THE ENLIGHTENMENT IN PRAXIS:
AN EXPERIMENT IN UNIFYING THEORIES OF AMERICAN POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT

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by

Jacob William Johnson, B.A., M.A.

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Michael Zuckert, Director

Graduate Program in Political Science
Notre Dame, Indiana
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There is a problem in the way the study of American political development (APD) is currently bifurcated between the “cultural” approach and the “institutional” approach. The cultural approach tries to explain change in terms of historical forces such as race, economics, liberalism, the founding, and so on. The institutional approach, on the other hand, tries to explain change logically, in terms of the history of the operational procedures of institutions such as political parties. The trouble is that these two approaches cannot integrate each other’s findings, and they maintain -- internally -- differing and opposing schools of thought about what exactly drives the evolution of America’s politics. My way of making sense out of this chaos is very straightforward: I
argue that at the root of all of America’s political development is a radical philosophical movement called the Enlightenment. In chapters one and two I show how there are four specific types of early Enlightenment thinking at work in America’s founding. I argue that these “types” are exemplified by the ideas of Francis Bacon, Charles Montesquieu, Thomas Hobbes, and Jean-Jacque Rousseau. I go on to show how three of America’s founding thinkers adapted these streams of thought and ended up forming the core principles of America’s political culture. I demonstrate that these philosophers were Thomas Jefferson, Alexander Hamilton, and James Madison. I show how this theory addresses some of the basic problems within the cultural APD literature. These problems include the way in which cultural scholars think that American politics is most essentially about the conflict between egalitarian and libertarian values. What I do is give a richer and more accurate picture of the deep complexity of American liberalism: I demonstrate how America’s three most influential philosophers intermingled four very different visions of liberalism, thereby setting America on a multifaceted, tortured, and convoluted developmental path. In chapters three and four I show how such philosophic differences and tensions play themselves out institutionally. I argue that the evolution of America’s presidential regimes is formed and guided by these tensions. In particular I show how institutional change is generated not merely by the conflict that is set in place when new systemic paradigms try to overcome old ones, as is commonly believed, but also that -- first and foremost -- these conflicts are the result of the melding of the incongruous elements of Jefferson’s, Hamilton’s, and Madison’s very different versions of liberalism.
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CHAPTER I:
THEORIES OF DEVELOPMENT

i. The Problematic of the Nexus Between Enlightenment and American Political Development

My approach to investigating the ‘how’ and ‘why’ of America’s political development has three layers to it: these layers constitute an analytic method that is something like the process of constructing a three-story building. In order to get the job done right, you have to start with a first story strong enough to support the others. My first story or layer is concerned with the intellectual tradition of the Enlightenment. It aims at a basic understanding of the doctrines of the early modern period and the mindset they created. The second layer is concerned with understanding the unique versions of the Enlightenment tradition that early Americans came up with. And the third layer analyzes how these American philosophies actually shape the development of the republic’s politics. The executive branch is the focus of the third layer because it is the primary institutional source of major ideological developments in the nation’s politics.

What this “three-layered” approach offers is an experimental means for filling a widely perceived lacuna in the American political development (APD) literature. The lacuna, thoroughly explored in sections iii and iv below, is most essentially this: how to
achieve a reasonable integration of the cultural and institutional perspectives within the
field of APD, given that (a) each of these two outlooks seem largely ill-equipped to
incorporate each other’s insights, and (b) the internal divisions within each view
aggravate this problem further.¹ What my three-layered approach identifies is how
Thomas Jefferson’s, Alexander Hamilton’s, and James Madison’s liberal philosophies
created, from the beginning, and continue to create, a quarrelsome, contradictory, and
agonal political culture that is clearly reflected in the way presidents engage their
political environment.

More specifically, chapters two and four demonstrate how America’s political
development reflects the influence of the Enlightenment’s “romantic” perspective, which
includes an antistatist, democratic, and egalitarian outlook. I describe this view as
‘Rousseauean’ because it is exemplified in the philosophy of Jean-Jacque Rousseau. The
Rousseauean elements within America’s development are attributed to the influence of
Thomas Jefferson’s liberal philosophy. America’s development is also shaped by the
Enlightenment’s positive views of technological progress and industrial (or non-agrarian)
capitalism. I call this view ‘Baconian’ because Francis Bacon’s philosophy is a very
good example of this kind of thinking. The strong Baconian elements within America’s
development are attributed to the influence of Alexander Hamilton’s liberalism. Also,
the Enlightenment’s skeptical-cynical side is clearly reflected in America’s development
in two ways. The first way comes from the idea that government must be a Leviathan,
able to control and organize the unruly masses. This way of looking at politics I call
‘Hobbesian’ because its positive statist sentiments are exemplified in the ideas of Thomas

¹ Karen Orren and Stephen Skowronek. The Search for American Political Development. (Cambridge:
Hobbes. The Hobbesian element within America’s development is paired with the influence of Alexander Hamilton’s liberalism. The second way comes from the view that political liberty is best preserved by self-absorbed consumerism and a highly factionalized citizenry. I call this view ‘Montesquieuean’ because it is clearly reflected in Charles Montesquieu’s theory of “the best society.” The Montesquieuean elements within America’s development are attributed to the influence of James Madison’s liberalism. Madison’s developmental influence is further extended by the fact that he added something critical to the avaricious and sectarian elements of the Montesquieuean perspective: he said that a republic can be large, which was a revolution in thinking for his time. He knew that a large republic would help facilitate the growth and functioning of both factionalism and economic self-interest.

In chapter four I use the theory above to demonstrate how American cultural and institutional change is interconnected. I first show that when a president successfully channels a demand to disestablish the nation’s major, standing ideological commitments, he sets up a “regime” -- a new set of national commitments that directly impacts policy for at least a generation. Chapter three explains why I believe there are only four regimes in American history. The philosophy of each newly established regime is the result of complex and contentious interactions between Jeffersonianism, Hamiltonianism, and Madisonianism. I show how these “conflicted interactions” are at work in the expansion and fall of regimes as well. Put differently, the institution of the presidency evolves in relation to a culture that insists on pushing together various types of liberalism that are not consistent with each other.
This “pushing together” impulse comes from the liberal unity that underlies the three philosophies. More generally, what ties together any of the diverse ideas that make up ‘liberalism’ is the single goal of revolutionizing human social existence through an anti-premodern philosophic methodology; namely, subjective naturalism, or the idea that the truth of things is discovered not in revelation but only in the individual’s ability to reason. American politics is anchored in this Enlightenment approach to arriving at "Truth." The American experiment’s current and past cultural realities, including its leaders and institutions, are thus interlocked by a basic outlook which maintains tensional visions of "Truth." More specifically, for all their differences, the men who undertook the American founding shared one goal: to discover by Reason what rights Nature gives people, and then protect them. Typically, this “protecting” was concerned with upholding private property, or, as they saw it, individual liberty. But, whereas Jefferson wanted to protect people’s liberties by way of Romantic ideals, Hamilton and Madison thought that a pragmatic approach was more suited for the job.

ii. A Better Approach to the Developmental Literatures

In this section I will chart how my theory, as outlined above, guides my general, “integrative” approach to the APD literature; then, in sections iii and iv, I will analyze the cultural and institutional perspectives in detail. To start, Philip Abbott and Herbert Croly

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understand the American tradition as being made up of only Jefferson’s individualism and positive view of human nature, and Hamilton’s undemocratic nationalism. But there really is a need for expanding the number of liberal, philosophic sources that influence America’s development. As I show in chapters two and four, the self-absorbed consumerism and profound factionalism which pervade America’s development comes from Enlightenment thought -- namely, Madison’s adaptations of Montesquieuean ideas. Abbott and Croly falsely attribute these phenomena to the simple conflict between a cynical Hamilton and an idealistic Jefferson.

There is also another basic version of this same false bifurcation of American development, and it comes in many forms. Louis Hartz demonstrates that American culture is liberal; that it promotes egalitarianism or democracy for the purpose of increasing (paradoxically) individual liberty or capitalist opportunity. He argues that American development has occurred in terms of this cultural paradigm alone. Similarly, Aaron Wildavsky notes that each American president is faced with meeting the political and social demands of his time from within a constant cultural dilemma -- balancing American liberalism's egalitarian and libertarian elements. James Morone demonstrates that American development has come in terms of a wish (or dream) to have an egalitarian...

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7 Ibid.

society without a concomitant enhancement of government size and power. He thus describes American developmental change as a conflicted flux between egalitarian "dreams" and libertarian "dread." He argues that the root of this conflict is the agonal amalgam of ideas that forged American constitution-and-state-making; namely, liberalism, republicanism, and democracy. Morone thus provides a more complex picture of what Wildavsky and Hartz similarly describe as “the core conflict in America’s political development” -- egalitarianism versus libertarianism. However, there are two common flaws that run through all three of these theories; the first is an overly narrow definition of American liberalism; and the second is the false notion that “egalitarianism versus libertarianism” properly identifies the primary battleground upon which America’s development is decided.

I want to argue first that it makes little sense to see America’s political development, as Morone does, as the result of one basic type of liberalism that is in conflict with democracy and republicanism. Indeed, America has not one liberalism but a number of liberalisms which are actually defined by their participation in different strains of republican and democratic ideals; these ideals are at the very definitional core of Jefferson’s, Madison’s, and Hamilton’s conflicting versions of liberalism. Thus, America’s development is understood best not by comparing and contrasting an overly simple definition of ‘liberalism’ with equally tidy understandings of ‘republicanism’ and ‘democracy,’ but rather, by seeing how three competing visions of liberalism play themselves out institutionally. I should also note that while Wildavsky alone pays heed to the critical nexus between culture and America’s primary institutional engine of

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national change, he is, like Morone and Hartz, nevertheless remiss in providing an account of how many quarrelling liberal strains of thought ground and circumscribe presidential regime development.

Theda Skocpol argues, however, that philosophical and cultural accounts of development are, in the first place, necessarily too broad to be of much use in explaining specific institutional outcomes. Of course, as I have been arguing all along, a richer and more philosophic accounting of American development actually makes integrating cultural and institutional perspectives possible. Specifically, the field of APD grapples with the historical construction of political arrangements by analyzing how different origins of political change work together in time, and it is the complex history of American political philosophy that is the cornerstone of these various “origin” points, both institutional and cultural. This is true at least inasmuch as (a) more typical institutional and cultural analyses of change are not intended in any way to cut off debate about how ideological factors root America’s development; and (b) the ideational circumstances which accompany the birth of a nation affect the whole term of its development. The study of American development necessarily includes then not only questions of past and present, in regards to culture and various institutions, but also political philosophy. And, even though it is admitted that “political philosophy and the

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11 Orren and Skowronek. p. x.

12 Ibid. p. xi.

13 Ibid. p. 1.

14 Ibid.
study of American political development are a great source of support for each other." I suggest that it is because political thought has not been given due attention in the study of America’s development -- perhaps by reason of sheer unfamiliarity -- that more success has not been had in the oft proclaimed ideal of “integration.”

I concede, of course, that the idea of liberalism circumscribing America’s national institutions is not exactly groundbreaking. However, little progress has been made in connecting issues of political culture with cyclical regime change. A case in point is the fact that Stephen Skowronek’s view of the Constitution as providing a developmental pattern of stability within cyclical regime change has not been linked to America’s primary liberal philosophies. What I demonstrate in chapter four is that the supposed “constant” of a liberal culture and Constitution in American development is, in reality, the continuous interrelation of a ternary of philosophical choices and options within regime recurrence.

My experiment in integration also suggests some interesting pathways in getting us a little closer to answering the following questions in the field of APD: is political change in America merely the result of reshuffling the same old forms of politics, or the result of something new coming to a head? Is there a discernable direction in American

\[\text{\footnotesize \text{15}}\] Ibid. p. 30.  
\[\text{\footnotesize \text{16}}\] Ibid.  
\[\text{\footnotesize \text{17}}\] Ibid.  
\[\text{\footnotesize \text{18}}\] Ibid. pp. 28-9. To repeat, unpacking liberal ideas to demonstrate the circumscribing effects of liberalism on institutional (regime) change is not entirely original, but the results of my three-fold brand of “unpacking” are, as is my linking this liberal multiplicity to regime analysis. For an example of a study that is very roughly similar to my own see Eldon Eisenach’s “Reconstituting American Political Thought from a Regime Perspective.” (Studies in American Political Development. 4: 169-228, 1990).
development?\textsuperscript{19} In regards to these questions, this study offers in chapters two and four the idea that Jefferson’s, Madison’s, and Hamilton’s philosophies are dominant in American political development, and that (a) these equally liberal ideologies are forced to interact and integrate with each other in contradictory ways in regimes; and (b) that the developmental impact of their “combined incongruity” evolves according to changing socio-political circumstances. Indeed, each regime is affected by and manipulates these “primary philosophies,” and this affects other regimes down the line. These ideologies’ amalgamations, when viewed over time, do have a highly discernable hierarchical structure and evolutionary direction. Specifically, it is argued that while Hamilton’s governmentally “centralizing” and capitalistic politics grows to be the dominant institutional feature in America’s development, Jefferson’s egalitarianism and localism, as well as Madison’s promotion of anti-majoritarianism and factionalism also evolve in regimes in ways that hem in the power and authority of Hamiltonianism.

\textbf{iii. The Cultural Perspective}

Given my general approach to the APD literature’s misidentification of the philosophic heritage of the American experiment, and its overall inability to answer its own integrative concerns because of this misidentification, an expanded critique of the cultural literature seems in order. Hartz supposedly rendered theories of progress in America’s developmental direction mute. He said that without a bourgeois revolution against feudalism -- that is, without true class consciousness -- Americans became impervious to seeing the impossible paradox of their brand of liberalism, which is intent

\textsuperscript{19} Orren and Skowronek. p. 7.
on the simultaneous achievement of both equality and capitalism. He argued that a certain cultural narrowness thus afflicts American politics, and this narrowness severely limits progress and constricts political alternatives. However, my analysis agrees with those who say that this brand of “consensus theory” lacks a sense of the inner dynamics of American liberalism, and is incapable of reporting on what distinguishes one reconstruction of America’s politics from another. In different words, what American politics produces is as important as noting what it does not produce, “true revolution.” Indeed, how did the American government adapt, for instance, to the unrelenting engine of social and economic change, industrial capitalism, if it is not fit for anything more than the reifying of its stagnant “original consensus?” What I offer to this debate is a way of understanding how a ternary confluence of divergent liberalisms -- in regimes -- shapes the “capitalism with equality” paradox. I offer a non-static narrative of how Madison’s negation of class consciousness and unity, in combination with Jefferson’s egalitarianism, effectively caged -- in different ways in different regimes -- the revolutionary implications of those popular movements opposed to Hamilton’s nationalist brand of commercial capitalism. (However, recall that I do not believe that Hartz’s “capitalism with equality paradox” is the primary battleground in America’s development.)

21 Ibid.
23 Ibid.
24 Orren and Skowronek. p. 60.
My arguments regarding consensus theory also provide a critical twist to Walter Dean Burnham’s understanding of regime change. Against Beardian optimism concerning “democracy’s advance,” he notes that in the realignment of 1896, sectional divisions produced the demobilization of a vibrant democratic politics such that, when industrial capitalism went to bat against pre-existing democratic structures, it meant the displacement of democracy, not big business. In basic agreement with Burnham’s thesis, scholars in the “lost alternatives” school of thought have “discovered” a rather lengthy record of ideological conflict and quashed alternatives in the historical record of American liberalism: they argue that the “democratic side” of major debates in American development is the perennial loser, in contrast to the winning side, which is composed of commercial and other elites. These scholars have indeed deepened our appreciation of how the New Deal’s original radicalism was tamed; how republican agrarianism was transmuted in favor of commercial industrialism; and how the demands of the poor and working class are usually co-opted by big business.

However, as it stands, there is a “missing link” in this discussion. In chapters two and four I argue that, in order to defeat the Hamiltonians’ elitist economic program “once

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26 Orren and Skowronek. p. 64.

27 Ibid. pp. 2-3.

28 Ibid. p. 66.

and for all,” Jefferson’s reconstruction of America’s politics succumbed to his opponents’ otherwise hated “big government” methods. The Jeffersonians’ ironic reification of a liberal perspective antithetical to itself is due, in part, to the frustration generated by the great developmental sway of Madison’s liberalism. This fact is the “missing link” I was referring to. At the core of Madison’s Constitution was a strict anti-majoritarian bent working against Jefferson’s ideal of small government and populism. Also, the Constitution was the major impetus for rooting the nation in John Locke’s call for “comfortable self-preservation,” a thought that became the cornerstone of the bourgeois side of Enlightenment thinking. So this “constitutional rooting” created, as Madison intended, a highly Montesquieuean state of affairs because it produced a highly factionalized and very self-interested citizenry obsessed with commercial/material comfort. This state of affairs was not conducive to Jefferson undergirding his virtuous, unitive, and humble agrarianism with a purposely weak central government -- a government too weak to sustain his own economic ideals. Thus, Jefferson’s adoption of more centralized governing methods to halt the institutional growth of Hamiltonianism could not stop Americans from accepting (at least implicitly) Hamilton’s Baconian desire to promote technological and commercial “progress” as the cornerstone of social existence. Ultimately, however, Hamiltonianism’s more Hobbesian, big government outlook helped to partially realize -- ironically -- some of Jefferson’s Romantic ideals. As we shall see, it was through a mix of administrations needing to sustain regime ideologies in the face of socio-economic upheavals and popular movements, in conjunction with Hamiltonianism’s bequeathing to America a strong, centralized,
executive structure, that Jefferson’s egalitarianism became a small but vitally “locked in” social democratic “release valve” in American politics.

The argument above thus frustrates those within the “lost (quashed) alternatives” camp who claim that radicalism’s inability to get an upper-hand in American politics confirms Hartz’s consensus theory. American liberalism is not a tidy and straightforward kind of thing -- a thing rooted in the kind of “consensus” Hartz spoke of: American liberalism is best pictured as a bitter family feud; that is, differing ideals joined together by only the common blood of rejecting premodern ideas of political freedom. The stamina and evolution of Jefferson’s liberal radicalism, due to its incongruous merging with opposing liberal traditions, shows how typical consensus-type theories oversimplify America’s philosophic heritage; they don’t see fluid combat because the definition of “consensus” they offer is merely “the inability of Americans to achieve a non-liberal revolution.”

Oddly enough, this line of reasoning also conflicts with those in the “alternatives” camp who rush to argue that Hartz is wrong because the gaping differences between radical ideals on the ground (from the masses “below”) and the death-inflicting institutional responses “from above,” suggest anything but “consensus.” As this study shows, this view is rooted in an exaggeration of Jefferson’s influence over the masses. The people’s genuine desire for populism and equality is largely offset (as noted above) by Madison’s very intentional constitutional engendering of a citizenry that is also highly factionalized, very economically self-interested, and without true class consciousness. Also, many of the outcomes of Hamilton’s economic nationalism were -- as we shall see

30 Orren and Skowronek. p. 67.
31 Ibid.
in chapter four -- very popular with Americans, even early on in the republic’s history. What this means is that the “masses versus elites” theories of American development do not sufficiently account for (a) the contradictory desires of a people influenced by the clashing traditions of Jefferson and Hamilton; and (b) Madison’s engineering of a social system capable of derailing most material and ideological conflicts between the elites and the masses. Chapters two and four show that the populist movements against Hamiltonianism fit into the Jeffersonian tradition nicely, even as it remains true that what most Americans wanted (and want) is not Jeffersonianism or Hamiltonianism per se, but the impossible -- both -- that is to say, everything. Americans wanted (and want) the “benefits” of economic nationalism (greater quantities of ever-changing and cheaper goods) without the necessary concomitant growth in elite power (bigger big government and bigger big businesses). Madisonianism created such philosophic confusion by encouraging a state of affairs wherein citizens become consumers above all else, oblivious to everything but themselves, and therefore capable of ignoring what the tension between Jeffersonianism and Hamiltonianism really reflects, the interminable conflict between “the many and the few.”

Importantly, one author, J. David Greenstone, maintains a view of this “consensus theory” debate that is I think is valuable. He says that the hallowed liberal principles of the American tradition admit for multiple meanings and definitions, depending on context. 32 Unfortunately, this “empowered alternatives” theory, though similar to my

own, is based on only one case study, Lincoln’s Civil War. This absence of a developmental trajectory is coupled with what I perceive to be an exaggeration of Lincoln’s ideational originality. Unlike Greenstone, I argue in chapter four that Lincoln did not “discover” a political alternative so much as he used to his advantage a well established set of Hamiltonian structures and ideas concerning federalism, business, and union. He used Hamilton’s philosophical legacy to fight the unintended consequences of Madison’s highly factional and “extended” nation. The sectarian hatred Lincoln encountered was brought on, in large part, by a Madisonian insistence on uniting two very different cultural regions with two very different conceptions of the definition of liberal freedom. Lincoln went to battle with the region that insisted that Jeffersonian structures and ideas regarding regional autonomy and antistatism were the only way to really protect liberty. In sum, contra the “empowered alternatives” theory, the interaction of all three major strains of the American tradition can easily account for not only Lincoln’s radical restructuring of America’s politics, but other “restructurings” as well (e.g. Jefferson’s, Andrew Jackson’s, and Franklin Roosevelt’s).

Rogers Smith, unlike Greenstone, argues that illiberal alternatives have always had (and continue to have) a tremendous impact on American development. His “multiple traditions” argument lacks however, not only a solid institutional base, but far more importantly, a good sense of what really constitutes ‘liberalism’ in the first place. Indeed, his understanding of liberalism underreports its diverse nature, and therefore is

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33 Orren and Skowronek. pp. 69-70.

34 I will discuss this scheme in chapter three.

not well suited to the task of seeing how America’s primary liberalisms actually encompass and undergird these supposedly illiberal “multiple traditions.” The deep complexity and multi-dimensionality of liberalism, which comes from its convoluted and contested history in modernity, is boiled down in Smith’s analysis to what I see as an overly simple, one-dimensional “dictionary definition.” For instance, he argues that inegalitarian policies, ascribed hierarchies, and racism are all illiberal. Surely, from within a more left-wing and contemporary sense of liberalism this is all true; but, from a more historical and perhaps less narrow view, such arguments are too thin to be a good means for understanding American development.

What I offer in the place of the “liberalism versus multiple traditions” theory is a syncretic dynamic of “liberalism versus liberalism versus liberalism.” A good illustration of this dynamic is the vast, gaping, polarizing differences between the Federalists and the Anti-Federalists over just about every issue. Both sides were liberal, but they maintained very different political sciences. And, within each camp, there were still more camps. It is in the light of all of this complexity and difference that I see a liberal place for the “disconcerting” aspects of America’s political tradition. For example, Jefferson was a racist, Madison didn’t care much for egalitarianism, wanted to divide people, promoted vice over virtue, consumerism, and self-interest, and Hamilton loved being an elitist. Some might wonder if all of this ugliness can really be liberal. I answer “yes.” I argue that America’s developmental evolution is fully liberal, just not happy and idyllic -- not the kind of liberal development Smith thinks of when he uses the term ‘liberal.’ As we shall see in chapter two, I, in step with most contemporary political theorists, link many supposedly illiberal ideas to both liberal economic theory and liberal institutional and

36 Orren and Skowronek. pp. 72-3.
social design. For instance, I show how in America’s development, liberal industrial capitalism requires economic imperialism (i.e. the destruction of native life-ways) and necessitates low wages for “the many.” In this way I ask why ascribed hierarchy, elitism, and racism are thought of as necessarily illiberal?

Of course, some might wonder if one can include in the same liberal breath both racism and, say, self-interest. In chapter two, however, it is demonstrated that American liberalism represents itself as acultural truth, and tends therefore, to de-legitimize and denigrate aboriginal cultures, often making them out to be hopelessly “backwards” and therefore necessarily “inferior.” Unlike Smith, I argue that such a view of liberalism may help explain why slavery and racism were (are) so tolerated in “liberal America.” It seems then that one real difference between Smith’s theory and my theory is that I never refer to a “true or pure liberalism” that is simply and sadly not adhered to by Americans. To be clear, I do agree that ideas that are not liberal influenced (in a certain sense) American development, including Whiggism and Protestantism, but I emphasize in chapter two how and why these and other traditions were so easily “baptized” into the liberal American faith -- how they were conscripted into the service of reifying various liberal ideals and purposes.

37 For an important look at this issue see David F. Ericson’s The Debate Over Slavery: Antislavery and Proslavery Liberalism in Antebellum America. (New York: New York University Press, 2000). More generally, modern philosophy has in it many examples of racism and imperialism for the same “acultural” reasons noted above; the most famous examples being Kant’s doubts that Africans were fully human, and Hegel’s promotion of war against the “irrationality” of non-Western cultures and peoples. My point is that modernity both calls into question and produces such views. Of course, premoderns were imperialists and racists and so on as well, but for presumably non-liberal reasons.

38 Orren and Skowronek. p. 73.

39 At issue here is the way in which all liberalisms are rooted in naturalism, while Protestantism is anchored in supernaturalism. However, I demonstrate in chapter two why American Protestantism was so easily re-rooted in Enlightenment naturalism.
iv. The Institutional Perspective

Within the institutional perspective, development is typically explained in terms of the interaction between voters, political leaders, regimes, the “free” market, social movements, parties, interest groups, businesses, and so on. The great appeal of making an “institutional turn” is that it helps to carry forward cultural insight into the complex temporalities of politics.\textsuperscript{40} My review will start with two of the most widely read institutional scholars because they deserve special attention. Then I will proceed to review the three main institutional schools of thought. Skowronek demonstrates that the major stages of American political development are guided by presidential regime-making, by way of disruptions in set patterns of ideological leadership, which are due to the interaction between ever-changing historical events and the ever-growing rationalization of economics, government, and society generally.\textsuperscript{41} Thus, though Skowronek does provide an institutional framework from which to understand the major movements within America’s political development, he takes no account of how the primary philosophies in the American tradition are reflected in the historical changes and rationalization processes that disrupt a regime’s ideological commitments. My analysis, however, provides an experimental framework for moving towards an account of how three competing expressions of American liberalism are reflected in the cyclical patterns of presidential regimes.

\textsuperscript{40} Orren and Skowronek. p. 77.

Skocpol demonstrates that in terms of specific policy debates, particular institutional configurations at given historical moments give clear advantage to the strategies of some social movements, political leaders, and interest groups, and not others. Skocpol also argues that America’s liberal culture sets, in a general way, the framework for her brand of institutionalism. However, what I offer is an explanation of how different liberal traditions undergird the institutional configurations of, and options for, the development of regime structures in particular. Also, as pointed to by Skocpol, there are a host of economic theories that attempt to demonstrate that development is a reaction to the institutional demands of business and the needs of the market and capitalist expansion generally (especially since the Industrial Revolution) (e.g. Lowi, Block, and Lindblom). However, such analyses fail to recognize how the cultural expression of the primary strains of American liberalism define and guide capitalist activity within different regimes.

“New institutionalists” such as Daniel Carpenter, Terry Moe, Barry Weingast, and Richard Bensel demonstrate that political order is circumstantial, something that government officials may or may not create and sustain, depending on self-interest, available resources, and the barriers to change they encounter. However, this view of

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42 Skocpol. Protecting Soldiers.


44 Lowi’s theory of American development comes close to being a bit of an exception to this rule, but the shortcomings of his work will be explored in ch. 3.

development does not consider how the creation of political order is, first and foremost, philosophic in nature. Chapters two and four show how the interests of presidential regimes are informed by various types of liberalism. The available resources for change are material, but only in the sense that an administration’s calculation of “material/rational benefit” is first interpreted from within the cultural framework of a regime’s commitment to a given mix of America’s ternary of liberal ideologies.

In “historical institutionalism,” or the “path-dependency” view, the ordering capacities of institutions are understood as being negotiated through time and by period boundaries. 46 Robert Lieberman, Jacob Hacker, E. E. Schattschneider, and others in this school of thought argue that outcomes in policy are always necessarily tied up with constraints that come from past institutional settlements -- settlements far removed from current controversies. 47 What this line of thought does not consider however, is the idea that regimes negotiate “period boundaries” and current controversies by way of the early republic’s contested and convoluted philosophic settlements. What this means -- as we shall see in chapter four -- is that the Madisonian, Jeffersonian, and Hamiltonian traditions negotiate “current controversies” through philosophic syntheses or settlements, which occur during times of regime change, and that each of these transitions influence the next transition, and so on. In this way, I try to put a bit of new perspective on a


46 Orren and Skowronek. pp. 96-7.

nagging problem within “path dependence.” The difficulty is this: by “moving political analysis backward in time in order to locate the on-going effects of institutional arrangements, path dependence falls prey to the dangers of infinite regress.” Indeed, there seems to be no way to reach a “beginning point” in this school of thought because politics and policies are not analyzed from “the beginning”: thus it cannot tell us when to stop connecting new policies with old ones when attempting to explain a given policy outcome, and this makes for messy modeling. In “path dependence” then, it seems as if policy explains politics and vice versa until everything explains everything because, unlike my approach, it doesn’t start with the “origin” of the American experiment, which is the interaction of three philosophies. By moving the discussion of politics out of the realm of only policy questions and institutional arrangements, and into the realm of political philosophy, something much more than mere background is gained; indeed, a definitive starting point in developmental space and time is achieved. The reality of a guiding group of liberalisms in America’s regime development means nothing less than identifying the philosophic root of a tree of interconnected policy branches that otherwise have no apparent beginning. By starting with the Enlightenment as a particular revolution in time, and by moving out towards America’s contested adaptations of this revolution, I built an experimental model of development capable of identifying how different regimes’ policy paths are “dependent,” first and foremost, on the negotiation of a finite number of ideational possibilities. After all, the Articles of Confederation were put away in favor of the Constitution, which started American institutional development on a clear-cut “reconstruction of philosophic ideas” — ideas which started the nation’s

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48 Orren and Skowronek. p. 107.

49 Ibid.
policy path anew; that is, created a beginning. To help demonstrate the validity and need for this view, I will examine below the last remaining approach within institutionalism, which some argue is the most promising approach yet developed.

“Intercurrence” is an approach in the study of American development wherein those like Karen Orren, Andrew Polsky, William Riker, and Jeffrey Tulis see “nonsimultaneity,” or the phenomenon of “multiple-orders-in-action,” in the historical construction of politics.\(^{50}\) This school of thought sees institutional arrangements as a matter of “multiple orders arranged uncertainly in relationship to one another.”\(^{51}\) The contingencies, multiplicities, and incongruities of institutional powers, authorities, and trajectories, it is argued, add up to a “foundational concept upon which the other historical-institutional theories of politics may be said to rest.”\(^{52}\) This approach demonstrates how the fragmented, incomplete, and contingent character of political change creates an evolving system of mutual impingement between old and new institutional arrangements.\(^{53}\) In this way, “intercurrence” helps explain why “reconstructions” in American politics are never truly totalizing: the ragged seams, contradictions, and asymmetries of past arrangements all but guarantee conflict in new arrangements, because even after new arrangements are settled, they retain at least partial


\(^{51}\) Orren and Skowronek. p. 114.

\(^{52}\) Ibid.

\(^{53}\) Ibid.
roots in old systems and allegiances. Intercurrence thus helps to identify and ameliorate the outstanding weaknesses of “path dependence,” inasmuch as it demonstrates not how new policies are tied to old policies ad infinitum, but rather how “the new” always maintains inconsistent shards of “the old,” thereby connecting the new with the old by moving first from “the old” in order to better understand “the new.”

However, this view of American development is deficient in the way that it doesn’t see what ultimately undergirds the connection between old and new institutional arrangements -- America’s three liberal traditions. More specifically, theories of “intercurrence” do not seem to understand how conflict is caused not only by asymmetrical and jagged transitions, but also by what these transitions reflect; namely, a conflicted intermingling of different liberal ideas. This assessment is similar to what I said above about “path dependence.” Indeed, just as interpreting policy changes correctly depends on appreciating the early republic’s original and incongruous philosophic settlements, so too with understanding the reason why transitions from “old” to “new” institutional settlements are always jagged; they are shaped by the early republic’s joining of incompatible philosophies.

The other shortcoming in this school of thought is thoroughly related to the first; it concerns the way in which “intercurrence” doesn’t recognize America’s political development as a fully liberal phenomenon, due to the republic’s inexact ideational transition from colonialism to modern independence. I agree with those like Orren who

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54 Ibid. pp. 114-16.
55 Ibid.
56 Ibid.
argue that the sweeping away of premodern traditions after the American Revolution was not total, but I emphasize that a certain liberal transmogrification of “holdovers” made them liberal enough “to pass.” That is to say that things like Protestantism were baptized into the liberal faith with relative ease.

In conclusion, theories of development have not been integrated because no one has recognized that cultural and institutional developmental patterns are born from, and are affected by, three competing expressions of early modern thinking. In the chapters that follow, it will be demonstrated that the conflicted political culture that Jefferson, Hamilton, and Madison made is reflected in the politics presidential regimes make.

57 Ibid. pp. 114–15. For example, Orren argues that patriarchy is an illiberal element in America’s development. My study doesn’t have the space to cover this important socio-political developmental pattern, but I would say that Orren, like Smith, is assuming that liberalism is defined by all that is good and left-wing in a contemporary way. Perhaps the reason they define liberalism anachronistically is because as liberals, they assume that liberalism necessarily progresses over time: they assume that liberalism’s earliest incarnations can’t be as truly liberal as today’s version(s). I, on the other hand, have never been given a reason to believe in this modern idea of “necessary progress.” I don’t see how Locke’s support of the death penalty is less liberal than the opposite stand, which today’s liberals are more likely to take. Both views are liberal. One is Romantic, the other cynical or pragmatic.

58 See footnote 40.
CHAPTER II:
THE MODERN TRADITION AND THE AMERICAN ENLIGHTENMENT

*Before delving into this chapter, it is important to make its two-fold purpose clear. What it does is investigate the nature of Enlightenment and modernity and then give a philosophic account of American political culture. By doing this, the first and second layers of my theory of integration will be laid. The third layer comes in chapter four, where I show how Jefferson’s, Hamilton’s, and Madison’s liberal philosophies shape the dynamics of cyclical regime change.

My interpretation of America’s development is based on a survey of some well-established theories of modernity and the American experiment. This interpretation takes on board some of the insights of “critical theory,” and thus maintains a more “post-liberal” and “post-individualist” spirit. This approach is anchored in the conviction that my analysis of American politics should be performed from outside the philosophical paradigm that gave the republic life, lest a new angle on development be lost, and with it, fresh insight into old questions.
i. a. The Divine

It makes sense to start any discussion of the nature of modernity with the question of “God.” In order to elevate the principle of subjectivity to new heights, enlighteners had to rethink God; they had to either abolish him or change him so that “Reason” could disestablish revelation as the foundation for social life. This shift away from the premodern god is what really allowed for the unfolding of a New Politics. In fact, it is difficult to overestimate the revolutionary implications of this “shift” towards secularism for the western world.\(^{59}\) As we shall see later, America’s development is very much about embracing this “shift” in favor of secular liberalism.

Roman Christianity was usually considered the main adversary of the Enlightenment by the philosophes, as well as their more moderate brethren, who took greater pains to disguise and/or downplay their belief that irrational bigotry and superstition were the result of the Church's medieval legacy.\(^{60}\) Enlighteners believed that the ancient pagans supplied them with a respectable, though very imperfect ancestral heritage for the idea that "Reason" should rule humanity.\(^{61}\) What enlighteners were fighting in particular was a tradition from men like saints Paul, Augustine, and Aquinas. Each believed, in different ways, one basic thing: that human nature is disoriented by self-love (concupiscence), and so, no person -- no matter his wisdom or virtue -- can, without grace, be fully or truly reasonable.\(^{62}\) As we shall see, pragmatic enlighteners had

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\(^{61}\) Ibid. pp. 32-3.

no use for the idea of “grace” healing human vice, at least not politically speaking. And romantics dismissed the idea that sin inclined people’s natures toward evil.

The desire to make modern, natural, civil theologies that could combat traditional, medieval beliefs was the result of a radical and new way of understanding the individual's relationship with himself and social tradition. The Reformation's ability to suggest that people can be their own prophet, priest, and king, without direct reference to a standing tradition (other than the Bible), gave modern subjectivity its roots. Indeed, Luther suggested, intentionally or otherwise, that God's Church and the communication of His mysteries were subject only to the power of the individual's interpretation and conscience. “Against faith in the authority of preaching and tradition, Protestantism asserted the authority of the subject relying upon his own insight.” This world-view came from the conviction that the Bible’s meaning is self-evident. Thus, as Gadamer put it, Protestant hermeneutics is nothing less than an impossible insistence on the abolition of hermeneutics itself.

The modern take on this idea of never having to step outside one’s consciousness and conscience to arrive at truth came probably with Descartes. I think it not unsafe to

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64 Ibid.

65 Ibid.


say that Luther’s “Here I stand” eventually led to Descartes's "I think, therefore I am."

Tocqueville put this spin on the issue:

The sixteenth-century reformers subjected some of the dogmas of the ancient faith to individual reason, but they still refused to allow all the others to be discussed by it. In the seventeenth-century Bacon, in natural science, and Descartes, in philosophy strictly so called, abolished accepted formulas, destroyed the dominion of tradition, and upset the authority of masters. The eighteenth-century philosopher turned this same principle into a general rule and undertook to submit the object of all his beliefs to each man's individual examination. It is surely clear that Luther, Descartes, and Voltaire all used the same method, and they differed only in the greater or lesser extent to which they held it should be applied.68

The greater the extent to which individual reason was applied to religion, the more God was demoted to the status of “demiurge,” "Architect," and the "Summation of Nature and all Its Laws." This new "Nature's God" was not personal: it was a "First Cause" that benevolently laid down natural principles which, if followed, yielded pleasure, and, if not followed, caused pain.69

This idea of "Nature's God" made it relatively acceptable to fear and undermine supernatural religion in the public sphere. This secularization (or naturalization) of society got an early boost from the thought of Thomas Hobbes.70 His “theology” emphasized making religion subjective and private. For Hobbes, life was brutal, painful, short, and mostly pointless; individuals entered into society under the absolute rule of a Leviathan so that they could protect themselves from their neighbors.71 From this philosophy sprung the idea that the 'public' sphere belonged not to saving souls but to

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68 in Democracy in America. (vol. 2; pt. 1, ch. I.)


71 Ibid. pp. 8-20.
commercial enterprises. In contrast to the ancient and medieval abhorrence of profiteering and usury, the new, more pragmatic god of the Enlightenment very much approved of the "wonder" of money and commerce as makers of social peace and civility.\(^{72}\)

Pragmatic enlighteners like John Locke, Charles Montesquieu, David Hume, and Adam Smith were more sophisticated in their approach to organizing society than Hobbes was, but they agreed with Hobbes that Reason would never prevail among the masses. These pragmatists argued that human imperfections were to become, ironically, the primary source of liberty by way of encouraging selfishness and re-labeling it "enlightened hedonism." They believed that humanity’s worst inclinations could be used to promote social welfare without any intention of "loving thy neighbor."\(^{73}\) For example, every individual's fear of being dominated or killed was now the basis for the preservation of life and property, via the exchange of the anarchy of self-defense for a government that protected "rights." Also, greed would create commerce, which in turn would create social peace by making all so infatuated with worldly goods that even the average person would feel invested in preserving social stability.

On the other hand, Romantic modern thinkers like Rousseau, Carlyle, and Goethe concluded that the idea that humans were intrinsically weak and wicked was to be dismissed.\(^{74}\) While romantics tend(ed) to be sympathetic to certain elements of medievalism, such traditionalism was seen as simplistic because evil, they said, was the


\(^{74}\) Ibid. pp. 59-61.
result of social conditioning: a proper education and social structure could attune people
to their innate goodness. They argued that the greed, classism, and generally unvirtuous
nature of European society were creating an environment that ensured that people’s
innate goodness would not be seen.\(^{75}\)

Of all the "natural theologies" within the Enlightenment project, Locke's probably
ranks as the most influential. His theory was the first to give a systematic view of the
good of a hedonistic and individualistic society. More specifically, Locke believed that
all human ignorance and wrong action were the result of a lack of knowledge, not
Original Sin. The mind, he said, was a "blank slate," subject to absorbing its
environment with gaps in how to reason through a constant in-flow of information. Jesus
Christ, as a prophet of Reason, filled in these gaps.\(^{76}\) Locke thus felt confident in his
ability to turn to Nature to see why God had made humans. What he concluded was this:
since humans (and all creatures) strive, more than anything else, to preserve themselves,
humanity’s greatest good must be self-preservation.\(^{77}\)

For Locke then, the primary force that spurs humans on to their greatest good is a
“passion” -- that is, the desire for preservation. For the most part, ancient and medieval
political philosophers considered passions mercurial and even tyrannical; Plato, Aristotle,
Augustine, and Aquinas believed that the passions tended to enslave people. But Locke
believed that Reason could do nothing more than serve the passion of self-conservation/

\(^{75}\) Ibid. pp. 62-3.

University Press, 2000). pp. 235-43 & 246. See also Thomas L. Pangle’s *The Spirit of Modern
Republicanism: the Moral Vision of the American Founders and the Philosophy of Locke*.  (Chicago: The

\(^{77}\) Ibid.
defense. Most importantly, Locke said that since this great desire for self-preservation determines how humans will behave, and because they cannot behave otherwise, any behavior that fulfills this desire, humans have an intrinsic right to do. What this logic yields for Locke is the strikingly modern notion that self-preservation and socio-political peace are inseparably linked together by an entitlement or "right" to be materially "comfortable" and propertied -- that is, be bourgeois.

The next logical step in the evolution of Locke's thinking came in the philosophy of Charles Montesquieu. For Montesquieu, unlike Locke, virtue and freedom (liberty) were irreconcilable. Montesquieu argued that the greatest or most important things in social life, such as science and private property, are brought about by vice, and that the best political order therefore depends on vice. Montesquieu inherited this idea from Machiavelli and his followers. Plato, Aristotle, Augustine, and Aquinas more or less agreed with Montesquieu that rarely were the good person and good citizen the same. But actually encouraging a political order that promoted moral vice was not, for these premodern minds, a reasonable conclusion to draw. From Montesquieu’s belief that “vice is virtue” came his idea that men must really then have concrete rights and duties,

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but “not in the natural sense of being originally known to men” or intended by God.\textsuperscript{83} For Montesquieu, religious thought had no intrinsic value; it could, however, be useful for civilizing people -- for preparing them to enter into a humane society with secular values.\textsuperscript{84}

\textbf{i. b. The American God}

A good number of the American founding elite, having been influenced by Whiggism, believed that Protestantism had opened the door to "reason" and "common sense." Protestantism was thus the precursor to the Enlightenment’s ability to challenge pagan and especially Catholic "superstition."\textsuperscript{85} In this way, the American Enlightenment and traditional Protestant views, though ultimately dissimilar, were in substantive agreement regarding the identification of their greatest common foe.\textsuperscript{86} Most of the primary founders were either Deists or highly facile Christians. For them, Descartes, Newton, Francis Bacon, Locke, and their own Benjamin Franklin were more honored and esteemed than any religious or ancient philosophical figure.\textsuperscript{87} Following Montesquieuian ideals, religiosity was important to most of them not for its Truth, but because it was "useful" to the practical enactment of their dream of building a liberal society. What was most attractive about almost any religion was its ability to provide social stability, via the encouragement and cultivation of self-restraint in a society rooted


\textsuperscript{84} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{85} George M. Marsden’s \textit{Religion and American Culture}, 2\textsuperscript{nd} ed. (Fort Worth: Harcourt College Publishers, 2001). p. 15.

\textsuperscript{86} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{87} Kramnick. p. xviii.
in individualism. For example, when asked what he believed about religion, Jefferson responded only that society could not survive without it.\textsuperscript{88}

The moral-political vision of the founders was highly influenced by Locke's attempt to rid Protestantism of any essential conflict with Enlightenment Reason.\textsuperscript{89} According to Tocqueville, the American people were open to ending the aforementioned conflict because, as intuitive Cartesians, they were comfortable with submerging their faith to Reason.\textsuperscript{90} Also, since science and rationalism had raised tough questions about traditional notions of God, many of early America’s theologians and pastors, like Cotton Mather, tried to shore up the foundations of traditional Christianity by remaking it in the image of science and rationality.\textsuperscript{91} Most Americans simply combined the idea of “God as a Great Mechanic” with their older ideas.\textsuperscript{92}

But believing strictly in a "clock-maker" God was highly fashionable among the primary founders. Perhaps, in the light of Darwin, the Deism of the founders seems quaint at best, but in the late 1700s it was a very reasonable position to take. The century's single most influential work on natural science and history, Linnaeus's \textit{Systema naturae} (1735), argued that it was "clearly evident" that a set of purposeful laws ordered the universe. These laws, he said, "must" have been set in place by an omnipotent


\textsuperscript{89} Pangle. \textit{The Spirit of Modern Republicanism}. p. 8.


\textsuperscript{92} Kramnick. p. xix.
"Designer." Happily for revolutionary leaders, the colonial Puritans left a legacy on which to build a bridge between their modern ideas and a still not fully rational populace. For example, the Puritan's "Covenant Theology" made swallowing the idea of a "government by personal contract" easy. Also, the Puritan's belief in the right to revolt against tyrants and in creating institutional restraints to stop popular tyrannies made the transition from colonialism to modern government relatively unproblematic for the majority.

There was, of course, a small but stubborn Puritanical inclination in the people to mimic Catholic ideas of the necessity for faith-based governmentality. These inclinations were overcome -- in part -- with elite arguments that said that upholding the right of the individual to believe in the brand of faith that he "knew" to be "true" easily outweighed the fact that he could not practice all of the implications of his faith socially and governmentally. The Puritan-Protestant tendency to divorce faith from works made such restrictions on "religious establishment" tolerable for most -- though still a little uncomfortable. Thus, the line of reasoning begun by Puritanism cleared the way for denying Christianity a place of unique governmental honor and financial support, and for prohibiting religious tests and oaths for federal office holders. These two constitutional

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93 Turner. p. 45.


95 Ibid.

96 Ibid.

97 Ibid. p. 109.

98 Ibid. See also Pangle. The Spirit of Modern Republicanism. pp. 21 & 27.

principles were supported by Madison and Hamilton, and very much in-line with Thomas Jefferson’s desire to put a wall of separation between Church and State.\textsuperscript{100}

Aside from Puritanism, there was another religious factor involved in the secularization of America’s political development, the Second Great Awakening. This religious fever took place in the immediate aftermath of the Revolution. Evangelicals were naturally anxious to make their Christianity synonymous with the Revolution’s radically democratic rhetoric because it was so popular with the people. These pastors argued that an uneven class structure was America’s most fundamental problem.\textsuperscript{101} It became popular to reject the distinction between the pew and the pulpit, and to promote individual intuition over theological expertise.\textsuperscript{102} What no one could have imagined was how these rather Rousseauian assaults on aristocracy, wealth, and education were going to become a chief impetus for destroying America’s religion-friendly life-ways.\textsuperscript{103} Indeed, because anything associated with colonial times had come to be thoroughly despised, most Americans refused to look back and cling to their old, aristocratic economy. What replaced this system was not equality, as most had expected, but the rise of crass commercialism and incessant competition.\textsuperscript{104} This development was, of course, more in line with Hamilton’s and Madison’s Federalist cause than it was with Jefferson’s


\textsuperscript{102} Ibid. pp. 9-10.

\textsuperscript{103} Ibid. p. 14.

\textsuperscript{104} Ibid.
Anti-Federalist dream of egalitarianism, capitalist-agrarianism, and social unity. In a sense, Jefferson’s hold on the political imagination of the American people was, from the very beginning, competing with the bourgeois promise of Madison’s and Hamilton’s Baconian and Montesquieuene ideologies.

ii. a. The Primacy of Nature and Science: new understandings of humanity and the physical world

As demonstrated in section i, the Enlightenment gave rise to "natural theologies" that framed and rooted American culture and state-building. By further developing these themes, I will be able to characterize and explicate the various political sciences that emerged from the American Enlightenment.

The most essential difference between modern science and the ancient and medieval sciences is the formers' belief that truth and facts are gained by means of a strictly hypothetical and/or experimental setting never found in the natural world itself.¹⁰⁵ For example, Newton's "First Law of Motion" states that every body left to itself moves uniformly, in a straight line. This law speaks then of some given "body" as somehow being "left to itself." It is not usually noticed how "unreal," so to speak, this law is: indeed,

Where do we find it? There is no such body. There is also no experiment which could ever bring such a body to direct perception. But modern science… is supposed to be based upon experience. Instead, it has such a law as its apex. This law speaks of a thing that does not exist. It demands a fundamental representation of things which contradict the ordinary.¹⁰⁶


¹⁰⁶ Ibid.
Similarly, Galileo thought of motion in terms of every body being uniform and rectilinear, with every obstacle excluded. He said that a body “changes uniformly when an equal force affects it.” Such abstraction can also be found in Descartes when he argues that one ought to ignore the fact that color 'is,' and concentrate only on the fact that all color does have shape and figure. In these examples it becomes clear that modern science is premised on making mostly irrelevant those typically premodern "scientific" concerns; namely, context, particularity, being, and essence.

Given that Enlightenment philosophy is so heavily premised upon inferring socio-political understanding from natural scientific investigation, the fact that early modern political sciences followed Hobbes’s disregard for questions of 'soul,' 'essence,' 'being,' and 'the good' makes sense. But enlighteners were concerned with more than just tearing down ancient and medieval outlooks; they were in the business of building up new social systems with the New Science. It was Francis Bacon in particular who first thought through the idea of making technology the cornerstone of social existence. He said that science could be used "for the relief of man's estate." More generally, most enlighteners wanted to use science to master nature and thereby fulfill Locke's call for "comfortable

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109 Ibid. p. 134.

Pragmatic enlighteners believed that the affluence created by scientific technique could make for a state of bourgeois self-preservation: this, they said, would meet men’s "most powerful and unchanging needs." However, this notion of an "unchangeable human nature" did not sit well with those who believed that science could move humans past their natural limits. Indeed, there is little doubt that modern historical consciousness is informed by a scientific spirit that sees nature as almost necessarily holding back human emancipation.

However, Hobbes, Montesquieu, Locke and many others argued against an overly optimistic view of science's ability to change human nature. Hobbes offered peace only on the condition of surrendering all to a Leviathan. Montesquieu and Locke, however, offered to "redirect" vice to the good of society. Like Machiavelli, Montesquieu and Locke attempted to demonstrate that self-reliance and self-love were at the root of true human strength and greatness. In particular, Locke’s "Science of Man" insisted that the mind was a “blank-slate” -- that it had no intrinsic object of desire. The motivation for pleasure, he said, arose from a connection between this "blank-slate" and it being informed by syntheses of observation, experience, sensation, reflection, education, passion, custom, and authority. This rather determinist theory of motivation laid the

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113 Ibid. p. 49.


modern groundwork for trying to scientifically redirect negative human behavior into positive social outcomes.\textsuperscript{117}

But it was Montesquieu’s political science that had the most praxis-oriented impact on modern cultural and institutional development. Montesquieu's innovative style and historical/cultural method set the modern groundwork for the perspectives still pursued in sociology, history, and economics. He is also widely considered to be the founder of political science as it is usually understood today.\textsuperscript{118} His historicism and unique brand of cultural relativism moved him to argue that the history of nations and cultures are ruled by certain general "scientific" principles.\textsuperscript{119} Montesquieu concluded that individuals are consumed with unquenchable passions destructive to social peace. Since people cannot get along, societies (or at least those in the West) should make religion a fully private matter.\textsuperscript{120} Additionally, he argued that societies should actually encourage their citizens’ passions. For Montesquieu, "To be free is mainly to follow one's appetites for money, prestige, and power."\textsuperscript{121} England, said Montesquieu, is a good example of how fostering "liberty" through the vices of commercial activity and competition can lead to a political system that is quite nearly indestructible. Such a

\textsuperscript{117} Ibid. p. 170.


\textsuperscript{120} Lowenthal. “Montesquieu” in History of Political Philosophy. p. 499.

\textsuperscript{121} Ibid.
system is not given over easily to revolution, tyranny, or social unrest because the protection of the system is in each Englishman's own financial/personal self-interest.\textsuperscript{122}

What Montesquieu was essentially arguing then was that the attainment of social peace is made possible through the disquietude of the passions. That is to say that a gnawing sense of "uneasiness" in social life is the result of people already living under a governmental system of 'liberty.'\textsuperscript{123} Indeed, for Montesquieu, it is the lack of personal tranquility that best sustains social/political liberty. In England, he said, economic and political factions rooted in self-interest are the life-blood of freedom. This is because commercial avarice and competition, as well as partisan conflict, makes the English greedy and agitated, and therefore vigilant against anything or anyone that might take away what they love most, their liberty -- that is, their property and their ability to pursue their own sense of happiness.\textsuperscript{124}

However, Rousseau did not hold avarice, art, science, or even philosophy as pursuits worthy of being fostered publicly or privately. He said that each of these was not only rooted in vice, but enslaved people into social systems of inequality and abuse because they necessarily promoted competition, luxury, and leisure.\textsuperscript{125} Indeed, Rousseau argued that all the great civilizations were guilty of corrupting their citizens because the arts and sciences do not and cannot promote virtue. He also argued that vice (especially

\textsuperscript{122} Ibid. pp. 499-500.


\textsuperscript{124} Ibid. p. 90.

avarice and pride) is the true reason why all civilizations fall into ruin. Finally, Rousseau asserted that humans in the State of Nature were innocent and noble because there was no property or society to impel them to self-interested behavior. His political science turned on reestablishing -- through education -- some of this lost, primitive glory by way of the “General Will”; that is, by making political society function like a body -- a unified entity that has a will which looks to the general well-being of its parts.


American views of the political sciences of the early Enlightenment agreed on one thing: "Nature and Nature's God" endowed individual men with certain entitlements or "natural" rights, especially to property. For the founders, the right to private property was the same as saying that men have a right to seek happiness. There is, however, a mythology associated with the facts given above. It states that the founders had one political science. Worse yet, it argues that this unity was the divine result of a steadily evolving Western tradition. The myth goes something like this: the American experiment is the perfect flowering of a tradition that started with Plato and Aristotle, was gathered up in Christianity, and then logically evolved into the Enlightenment. Of course, as we have discovered, the premodern Western tradition was abruptly and radically interrupted by modernity. The “consensus tradition” cannot be taken seriously

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126 Ibid.

127 Ibid.


129 Ibid.
because the elements of the Western tradition are “more different and more hostile to each other than the consensus view allows.” Getting rid of this type of consensus theory allows us to see that America’s development is thoroughly liberal. By cleverly adapting ancient republican, Whig, and Protestant belief and practice to their liberal purposes, the founders artfully emptied these premodern traditions of their real meaning. As we shall see later in this chapter, these traditions were indeed made to be compatible with the idea of natural rights. This “co-opting” process is exceptional in world history, and it has certainly “led America to a unique path of political development.”

But the question of America’s developmental “path” is really a question of one road with three intersecting lanes. Understanding this fact begins with this observation: though Americans did not invent the idea of “natural rights,” they were thinking and acting in a virginal political setting. In this “fresh” environment, Americans developed a new political science in two areas in particular. In the first place, they, or rather chiefly, James Madison, discovered a new federalism, a new principle of union among quasi-independent political member units. The Americans also developed a new republicanism.

Madison’s “new federalism” was built on a delicate balancing act between the central government and the states. Federalists, headed by Hamilton, wanted a strong central government, but Jefferson and the Anti-Federalists wanted the opposite. The

\[\begin{align*}
130 \text{ Ibid.} \\
131 \text{ Ibid. pp. 7 & 43.} \\
132 \text{ Ibid. p. 95.} \\
133 \text{ Ibid.} \\
134 \text{ Ibid. p. 5.} \\
135 \text{ Ibid. Emphasis added.}
\end{align*}\]
Constitution ended up giving the federal government extraordinary power in comparison to the Articles of Confederation, but it did not accept Hamilton’s wish for a “president-king.” Neither was there support for Jefferson’s agrarianism or his desire to prohibit parties. Also, Jefferson’s majoritarianism was reflected in only one-half of one-third of the government structure. In return for agreeing to such an odious document, Anti-Federalists bargained successfully for the Bill of Rights. Madison’s “new republicanism” reflected the hope of creating a large, commercial, and factional republic capable of quashing majority factions: he thought this kind of system would protect private property from unhappy mobs better than any other. The Constitution very much enshrined this principle: it built up a strong and extended union with no barriers to capitalist activity. But Madison, at least initially, wanted a federal government stronger than what the Constitution provided for. His desire to avoid mobocracy meant having a federal government powerful enough to keep the regions and factions of the country bound together and open to each other economically.¹³６ Hamilton, for his part, liked the vastness and the gritty commercialism of the “extended republic,” but had little taste for the kind of pseudo-nationalism factionalism created.¹³⁷ And of course, Jefferson wanted unity, not faction; and agrarianism, not industrialism.

As we shall see below, we can conclude at least two things from the facts above. The first is this: to speak of American politics is to speak of three different liberalisms.

¹³６ Banning. pp. 4-10 & 296.

¹³⁷ See Federalist No.’s 12 & 13.
And the second is this: to interpret and define these three liberalisms is to discern which Enlightenment philosophies shape American development.\textsuperscript{138}

In Jefferson’s version of the cosmos, answers to philosophic questions come from nature alone.\textsuperscript{139} Jefferson believed in a “Creator who required man to learn the nature and purpose of existence solely from the data of sensible experience.”\textsuperscript{140} “Nature was the Jeffersonian City of God.” Premodern thinkers would not typically have put so much faith in Nature: men like “St. Augustine believed that the material universe only imperfectly hinted the potentialities of man and of God.”\textsuperscript{141} For Jefferson, the “fact” of the goodness of Nature was evidenced “in the orderly scale of beings, in the indestructibility and fixity of species, in the impossibility of spontaneous generation, and in the perfect harmony and efficiency of the processes of nature.”\textsuperscript{142} Man, however, had become corrupted because of civilization. Indeed, civilization was intrinsically competitive and luxurious: it necessarily created class warfare and greed. Man’s vices thus reflected, said Jefferson, his being in an unnatural state of affairs. If put into a non-


\textsuperscript{140} Boorstin. pp. 54-5. (If astronomical space seemed empty, then human vision was to blame, said Jefferson. If no one had seen a mammoth lately, it was the fault of explorers; if diseases had no remedy or seemed to be out of sync with “the economy of nature,” then people had simply not been careful enough in their observations.)


\textsuperscript{142} Boorstin. pp. 54-5.
commercial and otherwise virtuous system of politics, men, said Jefferson, could become virtuous again. These convictions constitute Jefferson’s political science. Politically speaking then, Jefferson’s outlook was Rousseauian. He wanted to protect liberty by breaking down the elite power structures of society with majoritarianism and weak government. Jefferson went so far as to advocate abolishing the government’s laws every twenty years or so. Economically speaking, Jefferson was similarly Rousseauian. He wanted agrarianism to keep people simple and virtuous. Industrial commercialism and big cities, he thought, corrupted people’s sense of right and wrong with greed.

Hamilton’s political science argued that an enlightened political system rested mostly on self-interest and statist industrialism. He argued that a perfect governmental plan could never exist because all men are imperfect and even wise men disagree with each other. Hamilton’s brand of liberal pragmatism resulted in a Hobbesian approach to governance. He said that it was better to have one man rule with all of his flaws than to divide political leadership among many men: the latter system, he argued, would only be a compounded collection of each man’s errors, and the end product would be a

143 Ibid. pp. 50-61.

144 See Paul Merrill Spurlin’s *Rousseau in America*. (University City: University of Alabama Press). pp. 9-40 & 63. I think Jefferson may have got some of his ideas from Francis Hutcheson, especially in regard to his views on democratic individualism and religion as intuition.

145 Staloff. ch. 1. See also, Wood. The preface and introduction are especially important.


147 Ibid. (Jefferson disliked Montesquieu’s factionalism and commercialism.)

148 Ibid. p. 151.
convoluted and lethargic system of politics.\footnote{149} Politically speaking then, Hamilton believed in a government ruled by the executive branch. Hamilton was a nationalist through and through.\footnote{150} Economically speaking, Hamilton was Baconian in his approach. He wanted a commercial nation where the elite in government and business worked together to build up an industrial, capitalist empire.\footnote{151}

Madison’s political science was, like Hamilton’s, well within the liberal pragmatic approach. Madison was sure that people were naturally inclined to un-virtuous behavior. He argued that channeling the vice of avarice into a self-interested system of factious battling and endless consumption would disincline people to steal each other’s property.\footnote{152} Politically speaking then, Madison’s outlook was Montesquieuean. He wanted to protect people’s liberties by making sure the mob was divided. Having an “extended republic” helped guarantee the multiplication of social divisions.\footnote{153} Economically speaking, Madison was likewise Montesquieuean. He wanted a republic built on commercial greed. He hoped that people would become anxious and worried about protecting only their own property. Economic disquietude, he said, was the solution to mobocracy.\footnote{154}

\footnote{149} Ibid.

\footnote{150} Staloff. ch. 1. See also, Wood. The preface and introduction are especially important.

\footnote{151} Ibid. See also Knott. pp. 13-43.

\footnote{152} Ibid.

\footnote{153} It is important to make clear that Madison did understand factions to be evil, but he nevertheless endorsed their use in order to safeguard private property rights. See Banning. p. 205.

\footnote{154} Staloff. ch. 1; Wood. The preface and introduction are especially important; Knott. pp. 13-43.
iii. a. Foundationalism and Universalism

In sections i and ii of this chapter, the genesis and development of modern and American theories of theology and political science were explored. I will now further examine these themes with a focus on the way in which modern subjectivity became the foundation for western and American hopes of achieving "universal reason."

There are two basic ways to view the genesis of modern universal reason and its foundations in subjectivity, either culturally or aculturally. The former focuses on the philosophic differences between cultures, and the latter focuses on the demise of traditional life-ways as somehow natural, inevitable, and positive. The cultural theory argues that the modern West is a culture like any other. It has specific understandings of morality, personhood, religion, and so on. These understandings are not seen as being suggestive of some deeper, intrinsic truth that has been uncovered by the rise of subjectivity. The acultural theory holds, however, that universal reason is the non-ideological outgrowth of "I think, therefore I am." It assumes that modern western subjectivity and universal reason are simply recognitions of “fact,” like elementary mathematics is fact. Modernity is understood as the inevitable unfolding of human understanding -- an unfolding that was simply "waiting" for the right conditions to appear.

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157 Ibid.

158 Ibid.

159 Ibid. p. 154.
Of course, the naturalist, scientistic outlook of the acultural view is just that, an outlook.\textsuperscript{160} Its ideological origins are rendered invisible to most because the Cartesian and Lockean foundationalist epistemologies that undergird universal reason define themselves as fact.\textsuperscript{161} As one anthropologist put it, “universal reason” is really a culturally and historically situated "faith" -- a faith that maintains a unique understanding of the epistemological and ontological relations between the 'self' and the 'universal.'\textsuperscript{162} Historically, this “faith” evolved in the aftermath of Luther's "Here I Stand." In the wake of the Reformation, Europe could no longer sustain its Roman morality and ethics as being trans-subjective fact: the result was war.\textsuperscript{163} Indeed, because Luther “appealed to individual conscience and inner persuasion” in order to “reduce the number of authorities he would recognize to ‘sola scriptura,’” he “produced yet another version of the problem of many authorities.” If “every man recognizes only his own inner light,” then anarchy is the result because “every conscience constitutes a separate authority.”\textsuperscript{164}

From this new, confused state of affairs there emerged a desperate search -- starting with Hobbes -- for an ethical metanarrative that could create new and peaceful governmental arrangements and structures.\textsuperscript{165} ‘Rational autonomy' fit the bill nicely. It

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\textsuperscript{160} Taylor. “Two Theories.” p. 173. Taylor goes on to argue that this “suppression of background” originates in the Lockean idea that individuals somehow become aware of themselves independent of others, and then subsequently determine the good of others for their lives.
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\textsuperscript{161} Ibid.
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\textsuperscript{164} Ibid. p. 8.
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\textsuperscript{165} Ibid. p. 6.
\end{flushright}
proposed a social ethics without universal religion.\textsuperscript{166} Ethics, morality, art, the state, society, science, and so on all became mere manifestations of the principle of subjectivity, which is the activity of a “self-relating, knowing subject, which bends back upon itself as object, in order to grasp itself as in a mirror image.”\textsuperscript{167} This idea of rational autonomy caught on quickly. With wars consuming Europe, a marriage of convenience was had between modern subjectivity and the Reformation. This relationship is sometimes called the "Protestant Liberal Metanarrative." It is the idea that church and state should be strictly separated, and it is constituted by the notion that modern ethics and morality is natural fact, not philosophy.\textsuperscript{168} The narrative asserts that a secular, procedural framework allows all to pursue their individual conceptions of "truth" and "the good" without causing social chaos. It is, in sum, an "ontology of self-interest."\textsuperscript{169}

Recall that this ontology was informed mostly by Locke’s epistemology. Locke rejected any form of “innate ideas.”\textsuperscript{170} Not surprisingly then, socio-political thought started to turn on the idea that since the ‘subject’ has no innate attunement to Reason or God, vice must really be the key to unlocking the secret to universal peace and happiness.\textsuperscript{171} Thus the dialectic of sin against sin, it was claimed, makes for peace and prosperity. Most notably, G. W. F. Hegel, Immanuel Kant, and Karl Marx, each arguing

\textsuperscript{166} Ibid. p. xi.
\textsuperscript{167} Habermas. The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity. p. 18.
\textsuperscript{168} Katongole. p. xiii.
\textsuperscript{169} Ibid. pp. 241-2.
\textsuperscript{170} Taylor. Sources. p. 162.
\textsuperscript{171} Ibid.
through this logic, came to very different (but equally modern) conceptions of universal reason.

In Hegel's philosophy, one finds the most elaborate exposition and justification for a science of universal progress through a dialectic of vice against vice. Hegel considered wars between civilizations to be legitimate, inevitable, and indispensable for peace and progress.\(^{172}\) Hegel called on the West to conquer those nations which have not yet reached western standards of law, morality, economics, and so on. Hegel believed “that the realization of the fully developed state brings with it the withering away of war. Both indispensable and contrary to the developed state, it [war] only subsists because of the existence of other states which are not yet developed.”\(^{173}\) Hegel believed that the world would someday become fully Rational -- that is, European, modern, and Protestant. The existence of Catholic and non-Christian states and Asian empires was the signification of a spiritual and philosophic disease -- something that had to be, and would be, conquered in time.\(^{174}\)

Marx's Hegelian-dialectical-materialism was founded in the belief that political justice evolves out of the inherent or intrinsic contradictoriness of all existence. That the ruling classes were enslaving the masses was a necessary outcome of these laws; but so too was universal emancipation.\(^{175}\) Kant argued that Nature uses selfish propensities to


\(^{173}\) Ibid.

\(^{174}\) Ibid. p. 710.

bring about the general will of humanity, which is universal happiness.\textsuperscript{176} He believed that selfishness does indeed promote war and acquisitiveness, but it simultaneously inspires selfish counter-measures, and this process eventually leads to universal pacification, prosperity, and progress.\textsuperscript{177}

iii. b. America as the "Redeemer Nation": foundations for a universal gospel of empire

A good understanding of the American version of the Protestant Liberal Metanarrative is essential to understanding American political development. Jefferson wanted America to be an “empire of liberty.” He wanted to promote his version of liberal republican agrarianism not just continentally or hemispherically, but internationally.\textsuperscript{178} The Louisiana Purchase was certainly aimed at achieving this dream. Madison too wanted an extended republic, but for reasons rooted in stopping majoritarianism. And Hamilton dreamed of a vast, non-agrarian, commercial republic. For Hamilton, an enlightened America would harness natural resources and create a civilization capable of surpassing all previous developmental limits.\textsuperscript{179} These three American theories of rationalization and territorial expansion played a critical role in

\textsuperscript{176} Pierre Hassner. "Immanuel Kant" in \textit{History of Political Philosophy}. pp. 559 & 569.

\textsuperscript{177} Ibid. p. 573.

\textsuperscript{178} Jefferson believed in making America an empire, economically and philosophically; he believed that America was providentially chosen to lead the world to enlightened living. See Lerner, p. 108; Robert W. Tucker and David C Hendrickson's \textit{Empire of Liberty: The Statecraft of Thomas Jefferson}. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990); and Merrill D. Peterson's \textit{The Jefferson Image In the American Mind}. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1960).

\textsuperscript{179} See Robert E. Wright’s \textit{Hamilton Unbound: finance and the creation of the American Republic}. (Westport: Greenwood Press, 2002). Also Knott’s \textit{Alexander Hamilton}.
liberalizing a certain colonial tradition which said that America would save the world from medieval backwardsness.\footnote{180}

The Redeemer Nation complex -- which is also known as the "Chosen Nation" syndrome or Manifest Destiny -- is a fundamental part of America’s politics. It is the glue that binds together much of the millenarianism, racism, capitalism, and rationalized Protestant theology found in the American tradition. The post-colonial version of this complex foreshadowed -- significantly enough -- a good deal of the rigid absoluteness and militaristic triumphalism later differently expressed in Hegel’s theory of universal peace. But unlike Hegel’s philosophy -- or for that matter Marx’s and Kant’s -- America’s modern universalism maintains no conscious sense of needing to do bad in order to do good. The reason for this is clear: the Americans’ own awareness of universal mission comes mostly from Jefferson’s Romantic optimism transforming the aforementioned Protestant mythology,\footnote{181} which will be further examined below. Thus, at the level of conscious implementation, what is not present in American universalism and the foreign policies it spawns is the “from-bad-comes-good” pragmatism of Madison and Hamilton. This cultural inability to see the dark-side of American foreign policy is ultimately rooted, I think, in Locke’s foundationalist epistemology, which, like Descartes’\footnote{182}, suppresses the truth that modern thinking is not univocal, but a product of conflicted theory-making.\footnote{182} As we shall see, the material reality, instrumental processes, and practical outcomes of America’s foreign policy reflect Hamilton’s Baconian-

\footnote{180} Ibid.

\footnote{181} See footnote 178.

industrialism. Moreover, it is Madison’s mostly Montesquieuean desire to build a large nation of self-interested people obsessed with commercial gain that undergirds America’s brand of universal rationalization.

Taking a closer look at this phenomenon of modern thinking suppressing its own theoretical origins is important for understanding how America’s three liberalisms transformed the colonial Redeemer Nation complex. To emphasize, the American mind believes itself to be truly and simply empirical. Americans have always believed their politics to be a mere implementation of natural fact.\textsuperscript{183} As a result, Americans tend to be deeply anti-philosophical, unaware that their empiricism is a philosophy.\textsuperscript{184} And, because of this mindset, Americans are relatively incapable of perceiving any significant incoherence in their jumbled Protestant-liberal outlook.\textsuperscript{185} When the Puritanical and supernatural elements of the American tradition mixed with the liberal elements, the result was this storyline: the Protestant god selected a new chosen people and gave them a new promised land; and He did so for one basic reason: to make them the chief means of world-wide redemption through liberal Enlightenment thinking.\textsuperscript{186} Indeed, consider first that, historically, it was the New England Puritans who gave America its “eschatological spiritual biography.” In this biography, the American Self was the symbol-agent of universal rebirth because he was free of tradition, complete in and of

\textsuperscript{183} See footnote 178.

\textsuperscript{184} Van Zandt. p. 29.

\textsuperscript{185} Ibid. pp. 20 & 38. Tocqueville too draws similar conclusions about the complex interplay between the American tendency for unquestioning religious belief and their practice of Cartesian philosophy. He argues that Americans tend to coalesce, unreflectively, the incongruous as congruous, and, holding that all things can be explained, each man, “shut up in himself,” feels certified to “judge the world” with invincible certitude. See Democracy in America, (vol. 2, pt. 1, ch. I.)

himself.\footnote{Sacvan Bercovitch. \textit{The Puritan Origins of the American Self}. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1975). p. 108.} In the decade leading up to the American Revolution, this American Self was crystallized into the Redeemer Nation complex. In the rise of nationalism that followed the French and Indian War, an identity of being a separate and chosen people solidified among the colonists.\footnote{Tuveson. pp. 101-2.} It became more popular than ever for colonists to believe that they were destined, by God, to finish the job of the Reformation and thereby inaugurate “world regeneration.”\footnote{Ibid.} John Adams made clear that he believed that “the still powerful evils of the medieval world” and the “Romish Clergy” were the primary suppressors of freedom, and that liberation for the world was to come from a New Politics as established in the New Israel (America).\footnote{Ibid.} This myth, held by most of the elites and masses, argued that America would save the world -- by force if necessary -- from premodern savagery with the light of liberal capitalism, constitutional government, and technology.\footnote{Ibid. pp. vii-viii.} Many early Protestant leaders argued that Americans of British ancestry were especially suited for this job.\footnote{Ibid. pp. 26-7.}

The American Puritans got this idea of being the new Chosen People from the Reformation’s

…reversal of the Augustinian interpretation of history, which had prevailed during the Middle Ages and the Renaissance. Augustine assumed that the City of God, the mystic body of the faithful, must live, usually subject to some degree of persecution, separate from the world of action -- the City of Man -- until the Last Judgment would roll up history itself. Although the Book of Revelation predicts
that there will be a time when the power of evil is to be "bound" -- the millennium -- that prophecy is to be interpreted only allegorically; the millennium, Augustine concluded, began with the Resurrection.\textsuperscript{193}

However, the Puritans in England believed that “The Protestant Revolution set in motion a new study of the Scriptures. Over the centuries there had grown up a great body of interpretations which, the reformers asserted, had taken the place of the saving text itself.”\textsuperscript{194} This new interpretive scheme made it evident to most early Americans that the true meaning of redemption -- as revealed in Scripture -- had been destroyed by Roman Catholicism. The relationship between the City of God and the City of Man could intersect; they could be mutually beneficial to each other in a way hitherto thought impossible: in fact, what God really wanted was for Americans to actually birth the millennium themselves.\textsuperscript{195} Many (if not most) American Protestant leaders of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries argued that a large part of this "happy union" between the two cities was going to happen because of technological progress. Technology was seen as the clear means by which America would lead the fight to eliminate misery and war, thereby making real the millennial hope of “binding evil” in a holy politics of world improvement.\textsuperscript{196} In this way, the expectation of constant economic progress and prosperity became commonplace among Americans of almost every stripe.\textsuperscript{197} By the mid-1800s, millennialism was reaching a fever pitch, and an ever-growing number of Americans were starting to believe that technology would produce the millennium by

\textsuperscript{193} Ibid. pp. viii-ix.
\textsuperscript{194} Ibid. pp. 26-7.
\textsuperscript{195} Ibid. pp. 28-9.
\textsuperscript{196} Ibid. pp. 62-3.
\textsuperscript{197} Ibid. pp. 52-3.
actually reversing the effects of Original Sin.  

As time went on, millennialism died off, but the secular, Baconian ideals of industrial economic improvement to achieve world salvation did not.

However, the amount of labor needed to actualize these industrial dreams was well beyond what Americans could supply. And there was another problem: the goods produced to supply Madison’s dream of bourgeois “self-preservation” grew exponentially as his “extended republic” kept expanding, and such production eventually caused the persistent predicament of domestic gluts. The solution to these two problems was complex: in order to save Jefferson’s Romantic call for America to redeem the world, the American people’s racism would have to combine with Hamilton’s Hobbesian statism.

Indeed, consider first that slavery was, of course, a defining element in early America’s economic development. But beyond this, the American white male actually defined himself in opposition to what he imagined all people of color to be. Whites created the idea of the black ‘child/savage’ so that they could define themselves in positive terms by way of a reverse image. 

More broadly, it was common for white Americans to believe that non-whites were usually or generally incapable of self-governance. This belief justified not only the extraction of slave labor from Africans, but also murdering Native Americans and stealing their land, as well as compelling indentured servitude from Mexican and Chinese immigrants. 

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198 Ibid. p. 90.
200 Ibid. See esp. chapters seven and ten.
201 Ibid.
interests by making them less "idle" and/or "wasteful" of potential resources. But keeping business overhead expenses down required something more than free or cheap labor; it required constant production, regardless of domestic market needs and desires. Nineteenth century industrialists pointed out that it cost them less to continually produce goods, no matter the demand, than to shut down operations. Such immense surpluses made international outlets necessary, lest gluts cause greater panics than those suffered in 1873 and 1893. Creating foreign markets for America's gewgaws involved the creation of a large and powerful navy, and a concomitant commercialization of military and foreign policy. Thus, with big government and big business joined at the hip, the Redeemer Nation complex became essentially defined by its commercial imperialism at around the time of the Industrial Revolution.

iv. a. Reason and Rationalization

Sections i-iii of this chapter examined the genes is and development of modern and American theories of theology, political science, and universal reason. I will now examine how the processes of rationalization impact domestic economic and political relations in the West and America particularly.

Enlightenment conceptions of rational relations between the individual and the market were rooted, in large part, in Reformation theology. Specifically, it was Calvin’s

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204 Ibid.
205 Ibid. p. 258.
dramatic recasting of Lutheranism which ignited the secular process of redefining western social relations with a "capitalist business sense." What is most vital to grasp about Calvin’s role in creating “this worldly asceticism” is how his understanding of ‘calling’ got intertwined with his view of ‘predestination.’ For Calvin, there was absolutely no means, sacramental or otherwise, for turning “God's grace toward believers he had decided to condemn.” The resulting spiritual isolation of his followers is difficult to overstate. Naturally, each Calvinist wanted to know whether he or she was a part of the saved, the 'predestined elect.' Calvinists, as a matter of duty, were supposed to consider themselves among the elect and to repel every doubt. The only problem was that any doubt was already, in the first place, a sign of a distinct lack of God's saving grace. Thus, the biblical injunction to "make firm one’s calling” came to be interpreted (by most Calvinists) as a daily duty to acquire certainty of their elect status. To this end, Calvinist pastors offered practical advice. Restless work, they said, in a vocational calling would make clear that one was saved. Work alone, it was argued, banished all doubt about being saved because material success proved God’s favor. Specifically, Puritans created so-called "English Hebraism," which means that they took hold of the book of Job and made it central to their Calvinism. It was in the story of Job


208 Ibid. p. 60.

209 Ibid. pp. 40-1 & 64.

210 Ibid.

211 Ibid.
that they claimed to find justification for the notion that the elect were necessarily blessed materially.\textsuperscript{212}

Ultimately, Puritans created a system whereby the consumption and enjoyment of goods and profit was immoral, but the acquisition, production, and continual reinvestment of wealth and profit was believed to be a sign of God’s salvific favor.\textsuperscript{213} Such a system created, of course, investment capital because it provided a moral incentive for compulsive saving.\textsuperscript{214} However, this 'Protestant Ethic' also created an impossible quagmire: the unchaining of profit and the accumulation of wealth was necessarily juxtaposed to an unending source of great temptation to spend money for personal enjoyment and carnal fulfillment.\textsuperscript{215} In the end, the temptation to succumb to worldly pleasures became too great for most.\textsuperscript{216} It was this caving in to temptation -- this desire to spend -- that helped establish the idea of the business cycle.\textsuperscript{217} The Protestant roots of capitalism thus opened the way for Enlightenment philosophers to develop different theories for rejecting the medieval idea of a moral economy.\textsuperscript{218}

\textsuperscript{212} Ibid. pp. 110-11.
\textsuperscript{213} Ibid. p. 115.
\textsuperscript{214} Ibid. p. 117.
\textsuperscript{215} Ibid. p. 116.
\textsuperscript{216} Ibid. p. 118.
\textsuperscript{217} Ibid. p. 123.
\textsuperscript{218} Kramnick. pp. xvi-xvii. I don’t think it is too much to say that premoderns, both pagan and Christian, usually saw money-making as nothing more than avarice and usury: it was considered a profession unbecoming of a truly dignified and moral character. The accumulation of wealth in certain medieval family circles stood, however, in contrast to Church ideals. The institutional Church made routine concessions to the powerful financial interests in Italian city-states. Yet, “the perception never entirely disappeared that activity oriented to acquisition as an end in itself involved a fundamentally disgraceful situation, albeit one that existing realities made it necessary to tolerate.” (See Weber. p. 20). The old doctrine that, “the merchant cannot be pleasing to God,” and the Gospel edict against interest were taken fairly seriously in medieval times. Indeed, these principles were written into the Church’s canon law,
The one Enlightenment theory that most aided and abetted the capitalist cause is Locke's theory of subjectivity and "comfortable self-preservation." Locke said self-interest was good because it led to pleasure, and a lack of self-interest was bad because it led to pain. Locke argued that self-interest leads naturally to personal industriousness and therefore "comfortable self-preservation." For Locke, the self-serving ends of such industriousness yielded a material abundance that helped all people pursue their comfort and preservation. It was thus Locke’s theology of the pursuit of happiness that most reinforced what Weber rightly discerned as the Calvinist roots of “this worldly asceticism.”

From Locke's proto-capitalism came Adam Smith's full exposition. Traditionally, Smith’s philosophy is understood as marking a watershed in the history of modern liberalism because the practice of liberal politics was made conditional upon the practice of liberal economics. Locke's most profound connection to Smith is found in Smith's belief that selfishness, property, and rights are born, first and foremost, out of the natural human condition of hardship, cruelty, and ignorance, as well as the desire to ameliorate this condition. Liberalism thus understands social existence to be the result of psychological anxieties that foster a "natural” need for material acquisitiveness because and applied to the activities of businessmen because, as St. Thomas Aquinas said, striving for profit is moral turpitude. (See Weber. p. 33).


220 Ibid. p. 239.

221 Ibid.


223 Ibid. p. 21
pain is reduced by ever-increasing amounts of earthly comfort.\textsuperscript{224} Specifically, Smith said that Nature has inherent to it a unique set of rules, which, when employed, produce an ironical "harmony of interests." That is to say that selfishness leads, as if by an invisible hand, to the public interest -- an outcome which is never originally intended.\textsuperscript{225} Most famously, Smith argued that, "It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker, that we expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own interest. We address ourselves, not to their humanity but to their self-love."\textsuperscript{226} Recall however, that Montesquieu did not agree that people’s anxieties should be eased by a bourgeois lifestyle. Rather, he wanted their disquietude to be stoked by fears of losing this way of life. This fear, he thought, would make people vigilant in protecting a liberal system against its own destruction. Avarice and factions were, for Montesquieu, the best ways to fan the flames of restless worry. Thus, within the liberal tradition, there is disagreement about the underlying reason why society ought to be rooted in capitalism, science, and technology. But whatever the differences, it can be said that the technological "relief of man's estate" is essentially Baconian in its character: and this goal of “relief” from cruelty, hardship, and ignorance is premised on the total rationalization of society.\textsuperscript{227}

\textsuperscript{224} Ibid. p. 22.


\textsuperscript{226} Ibid. p. 14.

With the rise of rationalization, politics has become mostly a matter of overseeing the distribution of material interests through managerial administration.\(^{228}\) Weber argued that no matter the personalities of modern political leaders, bureaucratic decision-making mostly undercuts their "charismatic calling" -- that is, their calling to be autonomous individuals, free to express and implement the "ultimate values" of their societies.\(^{229}\) Indeed, when the modern politician attempts to place a government of technique into the service of "values," he is stopped by a system that can only accommodate those "values" that fit the mathematical processes of technical efficiency.\(^{230}\) In the modern state,

Technical economic analysis is substituted for the older political economy, included in which was a major concern with the moral structure of economic activity.

…The technician sees the nation quite differently from the political man: to the technician, the nation is nothing more than another sphere in which to apply the instruments he has developed. To him, the state is not the expression of the will of the people nor a divine creation nor a creature of class conflict. It is an enterprise providing services that must be made to function efficiently. He judges states in terms of their capacity to utilize techniques effectively, not in terms of their relative justice. Political doctrine revolves around what is useful rather than what is good. Purposes drop out of sight and efficiency becomes the central concern.\(^{231}\)

This way of looking at the state has been termed "technocracy." Technocracy is a political system in which the determining influence on governmental decision making belongs mostly to administrative technicians, especially those who regulate the


\(^{229}\) Ibid. p. 131.

\(^{230}\) Ibid. p. 132.

In technocracies, substantive disagreements over liberal ideologies have been mostly replaced by political rivalry over 'technique.' To emphasize, liberal states seem to become technocracies in order to fulfill the Enlightenment’s goal of “comfortable self-preservation” because industrious self-fulfillment requires technique. But Marcuse argues that modern scientific technique is essentially structured -- a priori -- to lead to “the ever-more-effective domination of nature,” which in turn creates “the instrumentalities” necessary “for the ever-more-effective domination of man by man.”

In this way,

“technology also provides the great rationalization of the unfreedom of man and demonstrates the ‘technical’ impossibility of being autonomous, of determining one's own life. For this unfreedom appears neither as irrational nor as political, but rather as submission to the technical apparatus which enlarges the comforts of life and increases the productivity of labor.”

In modernity then, Hobbesian governmentality has evolved such that technocracy controls citizens through the regulation and application of the techniques needed for sustaining “comfortable self-preservation.”

In somewhat the same spirit as Marcuse, Romanticism -- early on in the Enlightenment -- offered a negative, modern reaction to rationalization. As a philosophical movement, Romanticism emphasized(es) the importance of the human soul and its relationship to God; appreciating cultures foreign to Europe; learning from the


233 Ellul. p. 46. But, it is technology in the first place that has always enticed people -- and especially “the modern self” -- to see most everything in terms of potential materialistic gain, utility, and productive capacity. See Heidegger’s “The Question Concerning Technology” in *Basic Writings*. p. 305.


235 Ibid.
middle ages; promoting idealism and transcendentalism; viewing the universe less mechanistically; living the "emotional life"; and incorporating the virtues of peasants, the elderly, children, and aboriginal peoples into the mainstream of modern living. It was Marx -- who belonged to the third generation of Romantic European thought -- who described rationalization as “uninterrupted disturbance.” “Everlasting uncertainty and agitation distinguish,” said Marx, “the bourgeois epoch from all earlier ones.” “All that is solid melts into air,” and “all that is holy is profaned.”

iv. b. American Reason and the Processes of Rationalization

America's true zeal for capitalism and technology has often been regarded -- by both Americans and foreign observers -- as the primary hallmark of its culture, and certainly something that seems to set it apart from Europe. What this means is that the Romantic side of the American political tradition has certainly evolved in relation to a constant pressure to succumb to the economics of the pragmatic liberal tradition -- that is, Hamilton’s and Madison’s desire for urbanization and the total commercialization of society. Though the American Revolution was fought by the everyman in the hope of ...
obtaining the "right" to pursue happiness in a radically Jeffersonian way, it is, in reality, non-agrarian elitist commercial capitalism that necessarily roots this "pursuit." Indeed, it is Jefferson’s notion of the “pursuit of happiness” -- as explicitly opposed to the classical and medieval idea of a "summum bonum" or the "attainment of happiness" -- that ironically grounds the rationalization of American society. The reason for this is complex. Recall that Madison’s Montesquieuenean economic philosophy took root because Americans refused the old colonial moral economy after the Revolution. Indeed, as we learned previously, early on in American history, supernatural visions of world renewal got overtaken by some rather un-Jeffersonian notions of constant economic improvement. Essentially, Americans were overcome with a bourgeois desire to pursue their happiness with ever-increasing amounts of ever-changing goods. Remember too that Madison’s philosophy allowed this “overtaking” to flourish because his Constitution united, institutionally speaking, a vast expanse of land and resources with no agrarian restrictions on capitalist avarice.

But Americans did not like the results of their own greed. Only fifty years after the signing of the Constitution, a Romantic rebellion against Hamilton’s and Madison’s political sciences surfaced. The concerns of this movement were perhaps best summarized by Emerson's famous dictum that, "Things are in the saddle and ride

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242 Ibid.


mankind." Emerson, Thoreau, and the New England literati generally, urged Americans to reclaim their "collective soul" and reawaken a sense of imagination and love for nature. The slow but certain deadening of 'poetics' in early American culture was clear to most: indeed, foreign observers from England, France, and Germany were often struck by the way in which education among (white) Americans so clearly deemphasized topics of “heart and soul.”

For Thoreau,

The contemplation of undisturbed nature was… an antidote to the industrializing city where people "have become tools to their tools," living a spiritless routine of working and consuming as automata of the machine and the market without any real goals. The laborer, claimed Thoreau, "has no time to be anything but a machine" working to the unstoppable turns of the clock and gear. [Similarly,] Hawthorne's story "Celestial Railroad" mock[ed] the cult of speed and ease that he believed had diverted Americans from their traditional painstaking pilgrimage through the Christian life.

Often, industrial workers shared these American intellectuals’ more Rousseauian doubts about the virtues of industrialism. Workers often used these intellectuals’ religious and political rhetoric to denounce their own working conditions. It became rather popular to claim that industrialization was “creating a new aristocracy of factory owners as haughty as those English whom the patriotic revolutionaries had defeated some fifty years earlier.”

245 Cross and Szostak. p. 142.
246 Ibid. p. 142.
247 Brown. p. 139.
248 Cross and Szostak. p. 142.
249 Ibid.
250 Ibid.
Obviously, despite such protestations, the rationalization of American society went on unabated. The kind of liberal capitalism that was (is) at the very heart of the Constitution simply outmaneuvered the otherwise popular Jeffersonian strain of American liberalism. Importantly, this victorious developmental path -- grounded as it was in Madisonianism -- not only followed the Hamiltonians’ Baconian instinct for modernization, but did so through Hamilton’s Hobbesian desire for executive domination of the nation’s economic and political systems.\textsuperscript{251} Indeed, the developmental dynamic between statism and commercialism exerted a tremendous influence on America’s political evolution long before the Industrial Revolution or even the Civil War. In chapter four I show how, from the beginning, Jefferson’s tradition tried to defend itself against the effects of Madison’s and Hamilton’s economics by going against its own antistatism.\textsuperscript{252}

But it was the Industrial Revolution that caused the rise of a centralized and truly technique-driven politics.\textsuperscript{253} At the time, questions of economic regulation and state-building were at a boiling point, as the previous generation of "patchwork" laissez faire solutions had failed.\textsuperscript{254} What this failure reflected was an attempt to balance a particular paradox; namely, that comfortable self-preservation and capitalist expansion are undergirded by both the need for technocracy and the modern ideal of free individuals


\textsuperscript{253} pp. 165-6.

\textsuperscript{254} Ibid.
doing as they please. “By transforming ideological conflicts into matters of expertise and efficiency,” “the bureaucratic remedy” promised the impossible -- to reconcile the values of radical individual freedom with the need for statism.\textsuperscript{255} Also, because by definition a government by technique suppresses the charismatic calling of the politician, Presidents were (and are) constrained by the demands of technocracy; that is to say that they must contend with a bureaucracy that sometimes operates outside of their moral beliefs and political mandates.\textsuperscript{256}

\textbf{v. a. Libertarianism and Egalitarianism}

One on-going theme in the previous sections that still needs a bit more elaboration is ‘liberalism.’ This section will explore just how multi-faceted liberalism really is. Greater specification of the exact dimensions of liberalism will help me to properly analyze the modern project and the American experiment in particular.

In sections i-iv it was argued that the liberalism of the early Enlightenment posited the primacy of individual autonomy over cultural, social, religious, and communal traditions. It was also shown that liberalism claims a universal understanding of human nature such that historical and cultural particularities usually become secondary in assessing "true" human needs, wants, and desires.\textsuperscript{257} I think the following presents a fair summary and insightful delineation of what we have discovered about liberal

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item Ibid.  
\item Ibid.  p. 289.  
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individualism thus far. Locke’s goal was to make “self-preservation” possible. He wanted each person to have a right to pursue a bourgeois lifestyle. So his philosophy is egalitarian in the sense that all have rights, but libertarian in the sense that each person’s economic and social outcome is going to be different because the nature of each person’s “pursuit” is different. In terms of egalitarian and libertarian ideals, Montesquieu’s philosophy is much the same as Locke’s, except that Montesquieu wanted the bourgeois lifestyle to create a society of factions that inspire in individuals the paranoia that some person or group will steal their property. He thought fear was the best way to protect a liberal system from being undermined. Bacon’s philosophy is egalitarian in the sense that no man is excluded from the benefits of the material abundance created by science and industry, but libertarian in the sense that individuals are free to have more property and goods than others. Hobbes’s philosophy is egalitarian in the sense that each person receives equal protection from others under the Leviathan, but libertarian in the sense that self-interest leads men to wish only themselves good, even in a social setting. Finally, Rousseau’s philosophy is egalitarian because all possibility of competition and economic distinction is erased. I do not think his philosophy contains a libertine element, except to say that the individual can be said to be “truly free” because he does not suffer from the vices of pride and envy.

v. b. American Liberal Individualism: liberty versus equality

Most essentially, the American experience of liberal individualism is aligned with a "procedural ethic" wherein each person has his own conception of the good life, and the government functions as the protector of his liberty -- that is, of his "right" to life and
property so that he can pursue his own definition of happiness.\textsuperscript{258} In this way, a governmentally endorsed idea of the common good is not acceptable within American liberalism; but a common conception of "rights" is vital to America’s own political self-understanding.\textsuperscript{259}

As noted in chapter one, Hartz argued that American liberalism attempts to protect and promote this common conception of rights in a very particular way. In American culture, he said, progress is seen in terms of egalitarianism or democracy being used as a means for achieving libertarian ideals, that is, individual liberty or capitalist opportunity. But the question is, “how has this tradition actually been achieved in American history”? The answer is found, in part, in the battle between Hamilton’s statist ideology and Jefferson’s antistatist ideology, as fought on the terrain of Madison’s “extended republic.” In chapter four I examine this phenomenon. But for now I think it is enough to say that, for example, Thomas Jefferson’s infamous embargo, Andrew Jackson’s Bank War, Abraham Lincoln’s Civil War, and Franklin Roosevelt’s New Deal were all egalitarian crusades that utilized a sweeping statism to expand individual liberty -- that is, create equal access to pursue capitalist opportunities. However, as we shall see below, there is far more to this story. Indeed, antistatism was the original home of American egalitarianism. How did this Romantic cause lose its own house? Also, what is often missed by scholars is the fact that social division and inequality are liberal tools that are used for protecting individual property rights and entrepreneurial opportunity in

\textsuperscript{258} Taylor. \textit{Philosophical Arguments}. p. 185.

\textsuperscript{259} Ibid. p. 187.
the America tradition. Indeed, anti-egalitarian biases such as classism, as well as racial and other ascriptive hierarchies, are every bit a part of American liberalism as their antipodes.

As I have argued throughout this chapter, the Revolutionary War was fought, in the popular and uneducated mind, and by the typical enlisted man, on mostly the assumption of establishing a Protestant nation with healthy, Jeffersonian doses of a vague but promised economic populism. However, most of the elites who had created a good deal of this propaganda had quite different intentions in mind. There can be no doubt that during the 1780s a very large proportion of the nation’s elite were alarmed by the fact that the republic was becoming a full-fledged democracy. The "father" of the Constitution, James Madison, being part of the founding vanguard, worried greatly about many of the "overly" democratic trends that developed in the nation in the immediate post-revolutionary period. During the Revolution, the majority of states wrote highly democratic constitutions that delivered political power “to the most immediate representatives of the majority of voters.” These constitutions were composed by men whose modest social rank would have, in colonial times, excluded them from high office.

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260 See also sec. III, pt. ii of this chapter.

261 For an extensive discussion of these biases see Rogers M. Smith’s "Beyond Tocqueville, Myrdal, and Hartz: The Multiple Traditions in America." (The American Political Science Review, vol. 87, no. 3, Sep. 1993). pp. 549-66. Smith does not, of course, believe that these traditions are truly liberal.

262 Banning. pp. 5-6.

263 Ibid.

264 Ibid.

265 Ibid.

266 Ibid.
These new leaders were elected annually by an expansive and now demanding electorate. So, not surprisingly, these politicians were forced to respond to the post-war economic depression “with policies that favored debtors over creditors or postponed public obligations in order to provide relief.”

An ever-growing number of the conservative, established elite were highly contemptuous of these populist politicians; and men like Hamilton considered many of their measures, which included postponing taxes, printing paper money, and impeding the payment of debts, fundamental violations of those liberties and rights the Revolution had fought to protect. In sum, well-established leaders and the nation’s most influential citizens began to question whether their natural rights, either in principle or practice, could be made secure in a nation with such a Rousseauean political spirit.

For Madison, the Articles of Confederation were to blame for the elite’s growing discontent: this document, he said, was too supportive of a weak central government, and it allowed each state too much autonomy. Madison believed that with a very strong federal government taking power away from states, and with a much larger and economically faction-filled union, the masses would cease to agree on much of anything, and anti-democratic and anti-egalitarian measures would thereby be sufficiently empowered to protect property and other rights. Madison introduced these ideas in
Federalist No. 10. Thus, most especially Madison, but also Hamilton -- in opposition to Jefferson -- led the new country to a practical, philosophic space that redefined words such as 'democracy,' 'republic,' and 'federation' in order to "rescue" America from majoritarian "tyranny."²⁷³ In sum, Federalists like Hamilton and Madison were untrusting of the democratic nature of the new nation because its success required an optimistic view of the majority’s ability to avoid a de-evolution into mobocracy. The solution, constitutionally, to the problem of mobocracy ended up being both a strong dose of Hobbesian statism and Montesquieuean factionalism from within an “extended republic.”

It can be said then that concerns over protecting property rights yielded a constitutional system wherein factionalism encouraged classism and elitism over and against egalitarianism and populism. Part and parcel of this large republic of factions was the joining together of not only radically different views of state size and function, but wildly dissimilar views on the issue of slavery as well. As we shall see in chapter four, with such a divisive system in place, achieving egalitarian policies required drastic extensions of federal and especially executive power.

More generally, for some critics, such factionalism makes it difficult for American liberalism to progress, to gather up the moral and communal resources necessary to pass "strong laws" to prohibit the "tyranny of the majority" against, say, women, gays, and racial and other minorities. Likewise, such factious liberalism, it is argued, often strains the nation’s ability to inhibit the "tyranny of the minority” against the economic wishes of the majority, as with, say, living-wages or universal healthcare. American liberal individualism’s openness to factious enmity tends, therefore, to leave

²⁷³ Ibid. pp. 7 & 10.
individuals vulnerable to the tyranny of the minority by way of a weakening of democracy, and vulnerable to the tyranny of the majority by way of a weakening of republicanism (the ancient ideal of the government taking an active interest in the character of its citizens). Put differently, the moral resources for knowing how, why, and when to protect minorities from majorities, and majorities from minorities (through either statist or antistatist measures) can be difficult in a system that insists on 'faction' in the place of virtue.

vi. a. Progress

This section will pull together from previous sections of this chapter certain insights on the theme of ‘progress,’ and then briefly elaborate on them so as to make clear how liberalism’s more optimistic and pragmatic theories of progress have played themselves out in modern and American history.

In the first five sections of this chapter we said the following things about progress: first, Enlightenment thinkers worked to abolish premodern views of God so that humanity could progress into an age of Reason. Second, the pragmatic political sciences of Locke and Montesquieu tried to prove that humanity’s needs were best met through a bourgeois lifestyle. Third, the Romantic political sciences argued just the opposite. Fourth, universal progress was premised on forcing these kinds of views onto the whole world. Fifth, progress became synonymous with the rationalization of the political and economic realms.

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A good deal of Francis Bacon's scientism can be seen as the penultimate summation of the philosophy and praxis of most modern notions of progress. As noted in previous sections, the primary aim of Bacon's philosophy was to promote inventions “for the relief of man’s estate.” He desired the abolition of the typical ancient and medieval view that technology and invention were to be treated with suspicion.²⁷⁵ Some argue that for Bacon there was no God and no ultimate purpose or meaning to life except to build a technological 'Atlantis.’²⁷⁶ Bacon desired a threefold distinction among citizens: namely, philosophers, inventors/technicians, and the public.²⁷⁷ He believed that the most important of these three groups was, by far, the second, because scientific research was the key to building his Atlantis. These technicians would (generally speaking) know nothing of the ugly truth about the cosmos or humanity’s meaningless place in it: rather, this army of inventors would become preoccupied with technique as an end unto itself, unwittingly cooperating with Bacon's ideology of progress.²⁷⁸

vi. b. The Enacting of American Progress

As argued in previous sections, the American culture's general obsession with the idea of "progress" stems, in part, from the adoption of a Baconian idealism that promises the possibility of overcoming human limitation through technology.²⁷⁹ Recall too that Madison’s Constitution, though it was not attempting to build Bacon’s Atlantis, strongly

²⁷⁶ Ibid. p. 342.
²⁷⁷ Ibid. p. 343.
²⁷⁸ Ibid.
²⁷⁹ Tocqueville argues something along similar lines in vol. 2: pt.1, ch.I, of Democracy in America.
reinforced America’s technologically-driven Redeemer Nation complex. Indeed, as we have already seen, the actual and concrete structure of "progress" in America took the more Hamiltonian industrial-elitist route, and moved away from the more Jeffersonian, agrarian, and democratic path. I want now to explore this fact more deeply.

Hamilton’s Baconian industrialism faced various populist and agrarian opposition movements from the beginning of the republic until the early twentieth century. As we saw earlier, literary elites and the mass of Americans who worked in factories were rebelling against industrialism only fifty years after the ratification of the Constitution. But the heart of such opposition is found in “the great farmer movements of the nineteenth century.” These “were upwellings of protest against the system of power growing out of the raw and turbulent capitalism of the era.” This new “system of power” was not only undemocratic but anti-democratic; it was widely seen as destroying the possibility of creating a just and humane society. “According to Populism, there was an inverse relation between industrialism and freedom, because the machine was being made to exploit rather than serve man.” So how can it be that Jeffersonian sentiments were both so popular and yet ultimately defeated? Unraveling the mystery begins with two observations: first, the Lockean principles of “self-government” and “comfortable self-preservation” are different things, both of which are extremely popular

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282 Ibid.

283 Pollack. pp. 11-12.
with the American people. Second, these two principles do not, in practice, complement each other’s goals very well. To understand how this is so, some background is needed.

In the early republic, it was not terribly unreasonable for some of the elite to hope and even expect that white male citizens could and would be about equal in their resources -- namely, property, knowledge, and overall social standing. Seven out of every ten workers were employed in agriculture. Consequently, the average citizen’s capacity to influence political decisions was seen as roughly equal. Hamilton, however, had a very different dream for the young nation. Throughout the Federalist he makes clear that commercial industrialism, not agrarianism, is the proper earmark of a truly enlightened society. Anti-Federalists predicted accurately that if agrarian idealism and Hamilton’s brand of non-agrarian commercialism lived side by side, the latter would be the undoing of the former. But no one, not even Hamilton, could have fully foreseen how the modern corporation -- as the outgrowth of his own economic ideals -- would so thoroughly destabilize Jefferson’s Romantic politics. Indeed, commercial and corporate enterprises generate automatically inequalities among citizens in not only wealth and income, but also social standing, education, occupational prestige, and political influence. And, most Americans are employed by corporations. Thus, the "foreboding anticipations" of the early republic’s farmers can be seen as an intuition

285 Ibid.
286 See esp. No. 12.
288 Ibid.
289 Ibid.
that the nation’s engagement of bourgeois ideals would eventually overwhelm the ideals of self-government, equality, and personal autonomy. Indeed, no one doubts that individuals' lives are not self-determined when ruled by industrial or corporate goals because their income and property are subject to the dictates of market supply and demand, not by the "right" to live as they please.

The Industrial Revolution is traditionally seen as the "official" end of Jefferson’s agrarian idealism. But even before the Industrial Revolution or, for that matter, the Civil War, presidents like John Adams, James Monroe, and John Q. Adams were building up the nation’s infrastructure by playing off of the American people’s own Baconian inclinations. The people’s strong distaste for the inequality that resulted from these “inclinations” was eventually beat out by their own love of bourgeois “self-preservation.” Business and government elites in the late 1800’s spent the time and money needed to make any lingering Romantic doubts about industrialism go away: they told the American people what they had always wanted to hear: that somehow, incredibly, Jefferson’s egalitarian agrarianism was not really in opposition to industrialism. By 1905 the Supreme Court had come to ensconce in law the Madisonian principle that the right to profit and private property was superior to the goal of first ensuring political equality and self-governance through land giveaways and the like.

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290 Ibid. p. 72.
291 Ibid.
292 Ibid. p. 73-5.
On a similar note, the cumulative effect of two hundred thirty years of the American pursuit of “comfortable self-preservation” has resulted -- ultimately -- in a severe depletion of America's so-called "social capital." That is to say that economic progress can be understood as being quite counterproductive to socio-political progress inasmuch as previously high participatory rates by the average American in civic, community, and religious groups have dropped precipitously because economic “progress” has caused Americans to work longer hours for less money, increased mobility, and saturated the typical home with certain technologies, all of which tend to sap most of the incentive to be politically-minded. Such commercially-induced civic sloth seems to raise questions about American economic "progress" as it relates to the American desire for self-government. Thomas Jefferson predicted, in a sense, this state of affairs when he famously worried aloud that Americans would soon become so consumed with money-making that they would turn lazy in their responsibility to be ever-vigilant in defending their right to govern themselves. In the next and final section of this chapter we will look at why this worry of Jefferson’s is Madison’s Montesquieuean ideal.

vii. a. The New Structure and Meaning of Society

Based on the insights gained from previous sections, this section will bring together and examine different Enlightenment and American views of the purpose and definition of ‘society.’

As we discovered previously, Montesquieu changed Lockean liberalism by arguing that the attainment of social peace is made possible through the disquietude of

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the passions. A gnawing sense of "uneasiness" in social life reflects the fact that people are living in liberty. Commercial avarice and economic factions make people vigilant against those who might take away their property. However, Rousseau rebelled against this kind of liberalism. He argued that in such a competitive and greed-driven system, scarce resources are, in essence, auctioned off to the highest bidders: so, the rich end up richer and the poor poorer. In sum, the many work for the benefit of the few. And, "since these few control the laws, the many do not even enjoy the protection for which they are supposed to have entered into society." Thus, Rousseau believed that if "men are to be free and not the pawns of [the] interest groups in power," society cannot be anchored in avaricious disquietude or factionalism.

vii. b. The American Society of Individuals

Put plainly, Madison agreed with Montesquieu and disagreed with Rousseau. Madison believed that government must, above all else, safeguard the elite’s private property rights. More broadly, Madison’s definition of ‘citizenship’ is this: individuals should engage tirelessly in the pursuit of economic gain. For Madison, a citizen’s attachment to the community as a whole is merely instrumental to his selfish ends.

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295 Ibid. p. 87.

296 Ibid. p. 90.


298 Ibid.


300 David F. Epstein. The Political Theory of 'The Federalist'. (Chicago: The University of Chicago
Given Madison’s (and Hamilton’s) constitutional enshrining of this cynical politics of self-interest, Jefferson’s dream of a nation built on what can be seen as more Rousseauean themes was, to say the least, made problematical.\textsuperscript{301} Indeed, the possibility of establishing “radical democracy” in America is very much undermined by what I consider to be this cynical politics’ most remarkable feature, namely, its ability to abolish any critical sense of class consciousness.

Madison, of course, wanted America divided mostly along economic lines because he believed that the amount and type of property people have most influences their world-view. However, such distinctions, he said, also create a bad thing, awareness of one’s class.\textsuperscript{302} This “awareness” of belonging either to “the many” or “the few” was the main cause of social strife in the ancient republics, he argued.\textsuperscript{303} Madison believed that the large commercial republic provided a new political opportunity: to end the struggles that stem from differences over amounts of property by encouraging the struggles that stem from differences over kinds of property.\textsuperscript{304} In this new republic, an individual’s immediate kind of economic interest or occupation is the paramount concern in life; so the wide degrees of difference in amounts of wealth become unimportant to most. Madison believed that in a large country with countless factions, the overall economic picture of society would be lost on the individual: the only things the average citizen would know would be his own circle of interested relationships and any other

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item Banning. pp. 5-6.
\item Ibid. pp. 648-9.
\item Ibid.
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factions which immediately impact his life. For these reasons, the individual would never think to advance the general cause of the rich or the poor.\textsuperscript{305} Put differently, “The struggle of the various interests [or factions] veils the difference between the few and the many. In particular, the interest of the many as such can be fragmented into sundry narrower, more limited interests, each seeking immediate advantage.”\textsuperscript{306} However, chapter four shows how presidents engage their regimes’ interests in co-opting Jefferson’s populism and Hamilton’s nationalism in order to restrain the effects of Madison’s factionalism. Nevertheless, if I am not mistaken, constitutionally speaking, no other nation is so explicitly conceived on the “benefits” of factionalism. No other nation’s politics is so impacted by a theoretician who actually sought to increase factions for the good of society.

Finally, as noted above, Madison knew that his “solution” to the “problem” of populism and majoritarianism required all people to ceaselessly seek their own immediate private gain.\textsuperscript{307} Tocqueville claimed that this way of engaging life made for certain serious social pathologies. He argued that the "relentless pursuit" of material comfort and wealth had a dramatically negative effect on the psyche of the typical American.\textsuperscript{308} He said that because all of the avenues for satisfying well-being had been opened to all (white males), the competition for resources necessarily overpowered all else in America. He argued that however much the individual American may have, he nevertheless can only think “of the vast store of goods which constantly eludes him; this

\textsuperscript{305} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{306} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{307} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{308} Marvin Zetterbaum. "Alexis de Tocqueville" in History of Political Philosophy. p. 722.
thought ‘fills him with anxiety, fear, and regret and keeps his mind in ceaseless trepidation.’” Americans, Tocqueville argued, "clutch to everything and hold fast to nothing.” This state of constant Montesquieuean disquietude, which Madison had purposely engineered fifty years before Tocqueville’s time, troubled Tocqueville in a nearly Rousseauian way: he argued that there could never be a “technological solution to the problem of well-being” because “the desires of men increase with what they feed upon; there can never be enough for all.” Had Madison heard this complaint, I suggest his reply would have been, “Precisely.”

vii. c. Conclusion

Chapter one promised a three-layered theory of development that would reasonably integrate some of the cultural and institutional perspectives within the field of APD. It argued that the reason why these two outlooks cannot currently incorporate each other’s insights is because they lack a basic understanding of what really underlies America’s development as a whole, Enlightenment philosophy. This chapter constitutes the successful building of the first two layers of my theory. It interpreted the contours of the intellectual traditions that make up the Enlightenment. Then it showed how the patterns and facts of America’s political and cultural development result from the interaction of three different versions of Enlightenment thinking, namely, Jeffersonianism, Hamiltonianism, and Madisonianism. It interpreted and defined these three liberalisms by identifying the different ways in which they reflect the pragmatic and

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309 Ibid. p. 720.
310 Democracy in America.
311 Zetterbaum. p. 720.
Romantic outlooks of the early modern period. The third and final layer of my project is found in chapter four. There I will integrate the findings of this chapter with presidential regime analysis. Chapter three simply introduces the logic of chapter four’s integration.
i. Regimes

This chapter is a simple introduction to the third and final layer of my theory of development, which is found in chapter four. The third layer is a matter of integrating my understanding of American philosophy and culture with institutional analysis. I argue that Jeffersonianism, Hamiltonianism, and Madisonianism shape the way presidents engage the power of their office. The presidency has been, historically, the main institutional vehicle or channel through which national political change has been realized. \(^{312}\) The presidency has always stood out “as the chief point of reference for evaluating the polity as it moves through time and space”; it has always been the central, visible focal point of both the received order of things and popular demands for change. \(^{313}\) Thus, “Disruption of the status quo ante is basic to the politics presidents make and, beyond that, to the dynamics of American political development in the largest sense.” \(^{314}\) But again, my theory of integration is rooted in the idea that development is not really about the power of the executive branch per se, but the philosophies that form,


\(^{313}\) Ibid. p. 20.

\(^{314}\) Ibid. p. 4.
limit, and mold demands for change and presidential behavior. In a sense, my approach to development is akin to the way a classic play both stays the same and is always being re-interpreted: America’s philosophic traditions are like the script, and the presidency is like the unique talents of generations of actors attempting the lead role.

Of course, the question is, which presidents do I study to prove my theory right? Moreover, in itself, “the presidency” is a vast topic with many schools of thought. To narrow things down quite a bit, I have focused my energies on one definition and three questions. First the definition: when presidents successfully channel a demand to disestablish the nation’s major, standing ideological commitments, they set up what is called a “regime,” which is a new set of national commitments that directly impacts policy and institutional organization for at least a generation.315 Now the questions: which presidents have pushed through these kinds of paradigm shifts in America’s politics? What happened after these regimes were established? And why did these regimes end?

To answer the first question, my survey of the relevant literatures suggests that there is unanimous support for the idea that Thomas Jefferson established a regime.316 No one questions that Andrew Jackson did as well.317 And Abraham Lincoln and Franklin Roosevelt are in the same boat.318 There is, however, a question of whether


317 Magliocca. See esp. ch. 2’s discussion of presidential reconstruction.

other presidents should be added to the list. I do not take on this controversy because there is no reason to. I do not need to apply my theory of integration to anything other than the consensus of presidential scholars to prove my integrative model to be a good one.

Answering the second question about what happened during the regimes is a bit trickier. To simplify things I decided to pick out one president who, after a regime was established, most elaborated on its premises. I took this idea from Skowronek’s The Politics Presidents Make. For Jefferson I chose Monroe. Monroe’s presiding over the “era of good feeling” makes him the obvious choice. His actions in office were sweeping and bold for the time, and he attempted to articulate the country’s political commitments as a devout disciple of the Jeffersonian religion. For Andrew Jackson I chose James Polk. Not only did Polk identify himself as a true Jacksonian, but his program of Manifest Destiny was a clear and dramatic elaboration of the kind of populism Jackson’s reconstruction was rooted in. For Abraham Lincoln I chose Theodore Roosevelt. Roosevelt’s innovative and bold program of bureaucratic management was not only a reaction to the domestic chaos caused by the Industrial Revolution, but a simultaneous attempt to save the Republican party he inherited from Lincoln from becoming politically irrelevant. TR’s “radical-conservatism” was so bold, however, that it could be considered not “orthodox-innovation” but a “reconstruction” of the nation’s politics.

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319 When I researched this question of regime elaboration, I found it impossible to come to conclusions that were both sensible and yet different than Skowronek’s.


However, I do not think it is fair to say that he overturned the country’s basic political commitments. If anything, he tried to kill off the alternative visions that were being put forth by both left-wing radicals and Conservatives.\textsuperscript{323} For Franklin Roosevelt I chose Lyndon Johnson. This case was the easiest to decide because Johnson’s “Great Society” program was a clear-cut and sweeping elaboration of the New Deal.\textsuperscript{324}

Answering the last question about the end of regimes is a matter of looking at which president in a given regime comes immediately before a new regime is established. Andrew Jackson’s ability to reconstruct America’s politics was premised on defeating John Q. Adams and the direction he had taken Jefferson’s Democratic-Republican party in.\textsuperscript{325} So I chose Adams as the final president of Jefferson’s regime. Lincoln’s reconstruction was premised on ending the chaos that ensued from Franklin Pierce’s decision to align Jackson’s Democratic party with the repeal of the Missouri Compromise.\textsuperscript{326} So, for all practical intents and purposes, it makes sense to see Franklin Pierce, not James Buchanan, as the disjunctive force behind the collapse of Jackson’s regime.\textsuperscript{327} Franklin Roosevelt’s reconstruction was premised on defeating Herbert Hoover and the iron grip the Republicans had on the nation’s politics.\textsuperscript{328} So I chose Hoover as the last president of Lincoln’s regime. I should add that, using the definition

\begin{footnotes}
\item[323] Ibid.
\end{footnotes}
of ‘regime’ above, chapter four argues that Franklin Roosevelt’s regime has not ended because no one has successfully disestablished his recasting of the terms of America’s politics, either ideationally or institutionally.\textsuperscript{329} It is true that the Democratic party has suffered many national defeats and rejections since Roosevelt’s time, but even severe electoral setbacks do not indicate, in my judgment, the end of a regime. Once a regime’s ideas guide the everyday operations of government, then the regime is set until new ideas remake the way the government runs. The ideas of a regime do not need majority support to continue operating.\textsuperscript{330}

\textbf{ii. Regimes and Culture}

Finally, I want to give the reader a preview of the main developmental pattern found in chapter four. The pattern is this: Madisonianism ensures that neither Jeffersonianism nor Hamiltonianism can become, whole and complete, the nation’s sole reigning politics: this phenomenon is the root cause of regime development. Indeed, in Madison’s extended republic of factions, the Jeffersonians and Hamiltonians can never fully eliminate each other’s influence over the nation. Historically, the Jeffersonians are constantly looking for ways to save their ideals of antistatism, social unity, and agrarian egalitarianism from the Hamiltonians’ industrial statist elitism. But, because Madison’s constitutional support of bourgeois commercialism and anti-majoritarianism undermines so much of the American-Romantic agenda, Jeffersonians engage in a continuous fight

\textsuperscript{329} Skowronek sees things differently. He argues that Carter is the “end” of the regime because the American people actually rejected “Liberalism.” But he affirms that Reagan failed to recast America’s politics. When a politics dies but its institutional arrangements don’t, Skowronek calls this the “waning of regimes.” In any case, I think the average American has rejected only the idea of big government Liberalism, not its practice. All of the scientific polling data I’ve seen suggests that the essentials of the New Deal/Great Society paradigm remain very popular with most Americans.

\textsuperscript{330} See footnotes 4, 6, and 18.
for their populist ideals with the only tool available, the presidency. An historical pattern develops early on, wherein the limits on government power imposed by Jeffersonian antistatism are lifted to establish more unity among the people through democratic social and economic policies.\textsuperscript{331} Thus, the general dominance of Hamilton’s Hobbesian and Baconian industrial-statism becomes institutionally glued to policy concerns that are rather Rousseauean-egalitarian in their outlooks.

Furthermore, throughout the history of Madison’s “extended republic,” a great many self-interested factions and typically two loosely-fit-together parties group themselves around the different elements of the uncomfortable philosophic marriage outlined above, and they do so in eclectic ways because old dreams meld with changing circumstances and trends. For example, there might be four different antistatist factions: one that is pro-industrialism but anti-egalitarianism; another that is the exact opposite; another that approves of both egalitarianism and industrialism; and another that disapproves of both. Not surprisingly then, when factions come together to form a regime and reach a consensus on how to engage “the marriage” to make it more amenable to their agendas, the result is a highly fragile interlacing of interests. Thus, when a given president exercises his power to address the problems of the nation, he tends, not surprisingly, to rip apart the regime’s consensus.\textsuperscript{332} This cyclical phenomenon reflects the constitutional power of Madison’s Montesquieuean philosophy to ignite regime change through factionalism. America’s politics develop then in relation to “the marriage” -- that is, the jumbled aggregation of Jefferson’s, Hamilton’s, and Madison’s

\textsuperscript{331} Morone says something similar in \textit{Democratic Wish}. p. 13.

\textsuperscript{332} Except for FDR’s regime. (Again, Morone has a similar thought. \textit{Democratic Wish}. p. 18. See also pp. 25-6.)
unique approaches to what I characterize as four basic streams of thought in early modernity: the Hobbesian tradition, the Montesquieuean tradition, the Rousseauean tradition, and the Baconian tradition.
*This chapter presents the third and final layer of my project, which is an experiment in joining together institutional and cultural theories of American political development. I show how Jefferson’s liberalism is reflected in the way in which regimes move toward the Romantic side of early modern thinking, and how Hamilton’s and Madison’s approaches to liberalism are reflected in the way in which regimes move more toward the pragmatic side of early modern thinking. I also demonstrate that regime policies reflect the different ways in which these liberal traditions participate in the "Liberal Protestant Metanarrative"; that is, America’s “manifest destiny” to redeem the world for God through Reason, science, technology, and capitalism. (Note: italicized footnotes refer to my own analysis of modernity and the American tradition as presented in the seven sections of chapter two. For example: Ch. 2: i; ii.)

i. The First Regime: Thomas Jefferson, James Monroe, and John Quincy Adams

Thomas Jefferson was the natural choice of Anti-Federalists and others to lead a popular groundswell of opposition to Alexander Hamilton's domination of the nation's
first administration. Jefferson and, curiously, James Madison formalized this movement by founding the (Democratic-) Republican party. I say “curious” because, as we discovered in chapter two, Madison was opposed to Jefferson’s virtuous, unified, egalitarianism. However, we also learned that Madison opposed what can be described as Hamilton’s “president-king” model of statist nationalism.\textsuperscript{333} So why did Madison, a Federalist, “convert” to Republicanism? The answer, perhaps, is that he believed he had to balance the nation’s politics away from Hamilton’s form of nationalism,\textsuperscript{334} which was undermining the factional principles Madison had rooted the nation in. As we shall see, Hamilton did come close to quashing all political competition. So Madison, it seems to me, simply wanted more than one viable ideology in the republic. This makes sense because his Montesquieuean political philosophy demanded factionalism above all else. As this chapter will show, whatever the case may be about Madison’s famous “switch” in allegiances, this change did not lessen the developmental impact of his pragmatic philosophy on America’s regimes. My most basic argument made below is that Jefferson’s Romantic revolution against Hamilton’s pragmatic approach to running the country was ultimately undermined by Madison’s “extended republic.” Indeed, Jefferson’s antistatism and agrarianism fell by the wayside as he desperately tried to make social and economic unity a reality in the midst of a vast, diverse, and factious nation.

During George Washington’s administration, Hamilton came up with a plan for a credit-based national economy. He believed that building up the nation industrially

\textsuperscript{333} Banning. \textit{Sacred Fire}. p. 296. See also, Lance Banning. \textit{Jefferson and Madison: three conversations from the Founding}. (Madison: Madison House, 1995.)

\textsuperscript{334} Ibid.
required making available a large pool of money that could encourage and subsidize the investments of the wealthy, as well as pay for public works (internal improvements). Such “debt servicing” was, obviously, in the interest of the commercial elite. More specifically, Hamilton and his Federalist followers wanted the federal government to build up America’s economic power through low-interest loans from a national bank, and by making America’s biggest companies grow stronger through an exclusive and guaranteed relationship with British manufacturers.\textsuperscript{335} This system, they thought, would certainly secure a healthy future for the fledging republic.\textsuperscript{336} However, this plan created a governing network of influence that was highly elitist. In fact, it was a plutocratic scheme: the government elite would grow more powerful in order to empower the business elite. The plan reminded Americans too much of the British system they had just rejected with the Revolution.\textsuperscript{337} Thus, Hamilton's ideas enveloped the nation in what ended up being a vicious ideological battle over the "true" meaning of the Constitution.\textsuperscript{338} Indeed, Republicans and Federalists had very different ideas about how to make America’s political and economic system truly “enlightened.”\textsuperscript{339} The Hamiltonians' version of liberal industrial capitalism was confronted by the liberal idealism of the


\textsuperscript{337} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{338} Skowronek. Politics. p. 64.

\textsuperscript{339} Ch. 2: iv; v. See also Susan Dunn’s Jefferson Second Revolution: the election of 1800 and the triumph of republicanism. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 2004). p. 58.
Jeffersonians, the "popular voice," and the "vast majority," which refused the undemocratic nature of the plan. 340

When, under Washington's administration, the British began to interfere with American shipping, Hamilton, in an effort to save his economic plan, sent John Jay to London; what Jay brought back was a treaty that formalized America's subordinate relationship to Britain. 341 After Washington's administration ended, John Adams took over the presidency. Adams decided to make Washington's cabinet and policies, including the Jay Treaty, his own, so as to make an unqualified statement of political continuity. 342 Adams was a moderate Federalist who abhorred a good deal of Hamilton's economic plan, but Adams's moderation was overcome by his acknowledgement of the simple fact that the legitimacy of his presidency depended on upholding Washington's commitments. 343 These commitments reflected the Hamiltonians' rather Hobbesian understanding of the form and purpose of government, and their highly Baconian disinterest in promoting an egalitarian and agrarian economy. 344

When the Jay Treaty forced America into confrontations with Britain's enemy, France, Adams had to go along with Hamilton's highly statist war measures, which created an expensive and expansive land army, as well as highly repressive laws against

340 Dunn. See ch. 4.

341 Ibid. Ch. 1.

342 Skowronek. Politics. p. 66.

343 Ibid. See also Peter Onuf's The Mind of Thomas Jefferson. (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2007). Ch. 1.

344 Ch. 2: v, vi.
aliens and critics of the government.³⁴⁵ By 1798, Adams's administration had enough power to actually forcibly eliminate all popular opposition to the Federalists’ “trickle-down” economic plan. Adams also had the power to force America, as a British ally, to go to war with Spain.³⁴⁶ These wars with France and Spain would not have been aimed at achieving, as the Jeffersonians wanted, a singular and powerful role for America in world politics; rather, it would have been the result of the Federalists’ practice of making America a subordinate ally of Britain.³⁴⁷

Significantly, Adams's cabinet, under Hamilton's direction, and against Adams's explicit orders, plotted to make Hamilton the commander of the newly expanded army.³⁴⁸ This scheme took the form of the cabinet traveling to Mount Vernon behind Adams's back; there, Washington agreed with them and demanded that Hamilton be placed in charge of the army. And, as if to demonstrate the exact extent to which his political legitimacy did truly rest with the authority of the retired general, Adams capitulated to the directive.³⁴⁹ However, to regain some semblance of control, Adams eventually and momentously decided to strike out on his own. “Announcing in February of 1799 that he intended to press for peace with France, he reversed his cabinet's consensus, broke openly with the Hamiltonians, and wrenched the nation away from world war and domestic chaos.” “When push came to shove and Adams seized control in his own right, his own compatriots charged him with betrayal, and he went to the nation having repudiated the

³⁴⁵ Cunningham. Jefferson. Ch. 2.
³⁴⁶ Ibid.
³⁴⁷ Dunn. Ch. 1.
³⁴⁸ Ibid.
very system he seemed to represent." Unable to create a convincing and coherent narrative that accounted for his independent actions as an affiliated leader, he moved his party into a crippling state of disarray.

However, Adams’s move for political independence did nothing to abate the hatred Republicans had for him. Why? The Republicans were unforgiving because they were still fuming over Adams's policies, which rejected Jefferson’s more Romantic view of "good government." Jefferson could not forget that during the French crisis, the entirety of the federal government, including the army, had been used to undermine states’ rights and personal liberty. Such laws were contrary to what he and the Republicans believed the Revolution had intended to establish: a "truly" liberal federal government, defined necessarily by its weakness -- that is, by its inability to take away rights, such as free speech. For the Jeffersonians, rights were entitlements given by Nature, not offered conditionally by a highly centralized governmental authority. Similarly, the Federalists' efforts "on behalf of a small band of creditor-speculators" appeared to Republicans as highly counterrevolutionary because they were contrary to that vision of liberalism that emphasized(s) "egalitarian means for libertarian ends"; that is, a socio-economic system bent on supporting a populist, antistatist, and virtuous

351 Ibid.
352 Ch. 2: i.
354 McDonald. p. 13-38; Ch. 2: v; vi.
355 Ch. 2: ii; v.
356 Skowronek. Politics. p. 68.
agrarianism in order to achieve self-governance. The Republicans had then what can be described as a more Rousseauean vision of liberal politics, a vision rooted in the idea that commercial and governmental elites cannot help but to become corrupted by greed and enrich themselves by robbing individuals of the benefits of an egalitarian social system.

What’s most interesting to me about the war and economic plan is that it managed to undermine (at least temporarily) Madison’s hope of abolishing class conflict through obsessively self-interested economic factions. Indeed, Hamilton managed to stir up something along the lines of a class conscious majoritarian faction against the nation's economic elite. By working to make the nation large and factious, such a development is precisely what Madison had hoped the new nation could avoid. In sum, in the early days of the republic, the age-old struggle between "the many and the few" materialized because certain Rousseauean-democratic ideals overwhelmed the Montesquieuenean system of faction Madison had put in place to negate the desire for popular revolution. In this way, when the Hamiltonians constructed a liberal government that neglected the modern values of self-determination and the protection of rights, as achieved through a decentralized government and an agrarian economic system, they unintentionally designed their own institutional demise. By emphasizing more Baconian values of

357 Ch. 2: v; vi.
358 Ibid. v.
359 Ibid. iv; v; vi.
360 Dunn. Chps. 1 & 4.
361 Ch. 2: iv; v; vi.
362 Ibid. See also Cogliano. Ch. 2.
industrial capitalism and Hobbesian statism, the Hamiltonians pitted themselves against "the many," who persisted (for a while) in perceiving themselves as belonging to a single faction.

The Republicans went to the people and proposed to repair the damage done to the Constitution by the Federalists. Republicans claimed that they would retrieve the original and true meaning of the document by substantially reducing the power of the federal government. Republicans added that in matters of international trade and economics, the Hamiltonians had essentially sold the nation to the British in order to benefit the rich. Republicans proposed what they believed to be the "truly" American vision of economic development: it was nothing less than a militant defense of liberal commercialism as necessarily upholding "self-sufficient freeholders living in locally controlled agricultural communities." This reconstructive agenda of Jefferson’s reflected his vision of modern progress, which speaks to, as noted above, a philosophy of capitalism that has as its end the protection of "natural rights." For Republicans, keeping political power local and the economic system rural and farm-based, ensured that a plutocracy could never be established in America.

The election of 1800 was rich with symbolic meaning: most Americans saw the rise of Jefferson to the presidency as the restoration of “true government” itself because most people saw no difference between the Constitution and Jefferson himself. In this

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363 Cunningham. Jefferson. p. 111. See also Cogliano. Ch. 2.
364 Ibid.
365 Skowronek. Politics. p. 69. Also, Ch. 2: vi.
366 Ch. 2: ii; v.
367 Onuf. Ch. 1; Cunningham. Jefferson. p. 81-100.
way, Jefferson’s “party building and institutional reconstruction became incontestable requirements for restoring national unity.” And because “The eradication of Federalism became the transcendence of partisan combat,” Jefferson's reconstruction reveals the practice of that optimistic strain of Enlightenment politics that saw the masses as essentially rational, and believed it plausible to "convert" nearly all citizens to the "enlightened path of legitimate government." Jefferson stigmatized the worst of the High Federalists as un-American. But he also offered his party to anyone who was at least minimally willing to convert and become "enlightened." Jefferson wanted to "transcend partisan combat" by way of "disinterested service," and thereby "maintain constitutional probity," or the idea that his actions as President were honestly non-political and "above all concerns regarding faction and interest." Such idealism connotes the pursuit of certain modern theories regarding the achievement of a factual, natural, and non-ideological basis for "rational governance." It should not be missed that this Romantic and harmonious premise of Jefferson's reconstruction was not very comfortable with the equally liberal, Madisonian preference for the intentional multiplication of economic and political interests.

More specifically, one of the ways in which Jefferson dismantled the power of the Federalist party was by ending the monopoly that wealth and birth had on the highest

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369 Dunn. See Ch. 3.
371 Ibid. p. 70.
372 Dunn. Ch. 1; Ch. 2: ii.
373 Ch. 2: vii.
ranks of the army. The idea that wealth, birth, and privilege ought to play no role in determining an individual’s lot in life was fundamental to the Enlightenment’s goal of throwing off the hierarchical traditions of the premodern past. Jefferson’s reconstructive policies thus reflect, in part, Rousseauian ideals of a society wherein government and business elites cannot corrupt citizens with money, prestige, position, or power. Jefferson’s reconstruction was also rooted in his decision to immediately repeal all internal taxes and sack most of the nation's tax collecting agents. He even ended the policy of a permanent and expansive national debt in order to stop the industrialization of the economy. These actions shrunk the national budget, and this meant the end of both the "regular" navy and army, which were a tremendous expense. He replaced them with "republican" state militias and coastal forts and gunboats. There is no doubt that these new policies in finance and defense moved the nation toward the Romantic ideal of decentralized agrarian republicanism, and away from Hamilton’s Baconian and Hobbesian outlook.

However, Jefferson’s dream of building this kind of republic was, as noted above, necessarily linked to his theory that all of the factions in the “extended republic” could be fitted into the “one-nation-one-party” ideal. This is why Jefferson's revolution was

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375 McDonald. See esp. Preface.
376 Ch. 2: v; vi.
378 Dunn. Chps. 3 & 5.
379 McDonald. p. 172.
predicated on an expansive extension of the Republican regime's base of support.\textsuperscript{380} This “expansion” required Jefferson to reverse the purist Republican course he had taken during his first year in office. Indeed, he worked hard to include in his agrarian coalition commercial and manufacturing interests -- especially in the South. He wanted to not only unify factions, but also show his capitalist credentials. Conscientiously and systematically, Jefferson attempted to balance and placate factions within his “big-tent” party by using the federal government to build-up home markets, and by working for federal involvement in the promotion of rivers, canals, roads, the arts, and education, even as he simultaneously (and ironically) renounced governmental centralization.\textsuperscript{381} Jefferson's hypocrisy concerning constitutional interpretation and his unrepublican expansion of the scope of federal power shows the strain he was under to find a way to implement his “non-partisan” science of coordinating interests. In a nation built on Madison’s constitutionally expansive version of Montesquieu’s thinking, Jefferson had to build bridges between the North and the South, the rich and the poor, Republicans and Federalists, and the commercial and agricultural sectors.

It was the Louisiana Purchase that became the single most important act in Jefferson's presidency. The Louisiana Purchase, like Jefferson’s federal works programs, was aimed at balancing and harmonizing especially economic factions. With the Purchase, Jefferson was trying to ensure a limitless future of economic development in two distinct ways. One was an agrarian republic that could perpetuate itself forever, and the other was getting control of the Mississippi River and New Orleans in order to build-

\textsuperscript{380} Skowronek. \textit{Politics}, p. 70.

\textsuperscript{381} Ibid. p. 78.
up a commercial empire.\textsuperscript{382} Pursuing this dramatically bifurcated course of action demonstrates, once again, just how determined Jefferson was to fully realize his Romantic political science of “one-nation-one-party.” And, like his internal improvements program, the price he paid for this steely determination came in the form of forsaking of his own "minimalist" views concerning executive power and constitutional interpretation. Such hypocrisy was outweighed in his mind -- and in the minds of most -- by the Purchase's ability to synthesize "perfectly" his program of political unity.\textsuperscript{383} The Louisiana Purchase was, in sum, an experiment in realizing a tensional and even paradoxical definition of modern progress; one which requires -- all at once -- governmental boldness, commercial capitalism, a local, simple, egalitarian agrarianism, antistatism, and a sense of "limitless" opportunity.\textsuperscript{384} The Louisiana Purchase thus reflects a liberalism that desires the unification of disparate developmental impulses, both political and economic, within early modern thinking. Not surprisingly then, this “unification” was done in an ironic fashion: through a central government actively upbuilding the supports necessary for maintaining -- in perpetuity -- the virtuous simplicity of a decentralized agrarianism.\textsuperscript{385} Again, this bizarre brand of philosophic syncretism was the result of Jefferson trying to put the round peg of his more Rousseauean revolution into the square hole of Madison’s more Montesquieuean nation. Because the Louisiana Purchase also reified the American society's belief in its "destiny" of "westward expansion," one detects in it the rather modern notion of the


\textsuperscript{383} Skowronek. \textit{Politics}, p. 79.

\textsuperscript{384} \textit{Ch. 2}: iv; v; vi.

\textsuperscript{385} Ibid. iii; vi.
West’s "divine charge" to rationalize nature and its "noble savages." The Purchase certainly reflects a liberal philosophy of commercial empire; one linked with the peculiarly modern fascination with “limitless futures.” The Purchase can be seen then as an attempt to institutionalize and permanently fuse together two elements of the American mythos: virtuous agrarianism and the idea of the constitutional rightness of, and need for, an outward bound American "mission" of universal rationalization.

Indeed, one of the reasons that the Jay Treaty helped ignite Jefferson’s revolution is that he wanted to assert American trading power across the globe and make the nation fiercely independent and influential in world affairs.

Jefferson’s reconstruction faced its most serious difficulties toward the end of his second term. When the British, in 1806, started interfering with American shipping, he refused all policy options that resembled the Jay Treaty. Jefferson eventually decided to restrict British imports. Then, in 1807, when both Britain and France cut off all normal relations with America, he instituted an embargo on all foreign trade. This embargo, he thought, would force America to be economically independent of other nations. But the scale and brutal federal enforcement of the embargo meant nothing less than the

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386 Ibid. iii. Also Onuf. p. 166.
387 Ibid.
388 Ibid.
389 Skowronek. Politics. p. 65. See also Ch. 2: III; Francis Cogliano’s Thomas Jefferson: reputation and legacy. (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2006). Ch. 8.
390 Jefferson refused to align America with France in his economic battle with Britain, and he refused to take sides with France with regard to its recently renewed hostilities with Britain.
central government running the economy. The embargo was, in essence, undermining Jefferson’s most cherished ideals, especially in regard to individual liberty and states’ rights.\(^{393}\) Nevertheless, Jefferson saw the crisis as an occasion to undergird what a progress-oriented and liberal economic structure was thought to be by most early Americans.\(^{394}\) Jefferson's embargo was intended to achieve a social and economic "harmony" capable of underwriting political unity.\(^{395}\) He argued that the embargo gave the nation the opportunity "to turn seriously to that policy which plants the manufacturer and the husbandmen side by side and establishes at every door that exchange of mutual labors and comforts which we have hitherto sought in distant regions."\(^{396}\) In different words, the embargo was aimed at supporting the liberal republican ideal of an essentially cooperative, equal, non-contentious, and complementary relationship between widely different social and economic groups.\(^{397}\) Thus, though Jefferson’s initial routing of the Federalists seemed to indicate a good amount of unity in the nation, the embargo, like the Louisiana Purchase, was intended to remake what was, in reality, a sharply divided nation.\(^{398}\) In fact, as the embargo went on, and as controversy over the measure grew, more and more political and economic factions and regions surfaced. But the biggest dividing line in Madison’s “extended republic” was between the North and the South --

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\(^{393}\) Ibid.

\(^{394}\) Ch. 2: iv; vi. See also Spivak. pp. x-xii & Ch. 2.

\(^{395}\) Spivak. See Preface and Ch. 1.

\(^{396}\) Skowronek. Politics. pp. 82-3.

\(^{397}\) Spivak. Ch. 1.

\(^{398}\) Skowronek. Politics. pp. 82-3.
the former despised the embargo, the latter supported it. The embargo certainly failed then to achieve the goal of unity. In no way did its draconian measures manage to unify the nation under one Romantic ideology.

In conclusion, Jefferson's institutional reconstruction, which included the Louisiana Purchase, the embargo, and other policies similarly aimed at killing off the Federalist party, embodies his acceptance of the modern belief that a natural, factual, "Science of Politics" is achievable. His promotion of a liberal theory of capitalism aimed at protecting rights through an egalitarian, antistatist, and populist agrarianism was intended to harmonize political and economic factions through a Romantic (if not naïve) “science” of “one-nation-one-politics.” He tried to underwrite this goal by embracing Enlightenment ideals of universal rationalization. As we shall see below, the tensions in Jefferson’s political philosophy between statism and localism, commercialism and agrarianism, and his desire for socio-political unity in the face of a large, fractious, and diverse nation, created a regime riddled with unsolvable paradoxes, animosity, and dissent.

When James Madison became president, he took, as I will show, a very moderate approach to carrying on Jefferson's political philosophy. Nevertheless, in the last few years of Madison's administration, Republicanism enveloped the nation to such a degree

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399 Spivak. Ch. 1.
400 Ibid.
401 McDonald. pp. viii & 139.
that it became synonymous with the nation itself.\textsuperscript{403} In fact, nearly all Revolutionary notables eventually joined the Jeffersonians, especially those who wanted to play a role in running the federal government. And yet, as we shall see, this harmonious political environment was a façade: between the end of Jefferson’s presidency and the end of Madison’s, factional disputes in the party had only intensified. James Monroe, who became president after Madison, did not see this fact: he honestly believed that the nation had reached a basic but real philosophic consensus. What’s more, Monroe believed that he could negotiate an even more perfect consensus, thanks to his friendly ties to both moderate and hard-line (Old) Republicans.\textsuperscript{404} Monroe's specific charge as president, at least as he saw it, was to perfect the institutional practice of Jefferson’s political science.\textsuperscript{405} Ultimately, Monroe decided that the best way to do this was by systematically expanding the republic’s economic infrastructure in order to bind the nation together.\textsuperscript{406} In different words, Monroe’s political identity as a “faithful son” of Jefferson made Monroe think that he had received a clear and unambiguous set of philosophic premises on which to build a Republican society and government -- the perfection of which, he insisted, would be the greatest in human history.\textsuperscript{407}

True to his charge, Monroe’s top priority was making sure that his policies were fully “orthodox.” In his first term, as disputes arose between the various sections of the party and nation, he remained neutral. This tactic worked so well that Monroe is still the

\textsuperscript{403} Skowronek. \textit{Politics}. p. 86.


\textsuperscript{406} Gilman. pp. 13-4 & 80-90.

only president, other than Washington, to win reelection without any opposition. It seems then that this "era of good feeling" was the closest that Jefferson’s Romantic ideology ever came to becoming institutional fact. But factional problems arose when Monroe tried to capitalize on his reelection by pushing for internal improvements. Indeed, due to Jefferson's Romantic idealism of “one-nation-one-party,” Monroe encountered a baffling and contradictory array of views on public works. Consider that when Jefferson tried to harmonize the factions of Madison’s “extended republic” -- by way of the Louisiana Purchase -- he only added fuel to the fire of self-interest because the Purchase gave the regional, political, and especially agricultural and industrial factions of the nation even more space to develop separate identities and, consequently, define their interests even more narrowly. By Monroe’s time, these differences most typically expressed themselves through the “states’ rights versus nationalism” debate. More specifically, the party had come to be split between a moderate majority of nationalists and a still powerful group of radical states’ righters. How this majority developed is not difficult to determine. Recall that Jefferson’s “one-nation-one-party” ideal forced him to move away from his own antistatist and agrarian orthodoxy. As the party evolved, it settled, not surprisingly, on the same course as Jefferson had -- stealth Federalism. Indeed, just as Jefferson adopted quite a bit of Hamilton’s Hobbesian and


409 Ibid.


411 Cresson. See Intro. and ch. 1.

412 Ibid.

413 Ibid.
Baconian outlook, so the majority of Jefferson’s party eventually settled on the same ideas -- a powerful executive, commercial manufacturing, and internal improvements (i.e. “nationalism”).

After Monroe’s reelection, many nationalists in Congress, with Henry Clay at their helm, wanted to know why Monroe was not doing more in the way of internal improvements. They wondered aloud why Monroe was not acting in the same way Jefferson had on the issue, and they outright questioned whether he was a true Jeffersonian. Monroe, in reaction, calculated that with his overwhelming popularity he could safely come out with an aggressive program of internal improvements. He got the federal government involved directly in the building of roads, canals, and bridges. Indeed, he openly embraced America’s nationalist spirit. He argued that Nature herself was begging to be completed by Man; that public works would facilitate commerce between states; that his federal programs would add a good deal of convenience and comfort to American life; and, most importantly, that internal improvements would accomplish Jefferson’s goal of building a cohesive and united America.

However, Monroe’s arguments did absolutely nothing to convince antistatists of the good of nationalism. With pressure mounting from these Old Republicans to reverse his nationalist course, Monroe stepped back and pondered over something that had happened during Madison's administration. Madison, like Monroe, had to control the party's more zealous nationalists in order to maintain political peace. Nevertheless, Madison went ahead and established a new national bank and asked Congress to come up

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414 Ibid. See also 151-77.


416 Gilman. pp. 119-221.
with a bill to build more roads and canals.\textsuperscript{417} Then, dramatically, at the very last minute, he changed his mind: he decided to draw a clear line against more nationalism. Madison said that, in principle, national internal improvements required nothing less than a constitutional amendment. To the disbelief of his erstwhile admirer, Henry Clay, “Madison rejected his own bill.”\textsuperscript{418} Monroe, for his part, eventually decided that Madison was right to do what he did: so Monroe too rejected his own enthusiasm for internal improvements.\textsuperscript{419} Jeffersonian purists, embittered by the flurry of recent nationalist endeavors, approved very strongly of Monroe's turn-about.\textsuperscript{420} Nationalists, however, were furious. Clay argued that Monroe's new demand for a constitutional amendment could not be squared with past Republican actions. Indeed, Clay pointed out that Monroe's new position “did not account for the fact that many federal projects had previously been authorized by Republican congresses and sanctioned by presidents with presumably unimpeachable political credentials.” Specifically, “why did both Jefferson and Madison sign bills authorizing and extending the Cumberland road?” “Stung by these attacks, Monroe shot off an anxious letter to Madison.” But Madison “could not recall the circumstances of Jefferson's action. Madison ventured that the sage of Monticello had probably acted either ‘doubtingly or hastily.’” Madison went on to admit that “the extensions of the road that he himself had sanctioned had not received the

\textsuperscript{417} Ibid. pp. 221-33.

\textsuperscript{418} Skowronek. Politics, pp. 99-100.


\textsuperscript{420} Ibid.
attention they deserved." Clay, who was now joined by powerful men like John C. Calhoun and William Crawford, continued to press Monroe for a truly principled reason for avoiding internal improvements. Given Madison's inability to provide such a reason, Monroe began to feel free to think through the issue for himself.  

Monroe’s “free thinking” produced a state paper with a painstaking investigation into the entire history of federal improvements. It ended by arguing essentially for states' rights in principle and nationalism in practice. Monroe claimed that this position was the one, true interpretation of Republicanism. In this way, Monroe tried to impose sense and logic on what was, in reality, nonsensical: that is to say that he tried to get a conflicted and contradictory Republican politics to do something it could not do, become philosophically coherent. Indeed, the nuance between “principle” and “practice” that Monroe was trying to advance was, in reality, an attempt to force together the irreconcilable differences between various strains of early modern thought. Specifically, Monroe was trying to make sense of Jefferson’s own melding of his Romantic ideals of agrarianism and antistatism with Hamilton’s ideals of Baconian industrial progress and Hobbesian statism. But this “melding” didn’t even make sense to Jefferson, or Madison for that matter: after all, neither could give Monroe the consistent, pragmatic, and/or philosophic ammunition he needed to justify his momentary conversion to antistatism. Jefferson, Madison, and Monroe were thus, in their own ways, trying to achieve a liberal Romantic version of the liberal pragmatic call for bourgeois "comfortable self-

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422 Cunningham. Monroe. See ch. 6.
423 Ibid.
424 Ibid. Chps. 1, 2 & 6.
preservation," which is impossible. Indeed, Monroe’s call for material “convenience and comfort” required Hamilton’s upbuilding of a governmental and business elite; and yet Monroe, as a Jeffersonian, was simultaneously required to believe that the elite are, by definition, anxious to rob the people of their rights. In this way, Monroe’s “articulation” was anchored in an impossible premise at the core of Jefferson’s national unification efforts: namely, that simple forms of governmentality and economics are somehow compatible with “comfortable self-preservation.” Thus, it seems to me that the mercurial nature of Jefferson’s, Madison’s, and Monroe’s policy decisions are the result of an unthoughtful synthesis of ideologies. The philosophic Frankenstein they made and fed naturally expressed itself in erratic ways: vacillation and self-contradiction are the natural result of putting a Romantic head on a pragmatic body.

But, ultimately, Monroe did choose in favor of nationalism in practice, as did Jefferson, while Madison, of all people, did not. Why? Maybe Madison had one of his famous nervous breakdowns; maybe he was over-thinking things; maybe he was just a timid person and not a very good political leader; or maybe he wanted a constitutional amendment so that states’ righters would lose the economic debate officially and permanently. But whatever the case, majority support for nationalism shows how Hamilton’s more Baconian view of commercial development had, ultimately, more appeal and pull in a nation so deeply rooted in Madison’s Constitution, which defined freedom in bourgeois terms. Madison indeed worked hard to keep the document’s optimistic and idealistic elements to a minimum. Thus the Hamiltonian liberalism that undergirded -- in the first place -- the inauguration of "the age of nationalism" under

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425 Ch. 2: iv; v; vi.
Monroe reflected Madison’s Montesquieuean promotion of a society geared towards creating more and more opportunities for increasing wealth.

As it happened, not long after Monroe had set out his nationalist theory of internal improvements, the debate over states' rights came to a boil with the question of the conditions for Missouri statehood. With the issue of slavery at the core of congressional deliberations, the nation and party began to splinter more heavily than ever before. A worried Monroe agreed to a compromise: there would be no slavery in the unorganized northern regions of the Louisiana Purchase, but Missouri would be able to decide its own domestic institutions. Missouri’s right to have slaves was thus made secure, but “whether states admitted in the future were to be bound by the territorial arrangements set by the federal government was left ambiguous enough for the President to uphold the appearance of consensus.” That Monroe had to paper over such a deep division within the nation was due to the fact that anti-slavery Federalists had, in the beginning days of the republic, accepted into their midst southern slavery. Madison, for his part, accepted the fact of the evil of faction and slavery; but his uniquely modern

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426 Cunningham. Monroe. See ch. 1.
427 Ch. 2: vi; vii.
428 Skowronek. Politics. p. 103.
430 Ibid.
431 Skowronek. Politics. p. 103.
goal of avoiding mobocracy through a factional and “extended republic” was so important to him that it justified accepting the South with its “peculiar institution.”

However, Monroe’s ability to forestall a factional implosion within the party over states’ rights was short-lived. After the panic of 1819 and the recovery of 1822, nationalist congressional leaders felt it was time to reassert themselves on the issue of internal improvements. Congress passed a bill authorizing repairs to the Cumberland road, as financed by tolls. In a "principled" move that only appeared to contradict his preference for "nationalism in practice," Monroe vetoed the bill. In his veto message he pontificated on the true meaning of the Revolution and the Constitution. He said that loose interpretations of any number of clauses in the Constitution (including the commerce, national defense, and general welfare clauses) would, in the end, exact irreparable damage on the inviolable principle of states' rights. However, he also argued that, in practice, the federal government ought to "cause" as many simple appropriations for national improvements as necessary. Monroe concluded that these appropriations should not be part of a programmatic "system" of nationalization. Thus, Monroe fine-tuned his theory of “nationalism in practice” by making it clear that the federal government should only give money to the states for internal improvements. This, he claimed, was the true meaning of the Revolution and Constitution. Put differently,

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434 Cresson. pp. 338- 411.

435 Ibid.

436 Ibid.
Monroe claimed that his version of federalism was the true interpretation of Jefferson’s political science.\footnote{Ibid.}

Old Republicans were incensed with Monroe. To them he had destroyed the Constitution by reading into it the unlimited power of appropriation. And nationalists were fuming because he had robbed the federal government of the power to oversee and coordinate national improvements. Monroe thus “found himself besieged by fellow Republicans determined to explode his grand historical-political synthesis.”\footnote{Skowronek. Politics. p. 107.} In the end, Monroe’s elaboration and development of Jeffersonianism deepened the splits in the party; factions were becoming more and more extreme and hate-filled, and they moved the Romantically-inspired regime to the very precipice of its destruction.\footnote{Ibid. p. 108. See also Gilman. pp. 215-239.}

Put differently, Monroe’s “articulation” of the Romantic regime he inherited failed because it was built on Jefferson’s incongruous “unification” of Madison’s extended republic of Montesquieuean factionalism. In sum, those who were most inclined towards a national prohibition on nationalization, as well as an affirmative, national definition of progress as being essentially agrarian and democratic, were also those "orthodox" Old Republicans who wanted states’ rights to protect slavery.\footnote{Ammon. See chps. 1 & 2.} They wanted to be able to stop elites from gaining power through the establishment of a national economic system -- a system supported, ironically, by the popular majority.\footnote{Ibid.} But those who were most inclined to support a national limitation or even abolition of slavery, as well as endorse Hamiltonian-
style commercial nationalization, were also those least likely to embrace Jefferson’s states' rights populism because, even though the majority favored nationalization, such “localism” hindered their economic and abolitionist plans. Clearly then, with so many interests holding on to so many disparate, early modern ways of viewing democracy, statism, and capitalism, Madison’s Montesquieuian factionalism can indeed be said to have undermined Monroe’s “elaborative” leadership project.

Of course, with the 'Monroe Doctrine,' Monroe did have one great success in balancing all sides of the party. This articulation of Republican foreign policy managed to "neutralize" contending views within the party by synthesizing and harmonizing them. Monroe overcame isolationist tendencies within the party by infusing his message of national fulfillment and political perfection with the popular myth of Redeemer Nation. Indeed, the Monroe Doctrine staked a militaristic and philosophic claim over a whole continent, and extended a “benevolent protection” for liberal republicanism over an entire hemisphere.

In conclusion, Monroe's institutional elaboration of Jefferson's regime virtually collapsed under the idealistic weight of “one-nation-one-party.” The extreme factionalism within Madison’s “extended republic” made it impossible for Monroe to balance states' rights with national improvements. This struggle connotes a typically modern conflict between the two liberal goals of material progress and political liberty. Balancing the need for the central government to sponsor (modern ideals of) economic

442 Ibid.

443 Skowronek. Politics. p. 98.

444 Cunningham. Monroe. See esp. ch. 11.

445 Ibid. Also, Skowronek. Politics. p. 98.
development with states' rights was impossible for Monroe because the adherents of republican “localism” stood strong in their belief that the central government and economic elites would inevitably undermine individual liberty for their own gain. But, the fact that Monroe was successful in “articulating” Republican foreign policy, via the Monroe Doctrine, shows the immense and almost overriding lure of the modern ideal of universal rationalization in American culture.

With his election in 1825, John Quincy Adams became the fourth consecutive Republican to rule the executive branch. He said he wanted to run the country’s politics on the basis of talent, virtue, and merit alone. He argued that party labels ought to be discarded altogether, and he proclaimed the end of political prejudice and passion.\footnote{Mary Hargreaves. The Presidency of John Quincy Adams. (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1985). See pp. 10-40.} Adams’s desire for party-blind government was most essentially geared towards achieving a single goal: the once and for all clearing away of any constitutional objections to internal improvements whatsoever.\footnote{Ibid.} As it happened, Adams was not able to transcend Monroe’s version of nationalism. This is strange inasmuch as the pro-nationalist sentiment of the majority of Americans had only grown since the time of Monroe, and now extended from New England, through the Mid-Atlantic States, and out to the West.\footnote{Ibid.} In order to understand what went wrong for Adams we must draw a line between his politics and Jefferson’s and Madison’s philosophies.
First, recall that Jefferson’s political science took the form of a party only because it had to define itself against the Federalists. As we learned earlier, Jefferson maintained that his party’s ideology was not really an ideology but a reflection of the objective, natural, and scientific way to run a government. So, Jefferson’s “one-nation-one-party” idealism was, in essence, a claim of having discovered the non-partisan truth of politics. This claim is what Adams wanted to co-opt for his nationalist purposes. By abolishing even the label “Republican,” Adams was hoping that nationalism’s prospects would no longer be tied to the regressive ideology of antistatism. Indeed, with no antistatist faction to hold him hostage, Adams was sure that he would be free to promote Hamilton’s nationalism -- that is, the true, non-partisan, Hobbesian and Baconian elements within the Republican party’s politics.

Adams’s relationship to Madison’s thinking is bifurcated. Consider first that Adams's conceit that "politicization" was not necessary for achieving nationalization reveals his faith in that optimistic strain of Enlightenment thinking that suggests that reason will always conquer over passion in the end. Indeed, Adams thought that once "party-blind government" swept away ideological passion, nationalism would then -- necessarily and naturally -- prevail because it was the most rational developmental path for the republic. In a sense then, Adams tried to move the nation to embrace Madison’s liberal vision of a large and commercial republic while simultaneously opposing Madison’s concomitant commitment to Montesquieu’s theory of interest and

\[449\text{Ibid.}\]

\[450\text{Ch. } 2: ii; iv; vi; James E. Lewis, \textit{John Quincy Adams: policymaker for the Union}. Wilmington: SR Books, 2001). See chps 1 and 3; Remini. pp. 44-63.\]

faction as the true bases of good government. But, as we shall see, it is precisely because Adams’s economic plan was trying to establish itself in Madison’s republic that it did not succeed. This seems strange in light of one of the constant themes found in chapter two: that Madison’s commitment to a large commercial republic supports and undergirds Hamilton’s industrialism. However, recall that the factionalism of Madison’s republic also undermines the Romantic Republican ideal of disinterested government. Thus, what will be shown below is the futility of Adams trying to lead, in a disinterested way, a nation that was designed to be inherently factional: after all, the Republican party that Adams thought was too factional got that way because it insisted on representing the nation as a whole.

The disjunctive debacle of Adams’s administration began when a series of complexities concerning the Electoral College and the popular vote forced the election of 1825 into the House of Representatives. Adams, being the only candidate with a mandate from an entire block of states (New England), was able to edge out Andrew Jackson, who was more widely popular but without a regional "base." Through a series of adroit assurances to his political enemies, Henry Clay and Daniel Webster, Adams was able to win over these men’s regions and was elected president. Adams then offered Clay the position of secretary of state, and he accepted. Important national leaders, including Jackson, Crawford, Calhoun, Martin Van Buren, and George Clinton, all rallied together in opposition to this overt display of cronyism. Nevertheless, Adams went ahead and

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452 Ch. 2: vii.
453 Ibid. ii; iv; vii.
454 Hargreaves. See chps. 1 & 2.
455 Ibid.
proposed his truly monumental plan of nationalism through apolitical government. Every Republican precedent of (even formal) caution in the area of internal improvements was shattered. Adams mocked those who feared his nationalization efforts, and challenged them to transcend their "yokel politics." He argued that it would be a treachery of "the most sacred of trusts" to "hide in the earth" the full potential of human genius.\textsuperscript{456} Such sentiments reflected Jefferson's view of the complex capitalist interplay between Nature’s untapped abundance and Man’s “divine” duty to exploit such “rough but ready” munificence.\textsuperscript{457} But Adams separated this view from its originally agrarian roots and ignored the Jeffersonian fears of nationalization that had brought the Republicans to power in the first place. Specifically, Adams’s proposed, among many things,

- a federal Department of the Interior,
- a national naval academy,
- a national university,
- a national astronomical observatory,
- a national bankruptcy law,
- a national militia law,
- a national system of weights and measures,
- a national patent law,
- and a national system of improvements in transportation.\textsuperscript{458}

Antistatists, in reaction, were desperately looking for anything to stop this potentially ground-breaking shift in America’s economic and political system. They found what they were looking for in the way Adams was conducting his foreign policy. When the republics of Latin America asked Adams to send an American delegation to a hemispheric convention in Panama, they did so with the intent of creating friendly pacts and treaties.\textsuperscript{459} However, to act on this invitation meant moving against a longstanding

\textsuperscript{456} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{457} Ch. 2: ii.

\textsuperscript{458} Skowronek. Politics, p. 118.

Republican commitment of prohibiting formal alliances.\textsuperscript{460} And yet, as Adams argued, not sending a delegation to Panama would give the British a near hegemonic position in Latin America. This, he said, would effectively render the Republican “Monroe Doctrine” impotent.\textsuperscript{461} When Adams agreed to send a delegation, the hitherto irrelevant Republican radical outcast, John Randolph, was suddenly given a new lease on his political life. He claimed that there was a direct connection between the unprincipled bargain that had squeezed Adams into the White House and the President’s unprincipled “betrayal” of Republican foreign policy.\textsuperscript{462} The connection was a canard, but it worked. Randolph's charges energized a whole host of administration opponents, especially Calhoun and Van Buren. In the protracted process of Adams's belabored defense of attending the Panama convention, his program for national improvements stalled, and Americans once again split decisively into Adams and Jackson camps.\textsuperscript{463}

Adams’s supporters urged him to fight back and translate popular support for nationalism into popular support for himself and his program by building an overtly political organization, but he steadfastly refused.\textsuperscript{464} Fully embracing the Republican ideal of objective government, he insisted on acting in a "disinterested" fashion -- as a "neutral" manager of the "clear" national good. Wrapping himself in these claims,

\textsuperscript{460} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{461} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{462} Skowronek. Politics. pp. 122-23.

\textsuperscript{463} Ibid. p. 123. It is worth noting that Adams's disjunction also reflects, in part, how the Redeemer Nation complex allowed Randolph to lead the antinationalist faction into a successful show-down with the majority. The American adaptation of universal rationalization, which holds within itself the idea that God's saving nation should lead the world aggressively, did not -- strangely -- make Adams's decision to go to Panama popular. Rather, opponents cast doubt on the value of having international alliances by connecting Adams’s elitism with a certain pathology within the Redeemer Nation complex; namely, that "the New Israel" mustn’t be soiled and fettered by foreign influence. See Ch. 2: iii; Weeks. See ch. 4.

\textsuperscript{464} Lewis. See chps. 1 and 2.
Adams maintained a public posture of aloofness. As a result, his opponents continued to gain ground on him. So, in his last year in office, Adams relented and allowed his friends to create a "coalition" of support, but this tactic backfired. Now that Adams was overtly “playing politics” he made himself an easy target for the accusation of hypocrisy, of betraying his own principle of “talent and virtue alone.” This was strike three for Adams: the President’s enemies linked this “unprincipled politicking” to his similar lack of principles in both foreign policy and especially the “fraud” involved in the election of 1825. In this way, the intrigues of the election came back to haunt Adams: the bargain that had disregarded the voice of the people, the majority, was being effectively portrayed by administration opponents as a conspiracy that had aimed, all along, to increase the power of business and government elites. In the end, the Twentieth Congress decided to launch a review of all federal departments, which in turn supposedly documented the administration’s excursions into illegality and corruption. Administration opponents, now armed with this final bit of “evidence” against Adams’s integrity, coalesced around Jackson and the new Democratic party. Adams was defeated resoundingly in his reelection effort, and the Republican regime came to an end. In short, the liberal Romantic ideals of majoritarian democracy were used successfully by a minority faction to undermine the people’s own support of the liberal pragmatic call for nationalism.

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466 Ibid. pp. 124-5.
467 Ibid. See also Remini. pp. 80-90 & 160-71.
470 Ibid.
Considering this relatively small faction’s success in undermining a majority cause, it might seem, at first glance, that Madison’s theory of discouraging majoritarianism through factionalism was fully at play in Adams’s downfall. However, it is important to notice that antistatists injured Madison’s other Montesquieuian hope; namely, a system of factions built on bourgeois capitalism. In a similar vein, Madison’s theory of how to stop mobocracy was split in two under Adams because Adams divorced political interest from economic rationalization, thereby rendering the partisanship necessary for maintaining his majority cause impossible. From another angle, one might add that the majority could not perceive how strange it was that they were supporting the elitism inherent in nationalism and yet angry with Adams for his past disregard of the majority, given that Adams was supporting the majority’s own economic wishes. This political riddle can be explained by the fact that, historically, Americans have always had a hard time separating the pragmatic and Romantic elements of their philosophic tradition: they tend not to see the differences because they believe that all of the elements of America’s politics are the result not of human theorizing, but of one holistic set of scientifically discovered facts. ⁴⁷¹

In conclusion, the disjunction of Jefferson's regime was brought about by J. Q. Adams's politics, which reflected a unique combining of the primary liberalisms within the American tradition; namely, a Romantic or "disinterested" view of politics as mixed with a pragmatic liberal statism and commercial capitalism. This experiment in philosophic eclecticism failed because Adams refused to join the ideals of Madison's bourgeois commercialism with Madison’s pragmatic denial of the good of non-partisan virtue in politics.

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⁴⁷¹ Remini. pp. 160-71. Also, Ch. 2: iii; v; vii.
ii. The Second Regime: Andrew Jackson, James Polk, and Franklin Pierce

As we learned earlier, the corrupt bargain between J. Q. Adams and Henry Clay moved the masses to support Andrew Jackson: the majority called on Jackson to, above all else, end political privilege and elite entrenchment. In turn, Jackson promised to “break the knot of aristocratic corruption” that ruled the country. Jackson won the election of 1828 with a disparate coalition of southern planters, northern radicals, westerners, and Old Republicans. Given that most Americans still claimed Jefferson as their philosophic own, Jackson’s use of broad Jeffersonian themes made it easy for so many conflicted interests to agree on one man. In a country where the liberal pragmatic approach to nationalism and the Rousseauean themes of unity, virtue, and populist democracy were both so popular, the Romantic themes won out.

Consider, however, how the ever-growing and evermore contentious constellation of regional, economic, and ideological factions that elected Jackson were a manifestation of the near-ripening of the social conditions necessary for achieving Madison's republic of self-interested factionalism. Moreover, Madison’s Montesquieuean theory of elites being protected from populist movements through factions was at least partially present in Jackson’s reconstruction. After Jackson was elected, many in Congress, the Supreme Court, and big business told him that they were not going to give him much leeway in democratically reforming America’s political and economic system. As we shall see, these political and economic factions did not ultimately succeed in stopping Jackson’s

473 Skowronek. Politics, p. 130.
474 Ellis. See ch. 1.
475 Ibid.
populist movement. However, because of the substantial power of these factions, Jackson, in order to overcome their opposition, was forced to embrace an overtly partisan, party politics, as well as dramatically expand executive power.\footnote{Skowronek. Politics. p. 133.} In this way, because of Madisonian factionalism, Jackson’s version of Jefferson’s politics had to formally end even the pretense of disinterested non-partisanship, as well as continue to sharpen the pattern Jefferson had started of emboldening Hamilton’s Hobbesian statism.\footnote{Ch. 2: v; vi; vii.}

In the very beginning of his first term, Jackson was actually willing to accept a good amount of internal improvements and even a national banking system.\footnote{Skowronek. Politics. p. 136.} But Jackson was also a populist. He recommended constitutional amendments that would remove the Congress from presidential runoffs and limit presidents to one term.\footnote{Ibid.} In line with the Redeemer Nation complex, he also heartily endorsed states’ rights in order to aid in the extermination and removal of Indians from their lands so that average Americans could own their own property.\footnote{David S. Heidler’s Old Hickory’s War: Andrew Jackson and the quest for empire. (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2003).} And finally, he favored moderate limits on internal improvements and some mild reforms of the National Bank.\footnote{Ellis. See Intro.} Thus, Jackson’s early program of Jeffersonian re-entrenchment signaled only a soft turn away from Hamilton’s Baconian and Hobbesian philosophy.
In the summer of 1832, this rather moderate course was placed in jeopardy by congressional action, which refused Jackson’s suggestions for making the National Bank more amenable to states’ rights.\textsuperscript{482} Jackson, in turn, became increasingly uncompromising and radical in his efforts. Jackson fired charges of corruption at the Bank’s president, Nicholas Biddle, and at Henry Clay, who was championing congressional confrontation with Jackson.\textsuperscript{483} Eventually, Jackson claimed that the Bank was involved in a conspiracy to concentrate wealth in the hands of a very few elite and thereby violate the interests of the majority. Significantly, he claimed that the Bank had “arrayed section against section, interest against interest, and man against man, in a fearful commotion which threatens to shake the foundations of our Union.”\textsuperscript{484} By trying to make the Bank more amenable to Jeffersonian egalitarian and populist principles, Jackson was not just arguing against Hamiltonianism, but also heaping Romantic scorn on the Montesquieuenean theory implicit in Madison’s Constitution: that economic and regional factiousness and self-interest is a political good.\textsuperscript{485}

In response to Jackson's increasingly radical rhetoric, Clay and Calhoun, and the coalition they created to represent big business and Washington sentiment for the Bank, doubled their efforts to stop all reform.\textsuperscript{486} As one, last, desperate measure against entrenched interests, Jackson hatched a scheme for removing all federal deposits from the National Bank by placing them into politically friendly state banks. This move had the

\textsuperscript{482} Ibid.


\textsuperscript{484} Ibid. Also, Skowronek. \textit{Politics}. pp. 141-3.

\textsuperscript{485} Taylor. See ch. 2; \textit{Ch. 2: vii}.

\textsuperscript{486} Ibid. Chps. 2 & 3.
potential to effectively kill the Bank.\textsuperscript{487} Despite congressional outrage at such a brazen assertion of executive authority, he went through with his scheme, claiming that his reelection demonstrated a popular mandate for the measure.\textsuperscript{488} But Biddle responded to the "removal order" by abruptly curtailing loans, hoping that, by bringing the nation to its economic knees, he would expose the folly of Jackson's refusal to recharter the Bank.\textsuperscript{489} However, Biddle's actions managed only to squeeze the nation into an economic panic in the middle of an expansion, and Jackson successfully blamed the panic on Biddle and Congress.\textsuperscript{490} Nevertheless, Biddle raised the stakes yet again. In the face of an order by Jackson to release control over the military pension fund, Biddle decided to abruptly stop all pension payments.\textsuperscript{491} Of course, Jackson used this development to further prove his case that the Bank was run by power-mongering elites who had no care for the average American. Gradually, Jackson’s removal plan grew popular, and many states cooperated with it. And, as a result, the Bank collapsed.\textsuperscript{492} In April 1834, the Democratic floor leader of the House, James Polk, passed a series of resolutions upholding Jackson's plan. Jackson was thus able to not only make a clean break with the most important link between the federal government and the national economy, but also repudiate the whole framework of governmental arrangements in which the Bank was embedded.\textsuperscript{493}

\textsuperscript{487} Ibid. Ch. 4.

\textsuperscript{488} Ibid.


\textsuperscript{490} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{491} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{492} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{493} Skowronek. Politics. p. 142.
Thus, Jackson was able to (at least temporarily) unhinge the grip of Madisonian and Hamiltonian thinking on the operating mores of the national economy. Indeed, by severing the link between the federal government and the national economy, Jackson ensured that the nation took a very big step away from what J. Q. Adams had wanted America to become, a full-fledged commercial-industrial republic. In fact, Jackson’s Bank War forced the nation to reverse even the moderate nationalist course James Monroe had set the nation on. But, as noted earlier, Jackson’s success came at the price of ignoring the Jeffersonian ideals of non-partisanship and antistatism. Of course, Jefferson himself had, like Jackson, invested the presidency with quite a bit of power in the name of unity. There is, in a sense, a philosophic pattern here: both of these liberal romantics could not overcome Madison’s Montesquieuean, self-interested commercialism and Hamilton’s Baconian industrialism without Hamilton’s Hobbesian governmentality.

The issue of ‘state nullification’ was the other front on which Jackson's reconstruction was waged. In November of 1832, soon after his triumphant reelection, South Carolina nullified the tariffs of 1828 and 1832. The state’s leaders threatened secession if the federal government tried to enforce the law. Jackson, in response, issued a newly expanded and reinvigorated Jeffersonian message of states' rights and populist democracy. Namely, he proposed lowering tariffs; he opposed using public

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497 Cole. Intro. and ch. 5.
land revenues for internal improvements; and he urged land-giveaways for the masses to build up agrarianism. Of course, John Quincy Adams, Henry Clay, and nationalists of all stripes were horrified -- they saw this plan as a direct assault on the Constitution itself.\footnote{498} However, Jackson too wanted desperately to stop the "ultimate heresy" of state secession ("treason"). Jackson argued for the passage of his "Force Bill," which granted him sweeping powers to march federal troops into South Carolina to stop the secession before it started.\footnote{499} In the end, despite the outrage that was expressed by John C. Calhoun and other "nullifiers," no state rose up in defense of nullification per se, and South Carolina retreated in the face of military suppression.\footnote{500} It seems then that, in response to state nullification, the combination of Jackson’s Force Bill and his package of antistatist proposals was an attempt to save a central element of Jefferson’s philosophy: that political liberty rests on both states’ rights and a constitutional compact of philosophic, commercial, and regional unity.\footnote{501}

Towards the end of his presidency, Jackson faced the reality that his state bank scheme was generating a speculative boom that in turn threatened a major financial collapse.\footnote{502} Jackson responded by turning to a gradual conversion to hard currency. He told the Treasury Department to choose banks of deposit out of concern for financial soundness alone. This order was then followed by a tightening of central control over state banks. But this sudden shift in policy angered congressional Democrats. In

\footnote{498} Ibid.

\footnote{499} Ibid. See Conclusion.

\footnote{500} Ibid.

\footnote{501} Ch. 2: v; vi; vii.

\footnote{502} Skowronek. Politics. p. 154.
defiance, Congress expanded the number of depositories and explicitly limited executive power over them.\textsuperscript{503} Thus it can be said that, in the end, Jackson's program of Jeffersonian retrenchment was overtaken by a still more radical version of Jefferson’s antistatist and populist outlook.

In conclusion, Jackson's recasting of America’s political philosophy was a tough-minded Jeffersonian counter-reaction to the way in which both Madisonianism and Hamiltonianism had shaped the political and especially economic power arrangements of the republic. It was a movement to save the nation from the influences of factionalism, "moneyed elitism," and nationalism generally. However, Jackson’s recasting of America’s political commitments was un-Jeffersonian in the sense that his majority movement had to overcome elite factions by engaging in partisan politics and by radically expanding executive power. What this shows is that Madison’s plan for good government through factionalism was still in a state of institutional adolescence: though Madison’s Constitution had made practical inroads against Jefferson’s antistatism and goal of disinterested government, it had not yet overcome Jefferson’s populist influence over America’s political development.

James Polk's elaboration of Jackson's reconstruction began after a short period of nationalism with the Whigs, which did little to dampen the Democratic party's general ideological dominance.\textsuperscript{504} The Democratic party was, in fact, the first party to ever survive electoral defeat with a return to power.\textsuperscript{505} However, the Whigs ended up with

\textsuperscript{503} Ibid.

little to show for their victory when they defeated Van Buren in his bid for reelection in 1840. Indeed, William Henry Harrison's sudden death made John Tyler president. Tyler quickly asserted his independence from the Whigs and blocked their program of industrial-nationalism altogether.\textsuperscript{506} In 1844, the Whigs "excommunicated" Tyler and nominated Henry Clay, but the power of the Democratic machine gave Polk a narrow victory.\textsuperscript{507} Polk, the very image of Jacksonian orthodoxy, was, like Monroe before him, committed to moving forward on "the path already traced." Indeed, Polk’s election was widely understood as signaling an impending fulfillment of Jackson’s legacy.\textsuperscript{508}

With the power of the presidency having been built up for over sixty years, Polk was able to successfully engage, for a short while, the Redeemer Nation complex through his Manifest Destiny program.\textsuperscript{509} I will show that, through patronage, Polk's managerial style was a matter of trying -- rather futilely -- to use Hamiltonian statism to placate the conflicted factions that Jackson had grouped together to reestablish the Jeffersonian tradition. By spreading Jacksonianism across the continent, Manifest Destiny was supposed to make agrarian populism a permanent part of the American political and economic system.\textsuperscript{510} But, as we shall see, because Madison built the nation, constitutionally, on so many conflicted and self-interested factions, Polk’s program could not be sustained for long: the effects of Madison’s “extended republic” made

\textsuperscript{505} Ibid.


\textsuperscript{507} Ibid.


\textsuperscript{510} Ibid.
maintaining a single, majority vision of territorial expansion impossible. Indeed, it will become clear that in the short time between the end of Jackson’s presidency and the end of Polk’s four years, Madison’s anti-majoritarian philosophy had finally come into its own.

After leaving the Democrats and being kicked out of the Whig party, President Tyler used the issue of Texas annexation as a way to position himself to run for president as an independent in 1844. His call for immediate annexation caused great enthusiasm, especially in the South and West. But, when Tyler’s secretary of state, John C. Calhoun, linked the Texas issue explicitly to the South’s interest in slave expansion, the national mood soured. In response, presidential candidates Henry Clay and Martin Van Buren refused to commit to Texas annexation. James Polk, the former Tennessee governor and Speaker of the House, was a Texas enthusiast, but he remained loyal to Van Buren's bid for the Democratic nomination. When Van Buren failed to get the nomination, Polk became the perfect compromise choice between those Democrats that wanted Van Buren and those that wanted to annex Texas. With Polk as the nominee and the party now fully committed to Texas annexation, the threat of Tyler's candidacy faded.

But considering how Polk got the nomination, there can be no doubt that he was leading a conflicted party: the Texas issue was but a microcosm of the larger tension in the party between territorial expansion and slavery. To keep his presidency alive, Polk

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512 Van Buren insisted on running for the Democratic nomination despite losing his reelection bid in 1840.

had to manage this tension with patronage.\textsuperscript{514} Polk pledged to foster "no divisions" in the party and proclaimed that patronage would be distributed exactly equally to every faction and interest.\textsuperscript{515} By refusing to play favorites, Polk was intent on making sure that each group within the Democratic majority was sufficiently bribed into tolerating the others.\textsuperscript{516} Thus, it can be said that Polk was trying to use patronage to ensure that the Romantic ideal of political unity under minded factiousness -- the kind of factiousness Madison had hoped would dissemble majority consensus.\textsuperscript{517}

However, cracks in Polk’s coalition of interests began to surface almost immediately. Because Polk had a cabinet fully committed to Texas annexation, Van Burenites (especially in New York) accused Polk (for four years) of favoring the southern wing of the party over the other sections. Not surprisingly, by the time of the 1848 nominating convention, these New York "radicals" formally abandoned the party.\textsuperscript{518} However, before these radicals left, Polk attempted to ameliorate their anger and refute their accusations. He pandered to them by returning to “hard money” and by creating a national independent treasury system. But in order to do this he also had to call for a "tariffs-for-revenue" system so that the southern wing would not feel ignored. Then he recognized western concerns by insisting on a graduated reduction of land prices. Finally, he tried to make land acquisition in the northwest and southwest appear to

\begin{footnotes}
\textsuperscript{514} Skowronek. Politics. pp. 155-61.

\textsuperscript{515} Bergeron. See chps. 2 & 3.

\textsuperscript{516} Ibid. Also, Intro.

\textsuperscript{517} See Ch. 2: ii; vii.

\textsuperscript{518} Skowronek. Politics. p. 164-8.
\end{footnotes}
benefit all sections.\textsuperscript{519} But the fact was, despite all of this activity, no section felt fully recognized and serviced because no one section's insatiable appetite for patronage could possibly be met in full.\textsuperscript{520} Indeed, when one faction or section received patronage, the others always felt shortchanged and inevitably cried foul.\textsuperscript{521} Thus, the difficulties of dealing with self-interested factions in what was becoming an evermore “extended republic” could not be overcome, not even in a single, majority party.

But Polk was confident that his program of ‘Manifest Destiny’ was going to unite the party.\textsuperscript{522} Polk claimed that all of his policies were anchored in the one, true policy of Jacksonianism: that the federal government’s main job is to actively provide citizens with small portions of their own farm land.\textsuperscript{523} He thought that this “dogma” would bring the factions of the party together. Jefferson’s Louisiana Purchase was, of course, rooted in exactly this kind of democratic agrarianism. Polk believed, like Jackson and Jefferson before him, that agrarianism was the best way to allow individuals to pursue their happiness. And, like Jefferson and Jackson, Polk was able to deliver on this Romantic politics only by using, ironically, Hamilton’s more Hobbesian view of an active and strong government.\textsuperscript{524}

However, beneath the appearance of Polk’s success in making Romantic ideals a reality, Manifest Destiny was, in fact, strangling Polk’s politics because it was operating

\textsuperscript{519} Ibid. pp. 168-69.

\textsuperscript{520} Bergeron. See. ch. 1 & esp. p. 12.


\textsuperscript{523} Ibid. Intro., pp. 19-28 & ch. 2.

\textsuperscript{524} Bergeron. See pp. 33-45.
within Madison’s constitutional framework. Specifically, Polk’s downward spiral began when the British offered to settle the Oregon boundary at the 49th parallel. Polk had to decide if he wanted to go to war with Britain to obtain even more land, given that he was already in the midst of a war with Mexico for California and the greater southwest.\footnote{Skowronek. Politics. p. 171. A war that he initiated on the pretext that Mexicans had shed American blood on American soil during what was, in fact, a merely incidental skirmish on the Rio Grande.} When Polk decided to forego a war with Britain in favor of continuing his fight with Mexico, western and northwestern politicians were outraged and accused him of favoring southern interests over their own.\footnote{Bergeron. Ch. 3.} When Polk pressed these same western and northwestern Democrats to make-up for eastern defections in Congress over a downward revision of tariff rates, they obliged, but only in return for internal improvements. When the tariff issue went Polk's way, he reneged on his promise. Naturally, western and northwestern politicians turned against Polk.\footnote{Leonard. pp. 5, 10, 66-91.} Then, northeastern politicians and free soilers nation-wide started to turn against Polk because southwest territorial acquisition was adding more space for more slavery.\footnote{Haynes. Intro. & pp. 9-12 & 83-89.} Wasting little time, this anti-Polk "alliance" introduced in Congress the "Wilmot Proviso," which excluded slavery from any new land acquired from Mexico. Polk was furious, and southern politicians responded by declaring that the federal government had no authority to prohibit slavery in the new territories.\footnote{Leonard. p. 174.} Eventually, moderates and westerners settled on popular sovereignty, which would allow the people of the territories to decide the slavery issue for themselves.
Congress found it difficult to decide between these alternatives. Polk, for his part, stood with the Missouri Compromise of 1820 and said that the Missouri line ought to be extended to the Pacific. But none of these factions could see room for compromise. Thus, Polk could not balance the northern, western, and southern desire for universal rationalization.

Of course it was Madison who, in the first place, had squeezed together, under a single constitutional system, the regional factions of the North and South. They had always been opposed to each others’ economic and political interests, especially in regard to slavery. In Polk’s time, free soilers were arguing for territorial expansion in terms of Madison’s and Hamilton’s view of free labor. Southerners were arguing for territorial expansion in terms of the localism and antistatism at the heart of Jefferson’s understanding of modern freedom. From the South’s perspective, true freedom was achieved by limiting the central government's power over regional socio-political institutions. Popular sovereignty was, of course, somewhere in the middle of these two ideational poles. But western moderation was perceived by the South as essentially opposed to their interest in expanding slavery. In the end, when a bill came to Polk that made Oregon “free soil,” he signed it, but urged southerners to understand that he did so not out of an allegiance to "free soil," but only because it was technically within the extension of the Missouri line. Southerners were nevertheless furious that he signed the bill, and the other sections were very upset with his narrow reasoning for supporting

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530 Ibid.
531 Bergeron. pp. 16-8.
532 Ch. 2: vii.
533 Seigenthaler. See esp. ch. 5 & Conclusion.
the bill. As a result, the party began to splinter like never before. Not surprisingly then, Polk lost his bid for reelection and the Whigs took the White House for four years.

In conclusion, Polk's "articulation" of Jacksonianism was an impossible task of placating -- equally -- a very diverse array of sectional and other interests through patronage and Manifest Destiny. What this reflects are the effects of Madison’s “extended factional republic” making it impossible for a majority to come up with a single rationale for expanding the republic.

Franklin Pierce brought Jackson's regime to an end. Pierce found it impossible to lead the Democrats because the party’s factions could not agree on a basic set of ideological commitments. In fact, the Democrats lost the election of 1848 to the Whigs and Zachary Taylor because the party’s factiousness had only gotten worse since Polk’s time. After the election, free soil Democrats -- disgruntled with their party -- came to the aid of the faltering Whig majority in the House by helping them secure the passage of a series of temperate bills regulating slavery known as the "Compromise of 1850." Still clinging to Jefferson’s more Romantic ideal of national political unity, these moderate Democrats had hoped that the Compromise would split the differences

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534 Ibid.


538 Ibid.
between free soilers and southerners and somehow form a Union party.\textsuperscript{539} However, most Democratic leaders saw the Compromise as an opportunity to rebuild their party. They asked free soiler and southern Democrats to ignore their differences in exchange for the benefits of patronage that would come with retaking the White House.\textsuperscript{540} What was ignored in these machinations, however, was that the president who led these factions to victory would not be able to transcend their hatred for each other.\textsuperscript{541}

Not surprisingly, the Democratic convention of 1852 had a rather difficult time agreeing on who should lead such an incongruous coalition. On the forty-ninth ballot Pierce was chosen. As an unknown party regular, he allowed the party to engage in a mission of expedience over ideology.\textsuperscript{542} As we shall see, the reason why Pierce found it impossible to unite his party is because he was trying to govern not only Madison’s North-South factionalism, but also the territories these two factions had acquired through Polk’s Manifest Destiny. As I will show, with Pierce’s demise came the official end of the commitments Jackson had successfully rebuilt to fight Hamiltonian nationalism. Indeed, it will be demonstrated that Jackson’s regime and its Jeffersonian tradition of states’ rights, agrarianism, and majoritarian populism fell apart because of factional infighting. It will become clear that Pierce’s use of Hamiltonian statism could not stop the domestic anarchy caused by slavery. Consequently, he could not stop this anarchy from causing a political void that was eventually filled by a new national philosophy:

\textsuperscript{539} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{540} Nichols. pp. 10-14.

\textsuperscript{541} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{542} Skowronek. Politics. pp. 179-82.
namely, the Whig’s liberal, pragmatic, free soil nationalism -- a platform later taken up by the new Republican party.

In his first days in office, Pierce promised that each party interest would receive its fair share of patronage. He reached out to those who had elected him and even tried to set in motion a series of initiatives to end sectarian battling in the party permanently.\textsuperscript{543}

In different words, Pierce set out to put an end to all serious interruptions in his party’s electoral dominance. However, this plan met defeat at the hands of those Democrats who ultimately refused to forgive those who had deserted the party about five years earlier. New York Democrats who had remained loyal to the party in 1848 balked at the proposition that they would have to share the spoils of victory with the New York "free soil" Democrats who had abandoned Polk. These "hardshells" stoked the flames of suspicion that southern Democrats already had about Pierce’s friendly relationship with free soilers.\textsuperscript{544} Then, when Pierce insisted on choosing a good many free soiler Democrats for various appointments, the most radical of southern senators began to openly claim that their region had been shortchanged in patronage distribution. As a result, the party split, once again, into North versus South, and Pierce’s attempt to perfect the machinery of populist-majoritarian government imploded.\textsuperscript{545} Recall that what brought down Jefferson’s regime was a minority faction that moved against J. Q. Adams’s plan for Hamiltonian-style nationalism through Jeffersonian ideals of objective government. But, such a plan, despite its emphasis on social unity, was not the kind of


\textsuperscript{544} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{545} Ibid.
political development that was, by Madisonian standards, the worst threat to liberty because it at least promoted non-agrarian capitalism. But this cannot be said of Pierce’s patronage scheme, which was intended to sustain a strictly majoritarian and populist vision of government through the redistribution of wealth. So, in a sense, when the Montesquieuean factionalism of Madison’s Constitution divided Jackson’s regime under Pierce, it was working exactly to the end for which it was designed -- protecting wealth (property) from the designs of the masses.  

Despite failure, Pierce did not give up: Manifest Destiny appeared to him to offer a concrete way to bind the party together. He moved quickly to obtain more land from Mexico, and even grabbed hold of the idea of purchasing Cuba from Spain in the not-too-distant future. Immediately, southerners in Congress began to complain that the southwest extensions were, in actuality, part of a "backdoor" plot to extend free soil.  

The land, they said, would be used not for their benefit, but for a planned northern railroad. Southerners argued that the Nebraska territory would thus have to be organized according to the free soil principles of the Missouri Compromise. Stephen Douglas, anxious to ameliorate southern anxiety and secure his northern railroad, promoted the repeal of the Missouri Compromise. He proposed that Nebraska no longer be subject to antislavery mandates, but only to popular sovereignty -- as per the guidelines of the Compromise of 1850.  

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546 Ch. 2: ii; vi; vii.
547 Gara. See Intro., pp. 15-25, and ch. 2.
549 Gara. See ch. 4.
Pierce and his cabinet stood firm against repealing the Missouri Compromise, but when Douglas and a powerful group of southern senators pressured Pierce intensely, he changed his position and theorized that the only hope for saving his administration necessarily hinged on supporting Douglas. He reasoned that if he revoked the Missouri Compromise in favor of the Compromise of 1850, both northerners and southerners would be happy: the former would receive their railroad, and the latter would enjoy the halting of the haunting specter of a free soil movement gaining ground.\textsuperscript{550}

However, Pierce's momentous decision to repeal the Missouri Compromise convinced most moderates and free soilers that a “slave power” conspiracy had overtaken the federal government. Pierce had inadvertently sparked a political revolution. In the Senate, debate raged for weeks, but ended with a 37-14 victory for the Douglas-Pierce alliance. However, free soilers in the House were within striking distance of killing the (formally entitled) Kansas-Nebraska Act.\textsuperscript{551} In reaction, Pierce set into motion the "machinery" of the party with full force. Patronage manipulation, newspaper propaganda, and floor management were all used successfully in swaying just enough Northern Democrats to support the Act for it to pass. This display of presidential power-mongering disgusted most voters, and this disgust made the slave power conspiracy theory seem all the more true to a growing majority.\textsuperscript{552} Pierce attempted to diffuse the public’s outrage by exploiting the fact that Spain had recently seized an American cargo ship, the Black Warrior. In response, Pierce tried to provoke a war with Spain in order to take over Cuba. However, this normally popular call of Manifest Destiny was silenced

\textsuperscript{550} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{551} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{552} Skowronek, Politics, pp. 191-96.
when northern Democrats argued that the Cuba initiative was only going to add more
slaves to the Union. With the 1854 mid-term elections immanent, Pierce reversed
course. Nevertheless, most Americans remained incensed at not only the pro-slavery
implications of both annexing Cuba and the Kansas-Nebraska Act, but with the way in
which the latter became law. As a result, voters cleared away the Democratic party's
majority in the House with an oddball assortment of newcomers with few political ties to
any party. But despite the voters’ decision to essentially end the Jackson era, the
Kansas-Nebraska Act remained law, and Pierce was still president for two more years.

The Kansas-Nebraska Act became Pierce's personal undoing when free soilers
and pro-slavery bands killed each other on the fields of Kansas. Missourians on the
Kansas border had tried to force a pro-slave constitution on the governor Pierce had
appointed. However, the free soilers fought back and tried to set up their own
government. When Missourians started gearing up for a second invasion, most
Americans came to see popular sovereignty as the equivalent of anarchy. In the midst
of so much chaos, the new free soil Republican movement made itself the leading
alternative to the Democrats’ approach to territorial governance. Defined against the
anarchy of “Bleeding Kansas,” free soil was quickly becoming something more than just
another interest in American politics; it was becoming the philosophic first principle of

554 Gara. See chps. 3 & 4.
557 Ibid.
558 Ibid.
American liberalism because it seemed to be the only thing that could restore the nation’s politics and institutions to full health.\footnote{Ibid. Also, see Gara. pp. 198-214.} Thus, Madison’s Montesquieuean plan of North-South factionalism forced Jackson’s reconfiguration of Jefferson’s Romantic tradition of states’ rights, agrarianism, and majoritarian populism to fall apart. In a sense then, with the rise of the Republican movement, what the 1854 House election really did was clear a path for Hamiltonian nationalism to become America’s dominant philosophy a little later under Lincoln. Indeed, with the modern impulse for universal rationalization stirring up extreme factionalism, the Romantic liberalism of populist agrarian localism -- which had been protecting slavery from the beginning -- was disestablished, thereby making room for a clear alternative; namely, a pragmatic liberalism of industrialism and universal free labor.\footnote{Gara. See pp. 199-216.} \footnote{Skowronek. Politics. pp. 194-6.}

In the face of the nation’s meltdown, Pierce brought the power of the federal government to bear on Kansas to restore law and order. Pierce never stopped insisting that his position reflected the true meaning of the Constitution. Pierce believed that the Kansas-Nebraska Act upheld the fundamental constitutional principle of ‘compact.’ He argued that "'No portion of the United States shall undertake through the assumption of the powers of the General Government to dictate the social institutions of any other portion.'"\footnote{Skowronek. Politics. pp. 194-6.} It seems to me undeniable that Pierce was correct in saying that the Constitution protected slavery. Put differently, Pierce defined the South’s right to have slaves in the same antistatist way the Constitution did -- in terms of regional and popular sovereignty. Of course, this kind of liberalism was essentially bumped from its lawful
perch when the self-interest of some regions in Madison’s “extended republic” inclined
them to believe that these antistatist “terms” were inoperative unless free soil was first
universal.

In the end, with the nation in chaos, Pierce was sacked by the Democratic party in
1856 and replaced by the impotent James Buchanan, who governed over -- for all
practical intents and purposes -- a non-existent Union and regime.\textsuperscript{562}

In conclusion, Pierce's disjunction was rooted in the effects of attempting to
harmonize the free soil and southern factions in his party through Manifest Destiny and
patronage. Pierce's disjunction conveys a tension in America’s liberal traditions: can
Jeffersonian localism be legitimate in and of itself, or must there be some other, more
essential liberal principle that grounds it? Madison and Hamilton, both of whom were for
free labor, did not think that slavery had to be abolished first in order to create the Union.
It seems then that this “first principle” was essentially added to the liberal pragmatic
tradition of Madison’s and Hamilton’s bourgeois commercialism.

iii. The Third Regime: Abraham Lincoln, Theodore Roosevelt, and Herbert
Hoover

When Lincoln was elected president, the Kansas-Nebraska Act remained law, but
the South was, as ever, very defensive about its position in the Union: southerners were
fully aware that the Republican free soil movement was gaining in national popularity.\textsuperscript{563}
Though Jackson’s regime had been disestablished, nationalism and free soil had not yet

\textsuperscript{562} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{563} Richard Striner. \textit{Father Abraham: Lincoln’s relentless struggle to end slavery.} (Oxford: Oxford
become the majority view; nor had this rather Federalist outlook been set in institutional stone. What gave Lincoln the power to recast America’s fundamental political commitments was certainly not his popularity or his being swept into office by an adoring majority: rather, it was the fact that he was not accountable to any standing, commonly agreed upon national political philosophy.\textsuperscript{564} Put another way, there was no one to hold Lincoln to any particular test of an already established philosophic orthodoxy. Andrew Jackson’s reconstitution of Jeffersonianism had died with Pierce, so Lincoln was free of its localist strictures.\textsuperscript{565} Not surprisingly, Lincoln’s agenda was far more stridently Hamiltonian than anything that had come before it.\textsuperscript{566} Indeed, Lincoln repudiated the idea that the nation’s foundation had been built on a Jeffersonian orthodoxy of liberal antistatism, agrarianism, and regional sovereignty.\textsuperscript{567} He claimed that the Democrats had manufactured this myth and that the nation was now reaping its anarchic results. Put differently, Lincoln argued that the Democratic party had perverted the doctrine of states' rights, and he knowingly contradicted fact by implying that slavery was never an authentic element of the original constitutional compact.\textsuperscript{568} Lincoln argued that established power arrangements had forced upon the people a perversion of the "original purpose" and "first principles" of the Union.\textsuperscript{569} Lincoln insisted that his rejection of the

\textsuperscript{564} Skowronek. Politics. pp. 202-08.


\textsuperscript{568} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{569} Skowronek. Politics. pp. 206-09.
nation’s now defunct Democratic politics was, in reality, an affirmation of the true meaning of the Constitution. Thus, just like Jefferson and Jackson before him, Lincoln claimed that his politics was a simple return to the earliest and truest intentions of the founding.

Though he offered no particular path or map for saving the Union, Lincoln wisely maintained a basic leadership posture that was ambiguous; he used this plasticity to continually redefine himself and his purpose according to changing circumstances. Thus, despite his distinct lack of popularity -- even in the North -- Lincoln was able to transform the North’s desire for union into a wholesale constitutional paradigm shift. He radically reconfigured the very definition of American government and society through an aggressive use of the more pragmatic elements within America’s liberal traditions. As we shall see, Lincoln saved the underlying principles of Madison’s factional “extended republic” by protecting it with Hamilton’s Hobessian and Baconian philosophy of nationalized capitalism and statist governmentalism.

The sudden and unexpected secession of southern states from the Union, both before Lincoln was sworn in and early on in his administration, meant a withdrawal of all the southern representatives from Congress. Republicans were thus left unfettered to marshal the vast material resources of the North to defeat the South. It cannot be

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570 Ibid.  pp. 211-5.
571 Ibid.
573 Ibid.
574 Ch. 2: iv.  See also Ambrosius.  pp. 4-5, 8 & 14.
forgotten however, that in the very beginning of the war, Lincoln was willing to accommodate slavery in the South, depending on the rebellion's exact course of action.\footnote{Striner. See ch. 1.} But a little later Lincoln shifted his thinking and sided with the Republican radicals.\footnote{Ibid.} Lincoln made good use of the extraordinary systemic and patronage powers at his disposal in his effort to keep the Union together.\footnote{Ibid.} Most essentially, he drove the Union Army against the economic and political culture of the South, which was rooted in slavery.\footnote{Silbey. pp. 130-1.} Later public statements concerning an “openness” to ending the conflagration under certain conditions were, in fact, hiding the reality that Lincoln had firmly resolved to force the South back into the Union.\footnote{McPherson. See Preface and ch. 1. Fornieri. 44-9.}

In a certain sense, it can be argued with some cause that Lincoln’s war against America’s deep North-South socio-political divide was an assault on some of Madison’s Montesquieuenean ideals. Vastly different cultures, interests, and philosophies made majority action at the federal level difficult, and that was, after all, the main idea behind the “extended republic.”\footnote{Ch. 2: vi; vii.} But Madison himself, at least initially, also wanted a strong federal government in order to bind the nation unequivocally to the goal of economic self-interest and bourgeois commercialism. Madison did not want, however, like Hamilton did, a president-king to lead the national economy in a highly centralized
way. But historically, saving the factious and commercial elements of Madisonianism meant sharply undermining its commitment to co-equal branches. Indeed, consider first that Lincoln, in order to save the Union, and therefore the “extended republic,” had to -- somewhat ironically -- end the Constitution’s support of “two Americas.” What this entailed was thoroughly submerging the potency of the liberalism that was undergirding the South’s slave culture -- namely, Jefferson’s political science. Indeed, Lincoln had to liberate Americans from their addiction to some of their more Rousseauean ideals, especially agrarian anti-statism, in order to save the Union. The only available replacement tough enough for the job was Hamilton’s theory of government and economics -- the liberalism of industrial statism. Consider that Lincoln, or more precisely congressional Republicans, under immense pressure to finance and sustain the war, created a system wherein the federal government and national corporations had to intrude themselves more deeply than ever before into the everyday aspects of state business and the average citizen’s life. Because winning the war meant that the federal government and businesses had to cooperate and coordinate with each other, they symbiotically propelled each side to ever-greater heights. Thus, during the Civil War, expansive federal involvement in the economy was complemented by the appearance of national corporations and the consolidation of commercial interests generally.
More specifically, Republicans instituted national banking. Also, the Jeffersonian stigma associated with federal improvements was left behind. Indeed, “The Department of Agriculture Act, the Morill College Land Grant Act, the Homestead Act, and the Union Pacific Railroad Act heralded a wholly new dispensation in governmental affairs.” Such laws utterly altered the relationship between “American society and the federal government in commerce, finance, industry, and agriculture.”587

As noted above, elites in the private-sector had to bargain with government leaders over the shape of national policy in order to plan the war: what this did was create the skeleton form of a more pluralistic politics that, about fifty years later, displaced parties as the true center of American political life.588 Thus, the Republicans’ adaptation of Hamilton's "big business, big government" political science established in America what is called “technocracy.”589 In the rest of this chapter, we shall see that American technocracy turns on treating government as technique for the purpose of underwriting commercial activity. Put differently, American technocracy means displacing political debate with scientific bureaucracy so that “natural” and “objective” socio-economic goals can be identified and pursued.590 It is this reality of “capitalist technocracy” that most defines the second constitutional epoch.591 Thus, unlike the first constitutional epoch, wherein the Romantic Jeffersonian outlook defined what the true science of government was, in the second constitutional epoch, Hamilton’s pragmatic


589 Ch. 2: iv.

590 Ibid. ii; iv.

philosophy takes up this distinction. Also, the rest of this chapter will make clear that, from Lincoln on, the philosophy of “capitalist technocracy” is not highly susceptible to Jeffersonian advances. But, egalitarian and populist concerns do help to shape American technocracy. It will also be shown that Madisonianism has more sway than Jeffersonianism does in the second constitutional epoch because factions and self-interest continue to very much influence policy-making and coalition-building.

Curiously, it was Jefferson's and Jackson's reconstructions that made it possible for the Republicans to build up to a technocracy. In order to fight nationalism, Jefferson and Jackson evolved the executive role far beyond its constitutional strictures. As we discovered earlier, because the issues of nationalization and slavery were a constant source of factionalization for the nation, keeping alive the Romantic ideal of national unity and majoritarian populism meant antistatism had to give way to executive supremacy. Indeed, recall that Jefferson’s executive decision to go ahead with the Louisiana Purchase was intended to heal the wounds of division among states, regions, and interests. His “big government” embargo was aimed at the same goal. Also, Jackson fought the National Bank in the name of the majority by radically increasing his own power. And Polk used "vast systemic powers" to dole out patronage in order to smooth over sectarian hatred. Without all of this executive and governmental upbuilding, Lincoln and congressional Republicans would never have been able to create a new constitutional era of “big government and big business.”

Finally, it is worth noting that Lincoln's call for making the Union "forever worthy of saving," and his assertion that America is the "last best hope" for democracy in

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592 For a similar idea, see Silbey. pp. 130-44.

593 Fornieri. pp. 76-81. See also Ch. 2: iv.
the world, were declarations predicated on the abolition of slavery.\textsuperscript{594} As we shall see, this embrace of the Redeemer Nation’s “destiny” to be the guiding light of an irrational world impacts the second constitutional epoch in rather dramatic ways.

In conclusion, Lincoln's reconstruction was the inauguration of an entirely new constitutional epoch in American history. Lincoln's redefining of national purpose and "first principles" resulted in a massive rationalization and nationalization of America’s economic and governmental worlds. What this reflects is the triumph of Hamiltonian liberalism over Jeffersonian liberalism in America’s institutional political development.

Theodore Roosevelt became president at the beginning of the Industrial Revolution. With Lincoln’s constitutional epoch firmly in place, and his party in tight control of the nation’s politics, TR dedicated himself to safeguarding the Republican system from the turmoil of industrialization.\textsuperscript{595} Global capitalism, monopolies, corporatism, unbearable working conditions, and insecurity in this new economic age had made the public very hostile to both business and government.\textsuperscript{596} Roosevelt used Lincoln’s Hamiltonian version of “objective,” “scientific” government to formulate new solutions to these new problems. Indeed, he used “extrapartisan” modes of governmentality to de-politicize hot-button economic and political issues.\textsuperscript{597} Put differently, Roosevelt’s elaboration of Lincolonianism was a matter of using new and

\textsuperscript{594} Striner. See chps. 4 & 6.


\textsuperscript{596} Louis Auchincloss. Theodore Roosevelt. (New York: Times Books, 2001.)

\textsuperscript{597} Skowronek. Politics. p. 228-35.
powerful bureaucratic techniques to tame capitalism: he thought that this approach would avoid his party's "fossilization" as well as undercut the growing popularity of socialist, radical Democratic, and ultra-populist ideas.\textsuperscript{598} What will become clear, however, is that the factious effects of Madisonianism on Roosevelt’s program of “bureaucratic consensus-making” ensured that he could not sustain his program for longer than a term and a half.

Conservative party leaders and corporations were, of course, strongly opposed to Roosevelt’s bureaucratic additions to American technocracy. The only way he could get his desired programs implemented was by whipping up public support.\textsuperscript{599} Indeed, Roosevelt established a direct relationship between the office of the presidency and the public. It was in the name of the people that he initiated “trust busting” and great public works programs.\textsuperscript{600} It seems to me that Jefferson’s Romantic tradition of populist majoritarianism became the political means for securing the end of Hamilton’s Baconian economics. Indeed, plebianism was at the core of Roosevelt’s attempt to save industrial capitalism by making the economy more democratic and humane through Hamilton’s tradition of Hobbesian governmentalism. The fact that TR could dissolve powerful monopolies, establish the Interstate Commerce Commission, and pass the Hepburn Act and the Pure Food and Drug Act goes back to my point about Lincoln’s creation of the “big government, big business” paradigm: by using unprecedented governmental means


\textsuperscript{599} Ibid. pp. 230-9.

\textsuperscript{600} Ibid.
to save capitalism from its own irrationality, Roosevelt was definitely articulating Lincoln’s politics.

At least initially, in the face of social upheaval, Roosevelt was able to uphold the Republican’s winning electoral coalition of labor and business through administrative regulation and bureaucratic expertise. But, political success aside, he needed to adapt the nation’s economy to an increasingly competitive global capitalism. Recall from chapter two that Roosevelt developed his version of neo-imperialist capitalism to force the creation of new outlets for American goods, thereby avoiding dangerous gluts in the economy. With this goal in mind, Roosevelt carried out a revolution in Panama in order to secure control over its long-anticipated canal. More generally, he proclaimed America's hegemonic status in the hemisphere. America, he said, had an absolute right to protect its economic interests in Latin America militarily. Lest the rest of the world think that America was not a force to be reckoned with, he pushed an unprecedented peacetime build up of the Navy, and later celebrated this achievement by sending his Great White Fleet on a world tour. Thus, by evolving the Redeemer Nation complex into a straightforwardly militaristic and imperialist capitalism, Roosevelt dutifully reified Lincoln’s politics because he made sure that the policies of big government supported the international priorities and aims of big business.

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601 Ibid.


603 Collin. p. 216.

604 Ibid. See ch. 3.
However, Roosevelt's “articulation” began to fall apart by the end of his first term because of party infighting. For instance, because Lincoln's regime was composed of free traders, protectionists, labor, business, northerners, westerners, southerners, easterners, Conservatives, and Progressives, it was impossible for the party to come to a settlement on the issue of tariff rates.\textsuperscript{605} By Roosevelt’s second term, western resentment over his limiting access to natural resources and his removal of great expanses of land from public sale, combined with eastern outrage over Roosevelt's Hobbesian approach to executive power, caused Republicans in Congress to sabotage many of his legislative efforts.\textsuperscript{606} By his last year in office, the bureaucratically managed consensus he had so carefully built up had broken down completely, and political confrontation and sectarian division become the status-quo.\textsuperscript{607} Thus, even within a governmental and economic paradigm that had no great philosophic competition, the institutional blockades of Madison’s ever-expanding extended republic of self-interested factions and regions stopped TR’s “scientific” engineering of a majority consensus.

When the economy turned sour in 1907, the business community and Conservatives came down hard on the President, blaming his reforms for the panic. Roosevelt, embittered by the attacks, reached out to the "innocents" who bore the brunt of corporate greed. The proposals he pushed from this point on for social democracy and business regulation made Conservatives furious.\textsuperscript{608} Under these conditions, Roosevelt refused to run for president again. He turned instead to William Howard Taft and


\textsuperscript{606} Gould. pp. 181-88 & 301-09.

\textsuperscript{607} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{608} Ibid. See esp. ch. 7 & Conclusion.
secured victory for him. But TR became disillusioned and even furious with Taft when he pressed an antitrust suit against U.S. Steel. In Roosevelt's mind, Taft had reneged on his promise to maintain good ties between Conservatives and Progressives. Roosevelt decided to challenge Taft for the presidency as a third party candidate. For most voters, however, Roosevelt's reasons for running were too subtle to understand; and, with both Taft and TR battling for the White House, the door was opened for a Democratic interim administration that was willing to abide by the Republican boundaries of progressivism. The three-way race swept the Democrats to victory, with Woodrow Wilson at the helm.

In conclusion, Roosevelt's elaboration of Lincoln’s Hamiltonianism was carried out through big extensions of governmental bureaucracy in order to regulate the harsh effects of the Industrial Revolution. Roosevelt accomplished this by way of Jefferson’s Romantic populism. However, Roosevelt’s success in organizing the factions of Left, Right, labor, business, and regional sections into a sustainable majority through non-partisan technique, failed. This failure reflects the effects of Madison’s pragmatic philosophy because it was his constitutional design that put into place a political and economic system of extreme division and self-interest within an extended republic.

As is well known, Herbert Hoover's presidency was responsible for ending the iron grip that Republicans had had on America’s politics for almost sixty years. What

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610 Ibid. pp. 256-60.

led to this dissolution is rooted in the implications of a single fact: in Hoover’s time, Republican Conservatives had become stridently antistatist because they believed, beyond Adam Smith’s “invisible hand,” that God Himself had set down natural laws to rule the marketplace entirely and flawlessly. As we shall see, these antistatists were at the root of both Hoover’s demise and the end of Lincoln’s regime. (I should emphasize again that the end of Lincoln’s regime does not mean the end of the “big government, big business” philosophy of the second constitutional epoch.)

As I see it, the way the localist, antistatist Jeffersonian tradition survived in Lincoln’s constitutional system was by evolving so that it no longer stood against Hamilton’s Baconian capitalism, but actually for it. Lincoln’s technocracy was, in a sense, being challenged from the inside of the very party that had built it up: capitalism and technocracy, it was claimed by Conservatives, were separable after all. Hoover, however, was a moderate on the issue of “big government”; he was neither a strong statist nor an antistatist. It seems that Hoover steered a middle course within Hamilton’s “big government, big business” political science. In fact, he was chosen to be the nominee of the party because he was the least offensive candidate that statist Progressives and antistatist Conservatives could agree on. Many decades of party bickering and infighting had made the Republican party a heavily factionalized institution. But, in order to keep themselves in power, Republican Progressives and Conservatives agreed to

\[\text{\textsuperscript{612}}\text{Ibid.}\]

\[\text{\textsuperscript{613}}\text{Kendrick A. Clements. Hoover, conservation, and consumerism: engineering the good life. (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2000.) pp. 66-71.}\]


\[\text{\textsuperscript{615}}\text{Ibid.}\]
nominate Hoover and hide their mutual disdain for his moderate ideology. Indeed, both sides derided his scientific, apolitical methods and techniques as just so much nonsense. Progressives wanted more economic controls and guarantees than he was willing to offer, Conservatives the opposite. For his part, Hoover had hoped to move his party out of the realm of ideological bickering and into the realm of indisputable science, especially in regard to economic regulation. Hoover was essentially trying to transcend debate about the true interpretation of the political science of the second constitutional epoch.

When the stock market collapsed in 1929, Hoover's mild-mannered “government by technique” approach to fighting the Great Depression didn’t work: voluntary countercyclical stabilization programs did nothing to help the economy. The reason for this is clear: the leaders of America’s largest industries faced the perennial "collective action problem": that is to say that most of them saw no advantage to voluntarily cooperating with Hoover in the cause of achieving the common good. After all, if one industry or business failed to obey Hoover’s requests, it would actually gain a competitive advantage in comparison to those who did obey. Specifically, business leaders promised Hoover that they would increase investments and maintain current wages, but those same leaders couldn’t convince others in their sectors to do the same. Those who did comply with Hoover’s request maintained wages at the price of lay offs.

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and reduced working hours, which made the Depression worse.\textsuperscript{620} And, when the Federal Reserve Board expanded the money supply, banks greedily used the funds to shore up bad loans, not expand credit.\textsuperscript{621} What these failures represent, I think, are the effects of Madisonianism. While it is true that the collective action problem and greed are not uniquely American or Madisonian per se, it is also true that Madison designed the republic institutionally to be very large and factious so that collective action would be exceptionally difficult to achieve. Moreover, he designed the republic to be driven by avarice and obsessive self-interest.\textsuperscript{622} So it is the peculiar degree to which non-communal thinking pervades American culture, by institutional design, which I detect in Hoover’s policy failures. In some sense then, under the Republicans, Lincoln’s cultivation of Hamiltonianism was undermined by moderates and antistatists who refused to let bureaucracy and regulation provide a workable solution to the Depression. That is to say that American technocracy had stagnated in its ability to stay abreast of realistic ways to keep industrial capitalism afloat.

When Conservatives passed the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act of 1930, European economies, racked with war debt, were devastated by American protectionism. The result was an international economic depression which made America’s Great Depression worse.\textsuperscript{623} With no signs of the Depression coming to a close in 1931, Hoover went directly to the main source of the nation’s economic turmoil, the banks. With a series of grave “big government” threats in hand, Hoover tried to scare the banks into obeying his

\textsuperscript{620} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{621} Fausold. See ch. 6.
\textsuperscript{622} Ch. 2: vii.
\textsuperscript{623} Fausold. See ch. 6.
recommendations. Hoover had to try this voluntary approach yet again because he had to keep the Republican party united in order to win reelection -- he had to be able to go to his Conservative base with proof that he had done everything he could to avoid statism. When Hoover asked the banks to form an association of creditors to administer relief to solvent banks, he told them that if they didn’t, the federal government would seize control of the nation’s banks directly. Much to Hoover’s surprise, the country’s leading bankers were skeptical of Hoover’s plan and actually asked for the threatened federal action! Hoover refused, and, not surprisingly, the new National Credit Corporation that the bankers put together failed almost immediately.

This collapse was the last straw for most Americans: mass public pressure on Hoover to move against self-interested economic elites gave him enough space to finally institute the kind of governmentality that could, at least in theory, save the country’s economic system. Hoover’s Reconstruction Finance Corporation, enacted in January 1932, along with two other acts, constituted a clear and full-throated reification of the Hamiltonian credo of the second constitutional epoch -- that "big government's" most essential duty is to support and underwrite the long-term viability of "big business." The RFC expanded greatly the credit available to financial institutions and railroads, and the federal government took direct control of their administration. Also, the RFC provided federal loans to states for direct relief, for public works projects, and for the stabilization

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625 Olson. Chps. 2 & 3 (esp. pp. 44-54).
626 Ibid.
627 Ibid.
of prices in agriculture and industry generally.\textsuperscript{628} However, Hoover could not take political credit for these bold initiatives because, as noted above, he was tied to a Republican coalition with a strong antistatist base: he had to deny that he was doing anything radical. Even though Hoover’s actions anticipated much of the New Deal, Hoover insisted that he was in no way repudiating past Republican practice.\textsuperscript{629} Voters were turned off by this rhetoric; they wanted him to gladly embrace bold, new ideas. Franklin Roosevelt won the election of 1932 precisely because he was unabashed in calling for a new dispensation in governmental and economic affairs.\textsuperscript{630}

In conclusion, Hoover’s RFC speaks to a substantive reification of the "big business, big government" ideology. He tried to make this liberal paradigm healthier and updated through Jeffersonian egalitarian measures, as realized by a Hamiltonian statism capable of regulating Madisonian economic self-interest. However, Hoover was bound, electorally speaking, to the Conservatives’ insistence on the Jeffersonian tradition of antistatism, and it was this insistence that ended up bringing Lincoln’s regime to its end.

\textbf{iv. The Fourth Regime: Franklin Roosevelt, Lyndon Johnson, and Beyond}

After he was elected, Roosevelt faced the indefatigable nature of the Great Depression. The RFC was just starting to kick into high gear when Hoover was tossed out of the White House. It was up to Roosevelt to continue on the same “big government” path to economic reform. But, Roosevelt’s New Deal, unlike Hoover’s RFC, was seeking a permanent alteration in the way Washington and the corporate world

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{628} Ibid.
  \item \textsuperscript{629} Skowronek. \textit{Politics}, pp. 281-5.
  \item \textsuperscript{630} Ibid.
\end{itemize}
operated: he wanted the federal government to ensure a more democratic relationship between citizens and big business. Roosevelt argued that this “new” view of American government and economics was simply a reflection of the original intent of the Constitution. As we shall see, Roosevelt’s version of capitalist technocracy was, in fact, a very dramatic reification of Hamilton’s Hobbesian governmentality and Baconian economics. But, just as importantly, this “reconstruction” was put into the service of trying to achieve, ironically, Jefferson’s Romantic egalitarianism. However, it will also be made clear that Madison’s Montesquieuan plan to constitutionally engender factionalism in order to support elite interests over majoritarian demands blocked Roosevelt’s scheme to give himself the power he needed to reorganize the nation’s economy. And, because this “scheme” was necessary for effectively dealing with the Depression, FDR was not able to pull the nation out of its economic crisis with the New Deal.

The 1934 congressional elections expanded the initial rout of the Republicans in 1932, and gave Roosevelt an astoundingly popular endorsement of his Democratic vision. But, the grandiosity of Roosevelt's reconstructive efforts included his failed National Recovery Administration and his ill-conceived Court-packing scheme. In coming up with these and other ideas, Roosevelt used a hodgepodge of progressive ideas concerning administrative rationalization. His goal was to promote the American

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632 Ibid.

633 Ibid.
individuals' right to happiness through guaranteed economic security.\textsuperscript{634} He argued that the rich -- the economic aristocracy, as he put it -- were essentially trying to establish an autocracy by their refusal to fight the Depression. Indeed, the current economic situation, said Roosevelt, meant power for the elite and enslavement for the masses.\textsuperscript{635} Roosevelt’s reconstruction was then, in a sense, pushing against Madison's theory that, historically -- in democracies -- the most pressing problem is the majority destroying liberty by robbing the elites of their property. Thus, FDR was re-entrenching the Romantic tradition in American politics after years of it being ignored by Theodore Roosevelt’s successors.\textsuperscript{636} Like Jefferson before him, Roosevelt claimed that the greatest danger to liberty is the elites, who will inevitably rob the masses of their rights.\textsuperscript{637} Thus, in light of the Great Depression, Roosevelt was, in effect, arguing that Jefferson was right in his Romantic assertion that the pragmatic economic ideals of the Federalists would someday end up enslaving the majority.

But there was a bulwark of interests and institutions, most especially a densely organized corporate economy, which successfully thwarted a good deal of Roosevelt’s bold initiatives in Congress.\textsuperscript{638} Roosevelt’s opponents were successful in using the rhetoric of Madison’s and Jefferson’s concept of co-equal branches to thwart social democracy. As a result, what the New Deal ended up being was a series of half-

\textsuperscript{634} Basil Rauch. \textit{The History of the New Deal, 1933-1938.} (New York: Creative Age Press, 1944.) Ch. 1.


\textsuperscript{636} Bloomfield. See “Intro.”

\textsuperscript{637} \textit{Ch. 2: v; vi.}

\textsuperscript{638} Alan R. Lawson. \textit{A Commonwealth of Hope: the New Deal response to crisis.} (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2006.)
achievements and middling compromises. Also, the Supreme Court swept away a
good deal of the major underpinnings of the early New Deal. Nevertheless, Roosevelt
was able to achieve some major victories for sustaining the American capitalist
technocracy. With massive additions to the federal bureaucracy and executive authority,
FDR tamed substantially the irrationality of Hamiltonian industrial economics.
Roosevelt managed to pass the Tennessee Valley Authority, federal breadlines,
agricultural subsidies, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the Securities and
Exchange Commission, Social Security, the National Labor Relations Act, and the Fair
Labor Standards Act. But all of these “big government” measures and programs, as well
as many others, were not enough to win the battle against the Great Depression, even
though they did manage to set the nation, like never before, on an egalitarian economic
course. The reason for this is that Congress refused to pass Roosevelt’s original request
for executive reorganization; that is to say that Congress refused to radically expand
executive supremacy, even though the principle of co-equal branches had been abandoned from the time of the first administration. Of course, a far greater
centralization of the federal government under the president was the best hope for ordering the interests of industrial America. Indeed, Roosevelt understood that in the industrial age, the only viable way to fight for Jefferson’s ideals and protect the majority from the machinations of economic elites was, ironically, Hamilton’s “president-king” model of government. However, this “model” left only the ballot box to protect the

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people from executive tyranny, which was another major concern of Jefferson’s. Nevertheless, in the industrial age, economic factions were, in reality, so self-interested that they could not -- in an interdependent economy -- act to achieve the cooperation necessary to avoid systemic failure. One sector's failure could easily lead to another's, and so on; hence the need for direct, central governmental coordination and regulation of the national economy.

But FDR could not overcome those economic and political factions least likely to accept a "capitalist technocracy" built overtly on Hamilton’s “executive supremacy” and the Romantic ideals of populist egalitarianism. Indeed, the "extended republic" was designed to stop exactly the kind of majority, populist faction that was, during the Great Depression, demanding systemic change. During the Great Depression, the nation's interests were so vast, divided, and self-interested, that FDR could not -- without World War Two -- end the Depression. This is why, in my mind, Madison's undemocratic philosophy is incompatible with the needs of industrial capitalism in the post-Lincoln era. Put differently, Madison’s idea that self-interested sections and factions will stop each other from acting in a way injurious to liberty is a dubious one in the industrial and post-industrial world. Roosevelt was right to argue that the fact of the interdependence of all factions, sections, and interests in the republic meant that they had to work together in

642 Ch. 2: ii; vi; vii.


645 Ch. 2: ii; vii.
order to avoid disaster. In sum, contra Madison and Montesquieu, cooperation is the name of the game in keeping capitalism afloat.

Once the President's reorganization plan went down to defeat, a shadow form of the reorganization proposal was passed by Congress the next year. It formally recognized the President as first among equals. But again, the executive branch was not given enough power to put an end to the Depression. In the end, "executive reorganization" was established, in large part, on the terms and conditions of Madisonian factionalism, such that, the very interests that had inhibited the end of the Depression in the first place made sure that they retained just enough power to keep Roosevelt from ending the very problem they created. That half-measures and extraconstitutionalism became, by necessity, FDR's only options for addressing systemic capitalist failure, shows how Americans did not face the fact that the constitutional demand for co-equal branches was out of date. Hamilton had been right all along: only a president-king can lead an industrial economy. What this blindness reflects, in part, is the fact that Americans tend to believe that their economic and political system is the result of a straightforward and holistic implementation of scientifically discovered facts, not the result of conflicting pragmatic and Romantic philosophies from the eighteenth century. In sum, in terms of the Great Depression, the conflict between economic need and constitutional principle meant that the presidency got further wrapped up in its long history of "extraconstitutional" action, which was no substitute for what was really needed to fight the Depression -- a radical expansion of executive supremacy. This reality reminds me of what Machiavelli once said; that new laws rarely suffice to meet changing needs when

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646 Lawson. pp. 6-12; McElvaine. See Intro. and Conclusion.

647 Ch. 2: iii.
they are not in harmony with their constitutions. Thus, the lack of success that Roosevelt had in establishing what was truly necessary to end the Great Depression reflects how the political science of the post-Lincoln era stagnated, due to the effects of the other, equally American and liberal political sciences. Indeed, Hamilton’s definition of economic progress does not fit well with either Madison’s call for anti-majoritarian factionalism and co-equal branches or Jefferson’s antistatism, because the masses end up having no pragmatic, effective way to stop their rights from being violated. In this way, it seems that Hamilton’s political science needs its Hobbesian side to embrace Jefferson’s egalitarian populism in order to uphold its Baconian side.

In conclusion, the overall dominance of the Hamiltonian tradition in the post-Lincoln era was made incomplete by both Jeffersonian and Madisonian visions of limited government, co-equal branches, and factionalism. The Depression could not be broken because "executive supremacy" was not allowed to extend itself to the point of fully underwriting industrial capitalism, which is why World War Two alone could make the American capitalist technocracy healthy again. Nevertheless, FDR set the nation’s “big government, big business” political science on a substantially more Jeffersonian-egalitarian economic course than ever before.

Lyndon Johnson put his administration to the task of radically elaborating upon Franklin Roosevelt's Romantic-egalitarian recasting of Hamilton’s political science. Johnson summarized his commitment to FDR's Democratic regime with this initial charge: “At this moment of new resolve, let us continue.” Johnson's deepest political desire was to unite the Democratic party and the country behind a full realization of
Roosevelt's legacy through the "Great Society" program.\textsuperscript{648} Such boldness stands in contrast to Truman’s and Kennedy's loyal “caretaker” presidencies, and is certainly not akin to the presidency of Dwight D. Eisenhower, who embraced Roosevelt’s regime, but made conservative adjustments to it.\textsuperscript{649} However, as will be demonstrated below, Madison’s anti-majoritarian factionalism easily blocked the full version of Johnson’s grand elaboration of the Democratic regime.

When John F. Kennedy was assassinated in the South by a southerner, Johnson was eager to allow the tragedy to give civil rights and his Great Society the moral high ground they needed to outmaneuver the thirty year old impasse in the party between northerners and southerners, blacks and whites, labor and business, Liberals and Conservatives.\textsuperscript{650} After Johnson trounced Barry Goldwater in the election, Johnson was sure that he could pull off his grand party unification scheme and extend it to include the whole nation because he saw his victory as a sign that the American people had, generally speaking, come to a real and abiding consensus in favor of his regime’s philosophy.\textsuperscript{651} That is to say that Johnson believed that Americans had come to agree on the regime’s Romantic tweaking of Baconian economics by way of Hobbesian statism. Johnson thought he could bring the vast majority of Americans together under one progressive ideology by delivering "everything to everyone".\textsuperscript{652} the Great Society

\textsuperscript{648} Skowronek. Politics. pp. 326-34.


\textsuperscript{651} Woods. See pp. 45-95.

included lower taxes for big business, higher minimum wages, job training, public housing, more subsidies for farmers, civil rights for blacks, mass transit and "Model Cities" for urban dwellers, more investment in rural America, safer cars and better roads for suburbanites, improved healthcare for the elderly and children, more funding for schools, and even public television for sophisticates. In sum, Johnson's desire to expand and permanently ensconce a Democratic national majority beyond serious contestation reflects how the Great Society attempted to overcome faction through the implementation of social democracy. This scheme turned on pragmatic Enlightenment ideals of technocracy -- that is, using bureaucratic technique to treat citizens as customers. But more than this, Johnson's desire to create a true welfare state reflected a radical dedication to FDR’s technocratic commitment to keeping industrial economics healthy by countering the negative social outcomes of “big business” practices, especially the highly uneven distribution of wealth. More generally, it seems to me that Johnson's Great Society reflected an attempt to lessen the impact that racism and classism have on fulfilling Enlightenment ideals of the individual pursuit of happiness.

For Johnson, war in Vietnam and implementing his Great Society were inextricably bound together. In a sense, Johnson had no choice but to fight in Vietnam: fighting communism was a relatively straightforward matter of maintaining an American promise to the "free" world -- that the U.S. could always be depended on to combat

653 Ibid.
654 Ch. 2: iv.
655 Ibid. iv; vi.
656 Ibid. v; Andrew. Ch. 3.
Communist expansion. Even after Vietnam had come to be understood as an intractable quagmire by all within the White House, Johnson sided with his more hawkish advisors, and decided against a "graceful exit." The reason he did this is clear: Johnson believed that calling into question the regime's most foundational precept, anticommunism, would force him into an untenable political position because with out Vietnam, his attempt to establish social democracy could easily be labeled as "socialism" by Republicans and Conservative Democrats. With Vietnam however, the charge would seem hollow and even absurd; "how could an anti-communist crusader be a socialist?" Thus, the sober duty of combating a modern but non-liberal ideology, Marxism, was more than a matter of carrying through on the Redeemer Nation complex -- that is, the republic's self-appointed "international mission" of saving the world by spreading the "freedom" of capitalism; it was also a matter of trying to embrace the goal of achieving a social democracy in America. But expanding a liberal ideology of Hamiltonian statism and Jeffersonian egalitarianism required nothing less than Johnson preempting the charge of socialism (as leveled by powerful antistatist and libertarian factions) by producing absolute proof of his commitment to freedom, which came in the form of killing tens of thousands of communists. Johnson's commitment to fighting in an un-winnable war paid large social dividends, at least for a short while. It gave Johnson the political space he needed to pass the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Medicare bill of 1965.

657 George C. Herring. LBJ and Vietnam: a different kind of war. (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1994.)


659 Ibid.
But, by late 1965, Johnson’s economic advisers urged him to increase taxes in order to cover the incredible cost of both the Great Society and the war. Johnson said “no.” Tax hikes, he thought, would force Congress to debate his priorities. But in the last two years of his presidency, the party split over Johnson’s domestic and foreign policies. Conservative and Liberal Democrats could no longer agree to support both the war and the Great Society simultaneously. On the surface, the story of Johnson’s demise is very straightforward: Conservative Democrats thought the welfare state was too expensive and elaborate, and Liberal Democrats were peaceniks by nature. But in reality, the effects of having a very large republic with such a vast number of regions, interests, races, classes, businesses, and so on, meant that even Johnson’s very large majoritarian faction proved powerless -- as intended by Madison -- to achieve a consensual social democracy. In a sense, the technocracy of the second constitutional epoch was a tempting but inadequate means for reducing the persistent and divisive effects of Madisonian anti-majoritarianism. Indeed, all of the old cleavages of the “extended republic” came back to haunt Johnson: Conservative Democrats, especially in the South -- with notable exceptions -- were, at best, leery of the Great Society: its cost, socialist overtones, and aid to blacks were unnerving, and northern Liberal support made them apprehensive generally. Liberal Democrats, both black and white, linked Vietnam to racism, poverty, and white privilege because poor whites and minorities seemed to be carrying a disproportionate share of the war effort on their shoulders.

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661 Helsing. See Intro. and ch. 5.

662 Ibid. See also pp. 269-72.
Democrats were eager to support Wilbur Mills, chairman of the Ways and Means Committee, who wanted domestic social spending cuts to get the budget under control. And Liberal Democrats supported Senators J. William Fulbright and Robert Kennedy, who made clear that they would not support the war. Consider too that growing inflation and an international gold crisis forced Johnson to agree to significant spending cuts. Thus, even before he left office, the Great Society was under-funded and scaled down. A tax increase was passed, but it did not save Johnson's programs -- it came only by agreeing to more spending cuts.

In sum, Johnson’s failure to unite a party and the nation behind his policies reflects how Madison's goal of undermining a majority faction's ability to redistribute wealth worked very much as envisioned in the case of the Great Society. Indeed, not even a single national party could agree to sustain for longer than a few years the seemingly highly agreeable proposition of delivering "everything to everyone." Of course, Johnson believed naïvely that with his executive power he could overcome factions by balancing and placating interests. But Johnson faced the same problem that FDR had: recall that Roosevelt was unable to attain the degree of executive power he needed to unite factions because factions were, even then, already too powerful to be overcome. With thirty additional years of sectional and political animosity stewing, LBJ had no hope of maintaining a national consensus. Nevertheless, Johnson's program did expand dramatically government size, power, and purpose by excluding no one in benefits and programs.

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663 Berstein. See esp. chps. 1 & 6.
664 Ibid.
665 Ibid.
In the end, with Robert Kennedy's challenge for the nomination quickly becoming a juggernaut; Martin Luther King Jr.'s highly negative assessment of Vietnam; and Walter Cronkite's increasingly hostile reporting, Johnson decided against running for reelection in 1968.\footnote{Lafeber. pp. 312-15; Skowronek. Politics. pp. 354-6.} After RFK’s assassination, Hubert Humphrey took the nomination, and, finding himself losing to his Republican opponent, he distanced himself from Johnson personally and quickly gained ground on the newly Liberalized Richard Nixon. But the Democratic change in electoral tactics came too late, and Nixon eked out a narrow victory for the Republicans within the Democratic regime.\footnote{Ibid.}

In conclusion, Lyndon Johnson's articulation of Franklin Roosevelt's regime was rooted in the hopes of achieving social democracy and civil rights, as well as creating a Democratic party all Americans could agree on, by way of the efficient delivery of government services to all interests. This vision was undercut by party infighting over Johnson's attempt to both create a welfare state and fight the Vietnam War. The post-Lincolnian philosophy of "big government and big business" was incapable of establishing social democracy because the majority party reflected the “extended republic” itself, which was stubbornly rooted in the constitutional engendering of self-interested regions and political factions -- as fostered especially by the North/South divide.

As Franklin Roosevelt’s regime entered into the 1970s, there was a backlash evolving against its underlying principles, especially because LBJ’s policies sharpened
these principles and thus made them even more offensive to center-right voters and Republicans generally.\textsuperscript{668} The new Conservative movement gave voice to disgruntled Americans unhappy over taxes, racial integration, and the ever-growing costs of the welfare state. Democrats were more and more being blamed for rising crime rates and deficits as well.\textsuperscript{669} While Richard Nixon exploited these concerns for his own political gain, policy-wise, he very much added to Johnson’s elaboration of the regime’s commitments with the establishment of the Environmental Protection Agency, affirmative action, and so on. But, even in the midst of a growing national discontent with the regime, the core constituencies of the Democratic party continued to push for additional expensive and expansive programs. Predictably then, by the mid-70s so-called "Goldwater-Conservatism" sprang back to life with promises of aggressive anticommmunism, reducing the size of the welfare state, low taxes, and less regulation.\textsuperscript{670} After Nixon’s resignation and Ford’s pardon, the American people were willing to elect a Democrat President, just as long as he was a moderate.\textsuperscript{671} Jimmy Carter fit the bill and dedicated his presidency to fighting the Conservative movement by moderating the policies of the Democratic regime.\textsuperscript{672} But, as we shall see, this program failed because Madison’s constitutional system made it too difficult for Carter’s reforms to pass. Likewise, it will be demonstrated that when the Conservative movement gained power


\textsuperscript{669} Ibid.


\textsuperscript{672} Ibid.
with the rise of Ronald Reagan, their reforms also failed as a whole, and for the same reason Carter’s did. Thus, what will become clear is that after Lyndon Johnson, the basics of Roosevelt’s politics are virtually impossible to substantially adjust, much less reverse. Even though Johnson did manage to elaborate on the regime’s principles, Johnson faced, just like FDR did, the fact that he could not overcome Madisonianism’s anti-majoritarian factionalism. As an ever-growing number of factions accumulated around Johnson’s elaboration of Roosevelt’s Romantic reification of “big government” and “big business,” major change to the nation’s basic political commitments became essentially impossible.

Carter’s politics was anchored in his co-opting popular Conservative themes into a “lean and mean” Democratic message of common sense and technical expertise. His unique brand of efficient, technique-driven, extrapartisan politics promised to “fix” Liberalism. With the intent of making a great symbolical impact on both the public and Washington, he decided to cut nineteen Army Corps of Engineers water projects in the 1978 budget. These projects were some of the most deeply entrenched and popular pork-barrel projects -- popular with congressmen and constituents alike. The Democratic Congress was naturally outraged at Carter for attacking the bread and butter of their careers. Speaker Tip O’Neill was alarmed at how quickly ties between Capitol Hill and the White House had disintegrated. So he cut a bargain with Carter and they agreed to delete only half of the projects. However, congressional leaders remained outraged, and Conservatives exploited the hypocrisy of Carter approving ten projects he

673 Ibid.

himself had called "wasteful." Thus Carter found that his desire to truly reform “big government” was essentially impossible, given the acrimony, resistance, and political cost involved in even a small step toward change. Nevertheless, he turned his reformist sights on the other half of his regime’s version of Hamiltonianism, “big business.”

The burgeoning and popular cause of consumer protection seemed like a good way for Carter to prove that he could make FDR’s governmental framework popular again. Carter wanted to show that government could protect Americans from corporate irresponsibility. But because this new direction was not terribly bold, it did not excite the base of the Democratic party. On the other side, direct opposition was being fueled by big business and their well-financed political action committees. They made Carter’s proposal appear to be more of the same old Liberalism that had gotten the regime in trouble in the first place: they claimed that it was just more red-tape that would lead to more bureaucratic nightmares. As a result, the proposal became too unpopular for Congress to support.

Carter had one last trick up his sleeve. He went straight to the American people and argued that his failure to enact reform was not really due to the power of the Washington political and business establishment, but the American culture itself. The fundamental problem with American democracy, he said, was that Americans worshiped self-indulgence and mindless consumption. Indeed, inflation was out of control, but

\[675\] Ibid.

\[676\] Ibid.

\[677\] Ibid.

Carter insisted that this was really just a symptom of why he couldn’t get things done: he argued that Americans of all stripes had forgotten how to let go of their own interests in order to achieve a better society. Carter had come to the conclusion that he had to lead the people back to the path of civic virtue. He unveiled a stern economic austerity and energy conservation program. Carter told the American people that they would have to invest in self-denial, discipline, sacrifice, and work hard to achieve the common good.

The average citizen seemed nonplussed if not unimpressed with the President’s infamous "Crisis of Confidence" speech. Nevertheless, Carter forged ahead and fired the Federal Reserve chairman, William Miller, who was blamed by Wall Street for runaway inflation. Carter replaced him with the Conservative Paul Volcker. Volcker immediately saw an opportunity to get rid of Carter and his tough stance towards big business: Volcker reversed forty years of Democratic precedent in monetary policy and tried to shock the nation out of its inflationary spiral by replacing Keynesian orthodoxy with controlling the money supply so that interest rates could seek their own levels. The outcome of this policy was not a reduction in inflation, but the central bank engineering an election-year recession. This economic downturn, in combination with the intractable Iran hostage crisis, doomed Carter’s reelection effort, and Ronald Reagan was swept to victory in November 1980.

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679 Ibid.
680 Ibid.
681 Ibid.
682 Ibid. Also, ch. 1.
684 Ibid. pp. 403-11
What Carter’s demise reflects is the fact that his Romantic call to virtue, self-denial, sacrifice, and the common good was no match for the power of the Madisonian tradition within Roosevelt’s regime. Recall that the factions of the extended republic made it impossible for FDR to get the power he needed to organize the country’s economy properly. Johnson ran into a bigger and even stiffer version of the same basic problem of factionalism. By Carter’s time, there was no hope: the factions of Left, Right, the Fed, big business, and Congress were all working against his reform of the capitalist technocracy. Carter naïvely believed that he could overcome these factions by directly confronting the undergirding philosophy of the Constitution itself, self-interest. Naturally, this tactic didn’t work because the majority could not be moved to fight for the common good: the average citizen was, it seems, happily following Madison’s plan for avoiding mobocracy by being thoroughly bourgeois, self-interested, and thoughtlessly consumeristic. By attacking endless consumption, Carter only opened himself up to the politically damaging effects of an economic recession, at least in the sense that the American people were in no mood for self-denial after the Fed took Carter’s own advice about how to control inflation. In sum, the Baconian and Hobbesian traditions in American politics could not be reformed by Carter’s embrace of the Romantic tradition, due to the effects of Montesquieu’s factionalism on the institutional, political process. Put differently, unlike most other industrialized nations, by Carter’s time, Madison’s slow moving constitutional system had evolved such that significant national political change or reform was virtually impossible to achieve: by building up a “republic of factions”

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685 Ch. 2: vii.
686 Ibid.
and encouraging self-interested economic avarice, Madisonianism made it possible to fully incapacitate the executive branch from enacting a true reform of the status-quo.

The ultimate proof for this apparently irreversible state of conservative status-quoism in American politics is found in the fact that Ronald Reagan could not deliver on his promised “revolution.” As we shall see, despite all appearances, the so-called “Reagan Revolution” never occurred. The wide margins of his victories in 1980 and 1984 did not give Reagan the power he needed to recast the terms and conditions of American government: he was not able to remake the nation’s politics by combining the Jeffersonian antistatist tradition with the Hamiltonian industrialist tradition because his agenda was blocked by the Madisonian build up of a thick and immovable constellation of self-interested factions.

Reagan’s plan was to deregulate major industries, make deep cuts in social spending, radically increase the defense budget, and cuts taxes to their lowest levels in twenty years. But this plan, taken as an integrated whole, met an impassable challenge from lobbies, special interests, state and local officials, and national bureaucracies, all of which pressured Congress to stand against these changes. As a result, the administration could not achieve the deep cuts in domestic spending that were required to offset the proposed tax cuts and increases in defense expenditures. In May of 1981, Reagan tried to cut into entitlement programs, such as Social Security, but even the new Republican-led Senate voted 95-0 against this suggestion. So, with no hope of

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implementing the Reagan Revolution, Reagan’s staff perpetrated a fraud on the American people: Reagan’s advisors had little choice but to pretend that their economic program was still viable, or else face the prospect of admitting political impotence and doing nothing to change Washington. The Reagan team knew they were not adding up the numbers in their budget properly, but they passed it through Congress by insisting that everything would somehow balance out. After the budget passed, David Stockman, the Budget Director and architect of the plan, admitted that the budget made no economic sense: deep tax cuts, a massive military buildup, and an ever-expanding universe of domestic and entitlement spending was nothing less than madness.

The Federal Reserve, worried about inflation with so much new spending on the part of the government as well as taxpayers -- especially the rich, who could now afford to splurge on their desires -- implemented a monetary policy of restraint. Volcker held tight on the money supply, interest rates soared, and the recession -- still persisting from Carter’s time -- cut deeper than ever before. In the face of this downturn, Reagan had no choice but to agree with the Fed’s demand for a big tax hike in 1982: it would be the first of many. Nevertheless, the recession was getting worse; by 1983, the Fed, interested in saving Reagan’s business friendly presidency, reversed its policies and returned to the

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690 Ibid.

Keynesian principle of manipulating the money supply to attain desired interest rates.\textsuperscript{692} By the next year, with the economy seemingly healthy again, Reagan was overwhelmingly reelected. But the truth is that this “recovery” was built on sand: as Carter made clear, the only true means for economic salvation was to end mindless consumption. Reagan’s program reflected no Romantic plea for such a "virtuous sacrifice for the common good." The Fed stopped the recession for Reagan, but did no such favor for Carter, even though both men faced the same economic difficulties. Reagan took credit for an "economic boom" that was really the result of the Fed opening up the money supply. The Fed was thus essentially endorsing Reagan’s unbridled “credit card” approach to prosperity: indeed, without sufficient income in the federal coffers, Reagan’s spending spree ended up, by 1989, amounting to a three trillion dollar debt, much if it owed to foreign lenders.\textsuperscript{693}

Thus with Reagan’s failure, we see how, like Carter, a majority faction was unable to implement its plan for significantly altering the American capitalist technocracy. Despite the power Reagan wielded by his inheriting an office built up in the Hamiltonian tradition, it was not enough to fully beat out Madison’s constitutional engendering of Montesquieuian factionalism. In sum, with Reagan at the helm, the Right tried unsuccessfully to use Jefferson’s antistatist tradition to destabilize Jefferson’s egalitarian tradition, which had embedded itself in Hamilton’s Hobbesian statism. This lack of success, in combination with the rest of Reagan’s plan, meant that the Fed had to choose between the political repercussions of a devastating recession, or tolerate a massive national debt. This catch-22 could have been avoided had the American people


\textsuperscript{693} Ibid.
transcended their Madisonian inability to sacrifice for the common good by agreeing to higher taxes and less consumption. Indeed, other than breaking the back of vital entitlement programs, there was (is) no other option for saving Hamilton’s political science from financial ruin. Not surprisingly then, George H. W. Bush and Bill Clinton both raised taxes substantially. George W. Bush lowered them again, while spending more than ever. As a result, the debt has now climbed to nine trillion dollars.

Nevertheless, I think it is more than fair to say that G. W. Bush's failure to privatize Social Security shows that no matter the unpopularity or undermining of Roosevelt’s politics and party over the years, his regime, properly speaking, is intact because the New Deal -- and LBJ’s elaboration of it -- remain the basic structure of American governance: all politics today is really just haggling over its exact scope and size.\textsuperscript{694} As Theodore Lowi argues, after the Great Depression, technique-driven, statist governmentalism became irreversible.\textsuperscript{695} Stephen Skowronek has come to this same basic conclusion as well.\textsuperscript{696}

\section*{V. Conclusion}

One way to encapsulate what I’ve presented in this study is to say that presidential regimes are creatures of political philosophy. It is clear that presidents engage their office by way of the ideational formulations that precede their rise to power.\textsuperscript{697} More


\footnote{\textsuperscript{695} Ibid.}

\footnote{\textsuperscript{696} Politics. pp. 29-32.}

\footnote{\textsuperscript{697} Philip Abbott has put forward a similar thesis: see \textit{The Exemplary Presidency: Franklin D. Roosevelt and the American Political Tradition}. (Amherst: The University of Massachusetts Press, 1990).}
specifically, I argued that it is Jefferson’s, Hamilton’s, and Madison’s conflicted liberalisms that shape the way presidents engage (or establish) regime policy. In chapter one I demonstrated that one of the main reasons why the cultural and institutional developmental literatures have not yet been integrated is because APD scholars do not recognize how American political development is rooted in the institutional practice of very particular streams of Enlightenment thinking. In chapter two I laid out the way in which these “streams” shape America’s political culture by way of Jefferson’s, Hamilton’s, and Madison’s philosophies. In chapter three I outlined how America’s philosophic traditions are like a script that each president performs an interpretation of in order to lead the nation. I also set up a scheme to examine presidential regimes in order to show that America’s three liberalisms shape the political evolution of the nation’s most powerful branch of government. In this chapter, four, I carried out my experiment in integration. A brief summary of my findings seems in order.

After the nation had been reborn under Madison’s Constitution, Hamilton set America on a Federalist course of development, in opposition to the majority’s wishes. Jefferson led this majority to defeat Hamilton. Hamilton’s leadership was rooted in two forms of liberal pragmatic thinking: non-agrarian capitalism and the executive domination of government. For ease of philosophic reference I called the former Baconianism and the latter Hobbesianism. Jefferson’s philosophy, on the other hand, was rooted in Romantic liberalism, which meant that he believed in political unity, antistatism, agrarianism, and egalitarianism. I referred to this outlook as Rousseauean. Madison’s liberalism was pragmatic like Hamilton’s, but Madison believed that liberty was best protected by factions, self-interest, and greed. I referred to this idea as p. 7.
Montesquieu. Madison added to this perspective the idea of the “extended republic.” When Jefferson’s faction took over the government, his Romantic plans were somewhat foiled by Madison’s design of a republic that was so large and diverse that in order to achieve political unity Jefferson had to compromise his beliefs. Jefferson was forced to include in his “revolution” the governmental and economic nationalism he had come to office to depose. As the nationalist faction gained ground in Jefferson’s Democratic-Republican party, Andrew Jackson fought to reconstitute the government to make it conform to a more pure version of Jefferson’s Romantic ideas. Though this reconstitution was initially successful, Madison’s “extended republic” made holding Jackson’s Romantic majority faction together impossible. Indeed, the cultural, political, and economic divisions between the North and the South split not only Jackson’s Democratic party, but the Union as well. The Republican party was born to glue the nation back together, and Lincoln reordered American politics according to Hamilton’s Baconian and Hobbesian philosophy. But, Lincoln’s party could not maintain control of the nation’s politics because after the Industrial Revolution, Madison’s ever-expanding extended republic of self-interested factions and regions created too much infighting within this new majority party. Another reason the Republicans could not hold on to power is because Madison designed the republic to be driven by avarice and obsessive self-interest, which, by 1929, brought the nation to its economic knees. And, because Madison designed the republic to be very large so that collective action would be exceptionally difficult to achieve, reorganizing America’s industrialized and interdependent economy according to the principles of cooperation was impossible. The kind of governmentality that could, at least in theory, overcome this problem was indeed
never achieved, not even by Franklin Roosevelt’s Democratic majority, which was, nevertheless, able to reorganize the republic’s politics by adding a strong egalitarian element to the reigning Hamiltonian paradigm. As the republic stands now, constitutional limits and business and governmental factions make it impossible for presidents to lead majority factions to reorganize or substantially adjust America’s major political commitments: this is clear inasmuch as the nation’s mammoth debt is a good symbol of how the factions of the Left, Right, Congress, the Fed, big business, and countless special interests block presidents from substantially reordering the economic structure of the country. As we saw, this “blocking” is both for the better because it saves social democratic programs, and for the worse, because spending and taxes are not adjusted properly in other areas to accommodate these programs. In sum, American political development really is the “Enlightenment in praxis” because the basic ideas of Bacon’s and Hobbes’s philosophies constitute the ruling paradigm of America’s politics, and because this politics’ elitist and authoritarian tendencies are moderated and circumscribed by the concepts of social and economic equality typically associated with Rousseau, as well as Montesquieu’s promotion of factions.

With this summary we can see how, as I pointed out in chapter one, “consensus theory” does not have a good sense of the complexity and contested nature of American liberalism. Indeed, the incessant intermixing and evolution of three different American traditions practicing four distinct liberal outlooks makes implausible the claim that American politics is an uncontested and straightforward kind of thing. We see too how the “lost alternatives” school of thought seems, at a minimum, to at least underplay the sustained resilience of the Jeffersonian-Romantic tradition in America’s politics. We can
also say that the “illiberal alternatives” view fails to see how America’s development is fully liberal because it ignores the rich diversity of the liberalisms that constitute the American tradition. Finally, using the “intercurrence” model of institutionalism, we can say that new regimes always seem to end up with inconsistent shards of the philosophies of old regimes, and that such “incongruity” is the primary source of major conflicts within America’s politics. Due mostly to the influence of Madison’s tradition on America’s political and economic system, Jefferson and Jackson integrated Hamilton’s ideas into their regimes. Nevertheless, the resilient influence of Jefferson’s and Jackson’s antistatism helped propel Lincoln into the White House, but the Republican regime could not get rid of this ideology’s influence altogether. And this same antistatism, which helped bring Franklin Roosevelt to power, could not be overcome by his regime either.

More generally, as noted in chapter two, it can be said that the pattern of political evolution noted above is very much the result of Jefferson, Hamilton, and Madison embracing the underlying ideology of Deism because it allowed them to develop the purely natural political sciences that drive America’s institutions. Because these sciences universalized themselves in order to rationalize the whole world, America’s Redeemer Nation complex was caught up in promoting territorial expansion and imperial capitalism, as we saw especially in the presidencies of James Polk, Theodore Roosevelt, and Lyndon Johnson. Moreover, though the goal of rationalizing the economic and political arenas of modern life took root early on in American history, the formal emergence of capitalist technocracy in the late 1860s created a whole new constitutional epoch for the American state. This epoch still maintains(ed) the fundamental tension
inherent within liberalism itself -- the tension between egalitarianism and libertarianism. 
Even as ‘progress’ was formally defined by the Industrial Revolution as being opposed to 
economic and social equality per se, egalitarianism still helped to define American 
society as something more than a large land filled with avaricious individuals invested 
only in their narrow, immediate interests.

I think that the implications of my study shed light on many of the most important 
questions surrounding the Enlightenment project and modern politics generally. These 
questions are often grouped together in relation to the essential modern paradox between 
the processes of rationalism and scientific determinism, and the values of individualism, 
autonomy, and will. My study provides a systematic means for moving towards a good 
understanding of how these tensions play themselves out in America’s political system. 
Specifically, it seems that economic and governmental rationalization have mostly 
overrun what were supposed to be these same processes “proper complements” -- namely 
self-determination and autonomy; that is, freedom from overbearing, dictatorial, and 
hierarchical political and economic structures and systems. With both Hamilton’s and 
Madison’s philosophies gunning for Jefferson’s, this outcome can hardly come as a 
surprise. Thus, what did not materialize in American politics was the dream of rugged, 
free-thinking individuals, who, averse to anything superfluous and highfaluting, are 
unencumbered by most goods and bourgeois "needs.” But, the very same industrialism 
that ended such high hopes also spawned an ever-thickening and "immovable" 
governmental system that allowed the egalitarian and populist ethic in American politics 
to be irreversibly embedded in the nation’s primary political commitments. Thus, one 
could say that the triumph of Hamilton’s vision of economic and governmental
development under minded some of the basic principles of Madison’s Constitution because it helped create not only executive supremacy, but also a more Jeffersonian, plebiscitary version of the presidency. We saw this developmental pattern playing itself out in not only Jefferson’s administration, but especially in Jackson’s, Polk’s, Theodore Roosevelt’s, and Franklin Roosevelt’s. Thus, it is not unreasonable to say that the supposedly more contemporary phenomenon of presidential administrations using bureaucratic capacity to their popular benefit -- within an economic and political system that makes executive, centralized leadership mandatory for the nation’s well being -- is, in fact, a developmental pattern that spans the whole of the republic’s history.

Finally, it should be noted that in American politics, the constant increase in technique and bureaucracy, being as they are, deterministic, forceful, impersonal, and conglomerating in nature, are -- ironically -- largely reflections of the liberal call to pursue individual liberty and autonomy through capitalist commercialism. Indeed, the instrumental rationality that undergirds liberal ideals of commercial and capitalistic success -- which in turn requires the bureaucratic management of nearly every aspect of life -- is also the proposed means for achieving Montesquieu’s (as well as Locke’s and Smith’s) vision of "comfortable self-preservation." Because the pragmatic side of the Enlightenment understood commercialism and technology as simply a "rational" means for pursuing happiness in a self-determined way, America's participation in this idea of rationality helps makes sense of the steady and upward trajectory of technocracy in

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699 Ch. 2: vii.

700 Ibid. iv.

701 Ibid. ii; vi; vii.
American development. Furthermore, it is reasonably evident that the significance and need for competing ideologies and parties would be negated, at least in part, by a "service and technique oriented state apparatus." As we learned, technocracy is bent only on delivering resources and services -- for political advantage in a plebiscitary environment -- in a business-like manner, according to the demands of the "consumer-citizens" desires and needs. Lowi argues that “one of the mischievous consequences” of mixing technique and democracy “is the belief in solutions.” He argues that there are irresolvable tensions in having “big government” mixed with “the plebiscitary presidency.” There is, for example, a necessary tension between representation and efficiency, specialization and humanization, and “treating everyone equally” and “giving special attention to individual variation.”

Put differently, the modern attempt to empower the individual, given the elitism inherent in industrial capitalist progress and technocracy, means that presidential leadership, being a creature of modernity, is necessarily rooted in incongruous philosophic ideas, which in turn generate conflicted policy outcomes.

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