discussed the impact of six categories of events with important institutional effects: Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986; the collapse of the Soviet threat in 1991 and massive Army downsizing (1991-96); the main Army interventions throughout the 1990s (1991 Gulf War, Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo); Transformation, September 11th, and the Global War on Terrorism; the Army Training and Leader Development Panel’s (ATLDP) Officer Study Report; and events in Iraq and Afghanistan between 2003-07. These events all had significant impact on the education
system as well. In this final case study chapter, I highlight three additional topics that have occurred since the end of the Cold War that have had significant impact on the Army’s institutional military education. These three are the Middle States Commission on Higher Education (MSCHE) accreditation, National Defense Authorization Acts (NDAA) of 1993 and 2005, and the educational component of the ATLD.

5.2.1 Middle States Commission on Higher Education (MSCHE)

Both USMA and USAWC are accredited by the Middle States Commission on Higher Education (MSCHE),\(^\text{733}\) which is one of eight regional accrediting organizations of higher education in the U.S.\(^\text{734}\) In order to receive and then maintain accreditation through MSCHE, the institution must complete an extensive self-study every ten years. The MSCHE uses these studies, supported by a mid-term self-study, to conduct peer reviews to ensure the institution is achieving its own mission. While MSCHE can and does require changes, many of the changes are driven from the installation identifying its own weaknesses; and then, changing as the result.\(^\text{735}\)

Although both USMA and USAWC are accredited, MSCHE served a very different role for these institutions during the post-Cold War time period. USMA earned MSCHE accreditation in 1949, with its most recent reaccreditation in 1999. By 2008, USMA was also actively conducting its self-study for the 2009 reaccreditation application. In addition, USMA has also been accredited by the Accrediting Board for Engineering and Technology (ABET) since 1985 in civil engineering, electrical

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\(^\text{733}\) See [http://www.msche.org/](http://www.msche.org/). In Apr. 2008, MSCHE accredited 517 institutions and thirteen more were applying for accreditation.

\(^\text{734}\) Links to the others are at: [http://www.msche.org/?Nav1=ABOUT&Nav2=OTHERORGANIZATIONS&Nav3=Organization3](http://www.msche.org/?Nav1=ABOUT&Nav2=OTHERORGANIZATIONS&Nav3=Organization3)

\(^\text{735}\) Interview with Col. Cindy Jebb, deputy head of the Department of Social Sciences, and co-director of USMA’s 2009 Reaccreditation effort (2008).
engineering, mechanical engineering, and engineering management; and since 1997, in environmental engineering and systems engineering. In 1997, the Computer Science Accreditation Commission of the Computing Sciences Accreditation Board also granted accreditation to USMA’s computer science program. The USAWC, however, first sought its authority to award a master’s degree from the Department of Education in 1996, and subsequently applied to MSCHE to have its Master’s of Strategic Studies degree accredited in 1998. The USAWC earned the status in 2004.


The National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) is an annual bill in which Congress creates, extends, or modifies programs that the Department of Defense (DoD) implements. While there are important requirements from each, this dissertation focuses specifically on the military’s academic requirements deriving from the 1993 and 2005 NDAA’s. The 1993 NDAA required, among other things, that USMA and the U.S. Air Force Academy would increase their civilian faculty by the year 2000 from approximately four per cent to something much nearer the Naval Academy’s fifty per cent. With USMA’s faculty totaling approximately six hundred, increasing to its initial goal of twenty-five per cent—from thirty to one hundred fifty civilian professors—was a fundamental shift. Within the year USMA began hiring civilian faculty in large numbers; however, in 1997, as the result of budgetary constraints, the Academy


leadership decided to halt the transition at approximately twenty-one per cent.\textsuperscript{738} Since 1997, USMA has maintained approximately the same proportion of faculty: sixty-two percent are rotating junior military officers (captains, majors, and a few lieutenant colonels), generally completing three year tours; twenty-one percent, civilian faculty on six-year renewable contracts; and seventeen per cent, senior military (lieutenant colonels and colonels) permanently assigned to USMA for the remainder of their careers.

Among other requirements, the 2005 NDAA\textsuperscript{739} extended the military’s ability to certify Joint Professional Military Education Level II in addition to students attending the National Defense University schools.\textsuperscript{740} This allowed students also attending the service school colleges—USAWC, College of Naval Warfare, Air War College, and Marine Corps War College—to complete the Goldwater-Nichols joint education requirements while retaining each service school’s focus. As a consequence, this also added specific objectives and areas of emphasis each school had to teach, while decreasing the proportion of that service’s students and faculty (i.e. Army officers teaching and attending the USAWC) from seventy-five to sixty per cent.

5.2.3 The Army Training and Leader Development Panel (ATLDP), May 2001

The Army Training and Leader Development Panel (ATLDP), which CSA Gen. Eric Shinseki commissioned in May 2000 and was published a year later, was extremely critical of the Army’s educational system. While mentioning the lack of sufficient


resources that could facilitate change, the Panel argued that the basic structure and methods of the OES had changed very little since the end of the Cold War a decade prior.741 The study noted some Department of Defense (DoD) initiatives to adapt to the changing environment between the end of the Cold War and 9/11, including the establishment of the Centers for Regional Security Studies—the Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies, the Near East South Asia Center, the Africa Center, and the Asia-Pacific Center—to develop and strengthen both international ties and increase the military’s cultural and geographic understanding.742 However, the ATLDP concluded that OES was “not providing officers the skill sets they need to operate successfully.”743

As a result of this internally-requested study, the Army made fundamental institutional changes, including to three of its four formal professional military education schools: adding a new phase to its newly graduated lieutenant education (Basic Officer Leader Course), implementing a new Captain’s Career Course744 (after the officer’s first three-to-four year assignment), and completely restructuring the Command and General Staff College, including to make attendance mandatory—as opposed to a promotion discriminator—for all Army officers in the rank of major.745

The ATLDP also served as the foundation of additional Army studies evaluating and revising its leader development process, although they concluded much more optimistically. The June 2006 “Review of Education, Training, and Assignments of

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744 For a superb study on needed changes to the Captain’s Career Course, see Gehler, 2005.
Leaders (RETAL) addressed the Army’s need to develop multi-skilled leaders, or “pentathletes,” at all ranks. The final RETAL report, published in November 2006, was the “Army Leaders for the 21st Century.” Concluding that the Army’s current leader development model was “effective and provides adaptive, innovative leaders,” it then added that “the review confirmed that the officer leader development process requires a paradigm shift to address current shortfalls in specific skills that are needed to prepare them for full spectrum operations.”

5.3 The United States Military Academy at West Point, New York

The U.S. Military Academy (USMA) at West Point, New York, was created in 1802 to produce engineers required for the rapidly expanding country. While the Academy’s mission has remained fairly constant over these two centuries, with time its core academic curriculum has gradually shifted away from a strict math and science education to better meet the country’s needs. Cadets receive a broad liberal arts education in four years, requiring twenty-seven semester core courses (see Table 5.2)


747 Its six recommended initiatives included to adjust the Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) order of merit list to create incentives for pentathlete education and experiences; create an ROTC foreign immersion experience similar to that of USMA; initiate Leader Development Assignment Panels to augment the traditional officer assignment process; increase graduate school opportunities for mid-career officers remaining in operational assignments; create internships with other U.S. agencies and countries; and establish a Strategic Leader Development center to facilitate general officer development.


749 “Army Leaders for the 21st Century, Final Report,” p. 8. Interestingly, after this statement the report only mentioned NCO development and civilian corps competencies.

750 The Academy’s mission is “To educate, train, and inspire the Corps of Cadets so that each graduate is a commissioned leader of character committed to the values of Duty, Honor, Country; and prepared for a career of professional excellence and service to the Nation as an officer in the United States Army.” U.S. Military Academy website.
from eleven of the thirteen academic departments. To not break completely from its historical roots, each cadet still graduates with a Bachelor of Science degree after completing an additional three-course, nine-hour engineering sequence in chemical, civil, computer science, electrical, environmental, mechanical, nuclear, or systems engineering.

Table 5.2 REQUIRED ACADEMIC SEMESTER COURSES FOR GRADUATION, U.S. Military Academy, as of 2008 (Notes: N=27, plus an additional 3 engineering [for most cadets]; * are extra courses required for most humanities majors only)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Math, Science, Engineering</th>
<th>Humanities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chemistry (2)</td>
<td>American Politics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Computer Science &amp; Info Tech. (1-2*)</td>
<td>Economics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Math (4)</td>
<td>English (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Physical Geography &amp; Terrain Analysis</td>
<td>Foreign Language (2-4*)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Physics (2)</td>
<td>Military History (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engineering sequence (3)</td>
<td>History (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>International Relations</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Cadets can choose from over sixty majors in almost every discipline but religion or music, including thirty math, science, or engineering majors and thirty-one social science and humanities majors. Due to the extensive core requirements, however, cadets usually only take ten to eighteen courses within their major. The Academy articulates that this preference of breadth over depth is designed to help these future Army officers “to anticipate and respond effectively to the uncertainties of a changing

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751 Only the Systems Department and the Civil & Mechanical Engineering Department do not teach core courses; the other 11 are Behavioral Sciences & Leadership; Chemistry and Life Science; Electrical Engineering and Computer Science; English; Foreign Languages; Geography & Environmental Engineering; History; Law; Mathematical Sciences; Physics; and Social Sciences.

752 Cadets can double major if they have validated at least two courses. Validations do not allow cadets to take fewer courses; instead, this allows them to take a greater proportion of electives in their selected major. In recent years, political science and economics have been the most popular majors. USMA’s Academic Redbook; Greg Bruno, “West Point curriculum changes would build army with words,” *Times Herald-Record*, Feb. 10, 2007; and Brig. Gen. Patrick Finnegan, “Academic Briefing,” PowerPoint, United States Military Academy, 2006.
technological, social, political, and economic world.”753 While few contest this desired end state, it is less clear whether the Academy created a curriculum to support its goals or whether it created its goals to justify its almost intransigent core curriculum.

Despite the military’s hierarchical penchant, West Point’s academic structure more closely mirrors that of its civilian counterparts. The thirteen departments (similar to separate colleges at a university) have well established, distinct personalities with strong links to their academia and institutional counterparts. In addition, by design the academic structure promotes decentralized efforts and decisions on most matters. This system has been compared to one with a weak king (the Dean) with strong vassals (Department Heads). The Dean, while promoted to a brigadier general, is typically a former Department Head who for the past several decades has remained in this position for only five years before retiring.754 Department Heads, who by law are allowed to serve the remainder of their military careers as colonels and are promoted to brigadier general in name after retirement, often stay three to four times this length.755 As a result, West Point shares many of the same structural constraints with other universities in making Academy-wide academic changes.

What is different, however, is a collective and unifying sense among the departments to prepare their future graduates for service in the Army. Every graduate immediately enters active duty military service, with most newly-commissioned

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754 The Dean in 1985, Roy K. Flint, was the first Dean to serve this standardized five-year term. Previous deans had served from one to nine years before retiring.
755 Mandatory retirement for Academy Professors is 28 years for lieutenant colonels and 30 years for colonels; Professors, USMA, which all department heads are, must retire by age 64 regardless of years served.
lieutenants leading America’s sons and daughters within the year. Almost two-thirds of USMA’s faculty members are also temporarily-assigned, mid-career military officers, many of whom know each other from school or previous assignments. Many senior permanent professors are also Academy graduates or have served together previously. Consequently, informal cooperation is significantly easier and common at USMA, while creating consensus on formal initiatives is not impossible. As one senior civilian professor at USMA articulated, contrary to some civilian universities, West Point faculty are linked together by much more than a shared parking problem. This common purpose and familiarity among professors provides some institutional advantages when attempting to build consensus for Academy-wide changes or initiating interdisciplinary efforts.

Academics are only one of four domains that USMA defines as critical, with cadets taking courses and participating in athletics, military, and moral-ethical requirements throughout their four years. Their graduating class ranks are even a weighted average of the former three programs: 55%, academic; 30%, military; and 15%, physical. In this chapter, I just focus on the academic program, which serves as the Academy’s primary intellectual and educational focus.

5.3.1 Changes Since the End of the Cold War

The Academy is not recognized for its adaptability and willingness to make change, with cynics arguing that it represents two hundred years of history impeded by

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756 As an example, approximately seventy USMA graduates each from the Classes of 1995, 1996, and 1997 served as rotating faculty during my own tenure at West Point, with at least one of my fellow 1995 graduates teaching in every department.

757 Interview with Dr. Charles Reynolds, Professor of Computer Science, Electrical Engineering and Computer Science (EECS) Department (2008).
progress. There have been two major, one important, and several notable changes to its academic program since the end of the Cold War, which this section discusses. Specifically, the two major changes were in 1993, the proportion of civilian faculty significantly increased; and in 2006, the Academy implemented a program to drastically increase the foreign language and culture immersion opportunities for all cadets. The important, and only significant curriculum, change during this time period occurred in 2001, which decreased the required engineering sequence and added a second required information technology course. Finally, notable changes I briefly highlight due to their theoretical implications are the interdisciplinary education efforts, the law department transformation, privately-funded centers of excellence, and new courses and majors.

5.3.1.1 1993 Increased Civilian Faculty and Academic Rigor

As discussed in the previous section, the 1993 NDAA required USMA to drastically increase its civilian faculty. As the result of the legislation, it did not take long for USMA cadets and faculty to experience palpable changes. By 1998, civilian faculty had increased from four to twenty-one per cent, resulting in most cadets having at least

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758 In addition to this cliché, see also John Noonan (Captain, U.S. Air Force), “The Thayer System: After two centuries of success, it might be time to make some changes,” *Weekly Standard*, Aug. 1, 2007.

759 As with most academic institutions, USMA and USAWC frequently refer to events by their academic year rather than calendar year. To remain consistent with other changes within this dissertation, I identify events by calendar year in which this change was decided even if the actual change was not implemented until the Spring semester.

760 For an interesting analysis completed at the time of this decision supporting an even greater percentage of civilian faculty, see George H. Rhynedance, IV (U.S. Army, Maj. and USMA 1980), “More Civilians on the West Point Faculty: Good for the Army, or Not?,” thesis for the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College (Ft. Leavenworth, KS), 1993.
one civilian professor per semester. Of at least equal importance, academic research and scholarship simultaneously increased in priority, not only for the new civilian faculty needing to remain competitive, but also their military counterparts. Along with the faculty percentage with Ph.D.s increasing from twenty to thirty-four per cent during the 1990s, primarily due to the new civilian faculty, publishing and presenting research at academic conferences also came to be expected. USMA’s 1999 reaccreditation self-study concluded that the amount of research conducted at USMA increased substantially in recent years, citing several reasons: significant increases in external research funding, number of projects undertaken, number of cadets involved in research, and adding an Associate Dean for Academic Research in 1996 to facilitate the acquisition and administration of research grants. USMA also began aligning professional incentives for professors to research. As just one example, while professors who presented at academic conferences throughout the 1980s were considered “rock-stars,” by the late 1990s, rotating military faculty were required to complete professional research to be promoted from instructor to assistant professor.

USMA faculty and accreditation bodies have repeatedly acknowledged this intellectually beneficial change for the cadets and faculty. For instance, the 1997 ABET

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761 While this may seem less significant, this was a significant shift for cadets and faculty. As a USMA graduate of 1995 who attended during this transition, I still only had one civilian professor in my four years, who was a senior analyst from the Central Intelligence Agency and taught International Relations.


763 USMA, Institutional Self-Study, 1999, p. 89. There are additional restrictions at USMA for receiving grants and solicit funds since this is a federal institution and they are federal employees.

764 In an interview with Col. Eugene Ressler, Department Head of EECS (2008), he stated that the previous EECS department head, Col. Andre Sayles, used to discuss this change frequently. While serving as a rotating faculty member, Col. Sayles said that his one peer who presented a research paper at a conference was known as a “rock star.” Col. Ressler said within his department alone, in 2008 they average 100-120 research papers presented per year at academic conferences.
accreditation board noted that “The increased dependency on civilian faculty…appears to be adding to the quality of all programs.” The 1999 MSCHE reaccreditation study concluded that “Few developments in the last ten years have had more impact on the USMA than the ongoing restructuring of the faculty.” USMA’s senior leaders also have repeated the impact of this change to alumni and incoming cadets’ parents, specifically highlighting the increase in academic rigor from when they were cadets several decades prior.

5.3.1.2 2001 Changes to the Core Curriculum: Engineering Sequence and Information Technology (IT)

Beginning in Fall 2001, USMA decreased its mandatory engineering sequence for all cadets. While still wanting to retain an engineering focus sufficient enough for all cadets to graduate with a Bachelor’s of Science, cadets only had to take three semesters of three-hour engineering science and design classes, rather than five. In addition, all academic majors were required to have a capstone course that addressed cultural considerations, as well as integrating topics that were taught throughout the core curriculum. Due to the Academy-wide inertia required to plan and implement these changes, the Academy’s leadership also seized this window of opportunity to voluntarily

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767 Two examples are Superintendent Lt. Gen. F.L. Hagenbeck’s update to the Class of 1972 during its thirty-fifth reunion on Sept. 21, 2007, and Dean Brig. Gen. Pat Finnegan’s discussion with family members of incoming freshmen of the Class of 2011, which he personally recounted at a faculty update on Jan. 30, 2008. Both were graduates of USMA in 1971.

768 Interview with Dr. Dean Dudley, economics professor (Sosh) and on the curriculum committee (May 2008).
add a second required semester of information technology (IT) to the core curriculum.\textsuperscript{769} Cadets then took IT as a freshman and junior, a requirement extremely rare throughout academia at the time.\textsuperscript{770} As a result, however, cadets received only one additional elective with this change.

5.3.1.3 2006 Culture and Language Immersion

In recent years, the Academy has gone through various iterations of curriculum, from granting general degrees to awarding majors with honors starting in 2006. The only change to its core curriculum since 9/11, though, is that one additional year of languages is required for most humanities majors. Cadets enrolled in language courses also now meet every day, as opposed to traditional classes held every other day.\textsuperscript{771} As a result, by 2008 the Department of Foreign Languages (DFL) increased from forty to sixty full time professors, allowing them to continue teaching seven primary foreign languages: Arabic, Chinese, Russian, French, German, Portuguese, and Spanish. In 2007, DFL also hired a professor to teach a pilot course in Farsi, which its leadership expected would eventually be made permanent.\textsuperscript{772}

While these changes are not insignificant, the most critical component of this initiative was the $9 million DoD also provided annually, beginning in 2006, to help every cadet be immersed in a foreign culture for an extended time. In addition to paying

\textsuperscript{769} Interview with Col. Eugene Ressler, Department Head of EECS (2008), who was at the time also on the curriculum committee.

\textsuperscript{770} Interview with Dr. Charles Reynolds, Professor of Computer Science, EECS (2008).

\textsuperscript{771} The academic schedule alternates from Day 1 (hours A-F) and Day 2 (hours G-L), with four academic class hours each morning, an hour after lunch for alternating days of academic/military meetings, and two academic class hours each afternoon. In general, most classes meet every other day for fifty-five minutes, with forty lessons per semester.

\textsuperscript{772} Interview with Col. Ricky McPeak, department head of the Department of Foreign Languages (2008).
for the additional professors’ salaries, these funds are also used to help significantly expand cadets’ opportunities to spend a semester, summer, and/or academic-focused Spring Break overseas. This is a sea change for the academy. For example, in 2001, two cadets spent a semester in France. In 2008-09, there will be over 150 cadets studying abroad from Morocco to China for a semester. In addition, about 190 West Point cadets in spring 2008 participated in the Foreign Academy Exchange Program, spending Spring Break in one of over forty countries and hosting the international counterparts at USMA later in the semester. In summer 2008, another 390 cadets participated in three-week summer immersion programs in forty-three countries.

5.3.1.4 Interdisciplinary education efforts

Despite USMA being institutionally structured like other universities, with empowered departments (colleges) and strong bureaucratic obstacles to change, cross-discipline initiatives and interdisciplinary education have been increasingly common since the end of the Cold War. While not the only changes, here I discuss some of the ones institutionalized. Already having majors that required courses from other departments, in 1998 the Academic Board approved a new interdisciplinary major, Information Systems Engineering, which three departments collectively sponsored: Systems Engineering, Electrical Engineering and Computer Science (EECS, said ēēks), and Behavioral Sciences and Leadership. In Fall 2000 and within one year of the idea surfacing, the Department of Social Sciences (Sosh, said “sōsh”) and EECS also began a

774 Bruno (2007).
jointly-taught course on “Strategy, Policy and Tactics of Information Warfare and Cyberterrorism.”

In 2004, students from any major could also minor in the interdisciplinary Terrorism Studies. In 2005, Sosh initiated a course entitled “Winning the Peace,” in which approximately thirty-five subject matter experts from throughout the Academy, government (U.S. and others), and private sector each teach one lesson about challenges and opportunities their topic imparts when trying to help other countries help themselves.

In Spring 2007, the freshman world history course began dividing cadets into different regional focuses for one-third of the year, based on that cadet’s language class the following year. By Fall 2007, the newly-created Center for Languages, Cultures, and Regional Studies (CLCRS) was working to expand cadet opportunities and competencies in foreign language proficiency, intercultural competence, and regional knowledge.

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776 Originally designated as one of the four temporary colloquium courses (SS490) in the Sosh Department, EECS institutionalized this interdisciplinary course as one of its permanent electives, IT460, in Fall 2001. Interview with Lt. Col. Suzanne Nielsen, professor and director of International Relations in the Department of Social Sciences (2008).


5.3.1.5 The Law Department transformation

The Academy has made many decisions throughout this time period specifically affecting the Law Department, which its leadership used to help transform the department into an intellectual peer of the other departments. Of the thirteen academic departments, the Law Department is by far the smallest in faculty, with only sixteen authorized professors. The 1989 reaccreditation self-study recommended USMA decrease the required academic semesters from forty-four to forty; as a result, they also decreased the required semesters of law from two to one. While the additional law instruction was placed during the two-weeks after Christmas (called “Intercession”), by 2002, Superintendent Lt. Gen. William Lennox decided to eliminate Intercession without adding the law instruction back into the academic semester. In addition, beginning with the class of 1985, cadets had the first opportunity to select a major or field of study in which to specialize. With less focus throughout academia on the undergraduate study of law and fewer professors to teach, the Law Department was the last department to offer a law major in 1999. This began a series of critical initiatives, including the first permanent professors being assigned to the Law Department in 2001 (all other academic

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782 Even though the Law Department has proactively worked with the Department of Military Instruction to help incorporate education into the summer programs, the current Law Department leadership has strongly recommended that more time is needed to educate cadets in constitutional, military, and operational law. Interview with Ryan et al (2008); Finnegan (2004), p. 128.

783 Interview with Col. Maritza Ryan (head), Col. Mark Toole, Col. Gary Tidwell, and Dr. Mark Welton, the head and directors of the Department of Law (2008).
departments had at least five), an extensive cadet summer internship program, and a competition on the Law of Armed Combat with the Air Force, Navy, and Coast Guard academies and the Royal Military College of Canada. By 2002, this became an annual international service academy competition, with cadets also competing from Russia, China, Ireland, Greece, and Belgium. The department also served one of the founding members of the Consortium for Undergraduate Law and Justice Programs in 2003, including to host its first conference in April 2004 on Law and Terrorism.

5.3.1.6 USMA Research Centers

Since the end of the Cold War, USMA has also experienced a drastic increase in number and scope of research centers. Currently there are twenty-one USMA centers, including fourteen directly associated with one academic department and seven that are interdisciplinary or focused on other developmental aspects. These centers provide opportunities for cadets and faculty to complete research for the Academy, Army, military, and other non-profit groups worldwide. Examples include a center for professional military ethic, oral history, economic and manpower analysis, teaching excellence, molecular sciences, network science, and artificial intelligence analysis, with a complete list at Appendix G.

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784 These are active programs throughout the Academy, and these summer opportunities play an important role in many cadets’ decision making in what major they select. Law department cadet internships have included positions at the U.S. Supreme Court, Department of Justice, district attorney offices throughout the U.S. and at embassies abroad, and international criminal tribunals. Finnegan (2004), p. 129.


5.3.1.7 New majors and courses

Across the Academy’s thirteen departments, new majors since 9/11 include Nuclear Engineering, Chemical Engineering, Information Technology, Information Engineering, and International and Comparative Legal Studies, as well as a minor in Terrorism Studies. While these changes are notable, these six new majors and one new minor have resulted in only seven new courses being institutionalized in this period. These new courses and the department(s) that teach each include Comparative Legal Traditions (Dept. Law); Information Warfare (EECS and Sosh); and International Conflict Analysis and Negotiations, and Winning the Peace, Homeland Security, Terrorism, and Advanced Terrorism (Sosh). The final three courses were developed in conjunction with the new U.S. Army Combating Terrorism Center and the new terrorism minor.

5.3.2 Why and How USMA’s Changes Occurred

While there have been fundamental changes at USMA since the end of the Cold War, what is most critical is why and how these changes happened while others did not. Of most glaring stagnation is the core curriculum, which dictates the same courses for three-quarters of a cadet’s graduation requirements, regardless of his or her major. This lack of change is in no way due to a lack of internal assessment, external oversight, or civilian knowledge, as the Academy received frequent questions and external reviews during this time by its Board of Visitors, the Department of the Army (DA), DoD, the U.S. Congress, MSCHE, and ABET.\(^{787}\) Almost two-thirds of USMA’s faculty only teach

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for three years in between operational positions, and by 2007 most had served at least once in Afghanistan or Iraq.\footnote{Of USMA’s approximately 600 faculty members, 62% are rotating junior military officers (captains, majors, and a few lieutenant colonels) generally completing three year tours, 21% are civilian faculty, and 17% are senior military (lieutenant colonels and colonels) permanently assigned to USMA for the remainder of their careers. “USMA Faculty.”} USMA is designed to provide the one place in the Army where leaders have at least some time and the mission to anticipate and prepare cadets for long-term challenges.\footnote{Repeated in interviews with EECS and DFL department heads, Cols. Ressler and McPeak, respectively (2008).} Army constraints to change are also appreciably reduced, due to its relatively decentralized decision making and fewer stakeholders throughout the Army needed to implement changes. In a case expected to benefit from external prompting for change and less constrained from reaching consensus (see Table 5.3), why did only these changes occur?

Table 5.3 CAUSAL FACTORS AND THEIR EXPECTED PROBABILITY OF CAUSING CHANGE, U.S. Military Academy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>External Factors (Directly related)</th>
<th>Internal Factors (Directly related)</th>
<th>Internal – Consensus Req’d (Inversely related)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Civilian Knowledge</td>
<td>Proximity to Experiences</td>
<td>Dept. Army Centralized</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technology Impact</td>
<td>Inter-service Competition</td>
<td>Army-wide Stakeholders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Budget Impact</td>
<td>Reflect on New Environment</td>
<td>Low-Med</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defense Industry</td>
<td></td>
<td>Low-Med</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

From a bureaucratic perspective, as with any large institution there are significant hurdles to make administrative and substantive changes. As just one example,

“Horsemanship” was not dropped from the USMA curriculum until 1947.\footnote{Robert Cowley and Thomas Guinzburg (eds), \textit{West Point: Two Centuries of Honor and Tradition} (Canada: Warner Books), 2002, p. 210.}
provides only a partial and much less satisfying answer, however, for the cause of change and lack thereof, as real changes did occur during this time period. It is significant that most changes occurred outside of the core curriculum, although the impact on cadets and faculty are no less real. The reasons for change were in general in line with the theoretical expectations, with four primary exceptions. First, civilians were much less likely to make unilateral demands despite their knowledge of the situation, although budgetary constraints created requirements and opportunities throughout the post-Cold War time. Second, lessons learned played much less of an effect on promoting Academy-wide changes throughout this time period. Third, while inter-service Academy discussions were common, there is less evidence that USMA’s academic changes occurred as the result of competition with its Navy or Air Force peers. While not destructive, there was evidence of intra-Academy competition among USMA departments. Finally, while fewer than expected changes occurred across the Academy, change within each department was frequent and significant. I will spend the remainder of this section discussing why and how the previously mentioned changes occurred, analyzing the changes from 1991-2001, 2001-05, and 2006-07.

5.3.2.1 USMA Changes from 1991-2001

The 1993 change that increased USMA’s proportion of civilian professors, and consequently increased the Academy’s academic rigor, was overwhelmingly caused by Congress. While the Army had some institutional reasons to support this change due to the massive personnel downsizing but fewer cuts in required assignments to fill during
this period, most at USMA and the Army (through DoD) aggressively and comprehensively fought against this proposal in its early stages of development. The primary concern of Congress for this change was to find ways to decrease the $1 billion that DoD was then spending annually to educate and train its future officers. The Government Accountability Office (GAO) July 1991 report to Congressional Requesters, “DoD Service Academies: Improved Cost and Performance Monitoring Needed,” listed their first and second principal findings that “the Academies are the Most Expensive Commissioning Source” and their “Reported Costs Are Understated.” While this report did not directly state that an Academy graduate was an unwise use of resources, it highlighted the vast cost discrepancies among the commissioning sources. GAO also concluded that the academies’ varying cost reports provided inadequate information to managers and decision makers “to allow them to make completely informed decisions regarding resource allocations or raise questions concerning possible improvements in efficiency.”

A former USMA Superintendent (the three-star general, and most senior commanding officer at USMA) also explained that this change happened due to

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791 Between 1991-96, the Army reduced its active forces from 710,000 to 491,000, with 100,000 soldiers departing just in 1991. USMA has about six hundred faculty, so adjusting the civilian faculty from eight-to-nine per cent to its eventual twenty-one per cent would allow the Army to assign approximately seventy-five highly-successful officers to other billets.

792 George H. Rhynedance, IV (Maj. and USMA graduate, 1980), “More Civilians on the West Point Faculty: Good for the Army, or Not?,” thesis for the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College (Ft. Leavenworth, Ks.), 1993, p. 15.


794 In 1989 a USMA commission reportedly cost $228,500 per graduate; an Air Force Academy commission, $225,500; a Naval Academy commission, $153,200; the most expensive Reserve Officer Training Corps scholarship commission, $58,000; and an Officer Candidate School commission, up to $20,000. U.S. GAO (1991), p. 3.

budgetary reasons. In an *ArmyTimes* commentary entitled “Keep Officers as Members of West Point Ranks,” Lt. Gen. (Ret.) William Knowlton said Congress and the media began expressing their desire to increase civilian professors at USMA in the mid-1960s. When the Naval Academy’s accreditation difficulties became known at the time, this issue lost popularity, as the Naval Academy already had a majority of civilian professors. This idea surfaced again while Knowlton was Superintendent from 1970-74, and in this 1991 article he wrote “Now we are again being told that civilian classroom teachers would be cheaper.”

GAO also reported concern over West Point faculty’s lower proportion of professors with Ph.D.s, since most rotating officers have only earned a master’s degree prior to teaching. For instance, in 1991, twenty-six per cent of USMA’s faculty had Ph.D.s, while the average Ph.D. percentage of ninety-six civilian institutions offering undergraduate engineering degrees was seventy-nine per cent. The GAO report concluded that less education, in addition to short teaching assignments and a lack of formal teaching experience, “may inhibit the academies [USMA and Air Force] from providing an education worthy of the capabilities of their students.”

While Congress had unease about USMA’s academics, evidence shows this was a secondary concern. The primary sources from which it drew these conclusions were MSCHE accreditation reports; however, after DoD responded sharply to the GAO’s initial findings, even the GAO acknowledged MSCHE evaluations had overall been favorable of USMA. The GAO concluded that due to the consistency of MSCHE’s

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remarks over time, however, the intellectual rigor “is an ongoing concern that warrants oversight attention.”

DoD agreed to conduct a review in 1991-92 to improve faculty credentials in appropriate academic billets, which GAO found to be “completely responsive to the intent of our recommendation.”

If the GAO had mainly wanted more civilian professors at USMA, this could not have been its conclusion.

Budgetary constraints continued to play important and unexpected causes of change at USMA from 1991-2001. Traditionally USMA had been a passive recipient of private gifts and donations, primarily due to the legal difficulties of accepting private funds due to its federal status. For instance, in 1998 the Superintendent was required to secure DA approval to accept any private donation exceeding $20,000, and gift funds to USMA exceeded $10 million per year for the first time in 1994. The post-Cold War DoD budget reductions significantly impacted USMA for the first time in fiscal year 1997, as its Operation and Maintenance funds were reduced by $13 million. While eventually there was a partial restoration of funds, USMA would have had approximately $25 million per year known shortfalls against its requirements for 1998-2000.

As a result, USMA made two notable changes to how it funded programs, in addition to aggressively pursuing more federal funding, which changed and expanded academic and developmental opportunities for faculty and cadets. First, it launched its own cost reduction initiatives, which included the freezing of civilian faculty hiring at the

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801 USMA, Interim Report, Vol. I, 1998, p. 83. This study also recommended this level should be increased to $500 million.
fiscal year 1997 level of twenty-one per cent, and inviting fifty per cent fewer visiting professors for fiscal year 1998 and beyond. While it is not clear to what percentage the civilian faculty would have otherwise risen, USMA has maintained this proportion since. Second, USMA rapidly shifted to relying on private funds received through its Association of Graduates (a private organization) to greatly expand opportunities for cadets and faculty to conduct research and have additional educational opportunities. USMA began using private donations for summer domestic and international internships and work programs, the previously mentioned USMA research centers, physical activities, and cadet clubs. While it received $2 million in 1988, within a decade it received almost $150 million. By 2006, private donations had increased to over $230 million annually, with some arguing that the USMA Superintendent from 2001-06, Lt. Gen. William J. Lennox, Jr., would be most remembered for championing a new era of giving.

Not only did this change matter for the institution, individual departments also seized upon these opportunities. Here I will just mention changes within the Sosh Department—which includes International Relations, Comparative Politics, American Politics, Economics, the Combating Terrorism Center (CTC), and the Office of Economic Manpower Analysis—although similar efforts happened throughout the Academy. Sosh significantly benefits from the generous donations of private foundations and former


807 For instance, many of the initiatives within the Social Sciences Department are possible as the direct result of generous grants from the Compton Foundation, George Olmsted Foundation, MacArthur
USMA classes.\textsuperscript{808} Individual USMA graduates have also provided significant funds, including to provide seed funds for the CTC that was created only seventeen months after 9/11.\textsuperscript{809} The CTC helps educate cadets on intelligence and counterterrorism studies, teaching the newly created classes for terrorism minors and those taking terrorist-related classes as regular electives. At least as important, the CTC also links the gap between academic and governmental counterterrorism research efforts. Despite the academic benefits USMA receives, by remaining funded entirely by private donations and operational funds from Army units and other governmental agencies, for which it conducts research, the center is able to retain flexibility and greater legitimacy with both the .edu and .gov/.mil audiences.

Considering everything that was changing in the world and Army between 1991 and 2001, why did USMA not change more during this time? In addition to efforts devoted to hiring and incorporating civilian professors, creating new funding mechanisms, and implementing vice deans within the academic administration, USMA was also recovering from a series of significant curriculum changes occurring almost every year throughout the 1980s.\textsuperscript{810} As a result, USMA officially considered its

\textsuperscript{808} The Class of 1971’s class gift supports the Sosh Department’s Student Conference on US Affairs (SCUSA), which is the largest and oldest undergraduate U.S. foreign policy conference. Completing its fifty-eighth year in 2006, it involved eighty USMA cadets, 225 undergraduates from 145 universities and thirty-one countries, and over forty senior scholars and practitioners for the four-day event.

\textsuperscript{809} Of greatest significance, the Combating Terrorism Center was initially funded by a 1977 graduate of West Point who was also the Chairman of the New York Mercantile Exchange.

\textsuperscript{810} Changes included USMA requiring the Class of 1984 for the first time to earn a cumulative QPA of 2.0 to graduate; for the Class of 1985 optional majors were approved (augmenting the fields of study) (available majors: literature, foreign languages, behavioral science, geography, history, political science, economics, management, civil engineering, computer science, mechanical engineering, electrical engineering, chemistry, engineering physics, math); in 1986, it ended its “tracking” structure that distinguished HPA (Humanities and Public Affairs) and MSE (Math, Science, Engineering) tracks, and
curriculum to be in a “period of stabilization” from 1989-98, allowing the Dean and departments to pursue initiatives to better integrate the curriculum around its academic program goals and to implement recommendations from internal and external studies.\(^{811}\)

The one change that did occur during this time period—decreasing required courses from forty-four (thirty-two core, twelve elective) to forty (thirty-one core, nine elective), giving cadets a reasonable expectation of completing most of their requirements—was due to the reaccreditation self-study recommendation from 1989, which simply took several years to implement.\(^{812}\) While changes within courses from 1991-2001 included Army experiential lessons and analyses of the new strategic environment, USMA did not institutionalize additional changes during this time.

In addition, USMA’s administration spent significant time responding to an actual and expected change with the Officer Personnel Management System (OPMS, discussed in Chapter 3). First, as the Army downsized, promotion rates slowed. Even though officers undergo rigorous processes to be selected as permanent Academy professors, in the mid-1990s, repeated professors were not selected for colonel (O-6).\(^{813}\) Second, the Academy leadership also spent substantial time working with the Human Resource Command (HRC) on its draft 1996 OPMS XXI plans, which would have made it difficult

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for operational officers to be assigned as USMA temporary faculty.\textsuperscript{814} With two-thirds of its faculty in this category, USMA wanted to ensure its faculty—selected for their role model qualities for the Army’s next generation of leaders—represented officers of all specialties. Though extensive time and efforts were required, thereby delaying other intra-institutional initiatives, USMA was able to favorably adjust both systems to continue promoting and attracting the quality officers it wanted.\textsuperscript{815}

Finally, it is important to note that significant intra-departmental changes were also happening between 1991-2001. While the Law Department’s transformation served as the clearest example, these changes were representative of initiatives within other departments. This department’s efforts to create its own major and develop an intellectual identity stemmed from four reasons.\textsuperscript{816} First, the Law leadership requested its own major and permanent professors as the result of intra-Academy competition, as the department was concerned that otherwise its resources, professors, and courses would be subsumed by another department.\textsuperscript{817} Second, during this time, throughout academia, scholars and lawyers were increasingly appreciating the study of law as an intellectual endeavor within a liberal arts education. By helping found the Consortium for Undergraduate Law and Justice Programs, USMA not only promoted this effort, but also provided further justification within USMA of its intellectual rigor. Third, the Army had

\begin{footnotesize}

\textsuperscript{815} To fix promotions, USMA restructured its Functional Area 47, USMA Professor, to create a set number of distinct specialties by department instead of assignments to USMA as a whole. In addition to giving USMA more control over the colonels distribution across its departments, DA also had greater visibility where these officers were assigned. USMA, \textit{Interim Report}, Vol. VII, 1998, p. 7. In 2008 USMA still experienced difficulties getting operational officers assigned at USMA. By focusing on the educational benefits for retention and development, the Academy leadership—through active negotiations with personnel and operational commanders—were able to continue assigning these officers as faculty.

\textsuperscript{816} Reasons articulated in an interview with Cols. Ryan, Toole, and Tidwell and Dr. Welton, Dept. of Law (2008).

\textsuperscript{817} For instance, at the Naval Academy the Political Science Department teaches law courses.
\end{footnotesize}
repeatedly learned from its deployments about the importance of officers understanding law and how to help create the rule of law. As more officers with nation building experiences returned to teach, the Department was able to reinforce its intellectual and experiential application. Finally, the department’s leadership and vision made critical differences, as then Col. Patrick Finnegan (promoted to be the Academy’s Dean in 2005) formally severed links with the prosecutorial lawyers at West Point upon becoming Department Head. By emphasizing just education and teaching, as opposed to training and prosecuting, the department was able to solidify its identity as an intellectual peer of its peer academic departments.

5.3.2.2 USMA Changes from 2001-05

The next important USMA change, happening in fall 2001, is an example of civilian leadership providing the vision for change while allowing USMA to create its own plan to make changes it wanted. In 2000, the Secretary of the Army (and 1978 USMA graduate) Louis Caldera told USMA that it needed to focus less on engineering and more on culture, political science, and other humanities topics to prepare the Army’s future leaders for twenty-first century challenges.\(^{818}\) To meet this intent without undermining its accreditation standards for the math, science, and engineering students, the curriculum committee recommended decreasing the mandatory engineering sequence from five to three courses in addition to adding requirements to each major’s capstone course.\(^{819}\) While requiring every department to complete significant work, this created a

\(^{818}\) Interview with Col. Eugene Ressler, Department Head of EECS (2008), USMA classmate of Sec. Caldera and who was at the time also on the curriculum committee.

\(^{819}\) USMA leadership agreed on a three-course engineering sequence because deleting one course did not seem to meet the SecArmy’s intent, while only having a two-course sequence seemed too little for cadets to graduate with a B.S. degree. Interview with Col. Eugene Ressler, Department Head of EECS (2008), who was at the time also on the curriculum committee.
win-win situation across the departments. Engineering departments could spend less time teaching those cadets taking just the sequence, these departments no longer had to teach two versions of the same courses for their majors and those usually less enthusiastic about the engineering sequence, and all departments were given more time for their academic electives.\textsuperscript{820}

Since the Academy already had to alter its curriculum, Dean Brig. Gen. Daniel Kaufman decided to seize this opportunity of change to voluntarily add a second required semester of information technology (IT) to the core curriculum.\textsuperscript{821} There was general agreement throughout the Academy that this subject deserved more attention due to the changing strategic environment, with History, Systems Engineering, and Civil and Mechanical Engineering departments each submitting initial proposals for an IT course. After reviewing the proposals, Dean Kaufmann told the Electrical Engineering and Computer Science (EECS) Department that they would design and teach the course, even though they had not submitted their own proposal. The EECS leadership agreed to design and teach this second required course; however, since the department did not receive additional resources as a result, it was initially much less enthusiastic than otherwise expected.\textsuperscript{822} Secretary Caldera supported both proposals, even though they only weakly supported his vision of adding a cultural focus, and these changes were implemented in 2001.

\textsuperscript{820} Interview with Dr. Dean Dudley, economics professor (Sosh) and on the curriculum committee (Jan. 2008).

\textsuperscript{821} Interview with Col. Eugene Ressler, Department Head of EECS (2008), who was at the time also on the curriculum committee.

\textsuperscript{822} Interview with Col. Eugene Ressler, Department Head of EECS (2008)
While USMA was reticent to require institution-wide changes, its senior leadership increasingly and actively encouraged interdisciplinary integration during this time period. They promoted collaboration among departments, including the interdisciplinary majors and courses discussed last section.\(^{823}\) This emphasis was discussed in its 1989 reaccreditation self-study, senior leaders’ faculty briefs,\(^{824}\) and repeated in interviews with senior department leaders across the Academy in 2008.\(^{825}\) USMA leaders explained this emphasis due to their perceived need to better adapt to the country’s future strategic challenges,\(^{826}\) which Sep. 11, 2001, only heightened the awareness. The Army’s lessons in nation building throughout the 1990s introduced a generation of officers to the importance of cultural understanding, the need for interagency cooperation, and the impact of non-state actors. As these officers returned to USMA to teach in the early-to-mid 2000s, they brought with them battlefield experiences and academic credentials to incorporate these changes within West Point. These factors, along with institutional flexibilities to initiate new courses and private funding, helped initiate the new courses in law, terrorism, negotiations, and Winning the Peace (mentioned last section).

\(^{823}\) Examples include the 1998 Systems-EECS-BS&L major, Information Systems Engineering, and the 2001 EECS-Sosh elective “Strategy, Policy and Tactics of Information Warfare and Cyberterrorism.”

\(^{824}\) Specifically highlighted in Dean Brig. Gen. Finnegan’s faculty address (2005).


\(^{826}\) USMA, \textit{Interim Report}, Vol. I, 1998. This study focused largely on the need for future Army leaders to incorporate information technology while also working more closely with other military services and countries. The military, to include the Army and West Point, was still not focused on interactions with interagency, NGOs, or others in the civilian sector.
5.3.2.3 USMA Changes from 2006-07

The final major change at USMA since the end of the Cold War was the opportunity, beginning in 2006, for most cadets to participate in different cultural and language immersion experiences. This change also added two additional semesters of language for most humanities majors, while all language courses would be taught five days a week instead of the usual every other day academic schedule. The additional language requirement was largely the result of senior Army leaders requiring USMA to better institutionalize Secretary Caldera’s intent from 2000. The other parts of this major change, however, were primarily caused by a paired civilian vision-military plan. Leaders at USMA and throughout the Army had increasingly become aware of the need for additional language and culture education since the end of the Cold War, and the degree of intensity for change among external leaders was increasingly apparent. As the result, not only did a new strategic environment and experiential learning play critical roles in USMA actively shaping their plan, but also the Academy leadership had critical roles in making this plan a reality. Due to the extensive costs for additional faculty and overseas opportunities, this plan also could not have been implemented without the additional $9 million that DoD gave USMA.

Both Iraq wars played pivotal roles in this change occurring. After the 1991 Gulf War, leaders across DoD realized that the military had very little language, culture, or regional expertise, especially in Arabic and the Middle East. Concluding that teaching languages was too difficult, DA encouraged regional and cultural education, while the

827 Interview with Dudley (May 2008).
828 Information on this 2006 change, except where noted, is from an interview with Col. Ricky McPeak, professor and head of the Department of Foreign Languages (2008).
DoD Language Institute in Monterey, Ca., continued educating a small number of military people in foreign language listening and reading skills. Army cultural emphasis surfaced episodically, including to help decrease USMA’s engineering focus in 2001; however, 9/11 solidified the still inadequate changes that DoD had made as the result of its experiences and to meet future challenges. With Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld prioritizing the need to increase language capabilities, in 2002 the Pentagon began hosting monthly meetings on what progress was being made. By 2005 these meetings formalized a “Road Map” to institutionalize change, for which the Army G-3 for Training—which was also responsible for prosecuting two wars—was responsible.

Meanwhile, USMA leaders attending the monthly meetings and talking with Army, DoD, and Congressional leaders became increasingly aware of the momentum for change. After the 2001 curriculum changes, there was strong resistance to make additional changes to the core curriculum. As a result, the USMA curriculum committee conducted a study in 2002 that resulted in various options for change, without advocating their implementation. USMA’s Superintendent at the time, Lt. Gen. Lennox, continued advocating additional language training, while Brig. Gen. Daniel Kaufman, the Dean and former Sosh Department Head, advocated additional cultural and regional opportunities. With growing external (at least from DoD) and internal signs that a requirement for change was increasingly likely, USMA commissioned a second study to

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829 The DoD Language Institute was created to prepare intelligence analysts during the Cold War who could listen and transcribe data, rather than for soldiers to converse with foreign speakers. As it is still funded by the Army G-2 Intelligence Office, it has been very resistant to shifting from this focus. Interview with Col. McPeak (2008).

830 As a cadet, Lt. Gen. Lennox was required to take four semesters of language. He took Chinese and maintained his proficiency even while Superintendent.
determine its ideal plan to better incorporate language, regional, and cultural education. While having minimal expectations that its $6 million proposal would be accepted, when Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld asked at a meeting with all academy superintendents how they intended to transform, Lt. Gen. Lennox’s presentation was favorably received. After USMA leaders briefed the plan to Congress, Congress actually increased the total funding to provide all cadets the opportunity to spend time overseas, while also initiating plans at the other academies. With only two USMA cadets attending St. Cyr in France for almost twenty years beginning in the 1980s, this opportunity will have lasting effects on the officer corps as long as funds (government and/or private) exist.

Finally, the span of places at which the cadets are able to study was directly caused by Dean Brig. Gen. Kaufman’s initiative. Originally cadets were only allowed to study at military academies overseas, which provided valuable opportunities but limited the number of countries with which USMA could send cadets. 831 In 2002 while Dean Kaufman was visiting St. Cyr, he added a visit to L’École Polytechnique, during which he was able to initiate cadet semesters at this prestigious French civilian university. USMA’s leadership were then able to use this as the example to greatly expand its semester abroad programs to countries without military academies or those not wanting to exchange military cadets, even to countries like Russia and China. 832 In Fall 2008, USMA is also initiating a program to allow foreign military cadets to spend a semester at USMA. 833

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831 In 2008, the Air Force Academy leadership would still only allow its cadets to attend foreign military academies, which greatly reduced the number of their cadets participating in the semester abroad program. Interview with Col. McPeak (2008).
832 Interview with Col. McPeak (2008).
833 USMA is initiating this program in Fall 2008 as a test case with the Royal Netherlands Military Academy, The Netherlands.
In conclusion, real changes at USMA occurred throughout the post-Cold War time period, with existing theoretical arguments helping explain their causes. The most consistent source of change was a new strategic environment, supported by civilian intervention within the more substantial changes. Experiential learning and the senior leadership’s support of the change were also consistently important, with budgetary changes and new technology largely facilitating changes. While USMA and other academies were changing at the same time, there was not significant evidence that USMA changed itself as the result of this competition. These changes are summarized in Table 5.4.

Table 5.4 WHEN AND WHY CHANGES OCCURRED, U.S. MILITARY ACADEMY, 1991-2007 (major changes in green; important change, blue; notable changes, white)
5.4 The United States Army War College at Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania

The U.S. Army War College (USAWC) at Carlisle Barracks, Pa., was founded in 1901 by Secretary of War Elihu Root to provide a place for rising senior Army leaders to study and plan matters of national defense, military science, and command. Its purpose has continued to evolve over time, with its former senior leader, Commandant Maj. Gen. Richard Chilcoat, identifying four distinct eras of increasingly intellectual, joint, national strategic, and information age focus. Its mission has also continued to evolve along with the Army’s changing strategic foci, with interagency and intergovernmental environments and the Army’s strategic communication efforts not added until after 9/11. Ultimately the College aims to create national security professionals with expertise of the Army service and ability to thrive within the military and national security contexts, preparing these officers for assignments throughout the rest of their Army careers.


836 The USAWC’s mission is “To prepare selected military, civilian, and international leaders for the responsibilities of strategic leadership; educate current and future leaders on the development and employment of landpower in a joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational environment; research and publish on national security and military strategy; and engage in activities that support the Army’s strategic communication efforts.” In 2001, the only environments mentioned were “unified, joint, or multinational,” which is also common throughout DA and DoD documents. Robert H. “Robin” Dorff, “Professional Military Security Education: The View from a Senior Service College,” in James M. Smith, Daniel J. Kaufman, Robert H. Dorff, and Linda P. Brady, *Educating International Security Practitioners: Preparing to Face the Demands of the 21st Century International Security Environment* (Carlisle: Security Studies Institute), Jul. 2001, p. 22.

837 Point emphasized in an interview with USAWC Dean Dr. William Johnsen (Feb. 2008)
The War College and USMA have structural differences and similarities that help explain why changes happened and did not at different rates and magnitudes. While USMA is a four-year undergraduate school, the USAWC students earn a Master’s of Strategic Studies degree in ten months. USMA is one of three pre-commissioning sources that graduates enter the Army as the most junior officers, whereas the USAWC is one of four military Senior Service Colleges (see Figure 5.1) whose students are preparing to be their organization’s next generation of senior leaders. These experienced officers and civilians typically have sixteen to twenty-three years experience, arriving in the rank of colonel or lieutenant colonel (or military or civilian equivalent). As a result, DA, DoD, and civilian leaders have increasingly mandated curriculum requirements for USAWC, which are published in the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) Instruction for the Officer Professional Military Education Program (OPMEP). A final critical difference is that USAWC students are much more diverse, with the 2005 NDAA mandating that at least forty per cent of all students would not be from the Army (see Table 5.5 for a normal student distribution). In comparison, in 2007 of approximately 4,000 cadets, USMA enrolled fifteen international students per graduating class and twenty sister service academy cadets for one semester in the year. As a result, by composition the War College education has a greater focus on joint, international, and interagency efforts. Like USMA, though, USAWC attendance is highly competitive,

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838 Other Senior Service Colleges (SSC) are the Naval War College in Newport, Ri.; the Marine Corps War College in Quantico, Va.; and the Air War College on Maxwell Air Force Base in Montgomery, Al. Officers can also attend the National Defense University schools in lieu of an SSC.

with fewer than 350 selected from approximately 35,000 eligible officers receiving notification of their USAWC eligibility each year.\textsuperscript{840}

Table 5.5 SAMPLE RESIDENT CLASS, U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE, 2006-07

\textbf{Army (199, 59\%):} 165 Active, 17 National Guard, 17 Reserve  
\textbf{Civilian students (31, 9\%):} 15 DoD Leadership and Management Program (DLAMP), 10 Department of the Army, 6 Other government agencies  
\textbf{Other Services (66, 20\%):} 34 Air Force (27 Active, 3 National Guard, 4 Reserve), 11 Marines, 20 Navy (18 Active, 2 Reserve), 1 Coast Guard  
\textbf{International Fellows (40, 12\%)}

Source: USAWC Curriculum Catalogue, 2006-07, p. 38

While their relative proportion of the year has continued to shift, there are two parts of a USAWC year: the core courses and electives. Three separate departments teach these courses to all students: the Department of Command, Leadership, and Management; the Department of National Security and Strategy; and the Department of Military Strategy, Planning and Operations. The core curriculum now consists of six sequential courses held from July to February: Fundamentals of Strategic Thinking, the Theory of War and Strategy, Leadership, Strategic Art and Grand Strategy, Implementing the Strategy, and Resourcing the Strategy. A strategic course exercise, electives, the capstone national security seminar, an individual research project, and at least one public speaking engagement during the year (U.S. residents only) complete the academic year by June. I briefly highlight these requirements.

\textsuperscript{840} The Army holds a centralized selection board annually for Army officers. The sister services conduct their own selection process, and DA holds centralized selection boards for the civilian (primarily DA civilian) attendees. The USAWC Commandant can invite up to six students from other federal agencies, which their own organization selects. Combatant commanders nominate international officers from their region, which are then selected by USAWC, DA, DoD, and Department of State. USAWC Curriculum Catalogue, 2006-07, pp. 11-13.
The first two required courses, Fundamentals of Strategic Thinking (FST) and Theory of War and Strategy, were both begun in 2005. FST is a ten-day, interdisciplinary course focusing on cognitive, organizational, and environmental domains of strategic leadership. Its writing requirements help identify officers who need additional concentration in effective writing. The second course concentrates on the challenges of creating political victory after a military success. Its main themes include strategy, war, and the international system; theories of war; the conduct of war, from major combat operations to counterinsurgency; and victory, aftermath, and the future.

The third and fourth courses focus on topics within the social sciences. The third course is the Strategic Leader course. Building upon FST, it applies concepts from psychology, sociology, and organizational theory to the Army profession. Concentrating on leading and making decisions in complex, strategic, and ethically-challenging situations, this class focuses on the challenges emanating from the uncertain, fluid, and complex environment. Fourth is the National Security Policy and Strategy course, which is similar in design to graduate political science and national security courses. It deals with many of the same topics as USMA’s mandatory SS307 International Relations course, although its students benefit from twenty years of military experience. It primarily analyzes national security policy, national security strategy, and national military strategy. In addition, it evaluates strategic culture and national values, the domestic and international security environments, the U.S. national security decision-making system, the elements of national power, national strategy documents, and contemporary non-conventional and conventional national security threats.\footnote{The Department of National Security and Strategy (DNSS) website, USAWC.}
The final two core courses are Implementing National Military Strategy (INMS) and Joint Processes and Land Power Development (JPLD). INMS examines theater strategic warfare, interventions involving violence, and stability operations, for which Combatant Commanders are responsible to plan and execute. The class discusses various military and non-military components involved in campaign plans, drawing on case studies and their lessons from current and historic interventions. JPLD focuses on resourcing the strategy. Based on the land-based unit requirements from the National Military Strategy, it teaches the design and funding for defense, joint, and Army processes and systems. JPLD also discusses the institutional Army’s role in manning, equipping, and training units for the Combatant Commanders stationed around the world.

The final requirement before the electives is the Strategic Decision Making Exercise. Consistently set fifteen years in the future, this simulation requires students to apply material from the core courses to plan for and lead in multiple crisis scenarios. Students role play leaders from across the Army, DoD, and interagency, requiring them to respond to simulated, realistic crises and incorporate experiential learning at the operational and strategic levels. Specific challenges include working within the interagency process, developing Presidential Decision Directives, creating strategic guidance, allocating military forces, executing campaign plans, conducting international coordination, and negotiating conditions of conflict termination.

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842 Stiehm, p. 165, identifies this “‘crown jewel’ exercise” as a “dramatic” change. See also Johnsen et al, pp. 37-38.
The final classroom requirement is five electives from approximately one hundred choices, including one elective required to be a Regional Strategic Appraisal (RSA).\textsuperscript{843} Electives are taught by professors from throughout the War College,\textsuperscript{844} and range from courses such as The Strategic Environment and World Religions, Systems Leadership: Organizational Theory & Change, Economics of National Security, Non-Lethal Weapons, and Just War Analysis of U.S. Military Intervention (see Appendix F for the 2006-08 electives). Students take one of six RSAs: Africa (sub-Sahara), the Americas (North and Latin America), Asia (East and South Asia), Europe (Western and Eastern Europe), Eurasia (Russia, Caspian/Black Sea and Inner Asia), and the Middle East (including North Africa). The RSA uses the region as a case study to better understand other regions’, states’, and societies’ perspectives and values, and how culture can affect policy and strategy formulation and outcome.\textsuperscript{845}

In the final week before graduation, the USAWC holds the course’s capstone National Security Seminar (NSS). Along with hosting distinguished speakers and participating in a staff ride to Gettysburg, the NSS provides the opportunity for these future Army leaders to hear from and candidly engage with renowned national and international practitioners and scholars. The USAWC also invites a diverse group of one hundred sixty visitors from across the U.S. to participate in this week’s events and

\textsuperscript{843} Students within the Advanced Strategic Arts Program (ASAP) and the National Security Policy Program (NSPP) are exempt from the standard regional studies requirement, as they take specially tailored regional programs.

\textsuperscript{844} Additional professors come from the Department of Academic Affairs, the Strategic Studies Institute, the Center for Strategic Leadership, the Military History Institute, and the U.S. Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute.

\textsuperscript{845} Students use the USAWC Analytical Cultural Framework to systematically analyze other regions, specifically including the following dimensions: national identity; political culture; regional identity; political system; strategic culture; and globalization and culture. USAWC Curriculum Catalogue, 2006-07, p. 25.
discussions, not only to better integrate them into efforts the military is pursuing but also to provide their perspectives and experiences to this predominantly military class.\footnote{For additional information, see \url{http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usawc/dnss/nss/nss.htm}.}

Figure 5.2 graphically depicts the USAWC year, which was still current in 2008.
5.4.1 Changes at USAWC Since the End of the Cold War

The USAWC has continued to evolve throughout its century-long existence, including since the end of the Cold War. During this time there was one major (results in a fundamentally different experience), three important (a considerable effect), and two notable (evolutionary) changes with theoretical importance. The major change in 2005 was a fundamental restructuring of the core curriculum, refocus of the RSA, and lowering the proportion of Army faculty and students. The three important changes were additional time for electives in 1992, a shift to greater civilian faculty from 1995-2001, and the decision to seek accreditation for the master’s degree in 1996. The two notable changes were the creation in 1999 of the Advanced Strategic Art Program and permanent military professors for the War College. I discuss these in turn.
5.4.1.1 2005 Overhaul of the Core Curriculum and Regional Studies Appraisal and Fewer Army Students and Faculty

Academic Year 2005-06 brought about a significant restructuring and reorientation of the entire USAWC education and participants, including four main changes. First, the curriculum returned from four to six core courses, with the new courses emphasizing theoretical and methodological techniques and concepts to provide a more academically-focused foundation. In addition to updating material presented within the four existing core courses, the Fundamentals of Strategic Thinking (re-)introduced students to graduate level expectations and requirements. The second new course, Theory of War and Strategy, then provided the theoretical foundations and intellectual framework for the master’s degree, primarily from international relations and national strategy disciplines. Second, the College decreased the formal “contact hours” (such as in the classroom) between faculty and students per week to fifteen, from the previous range of twenty-one to twenty-four. Third, it adjusted the Regional Strategic Appraisal (RSA) from a U.S.-centered national security analysis to one much more attuned to cultural, political, and economical factors within that region.847 Finally, no more than sixty per cent of the students and faculty could be Army officers, which decreased from seventy-five per cent.848

848 Beginning in 1996, Congress (see also the Mar. 1, 1996 OPMEP, CJCSI 1800.01, p. B-2) mandated that SSCs had to have at least 20% non-service students. The Aug. 30, 2004 OPMEP (CJCSI 1800.01B, p. 3) increased this requirement to 25%, with the 2005 NDAA (and corresponding Dec. 22, 2005 OPMEP, CJCSI 1800.01C, p. 3) increasing the requirement to 40%.
5.4.1.2 1992 Time for Electives

As this senior education must be completed between mid-August and mid-June, USAWC faculty have continuously adjusted the proportion of core-versus-elective courses to best educate the students.\(^{849}\) In 1992 an important shift occurred, as the core curriculum decreased from six to four courses and ended before the Christmas holidays instead of mid-April.\(^{850}\) In addition, the War College added a month-long capstone “National and Theater Strategy Exercise,” in between two eight-week elective periods.

Until 2005, other minor curriculum changes continued to occur. In 1994, the “Strategic Leadership” and “National Military Requirements and Capabilities” courses combined into a new course, “Responsible Command,” without adjusting the core-electives proportions. The four-week capstone exercise was also replaced by the previously mentioned two-week Strategic Decision Making Exercise, conducted in a new state of the art facility to use technological advances to facilitate learning.\(^{851}\)

5.4.1.3 Increased civilian faculty

At the USAWC since the early 1990s, there has been a redistribution of military-to-civilian ratio. In 1993, the majority of instructors were military (103 of 139); yet by 2005, there were only twenty-eight active duty Army faculty.\(^{852}\) There are some significant benefits to this changing proportion, as people with more advanced degrees and longevity can help provide more academic rigor and greater stability. Unfortunately,

\(^{849}\) They identify this as a “dynamic tension” of the War College. Johnsen et al, p. 172.

\(^{850}\) Johnsen et al, p. 53. The two courses eliminated were Regional Studies Appraisals, which became a required elective, and Global and Theater Strategy Applications.


\(^{852}\) Johnsen et al, pp. 131, 133.
the civilian-to-military ratio is creating a situation in which at most Army schools, which are designed to be academic and professional military education opportunities, the students are better aware of the complexities and realities of the current challenges than their instructors. The Army has not yet dealt with this issue well, nor is there a simple way to correct this issue given the current operational tempo.

At the USAWC as well as many other Army institutional organizations, many of the civilian professors are in fact retired military officers. While this breadth and depth of knowledge is tremendous, it can also retard the ability to change from a Cold War mentality to the threats the Army and country faces today. There are few formal or informal systems to teach the professors about new changes, and psychology and learning theories argue that people tend to remain wedded to schemas formed when they were young unless a dramatically different experience changes them. As a result, there is a paradigmatic struggle between the Cold War generation and younger generations on what expert knowledge the Army should specialize.

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853 This is primarily referring to Army schools after the initial entry ones, like USMA and the basic officer courses.

854 This is further exacerbated by the fact that the lieutenants and captains, who have the greatest interactions with the cultures and direct combat, are usually educated by the least experienced officers in the OES. ATLDP (2001), p. OS-11. Wong (2004) also provides an exceptional analysis of the leadership experiences that usually just the most junior leaders in the Army are getting as a result of OIF.

855 Former Assistant Dean for Academics Col.(Ret.) Kevin Weddle estimated that 40% of the civilian faculty were retired military. Interview (2008).

856 Lt. Gen. William Caldwell also discussed with senior USMA faculty (2008) the difficulties he was currently experiencing at the mid-career officer education at Ft. Leavenworth, which currently has only 18% active duty military faculty.

In 1996, the War College sought accreditation for both its resident and distance education programs from U.S. Department of Education and Congress, followed by a regional accreditation from the Middle States Commission on Higher Education (MSCHE). Requiring six periods of self-study and assessment, along with multiple visits and reviews, MSCHE granted initial accreditation for the Master’s of Strategic Studies degree in June 2004.

In addition, as the result of the 1986 Goldwater Nichols Act, senior officers must receive two phases of joint professional military education (JPME) prior to making general officers. From 1997-2004, the War College was certified and accredited under the military Process for Accreditation of Joint Education for the first JPME phase, requiring five separate reviews and self-studies. As the result of the 2005 NDAA, USAWC and the other senior service colleges were also authorized to teach the second JPME phase, once accredited by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS). These military accreditations added extensive educational requirements. For instance, before earning Phase II accreditation, USAWC was required to add seven learning areas, supported by thirty-one learning objectives, on the operational and strategic levels of war.

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858 Newland, p. 40.
5.4.1.5 Advanced Strategic Art Program

The first notable change during this time was the creation of the Advanced Strategic Art Program (ASAP) in 1999. The six-month program aims to educate a small group of national security professionals at the strategic (theater, or combatant command) level and higher in the theoretical and historical art of joint, interagency, and international concepts and operations. The course has four interactive seminars with guest lecturers and a five-day trip to Washington, D.C. Created as the senior equivalent to the mid-career “School of Advanced Military Studies” course at Ft. Leavenworth, which produces the Army’s operational “Jedi Knights,” ASAP graduates earn the additional skill classification “6Z-strategist.” This designation, along with support from the Army’s Human Resource Command (HRC) and individual combatant commands, have resulted in many of the graduates being assigned immediately after graduation to serve as senior planners on theater-level and higher staffs.

5.4.1.6 Professor, USAWC

The final post-Cold War change with theoretical significance is the 1999 addition of permanent active duty Army professors at USAWC, similar to those at USMA. Since 1999, the USAWC Commandant has been permitted every year to select two officers to return to graduate school to earn their Ph.D. and serve as War College faculty until their mandatory retirement. Since military professors at USAWC do not usually receive

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additional graduate education before teaching, which is common for USMA rotating and permanent professors, this program significantly increases the percentage of USAWC Army faculty having doctorate degrees. No more than twelve permanent officers may serve at a time; however, due to the added value of these “doctor-colonel” professors, USAWC has been trying to increase this number to sixteen.

5.4.2 Why and How the USAWC Changes Occurred

While less commonly reputed by pundits for its organizational stagnation, the USAWC has received several critical reviews—even since 9/11—for its lack of adapting and learning. As with USMA, this is also not due to the lack of external advice and reviews from Congress, the CJCS Officer Professional Military Education Program, the USAWC Board of Visitors, civilian accreditation bodies, the biennial general officer survey, the biennial alumni survey, and the biennial faculty survey. Judith Hicks Stiehm’s 2002 book on the War College noted it had made some important changes, although she concluded that along with needing a much greater focus on education and academics (vice training), the new strategic environment also prompted an unfilled need to study peace in addition to the existing curriculum on war. A 2002 RAND study also argued the core curricula lacked “any in-depth examinations of actual post-Cold War

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865 Even before this program was in place, there was “a longstanding agreement” among the CSA, Army G1, and USAWC that up to twelve officers could be stabilized at USAWC. These designated Professor, USAWC, who are now returned to graduate school to earn their Ph.Ds., now also count against this total. Johnsen et al, pp. 121-22.

866 Johnsen et al, p. 121.


868 Stiehm, especially pp. 196-200.
other-than-MTW [major theater war] experiences to provide students an understanding of the nondoctrinal realities these operations imposed on Army senior leaders.  

Additionally, there are many parallels changes made—and lack thereof—with those at USMA. Each increased its civilian faculty throughout the 1990s, made only one significant change to the core curriculum (although the USAWC was a major change), and an emphasized cultural and regional focus was not added until mid-2000s. A quick scan of Table 5.1 shows that while there were similar changes in these academic institutions, their causes were quite divergent. In this section, I first highlight the theoretical expectations for change, and then chronologically discuss why and how the USAWC changes occurred.

Structurally, the USAWC has some benefits relative to USMA in order to make changes. USMA has thirteen academic departments, led by long-standing permanent professors and approximately six hundred faculty members, two-thirds of which are mid-career Army officers. Cumulatively, they teach thirty core courses over four years to (all resident) undergraduates preparing to enter the Army. USAWC, on the other hand, only has three primary teaching departments and 134 professors throughout the entire College serving in some faculty capacity for the one academic year. Since most military professors are senior service college (SSC) graduates themselves, few serve longer than

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869 David E. Johnson, “Preparing Potential Senior Army Leaders for the Future: An Assessment of Leader Development Efforts in the Post-Cold War Era,” RAND, Sep. 2002, p. 19. Interestingly, in an interview with USAWC Dean Dr. William Johnsen, I specifically asked for his assessment (then and now) of the 2002 RAND report’s accuracy. He stated that USAWC leadership was stunned by the report, and presumed that the author relied upon externally available material for his conclusions. Despite spending significant time and effort responding to the report after it was published, the USAWC Dean, Deputy Dean, department heads, and course directors were not interviewed for the report.

870 Johnsen et al, p. 128. Only seventy-four professors work within the main three departments, with the remainder of the faculty being assigned in the Department of Distance Education, Center for Strategic Leadership, Strategic Studies Institute, Army Physical Fitness Research Institute, and Army Heritage and Education Center. Johnsen et al, p. 185.
eight years before reaching mandatory retirement, while many only serve three to four.\textsuperscript{871}

While this has some stability drawbacks, these rotations provide greater opportunities for new ideas and experiences to be infused within the curriculum,\textsuperscript{872} including at more senior ranks than with USMA’s mid-career rotating faculty. In addition, almost all USAWC students arrive after completing difficult assignments around the world; by 2008, a high percentage were returning from one or more year-long combat tours in Iraq and Afghanistan.\textsuperscript{873} As USAWC’s education relies heavily on student discussions within the classroom,\textsuperscript{874} this close proximity to the battlefield further enhances the institution’s ability to incorporate the Army’s lessons.

There are some structural commonalities between the two academic institutions that prompt and retard change. As with USMA, civilians have a relatively high level of knowledge about this academic institution. The USAWC also relies on DA for its budget, making significant budgetary changes likely to affect the institution. As the College is focused on strategic leadership as opposed to technical education or materiel

\textsuperscript{871} The USAWC does not benefit from USMA’s delayed retirement, which allows the senior permanent professors at USMA to retire at age sixty-four, regardless of years served in the Army.

\textsuperscript{872} Johnsen et al, p. 122.

\textsuperscript{873} Interview with Weddle (2008).

\textsuperscript{874} Many have actually found reliance on these exchanges rather than instruction as “disturbing,” including the U.S. House of Representative, Committee on Armed Service’s “Report on the Panel on Military Education,” 101\textsuperscript{st} Congress, First Session, Apr. 21, 1989, which is also known as the Skelton Report. Stehm (2002) agrees with this argument, saying that “When the war-college year is measured against the ideal civilian education, it falls short. This needs to be recognized if the goal is in fact education rather than training.” Dean Johnsen, who served as Stehm’s officemate during her research at the USAWC, strongly disagreed with her assessment, arguing that the intent of USAWC must remain a professional military education and not just another graduate education. While very aware of the need to provide an intellectually rigorous education, Johnsen emphasized the importance of drawing upon the students’ vast experiences while covering a great breadth of topics throughout the year, specifically to prepare these students to lead the institutional Army and military. Due to the divergent student population and mission of this College, Johnsen did not consider civilian graduate programs—especially Ph.D. programs that due provide great depth in specific topics—to be the ideal model to which they should even try to attain. Interview (Mar. 2008).
purchasing, technological changes and the defense industry are expected to have even less of causal effect.

Also similar to USMA’s competition with the other service academies, the USAWC must compete with the other SSCs to attract the best and brightest officers. Officers are eligible to attend any SSC, and increasingly since the end of the Cold War, SSCs have been required to enroll joint and interagency students.875 Both USMA and USAWC are also primarily focused on education, providing relatively more opportunities than other systems throughout the Army to reflect on future challenges its students and the Army will face. Finally, there are also relatively fewer stakeholders across the Army with vested interests in change at USAWC. With only five-to-eight per cent of each year’s officer cohort attending the College,876 who are already senior officers, changes at the USAWC personally and professionally affect a much smaller number than the previously discussed personnel and training changes.

Finally, the USAWC also has a structural constraint to change relative to USMA. As the final, formal education that most Army officers receive, the institutional Army and Joint Staff have significant interest in what its graduates are being taught. This relative DA centralization has resulted in an increasing number of requirements throughout the post-Cold War time period, especially with the slow JPME institutionalization from the

875 Beginning in 1996, Congress (see also the Mar. 1, 1996 OPMEP, CJCSI 1800.01, p. B-2) mandated that SSCs had to have at least twenty per cent non-service students. The Aug. 30, 2004 OPMEP (CJCSI 1800.01B, p. 3) increased this requirement to twenty-five per cent, with the 2005 NDAA (and corresponding Dec. 22, 2005 OPMEP, CJCSI 1800.01C, p. 3) increasing the requirement to forty per cent.

876 Interview with Weddle (2008). Officers are tracked for personnel and education reasons by their commissioning year cohort.
1986 Goldwater Nichols Act. These theoretical expectations for change are shown in Table 5.6.

Table 5.6 CAUSAL FACTORS AND THEIR EXPECTED PROBABILITY OF CAUSING CHANGE, U.S. Army War College

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>External Factors (Directly related)</th>
<th>Internal Factors (Directly related)</th>
<th>Internal – Consensus Required (Inversely related)</th>
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<tr>
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<td>Proximity to Experiences</td>
<td>Dept. Army Centralized</td>
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<td>Technology Impact</td>
<td>Inter-service Competition</td>
<td>Army-wide Stakeholders</td>
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<td>Budget Impact</td>
<td>Reflect on New Environment</td>
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<td>Defense Industry</td>
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5.4.2.1 Why and How Changes at USAWC Occurred from 1991-2001

The first important change at USAWC in the post-Cold War period was the increased time for electives in 1992. In addition to being the first curriculum created after the fall of the Soviet Union, former Commandant Maj. Gen. William Stoff primarily caused this change. Given the tremendous fluctuation in the strategic environment coupled with recent military interventions in Panama and the Persian Gulf, Stofft thought USAWC students had to be trusted to help shape their own development. Declaring 1992 the year of “personal learning and growth,” he thought these adult students should be allowed to select proportionally more courses they knew they needed for their own futures. In addition, there were significantly fewer external curriculum

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877 For instance, then USAWC Commandant Maj. Gen. Richard Chilcoat wrote in 1995 that this legislation’s “effects even yet have not fully registered.” Chilcoat (1995-96), p. 11.

878 Johnsen et al, p. 53, identify AY 1991-92 as “probably the last USAWC curriculum strongly influenced by the Cold War.”

879 Interview with Dean Johnsen (Mar. 2008), who was in his first year at the USAWC in 1992.
requirements at the time, as USAWC was not accredited by the military or a civilian institution. Creating more time for electives also provided faculty more flexibility with their own schedules. With the future uncertain and fewer external constraints, Stofft was able to more quickly create consensus around this win-win option, and the change went into effect that Fall.880

Although USMA and USAWC increased their proportion of civilian faculty at the same time, the USAWC change was not primarily the result of external causes. USAWC had been receiving external pressure—especially following Goldwater Nichols—to increase civilian faculty.881 DoD’s shrinking post-Cold War budget also created strong externally-driven incentives to cut both institutions’ budgets. The main differences with USMA, though, were that Congress did not legislate change as it did with USMA. Instead, fierce intra-Army competition for those senior officers interested in and qualified to teach at USAWC—who were also highly sought for senior positions elsewhere during the downsizing—primarily resulted in fewer officers being assigned.882 For instance, former USAWC Commandant Maj. Gen. Robert Scales said that in the late 1990s when trying to hire more Army officers, there were only eighty-six Army colonels with Ph.D.s, and only six were in positions that were capable of being reassigned to USAWC.883

880 Interview with Dean Johnsen (Mar. 2008), who also argued that given the current, substantial JPME requirements, he does not think they could decrease the proportion of time allotted to the core courses while still meeting these externally-directed requirements, even if the USAWC wanted.

881 Congress began a series of studies to review DoD’s implementation plans and assess its education system to prepare strategists, war fighters, and tacticians. Led by Congressmen Ike Skelton (D-Mo.), one of their recommendations in 1989 was for all SSCs to increase their civilian faculty. See U.S. House of Representatives (1991); also Stiehm, Ch. 9 and pp. 183-84.

882 As discussed in Chapter 3, from 1991-96 the Army reduced its active forces from 710,000 to 491,000, even though many of the required positions were not correspondingly eliminated, while the operational tempo increased. As a result, the Army experienced a significant demand-to-supply imbalance, especially for senior officers with excellent records.

Two external initiatives further increased the proportion of civilian faculty to the current forty-five per cent population. First, when then Secretary of Defense William Cohen established the Defense Leadership and Management program in 1997 to better educate and train senior DoD civilian employees alongside their military counterparts, DoD also provided more funds to USAWC to hire additional civilian faculty. Second, not only did the 2005 NDAA require Army students be constrained to sixty per cent, but also it limited the number of Army faculty to this same proportion. This further reduced the number of active duty Army professors from thirty-five to twenty-eight.

As with USMA, the increase in civilian faculty has had some positive effects. As HRC assigned fewer officers to teach, many of those retiring changed their military uniforms to suits and continued teaching. This helped provide some stability while retaining experience at USAWC. Unfortunately most of these officers had not been permitted to earn a doctorate degree prior to being assigned, so the proportion of “civilian” faculty with Ph.D.s did not increase despite this being a major motivation for external actors increasing the number of civilian faculty.

One of Commandant Scales’ priorities during his 1997-2000 tenure was to increase the proportion among his faculty of civilian intellectuals who focused on the institutional Army. As one of the few War College Commandants with a Ph.D.

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884 The U.S. Department of Defense Leadership and Management Program (DLAMP) is a DoD competitive leader development program, which aims “to prepare, certify and continuously educate and challenge a highly capable, diverse, mobile cadre of senior civilians capable of leading in a ‘joint’ environment. It also nurtures a shared understanding and sense of mission between civilian and military leaders.” For more information on this program, see [http://www.cpol.army.mil/library/permss/70B.html](http://www.cpol.army.mil/library/permss/70B.html)

885 Johnsen et al, pp. 131-32.
886 Johnsen et al, p. 133.
887 Interview with Johnsen (Feb. 2008).
himself, he thought it critical to develop a cadre willing and able to think strategically about the Army’s and military’s future challenges and how best to meet them. As a result, he hired scholars who quickly became renowned scholars in their fields, such as Stephen Biddle, Tami Davis Biddle, Antulio Echevarria II, Steven Metz, Williamson Murray, and Leonard Wong. Unfortunately for USAWC, however, this institution must continue to compete with the rest of academia and the military for the best civilian and military minds. As these civilian scholars’ works were so well received, by 2008 many of them had senior positions elsewhere.889

While intra-Army competition for superior military faculty primarily caused more civilian faculty to be hired, inter-service (with Navy, Air Force, etc.) competition for superior students largely drove the decision for USAWC to seek MSCHE accreditation.890 In 1996, USAWC was the only SSC not offering or pursuing an accredited master’s degree, and so Commandant Chilcoat decided to seek federal and regional accreditation.891 Chilcoat’s successor, Commandant Scales, strongly supported this accreditation as well, although he was also very concerned about the accreditation’s ability to counterbalance the increasing JPME requirements being placed on the SSCs.892 By having an accredited master’s degree, USAWC could prevent what Scales expected was an even further eroding of the historical and social science focus, which he thought was critical to developing strategic thinkers. Scales also delayed accreditation for the residence program until the distance education program could also be accredited in 2004,

890 Interview with Dean Johnsen (Feb. 2008).
891 Chilcoat, 2002.
since he thought the Army equally needed its senior officers learning by correspondence to be afforded this intellectual rigor.\textsuperscript{893}

As organizational theory would expect, leader priorities also had pivotal roles in the Advanced Strategic Arts Program (ASAP) and Professor, USAWC, beginning in 1999. Scales identified these as two of his five priorities as Commandant, with quality civilian intellectuals, strategic communications, and quality distance education being the other three. He created ASAP as a test case, hoping to eventually shift the entire War College curriculum towards educating historically-informed, interagency- and internationally-attuned national security professionals. While this drastically divergent program was well received and its graduates continue receiving prestigious assignments, due to internal USAWC and Army leadership constraints,\textsuperscript{894} by 2008 USAWC continued to teach only about fifteen students in ASAP per year. As such, I only classify it as a notable change.

Scales also initiated through the Chief of Staff of the Army the permanent professor, USAWC, to help attract and retain military officers with academic credentials. Even though USAWC had been permitted to stabilize up to twelve officers as faculty, few had doctorate degrees and not all even had master’s degree in the subjects they were teaching. This program also helped with accreditation,\textsuperscript{895} since almost half of its military faculty would have Ph.D.s once the program reached maturity. Again, due to the very

\textsuperscript{893} Since only five-to-eight per cent Army officers have the opportunity to attend the resident course, most of whom have succeeded in more traditional assignments, Maj. Gen. Scales—who has a Ph.D. in history—thought the Army would be failing to properly educate some of its better scholars by not also accrediting its distance education program. Interview with Maj. Gen.(Ret.) Scales (2008).

\textsuperscript{894} Scales reiterated how difficult major changes were to make, even as leader and when senior bosses are generally supportive of one’s endeavors. Interview with Maj. Gen.(Ret.) Scales (2008).

\textsuperscript{895} Interview with Weddle (2008).
small number of officers affected, I classify this as a notable change. It is important to note, however, that despite the muddy boots culture that de-prioritizes soldier-scholars, in its first year the College had twenty-four applicants for two slots, including those with stellar operational records.896

5.4.2.2 Why and How Changes at USAWC Occurred from 2002-07

The final—and only major—change at USAWC was the 2005 overhaul of the core curriculum, including two additional courses, fewer contact hours, and a reorientation of the Regional Strategic Appraisal (RSA) elective. While the 2005 NDAA (civilian legislation) supported these changes with broadly-defined requirements,897 the initiative and direction of this change was overwhelmingly the result of an internally-driven, strong consensus for change. The faculty began a zero-based review for the curriculum’s overhaul in Summer 2002, which was reinforced by internally-driven feedback surveys, the ATLDP, and RETAL studies.898 Tactical and operational experiential lessons learned played much less of a role in causing these changes, as USAWC is a strategically-focused College899; although, the post-Cold War strategic-level lessons and expected future needs were critical in building consensus among the faculty that major changes were required.900

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896 In an interview with Maj. Gen.(Ret.) Scales (2008), he said he was admonished by HRC for initiating the program without its prior support, while charging the College would not be able to attract quality officers. Scales mentioned that at least one applicant was a former battalion commander who had been selected twice “below-the-zone,” or the earliest opportunity possible.

897 The 2005 NDAA required—although this change was requested by them as well—all war colleges to be Joint Professional Military Education Level II certified, thus adding specific objectives and areas of emphasis to be taught. USAWC was JPME certified in 2007.


899 Point emphasized in interviews with Johnsen (Feb. 2008) and Weddle (2008).

900 Repeated in interviews with Johnsen (Feb. 2008) and Weddle (2008).
intent, USAWC leadership were able to more quickly overcome internal resistance to implement the changes they wanted.901

The addition of the first two core courses were driven by the leadership’s priorities of strengthening the students’ thinking skills, commonly referred to as “how to think versus what to think.”902 As the War College is the first graduate school for almost one-quarter of the attendees903 while few have recently been in an academic setting, Fundamentals of Strategic Thinking (re-)acquainted students with strategic level thinking and graduate level expectations. The Theory of War and Strategy course was added to more explicitly address the strategy of war at this War College,904 while both courses also helped fulfill civilian and JPME II accreditation requirements.905

The decision to decrease contact hours was also a leadership priority supported by Congressional intent. Faculty found that as students were required to attend more classes, they completed even less of their homework and the quality of the educational experience suffered. By lowering the required hours closer to civilian graduate programs, students would have more time to complete their homework and reflect on the material.

In addition to receiving support from MSCHE for this reduction, the College’s leadership

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901 Repeated in interviews with Johnsen (Feb. 2008) and Weddle (2008).
902 By at least 2006, this was a very common mantra within all Army institutions. While in Baghdad in summer 2006, Mstr. Sgt. John McFarlane astutely noted that this was a ridiculous comment. Officers entering the Army today already knew how to think, as they are the brightest officers the Army has ever had. Rather, he argued education provided additional methods and tools to help officers think in different ways.
903 On average, seventy-seven per cent of the students hold a graduate degree, although these degrees range widely in major, prestige of institution, and whether completed as a full- or part-time student. USAWC Curriculum Catalogue, 2006-07, p. 49.
904 Dean Johnsen (Feb. 2008) strongly emphasized this point.
905 CJCSI 1800.01C. The two most prevalent requirements include (JLA 7a) synthesize techniques for leading in a joint, interagency, and multinational environment; and (JLA 7b) synthesize leadership skills necessary to sustain innovative, agile, and ethical organizations in a joint, interagency, and multinational environment.
was able to ward off additional JPME requirements and other “good” ideas by emphasizing this change met Congressional intent for more time devoted to “thoughtful reflection and research.”

Finally, the RSA shift was caused by a very similar, internally-driven motivation as USMA’s 2006 increase in cultural and regional focus. Senior USAWC leaders wrote in 2005 that its faculty and students had to develop a much deeper cultural understanding of the places and their people where the military was deployed and might serve in the future. The leaders also acknowledged that the dramatic current and future fluctuations in the strategic environment were “a major impetus for [the 2005] curricular change.”

There was growing awareness throughout the College and Army that its officers had too little appreciation of the cultural dimension of policy/strategy formulation and outcome. Even though some within the College resisted the change, primarily for personal reasons, since everyone understood the need the College was able to voluntarily implement these three changes in 2005.

These three changes were internal USAWC initiatives, which the 2005 NDAA and civilian leadership helped support. In contrast, the final change in 2005—the increase of non-Army students and faculty—was caused by civilian legislation within the NDAA. Congress intended to even further increase student exposure to senior civilians,

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906 This is a priority of Congressmen Ike Skelton (D-Mo.); specific wording in interview with Dean Johnsen (Mar. 2008).
907 Johnsen et al, p. 51.
908 Johnsen et al, p. 49.
909 In an interview, Weddle (2008) stated that while most faculty agreed conceptually with the proposed changes, dissenters were primarily concerned with their ability to continue research, take vacations, focus on teaching, etc., since this would be different than how they had worked previously. These are very expected reactions within organizational theory.
910 Interview with Weddle (2008).
international students, and sister service (joint) officers. As a result, not only were relatively more small groups led by non-Army faculty, but each small group of typically twenty students had a much richer breadth of student perspectives. For instance, by 2006 in each group there were on average twelve Army officers (including one national guard and one reserve), two civilians, four sister service officers, and two international officers (see Table 5.5 for a sample class).\textsuperscript{911} Col.(Ret.) Kevin Weddle, former USAWC Assistant Dean for Academics, emphasized the fundamental impact of this (civilian-driven) change for the students’ and faculty’s War College education, despite the current lack of metrics to measure the impact of this change.\textsuperscript{912}

The 2005 changes were also supported by suggestions from the students. Unlike at USMA, USAWC students have significantly more experiences, confidence, and knowledge to recommend specifically needed changes. The USAWC requires its students to complete formal, detailed evaluations of the courses that enable bottom-up concerns and suggestions to be heard.\textsuperscript{913} Bottom-up recommendations are usually slow and difficult to implement; however, these have helped reinforce the need for change, especially after the Iraqi insurgency intensified in 2004. Repeated classes commented that their education did not resemble what they were being asked to do in the field, even considering the course focuses of strategic matters rather than most students’ tactical and operational experiences.\textsuperscript{914} In addition, for the first time in 2005 the USAWC asked the

\textsuperscript{911} USAWC Curriculum Catalogue, 2006-07, p. 38.

\textsuperscript{912} Interview with Weddle (2008).

\textsuperscript{913} USAWC Curriculum Catalogue, 2006-07, pp. 363-64. USMA requires its cadets to complete these too; however, when instructors want detailed feedback they usually ask for information outside of this system. This is due to the cadets’ general lack of effort filling these out, usually as their last requirement prior to departing for semester breaks.

\textsuperscript{914} When I asked Dean Johnsen (Feb. 2008) about this claim, he said students had been providing feedback that their previous experiences were incorporated too little within this course. He emphasized,
U.S. Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute, co-located at Carlisle Barracks, to help advise ways to more fully incorporate full spectrum operations.\textsuperscript{915} These additional inputs, along with extensive internal studies and the 2005 NDAA, resulted in major curriculum changes being implemented in 2005.\textsuperscript{916} These changes and their causes are summarized in Table 5.7.

Table 5.7 WHEN, WHY, AND HOW CHANGES OCCURRED, U.S. Army War College, 1991-2007 (Note: major changes in green; important change, blue; notable changes, white)

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however, that most students arrive after completing tactical and operational assignments, whereas USAWC is preparing its graduates for their future strategic-level positions. He said that lessons learned are a very important part of the course, especially with the course’s focus on discussions and learning from each other; however, he said the College constantly struggles to keep discussions and education on the strategic level despite students’ unfamiliarity with this level.

\textsuperscript{915} Interview with Dr. Bill Flavin, PKSOI (2007).

\textsuperscript{916} McCausland (“Annex C: USAWC Curriculum Development Process”), p. 368.
5.5 Why Haven’t There Been More Important Changes? What Can Be Done About This?

While this chapter has spent significant time discussing changes that occurred since the end of the Cold War, it is important not to conflate many initiatives with major changes. In these seventeen years of strategic upheaval and repeated Army interventions, USMA made only minor visible changes to its core curriculum; the USAWC, one major change in 2005. Admittedly there have been substantial changes within many of the individual courses, as every year the USAWC replaces approximately one-quarter of its readings, lesson objectives, and material discussed within the unchanging titled courses.\textsuperscript{917} Departments at USMA report a similar evolution.\textsuperscript{918} And yet, the academic foundations that these institutions’ graduates all receive—their core curriculums—have remained almost stagnant. Why has more not changed?

There are three structural reasons specific to USMA why more change has not occurred to the core curriculum. First, USMA is constrained from changing by its desire to remain accredited by the Accreditation Board for Engineering and Technology (ABET). Second, there is an unbalanced power distribution, by design, which favors the departments. Third, those officers serving at USMA with the most recent lessons have less institutional power and short tenures at the Academy. I explain these in turn.

First, prospective changes to the core curriculum will only be considered if they do not affect USMA’s ability to retain its engineering accreditations. Originally created as an Army engineering school, USMA now has seven engineering and computer science

\textsuperscript{917} Repeated in interviews with Dean Johnsen (Feb. 2008) and Weddle (2008); comparisons of the 2006, 2007, and 2008 lessons substantiated the claims. See also Johnsen et al, pp. 58-61, for specific changes within the core courses.

\textsuperscript{918} Specifically mentioned in interviews with senior members of the departments of EECS (Ressler and Reynolds), History (Betros and Cole), Law (Ryan), and Sosh (Jebb) (all 2008).
accredited programs. While there is no Army or academic requirement that USMA remain ABET accredited, the current Superintendent, Lt. Gen. F.L. Hagenbeck, articulated in Feb. 2008 that this accreditation remains an “absolutely essential” educational component, considering the large proportion of Army technical specialists who are USMA graduates. He also added that these accreditations provide an important recruiting advantage, due to the competitive nature of all universities to attract students interested in math and science degrees.

Second, USMA is designed for institutional power to reside with the departments rather than the central administration, despite the military’s hierarchical penchant and higher-ranking Dean and Superintendent. At USMA, permanent professors were only assigned as Academy-wide vice deans in the mid-1990s, whereas permanent professors within the departments have existed throughout the Academy’s existence. While the Academic Dean is senior in rank and position, the “short tenured weak king/long staying strong vassals” relationship even further enhances the need for consensus before making important institutional changes. Unlike in academia, the Superintendent and Dean can force change at USMA if a strong enough priority; however, department heads’ tenures can and often do last several magnitudes longer than the rotating Academy and Army leadership. Of the one hundred department heads serving since 1838, even if including the current eight of the thirteen department heads who have served fewer than

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919 In 1985, USMA was first accredited by the Accreditation Board for Engineering and Technology (ABET) in civil engineering, electrical engineering, mechanical engineering, and engineering management majors. In 1997, ABET also accredited Environmental Engineering and Systems Engineering majors and the Computer Science Accreditation Commission of the Computing Sciences Accreditation Board accredited the Computer Science major.


921 Point made in interview with Dr. Charles Reynolds, Professor of Computer Science, EECS (2008).
four years, the average department head has served almost twelve years. Of those serving over ten years, their average tenure is seventeen years (see Figure 5.3). These are not just historical examples, either, as two current department heads have each served seventeen and twenty-one years in their current position. While there are some real benefits with this degree of stability, departments—and their designated faculty comprising various committees—can delay most controversial or power-losing proposals.

Figure 5.3 Tenure of U.S. Military Academy Department Heads, from One-to-Thirty-Five Years, 1838-2008 (Note: N=100; Ave=12 years, with eight of thirteen current Department Heads having served fewer than four years)

Source: Nameplates on USMA department heads’ chairs, USMA Academic Board Room
The curriculum composition and administrative requirements add even more constraints to change. Since eleven of the thirteen departments teach at least one core course and resources (faculty and money) are allocated to departments based on credit hours taught, all changes are made in a zero-sum environment and can have drastic second- and third-order effects. In addition, the laborious process to create any new course, coupled with the current Dean’s guidance that there are already too many courses and majors, provides departments strong incentives to alter existing courses instead of undergoing bureaucratic hurdles to initiate new ones or attempt to change the core curriculum. As a result, leaders predominantly spend enormous time and personal capital to create consensus among those being affected before attempting to make an internally-driven change.

Finally, even though the majority of USMA’s professors have repeated deployment experiences, especially by 2007, these soldier scholars are at least two years removed from their experiences, with few deploying during their USMA assignment.

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922 Point made in an interview with Dr. Dean Dudley, economics professor (Sosh) and on the curriculum committee (Apr. 2008). Only Systems and Civil and Mechanical Engineering do not teach a core courses, although both departments teach popular engineering sequences.

923 For a department to initiate a new course, in addition to identifying a course it wants to delete (except by exception), it must 1) conduct an extensive internal review why existing courses are not meeting this need, along with creating a course with syllabus, goals by lesson blocks, and learning model (what and how it will be taught, assessment tools, feedback mechanisms, etc.); 2) receive department head approval; 3) submit a memorandum and supporting documents to the Curriculum Committee justifying the course’s need, academic value, and plan to implement and assess; 4) if the Curriculum Committee supports the course, it will forward the proposal to the General Committee who can support or reject its addition. Interview with Dudley (Apr. 2008).

924 Except by exception, since faculty are considered to be used at full capacity, Dean Finnegan expects departments to delete a course when adding a new one. The Dean also commissioned studies by the Curriculum Committee in 2007 to determine whether USMA was teaching too many majors and courses. Both studies concluded in the negative, although they reinforced the conclusion that faculty were being fully utilized. Interview with Dudley (Apr. 2008).

925 Except in rare cases when faculty earned their degree prior, rotating faculty spend two or three years at graduate school before serving as faculty. The main exception are officers teaching purer Army and military (not academic) topics within the Department of Military Instruction, who arrive straight from an operational assignment.
Consequently, this time delay somewhat lessens their intensity to make change, while also bringing to USMA more dated information. Junior faculty ideas, while often the most innovative and relevant to the new operating environment, also require bottom-up changes and have less institutional pull.926 Junior faculty also remain at USMA for only two or three years, making changes more difficult to see through to their completion. As a result, most innovative changes at USMA are within courses, where instructors and course directors can change material and discussions to more directly relate to lessons learned or a new strategic environment. While these adaptations are common, they are less likely to remain institutionalized or have a lasting impact. In addition, these intra-course changes are not easily captured by externally completed analyses, providing further support to the perceived stagnation. These structural constraints, in addition to its unofficial moratorium on additional curriculum changes from 1989-98 while recovering from the series of changes throughout the 1980s,927 retarded even potential curriculum adjustments for most of the post-Cold War period.

There are also two reasons unique to USAWC why only one major change occurred to the core curriculum: civilian accreditation and closer centralization to the headquarters of the Department of the Army. Evidence is mixed on the effects of seeking MSCHE accreditation and authority to award a master’s degree in 1996. Then Dean Col.(Ret.) Jeffrey McCausland wrote that from 1996 and 2002, while USAWC was pursuing civilian accreditation, “it made little sense to embark on any significant changes

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926 Unlike student at USAWC, Very few cadets have experiences outside of high school; consequently, cadets are not significant sources of substantive change, although their social and learning habits have greatly altered the pedagogical approaches used.

to the curriculum." In interviews with other senior leaders at USAWC at the time, however, their views on constraints that accreditation provided are on the opposite side of the spectrum. Assistant Dean for Academics Col. (Ret.) Kevin Weddle argued accreditation had no impact whatsoever on the curriculum, as the faculty thought they were simply receiving credit for what they already were doing. Dean Col. (Ret.) William Johnsen contended the College increased the academic rigor independent of the accreditation due to the changing strategic environment. Then Commandant Maj. Gen. (Ret.) Robert Scales explained that the accreditation helped freeze the gradually-diluting academic focus due to the increasing number and scope of JPME requirements. Regardless, USAWC waited until Fall 2002—when accreditation was almost complete—to create the Curriculum Transformation Group that recommended the changes implemented in 2005.

The second change, DA centralization, was in fact a stronger constraint on change than theoretically expected (rated medium-high, as opposed to USMA’s low-medium). The impact of this factor increased throughout the time period, largely due to the increased institutionalization of Goldwater Nichols, while there was also variance based on the Army Chief of Staff. Unlike the internal USMA bureaucracy retarding

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928 McCausland, pp. 368-70; also repeated in that volume’s chapter by Johnsen et al, p. 55.
929 Interview with Weddle (2008).
930 Interview with Johnsen (Feb. 2008).
931 Interview with Scales (2008).
932 McCausland, p. 368.
933 For instance, in an interview with Maj. Gen,(Ret.) Scales (2008), who served as Commandant from 1997-2000, he argued that CSA Dennis Reimer provided great support and flexibility, although he had wanted more guidance from DA and DoD. By 2008, Dean Johnsen said in an interview (Feb. 2008) that even if they wanted to change the proportion of core versus elective courses, there were so many JPME requirements within the core courses that he did not think they had flexibility to give more time to electives.
curriculum changes, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff—the entire military’s most senior officer—must approve all USAWC substantive changes that significantly affect the nature, mission, or objectives of an institution. Examples requiring this approval are adding major courses affecting the Joint or service Professional Military Education (JPME/PME) or substantially decreasing the time devoted to a major JPME/PME course or program. To make even limited changes, the director of the Joint Staff must approve requests in writing.

In addition, this centralization resulted in USAWC leadership spending significant time warding off “good” ideas (as opposed to mandates) from civilian leaders. As previously mentioned, USAWC initiated a “zero-based review” of its core curriculum in 2002 intending to overhaul its curriculum, which was also three years before the 2005 NDAA reinforced the need to implement the major changes. While time to create consensus on the type of changes delayed the process, the three year delay between initiating the review and changing the curriculum was exacerbated by at least six events: warding off suggestions from DoD to switch all USAWC students to distance learning (Jul. 02-Apr. 03); a GAO Report recommending the College switch to all distance learning (Mar.-Nov. 03); a Secretary of Defense “Snowflake” asking why USAWC should not co-locate with the mid-career Command and General Staff College at Ft. Leavenworth (Feb.-Aug. 03); multiple Chiefs of Staff of the Army (Sep. 03-Jan. 04); Defense Base Closure and Realignment (BRAC) decisions about Carlisle Barracks (Feb. 04-Apr. 05); and a Secretary of Defense “Snowflake” (Feb. 05) asking why DoD should

not curtail all Professional Military Education courses.\textsuperscript{936} The USAWC Commandant finally approved in concept a new curriculum in June 2004, and in October 2004 approved the curriculum that finally went into effect in August 2005.\textsuperscript{937} USAWC Dean Johnsen acknowledged that the NDAA helped provide important leverage for those still resistant to the proposed changes, primarily due to the effects it would have on them individually.\textsuperscript{938} Buttressed by broadly-stated legal requirements that Army leaders worked with Congressional members to accept,\textsuperscript{939} in 2005 the USAWC implemented its primarily self-developed changes to the core curriculum and regional studies programs.

A final reason that so few substantive changes have been made to either institution’s curricula is the decreasingly available Army-provided resources to make changes since the end of the Cold War. Fewer resources results in professors teaching more courses,\textsuperscript{940} thus decreasing research and time to either institutionalize lessons learned or better prepare students for future challenges. While the military is receiving additional hundreds of billions of dollars annually to prosecute wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the vast majority of this is going directly to war-related costs. The U.S.


\textsuperscript{937} Johnsen et al, p. 100.

\textsuperscript{938} In an interview (Feb. 2008), Dean Johnsen specifically discussed the importance of the OPMEP, which is the military’s operationalization of the NDAA, to overcome bureaucratic hurdles to make the changes that they wanted and had proposed after two years of work. In a subsequent interview (2008), then Assistant Dean for Academics Weddle stated that while most faculty agreed conceptually with the proposed changes, dissenters were primarily concerned with their ability to continue research, take vacations, focus on teaching, etc., since this would be different than how they had worked previously. These are very expected reactions within organizational theory, which expects individuals’ resistance to change.

\textsuperscript{939} Interview with Dean Johnsen (Feb. 2008). He stated that senior Army and military leaders worked closely with members of Congress on this issue, especially Congressman Skelton, to keep the requirements as broad as possible to allow variance among the service war colleges. He said that Congress took their suggestions very seriously, with the law providing a general framework within which they have flexibility to adjust.

\textsuperscript{940} This is USMA Dean’s reasoning for not adding additional courses without deleting one correspondingly. Interview with Dudley (Apr. 2008).
Army Training and Doctrine Command, responsible for the Army’s doctrine, training, education, and recruiting, annually receives only five per cent of all the Army’s budget, and are continuously asked to do more with fewer people and resources.\textsuperscript{941} For instance, in 2006 USMA was projected to have at least a $47 million deficit in large part due to Base Realignment and Closure decisions.\textsuperscript{942} Consequently, Army-supported projects and research are less likely to be supported, making internal-professor initiatives less probable.

It is important to place these criticisms in perspective, as both institutions have been willing to voluntarily make and support major changes to improve their academic rigor and educational experience throughout this time period. Since 2004, USAWC has become accredited, and USMA still maintains exceptional national ratings, being tied for third nationally in 2007 by the U.S. News and World Report for the best undergraduate engineering education programs at schools whose highest degree is a bachelor’s or master’s.\textsuperscript{943} The challenge, however, is to better understand why these changes were able to happen to encourage change even when combat lessons from Iraq and traumatic events like 9/11 have not occurred. What institutionally should be changed at USMA and USAWC to help make continued progress more likely?

There should be two major initiatives at USMA to make internally-driven changes more likely. First, USMA should be required to complete a zero-based review of its core curriculum; and second, it should limit permanent professors’ assignments, for instance

\textsuperscript{941} Interview with Lt. Gen. Thomas Metz (2007).
\textsuperscript{942} This is primarily due to the 2005 Base Realignment and Closures, which directed USMA to relocate its Preparatory School from Fort Monmouth, NJ, by 2011 without providing sufficient additional funds. Bruno, 2006.
\textsuperscript{943} U.S. News and World Report, America’s Best Colleges 2007.
to no more than ten years per position, allowing the most senior professors to move to USMA administrative positions. First, USMA should be required to complete a zero-based review of its core curriculum, as USAWC began in 2002, in coordination with designated external military and scholar representatives.\(^{944}\) USMA has a responsibility to graduate officers able to serve in operational and technical positions throughout the organization, and challenging cadets across disciplines—math, science, engineering, and humanities—can only help with their future responsibilities.\(^ {945}\) What is missing, however, is a deliberate analysis that these thirty required courses are the optimal solution for all cadets.\(^ {946}\) For instance, do all cadets need four semesters of math, two of physics, and two of chemistry if they intend to serve as a future soldier statesmen or strategist? Would the Army be less well served if some exchanged half these courses for more culture, history, economics, or regional studies? Would decreasing the number of required math and science courses really prompt many cadets to major in humanities instead of a technical major, since they would not be required to complete as many

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\(^{944}\) This idea was supported in concept by Col. Dan Ragsdale, USMA Vice Dean for Academics (2007). He suggested several Army Majors, finishing their USMA teaching assignments, could serve as the primary researchers to maximize institutional knowledge while minimizing organizational loyalties that might present obstacles to change.

\(^{945}\) Even as an USMA undergraduate engineering major myself, not until completing this research did I agree with the wisdom of requiring all cadets to have rigorous backgrounds in humanities and math, science, and engineering. Especially with decreasing numbers in the Reserve Officers’ Training Corps (ROTC), over which the Army has even less control of the civilian universities’ curriculum, the Army cannot afford to lose these technical experts within its ranks. While the majority of cadets may not choose to major in math, hard sciences, or engineering, the logic and methodological lessons from these courses cannot hurt the organization, especially given the nature of challenges that all Army officers face today and for the foreseeable future.

\(^{946}\) Idea from interview with Col.(Ret.) Don Snider, professor in the Sosh Department, when brainstorming ideas to be included within the SS490B Winning the Peace course that I course directed in Spring 2007 (2006).
courses for the technical major?\textsuperscript{947} At a minimum, the Academy should be required to explain what all graduates need, and then create the core requirements, rather than justifying why the current curriculum is appropriate.\textsuperscript{948} By incorporating external and internal reviewers, the Academy can remain sensitive to its traditions while still producing evidence whether this curriculum best serves the Army’s and country’s future needs.

Second, USMA permanent active duty military professors should be restricted to a maximum time allowed in one job, such as no more than ten years in any one position.\textsuperscript{949} Unlike most Army colonels who must retire after thirty years of active duty service, permanent USMA professors are permitted to serve until age sixty-four. It is not uncommon for officers in their late thirties and early forties to return to USMA for permanent positions, rarely serving outside of that department. Having a “term limit” would provide all department heads at least two opportunities to be selected as Dean, and would still permit them to serve in senior USMA administrative positions after completing ten years in this job. This would not limit the number of years the officer could spend in other positions, with department heads and their deputies typically

\textsuperscript{947} This is one of the more common arguments against either decreasing the entire core curriculum or returning to separate tracks for humanities versus math, science, and engineering majors. Interview with Dudley (Apr. 2008).

\textsuperscript{948} In 2008, USMA was undergoing a long-term evaluation to determine what its graduates needed, although the focus was across the three areas—academic, military, and athletic—as opposed to just focusing on the curriculum. While taking a holistic analysis is also critical, I argue that a much more rigorous analysis of just the academic portion needs to be completed.

\textsuperscript{949} Before implementing this, a serious statistical analysis should be conducted to determine the optimal number of years to which professors would be limited. Ten years is a reasonable number, considering the turnover of more senior USMA leadership, but this is not necessarily the best answer. Another option could be to only limit the department head’s tenure in this position, while still allowing subordinates within the departments remain longer. The primary intent is to provide younger officers the feasible opportunity to advance while potentially reassigning the most senior officers to Academy-wide interests, which would institutionally encourage innovation within the departments and Academy as a whole. This change would not impact USAWC’s professors, who are rarely assigned before their twenty-second year and do not have the exception to mandatory retirements that do Professors, USMA.
spending many years in more junior positions. While still providing continuity—including positions lasting two terms of the Academy’s most senior leaders\textsuperscript{950} and 2.5 terms of the Army’s Chief of Staff—this would allow departments to be continually led by those with newer academic ideas, more recent battlefield experiences, and less ingrained bureaucratic resilience. This would provide promotion opportunities for all permanently assigned professors, while also encouraging greater innovation within departments, as individuals could reasonably expect an opportunity to advance. This would also position the most senior officers at USMA to a centralized position, providing greater momentum and resources to make integrating, holistic changes across USMA. As a result, the entire Academy—rather than primarily within departments—would institutionally be more likely to learn and adapt.

At USAWC, the main institutional change that should occur is that at least one-fourth (n ≥ 8) active duty Army professors at USAWC should be recent brigade commanders. While these officers would not be available for an additional one or two years for other institutional assignments, serving as professors would be important symbolically and substantively to the USAWC and Army for several reasons. Symbolically, by assigning those officers most likely to make general officers as professors, this would provide tangible evidence that the Army valued thinking and learning among its most senior leaders. During the Interwar Period, this was common practice in the Army, for which many credit the Army’s World War II successes.\textsuperscript{951}

\textsuperscript{950} USMA’s Dean, who is usually a former department head promoted to a brigadier general, serves in this position for five years prior to mandatorily retiring. The Academy’s most senior officer, the Superintendent, has also traditionally served in his position for five years before mandatorily retiring.

Substantively, this would incorporate recent faculty leadership experiences within the classrooms and among the other professors, since currently the students provide most of the recent experiential lessons. The commander-professors should be encouraged to publish during their tenures, further promoting scholarship and critical thinking from the Army’s most senior leaders. This would also increase the value students place on their education and effort they exhibit throughout this year, which many use for rest and recovery from multiple deployments. While students should still enjoy their education, in an organization prioritizing professional reputations, having future general officers as professors cannot help but increase the quality and intensity of everyone’s learning.

In conclusion, the officer education system is one of the clearest cases of the organization changing despite itself. Civilians played important roles, although not as common as theoretically expected and often not in helpful or mandating ways. The Army primarily changed on its own, although the changes as the result of experiential lessons from the 1990s and new strategic environments (post-Cold War and post-9/11) took many years to become institutionalized. Given the long-term and direct impact of education on creating adaptive, thinking leaders able to meet challenges about which we do not even know, even more research on these institutions and their programs should be conducted. Simply realizing that changes outside of the core curriculum are much more


952 An easy and logical opportunity for this would be within the War College’s own quarterly journal, Parameters.

953 Interview with Weddle (2008). Professional military education has traditionally been viewed as a time to relax and spend with your family, advance personal interests, etc., which leaders did not have time in operational assignments. Col. Weddle noted that in the past few years students are becoming less intellectually engaged, which he credited to the overwhelming percentage of officers recently returning from multiple year-long combat deployments.
likely is important for theoretical and substantive reasons. Substantively, this can help focus research efforts where one thinks they are most needed, realizing that both areas are producing real change. Theoretically this is also important, though, since it helps one better understand that even entrenched organizational molds do not have to be broken before major institutional changes can and do occur, which fundamentally alter the experience for those attending.
CHAPTER 6:
CONCLUSION

6.1 Introduction

Are we inevitably fighting the last war? Armies are notoriously resistant to change, with few arguing the U.S. Army is any exception. Most scholars expect it will only progress on peripheral matters that increase its budget, resources, or autonomy from meddling civilians. Internal competition, group think, the desire to reduce uncertainty, and decisions by Standard Operating Procedures perpetuate its bureaucratic culture of stagnation. Without civilian intervention or catastrophic failure, most conclude voluntary change is very difficult and unlikely.954 While some have contested this premise, most analyses, regardless of their conclusions, focus on data from previous eras: the Interwar Period, Cold War, and Vietnam War being the most common.955 Much has changed since the end of the Cold War, including a markedly different strategic environment,

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955 Williamson Murray and Allan R. Millett (1996) focus on learning and innovation in the interwar period, with Stephen Peter Rosen (1991) also citing critical examples from this period; Kimberley Marten Zisk (1993) and Matthew Evangelista (1991) discuss innovation within the U.S.-USSR arms race; and John Nagl (2005) discusses U.S. innovation during Vietnam and British innovation during its Malaya counterinsurgency. Two scholars who have completed extensive research on this time frame are Dr. Janine Davidson (now Director, Consortium for Complex Operations, OSD-Policy) and Dr. Tammy Schultz (now at Center for a New American Security), both who have been tremendously helpful in advice and information.
recurrent U.S. Army interventions, decrease in military veterans in public office, and visible changes being made within the organization. These changes provide sufficient evidence and imperatives for theoretical and national security reasons to determine whether existing scholarly arguments remain consistent.

Why has the institutional Army changed since the end of the Cold War? There is evidence civilian leaders caused significant changes, which authors like Barry Posen (1984) and Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow (1999) expect. Since the end of the Cold War, however, evidence showed that the institutional Army changed primarily by its own initiative, due to the new strategic environment. Being able to break this organizational mold—often despite the bureaucracy—provides additional support for arguments of Stephen Peter Rosen (1991) and Williamson Murray and Allan R. Millett (1996) that the Army can and does change itself in important ways. While still observed in my cases, civilian directives, changing technology, budgetary decisions, experiential learning (“lessons learned”), and competition with other military services (Navy, Air Force, Marines) provided much less of a causal influence. This was in large part due to the sporadic civilian intervention during this time, which concentrated where civilians already had more knowledge. Even when directed to change, the Army was also

956 Our country’s efforts in interventions are clearly not just by the Army nor unilateral; however, I have only examined the Army’s efforts to provide a more in-depth analysis on this organization and the possibility of its change as the result of learning.


typically allowed—and proactively worked—to determine its own way to fulfill its civilians’ mandates, making civilian-only decisions rare.\footnote{The main exception to this is the Congressional mandate in the 1993 National Defense Authorization Act to increase the proportion of civilian professors at USMA from about five per cent to twenty, which had less support initially from the Army.} Contrary to scholars’ mantras that the Army is fighting the last war and the Army’s claim that it is a learning institution, however, evidence is less sanguine in the institutional organization’s willingness to incorporate all of it experiential lessons.

In this dissertation, I tested existing political science arguments on why the Army changes, focusing on four externally-imposed and three internally-driven reasons. The first external cause of change is due to civilian intervention from either the executive or legislative branches, as argued by scholars such as Barry Posen (1984) and Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow (1999). The second external source of change was new technology, as discussed by scholars such as Stephen Peter Rosen (1991) and Terry Pierce (2004),\footnote{Terry C. Pierce, \textit{Warfighting and Disruptive Technologies: Disguising Innovation} (Ny.: Frank Cass), 2004.} and the third external cause was budgetary reasons, which scholars like James Q. Wilson (1993) discussed. The final external reason for the Army to be required to change is due to input from defense industries, which those like Judith Reppy (2000)\footnote{Judith Reppy (ed), \textit{The Place of the Defense Industry in National Systems of Innovation}, Cornell University Peace Studies Program, Occasional Paper #25, Apr. 2000.} supported. The first internally-driven reason for change was due to experiential learning, argued by Army scholars such as Brig. Gen. David A. Fastabend and Col. Robert Simpson (2004)\footnote{David A. Fastabend (Brig. Gen.) and Robert Simpson (Col.), “Adapt or Die: The Imperative for a Culture of Innovation in the United States Army,” \textit{Army}, Vol. 54, Feb. 2004.} and Gen. David Petraeus.\footnote{Briefed to the Department of Social Sciences in Mar. 2006; this “Engine for Change,” which was endorsed by Gen. Petraeus while he served as the Combined Armed Center commander at Ft.} The second internal cause of
change was intra- or inter-service competition, as discussed by such authors as Posen (1984), Andrew Bacevich (1986), Wilson (1993), and Owen Cote (2003). The final voluntary reason for change was a new strategic environment, which scholars like Jack Levy (1994), Williamson Murray and Allan Millett (1996), and Williamson Murray (2001) argued.

I also analyzed how the Army changed, applying concepts from the organizational theory and political science literatures. First, scholars like Michael Beer (2004) highlight the importance of the top leader and management team to proactively lead the change. Second, scholars like Barry Watts and Williamson Murray (1996) emphasized the defining role consensus on the need for and direction of change, despite the Army being a mechanistic, hierarchical organization.

While there are many ways to analyze why the Army changes, in this paper I tested my arguments by examining the U.S. Army’s officer personnel system, officer educational system, and its main training installations from 1991-2007. Specifically, I analyzed the Officer Personnel Management Systems (OPMS); the U.S. Military

Leavenworth, Ks., remained with the organization after his departure to lead the U.S.-led military coalition efforts in Iraq.


967 Levy was primarily concerned with learning and foreign policy, although most of his typologies and arguments were interchangeable with organizational learning, which he considered a simpler process to analyze (p. 289). Jack S. Levy, “Learning and Foreign Policy: Sweeping a Conceptual Minefield,” International Organization, Vol. 48, No. 2, Spring 1994, pp. 279-312.


Academy (USMA) at West Point, Ny., and the U.S. Army War College (USAWC) at Carlisle Barracks, Pa.; and the National Training Center (NTC) at Fort Irwin, Ca., the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) at Fort Polk, La., and the Joint Multinational Readiness Center (JMRC, formerly the Combined Maneuver Training Center, or CMTC) at Hohenfels, Germany. As a result, my analysis did not focus on combat tactics, strategies within and between interventions, or even all institutional changes (such as doctrine, organizational structure, materiel, or facilities). Since I am doing longitudinal case studies just of the U.S. Army, I examined two of the organization’s unique cultural attributes and their effects on change. First, I hypothesized that the Army would not voluntarily change in a way that undermined its “muddy boots,” high intensity warfare culture. Second, I hypothesized that the Army would not voluntarily change in a way that eroded the relative power of the organization’s elite, primarily those within the infantry and armor branches.

These cases are important for methodological and substantive reasons. Methodologically, by selecting three institutional processes over which the Army has the most influence and conducting longitudinal case studies over sixteen years for each, I can better control for external influences and help explain not only change but the lack thereof. Substantively, scholars such as Rosen (1991) and Murray and Millett (1996) have recognized these areas as important catalysts for long term change in how officers think and act, since they define and reinforce the institutional incentives for success.

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Since U.S. Public Law No. 99-433, “Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986,” the institutional Army’s mission is to prepare people, their training, and equipment for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and his subordinate combatant commanders to employ worldwide. While the Army at first resisted these multi-service, or joint, requirements, increasingly joint deployments are becoming the norm. Consequently, Army-pure causal arguments for these topics would be less accurate, while analyzing changes among interventions should include distinctions of political strategies or goals. As a result, I focus on neither.
These cases are also much less studied, as most scholars who do analyze questions during the time period focus on the Revolution in Military Affairs, changes in doctrine, the impact of culture on change, or the transformation of the organization’s structure and equipment.

The question of why the institutional Army has changed in our contemporary environment also has theoretical and policy implications. Theoretically, if the Army can change itself substantially, either due to a change in strategic environment or as a result of learning, this would challenge most current arguments in political science and organizational theory. While I do not contest other scholars’ arguments for the time period they covered, today’s new strategic environment, all volunteer force, operational experiences, and additional resources make a compelling case to reexamine the theories.

There is also policy significance to why the Army changes. With fluid, complex challenges and fewer civilian leaders having knowledge of or experience with the Army, there is an opportunity and need for the Army not to wait on external demands to change.\textsuperscript{972} If one can empirically determine the areas in which the Army can and cannot break its organizational mold, one can help military leaders more efficiently and effectively develop methods and incentives that create consensus in areas of feasible change. Simultaneously, one can help better inform civilian leaders of the areas in which they must intervene if they are not satisfied with the status quo.\textsuperscript{973} In an era with many competing demands of national strategic importance, by better discerning these areas, I

\textsuperscript{972} Michael Desch (1999) discusses this situation in detail, highlighting the civilian-military tensions that result in part from fewer veterans in political office. I focus on these constraints as part of the change-resistant institutional structure rather than the cause of a certain type of relationship. See especially pp. 30-31, Michael C. Desch, \textit{Civilian Control of the Military: The Changing Security Environment} (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press), 1999.

\textsuperscript{973} Suggestion made in an interview with Michael McNerney, OSD-Policy (2007).
The remainder of this chapter is organized in three sections. Section 6.2 summarizes my theoretical structure, including the primary hypotheses about why the Army changes and expectations for my three case studies. Section 6.3 discusses the primary findings, focusing my analysis on unexpected conclusions and important findings across the cases. In the final section, I discuss the implications of what this evidence means for the Army’s ability to change itself only in some areas. I conclude with suggestions for the Army to better institutionalize many of its hard-learned lessons across the organization even while actively engaged throughout the world.

6.2 Theoretical Expectations and Cases

To help determine why the institutional Army has changed since the end of the Cold War, I primarily analyzed seven causes of change. Four causes are external stimuli: civilian knowledge, technological improvements, budgetary impacts, and defense industry persuasion. With my case studies focusing much less on equipment and materiel factors, I expected the primary external influence to come from civilian intervention. Three additional causes come from internal stimuli: the proximity in time and intensity of that institution to battlefield experiences, the role of intra-service (i.e. infantry, armor, engineers, etc.) or inter-service (Navy, Air Force, Marines) competition, and the time and effort devoted to reflecting on and analyzing the future strategic environment. I expected change to vary directly with each of these variables, i.e. the greater knowledge civilians have with respect to an institutional area, the more likely they are to cause change within that sub-institution.
Despite being a hierarchical organization, achieving consensus is critical for the Army to change itself, as emphasized by Millet (1996) and Watts and Murray (1996). In addition to the three internal causes of change, I also include two additional internal constraints on voluntary change to disaggregate the need for and type of change: how centralized is the decision making process within the Army, and how many people throughout the Army have a strongly vested interest, what I call stakeholders, in the institution changing that process. I expect both variables to vary inversely to the probability of the Army changing itself. If the Army can create consensus on the need for and type of change within these constraints, I expect the Army will be more likely to change itself. Without consensus in the need for and type of change, however, I expect either a more decentralized change (i.e. change in an academic department instead of the entire college) or a weaker centralized change to occur, thus making the impact much weaker on the institution. Due to the cases I am researching, my corresponding primary hypotheses are listed in Figure 6.1.

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974 Allan R. Millett and Barry Watts and Williamson Murray include this concept within their variable of “military organizational politics.” While their focus is broader, analyzing bureaucratic tactics supporting or inhibiting innovation (to include inter-service rivalries), they argue that there is an “unavoidable necessity of bureaucratic acceptance to successful peacetime innovation.” (409). Allan R. Millet, “Patterns of Military Innovation,” especially pp. 349-59; and Barry Watts and Williamson Murray, “Military Innovation in Peacetime,” pp. 369-415; both in Murray and Millet (1996).
Why
H1. The greater the civilian knowledge of the subject, the more likely they are to cause change.
H2. The closer in time and intensity an institution is to battlefield experiences, the more likely the Army is to change itself due to lessons.
H3. The more time leaders in an institution have to reflect on the future, the more likely the Army is to change itself when a new strategic environment is anticipated.
H4. The Army will not voluntarily implement major changes that undermine its “muddy boots” culture.
H5. The Army will not voluntarily implement changes that decrease the relative power of its organizational elite (i.e. infantry and armor).

How
H6. The Army’s senior leader (or the system’s leader, in a decentralized system) must prioritize a major change for the Army to change itself.
H7. The greater centralized (nearer the Department of Army) the decision making process for that institution, the less likely the Army is to change itself.
H8. The greater the number of Army stakeholders for that institution, the less likely the Army is to change itself.
H9. The greater the recognized need for change but not agreed direction of change, the more likely even more decentralized changes or weaker centralized changes (thus less important institutionally) will occur.

Figure 6.1 Primary Research Hypotheses, Why and How the Army Changes

I also expected that there would be four important cultural and bureaucratic constraints on the U.S. Army’s ability to voluntarily complete certain types of changes. These included two constraints on what type of changes were possible and two on how changes were implemented. First, internally-driven changes could not counter the organization’s fundamental warrior cultural attributes. Second and closely related, the proposed changes could not undermine the organizational elite—the maneuver branches (primarily infantry and armor)—or its relative power within the organization. Third, despite its hierarchical structure, an overwhelming proportion of senior officers had to reach consensus on the need for change and be socialized to the potential modification.
Finally, since organizational change is extremely difficult even when all agree it is needed, the Army’s senior officer, the Chief of Staff of the Army (CSA, or the senior leader in a more decentralized system), had to prioritize this change very early in his tenure (most likely in the first year). The senior leader also had to remain personally involved throughout the process to make the change happen, as his involvement was necessary but not sufficient for change to occur from within. While theoretically possible for him to minimize the effects of the first two constraints, I did not expect to find empirical evidence to support this claim. If all four of these constraints were met, I expected internal changes could and would occur, despite the pessimism that most political science scholars have. However, as the result of these constraints, I expected there would be categories of changes that were effectively too difficult for the Army to change itself without an external stimulus requiring change.

In my analysis, I primarily focused on why major and important changes occurred. I defined a major change as something that altered the institution so that those participating before and after this change would have had fundamentally different experiences, perspectives, and/or skills and attributes. I also included what I classified as important changes in my analysis, which had a considerable effect on those in the institution but do not meet the threshold of a major change. Finally, I also described some of the theoretically significant, but evolutionary changes, which I classified as notable. Evolutionary changes still cause real change, as William Grimsley (2001)975 highlighted; however, my primary emphasis was to discern why the more dramatic changes occurred and did not occur during this time period.

To test this argument, I examined the causes of change in the Army’s officer personnel, educational, and training institutions since the end of the Cold War. Of the Army’s seven main institutions (the others being doctrine, organizational structure, materiel, and facilities), these three systems should have been relatively the easiest cases for the Army to change itself. The Army fiercely protects its ability to grow and develop its own leaders throughout their careers (except in specialty branches, such as medical, legal, and religion). Civilians have much less knowledge within these areas than the other systems, in part due to the inaccessibility of information and in part due to their less immediate impact on national military strategy and decision making. There are variances among the cases, though, which provided the opportunity to expect change at different frequencies and magnitudes. For instance, I expected more civilian-driven changes in the educational institutions, considering their better understanding of these systems. I also expected greater internal bureaucratic resistant to change in the personnel system, since it is very centralized and has a high degree of Army-wide stakeholders. My causal factors and their expected probability of causing change by case study are summarized in Table 6.1.
Table 6.1 Causal Factors and their Expected Probability of Causing Change in the Institutional Army

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Causal Factor</th>
<th>External Factors (Directly related)</th>
<th>Internal Factors (Directly related)</th>
<th>Internal – Consensus Req’d (Inversely related)</th>
<th>Expected Sources and Types of Change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Army System</td>
<td>Civilian Knowledge</td>
<td>Technology Impact</td>
<td>Budget Impact</td>
<td>Defense Industry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Officer Personnel Management</td>
<td>Med</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Low-Med</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Army: proactive; incremental until high consensus on type of change; Civilian: periodic
Army: proactive; periodic, more decentralized, some inter-service; Civilian: periodic, important
Civilian: periodic, important; Army: reactive and proactive; incremental, more centralized, some inter-service
Army: reactive; incremental until moderate consensus on type of change; Technological advances and budgetary shifts will affect change
6.3 The Findings

Despite the tumultuous time period, there were relatively few major changes to the officer personnel, officer education, and institutional training from 1991-2007. Civilians intervened in significant ways primarily in the educational institutions, with modest impacts from new technology and budgetary changes across the cases. Intra- and inter-service competition played only a minor role in change, and the vast majority of experiential lessons learned caused change only after 2003. The most consistent cause of change was Army-led changes as the result or anticipation of a new strategic environment, which was usually paired with one or more other influences. These findings, summarized in Table 6.2, lend much greater support to scholars like Samuel Huntington (1957), Rosen (1991), and Murray and Millet (1996), while providing additional evidence against arguments made by Posen (1984) and Allison and Zelikow (1999).
Table 6.2: When and Why Important Changes Occurred in the Institutional U.S. Army, 1991-2007 (major changes in green; all others, important changes)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Proportional Influence within each System</th>
<th>Personnel</th>
<th>Training</th>
<th>Education: USMA</th>
<th>Education: USAWC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>External (Why)</strong></td>
<td>Low-Med</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Low</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Technology</strong></td>
<td>Low-Med</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Med-High</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Budget</strong></td>
<td>Med</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Med</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Industry</strong></td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Low</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Internal (Why)</strong></td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>High</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Experiential Learning</strong></td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Low</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Inter-service Competition</strong></td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Low</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Strategic Environment</strong></td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Med-High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Leader Priority</strong></td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In this section, I discuss the six most important and cross-cutting findings. First, civilians are not fixing the military, even when problems arise. Second, despite its hierarchical structure, leadership priority and consensus were both critical in the Army making voluntary changes. Third, despite the oft-repeated claim by Posen (1984) and Allison and Zelikow (1999), there was overwhelming evidence that the Army changed itself without first failing. Fourth, evidence was less supportive of the institutional Army’s willingness to incorporate experiential lessons that countered its culture. Fifth, major changes often occurred outside of bureaucratic constraints, in part because these changes to the formal systems were so difficult to make. Finally, there were real limits to the changes the Army could voluntarily make.

The first finding from my analysis was that despite the dominant argument in the literature, at least during this time period civilians were not saving the military, even when problems arose. There were minimal civilian-imposed requirements throughout this time period, especially by Congress,976 despite the massive changes in strategic environment in 1991 and 2001 and difficulties in Iraq by 2004. While the executive and legislature did not ignore the Army, their efforts primarily focused on matters with which they readily had knowledge or had more immediate impact: societal matters (i.e. homosexuals in the military), sexual harassment cases, integrating technology for precision warfare, base realignments, and care for wounded warriors. Congress did require the Army to downsize its personnel by one-third977 after the fall of the Soviet Union and successful 1991 Gulf War; however, neither Congress nor the Office of the


977 Between 1991-96, the Army reduced its active forces from 710,000 to 491,000, with its entire forces decreasing from two million to approximately 1.4 million.
Secretary of Defense (OSD) required the Army to also change its personnel policies. As a result, the organization labored with its increasingly strained 1985 personnel management system until 1997.

Most civilian-required changes came in broad guidance only, with the affected institution proactively creating specific programs to meet the civilian intent. For instance, the 2005 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) required all war colleges to be Joint Professional Military Education Level II certified, thus adding specific objectives and areas of emphasis to be taught, and it also limited the proportion of U.S. Army students attending to sixty per cent. Three years before this NDAA, however, the USAWC had initiated its own “zero-based review” of its core curriculum to better prepare its students for the strategic challenges they would be facing.978 The USAWC Dean, Dr. Bill Johnsen, acknowledge that the NDAA helped provide important leverage for those within the organization who were resistant to the type of change, primarily due to the effects it would have on them individually.979 Buttressed by broadly-stated legal requirements that Army leaders worked with Congressional members to accept,980 in

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978 While time to create consensus on the type of changes delayed the process, the three year delay between initiating the review and changing the curriculum was exacerbated by the administration warding off suggestions from OSD and the Government Accountability Office. USAWC, “2008 Commandant Curriculum Brief,” Jan. 26, 2008.

979 In a Feb. 2008 interview with USAWC Dean Dr. William Johnsen, he discussed the importance of the Officer Professional Military Education Policy (OPMEP), which is the military’s execution plan for the NDAA, to overcome bureaucratic hurdles to make the changes they wanted and had proposed after two years of work. When asked for additional clarification, at the time Assistant Dean for Academics, Col. (Ret.) Kevin Weddle (2008) stated that while almost all professors agreed in concept with the needed changes, most dissenters were concerned with their ability to continue research, take vacations, focus on teaching, etc., as the changes would significantly alter everyone’s schedule. These are very expected reactions within organizational theory, which expects individuals’ resistance to change.

980 Interview with USAWC Dean Johnsen (Feb. 2008). He stated that senior Army and military leaders worked closely with members of Congress on this issue, especially Congressman Ike Skelton (D-Mo.), to create requirements broad enough to allow variance among the service war colleges. He said Congress took their suggestions very seriously, with the law providing a general framework within which they are given flexibility to adjust.
2005 the USAWC implemented primarily its self-developed changes to the core curriculum and regional studies programs.\textsuperscript{981}

The primary exception to this combined-effort educational change was Congress’ requirement from the 1993 NDAA\textsuperscript{982} that USMA would increase its approximately five per cent civilian faculty to approximately twenty-five per cent over ten years.\textsuperscript{983} There is little evidence that USMA actively worked to create this requirement, although the Army had some institutional reasons to support this change, due to the massive personnel downsizing but fewer cuts in required assignments to fill during this period.\textsuperscript{984} The other changes at USMA and USAWC, however, were either internally-driven or more frequently simultaneous top-down and bottom-up driven changes. For changes at USMA, civilian leadership provided the vision for change while allowing USMA to create its own plan to make changes it wanted. For instance in 2000, the Secretary of the Army (and 1978 USMA graduate) Louis Caldera told USMA that it needed to focus less on engineering and more on culture, political science, and other humanities topics to

\textsuperscript{981} The major changes included adding two methodological and substantive courses within its core curriculum, fewer “contact hours” per week (from 21-24 to only 15), greater emphasis on providing tools how to think, and adjusting its regional studies from a U.S.-centered national security analysis to one much more attuned to cultural, political, and economic factors within that region. USAWC, “2008 Commandant Curriculum Brief,” Jan. 26, 2008.

\textsuperscript{982} National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1993, 102\textsuperscript{nd} Congress, Public Law No. 102-484, Sec. 523.

\textsuperscript{983} USMA began hiring civilian faculty in large numbers in 1993. In 1997, as the result of budgetary constraints, the Academy leadership decided to halt the transition at approximately twenty-one per cent, and the proportion of civilian faculty remains at that level today. U.S. Military Academy, \textit{Interim Report of the Middle States Accreditation Self-Study Steering Committee}, Vol. VII “Report of the Faculty Working Group” (West Point, Ny.), Nov. 1998, p. 7.

\textsuperscript{984} USMA has about six hundred faculty, so adjusting the civilian faculty from eight-to-nine per cent to its eventual twenty-one per cent would allow the Army to assign approximately seventy-five highly-successful officers to other billets.
prepare the Army’s future leaders for twenty-first century challenges.\textsuperscript{985} To meet this intent while balancing accreditation constraints for the math, science, and engineering students,\textsuperscript{986} USMA decreased its mandatory engineering sequence from five to three courses, providing cadets more opportunity to focus on their own interests. It also seized this opportunity of change to voluntarily add a second required semester of information technology to the core curriculum,\textsuperscript{987} which was extremely rare throughout academia at the time.\textsuperscript{988} There was general agreement throughout the Academy that this subject deserved more attention due to the changing strategic environment,\textsuperscript{989} and both changes went into effect in 2001.

This lack of civilian action—despite the more frequent displays of interest—since the end of the Cold War was even less than I expected, given their relatively high understanding of the Army’s educational and, more generally, human resource systems. Admittedly some of this is based on my case selection, as there is overwhelming evidence of Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld’s intervention with respect to

\textsuperscript{985} Interview with Col. Eugene Ressler, Department Head of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science (EECS, 2008), USMA classmate of Sec. Caldera and who was at the time also on the curriculum committee.

\textsuperscript{986} In 1985, USMA was first accredited by the Accreditation Board for Engineering and Technology (ABET) in civil engineering, electrical engineering, mechanical engineering, and engineering management majors. In 1997, ABET also accredited Environmental Engineering and Systems Engineering majors and the Computer Science Accreditation Commission of the Computing Sciences Accreditation Board accredited the Computer Science major. While there is no Army or academic requirement that USMA remain ABET accredited, this remains an “absolutely essential” (USMA Superintendent Lt. Gen. F.L. Hagenbeck, address to USMA staff and faculty, Feb. 28, 2008) educational component, given the large proportion of Army technical specialists who are USMA graduates, and a recruiting advantage, given the competitive nature of all universities to attract students interested in math and science degrees.

\textsuperscript{987} Interview with Col. Ressler, Department Head of EECS (2008), who was at the time also on the curriculum committee.

\textsuperscript{988} Interview with Dr. Charles Reynolds, professor of Information Technology in EECS (2008).

\textsuperscript{989} Interestingly, after USMA decided to include this course, the departments that made initial recommendations to teach it were History, Systems Engineering, and Civil and Mechanical Engineering. After reviewing the proposals, the Dean at the time, Brig. Gen. Daniel Kaufman, told EECS they would design and teach the course, which EECS accepted despite not wanting to teach a second core course to all cadets. Interview with Col. Ressler, Department Head of EECS (2008).
materiel and organizational structure during his tenure. With respect to these three areas, however, there is less hope that calls for Congressional action to help fix personnel policies from officers like Paul Yingling (2007) will be actively acted upon without greater information and pressure.

My second finding was that both the Army’s senior leadership and consensus among that system’s stakeholders were critical for the Army to voluntarily change itself. While military mavericks secretly carrying out their civilian masters’ wishes may have some intuitive appeal, I found no evidence supporting this concept within my cases. In line with scholarly arguments, repeated interviews with general officers, and officers working to change Army institutional processes, the evidence reinforced the overwhelming need for consensus for the Army to change itself. The Chief of Staff of the Army (CSA) and other senior leaders of the Army’s institutional processes are named to their positions only after several decades of leadership among their peers. Even when an issue was one of the CSA’s top priorities, he spent enormous time and personal capital to build consensus throughout the span of stakeholders needed for the change.

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991 Paul Yingling, “A failure in generalship,” Armed Forces Journal, May 2007. In a Feb. 8, 2008 meeting with Lt. Cols. Yingling and John Nagl with senior scholars and practitioners interested in change in the armed forces, two senior attendees strongly argued against the likelihood of Congressional action for which both officers called. One attendee stated that if the military, with its discipline and can-do spirit, cannot fix itself, there is no chance that a disorganized, self-serving Congress can.

992 Rosen (1991) and Ricky Waddell (1993) argue mavericks are less useful in creating institutional change, while Deborah Avant (1993: 414) includes this logic to distinguish among mavericks and more effective internal military sources of change.

993 Mentioned in interviews with Lt. Gen. F.L. Hagenbeck (2007) and Col. Toby Green (2008). Also, Gen.(Ret.) Montgomery Meigs (2007) discussed the difficulty of any individuals, including the CSA, to change the organization; Lt. Gen.(Ret.) Theodore Stroup (2007) argued that senior leaders need to have a unanimous vision, otherwise they would not make a difference.
Designating or encouraging “change agents” helped expedite this process, although the Army also consistently used in-depth studies and deliberation among all major stakeholders before attempting change of any magnitude during this time period.

In addition to not being easy to attain, consensus must also be created on the need for and type of change. Evidence supported my hypotheses that consensus on the need for change helped increase its likelihood; however, consensus on the type of change was critical for the magnitude, direction, and rate of the change. As an example, by 1997 there was overwhelming support among officers that their personnel management system was becoming dysfunctional. To create an opportunity for technical specialists to advance to the rank of colonel while providing combat specialists (i.e. infantry, armor, artillery) more time in their critical jobs, the combat specialties agreed to decrease their proportion of colonel authorizations and the technicians agreed not to compete for the operational jobs. The combat specialists did not agree to give up their control of the most senior leadership positions, however, so this change did not fundamentally alter those leading the organization.

By 2005 there was large consensus across the organization of the need for significant change, with all cases making substantial changes between 2005-06 (see Table


995 In addition to the CSA designating a permanent task force to oversee the 2006 OPMS changes, they also adopted the existing and extensive stakeholder processes to socialize proposed changes and receive feedback from senior leaders throughout the Army. This included fifty-five voting colonels in the Council of Colonels (CoC), fifty-six voting one- and two-star generals (and civilian equivalents), and thirty-four voting three-star generals (and civilian equivalents) in the General Officer Steering Committees (GOSC) from throughout the institutional Army. Each GOSC meets annually in alternate six months to review CoC input and identify new initiatives. Ideas are then presented bi-annually to the Army G-1, Vice CSA, and CSA in separate updates.

996 As just one example, by the mid-1990s there were 3,400 more field grade officer jobs than officers.
6.2). The Combat Training Centers (CTCs), USAWC, and USMA were all able to make major changes. USMA’s change, which added significant language and cultural immersion opportunities, also avoided the bureaucratic stranglehold on the curriculum (more about this later). While most agreed that the officer personnel system needed to be changed, there was not consensus on the type or magnitude of changes needed. As a result, the 2006 officer personnel changes were still visionary adjustments by early 2008. Table 6.3 summarizes these changes, using the years 1991 (end of Cold War), 1997, 2002 (post-9/11), and 2005 (post Iraq 2003) as data points during my analysis.
Table 6.3 ARMY CONSENSUS ON THE NEED FOR AND TYPE OF CHANGE AND THE U.S. ARMY-LED CHANGES, in Years 1991, 1997, 2002, and 2005 (Note: major changes are in bold)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Army System</th>
<th>Previous Important Change</th>
<th>Need 1991</th>
<th>Type 1991</th>
<th>Need 1997</th>
<th>Type 1997</th>
<th>Need 2002</th>
<th>Type 2002</th>
<th>Need 2005</th>
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<td>Combat Training Centers</td>
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<td>Low</td>
<td>Low-Med</td>
<td>Low-Med</td>
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<td>Change</td>
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<td>1993 JMTC, 1995 JRTC, limited Stability Operations</td>
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The third primary finding from my analysis was that despite the oft-repeated claim originally by Posen (1984)\textsuperscript{997} and Allison and Zelikow (1999),\textsuperscript{998} there is overwhelming evidence that the Army changed itself before suffering national defeat. While events in Iraq led some senior U.S. political leaders in 2007 to proclaim mission failure,\textsuperscript{999} even at the time few military leaders considered the military to be defeated in Iraq.\textsuperscript{1000} As expected from works like the 2004 Army article “Adapt or Die”\textsuperscript{1001} and organizational theorist Chris Argyris (1999), the fear of failure rather than the actuality of defeat was sufficient for the Army to voluntarily and rapidly make substantial changes. All three cases had at least important changes implemented between 2005-06, with both educational institutions and the CTCs having major changes during this time period. The lessons learned in Iraq, coupled with lessons throughout the 1990s interventions, helped rapidly create consensus throughout the Army that change was needed despite the bureaucratic, cultural, and psychological\textsuperscript{1002} impediments to change. Civilian intervention, budgetary changes, and new technology impacted the rate, direction, and

\textsuperscript{997} Posen, p. 57, argues that change can come when “Soldiers fail; civilians get angry and scared; pressure is put on the military.” Later, he argues that civilians will intervene after disasters or when fearing defeat, (pp. 76-79) and the military can innovate when it “registers a large failure.” (p. 224)

\textsuperscript{998} Allison and Zelikow, p. 172, argue that “Dramatic change occurs usually in response to major disasters.” While still expecting civilians to require the organization to change as a result, they also expect military leaders responsible for the disaster to be replaced with those committed to change.

\textsuperscript{999} Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid specifically charged in Apr. 2007 that the Iraq War was lost and the surge had failed, urging Congress to require the President to establish timetables to end the military’s efforts in Iraq. Haraz N. Ghanbari, “Reid: Iraq War lost, U.S. can’t win,” MSNBC.com, Apr. 20, 2007.

\textsuperscript{1000} In discussions, briefs, and meetings with four-star generals to junior lieutenants, from Iraq to academia, throughout these five years I cannot remember an active duty officer arguing that our military in Iraq was even nearing defeat. Many were frustrated with our military strategy, especially while most soldiers lived on the large bases through the end of 2006.

\textsuperscript{1001} Fastabend and Simpson, 2004.

magnitude of these changes; however, there was strong support and leadership within the Army to overcome its bureaucratic and cultural constraints and change itself in significant ways.

The training installations were most dramatically affected by the experiences in Iraq, beginning in 2003, with the integration of counterinsurgency and stability operations lessons learned. By 2006 the CTCs were integrating almost in real-time the lessons from Iraq and Afghanistan through bi-weekly video teleconferences,\textsuperscript{1003} while the CTC officers were able to pre-visit the area to which the training unit would deploy to keep the training current.\textsuperscript{1004} The CTCs have also benefited significantly from the almost $800 billion Iraq and Afghanistan Supplementals (as of fiscal year 2008),\textsuperscript{1005} including the multi-billion dollar efforts to help defeat the improvised explosive devices (IED) that kill the majority of soldiers in Iraq.\textsuperscript{1006} The Army’s premier training center at Ft. Irwin, Ca., has an annual budget nearer $612 million, with almost half of that devoted just to the actual exercises.\textsuperscript{1007} As a result, these additional resources have expedited the

\textsuperscript{1003} I attended one of the meetings on Jun. 19, 2006, in Baghdad while serving as a liaison to the Multi-National Corps-Iraq for the Center for Army Lessons Learned.

\textsuperscript{1004} Interview with Col. Green, who served as the senior observer controller (O/C) at the Joint Multinational Readiness Center in between deployments to Iraq in 2003 and 2007-08 (2008). He thought O/Cs from Europe (like himself) were able to visit Iraq and Afghanistan more frequently due to proximity, but he was aware that the other installations had similar practices.

\textsuperscript{1005} From the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation website, as of Feb. 20, 2008. \url{http://www.armscontrolcenter.org/policy/securityspending/articles/supplemental_war_funding/}

\textsuperscript{1006} This includes the efforts of the Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization (JIEDDO), which was originally requested by then Central Command (CENTCOM) Commander Gen. John Abizaid in Oct. 2003 to address the growing IED problem. By Oct. 2007 the organization had grown to over 400 specialists and been appropriated $8.023 billion, with Gen. (Ret.) Montgomery Meigs (its first director) able to authorize projects less than $25 million. U.S. DoD Directive 2000.19E, “Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization,” Feb. 14, 2006, p. 3; JIEDDO 2006 Annual Report, p. 6; JIEDDO 2007 Annual Report, pp. 17-18; For more information, see \url{https://www.jieddo.dod.mil/}.

\textsuperscript{1007} In 2001, Ft Irwin had an annual operating budget of $84.6 million for its active duty personnel, with an additional $123.274 million for leases and contracts and $104.2 million for civilian workers, travel, transportation, supplies, and equipment. John Sullivan (M. Sgt.), “Military exercise in the desert to cost about $30 million,” U.S. Army Public Affairs, Jun. 21, 2001.
incorporation of institutional training changes at a level unprecedented since the National Training Center (NTC) was created in 1981.

Equally as important for understanding organizational change, though, was the declining relative importance of success at the training centers versus one’s results and reputation on the battlefield.\textsuperscript{1008} In peacetime, performance at a CTC typically serves as the discriminator for one’s evaluation and professional reputation, which directly determines promotions and prestigious assignments.\textsuperscript{1009} In addition, commanders select the scenario their unit will fight at the CTC, providing further deterrents to innovate and experiment with new approaches. Some units deploying to NTC as late as October 2002 still fought the traditional, high-intensity Cold War scenario, despite leaders at all levels widely presuming they would encounter inner-city fighting in their scheduled Iraq deployment.\textsuperscript{1010} Once the Iraq war started, however, senior commanders were much more likely to provide subordinates time at the CTC for their own training and initiatives, practicing recent techniques used on and lessons from the battlefield.\textsuperscript{1011}

My fourth major finding was that contrary to scholars’ mantras that the Army is fighting the last war and the Army’s claim it is a learning institution, evidence is less sanguine in the institutional organization’s willingness to incorporate experiential lessons that counter its “muddy boots,” high-intensity cultural preferences. Instead, as Table 6.2

\textsuperscript{1008} Point made in an interview with Col. Green, former senior O/C at JMRC (2008). Rosen, p. 19, also discussed the critical importance of reputation, since officers determine in “wartime who will live and die, and how, who will be honored, and who will sit on the sidelines.”

\textsuperscript{1009} Col. Green pointed out the even greater importance of one’s reputation from a CTC rotation. Interview (2008).

\textsuperscript{1010} Interview with Maj. Todd Brown (2008), who was in 2002-03 a company commander in the 4\textsuperscript{th} Infantry Division, in their NTC rotation preparing to deploy to Iraq as the follow-on force.

\textsuperscript{1011} Interviews with Maj. Matthew Zais (2008), who was in 2005-06 a company commander in the 101\textsuperscript{st} Airborne Division (Air Assault), in their JRTC rotation preparing to deploy to Iraq; and Col. Green (2008).
highlights, the institutional Army consistently changed as the result or anticipation of a
new strategic environment. Forward-looking change is not negative, and the imbalance
of change from 1991-2007 towards a new strategic environment could be expected given
the critical international events, even if the Army were a learning institution.

The error in this conclusion is that a generation of Army leaders learned critical
lessons from nation building interventions throughout the 1990s.\textsuperscript{1012} Only minor
institutional changes occurred,\textsuperscript{1013} however, as these lessons countered the Army’s
muddy boots culture and prioritized efforts away from the organization’s elite combat
forces. Individuals retained this new knowledge, which many scholars and practitioners
agree allowed the changes to be institutionalized much easier the following decade.\textsuperscript{1014}
Not only did the 2003 Iraq War reinforce the salience of these lessons, but consensus
began to develop that the 1990s experiences were much more representative of the future
strategic challenges that the muddy boots Army would face. With the lessons and
conception of a new strategic environment intersecting, the Army spearheaded significant
changes across the institution that helped expedite a paradigm shift away from a “big
war” mentality. Even though Army leaders in 2008 were still fiercely debating the future
breadth of expected “full spectrum operations,” which were included in their formal

\textsuperscript{1012} Major Army peacekeeping deployments begun in the 1990s include Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia,
and Kosovo. Since the end of the Cold War, however, the U.S. military has conducted over 70 named

\textsuperscript{1013} Worley made the same argument for those in Vietnam, arguing that “The young officers who
served [in Vietnam] learned the small-wars environment, but the institutional army did not.” Worley, p. 71.

\textsuperscript{1014} Arguments made in interviews with Dr. Janine Davidson (2007), Dr. William Flavin (2007),
Lt. Col. John Nagl (2007), and British Col. (commander of the U.S. Army Stability Operations Division in
the Pentagon) Simon Wolsey (2007).
operations doctrine in February 2008, most leaders no longer doubted that lessons from the 1990s and today would be applicable in the future.

My fifth main finding is that major changes to the institutional Army were more likely to happen outside the system’s bureaucratic stranglehold, in part because these changes were so difficult to make. This was especially apparent when analyzing the core curricula at USMA and USAWC. Throughout this time period, USMA made only minor visible changes to its core curriculum; the USAWC, one major change in 2005. This apparent stagnation has raised concerns from scholars and military officers, including a scathing 2002 RAND report on the lack of USAWC changes since the end of the Cold War, and a 2007 article on USMA entitled “The Thayer System: After two centuries of success, it might be time to make some changes.” What these analyses lack, however, is an appreciation of change below the surface of course titles, and academic-based changes outside the curriculum.

For instance, every year the USAWC replaces approximately one-quarter of its readings, lesson objectives, and material discussed within the unchanging titled courses, and departments at USMA reported a similar evolution. USMA’s two

\[^{1015}\] The Army Field Manual 3-0 *Operations* (Feb. 2008) identifies stability operations—including counterinsurgency, nation building, peace keeping, and other missions the Army has historically completed for the nation—as equally importantly efforts as offense and defense.


\[^{1017}\] John Noonan (Capt., U.S. Air Force), “The Thayer System: After two centuries of success, it might be time to make some changes,” *Weekly Standard*, Aug. 1, 2007. Called the “father” of USMA, Sylvanus Thayer served as its Superintendent from 1817-33, during which time the Academy at West Point became the nation’s first engineering college.

\[^{1018}\] Repeated in interviews with USAWC Dean Dr. William Johnsen (2008) and former Assistant Dean for Academics, Col.(Ret.) Kevin Weddle (2008); comparisons of the 2006, 2007, and 2008 course lessons substantiated these claims.

\[^{1019}\] Specifically mentioned in interviews with senior members of the departments of EECS (Ressler and Reynolds), History (Betros and Cole), Law (Ryan), and Sosh (Jebb), (all 2008).
major academic changes would also be almost invisible to an analysis just of the curriculum: the increase in academic rigor and emphasis on all faculty completing research as the result of the 1993 Congressional mandate to increase civilian faculty (discussed in the first finding), and the 2006 DoD-sponsored, USMA-created plan to allow most cadets the opportunity to visit and/or study abroad up to a semester at civilian and military schools.\textsuperscript{1020} By changing outside of the core curriculum, the institution’s leaders minimized inter-departmental rivalries for additional time and resources and the additional bureaucratic constraints to change. While these changes make research more difficult and can possibly explain conflicting analyses of progress occurring,\textsuperscript{1021} they have undoubtedly altered the West Point experience for those attending.

Working outside of the organizational constraints is not unique to education, as one of the most important changes to the personnel system in 2006 was to provide substantially more opportunities for mid-career officers to attend graduate school. By early 2008, there was no corresponding change in promotion policies or additional requirements established for officers to have advanced degrees in order to receive prestigious assignments. Instead, this change was possible because it aligned with CSA Gen. Peter Schoomaker’s (2003-07) vision of creating officer “pentathletes,” or officers who are flexible and adaptable to change, while also assisting with the difficult retention

\textsuperscript{1020} Along with experiencing this difference among my cadets’ opportunities while teaching international relations, as this change was implemented during my tenure as Assistant Professor in the Department of Social Sciences (2005-08), the Dean, Brig. Gen. Pat Finnegan, also identified these two changes as the fundamental differences in USMA now as opposed to when he was a cadet (Class of 1971) while briefing family members of incoming freshmen of the Class of 2011.

\textsuperscript{1021} In an interview with USAWC Dean Johnsen, I specifically asked for his assessment (then and now) of the 2002 RAND report’s accuracy. He stated that USAWC leadership was stunned by the report, and presumed that the author relied upon externally available material for his conclusions. Despite spending significant time and effort responding to the report after it was published, the USAWC Dean, Deputy Dean, department heads, and course directors were not interviewed for the RAND report.
issues exacerbated by repeated combat deployments to Iraq and Afghanistan. While the long-term effects this policy could be tremendous, as future generations of successful officers will no longer have to rely on teaching assignments at USMA to be given opportunities to attend graduate school full-time, it is still too early to judge its success in altering the competencies of the organization’s most senior leaders.

Finally, my sixth major finding from researching why changes occurred in the institutional Army from 1991-2007 was that there were real limits to what the Army could voluntarily change. Not only were certain topics effectively in the “too hard to try” category, but top-down driven changes were exceptionally difficult. For instance, the only two times the officer personnel system changed during this period, 1997 and 2006, were because the CSA at the time made this one of his top priorities in the first year of his four-year tenure. While the 1997 update was a major change for the 99.5% of the Army’s commissioned officers who rank lieutenant through colonel, since Vietnam the Army has not attempted to directly change the composition of its general officer

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1022 Lt. Gen. Hagenbeck, Army G-1 at the time, stated that the graduate school programs had initially been created as a retention tool for junior and mid-career officers. He said that this reason was less convincing for then CSA Gen. Schoomaker; however, when Lt. Gen. Hagenbeck included the longer-term developmental benefit of educating strategic leaders within his analysis, CSA Schoomaker became an avid advocate of the program. Interview (2007).

1023 For budgetary reasons, the number of full-time graduate school opportunities for mid-career Army officers gradually eroded until 2005. In an interview with Lt. Gen. Hagenbeck (2007), he stated that there were between 5,000-7,000 (he had varying reports) graduate school “slots” per year when he was commissioned in 1971; by 2003 when he became Army G-1, there were only 412. The majority of these are for those preparing to teach at USMA, although functional specialists and the Corps of Engineers also have a much smaller number of advanced schooling opportunities.


1025 U.S. Public Law No. 96-513, 94 Stat. 2835, “Defense Officer Personnel Management Act (DOPMA) of 1980,” limited the number of general officers (GOs) all services could have. As a result, in 2008 the Army had 64,500 commissioned officers and 301 GOs, or 0.46% of the officer personnel.
population. As an educational example, USMA declared a moratorium on curriculum changes for almost a decade, considering 1989-98 a “period of stabilization” after completing a series of curriculum changes throughout the 1980s. Not until 2001 did USMA’s core curriculum change, with the net effect being that the change eliminated one required course for all cadets.

This becomes especially critical to understand in areas in which change is centralized, such as the officer personnel system, or when needed changes span the entire organization. Chiefs of Staff are routinely remembered for the one or two institutional changes they made, such as updating Army processes with technological advancements, spearheaded by CSA Gen. Gordon Sullivan from 1991-95, or modernizing equipment and the organizational structure, begun by CSA Gen. Eric Shinseki from 1999-2003. By better understanding what the Army is capable of changing and why, the Army, civilian leadership, and scholars can better work together to determine what changes—if any—can help institutionalize and provide incentives for the Army to continuing succeeding against today’s and tomorrow’s challenges.

6.4 Why Haven’t There Been More Important Changes? What Can Be Done?

I have argued in this dissertation that the Army has voluntarily made some significant changes in its institutional personnel, education, and training systems since the

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1026 Congress’ 1986 Goldwater Nichols Act that requires joint experience and education to make general officer is the only real (and externally-driven) personnel policy change enacted nearer the post-Cold War time.


end of the Cold War, in large part due to the new strategic environment. Civilians did help buttress and inspire a few major changes, while technological advancements and budgetary shifts provided opportunities for greater and more rapid adjustments. Experiential lessons also were important; although not before the fear of failure in Iraq, as the result of counterinsurgency and nation building deficiencies, were many of the “soft power” lessons institutionalized.

In the years following the 2003 invasion of Iraq, some vocal dissention has surfaced from junior and mid-career officers against the most senior leaders. Lt. Col. Paul Yingling’s (2007) article, “A failure in generalship,”¹⁰²⁹ has prompted serious discussion within and outside of the Army, after he claimed the Army’s leadership failed to prepare the Army or properly advise the civilian leadership for Iraq in 2003. Charging that “a private who loses a rifle suffers far greater consequences than a general who loses a war,”¹⁰³⁰ he promoted Rosen’s (1991) ideas to rectify these problems by changing the officer personnel system. He called on Congress to force the military to change its officer promotion system in order to reward intelligence, creativity, and moral courage, including specific adjustments to the process for selecting general officers. These suggestions did not go unnoticed, as Congressional staffers visited with groups at various military academic institutions in the Fall of 2007 to determine what, if anything, should be done.¹⁰³¹ Given these suggestions, why was the Army not making more changes on its own?

¹⁰³¹ Despite this interest, it was not apparent by Spring 2008 that this visit resulted in any changed policies.
For the officer personnel system, there are at least four reasons why internally-driven changes are no more frequent than they are. First, the generals are products of the current system; most believe that if it were good enough to create them, it cannot need a complete overhaul. Second, most major personnel changes take a generation to take effect. Most generals today were already colonels when OPMS XXI went into effect in 1997, making these changes irrelevant to them. Third, the Army has not yet tried, with explicit guidance for all OPMS changes echoing that of CSA Gen. Schoomaker in 2004: “Don’t do anything so radical it has to go to the Hill.”1032 Finally, the prerequisite for consensus all-but prohibits voluntary changes that undermine the existing power holders. With Congressional limits since 19801033 on the number of generals per service, for every specialty general officer position added, one operational general officer position would have to be eliminated. With its proclivity for conservative, worst-case scenario thinking, in large part because it is the primary organization tasked by society to employ deadly force overseas on the country’s behalf, it is unlikely to imagine that the Army leadership would voluntarily make changes to its most senior members to change what resembles themselves.1034

The officer education system also has several institutional reasons delaying progress. By design, academia tends to adjust more slowly than changes in tactics or best

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1033 From the U.S. Public Law No. 96-513, 94 Stat. 2835, “Defense Officer Personnel Management Act (DOPMA) of 1980.”

practices. Changes at USMA and USAWC, founded in 1802 and 1901 respectively, have been even slower than other educational institutions for two primary reasons. Institutionally, their dogmatic traditions and bureaucratic processes provide double layers of organizational resistance to change. The departmental fiefdoms (especially at USMA) facilitate permanent professors stifling consensus by design, as their tenures last several magnitudes longer than the rotating Academy and Army leadership. Not only are both closely scrutinized by civilian and military accreditation bodies, but their overlapping missions of academics and professional military education place significant demands on what must be taught (especially USAWC). These two educational institutions also experience an appreciably reduced intensity for change. Fewer military veterans with recent combat experiences are in positions to cause change at USMA, and fewer professors at the USAWC have experience with changes in academia. Finally, throughout the downsizing in the 1990s and while focused on the war today, the Army is providing even fewer resources to these educational institutions to facilitate changes.

Finally, the Army’s penchant for high-intensity conflict against a predictable enemy crossing the Fulda Gap or deserts of Kuwait greatly impeded change at the training institutions. Following Vietnam, the Army’s new all-volunteer force catapulted from a broken, defeated Army through training. This derivative muddy-boots, combat-prioritized culture consciously chose not to institutionalize its 1990s nation building lessons. While all skills cannot be the priority, the vast number of stakeholders did not agree that the Army could afford to prioritize away from a Soviet-like threat, which

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1035 This is a common argument especially among those promoting specialized units over “full spectrum” units focused on all missions. For an overview, see Andrew Felckert, “Does the Army Need a Full-Spectrum Force or Specialized Units? Background and Issues for Congress,” Congressional Research Service (Library of Congress: Washington, D.C.), Jan. 18, 2008.
stifled real change. Only when these lessons were coupled with large-scale violence, as seen in Iraq by 2004, were leaders at all levels able rapidly to incorporate these lessons in a major way. Additional funds greatly enhanced the magnitude and pace of change, while major technological advancements played little part in causing the fundamental CTC changes in the mid-2000s.

The real challenge, however, will be whether the new leadership can maintain this momentum to make real changes and keep changing itself when fewer leaders are learning new lessons. In 2006, the Army CSA articulated that officers needed to be multi-skilled leaders, or what he called officer “pentathletes,” to be able to learn from and adapt to the Army’s future challenges. During this time period, most officers’ mind-extending experiences came from operational deployments after 9/11, although the Army must create institutional incentives to encourage initiative and innovation when not actively engaged in war. Acknowledging the need for consensus and real constraints to changing, I argue the Army still can and should make changes within four areas. The four main suggestions are first, create peacetime institutional incentives to innovate; second, adjust the prerequisites for general officers; third, prioritize quality versus quantity of mid-career officers by realigning promotion ceilings with Congressional goals and increasing the lateral commissions for mid-career officers; and fourth, fiercely protect the Army’s “personnel research and development (R&D) budget,” or graduate school opportunities for mid-career officers. These are summarized in Table 6.4 at the end of the recommendations.

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1037 While I present specific paths that already have some support throughout the Army, these are by no means the only ways to achieve the larger intent of the four headings.
6.4.1 Create peacetime institutional incentives to innovate

The Army must create institutional incentives for its leaders to remain innovative once active fighting decreases. Given the Army’s need for consensus to make real change, Congress and/or OSD should require the Army to create its own plan over the next year to accomplish this. While not the only solutions, I highlight four suggestions the Army could make even with its existing constraints. First, on the front side of an officer’s evaluation report (OER), the thirteen “word picture” characteristics1038 should be replaced with a text entry for “Self-Development and Strategic Communications.”1039 Army Chiefs of Staff for at least a decade have prioritized both areas,1040 adding significant resources and emphasis to both, especially since 2006.1041 While these topics are not intrinsically connected, by linking them it would provide greater variance in available responses on the OER, thus decreasing officers’ anxiety over change. Adding this to the front side of the OER would also ease this addition, as this section is generally regarded as being less valuable.1042 Ultimately, though, this would be a first step for the

1038 This is Part IVb: Leader Attributes/Skills/Actions of the Dept. of Army Form 67-9.
1039 At three-to-four lines maximum, examples of possible entries would be enrollment in educational or developmental classes, published articles or lessons submitted to the Center for Army Lessons Learned, or involvement in community activities.
1040 For instance, during CSA Gen. Shinseki’s first visit to the War College in 2000, he directed that all U.S. military students at USAWC would conduct at least one public speaking engagement before graduation. He said he was concerned that the Army needed to stay better connected to the American people. Within a few years this requirement was changed to include all resident USAWC students who were U.S. citizens. Interview with USAWC Dean Johnson (Feb. 2007).
1041 Interview with Lt. Col. David Harper, Deputy Division Chief for the Leader Development Division, Training Directorate, Dept. Army G-3/5/7 (2007). For instance, officers can now take over 2,600 free courses on-line in information technology, business, leadership, self-development and Rosetta Stone® foreign languages through the Army Knowledge Online website.
1042 Lt. Gen. Hagenbeck, former Army G-1 and responsible for the OER, stated that while there was minimal support to keep the word picture section, no one could agree how to change it. As a result, they did not change it during his tenure. Interview (2007).
Army to create tangible ways to reinforce areas it declares important due to the long-term effects for the institution.

Second, the Army should require all officers to complete “360-degree” evaluations. Increasingly advocated in discussions and print, this system allows coworkers and subordinates to anonymously comment on an officer’s behavior and abilities. At first, these evaluations should be used for developmental purposes, annotating completion also on the front side of the OER. Within five-to-six years, the Army should be required to determine how best to incorporate this feedback within the OER substantively, providing time for consensus and to minimize unintended consequences. Along with improving organizational communication, this feedback would help capture innovative ideas from those most likely to experience change—the junior officers—and promote officers who do not just resemble their more senior counterparts.

Third, and in the same vein, USMA—along with designated external military and scholar representatives—should be required to complete a zero-based review of its core...

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1044 I would add a Yes/No box, similar to the one required for the Officer Development Support Form. For more information on the Army’s 360-degree assessments, see http://www.benchworks.army.mil/.

1045 In an email interview (2008), Lt. Col. Mark Lukens, who has served extended time in the U.S. Army Human Resource Command (HRC), Army G-1, and Office of the Secretary of Defense, specifically recommended one option: Once a year an officer would receive a normalized score based on three (1 to x) rankings: senior rater, peers and senior non-commissioned officer (NCO), with the senior NCO being the senior rater’s command sergeant major. This quantifiable data could then be compared regardless of the unit size. Another option would be to just include fellow officers’ evaluations and rankings.

curriculum as the USAWC did beginning in 2002.\textsuperscript{1047} The Academy has a responsibility to graduate leaders able to serve in operational and technical positions throughout the organizational Army, and challenging cadets across disciplines can only help with their future responsibilities.\textsuperscript{1048} What is missing, however, is a deliberate analysis that these thirty required courses are the best solution for all cadets.\textsuperscript{1049} For instance, do all cadets need four semesters of math, two of physics, and two of chemistry if they intend to serve as a future soldier statesmen or strategist? Would the Army be less well served if some exchanged half these courses for more culture, history, economics, or regional studies? At a minimum, the Academy should be required to explain what all graduates need and then create the core requirements, rather than justifying why the current curriculum is appropriate. By combining external and internal reviewers, the Academy can remain sensitive to its traditions while still producing evidence whether this curriculum best serves the Army’s and country’s future needs.

Fourth, permanent active duty military professors at USMA\textsuperscript{1050} should have a “term limit” for any position, such as not longer than ten years.\textsuperscript{1051} This would not limit

\textsuperscript{1047}This idea was supported in concept by Col. Dan Ragsdale, USMA Vice Dean for Academics (2007). He suggested several Army Majors, finishing their USMA teaching assignments, could serve as the primary researchers to maximize institutional knowledge while minimizing organizational loyalties that might present obstacles to change.

\textsuperscript{1048}Even as an USMA undergraduate engineering major myself, not until completing this research did I agree with the wisdom of requiring all cadets to have rigorous backgrounds in humanities and math, science, and engineering.

\textsuperscript{1049}Idea from interview with Col.(Ret.) Don Snider, professor in the Sosh Department, when brainstorming ideas to be included within the SS490B Winning the Peace course that I course directed in Spring 2007 (2006).

\textsuperscript{1050}This recommendation currently targets USMA, since USAWC’s permanent professor program is significantly newer while military professors teaching at the War College also arrive much later in their career due to the more senior students enrolled.

\textsuperscript{1051}Mandatory retirement for Academy Professors is twenty-eight years for lieutenant colonels and thirty years for colonels; Professors, USMA, which all department heads are, must retire by age sixty-four regardless of years served. Since most Army officers are commissioned in their early twenties, many of these professors serve over forty years in the Army.
the number of years the officer could spend in other positions, with department “heads” and their deputies typically spending many years in more junior positions. This would provide all department heads at least two opportunities to be selected as Academic Dean (a career-terminating five-year term),\textsuperscript{1052} which is also 2.5 terms of an Army’s Chief of Staff. While still providing sufficient continuity, this would allow departments to be comprised of those with newer academic ideas, more recent battlefield experiences, and less ingrained bureaucratic resilience. In addition, professors completing ten years in one job could still transfer to institutional academic or administrative assignments, which would allow the entire institution to benefit from their experiences while also creating a degree of influence outside of the departments. As a result, the entire Academy—rather than primarily within departments—would institutionally be more likely to learn and adapt.

Fifth, at least one-fourth ($n \geq 8$) active duty military professors at USAWC should be recent brigade commanders. While these officers would not be available for an additional one or two years for other important institutional assignments, serving as professors would be important symbolically and substantively to the USAWC and Army for several reasons. Symbolically, by assigning those officers most likely to make general officers as professors, this would provide clear evidence that the Army valued thinking and learning among its most senior leaders.\textsuperscript{1053} Substantively, this would

\textsuperscript{1052} USMA’s Dean, who is usually a former department head promoted to a brigadier general, has served in this position for five years since 1985, prior to mandatorily retiring. Before 1985, deans remained in their position from one to nine years. The Academy’s most senior officer, the Superintendent, also serves in his position for five years. Historically this position has also been a career-terminating assignment.

incorporate recent faculty leadership experiences within the classrooms and among the other professors, since currently the students provide most of the recent experiential lessons. The commander-professors could be encouraged to publish, such as in the War College’s journal, *Parameters*, which would further promote scholarship and critical thinking from the Army’s most senior leaders. Assigning rising leaders as professors would also increase the value students place on their education and effort they exhibit throughout this year, which many use for rest and recovery from multiple deployments.\(^{1054}\) While students should still enjoy their education, in an organization prioritizing professional reputations, having future general officers as professors cannot help but increase the quality and intensity of everyone’s learning.

The fifth way I would help institutionalize innovation would be to enact the U.S. Army’s Training and Doctrine Command 2008 proposal that commanders should no longer be permitted to select what battle they fight at the Combat Training Centers (CTCs). Instead of fighting the battle at which they are more confident they can “win,” units should be required to train and be evaluated on missions of all types during the exercise. As political scientists such Rosen (1991) and Steven Metz and James Klevit (1994) discuss, the training experiences are valuable because the Army can test and experiment with new ideas. With an emphasis on working through difficult, complex problems as a synchronized team, rather than prioritizing winning, the Army could

\(^{1054}\) Interview with Weddle (2008). Professional military education has traditionally been viewed as a time to relax and spend with your family, advance personal interests, etc., which leaders did not have time in operational assignments. Col. Weddle noted that in the past few years students are becoming less intellectually engaged, which he credited to the overwhelming percentage of officers recently returning from multiple year-long combat deployments.
continue to make progress itself without necessarily needing battlefield lessons from which to learn.\textsuperscript{1055}

The sixth way I would help institutionalize innovation would be to create peacetime criteria for success for battalion, brigade, and division commanders \textit{in addition to} achievement at CTC.\textsuperscript{1056} This is especially critical given the recurring post-Cold War lessons that Army leaders cannot be successful if they win the war and lose the peace. The CTCs are invaluable for preparing for certain types of tactical combat, although they also encourage more conservative, predictable, and discrete solutions. Senior commanders should create innovative evaluative methods themselves, but possible examples are pairing unit leaders with city administrations, organizations and institutions outside of the U.S. military, or multi-ethnic populations. These opportunities would allow Army officers to better understand others’ perspectives, while also benefiting from others’ lessons and ideas. These are all existing ways that Army leaders are innovating in order to help their subordinates be better prepared for the challenging future, while recognizing that the past few decades provided many lessons from which the Army can and should draw. By institutionally encouraging innovation in addition to retaining the skills to destroy one’s enemies, the Army can continually educate and train its leaders for the unexpected.

\textsuperscript{1055} This was one of Maj. Gen. Hertling’s main suggestions for improving the Army’s training, in addition to a more deliberate focus on preparing senior leaders for their strategic challenges. Interview (2008).

\textsuperscript{1056} Col. Green (2008), a former senior O/C at JMRC, supported this idea. He suggested this argument in his own thesis, although acknowledged his ideas received little support at the time.
6.4.2 Adjust the prerequisites for general officers (GOs)

My second main suggestion to help the Army change despite its bureaucratic constraints is to adjust the organization’s prerequisites to make general officer (GO). Currently, the Army has two main criteria for its 301 generals: successful brigade command and (Congressionally-mandated) joint qualifications. While neither is trivial, these are not the only qualities needed to lead one of the world’s largest organizations.

First, the Army should promote and assign GOs with technical, functional, and staff expertise in the most senior jobs for that expertise.\textsuperscript{1057} For instance, the Army’s senior operations researcher or information operations officer should be someone educated and trained in that specialty.\textsuperscript{1058} Successful command should still be rewarded; however, the Army should develop more nuanced selection criteria for its strategic leaders than success at the tactical and operational levels.\textsuperscript{1059}

The Army should also require that all officers competing for GO selection must have worked at least one year in assignments whose main purpose is to work with other non-military governmental agencies, non-governmental agencies, industries, or countries.\textsuperscript{1060} A similar requirement already exists for senior civilians within the U.S.

\textsuperscript{1057} Lt. Gen. Hagenbeck, former Army G-1, thought that with deliberate planning, socialization, and oversight, the CSA could gradually implement a change to the selection boards’ criteria for choosing general officers, although this change would require significant political capital and continuous oversight to ensure its implementation. Interview (2007).

\textsuperscript{1058} To provide time for this transition, initially these jobs should be designated for someone from either the operational or the functional area, with a sunset clause on the dual designation.

\textsuperscript{1059} For a historical analysis of the varied professional career paths of the WWII corps commanders, see Berlin, 1989.

\textsuperscript{1060} For greater flexibility while still serving for sufficient periods, this time could be cumulative from two assignments. Example jobs could include the foreign military trainers (Military Transition Team, or MiTT), foreign education such as Fulbright fellowship or an international staff college, assignments in IGOs or with NGOs, training with industry (TWI), U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) jobs, or assignments in any other U.S (not U.S. military or DoD) or state government agency. USACE district, division, or laboratory jobs would be exceptions since they are overwhelmingly civilian (USACE has
government intelligence community, and the Presidential directive buttressing this change could be used to enact this requirement for Army officers.\textsuperscript{1061} For greater flexibility while still serving for sufficient periods, this time could be cumulative from two assignments throughout an officer’s career. By 2008 the Army was already annotating officers’ experiences in these environments—identifying them as Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental, or Multi-National (JIIM) experiences—because of the clear recognition of their importance. While many GOs would likely have these broadening experiences already, making the requirement less obtrusive than may first appear, this would help institutionally reinforce the importance of these non-muddy boots assignments for all aspiring leaders.

6.4.3 Prioritize quality versus quantity mid-career officers

My third main suggestion is that the Army should realign the mid-career promotion system closer to the 1980 Defense Officer Personnel Management Act (DOPMA) requirements, prioritizing quality over the quantity of officers who remain in the organization.\textsuperscript{1062} First, the Army should enforce promotion ceilings no more than ten percent above DOPMA requirements for centralized selections at major and above.\textsuperscript{1063} In a system that creates leaders from within its own ranks, it is not organizationally healthy


\textsuperscript{1063} DOPMA goals are ninety-five per cent to captain; eighty per cent, major; seventy per cent, lieutenant colonel; and fifty per cent, major.
to keep promotion rates at ninety per cent and higher, thereby consistently exceeding DOPMA goals by fifteen to twenty per cent.\footnote{In 2001, promotion rates were ninety-nine per cent to captain, eighty-three percent to major, and seventy-six per cent to lieutenant colonel; in 2006, promotions were ninety-eight per cent to captain, ninety-eight per cent to major, and ninety-one per cent to lieutenant colonel. Henning, p. CRS-9; U.S. Army, “2007 Army Posture Statement,” Addendum E; see also Mark Mazzetti, “Army’s Rising Promotion Rate Called Ominous,” The Los Angeles Times, Jan. 30, 2006.} Second, the Army should return the promotion time to captain from the current thirty-eight months to four years,\footnote{In 1999, for officers commissioned in 1996 and later, the Army lowered the required time in service to Captain from forty-eight to forty-two months; and in 2002, decreased this to thirty-eight months.} allowing junior officers more time to serve in developmental positions with soldiers, which are less common once the officer earns the rank of captain. Third, in addition to completing 360-degree evaluations, these junior officers should again be evaluated against their peers. Especially at a time when reports indicate the best officers are leaving the organization,\footnote{Specifically repeated in conversations, especially with my peers’ discussions with former subordinates; also, interview with Maj. Skaggs, OPMS Task Force, whose previous job was the Military Intelligence Captain Representative for HRC (2007).} these changes will help return a sense of healthy competition, fairness, and increased morale among officers who sense that performance now matters much less.\footnote{See for instance Lucian K. Truscott IV, “The Not-So-Long Gray Line,” New York Times, Jun. 28, 2005; and Andrew Tilghman, “The Army's Other Crisis: Why the best and brightest young officers are leaving,” Washington Monthly, Dec. 2007.}

To compensate for the fewer officers being promoted, the Army should begin direct commissions for mid-career officers for all branches except those in maneuver, fires,\footnote{Specifically excluding Infantry, Aviation, Armor, Field Artillery, and Air Defense Artillery.} and special operations. These professionals should also be commissioned at an entry level commensurate with their experiences, rather than as a junior first lieutenant (which can be adjusted based on one’s education level). The Army already directly commissions relatively small numbers of medical, legal, and religious officers.
annually;\textsuperscript{1069} however, the Army should create a program to commission those with subject matter expertise for branches whose primary job is not war-fighting. While this most closely counters the Army’s muddy boots culture that all wearing the uniform must start their careers from the bottom, the Army’s current shortage of mid-career officers creates a window of opportunity to enact this change.\textsuperscript{1070} Branches should maintain their expected competencies by rank, and the Army leadership should determine appropriate percentages of allowable direct commissions by rank and specialty. This would provide an opportunity for professionals outside the Army to serve the nation without incurring drastic pay cuts and status demotions. For the Army, this would also add a relatively small proportion of volunteers with new ideas, skills, and experiences at a time that the organization needs a greater number of quality people in its ranks.

6.4.4 Protect the “personnel research and development (R&D) budget” (civilian graduate school)

My final main suggestion to help the Army change despite itself would be for the organization to fiercely protect its “personnel research and development budget,” or graduate school opportunities for mid-career officers. Given the intrinsic value that most aspiring leaders place on advanced education, this program’s budget should increase even when others’ decline, justifiable for both developmental and retention purposes. Civilian

\textsuperscript{1069} Branches allowing direct commissioning are Chaplain, Judge Advocate General (legal), Dental Corps, Veterinary Corps, Medical Corps, Medical Service Corps, Army Nurse Corps, and Army Medical Specialist. Between 2001-06, the Army averaged just over 750 direct commissions to 1Lt. and COL for all these branches. U.S. Army G-1, “FY09 Program Review & Selected Manpower Topics, Briefing to Dr David S. C. Chu (Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel & Readiness),” July 11, 2007.

\textsuperscript{1070} While the Army’s operational tempo has caused strains on officer retention, the largest reason for shortage in Spring 2008 was the Army’s transformation to the Brigade Combat Team structure. Between 2004 and 2012, as the result of brigade headquarters staffs increasing in size without significantly adjusting the size of division headquarters staffs, the Army anticipates needing almost 8,000 additional captains, majors, and lieutenant colonels from all branches just due to structural changes. Ibid.
graduate school is not necessary for officers to become more adaptive and flexible; however, this route is usually sufficient to enhance the mental agility and creativity needed to counteract a thinking or evolving adversary: whether one with improvised explosive devices or in reaction to a tsunami and earthquake in South East Asia. Especially when afforded two years of education before too senior to significantly impact their perspectives,\textsuperscript{1071} this education exposes officers intellectually and socially to divergent perspectives. This experience should precede a master’s degree from a war college, allowing officers the opportunity to receive more academic and professional military education before assuming the organization’s most senior leadership positions.

Table 6.4 RECOMMENDED CHANGES TO THE INSTITUTIONAL U.S. ARMY OFFICER PERSONNEL, EDUCATION, AND TRAINING SYSTEMS

1. **Create peacetime institutional incentives to innovate**
   - add Self-Development and Strategic Communications to OER
   - all officers complete “360-degree” evaluations
   - USMA complete a zero-based review of its core curriculum
   - military professors at USMA and USAWC serve $\leq$10 years/job
   - military professors at USAWC include recent successful commanders
   - do not allow evaluated units at the CTCs to select their own battle
   - create peace-time criteria for commanders’ success *in addition to CTC*

2. **Adjust the prerequisites for general officers (GOs)**
   - promote GOs with technical, functional, and staff expertise
   - require $\geq$ 1 yr. with other agencies, industries, or countries

3. **Prioritize quality versus quantity mid-career officers**
   - enforce promotion ceilings $\leq$10% DOPMA requirements
   - return the promotion to captain to four years
   - reinstate junior officer evaluations against their peers
   - commission mid-career officers into Army branches not focused on war-fighting

4. **Protect the “personnel R&D budget” (civilian graduate school)**

\textsuperscript{1071} Point made by Lt. Col. Nagl, interview (2007), when discussing educational changes at the War College. He argued that even by his rank and age, most officers’ experiences are less effective at changing their perspectives than earlier in one’s career.
6.4.5 Only the beginning

What do my findings portend for the future? There is no doubt that these are challenging times for the U.S. Army, requiring the organization to evolve from lessons and a new environment while actively engaged throughout the world. The Army is also far from the only organization wrestling with the issue of change, especially in the aftermath of the 2003 Iraq War.\textsuperscript{1072} With the current political analysis suggesting the U.S. is in a “long war” against terrorism, it seems unlikely that in the near future, the Army or country will be given time to analyze the future or learn and apply its lessons in peacetime. And yet, evidence has shown that once consensus exists that change is needed, this massive organization can change from within. The vision cannot contradict—even if it does not directly support—the Army’s muddy boot culture or undermine the maneuver leaders, but this time period also illustrated that even what the culture considered “muddy boots” can shift. This counters conventional wisdom outside the Army, even if the evidence is not as positive as those within the organization often contend.\textsuperscript{1073}

Civilian oversight and direction are critical to ensure the Army remains aligned with the country’s strategic needs. Some of the most effective changes came when

\textsuperscript{1072} Major efforts include those within the State Department, begin in 2006, and those advocating reorganization of the U.S. interagency process within the Project for National Security Reform.

\textsuperscript{1073} When completing this research, it became clear that not only is there dissonance about what the Army should focus—coming from various generations of civilians and active duty and retired military officers—but there is also a monumental difference in the perception of most civilians and those in the military as to whether the Army is changing itself. While most civilians were skeptical that the Army could learn and implement change except on tactical techniques and procedures, I had to refocus my questions to many military personnel since the answer to them was so obviously yes—change was happening as the result of learning—that this inquiry made little sense to them. Most Army officers think the Army is learning and changing as a result, although some questioned whether or not we could learn and change fast enough for our current efforts. On the other hand, the inability of the Army to internally cause change was a very common theme among many U.S. government interagency people with whom I talked in Baghdad in the summer of 2006, with civilians from within the Office of Secretary of Defense making this case most strongly.
civilians provided a clear intent and the Army was able to create its own plan to meet their goal. Civilian leadership can only prioritize so many areas with respect to the Army, though, and they have not required many significant changes to the personnel, education, and training systems despite the massive strategic changes since the end of the Cold War. This could be since the civilian leadership was satisfied with the changes; however, evidence points to the decreasing experience with and knowledge of the military in both Congress and the executive branches of government as a more likely cause. Given the recent, important changes across these cases, there is also less evidence of overwhelming consensus within the organization for additional major changes, despite the gap between stated priorities and the current institutional incentives.

If the Army is resistant to making additional major changes, I agree with Yingling (2007) that the Secretary of Defense or Congress can and should intervene. While they can pass new legislation or DoD directives, thus dictating policies, at a minimum they should expect regular updates on the Army’s substantive changes to institutionalize organizational innovation. For instance, if the Army leadership says officer “pentathletes” are critical for the future, the Army should then present and update plans to deliberately create general officers with these qualities. If the Army is a thinking institution, which can both incorporate learning and change to meet new threats, it must institutionalize ways to reward those who exemplify these qualities. By requiring the Army to determine quantifiable ways it will be prepared to deal with the twenty-first century challenges, civilians could compel change while allowing those most knowledgeable to recommend the specifics. Given the increased awareness of the need, the greater number of Army officers with this knowledge, and the desire to continuously
improve, this prompting may be enough. If it is not, the civilian leaders would then have sufficient information and justification to do what scholars already assume they are: fix the Army themselves.
APPENDIX A:
U.S. POST COLD WAR MILITARY OPERATIONS

Totals: 33 Named Traditional warfare/national security operations (green)
124 Named Non-traditional/nation building, humanitarian, etc., operations (white)

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<td>Jump Start</td>
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<td>Unified Assistance</td>
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<td>Nomad Endeavor</td>
<td>Taszar, Hungary</td>
<td>March 1996 - 1996</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Safe Border</td>
<td>Peru / Ecuador</td>
<td>1995 - Jun-99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gatekeeper</td>
<td>California</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hold-the-Line</td>
<td>Texas</td>
<td>1995 - ongoing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Safeguard</td>
<td>Arizona</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Shield</td>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>Jan-95 - Mar-95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intrinsic Action</td>
<td></td>
<td>1 Dec 1995 - 1 Oct 1999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Desert Spring</td>
<td></td>
<td>1 Oct 1999 - ongoing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uphold/Restore Democracy</td>
<td>Haiti</td>
<td>Sep-94 - Mar-95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quiet Resolve/Support Hope</td>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>Jul-94 - Sep-94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Safe Haven/Safe Passage</td>
<td>Cuba &gt; Panama</td>
<td>Sep-94 - Mar-95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sea Signal/JTF-160</td>
<td>Haiti - Guantanamo, Cuba</td>
<td>May-94 - Feb-96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Able Vigil</td>
<td>Cuba</td>
<td>Aug-94 - Sep-94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Able Sentry</td>
<td>Serbia-Macedonia</td>
<td>05 Jul 1994 - 28 Feb 1999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distant Runner</td>
<td>Rwanda NEO</td>
<td>Apr-94 -</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quick Draw</td>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>1994</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iris Gold</td>
<td>SW Asia</td>
<td>1993 - ongoing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korean Nuclear Crisis</td>
<td>North Korea</td>
<td>Feb-93 - Jun-94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Able Manner</td>
<td>Haiti - Guantanamo, Cuba</td>
<td>Jan-93 - Nov-94</td>
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<tr>
<td>Provide Relief</td>
<td></td>
<td>Aug-92 - Dec-92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Restore Hope</td>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>Dec-92 - May-93</td>
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<tr>
<td>Continue Hope</td>
<td></td>
<td>May-93 - Dec-93</td>
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<tr>
<td>Deny Flight</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Decisive Endeavor / Decisive Edge</td>
<td>Bosnia-Herzegovina</td>
<td>12 Apr 1993 - 20 Dec 1995</td>
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<td>Decisive Guard / Deliberate Guard</td>
<td></td>
<td>Jan 1996 - Dec 1996</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>20 Jun 1998 - 24 Nov 2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operation</td>
<td>Location</td>
<td>Start Date</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Sky Monitor</strong></td>
<td>Bosnia-Herzegovina</td>
<td>16 Oct 1992</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provide Transition</td>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>Aug-92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maritime Guard</td>
<td>Adriatic Sea</td>
<td>22 Nov 1992</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sharp Guard</td>
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<td>15 Jun 1993</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Determined Guard</td>
<td></td>
<td>Dec 1996</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provide Promise</td>
<td>Bosnia</td>
<td>03 Jul 1992</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Garden Plot</td>
<td>Los Angeles, CA</td>
<td>May-92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Silver Anvil</td>
<td>Sierra Leone NEO</td>
<td>May-92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provide Hope I</td>
<td></td>
<td>Feb-92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provide Hope II</td>
<td>Former Republics of the</td>
<td>Apr-92</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Soviet Union</td>
<td>1993</td>
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<tr>
<td>Provide Hope III</td>
<td></td>
<td>Jan-94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provide Hope IV</td>
<td></td>
<td>Nov-98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provide Hope V</td>
<td>Gatamam, Cuba</td>
<td>Nov-91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GTMO</td>
<td></td>
<td>Nov-1991</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Safe Harbor</td>
<td></td>
<td>Jun-05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quick Lift</td>
<td>Zaire</td>
<td>Sep-91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Victor Squared</td>
<td>Haiti NEO</td>
<td>Sep-91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fiery Vigil</td>
<td>Philippines NEO</td>
<td>Jun-91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Productive Effort/Sea Angel</td>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>May-91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provide Comfort</td>
<td></td>
<td>5 Apr 1991</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provide Comfort II</td>
<td>Kurdistan</td>
<td>24 July 1991</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern Watch</td>
<td></td>
<td>31 Dec 1996</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southern Watch</td>
<td>Southwest Asia / Iraq</td>
<td>1991</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern Exit</td>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>Jan-91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Desert Falcon</td>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>1991</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Desert Shield</td>
<td></td>
<td>Aug-90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imminent Thunder</td>
<td></td>
<td>Nov-90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proven Force</td>
<td>Southwest Asia</td>
<td>Jan-91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Desert Storm</td>
<td></td>
<td>Jan-91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Desert Sting</td>
<td></td>
<td>Jan-91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Desert Sword/Desert Sabre</td>
<td></td>
<td>Feb-91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Desert Farewell</td>
<td></td>
<td>Jan-92</td>
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<tr>
<td>Steel Box/Golden Python</td>
<td>Johnston Island</td>
<td>Jul-90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sharp Edge</td>
<td>Liberia</td>
<td>May-90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Golden Pheasant</td>
<td>Honduras</td>
<td>Mar 1988</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alliance</td>
<td>U.S. Southern border</td>
<td>1986</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multinational Force and Observers</td>
<td>Sinai</td>
<td>1982</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korea</td>
<td>Korea</td>
<td>25 Jun 1980</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/index.html
APPENDIX B:
THE CURRENT U.S. ARMY OFFICER CAREER FIELDS,
OFFICER PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT SYSTEM (OPMS) (2006)

Key
- **Career Fields**: Major groupings for promotion and personnel management purposes
- **Branch**: Officers commissioned into (except for Special Forces, Psychological Operations, Civil Affairs, and Acquisition)
- **Functional Areas (FA)**: Accessed into while Captain through Lt. Col. (has changed in OPMSs)
- Numbers in parenthesis are the Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) number

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Maneuver, Fires &amp; Effects (MFE)</th>
<th>Force Sustainment (FS)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Infantry (11)</td>
<td>Transportation (88)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aviation (15)</td>
<td>Ordnance (91)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armor (19)</td>
<td>Quartermaster (92)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engineer (21)</td>
<td>FA90 - Logistician</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Police (31)</td>
<td>Adjutant General (42)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chemical (74)</td>
<td>FA43 - Human Resources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Field Artillery (13)</td>
<td>Finance (44)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Defense Artillery (14)</td>
<td>FA45 - Comptroller</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special Forces (18)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Psych. Operations (PSYOPS) (37)</td>
<td>Special Operations Forces (SOF)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Affairs (38)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FA30 - Information Operations</td>
<td>Logistics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FA46 - Public Affairs</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Soldier Support</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Maneuver Support
Fires
Effects
Logistics
Soldier Support
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acquisition (51)</th>
<th>Acquisition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Operations Support (OS)</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Signal (25)</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FA24 - Telecomm Systems Engineer</td>
<td>Network &amp; Space Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FA40 - Space OPS</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FA53 - Info Systems Management</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Military Intelligence (35)</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FA34 - Strategic Intel</td>
<td>Intelligence, Surveillance &amp; Reconnaissance (ISR) &amp; Area Expertise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FA48 – Foreign Area Officer (FAO)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FA52 - Nuclear and Counterproliferation</td>
<td>Plans Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FA59 - Strategic Plans &amp; Policy</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FA49 - OPS Research &amp; Systems Analysis</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FA50 - Force Management</td>
<td>Forces Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FA57 - Simulation OPS</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FA47 - Academy Professor</td>
<td>Education &amp; Training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Health Services (HS)</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medical Corps</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dental Corps</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Veterinary Corps</td>
<td>Army Medical Department (AMEDD) Health Services Division</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nurse Corps</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medical Specialist</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medical Services</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Other Special Branches</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chaplain</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Judge Advocate General</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: All Special Branches (Army Medical Department [AMEDD], Chaplain, and Judge Advocate General [JAG]) are aligned within the Force Sustainment category of the Functionally Aligned OPMS Design. The Officer Personnel Management Directorate’s (OPMD) organization does not perfectly reflect the OPMS Design; AMEDD branches are managed within a separate OPMD division, and Chaplains and JAG officers are managed external to Human Resource Command (HRC).
APPENDIX C:

ARMY G-1 ORGANIZATION CHART

Source: Army G-1 Organization Chart, Jun. 2007
APPENDIX D

OFFICER EVALUATION REPORTS:

OFFICER EVALUATION REPORT (67-8), SEP 1979-SEP 1997
OFFICER EVALUATION REPORT (67-9), OCT 1997-NOV 2004
OFFICER EVALUATION REPORT (67-9), DEC 2004-FEB 2006
OFFICER EVALUATION REPORT (67-9), MAR 2006-PRESENT
**OFFICER EVALUATION REPORT (67-8, FRONT), SEP 1979-SEP 1997**

**PART I - ADMINISTRATIVE DATA**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>a. LAST NAME - FIRST NAME</th>
<th>b. SSN</th>
<th>c. GRADE</th>
<th>d. DATE OF RANK</th>
<th>e. f. SPECIALTIES</th>
<th>g.</th>
<th>h. CODE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Yea</td>
<td>Month</td>
<td>Day</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>i. UNIT, ORGANIZATION, STATION, ZIP CODE OR APO, MAJOR COMMAND</th>
<th>j. REASON FOR SUBMISSION</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>l. PERIOD COVERED</th>
<th>m. NO. OF MONTHS</th>
<th>n. MILPO CODE</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>o. RATED OFFICER COPY</th>
<th>p. FORWARDING</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(Check one and)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. GIVEN TO OFFICER</td>
<td>2. forwarded TO OFFICER</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>q. EXPLANATION OF NONRATED PERIODS</th>
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<tbody>
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</table>

**PART II - AUTHENTICATION**

(Rated officer signature verifies PART I data and RATING OFFICIALS ONLY)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>a. NAME OF RATER (Last, First, MI)</th>
<th>SSN</th>
<th>SIGNATURE</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
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GRADE, BRANCH, ORGANIZATION, DUTY ASSIGNMENT

 DATE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>b. NAME OF INTERMEDIATE RATER (Last, First, MI)</th>
<th>SSN</th>
<th>SIGNATURE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

GRADE, BRANCH, ORGANIZATION, DUTY ASSIGNMENT

 DATE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>c. NAME OF SENIOR RATER (Last, First, MI)</th>
<th>SSN</th>
<th>SIGNATURE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
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</table>

GRADE, BRANCH, ORGANIZATION, DUTY ASSIGNMENT

 DATE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>d. SIGNATURE OF RATED OFFICER</th>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>e. DATE ENTERED ON DA FORM 2-1</th>
<th>f. RATED OFFICER</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>g. SR MPO INITIALS</th>
<th>h.</th>
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**PART III - DUTY DESCRIPTION** (Rater)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>a. PRINCIPAL DUTY TITLE</th>
<th>b. SSI/MOS</th>
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<tbody>
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<td></td>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>c. REFER TO PART IIIa, DA FORM 67-8-1</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
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</tbody>
</table>

**PART IV - PERFORMANCE EVALUATION - PROFESSIONALISM** (Rater)

(Items 1 through 14 below, indicate the degree of agreement with the following statements as being descriptive of the rated officer. Any comments will be reflected in b below.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1. High Degree</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>Low Degree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Possesses capacity to acquire knowledge or grasp concepts</td>
<td>Displays sound judgment</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demonstrates appropriate knowledge and expertise in</td>
<td>Seeks self-improvement</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maintains appropriate level of physical fitness</td>
<td>Is adaptable to changing situations</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Performs under physical and mental stress</td>
<td>Sets and enforces high standards</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Encourages candor and frankness in subordinates</td>
<td>Supports EO/EO</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clear and concise in written communication</td>
<td>Clear and concise in oral communication</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**b. PROFESSIONAL ETHICS**

(Comment on any area where the rated officer is particularly outstanding or needs improvement)

|---------------|-------------------|------------|---------------|--------------|

**FORM 67-8** REPLACES DA FORM 67-7-1, 1 JAN 73, WHICH IS OBSOLETE, 1 NOV 79.

US ARMY OFFICER EVALUATION REPORT
### OFFICER EVALUATION REPORT (67-8, BACK), SEP 1979-SEP 1997

**PART V - PERFORMANCE AND POTENTIAL EVALUATION (Rater)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>a. RATED OFFICER'S NAME</th>
<th>SSN</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>RATED OFFICER IS ASSIGNED TO ONE OF HIS HER DESIGNATED SPECIAL TIES/MOS</td>
<td>YES ☐ NO ☐</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>b. PERFORMANCE DURING THIS RATING PERIOD. REFER TO PART III, DA FORM 67-8 AND PART III a, b, AND c, DA FORM 67-8-1</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ALWAYS EXCEEDED REQUIREMENTS ☐</td>
</tr>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>c. COMMENT ON SPECIFIC ASPECTS OF THE PERFORMANCE. REFER TO PART III, DA FORM 67-8 AND PART III a, b, AND c, DA FORM 67-8-1. DO NOT USE FOR COMMENTS ON POTENTIAL!</th>
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</table>

**PART VI - INTERMEDIATE RATER**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>a. COMMENTS</th>
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</thead>
</table>

**PART VII - SENIOR RATER**

<table>
<thead>
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<th>a. POTENTIAL EVALUATION (See Chapter 4, AR 623-105)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SR</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>b. COMMENTS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

A COMPLETED DA FORM 67-8-1 WAS RECEIVED WITH THIS REPORT AND CONSIDERED IN MY EVALUATION AND REVIEW

| YES | NO (Explain in b) |
Junior Officer Development: New initiative to developmentally counsel lieutenants and junior warrant officers.

Note: The front of this version looks significantly different and theoretically could be used as a development and assignment tool. Practically speaking, however, 1) all blocks are still checked "yes" unless major problems exist, and 2) neither raters nor assignment managers in actuality use these descriptions. Almost all officers agree this part of the OER is effectively worthless except for those with character problems, but there is no agreement on what to change it to.

Added new organizational Army Knowledge Online (AKO) email address (name@us.army.mil)
The most significant change to the OER since 1979, forcing senior raters to designate no more than 49% of officers they rated at that time, and in that rank, in the "top block" (highest mark). If an officer purposefully or accidentally rated too many above center of mass, HRC automatically changes the rating to a center of mass and requires that person's boss to counsel the offending officer in writing. Almost everyone dislikes this change, especially as those in combat must abide by the same rules as those in garrison. However, there is no agreement how to change it. While new lieutenants were compared in this way by the senior raters until 2002, by Jan. 2004 senior raters did not fill out this block even for Captains, due to exceptionally high promotion rates, retention concerns, and to promote greater development of the more junior officers.

New stated requirement to list 3 suggested future assignments, although (most) senior raters were already doing this implied task. Also adding a career field was new.

New listing of "unique professional skills or areas of expertise" and a potential career field for CPTs through Lt. Col.s, which coincides with the OPMS change creating four separate career fields and the opportunity for all officers to make COL. regardless of specialty. While most raters and rated officers seemed to pay attention to what went into this block, it is less clear how much boards assigning officers into career fields used this as a discriminator.

"Performance" and "potential" for promotion were previously separate blocks; in 2006 the OER re-separated these as they had been in the 1979 version.

New categories, although only those with serious problems receive other than the "Outstanding performance, must promote" block.

The most significant change to the OER since 1979, forcing senior raters to designate no more than 49% of officers they rated at that time, and in that rank, in the "top block" (highest mark). If an officer purposefully or accidentally rated too many above center of mass, HRC automatically changes the rating to a center of mass and requires that person's boss to counsel the offending officer in writing. Almost everyone dislikes this change, especially as those in combat must abide by the same rules as those in garrison. However, there is no agreement how to change it. While new lieutenants were compared in this way by the senior raters until 2002, by Jan. 2004 senior raters did not fill out this block even for Captains, due to exceptionally high promotion rates, retention concerns, and to promote greater development of the more junior officers.

New stated requirement to list 3 suggested future assignments, although (most) senior raters were already doing this implied task. Also adding a career field was new.

New listing of "unique professional skills or areas of expertise" and a potential career field for CPTs through Lt. Col.s, which coincides with the OPMS change creating four separate career fields and the opportunity for all officers to make COL. regardless of specialty. While most raters and rated officers seemed to pay attention to what went into this block, it is less clear how much boards assigning officers into career fields used this as a discriminator.

"Performance" and "potential" for promotion were previously separate blocks; in 2006 the OER re-separated these as they had been in the 1979 version.
Eliminated "Junior" and also required developmental counseling for captains and chief warrant officer 2

DA FORM 87-9, DEC 2004

REPLACES DA FORM 570, OCT 07, WHICH IS OBSOLETE.

APR 11-05
OFFICER EVALUATION REPORT (67-9, BACK), DEC 2004-FEB 2006;
CHANGES IN RED

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<th>NAME</th>
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PART V: PERFORMANCE AND POTENTIAL EVALUATION (Rate)

- EVALUATE THE RATED OFFICER'S PERFORMANCE DURING THE RATING PERIOD AND HIGHEST POTENTIAL FOR PROMOTION
  - OUTSTANDING PERFORMANCE
  - SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE
  - UNSATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE
  - MUST PROMOTE
  - PROMOTE
  - DO NOT PROMOTE
  - OTHER (Explain)

- COMMENT ON SPECIFIC ASPECTS OF THE PERFORMANCE AND POTENTIAL FOR PROMOTION. REFER TO PART II, DA FORM 67-9 AND PART VI, 6 AND 7, DA FORM 67-91.

PART VI: INTERMEDIATE RATERS

- IDENTIFY ANY UNIQUE PROFESSIONAL SKILLS OR ABILITIES OF EXPERTISE OF VALUE TO THE ARMY THAT THE OFFICER POSSESSES FOR ARMY COMPETITIVE CATEGORIZATION THROUGH LTC. ALSO INDICATE A POTENTIAL CAREER FIELD FOR FUTURE SERVICE.

PART VII: SENIOR RATER

- EVALUATE THE RATED OFFICER'S PROMOTION POTENTIAL TO THE NEXT HIGHER GRADE

  - BEST QUALIFIED
  - FULLY QUALIFIED
  - DO NOT PROMOTE
  - OTHER (Explain below)

- POTENTIAL COMPARED WITH OFFICER'S SENIOR RATED IN SAME GRADE (OVERPRINTED BY DA)
  - ABOVE CENTER OF MASS
  - CENTER OF MASS
  - BELOW CENTER OF MASS

- COMMENT ON PERFORMANCE/POTENTIAL

- LIST 3 FUTURE ASSIGNMENTS FOR WHICH THIS OFFICER IS BEST SUITED. FOR ARMY COMPETITIVE CATEGORIZATION THROUGH LTC. ALSO INDICATE A POTENTIAL CAREER FIELD FOR FUTURE SERVICE.
OFFICER EVALUATION REPORT (67-9, FRONT), MAR 2006-PRESENT;
CHANGES IN RED

For use of this form, see AR 67-9, the appropriate portion in DOD-GEN, Q-1.

PART I - ADMINISTRATIVE DATA

1. NAME (Last, First, Middle Initial)

2. SSN

3. RANK

4. DATE OF BIRTH (MM/DD/YY)

5. BRANCH

6. REGULATION/COMBAT SPECIALTY

7. UNIT, ORG., STATION, ZIP CODE OR APO, MAJOR COMMAND

8. AWARD CODE

9. CODE FOR SUBMISSION

10. PERIOD COVERED

11. RATED PERIOD END (MM/DD/YY)

12. RATED PERIOD BEGIN (MM/DD/YY)

13. NUMBER OF BREVETS

14. NUMBER OF LEVELS

15. RATED OTHERS OFFICER'S EMAIL ADDRESS

16. DOD CODE

17. FSB CODE

PART II - AUTHENTICATION

(Authorized officer's signature verifies his or her complete OER Parts I-IV and the administrative data are correct)

1. NAME OF INTERMEDIATE RATEE (Last, First, Middle Initial)

2. RANK

3. POSITION

4. SIGNATURE

5. DATE (MM/DD/YY)

6. NAME OF SENIOR RATEE (Last, First, Middle Initial)

7. RANK

8. POSITION

9. SIGNATURE

10. DATE (MM/DD/YY)

11. SENIOR RATEE'S ORGANIZATION

12. BRANCH

13. DIRECT SUPERVISOR'S NAME

14. EMAIL ADDRESS (Gov or Mil)

15. SIGNATURE OF RATED OFFICER

16. DATE (MM/DD/YY)

PART III - DUTY DESCRIPTION

1. DUTY TITLE

2. DUTY ADDRESS

3. DUTY COMPLETION DATE

PART IV - PERFORMANCE EVALUATION - PROFESSIONALISM

CHARACTER

1. HONOR

2. INTEGRITY

3. DUTY

4. LOYALTY

5. RESPECT

6. SELFLESS SERVICE

7. COURAGE

8. RESPONSIBILITY

9. COURAGE

10. LOYALTY

11. RESPECT

12. SELFLESS SERVICE

13. COURAGE

14. RESPONSIBILITY

PART V - DUTY DESCRIPTION

1. DUTY TITLE

2. DUTY ADDRESS

3. DUTY COMPLETION DATE

NEW FORM TYPE THAT ALLOWED DIGITAL SIGNING AND SUBMISSION VIA EMAIL DUE TO SIGNIFICANT CHALLENGES WITH FILING THESE DURING LARGE-SCALE DEPLOYMENTS

ALL DATES NOW TYPED; PREVIOUSLY EACH PERSON WAS SUPPOSED TO HAND WRITE THE DATE WHEN THEY SIGNED THEIR NAME, ALTHOUGH MOST PERSONNEL SHOPS FILLED IN THE DATES TO HELP MAINTAIN THE SENIOR RATER'S PROFILE AT < 49%

Personnel clerk no longer required to initial requiring .mil or .gov email addresses

DA FORM 67-9, MAR 2006

Page 1 of 2

APVYUL0
A much shorter section for the rater to discuss only the rated officer's performance.

As with the 1979 OER, a short section to provide comments on the rated officer's potential for promotion.

Potential career fields only listed for CPTs (vice through Lt. Col.), since by 2006 officers were only assigned into career fields during their Career Field Designation board (as CPTs), except on a case-by-case basis.
## APPENDIX E:

**ESTIMATED EDUCATIONAL LEVEL OF ACTIVE DUTY MILITARY PERSONNEL (CUMULATIVE PERCENT, END OF FISCAL YEAR)**

Note: highest record kept is undergraduate degree

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Source: Department of Defense, “Selected Manpower Statistics,” Fiscal Year 2005, Defense Manpower Data Center, Statistical Information Analysis Division, Table 2-18, p. 69
APPENDIX F

ELECTIVES TAUGHT AT THE U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE

(2006-07 & 2007-08 CHANGES)

Department of Command, Leadership and Management (27)

Executive Overview of Research, Development, and Acquisition Management
RDA Management for Acquisition Professionals
Industrial Preparedness
Defense Resource Management
Joint Issues and Processes
Military Personnel Management
Reserve Components: Organization, Roles, and Issues
Force Management
Human Resources Management for Strategic Leaders
Medical Services - A Force Multiplier for Strategic Leaders
Military Assistance (2008: Defense Support) to Civil Authorities
Managing Organizational Change
Strategic Planning and Management

Department of National Security and Strategy (29)

Strategic Decision-making
The Nature of Grand Strategy
National Level Intelligence Activities
Economics of National Security
Law for Senior Commanders
Policy Making and Implementation
National Security and Public Policy
Civil-Military Relations in Comparative Perspective

The Strategic Environment and World Religions
Creative Thinking
Critical Thinking
Military and the Media
Joint Systems and Processes for International Fellows
Materiel Life Cycle Management
Health & Fitness Challenges of Future Military Operations
Organizational Behavior
Readings on Strategic Leadership
Systems Leadership: Organizational Theory & Change
Emerging Technologies for Strategic Leaders
Research and Development for Transformation
Omar Bradley Chair of Strategic Leadership

Congress and National Security Policy
The Interagency Process and National Security
How to Negotiate: Strategy and Process (2007 only)
Homeland Security Policy and Strategy
Militant Islam
Post Conflict Strategy
Strategy & Military Operations in Failed States
Dirty Politics: Drug Lords, Terrorists and Non-state Security Threats
War by Other Means: Political Violence and Terrorism Studies in Strategic Issues
(2008: Terrorism in the 21st Century: Religions and Ideological Violence)
U.S. Foreign and National Security Policy in Historical Perspective
War in the Ancient World
Grand Strategy and the Strategic Art; 431 BC – 1815
Classical Military Strategy: Thucydides’ History of the Peloponnesian Wars

The European Campaign: From Breakout Through the Ardennes (2007 only)
Men in Battle: The Human Dimensions of Warfare
2008: Modernity and Failed and Emerging States
2008: The Military in Politics: Global Perspectives on Civil-Military Relations

Department of Military Strategy, Planning, and Operations (16)
Information Operations Fundamentals
Joint Operations Concepts (2007 only)
Campaign for Commanders
Theater Intelligence Operations
Non-Lethal Weapons
Component Command Warfighting (2007 only)
Theater Logistics
Sea Power: Naval Strategy and Operations
Special Operations
Air Power and Modern Warfare

Joint Land Operations (2007 only)
Expeditionary Warfare
Case Studies in Center of Gravity Determination
American Involvement in Vietnam
International Hot Spots and the Military Implications
Campaign Analysis Course
2008: Joint Warfighter Advanced Studies Program

Department of Academic Affairs (5)
Executive Public Speaking (EPS) (2008: Public Speaking for Strategic Leaders)
Writing for Publication
Personal Experience Monograph (PEM)

Directed Study (Reading)
Directed Study (Writing)

Strategic Studies Institute (1) Transforming the Army

Center for Strategic Leadership (24)
Strategic Crisis Action Planning
Joint Land, Aerospace, and Sea Simulation (JLASS) War Game
Environmental Security
Strategic Communication
Peace and Stability Operations Issues: Concepts, Planning and Execution
Strategic Fundamentals of Asymmetric Cultural War: American Indian Wars
Rule of Law: Establishing, Re-establishing & Defending
International Development: The Third Leg of the National Security Triad
OPERGISTICS (The Future of Operational Logistics)
Implications of Network Centric Operational Environment
Joint Military Robotics
Weapons of Mass Destruction
The Army Industrial Base
Modeling, Simulation and Gaming in the Department of Defense
Strategic Planning: Practical Applications
Geography and National Security
Just War Analysis of U.S. Military Intervention
Decision Analysis for Senior Leaders
Military Applications of Artificial Intelligence: Intelligence Analysis
Joint Crisis Action Planning and Execution Across the Spectrum of Conflict
Modern Aids to the Military Decision Making Process (MDMP) and Crisis Action Planning (CAP)
Urban Operations in the 21st Century
Digital Game-Based Learning

Military History Institute (1) Oral History Program
APPENDIX G

USMA CENTERS OF EXCELLENCE

AND THEIR HOST DEPARTMENTS (OR ORGANIZATION)

1. Center for Company-Level Leadership (CCLL, USMA),
2. Center for Enhanced Performance (CEP, Dean),
   http://www.dean.usma.edu/centers/cep/default.htm
3. Center for Environmental & Geographical Sciences (CEGS, Geography and Environmental Engineering), http://www.dean.usma.edu/departments/geo/CEGS/
4. Center for Molecular Sciences (Chemistry & Life Sciences),
   http://www.dean.usma.edu/departments/chem/
5. Center for Oral History (History)
   http://www.dean.usma.edu/departments/history/default.htm.
6. Center for Study of the Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC, Law),
   http://www.dean.usma.edu/departments/law/cslac/
7. Center for Teaching Excellence (CTE), http://www.dean.usma.edu/centers/cte/
8. Center for Technology-Enhanced Language Learning (CTELL, Foreign Languages),
   http://www.dean.usma.edu/departments/dfl/CTELL.htm
9. Civil Engineering Research Center (CERC, Civil & Mechanical Engineering),
   http://www.dean.usma.edu/departments/cme/Civil/civil.htm
10. Combating Terrorism Center (CTC, Social Sciences), http://www.ctc.usma.edu/
11. Information Technology and Operations Center (ITOC, Electrical Engineering and Computer Science), http://www.itoc.usma.edu/
12. Leader Development Research Center (LDRC, Behavioral Sciences & Leadership),
    http://www.dean.usma.edu/departments/bsl/
13. Mathematical Sciences Center of Excellence (MSCE, Mathematical Sciences)
    http://www.dean.usma.edu/departments/math/research/msce/
14. Mechanical Engineering Research Center (MERC, Civil & Mechanical Engineering),
    http://www.dean.usma.edu/departments/cme/Mechanical/mechanical.htm
15. Network Science Center (Electrical Engineering and Computer Science, with Behavioral Sciences & Leadership, Mathematical Sciences, Social Sciences, Systems), http://www.netscience.usma.edu/
17. Office of Economic & Manpower Analysis (OEMA, Social Sciences),
    http://www.oema.usma.edu/
18. Operations Research Center (ORCEN, Systems), http://www.orcen.usma.edu/
    http://portal.dean.usma.edu/departments/se/Orcen/ORCEN.aspx
19. Photonics Research Center (Chemistry & Life Science and Physics),
http://www.dean.usma.edu/centers/photonics/
20. Simon Center for the Professional Military Ethic (SCPME, USMA),1074
http://www.usma.edu/Cpme/
21. Warfighting Simulations Center (WARCEN, Military Instruction),
http://www.usma.edu/dmi/warcen.htm, (see also http://www.fa-
57.army.mil/newsletter/online/Summer2006/sims.html)

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Casey to make West Point Center of Excellence for Ethics, Values,” Army News Service, Apr 26, 2007
http://www.army.mil/-news/2007/04/26/2866-gen-casey-to-make-west-point-center-of-excellence-for-
ethics-values/


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http://www.armscontrolcenter.org/.

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Hanley, Michael D. (Lt. Col.) and James G. Riley (Maj.), “Battle Rhythm,” in U.S.
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Hardesty, J. Michael (Col.) and Jason D. Ellis, “Training for Peace Operations: The U.S.
Army Adapts to the Post-Cold War World,” U.S. Institute of Peace Peaceworks,
http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0OXU/is_9_60/ai_n15675506/pg_2


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Col. Toby Green, senior observer controller (O/C) at JMRC in between deployments to Iraq in 2003 and 2007-08, Jan. 18, 2008.


Col. Donald Jackson, Director of Civil Affairs and Civil Military Integration, at the U.S. Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute, Mar. 9, 2007.


Dr. William “Bill” T. Johnsen, Dean of the USAWC, Feb. 21 and Mar. 3, 2008.
Fred Kaplan, Journalist, Mar. 4, 2008.


Col. Ricky McPeak, head of the Department of Foreign Languages, USMA, Jan. 24, 2008.


Lt. Col. Suzanne Nielsen, professor and director of International Relations in the Department of Social Sciences, USMA, Jan. 8, 2008.


Dr. Charles Reynolds, professor of Computer Science for the Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science and on the USMA curriculum committee, USMA, Jan. 16, 2008.


Col. Maritza Ryan (head), Col. Mark Toole, Col. Gary Tidwell, and Dr. Mark Welton, the head and directors of the Department of Law, USMA, Jan. 18, 2008.


Maj. Matt Skaggs, Officer Personnel Management System Task Force, who was a company commander in the 1st Cavalry Division during its deployment to Iraq, Aug. 10, 2007.

Col. (Ret.) Don Snider, professor in the Social Sciences Department, USMA, Dec. 12, 2006.


Col. (Ret.) Kevin Weddle, former Assistant Dean for Academics of the USAWC, Feb. 25, 2008


Lt. Col. Scott Womack, professor in the Department of Foreign Languages and deputy director of the Center for Languages, Cultures, and Regional Studies, USMA, Jan. 17, 2008.


Maj. Matthew Zais, who was in 2005-06 a company commander in the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault), in their JRTC rotation preparing to deploy to Iraq, Feb. 21, 2008.
Senior civilian and military leaders in Baghdad while serving as a liaison for the Center for Army Lessons Learned to the Multi-National Corps-Iraq (Jun.-Jul. 2006).

Summer Internship in the Plans, Policy, and Analysis Office of the Political-Military Affairs Bureau, Department of State, Summer 2007.

Four mid-level (Captains and Warrant Officers 2 and 3) Apache helicopter pilots deployed to Task Force Hawk, Tirana, Albania, Jun. 1999, who had participated in the computer exercise at Grafenwoehr, Germany (then part of the 7th Army Training Command), in which the Army successfully simulated the use of Apaches and Multiple Launch Rocket System for deep attack operations.