INSURGENCIES, COUNTERINSURGENCIES, AND CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS: WHEN, HOW, AND WHY DO CIVILIANS PREVAIL?

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Abstract

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Most scholars of civil-military relations argue that the presence of domestic security threats increases the role of the military in politics. However, domestic security threats do not always increase the political involvement of the armed forces. And when they do, the effects vary across time and space. Why do comparable experiences with internal security threats have divergent effects on the nature of civil-military relations?

This is an important theoretical question with great policy relevance. For centuries, civilian leaders have struggled with the problem of subordinating militaries to their authority. The lack of civilian control over the armed forces has become a major factor that blocked the consolidation of democracies in numerous countries of Europe, Africa, Asia, and Latin America. In those countries where the military is a key actor in policy making, the presence of domestic security threats and internal enemies has been a common justification for this political involvement. Therefore, it is important to understand the actual connection between national security threats and civil-military relations and to discover the conditions under which the former is likely to lead to an increase in the political involvement of the armed forces.
In order to provide an answer to this research question, this dissertation presents a comparative case study of counterinsurgency policy making in Turkey and Peru, which have fought against Kurdistan Workers’ Party and Shining Path terrorists, respectively, from the 1980s onwards. This study shows that structural variables, such as the presence or degree of threat, are not sufficient to explain the military’s role in politics. Instead, it develops a theory of dynamic civil-military interaction, which shows that it is the interaction of strategic choices made by civilian leaders and military organizations in domestic threat environments that lead to different outcomes in civil-military relations. Sometimes this interaction is limited to the government’s preference of a particular policy option and the military’s expression of criticism or agreement with it. Sometimes it involves intense discussion and even bargaining among civilian and military actors. Both political leaders and military organizations are goal-oriented actors. That is why, they develop their policy preferences based on their assessment of costs and benefits of a particular move. Because civilian and military assessments about the costs and benefits of different policy options vary according to specific conditions, the resulting policy could reflect a different balance of power between the government and the armed forces each time. This dissertation’s main argument is that these specific conditions, whose presence makes civilian control over the armed forces more likely in internal threat settings are first, the strength of the head of government, second, the civilian leadership’s legitimacy in the eyes of the military, and third, the extensive and systematic international pressure for democratization.
To my husband Ali Emre and to my parents Ülker and Cevdet Kayhan
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1.1 Research Question and Theory in Brief

Today, there is a widespread conviction in the civil-military relations literature that the presence of domestic security threats leads to an increase in the political involvement of the armed forces. However, this conventional wisdom has a difficult time in explaining not only cases such as Sri Lanka and Colombia, where the military has not become a strong political actor despite these countries’ long-lasting internal violence, but also cases such as Indonesia, Philippines, Turkey, Peru, Israel and many others where the armed forces have played different political roles in domestic threat environments ranging from constraining the government’s freedom of action for certain policy options to carrying out coups d’état and establishing military regimes.

This is an important theoretical issue with great policy relevance. For centuries, civilian leaders have struggled with the problem of subordinating militaries to their authority. The lack of civilian control over the armed forces has become a major factor that blocked the consolidation of democracies in numerous countries of Europe, Africa, Asia, and Latin America.

In those countries where the military is a key actor in policy making, the presence of domestic security threats and internal enemies has been a common
justification for this political involvement. Therefore, it is important to understand the actual connection between national security threats and civil-military relations and to discover the conditions under which the former is likely to lead to an increase in the political involvement of the armed forces. Understanding this connection is the first step for civilian policy makers to formulate policies that not only aim to eliminate national security threats, but also guarantee civilian control over the militaries.

The purpose of this dissertation is to show that the impact of internal security threats on civil-military relations is in fact more diverse than is acknowledged in the current literature. It shows this variation through a comparative case study of counterinsurgency policy making in Turkey and Peru, which have fought against the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) and Shining Path insurgents, respectively, from the 1980s onwards and which have experienced different degrees and forms of civilian control over the armed forces during this time period.

This dissertation does not disregard the relevance of internal threats themselves in efforts to explain civil-military relations. Without a doubt, domestic security threats provide the framework within which military organizations find the rationale for their involvement in politics. However, structural variables such as the presence or degree of threat do not constitute a sufficient factor to explain the nature of civil-military relations. Rather, it is the interaction of strategic choices made by civilian leaders and military organizations in domestic threat environments that lead to different outcomes in civil-military relations.¹ In other words, *domestic security threats to the state lead to different degrees of civilian control*.

¹For an assessment of Strategic Choice perspectives, see David Collier and Deborah L. Norden, “Strategic Choice Models of Political Change in Latin America,” *Comparative Politics* 24, no. 2 (January 1992), 230.
control over the armed forces across time and space because internal security poli-

cies are formed as a result of a strategic interaction between civilian governments
and the armed forces. Thus, the consequent balance of power between the civilians
and the military does not always favor the latter.

Especially in those countries with a strong military organization, the presence
of a domestic security threat initiates a process of political interaction between
the governments and the armed forces as to how to fight against the internal
threat and resolve this domestic conflict. Sometimes this interaction is limited
to the government’s preference of a particular policy option and the military’s
expression of criticism or agreement with these civilian preferences. Sometimes it
involves intense discussion and even bargaining among civilian and military actors.
Both political leaders and military organizations are goal-oriented actors. That is
why, they develop their policy preferences based on their assessment of costs and
benefits of a particular move. Because civilian and military assessments about
the costs and benefits of different policy options vary according to specific condi-
tions, the resulting policy could reflect a different balance of power between the
government and the armed forces each time. This dissertation’s main argument
is that these specific conditions, whose presence makes civilian control over the
armed forces more likely in internal threat settings are first, the strength of the
head of government, second, the civilian leadership’s legitimacy in the eyes of the
military, and third, the extent of the international pressure for democratization.

Among these three factors, the strength of the head of government (IV₁) and
the civilian leadership’s legitimacy in the eyes of the military (IV₂) together consti-
tute the necessary conditions for the realization of civilian control over the armed
forces.

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2The concept of strategic interaction is used to describe situations where an actor’s behavior
is contingent upon the choices or likely choices of other relevant actors.
forces in the area of internal security policy making. When both of these conditions are present, it is highly likely that the civilian leaders will establish control over the military, particularly in the area of internal security. The international pressure for democratization is, on the other hand, a supporting condition, which either enhances the likelihood of civilian control in those cases where both IV\textsubscript{1} and IV\textsubscript{2} are present or compensates the lack of one of these variables. For example, for a weak head of government, international pressure for democratization provides an outside support group to endorse his/her policy preferences in the domestic arena and increases their likelihood of implementation. On the other hand, for a strong head of government who has low legitimacy in the eyes of the military, international pressure may increase this legitimacy to some extent and pressure the military to be more open to civilian agendas. Figure 1.1 presents this proposed theory.\textsuperscript{3}

This study presents an important contribution to the study of internal conflicts and civil-military relations. It demonstrates that the effects of domestic security threats on civil-military relations are more divergent than is acknowledged in the current literature. Since the context within which an internal threat emerges matters, these kind of threats do not automatically increase the military’s involvement in politics. In order to have a complete understanding of domestic security threats and civil-military relations, it is necessary to look at the specific circumstances in which civilian and military actors respond to domestic security threats.

\textsuperscript{3}It is likely that the political strength of a head of government influence this leader’s legitimacy in the eyes of the military. A political leader who has an unchallenged authority over his/her political party and whose political party has a majority of seats in the legislature, may gain the respect of military officers. However, civilian leadership’s legitimacy is not always determined by these factors and sometimes legitimacy is more about the civilian leader’s personal or ideological characteristics and history. Due to the independent value of this variable, it is more useful to present “legitimacy in the eyes of the military” as an independent variable in this study.
1.2 A Literature Overview

Domestic political conflict has been an important element of world politics for centuries. Broadly speaking, “domestic political conflict” refers to “violent or potentially violent political disputes whose origins can be traced primarily to domestic rather than systemic factors, and where armed violence takes place or threatens to take place primarily within the borders of a single state.”¹ Scholars and practitioners have used several terms to refer to different forms of political conflict and violence that have taken place within the borders of a state. Examples include, but are not limited to, rebellion, civil war, low intensity conflict, subversion, small war, insurgency, counterinsurgency, terrorism, counterterrorism, and other related phenomena.

guerrilla warfare, and unconventional warfare.\textsuperscript{5}

Domestic threats to the state are not a new phenomenon. As early as the 19\textsuperscript{th} century, authors of political violence began to make a distinction between internal and external wars.\textsuperscript{6} However, this subject failed to receive much scholarly attention during the cold war.\textsuperscript{7} The main reason for this is the extensive preoccupation of the scholars with super power rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union in the aftermath of World War II. Nonetheless, authors such as Harry Eckstein and Samuel Huntington wrote about how internal conflicts played a role in shaping super power behavior in the 1960s.\textsuperscript{8} The end of the cold war brought a new emphasis on the issue of internal conflict. As the subject of super power confrontation faded away after 1989, there appeared a new realization of the importance of domestic political violence as a serious problem with grave domestic, regional, and international consequences. Current research shows that internal wars constitute more than 80 percent of the wars and casualties that have been recorded since the end of World War II.\textsuperscript{9}

Having recognized the importance of domestic conflict and violence in world


politics today, this dissertation focuses on one of the most prevalent and violent forms of internal violence in this dissertation, namely insurgencies. Insurgencies constitute one of the most common types of domestic violent conflicts that have been observed since the end of World War II. According to the Central Intelligence Agency’s Guide to the Analysis of Insurgency, an insurgency is a “protracted political-military conflict over control of the state or some portion thereof using irregular military forces.”10 Insurgents aim at weakening government’s control and legitimacy through instruments such as guerrilla warfare, terrorism, covert party organization, and international activity.11

Internal threats and violence that develop in the form of insurgency movements, as well as the government’s subsequent response to end such violence create repercussions domestically, regionally, and internationally. However, this type of political violence poses its most devastating impact on the targeted state itself. Domestic security threats to the state have a tremendous effect on the development of state institutions, their relationships and the balance of power among these different institutions.

One of the most important areas on which such domestic threat environments have an influence is civil-military relations. Since insurgents are usually perceived as actors that present both a military and a political threat to the state, the nature of the state’s response to this threat is likely to create a civil-military tension and affect the balance of power between the civilian and military institutions of the state. However, these threat environments do not generate a uniform impact on civil-military relations regardless of time and space. While internal threats may


11 Ibid.
not always cause a significant change in civil-military relations, they may at times lead to a severe increase in the military’s political role and even to the total militarization of the state.

However, neither the civil-military relations nor the counterinsurgency and state formation literatures have sufficiently and systematically dealt with this subject. While the scholars of civil-military relations believe that the presence of domestic security threats increases the role of the military in politics and disregard the variation in the nature of civil-military relations that develop in response to such internal problems, the counterinsurgency literature tends to focus primarily on civil-military coordination in conducting counterinsurgency campaigns. On the other hand, the state formation literature mainly studies the effects of external threat environments on state building practices. Few scholars of state formation who deal with the issue of internal threats unfortunately fail to address the issue of civil-military relations. This dissertation addresses this critical omission in the literature. Based on the observation that domestic security threats cause varying effects on civil-military relations in different countries, as well as time periods, and thus shape the state apparatus and regime structure in different ways, it provides an answer to the question *why do similar experiences with internal security threats have divergent effects on civil-military relations?*

Although many scholars of civil-military relations have made arguments about the relationship between domestic threat environments and civil-military relations, the number of theoretical studies that specifically explore this relationship is limited. Huntington and Stepan are two leading authors on this subject. According to Huntington, the answer to the question of how domestic security threats affect civil-military relations lies in the nature of domestic threats themselves. He
argues that internal challenges to the state are usually political in character and they make the political and military roles of the major actors indistinguishable.\textsuperscript{12} Stepan, instead, focuses on military ideology and argues that the type of military training officers receive makes a difference. He contends that the concept of \textit{new professionalism}, which signifies expertise in the areas of internal security and national development besides external defense, could result in the military’s role expansion and lead to more military involvement in politics.\textsuperscript{13} Although these two authors make a very important contribution to the civil-military relations literature, the former does not include a well-developed empirical analysis in his arguments, while the latter accounts for military’s political involvement during only a limited time period in Latin American history, which does not easily allow for generalizations.

Desch, on the other hand, presents a comprehensive framework. In \textit{Civilian Control of the Military} (1999), he asserts that civilian control is weakest when a state faces mainly domestic threats because in these situations civilian leadership becomes less likely to be attentive to national security issues and military organizations become more likely to unify against the internal enemies, which increases the latter’s political involvement.\textsuperscript{14} Albeit useful, Desch’s explanations are not always supported by real world events and his over-reliance on structural variables leaves many outcomes unexplained. For example, Colombia, despite its protracted insurgency, has not felt a threat of a military coup since the 1950s. Likewise, al-

\textsuperscript{12}Samuel P. Huntington, “Patterns of Violence in World Politics,” pp. 19-22.


though the Tamil guerrillas have substantially challenged the Sri Lankan state and led to more than 60,000 fatalities since the 1980s, the armed forces have not really involved in Sri Lankan politics.

It is possible to encounter the common conviction about the connection between threat environments and the role of the armed forces in politics in several studies other than those listed above. Just to give a few well-known examples, Welch and Smith (1974), O’Donnell (1979), Rouquié (1987), Pion-Berlin (1992), Hunter (1997), Koonings and Kruijt (2002), and numerous others all argue in one way or another that the presence of internal threats contribute to an increase in the political involvement of the armed forces.\(^\text{15}\)

However, many studies that have been produced so far suffer from major shortcomings. First, most of these works do not systematically investigate how and in what ways internal security threats lead to military involvement in politics and they leave unexplored the mechanisms that tie threat perceptions with civil-military relations. Second, their findings are not always supported by real world events because they often do not explore those cases where civilian control over the armed forces remains intact despite the presence of domestic security threats.

Very recently, Paul Staniland, in “Explaining Civil-Military Relations in Complex Political Environments,” went against the conventional wisdom in the civil-military relations literature.\(^\text{16}\) Based on a paired-comparison of India and Pakistan, he showed that it is possible to come across praetorian militaries in external


threat environments, as well as, military subordination to civilian authority in internal threat environments. According to Staniland, one needs to examine the interaction of military threat perceptions with domestic structures, namely political institutionalization and civilian government legitimacy, in order to account for the variation in civilian control over the armed forces.\textsuperscript{17} Despite his important contribution to the literature, first, Staniland’s theory does not pay sufficient attention to the civil-military interaction per se. Second, his emphasis on the popular legitimacy of governments brings into minds the question of whose assessment of government legitimacy one should take into account to understand civil-military relations and what if the armed forces have a different assessment of government legitimacy from the broader public.

Another relevant area of research is the counterinsurgency literature. However, scholars of this literature have also failed to pay sufficient attention to the relationship between domestic security threats and civil-military relations. Bruce Hoffman rightly suggests that “at the foundation of counterinsurgency is the salience of the political dimension—in doctrine, planning, implementation, and most importantly, operational coordination.”\textsuperscript{18} Therefore, in counterinsurgency operations—even more so than the cases of conventional warfare—the need for civil-military cooperation and coordination is very strong. Despite this need, political and military preferences do not usually coincide in low intensity conflict situations.\textsuperscript{19}

\textsuperscript{17}Ibid., 322.


Along with Hoffman, the majority of the counterinsurgency scholars recognize the civil-military tension inherent both to the counterinsurgency policy making process and to the counterinsurgency operations. However, scholars of this literature have, so far, failed to explore this subject systematically and empirically.

Civil-military relations is in fact a widely discussed issue by the theorists and practitioners of the counterinsurgency doctrine. Several leading works on the British counterinsurgency operations such as Charles Gwynn’s *Imperial Policing* (1939), Robert Thompson’s *Defeating Communist Insurgency* (1966), Julian Paget’s *Counter-Insurgency Campaigning* (1967), and Frank Kitson’s *Low Intensity Operations: Subversion, Insurgency, Peace-keeping* (1971) discuss the importance of the government’s formulation of a clear political goal, establishment of civilian primacy over the military and the significance of coordination and cooperation between the civilian and military actors throughout the counterinsurgency campaign.20 The French have a different view about the nature of the counterinsurgency.21 However, regarding the issue of civil-military relations, the key writings on the French counterinsurgency doctrine such as David Galula’s *Counter-Insurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice* (1964), Roger Trinquier’s *Modern Warfare: A French View of Counterinsurgency* (1964), and Peter

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Paret’s *French Revolutionary Warfare from Indochina to Algeria* (1964) also discuss the shared responsibility between civilian and military actors in conducting counterinsurgency campaigns and the importance of civilian primacy over the military.\(^22\) Finally, studies on the US counterinsurgency doctrine, which developed as a result of the US experiences in the Philippines, Vietnam, Central America, and the Middle East, discusses the dichotomy between the more politically-oriented hearts and minds approach and a more military-oriented “war is war” approach in the conduct of counterinsurgency campaigns.\(^23\) But, none of these works provide a systematic analysis of the impact of this insurgent violence and the subsequent counterinsurgency campaign on the issue of civil-military relations.

A final group of studies where we encounter a study of internal threat environments is the state formation literature. Scholars of this literature have, in different ways, analyzed the impact the threats from below on the state apparatus. However, they have mainly focused on how domestic security threats affect the fiscal power and tax collection capacity. They have not paid sufficient attention to other aspects of the state apparatus, one of which is the balance of power between the civilian and military dimensions of the state.

State formation scholars have created a rich literature on the connection between interstate war and the evolution of the state (Hintze, 1975; Tilly, 1975; Mann, 1986; Ertman, 1997; Downing, 1992; Barnett, 1992). The conventional


\(^{23}\)Cited in MAJ Thomas Erik Miller, *Counterinsurgency and Operational Art: Is the Joint Campaign Planning Model Adequate?* (AY 2002-2003), p. 23. For one of the earliest documents about the US counterinsurgency doctrine, see *Small Wars Manual*, United States Marine Corps, 1940.
wisdom that emerged out of these studies was precisely expressed by Charles Tilly as “war made the state, and the state made war.” However, with respect to intrastate conflicts and wars, scholars have produced contradictory accounts. For example, while a number of authors argue that internal threats have a similar influence on the state’s extractive capacity as interstate wars, i.e., the presence of internal threats lead to an increase in the state’s ability to collect taxes (Cohen, Brown, and Organski, 1981; David, 1991; Stubbs, 1999), others contend that domestic security threats tend to decrease the capacity of a state by causing fragmentation among the population (Herbst, 2000) and undermining its fiscal power (Jackson and Rosberg, 1982; Herbst, 1990). On the other hand, some authors assert that internal security threats lead to different degrees of state capacity under different conditions (Ayoob, 1995; Rich and Stubbs, 1997; Slater, 2005).


Although these scholars made important contributions to the study of domestic political violence, they have not dealt with its impact on the relationship between civilian governments and military organizations.

Having presented an overview of the literature, it becomes clear that the connection between domestic security threats and civil-military relations is a neglected area of study. While the authors of state formation and counterinsurgencies have not made this subject their main focus of attention, the efforts of the scholars of civil-military relations did not always generate systematic analyses.

Today, the conventional wisdom in the civil-military relations literature tells us that domestic security threats in a country lead to an increase in the political involvement of the armed forces. However, this widely accepted view disregards the possibility that civilian leaders may sometimes possess the essential resources to exert effective control over the militaries and military organizations may voluntarily or involuntarily choose to play a lesser political role when confronted with domestic security threats. This shows that a deeper understanding of the interaction between civilian governments and military organizations in the face of domestic security threats is essential.

This research addresses an important omission in the political science literature by uncovering the mechanisms through which domestic security threats influence the interactions between civilian and military actors and lead to different levels and forms of military involvement in politics. By doing this, it challenges a widely accepted conviction that internal threat environments inevitably reinforce the role of the armed forces in politics and decrease civilian control. This research also shows how policy makers can utilize their political resources to maintain civilian control over internal security policy making. Having observed an obvious dearth of
theoretical studies on the relationship between domestic threat environments and civil-military relations, my goal is to advance the literature on this subject and elaborate hypotheses about how internal threats shape the nature of civil-military relations under different conditions.

1.3 Dependent Variable: Degree of Civilian Control over the Armed Forces in Internal Security Policy Making

The dependent variable of this study is the degree of civilian control over the armed forces in internal security policy making. Scholars of civil-military relations frequently use concepts such as the role of the military in politics or civilian control over the armed forces. However, they interpret these concepts in slightly different ways and they utilize different indicators to measure them. For example, while some scholars focus on the presence or absence of coups d’état in order to understand the degree of civilian control, others explore the military’s institutional prerogatives or privileges in policy making. This dissertation does not utilize these operationalizations of civilian control because such indicators do not always accurately demonstrate the level of the military’s involvement in politics. For example, although a military organization never thinks about carrying out a coup d’état, it may still have a lot of influence in policy making. On the other hand, despite a military organization’s extensive institutional prerogatives, it may not be able to take advantage of these prerogatives when a civilian leader dominates policy making in practice.

Thus, this dissertation uses Trinkunas’ definition of civilian control. According to Trinkunas, “[c]ivilian control exists when government officials have authority over decisions concerning the missions, organization, and employment of a state’s
military means.”

Civilian control necessitates that “officials have broad decision-making authority over state policy, free from military interference.” Thus, in order to understand the degree of civilian control, one needs to assess the extent to which civilian leaders control policy making processes. Since this study explores the impact of domestic security threats on civil-military relations, the main interest is in understanding the degree of civilian control in the area of internal security. Therefore, the focus is on the extent of military participation and autonomy in the making of internal security policies.

In order to assess the degree of civilian control over internal security, both primary and secondary data sources, as well as in-depth interviews with politicians, retired military officers, scholars, and journalists in Turkey and Peru are utilized. In light of clear coding criteria, which is presented and discussed in Chapter 2, civilian control over the internal security policy making process is coded for different governmental periods in Turkey and Peru on a scale of (-5) to (+5). This measurement is supported by expert surveys conducted by a number of experts on Turkish and Peruvian politics and civil-military relations. The civilian control scores between (-5) and (+5) are then converted to a scale of low, moderate, and high for ease of presentation.

1.4 Causal Story and Hypotheses

Although both Turkey and Peru fought against terrorist organizations from the 1980s onwards and carried out protracted counterinsurgency campaigns against


27Cited in ibid.
them, the military’s role in policy making did not develop fully parallel to the change in the degree of threat, but rather followed two different paths in these two cases. In Turkey, as the PKK threat gradually increased between 1984 and the early 1990s, the military’s role in counterinsurgency policy making decreased under the leadership of first Prime Minister and then President Turgut Özal. Especially, after the declaration of a state of emergency regime in 1987, the Ministry of Interior became the main institution responsible for the fight against the PKK. However, as the PKK threat reached its peak in 1993, the TSK took over the initiative in the fight and led a successful counterinsurgency campaign in the rest of the 1990s. On the other hand, in Peru, the military was assigned the task of fighting against the Shining Path in late 1982 and dominated the counterinsurgency policy making process afterwards. However, as the Shining Path threat tremendously increased in the late 1980s and early 1990s, President Fujimori, a civilian leader, who came to power with the 1990 elections, centralized the counterinsurgency policy making process and established civilian control over the Peruvian Armed Forces with Vladimiro Montesinos.

Structural variables, such as the presence or degree of threat, cannot account for the degree of civilian control by themselves in these internal threat environments. Therefore, this dissertation develops a theory of dynamic interaction between civilian governments and the armed forces. I argue that in order to understand the nature of civil-military relations in domestic threat environments, it is necessary to look at the internal security policy making process itself and explore the specifics of the civil-military interaction. Internal security policies are often devised as a result of a strategic interaction between governments and the armed forces and the resulting balance of power between civilian governments and milit-
tary organizations varies depending on the evolution of this political interaction. This is an alternative account about the relationship between internal threats and civil-military relations, which is more viable to explain the widespread variation in the degree of civilian control in different domestic threat environments. The main differences between the threat-based theories of civil-military relations and my account on dynamic civil-military interaction is presented in Table 1.1.

In order to understand the civil-military interaction in internal threat settings, it is first necessary to look at the civilian side of the story and figure out why politicians develop a particular set of policy preferences in fighting internal enemies. To develop this part of the decision making process, I utilize some assumptions of rational choice theory. I assume that politicians are rational actors who are mainly interested in seeking and maintaining office. In the face of electoral competition, the candidates’ goal is to maximize their votes in order to win elections.\(^\text{28}\) Thus, politicians “need to convince more citizens to prefer them than their opponent(s), and they need to convince these supporters to vote in greater numbers than their opposition.”\(^\text{29}\)

Most of the time, politicians seek to gain and maintain office. They tend to pursue policies that are likely to boost their popularity, enhance their political careers, and increase the chances of their reelection. However, in those countries where the military is a strong political actor, politicians have to take into account this reality. Contexts of regime uncertainty where there is still a real possibility


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Model</th>
<th>Structural threat-based theories of civil-military relations</th>
<th>A theory of dynamic civil-military interaction</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Central Argument</td>
<td>The presence of domestic security threats leads to an increase in the military involvement in politics. It can also be inferred from this argument that the higher the degree of threat, the greater the military's role in politics.</td>
<td>Internal security policies are devised as a result of a strategic interaction between the governments and the armed forces, where each actor takes action based on its own policy preferences. The outcome of this interaction, i.e., the resulting civil-military balance of power, is mainly shaped by the strength of the head of government, the civilian leadership’s legitimacy in the eyes of the military, and the extent of international pressure for democratization.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Role of individual or organizational actors</td>
<td>Both civilian and military actors play a low-key role because the presence or degree of threat is the main determining factor in civil-military relations.</td>
<td>There is considerable room for actors’ behavior. It is the political give and take between civilian and military actors that produce internal security policies and shape the consequent balance of power between civilian governments and military organizations.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
for a military takeover somewhat modify politicians’ calculations about their political survival and force them to engage in two different endeavors at the same time. While on the one hand, electoral competition forces politicians to focus on increasing their votes, on the other hand, their need to share the political arena with the military compels them to develop strategies that will make coups d’état more costly for military officers. Therefore, in those countries where the military is a strong actor in politics, the politicians’ goal of gaining and maintaining office not only forces them to develop policies that will help increase their public support, but also to build what I call a coexistence strategy with the armed forces.

This situation has a significant impact on the formation of civilian preferences in internal security. In countries with a strong military, the timing and content of civilian preferences in internal security policy reflect not only the politicians’ desire to collect votes, but also their need to share the political arena with the armed forces.

Once civilian preferences in internal security policy take shape, it becomes important how the armed forces perceive these preferences and respond to them. The armed forces develop their position in light of their institutional culture and interests, calculate costs and benefits of their response, and decide whether it is better to go along with the civilian preferences or to confront the government.

During this give and take between the civilian government and the military, three major factors influence the calculations of both actors and significantly shape the resulting civil-military balance of power.

H₁: The greater the strength of a head of government, the more likely s/he is

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to develop internal security policies that challenge the military’s priorities and the less likely the military is to confront civilian leadership.

The strength of political leaders, more specifically, the heads of government refers to a number of instruments, namely constitutional powers and partisan powers over legislation, which civilian leaders possess and utilize to exert their influence over policy.\textsuperscript{31} Constitutional powers over legislation are those powers that are “inherent in the office of the presidency [or prime ministry] that allow incumbents to have their preferences taken into consideration in the passage of legislation.”\textsuperscript{32} Constitutional powers include veto powers and/or their overrides, decree powers, exclusive power of legislative introduction, and budgetary powers. Partisan powers, on the other hand, signify the political leaders’ control over their political party and for that party to be in control of a majority of seats in the parliament. Here, it is necessary to note that in addition to constitutional and partisan powers, public support is also a very important factor that strengthens the civilian head of government’s hand vis-à-vis the military. However, public support is not presented as a separate measure of strength in this dissertation because variation in a political leader’s public support often has its impact through other factors such as election results, a change in the level of legitimacy in the eyes of the military, or a change in one’s control over a political party. For example, a decrease in the head of government’s public support may not have a practical impact on

\textsuperscript{31}I borrowed this variable from the presidentialism literature. Presidential power is often assessed by two measures: constitutional powers and partisan powers over legislation. See Matthew Soberg Shugart and Scott Mainwaring, “Presidentialism and Democracy in Latin America: Re-thinking the Terms of the Debate,” in Presidentialism and Democracy in Latin America, eds. Scott Mainwaring and Matthew Soberg Shugart (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997), p. 40.

\textsuperscript{32}Matthew Soberg Shugart and Scott Mainwaring, “Presidentialism and Democracy in Latin America,” p. 40.
this politician’s ability to influence policy until this decrease is reflected in the next election results. Or a decrease in a head of government’s public support may not weaken his/her position vis-à-vis the military if this civilian leader has another source of legitimacy in the eyes of the military. Therefore, although the variation in the political leaders’ public support and its implications are discussed in the empirical chapters, public support is not examined as an independent variable. Rather, it is analyzed as an important factor that influences the level of civilian control through other independent variables.

The strength of the head of government is a very important variable because although strength does not guarantee a civilian leader’s control over policy, its absence definitely makes this control impossible. Before even taking into account a political leader’s relationship with the military and how the military will respond to a particular civilian policy proposal, one needs to know whether that civilian leader has the necessary constitutional and partisan powers to carry out his/her policy preferences. For example, if a civilian leader does not have the necessary support from his party’s members in the Parliament to pass a policy proposal, that leader will not be able to pursue that policy regardless of the military’s preferences. Thus, in order to have a chance of exerting civilian control over internal security policy making, a head of government first needs to have the necessary strength. However, in those countries where there is also a strong military actor in politics, although a high level of strength is necessary to achieve civilian control over internal security, it is not sufficient.

While a political leader’s strength provides him/her the necessary confidence and instruments to challenge the military’s policy preferences, at the same time it makes it difficult, but not impossible, for the military to defy civilian leadership.
This is either because with the presence of a capable civilian leader, the armed forces do not feel the need to intervene in the policy making process, or because confronting a capable leader with high levels of popular, governmental, and bureaucratic support is likely to decrease the military’s legitimacy and support in the eyes of the people. However, without having information about how the military perceives civilian leadership, it is not possible to make a prediction about how the military will respond to civilian policy preferences and how the resulting civil-military balance of power will be shaped.

As mentioned above, the head of government’s strength can be assessed in two major dimensions, namely a political leader’s constitutional and partisan powers over legislation. In this dissertation, the main focus for the measurement of strength is on partisan powers since constitutional powers do not cause a significant variation in the strength of the head of government in my two major cases of Turkey and Peru. Constitutional powers over legislation are most important when they give the heads of government the ability to carry out legislation independent of their political parties. Because neither Turkish nor Peruvian heads of government have this ability, political leaders’ strength is mostly determined by the leaders’ control of their political party, and for that party to be in control of a majority of seats in the legislature.

The presence or absence of partisan powers is determined through first, whether or not the head of government’s political party has a majority of seats in the legislature, and second, whether or not the head of government has control over his/her political party. It is possible to determine the former easily by looking at the composition of the legislature during the relevant government’s tenure. As for the latter, the assessment about a political leader’s control over his/her po-
political party is made through interviews and secondary sources on different party organizations and intra-party relations. Based on the assessments of these two dimensions, an evaluation is made about the strength of a head of government, that is, about whether a political leader has the necessary powers over legislation to carry out his/her policy preferences. A summary of how these indicators of strength and other independent variables are coded and measured is presented in Table 1.2.33

The second factor that influences the civil-military interaction is the civilian leaders’ legitimacy in the eyes of the military. In responding to a government’s policy preferences, the armed forces need to decide whether or not to go along with the civilian preferences based on their assessment of the civilian leader and his/her policy preferences.

H2: The military’s decision about whether to go along with the civilian preferences in internal security is shaped by how negatively the military perceives civilian leadership in light of its institutional culture and interests. Thus, the higher the legitimacy of the civilian leadership in the eyes of the military, the more likely the military will go along with civilian preferences in internal security.

The civilian leadership’s legitimacy in the eyes of the military can be achieved in three different ways. First, in line with Samuel Huntington’s definition of objective control over the military, the recognition of military professionalism keeps the armed forces away from politics and lead them to perceive civilians as the real policy makers in a country. Thus, any civilian leader who possesses legitimate authority within the state also has legitimacy in the eyes of the military.

33This table is presented in a similar format as used by Edurne Zoco in her dissertation titled The Collapse of Party Systems in Italy, Peru, and Venezuela: A Cross-Regional Theory (University of Notre Dame, 2008).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Indicators</th>
<th>Measurement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The head of government’s political strength</td>
<td>Majority of seats in the legislature</td>
<td>Strong head of government when both of the indicators are present</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Head of government’s control over his/her political party</td>
<td>Weak head of government when one or more indicators are absent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civilian leader’s legitimacy in the eyes of the military</td>
<td>Military’s trust towards the civilian leadership</td>
<td>High legitimacy when one of these indicators is present</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Military’s recognition of its professionalism</td>
<td>Low legitimacy when none of these indicators is present</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Military’s allegiance to a particular civilian group</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extent of international pressure for democratization</td>
<td>Presence or absence of regular monitoring, incentive, and sanctioning mechanisms</td>
<td>present=high</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>absent=low</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
organization. Second, a civilian leader can have legitimacy in the eyes of the military because of the military’s allegiance to a particular civilian group such as a specific social class. In fact, as Huntington describes in his discussion of subjective civilian control, such a case arises when the power of a particular civilian group is maximized vis-à-vis the military. Finally, especially in those countries where the military has historically been an influential actor in politics, civilian leadership’s legitimacy is usually achieved through the military’s trust towards the political leader in government. In order to make a valid assessment for the civilian leadership’s legitimacy in the eyes of the military, it is essential to understand the historical role, characteristics, and the mission of the military organization in question. The information on the military’s views about a particular civilian leader and his/her policy preferences is gathered from the military officers’ public statements, their memoirs, and in-depth interviews with retired military officers.

The third important factor that affects civil-military interaction in internal security policy making is the outside pressures for democratization. Today, the role of international actors in democracy promotion is well known. As a result of the explicit role played by the international context in the democratization processes of the eastern European countries, attempts to explore this connection have been steadily increasing. Since the establishment of civilian control over the armed forces is an essential element of democracy promotion, international actors also have an impact on the evolution of civil-military interaction in several

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countries and issue areas, including internal security policy making. Today, the real question is no longer whether international factors matter, but rather how and to what extent such external influences shape domestic politics. In line with this discussion, it is important to explore what kind of an impact international actors pose to internal security decision making processes. This dissertation argues that the nature of the pressure itself makes a difference:

H₃: *Extensive and systematic international pressure facilitates the establishment of civilian control over the military in internal security policy making.*

The extensiveness and systematic nature of the international pressure is assessed by looking at the presence or absence of regular monitoring, incentive and punishment mechanisms available to an international actor—an international organization or a great power—in its system of democracy promotion. International pressure with the presence of these mechanisms is more likely to facilitate civilian control over the military than the type of international pressure which is limited in nature and lacks clear incentive and sanctioning mechanisms. The reason is that in the absence of regularly functioning monitoring, incentive, and sanctioning mechanisms, international pressure means nothing more than words with no outcome. But extensive and systematic international pressure provides a mechanism where behavior is monitored regularly and either rewarded or punished according to the realization or failure of a certain nature of civil-military relations in internal security policy making.

Here, it is not argued that external pressure alone determines what kind of a civil-military relationship develops in a domestic threat environment. As presented before, international pressure is only a supporting condition and internal factors, mainly the strength of the head of government and the civilian leader-
ship’s legitimacy in the eyes of the military, matter tremendously in this process. Rather, I aim to show that international factors sometimes play a very important role in tilting the civil-military balance of power towards one of these actors.

In sum, this dissertation argues that the degree of civilian control over internal security is determined as a result of an interaction between civilian governments and military organizations in the face of domestic security threats. During this interaction, the strength of the head of government (IV$_1$), the civilian leadership’s legitimacy in the eyes of the military (IV$_2$), and international pressures for democratization play a very important role in shaping the resulting civil-military balance of power. While IV$_1$ and IV$_2$ together constitute the necessary conditions for the realization of civilian control over internal security policy, the presence of extensive and systematic international pressure for democratization constitutes a supporting condition which simultaneously influence both independent variables and tilts the civil-military balance of power towards the civilian actors. The summary of this dissertation’s theoretical predictions is presented in Table 1.3.

Explaining civilian control based on the dynamics of the civil-military interaction is an important point where I disagree with many of the authors of civil-military relations. Despite some contrary examples, the majority of the civil-military relations scholars analyze civil-military relations in a unidimensional manner, that is, they look at either the civilian or the military side of the story and emphasize only one dimension of the civil-military relationship.$^{35}$ However, as obvious from the name of the field, there are two sides to the interaction between

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$^{35}$For an excellent contrary example, see Peter D. Feaver, *Armed Servants: Agency, Oversight, and Civil-Military Relations* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2003). Peter Feaver presents American civil-military relations as a principal-agent interaction and discusses when the armed forces choose to work or shirk in response to civilian orders.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent Variables</th>
<th>Presence of International Pressure</th>
<th>Absence of International Pressure</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strong head of government/High legitimacy in the eyes of the military</td>
<td>High civilian control over internal security policy is highly likely. International pressure further enhances civilian control over internal security.</td>
<td>High civilian control over internal security policy is highly likely.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strong head of government/Low legitimacy in the eyes of the military</td>
<td>Civilian control is threatened. But international pressure limits military's participation in internal security policy making.</td>
<td>Civilian control is threatened. Military will increase its autonomy in policy making if it does not see this costly for the military institution.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weak head of government/High legitimacy in the eyes of the military</td>
<td>Weak political leader tends to use the military as his/her support base. Thus, military's participation and autonomy in internal security policy making is likely. But the military's role is restricted by international pressure.</td>
<td>Weak political leader tends to use the military as his/her support base. Thus, military participation and autonomy in internal security policy making is likely.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weak head of government/Low legitimacy in the eyes of the military</td>
<td>Civilian control is threatened. International pressure could help the civilian leadership reclaim authority to some extent. But strong civilian control over internal security policy is highly unlikely</td>
<td>Weak civilian control over internal security policy is highly likely</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
governments and the armed forces and for a complete analysis, it is essential for scholars to take this reality into account.

1.5 Methodology

This dissertation explores how domestic security threats shape the nature of civil-military relations in different countries and time periods through a comparative case study of Turkey and Peru over time. There are two major reasons why a qualitative small-N method is utilized in this research. First of all, case study is a useful method for discovering new variables, generating new hypotheses, and clarifying causal relationships. As John Gerring argues, “case studies enjoy a natural advantage in research of an exploratory nature.” It is because case study method allows for a close and detailed analysis of a unit and as a result it helps the generation of new insights and hypotheses that have not been apparent before. This is important for my research because first, this dissertation addresses an understudied question in political science, namely how domestic security threats affect civil-military relations and challenges the widespread assumption that the presence of internal security threats inevitably lead to an increase in the political


38 Ibid., p. 350.
involvement of the armed forces. Then, it accounts for the observation that the presence of domestic security threats produces a variety of civil-military relations across time and space. Thus, this research characterizes a mainly exploratory process in which I uncover variables and elucidate causal relationships that have not been extensively studied before.

Second, case studies provide valuable tools not only to clarify basic correlations, but also to understand causal mechanisms and intervening variables. As Van Evera argues, case studies not only tell us about whether hypotheses hold, but also why they hold. They allow for an in-depth analysis of events and causal connections. Case study method is especially useful for the analysis of decision making processes because “[w]hen studying decisional behavior case study research may offer insight into the intentions, the reasoning capabilities, and the information-processing procedures of the actors involved in a given setting.” This is an important feature for my research since this dissertation is mainly interested in finding out how civilian and military actors interact in developing counterinsurgency policies.

Among several different types of case studies, this study carries out a heuristic case study, which means that it is a hypothesis generating and theory developing effort about the connection between domestic threat environments and civil-military relations. Its objective is to formulate possible explanations about


42For different types of case studies, see Arend Lijphart, “Comparative Politics and Compar-
this understudied connection in light of two cases, namely Turkey and Peru. The study of Turkey and Peru constitutes the first step in my effort to later broaden the scope of this research to other cases and develop generalizable theories on the subject.

Although numerous countries around the world have been struggling with domestic security threats, there are a number of important reasons why Turkey and Peru are important cases for a better understanding of how domestic security threats and civil-military relations are connected. First, these countries’ struggles against terrorist organizations, namely the PKK and the Shining Path, provide surprisingly similar experiences of domestic security threats. This gives the opportunity to study why the nature of civil-military relations varies in the face of similar threat environments. Both the PKK and Shining Path were founded as revolutionary organizations with a significant Marxist-Leninist-Maoist influence and an ethnic and regional character. Insurgents grew out of impoverished regions and pursued similar targets, such as local state officials, peasants, village self-defense groups, and security forces. They resorted to both terrorism and guerrilla warfare. Their aim was to show that the state was not able to protect its own citizens and they ultimately wanted to establish revolutionary regimes. Also, throughout their long-lasting fights against insurgencies during the 1980s

43 With respect to their ultimate goals, PKK and SL diverge to some extent because although SL wanted to establish a revolutionary regime in Peru, PKK’s aim was to create a Marxist Kurdish state only in the southeastern part of Turkey.

and 1990s, both Turkey and Peru suffered from a high death toll.\footnote{In Turkey death toll rose to more than 35,000, while in Peru the number of deaths was approximately 69,000.}

The similarity between the scope and type of the domestic security threats experienced by Turkey and Peru is, in fact, not coincidental. In the late 1970s, "Öcalan [the head of the PKK] studied the methodology and strategy of the radical leftist terrorist organizations both within and outside Turkey, especially the Shining Path."\footnote{"The Case of the PKK: History, Ideology, Methodology, and Structure (1978-1999)," \textit{Ankara Papers} 9, no. 1 (2004), p. 25.} Moreover, in the early 1990s, British experts stated that there were organic ties developing between the PKK and the Shining Path.\footnote{Cited in İsmet İmset, \textit{PKK: 20 Years of the Separatist Violence (1973-1992)} (Ankara: Turkish Daily News Yayınları, 1993), p. 135.} Although a number of scholars and journalists have acknowledged Turkey and Peru’s parallel experiences,\footnote{Examples include İsmet İmset, Mehmet Ali Kışlah, and Michael Radu.} their efforts have not generated a systematic study, yet. Therefore, this dissertation takes advantage of the long-neglected opportunity these countries provide for comparison and to examine what kind of lessons they can learn from each other.

Secondly, Turkey and Peru provide a considerable variation in the degree of civilian control over the armed forces in counterinsurgency policy making. Throughout their prolonged fights against the PKK and the Shining Path, Turkey and Peru witnessed different degrees of civilian control over the armed forces over time and this variation in civilian control did not always develop parallel to the change in the level of internal threat. It is often argued that in Turkey when the PKK threat was at its peak in 1993, the TSK took the initiative in the fight against the PKK. On the other hand, in Peru when the Shining Path almost brought the
Peruvian state to the verge of collapse, it was Fujimori—a civilian leader—who was in command.

Finally, Turkey and Peru are two of the least likely cases to observe periods of civilian control over the military in the face of domestic security threats. In both of these countries, the armed forces have historically been influential actors in politics. They have perceived themselves as the guardians of the state and they have not hesitated to challenge civilian rule when they perceived that the state was in danger. Therefore, in the face of insurgency movements, we would easily expect the military’s domination of the policy making process. The fact that even these countries show some variation in the degree of civilian control over the military needs further exploration.

In order to assess causal connections, this study uses both within and cross-case analyses. Besides the analysis of Turkey and Peru as two different countries, I also examine within case variation across time and I look at the nature of civil-military relations during tenures of various civilian leaders in these countries throughout their counterinsurgency campaigns. I study four different administrations for Turkey between 1984—the beginning of the PKK insurgency—and present, namely Turgut Özal (1984-1993), Tansu Çiller (1993-1996), Bülent Ecevit-Devlet Bahçeli-Mesut Yılmaz (1999-2002), and Tayyip Erdoğan (2002-present) administrations. For Peru, there are three consecutive administrations under study throughout the counterinsurgency campaign against the Shining Path. These are Fernando Belaúnde (1980-1985), Alan García (1985-1990), and Alberto Fujimori (1990-2000) administrations.

This dissertation mainly uses process tracing in order to demonstrate the causal processes. Process tracing refers to “the effort to infer causality through the iden-
tification of causal mechanisms.” 48 With this method, the causal chain between the level of domestic security threats and the degree of civilian control over the military in internal security policy making in Turkey and Peru is identified. 49

In order to trace the processes of counterinsurgency policy making in Turkey and Peru, this study takes advantage of three major sources for acquiring evidence, namely semi-structured interviews with political and military elites, primary data sources, and published secondary sources. First of all, in both of my cases I conducted semi-structured interviews with those actors that have either participated in making counterinsurgency policies or actively fought against insurgents, such as politicians, bureaucrats, and retired military officers, as well as with academics and journalists who have closely followed these processes from the 1980s onwards. Second, I took advantage of the primary sources that are available to researchers today. Due to the sensitivity about domestic security issues, reaching primary materials have been difficult in both of my cases, but more so in Turkey than Peru since the PKK terrorism has been on the rise since 2004. However, in order to assess how threats from insurgents have been perceived and how counterinsurgency decision making process has proceeded, I was able to reach Peruvian military counterinsurgency manuals and the minutes of the Turkish Grand National Assembly meetings where counterinsurgency policies were discussed. Finally, I made use of published secondary sources such as, academic books, articles, and reports, newspapers, memoirs of those retired politicians and generals who played important roles in the policy making process, as well as military journals.


49 See Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences, pp. 206
1.6 Organization of the Chapters

The rest of the dissertation proceeds as follows: Chapter Two demonstrates that the degree of civilian control over the armed forces in counterinsurgency policy making in Turkey and Peru does not always covary together with the change in the degree of threat from domestic forces. By measuring the degree of threat and civilian control in Turkey and Peru from the 1980s onwards, this chapter shows that the relationship between domestic security threats and civil-military relations is more complex than is acknowledged in the current literature. Chapters Three and Four present the findings from the cases of Turkey and Peru. These chapters provide a theoretically oriented narrative of how the PKK and the Shining Path insurgencies shaped the nature of civil-military relations. Chapter Five explores the plausibility of my theory in three other cases, namely Sri Lanka, Israel, and Indonesia without providing a systematic application of the variables. Finally, Chapter Six summarizes the major findings of my research and concludes this dissertation.
CHAPTER 2

ASSESSING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE LEVEL OF DOMESTIC THREAT AND CIVILIAN CONTROL OVER COUNTERINSURGENCY POLICY MAKING IN TURKEY AND PERU

The first important step in this research is to empirically challenge the conventional wisdom in the civil-military relations literature that domestic security threats lead to a decrease in civilian control over the armed forces. In order to show that the impact of internal threats on civil-military relations is more diverse and complex than is acknowledged in the current literature, this chapter assesses how the degree of internal threat and civilian control over the military in internal security policy varies over time in Turkey and Peru.

In order to assess the degree of threat, the absolute number of fatalities caused by the PKK and the Shining Path over time in Turkey and Peru is used. Measuring the number of fatalities is a common way of assessing the intensity of conflicts and violence. Several datasets such as the Correlates of War, the Uppsala/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset, and the State Failure Dataset all assess the intensity of violence based on the number of fatalities caused by the particular conflict under study. This dissertation also follows this approach and focuses on the number of fatalities. However, it slightly diverges from the common practice because while most of the major conflict datasets measure the intensity of conflict in general, what is necessary here is to assess the degree of threat from the insurgents. That
is why, while the aforementioned datasets tend to count all conflict-related deaths to measure the intensity of conflict, this dissertation only focuses on the number of fatalities caused by the insurgents in Turkey and Peru. The main focus is on the level of violence inflicted on the security forces and civilians by the insurgents in these countries in order to measure the degree of threat.

For the Turkey case, this information is gathered from the National Police statistics, secondary data sources, Global Terrorism Database figures, and also annual Turkey Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, which are released by the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor of the United States Department of State. For the Peru case, the Final Report of the Peruvian Truth and Reconciliation Commission is utilized for the most accurate number of fatalities. In order to support this domestic threat assessment based on the absolute number of fatalities, this chapter also provides a narrative of how the degree of threat varied over time in these countries in light of primary and secondary sources, as well as semi-structured interviews in Turkey and Peru.

In order to understand the degree of civilian control over internal security, this chapter also evaluates the extent to which civilian leaders control decision making in the area of counterinsurgency versus military participation and autonomy in the making of these policies. For the purpose of assessing the degree of civilian control in different time periods in Turkey and Peru, a clear coding scheme was developed, which is composed of 5 questions presented below. These questions allowed me to make a clear judgement on the degree of civilian control over different aspects of the counterinsurgency policy making process. These judgements are based on objective information from secondary data sources, as well as semi-structured interviews with politicians, retired military officers, scholars, and journalists in
Turkey and Peru. The findings of this coding scheme is then aggregated into a scale of low, moderate, and high for ease of presentation.

In order to support these assessments, this chapter also presents the findings of a number of surveys with scholars and journalists who are experts on Turkish and Peruvian civil-military relations. In fact, these expert surveys were initially conducted for the purpose of obtaining a clear measurement of civilian control over counterinsurgency. In order to do this, several experts of Turkey’s and Peru’s civil-military relations were asked to make an assessment about the degree of civilian control over the counterinsurgency policy making process for specified time periods on a scale of low, moderate, and high. However, the responses of the experts who agreed to participate in the survey turned out to be more inconsistent than expected and the intercoder reliability measure was not high enough to confidently use the expert opinions as the main measure of civilian control over counterinsurgency. However, the results of the expert surveys are still included in this chapter because despite their overall weakness in intercoder reliability, these expert survey results could shed light on certain time periods in Turkey and Peru where coders seem to agree with each other about their civilian control assessments.

2.1 Coding Rules

The coding rules to measure civilian control over the counterinsurgency policy making process were developed in light of several studies that made an effort to measure the power and the privileges of the armed forces as well as civilian control over militaries. These works include, but are not limited to, Stepan’s *Rethinking Military Politics*, Obando’s “The Power of Peru’s Armed Forces,” Degregori’s
From these works, those factors that are most relevant to internal security policy making were included in the coding scheme. The coding rules developed for this dissertation are as follows:

1. Did civilian leaders develop counterinsurgency policies? Did civilian leaders develop these policies even when they faced opposition from the military?

   • Yes, civilian leaders developed counterinsurgency policies even when they faced opposition from the military (+1).

   • Civilian leaders developed some counterinsurgency policies in spite of the military’s opposition, but other times military preferences prevailed OR Civilian leaders developed counterinsurgency policies that were not opposed by the military (0).

   • The military developed counterinsurgency policies without much civilian input (-1).

2. Did civilian leaders influence appointments, promotions, and dismissals of those military officers who played a role in the counterinsurgency campaign?

   • Yes, civilian leaders influenced the appointments, promotions and dismissals of those military officers who played a role in the counterinsurgency campaign (+1).

   • Civilian leaders only had limited influence on the appointments, promotions and dismissals of those military officers who played a role in the counterinsurgency campaign (0).
• No, civilian leaders did not influence the appointments, promotions and dismissals of those military officers who played a role in the counterinsurgency campaign (-1).

3. Did civilian leaders punish human rights violations conducted by the security forces during the counterinsurgency campaign?

• Yes, civilian leaders punished human rights violations (+1).
• Civilian leaders either rarely punished or did not punish human rights violations (-1).

4. Did the military have administrative control over those areas of the country where counterinsurgency campaign was carried out?

• Yes, the military had administrative control over those areas of the country where counterinsurgency campaign was carried out (-1).
• No, the military did not have administrative control over those areas of the country where counterinsurgency campaign was carried out (+1).

5. Did civilian leaders control the military’s budget?

• Yes, civilian leaders usually controlled the military’s budget (+1).
• Civilian leaders had limited control over the military’s budget (0).
• No, civilian leaders did not control the military’s budget (-1).

All 5 questions presented above focus on the prerogatives of the civilian and military actors in the making of counterinsurgency policies. A (+1) score for a question signifies a behavior that should enhance civilian control, while a (-1)
score means an action that should endanger civilian control. On the other hand a (0) score refers to a behavior whose presence or absence does not bring much change in civilian control either positively or negatively.

When coding different time periods in Turkey and Peru according to these rules, each head of government’s tenure is given at least one time period. However, if the answers to the above questions change during a head of government’s tenure, the periods where there is a change in civilian control is shown separately as a different time period within a president’s or prime minister’s tenure.

The coding rules specified above produces a scale from (-5) to (+5) for each time period under study. While each time period’s score for the relevant head of government is measured by adding the scores for the five questions presented above, these scores are aggregated into a scale of low, moderate, and high. This aggregation is very intuitive and only used for ease of presentation. While the top two scores are presented as high civilian control over counterinsurgency, the two bottom scores are presented as low civilian control over counterinsurgency. The next two high scores and the next two low scores are presented as moderate/high and low/moderate respectively. Finally, the remaining scores in the middle of the scale are presented as moderate. Table 2.1 provides a summary of this aggregation.

In order to prevent the loss of information in the subsequent assessments, the disaggregated scores are used to measure the correlation between the level of

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1There are a few exceptions to this rule for the case of Turkey. Especially in the 1990s, Turkey suffered from short-lived coalition governments. For those governments whose tenure lasted for 1 year or less and did not survive long enough to bring a change in the answers to the 5 questions presented here, a separate analysis is not provided. Another exception is that during the Justice and Development Party government’s tenure in Turkey between 2002 and present, Abdullah Gül became the care-taker prime minister in November 2002 and transferred this position to Tayyip Erdoğan when the latter’s political ban was removed in March 2003. However, due to the continuity of the policies in the tenures of these two prime ministers, they are not examined under separate time periods.
TABLE 2.1

AGGREGATION SCALE

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<tr>
<td>+5</td>
<td>High</td>
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<tr>
<td>+4</td>
<td>High</td>
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<td>+3</td>
<td>Moderate/High</td>
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<td>+2</td>
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threat and civilian control over counterinsurgency.

2.2 Turkey’s PKK Threat and Civilian Control over the Military

2.2.1 Measuring the PKK threat to Turkey

The PKK is an armed, separatist, and terrorist organization in Turkey, which was established in 1978 by Abdullah Öcalan. It is mostly composed of Kurds living in Turkey and until the late 1990s its ultimate goal was to establish the
“independent, united, and democratic Kurdistan.”² After that time, the PKK claimed that it would also be open to solutions within a democratic Turkey.³ The PKK’s ideology is highly shaped by Marxism-Leninism-Maoism and according to the organization’s documents, it attempts to liberate southeast Anatolia from the rule of the “imperialist Turkish state.”⁴

Figure 2.1 demonstrates the absolute number of fatalities caused by the PKK in Turkey over time. Based on the absolute number of fatalities, the PKK threat in Turkey started with 69 fatalities caused by the PKK in 1984. This number steadily increased until 1991, but remained between 100 and 1000 fatalities per year. Between 1992 and 1995, the PKK caused deaths of more than 1000 security forces and civilians on an annual basis. From 1995 onwards, the death toll of the PKK began to decrease and between 1996 and 1999 it remained between 100 and 1000 fatalities per year. After the capture of the PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan in 1999, the PKK threat decreased considerably with less than 100 annual fatalities caused by the PKK. This situation lasted until 2004. Between 2005 and 2008, the PKK threat once again began to increase with more than 100 but less than 1000 fatalities caused by the PKK per year.

My internal threat assessment in Turkey based on the absolute number of fatalities caused by the PKK is also supported by several primary and secondary data sources, as well as the findings of my interviews with scholars, journalists,


³The PKK’s demands for a peaceful solution include acknowledging Kurds in the Constitution as one of the founding peoples of the Republic of Turkey and granting autonomy to them in southeastern Turkey. These demands have been rejected by the state actors as being against the unitary character of Turkey.

⁴Nihat Ali Özcan, PKK (Kürdistan İşçi Partisi) [PKK (Kurdistan Workers Party], p. 64.
Figure 2.1. The number of fatalities caused by the PKK over time
politicians, and retired military officers.

The PKK conducted its first major terrorist attack in 1984 in Eruh and Şemdinli. With approximately 200-300 armed militants, it began to carry out attacks on peasants, village leaders, and civil servants of southeast Anatolia. Öcalan argued that by attacking soft targets...he could show the people that the Turkish state was not able to protect its own citizens or supporters." However, during the initiation of the conflict, Öcalan was not able to gather much public support from the Southeast Anatolian people. Moreover, the then Prime Minister Turgut Özal belittled the PKK threat and referred to the PKK as a bunch of bandits.

The PKK began to increase its attacks in these early stages. Especially, the year 1987 marked the professionalization of the PKK. From 1987 onwards, the PKK’s recruitment levels increased significantly and attacks against the Turkish security forces intensified. Moreover, voluntary and involuntary support for the PKK increased significantly among the public. There was no single civilian or military personnel in the region who denied the presence of public backing for the PKK. According to the official civilian sources, in the late 1980s, PKK militants were able to move freely without much difficulty in the Southeast and Turkish

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8Ibid., p. 221.

soldiers were not leaving their barracks after 5-6pm in the evening. Thus, in line with the number of fatalities, the PKK threat steadily increased throughout the 1980s after its first major attack in Eruh and Şemdinli.

The 1991 Gulf War significantly intensified the PKK threat to Turkey. The power vacuum that emerged in northern Iraq in the aftermath of the Gulf War provided an important living space and a military base for the PKK, which made it easier for the PKK terrorists to cross the Iraqi-Turkish border whenever they needed. This mountainous region was also difficult for the Turkish security forces to reach. Moreover, when the Gulf War ended, the PKK took possession of the Iraqi army’s heavy weapons after the latter left northern Iraq. These were invaluable opportunities for the PKK. In the post-Gulf War period, Öcalan acknowledged the importance of this development by saying that “since the Gulf War, northern Iraq became a very important place where we got stronger and consolidated our tactics. It became a solid base for our armed or party activities.”

The worsening situation in the Southeast was also apparent among the Turkish civilian and military leaders during this period. The number of killings by the PKK increased tremendously. Although the total number of fatalities caused by the PKK among the Turkish Armed Forces (Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri-TSK), policemen, village guards, and civilians was 1619 between 1984 and 1990, this


12 Ibid., p. 249.
number skyrocketed to 4132 between 1991 and 1993.\textsuperscript{13} The year 1993 constituted the statistical peak of the number of fatalities caused by the PKK terrorists in Turkey. Between 1992 and 1995, this number remained over 1000 per year. When General Doğan Güreş, the then Chief of General Staff went to the Southeast in 1991, he stated that “he was genuinely concerned about the situation.”\textsuperscript{14} During this period both civilian and military actors acknowledged that there was a dual authority in the region. Especially at night, the PKK was in control of quite a few towns and villages. Several inhabitants of the region stated that the state was almost non-existent and the local state officials were not able to carry out their duties. As a former Governor of the Emergency Rule Region stated, the PKK was even collecting taxes from the local people.\textsuperscript{15}

As a result of Turkey’s effective counterinsurgency campaign from 1993 onwards, the PKK threat decreased steadily throughout the rest of the 1990s. Former Governor of the Emergency Rule Region Ünal Erkan stated that early 1994 marked important signs of progress in Turkey’s fight against the PKK in that participation to the PKK, as well as, its international support began to decrease from 1994 onwards.\textsuperscript{16} Especially in 1997, several internal PKK documents mentioned that the PKK was deteriorating and even collapsing.\textsuperscript{17} The press briefings of the National Security Council (\textit{Milli Güvenlik Kurulu}-MGK) meetings were


\textsuperscript{14}Hasan Cemal, \textit{Kürttler [The Kurds]}, p. 161.

\textsuperscript{15}Ibid., pp. 161-168.

\textsuperscript{16}Interview with Former Governor of Emergency Rule Region Ünal Erkan (Ankara: May 22, 2007).

\textsuperscript{17}Fatih Altaylı, “Pişmanlık Yasası Gerek,” [Repentance Law is Necessary], \textit{Hürriyet}, (November 27, 1997); “Apo Zeka Özürli,” [Apo is Mentally Retarded], \textit{Hürriyet}, (December 3, 1997).
also a clear indicator of the decreasing threat from the PKK. For example, after its September 25, 1997 meeting, the MGK stated that the acts of terror had decreased to a controllable degree after the long-lasting struggle against the separatist terrorist organization in the east and southeast Turkey.\(^{18}\) Between 1996 and 1999 the fatalities caused by the PKK decreased to less than 1000 per year.

However, even with the capture of the PKK leader Öcalan in February 1999, the PKK threat did not completely disappear. The PKK declared a unilateral ceasefire in September 1999 and withdrew its militants to northern Iraq. Moreover, only between 50 and 100 fatalities were caused by the PKK per year until 2005. However, there appeared concerns in Turkey about the politicization of the PKK issue. According to these concerns, which were especially expressed by the Turkish military, members of the Turkish security bureaucracy, as well as, the Nationalist Action Party, after the arrest of Öcalan, the PKK threat did not disappear, but only entered into a new phase.

Finally, the US War in Iraq once again provided an opportunity space for the PKK in northern Iraq. With the refusal of Turkey to open a second front in the war and the resulting active role of the Iraqi Kurdish groups, namely Kurdistan Democratic Party and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan as America’s local allies in the war caused concerns in Turkey about the possible establishment of an independent Kurdish state in the region and its potential implications on Kurds in Turkey. When the PKK put an end to its unilateral ceasefire in 2004, these concerns increased substantially, which once more increased the threat perception from the PKK. Since 2004 the death toll inflicted on Turkey by the PKK terrorism has been increasing and today, the clashes between the Turkish security forces and

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the PKK are still going on. Turkey has been continuing its fight against the PKK through several means, including cross-border operations against the PKK bases in northern Iraq.

2.2.2 Measuring civilian control over counterinsurgency

In light of the coding criteria presented before, this section assesses civilian control over the counterinsurgency policy making process for different time periods in Turkey.

**Turgut Özal’s prime ministry 1984-1986: total score: (-3)**

1. Developing counterinsurgency policies: score: (0)

At first, Turgut Özal did not take the PKK threat seriously and referred to the PKK as a bunch of bandits. Moreover, this time period was the immediate aftermath of the 1980-1983 junta regime. That is why, Turgut Özal did not want to cause problems by offering novel ideas in the area of security. His contributions were in the area of accelerating the economic and social development of the southeast Turkey. Other than this, Özal mostly followed the military’s policies to fight against the PKK terrorism such as the initiation of the village guard system. The military treated the PKK issue as part of its general counterterrorism strategy and it conducted several operations both in the Southeast and across the Iraqi border during this period.

2. Appointments, promotions, dismissals: score: (-1)

The new Turgut Özal government did not have an influence in the appointment of the chief of general staff because General Necdet Üruğ was appointed by the 1980-1983 military regime. Moreover, the president of this period, who made the

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19Müge Akmur, Civil-Military Relations in Turkey, p. 88.
final approval of the rest of the senior appointments and promotions, was Kenan Evren, the leader of the 1980 coup.

3. **Human rights violations: score: (-1)**

During this period, although Turkey officially recognized global human rights norms, the state elites stated that either human rights violations did not take place or they were part of the country’s fight against terrorism. Therefore, human rights violations were not punished.

4. **Administrative control by the military: score: (-1)**

Several provinces of the southeast Turkey were under martial law, which meant that the military had the ultimate administrative authority in these provinces.

5. **Military budget: score: (0)**

Until the 2003-2004 EU harmonization reforms, civilian leaders had limited control over defense budgeting and defense procurement. The military expenses were not fully transparent and the Court of Account’s audit was not total. Moreover, although the military’s budget has always been subject to parliamentary approval in Turkey, the parliamentarians’ input in this process was limited. The Parliament’s role was mainly “that of setting the organizational outline of the armed forces, providing appropriations to fund their operations, and re-affirming policies and practices set from the General Staff and Ministry of National De-

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22İlter Türkmen, “Türkiye’de Savunma Harcamaları” [Defense Expenditures in Turkey], *Hürriyet* (December 23, 2002).

1. Developing counterinsurgency policies: score: (+1)

In 1987, with Prime Minister Özal’s initiative, the martial law regime was replaced with a State of Emergency Regional Governorate, where the counterinsurgency campaign was conducted and coordinated under civilian responsibility, mainly under the command of the Ministry of Interior, the Emergency Rule Governor, and the Gendarmarie forces under the Governor’s authority. The State of Emergency rule was instituted despite opposition from the military. According to the former Chief of General Staff Doğan Güreş, during this period, the General Staff’s role in the fight against the PKK was limited to providing equipment and military forces, as well as military training upon request. Moreover, this period marked Turgut Özal’s several political initiatives for the resolution of the Kurdish issue, such as opening Turkey’s doors for the Kurdish refugees in the aftermath of the Halabja incident in 1988 and removing the ban on the Kurdish language in 1991 despite the initial opposition from the military in both cases, arranging secret meetings with the Iraqi Kurdish leaders, and promoting the creation of a safe haven for the Kurds in northern Iraq in the aftermath of the 1991 Gulf War. Özdağ and Aydmh argue that “Özal generally resisted leaving the PKK issue solely to the military” and before Özal’s death in 1993 the military did not have full control over the situation.

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25 Ümit Özdağ and Ersel Aydmh, “Winning a Low Intensity Conflict: Drawing Lessons from
2. Appointments, promotions, dismissals: score: (+1)

Turgut Özal exerted his influence on the military appointments. He managed to have his preferred Chief of General Staff candidate General Necip Torumtay appointed instead of the military’s preferred candidate Necdet Öztörn in 1987.²⁶

3. Human rights violations: score: (-1)

During most of the 1980s and first half of the 1990s, although Turkey officially recognized global human rights norms, the state elites stated that either human rights violations did not take place or they were part of the country’s fight against terrorism.²⁷ Therefore, human rights violations went unpunished.

4. Administrative control by the military: score: (+1)

With the removal of the martial law regime in southeast Turkey, the military lost its administrative control. Under the new State of Emergency Rule, civilian officials possessed the administrative authority.

5. Military budget: score: (+1)

Turgut Özal broke the taboo about the military’s autonomy in issues relating to its internal organization and funding requirements, including the defense budget. In 1987, he “took the initiative in reviewing the country’s defense funds and brought into public discussion resource requirements for professionalizing the army.”²⁸

**Turgut Özal’s presidency, November 1991-April 1993: total score:**

the Turkish Case,” *Review of International Affairs* 2 (2003).


1. Developing counterinsurgency policies: score: (0)

The Motherland Party lost the October 1991 elections and a True Path Party (Doğru Yol Partisi-DYP)-Social Democratic Populist Party (Sosyal Demokrat Halkçı Parti-SHP) coalition government came to office in November 1991. Under this new administration Turgut Özal—as the President of Turkey—somewhat lost his ability to develop his preferred policies.\textsuperscript{29} He succeeded in implementing certain policies such as meeting with the Iraqi Kurdish leaders and building indirect contacts with the PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan. However, he failed in some of his attempts. For example, during this period, although Turgut Özal suggested opening to discussion the possibility of a federation with the Kurds, wanted to declare a general amnesty if the PKK quit its armed struggle, proposed broadcasting in Kurdish and including Kurdish in the education system, his efforts were blocked by more conservative actors in Turkish politics.

2. Appointments, promotions, dismissals: score: (0)

Decisions for the military promotions were made at the annual August meeting of the Supreme Military Council, which is headed by the prime minister and the deputy chief of general staff. Also, President Turgut Özal had the final say in the appointment of the senior commanders. However, “in practice, the service commanders are selected according to their seniority by the chief of the TGS [Turkish General Staff], who traditionally informally notifies the prime minister

\textsuperscript{29}Henry J. Barkey and Graham E. Fuller, \textit{Turkey’s Kurdish Question} (Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield: 1998). The president is not the head of government in Turkey according to the constitution. However, since Turgut Özal played the most important role in developing counterinsurgency policies during these years, he is analyzed as the main political figure for this time period.
of his choice before the list is prepared for signature.”

Therefore, civilian leaders only had limited control over these decisions.

3. Human rights violations: score: (-1)

Human rights violations conducted by the security forces were not punished by the civilian leaders. The government failed to investigate those killings in the Southeast for which there were claims about the complicity of the security forces.

4. Administrative control by the military: score: (+1)

The State of Emergency regime continued under which civilians maintained administrative control.

5. Military budget: score: (0)

As discussed above, until the 2003-2004 EU harmonization reforms, civilian leaders had limited control over defense budgeting and defense procurement. The defense budget was made by the General Staff and the Ministry of Defense, and approved by the Turkey’s Grand National Assembly. However, micromanagement of the defense budget and debates on military spending did not occur. Moreover, the defense budget was not fully transparent and the Court of Account’s audit was not total.

Tansu Çiller’s prime ministry and deputy prime ministry, 1993-1997: total score: (-4)

1. Developing counterinsurgency policies: score: (-1)

In 1993, when Tansu Çiller became the prime minister of Turkey, she “turned over conduct of the Kurdish policy to the military” and the Turkish Military

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32Henry J. Barkey and Graham E. Fuller, Turkey’s Kurdish Question.
acquired full initiative and command over the counterinsurgency campaign against the PKK from 1993 onwards.\textsuperscript{33}

Under the True Path Party-Welfare Party coalition government between 1996 and 1997, Necmettin Erbakan wanted to engage in an indirect contact with the PKK “to explore the possibilities that the Kurdish militants may lay down their arms.” However, he could not go forward with this thought.\textsuperscript{34}

\textit{2. Appointments, promotions, dismissals: score: (-1)}

Tansu Çiller did not have influence over the appointments and promotions. “Indeed, in August 1993, immediately after taking office, the new Prime Minister Tansu Çiller endorsed the wish of the incumbent general chief of staff to extend his own term.”\textsuperscript{35} Moreover, in August 1994, at the request of the military, she extended the terms of the Air Force Commander and the Naval Forces Commander for another year.\textsuperscript{36}

\textit{3. Human rights violations: score: (-1)}

This time period is considered one of the worst in terms of human rights violations in Turkey.\textsuperscript{37} However, civilian leaders failed to prevent or punish these violations.

\textit{4. Administrative control by the military: score: (-1)}

During this period, the State of Emergency rule continued in the Southeast.


\textsuperscript{34}Henry J. Barkey and Graham E. Fuller, \textit{Turkey’s Kurdish Question}, p. 136.

\textsuperscript{35}Ümit Cizre, “The Anatomy of the Turkish Military’s Political Autonomy,” p. 162.


Thus, in principle, the military did not have administrative control over these areas. However, in practice, due to the weakness of the state capacity in the region, the military also participated in providing health, education, and infrastructure services to the public alongside civilian authorities.

5. **Military budget: score: (0)**

As discussed above, the civilian leaders’ control over the military budget was limited and there was not much improvement until the 2003-2004 EU harmonization reforms. The defense budget was made by the General Staff and the Ministry of Defense, and approved by the Turkey’s Grand National Assembly. However, micromanagement of the defense budget and debates on military spending did not occur. Moreover, the defense budget was not fully transparent and the Court of Account’s audit was not total.

**Bülent Ecevit’s deputy prime ministry and prime ministry, 1998-2002: total score: (-2)**

1. **Developing counterinsurgency policies: score: (0)**

In 1998, the General Staff presented a plan to the MGK about pressuring Syria to expel the PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan from Damascus. The years 1998 and 1999 witnessed the successful implementation of this plan with the cooperation of civilian and military actors. Although this plan was originally presented by the Land Forces Commander Hüseyin Kıvrıkoğlu, both the government and President Demirel played a very important role in the implementation of this plan.

After the capture of Öcalan and with the recognition of Turkey as an official candidate to the European Union during the 1999 Helsinki Summit, the Democratic Left Party-Nationalist Action Party-Motherland Party coalition took a number of initiatives in the area of Kurdish cultural rights and lifting of the
death penalty despite some opposition from the military. However, the TSK were still the dominant actor in the military aspect of the counterinsurgency campaign.

2. Appointments, promotions, dismissals: score: (0)

As discussed above, decisions for the military appointments and promotions were made at the annual August meeting of the Supreme Military Council, which is headed by the prime minister and the deputy chief of general staff. Also, President had the final say in the appointment of the senior commanders. The civilian leaders exerted limited influence over the appointments and promotions during this period. While the government and the president did not accept the then Chief of General Staff Hüseyin Kivrıkoğlu’s recommendation about not appointing General Hilmi Özkoğ as the new Chief of Staff, they did go along with his suggestion about appointing Aytaç Yalman as the new land forces commander. The latter decision was against the established practice.38

3. Human rights violations: score: (-1)

Especially, with the decrease in the PKK threat, the number of human rights violations decreased, but continued in the form of extrajudicial killings, beatings, and torture. However, the government failed to adequately investigate these abuses. “Investigations and trials of officials suspected of abuses continued to be protracted and often inconclusive.”39

4. Administrative control by the military: score: (-1)

During this period even the state of emergency regime was gradually removed by the government. However, the military still participated in administrative

38 According to the established practice, the former first army commander is appointed as the new land forces commander.

tasks. The restructuring of the infrastructure in the post-terror phase was “carried out under the de facto supervision of the armed forces.” There were reports that “military troops...[were] rebuilding bridges, schools and even villages, and that the civilian authorities...[were] trying to provide ‘logistical support’ to them” during this period.  

5. *Military budget: score: (0)*

As discussed above, the civilian leaders’ control over the military budget was limited. The defense budget was made by the General Staff and the Ministry of Defense, and approved by the Turkey’s Grand National Assembly. However, micromanagement of the defense budget and debates on military spending did not occur.

*Abdullah Gül’s and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s prime ministry, 2002-2005: total score: (+2)*

1. *Developing counterinsurgency policies: score: (+1)*

Between 2002 and 2005, the AKP administration wanted to resolve the Kurdish question within the context of Turkey’s EU accession process. The Government carried out a number of EU harmonization reforms, which aimed at expanding cultural rights in Turkey and decreasing the role of the military in national security policy making. These reforms were carried out despite opposition from the military.

2. *Appointments, promotions, dismissals: score: (0)*

As discussed above, decisions for the military appointments and promotions were made at the annual August meeting of the Supreme Military Council, which is headed by the prime minister and the deputy chief of general staff. Also, President

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had the final say in the appointment of the senior commanders. However, “[i]n practice, the service commanders are selected according to their seniority by the chief of the TGS [Turkish General Staff], who traditionally informally notifies the prime minister of his choice before the list is prepared for signature.”\(^{41}\) Therefore, civilian leaders only had limited control over these decisions.

3. Human rights violations: score: (-1)

There were investigations of unlawful killings carried out by the security forces. However, the number of arrests and prosecutions in such cases remained low and convictions were rare.\(^{42}\)

4. Administrative control by the military: score: (+1)

Although the military still had an important presence in the Southeast, with the total removal of the state of emergency rule, the civilian leadership possessed the administrative authority in the area.

5. Military budget: score: (+1)

The government carried out important reforms to establish stronger civilian control over military spending. These reforms increased the transparency of the budget process and expanded the role of the Court of Accounts in auditing military expenses. The 7th reform package brought extra-budgetary funds into the overall state budget and it required more detailed information and documents in the defense budget proposals.\(^{43}\) Moreover, the government took active part in the making of the defense budget during this period.\(^{44}\)


\(^{44}\)p. 147.
Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s prime ministry, 2006-2008: total score: (+1)

1. Developing counterinsurgency policies: score: (0)

From 2006 onwards, the Erdoğan Government slowed down its political initiatives in the resolution of the Kurdish issue and resorted to mainly military means in the counterinsurgency campaign. Although the Erdoğan government accepted a number of military’s preferences in the fight against the PKK from 2006 onwards, it did not grant full control to the General Staff.

2. Appointments, promotions, dismissals: score: (0)

As discussed above, decisions for the military appointments and promotions were made at the annual August meeting of the Supreme Military Council, which is headed by the prime minister and the deputy chief of general staff. Also, President had the final say in the appointment of the senior commanders. However, “[i]n practice, the service commanders are selected according to their seniority by the chief of the TGS [Turkish General Staff], who traditionally informally notifies the prime minister of his choice before the list is prepared for signature.”45 Therefore, civilian leaders only had limited control over these decisions.

3. Human rights violations: (-1)

The number of arrests and prosecutions in human rights violations cases remained low and convictions were rare.

4. Administrative control by the military: score: (+1)

Although the military still had an important presence in the Southeast, with the total removal of the state of emergency rule, the civilian leadership possessed the ultimate authority in the area.

5. Military budget: score: (+1)

As mentioned above, the government established stronger civilian control over military spending. These reforms increased the transparency of the budget process and expanded the role of the Court of Accounts in auditing military expenses. The 7th reform package brought extra-budgetary funds into the overall state budget and it required more detailed information and documents in the defense budget proposals. 46 Moreover, the government took active part in the making of the defense budget during this period.

As explained above, this study’s first attempt was to conduct expert surveys in order to obtain a valid measurement of civilian control over counterinsurgency. In order to accomplish this for the Turkish case, several experts of Turkey’s fight against the PKK and Turkish civil-military relations were asked to make an assessment about the degree of civilian control over the counterinsurgency policy making process in Turkey for different time periods on a scale of low, moderate, and high. Among these assessments, the most consistent answer was for the time period 1993-1997, which all respondents described as a period of low civilian control. This is consistent with the score based on the coding rules for 1993-1997. However, the rest of the responses of the experts on Turkey who agreed to participate in the survey turned out to be more inconsistent than expected and the intercoder reliability measure was not high enough to use these expert opinions as the main measure of civilian control over counterinsurgency. Therefore, the expert opinions are presented only as a supportive measure of civilian control in this dissertation. Otherwise, the expert survey results are inferior to the coding

rules because of their subjectivity and low intercoder reliability scores. The responses of 8 experts who agreed to participate in the survey is presented in Table 2.2. Based on these answers where a high score is represented as 2, a moderate score is represented as 1 and a low score is represented as 0, the arithmetic mean of all pairwise intercoder reliability measures calculated with Pearson coefficients is 0.5631 with a standard deviation of 0.2515, where 0.8 or higher measures would indicate a high level of intercoder reliability.

According to the assessment based on the coding rules developed in this study, the change in civilian control over the counterinsurgency policy making process in Turkey over time is presented in Table 2.3. Moreover, Figure 2.2 summarizes how the PKK threat and the civilian control over the military in the area of counterinsurgency policy has developed in Turkey over time. This assessment of the PKK threat in Turkey and the civilian control over counterinsurgency shows that the connection between domestic security threats and civilian control over the military is more complex than is acknowledged by the threat-based theories of civil-military relations. The correlation between these two variables is -0.2465 where -1 would indicate a perfect inverse correlation between the PKK threat and civilian control over counterinsurgency. The correlation does not change much and becomes -0.1404 when natural log of the number of fatalities is used for the measurement of the correlation.

Figure 2.2 demonstrates that although the level of threat could help explain the change in civilian control over counterinsurgency to some extent, there are some time periods that cannot be accounted for with this variable alone. First, a very good example of the complex relationship between domestic security threats and
### Table 2.2

**Expert Opinions about Civilian Control over the Counterinsurgency Policy Making Process in Turkey**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years</th>
<th>Coder 1</th>
<th>Coder 2</th>
<th>Coder 3</th>
<th>Coder 4</th>
<th>Coder 5</th>
<th>Coder 6</th>
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<td>Mod</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>2006-2008</td>
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<td>Mod</td>
<td>Mod</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Low/Mod</td>
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### Table 2.3

**Civilian Control over the Counterinsurgency Policy Making Process in Turkey**

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<th>Years</th>
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<td>1998-2002</td>
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<td>2002-2005</td>
<td>+2</td>
<td>Moderate/High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006-2008</td>
<td>+1</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

65
Figure 2.2. Relationship between the PKK threat and the degree of civilian control over counterinsurgency in Turkey
civil-military relations is Turgut Özl’s tenure between 1984 and 1993. During this period, although the PKK threat increased from 1984 onwards, civilian control over the fight against the PKK also increased especially after 1987 and did not drop to low levels until Tansu Çiller’s Prime Ministry in 1993. Second, after the capture of Abdullah Öcalan in 1999, despite a significant decrease in the PKK threat in Turkey, the TSK continued to hold a substantial control over internal security and civilian control only increased to a low/moderate level. Finally, after 2006, although there is not a significant increase in the level of the PKK threat, the AKP government’s control over the fight against the PKK somewhat decreased. These time periods demonstrate that in order to better understand the relationship between domestic security threats and civil-military relations, it is necessary to look at how the threat interacts with the domestic and international context.

The next section turns to Peru and presents how the relationship between the Shining Path threat and civilian control over the armed forces in the area of counterinsurgency has evolved over time in this country.

2.3 Peru’s Shining Path Threat and Civilian Control over the Military

2.3.1 Measuring the Shining Path threat to Peru

Shining Path is an armed Maoist organization in Peru, which was founded in 1970 by Abimael Guzmán. The Shining Path mainly developed in the department of Ayacucho and “[i]ts stated goal...[was] to destroy existing Peruvian institutions and replace them with a communist peasant revolutionary regime.”

Figure 2.3 demonstrates the absolute number of fatalities caused by the Shining Path threat to Peru.
Path in Peru over time. Based on these numbers, the Shining Path threat in Peru started with less than 50 deaths in 1980 and 1981. These numbers skyrocketed in 1983 and 1984 and exceeded 1000 fatalities per year. After this brief violent period, the Shining Path threat somewhat decreased and the organization caused less than 1000 deaths per year until 1988. Between 1989 and 1992 the threat increased tremendously once again and the number of fatalities caused by the Shining Path reached more than 1000 per year. From 1993 onwards, the Shining Path threat decreased steadily and dropped to less than 50 in the year 2000.

My internal threat assessment in Peru based on the absolute number of fatalities caused by the Shining Path per year is also supported by the realities on the ground as described by several primary and secondary data sources, as well as the findings of my interviews in Peru.

The Shining Path pursued nonviolent activism for approximately a decade and in May 1980 it initiated its armed struggle against the Peruvian state with a symbolic burning of ballot boxes in the Ayacucho town of Chuschi. The Fernando Belaúnde government was caught unprepared by this action and at first failed to make a correct interpretation of what was really going on in Ayacucho. He referred to the insurgents as “cattle rustlers and delinquents” and assigned

48 These numbers are taken from the Final Report of the Peruvian Truth and Reconciliation Commission. See “Rostros y Perfiles de la Violencia,” vol. 1, p. 183. Although the Truth and Reconciliation Commission has an estimate of 69,000 total deaths and disappearances in Peru throughout its armed conflict, concrete yearly numbers are only present for those cases reported to the Commission. The number 69,000 is calculated based on an estimate of unreported cases. Therefore, only the number of deaths and disappearances reported to the Commission is used in this dissertation. However, it is necessary to note that the number of fatalities caused by the Shining Path are estimated to be much higher than this figure is able to present.

Figure 2.3. Number of fatalities caused by the Shining Path
the duty to confront the subversion to the Police Forces.\textsuperscript{50} Minister of Interior José de la Jara stated that the Shining Path was a group without strength and he argued that speaking of a wave of terrorism was an exaggeration.\textsuperscript{51} In these initial years, the acts of the Shining Path were mainly centered in Ayacucho and they consisted of arbitrary terrorist attacks on “official buildings, banks, police stations and communication installations, as well as, from time to time, other ‘revisionist’ left-wing groups.”\textsuperscript{52} The number of fatalities caused by the Shining Path during 1980 and 1981 was less than 50 per year and this number reached over 100 in 1982.

From 1982 onwards the Shining Path acts intensified and the organization began to gain control and support in many parts of Ayacucho. Accordingly, the Shining Path threat increased tremendously in Peru. By December 1982, it became clear that the Police Forces were not able to cope with the insurgency. Furthermore, due to fears of violence, the 1983 municipal elections could not take place in several Ayacucho provinces and “[i]n the one province where balloting was possible, abstention was over 50 percent, and 56 percent of all votes were null and blank,” which indicated public support for Sendero.\textsuperscript{53} The Shining Path also began to extend its acts to the other parts of the country from 1982 onwards.

By early 1983, “a state of emergency had been declared in five provinces of the

\textsuperscript{50} Alberto Bolívar Ocampo, “Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Peru, 1980-90,” \textit{Low Intensity Conflict \& Law Enforcement} 6, no. 1 (Summer 1997), p. 11.


\textsuperscript{52} “Local Elections-Cabinet Changes-Other Internal Developments,” \textit{Keesing’s Record of World Events} 26 (December 1980), Peru, p. 30647.

Ayacucho region and administrative control of the armed forces began.” As a result, during 1983 and 1984 the Peruvian Armed Forces carried out a vigorous counterinsurgency campaign against the Shining Path. During these years, the Shining Path threat caused more than 1000 fatalities per year.

In the aftermath of the military’s counteroffensive, the presence of the Shining Path somewhat decreased in Ayacucho and there was a period of relative calm in the region. Interior Minister Abel Salinas Izaguirre claimed in February 1986 that “the military had narrowed the theatre of Sendero Luminoso operations from 80 percent to 20 percent of the Andean region.”

However, this period of tranquility did not last long. The military’s counteroffensive in 1983-1984 failed to bring about the “final blow” political leaders expected. Especially after the prison riots of June 1986, the Shining Path violence gained a national character. Terrorist attacks substantially intensified in urban areas, particularly in Lima. That is why, after the temporary calm in Ayacucho, the Shining Path threat began to increase once again and continued this pattern until the capture of Abimael Guzmán in 1992. According to the final

54David Scott Palmer, “Rebellion in Rural Peru,” p. 129.


58“Los Períodos de la Violencia,” p. 69

report of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, the period 1989-1992 constituted the years of extreme crisis of the internal conflict.60 Especially in the late 1980s and early 1990s, half of the Peruvian population was living under the state of emergency.61 From 1989 to 1991 the number of fatalities caused by the Shining Path once again reached more than 1000 per year.

After Fujimori came to power in 1990, he initiated an effective counterinsurgency campaign against the Shining Path. With the capture of Abimael Gúzman, as well as two other high ranking members of the organization in 1992, the process of the Shining Path’s collapse began. While Guzmán tried to negotiate and reach an agreement with the Peruvian state after he was imprisoned, some Sendero militants, who referred to themselves as “Sendero Rojo,” preferred to continue with the violent path. However, the Shining Path threat rapidly decreased after this point. Especially from 1992 onwards the number of fatalities per year steadily decreased. “[A]ccording to most sources, the level of terrorist actions in 1994 was the lowest since 1981.”62

By 1995, the Shining Path was far from posing a serious challenge to the Peruvian state.

2.3.2 Measuring civilian control over counterinsurgency

In light of the coding criteria presented earlier in this chapter, this section assesses civilian control over the counterinsurgency policy making process for different time periods in Peru.

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60 “Los Períodos de la Violencia,” 71-72.

61 Ibid., p. 73.

Fernando Belaúnde’s presidency, 1980-1982: total score: (+4)

1. Developing and implementing counterinsurgency policies: score: (+1)

When the Shining Path burned ballot boxes in Chuschi in 1980, there was not a complete understanding of the extent of the threat posed by the Shining Path among different sectors of the Peruvian state. As a response to the Shining Path acts, the Belaúnde administration first put the special police forces, namely the Sinchis, in charge of dealing with the insurgency. “[T]he decision to give the military a role in counterinsurgency was made in late December 1982.”

2. Appointments, promotions, dismissals: score: (+1)

When Belaúnde came to office, he accepted the condition that the commanders of the army, navy, and the air force, who were in office during the military regime, would maintain their positions. However, the Belaúnde administration did not give the duty to fight against the Shining Path to the military until late 1982. Therefore, the government had control over the military appointments in the area of counterinsurgency until December 1982.

3. Human rights violations: score: (0)

The military did not get involved in human rights violations during this period because they did not take part in the counterinsurgency campaign until the end of 1982.

4. Administrative control by the military: score: (+1)

The military did not have administrative authority until late 1982 over those areas of the country where counterinsurgency campaign against the Shining Path

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64 Interview with Professor Ciro Alegría, who headed the Peruvian Truth and Reconciliation Commission’s investigation of the armed forces (Lima: August 14, 2007).
was conducted.

5. Military budget: score: (+1)

The Belaúnde administration did not give the duty to fight against the Shining Path to the military until late 1982. Thus, the counterinsurgency budget only involved the spending on the police forces during this period, which was shaped by the administration.

Fernando Belaúnde’s presidency, 1983-1985: total score: (-3)

1. Developing and implementing counterinsurgency policies: score: (-1)

The Belaúnde administration gave the duty to fight against the Shining Path to the military in December 1982. After the declaration of states of emergency in a number of provinces, the Belaúnde Administration did not make any attempt to establish a system of civilian coordination and supervision over the military activities. Since there was not a central command structure for the counterinsurgency campaign, either, the military leaders in the emergency zones were quite autonomous in formulating their own policies against the Shining Path.

2. Appointments, promotions, dismissals: score: (0)

The Belaúnde government initiated the requirement that the promotions of generals and admirals be ratified by the Congress. Moreover, when the Political Military Commander General Adrián Huamán began to promote expensive socio-economic development policies in the emergency zones, President Belaúnde removed him from office. But this happened only with the approval of the Commander of the Joint Forces.

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3. Human rights violations: score (-1)

The military forces got involved in numerous human rights violations between 1983 and 1985. However, during this period the government did not use its authority to prevent or sanction these violations of the rights against the local population. Moreover, the Congress did not investigate disappearances despite existing reports.67

4. Administrative control by the military: score: (-1)

Once the Belaúnde government declared emergency zones in a number of provinces in Ayacucho, Apurimac, and Huancavelica, these provinces were in practice transferred to direct military rule. The political military commanders possessed absolute political authority which superseded the authority of elected officials.68

5. Military budget: score: (0)

President Belaúnde exerted his influence on the military’s counterinsurgency budget during this period. He did not permit military engagement and spending in the areas of social and economic development of the emergency zones. But he only managed to do this because an important sector of the military was against those policies which would demand military’s further acquisition of political roles.

Alán García’s presidency, 1985-1986: total score: (+3)

1. Developing and implementing counterinsurgency policies: score: (+1)

When Alán García was elected President in 1985, he initiated a reform process in Peru’s counterinsurgency campaign to guarantee military’s subordination to civilian control and respect for human rights. The García administration unified


three separate police forces, punished those military officers who violated human rights, and initiated a number of development projects in the emergency zones.

2. Appointments, promotions, dismissals: score: (+1)

When Alán García came to office, he removed a few high-ranking generals from their posts due to involvement in human rights abuses. Moreover, he established a system of cooptation. “The government secured the political support of high-ranking military officers in exchange for important state appointments, such as minister of defense, minister of interior, ambassadors, and so forth.”

3. Human rights violations: score (+1)

As mentioned above, President García initially placed a lot on emphasis on respecting human rights. During this early phase of his presidency, he removed a few high-ranking generals from their posts due to involvement in human rights abuses.

4. Administrative control by the military: score: (-1)

Despite García’s reforms in Peru’s counterinsurgency campaign, military’s rule in the emergency zones continued.

5. Military budget: score: (+1)

President García exerted his influence over the counterinsurgency budget. He restricted the military’s arms purchases and initiated a number of development projects under civilian leadership.

**Alán García’s presidency, 1987-1990: total score: (-1)**

1. Developing and implementing counterinsurgency policies: score: (0)

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In the aftermath of the prison incidents, García began to believe that he had no other alternative than using the military means to fight against the Shining Path.\footnote{Interview with former Senator Rolando Ames Cobían, who also served as a Commissioner for the Peruvian Truth and Reconciliation Commission (Lima: August 20, 2007); interview with Political Analyst Eduardo Toche from the Center for the Study and Promotion of Development [Centro de Estudios y Promoción de Desarrollo] (Lima: August 17, 2007); interview with Professor Martín Tanaka from Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú (Lima: August 15, 2007).} As a result, the armed forces gradually acquired autonomy in the area of counterinsurgency policy. However, President García continued to exert some influence. For example, he established a ministry of defense although he ended up appointing a retired military officer as the first minister. Moreover, he formed a special police group which was primarily responsible for the capture of Shining Path leaders.

2. Appointments, promotions, dismissals: score: (0)

In contrast to his early presidency, President García did not actively make decisions on appointments, promotions, and dismissals of the military personnel during this period. However, he continued his policy of cooption. With this policy, he either formed an alliance with the dominant group in the military, or supported the rival group and helped it prevail in the intra-military power struggle.\footnote{Enrique Obando, “Fujimori and the Military,” in Fujimori’s Peru: The Political Economy, eds. John Crabtree and Jim Thomas (London: Institute of Latin American Studies, 1998), p. 196.}

3. Human rights violations: (-1)

The García administration could not maintain his policy of punishing human rights violations during this period. For example, when killings by military officers were discovered in Cayara, the García administration did not punish these human rights violations.\footnote{John Crabtree, Peru under García: An Opportunity Lost (Pittsburgh: University of Pitts-}

77
4. Administrative control by the military: score: (-1)

More and more provinces were declared as emergency zones. The military’s control over these areas continued. “Consequently, the armed forces took charge of almost one-third of the territory of the country...[I]n most places, the only state authority was the army.”74

5. Military budget: score: (+1)

During this period, the military did not have autonomy over its own counterinsurgency budget. The García administration cut the military spending and significantly decreased the economic prerogatives of the military.75

Alberto Fujimori’s presidency, 1990-1995: total score: (0)

1. Developing and implementing counterinsurgency policies: score: (0)

When Fujimori came to power in 1990, he became the first President, after 11 years, who adopted a unified counterinsurgency strategy to put the Shining Path under control. He carried out several legislative decrees, unified the intelligence systems, increased the arming of rondas campesinas, brought the system of faceless judges, etc. However, these policies had its roots in the studies of a number of civil-military analysts at the SIN and Libro Verde prepared by the military in late 1980s. Therefore, the policies proposed by the civilian leadership during this period were those policies supported and approved by the military.

2. Appointments, promotions, dismissals: score: (+1)


74 Enrique Obando, “The Power of Peru’s Armed Forces,” p. 112.

The Fujimori administration intensified the cooptation policy of the García years.\textsuperscript{76} As a result, during this period, the military did not control the appointments of the high-command, including the commander general, chief of staff, and the inspector general from the army, navy, and the air force.\textsuperscript{77}

3. Human rights violations: score (-1)

The military forces engaged in numerous human rights violations, such as the disappearance of several students and a professor at La Cantuta University as well as the killings in the Barrios Altos district of Lima.\textsuperscript{78} Thus, “[a]buses committed by the armed forces continued and remained unpunished.”\textsuperscript{79}

4. Administrative control by the military: score: (-1)

The administrative powers of the military in the emergency zones continued and even expanded during Fujimori’s tenure. In these special military zones, “the military effectively governed on a regional level.”\textsuperscript{80}

5. Military budget: score: (+1)

The military did not have autonomy over its own budget. The military exerted almost no pressure to for the approval of their budget.\textsuperscript{81}

Similar to the Turkey case, as part of this research, several experts of Peru’s

\textsuperscript{76}Enrique Obando, “The Power of Peru’s Armed Forces,” p. 113.

\textsuperscript{77}Ibid., p. 114.

\textsuperscript{78}Enrique Obando, “The Power of Peru’s Armed Forces,” p. 115.


\textsuperscript{81}Enrique Obando, “The Power of Peru’s Armed Forces,” p. 116.
fight against the Shining Path and Peruvian civil-military relations were asked to make an assessment about the degree of civilian control over the counterinsurgency policy making process in Peru for different time periods on a scale of low, moderate, and high. Among these assessments, the most consistent answer was for the time period 1983-1985 where 7 out of 8 respondents described this time period as a period of low civilian control. This is consistent with the score based on the coding rules for 1983-1985. However, the rest of the responses of the experts who agreed to participate in the survey turned out to be more inconsistent than expected and the intercoder reliability measure was not high enough to confidently use the expert opinions as the main measure of civilian control over counterinsurgency. The responses of 8 experts who agreed to participate in the survey are presented in Table 2.4. Based on these answers where a high score is represented as 2, a moderate score is represented as 1, and a low score is represented as 0, the arithmetic mean of all pairwise intercoder reliability measures calculated with Pearson coefficients is 0.5098 with a standard deviation of 0.4909, where 0.8 or higher measures would indicate a high level of intercoder reliability.

According to the assessment based on the coding scheme developed in this dissertation, the change in civilian control over the counterinsurgency policy making process in Peru over time is presented in Table 2.5. Figure 2.4 summarizes how the civilian control over the military in the area of counterinsurgency policy making has developed in Peru over time. This assessment of the Shining Path threat over time and the civilian control over counterinsurgency policy making shows that the connection between domestic security threats and civilian control over the military is more complex than is acknowledged in the current literature. The correlation between these two variables is -0.7266 where -1 would indicate
TABLE 2.4

EXPERT OPINIONS ABOUT CIVILIAN CONTROL OVER THE COUNTERINSURGENCY POLICY MAKING PROCESS IN PERU

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<td>.</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Mod</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a perfect inverse correlation between the Shining Path threat and civilian control over counterinsurgency. The correlation does not change much and becomes -0.6851 when natural log of the number of fatalities is used for the measurement of the correlation. A very good example of this complex relationship for Peru is the second half of García’s tenure between 1987 and 1990, as well as Fujimori’s tenure between 1990 and 1995. First, although the Shining Path threat increased tremendously after 1986, civilian control over counterinsurgency did not completely disappear and stayed at moderate levels during the rest of García’s presidency. Moreover, although the Shining Path threat was at a very high level in the early 1990s, Alberto Fujimori established a moderate degree of control over the Peruvian military in the area of counterinsurgency with the help and guidance of Vladimiro Montesinos and played an important role in eliminating the Shining Path insurgency.

Chapters Three and Four present a discussion of the reasons why the degree
### TABLE 2.5

CIVILIAN CONTROL OVER THE COUNTERINSURGENCY POLICY MAKING PROCESS IN PERU

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Score</th>
<th>Control Level</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1980-1982</td>
<td>+4</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983-1985</td>
<td>-3</td>
<td>Low/Moderate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985-1986</td>
<td>+3</td>
<td>Moderate/High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987-1990</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990-1995</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Figure 2.4.** Relationship between the Shining Path threat and the degree of civilian control over the armed forces in counterinsurgency policy making in Peru
of threat from the PKK and the Shining Path does not always covary together with the degree of civilian control over the military in counterinsurgency policy making. With theoretically oriented narratives of Turkey and Peru, these chapters demonstrate that in addition to the presence or degree of threat, it is also necessary to look at the strength of the head of government, civilian leadership’s legitimacy in the eyes of the military, and the extent of the international pressure for democratization in order to account for the nature of civil-military relations in Turkey and Peru.
CHAPTER 3

TURKEY’S FIGHT AGAINST THE PKK AND ITS IMPACT ON CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS

This chapter demonstrates how the theory of dynamic civil-military interaction applies to the case of Turkey during the time period of 1984 to 2008. With an analysis of the Turgut Özal, Tansu Çiller, Bülent Ecevit, and Tayyip Erdoğan governments, it shows that a change in the level of threat does not bring an automatic change in the level of civilian control over the counterinsurgency policy making process. Thus, this chapter explains how the level of threat interacts with the strength of the head of government, civilian leadership’s legitimacy in the eyes of the military, and the extent of international pressure for democratization and shape the civil-military relations during the counterinsurgency policy making process.

Turgut Özal came to office as the prime minister of Turkey in 1983, in the aftermath of the 1980-1983 military junta regime. Until Özal became the prime minister for a second term and believed that he consolidated his authority vis-à-vis the military, he avoided policies that would cause uneasiness on the part of the military. However, between 1987 and late 1991, Turgut Özal accomplished important initiatives in Turkey’s fight against the PKK and succeeded in establishing a moderate/high degree of control over the counterinsurgency policy making process. This mainly resulted from his strong partisan powers and high legitimacy in
the eyes of the military. The European countries’ pressure for democratization in Turkey further strengthened Özal’s hand in policy making and made the military more open to civilian agendas. When ANAP lost its majority in the parliament as a result of the October 1991 elections, Turgut Özal’s ability to influence policy also decreased. However, by taking advantage of his recognized authority within the ministries, Turgut Özal was able to maintain a moderate degree of control over the counterinsurgency policy making process between October 1991 and April 1993 despite an increasing PKK threat.

Tansu Çiller, who became the prime minister of Turkey in 1993, had an opposite experience. Çiller came to office with weak partisan powers and a lack of trust among military officers. She was an inexperienced leader who did not have much knowledge about the major political issues of the country. Therefore, she could not establish her authority over the governing coalition and she could not gain legitimacy in the eyes of the military. Although Çiller tried to propose a political solution to the Kurdish question when she first came to power, she could not find support for her policy proposals. As a result, she realized that the only way for her to remain in office was to enter into an alliance with the military. Through this alliance, while Tansu Çiller utilized the military as her support base and guaranteed her political survival, she transferred full control of the counterinsurgency policy making process to the military.

In 1999, the DSP-MHP-ANAP coalition government came to office and until the end of its tenure in 2002, this government maintained a low/moderate degree of control over the fight against the PKK despite the low level of internal threat during this period. Although the government held a majority of seats in the parliament, there were major ideological and programmatic differences among the
three coalition partners. Therefore, Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit’s control over the governing coalition was very much dependent on the extent to which the members of these parties were able to reach an agreement on particular issues. Moreover, this government came to office at a time when the military did not have a high level of trust towards the civilian leaders in Turkey in the area of national security. This trust further decreased towards the coalition government due to its ineffective performance. However, the EU pressure for democratization played an important role during this period by strengthening the pro-EU and pro-reform forces’ hand vis-à-vis the military and allowed the implementation of a few reforms in this area.

Finally, Abdullah Gül became the care-taker prime minister of Turkey after the November 2002 elections and left his position to Tayyip Erdoğan in March 2003. Erdoğan came to office with high partisan powers, but a low legitimacy in the eyes of the military. The military officers were concerned about the AKP members’ Islamist roots. However, this did not become a major constraint for the government’s ability to implement its preferred policies. For, the EU’s pressure for democratization in Turkey provided an external support base for the Erdoğan government and made the military more open to civilian initiatives. As a result, Tayyip Erdoğan succeeded in establishing a moderate/high degree of control over the counterinsurgency policy making process between 2002 and 2005. However, from 2006 onwards, as the EU reform process lost its pace, the Erdoğan government’s policies to end the PKK were left without a clear framework. This made the AKP’s low legitimacy in the eyes of the military emerge as an important constraint for Tayyip Erdoğan during this period. As a result, he was only able to overcome this problem through entering into an implicit agreement with the mili-
tary. In this new state of affairs, while Prime Minister Erdoğan did not completely lose his influence over the fight against the PKK and maintained a moderate degree of control, he began to place more emphasis on seeking the consent and the cooperation of the military in this area.

A summary of the assessment of independent and dependent variables for the Turkish case is presented in Table 3.1.

3.1 Dynamics of Civil-Military Relations During Turgut Özlal’s Tenure

Turgut Özlal, who served first as the Prime Minister (1983-1989) and then the President of Turkey (1989-1993) is an interesting figure in terms of Turkey’s civil-military relations. Özlal pursued unorthodox policies to end the PKK insurgency and he was frequently accused of not following the state tradition in the area of security. Under his leadership, civilian control over the armed forces in the area of internal security gradually increased until late 1991 despite the increasing PKK threat. Turgut Özlal’s success resulted from a combination of his political strength, a positive attitude from the military about his achievements and efforts and Turkey’s desire to be a member of the western world. Although Özlal’s control over the fight against the PKK decreased after the Motherland Party (Anavatan Partisi-ANAP) lost its majority in the parliament in the October 1991 elections, he did not completely lose his ability to influence policy and his control over the policy making process remained at a moderate level until he died in April 1993.

3.1.1 Turgut Özlal’s political calculations and policy preferences:

Turgut Özlal came to power as a result of the 1983 elections—the first elections held after the 1980-1983 junta regime. This was a time when Turkey was
### TABLE 3.1

**ASSESSMENT OF INDEPENDENT AND DEPENDENT VARIABLES**

**FOR THE CASE OF TURKEY**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years</th>
<th>Civilian control over counter-insurgency policy</th>
<th>Head of government’s strength</th>
<th>Legitimacy in the eyes of the military</th>
<th>Extensive and systematic international pressure</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1984-1986</td>
<td>Low/Mode</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987-1991</td>
<td>Mode/High</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991-1993</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993-1997</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998-2002</td>
<td>Low/Moderate</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002-2005</td>
<td>Mode/High</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006-2008</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
recovering from high levels of fragmentation and polarization in society. With his ANAP, Özal wanted to represent a new beginning in Turkish politics by bringing together diverse segments of the society. He argued that ANAP “hosted four different and seemingly irreconcilable ideological strands of conservatism (traditional Sunni Islam), nationalism, economic liberalism, and social democracy within its ranks.”

Turgut Özal won the elections despite explicit opposition from the TSK. So, when he came to power, he was aware of the fact that he was not the preferred candidate of the main actors of the 1980 coup, including President Kenan Evren and the Chief of General Staff Necdet Ürüş. However, Özal’s success at the expense of those parties advocated by the military demonstrated a willingness on the part of the society for further civilianization and democratization of the regime. According to him, this could only be possible through catching up with the economically developed countries of the western world. He thought that economic transformation of Turkey would also bring social, political and cultural transformation. Therefore, he undertook several economic reforms in the 1980s and 1990s in order to bring about the neo-liberal transformation of the economy and to better integrate Turkey into the world economy. Moreover, Özal emphasized building close relations with both the US and the European Community (EC-later became the European Union). He even made an official application for EC membership in 1987.

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It is possible to argue that Özal’s policies to resolve the Kurdish question in Turkey via further democratization and economic development of the southeastern region were part of his broader goal of turning Turkey into an economically developed country and a member of the EC. “The first Özal Government expressed the membership to the Community as its ‘ultimate aim’ in the government program”\(^4\) and the EC was very much concerned about the consolidation of democracy in Turkey after the transition to a civilian regime. The European countries made normalization of relations conditional on the improvements in the human rights in Turkey. Moreover, in 1985 the European Parliament “accused the government of ‘launching a systematic campaign of genocide against the Kurdish minority’.”\(^5\) Therefore, there was no doubt that a counterinsurgency policy based on purely military means was damaging relations with the EC. For a political leader for whom building stronger ties with the EC was a major foreign policy goal, suggesting democratic openings in resolving the Kurdish issue was the rational option to follow.

However, these were not Turgut Özal’s only considerations. He was a political leader who could successfully read the power relations in Turkey. Especially during the first few years of his prime ministry, Özal wanted to form a cautious relationship with the military. He was aware of the fact that he had to be careful about the military’s concerns and that not doing so would jeopardize his political survival. His main strategy was to avoid any major confrontation until he believed that he established his authority in politics.\(^6\) Thus, until the 1987 elections


\(^5\)Cited in ibid.

\(^6\)Hasan Cemal, *Özal Hikayesi* [The Özal Story], pp. 69-89.
in which Özal became the prime minister of Turkey for a second term, he avoided any major confrontation with the TSK. He always consulted President Kenan Evren—the leader of the 1980 coup—during the governmental decision making process. Whenever governmental decrees were changed by the military without even letting the government know, Özal accepted the military’s preferences. He thought that an early move for further civilianization of the regime would bring back the military, as was the case in the previous coups d’état of Turkey. Özal once said that he could have begun his efforts to develop a political solution to the Kurdish issue earlier; however, ANAP’s first few years in government marked the struggle for transition to a civilian regime. That is why, President Kenan Evren had more governing authority among the ministers than Özal.

In addition to his cautious attitude towards the military in the first few years of his tenure, Özal made a considerable effort to establish a close relationship with the US. Improving the Turkish-American alliance was part of Özal’s goal of making Turkey part of the Western World. However, another important reason for this was that he believed it was not possible to conduct a coup in Turkey without American backing. Thus, he thought that building close relations with President George Bush could function as a safety valve and prevent a coup initiative against him if such a scenario arises.

As can be seen, although Turgut Özal realized what kind of policies on the Kurdish issue could bring him domestic and international support, especially the

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7Ibid.


timing of these initiatives were significantly shaped by his relationship with the TSK. He preferred to wait for his policy initiatives until he established his authority and formed a relationship with the armed forces based on trust.

Turgut Özal initially consented to military options on the PKK issue. Several provinces in the Southeast were under martial law at that time and within this context the TSK conducted several operations both in the Southeast and across the Iraqi border. Özal also initiated the village guard system in 1985, which meant the participation of mostly Kurdish militias from southeast Turkey in the fight against the PKK. Civilian policies of this period consisted of accelerating the economic and social development of the southeastern part of Turkey through the Southeast Anatolia Project.

The Özal administration’s initiatives began with its replacement of the martial law in the southeast Turkey with a state of emergency (Olağanüstü Hal-OHAL) in 1987, which signified a system of control under civilian administrators in contrast to the martial law regime where the authority belongs to the martial law commander. There were ten provinces within the new state of emergency region, namely Hakkari, Van, Mardin, Diyarbakır, Adıyaman, Bitlis, Siirt, Bingöl, Muş, and Tunceli. Under the state of emergency, the fight against the PKK was going to be conducted under the command of the police and gendarmerie forces instead of the Turkish Armed Forces. In order to establish coordination among the governors of the emergency rule provinces and among the civilian and military actors, an emergency rule governor was also appointed. The emergency rule governor had the authority to ask for additional forces from the Turkish army and the air force through the Ministry of Internal Affairs.¹⁰

The OHAL regime in the southeast was established despite tremendous opposition from the TSK. Many military officers thought it was too early to remove the martial law. General Hasan Kundakçı saw OHAL as a cause of increasing PKK threat from 1987 onwards.\textsuperscript{11} Doğan Güreş identified it as his biggest trouble in 1991 due to its uncertain chain of command.\textsuperscript{12} In his interview with Fikret Bila, former Chief of General Staff Doğan Güreş mentioned that he expressed his criticism of the OHAL regime several times both publicly and during the NSC meetings.\textsuperscript{13} However, the political leaders went along with the system of OHAL Regional Governorate and it was not until 1992 when the General Staff began to assume a larger role in the fight against the PKK.

Turgut Özal took another important step in 1988 by opening Turkey’s borders to approximately 60,000 Kurdish refugees from northern Iraq who fled from the chemical weapon attacks of the Iraqi Army. The Özal government, which was dealing with a Kurdish separatist movement within Turkey at that time, wanted to keep the refugees out of Turkey at first. Several TSK members were also against admitting Kurdish refugees into Turkey due to fears that this could present an opportunity for PKK terrorists to enter Turkish territory easily. However, due to mainly humanitarian concerns, Turgut Özal made the decision to open Turkey’s borders to Kurdish refugees by taking full responsibility of this policy on himself and by using his ability to persuade other major players of Turkish

\textsuperscript{11}Fikret Bila, \textit{Komutanlar Cephesi} [The Commanders Front] (İstanbul: Detay Yayıncılık, 2007), p. 130.

\textsuperscript{12}Under the state of emergency, the military was not officially part of the chain of command in the fight against the PKK. The state of emergency chain of command consisted of the State of Emergency Governor, Gendarmerie Public Order Commander, and the Minister of Interior respectively. See ibid., pp. 42-43.

\textsuperscript{13}Ibid., p. 43.
decision making.\textsuperscript{14}

Turgut Özal also made a substantial effort to lift the ban on Kurdish language in 1991, as well as to remove articles 141, 142, and 163 of the Turkish Penal Code, which were restrictions on the freedom of thought and association. The TSK openly expressed their opposition to both of these initiatives.\textsuperscript{15} With respect to the removal of the ban on the Kurdish language, the military was concerned that Kurdish cultural rights would lead to Kurdish requests for independence in the long run.\textsuperscript{16} And as for the changes in the Turkish Penal Code, even several ANAP deputies were against the total removal of articles 141, 142, and 163 since they were concerned about its security-related implications.\textsuperscript{17} In response to this, Özal talked with several military officers, ANAP deputies, and even tried to influence a number of deputies from opposition parties and helped decrease the volume of the opposition to these issues and paved the way for these amendments in 1991.

Finally, Turgut Özal put a great emphasis on building dialogue with the Iraqi Kurdish leaders. He arranged secret meetings with Talabani and Barzani in 1991 without the knowledge of the Parliament and the National Security Council and


\textsuperscript{16}Nilüfer Yalçın, “Askeri Yetkililer Kaygılı” [The Military Authorities are Concerned], Milliyet (March 28, 1991).

\textsuperscript{17}Fikret Bila, “ANAP’ta 141, 142 ve 163 Endişesi” [The Concern for 141, 142, and 163 at ANAP], Milliyet (March 29, 1991); Fikret Bila, “Özal’ı Bekleyen 6 Büyük Sorun” [6 Major Problems that are Awaiting Özal], Milliyet (March 30, 1991).
promoted the creation of a safe haven for the Kurds in northern Iraq in the aftermath of the Gulf War. Özl’s meetings with the Iraqi Kurdish leaders received a lot of criticism from the TSK as well as the opposition parties. However, Turgut Özl, by emphasizing the importance of establishing close contacts in northern Iraq and having access to first-hand information from the region, managed to convince many of these critics and even arranged subsequent talks with Talabani and Barzani. Once the General Staff was convinced about the possible advantages of establishing ties with northern Iraq, it also held additional meetings with the Iraqi Kurdish leaders. During this period, relations with Talabani and Barzani reached a point where the TSK and these Iraqi Kurdish leaders carried out joint operations against the PKK.

In 1991, Turgut Özl also succeeded in implementing his idea of establishing a safe haven for the Iraqi Kurds in northern Iraq in the aftermath of the Gulf War. Although the TSK were opposed to this idea due to their concern that this safe haven could lead to the formation of a de facto Kurdish state in northern Iraq, they had to accept this policy once the UN Security Council Resolution 688, which established the safe haven, was accepted by Turkey.

Despite these achievements, after the October 1991 elections, Turgut Özl lost his control over the policy making process to some extent. In these elections, the ANAP lost its majority in the parliament and could not take part in the new coalition government. As a result, Özl lost his major instrument in policy making. Between October 1991 and April 1993, Turgut Özl still took advantage of his recognized authority in the ministries and in the National Security Council and managed to implement some of his policies. For example, he continued to

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play an important role in the improvement of relations with the Iraqi leaders. Moreover, he established indirect contacts with Öcalan to convince the PKK to declare a ceasefire in 1992 and 1993. Once this was achieved, he made a great effort to provide an amnesty plan to end the PKK violence. He thought that Öcalan’s unilateral ceasefire in 1993 was a good opportunity to implement his amnesty. He was planning to announce this plan when he died on April 17, 1993. Although the government prepared a similar amnesty plan after the death of Turgut Özal, this plan was not implemented due to the PKK attack in May 1993 on an unarmed vehicle where 33 soldiers were killed.

While Turgut Özal succeeded in implementing his policies presented above between October 1991 and April 1993, he failed to put into effect others. For example, although he suggested opening to discussion the possibility of a federation with the Kurds, proposed broadcasting in Kurdish and including Kurdish in the education system, he could not convince the government to advocate these policies.

All in all, Turgut Özal managed to implement a substantial portion of his policy preferences in the fight against the PKK during his tenure, and especially between 1987 and 1991 the degree of civilian control over the counterinsurgency policy making process reached a moderate/high level despite a steady increase in the PKK threat from 1984 onwards. Although his influence in policy making somewhat decreased when the ANAP lost its parliamentary majority in October 1991, Özal did not completely lose his control over counterinsurgency until his death in April 1993. The next section presents the major reasons why Turgut Özal succeeded in implementing an important portion of his policy preferences in the fight against the PKK despite the military’s opposition.
3.1.2 Turgut Özal’s political strength

A very important factor that helped Özal carry out his initiatives in the fight against the PKK was his political strength. First, Turgut Özal came to power with a broad public support. In the 1983 elections ANAP received 45.1 percent of the votes and 211 out of 400 seats in the parliament. This gave Özal not only a strong mandate, but also a parliamentary majority. Despite a decrease in his party’s votes over time, his legislative majority expanded after the 1987 elections as a result of which ANAP won 292 out of 450 seats in the parliament.\(^{19}\) ANAP’s legislative majority gave Özal a great advantage in pursuing his policy preferences, especially those that required a parliamentary vote to take effect.

Besides his parliamentary majority, Turgut Özal had a recognized authority and a strong backing among the members of his political party. As the mastermind of ANAP, he had the support and respect of his party members. Moreover, before he was elected prime minister, Özal had served in several different private companies and bureaucratic positions and had already proven his competence and leadership. This allowed him to be able to rely on the cooperation of his ministers, ANAP deputies, and the members of the bureaucracy whenever he wanted to carry out a government policy. For example, when Özal arranged secret meetings with the Iraqi Kurdish leaders, Talabani and Barzani, these meetings were held without informing the parliament. But since all the ministers in the cabinet, including the Minister of Foreign Affairs, were from ANAP, Özal did not have a difficulty in exerting his influence and arranging these meetings through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.\(^{20}\)

\(^{19}\)This contradictory outcome was the result of the 10 percent election threshold in Turkey.

\(^{20}\)Müge Aknur, Civil-Military Relations in Turkey: Analysis of Civilian Leaders, (Ph.D. dis-
When Özal became the president in 1989, it was expected that he would lose his prior influence over legislation. In Turkey although the president’s powers are more extensive than in other parliamentary systems, his/her leadership is symbolic and the government is effectively headed by the prime minister. However, Turgut Özal succeeded in overcoming this constraint with the ANAP’s parliamentary majority and his strong authority over ANAP. He appointed, as prime minister, Yıldırım Akbulut, whom he thought was a low key figure and someone that would allow him to maintain his influence on governmental decisions. Özal was successful in doing this until ANAP lost its majority in the parliament in the October 1991 elections and failed to take part in the new coalition government. Once the DYP-SHP coalition came to office, it became difficult for Turgut Özal to implement his policy preferences regarding the Kurdish issue since he lost his previous control over the governing coalition during this period. However, by taking advantage of his recognized authority within the ministries, Turgut Özal was able to maintain a moderate degree of control over the counterinsurgency policy making process between October 1991 and April 1993.\footnote{During this period, it was also difficult for the new Prime Minister Süleyman Demirel to establish civilian control over the counterinsurgency policy making process. For, his political party did not have a majority of seats in the parliament and he was heading a coalition government whose partners had a difference of opinion about how to approach the Kurdish Question.} Although he managed to put into effect some of his preferred policies, he could not do this for all of his preferences.

In sum, Turgut Özal was a strong political leader, especially until October 1991. This was due to his strong authority over ANAP and the ANAP’s control of a majority of seats in the parliament. This situation gave Özal the necessary instruments to exert his influence on the policy making process. However, as a result of the October 1991 elections, the ANAP lost its majority in the Parlia-

\textsuperscript{21}
ment and this decreased, although did not completely eliminate, Özal’s ability to influence policy.

Turgut Özal’s strong partisan powers cannot account for his failure to establish a high level of control over the counterinsurgency policy making process between 1984 and 1986. Moreover, from 1987 until late 1991, Turgut Özal’s partisan powers were a necessary, but not a sufficient condition that brought his moderate/high degree of control over the counterinsurgency policy making process. His partisan powers gave Özal the necessary instruments to influence policy. However, Özal’s partisan powers cannot account for why the armed forces preferred to go along with his policies despite their opposition to many of these issues. The same is true for Özal’s moderate degree of control in 1992-1993. Therefore, the next section analyzes how the Turkish military perceived Özal’s leadership and responded to his preferences.

3.1.3 How the TSK perceived Turgut Özal

Although Turgut Özal had considerable political strength, this was not sufficient to implement his policy initiatives in the fight against the PKK. As an indispensable actor in the national security affairs of Turkey, it was also crucial what the TSK thought about Özal’s policy proposals and how they chose to respond.

Since the Ottoman times, the military has occupied a prominent position in the Turkish state structure. Especially after the key role played by the military officers in the establishment of modern Turkey, Atatürk defined the TSK as “[t]he armored statement of Turkish unity, Turkish strength and ability and Turkish
patriotism.” Since the foundation of the Republic of Turkey, the Turkish military has seen itself as the guardian of the secular and democratic state, as well as, the vanguard of modernization and Westernization.

This role has also been legally codified in several ways. First, along with the top civilian leaders, the Military High Command participates in the meetings of the National Security Council (Milli Güvenlik Kurulu-MGK). The MGK, which was established in the aftermath of the 1960 coup, is chaired by the President of Turkey and it plays a leading role in the formulation and implementation of the national security policy of Turkey. Second, According to the Article 35 of the Internal Service Act of the TSK, “the military is responsible for defending both the Turkish Fatherland and the Turkish Republic as defined by the Constitution.” Finally, Article 85 of the Internal Service Regulations of the Turkish Military states that “Turkish Armed Forces shall defend the country against the internal as well as the external threats, if necessary by force.” These legal arrangements makes the TSK an important actor in the formulation of national security policy of Turkey. Thus, it becomes important how the Turkish Military responds to the civilian policy preferences in this area.

There was no doubt that Turgut Özal was a surprise Prime Minister in 1983 in the eyes of the military. For the 1983 elections, the TSK allowed the participation of only three political parties. They wanted the Nationalist Democracy Party (MDP), led by retired General Turgut Sunalp to form the government, the Populist

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24Cited in ibid.
Party (HP) led by Necdet Calp—former Undersecretary of the Prime Ministry in the Bülent Ulusu government—to act as the main opposition, and ANAP to represent the rest of the tendencies in the parliament.\footnote{Altan Öymen, “Siyaset hayatımızda ‘normalleşme’nin ilk adımları...” [The First Steps of ‘Normalization’ in Our Political Life] Radikal (May 20, 2007).} However, ANAP ended up winning around 45 percent of the votes in the elections.

Despite the fact that Özal was a surprise prime minister for the armed forces, the TSK had a history of working with him. Özal was appointed as the Undersecretary of the Prime Ministry in 1979 and he was the mastermind behind the January 24, 1980 austerity program. In this position, Özal played a very important role in formulating policies to take Turkey out of the deep economic crisis that had been going on from the 1970s onwards. Before the initiation of this economic program, “[h]e [Özal] was dispatched by Prime Minister Demirel to the General Staff headquarters to explain to the generals the state of the economy and the need for radical fiscal and monetary reforms. At these ‘briefings’ Özal established an easy rapport with his audience, and convinced the top brass of his competence on economic matters.”\footnote{Cited in Feride Acar, “Turgut Özal: Pious Agent of Liberal Transformation,” in Political Leaders and Democracy in Turkey, eds. Metin Heper and Sabri Sayarı (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2002), p. 166.} As a result of his role in this economic program, Turgut Özal negotiated with the TSK to become the deputy prime minister in charge of economic affairs in the interim government that was established after the 1980 military coup.

When Turgut Özal began to serve in the interim government, the armed forces were in fact concerned about his Islamist connections. Turgut Özal, who became the Undersecretary of the State Planning Organization in 1967, was known as “one of the ‘clogged brothers’ (Takunyalı Biraderler)” alongside his brother.
Korkut Özal, who was the General Director of the Petroleum Corporation of Turkey.\textsuperscript{27} Moreover, in the late 1970s, Turgut Özal got involved in the Islamist National Salvation Party (\textit{Milli Selamet Partisi}-MSP) and had a failed attempt at becoming a deputy in the 1977 national elections.\textsuperscript{28} However, as General Kenan Evren stated, “[D]espite Özal’s Islamist credentials, the generals were ‘assured by the fact that as a couple [Özal and his wife] they looked civilized.’”\textsuperscript{29} Evren also acknowledged that although the generals were not happy about giving this powerful governmental position to Özal, they ended up doing so because “they thought he was indispensable in dealing with international financial institutions and foreign countries.”\textsuperscript{30}

Despite this close working relationship between Turgut Özal and the military, Özal did not have a high level of legitimacy in the eyes of the military in the first few years of his government. The TSK did not trust the civilian leadership, especially in the area of national security, in the aftermath of the polarized and terrorized atmosphere of the late 1970s and they wanted Turgut Sunalp, a retired general, to carry Turkey through its transition to democracy. As a result, despite his strong partisan powers, Prime Minister Özal remained mainly responsible for economic affairs, while the military was responsible for national security issues in the first few years of his tenure.

However, the military also knew that Turgut Özal was a competent and coura-

\textsuperscript{27}This nickname “alluded to their practice of washing up for prayers wearing clogs in the lavatories of their office buildings.” See Feride Acar, “Turgut Özal: Pious Agent of Liberal Transformation,” p. 165.

\textsuperscript{28}Ibid., pp. 165-166.

\textsuperscript{29}Ibid., p. 166.

\textsuperscript{30}Cited in Feride Acar, “Turgut Özal: Pious Agent of Liberal Transformation,” p. 166.
geous leader. Therefore, the military’s trust towards him improved over time with his successful policy performance. During his premiership, Özal played a key role in the transformation of the Turkish economy from import-substitution to an export-oriented system in order to integrate Turkey with the world economy. His program revolved around close cooperation with the IMF and World Bank, as well as the EC. During his tenure, Turgut Özal succeeded in abolishing some of the legal regulations that restricted Turkey’s imports from other countries, privatizing state economic enterprises, allowing the circulation of foreign currencies, and lifting protections on domestic industries. Moreover, he brought phone networks, electricity, and highways to distant parts of the country. Between 1981 and 1983 Turkey’s GDP expanded by 4.2 percent, 4.5 percent, and 3.3 percent respectively. From 1984 to 1991, the “annual growth rate averaged six to eight percent. Per capita national product doubled from $1,300 to $2,600, at the same time as purchasing parity doubled.” These positive developments helped Özal to gain respect and confidence, to consolidate his authority, and also provided him with a considerable room to maneuver in formulating policies to end the PKK violence in Turkey.

Özal also made a substantial effort to gain the military’s confidence in the area of national defense. He tried to get to know the military, their needs, and

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32 Hasan Kazdağlı, “Turgut Özal’ın İktisadi Reformları” [Turgut Özal’s Economic Reforms], in Kim Bu Özal? Siyaset, İktisat, Zihniyet [Who is this Özal: Politics, Economics, and Mentality], eds., İhsan Sezal and İhsan Dağı (Istanbul: Boyut Kitapları), p. 469

33 Müge Akınur, Civil-Military Relations in Turkey, p. 103.

34 Interview with a retired colonel who requested anonymity.
their pleas better. Özal improved his knowledge on the issues of security and armaments, played an important role in the foundation of the Under Secretariat for Defense Industries as well as the Defense Industry Support Fund which is kept outside the general budget. He regularly participated in the meetings of the Supreme Military Council and always tried to learn about the military’s projects. As a matter of fact, it was Turgut Özal’s initiative, which led to the making of the first five-year Turkish national security strategy—known as the National Security Policy Document. Özal’s willingness to take the lead in the area of national security, when combined with his conciliatory approach towards the TSK “provided a smooth civilianization of the political system.”

In fact, Turgut Özal’s initial treatment of the PKK as a bunch of bandits and his lack of a strong military response against the PKK’s terrorist acts were highly criticized by many military officers. However, the military’s recognition of Özal’s leadership skills facilitated his control over counterinsurgency policy making. Due to Turgut Özal’s image as an effective and courageous leader, his successes in the area of economy, and his willingness to take the lead in national security affairs, the armed forces preferred to voice their criticisms through democratic means and preferred to go along with civilian preferences when decisions were made by Turgut Özal during this period.

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3.1.4 The role of international actors

In the aftermath of the 1980 coup d’état, there was a lot of pressure on Turkey from the European countries for the democratization of the regime. The EC froze its relations with Turkey and later made financial aid conditional on improvements in democratization and human rights.\(^\text{37}\) Moreover, the Council of Europe suspended Turkey’s membership.\(^\text{38}\) With Turkey’s application for full membership to the EC in 1987, European pressure increased significantly.\(^\text{39}\) Although there was an expectation in Turkey that accession would not occur immediately, there was great enthusiasm within the political establishment about Turkey’s possible membership. The increase in international pressure played an important role in keeping civil-military relations within democratic limits under the leadership of Turgut Özal.

First, European countries forced the military to return to the barracks as soon as possible and this enabled a relatively quick transition to democracy. The European pressure for a transition to democracy was also an important reason why the military easily accepted the formation of a government under the leadership of Turgut Özal instead of their preferred candidate Turgut Sunalp. Second, European demands strengthened Özal’s hand and legitimized his attempts to find a democratic solution to the Kurdish issue both among politicians and among the military officers. Third, these pressures facilitated the military’s openness to


\(^{39}\) Ibid.
civilian agendas and encouraged it to go along with Özal’s policies. The Turkish military has historically seen itself as a firm follower of Atatürk’s goals, one of which is to bring Turkey to the ranks of the Western developed countries. Therefore, in the aftermath of the 1980 coup, the TSK was sensitive about maintaining his mission in the modernization of Turkey and not blocking Turkey’s ties with the western world.40

However, after Turkey received a response from the EC about its membership application, the EC’s pressure for democratization in Turkey gradually decreased. In its Opinion in 1989, “[t]he Commission did not recommend starting accession negotiations with Turkey while noting its eligibility.”41 The Commission Opinion mentioned problems with Turkey’s democracy, especially its human rights violations, economy, the Kurdish issue, and its disputes with Greece and Cyprus as reasons why accession negotiations were not going to start in the immediate future. Instead of accession negotiations, the European Commission suggested the establishment of a Customs Union with Turkey, as envisaged by the 1963 Ankara Treaty and the 1970 Additional Protocol.42 However, this did not help the EC maintain its pressure on Turkey mainly because Turkey was out of the close focus of the EC from the early 1990s onwards. During this period, while on the one hand, the EC counties concentrated on building the common market, on the other hand, they went into a process of enlargement after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Therefore, from the early 1990s until the declaration of Turkey as an

40 For a comprehensive account about how regional organizations influence democratization see Jon C. Pevehouse, Democracy from Above: Regional Organizations and Democratization.


42 Ibid.
official candidate in 1999, the EC/EU’s pressure for democratization in Turkey was not as strong as the 1980s.

In sum, during the 1980s, the European countries played an important role in promoting democratization in Turkey. While this external pressure accelerated the transition to a democratic regime in Turkey after the 1980 coup, it also legitimized Turgut Özal’s efforts to find a political solution to the Kurdish question. On the other hand, the European pressure facilitated the military’s openness to civilian agendas. However, from the early 1990s onwards, the EU’s pressure for further democratization in Turkey weakened due to the organization’s focus on the implementation of the common market and enlargement to eastern Europe.

3.2 Dynamics of Civil-Military Relations During Tansu Çiller’s Tenure

After Özal’s death in 1993, Tansu Çiller became the Prime Minister of Turkey. When she came to power, she was determined to further civilianize the regime and offer a democratic solution to the Kurdish issue. Her ideas included creating a civilian Security Council, making Kurdish broadcasts on state-owned television, and even applying the Basque model to end the PKK insurgency. However, she neither had the parliamentary majority, nor had an established authority over the governing coalition in order to put into practice these policies. She was also perceived as an inexperienced politician by military officers. Finally, the EU failed to exert a systematic pressure on Turkey for the democratization of civil-military relations during this period because of the mutual interest of Turkey and the EU in the signing of the Customs Union Treaty. Faced with criticisms from all the major actors of Turkish politics, “Çiller rapidly backed off further personal

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43Henry J. Barkey and Graham E. Fuller, *Turkey’s Kurdish Question*, p. 137.
interest in the problem and turned over conduct of the Kurdish policy to the military.”

Tansu Çiller gave her unconditional support to the implementation of the military’s preferences on the issue and as a result, during her tenure, civilian control over the armed forces decreased to a low level and military’s autonomy in fighting against the Kurdish insurgency increased tremendously. Examples of the counterinsurgency policies that marked this shift in the balance of power in Turkish civil-military relations include the establishment of a military-dominated Security Council to deal with the Kurdish Issue, intensification of cross-border operations, imprisonment of pro-Kurdish Democracy Party (Demokrasi Partisi-DEP) representatives, and an increase in village evacuations and human rights violations by the security forces.

3.2.1 Tansu Çiller’s political calculations and policy preferences

Tansu Çiller assumed the leadership of the DYP as well as the leadership of the existing coalition government between the DYP and SHP in 1993. She came to office when Prime Minister Süleyman Demirel was elected president after the death of President Turgut Özal. Thus, she became the prime minister of Turkey without popular elections. Contrary to Turgut Özal, she did not have in mind a clear and long-term vision as to what she would do for Turkey during her premiership. However, one important thing that she was aware of was the newly emerging emphasis on “effective governance.” During his tenure, Özal had politicized several issues of daily life, such as telecommunications and value-added tax, and appealed to the voters with concrete issues rather than abstract vocabulary.

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44 Ibid., p. 137.

issues that she thought would boost her popularity were first, ending the PKK terrorism and second, building a customs union with the EU.

Çiller first tried to pursue policies in the Özal tradition in these areas. She wanted to end the PKK violence as soon as possible and direct the resources that were then used to fight against the insurgency into solving the economic problems. Therefore, she suggested granting cultural rights to the Kurds in Turkey, such as broadcasting in Kurdish, offering Kurdish courses, granting autonomy to the Kurds similar to the autonomy of the Basque region in Spain, and she also wanted to make the Turkish Grand National Assembly as the main actor in the resolution of the Kurdish issue.

In order to convince the opposition leaders that a political solution to the Kurdish Question was essential, Tansu Çiller met with these party leaders and talked with them personally. However, she did not know enough about the Kurdish question and that is why, she was not convincing about the necessity of her proposed policies. Her suggestions were severely criticized by several military officers, opposition leaders, President Demirel, and even by the members of her own political party. What especially attracted criticism was her views on granting cultural rights to the Kurds. President Demirel told her that before ending the PKK terrorism, the issue of cultural rights could not be opened to discussion. Moreover, Chief of General Staff Doğan Güreş had a long meeting with Çiller where he explained to her how the terrorism issue in Turkey could be solved by military means.

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When Çiller attempted to act on her idea of establishing a Parliament-based National Security Council, several leading members of her political party DYP refused this idea immediately and told her that “such a commission would hand over the executive powers of the government to the parliament” and this would be unconstitutional. Moreover, after a meeting with the Spanish Prime Minister Felipe Gonzalez in October 1993, Tansu Çiller talked about applying the Basque model to Turkey. But once again, she was criticized by the military officers, President Demirel, and her own political party. The general opinion was that granting cultural rights and autonomy to the Kurds would jeopardize the unity and integrity of the country. After receiving these criticisms, Çiller understood that she would not be able to bring together enough political support for the peaceful solution to the Kurdish question and that insisting on such policies could jeopardize her political survival.

After that point, Çiller started to turn towards more conservative policies in fighting against the PKK insurgency. However, she neither had the knowledge nor had the experience to be in control over developing and implementing these coercive policies. As a result, she entered into an alliance with the military. She saw the presence of Doğan Güreş and his suggestions about fighting the PKK as an opportunity for her political career. She allowed “greater involvement of the military in decision making notably by giving them virtually a free hand in dealing with the Kurdish separatist movement.” By doing this, she thought that she could use the future defeat of the PKK with the military’s policies to her advantage and be the heroic Turkish leader who ended the PKK violence. Moreover, since

48Müge Aknur, Civil-Military Relations in Turkey, p. 162.

she was receiving substantial criticism for her previous declarations on the Kurdish issue, for her leadership style, and for her lack of political capacity from several politicians in and outside of the government, as well as the military, she thought that having the TSK on her side could compensate her weak position in Turkish politics and guarantee her political survival.

Once Prime Minister Çiller turned to the military in the fight against the PKK, she lost her control over the policy making process. First, instead of a parliament-based National Security Council, a military-dominated Security Council, which was mainly responsible for the Kurdish question, was established. This Security Council was also given executive powers.\textsuperscript{50} Furthermore, Chief of General Staff Doğan Güreş began to have a tremendous influence in the decision making process. The mechanism between Doğan Güreş and Tansu Çiller was usually that Güreş would tell Çiller what should be done in the fight against the PKK at that particular time and a few days later Prime Minister Çiller would order him to carry out the measures that he mentioned a few days ago.\textsuperscript{51} During Tansu Çiller’s tenure, Doğan Güreş sometimes even made decisions on his own without letting the government know in advance, such as sending troops to different provinces or sending war planes to particular areas.\textsuperscript{52}

In 1993, 1994, and 1995 major cross-border operations into northern Iraq took place. Moreover, in December 1993, at the request of the Chief of General Staff, the government froze all army discharges for approximately 3-5 months. Tansu Çiller acknowledged that this decision was not formulated by the government,

\textsuperscript{50}Müge Aknur, Civil-Military Relations in Turkey, p. 167.

\textsuperscript{51}Yavuz Gökmen, \textit{Sarışın Güzel Kadın [Beautiful Blonde Woman]}, p. 84.

\textsuperscript{52}Müge Aknur, Civil-Military Relations in Turkey, p. 168.
but it was the demand of the National Security Council and the security forces.\textsuperscript{53} Similarly, in many other policies that marked this period, such as the increase in the number of village guards that were used in the counterinsurgency campaign, disregard of the PKK’s cease fire offers, and increase in village evacuations and human rights violations, it was possible to see the military’s domination of the decision making mechanism in the fight against the PKK.

What created one of the most serious political implications during this period was the imprisonment of the pro-Kurdish DEP representatives in the parliament in March 1994. This policy was also carried out at the insistence of Chief of General Staff Doğan Güreş. The military always believed that the DEP representatives had close ties with the PKK and at a summit meeting with Prime Minister Çiller, Güreş reiterated these thoughts. As a result, the immunities of the DEP representatives were removed in March 2, 1994 and these representatives were arrested on charges of separatism. They were tried at State Security Courts and sentenced to prison. The DEP was closed by the Constitutional Court in June 1994.

The next section turns to the reasons why Prime Minister Tansu Çiller failed to establish her control over the counterinsurgency policy making process and left the military substantially autonomous in the decision making process.

3.2.2 Tansu Çiller’s political strength

A very important reason why Çiller failed to establish control over the counterinsurgency policy making process was her weak partisan powers. Tansu Çiller did not have the essential cadres behind her to carry out her preferred policies. As mentioned above, she did not come to power as a result of popular elections.

\textsuperscript{53}Cited in Müge Aknur, Civil-Military Relations in Turkey, p. 180.
After Turgut Özal died of a heart attack in April 1993, Süleyman Demirel, the then Prime Minister and the leader of the governing DYP, was elected President. In the extraordinary general congress of the DYP on June 13, 1993, Tansu Çiller was elected the new party leader and as a result of this, she automatically became the prime minister of the existing DYP-SHP coalition government. Therefore, she did not come to power with a strong mandate from the public, which could have strengthened her hand within the DYP.

In fact, when Çiller became the Prime Minister in 1993, the coalition government was in control of a majority of the seats in the TGNA. The DYP and SHP together were holding 266 seats in the 450-member parliament. 178 of these seats belonged to the DYP. However, Tansu Çiller did not have a strong authority over the governing coalition. There were already ideological and programmatic differences between the members of the DYP and SHP. But in addition to this, Çiller did not even have control over her political party. She was elected the chairwoman of the DYP in 1993 mostly because of the intra-party struggles where the leading members of this party remained divided and could not gain enough votes. Therefore, although she became the chairwoman of the DYP, she did not have a support base within this political party. Several prominent figures in the party were aware that she did not have much political knowledge and experience. Moreover, they were not happy about her practices and leadership style. Meral Akşener—Çiller’s former colleague and confidante—once mentioned that “we have problems with (her) leadership. The only adjectives we may use to describe our leader are ‘liar,’ ‘unfaithful,’ and ‘unreliable.’”\footnote{Quoted in Ümit Cizre, “Tansu Çiller: Lusting for Power and Undermining Democracy,” in \textit{Political Leaders and Democracy in Turkey}, p. 206.} As a result, the members of the DYP did not trust her policy proposals. This prevented Tansu Çiller from implementing her
proposed political solution to end the PKK violence when she came to office as the prime minister.

Without reliable cadres that Prime Minister Çiller could utilize to develop and implement policies, it was very difficult for her to continue with her prime ministry. She was aware that her lack of a support base would jeopardize her political survival sooner or later. Therefore, she thought that the only way available to her was to enter into an alliance with the military and have the TSK as her support base during her tenure. After this decision, she gave a blank check to the armed forces and left policy making to them in the fight against the PKK.

3.2.3 How the TSK perceived Tansu Çiller

When Çiller first came to office, she did not have a high level of trust in the eyes of the military officers; but this situation changed pretty quickly. In Çiller, the TSK initially saw an incompetent prime minister, who was endangering the survival of the Turkish state with her suggestions about Kurdish cultural rights at a time when the PKK threat was on the rise. Therefore, they thought that they should help this inexperienced leader better understand the realities of Turkey and develop the essential policies to effectively fight against the PKK insurgency. They knew that Çiller did not possess the necessary knowledge and skills to develop an effective counterinsurgency policy. Thus, the then Chief of General Staff Doğan Güreş told her about the preferred strategies of the TSK in fighting the insurgency and assured her that with these strategies, the TSK would

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55İlknur Çevik, “The civilians have to learn how to run Turkey?” *The Turkish Daily News* (October 28, 1997).

56Interview with a retired colonel.
be able to defeat the PKK in a short period of time.\footnote{Interview with a retired general who requested anonymity (Ankara: May 29, 2007).}

This provided a great opportunity for Prime Minister Çiller. Tansu Çiller did not possess the essential instruments of policy making, such as her political party’s majority in the parliament and competent cadres that she could rely on to develop and implement policies. Thus, by entering into an alliance with the military, she would gain a support base to ensure her political survival and she would be the hero once the PKK is defeated with the military strategies. On the other hand, the military would gain a free hand in the conduct of the counterinsurgency campaign. This mutually beneficial situation resulted in the formation of close cooperation and coordination between Tansu Çiller and the military throughout her tenure and significantly increased trust towards her among military officers. From this point onwards, Çiller provided full political backing to the military in its fight against the PKK and developed an inflexible stance in combatting terrorism. In an interview, a retired general who actively took part in the fight against the PKK mentioned that the most harmonious army-government relationship and work environment in the counterinsurgency campaign was during the prime ministry of Çiller. For, she fulfilled all the needs and demands of the armed forces in the fight.\footnote{Interview with a retired general who requested anonymity (Ankara: May 29, 2007).} Indeed, this perception is shared by several other military officers. For example, Chief of General Staff Doğan Güreş once stated: “The prime minister acted like a tiger, and the Armed Forces liked it. I worked with ease with several prime ministers—Özal, Akbulut, Yılmaz, and Demirel. But with Çiller I worked with more ease.”\footnote{Quoted in Ümit Cizre, “Tansu Çiller: Lusting for Power and Undermining Democracy,” p. 203.}

Thus, while the Turkish military provided a strong and reliable support base
for the Çiller government, it in turn increased its autonomy in the fight against the PKK. During this process, the security forces stayed immune from human rights violations and Chief of General Staff Doğan Güreş even demanded and succeeded in extending his term for another year in 1993. In this mutually beneficial relationship, Tansu Çiller’s uncompromising attitude against the PKK and her willingness to fulfill the demands of the military in the counterinsurgency campaign pleased the military officers, helped maintain her legitimacy in the eyes of the military, and guaranteed her political survival without a civilian support base.

3.2.4 The role of international actors

During this period, international actors did not play an important role in strengthening Çiller’s hand in internal security. As discussed before, Turkey received a negative response from the European Commission about its application for full EC membership in December 1989. In its opinion, the European Commission suggested focusing on a customs union agreement and leaving full membership for later.

During the realization of the Customs Union Agreement, the EU indeed emphasized that Turkey was required to carry out certain political and human rights reforms in order to fully put into effect the customs union. The EU especially mentioned the importance of providing a political and peaceful solution to the Kurdish issue and presented this as a condition for establishing a customs union with Turkey.60 Upon the closure of the pro-Kurdish DEP by the Constitutional Court of Turkey, the then President of the European Commission Jacques Delors “warned Ankara that the customs union agreement would not be signed without

guarantees that Turkey would respect human rights and find a political solution to the Kurdish problem.”

Moreover, the European Parliament suspended the October 1994 meeting of the Joint Parliamentary Committee and stated that Turkey was expected to show progress over the issue of human rights and provide a peaceful political solution to the Kurdish question for the realization of the new contractual relationship between Turkey and the EU.

Despite these statements about the conditions of the customs union agreement and despite the EU’s negative opinion about the state of democracy and human rights in Turkey, the EU did not impose many real criteria for the establishment of the customs union. Moreover, the member states did not block the completion of the customs union due human rights violations and the treatment of the Kurdish question in Turkey. Contrary to the expectations, several EU member states such as Germany, France, and the United Kingdom promoted the customs union with Turkey and even pressured those unwilling member states to support the agreement. During this process, France, which held the EU presidency at that time, pushed Greece to abandon its opposition, Tony Blair asked British Labor MEPs in the European Parliament to vote for the customs union, and Germany declared full support for the customs union agreement between Turkey and the EU. Since the EU was highly committed to establishing a customs union with Turkey after its recommendation not to initiate accession negotiations with this country, it did not fully use its incentive and sanctioning mechanisms to pressure

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61 Cited in ibid.


63 Ibid.

64 Ibid.
Turkey to carry out democratization reforms as a condition of the customs union agreement. “In fact, despite the earlier EU statements linking the establishment of the customs union with improvements in Turkey’s human rights and the Kurdish issue, the Union abandoned its earlier critical policy stance and even showed greater enthusiasm than Turkey for the establishment of the customs union.”  

During the negotiations, certain steps were taken by the Turkish government in order to demonstrate progress in the area of democratization. For example, in summer 1995 the government amended a number of provisions of the 1982 Constitution in order to remove certain restrictions on the freedom of expression and association. These changes included abolishing the restrictions on the political activities of associations, allowing the university students and staff to be members of political parties, and amending the article 8 of the Anti-Terror Law in order to extend freedom of expression. Despite these improvements, the EU in this period did not play a role in strengthening civilian control in the area of internal security. Although from time to time it made statements about the criteria Turkey has to fulfill in order to complete the customs union agreement, member states were committed to establishing the customs union between the EU and Turkey as soon as possible and did not impose sanctions or block the customs union negotiations in response to a lack of progress in Turkey’s state of democracy.

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65Ibid., p. 36


3.3 Dynamics of Civil-Military Relations During the DSP-MHP-ANAP Coalition Government (1999-2002)

Most of the developments that took place between 1999 and 2002 regarding Turkey’s fight against the PKK revolved around the process of the PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan’s capture, who was living in Damascus, Syria and Turkey’s efforts to formulate policies to end the PKK in the post-terror phase. During the center-left Democratic Left Party (Demokratik Sol Parti-DSP), right-wing Nationalist Action Party (Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi-MHP), and center-right ANAP coalition government’s tenure, civilian control over counterinsurgency policy making remained at a low/moderate level despite the decreasing PKK threat after the capture of Öcalan. The presence of a low/moderate degree of civilian control during this period resulted from a combination of Bülent Ecevit’s weak partisan powers, the military’s lukewarm attitude towards civilian leadership in general and the coalition government in particular, and the EU’s pressure for further democratization in Turkey once Turkey was officially declared as a candidate member in December 1999. While the weak partisan powers and the military’s negative attitude about civilian leadership constrained the government’s hand in policy making, the EU pressure for democratization legitimized pro-reform forces to some extent and allowed the implementation of certain reforms with respect to the Kurdish question.

3.3.1 The DSP-MHP-ANAP government’s political calculations and policy preferences

The PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan lived in Damascus, Syria for many years. During the July 1998 meeting of the National Security Council, Land Forces Com-
mander General Hüseyin Kıvrıkoglu presented a comprehensive plan about pressuring Syria to expel Öcalan. When Kıvrıkoglu was appointed as the Chief of General Staff in August 1998, his first move was to order the implementation of this plan. According to Sükri Elekdag, “PKK Zayıflıyor, Kürt Sorunu Ağırlaşıyor” [The PKK is Weakening, the Kurdish Problem is Getting Heavier], Milliyet (July 26, 1999).

Accordingly, the successive Land Forces Commander General Atilla Ateş delivered a speech on September 15, 1998 in the city of Antakya, which is near the Syrian border and in this speech he threatened Syria with military action if it did not force Öcalan out of Damascus. This initiative was taken one step further with President Süleyman Demirel’s inaugural speech before the Turkish Grand National Assembly on October 1, 1998 where he stated that Turkey’s patience was running out in the face of Syria’s hostile attitude towards Turkey. This initiative instigated a set of events that eventually resulted in the ousting of Öcalan from Syria and his arrest in Kenya in February 1999.

When Turkey threatened Syria with military action in September 1998, a coalition of ANAP and DSP was in government, where Mesut Yılmaz was the prime minister and Bülent Ecevit was the deputy prime minister. In January 1999, Ecevit began to serve first as the prime minister of the care-taker government, which was in office until the April 1999 elections and then the prime minister of the DSP-MHP-ANAP coalition government in May 1999, which lasted until November 2002. Therefore, Ecevit was one of the leading civilian figures throughout most of the process of Öcalan’s arrest and its aftermath.

68 Sükri Elekdag, “PKK Zayıflıyor, Kürt Sorunu Ağırlaşıyor” [The PKK is Weakening, the Kurdish Problem is Getting Heavier], Milliyet (July 26, 1999).

69 Murat Yetkin, “137 Fırtınalı Gün... (1)” [137 Stormy Days... (1)], Radikal (August 9, 2004).

70 “Suriye’ye Karşı Sabrımız Taşıyor” [Our Patience is Running Out against Syria], Radikal (October 2, 1998).

71 This is ironic since Ecevit was not originally in favor of the hard line initiative of Atilla Ateş and Süleyman Demirel against Syria. See Murat Yetkin, 137 Fırtınalı Gün... (3) [137 Stormy
Bülent Ecevit always had a regional perspective towards PKK terrorism. He stated several times that Turkey had a southeast problem, rather than a Kurdish problem.\textsuperscript{72} In many DSP publications and in his speeches, Ecevit attributed the problem to the feudal structure of the region and he believed that the PKK terrorism could not be eliminated completely before this socio-economic structure of the region was changed through economic investment and land reform.\textsuperscript{73} Therefore, he did not see the ethnic approach, such as granting cultural rights to the Kurds, as a solution to the southeast problem.

The second major partner of the coalition government, MHP, has been regarded as a radical right-wing and ultra-nationalist party since it was established in 1969. The MHP got involved in many killings and atrocities in the 1970s in the name of fighting against Communism, as well as in the state’s covert operations against the PKK in the 1990s.\textsuperscript{74} Therefore, when Devlet Bahçeli was elected the chairman of the MHP in 1997, he “created an image of being a centrist party and downplayed its earlier emphasis on ultranationalist and extremist views.”\textsuperscript{75} This image helped the MHP to obtain the second highest share of the votes in the April 1999 elections.

However, the MHP was still a hard-liner with respect to Turkey’s fight against


\textsuperscript{73}Ibid., p. 16; interview with DSP Deputy Chairman and Burdur Representative in the 23\textsuperscript{rd} TGNA Hasan Macit (January 11, 2008).

\textsuperscript{74}Alev Çınar and Burak Arıkan, “The Nationalist Action Party: Representing the State, the Nation or the Nationalists?” \textit{Turkish Studies} 3, no. 1 (Spring 2002), pp. 32-33.

the PKK. Bahçeli always perceived Turkey as a unitary nation-state. He promoted Turkey’s military struggle against the PKK and he was against cultural openings such as the establishment of a Kurdish political party or the voice of Kurdish demands in the political arena.\textsuperscript{76} He was not pleased with the European countries’ efforts to advocate Kurdish rights in Turkey because for a long time, the MHP claimed that the EU supported the PKK acts and was in favor of the creation of a Kurdish state in Turkey.

On the other hand, Mesut Yılmaz, the head of the ANAP and the junior partner of the DSP-MHP-ANAP coalition government had a different view on Turkey’s fight against the PKK. In the mid-1990s Mesut Yılmaz prepared proposals for reform in the southeast, which involved removing restrictions on the cultural rights of the Kurds and decreasing the military presence in the region.\textsuperscript{77} In the late 1990s, Yılmaz began to connect the issue of cultural rights with Turkey’s EU project and look at Turkey’s fight against the PKK within the context of Turkey’s EU membership process. This connection became more evident when Yılmaz stated that “the road to the EU goes through Diyarbakır, the largest city at the center of the Kurdish-majority region of Turkey.”\textsuperscript{78} Thus, unlike his coalition partners, Mesut Yılmaz had an ethnic approach to the PKK insurgency and he thought that further democratization efforts, such as granting cultural rights to the Kurds would contribute to the resolution of the Kurdish issue.

Despite these different approaches, all three parties of the coalition government

\textsuperscript{76}Ibid., p. 65

\textsuperscript{77}These proposals were mainly the result of the studies carried out by the ethnically Kurdish members of the ANAP. See Henri J. Barkey and Graham E. Fuller, \textit{Turkey’s Kurdish Question}, p. 114.

\textsuperscript{78}Ersel Aydınlı, “Between Security and Liberalization,” p. 219.
had a political interest in initiating a reform process regarding the Kurdish issue in the aftermath of Öcalan’s capture. First, Turkey was officially declared as a candidate country by the EU during the 1999 Helsinki Summit. This long-awaited development revitalized the public’s hope about being part of Europe. According to a nationwide survey conducted by Necat Erder and his associates, while 54.8 percent of the respondents said they “would like Turkey to be a member of the EU” in 1996, this number increased to 61.8 percent in 1998. Moreover, according to the Applicant Countries Eurobarometer survey conducted in 2001, 68 percent of the respondents in Turkey stated that they would vote for Turkey’s membership of the EU in a referendum. Under these circumstances, approaching the PKK issue within the context of the EU accession process was a rational option to follow for the government in the aftermath of Öcalan’s arrest.

Besides the fact that there was an increasing demand among the public for Turkey’s EU membership, each coalition partner also had an important additional stake in being part of a political reform process within the context of the EU. The MHP’s ultra-nationalist past forced Devlet Bahçeli to emphasize his party’s moderation, pragmatism, and centrist tendencies and made him more open to reform agendas. On the other hand, Bülent Ecevit tried to moderate his party’s image during this period because when he was in government in the 1970s, he was known for his reluctant European stance. Finally, Mesut Yılmaz wanted to renew his public image because he had to cope with serious corruption charges in the 1990s. Thus, DSP, MHP, and ANAP all had an interest in developing a reform-


minded image during their partnership in the 1999-2002 coalition government and they made an important effort to initiate these political reforms required by the EU as a condition for membership.\textsuperscript{81} The EU reform process became the government’s common ground to take certain steps in Turkey’s fight against the PKK in the aftermath of Öcalan’s arrest.

However, these were not the only considerations of the government. After the successful counterinsurgency campaign that the Turkish military conducted against the PKK in the 1990s and after the post-modern coup of the February 28th Process, the government was aware that they had to be cautious about handling the issues of national security and they had to deal with these issues in cooperation and coordination with the military. As a result while the government mostly focused on the structural reforms in the economy when it came to office, the military aspect of the fight against the PKK was left to the military. During this period, even the post-conflict restructuring in the southeast was conducted by the military and civilians only provided logistical support.

According to the then Minister of Defense Sabahattin Çakmakoğlu, during this period, civil-military relationship was without problems and the government provided the demands of the Turkish military in its fight against the PKK.\textsuperscript{82} Therefore, there was not much conflict in the policy making process with respect to the military aspect of the counterinsurgency. The policies that created much tension between civilian and military actors, as well as among different civilian actors during this period were about the political aspect of the fight, namely about


\textsuperscript{82} Interview with the former Minister of Defense Sabahattin Çakmakoğlu (Ankara: January 7, 2008).
how to deal with Öcalan once he was sentenced to death penalty and whether to grant cultural rights to the Kurds in Turkey.

After the arrest of Abdullah Öcalan in February 1999, there appeared concerns about the politicization of the PKK issue. This concern was especially expressed by the Turkish military, members of the Turkish security bureaucracy, as well as the MHP. According to this view, after the arrest of Öcalan, the PKK threat did not diminish, but only entered into a new phase. The PKK itself greatly contributed to the emergence of this fear in the minds of the Turkish security establishment. For example, Abdullah Öcalan, in his defense which he prepared for his trial in İmralı, requested the acknowledgement of the Kurds in Turkey and highlighted the importance of Kurdish cultural rights for a political and democratic solution of the Kurdish question. Moreover, in February 2000 the PKK declared that from now on it would pursue a political struggle, instead of an armed struggle. Finally, Osman Öcalan—Abdullah Öcalan’s brother—was reported as stating that “Kurdish television and education were seen as a way to a more integrated Kurdish nation, the mobilizing power for the future independent state.” Such statements led to the widespread opinion that the politicization of the PKK was just another way of promoting separatism in Turkey. Although it was clear that the PKK’s ability to challenge the Turkish state was to a large extent eliminated during this period, these doubts created problems among the parties of the coalition government, as well as between the civilian and military leaders in

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84 “PKK Silahlı Mücadeleye Nokta Koydu” [PKK Put an End to the Armed Struggle], Radikal (February 10, 2000).

formulating policies to solve the Kurdish question in Turkey in the post-violence era.

One of the policies that the government promoted in the early aftermath of the arrest of Öcalan was to prepare an economic investment package, which involved the transfer of 40 trillion TL to a number of cities in the east and southeast regions of Turkey. Another 250 trillion was added to this amount by Halk Bank. This policy was put into effect right away; however, it failed to bring drastic changes to the lives of the people living in the region.

A second important move was a 107-article Southeast Action Plan whose starting point was the National Security Council meeting on December 26, 1999. Having thought that the atmosphere of terror and its negative consequences in the region could not be fully eliminated with only security measures, the MGK decided to prepare a regional development plan. With President Süleyman Demirel’s directive and under the leadership of Secretary General—General Cumhur Asparuk—the Southeast Action Plan was prepared and approved by the MGK in its meeting on February 25, 2000. This plan was put into effect by Ecevit on May 9, 2000. Although many state institutions contributed to the preparation of this plan and its implementation was the result of a civil-military coordination, it was reported that the TSK played a key role in initiation of this process and the preparation of the Action Plan.

86 “Güneydoğu Çıkarması” [Landing on the Southeast], Radikal (March 7, 1999); “Doğu ve Güneydoğu’ya 250 Trilyon Lira Daha” [250 Trillion Liras More to the East and the Southeast], Radikal (March 8, 1999).

87 Murat Yetkin, “Eylem Planı 107” [Action Plan 107], Radikal (September 14, 2000); Ertuğrul Özkök, “Kürt Kimiliği Ne Kadar Yerleşti” [How Much the Kurdish Identity Has Established], Hürriyet (September 15, 2000); Fikret Bila, “Devlet, G. Doğu’da Harekete Geçti” [The State Took Action in the Southeast], Milliyet (September 14, 2000).

88 İsmet Berkan, “Güneydoğu’da Fikri Takip Eksikliği” [Lack of Ideational Pursuit in the
In the aftermath of Öcalan’s arrest, one of the biggest problems that arose was in the area of granting cultural rights to the Kurds. While the DSP leader Ecevit, ANAP leader Mesut Yılmaz, Foreign Ministry officials, and even the director of the National Intelligence Organization expressed their support for certain cultural rights such as Kurdish television and Kurdish language education, the TSK and MHP argued that such a move would threaten the unity of Turkey.

An important conflict emerged when the General Staff released a domestic security assessment report on December 7, 2000, as Prime Minister Ecevit was attending the EU’s Nice Summit. This report stated that, as the PKK’s violence was decreasing, the terrorist organization was in an effort to emerge as a political force. This effort, which began to show itself as requests for rights such as recognition of Kurds as a separate people, incorporating this recognition into the Constitution, and broadcasting and education in Kurdish, constitute merely another dimension of PKK’s separatist goals. Despite the General Staff’s declaration, the Foreign Ministry expressed its support for guaranteeing cultural rights for all citizens of Turkey, allowing broadcasts in languages other than Turkish, and grating people the right to learn their mother tongue.

Southeast], Radikal (September 16, 2000); Sedat Ergin, “Güneydoğu Eylem Planı Ne Durumda?” [What is the Status of the Southeast Action Plan?], Hürriyet (April 5, 2002).


90Tüker Alkan, “Kim Bölücü?” [Who is the Separatist?], Radikal (November 16, 2000); Hasan Cemal, “Türkiye: AB’nin içinde mi bölünür, dışında mı? (1)” [Turkey: Would it get separated inside or outside the EU? (1)], Milliyet (January 13, 2001).

91“Kürtçe TV’ye Fren” [Applying Brakes to the Kurdish TV], Radikal (August 8, 2000).


93“Zirvede Kürtçe Çatlağı” [The Kurdish Split at the Summit], Radikal (December 9, 2000).
tained that Kurdish television and education was a domestic need for Turkey.\footnote{Cited in Ersel Aydınlı, “Between Security and Liberalization: Decoding Turkey’s Struggle with the PKK,” ftnt. 19.} Moreover, the Presidency stated that there were certain steps that Turkey needed to take in the area of democratization and human rights, which was interpreted as President Ahmet Necdet Sezer’s positive attitude towards the issue of Kurdish cultural rights.\footnote{“Köşk’tе Kürtçe TV Kargaşası,” [Turmoil about Kurdish TV at the Palace], Hürriyet (December 9, 2000).} After these discussions, Prime Minister Ecevit only mentioned that he shared the General Staff’s concerns about the politicization of the PKK.\footnote{“Ecevit Askere Hak Verdi” [Ecevit Agreed With the Military], Radikal (December 12, 2000).}

In spite of these intense discussions and especially opposition from the MHP as well as the TSK about Kurdish cultural rights, Turkey’s EU accession process helped ease the debate and strengthened the hands of the pro-reform forces within the government and bureaucracy because granting cultural rights to the Kurds was one of the conditions for Turkey’s membership to the EU. As a result of the third EU harmonization package, which entered into force on August 9, 2002, broadcasting in Kurdish and learning Kurdish language became possible.

During the same time period, Ecevit began to implement his village-town project (köy-kent projesi) as a solution to the socio-economic dimension of the PKK terrorism. With this project, which also received support from the World Bank, he wanted to build several village-towns in the southeast Turkey, where those people who had to leave their homes due to evacuations as a result of PKK terrorism, could return to their villages.\footnote{Ecevit, Köy-Kenti Ordu’dan BaŞlatıyor” [Ecevit is Starting Village-Town from Ordu], Hürriyet (September 3, 2000);} Since the villages are too spread out in the southeast region, this project aimed at focusing public investments at partic-
ular locations where a few villages together could take advantage of them.

A final issue came up regarding what should be done with Öcalan. The question of whether Öcalan should be sentenced to death created sharp discussions among the members of the coalition government, as well as among the public. In fact, death penalty had not been used in Turkey since 1984. However, this did not prevent the issue from becoming a significant point of debate after the arrest and trial of Öcalan. Ecevit had been against the death penalty since the executions of Deniz Gezmiş, Yusuf Aslan, and Hüseyin İnan—student leaders of a leftist movement named the People’s Liberation Army of Turkey—in 1972. Therefore, when discussions about Öcalan’s possible execution arose, he refused to give his consent to this and he advocated the total lifting of the death penalty. ANAP leader Mesut Yılmaz, who was the deputy Prime Minister responsible for EU affairs, also expressed his support for the abolishment of the death penalty during this process. On the other hand, from the very beginning, the MHP stood against the abolishment of the death penalty and advocated the execution of Öcalan as soon as possible.98 MHP had an inflexible stance on the issue not only because of its nationalist character, but also because of its use of the possible execution of Öcalan as an important policy goal during the 1999 election campaign. Finally, the TSK argued that they are one of the warring sides in the fight against terrorism. Therefore, they refused to express their views on the issue of death penalty and they added that the final decision will be given by the politicians and the judiciary.99 Despite these discussions and especially the MHP’s oppo-

98 Bilal Çetin, “AB’ye Giden Yolun Tehlikeli Virajlari” [The Dangerous Curves of the Way to the EU], Radikal (January 4, 2000); Murat Yetkin, “İdam’ın İpi MHP’de” Radikal (January 3, 2002).

99 Fikret Bila, “İdam Masaya Yatırıldı” [Death Penalty was Discussed], Milliyet (February 28, 2002).
sition to lifting the death penalty, Turkey’s goal of EU membership once again helped ease the debate because the removal of the death penalty from the Turkish Criminal Code was one of the conditions for Turkey’s membership to the EU. “Bahçeli...extricated himself from this difficult situation by notifying his coalition partners that the MHP would continue to oppose the amendment when it is taken up by parliament; however, if the amendment is adopted by the votes of the other coalition members as well as those of the opposition the MHP would not terminate the coalition.”

As a result of the October 2001 reform package, the government abolished the death penalty except “in times of war, imminent threat of war, and for crimes of terrorism.” Then in August 2002, the government completely abolished death penalty in times of peace and removed terrorist crimes from the list of activities for which death penalty could be used.

3.3.2 The DSP-MHP-ANAP coalition’s political strength

A very important factor that resulted in the tripartite coalition’s low/moderate control over counterinsurgency was the head of government’s weak partisan powers. Although Bülent Ecevit was the prime minister between 1999 and 2002, neither his political party had a majority of seats in the parliament, nor he had full control over the members of the governing coalition. In fact, the total number of seats held by the DSP, MHP, and ANAP provided the government a clear majority in the TGNA. Three parties together held 63 percent of the seats in the parliament, which made this coalition Turkey’s strongest government since Turgut Özal obtained 64 percent of the seats in the 1987 elections. However, none of the parties alone won more than approximately 22 percent of the votes cast in

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the 1999 elections. While the DSP obtained 22.19 percent of the votes, the MHP won 17.98 percent, and ANAP won 13.22 percent of the votes in the elections. Therefore, the cadres that the government needed to rely on to formulate and implement policies were divided by serious ideological and programmatic differences. Their smooth working was dependent on the extent to which the members of the coalition could agree on what kind of policies to formulate and implement. Although DSP, MHP, and ANAP were all open to compromise in order to ensure the survival of the coalition and they made a tremendous effort to reach a common ground in policy making during this period, there were issue areas, which made agreement difficult and prevented the government from forming a strong and unified body vis-à-vis the military and other opposition circles. One of these issue areas was how to resolve the Kurdish issue in the aftermath of the arrest of Abdullah Öcalan. Especially the MHP played a key role in blocking or postponing some of the democratization reforms in this area.

It was clear that the members of the coalition government were divided on how to approach the Kurdish question. However, even the limited number of available cadres could not be utilized effectively by the DSP-MHP-ANAP government with the goal of fully eliminating the PKK and resolving the Kurdish issue. Two devastating earthquakes that took place in İstanbul and Kocaeli in August and November 1999 caused deaths of approximately 17000 and 1000 people, respectively and brought down tens of thousands of buildings. Moreover, as a result of the economic crises in 2000 and 2001, which were the worst economic

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102 “Quake rescue repairs government’s image,” (November 17, 1999), available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/524621.stm
crises in Turkey’s history, Turkish lira was devalued overnight by 50 percent in February 2001, approximately 2.3 million people lost their jobs and the Turkish economy contracted by approximately 8.5 percent.103 The earthquakes in 1999, as well as the deep economic crises of November 2000 and February 2001 prevented the government from focusing mainly on the fight against the PKK and constrained resources available to the government to develop civilian initiatives in this area.

In sum, the DSP-MHP-ANAP coalition government had a low/moderate level of civilian control over the fight against the PKK. An important reason for this was the head of government’s weak partisan powers. None of the political parties had a majority of seats in the parliament and Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit did not have control over the governing coalition. The coalition partners had a wide variety of views about the Kurdish question and the available cadres could not be mobilized effectively due to the deep economic crises of 2000 and 2001, as well as the 1999 earthquakes. This situation significantly constrained the government’s hand in counterinsurgency policy making.

The coalition government’s weak partisan powers were a necessary, but not a sufficient condition that resulted in its low/moderate degree of control over the policy making process in the fight against the PKK. The government’s partisan powers can explain its failure to exert a strong control over the policy making process, but this cannot fully account for why the government’s ability to influence policy did not completely disappear and why the military eventually gave its consent to granting certain cultural rights to the Kurds.

3.3.3 How the TSK perceived the DSP-MHP-ANAP coalition

The DSP-MHP-ANAP coalition government began to serve at a time when the Turkish military had a general distrust towards civilian leadership, especially in the area of national security. First, this administration came to office a short period after the February 28 Process. This process involved the resignation of the DYP-RP (Welfare Party-Refah Partisi) coalition government led by Islamist Necmettin Erbakan as a result of a set of events initiated by a memorandum given by the military on February 28, 1997. After the Islamist RP became a major partner in the RP-DYP coalition government in June 1996, Turkey’s secular establishment felt increasingly concerned about Islamic reactionism (irtica). This perception led to the delivery of a list of measures from the MGK to the government on February 28, 1997, which aimed at strengthening the secular system. However, once it became clear that the government was not carrying out these measures, continuing pressure from the MGK and a substantial accompanying public pressure, resulted in the collapse of the RP-DYP coalition government in June 1997. The February 28 process was widely referred to as a post-modern coup. Thus, the post-February 28 process was a time period when the Turkish military was highly sensitive about national security issues and did not trust much and was not open to civilian agendas in this area.

This became more apparent when Deputy Prime Minister Mesut Yılmaz gave a speech to his party’s convention on August 4, 2001 and argued that “Turkish politics was afflicted by a ‘national security syndrome’ which, so he claimed, only served to frustrate the reforms necessary to democratize and integrate the Turkish

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political system into the European Union.”

105 The General Staff gave a harsh verbal response to this claim by saying that “national security should not be an issue of political exploitation” and added that “matters related to the existence, well being and happiness of the Turkish nation should be discussed at serious platforms that are detached from daily politics.”

106 This exchange of words showed the military’s sensitivity about any possible vulnerability that could appear in the area of national security.

Second, as a result of the ineffective performance of the government in the face of the 1999 earthquakes and the 2000 and 2001 economic crises, the military’s trust towards the coalition decreased further. In fact, the military had a high level of respect for Bülent Ecevit for his successful military operation in Cyprus in 1974. However, especially in 2001, there was growing distrust among military officers about the government’s and especially Prime Minister Ecevit’s ability to effectively govern the country. During this time period, the military began to express its uneasiness about the prime ministry of Bülent Ecevit due to his old age and health problems. A number of retired generals even sent a message to those political figures close to Ecevit that he should resign and let somebody else from his political party serve as Prime Minister.

107 The TSK, alongside several civilian groups, had concerns about Ecevit’s physical capacity to govern the

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106 “Military to Yılmaz: Don’t Exploit National Security,” Turkish Daily News (August 8, 2001); “Genelkurmaydan Sert Uyarı” [Harsh Warning from the General Staff], Radikal (August 7, 2001).

107 Murat Yetkin, “‘Ecevit Gitsin, Özkan Gelsin,’” Radikal (October 31, 2001). Both Murat Yetkin and Fikret Bila argue that although this concern was expressed by retired generals, they in fact reflect the atmosphere among the active military personnel. See Murat Yetkin, “‘Ecevit Gitsin, Özkan Gelsin,’” and Fikret Bila, Ankara’da Irak Savaşları [Iraq Wars in Ankara], pp. 37-38.
country and especially formulate the necessary policies to overcome the economic problems of the country. This low level of trust towards the civilian leadership constrained the government’s already limited space to maneuver regarding the Kurdish issue. However, despite the head of government’s weak partisan powers and the civilian leadership’s decreasing legitimacy in the eyes of the military, the DSP-MHP-ANAP coalition government managed to carry out a few reforms as a step in the resolution of the Kurdish question during its tenure. This situation was the result of the EU’s systematic pressure for democratization in Turkey and is described in the following section.

3.3.4 The role of international actors

Between 1999 and 2002, international actors, especially the EU played an important role in tilting the civil-military balance of power in Turkey somewhat towards the former with respect to the Kurdish issue. The head of government had weak partisan powers in dealing with the Kurdish issue and the military did not have much trust towards the civilian leadership during this period. Within the context of this weak civilian leadership in the area of national security, the EU’s pressure for democratization in Turkey did not bring a high level of control over the policy making process to end the PKK and resolve the Kurdish question. However, it strengthened the pro-EU and pro-reform forces’ hand vis-à-vis the military and nationalist circles to some extent and allowed the implementation of a few reforms in this area.

Turkey was officially admitted as a candidate country during the EU’s Helsinki Summit in December 1999. As a result, the EU declared the first Accession Part-

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nership Document for Turkey on March 8, 2001. This document provided a list of short-term and medium-term priorities that Turkey needed to address in order to fulfill the Copenhagen criteria. The demand for Kurdish rights in the Accession Partnership initiated tough discussions about cultural rights in Turkey. In response to the Accession Partnership, The TGNA approved the National Program for the Adoption of the Acquis on March 19, 2001. The National Program “set out the extent and means through which Turkey intended to address EU priorities.” However, it reflected the lack of a clear policy towards the Kurdish question in the aftermath of Öcalan’s capture due to the wide variety of opinions about this issue within the government and within the security establishment. The National Program approved in March 2001 turned out to be a vague document that did not reach the level of expectations.

Despite these constraints, the weakness of the government was to some extent compensated by external elements, more specifically by the EU accession process between 1999 and 2002 and this interaction enabled the DSP-MHP-ANAP coalition government to initiate an important reform process of democratization that dealt with a few issues addressing the priorities of the Accession Partnership, including Kurdish cultural rights and lifting the death penalty. The TGNA passed the first reform package on October 3, 2001. This package was a constitutional amendment that involved the review of 34 articles of the Constitution. The second reform package was passed on August 3, 2002. These reform packages included guarantees on the freedom of expression and thought, lifting of the death penalty, and removal of the legal restrictions on broadcasting in and learning languages other than Turkish. An important factor that contributed to this development

109 Nathalie Tocci, “Europeanization in Turkey: Trigger or Anchor for Reform?” South European Society and Politics 10, no. 1, p. 75.
was that the recognition of Turkey’s EU candidacy, the announcement of the Accession Partnership, and the increase in the EU’s financial assistance to Turkey made the accession process more credible and concrete in the eyes of the civilian and military actors during this time period. Moreover, the expectation that the 2002 Copenhagen Summit might lead to developments regarding the granting of a date for accession negotiations accelerated the reform process. “[T]he EU, as an external anchor...enabled both the government and the pro-reform societal groups to legitimate the democratization reforms.”\textsuperscript{110} Moreover, while the EU pressure broke the inertia of the government and prevented policy reversals, it also allowed the civilian leaders to show the reform process as a requirement in the EU accession process.\textsuperscript{111} As Öniş states, with a relatively weak coalition government in charge, “a change of this magnitude would have been impossible in the absence of a powerful and highly institutionalized EU anchor in the direction of full membership.”\textsuperscript{112}

In sum, between 1999 and 2002, important civilian initiatives took place as a step to resolve the Kurdish question in Turkey. After Öcalan was arrested, although the PKK violence diminished to a great extent, civilian control over the fight against the PKK did not significantly increase, as would be expected by the threat-based theories, but remained at a low/moderate level. During this process, the governing coalition not only suffered from ideological differences, but also had to deal with the consequences of the August and November 1999 earthquakes and

\textsuperscript{110}Mehmet Uğur, “Testing Times in EU-Turkey Relations: The Road to Copenhagen and Beyond,” \textit{Journal of Southern Europe and the Balkans} 5, no. 3 (August 2003), p. 176. Also see Nathalie Tocci, “Europeanization in Turkey: Trigger or Anchor for Reform?” p. 81.

\textsuperscript{111}Mehmet Uğur, “Testing Times in EU-Turkey Relations,” p. 176.

serious economic crises in 2000 and 2001. This ineffective performance of the government, when coupled with the military’s hesitant attitude towards civilian leadership in general in the aftermath of the February 28 process and its concern about Prime Minister Ecevit’s capacity to govern further constrained the government’s hand in policy making. While these problems prevented the government from developing an effective policy to resolve the Kurdish issue in the post-terror phase, the EU pressure helped certain civilian initiatives prevail and allowed reforms in the area of Kurdish cultural rights and lifting of the death penalty.

3.4 Dynamics of Civil-Military Relations during Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s Tenure

The Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi-AKP) was founded in August 2001 under the leadership of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Abdullah Gül. Its emergence was the result of the February 28 Process, which led to the closure of the Welfare Party in 1998 and the subsequent Virtue Party in 2001 due to their anti-secular activities. After the closure of the Virtue Party by the Constitutional Court’s decision in June 2001, while the older generation of Islamists founded the Felicity Party, the members of the younger generation launched the Justice and Development Party.\textsuperscript{113} Tayyip Erdoğan became the first chairman of the AKP.

The AKP came to office as a result of the November 2002 national elections. Since Erdoğan was imprisoned and banned from politics in 1998 due to a poem that he recited during a speech,\textsuperscript{114} Abdullah Gül served as the care-taker prime

\textsuperscript{113}Gareth Jenkins, “Muslim Democrats in Turkey?” \textit{Survival} 45, no. 1 (Spring 2003), p. 53.

\textsuperscript{114}The quatrain that he recited was: Minarets are bayonets / Domes are helmets / Mosques are barracks / Believers are soldiers. See Metin Heper and Şule Toktaş, “Islam, Modernity, and Democracy in Contemporary Turkey: The Case of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan,” \textit{Muslim World} 93,
minister until Erdoğan’s political ban was removed in January 2003 and he entered the parliament via by-elections in March 2003. After the AKP government came to office in late 2002, the PKK’s terrorist acts began to increase once again. Especially the US War in Iraq provided an opportunity space for the PKK in northern Iraq and the PKK put an end to its unilateral ceasefire in 2004.

Within the context of this re-emerging PKK threat, Tayyip Erdoğan succeeded in establishing a moderate/high degree of civilian control over the fight against the PKK in the early years of his prime ministry. However, especially from 2006 onwards, his control over the policy making process somewhat decreased and remained at a moderate level. His initial success was the result of his strong partisan powers and the international pressure for democratization. During the early years of his prime ministry, while Erdoğan’s strong partisan powers provided his government with the necessary instruments in policy making, the EU pressure for further democratization in Turkey helped compensate for the lack of the AKP leadership’s legitimacy in the eyes of the military and allowed the AKP to exert its agenda with respect to the Kurdish question. From 2006 onwards, the weakening EU pressure on Turkey brought the AKP’s legitimacy problems among military officers to the forefront. Although Erdoğan still had a high level of political strength during this period, the TSK’s negative perception of the AKP made Erdoğan search for a political compromise with the military in response to the weakening EU factor and lose some of his control over the fight against the PKK.

no. 2 (April 2003).
3.4.1 Tayyip Erdoğan’s political calculations and policy preferences

The AKP emerged with a strong democratization and human rights discourse in 2001. From the mid-1990s onwards, Turkey’s secular establishment’s concerns about reactionism rose tremendously and there were still ongoing suspicions about the AKP’s ties to political Islam despite its leading figures’ statements to the contrary. Tayyip Erdoğan declared that they were not a continuation of the National Outlook Movement (*Milli Görüş*).  

Members of the AKP several times stated that their party was committed to secularism and it was more of a Muslim Democrat party rather than an Islamist one. However, this was not enough to eliminate the AKP’s problem of legitimacy. Therefore, the AKP developed a three-layered strategy to deal with this situation:

“first, adopt a language of human rights and democracy as a discursive shield; second, mobilize popular support as a form of democratic legitimacy; and third, build a liberal-democratic coalition with modern/secular sectors that recognize the JDP [AKP] as a legitimate political actor.”

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115 Ergun Aksoy, “Milli Görüş Elbisesi Çıktı,” [The National Outlook Shirt was Taken Off], *Radikal* (May 17, 2003). The National Outlook has been a movement of political Islam in Turkey led by Necmettin Erbakan. The movement established several political parties such as the National Order (1970-1971), National Salvation (1972-1980), Welfare (1983-1998), Virtue (1997-2001), and the Felicity Party (2001-present). Except for the existing Felicity Party, all others were closed down by Turkey’s Constitutional Court.


The AKP presented its goal for democratization in the *Development and Democratization Program*, which was published in December 2001 and which constituted the basis of the party’s policies.\(^{118}\) The party emphasized the importance of human rights, democracy, and the rule of law in this document. Moreover, in line with this discourse, Erdoğan declared the EU accession process as the priority of the government as soon as the AKP came to office in November 2002. For the AKP leaders, the EU accession process was also the way to end the PKK terrorism and resolve the Kurdish issue in Turkey. The party did not develop a separate policy towards the Kurdish question. Instead, the party program presented the AKP’s approach towards the resolution of the Kurdish issue within the framework of the general democratization project.\(^{119}\)

The emphasis on Turkey’s EU project was a strategic choice for the AKP. The EU project was a key policy through which the AKP aimed at transforming Turkey into a pluralist country with a fuller democracy and human rights.\(^{120}\) As Abdullah Gül stated, the leading figures of the AKP believed that “a general improvement in democracy in Turkey would bring positive results for all circles or groups in the country, including Islamically-oriented circles.”\(^{121}\) Moreover, the EU membership process was regarded as a modernization project, which would enhance the AKP’s legitimacy, decrease its feeling of insecurity vis-à-vis the secular

\(^{118}\)Gareth Jenkins, “Muslim Democrats in Turkey?” p. 53.

\(^{119}\)AK Parti Programı [The AK Party Program], (August 14, 2001), p. 11.


establishment, and also help the party receive support from different segments of the society, including the business sector, media, and other social democrat and liberal circles. Since the public support for Turkey’s future EU membership was around 70 percent in the early 2000s, promoting Turkey’s EU project was a rational policy choice that would bring a high level of support from a wide variety of people and increase the chances of AKP’s election victory.

However, these were not the AKP’s only considerations. Tayyip Erdoğan’s focus on Turkey’s EU accession process was also the party’s coexistence strategy with the military. The AKP considered Turkey’s EU accession process also as a way to “limit the power of the military over domestic politics via the NSC [National Security Council] or more directly to enhance civilian control over the military, strengthen civil society including pro-Islamic associations and endowments, expand freedom of expression, and make party closure more difficult.”

The Deputy Chairman of the AKP—Dengir Mir Mehmet Fırat—mentioned in an interview that the AKP’s commitment to the EU project and the strategic moves


123 According to the Candidate Countries Eurobarometer Survey, in Fall 2002 the public support for Turkey’s future EU membership was 65 percent. This number rose to 67 percent in Fall 2003 and to 71 percent in Spring 2004. Available at http://www.ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/cceb_en.htm Indeed very different groups in society were united under the goal of Turkey’s EU membership at that time. For example, while the liberals and the business community were interested in the basic freedoms and the economic progress that Turkey’s EU membership would bring, the Kurdish people saw it as a way to improve human rights and cultural freedoms. On the other hand, the pro-Islamic circles thought that integration into the EU would decrease the military’s role in politics, whereas the TSK considered the EU membership as the guarantee of the country’s place in the western developed world. See David L. Phillips, “Turkey’s Dreams of Accession,” Foreign Affairs 83, no. 5 (September/October 2004), pp. 86-97.

against the military are not totally independent from each other.\footnote{Quoted in Zeki Sargil, \textit{Endogenizing Institutions} (Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Pittsburgh, 2007), p. 147.}

In sum, the AKP had three major goals in its enthusiasm for the EU project in the early 2000s: First, as a political party coming from Islamist origins, the support for the EU accession process was a strategy that would bring legitimacy to the AKP in the eyes of the secular groups that seemed suspicious of the AKP’s intentions. Second, the EU project was a policy choice that would help the AKP to appeal to different segments of the society and increase its chances of election. And finally, The AKP leaders thought that the process of EU accession would open the way for an increase in the civilian control over the armed forces.

In addition to this strategy, once Tayyip Erdoğan came to office, he also made a special effort to avoid any confrontation with the armed forces that could jeopardize the government in the early years of his tenure.\footnote{Ümit Cizre, “The Justice and Development Party and the Military: Recreating the Past After Reforming It?” in \textit{Secular and Islamic Politics in Turkey: The Making of the Justice and Development Party}, p. 134.} He tried to stay away from acts that could increase suspicions about the AKP Government’s Islamist credentials.

The AKP government was able to pass several EU harmonization packages through the parliament between 2003 and 2004. These reform packages marked important changes with respect to Turkey’s fight against the PKK and the development of political solutions to the Kurdish question. These reforms included improvements in the area of eliminating torture and ill-treatment, the amendment of the broadcasting law to allow for broadcasting in languages other than Turkish by public and private radio and television stations, amendment of the Civil Registry Law to permit granting of Kurdish names to children, a partial amnesty law
that aimed at integrating some of the PKK militants into society, implementation of the “Return to Village and Rehabilitation Project” in order to facilitate the return to the villages of those who had to leave due to the fight against the PKK, and amendment of the anti-terror law in order to expand the freedom of thought and expression.\textsuperscript{127} Another set of reforms were passed during the same time period to increase civilian control over national security policy making. These reforms included abolishing the executive and supervisory powers of the MGK, reducing the frequency of the MGK meetings from once a month to every other month, permitting civilians to serve as the MGK Secretary General, and allowing for greater civilian scrutiny over the military budget.\textsuperscript{128} As a result of this impressive reform process, the EU opened accession negotiations with Turkey on October 3, 2005.

During this period, military circles criticized Tayyip Erdoğan’s approach to the fight against the PKK, which was perceived as purely within the context of the EU accession process and they opposed the Prime Minister’s efforts to decrease the role of the MGK in Turkey’s national security policy making. During an interview, a retired general stated that Tayyip Erdoğan was meeting the PKK’s demands in the name of Turkey’s EU membership process.\textsuperscript{129} In fact, it has been found out that during 2003 and 2004 a number of high-ranking generals tried to put together military coup d’état plans to overthrow the AKP government.\textsuperscript{130} However, they


\textsuperscript{129}Interview with a retired general who requested anonymity (Ankara: May 27, 2007).

\textsuperscript{130}Hasan Cemal, “Demokrasi ve Hukuku Katleden Sürec: Kontrgerilla, Susurluk, Sarkız, Ayişği ve Ergenekon Notları (4)” [The Process that Destroyed Democracy and Law: Counter-
could not find enough support from the rest of the military officers and especially from Chief of General Staff Hilmi Özkök to put these plans into effect. The General Staff under the leadership of General Hilmi Özkök preferred to remain within democratic limits and whenever there was an issue that the TSK were uneasy about, he used official venues of discussion between the military and the government such as their regular meetings or the MGK to inform the government about these problems. For example, in July 2003, when a number of major civil-military reforms were passed by the TGNA such as decreasing the MGK’s power in policy making, the General Staff raised criticisms about certain elements of these reforms. However, even in this case, the members of the Turkish General Staff expressed their concerns within the limits of the democratic legal process and they did not block or delay the reform package when the government did not accept some of their recommendations in the final version of the reform package.\footnote{Ismet Berkan, “MGK ve Yedinci Paket” [The MGK and the Seventh Package], \textit{Radikal} (28 July, 2003); Deniz Zeyrek and Hilal Köylü, “Çankaya’da Hava Puslu” [The Weather is Foggy in Çankaya], \textit{Radikal} (August 1, 2003); Giles Merritt, “The EU Constitution: Turkey’s Generals May be the Real Obstacle,” \textit{International Herald Tribune} (18 September, 2004).}

Hilmi Özkök made a tremendous effort to keep the TSK away from politics during this period and he believed that the military’s intervention in politics would not bring any positive outcomes both for the Turkish military and for the country.\footnote{Murat Yetkin, “Özkök’ten Savurma: Beni 28 Şubattağiler gibi Davranmakla Suçladılar” [Defense from Özkök: They Accused me of Behaving like the Ones in the 28 February Process], \textit{Radikal} (December 25, 2008).}

Between 2002 and 2005, Erdoğan openly demonstrated at several occasions that decisions about the country’s national security was the business of the civilian governments. For example, the government did not submit the drafts of the 6\textsuperscript{th} and 7\textsuperscript{th} harmonization packages to the MGK before they were voted in the TGNA.
Moreover, the Erdoğan administration overruled, in the Parliament, President Sezer’s veto of the amendments to the Anti-Terror Law.\textsuperscript{133} Also, “the government was observed as actively involved in the preparation of the new MGSB [National Security Defense Document] in 2005.”\textsuperscript{134}

After this extensive reform process and a moderate/high level of civilian control over the counterinsurgency policy making process, Prime Minister Erdoğan’s counterinsurgency policy and his relations with the military began to change from 2006 onwards. This change resulted from the public’s disillusionment with the EU accession process and the increasing nationalism in Turkey in response to the intensification of the PKK terrorism. As mentioned before, after the beginning of the US war in Iraq, the PKK terrorists, most of whom withdrew to northern Iraq in the aftermath of Öcalan’s capture, began to enter into Turkey again in the summer of 2003 and acquired the weapons of the old Iraqi army.\textsuperscript{135} On June 1, 2004 the PKK put an end to its unilateral ceasefire that began in September 1999 and after this declaration, the PKK’s terrorist acts intensified steadily.\textsuperscript{136} This situation increased the nationalist voices in the society and as the elections were approaching, made the AKP government consider the necessity of military means in the fight against the PKK.

Moreover, from 2006 onwards, the AKP government’s EU project began to lose its pace. After the beginning of accession negotiations between Turkey and the


\textsuperscript{134}Ibid., p. 139.

\textsuperscript{135}Fikret Bila, “Türkiye, Barzani’den Fazlasını Yapamaz mı?” [Can Turkey Not Do More Than What Barzani Does?], \textit{Milliyet} (December 27, 2005).

EU in October 2005, there appeared a feeling of disappointment in society about the EU. First, while the EU gave Turkey a date for the initiation of accession negotiations, there was a general perception in Turkey that the EU’s conditions for membership would never be completely fulfilled since some of these conditions were about highly sensitive political issues such as the Cyprus question. Second, there was an increasing public opposition in Europe to Turkey’s membership and this negative public opinion became more pronounced in May and June 2005 when the proposed EU Constitution received a no vote in the French and Dutch referendums. And third, when the EU officially initiated accession negotiations with Turkey in October 2005, “the protracted wrangling that preceded the inauguration ceremony reinforced the already widespread suspicion in Turkey that the EU would never accept the country as a full member.”  

All of these developments increased anti-EU sentiments in Turkey and contributed to a further increase in nationalism. The Turkish public support for EU membership decreased to 55 percent in Fall 2005, 54 percent in Fall 2006 and 52 percent in Spring 2007.  

Within this context of increasing nationalism and decreasing public support for Turkey’s EU membership, the AKP Government could not continue with the EU project with the same enthusiasm. As the EU project slowed down, there emerged inconsistencies in the AKP’s policy towards ending the PKK insurgency, which was previously tied to the EU accession process and Prime Minister Erdoğan began to talk more about the military aspect of fight against the PKK. For example, after Prime Minister Erdoğan mentioned in Diyarbakır—a city in the southeast Turkey with a high Kurdish population—that the Kurdish question will be solved

with further democratization, in a speech in New Zealand he talked about the separatism problem in Turkey and claimed that the common denominator among the society was Islam, while the ethnicity constituted the sub-identity of the people.  

From a rationalist point of view, losing enthusiasm for Turkey’s EU accession process and the consideration of the use of coercive measures in order to end the PKK violence was not a surprising behavior for Prime Minister Erdoğan in the face of increasing nationalist sentiments in the society and decreasing support for Turkey’s EU membership, especially considering the upcoming elections. Ümit Cizre argues that this change in policy was “related to his [Erdoğan’s] plans to win the conservative-nationalist support in the 2007 parliamentary elections.”

However, the government’s decreasing emphasis on the EU accession process also damaged its relations with the military. As the EU connection weakened, there appeared a growing concern among the members of Turkey’s secular establishment about the AKP’s failure to protect the Republic’s secular nature. These concerns further increased with the approaching presidential elections in 2007. Since the AKP possessed a majority of seats in the parliament, the party had enough votes to elect one of its members as president. In this case, politicians with Islamist roots would be in control of three top political institutions, namely the prime ministry, parliament, and the presidency of Turkey at the same time. Before the presidential elections in April 2007, a number of demonstrations took place against the possibility of Tayyip Erdoğan’s candidacy for the presidency.

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139 Fikret Bila, “Erdoğan’ın ‘Kürt Sorunu’ Söylemi Değişti, Kimlik Söylemi Sürüyor” [Erdoğan’s “Kurdish Question” Discourse Has Changed, Identity Discourse is Going On], Milliyet (December 7, 2005); Derya Sazak, “Diyarbakır Sendromu” [Diyarbakir Syndrome], Milliyet (August 13, 2005); Fikret Bila, “Vatandaşlık ve Müslümanlık ‘Kürt Sorunu’nu Çözer mi?” [Can Citizenship and Muslimhood Solve the ‘Kurdish Question’?], Milliyet (December 5, 2005).

140 Ibid., p. 158.
When Abdullah Gümüş—a leading figure of the AKP—emerged as the presidential candidate, at the end of the first round of presidential elections, the General Staff issued a memorandum from its official website and stated that the TSK is a defender of secularism and that they are ready to act if necessary.\(^{141}\)

Although the government did not step back when confronted with the military’s e-memorandum and actually criticized the military’s undemocratic behavior in this case, this process significantly shaped the government’s subsequent control over policy making against the PKK. The e-memorandum led to early parliamentary elections in July 2007 where the AKP emerged as the winning party. However, having clearly realized that the TSK were seriously uncomfortable with Abdullah Gümüş’s presidency and that they were fearful of the AKP’s potential for developing an anti-secular agenda once the presidency was also under the AKP’s control, Tayyip Erdoğan developed a new coexistence strategy with the armed forces from 2007 onwards and began to see Turkey’s fight against the PKK as an issue area through which the AKP could re-build a cooperative relationship with the state establishment.\(^{142}\) This led to the establishment of a new basis of understanding between Prime Minister Erdoğan and the military in Turkey’s fight against the PKK.

In this new state of affairs, the Erdoğan government did not completely lose control over the policy making process, but rather maintained a moderate degree of control. The government paid more attention to the requests of the military in the fight against the PKK and the civilian and military actors made an effort to reach a common understanding in the policy making process. The Erdoğan

\(^{141}\)“Askerden Çok Sert Çıkış,” [A Very Harsh Reaction from the Military], Radikal (April 28, 2007).

\(^{142}\)Interview with Fatih Altaylı (İstanbul: December 31, 2008).
government placed more importance to receiving the support of the military side in its moves. Although civil-military tension was clearly present during this period, it was also possible to observe the civil-military effort to work in cooperation and coordination in ending the PKK violence in Turkey.

As mentioned before, from 2006 onwards, in the face of the increasing PKK threat, the use of coercive measures against the PKK began to be discussed more frequently. In response to the demands of the security bureaucracy, the Erdoğan government introduced a rather restrictive anti-terror bill on June 29, 2006.\textsuperscript{143} This anti-terror bill aimed at freeing the hand of the security forces in PKK operations by increasing their powers and responsibilities.\textsuperscript{144}

As a result of the PKK attacks in 2007, \textquoteleft [t]he Turkish policy makers, together with the military elites, began to seriously discuss a more far-reaching military option, i.e. a cross-border military operation in northern Iraq to destroy the PKK camps and put an end to the nascent establishment of an independent Kurdish state.\textsuperscript{145} However, despite the military\textquotesingle s demands, the Prime Minister did not give his approval to this immediately due to his concern about losing electoral support from the Kurdish voters in the upcoming elections. Instead, he stated that the TSK should eliminate the PKK terrorists within Turkish borders first. However, after the PKK attacked the gendarmerie stations following the July 2007 parliamentary elections, a military operation became inevitable. As part of this process, Şırnak, Hakkari, and Siirt provinces in the Southeast were declared


\textsuperscript{144}Murat Yetkin, “Terör ve İrtica ile Miçadele ve Hükümetin Sıkıntısı,” [Struggle with the PKK and Reactionism and the Government\textquotesingle s Concern], \textit{Radikal} (May 4, 2006).

\textsuperscript{145}Ertan Efeğil, “Turkey\textquotesingle s New Approaches toward the PKK, Iraqi Kurds and the Kurdish Question,” \textit{Insight Turkey} 10, no. 3 (July-September 2008), p. 54.
security areas.\footnote{Ibid., p. 58.}

In the process of planning cross-border operations into northern Iraq, the Erdoğan administration sought the cooperation of the US in Turkey’s fight against the PKK and it clearly communicated to the US administration that Turkey wanted to see concrete steps from the American officials about the PKK issue. In response to this request, the US government began to cooperate with Turkey in its PKK operations by “sharing intelligence, supporting limited military operations against the PKK camps, and pressuring the Kurdish administration.”\footnote{Cited in Ertan Efegil, “Turkey’s New Approaches toward the PKK, Iraqi Kurds and the Kurdish Question,” p. 59.} As a result, the Turkish military conducted land and air operations against the PKK targets in northern Iraq.

During this period, the Erdoğan government also promoted and succeeded in establishing a closer relationship with the Iraqi President Talabani and Kurdish regional administration in Iraq, and managed to do this despite the TSK’s initial opposition. The military officers were reluctant to recognize the Iraqi Kurds as an autonomous administration and they were concerned that Talabani was providing support for the PKK. However, within the context of negotiations among Turkey, the US, and the Kurdish regional administration about Turkey’s air and land operation against the PKK, the military’s opposition weakened. The military officers also realized that it was very difficult to carry out an effective struggle against the PKK without the cooperation of the Iraqi Kurds.

On the other hand, Prime Minister Erdoğan also promoted economic measures in the Southeast. Investments in the areas of health, education, agriculture, and
irrigation increased under the AKP government.\textsuperscript{148} The government offered financial benefits to those companies willing to invest in the Southeast. Moreover, the government declared the Southeast Anatolia Project (GAP) Action Plan, which involved a number of projects that would improve the socio-economic conditions in the region.

Finally, there was an important opening in the area of Kurdish cultural rights during this period. In fact, the armed forces object to granting special rights to a particular ethnic group in Turkey because they see this kind of policy against the national unity and territorial integrity of the state.\textsuperscript{149} However, with the Erdoğan government’s initiative, the state-owned Turkish Radio and Television Corporation launched a new TV channel that began broadcasting in Kurdish. This was a very important opening towards the Kurdish-speaking citizens of Turkey. But it has to be emphasized that this opening was made possible after being discussed in the National Security Council and after receiving the consent of the military. The military stated that it perceived the new Kurdish channel as a cultural opening that did not endanger the unity of the Turkish state.\textsuperscript{150}

In sum, Prime Minister Erdoğan was able to maintain a moderate/high degree of control over the fight against the PKK between 2002 and 2005. However, from 2006 onwards, the Erdoğan government’s counterinsurgency policy and its relations with the military began to change. The government did not lose its control

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\textsuperscript{148}Yalçın Bayer, “AKP Güneydoğu’da Neler Yapıyor?” [What is the AKP Doing in the Southeast?], \textit{Hürriyet} (January 15, 2008).
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\textsuperscript{149}Fikret Bila, “84. Yılında Cumhuriyetin Kırmızı Çizgisi” [The Republic’s Red Line in Its 84th Anniversary], \textit{Milliyet} (October 30, 2007).
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\textsuperscript{150}Fikret Bila, “Genelkurmay’ın Kürtçeye Bakışı” [The General Staff’s View about Kurdish], \textit{Milliyet} (February 28, 2009); Murat Yetkin, “Genelkurmay’ın TRT Şeş’e Bakışı” [The General Staff’s View about TRT Şeş], \textit{Radikal} (February 28, 2009).
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over the policy making process and actually accomplished important initiatives in the fight against the PKK during this time period. However, the Erdoğan government made an important effort to develop and carry out these policies with close cooperation of the military and it sought to receive the military’s consent most of the time. As a result, the government maintained a moderate degree of control over the policy making process. A common will between the government and the military developed in the fight against the PKK and led to important developments in Turkey’s counterinsurgency campaign in this period.

3.4.2 Tayyip Erdoğan’s political strength

A very important factor that enabled Tayyip Erdoğan to impose a moderate/high level of control over the counterinsurgency policy making process between 2002 and 2005 was his strong partisan powers. In the November 2002 elections, the AKP won 34.3 percent of the vote cast, which brought the party 363 out of 550 seats in the TGNA. This gave Erdoğan not only a strong mandate from the public, but also a parliamentary majority. This election result allowed for the formation of a single party government first under the prime ministry of Abdullah Gül and then Tayyip Erdoğan from March 2003 onwards.151

In the July 2007 parliamentary elections, the AKP was able to increase its vote share and received 46.66 percent of the votes. This brought 340 seats to the party in the TGNA.152 The 2007 elections enabled the AKP to confirm its popular

151The AKP’s single party government came after eleven years of political instability caused by successive coalition governments in Turkey.

152In the July 2007 elections, the number of seats held by the AKP in the parliament decreased despite the party’s increased vote share. This resulted from the fact that compared to the 2002 elections, more parties were able to pass the 10 percent electoral threshold and enter the parliament in 2007.
mandate and maintain its parliamentary majority.

Tayyip Erdoğan was also in control of the AKP’s parliamentary majority throughout his tenure. Political parties in Turkey are usually hierarchical and they are centered on a single leader. The AKP is no exception. This political party has been mainly dominated by the charismatic leadership of Tayyip Erdoğan since it was first established. Moreover, there is a weak intra-party democracy and a strong intra-party discipline in the AKP. That is why, Tayyip Erdoğan has an established authority over his political party. As a result, during his tenure as the prime minister of Turkey, Erdoğan has been in control of the loyal AKP members in the parliament as well as the ministries and he has been able to rely on these AKP cadres to develop and implement policies.

Thus, Prime Minister Erdoğan possessed strong partisan powers and he succeeded in maintaining these powers throughout his tenure. The AKP’s clear majority in the TGNA and Erdoğan’s recognized authority among the AKP members gave Tayyip Erdoğan the necessary instruments in policy making. Erdoğan’s strong partisan powers were a necessary condition that prevented the loss of his control over the counterinsurgency policy making process until today. However, the prime minister’s political strength cannot account for why from 2006 onwards, his control over the fight against the PKK decreased and remained at a moderate level. In order to understand this, it is also important how the Turkish military perceived the Erdoğan government and how the EU pressure for democratization in Turkey developed during Erdoğan’s tenure.

3.4.3 How the TSK perceived Tayyip Erdoğan

When Tayyip Erdoğan became the prime minister of Turkey, it was hard to overlook the distrust of the military officers towards him. Erdoğan spent most of his political career in those political parties that have been part of the National Outlook Movement in Turkey, such as the National Salvation Party, Welfare Party, and the Virtue Party. Throughout the 1990s, he made several anti-secular statements such as “Praise be to God, we support sharia law,” “Parliament should be opened with prayers,” and “All schools should be Prayer Leader and Preacher Schools (İmam Hatip Okulları).”

Thus, although the members of the AKP emphasized their “adherence to the ideological creed of the Republic” and they argued that AKP was a conservative democratic party rather than an Islamist party, the TSK still had suspicions about whether Tayyip Erdoğan would engage in anti-secular activities once he was in office.

The military’s distrust towards the AKP was so intense that during the years 2003 and 2004, a number of high-ranking military officers began to plan a coup d’état against the government. However, they were not able to attract enough support from the rest of the military officers and especially from the Chief of General Staff Hilmi Özkök. As a result, between 2002 and 2005, the military eventually decided to go along with Erdoğan’s efforts to resolve the Kurdish question through Turkey’s EU membership process although it opposed to some of the EU harmonization reforms.

The Erdoğan government’s policy performance was quite impressive until late

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154 Quoted in ibid., p. 52.

2005. The government’s commitment to the IMF program helped Turkey’s economic recovery and resulted in a substantial reduction of the inflation rate to its lowest level since the early 1970s.\textsuperscript{156} Moreover, the AKP’s enthusiasm about the EU project increased confidence about Turkey’s economic situation among domestic and international investors and in its first few years in office, the government managed to accomplish important economic reforms such as banking sector regulation.\textsuperscript{157} In the foreign policy realm, The Erdoğan government brought Turkey closer to EU membership and played an important role in the initiation of accession negotiations in October 2005. However, this did not eliminate the feelings of distrust among military officers towards the Erdoğan government. The AKP was perceived as developing an anti-secular agenda because of its efforts to write a new constitution and remove the ban on wearing headscarves in universities.

These feelings of distrust reached a crisis level in the run-up to the presidential elections in Turkey in April 2007. As described before, the AKP’s intention to elect one of its members as the new president increased suspicions about the AKP’s anti-secular tendencies among military officers. This situation led to the General Staff’s e-memorandum on April 27 and the conduct of early parliamentary elections in July 2007. Although the AKP once again emerged as the winning party from the elections and even increased its vote share, Tayyip Erdoğan came to the realization that with such a high level of distrust from the military, it was not possible for the government to effectively control the policy making mechanism. This situation was having its most serious effect on the counterinsurgency policy making process. As a result, the Erdoğan government and the military entered into a new working


\textsuperscript{157}Ibid., pp. 208, 216.
relationship in this period. They came to a mutual understanding about Turkey’s fight against the PKK and made sure to establish cooperation and coordination in the policy making process.

All in all, the Erdoğan government has suffered from feelings of distrust from the military throughout its tenure. After this problem reached a crisis situation with the presidential elections in April 2007, Erdoğan took concrete steps to overcome this problem and reached a basis of understanding with the military. In this new state of affairs, Tayyip Erdoğan saw Turkey’s fight against the PKK as a way to build a cooperative relationship with the state establishment.

This situation explains why the Erdoğan government began to pay more attention to seeking the military’s consent and cooperation in Turkey’s counterinsurgency campaign and maintained a moderate degree of control in policy making in recent years. However, it does not explain why the Erdoğan government’s control over the counterinsurgency policy making process slightly decreased from 2006 onwards and it does not explain why the military preferred to go along with the government’s EU-centered policies in dealing with the PKK and the Kurdish question between 2002 and 2005. In order to have a more complete understanding of the dynamics of civil-military relations during this period, it is also necessary to examine the role of the EU pressure for democratization in Turkey.

3.4.4 The role of international actors

The EU’s pressure for democratization in Turkey completes the argument about the Erdoğan government’s tenure and explains why a combination of Tayyip Erdoğan’s high partisan powers and a low legitimacy in the eyes of the military brought a moderate/high degree of control over the counterinsurgency policy mak-
ing process between 2002 and 2005. The EU connection also explains why the Erdoğan government’s control over the fight against the PKK slightly decreased from 2006 onwards. This situation resulted from the EU’s extensive and systematic democracy promotion mechanism. Between 2002 and 2005, the EU’s pressure for democratization both legitimized the AKP’s policies and increased the government’s legitimacy in the eyes of the military to some extent. As a result, the military decided to go along with the civilian preferences in the fight against the PKK during this period. However, after Turkey’s accession negotiations started, the Erdoğan government decreased its reform pace and lost its main policy framework in the fight against the PKK. Eventually, he had to turn to the military.

When the AKP government assumed office, it had a clear goal of starting accession negotiations with the EU as soon as possible. The government knew that it had to make a substantial progress towards the fulfillment of the Copenhagen criteria in order to initiate the negotiation process. Although the military was in clear opposition to some of the EU harmonization reforms, it ended up going along with the government’s preferences in this area.

First, the EU’s demands enhanced Erdoğan’s political strength by providing him an external support base for his policies and legitimized his efforts to resolve the Kurdish issue. On the other hand, the EU pressure for democratization gave the Erdoğan government some legitimacy in the eyes of the military and facilitated the military’s openness for civilian agendas. The TSK’s support for Turkey’s future EU membership helped the government to carry out its EU project without a serious interference from the military until 2005.

The TSK have historically considered themselves as a guardian of the secular and democratic Turkish state, a vanguard of Westernization, a close follower of
Atatürk’s principles, and a representative of the will of the nation. Due to these elements, the TSK refrained from taking any action that would hinder Turkey’s EU project. First, Turkey’s EU membership is generally considered as a means to attain Atatürk’s goal of bringing Turkey to the ranks of the developed countries and the TSK could not stand in opposition to this goal since following Atatürk’s path is a key element of the Turkish military’s vanguard role and organizational raison d’état. Second, for the Turkish military, who identifies itself as the representative of the will of the Turkish nation, it was not possible to take any action against Turkey’s EU project considering that public support for EU membership was approximately 70 percent during this period.\textsuperscript{158} Doing otherwise could damage the positive image of the TSK in the eyes of the Turkish public. Ümit Cizre summarizes this situation as follows:

“the initial years after 2002 suggest that the high command realized that to continue its traditional pattern of wielding political influence might damage its own corporate interests as the interplay of domestic and external dynamics created a state of affairs in which the choices available to the military establishment was either confrontation with a popularly-elected government and its popularly-backed project or the acceptance of some curtailment of its own power.”\textsuperscript{159}

The TSK chose the latter and expressed its support for the process of Turkey’s accession to the EU and avoided acts that could jeopardize this process. For example, in 2003, Deputy Chief of Staff, General Yaşar Büyükanıt, during a symposium

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item[\textsuperscript{158}] Candidate Countries Eurobarometer (Fall 2002, Fall 2003, Spring 2004), available at \url{http://www.ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/cceb_en.htm}.
\item[\textsuperscript{159}] Ümit Cizre, “The Justice and Development Party and the Military: Recreating the Past After Reforming It?” p. 141.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
titled “Globalization and National Security,” argued that the TSK could never be in opposition to Turkey’s EU project because EU membership is a must to achieve Atatürk’s goal of bringing Turkey to the ranks of the most developed nations. On the other hand, Army Chief General Aytaç Yalman, during his speech at the beginning of the 2003-2004 academic year of the Army War College, stated that the Turkish military, which is integrated with the Turkish nation, is the vanguard of modernization and thus it can never place itself against democracy and the EU.

Thus, the EU pressure for further democratization in Turkey played a very important role in the establishment of a moderate/high degree of civilian control over the policy making process to resolve the Kurdish issue between 2002 and 2005. During this process, the Erdoğan government possessed strong partisan powers. However, his government was not trusted among military officers and this was an important constraint in the policy making process. The EU’s pressure for democratization compensated for this lack of legitimacy and compelled the military to go along with civilian preferences.

However, from 2006 onwards, the EU’s role began to lose its importance. First, there was a general perception in Turkey that the EU’s conditions for membership would never be completely fulfilled since some of these conditions were about highly sensitive political issues. Moreover, there was increasing opposition within the EU countries towards Turkey’s possible EU membership. German and French leaders explicitly expressed their opposition towards Turkey’s membership and

160 Murat Yetkin, “Asker AB’den Tarih Peşinde” [The Military Seeks a Date from the EU], Radikal (May 30, 2003); General Yaşar Büyükanıt, “AB’ye Karşı Olamayız” [We Cannot be Against the EU], Radikal (May 30, 2003).

Nicolas Sarkozy made an explicit effort to slow down the negotiations. The relations with the EU received further damage after referendums in France and Netherlands, as a result of which the EU’s proposed Constitution was rejected. This no vote was interpreted as a negative public opinion against Turkey’s future EU membership. Therefore, the EU’s membership perspective, especially its incentive mechanism vis-à-vis Turkey got damaged during this period. The public began to lose its belief that Turkey would be a full EU member if it met all the membership requirements.

This situation coincided with the re-emerging PKK threat in Turkey and increased public pressure for the formulation of coercive policies in addition to the democratization scheme. The Erdoğan government’s Kurdish policy, which was mainly connected to the EU was left without a clear framework. Moreover, as the EU lost its credibility in the eyes of the public about Turkey’s future membership, the external support system that facilitated the military’s openness to civilian agendas also collapsed. As a result, the Erdoğan government’s policies became relatively inconsistent during this period. While on the one hand, Erdoğan sometimes deferred to the demands of the security forces by providing them a freer hand in the fight against the PKK, on the other hand, he kept mentioning the importance of further democratization and blocked military operations.

After the 2007 parliamentary elections, the combination of Erdoğan’s strong partisan powers and a low legitimacy in the eyes of the military was still in place. That is why, Erdoğan came to the conclusion that the only available way to effectively deal with the PKK under these circumstances was to reach a common understanding with the armed forces and establish a system of cooperation and coordination with them in the counterinsurgency policy making process. As a
result, although Prime Minister Erdoğan did not completely lose control over the fight against the PKK, he began to place more emphasis on seeking the consent of the military in this area and he maintained a moderate degree of control.

Thus, from 2006 onwards, the weakening of the EU’s incentive mechanism in the eyes of the Turkish public left the AKP without a clear framework in the fight against the PKK. Moreover, the civilian leadership’s low legitimacy in the eyes of the military was still an important constraint in the policy making process. The government was only able to overcome this situation through entering into an agreement with the military and keep at least a moderate degree of control.
CHAPTER 4
PERU’S FIGHT AGAINST THE SHINING PATH AND ITS IMPACT ON
CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS

This chapter demonstrates how the theory of dynamic civil-military interaction applies to the case of Peru during the time period of 1980-1995. With an analysis of the presidencies of Fernando Belaúnde Terry, Alán García Pérez and Alberto Fujimori, it shows that the change in the degree of threat does not bring an automatic change in civilian control over the counterinsurgency policy making process. Thus, this chapter explains how the level of threat interacts with the strength of the head of government, civilian leadership’s legitimacy in the eyes of the military, and the extent of the international pressure for democratization and shape the civil-military relations during the counterinsurgency policy making process.

In 1980, when Fernando Belaúnde came to office as the president of Peru, the Peruvian military did not hide its historical distrust towards him. However, at the same time, in the aftermath of a 12-year military regime, the military had a strong belief in its professionalism and in principle thought that civilian leaders should be the policy makers in the country. Military officers were of the opinion that political intervention had a negative impact on their institutional structure. Thus, the military was more open to civilian agendas in the initial years of the Belaúnde presidency. During this period, Fernando Belaúnde’s political party also
had a majority of seats in the Congress. President Belaúnde did not fully take advantage of his partisan powers and develop a comprehensive counterinsurgency policy because of his tendency to emphasize his executive authority and his failure to understand the real extent of the Shining Path threat. However, he at least ordered the police forces to play the main role in the counterinsurgency campaign and initially maintained a high civilian control vis-à-vis the military in the fight against the Shining Path. However, in late 1982, it became clear that the police forces were not able to cope with the Shining Path. As a result, Belaúnde assigned the duty to fight against the insurgency to the armed forces and gave them a free hand in policy making. Thus, between 1983 and 1985, the Peruvian military acquired tremendous autonomy over the counterinsurgency campaign.

Alán García, was elected president in 1985. He came to office with strong partisan powers and a high legitimacy in the eyes of the military. This allowed him to build a high level of civilian control over the counterinsurgency policy making process. However, especially from late 1986 and early 1987 onwards, first, García realized that military means were the only effective way in the fight against the Shining Path and second, his failed economic policies led to a serious decline in his public support. These developments both weakened President García’s authority among the APRA members and decreased his legitimacy in the eyes of the military. As a result, his control over the counterinsurgency policy making process decreased significantly. However, since García succeeded in maintaining his support base within the Ministry of Interior, he pursued a parallel counterinsurgency policy via the police force during the second half of his presidency and managed to keep a moderate degree of control over the counterinsurgency campaign.

Finally, Alberto Fujimori came to office in 1990 with weak partisan powers,
but a high level of support from the military. Fujimori’s political party, Change 90, was not composed of competent politicians who were ready to unify for a political cause and this party did not have a majority of seats in the Congress. Thus, Fujimori did not have the necessary instruments to exert his influence over the policy making process. However, by taking advantage of his support among military officers, Fujimori entered into a symbiotic relationship with the military. With the military’s support, Fujimori established a moderate degree of control over the counterinsurgency policy making process. His control remained at a moderate level because his dependence on the armed forces as a support base forced him to grant some autonomy to them in the counterinsurgency campaign.

A summary of the assessment of independent and dependent variables for the Peruvian case is presented in Table 4.1.

4.1 Dynamics of Civil-Military Relations During Fernando Belaúnde Terry’s Tenure

Fernando Belaúnde, from the Popular Action Party (Partido de Acción Popular-AP) came to office as a result of the 1980 presidential elections, which were held for the first time since 1963. As his administration witnessed Peru’s transition to democracy after a 12-year military regime, Belaúnde also experienced the beginning of the Shining Path’s armed struggle against the Peruvian state. From the time the Peruvian armed forces were granted the duty to fight against the Shining Path onwards, civilian control over counterinsurgency policy making decreased significantly and the military almost completely took over the fight against the insurgency. The major reasons for this were a combination of Belaúnde’s inability to take advantage of his party cadres and the military’s increasing distrust
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years</th>
<th>Civilian control over counter-insurgency policy</th>
<th>Head of government’s strength</th>
<th>Legitimacy in the eyes of the military</th>
<th>Extensive and systematic international pressure</th>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td>1980-1982</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Low</td>
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<td>1983-1985</td>
<td>Low/Mode</td>
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<td>1985-1986</td>
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<td>1987-1990</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>Low</td>
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<td>1990-1995</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>Low</td>
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TABLE 4.1

ASSESSMENT OF INDEPENDENT AND DEPENDENT VARIABLES
FOR THE CASE OF PERU
4.1.1 Fernando Belaúnde’s political calculations and policy preferences

Once Belaúnde came to office, he was caught unprepared by the mounting armed struggle of the Shining Path. Belaúnde did not take the Shining Path threat seriously at first and he referred to the insurgents as “cattle rustlers and delinquents.”\(^1\) He thought that the intelligence he received about the insurgency was part of a military plan to obtain power.\(^2\) Belaúnde was the very president whom the military overthrew in the 1968 coup. Therefore, he was concerned that the military could come back upon the first failure of the democratic regime.\(^3\) Moreover, as a new president he did not want to appear in need of the armed forces to maintain order in the country.\(^4\) As a result, Belaúnde assigned the duty to confront the subversion to the police forces. He did not give his consent to the military’s involvement in the fight until it became clear in December 1982 that the police would not be able to cope with the Shining Path.

Once Belaúnde put the military in charge of the counterinsurgency campaign, he opted for a clear-cut coercive approach in the fight against the Shining Path.

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\(^1\)This had something to do with the fact that right before the transfer of power to the newly elected Belaúnde, the military government removed all the intelligence files about the emergence of the Shining Path movement with the fear that the military’s lack of response despite the presence of several intelligence reports about the Shining Path would be known by the whole public. See Gustavo Gorriti Ellenbogen, *The Shining Path: A History of the Millenarian War in Peru* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1999), p. 54.


\(^3\)Interview with Professor Ciro Alegría, who headed the Peruvian Truth and Reconciliation Commission’s investigation of the armed forces (Lima: August 14, 2007).

throughout his tenure. There were two important reasons why the Belaúnde administration advocated the use of purely coercive methods against the insurgency. First, the administration found alternative methods such as the promotion of economic and social development in the Ayacucho region costly and that is why, it preferred cheaper repressive policies.\(^5\) Moreover, along with many officers who hesitated for too much involvement of the military in politics, Belaúnde thought that implementing a developmentalist approach to counterinsurgency could be dangerous in terms of causing further role expansion for the military.\(^6\) Instead, he pursued a military approach to counterinsurgency, provided the military with a large defense budget and a generous arms acquisitions program.\(^7\)

Thus, the Belaúnde government’s preferences in counterinsurgency were not only determined by his desire to end the Shining Path, but also shaped by his need for a peaceful coexistence with the military in order to maintain his office. This way of thinking first made him delay granting the duty to fight against the Shining Path to the military. And then once the military was in charge, Belaúnde tried to prevent the military’s role expansion as much as possible by avoiding developmentalist means to end the violence in Peru.

However, these measures could not prevent the military’s domination of the counterinsurgency policy making mechanism. Throughout his 5-year presidency, Belaúnde failed to formulate “a counterinsurgency strategy of . . . [his] own to


\(^6\)Philip Mauceri, State Under Siege, p. 138.

replace that of the Armed Forces,” and handed over the counterinsurgency policy making to the Peruvian military.

The Belaúnde administration declared a state of emergency in October 12, 1982, which signified a transfer of political authority in those provinces under emergency rule to a Political-Military Commander. Under the state of emergency regime, individual rights, such as the right to public assembly and habeas corpus were suspended and the security forces were allowed to enter houses and make arrests without warrant. However, the state was not fully equipped for a military approach to counterinsurgency, either. The military did not have experts in counterinsurgency. The Intelligence Service was weakened by Belaúnde since “the military government had used the service to control the political parties and deport activists.” And the counterinsurgency campaign did not have a central command structure. Since there was a lack of agreement over the contents of the counterinsurgency strategy, the military leaders in the emergency zones were left on their own. In fact, the military asked for a specific mandate from President Belaúnde for its actions in the emergency zones. However, while the President did not sign the military’s proposal for a specific mandate, he did not

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formulate a policy of his own, either.\textsuperscript{13} Thus, during this period, the political-military commanders in the emergency zones were left with a great autonomy to come up with their own policies. For example, while the Political-Military Chief General Clemente Noel Moral focused on military methods to fight the Shining Path and resorted to human rights violations, including tortures, disappearances, and extrajudicial executions in Ayacucho throughout 1983,\textsuperscript{14} his successor General Adrián Huamán Centeno advocated a different approach in 1984 that would include economic and social development programs in the region.

During his tenure, General Clemente Noel made important decisions, which significantly shaped Peru’s counterinsurgency campaign. First, he revised the internal defense plans for the National Security Subzone of Ayacucho and Huancavelica, which were previously developed to take effect in case of external warfare and he requested the incorporation of the province of Andahuaylas to the same National Security Subzone.\textsuperscript{15} Moreover, General Clemente Noel replaced the military personnel in Ayacucho with forces from places such as Lima, Ica, and Huánuco. This resulted in the appearance of the armed forces almost as an occupation force in the region because the new military forces were not familiar with the local culture and did not speak the local language Quechua.\textsuperscript{16} Finally, General Clemente Noel increased the military forces in and around Ayacucho when the confrontation

\textsuperscript{13}Josephine Marie Burt, “Failing States and Political Vacuums,” p. 105.


\textsuperscript{15}Although these internal defense plans were primarily developed for external warfare, possible contingencies for internal conflict, such as the resurgence of guerrilla movements or protests were also included. However, according to these internal defense plans, in such situations, the role of the armed forces would be short-lived. See Carlos Tapia, \textit{Las Fuerzas Armadas y Sendero Luminoso: Dos Estrategias y Un Final} (Lima: Instituto de Estudios Peruanos, 1997), pp. 29-31.

\textsuperscript{16}Ibid., p. 31.
with the Shining Path became inevitable.\textsuperscript{17}

When General Adrián Huamán Centeno took office in 1984, he wanted to pursue a developmentalist approach to counterinsurgency, which would address the socio-economic causes of the insurgency. General Huamán was originally from Apurímac and he could speak Quechua. Thus, he was more familiar with the problems of the region. However, his policies found support neither in the Peruvian armed forces nor in the government due to their possible implications on the military’s role expansion and their costly nature.\textsuperscript{18} Although General Adrián Huamán returned to the practice of assassinations and disappearances in the fight against the Shining Path, his explicit criticisms of the government led to his removal from his post. Colonel Wilfredo Mori Orzo, who was Huamán’s successor, also continued the counterinsurgency campaign with harsh military policies.\textsuperscript{19} The extent of the violence became clear when mass graves of people who were killed by the military was discovered in 1984.

In sum, from the beginning of the Shining Path’s armed struggle in May 1980 until late 1982, both the Belaúnde government and the military resisted the latter’s involvement in the fight against the Shining Path. However, when the Peruvian military was assigned this task in late 1982, it conducted the counterinsurgency campaign with great autonomy. Once Belaúnde left the fight against the Shining Path to the military, he did not provide much direction in the counterinsurgency policy making process. As a result, the political-military commanders of the emergency zones who came to office for a one-year period mostly remained on their

\textsuperscript{17}Ibid., pp. 30-31.


\textsuperscript{19}Enrique Obando, “Las Relaciones Civil-Militares en el Perú en la Década del 90,” p. 286.
own in the fight. Moreover, the resulting counterinsurgency policies reflected their preferences as well as the divisions within the armed forces as to how to resolve the Shining Path issue.

4.1.2 Fernando Belaúnde’s political strength

An important reason why President Belaúnde started his tenure with a high civilian control over counterinsurgency and could not maintain this control during the second half of his presidency was his failure to take advantage of his partisan powers. The AP in general and Belaúnde in particular were very successful in the 1980 elections, receiving 45.4 percent of the popular vote for presidency and winning 26 seats of the 60-member Senate, as well as 98 seats out of the 180-member Chamber of Deputies.²⁰ Thanks to an alliance with the Popular Christian Party (Partido Popular Cristiano-PPC), President Belaúnde’s AP guaranteed an absolute majority both in Senate and in the Chamber of Deputies.²¹ These numbers provided Belaúnde and the AP a strong popular mandate and a majority in the Congress. So, Belaúnde at first seemed to have solid public backing and loyal cadres in the Congress to rely on to formulate and implement counterinsurgency policies.

However, he did not fully make use of these initial advantages first, due to his unwillingness to rely on the representatives in the Congress in an attempt to emphasize his executive power vis-à-vis the legislature and due to his failure to understand the real extent of the Shining Path threat. Because of his autocratic


ruling style and his down play of the insurgency, Belaúnde could not develop a coherent and comprehensive counterinsurgency policy. Most importantly, without utilizing the AP cadres, he could not establish control over the security bureaucracy. When the Belaúnde government came to office, the national defense system, which was established during the military regime period, was left untouched. The administration “did not in any way modify the structure of the national defense system so as not to alienate the armed forces.” Moreover, the National Intelligence Service (Servicio de Inteligencia Nacional-SIN) was weakened by Belaúnde since the military regime utilized the SIN to keep political parties under control and to deport activists. The Belaúnde administration not only disabled the SIN’s system of surveillance over society, but also hampered its activities by decreasing its budget. Although Belaúnde did these things to limit the influence of the armed forces in the aftermath of the 1980 elections, these measures also constrained Belaúnde’s hand in formulating and implementing effective counterinsurgency policies.

Despite his failure to utilize the AP cadres, President Belaúnde technically had a high degree of control over the counterinsurgency policy making process from the beginning of the Shining Path’s armed struggle in 1980 until late 1982. This means that he could not develop a coherent and comprehensive counterinsurgency policy to eliminate the Shining Path. But he ordered the police forces to fight against the insurgents and managed to keep them as the state’s main response to the insurgency until they were defeated by the Shining Path militants. However,

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as discussed in the next section, Belaúnde succeeded in maintaining his control over counterinsurgency until the end of 1982 mainly because the military was initially reluctant to take part in this fight.

Once Belaúnde assigned the military with the duty to intervene in the counterinsurgency campaign, he almost completely lost his control over the policy making process because Belaúnde was neither in control of a civilian coalition to develop an alternative civilian counterinsurgency policy, nor he was a political leader that the military could trust.

In sum, Fernando Belaúnde came to office with strong partisan powers. However, he did not take advantage of his AP cadres to establish his control over the counterinsurgency policy making process. Although he was able to rule by decree to some extent and put the police forces in charge of the fight against the Shining Path, in late 1982, with the military’s participation in the counterinsurgency, he almost completely lost his control over the policy making process. Especially his failure to utilize the AP cadres substantially constrained his hand in developing policies alternative to the military’s preferences.

President Belaúnde’s failure to utilize his party cadres in order to develop a coherent and comprehensive counterinsurgency policy was certainly a necessary condition for his later loss of control over the counterinsurgency policy making process. However, this explanation is not sufficient to understand why the military decided to go along with civilian preferences in counterinsurgency in the initial years of Belaúnde’s presidency. Therefore, it is also important to understand how the military perceived Belaúnde as a president.
4.1.3 How the Peruvian military perceived Fernando Belaúnde

In addition to President Belaúnde’s failure to take advantage of the AP cadres, another important reason why he could not maintain control over the counterinsurgency policy making process from late 1982 onwards was the military’s lack of trust towards him.

Peru’s return to democracy between 1977 and 1979 was mainly a top-down process where the military kept most of its prerogatives intact and ensured that those politicians preferred by the military would be elected. Members of the Constituent Assembly, which was formed in 1978 to write and approve a new constitution, included clauses in the new constitution such as granting the public the “right to insurgency” to defend the constitutional order and declaring the military as “non-deliberative.”\(^{25}\) These clauses were tacitly accepted by the armed forces since the armed forces also wanted to prevent their institution from engaging in direct political rule after the transition to democracy.\(^{26}\) However, this never meant that the military would not be a political actor anymore because the Constituent Assembly, which was controlled by the American Popular Revolutionary Alliance and the Popular Christian Party (Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana-APRA and Partido Popular Cristiano-PPC) did not make a real effort to reorganize the civil-military relationship in Peru and to eliminate the military’s institutional prerogatives.\(^{27}\) For example, although the 1979 Constitution established a National Defense System with the duty of formulating measures to guarantee the country’s


\(^{26}\)Ibid.

\(^{27}\)Fernando Belaúnde’s AP did not participate in the Constituent Assembly.
sovereignty and territorial integrity, “[t]he outgoing military regime passed the laws governing this body and reserved significant power for the military.” 28 Moreover, President Morales Bermúdez, in a speech in 1979, clearly stated that the Peruvian armed forces would continue to stay in politics as an institution in matters concerning the life of the fatherland, sovereignty, and development. 29 Finally, when Fernando Belaúnde came to office, he accepted that his government would not be allowed to investigate cases of military corruption, the military budget would not be controlled by the Ministry of Economy and Finance, and the armed forces would have a say in the strategic economic issues, such as oil exploitation in the jungle areas. 30 Thus, after Peru’s return to democracy, the Peruvian military was not completely detached from politics, especially in matters concerning the security of the country.

Despite his appeasement of the military’s demands, Fernando Belaúnde was still a surprise president for the military in 1980 since the military’s preferred candidate Víctor Raúl Haya de la Torre, from APRA, died a few months before the election. Belaúnde was the very president which the military overthrew in the 1968 coup d’état. Therefore, there was a historical tension between Belaúnde and the Peruvian military. After Fernando Belaúnde was elected president, rumors spread that generals from the Velasco era, such as Rafael Hoyos Rubio, were uneasy about his election and they were looking forward to having an opportunity for his overthrow. 31


31 Lewis Taylor, “Counterinsurgency Strategy, the PCP-Sendero Luminoso and the Civil War
Thus, it became apparent from the beginning that civil-military relations in Peru during Belaúnde’s 1980-1985 administration was going to develop within the context of mutual uneasiness and distrust. The emergence of the Shining Path insurgency made this situation even worse since the counterinsurgency campaign required a high level of civil-military cooperation and coordination, which was far from taking place. However, the Peruvian military did not defy civilian leadership’s preferences in the fight against the Shining Path and went along with President Belaúnde’s strategy of utilizing police forces in the fight.

This behavior mainly resulted from the military’s belief in its professionalism. When the Shining Path initiated its armed struggle, the Peruvian armed forces, after a 12-year military regime, were not very enthusiastic about playing a big role in the fight against the subversion because they were aware of their political involvement’s negative effects on the military organization. “At the end of military rule, the Peruvian armed forces were demoralized, divided, and intent on restoring their shattered unity by depoliticizing the institution.” Therefore, although there was distrust between President Belaúnde and the military, the military in principle saw the civilian leaders as the legitimate policy makers in the country. The then Minister of War General Luis Cisneros Vizquerra stated in late 1982 that he was against the use of the armed forces in the fight against the Shining Path unless it was strictly necessary. Instead, he demanded a comprehensive solution with the participation of several institutions including the political parties. Degregori argues that this line of thinking was to a large extent the


The military’s understanding of the necessity for a comprehensive approach in the fight against the Shining Path with the participation and close contact among several actors such as political and judicial authorities, police forces, and the population was also expressed by the Political-Military Commander General Clemente Noel.  

Unfortunately, the Belaúnde government failed to develop such a comprehensive approach in the fight against the Shining Path. Instead, “civilian officials openly encouraged the military to increase its role in counterinsurgency planning and operations.” Once President Belaúnde assigned the duty to fight the Shining Path to the military, he not only refused to formulate economic and social policies to complement the military strategy, but also did not clarify the military’s mandate in the emergency zones. Although a number of developmentalist military officers, especially the then Political-Military Commander General Adrián Huamán in 1984 suggested that the military should also play a role in the implementation of the preferred comprehensive approach and should have a say in the economic and social policies in the region, this kind of role expansion was not approved by Belaúnde, who was concerned about excessive spending, and those military officers who were conscious about the fact that political involvement was

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36 Philip Mauceri, State Under Siege, p. 136.
bringing divisions within the military organization.

4.1.4 Role of international actors

International actors such as international organizations and great powers did not play a role in facilitating civilian control over the counterinsurgency policy making process. Especially after Belaúnde began to grant a substantial degree of autonomy to the armed forces with the declaration of the Ayacucho emergency zone, he was criticized by several international human rights organizations. However, in spite of their criticisms, these organizations did not have a system of incentives and sanctions. It was no surprise that at a press conference Belaúnde once said that he threw the Amnesty International reports into the garbage can.\textsuperscript{37}

4.2 Dynamics of Civil-Military Relations During Alán García Perez’s Tenure

Alán García, the APRA candidate, was elected President in 1985. He came to office with promises to reform the way Peru was carrying out its counterinsurgency campaign and to increase civilian control over the military. Although García succeeded in doing this to a great extent and established a moderate/high degree of control over the counterinsurgency policy making process early in his presidency, he failed to fully maintain his reform agenda from 1987 onwards. His initial success was the result of his strong partisan powers and his high legitimacy in the eyes of the military. During the second half of his presidency, although President García lost his control over counterinsurgency to some extent, his ability to shape the policy making process did not completely disappear and he managed to maintain a moderate degree of control from 1987 until 1990. This is important

\textsuperscript{37}John Crabtree, \textit{Peru under García}, p. 96.
because García succeeded in keeping some degree of control over counterinsurgency despite a tremendous increase in the level of the Shining Path threat from 1987 onwards. Although Alán García’s decreasing control over his party and the military’s increasing distrust towards him constrained his hand in policy making during the second half of his presidency, he was able to maintain his influence over the Ministry of Interior and through this he managed to develop a parallel line in counterinsurgency, which focused on the use of police forces. Although international actors criticized some of President García’s policies during his tenure, these criticisms were not part of a broader mechanism of regular monitoring, incentives, and sanctions in order to encourage democratization in Peru. Therefore, international criticisms did not play an important role in enhancing García’s control over the armed forces in the counterinsurgency policy making process.

4.2.1 Alán García’s political calculations and policy preferences

When Alán García was elected president in 1985, he was determined to change the way Peru was conducting its counterinsurgency campaign against the Shining Path. García witnessed the mistakes of the counterinsurgency policies under Belaúnde’s presidency and he observed the popular demand for reform. Therefore, he realized that a reform agenda would appeal to the majority of the Peruvian society. Throughout his election campaign, García made promises for a change in the nature of the counterinsurgency, which would include negotiations, military’s subordination to civilian control, and respect for human rights. Moreover, he pledged for economic and social assistance projects in underdeveloped regions under civilian leadership.38 During his election campaign, Alán García placed a

great emphasis on the development aspects of the fight against the Shining Path, such as the importance of decreasing poverty, promoting agricultural development, and addressing the problems of the Indian population.

Alán García’s belief that he could bring all these changes to Peru resulted from his perception of APRA as a revolutionary party. APRA was a left-leaning party in the 1930s-1940s and it was considered anti-establishment. In the late 1970s there were still fantasies among APRA members about the party’s revolutionary roots. Many people believed that García incarnated APRA’s revolutionary principles. He believed this himself, too.\(^39\) Thus, the idea was that APRA’s coming to power represented a social revolution, which would lead to a just distribution of wealth, decrease in the number of poor people, and finally the defeat of the Shining Path’s policies.\(^40\)

However, when García came to office, he knew that he could not just focus on the popular demand for reform in counterinsurgency and carry out his policy preferences right away because he had to find a way to coexist together with the armed forces and guarantee his political survival. What former President Belaúnde did was to give the armed forces almost complete independence in military affairs. Instead, García wanted to establish control over the military and he decided to do this in two different ways. First, he acquired the support of a sector of the military high command in order to prevent a coup initiative and guarantee his political survival.\(^41\) Thus, he coopted a number of generals and admirals and appointed them to high posts in Peru and abroad. Second, under the direction

\(^{39}\)Interview with Journalist Gustavo Gorriti (August 17, 2007).


of the Minister of Interior Agustín Mantilla, García tried to turn the police into a force loyal to the president in order to counterbalance the power of the armed forces.\(^{42}\) Therefore, he placed a lot of importance to the use of police forces in the fight against the Shining Path. As a rational politician, Alán García not only made an effort to find out the demands of the Peruvian society and appeal to broad segments of the public in his election campaign with his reform agenda, but he also shaped his counterinsurgency policies in a way that would allow him to guarantee his political survival vis-à-vis the armed forces.

Alán García managed to implement some of his reform promises upon taking office. First, he stressed his constitutional duty as the commander-in-chief of the armed forces in public by flying the flag of the armed forces on the top of the presidential palace besides the national flag of Peru.\(^{43}\) Second, in contrast to Fernando Belaúnde, who always tolerated the military’s arms purchases, García restricted the military’s spending for arms. Then, he unified three separate police forces, namely the Guardia Civil, Guardia Republicana, and Policía de Investigaciones into a single national police unit in 1986. He both united and reformed the police forces. He formed a Peace Commission in order to find a way to reach a lasting peace in Peru. When mass graves of peasants were found in Pucayacu and Accomarca, García clearly showed that he was serious about his emphasis on respecting human rights in Peru’s counterinsurgency campaign. Since the military did not identify those responsible for these human rights violations, he removed the President of the Joint Command of the Armed Forces, Lieutenant General César Enrico Praeli, Chief of the Second Military Region, General Sinecio Jarama, and

\(^{42}\)“Las Fuerzas Armadas” [The Armed Forces], p. 276.

\(^{43}\)John Crabtree, Peru under García, p. 109.
Political-Military Commander of Ayacucho, General Wilfredo Mori, from their posts. These policies were not welcomed by the Peruvian armed forces and they were carried out despite their opposition. Especially President García’s removal of several high-ranking generals from their posts as a result of the human rights violations in Pucayacu and Accomarca caused tremendous discontent within the military. In private, military officers accused García’s strict controls over human rights for their limited success in the fight against the Shining Path. But, although the military did not support these policies, it did not actively resist them and try to block these moves, either.

In addition to the above-mentioned actions, the García administration also put into effect a number of development projects as part of its comprehensive counterinsurgency policy. García identified several departments of Peru, including Ayacucho, Apurímac, Cuzco, Huancavelica, Puno, Arequipa, Tacna, and Moquegua as his priority geographic area. In this region where 16.8 percent of the Peruvian population lived, the government aimed at addressing the specific needs of the people in a variety of areas such as education, health, and transportation. Most importantly, the administration supported agriculture in all southern highland departments of Peru, including the emergency zones, with the new Trapecio Andino program. This program “provided peasants interest-free loans from the state

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Agrarian Bank and technical assistance from the Agriculture Ministry.” García also initiated *Rimanacuys*, which were public dialogs between peasant leaders and government officials.

During this period, as a result of the government’s pressure for the prevention of human rights violations, the Peruvian military stayed away from a purely military approach. From September 1985 onwards, the Joint Command limited its military operations and put more emphasis on development projects in the emergency zones. Minister of War General Jorge Flores Torres was one of the most prominent figures who promoted this approach. In an interview in 1987 General Flores emphasized the importance of a comprehensive approach composed of economic, psychological, and educational actions in the fight against the Shining Path.  

Thus, when Alán García came to office, he managed to exert his will vis-à-vis the armed forces to a large extent in Peru’s counterinsurgency campaign and he succeeded in prioritizing the respect for human rights and the focus on the development aspects of the fight against the Shining Path. However, García’s counterinsurgency policy and his relations with the military began to change with three prison uprisings in Lima and Callao initiated by Shining Path terrorists in June 1986 and the increasing economic problems in Peru. After Alán García ordered the suppression of these uprisings, almost three hundred Shining Path terrorists—some of them after having surrendered—were killed by military and police forces. Although the military argued that it took verbal orders for the execution of the inmates directly from President García, García did not take


48 “El General Flores Defiende la Defensa,” p. 36.
political responsibility for these events and several military and police officers faced trials as a result of their involvement in prison massacres. After these incidents, officers began to demand written orders from the administration before they needed to get involved in politically sensitive cases. The military’s distrust towards the government led the former to adopt a more defensive approach in its struggle against the Shining Path and to be reluctant to directly confront the subversive forces.

With the experience of prison riots, Alán García began to realize that he had no other alternative than using the military means to fight against the Shining Path.\(^\text{49}\) Especially from 1987 onwards, the Shining Path violence spread to cities, including Lima and took the lives of several mayors and other APRA members. The territory controlled by the Shining Path increased steadily. During this period, it also became apparent that García’s developmentalist approach to counterinsurgency was not producing positive outcomes.

In early 1987, there were clear signs that Alán García’s economic policies were not generating enough funds for the development projects in the southern highlands. In fact, the Peruvian economy experienced growth in 1986 and 1987. However, there was a decline in government income in these years. The government income “fell from 46 per cent of GDP in 1985, to 33.5 per cent in 1986, and to 26 per cent in 1987.”\(^\text{50}\) Therefore, several development projects suffered from insufficient funds. Moreover, the peasants in the highlands were reluctant

\(^{49}\)Interview with former Senator Rolando Ames Cobán, who also served as a Commissioner for the Peruvian Truth and Reconciliation Commission (Lima: August 20, 2007); Interview with Political Analyst Eduardo Toche from the Center for the Study and Promotion of Development [Centro de Estudios y Promoción de Desarrollo] (Lima: August 17, 2007); interview with Martín Tanaka (Lima: August 15, 2007).

\(^{50}\)John Crabtree, *Peru under García*, p. 60.
to participate in these projects because of their fear of the Shining Path’s violent response.

Although the García government’s counterinsurgency policy began to shift away from the developmentalist approach towards the use of military methods during this period, Alán García continued to emphasize that the military should respect human rights in its fight against the Shining Path. However, as the severity of the economic crisis in Peru increased, it became more and more difficult for García to impose his policy preferences in counterinsurgency over the armed forces. “By early 1987...autonomy in counter-insurgency—the key everyday preoccupation of the military—was passing back into the hands of the armed forces.”

The decrease in the García government’s control over the military became evident during the creation of the Ministry of Defense. In March 1987 García brought together the separate ministries of War, Navy, and Aeronautics, as well as the Joint Command of the Armed Forces and the National Defense Secretariat in order to establish a single Ministry of Defense. This decision was met with criticism among both some sectors of the armed forces, mainly the Navy and the Air Force, and retired military officers. “The military sustained that the new ministry was designed to drain political power from the Armed Forces by diminishing their representation on the Council of Ministers from three ministers to one.” Moreover, there was concern within the armed forces that Alán García would appoint a civilian minister of defense in an attempt to exert his control over the armed forces. Although García went ahead with the establishment of the Ministry of Defense, the resentment from the armed forces caused him to back

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51Ibid., p. 112.

down and appoint a retired general—the then Commander-in-Chief of the Army, General Enrique López Albújar—as the new Minister of Defense. The fact that the Minister of Defense only recognized those plans and actions approved by the armed forces did not help enhance civilian control over counterinsurgency policy.

Another incident which demonstrated further decrease in civilian control over counterinsurgency from 1987 onwards was the Cayara massacre where approximately 30 villagers were killed by security forces. In response to this event, the García government did not take any action against those involved in human rights violations, which stood in complete contrast to his response to the Pucayacu and Accomarca killings earlier in his presidency. Although the prosecutor who investigated this case was threatened by military officials, his final report found the political-military commander responsible for the killings. However, the government failed to act on this report.\textsuperscript{53} Furthermore, in the aftermath of Cayara, the government agreed to a number of decisions that would grant greater autonomy to the military in the fight against the Shining Path. These decisions included allowing the military to intervene in those places not under the state of emergency, and creating a national defense fund outside of the national budget.\textsuperscript{54}

Once civilian control over counterinsurgency decreased, policy making was left to the political-military commanders in the emergency zones once again. As in President Belaúnde’s tenure, yearly turnover of these commanders led to inconsistencies in policy and shifts between internal war and developmentalist approaches in counterinsurgency according to the preferences of the generals in charge.

Despite the increased autonomy of the military in counterinsurgency from

\textsuperscript{53}Philip Mauceri, “Military Politics and Counter-Insurgency in Peru,” p. 96

\textsuperscript{54}John Crabtree, \textit{Peru under Gracía}, pp. 204-205.
1987 onwards, civilian control over policy making did not disappear completely because President García maintained a parallel counterinsurgency policy mechanism through the Ministry of Interior. The García administration gave weapons and armored vehicles to the police forces for warfare and increased their role in counterinsurgency. Moreover, in 1989 with the initiative of Agustín Mantilla, a special group of police intelligence unit was formed. This Special Intelligence Group (Grupo Especial de Inteligencia-GEIN) was given the only duty of pursuing the Shining Path leadership.\(^{55}\) Also, a paramilitary organization named the Comando Rodrigo Franco (CRF) appeared in late 1988 in order to eliminate Leftist leaders. There were claims that the CRF was connected to the police forces, APRA, and especially the Minister of Interior Agustín Mantilla.\(^{56}\)

However, none of these acts helped eliminate the Shining Path violence. By the year 1989, Peru was in a grave economic crisis accompanied with coup rumors and 33 percent of the departments in Peru were under the state of emergency.\(^{57}\)

### 4.2.2 Alán García’s political strength

An important reason why President García’s control over counterinsurgency fluctuated during his tenure from a moderate/high control early in his presidency towards a moderate degree of control from 1987 onwards has a lot to do with the variation in his strength.

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Alán García came to office as a result of a landslide victory in the 1985 elections. He won 53.1 percent of the votes, which brought APRA 32 seats in the 60-member Senate and 107 seats in the 180-member Chamber of Deputies. García was also in control of the APRA’s parliamentary majority in the early years of his presidency. In fact, APRA was an eclectic party composed of ideologically and culturally different people and full of ideological and personal rivalries. Moreover, upon taking office, García relied on a small group of mostly non-APRA or younger generation APRA advisors and alienated a majority of the Apristas (APRA members) in decision making due to the fact that there were not many trained personnel within this political party. Despite the potential for intra-party tension and conflict, García succeeded in maintaining strong partisan powers in the initial years of his presidency because first, APRA was a political party with a long tradition of loyalty for the party chairman. Second, after the 1985 elections, García was widely appreciated among APRA members as the leader who opened APRA to the broader segments of the society and carried the party to government after 60 years of its foundation by Víctor Raúl Haya de la Torre. And third, García enjoyed tremendous public support at that time. He had 90 percent of public approval in September 1985 and 70 percent of public approval in September 1986. This popularity prevented APRA members from questioning his authority and decisions. “His growing popularity in the country...was the guarantee of his hegemony within APRA.” Therefore, García did not face any serious opposition from the members of his party in the initial years of his presi-

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59 John Crabtree, Peru under García, p. 72.
dency. He and his close circle of advisors were in control of governmental decision making during this period. The APRA majority in the Congress and President García’s hegemony over the APRA gave him the necessary confidence and policy making instruments to exert his influence over counterinsurgency.

However, from late 1986 and early 1987 onwards, Alán García’s popularity began to decline mainly due to the emerging economic problems. Inflation reemerged in early 1987, a general strike took place in May 1987, and García’s nationalization of the private banking sector in July 1987 resulted in a severe political and economic crisis.60 During his election campaign and the initial years of his presidency, Alán García emphasized the importance of cooperation with the private sector and he was explicit about his opposition to the state expropriation of the private sector. However, in the aftermath of the banks expropriation, the consensus Alán García built among the political and economic actors collapsed. According to Crabtree, Alán García’s decision to nationalize the private banks in July 1987 was a landmark decision in the political and economic fortunes of his government.61 This turned out to be a very unpopular move among the public, business community, the Congress, and even in his own political party. “García’s popularity fell from an almost 70 percent approval rating in June to as low as 30 percent after the violent takeover of the banks in October.”62 In 1988-1989, hyperinflation rose to more than 7000 percent and per capita gross domestic product dropped more than 10 percent.63 García’s approval ratings fell to 16 percent in

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61 John Crabtree, *Peru under García*, p. 121.

62 Cited in Carol Graham, *Peru’s APRA*, pp. 119-120.

October 1988 and 9 percent in January 1989.\textsuperscript{64}

The decline in President García’s public support from 1987 onwards also affected his partisan powers and restrained his control over APRA. When the consensus on García’s leadership collapsed, the ideological and personal rivalries within APRA began to reappear. “[A]s García’s popularity plummeted. . . the party’s power in the executive branch increased, and the discrepancies and contradictions within its ranks had substantial impact on the course the government took.”\textsuperscript{65} This produced inconsistent policies, which resulted in a further decrease in public support for the government.

The decline in García’s strength from late 1986 and early 1987 onwards brought about an important change in his control over the armed forces in the area of counterinsurgency because when García’s control over APRA decreased, his confidence vis-à-vis the military also decreased and he lost some of his important instruments necessary for policy making. Increasing opposition towards President García within his cabinet and among other APRA members led to a decrease in the number of people he could rely on to form a strong coalition vis-à-vis the military in the area of counterinsurgency and as a result constrained his hand in policy making.

One exception was the Ministry of Interior and the police forces under its authority. President García’s earlier efforts to develop a unified national police force loyal to the presidency worked in his advantage during this period. With the support of Minister of Interior Agustín Mantilla, President García was able to maintain a parallel counterinsurgency policy to that of the armed forces during

\textsuperscript{64}Cited in Juan J. Linz, “Presidential or Parliamentary Democracy,” p. 29.

\textsuperscript{65}Carol Graham, \textit{Peru’s APRA}, p. 128.
the second half of his presidency. Especially the GEIN, which was established as part of this strategy in 1989, played a very important role in the capture of Guzmán in 1992.

In sum, in the initial years of his presidency, García had a moderate/high degree of control over the military in the area of counterinsurgency. This was in part due to his control over APRA and the APRA’s control of a majority of seats in the Congress. However, when the García administration’s policy preferences began to alienate those people who supported him in 1985, his public support declined and his power over the APRA cadres was shaken. Therefore, from 1987 onwards, the García administration’s ability to shape the counterinsurgency policy making process was constrained significantly.

The decrease in President García’s partisan powers was a necessary, but not a sufficient condition that led to his moderate degree of control over the counterinsurgency policy making process during the second half of his presidency. The variation in García’s partisan powers can explain the change in his ability to influence the policy making process, but cannot fully account for why the military consented to civilian preferences in the initial years of García’s presidency and began to defy his preferences later on. Thus, it is also important how the Peruvian military perceived the changes in García’s leadership and behavior. In order to better understand these dynamics, the next section looks at how the Peruvian military perceived the García administration throughout his tenure.

4.2.3 How the military perceived Alán García

It is hard to overlook the historical distrust between APRA and the Peruvian armed forces. This distrust had its roots in the political rivalry between Víctor
Raúl Haya de la Torre—founder of APRA—and General Luis M. Sánchez Cerro in the 1931 presidential elections. After Sánchez Cerro’s victory in the 1931 elections, the APRA initiated a violent revolt in July 1932 in Trujillo, where approximately 60 army officers and at least 1000 APRA members were killed. This tension eventually resulted in the assassination of Sánchez Cerro in 1933 by an APRA militant named Abelardo Mendoza Leyva. This experience created an intense skepticism between the military and APRA.

However, over time, the APRA reduced its revolutionary rhetoric and moved towards the center of the Peruvian politics, which positively changed the party’s image in the eyes of the Peruvian armed forces. “The emergence of the left as a force, meanwhile, made APRA all the more acceptable to the military,” During the presidency of Morales Bermúdez, meetings were held between the military and APRA within the context of the military’s desire to conduct elections and convene a constitutional assembly. When APRA turned out to be the dominant party in the constituent assembly elections in 1978, the party began to play a key role in the transition process towards democracy and the relations between the Morales Bermúdez government and APRA improved. The APRA leader Haya de la Torre emerged as a prominent figure in the constituent assembly and he made a great leadership effort to bring together the forces of left and right in the assembly in order to draft a new constitution.

Thus, when Alán García was elected president in 1985, the military did not

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67 Carol Graham, Peru’s APRA, p. 67.

68 Carol Graham, Peru’s APRA, pp. 62-63.
have a negative reaction. The military perceived García as a popular leader with a nationalist ideology who could bring political stability and who had the capacity to take the initiative in Peruvian politics. The military was impressed by García’s public support and his leadership in APRA. Especially, his popularity was a vital factor which allowed him to have the upper hand in his interactions with the military. As for García’s counterinsurgency policy preferences, the military was ambivalent. Those military officers who were part of the developmentalist tradition in counterinsurgency, were supportive of the social and economic development programs that were advocated by Alán García in the southern highlands. However, García’s moves such as the removal of three high-ranking generals in response to human rights violations in Accomarca, as well as the military’s reluctance to identify the responsible officers for the killings, his reorganization of the police force, and his restriction of the military’s arms purchases were not welcomed by the armed forces. However, the military did not actively resist these moves because of the strong support García had in broad sectors of the Peruvian society.

The turning point for García’s control over counterinsurgency came in the aftermath of the 1986 prison riots. García’s failure to take political responsibility for his orders during these riots caused tremendous indignation within the military. When the military’s disappointment about President García’s behavior following the suppression of the prison riots coupled with his inability to cope with the economic problems of the country, his impression in the eyes of the military began to deteriorate. From early 1987 onwards, García gradually turned into an erratic leader with unpredictable policies. The most important aspect of this problem

69 John Crabtree, *Peru under García*, p. 112.
for the military was García’s inconsistent attitude towards the Shining Path. In 1988 in an off the record speech to the APRA youth, which leaked to the press, President García praised the Shining Path. He stated that:

“Mistaken or not, the senderista has what we do not have: mystique and dedication... Those people have what merits our respect and my own personal admiration because they are, whether you like it or not, militants. Fanatics they call them. I believe that they have mystique and it is part of our self-criticism, compañeros, to know how to recognize that whoever subordinated or not, gives himself to death, gives his life, has mystique.”

In a similar inconsistent fashion, in 1989 when a Shining Path militant was captured, Prime Minister visited him in order to make sure that he was not being mistreated upon the request of the militant’s father, who was a former Aprista deputy and friend of Villanueva.

As a result of these kinds of contradictory behavior on the part of the García administration from 1987 onwards, substantial resentment began to appear within the military towards the government and coup rumors began to emerge. García was seen as driving Peru into a chaos both economically and politically. Upon observing that García’s actions were becoming increasingly contradictory from 1987 onwards and upon noticing that García’s popularity among the public and within APRA was in rapid decline, the military began to exert his will in the counterinsurgency campaign. For example, when the Shining Path attacked a police post

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70 “El Cassette de Ayacucho,” Caretas (July 4, 1988), cited in Carol Graham, Peru’s APRA, p. 158.

71 Ibid., p. 166.
in San Martín in 1988, the military forces close to this post refused to send reinforcements without written orders. They argued that “they feared an ambush and could not send helicopters due to ‘bad weather.’” Garcia’s decreasing legitimacy in the eyes of the military became most apparent in the government’s response to human rights violations in the later years of his presidency. With respect to the discovery of killings by military officers in Cayara in 1988, “García was no longer able to set the terms of his relationship with the military as he had done in 1985.” The decline in García’s public support and his weakening leadership within APRA negatively affected García’s legitimacy for the armed forces. As a result of this situation, President García no longer felt confident to exert his will vis-à-vis the armed forces and feared possible coup attempts. Therefore, the military was able to increase its autonomy in the counterinsurgency policy making process from 1987 onwards.

4.2.4 Role of international actors

Throughout President García’s tenure, international actors such as international organizations and great powers did not play a role in facilitating civilian control over the counterinsurgency policy making process. Human Rights groups such as the Human Rights Watch criticized human rights violations that took place during Peru’s counterinsurgency campaign and they argued that such cases were not investigated and punished effectively. On the other hand, the United states only demonstrated rhetorical support for Peruvian democracy and this rhetorical support never turned into a serious economic support. Especially during García’s

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73 John Crabtree, Peru under Garcia, p. 204.
presidency, because of his nationalistic position on Peru’s international debt and because of his criticisms of the U.S. foreign policy, the U.S. economic aid to Peru decreased significantly.\textsuperscript{74} However, in spite of these criticisms, international actors did not have a system of incentives and sanctions to encourage democratization and help establish civilian control in a systematic way in Peru.

4.3 Dynamics of Civil-Military Relations During Alberto Fujimori’s Tenure

Alberto Fujimori became the President of Peru in 1990, when Peru was in a state of prolonged economic crisis and widespread terrorism. During his tenure, Fujimori not only promoted effective policies to deal with the country’s economic collapse, but also became the first President, after 11 years, who adopted a unified counterinsurgency strategy to put the Shining Path under control. While doing this, Fujimori established a moderate degree of control over the Peruvian armed forces despite a high level of threat from the Shining Path in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Fujimori managed to achieve this by compensating his weakness as the head of government with a marriage of convenience with the armed forces. This kind of undemocratic control over the military was not challenged by the international actors because even in the aftermath of Fujimori’s \textit{autogolpe}, the international pressure on Peru was only for restoring the free elections and was not interested in imposing an extensive framework for democratization for the state structure as a whole.

4.3.1 Alberto Fujimori’s political calculations and policy preferences

Alberto Fujimori was elected President on June 10, 1990 with a landslide victory. However, he won the elections without an institutionalized political party, without a popular base, without a majority in the Congress, and without a clear strategy as to what to do during his presidency. Actually, being an unknown figure in politics turned him into an attractive candidate at a time when the public was distrustful of traditional politicians.\textsuperscript{75} During his campaign visits, Fujimori wore regional clothes and danced with local music. “His motto was ‘Honor, Technology, and Work.’ And he promised to be ‘A President Like You.’”\textsuperscript{76}

When Fujimori came to power, he was aware of the fact that, without a majority in the Congress and a strong and unified political party or coalition to rely on, it was not possible for him to deal with the deep economic crisis Peru was in, as well as, the increasingly violent terrorism of the Shining Path. He also knew that under these circumstances, a military takeover was a real possibility. Although Fujimori initially considered forming alliances with other political parties, this could not happen due to sharp ideological and programmatic differences among the political parties of Peru at that time. Eventually, he had to choose a coexistence strategy with the armed forces in the form of coopting a sector of military officers in order to guarantee his office and then to safely focus on addressing Peru’s problems.

The mastermind behind this strategy was Vladimiro Montesinos—former army


captain who was ousted from the military due to transferring secret information to the CIA and the Pentagon. Fujimori met Montesinos during his election campaign. As a lawyer, he helped Fujimori with a judicial investigation in which the latter was accused of avoiding taxes for a real estate. While Montesinos managed to resolve this issue through his contacts in the judiciary, he gained Fujimori’s trust. After Fujimori was elected President, Montesinos began to act as his unofficial national security advisor.

Under Fujimori’s Presidency, Montesinos played a key role in establishing control over the armed forces. As a former military officer, he had an insider perspective of the military and he advised Fujimori on issues such as who is who, whom to promote and whom to dismiss. Moreover, his control over the National Intelligence Service (Servicio de Inteligencia Nacional-SIN) enabled him to closely monitor the armed forces. As a result of this strategy of cooption, Fujimori and Montesinos “and not the military itself became the controlling force in subsequent policy initiatives.”

Fujimori and Montesinos played an important role in the adoption of a unified and effective counterinsurgency policy against the Shining Path. When Fujimori came to power, Peru did not have a clear and consistent counterinsurgency strategy. The Peruvian Armed Forces had been assigned the task to fight against the Shining Path in late 1982. However, the fight was highly fragmented and mostly left to the political-military commanders of the emergency zones. The turnover of these commanders every year was also an important obstacle to the formation

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of experienced military leaders and continuous policies. In response to this situation, Fujimori put a great emphasis on the centralization of decision making in the area of counterinsurgency and adopted a cohesive counterinsurgency policy for the first time.

There are two different accounts on the origins of this policy. First, according to the Final Report of the Peruvian Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Fujimori carried out the counterinsurgency strategy developed by the armed forces. In the late 1980s, several state institutions discussed more effective ways of fighting the Shining Path and the military was no exception. In their Countersubversive Manual, which was approved in August 1989, the armed forces provided a detailed analysis of the Shining Path insurgency, emphasized the importance of gathering intelligence, as well as, gaining the support of the population, and recommended the necessity to fight against the Shining Path simultaneously in political, economic, psychosocial, and military fronts. On the other hand, Enrique Obando states that the counterinsurgency policy of Fujimori had its root in the policies developed in the late 1980s by a group of civilian and military intelligence analysts at the SIN, including Montesinos. This policy emphasized the unification of the state intelligence system, full support of the rondas in the fight against the Shining Path, and assigning political control to the military in those areas under the emergency rule.

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81 Carlos Tapia, Las Fuerzas Armadas y Sendero Luminoso, pp. 48-53.

82 Interview with Colonel Pablo Delgado de la Flor by Enrique Obando, cited in “Las Relaciones Civil-Militares en el Perú en la Década del 90: Lecciones para el Futuro,” in Las Fuerzas Armadas en la Región Andina: No Deliberantes o Actores Políticos?, ed. Martín Tanaka (Lima:
program, the armed forces also gave their approval to this strategy, “even though they had not originally designed it”\textsuperscript{83} and they were hesitant about its certain provisions.

Considering the key role played by the SIN under the direction of Montesinos during Fujimori’s Presidency, Obando’s argument is highly convincing. It seems that SIN’s policy considerations were close enough to the military priorities that they received the latter’s full support.

The Fujimori administration carried out several reforms in order to mobilize the resources of the country in the fight against the Shining Path and centralize policy making authority under the executive branch. Because his political party did not possess a majority of seats in the Congress, Fujimori could not pass all of these reforms through the Congress. As a result, Fujimori conducted a self-coup in 1992 with the support of the Peruvian armed forces and closed the Congress. After the self-coup, by presidential decree, Fujimori gave enhanced decision making authority to the Joint Command of the Armed Forces, the National Defense Council, and the SIN in the area of counterinsurgency.\textsuperscript{84} Also, he unified all the intelligence services under the SIN. Secondly, he took the necessary steps to arm the local peasant groups (\textit{rondas campesinas}) as part of an effective defense against the Shining Path. In fact, the \textit{rondas} had requested arms from President García in the late 1980s. However, both the armed forces and the García government hesitated to provide training and arms to these peasants for fear that such tools


could be used against the state instead. Fujimori also brought the procedure of “faceless judges” in trials of captured guerrillas in order to prevent the “systematic intimidation and even assassination of judges assigned to oversee the trials, which had a chilling effect on their willingness to convict.” Then in 1993 the Government put into effect a “repentance law” in order to encourage the Shining Path militants and sympathizers to surrender in return for “support, retraining, and progressive reintegration into society.” Finally, Fujimori also promoted small development programs in underdeveloped areas, where there was concern about Shining Path’s presence.

The next section turns to the reasons why Fujimori succeeded in establishing a moderate degree of civilian control over the armed forces in the fight against the Shining Path although he came to power in a period of increased Shining Path threat.

4.3.2 Alberto Fujimori’s political strength

Although Fujimori eventually managed to carry out his policies without much interference from other institutions of the state, he was not a strong president at first. Fujimori had extremely weak partisan powers. His Change 90 (Cambio 90) was not an institutionalized and cohesive political party. It had an eclectic political base and it brought together ideologically different people. Many of the Change 90 representatives were inexperienced as well as incompetent and they

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87 Ibid., p. 208.
88 Ibid., p. 209.
did not have the ability to unify in order to support the president’s policies.\textsuperscript{89} Also, when Fujimori was elected President, Change 90 did not have a majority in the Congress. After the 1990 elections, this political party only had “32 seats (18 percent) in the Lower House and 14 seats (23 percent) in the Upper House.”\textsuperscript{90}

Fujimori’s weak partisan powers constrained his ability in policy making in two different ways. First, he did not have the necessary cadres to rely on in his political party and in the Congress to formulate effective counterinsurgency policies. As mentioned above, most of the Change 90 members were inexperienced people with different ideologies and did not have the ability to unify for a cause. This was a very important problem since Fujimori himself did not have any experience in politics and he did not come to office by knowing how he would approach to Peru’s political and economic problems. Second, even if Change 90 had been a unified organization composed of competent members, this political party would still not be a very effective instrument for Fujimori in policy making because Change 90 did not have a majority of seats in the Congress. As a result, when the Fujimori administration presented before the Congress a number of legislative decrees to effectively combat the Shining Path, he failed to have all of these legislative decrees approved because Fujimori did not have enough supporters in the Congress that would endorse his policy proposals. Therefore, the only way available to Fujimori to implement his policies was to take advantage of his support from the military and close the Congress on April 5, 1992 with a self-coup in order to carry out his legislative reforms in counterinsurgency. Through

\textsuperscript{89}Rex Hudson, ed., Peru: A Country Study; Charles D. Kenney, Fujimori’s Coup and the Breakdown of Democracy in Latin America, pp. 90-92

\textsuperscript{90}Charles D. Kenney, Fujimori’s Coup and the Breakdown of Democracy in Latin America, p. 90.
this non-traditional way of policy making, Fujimori—with the help and direction of his unofficial national security advisor Vladimiro Montesinos—succeeded in establishing a moderate degree of control over the counterinsurgency policy making process during his tenure.

Although Fujimori’s weak partisan powers can easily explain why he failed to develop a high degree of control over the armed forces in the area of counterinsurgency policy making, they are not sufficient to account for why Fujimori eventually succeeded in establishing a moderate degree of control. The next section completes the argument and shows how Fujimori developed a moderate degree of control over the policy making process in spite of his weak partisan powers.

4.3.3 How the military perceived Alberto Fujimori

The Peruvian military made its decision to go along with Fujimori in light of a number of assessments. First, the armed forces saw in Fujimori an effective leader willing to solve the problems of Peru. When he came to office, although Fujimori did not have a clear plan about what he was going to do, he was open to proposals that would eliminate Peru’s economic and political problems. Moreover, Fujimori did not appear ideologically threatening to the military. Instead, he was more of a pragmatic leader with substantial public support. Despite his deficiencies in his partisan powers, Fujimori had a strong public support and he was able to maintain this support until after the mid-1990s. Between 1990 and 1994, a polling agency in Peru “reported that Fujimori received the support of 65 percent of Peruvians surveyed among various regions, age groups, and economic sectors.”

91 Second, in the early 1990s, the Peruvian military was cognizant of the

necessity of effective civilian leadership in Peru’s counterinsurgency campaign. Although the military participated in both formulating and implementing counterinsurgency policies from 1980 onwards, it failed to come up with a consistent national counterinsurgency strategy. The policies implemented by the military reflected the divisions and disagreements within the military organization. This situation played an important role in the prolongation of the Shining Path insurgency and the failure to put an end to the violence. Therefore, by the late 1980s and early 1990s, the Peruvian military had already realized that it failed to develop an effective strategy to combat the insurgency. As a result, it was more open to civilian initiatives that could solve the problems of the previous ineffective policies.

This situation created an opportunity for both Fujimori and the Peruvian armed forces. Fujimori did not possess the traditional means of policy making in a democratic country, such as a majority in the Congress and reliable and competent cadres in the ministries. In order to overcome this problem, with the guidance of Montesinos, he began to control the internal workings of the armed forces through the system of cooption and compensated the lack of his instruments for political strength with the support of the military. Fujimori “won the active support of an important sector of the military by providing the full political backing they needed to combat terrorism.” Although this helped him gain control over policy making to some extent, his dependence on the armed forces as a support base forced him to give certain concessions to them in the fight against the Shining Path—such as immunity from human rights violations and political control over

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92Philip Mauceri, “Military Politics and Counter-Insurgency in Peru,” p. 84.

emergency zones—and prevented him from establishing a high degree of control over counterinsurgency.

Fujimori managed to maintain his legitimacy in the eyes of the military in the later years of his presidency and continued his symbiotic relationship with the military. He implemented successful economic policies that increased his confidence in the eyes of the armed forces and public. His economic plan—the fujishock which involved abolishing state subsidies, decreasing tariffs, reforming the tax system, and allowing the free circulation of foreign currencies—transformed Peru’s economy from an import-substitution system to an export-oriented strategy. Fujimori also made an important effort to improve Peru’s relations with the international financial community.94 His policies paid off in a short period of time and “the fujishock dramatically reduced inflation (from 7,650 per cent in 1990 to 139 per cent in 1991, to 55 per cent in 1992 to 27 per cent in 1993).”95

In addition to his economic success, Fujimori carried out a determined counterinsurgency campaign, which resulted in the capture of the Shining Path leader Guzmán in 1992. Many military officers supported the Fujimori Government’s counterinsurgency policy and neoliberal economic program, which brought stability and economic growth to the country. In fact, the military had three different groups of officers: those coopted officers who were loyal to Fujimori, those institucionalistas who were against Fujimori, and those institucionalistas who decided to support Fujimori’s efforts although they were not coopted. The latter group stood behind Fujimori due to their belief that what Fujimori was doing was important


95 Ibid.
Thus, while the Peruvian military provided a reliable backing for Fujimori’s Government, it in turn played an active role in the fight against the Shining Path and stayed mostly immune to accusations about human rights violations. In Obando’s words, this situation generated a marriage of convenience between Fujimori and the Peruvian Armed Forces throughout Fujimori’s presidency. All in all, many members of the Peruvian military had a positive attitude about Fujimori and this facilitated his control over the counterinsurgency policy making process.

4.3.4 The role of international actors

Unfortunately, international actors did not play an important role in preventing Fujimori’s symbiotic relationship with the military and in increasing his control over Peru’s internal security policy. In fact, in the aftermath of the autogolpe, especially the US and the Organization of American States (OAS), expressed their discontent towards Fujimori’s rule. While the US suspended aid to Peru, the OAS threatened Peru with sanctions. However, this international pressure was mostly confined to the reinstallation of free and fair elections. The US and the OAS did not have a comprehensive system for democracy promotion based on incentives and sanctions. Once Fujimori promised to restore free elections, there was not much pressure about democratizing the way Peruvian civil-military relations worked. Although Fujimori’s control over the military remained substantial dur-

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96 Ibid., 398.


ing this period thanks to his cooptation strategy and symbiotic relationship with the military, the latter still had important autonomies in the fight against the Shining Path. The international actors did not help him reinforce his control over internal security by pressuring him to punish the military’s human rights violations or prevent its political control in the emergency zones. Therefore, these areas remained as part of the military’s prerogatives.

Overall, Fujimori initiated an important reform program for the Peruvian state. While on the one hand he carried out an effective counterinsurgency policy, on the other hand he took the necessary steps for the neoliberal transformation of the country. Since he did not have a political support group when he came to power, he built a symbiotic relationship with the armed forces in order to maintain his office. With the help and guidance of Montesinos, Fujimori coopted a group of officers in the military and received their support throughout his tenure. As a result of his successes in the area of economics and national security, even several uncoopted officers gave their support for Fujimori’s policies, which in the end guaranteed Fujimori’s personal control over the military during Peru’s fight against the Shining Path. Since the international actors were mostly interested in the presence of a seemingly democratic regime in Peru, they did not play an important role in increasing civilian competence in areas such as punishing the military’s human rights abuses or challenging its political control in the emergency zones.
CHAPTER 5

DOMESTIC SECURITY THREATS AND CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS IN OTHER PARTS OF THE WORLD

This dissertation is a theory development effort in an area where not many theoretical studies have been produced. Its main goal is to develop plausible hypotheses in order to explain why there are varying degrees of civilian control over internal security policy making in those countries that cope with internal security threats. It does this in light of the experiences of two countries, namely Turkey and Peru. However, for a better understanding of civil-military relations in domestic threat environments, it is essential to look at cases other than Turkey and Peru and see whether findings based on an analysis of Turkish and Peruvian counterinsurgency campaigns could help explain the experiences of other countries.

This chapter focuses on three additional cases, namely Indonesia, Israel, and Sri Lanka. The major reason why these three additional cases are discussed is that although all of these countries had to deal with insurgency movements, their civil-military relations developed in different ways in the face of their severe internal security problems. While the Indonesian armed forces challenged civilian rule from time to time in the face of the internal security problems, in Sri Lanka the military remained under civilian control throughout the LTTE (Liberation Tigers of the Tamil Eelam) insurgency. On the other hand, in Israel a civil-military partnership in policy making emerged in response to the Palestinian issue where
the Israeli Defense Forces got involved in policy making, but remained subordinate to civilian authority.

The following pages do not present a detailed study of these three additional cases and do not carry out a complete systematic application of the theory developed in this dissertation because of time and space limitations for such an extensive study. However, this chapter presents brief analyses of whether this study’s main arguments could be relevant in countries other than Turkey and Peru and could have potential validity in other parts of the world.

5.1 Domestic Security Threats and Civil-Military Relations in Israel

Israel has always been an interesting case for scholars of civil-military relations. Since the country’s establishment in 1948, Israel has constantly experienced internal and external threats, wars, and terrorism. However, the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) have never carried out a coup d’etat against the government. But this does not mean that the military has not been involved in politics. The IDF is a very influential actor in Israel’s national security policy making process and its power within the decision making apparatus is stronger than what is typically observed in liberal democratic regimes.

The prominent role of the military in Israel comes from its role in the nation-building experience of the country. The military played a very important role in the 1948 Israeli War of Liberation and it enhanced its reputation in the 1956 Sinai victory and 1967 Six Day War. This brought the IDF to a prominent position in Israeli politics. Because the Jewish military organizations in Palestine were highly political before the Israeli independence, Ben-Gurion placed a lot of emphasis on eliminating politics from Israel’s “unified national army” and establishing civilian
control over the military in the aftermath of Israel’s independence.\textsuperscript{1}

However, this effort to establish civilian control over the IDF has not been entirely successful. For, “the [Israeli] military is constantly involved in the affairs of the state as is the civilian authority in the affairs of the military and. . . this two-way influence is constant.”\textsuperscript{2} The IDF has always been involved in Israeli politics. However, since 1967 the political role of the military has further increased due to the military administration established in the occupied territories in the aftermath of the Six-Day War. The IDF has not only been responsible for maintaining security and public order in the occupied territories, but also acted as military governors to protect the welfare of the Palestinians.\textsuperscript{3}

Although the presence of a political-military partnership in national security policy making has been a permanent feature of Israeli politics, the influence of civilian and military sides within this partnership varied in different governmental periods. The following analysis focuses on the period from the late 1980s and early 1990s onwards because while Israel’s sense of external threat from the Arab countries of the Middle East decreased in this time period, the Palestinian uprising in the occupied territories of West Bank and Gaza became the major security concern. First, after the fall of the Soviet Union, Syria’s threat to Israel lost its credibility. It was not possible for Syria to declare war against Israel without the help and support of the Soviet Union. Moreover, after the 1991 Gulf War, Iraq


also stopped being a credible external threat to Israel.\(^4\) Finally, in 1994 Israel and Jordan signed a peace treaty, as a result of which territorial disputes between these two countries were solved and relations were normalized. On the other hand, from the late 1980s onwards, Israel’s security focus shifted to the occupied territories with the eruption of the First Palestinian Intifada in 1987 and continued with the Al Aqsa Intifada in 2000. Thus, although the boundary between Israel’s external and internal threats is usually blurred, at least from the late 1980s and early 1990s onwards, it is possible to say that Israel had to primarily cope with the Palestinian threat. This focus makes it possible to analyze Israeli civil-military relations primarily within the context of an internal threat. Figure 5.1 shows the level of threat caused by the Palestinians to the Israeli state from the 1980s onwards.\(^5\)

The Israeli military always played a role in national security policy making from the late 1980s and early 1990s onwards and that is why civilian control was never fully established. The main reason for this is first and foremost the heads of government’s lack of control over the intelligence bureaucracy. The Military Intelligence Directorate is not only the main military intelligence agency in Israel, but it is also a strategic analyst of developments in the Middle East and in other parts of the world. A parallel civilian intelligence bureaucracy does not exist.\(^5\)`

\(^4\)Ibid., p. 33.

Figure 5.1. Number of fatalities caused by the Palestinians over time
the prime minister, and the cabinet as a whole."\textsuperscript{6} What makes matters worse is that it is the leaders at the Military Intelligence Directorate who decide what intelligence policy makers receive, whether one piece of information is considered vital, how it is classified, etc. Another chronic problem that limits the Israeli head of government’s ability to influence policy is the role of the Planning and Policy Directorate in policy making. The Planning and Policy Directorate first emerged within the military and in 1974 it transformed into a joint unit of the military and the Ministry of Defense. Although this new status gave the directorate legitimacy in the civilian sphere, civilian influence in it did not increase and it continued to be dominated by the IDF.\textsuperscript{7} Thus, the weak control over the intelligence bureaucracy is a constant feature of Israeli heads of government in the area of national security policy making. Finally, Israeli civilian and military elites do not exist in separate spheres from each other. Former military officers have usually occupied important political positions in Israel.\textsuperscript{8} Although military officers resign from their posts before assuming political positions, it is hard to claim that these military leaders act completely as civilian policy makers when they assume political positions. Civilian control over counterinsurgency policy making in Israel does not reach high levels because of these weaknesses; however, the civil-military balance of power still vary to some extent according to changes in the civilian leaders’ political strength and the civilian leadership’s legitimacy in the eyes of the military.

An important period to consider within this context is the prime ministry of

\textsuperscript{6}Ibid., p. 49.

\textsuperscript{7}Ibid., pp. 56-58.

Yitzhak Rabin. During Yitzhak Rabin’s tenure between 1992 and 1995, although the IDF continued to act as an important political actor, Rabin enjoyed an important degree of control over the national security policy making process with the help of his party’s majority in the Parliament, his control over the Labor Party, and his legitimacy in the eyes of the military. For example, when an Israeli policeman was kidnapped and murdered in 1992, the decision to deport 415 Arab residents, who took responsibility for this incident, from Gaza Strip and West Bank was essentially shaped by the advice of the then Chief of General Staff Ehud Barak. Rabin informed the relevant ministers about this “governmental” decision right before the cabinet approved it and the then Minister of Foreign Affairs Shimon Peres did not even learn about the deportation decision since he was abroad.\(^9\) On the other hand, Rabin exerted his control over the policy making process. For example, having seen that the intelligence assessments of the Military Intelligence Directorate were significantly shaped by the worldview of young intelligence officers, Prime Minister Rabin requested the raw information based on which assessments were developed and made decisions accordingly.

An important reason why Rabin enjoyed some space to maneuver in Israeli national security policy making during his prime ministry was his political strength. Rabin was very popular among the Israeli public especially due to his successful career as the chief of staff during the 1967 Six-Day War.\(^10\) As a result, the Labor Party led by Rabin gained a clear victory in the 1992 elections, which is usually very difficult with the divided nature of Israeli politics and the country’s low election threshold (1.5 percent). Labor Party won 34.6 percent of the votes and 44

\(^9\)Yehuda Ben Meir, *Civil-Military Relations in Israel*, pp. xii-xiii.

seats in the Knesset in the 1992 elections, while Likud won 24.9 percent of the votes and 32 seats.\textsuperscript{11} In 1992, “[n]ot only did Labor win more seats than Likud, but perhaps more importantly Labor and parties to its left had a blocking majority.”\textsuperscript{12} According to an opinion poll, approximately 80 percent of those Likud supporters who voted for Labor in the 1992 elections did so because of Rabin’s candidacy for prime ministry.\textsuperscript{13} This situation enhanced Rabin’s hand within the Labor Party and strengthened his control over the Labor Party members. It was apparent that without Rabin, Labor would not have won the 1992 elections. Therefore, in the aftermath of the 1992 elections, his behavior vis-à-vis the other Labor leaders changed and he made it clear that he wanted to be the undisputed leader. For example, Rabin insisted on his exclusive right to determine ministerial appointments.\textsuperscript{14} Finally, Rabin also possessed a high level of trust in the eyes of the military. Rabin was a former Chief of Staff and he liked the work style of the military in contrast to the slow functioning of the government bureaucracy. Young military officers referred to Rabin as “Mr. Security,” admired him, and “were loyal to him in a manner unusual in civilian life.”\textsuperscript{15} Therefore, officers willingly submitted to Rabin’s personal authority.\textsuperscript{16} In sum, Rabin’s strong position in the Labor Party, the Labor Party’s majority in the Knesset, and his legitimacy


\textsuperscript{13}Cited in ibid., p. 65.

\textsuperscript{14}Ibid., p. 79.


\textsuperscript{16}Yoram Peri, \textit{Generals in the Cabinet Room}, p. 60.
in the eyes of the military helped him exert his influence over the national security policy making process and as a result, Rabin played a very important role in the Oslo Peace Process. However, the IDF was still an important actor in policy making during this period because Rabin liked the work style of the military and he preferred to rely on the military officers in policy making instead of civilian bureaucracy.

The Israeli civil-military relations witnessed an opposite experience during the prime ministry of Benjamin Netanyahu. During Netanyahu’s tenure, the civil-military partnership in Israeli national security policy making continued. However, within this partnership civilian influence decreased significantly because of Netanyahu’s lack of strong partisan powers, and his low legitimacy in the eyes of the military.

“Shortly after Benjamin Netanyahu replaced Peres as prime minister in 1996, it became clear just how involved the military had become in political affairs and how dependent the political leadership had become on the military—for information and intelligence assessments, for political and strategic planning, and for the practical know-how that the IDF commanders acquired in the territories.”

Netanyahu was critical of the Oslo peace process and he did not want to continue with it. He also wanted to decrease the role of the IDF in national security policy making because he saw the Israeli military as an advocate of Labor Party policies. This perception was strengthened by the fact that the heads of several security apparatuses, including the Chief of General Staff Amnon Lipkin

\footnote{Ibid.}
Shahak was appointed by the Peres-Rabin government. however, Netanyahu could not succeed in decreasing the military’s role in national security policy making. Instead, throughout Netanyahu’s government between 1996 and 1999, the IDF leaders played an important role in restraining and moderating Netanyahu’s initiatives and blocked some of his attempts.

An important reason for this was Likud’s lack of a majority of seats in the Parliament. In the 1996 Knesset elections, Labor emerged as the victor vis-à-vis Likud. While the Labor Party won 26 percent of the votes and 34 seats in the Parliament, the Likud-Gesher-Tzomet list won 25.1 percent of the votes and 32 seats. However, among these 32 seats, only 23 of them belonged to Likud. Although Netanyahu was given the duty to form the cabinet after the elections, he could not begin his prime ministry with a strong mandate. The Likud’s numerical weakness in the Knesset constrained Netanyahu’s hand in policy making. His coalition government was composed of eight partners and that is why Netanyahu had to cope with several tensions and restraints in the process of forming the government’s Palestinian policy. Especially Netanyahu’s hawkish coalition partners constrained his room to maneuver in the peace process.

Benjamin Netanyahu did not have a strong control over Likud members, either. First, he did not have a clear support group within the party. Netanyahu was close to Moshe Arens. However, after Arens’ retirement, Netanyahu could not play a leadership role in the party. Many of Arens supporters thought that Netanyahu was too young and inexperienced. Thus, in the absence of primaries, Netanyahu


would not have been elected as the leader of Likud. He tried to consolidate his power in the party after his victory in the primaries. However, “Netanyahu clearly at no time enjoyed majority support within the party institutions.”

In 1996, for the first time in Israel, the prime minister came to office with direct popular elections. Between two candidates—Shimon Peres from the Labor Party and Benjamin Netanyahu from the Likud Party—Netanyahu was elected prime minister with 50.5 percent of the votes. However, there were several Likud members who were of the opinion that Netanyahu won the 1996 elections at the expense of his political party. There was a strong belief within Likud that although Netanyahu’s deals with Tsomet and Gesher Parties strengthened his candidacy among the Israeli Right wing voters for the prime ministerial elections, this alliance limited Likud’s representation in the Knesset. Thus, Netanyahu never played a clear leadership role in his political party and this resulted in the fact that he did not possess loyal cadres that he could rely on to develop and implement policies.

Finally, Netanyahu had a low level of legitimacy in the eyes of the IDF officers. The IDF did not have a high opinion of Netanyahu’s leadership capacity. Several officers perceived him as “not balanced” and “folds under pressure” and did not think that Netanyahu was a reliable and trustworthy leader. The IDF officers

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22 Ibid., p. 224.


24 Ibid., p. 222.

25 Yoram Peri, Generals in the Cabinet Room, p. 80.
perceived him “as someone who dodges responsibility but is quick to saddle others with it and to ascribe blame.”\textsuperscript{26} As a result of all these problems with Netanyahu’s partisan powers and his lack of legitimacy in the military, he failed to decrease the IDF’s role in national security policy making, especially in the making of Israel’s Palestinian policy. On the contrary, the military role in policy making increased during his tenure. In fact, in the 1999 elections, a lot of retired generals joined political parties that opposed Netanyahu’s government with the goal of “rescue[ing] Israel from its incumbent leadership.”\textsuperscript{27}

Ehud Barak, who came to office after Benjamin Netanyahu, also experienced problems with exerting his control over national security policy making and he had several clashes with the military. In fact, with the help of public pressure, he succeeded in overcoming military opposition in certain issues such as withdrawing from southern Lebanon. However, the IDF officers had a considerable degree of autonomy on the ground. Commander Yomtov Samia, who was responsible for the Gaza Strip, once stated that “[n]obody will tell me how to win.”\textsuperscript{28} During Ehud Barak’s prime ministry, there was clear evidence that from time to time the military refused to implement the government’s Palestinian policies. For example, the military did not pull back tanks from a certain area, as was decided by the government and it resisted the government’s efforts to ease the economic sanctions on the Palestinians.\textsuperscript{29} Especially the Chief of Staff Shaul Mofaz had a lot of freedom of action and he was not stopped by Prime Minister Barak.

\textsuperscript{26}Ibid.

\textsuperscript{27}Ibid., p. 83.

\textsuperscript{28}Quoted in ibid., p. 105.

\textsuperscript{29}Ibid., p. 106.
The most important reasons for this were the Labor Party’s lack of majority in the Knesset, Ehud Barak’s weak authority over the Labor Party, and his weak legitimacy in the eyes of the military. Ehud Barak came to office with a clear mandate as a result of the 1999 prime ministerial elections. He received 56.1 percent of the vote, while his opponent Netanyahu received 43.9 percent. This outcome made it clear that the Israeli public wanted to continue with the peace process and gave Ehud Barak a clear mandate to accomplish this. However, Barak did not enjoy the presence of loyal cadres that he could reply on for policy making and implementation. First, the 1999 Knesset elections did not produce a clear outcome. The One Israel list composed of Labor, Gesher, and Meimad parties won 20.2 percent of the vote and 26 seats in the parliament. The left-of-center parties held a total of 60 seats at that time in the Knesset. However, forming a coalition with Arab Knesset members was a cultural taboo and even with Arab Knesset members, the opposition still had numerical strength. That is why, Ehud Barak ended up including right-wing parties in his coalition government such as Shas, Yisrael Ba’aliya, and the National Religious Party. These three parties held 28 seats in the Knesset and this situation significantly constrained Barak’s hand in policy making, especially in the area of Palestinian policy.\textsuperscript{30} In 1999, Ehud Barak “was elected on a clear peace platform, but simultaneously lacked a peace coalition.”\textsuperscript{31}

One more reason why Barak could not establish a strong control over policy making was his unwillingness to take advantage of the leaders of the Labor Party. Ehud Barak was not the most prominent figure in his political party. That is


\textsuperscript{31}Cited in ibid.
why when he was elected prime minister, he alienated important leaders such as Shimon Peres and Yossi Beilin from effective decision making in order to be in total control of the party. Ehud Barak gave these figures less visible roles and left them out of the Palestinian policy. “As a result of this choice, the people Barak relied on to handle the peace process were far less experienced and less competent than those who skillfully negotiated the Oslo Accord.”

While the Labor Party’s lack of a majority of seats in the Knesset and Ehud Barak’s failure to take advantage of experienced Labor leaders constrained his ability to control policy making in the Palestinian issue, his low legitimacy in the eyes of the military made military officers refuse to go along with his policy preferences from time to time and increase their autonomy. The IDF as an institution, and especially the Chief of Staff Shaul Mofaz did not admire how Ehud Barak handled policy making. In fact, Barak was a former IDF officer and he had close relations with the military. However, he preferred to rely on a small group of people from the military in his decision making. Moreover, in late 2000, the military was more and more of the opinion that the government’s decisions were based on political considerations due to the coming elections. 32 Especially when it became clear that Ehud Barak was going to lose the upcoming elections, he completely lost his legitimacy in the eyes of the military. As a result of this, military officers behaved autonomously on the ground and refused to obey certain governmental orders.

After Ehud Barak resigned, prime ministerial elections took place in February 2001. This was the last time elections for the prime minister were held separately from elections for the Knesset. In these elections, while Ariel Sharon won 62.4

32 Yoram Peri, Generals in the Cabinet Room, pp. 105-106.
percent of the votes, his contender Ehud Barak won only 37.6 percent of the votes. Sharon came to office with a strong mandate from the public in 2001. However, since there were no simultaneous Knesset elections, Labor remained as the political party with more seats in the parliament and Sharon had to form a coalition government. His coalition government was composed of 8 political parties, including Labor, and this significantly constrained Sharon’s hand in policy making.

Sharon was against the Oslo Accords and he wanted to use a predominantly military approach to end the Palestinian issue. However, Labor Party still perceived the Palestinian Authority as a potential legitimate partner in the future negotiations. This prevented Sharon from implementing his preferred policies in the Palestinian issue. Another additional factor that contributed to the oscillating policies of the government during this period was the US pressure about not conducting certain operations and not using certain weapons against the Palestinians.\(^{33}\)

Ariel Sharon’s political constraints explain to some extent why he was not in complete control of the policy making process. But the civilian leadership’s low legitimacy in the eyes of the military completes the argument and accounts for why the military refused to go along with some of the resulting policies. When Sharon came to office, there was a mutual distrust between him and the military officers. Sharon constantly criticized “the IDF’s inability to lower the number of terrorist attacks and to reduce significantly the number of injured Israelis.”\(^{34}\) On the other hand, the military was of the opinion that the political leaders

\(^{33}\)Ibid., p. 111.

\(^{34}\)Ibid., p. 110.
were not taking responsibility for their actions and instead blaming the military.\textsuperscript{35} Moreover, Defense Minister Ben-Eliezer had a “low personal prestige” in the eyes of the military officers. Although Ben-Eliezer was a retired military officer, he “did not enjoy the admiration and respect of the senior command.”\textsuperscript{36} This situation encouraged the military to act autonomously from time to time.

The 2003 Knesset elections rectified this situation to some extent. Ariel Sharon’s Likud received 29.39 percent of the votes and 38 seats in the parliament in 2003, whereas Likud’s nearest contender Labor-Meimad list received 14.46 percent of the votes and 19 seats. Accordingly, Sharon was able to form his government as a center-right coalition without the participation of Labor. Moreover, he replaced Defense Minister Ben-Eliezer with Shaul Mofaz.\textsuperscript{37} Sharon’s center-right coalition led to a decrease in the difference of opinions between the political leaders and the IDF in the Palestinian issue and Sharon’s second term as a prime minister turned out to be a relatively harmonious one.

As can be seen, the head of government’s partisan powers and his legitimacy in the eyes of the military played an important role in shaping the policy making process in the Palestinian issue and influenced the prime minister’s room to maneuver in the Palestinian policy. In Israel, the civil-military relations often developed as a civil-military partnership in policy making due to the military’s control over the Military Intelligence Directorate as well as the Policy and Planning Directorate. Moreover, the involvement of retired military officers in party politics also increased the military’s role in policy making. Despite this enhanced

\textsuperscript{35}Ibid., p. 111.
\textsuperscript{36}Ibid., p. 114.
\textsuperscript{37}Ibid., p. 132.
military role, the head of government’s partisan powers and his legitimacy in the eyes of the military played an important role in tilting the civil-military balance of power towards the former.

5.2 Domestic Security Threats and Civil-Military Relations in Sri Lanka

It is also possible to see the importance of the head of government’s partisan powers and his/her legitimacy in the eyes of the military in Sri Lanka’s counterinsurgency policy making process. Sri Lanka is one of the rare places where civilian control over the armed forces was never interrupted despite the country’s high level of internal threat. Although the Sri Lankan state has been seriously challenged by the Liberation Tigers of the Tamil Eelam (LTTE) since the 1980s onwards, the military has not assumed a political role so far.38

The LTTE, which was established in 1976, is one of the most violent secessionist organizations. It has used terrorism, especially suicide bombings, and guerrilla warfare in order to reach its goal of forming an independent Tamil state in northeastern Sri Lanka. Figure 5.2 shows the level of threat caused by the Tamil insurgency to the Sri Lankan state from the 1980s onwards.39 It is very interesting to observe that despite the high level of threat posed by the insurgency to the Sri Lankan state, the military did not turn into a strong actor in politics.

The political alienation of the Tamils in Sri Lanka has its roots in the 1950s

38Sri Lanka also had to cope with a leftist insurrection in 1971 and 1987-1989, namely the People’s Liberation Front (JVP). However, the government suppressed these rebellions and eliminated the group in a relatively short period of time.

Figure 5.2. Number of fatalities caused by political violence in Sri Lanka over time
when British colonial rule over the island ended and the Tamil minority wanted to protect its cultural rights vis-à-vis the Sinhalese majority in the post-independence period. The alienation of the Tamils gradually advanced in the 1960s and in 1972 a low level of armed insurrection began.\(^40\) The Tamil violence escalated in the 1980s and in 1983 the killing of the LTTE “military wing” commander by the Sri Lankan security forces instigated a set of events as a result of which a series of anti-Tamil riots took place, 400 people were killed, and 100,000 were left homeless.\(^41\) The year 1983 is widely accepted as the beginning of the Tamil insurgency.

In the face of the Tamil rebellions, at first, the military did not play a very important role. Sri Lanka does not have a martial tradition. The military neither participated in great battles for its colonial ruler Britain, nor fought against it for independence. Therefore, the military did not acquire prominence in Sri Lankan state formation and politics.\(^42\) It perceived civilians as the legitimate rulers of the country and remained subservient to them.\(^43\) As a result, in the immediate aftermath of the country’s independence from British colonial rule, Sri Lanka


\(^43\) The only exception to this rule is the 1962 abortive coup attempt by a group of military and police officers. However, even in this case, the commander of the army did not know about this coup plan and those military officers part of the coup attempt did not plan on ruling the country. Instead, they wanted to replace the government with a group of former prime ministers. Moreover, there were claims about the possibility of a crucial role played by the opposition parties in this coup attempt.
did not have a large military force and what existed was mostly for ceremonial functions. The country’s “external security was guaranteed by a mutual security arrangement with Britain, while the function of internal security was usually left to the police.”

However, once the governments began to use the military in the fight against the Tamil insurgency, the military organization expanded rapidly. While the total number of the armed forces personnel was 15,000 in 1982, this number reached 75,000 in 1987. Moreover, while defense expenditure was 3.5 percent of the Sri Lankan Gross National Product in 1985, this number was 16.8 percent in 1987.

However, during Sri Lanka’s counterinsurgency campaign, the military officers continued to carry out the policies devised by civilian authorities and did not become partners in policy making.

Two heads of government who established the strongest control over Sri Lankan counterinsurgency policy making process were J. R. Jayewardene (1978-1989) from the United National Party (UNP) and Chandrika Kumaratunga (1994-2005) from the People’s Alliance (PA). Their control over counterinsurgency was strongly connected to their political strength, i.e., their strong partisan powers and their legitimacy in the eyes of the military.

Jayewardene came to office as the prime minister of Sri Lanka with the July 1977 elections, but he turned Sri Lanka into a semi-presidential system and continued his tenure as the president. During his term of office, Jayewardene mostly implemented coercive counterinsurgency policies and he ordered two major offen-


sives against the insurgents. He passed the Prevention of Terrorism Act, which gave the police drastic powers of arrest and detention. He declared states of emergency in the Tamil areas of the country. Moreover, he prohibited the members of the parliament from advocating separatism. Jayewardene also signed the India-Sri Lanka Accord in 1987, which aimed to initiate negotiations between the government and the Tamil insurgents and allowed the intervention of the Indian Peacekeeping Force (IPKF) in northern and eastern Sri Lanka. Despite these coercive policies of Jayewardene, civilian supremacy over the military continued.

One important reason for this was Jayewardene’s strength as the head of government. In the 1977 elections, the UNP won a landslide victory by receiving 50.9 percent of the votes and 140 of the 168 seats in the parliament. The UNP’s contender Sri Lanka Freedom Party won only 29.7 percent of the votes and 8 seats. Furthermore, in the 1982 presidential elections, Jayewardene won 52.9 percent of the votes, while his nearest contender received only 39.1 percent of the votes. Thus, Jayewardene came to office with a strong mandate from the public and his political party possessed a majority of seats in the parliament. What enhanced this position was his strong authority over the UNP. The UNP experienced a major defeat in the 1970 elections and Jayewardene assumed leadership in the party after this experience. From 1970 onwards, “Jayewardene departed from the personality-dominated UNP status quo. Instead, he established a strong party organization and recruited members of the younger generation, traditionally attracted to the leftist parties, to fill UNP party ranks.”


support within his political party due to these achievements and his political skills were acknowledged by the party members. When strong party discipline in the UNP was added to this mix, there was no question that Jayewardene had a strong control over his political party. Thus, President Jayewardene did not have any problems on the civilian side that could constrain his influence in policy making. In this equation, it was also important that the civilian leadership continued to have legitimacy in the eyes of the Sri Lankan military. As mentioned above, the Sri Lankan military did not assume a political role and military officers saw civilian leaders as the legitimate rulers of the country. Therefore, they did not try to assume a role in policy making in the face of the Tamil insurgency.

A similar situation existed during the presidency of Chandrika Kumaratunga of the People’s Alliance between 1994 and 2005. Kumaratunga brought important changes in Sri Lanka’s counterinsurgency campaign especially until 2001 parliamentary elections when the People’s Alliance lost its parliamentary majority. She primarily placed emphasis on initiating negotiations with the LTTE and establishing peace. She also relaxed the embargo on the LTTE-dominated areas. When these negotiations collapsed, Kumaratunga turned to coercive policies and ordered a military campaign in the LTTE heart of Jaffna with the aim of weakening the LTTE for a future settlement.48 Although negotiations resumed in 2002, Kumaratunga’s strength was compromised after the 2001 elections and she could not play a dominant role in the making of counterinsurgency policy.

Kumaratunga’s ability to establish a strong control over counterinsurgency policy between 1994 and 2001 was mainly the result of her political strength. In the 1994 parliamentary elections, her political party acquired the plurality of the

seats in the parliament. The PA won 49 percent of the votes and 105 seats in the 225-member parliament, while the UNP won 44 percent of the votes and 94 seats. Moreover, in 1994 Chandrika Kumaratunga won the presidential elections with 62.3 percent of the vote, whereas her contender Srima Dissanayake received only 35.9 percent. This gave a strong mandate to Kumaratunga. Kumaratunga’s decisive victory was not only important for its size, but also for its scope. Except for one remote area, she won in all of Sri Lanka’s polling divisions.\textsuperscript{49} This clear outcome strengthened the PA plurality in the parliament and increased the president’s legitimacy in the eyes of the opposition. The PA’s unity and the decline in intra-party factionalism at the time also helped strengthen Kumaratunga’s hand in policy making. However, Kumaratunga’s ability to control counterinsurgency policy was compromised with the 2001 parliamentary elections. In these elections the PA received only 37.2 percent of the votes and 77 seats in the parliament, while the UNP received 45.6 percent of the votes and 109 seats. The new prime minister Ranil Wickremasinghe from the UNP came to office after the elections and President Kumaratunga had to work with an opposition prime minister. This constrained her hand in policy making and she could not always convince the parliamentarians to go along with her policy preferences due to her political party’s weak position in the parliament.

In contrast to Jayewardene and Kumaratunga, President Premadasa experienced problems in policy making. Premadasa assumed presidency with a relatively narrow margin in the 1988 election. While he won 50.4 percent of the votes cast, his contender Sirimavo Bandaranaike won 45 percent of the vote. Thus, although he had a solid majority of the votes in the elections, his triumph was not as massive

and clear as Presidents Jayewardene and Kumaratunga.

The 1989 parliamentary elections presented an opportunity to President Premadasa. In these elections, Premadasa’s UNP received 50.7 percent of the votes and 125 seats, while its nearest contender the Sri Lanka Freedom Party received 31.8 percent of the votes and 67 seats. This outcome gave the UNP a majority of seats in the parliament. However, President Premadasa could not dominate the parliament. He did not have an unquestioned leadership in his political party and his actions further weakened his position in the UNP. He chose a less than competent politician as his prime minister, which led to defections within the UNP. Moreover, “[H]is preference for the support of mediocrities within the party led to factionalism and finally schism leading to open defiance.”50 Thus, he did not have the opportunity to take advantage of the available UNP cadres in the parliament. There were constant divisions in the UNP during his tenure. For example, when a notice of a motion to impeach Premadasa because of corruption, nepotism, and subverting the constitution was signed by the majority of the MPs, the UNP members Lalit Athulathmudali and Gamini Dissanayake were among the signatories.51 As a result of these problems in his partisan powers, Premadasa faced some problems in policy making and he could not implement every policy preference he had. On the other hand, President Premadasa was not highly trusted among military circles, either. However, the Sri Lankan armed forces continued to perceive the civilian politicians as the real policy makers of the country and as a result of this, they still did not think about overthrowing the government and did not

50 Adrian Wijemanne, War and Peace in Post-Colonial Ceylon (New Delhi, Orient Longman, 1996), pp. 53-54.

try to dominate the policy making process. But during Premadasa’s tenure, there was one incident where the military behaved autonomously from the civilians. In response to the president’s policy of arming the LTTE insurgents in order to help them fight against the IPKF, “behind the President’s back a military build-up took place in the eastern province to counter the growing power and influence of the LTTE there.”

All in all, this brief discussion of Sri Lanka’s counterinsurgency campaign against the LTTE shows that despite a high level of internal threat, when political strength is combined with the civilian leadership’s legitimacy in the eyes of the military, it is possible to observe civilian control over the armed forces in the area of internal security. A majority of seats in the parliament, when present with the head of government’s control over the political party that has the majority of seats, provides the head of government with the necessary instruments in policy making. On the other hand, a strong head of government, who also possesses legitimacy in the eyes of the military, usually makes the military go along with civilian preferences even when it opposes these preferences from time to time.

5.3 Domestic Security Threats and Civil-Military Relations in Indonesia

Indonesia is a country where the military has always been an important actor in politics. This situation has its roots in the key role the Indonesian army played in the War of Independence. During the War of Independence, while the civilian leaders, particularly Sukarno, searched for ways to negotiate with the Dutch, the military leaders initiated an armed struggle for Indonesian independence, which was accomplished in 1949. This created the mentality among the military officers

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52 Adrian Wijemanne, War and Peace in Post-Colonial Ceylon, p. 49.
that the armed forces were not only the executive agents, but also the shareholders of the Republic of Indonesia.\textsuperscript{53} This role belief was enhanced with the Indonesian military’s role in suppressing regional rebellions in the 1950s and communist rebellions in the 1960s.

These developments created the dual function (\textit{dwifungsi}) doctrine within the armed forces. According to this doctrine, the Indonesian military had a dual role “both as a defender of the state and as an active component of the social and political life of the state.”\textsuperscript{54} Thus, the military officers from time to time occupied positions that are usually taken by civilians in other countries, such as governorships or heads in government agencies.\textsuperscript{55}

Indonesia remained under the authoritarian rule of Suharto between 1967 and 1998. Although the military played an important political role during the initial years of Suharto’s authoritarian regime, its autonomy decreased significantly in the later years.\textsuperscript{56} Suharto had to resign from presidency in 1998 as a result of domestic and international demands for democracy as well as the negative effects of the 1997 Asian financial crisis. The post-Suharto period presents a valuable opportunity to study the impact of domestic security threats on Indonesian civil-military relations because the post-Suharto era represents a period in the Indonesian history where the state mainly witnessed internal threats rather than external ones. During this period, the Indonesian state had to deal with radical Islamists, communal

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\textsuperscript{55} Ibid., p. 10.

\textsuperscript{56} Angel Rabasa and John Haseman, \textit{The Military and Democracy in Indonesia: Challenges, Politics, and Power} (Santa Monica: RAND, 2002), pp. 36-37.
\end{flushleft}
strife, and separatist movements in Aceh and Papua. The insurgency in Aceh 
was usually considered “as the most serious current challenge to the Republic’s 
territorial integrity.”\textsuperscript{57}

Until the 19\textsuperscript{th} century, the Aceh province was an independent sultanate. However, after the Dutch left in 1949, the newly independent Indonesian state established its control over the province. The strong ethnic and religious identity of the Acehnese and Aceh’s resentment to the centralized rule of Indonesia led to the initiation of a rebellion in the mid-1970s by the Free Aceh Movement (\textit{Gerakan Aceh Merdeka}-GAM). Although the GAM violence continued in fits and starts throughout the 1980s and 1990s, the collapse of the Suharto regime gave a new life to the insurgency.\textsuperscript{58} Figure 5.3 shows the level of threat caused by the GAM to the Indonesian state from the 1990s onwards.\textsuperscript{59} In the face of the GAM, civilian control over the counterinsurgency policy making process did not disappear in the post-Suharto era and showed variation in different governmental periods.

Parliamentary and presidential elections took place in Indonesia for the first time in June and October 1999 respectively after the authoritarian rule of Suharto. In the parliamentary elections while the Megawati Sukarnoputri’s political party the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle won 33.76 percent of the votes and 153 of the 462 seats in the parliament, Habibie’s Golkar Party won 22.46 percent of the votes and 120 seats. Abdurrahman Wahid’s National Awakening Party, on the other hand, won 12.62 percent of the votes and 51 seats. Finally, the armed

\textsuperscript{57}Ibid., p. 99.

\textsuperscript{58}Ibid., pp. 99-100.

\textsuperscript{59}It is important to note that the numbers for the Aceh conflict are not very reliable and what is presented here are mostly approximate numbers. This also makes it difficult to clearly show who was responsible for the fatalities. \textit{Armed Conflicts Report}, Project Ploughshares, available at \url{http://ploughshares.ca/libraries/ACRText/ACR-TitlePageRev.htm#Preface}.

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Figure 5.3. Number of fatalities caused during the Aceh conflict in Indonesia over time
forces had 38 seats. In October 1999 Abdurrahman Wahid—the Chairman of the National Awakening Party—was elected president by members of both houses of the parliament. Wahid won 373 votes while his contender Megawati won 313 votes. As a result of this, Wahid became the President and Megawati became the Vice-President of Indonesia.

The Wahid government “launched the most courageous military reform project in many decades” during the initial years of its tenure. President Wahid appointed a well-respected civilian academic as minister of defense, dissolved a security agency, which was used for political surveillance by the military, and removed the socio-political offices of the Ministry of Interior, which served as a military bastion. In late 1999, he formed a human rights tribunal which investigated abuses conducted by military forces in East Timor during the referendum process and after this he forced Commander in Chief General Wiranto to resign from his post. Finally, the Wahid government initiated negotiations with the GAM and signed a temporary cease-fire on May 15, 2000. More importantly, the Wahid administration accomplished these things within the context of increasing communal violence in Indonesia. Between 1999 and 2001, there were ethnic and religious conflicts in several parts of the country and these conflicts resulted in the loss of thousands of lives. Moreover, the separatist movements in Aceh and Papua were

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61 Ibid.


63 Angel Rabasa and John Haseman, *The Military and Democracy in Indonesia*, p. 103
also challenging the Indonesian state during this period.

A very important reason why the Wahid government succeeded in implementing these reforms in its early years was Wahid’s strong partisan powers. In fact, Wahid’s National Awakening Party did not hold the majority of seats in the parliament. However, the coalition cabinet was formed with the participation of most of the political parties and these parties were unified for the purpose of democracy. Therefore, the Wahid government was able to act as a majority government at first and Wahid possessed the necessary tools to exert his influence in the internal security policy making process. However, although Wahid’s support base in the parliament was necessary to develop policies, his partisan powers were not sufficient to make sure that the military would go along with the civilian preferences. The latter was achieved by the military’s positive perception of President Wahid. Wahid did not have a legitimacy problem in the eyes of the military in the earlier years of his presidency. He had strong Islamic credentials, political savvy and wit and he compensated key army officers such as Wiranto, Yudhoyono, and Gumelar with cabinet posts. Moreover, the armed forces had just experienced a humiliating defeat in East Timor and there were divisions between reformist and more conservative anti-reform officers. There was a group of officers who actively supported Wahid’s efforts. That is why, the armed forces were not in a position to criticize the legitimacy of Abdurrahman Wahid in the initial years of his presidency. Instead, they complied with the civilian leadership’s policy preferences.

However, this positive environment did not last long. Over time, President

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65 Quoted in ibid.

66 Ibid., p. 20.
Wahid lost his power over the governing coalition by alienating its major members. In April 2000, he dismissed Minister of Investment and State-Owned Enterprises Laksamana Sukarni and Trade Minister Jusuf Kalla. While the former was a confidant of Vice-President Megawati, the latter was a Golkar advocate. These dismissals alienated the two largest political parties in the parliament. President Wahid did not stop at that point and continued to replace ministers from different political parties with his loyalists. This weakened President Wahid’s support base significantly.67 “Gradually excluded from power and disillusioned with the president’s leadership, the parties that had secured Wahid’s election began to unite against him.”68 This constrained President Wahid’s policy making capacity to a great extent. But what is more, after the initial years of his presidency, Wahid also lost his legitimacy in the eyes of the military. Especially from the second half of the year 2000 onwards, President Wahid began to be perceived as an erratic and incompetent leader who lost his parliamentary support among military officers. Wahid’s alleged role in financial scandals which led to several student demonstrations also showed that he was losing his public support. This further decreased the President’s legitimacy in the eyes of the military.69 As a result, some of Wahid’s reform initiatives were aborted and from the second half of 2000 onwards, the fast pace of reforms in Indonesian civil-military relations came to an almost complete stop.70 When both civilian and military leaders got united against President Wahid, on July 23, 2001, he was ousted from office with


68 Cited in Marcus Mietzner, “The Politics of Military Reform in Post-Suharto Indonesia,” p. 27.

69 Ibid.

70 Ibid., p. 28.
a vote in the parliament.

A different set of dynamics was at work during the presidency of Megawati. Megawati became the president of Indonesia when Abdurrahman Wahid was ousted from his post with a parliamentary vote. During her tenure, the military enhanced its autonomy and increased its say in national security policy making. It became a key player in policy making especially in those regions suffering from separatist movements and communal clashes.\textsuperscript{71} This mainly resulted from Megawati’s inability to have an established control over the governing coalition. Megawati’s Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle had a majority of seats in the parliament and after the oust of Wahid, “she received assurances from senior politicians that she would be allowed to serve out her term.”\textsuperscript{72} However, Megawati did not feel secure and she did not believe that she would be able to maintain her control over the government. Several political leaders who stated that they would not challenge her presidency had less than perfect relations with Megawati in the 1980s and 1990s.\textsuperscript{73} That is why, she thought that she needed an alternative support base that she could rely on to continue with her presidency. The military was a good candidate for this purpose because Megawati was widely trusted among military circles. In fact, she was considered the political mascot of the armed forces.\textsuperscript{74} Megawati was a conservative politician. She was mainly interested in the territorial integrity of Indonesia and she was unimpressed by concerns about

\textsuperscript{71}Ibid., 37.

\textsuperscript{72}Marcus Mietzner, “The Politics of Military Reform in Post-Suharto Indonesia,” p. 34.

\textsuperscript{73}Ibid., pp. 34-35.

\textsuperscript{74}Ibid., p. 45.
human rights and individual freedoms. As a result, she entered into a mutually beneficial relationship with the military. While the military’s support for Megawati guaranteed her presidency, in turn she gave certain concessions to the military officers. For example, some civilian posts were filled with military officers and the military’s budget requests were fulfilled without any difficulty. Moreover, President Megawati left the counterinsurgency policy making and implementation in Aceh largely to the military.

During this period, international pressure for democratization, particularly for the establishment of civilian control over the armed forces in Indonesia also decreased as a result of the September 11 attacks on the U.S. and the subsequent war on terror. After the September 11 attacks, the U.S. became more interested in building a multinational coalition in its war against terror. Therefore, the U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and Secretary of State Colin Powell stated that the Indonesian military had achieved an important degree of progress in its reforms and the Congress would lift restrictions on this country. As a result, “[t]he role of international pressure in promoting military reform, which had always been rather marginal in Indonesia, was now reduced to an absolute minimum.” So, a combination of Megawati’s weak partisan powers, strong legitimacy in the eyes of the military, and the lack of international pressure for democratization during her presidency produced a head of government who gave concessions to the military and increased its political role in order to provide a support base for her rule.

This period initiated a process in which military officers became key actors in politics once again and political parties began to recruit military candidates.

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75 Ibid., p. 35.

76 Ibid., pp. 40-41.
Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono was one of these retired generals and he was elected president in 2004. Yudhoyono’s most important achievement was the Helsinki Peace Accord in the Aceh conflict. This was a very important achievement because for the first time in Indonesian history, “the government was able to secure the military’s support for a negotiated settlement with separatist rebels.”\textsuperscript{77} However, this success turned out to be an isolated event during Yudhoyono’s presidency and he could not generalize these kinds of reform moves due to his weak partisan powers.

Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono had become a popular figure by the time of the 2004 parliamentary elections. However, Yudhoyono’s popularity did not bring success to his Democratic Party. The Democratic Party only received 7.5 percent of the votes and got 57 of the 550 seats in the People’s Representative Council in 2004. But this was enough for a party to have a presidential nominee. In the subsequent 2004 presidential elections, the president of Indonesia was elected with popular vote for the first time. In these elections, Yudhoyono received 60.6 percent of the votes in the second round, while his contender Megawati received 39.4 percent of the votes. Although Yudhoyono was elected president with a lot of public support, his political party did not have a majority in the parliament. As a result, Yudhoyono had to form a coalition government composed of several different political parties and he had to deal with rivalries with other political leaders throughout his presidency. Thus, he could not establish a strong control over his governing coalition and this constrained his hand in policy making. Although he had a strong authority within his Democratic Party, this was not enough.

As for the military, Yudhoyono did not have a problem of legitimacy among

\textsuperscript{77}Ibid., p. 51.
officers. However, he achieved this position mostly through concessions that he made to the military organization. He brought many retired military officers to government posts. Moreover, he was sensitive about the concerns of the military in the case of Aceh and he knew that he had to provide economic incentives to the military in order to receive its support for the negotiated settlement with the GAM. “The compensation offered to TNI [The Indonesian Military] in the form of ‘withdrawal funds’ significantly reduced the military’s opposition toward the accord.”78 But legitimacy in the eyes of the military without the necessary instruments to develop and implement policies did not help Yudhoyono to establish full civilian control over policy making. The military officers continued to have an important degree of autonomy in the decision making process.

Finally, the international pressure for democratization further decreased during the presidency of Yudhoyono and international actors did not play a role in encouraging civilian control over the military. On the contrary, the Bush administration removed the conditions that the Congress had previously established for the restoration of full military-to-military relations with Indonesia. The administration showed the U.S. national interests as the reason for this removal. 79

In sum, civilian control over the internal security policy making process showed variations in Indonesia in the post-Suharto period. A brief discussion of the Indonesian politics in the late 1990s and 2000s shows that despite the presence of internal security threats, when strong partisan powers are combined with the civilian leadership’s legitimacy in the eyes of the military, it is possible to observe civilian control over the internal security policy making process.

78Ibid., pp. 51-52.

79Ibid., p. 52.
A discussion of the dynamics of domestic security threats and civil-military relations in Israel, Sri Lanka, and Indonesia shows that the theory of dynamic civil-military interaction developed in this dissertation has a potential validity in other parts of the world. Based on the analyses of these countries, it is once again possible to observe that there is not an automatic relationship between internal threats and the military’s involvement in politics. Similar to the experiences in Turkey and Peru, in Israel, Sri Lanka, and Indonesia, it was clearly observed that when strong governments are accompanied with the civilian leadership’s legitimacy in the eyes of the military, there is a higher likelihood for the establishment of civilian control over the armed forces in the area of internal security policy making.
CHAPTER 6

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

6.1 Summary of the Findings

In light of a comparative case study of Turkey and Peru, this dissertation developed a theory of dynamic civil-military interaction, which accounted for the conditions under which civilian leaders are more likely to exert control over the internal security policy making process in the face of internal threats. The main goal was to present an explanation for why the degree of civilian control over internal security policy making varied in Turkey and Peru in different governmental periods although both of these countries had to cope with acute internal security problems from the 1980s onwards.

This dissertation showed that contrary to the conventional wisdom in the civil-military relations literature, the presence or degree of threat is not a sufficient variable to explain the military’s role in politics. Instead, it is the interaction of strategic choices made by civilian leaders and military organizations in domestic threat environments that lead to different outcomes in civil-military relations. In other words, domestic security threats to the state lead to different degrees of civilian control over the armed forces across time and space because internal security policies are formed as a result of a strategic interaction between civilian governments and the armed forces. Thus the consequent balance of power between
the civilians and the military does not always favor the latter. This civil-military interaction is mainly shaped by the strength of the head of government, the civilian leadership’s legitimacy in the eyes of the military, and the extent of international pressure for democratization.

Among these three factors, the strength of the head of government (IV₁) and the civilian leadership’s legitimacy in the eyes of the military (IV₂) together constitute the necessary conditions for the realization of civilian control over the armed forces in the area of internal security policy making. When both of these conditions are present, it is highly likely that the civilian leaders will establish control over the military, particularly in the area of internal security. The international pressure for democratization is, on the other hand, a supporting condition, which either enhances the likelihood of civilian control in those cases where both IV₁ and IV₂ are present or compensates the lack of one of these variables.

With a systematic longitudinal analysis of the change in the level of threat and change in the level of civilian control over the counterinsurgency policy making process in Turkey and Peru, Chapter 2 demonstrated that there was not a perfect inverse correlation between these two variables. A change in the level of threat did not bring an automatic change in the level of civilian control in these two countries. Thus, this chapter showed that the domestic and international contexts within which internal threats are perceived and responded to play an important role in shaping civil-military relations.

Chapters 3 and 4 applied the theory of dynamic civil-military interaction to the cases of Turkey and Peru. Three observations from Peru and four observations from Turkey showed that those heads of governments who had strong partisan powers and a high legitimacy in the eyes of the military had a better chance
to establish their control over the counterinsurgency policy making process even when they faced domestic security threats.\footnote{As mentioned in Chapter 1, in addition to the partisan powers, constitutional powers over legislation can also be an important variable in determining the strength of the head of governments, especially when the head of government has a policy making ability independent of the parliament. However, this dissertation did not focus on this variable since this was not the case of Turkey and Peru and there was not a significant variation in constitutional powers of the head of governments in these countries.} For example, first Prime Minister and then President Turgut Özal exerted a tremendous influence over the Turkish armed forces in the area of counterinsurgency between 1987 and 1991 mainly because during this period his political party ANAP possessed 64.9 percent of the seats in the parliament and Özal had an established authority over ANAP. Moreover, the military was well aware of Turgut Özal’s courageous and effective leadership characteristics. Therefore, military officers preferred to go along with civilian preferences even when they opposed to many of these policies. Similarly, in Peru, President Alán García Perez succeeded in establishing a high level of civilian control over the counterinsurgency policy making process when he first came to office. This had a lot to do with the APRA’s majority of seats in the Congress in 1985 and García’s strong authority over the APRA. Moreover, the Peruvian armed forces were impressed by the support Alán García had among the public in 1985. Therefore, President García did not have a problem establishing his control over the counterinsurgency policy making process when at the beginning of his presidency. The military officers decided to go along with his preferences in counterinsurgency even when they opposed to some of these policies such as the strong emphasis García placed on the respect for human rights in the fight against the Shining Path.

The study of Turkish and Peruvian counterinsurgency campaigns also showed that when the heads of government did not have strong partisan powers or when
they did not have legitimacy in the eyes of the military, they usually experienced problems with exerting their influence over the policy making process. Tansu Çiller and Bülent Ecevit governments had this problem in Turkey in the 1990s. Both of these prime ministers headed coalition governments. Thus, their political parties did not have a majority of seats in the parliament. In addition to this constraint, Tansu Çiller was also perceived as an inexperienced leader who did not know much about governance among both civilian and military elites. Thus, Turkey’s fight against the PKK remained mostly under the control of the Turkish military during their tenures. This was an interesting outcome especially for the prime ministry of Ecevit in the DSP-MHP-ANAP coalition government between 1999 and 2002 because in the aftermath of Abdullah Öcalan’s capture in 1999, the PKK threat decreased significantly. The threat-based theories would expect an important increase in civilian control over the military during this period. A similar situation took place in Peru in the second half of Fernando Belaúnde’s and Álán García’s presidencies. Presidents Belaúnde and García had problems with their legitimacy in the eyes of the military in the later years of their tenures and this significantly constrained their hand in policy making. These periods witnessed an important increase in the military’s autonomy in counterinsurgency policy making.

An interesting finding that came out of the analyses of Turkish and Peruvian counterinsurgency experiences was that in those time periods where the civilian leader did not have the necessary instruments for making policies, but had legitimacy in the eyes of the military, it was possible to observe a tendency on the part of the civilian leaders to use the military as a support base in order to guarantee their political survival. The best example for this situation was the presidency of
Alberto Fujimori. When Fujimori came to office, his political party, Change 90, did not have a majority in the Congress. Moreover, Change 90 was composed of inexperienced and incompetent politicians who did not have the ability to unite for the purpose of policy. Thus, Fujimori did not have the necessary instruments to influence policy. As a weak head of government, he had to face the real possibility of a military takeover. In order to overcome this problem, Fujimori entered into a marriage of convenience with the armed forces and used them as a support base. Fujimori carried out an *autogolpe* against his own Congress in April 1992 with the support of the military and by this way, he removed the constraints in front of his policy making. In the civil-military partnership regime that governed Peru throughout Fujimori’s presidency between 1990 and 1995, Fujimori managed to establish a moderate degree of control over the military in the area of counterinsurgency. However, this happened with the direction of his unofficial national security advisor Montesinos who helped him establish a system of cooption within the armed forces.

Tansu Çiller in Turkey experienced a similar situation. When she became the prime minister of Turkey in 1993, she had to lead a coalition government. Thus, her political party did not have a majority of seats in the parliament. There was not a unity of purpose between the coalition partners. Moreover, although Tansu Çiller was recently elected as the chairman of her political party, this was mostly the result of intra-party struggles and she did not have a support base within her political party. Therefore, when she came to office, she neither had supporters in her party that she could rely on to make policies, not had a majority of seats in the parliament to easily pass legislation. As a result, she could not implement the policies she had in mind to resolve the Kurdish question and she ended up turning
to the military for support in the fight against the PKK. In return, the military increased its autonomy in the fight against the PKK and Çiller did not have much contribution to the policy making process in the rest of her prime ministry.

One final conclusion that was derived from the analyses of Turkey’s and Peru’s fight against the insurgents was about the impact of international actors. Chapters 3 and 4 showed that international actors could play an important role in facilitating civilian control over the armed forces in the area of counterinsurgency. However, this role is most effective when these actors had a system of regular monitoring with clear incentives and sanctions. Turkey’s EU membership process provided this extensive mechanism, while in Peru a similar system did not exist. Even when the US and the OAS criticized Fujimori for his autogolpe in 1992, their pressure was mostly for the conduct of elections and opening of the Congress and did not involve deeper issues such as the reform of civil-military relations. However, even in those cases where an extensive and systematic international pressure was present, this mostly acted as a supporting condition. International pressure either enhanced the likelihood of civilian control in those cases where both there was a strong political leader in government and this political leader had a high level of legitimacy in the eyes of the military, or compensated the lack of one of these factors. For example, in his first term as the prime minister of Turkey, Tayyip Erdoğan was a strong head of government who had an established authority over his political party and whose political party had a majority of seats in the parliament. However, due to his Islamist roots, he was suffering from a low level of legitimacy in the eyes of the military. During this period, the EU’s pressure for democratization in Turkey strengthened Tayyip Erdoğan’s hand and helped him implement reforms that granted a number of cultural rights to the
Kurds and that decreased the military’s role in national security policy making. Since there was a strong public support for Turkey’s EU membership during this period, the Turkish military, which saw itself as the representative of the will of the nation, did not want to block the accession process and preferred to go along with civilian preferences.

After the detailed analyses of the experiences of Turkey and Peru in the fight against domestic security threats, Chapter 5 presented a discussion of three additional cases, namely Israel, Sri Lanka, and Indonesia. These cases were chosen because these countries experienced different levels of civilian control over their militaries in the face of domestic security threats. While in Sri Lanka civilian control remained intact, in Indonesia the armed forces sometimes challenged civilian governments in the face of domestic security threats. On the other hand in Israel, a civil-military partnership in national security policy making developed over time. An analysis of these countries clearly showed that the arguments developed in this dissertation are not only applicable to the cases of Turkey and Peru and have significant potential to explain the experiences of other countries that experience domestic security threats. Similar to what happened in Turkey and Peru, it was observed that in Israel, Sri Lanka, and Indonesia, those heads of governments who had strong partisan powers and a strong legitimacy in the eyes of the military were more successful in establishing their control over the military in internal security policy making.

6.2 Contributions

This dissertation provides a number of important contributions to the existing political science literature. First, as mentioned throughout this study, it challenges
the conventional wisdom in the civil-military relations literature that domestic security threats inevitably increase the role of the military in politics. The detailed study of the Turkish and Peruvian counterinsurgency campaigns, as well as the discussion of the relationship between domestic security threats and civil-military relations in Israel, Sri Lanka, and Indonesia showed that the presence or degree of threat is not sufficient to explain the military’s involvement in politics. The domestic and international contexts within which states perceive and respond to internal threats play a very important role in shaping the civil-military balance of power. More specifically, the strength of the head of government, civilian leadership’s legitimacy in the eyes of the military, and extensive and systematic international pressure for democratization are factors that significantly increase the likelihood of civilian control over the armed forces in the area of internal security.

Second, this study of civil-military relations in Turkey and Peru shows that although politicians seek to gain and maintain office most of the time, in those countries where the military is a strong political actor, politicians have to take into account this reality. In these countries, while on the one hand, electoral competition forces politicians to focus on increasing their votes, on the other hand, their need to share the political arena with the military compels them to develop strategies that will make coups d’état more costly for military officers. Therefore, in countries with strong politicized militaries, the politicians’ goal of gaining and maintaining office not only forces them to develop policies that will help increase their public support, but also build an accompanying coexistence strategy with the armed forces.

Third, this dissertation contributes to the political science scholarship by pre-
senting a comparative study of Peru, a Latin American country, and Turkey, which
is geographically and historically located between the Middle East and Southeast
Europe. Although a number of scholars and journalists have acknowledged Turkey
and Peru’s similar experiences in their fights against domestic security threats be-
fore, this is the first study that theoretically and systematically explored this
relationship. Thus, this dissertation not only took advantage of a long-neglected
opportunity these countries provided for comparison, but also became one of the
several studies that showed the value of cross-regional works in political science.
It is important to keep in mind that sometimes countries with quite different geo-
graphical and historical conditions could present valuable contexts to understand
broader political phenomena in light of their similar experiences in certain areas.

Fourth, this study makes an important contribution to the scholarship on
Turkish politics by presenting a theoretical analysis about the relationship between
the fight against the PKK and civil-military relations in Turkey. Although this
connection is mentioned or discussed in several places, this dissertation is one of
the very few studies that systematically explored how Turkey’s fight against the
PKK has affected civil-military relations in this country from the 1980s onwards.

Finally, this dissertation demonstrates the importance of developing system-
atic measures of civilian control in studies of civil-military relations. The results of
the expert surveys presented in Chapter 2 show that the concept of civilian control
is perceived and measured quite differently by different scholars and practition-
ers of Turkish and Peruvian politics. Therefore, intuitive assessments of civilian
control are likely to produce inconsistent measures. Thus, this research attracts
attention to the importance of the need to formulate systematic assessments of
civilian control in civil-military relations studies in order to reach theoretically
and empirically useful findings.

6.3 Directions for Further Research

The research conducted for this dissertation brought to light the necessity for further research in a number of topics. First, by demonstrating that a change in the level of internal threat did not bring an automatic change in the level of civilian control over internal security in Turkey and Peru, this dissertation made it essential to broaden the scope of this research to more countries in order to see whether the civil-military dynamics explained here can be generalizable to other countries. Chapter 5 made an initial effort to understand this. This chapter explored the potential validity of the theory developed in this dissertation for three countries other than Turkey and Peru. The discussions of Israel, Sri Lanka, and Indonesia showed clear potential for the usefulness of the arguments developed in this dissertation for other countries. Thus, it is necessary to expand the scope of this dissertation to other cases in the future and carry out a systematic analysis about whether the theory of dynamic civil-military interaction has a more general applicability than presented here.

Second, throughout this dissertation, a major task was to examine the behavior of Turkish and Peruvian militaries in response to domestic security threats and to understand how they responded to civilian policy preferences in light of their institutional culture and interests. For the purposes of this study, the internal dynamics of the military organizations were not analyzed in detail. However, considering the rise of low-intensity conflicts around the world, an important area of research today is the change in intra-military dynamics within the context of internal threats. An important aspect of this is the change the military organiza-
tions go through in responding to domestic security threats. Therefore, a possible direction for future research is to explore what triggers military innovation and learning, how militaries adapt to unconventional types of warfare, and why different directions of change and innovation are pursued by military organizations under different domestic and international circumstances.

A final direction for future research is a more extensive study of the impact of domestic security threats on the formation and evolution of state institutions. State formation scholars have so far created a rich literature on the connection between interstate war and the evolution of the state (Hintze 1975, Tilly 1975, Mann 1986, Ertman 1997, Downing 1992, Barnett 1992). However, with respect to intrastate conflict and wars, scholars have produced contradictory accounts. While a number of authors argue that internal threats have similar influences on the state’s extractive capacity as interstate wars, i.e., the presence of internal threats leads to an increase in the state’s ability to collect taxes (Cohen, Brown, and Organski 1981, David 1991, Stubbs 1999), others contend that domestic security threats tend to decrease the capacity of a state by causing fragmentation among the population (Herbst 2000) and undermining its fiscal power (Jackson and Rosberg 1982, Herbst 1990). Therefore, it is imperative to explore the actual connection between internal wars and state institutions and account for why domestic security threats lead to different degrees of state capacity and different types of state institutions under different conditions.
APPENDIX A

LIST OF INTERVIEWS CONDUCTED IN TURKEY AND PERU

• Yılmaz Aklar. Retired colonel, Turkish Armed Forces; Secretary General of the Eurasian Strategic Research Center, Ankara, Turkey. Ankara: July 20, 2006; July 10, 2007.

• Ciro Alegría Varona. Professor of Philosophy, Pontifical Catholic University of Peru; Head of the Peruvian Truth and Reconciliation Commission’s investigation of the armed forces. Lima: August 14, 2007.


• Rolando Ames Cobían. Professor of Sociology, Pontifical Catholic University of Peru; Former Senator as an independent within the United Left Front (1985-1990); Chairman of the Investigatory Commission of the Congress on the prison massacre in 1986


• Recai Birgün. DSP İzmir Representative in the 23rd TGNA; Former police officer who worked for the General Directorate of Security at various ranks.


• Ercan Çitlioglu. President, Strategic Research Center, Bahçeşehir University, İstanbul, Turkey. İstanbul: January 14, 2008.

• İhsan Dağı. Professor of International Relations, Middle East Technical University, Ankara, Turkey. Ankara: January 6, 2009.


• Yalım Eralp. Former ambassador; Advisor to Tansu Çiller. İstanbul: June 11, 2007.

• Hasan Erçelebi. DSP Denizli Representative in the 23rd TGNA. Ankara: January 8, 2008.


• Erhan Göksel. Former Advisor to Turgut Özal, Tansu Çiller, Mesut Yılmaz, and Süleyman Demirel; President of Verso Political Research Center. Ankara:


- Ersin Kalaycıoğlu. Professor of Political Science at Sabancı University, İstanbu, Turkey. Istanbul: June 21, 2007.


• Retired Colonel of the Turkish Armed Forces who requested anonymity. Ankara: January 8, 2007.


• Özay Şendir. Journalist. İstanbul: December 24, 2006; December 31, 2008.


• Martín Tanaka. Professor of Sociology, Pontifical Catholic University of Peru; Researcher, Institute of Peruvian Studies. Lima: August 15, 2007.


• Masum Türker. DSP İstanbul Representative in the 21st TGNA; Former Minister of state. Ankara: January 11, 2008.

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