MODERN FORMS OF PREJUDICE IN THE SOCIAL DOMINANCE

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: POSITIVELY VALENCED ATTITUDES AS HIERARCHY-ENHANCING LEGITIMIZING MYTHS

A Dissertation

Submitted to the Graduate School
of the University of Notre Dame
in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements
for the Degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

by

Nelson Eugene Walls, B.A., M.S.S.W., M.A.

Daniel J. Myers, Director

Graduate Program in Sociology
Notre Dame, Indiana
July 2005
The dissertation examines the functioning of modern forms of prejudice as legitimizing myths within the social dominance theoretical framework, with a particular focus on positive stereotypes and other non-hostilely valenced prejudices. Numerous scholars have suggested that positively-valenced stereotypes and attitudes play an important role in the maintenance and support of social stratification, particularly in the social context when more hostile forms of these prejudices have become increasingly stigmatized. However, little empirical work has been completed to test this supposition and what work has been done has tended to focus on racial and ethnic prejudice.
Using ambivalent sexism and modern heterosexism as exemplars, the dissertation finds mixed support for the hypothesis that modern forms of prejudice function as hierarchy-enhancing legitimizing myth as suggested by social dominance theory. The protective paternalism subcomponent of ambivalent sexism, aversive heterosexism, and amnestic heterosexism function, for the most part, in the manner predicted by social dominance theory. However, the gender differentiation and heterosexual intimacy subcomponents of ambivalent sexism, paternalistic heterosexism, and positive stereotypic heterosexism do not.

Additionally, the dissertation uncovers a pattern whereby the opposition to equality subdomain of social dominance orientation predicts opposition to ameliorative public policies, but not subdomains of hostile or modern forms of prejudice. Conversely, the group-based dominance subdomain of social dominance orientation predicts subdomains of hostile and modern forms of prejudice, but not opposition to ameliorative public policies.
CONTENTS

LIST OF FIGURES .................................................................................................................. vi

LIST OF TABLES ................................................................................................................... ix

PREFACE ................................................................................................................................ xii

CHAPTER 1: AN INTRODUCTION TO SOCIAL DOMINANCE AND MODERN PREJUDICE THEORIES

1.1 Modern Prejudice ........................................................................................................... 3

1.2 Social Dominance Theory .......................................................................................... 12

1.3 Prejudice and Social Dominance Theory .................................................................... 20

CHAPTER 2: METHODOLOGY, SAMPLE, AND METHODOLOGICAL LIMITATIONS

2.1 Overview ....................................................................................................................... 23

2.2 Sample ......................................................................................................................... 23

2.3 Research Protocol ....................................................................................................... 26

2.4 Measures and Instruments ......................................................................................... 30

2.5 Study Limitations ....................................................................................................... 39

CHAPTER 3: CONCERNS ABOUT THE SOCIAL DOMINANCE ORIENTATION SCALE

3.1 Overview ....................................................................................................................... 46

3.2 Social Dominance Orientation and Measures of Prejudice ....................................... 47

3.3 Hypotheses .................................................................................................................. 50

3.4 Results ......................................................................................................................... 56
CHAPTER 6: SOCIAL DOMINANCE THEORY, SUBDOMAINS OF HETEROSEXISM, AND SUPPORT FOR LESBIAN AND GAY RIGHTS

6.1 Overview ........................................................................................................................................204
6.2 Social Dominance Theory and Heterosexism .............................................................................205
6.3 Heterosexism and Support/Opposition to Lesbian and Gay Rights ..........................................207
6.4 Social Dominance Theory and Ameliorative Public Policies ..................................................209
6.5 Hypotheses .....................................................................................................................................209
6.6 Sample, Measures and Research Protocol .................................................................................214
6.7 Results ..........................................................................................................................................214
6.8 A System of Heterosexisms ..........................................................................................................227
6.9 Conclusion .....................................................................................................................................232

CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSION

7.1 Social Dominance Orientation .......................................................................................................233
7.2 Modern Heterosexism ..................................................................................................................235
7.3 Modern Prejudice as Hierarchy-enhancing Legitimizing Myths .................................................236
7.4 Future Research .............................................................................................................................237
7.5 In Closing .....................................................................................................................................240

REFERENCES ......................................................................................................................................242

APPENDIX I: SOCIAL DOMINANCE ORIENTATION SCALE .........................................................275
LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1.1: The Effects of Social Dominance Orientation on Hierarchy-enhancing and Hierarchy-attenuating Social Policies as Mediated by Hierarchy-enhancing and Hierarchy-attenuating Legitimizing Myths ..................................................17

Figure 3.1: One Factor Model of the Social Dominance Orientation Scale ...............78

Figure 3.2: Two Factor Model of the Social Dominance Orientation Scale ...............84

Figure 4.1: Correlational Structure of the Subscales of the Multidimensional Heterosexism Inventory (v.3) ..................................................................................143

Figure 5.1: One Factor Model of Gender Equity Policies ........................................178

Figure 5.2: Three Factor Model of Gender Equity Policies......................................179

Figure 5.3: The Predicted Relationship between the One Factor and Two Factor Models of the Social Dominance Orientation Scale, Sexism, and Gender Equity Policies ..................................................................................185

Figure 5.4: The Role of Hostile Sexism as a Mediating Factor in the Relationship between the One Factor Model of Social Dominance Orientation and Support for (A) Women’s Rights, (B) Affirmative Action, and (C) Abortion Rights.................................................................186

Figure 5.5: The Role of Hostile Sexism as a Mediating Factor in the Relationship between the Two Factor Model of Social Dominance Orientation and Support for (A) Women’s Rights, (B) Affirmative Action, and (C) Abortion Rights.................................................................189

Figure 5.6: The Role of Benevolent Sexism as a Mediating Factor in the Relationship between the One Factor Model of Social Dominance Orientation and Support for (A) Women’s Rights, (B) Affirmative Action, and (C) Abortion Rights........................................................................192

Figure 5.7: The Role of Benevolent Sexism as a Mediating Factor in the Relationship between the Two Factor Model of Social Dominance Orientation and Support for (A) Women’s Rights, (B) Affirmative Action, and (C) Abortion Rights........................................................................193
Figure 5.8: The Role of Three Subcomponents of Benevolent Sexism as Mediating Factors in the Relationship between the Two Factor Model of Social Dominance Orientation and Support for (A) Women’s Rights, and (B) Affirmative Action .................................................................195

Figure 5.9: The Role of Three Subcomponents of Benevolent Sexism as Mediating Factors in the Relationship between the Two Factor Model of Social Dominance Orientation and Support for Abortion Rights ....................198

Figure 6.1: The Role of Hostile Heterosexism as a Mediating Factor in the Relationship between the One Factor Model of Social Dominance Orientation and Support for Lesbian and Gay Rights .................217

Figure 6.2: The Role of Hostile Heterosexism as a Mediating Factor in the Relationship between the Two Factor Model of Social Dominance Orientation and Support for Lesbian and Gay Rights ..........................218

Figure 6.3: The Role of Aversive Heterosexism as a Mediating Factor in the Relationship between the One Factor Model of Social Dominance Orientation and Support for Lesbian and Gay Rights ...................220

Figure 6.4: The Role of Aversive Heterosexism as a Mediating Factor in the Relationship between the Two Factor Model of Social Dominance Orientation and Support for Lesbian and Gay Rights .................221

Figure 6.5: The Role of Amnestic Heterosexism as a Mediating Factor in the Relationship between the One Factor Model of Social Dominance Orientation and Support for Lesbian and Gay Rights .....................222

Figure 6.6: The Role of Amnestic Heterosexism as a Mediating Factor in the Relationship between the Two Factor Model of Social Dominance Orientation and Support for Lesbian and Gay Rights .....................223

Figure 6.7: The Role of Paternalistic Heterosexism as a Mediating Factor in the Relationship between the One Factor Model of Social Dominance Orientation and Support for Lesbian and Gay Rights .....................224

Figure 6.8: The Role of Paternalistic Heterosexism as a Mediating Factor in the Relationship between the Two Factor Model of Social Dominance Orientation and Support for Lesbian and Gay Rights .....................225

Figure 6.9: The Role of Positive Stereotypic Heterosexism as a Mediating Factor in the Relationship between the One Factor Model of Social Dominance Orientation and Support for Lesbian and Gay Rights .....................226
Figure 6.10: The Role of Positive Stereotypic Heterosexism as a Mediating Factor in the Relationship between the Two Factor Model of Social Dominance Orientation and Support for Lesbian and Gay Rights.........................................................227

Figure 6.11: The Role of All Subdomains of Heterosexism as Mediating Factors in the Relationship between the Two Factor Model of Social Dominance Orientation and Support for Lesbian and Gay Rights.........................................................229
LIST OF TABLES

Table 1.1: Four Types of Out-groups and Types of Prejudice as a Function of Perceived Warmth and Competence ................................................................. 4

Table 2.1: Regression of Composite Prejudice Measure on Four Predictors ............... 42

Table 3.1: Percentage of Participants Thinking about Each Social Group while Completing the Social Dominance Orientation Measure .................................. 57

Table 3.2: Regression Analyses Predicting Percentage of Time Thinking about Social Groups while Completing the Social Dominance Orientation Measure on Experimental Condition ............................................................... 59

Table 3.3: Regression Analyses for Social Dominance Orientation Measure on Hostile Prejudice and Percentage of Time Thinking about Social Groups, by Experimental Condition ............................................................... 61

Table 3.4: Regression Analyses for Social Dominance Orientation Measure on Hostile Sexism and Hostile Heterosexism, by Experimental Condition .......... 63

Table 3.5: Correlations, Variances, and Discrepancies of the One Factor Solution of the Social Dominance Orientation Scale .................................................. 82

Table 3.6: Discrepancies of the Two Factor Solution of the Social Dominance Orientation Scale .......................................................................................... 85

Table 3.7: Correlations between the Opposition to Equality and Group-based Dominance Subdomains, by Gender, by Experimental Condition ...................... 86

Table 3.8: Regression Analyses of Political Conservatism on Opposition to Equality and Group-based Dominance, Full Sample and by Gender ..................... 89

Table 3.9: Regression Analyses of Political Conservatism on Opposition to Equality and Group-based Dominance Subscales, Male Sample by Race .......... 90

Table 3.10: Regression Analyses of Support for Gendered Affirmative Action on Opposition to Equality and Group-based Dominance Subscale, Full Sample and by Gender ......................................................... 92
Table 3.11: Regression Analyses of Belief that the U.S. Provides Equal Opportunity to All on Opposition to Equality and Group-based Dominance Subscales, Full Sample and by Gender ..............................................95

Table 3.12: Regression Analyses of Belief that the Gender Stratification System is Fair on Opposition to Equality and Group-based Dominance Subscales ..........96

Table 4.1: Regression Analyses of Apathetic Heterosexism (MHI, v.3) on Political Ideology, and Religious Tradition .................................................................135

Table 4.2: Regression Analyses of Paternalistic Heterosexism (MHI, v.3) on Having Lesbian/Gay Friends or Casual Acquaintances, and Political Ideology ........................................................................................................138

Table 4.3: Regression Analyses of Positive Stereotypic Heterosexism (MHI, v.3) on Gender and Gendered Interests ............................................................................140

Table 4.4: Correlations between Subscales of the Multidimensional Heterosexism Inventory (MHI, v.3) .........................................................................................142

Table 4.5: Items and Factor Loadings of the Multidimensional Heterosexism Inventory (MHI, v.4) .............................................................................................149-151

Table 4.6: Regression Analyses of Aversive Heterosexism (MHI, v.4) on Political Ideology, Religious Tradition, and Hostile Sexism .............................................154

Table 4.7: Regression Analyses of Amnestic Heterosexism (MHI, v.4) on Political Ideology, Religious Tradition, and Hostile Sexism ..............................................155

Table 4.8: Regression Analyses of Paternalistic Heterosexism (MHI, v.4) on Political Ideology, and Hostile Sexism ........................................................................156

Table 4.9: Regression Analyses on Positive Stereotypic Heterosexism (MHI, v.4) on Gender, Hostile Sexism, and Political Ideology .............................................160

Table 5.1: Summary of the Relationships between Social Dominance Orientation Subdomains, Hostile Sexism, and Gender Equity Politics ........................................199

Table 5.2: Summary of the Relationships between Social Dominance Orientation Subdomains, Subcomponents of Benevolent Sexism, and Gender Equity Politics ........................................................................................................200

Table 6.1: Summary of Findings Regarding Relationships between Social Dominance Orientation, Subdomains of Heterosexism, and Support for Lesbian and Gay Rights ...........................................................................................................228
Table 6.2: Findings Regarding Relationships between Social Dominance Orientation, Subdomains of Heterosexism, and Support for Lesbian and Gay Rights, as a System of Heterosexisms ................................................................. 231
PREFACE

The topics of racism, sexism, and heterosexism (along with numerous other clusters of prejudicial attitudes) have been topics of considerable research in the social sciences for a number of decades. The prevalence and staying power of prejudicial attitudes toward groups that are – in some way – different from ourselves is a complex topic with many layers. Some have sought explanations in evolutionary processes or pre-conscious cognitive processes, while others have examined societal norms or conscious attitudes and belief systems. In reality, attitudes toward “the other” are, no doubt, intertwined among all of these layers, and are, likewise, embedded in systems of social structure.

Neither psychology, nor sociology – nor the nexus between the two disciplines, social psychology – have the one answer that is the key to understanding human prejudice. While this work attempts to draw on work done in all three social sciences, with additional insight from political science, it is, admittedly, only one small drop in an ocean of research that attempts to make sense of this topic, and scholars from both disciplines will likely have issues with some of the choices made and conclusions drawn. Regardless, my hope is that this represents the first step in a personal research agenda that continues to examine prejudicial attitudes that fall outside the more traditional hostile attitudes toward social groups.

The thought that positive stereotypes or paternalistic attitudes may have an important role to play in maintaining social stratification is not a particularly optimistic
one. After all, given the difficulty we humans have had in dislodging the most hostile and violent forms of prejudice, the task of undoing positively-valenced prejudicial attitudes seems particularly daunting. Until we can, however, understand the ways in which these less negatively-valenced attitudes play a role in maintaining systems of inequity, we cannot hope to begin dismantling them or the discriminatory behaviors associated with them. While there are a number of scholars who concur that positively-valenced attitudes can and do play a role in maintaining social stratification, there are others who argue vigorously that this is not the case. I look forward to participating in this ongoing debate.

This dissertation represents the culmination of work undertaken over the last few years, and while my name is emboldened across the title page, in reality it is the outcome of countless hours of work put in by many others as well. In the five years of my graduate experience, I have been supported and challenged by many people along the way. Without them I would not be where I am today, and it is more a testament to their belief in me and to their willingness to engage me that I have made it this far. Would it were that everyone had the kind of support that I have been fortunate enough to find along this path.

First, I would like to thank my committee members for their feedback, their consultations, and their patience with my process as I have worked on this project. As an outside chair, Susan Blum not only performed her duties admirably, but provided feedback and ideas on the content of my work.

Before he had even arrived on campus, Michael Emerson agreed to sit on my committee, and helped me fashion a series of questions that ended up in my final survey. While he may not have realized it, his struggle to live his life in a manner that does not
tacitly comply with the institutional racism that he studies is inspiring, and reminds me to make life choices that challenge the white male privilege that has, no doubt, played a role in many of the “successes” in my life.

I thank Rich Williams for his willingness to endure countless questions about structural equation modeling and LISREL, as well as his consistent challenge to me to understand my work in relation to its application to the world around us. His guidance through my learning curve as I struggled with both conceptual and empirical snags, his dry wit, and his constant, quiet passion has been an amazing voice of reason during my tenure at Notre Dame.

There is no possible way that I can convey my indebtedness to Felicia LeClere, and this accounting will fall far short of the actual credit she deserves. In very pragmatic ways, she gave me many of the tools that I needed for this journey. She provided me with many material supports – an office, a computer, supplies, access to a server on which I could house my online survey, and much more. She challenged me intellectually, pushed me to clarify my ideas, argued with me (endlessly at times) about the meaning of survey non-response and other such esoteric methodological issues, and supported my choices even when they were somewhat unorthodox. Felicia’s courage, grace, sense of humor, and dogged refusal to allow her voice to be silenced continues to call me to a higher ground of authenticity, knowing full well that such a life lived has costs. Her departure from Notre Dame is a huge loss for the University, the Department of Sociology, and for the many students whose lives she would have touched.

For his encouragement and unwavering faith in me, I am deeply thankful to my advisor, colleague, and friend, Dan Myers. He has given me numerous opportunities that
have helped me grow as both a researcher and a teacher. He has steadfastly and
courageously created a space for me to do work on sexuality in an environment that
constantly justifies and legitimizes anti-lesbian/anti-gay attitudes and institutional
behaviors. Dan willingly co-sponsored the Queer Studies Reading and Research Group
with me, knowing full well that in doing so he placed himself at odds with the University
of Notre Dame administration. For being an unflattering ally, I am thankful beyond words.

In addition to my dissertation committee, others have also played an instrumental
role in this accomplishment. For sharing her experience and knowledge regarding CDML
and Filemaker Pro – without which I would have been unable to use the Internet-based
survey – I am deeply indebted to Elizabeth Tucker in the Laboratory for Social Research.
And, for always being supportive in so many ways, my appreciation goes out to Carla
May, Pat Kipker, and Katie Schlodtfeldt. All three have made my passage through these
halls one of joy and laughter.

There are countless individuals who played key roles in the data collection
process and for their cooperation and assistance I am also thankful. They include
Stephanie Arnett, Karen Boyd, Brandy Ellison, Carrie Erlin, David Hachen, Carol Jarvis,
Basia Karwaciniski, Benedict Ngala, Carolette Norwood, Jerry Park, Joe Rumbo, Eric
Stromberg, Kevin Tholin, and Maureen Wynne. Without the support of these folks, this
study would not exist.

In addition to research, teaching has been an important focus for me during my
graduate tenure. I am inspired by the faith of those who gave me opportunities to begin to
develop the craft of teaching, offering their insights, wisdom and encouragement along
the way. For those opportunities, I thank Susan Alexander, Scott Sernau, Mike Keen,
Jeanne Leichty, Lisa Hardy, Carol Jarvis, Catherine Shoupe, Fran Kominkiewicz, and Dan Myers. My teaching has benefited from their input and their experience.

I have encountered many wonderful people in my five years in graduate school who have made this time memorable, and who have reminded me that the most important joys are more frequently found in the process, than in the outcome. Among those who have walked with me during this time are Eric Sartain and Brooke Dezio, Brandy Ellison, Matt and Joy Loveland, Matt Larner, Maria-Elena and Paul Diaz, Rob Bossarte, Beth Boehne and Mark Bottita, David Ortiz and Stephanie Arnett, Roshin Sen, Sarah MacMillen, Keely Jones, Astrid Henry, Karen Boyd, Tom King, Stacey Tiberio, Mike Lau, Mignon Montpetit, Angie Krumm and Chris Gonzales, Susan and Brett Alexander, Dan Brinks, Mary Porter, Martha Carroll and Sandra Stratton, Beth and Terry Morlock, and Judy Spigle. Thank you for all of the kindness, fun, and warmth you have shared.

Finally, I would like to thank two individuals who call me to be so much more than I could have ever imagined myself being. I do not possess the words to express my love nor the depth of my appreciation to Robert Rodriguez – a truly amazing man and dear friend – who has seen me through times of painful change and (hopefully) growth. I am eternally grateful for all that he has given me, and for all the ways in which he has supported and cared for me. More than any other, he knows me – and that is a frightening and yet wonderful realization that anchors me.

In sometimes surprising ways, people have arrived in my life to hold my hand as I move from one segment of my life that is coming to a close into a new one, helping me bridge the gap from where I was to where I am headed. David Fronczak is one of those people. Suddenly, in the home stretch of this graduate experience – with major life
changes looming all about me – I looked up and there he was. With each passing day, I find myself more amazed at his tenderness, his generosity, his steadfastness, and his faith in me. He makes me laugh and in him, I find renewed hope and an ever-deepening love.
CHAPTER 1

AN INTRODUCTION TO SOCIAL DOMINANCE AND MODERN PREJUDICE THEORIES

Group inequalities in social, political, and economic outcomes have existed in virtually all post-hunter and gatherer societies (Davis and Moore 1945; Kerbo 2003; Tumin 1953). Societies have varied significantly in the manner and extent of inequalities, by which characteristics are salient markers of status among social groups, and by who is included and excluded within these groups (Dumont 1970; Hofstede 1984; Sidanius 1993). In terms of these inequalities, societies can be conceptualized as systems of group-based social hierarchies where dominant groups receive a disproportionately large share of positive social values (e.g., political power, high social status, wealth, material resources) and subordinate groups receive a disproportionately large share of negative social values (e.g., low social status, poverty, societal sanctions, stigmatization; Sidanius and Pratto 1999). The inequality in the social structure and its institutions are maintained, at least in part, by attitudes, beliefs, and ideologies that justify the stratification (Bem and Bem 1970; Eyerman and Jamison 1991; Jost 1995). Given the long-standing and almost universal nature of these systems of inequality and the prejudice, stereotypes, violence and coercion that accompany them, these issues have been topics of a considerable amount of research within the social sciences (Fiske 1998).
Some of the more recent work on prejudice and stereotypes has examined the ways in which prejudice and stereotypes have changed over time. What has historically been a predominately hostile cluster of attitudes toward lower status groups has evolved, in some cases, into a set of attitudes with more ambivalent and/or positively-valenced components. Much of this scholarship has examined attitudes toward women and people of color, but theoretically these shifts in the manifestations of prejudice could apply to many other social groups. It has been argued elsewhere (Morrison and Morrison 2002; Walls and Rodriguez 2004) that attitudes toward lesbians and gay men are also experiencing this shift.

This project primarily examines how ambivalent attitudes and positive stereotypes function to maintain and support social stratification. Social dominance theory suggests that prejudice and stereotypes function primarily as ideologies that justify system stratification. Below, in the first chapter, a brief overview of modern prejudice, and social dominance theory is provided, as well as a discussion of the the relationships between social dominance theory and both traditional and modern prejudice. In the next chapter, the primary study’s methodology and limitations are discussed. In Chapter Three, two concerns that have been raised in recent literature regarding the social dominance orientation scale are explored. Chapter Four focuses on the conceptualization and empirical measurement of modern subdomains of heterosexism including the development and testing of a measurement instrument through a series of four studies. In the next two chapters modern sexism and modern heterosexism are examined within the context of social dominance theory. The final chapter concludes with a summary of findings, and future directions for this work.
1.1 Modern Prejudice

Most of the academic literature has historically defined prejudice as a hostile or antipathetic attitude toward members of certain social groups (Allport 1954; Tajfel 1981). Given this perception of prejudice among researchers, studies have typically sought to find uniformity in affect, cognitive perceptions, and behavior toward members of stigmatized social groups. When studies have found results that fail to show congruency between them, researchers have had difficulty in explaining the findings (see Zanna and Rempel 1988). More recently, however, researchers have proposed that prejudice toward many groups reflects ambivalence: a combination of both positive and negative affect, attitudes and behaviors (Fiske, Glick, Cuddy and Xu 1999; Glick and Fiske 1996). This work on ambivalence as a component of prejudice extends some earlier work in the social psychological literature on how we view others.

Part of Asch’s (1946) work on perceptions of others utilized manipulations of the contrast between warmth and competence. He noted that the meaning of various terms associated with competence could come to mean very different things in different contexts. For example, intelligence was associated with wisdom when applied to a “warm” individual, but associated with slyness when applied to a “cold” individual. Rosenberg, Nelson, and Vivekanathan (1968) – using multidimensional scaling techniques – identified that the two underlying traits most often used to describe others were indeed competence (e.g., intellectual and task abilities) and warmth (e.g., sociability and agreeability).

By examining years of research about the content of stereotypes for various social groups and applying Asch’s intuitive understanding and Rosenberg’s empirical
findings, Fiske and colleagues (Fiske, Cuddy, Glick and Xu 2002; and prior versions of the model, Fiske 1998; Glick and Fiske 1996) developed a two-by-two model of stereotype content (warmth x competence) which illustrates the co-existence of negative and positive affect, attitudes and behaviors toward many social groups. (See Table 1.1) The structural relationship between social groups, they found, was predictive of which quadrant of the table stereotypes of the social group would fall.

TABLE 1.1
FOUR TYPES OF OUT-GROUPS AND TYPES OF PREJUDICE AS A FUNCTION OF PERCEIVED WARMTH AND COMPETENCE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Warmth</th>
<th>Competence</th>
<th>Low</th>
<th>High</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>Paternalistic Prejudice</td>
<td>Low status, not competitive</td>
<td>Admiration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Low status, competitive</td>
<td>Pity, sympathy</td>
<td>High status, not competitive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(elderly, disabled, housewives)</td>
<td>Pride, admiration</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(in-group, close allies)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Contemptuous Prejudice</td>
<td>Low status, competitive</td>
<td>Envious Prejudice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Contempt, disgust, anger, resentment</td>
<td>High status, competitive</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(welfare recipients, the poor)</td>
<td>Envy, jealousy</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Asians, Jews, rich people, feminists)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SOURCE: Fiske, Cuddy, Glick and Xu (2002)

The content of stereotypes arises out of a combination of the social groups’ relative status and structural interdependence (Glick and Fiske 2001). Status predicts the competence component of stereotypes, and interdependence (whether the group is perceived to be competitive or cooperative) predicts the warmth aspect of stereotypes.
Envious prejudice arises out of the combination of perceived high competence and low warmth. Asians, Jews and rich people are respected and envied for their competence, but are stereotypically seen as cold and are thus disliked. People with disabilities, the elderly and housewives are seen as being low in competence, are not seen as competitive threats, and are thus perceived as warm. Thus, they may be liked and patronized resulting in paternalistic prejudice and, possibly, exploitative relationships. Most traditionally disenfranchised groups fall into these two quadrants of the table. However, some groups are seen as incompetent and also not viewed as warm, resulting in contemptuous prejudice: welfare recipients and poor people. The final quadrant, high competence and warmth results in admiration and is occupied by the in-group and close allies. Consequent research on their stereotype content model has provided additional support to this conceptualization (Clausell and Fiske 2004; Eckes 2002).

From an intergroup relations perspective, Jackman (1994) has also made persuasive arguments that subjectively positive feelings play a critical role in maintaining stratification in group relations marked by long-term social inequality. Decoupling hostility from discrimination has enabled her to delineate the role of intimacy, persuasion, and paternalism in the continuation of privileged and subordinated group statuses. The form in which this paternalistic ideology manifests itself varies depending upon the ways in which relations between the two groups are structured. For example, the relationship between males and females is typically marked by much higher degrees of intimacy than are typical of the relationships between people of different races. This difference shapes the way in which positively-valenced attitudes and feelings operate in the maintenance of social stratification.
More specifically, positive stereotypes have been theorized to play a role in justifying gender stratification (Crocker, Major and Steele 1995; Glick and Fiske 1997). In their examination of ambivalent sexism, Glick and Fiske (2001, see also Haddock and Zanna 1998; MacDonald and Zanna 1996) found that hostile attitudes toward women were applied to non-traditional women (career women, feminists, lesbians) and benevolent attitudes were applied to traditional women (housewives, secretaries, sexy chicks). Their work suggests that the two components of sexism may work to reward women who embrace traditional social roles for women and punish women who embrace more modern social roles.

In studies used in the development of the Multidimensional Heterosexism Inventory (Walls and Rodriguez 2002), males endorsed significantly more positive stereotypes of lesbians and gay men than did women. Further examination indicated that this was particularly true of men who indicated that they had more feminine interests, suggesting that positive stereotypes may play a role in establishing a privileged, heterosexual masculine identity while, at the same time, allowing men to appear “non-prejudiced” given the increasing social stigma of anti-gay/anti-lesbian attitudes, particularly among university students (Norris 1991). Modern heterosexism in this theoretical framework is argued to be comprised of four subdomains: aversive heterosexism, amnestic heterosexism, paternalistic heterosexism, and positive stereotypic heterosexism. Aversive heterosexism encompasses a cluster of attitudes that suggest that lesbians and gay men receive too much attention, and that the lesbian and gay community is pushing too hard and too fast for civil rights. Amnestic heterosexism denies the existence of stratification based on sexual orientation, suggesting that anti-lesbian/anti-
gay attitudes are a remnant of the past, or that lesbians and gay men are not penalized for their sexual orientation. Paternalistic heterosexism indicates a preference for heterosexuality based on fears of societal reaction to lesbians and gay men, and positive stereotypic heterosexism encompasses the endorsement of positive stereotypical images of lesbians and gay men. (More precise definitions and detail regarding the attitudes can be found in Chapter Four.) While all four clusters of these attitudes are not necessarily positively-valenced, they all appear less hostile than traditional anti-lesbian/anti-gay attitudes, or what has most commonly been called homophobia in the existing literature.

This more complex conceptualization of prejudicial attitudes not only provides a plausible explanation for the discrepancy between attitudes and behaviors found in some research on prejudice and discrimination, but also provides a framework for understanding the disparity between documented improved attitudes toward traditionally disenfranchised social groups and on-going structural inequalities. So how might these less hostile – or even seemingly positive – attitudes function? Theoretically, these functions can be thought of in two overarching categories. The first pertains to what may be perceived as the more neutrally-valenced attitudes, the second to the more positively-valenced attitudes. Each category is discussed in more detail below.

The more neutrally-valenced subdomains of modern prejudice function as a smokescreen to hide true prejudicial attitudes or feelings, and, depending on one’s theoretical orientation toward modern prejudice, these attitudes operate and function in different ways. Three of the primary theoretical understandings of modern prejudice as it applies to race are McConahay and Hough’s modern racism theory, Katz and Hass’s ambivalence theory, and Gaertner and Dovidio’s aversive racism theory.
McConahay and Hough (1976) viewed modern racism emerging as a result of the increasing discomfort that whites felt about the direct expression of racism. Because racism was growing increasingly more stigmatized, rhetoric shifted to camouflage the underlying motivating factor. Instead of opposing affirmative action directly on racial terms, affirmative action came to be opposed because it conflicted with the value of equal opportunities. The fact that opposition to affirmative action negatively impacted people of color just happened to be one of the unfortunate outcomes – not the primary goal of the opposition. In this perspective, the expression of modern prejudice is more of a conscious decision to hide one’s prejudicial attitudes.

Katz and Hass (1988) rather believed that whites held conflicting views of African Americans. On one hand, African Americans were clearly disadvantaged and so deserved assistance, but on the other hand, they also had some cultural values and ways of life that were deviant compared to the majority white values and behaviors. This ambivalence results in extreme responding, pushing the response in both positive (excessive high praise) and negative (excessive strong condemnation) directions depending on the situation and context.

Finally Gaertner and Dovidio’s (1986) aversive racism model argues that most whites endorse egalitarian values while at the same time are socialized by American culture into holding antipathy for African Americans and other racial minority groups. Because, however, Americans like to perceive themselves as fair and egalitarian, their antipathy is aversive to their own self-concept. This results in discriminatory behavior or the endorsement of anti-African American attitudes when the antipathetic behavior or attitudes can be explained away by other factors, thereby, failing to challenge
person’s non-racist self-concept. In this model, the prejudicial beliefs are not consciously held.

Regardless of the underlying theoretical notion about these more neutrally-valenced forms of modern prejudice, however, the resulting view of the way in which these modern prejudices function is to provide a justification for attitudes and behaviors that “just happen” to negatively impact the targeted social group.

More positively-valenced attitudes may function however in a number of different ways to maintain stratification. First, for the privileged group, these attitudes may allow members to see their higher status position as well-deserved, or even as a burdensome responsibility. This includes ideologies such as the “White man’s burden” in reference to slavery (Jackman 1994) or the idea that Europeans were rescuing primitive societies from their backward beliefs and ways as a justification for colonialism (Glick and Fiske 2001). Positive qualities can be attributed to the targeted social group, but paternalistic notions of what is in the group’s best interest comes out of the values and belief structures of the dominant group. These beliefs, in the examples given above, further rationalized that the resources gained through the exploitative relationships were just payment in return for the task of civilizing or care-taking. Therefore, the oppressed groups in these situations should feel gratitude for what is being given to them. This dynamic produces a protective or paternalistic response, and often accompanies the notion that as the targeted group adopts the cultural values and behaviors of the dominant group, their lot in life will improve. It is the deviance of the target group, the ideology argues, that is responsible for the paternalism in the first place.
With reference to lesbians and gay men, assimilationists operate under the premise that the more alike lesbians and gay men are to what they perceive as the standards of heterosexuality (gender conforming behavior, monogamous relationships, non-deviant sexual practices), the more likely that the heterosexual majority will tolerate and approve of same-sex identities and relationships. Some even adopt this approach to such a degree as to exclude drag queens, feminine men, masculine women, same-sex S/M adherents, and those who practice anything other than monogamy from participating in their events, and/or having visibility or taking leadership in their organizations. By denying some aspects of the lesbian and gay community and reaffirming the rules of heterosexual standards, then, a place at the table will be granted by the dominant group.¹

The underlying belief – that lesbians and gay men cause their own persecution because they violate traditional gender roles – was supported by one early study (Laner and Laner 1980), but more recent findings suggest that simply knowing that someone is lesbian/gay is more important in predicting comfort level in various contexts than whether the lesbian/gay person adheres to traditional gender interests and behavior (Schope and Eliason 2004).

A second way in which more positive attitudes – in this case positive stereotypes – may help maintain stratification is by reducing resistant to stratification within the oppressed group (Glick and Fiske 2001; Jackman 1994). Women who endorse benevolent sexism are less likely to label behavior as discriminatory. Moya, Expósito and Casado (1999) found that women high in benevolent sexism were more likely to excuse

¹ It should be noted that the assimilationist strategy may be effective in gaining political power and social acceptance for the normative part of the lesbian and gay community, but does so at significant political and psychological costs for the remaining parts of the community.
benevolently-justified discriminatory behavior by non-intimate men (e.g., a boss) as well as overtly hostile discrimination by a male romantic partner. Research also indicates that members of the oppressed group are more likely to endorse positive stereotypes about their social group than dominant group members are to endorse the same stereotypes (Wood and Chesser 1994).

Combining Katz and Hass’s (1988, see also Glick and Fiske 1996) notion of ambivalence with Gaetner and Dovidio’s (1986) self-concept protective function of aversive prejudice leads to a third possible way in which modern prejudice may function. The endorsement of positive stereotypes may allow members of the dominant group who perceive themselves as non-prejudiced to maintain an ideology that differentiates their dominant group from that of the target group. If this were the case, it should not be surprising to find that endorsement of positive stereotypes functions as a “liberal” form of the prejudice as has been suggested by some researchers (Cooper 2001).

Finally, positive stereotypes often imply certain social roles for oppressed group members which may lead to occupational segregation (Ridgeway 1997). The idea of women as necessarily nurturing and compassionate suggests that women are not appropriate in direct military service, cut-throat positions in business, as high-powered lawyers or politicians or as President of the U.S. This results in the restriction of women to careers the embody traditionally feminine characteristics (Bielby and Baron 1986; Foschi, Lai, and Siegerson 1994; Lott 1985; Ridgeway 1997). Similarly, the creative and aesthetic aspects of positive stereotypes about gay men may lead to occupational segregation of gay men into fashion- and art-related careers (Blanford 1999; Lippa 2002) and those which are traditional female occupations such as social workers, counselors
and librarians (Blanford 1999; Carmichael 1995; Ellis and Riggle 1995; Nieto 1996). In general these types of employment fields are perceived to be more tolerant of homosexuality (Badgett 1995; Esoffier 1997).

It is in these different ways that neutrally- and positively-valenced attitudes and beliefs of modern prejudice may operate to maintain social stratification.

1.2 Social dominance theory

*Overview.* Social dominance theory (Sidanius and Pratto 1999) was developed as an attempt to synthesize many of the theoretical approaches to understanding prejudice and discrimination and to answer two primary questions of concern to social scientists. First, why do members of social groups oppress and discriminate against members of other social groups? And, second, why is this oppression entrenched in human societies and difficult to dislodge? In the original conceptualization of the theory, Sidanius and Pratto (1999) integrated seven primary ideas and theories that they viewed as “the most critical and useful components and models” (p. 31) of existing theory on prejudice and discrimination. They included (a) authoritarian personality theory (Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson and Sanford 1950), (b) Rokeach’s (1979) two-value theory of political behavior, (c) Blumer’s (1960) group position theory, (d) Marxism and neoclassical elite theories (Michels [1911] 1962; Mosca [1896] 1939; Pareto [1901] 1979), (e) empirical findings from political attitude and public opinion studies, (f) Social Identity Theory (Tajfel and Turner 1986), and (g) modern thinking among evolutionary psychologists (Reynolds, Falger and Vine 1987). Later in its development, the theory also

Social dominance theory argues that every complex society is organized by systems of social group-based hierarchies in which at least one social group has dominance over others, and at least one group occupies a subordinate position. They explicitly argue for a group-based social hierarchy rather than an individual-based social hierarchy. In the individual-based version, certain individuals may have a disproportionate share of wealth, resources, status, and power, but they do so by virtue of highly-valued individual characteristics (such as artistry, high intellectual ability, athleticism). In a group-based hierarchical system, individuals may still experience disproportionate privilege and power, but it is not necessarily due to their individual characteristics or accomplishments, but rather due to their membership in a social group that has high social status within that society. These are typically social groups based on characteristics such as gender, race, lineage, ethnicity, and age.

Social dominance theory does not suggest that personal accomplishments have nothing to do with the social positions that individuals occupy within group-based hierarchies, but rather that membership in certain privileged social groups results in greater access to resources that, in turn, facilitate individual achievement. Additionally, membership in a privileged group may also yield greater returns for education, years of experience, and expertise than those same assets yield for members who are in a non-privileged group. Through these processes the achieved component of social status is quite dependent upon the social status and power of the ascribed groups to which one belongs.
The social dominance approach contends that there is a set of fundamental and general processes that undergird the emergence and maintenance of group-based stratification within societies even though there is variation in the degree to which societies are hierarchically organized and around which groups are granted status.

While different theorists have theorized different combinations and structures of systems of stratifications within societies (see for example Van de Berghe 1978), Sidanius and Pratto (1999) suggest a “trimorphic structure”: an age system, a gender system, and an “arbitrary-set” system. While all three stratification systems share some commonalities, they contend that the age and gender system – although malleable to some degree – are trans-historical and cross-cultural existing within all post-hunting and gathering social systems. The arbitrary-set system, on the other hand, is characterized by an extremely high degree of variability with social context having more influence on which group distinctions are salient and how the boundaries around group inclusion and exclusion are drawn. The arbitrary-set system might include stratification by class, race, religion or other social group differences. The arbitrary-set system is the most situationally and contextually defined and has a high degree of plasticity across cultures and historical periods.

Legitimizing Myths. In order to minimize intergroup conflict, the group-based inequalities in a society are legitimized through ideologies which justify discrimination (Icheiser 1970, Jost and Banaji 1994, Jost and Major 2001; Sidanius 1993) and, when widely accepted within a society, come to be accepted as self-apparent truths (Crocker, Major and Steele 1998; Jackman 1994). The issue of legitimacy has a long history in political and sociological scholarship. Zelditch (2001), in his historical examination of
the topic, has traced its earliest roots back to Thucydides’ (423 B.C.E) question of “What makes power…morally right?” Legitimacy has been examined by social science scholars such as Weber ([1918] 1978), Mills (1940), Parsons (1958), Gamson (1975), and Tilly (1978). In more contemporary scholarship, the idea of legitimacy has taken its place as a central tenet of both system justification (Jost and Banaji 1994) and social dominance (Sidanius and Pratto 1999) theories.

Within the context of social dominance theory, the term legitimizing myths is used to capture the concept of these system-justifying ideologies. The term myths in this framework is not intended to imply that these beliefs are necessarily true or false, but rather that they appear to be true because there is substantial consensus in a society such that enough people behave as if they are true. The concept of legitimizing myths within social dominance theory owes much to Marx’s ([1846] 1970) notion of ideology, Mosca’s ([1896] 1939) concept of “political formula,” Gramsci’s (1971) idea of “ideological hegemony,” Moscovici’s (1981, 1988) concept of “social representation” and Durkheim’s ([1893] 1933) notion of “collective representations” (Sidanius and Pratto 1999).

Legitimizing myths are formally defined as, “values, attitudes, beliefs, causal attributions, and ideologies that provide moral and intellectual justification for social practices that either increase, maintain or decrease levels of social inequality among social groups” (Sidanius and Pratto 1999, p. 104). Legitimizing myths are the cultural scripts that link individual social belief to social practice and may function to either enhance or attenuate stratification within a society.
Legitimizing myths may take a number of forms. They may be ideologies such as the Protestant work ethic, the belief that the U.S. is a meritocratic society, or the endorsement of democratic egalitarian values. They may be cultural beliefs such as the belief that intelligence is a fixed capacity that can be accurately measured by intelligence tests. Or, they may be stereotypes and prejudices about a social group.

One goal of social dominance theory has been to connect individual level differences with both cultural-level scripts, and with support or opposition to macro-level public policies. The theory suggests that these cultural-level scripts, or legitimizing myths within this framework, will mediate the relationship between the individual level endorsement of group-based social hierarchy (known as social dominance orientation) and support of (or opposition to) public policies that seek to attenuate stratification. In other words, part of the relationship between social dominance orientation and support for ameliorative public policies is a result of the causal relationship between social dominance orientation and the legitimizing myths. Social dominance orientation should have both a direct relationship with public policy support, and an indirect relationship with this support through the legitimizing myth. In this way legitimizing myths become the mezzo-level cultural scripts that connect the micro- to the macro-level.

Individuals who have a high social dominance orientation – that is they believe that societies should be highly structured and that certain social groups deserve better treatment – should, accordingly – embrace hierarchy-enhancing legitimizing myths and reject hierarchy-attenuating legitimizing myths. This endorsement of hierarchy-enhancing legitimizing myths should also be related to higher endorsement of hierarchy-enhancing public policies and rejection of hierarchy-attenuating public policies. The opposite of this
pattern should hold true for individuals who have a low social dominance orientation. Finally, the theory suggests that the relationship between the individual social dominance orientation and the endorsement of either hierarchy-enhancing or hierarchy-attenuating public policy should also be mediated by these legitimizing myths. The formal model for this relationship is represented in Figure 1.1.

**Figure 1.1. The Effects of Social Dominance Orientation on Hierarchy-enhancing or Hierarchy-attenuating Social Policies as Mediated by Hierarchy-enhancing or Hierarchy-attenuating Legitimizing Myths.** (Source: Sidanius and Pratto 1999)

*The Asymmetrical In-group Bias Hypothesis*

Group-based social hierarchy is also maintained, in part, by what is known as *behavioral asymmetry* which suggests that – on average – “there will be differences in the behavioral repertoires of individuals belonging to groups at different levels of the social power continuum” (Sidanius and Pratto 1999, p. 43). These behavioral patterns maintain and reinforce the status differences between the social groups in the hierarchy and are affected by socialization, psychological biases, legitimizing ideologies and other factors.
One of the primary subtypes of behavioral asymmetry is known as the *asymmetrical in-group bias hypothesis*.

In-group bias, the favoring of one’s own social group over groups to which one does not belong, is a well-established phenomenon in the social psychological literature. Ethnocentrism was the term that Sumner (1906) first used to describe this pattern and since then in-group favoritism has been documented fairly consistently even showing that the mere perception of belonging to two distinct non-existent groups is sufficient to trigger intergroup discrimination favoring the in-group (Billig and Tajfel 1973; Tajfel, Billig, Bundy, and Flament 1971; Turner 1975).

Social dominance theory contends that the in-group bias mechanism functions differently based on the groups’ social status within the stratification system, that is, members from high status social groups will tend to have higher levels of social dominance orientation than will members from lower status social groups. However within the same social group (either the dominant or the subordinate group), in-group bias will also vary based on individual levels of social dominance orientation. Individuals high on social dominance orientation, then, *regardless* of their own group’s status should display stronger biases in favor of the high-status group on dimensions that are related to the group distinctions and status (Levin, Federico, Sidanius, and Rabinowitz 2002). In support of this notion, negative affect toward low-status groups has been shown to be correlated with high social dominance orientation for members of both high- and low-status groups (Federico 1999; Levin and Sidanius 1999; Rabinowitz 1999). However, empirical findings have not been wholly consistent in supporting this relationship. Some studies have found that group-based social dominance orientation reinforces favoritism
for the higher status group *primarily* among members of the higher status group and not for both status groups (Mitchell and Sidanius 1993; Sidanius 1993; Sidanius, Levin, Federico and Pratto 2001, Sidanius and Pratto 1993 1999).

Social dominance theory has responded to this inconsistency in findings by incorporating recent findings from system justification theory (Jost and Thompson 2000) into its development. In a factor analysis of items on the social dominance orientation scale, Jost and Thompson (2000), two system justification theorists, suggest that the scale actually captures two distinct, but related constructs: a) a system-justifying construct whereby there is the desire to maintain the existing system of hierarchical relations regardless of the impact for one’s own social group and b) a group-justifying construct whereby there is a desire to promote the interests, status and power of one’s own group. In its reflection of the system-justifying component, then, social dominance orientation should lead to preference for the high-status group regardless of one’s own group status. However when it captures the group-justifying component, social dominance orientation should lead to favoritism for one’s own group. Jost and Thompson (2000) using the scale items loading on these different factors, tested and found support for this hypothesis.

These findings suggest that ideas advanced by system justification theory and social dominance theory work in concert to explain differences in support for public policies and favorable ratings of high-status groups. When members of both high- and low-status groups perceive the existing hierarchy to be legitimate, they consensually favor the high-status group (Ellemers, Van-Rijswijk, Roefs, and Simons 1997; Jost et al. 2001; Sidanius and Pratto 1999; Taylor, Moghaddam, Gamble and Zellerer 1987; Turner 1975; Turner and Brown 1978). When this distinction between the groups is not seen as
legitimate, the two groups no longer have consensual norms and tend to follow their own interests (see Jost et al. 2001; Levin et al. 2002; Turner and Brown 1978).

1.3 Prejudice and Social Dominance Theory

*Traditional Prejudice.* Social dominance orientation is one of the strongest predictors of negatively-valenced prejudice (Altemeyer 1998). Empirical studies have documented social dominance orientation as a significant predictor of anti-African American racism, sexism (Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth and Malle 1994; Sidanius 1993; Sidanius and Pratto 1993; Sidanius, Pratto and Bobo 1994, 1996), homophobia (Pratto, et al. 2000; Whitley and Lee 2000), cultural elitism (Pratto et al. 1994), and negative attitudes towards Asians and aboriginals (Heaven and Quinton 2003). In addition, individuals with higher levels of social dominance orientation display higher levels of intergroup bias even in “minimal intergroup situations” based on arbitrary group assignments (Levin et al. 2002; Sidanius, Pratto and Mitchell 1994; Sidanius, Pratto and Rabinowitz 1994), as well as, discriminatory behavior towards the group to which they do not belong (Sidanius et al. 1994). This relationship is robust and holds even when measures capture implicit attitudes (Pratto and Shih 2000).

Similarly a number of studies have found that social dominance orientation is negatively related to endorsement of civil rights policies, social welfare programs, and environmentalism (Pratto et al. 1994). High scores on social dominance orientation are negatively correlated with being open to new experiences (Heaven and Bucci 2001), honesty, and support for international harmony and equality (Heaven and Connors 2001).
Modern Prejudice. Little work has been attempted on how modern forms of prejudice function within a social dominance theory framework and what has been done has primarily focused on issues of symbolic racism. Sidanius, Devereux and Pratto (1992) examined the theoretical relationships predicted by both symbolic racism theory and social dominance theory. While they found some support for symbolic racism’s suggested relationship between variables, their examination of the same data found that the relationships hypothesized by social dominance theory were more strongly supported, and the social dominance model proved to be a better overall fit for the data. Finally, they tested both traditional and symbolic racism as legitimizing myths within the social dominance theory model. “Sear’s index of symbolic racism really functions as a legitimizing myth, and a very good one at that. SD theory suggests, consistent with the results that symbolic racism is driven not by traditional racism but by opposition to egalitarianism and a desire for superiority over negative reference groups” (Sidanius et al. 2001, p. 391). In addition, they concluded that within the U.S., old-fashioned, traditional racism has lost its viability as an acceptable basis for public policy that fosters white group dominance.

One other study examining this relationship found similar results. Higher levels of social dominance orientation was predictive of increased levels of modern racism (Miller, Smith, and Mackie 2004), and in an exploration of descriptions of affirmative action attitudes, Arriola and Cole (2001) found that certain affirmative action frames were related in similar fashion to both modern racism and social dominance orientation.

---

2 The sample was a nationally representative, probability sample of white Americans.
A number of studies have examined modern forms of sexism and social dominance orientation as covariates predicting variability in other constructs (Russell and Oswald 2001; Russell and Trigg 2004; Thomas and Esses 2004), while fewer have looked more directly at the relationship between the two. One study that did examine the direct relationship was conducted by Sibley and Wilson (2004) and found that social dominance motives combined with sociocognitive processes to undergird the gender stereotyping that results in the expression of ambivalent sexism.

Overall the existing literature consistently outlines the positive relationship between hostilely-valenced forms of prejudice and social dominance orientation. Further, it also seems to suggest that modern forms of prejudice do, indeed, function as hierarchy-enhancing legitimizing myths, although the support for this component is much less well-established. It is this intersection between social dominance theory and modern forms of prejudice that is the central concern of this dissertation.
CHAPTER 2
METHODOLOGY, SAMPLE, AND METHODOLOGICAL LIMITATIONS

2.1 Overview

This study was administered through a web-based survey to undergraduate students at six different institutions of higher education. Access to the survey was limited through the use of passwords and unique identifiers to reduce the likelihood that the samples are not contaminated by respondents other than those legitimately in the samples.

This chapter includes, first, a discussion of the sample along with descriptive statistics about the sample. After that, the research protocol is outlined, followed by a discussion of measures and instruments used in the survey. The chapter ends with a discussion of the limitations of the study.

2.2 Sample

Participants. Participants in the study were undergraduates taking introductory social science courses at one of six U.S. colleges and universities. As one option to complete a course component on social science research, students were given the option

---

3 Chapter 4 covers three supplemental studies in addition to the primary study and sample described here. As those three studies are solely utilized in Chapter 4, discussion of the methodology and sample regarding those three studies is covered in Chapter 4, and is omitted from this chapter.
to participate in the study. The different sites represent different types of secondary educational institutions.

Five of the research sites were private universities, consisting of two Catholic-affiliated schools, one Mennonite-affiliated college, one Baptist-affiliated university, and one university not affiliated with a religious denomination. The sixth school was a medium-sized public university in the Midwest. By tapping into six very different undergraduate pools of students, it was anticipated that the study would have greater variability in terms of age, life experiences, sociopolitical orientation, religious affiliation and religiosity, race/ethnicity, socioeconomic status and marital status than is typically captured in studies using undergraduate convenience samples. While this strategy increases variability, it does not alleviate generalizability concerns about studies that utilize a non-representative sample of undergraduate students. (See Section 2.5 Limitations below).

Sample Descriptives. The final sample consists of 651 undergraduates taking introductory social science courses, a sample size larger than the number needed to be adequate for testing of small to medium structural equation models which is approximately 400 (Boomsma 1983). Of the 651 respondents, 70.05% were female and 29.95% were males. Caucasians made up the majority of the sample (81.1%), followed by Hispanics (6.7%), African Americans (5.4%), Asian/Asian Americans (3.85%), biracial (2.31%), and less than 1% each of individuals who identified as Native

---

4 Approximately 42% of the sample was from the public university, 19% from a Catholic university, 12% from a Catholic women’s college, 11% from the private secular university, and 8% each from the Mennonite and Baptist schools.
Americans, or other race. The majority of respondents were first year students (54.2%), 25.5% were sophomores, 12.9% were juniors and the remaining 7.4% were seniors.

Ages ranged from 18 to 56, with a mean of 20.4 years and a standard deviation of 4.5 years. Almost 66% of the students identified as middle class, 19% as working class, 12% as upper class and 3% as lower class. Income was reported in categories, with 8.6% reporting family incomes of less than $25,000, 23.4% with incomes between $25,000 and $54,000, 17.2% between $55,000 and $74,000, 26.4% between $75,000 and $104,000, and the remaining 24.4% report family incomes of $105,000 or greater.

With regard to religion, 38.1% of the sample reported religious affiliations as Catholic, 34.1% with churches in denominations classified as conservative Protestant, 14.4% reported no religious affiliation, 11.6% as mainline or liberal Protestant, and the remaining 1.7% as other non-Christian religious affiliation. Almost 35% of the respondents consider themselves liberal, 24% moderate, and the remaining 41% conservative.5

The research protocol was structured in such a way as to decrease the likelihood of missed items or failure to complete survey. (See Section 2.3 Research Protocol below for discussion). Range of missing data on items went from 0 missing values on the first four items of the survey to 11 missing values (1.69%), on the income question. The vast majority of items had between 3 missing cases (0.46%) and 7 missing cases (1.08%). Even though the percentage of missing values was extremely low, maximum likelihood

5 Liberal category includes those who considered themselves as strongly liberal, liberal, or slightly liberal. Likewise, the conservative category includes those who consider themselves as strongly conservative, conservative, or slightly conservative.
multiple imputation was utilized using the LISREL 8.71 program (Jöreskog and Sörbom 2002).

2.3 Research Protocol

During class time, instructors passed out information regarding the required research credit for completion of the course, including a description of each of the options that were available to meet the requirement.\(^6\) Included in this information were a description of the study and a copy of the online consent form that students had to sign prior to participating in the survey. Students were then given approximately a week to review the materials and decide which option they would complete to meet the research requirement of the course.

In addition to fulfilling the required research credit for their course, a lottery was held in which four students’ were chosen to receive fifty dollar gift certificates from a local retailer. After each module that the student completed (see below for additional information on the modules), the student was allowed the opportunity to enter their name into the lottery for the gift certificates one additional time. This permitted each student to enter the lottery up to eight times. Students were also given the option not to participate in the lottery.

Study packets were prepared for all students who opted for participation in the study which included more detailed information about what the participant should expect, \(^6\) Institutional Review Boards at five of the six schools approved providing one additional option which was a reaction paper to a brief article on research methodology. One of the schools required additional options which included attendance of and participation in discussion about a brief film on the use of research throughout the history of the U.S., and an online exploration of databases available for research purposes. Of the 664 students, 13 (1.96%) chose the reaction paper over participating in the study. No students chose the film discussion or the online exploration of databases available.
the website address, the website password, a class sign-in number, a unique sign-in number for each student. An additional copy of the online consent form that students would be required to sign in order to participate was also included in the packet.

Upon login, participants were required to enter both their class and personal passwords to access the survey website. The participant was informed that the study in which they were about to take part examined attitudes regarding contemporary social issues and public policies. They were informed that the study consisted of completion of six different modules of an online survey which should take them no more than 1 hour to complete. Subsequent to this explanation, participants were given the opportunity to consent to their involvement by electronically signing the consent form.

Participants then completed a survey consisting of demographic information, attitudes regarding public policies and endorsement of specific beliefs, and a set of measures for social-psychological constructs of interest for the study. The social-psychological scales used are established scales in the social sciences and have been tested for reliability and validity. The demographic and attitudinal questions were developed from two sources. The first, the General Social Survey is a national representative social science study administered every two years by the National Opinion Research Center at the University of Chicago. The second source for demographic questions is from social science literature that looks specifically at attitudes, beliefs and endorsement of public policy. Demographic data include age, race/ethnicity, gender, parental education, urbanicity and social class. Social-psychological constructs to be measured include religiosity, political ideology, authoritarianism, social dominance orientation, modern sexism and heterosexism. Attitudes and beliefs include endorsement
of various religious themes (e.g., anti-structuralism, social gospel, civic gospel, moral relativism), and commonly-endorsed values in the U.S. (e.g., meritocracy, equal opportunity, patriotism). Opinions on public policy include questions regarding affirmative action, reproductive rights, equal rights for women and lesbian/gay rights.

In order to allow flexibility and increase participant completion of the survey, the variables collected were grouped into six modules that a participant could complete one or two modules and come back at a later point to finish the survey. On average, each module contained 40 questions. In addition, a completion bar was incorporated into the survey pages so that the participant knew how much of the survey they had completed and how much remained for them to complete.

All participants were required to complete the sociodemographic question module first which also included the social dominance orientation scale. Then one-third of the participants were primed for gender salience, one-third for sexual orientation salience, and the final third were unprimed. This manipulation was utilized to test a methodological concern identified in the literature regarding the meaning of the social dominance orientation scale. (See Chapter 3, part 2 for the outcome of this experimental manipulation). One-half of each group then completed the modules regarding their attitudes, beliefs and public policy endorsement, followed by the sexism and heterosexism scales. The other half received the questions in the opposite order to enable the ruling out of order effects. The web-based survey administration allowed respondents to scroll back and forth within each module, but once a module was completed, the respondent was unable to review their previous answers or to change them.
Individual questions that were unanswered triggered a message informing the respondent that they had missed the question and allowed them to subsequently answer the question or continue to the next module if they had intentionally skipped the question.

Respondents who had not completed the survey by a week before the class deadline set by their instructor were sent an email reminding them that they had signed up for participation in the survey, and provided contact information in case they had lost their password information, or were having difficulty accessing the survey. A second reminder email was sent one day prior to the deadline, and then a final email was sent one day after the deadline providing them with one last day in which they could complete the requirement. These email prompts resulted in almost all students who signed up for the study completing the survey. Of the 691 students who signed up to participate in the study, less than 6% \((n=40)\) failed to do so.

To decrease the amount of accidental item non-response, all questions that weren’t answered in the module resulted in a warning message being displayed before the student could submit their answers and proceed to the next module. The message informed the student that they had missed a question, and identified the question missed. It then allowed the student to either return to the module and answer the question (in the case where the question had been skipped accidentally) or to proceed without answering the question (in the case where the student did not wish to respond to the question). This resulted in very low item non-response rates, the vast majority of which were under 1%. The question regarding income had the highest non-response. Eleven (1.69%) respondents out of the 651 chose not to answer the income question.
Upon completion of the survey, the participants were thanked and were provided with a brief debriefing webpage which included contact information for the principal investigator should they have any questions or wish to receive information regarding the study’s outcome once the study was completed. A brief summary of results of the study were sent in the summer following participation in the survey for those who had requested the study’s outcomes.

2.4 **Measures and Instruments**

The following measures were used in the study, along with additional questions that were included for later research. The measures selected are drawn from published studies examining social dominance, prejudicial attitudes or public opinions. All scales used have demonstrated adequate psychometric qualities.

*Gender Prime/Sexual Orientation Prime.* Respondents who were randomly assigned to one of the two primed conditions were first directed to a “practice questions” webpage. The page of six questions was clearly marked as a page of practice questions, and the respondents were given the instructions, “Here are six quick practice questions that are similar to many of the questions you will be asked in the survey in terms of style and content. Please take a moment and choose the correct answer by clicking on the appropriate radio button that corresponds to your answer.” Respondents in the gender prime condition next saw the statement, “Answer these questions thinking about **YOUR** gender group (either males or females),” while respondents in the sexual orientation

---

7 As with the information regarding the study sample, the variables discussed here were included in the primary study. Additional variables were included in preliminary studies used in the development of the Multidimensional Heterosexism Inventory. Those variables are discussed within the context of the study in which they occurred in Chapter 4.
prime condition saw the statement, “Answer these questions thinking about YOUR sexual orientation group (heterosexuals, bisexuals, or lesbians and gay men).”

The first question asked the respondent to indicate either their gender or sexual orientation and the remaining questions asked about how they felt about belonging to their gender or sexual orientation group. These questions were modeled on the questions used for priming by Schmitt, Branscombe and Kappen (2003).  

Respondents who were in the non-primed experimental group were directed from the consent form webpage directly to the first module of the survey.

Social Dominance Orientation. The Social Dominance Orientation (SDO) scale was the first series of items in the first module completed by all respondents. The 16-question scale is the sixth published version of the social dominance orientation scale, and is the product of testing of items on 18,741 respondents in 45 samples from 11 different countries. Some of the samples were probability samples, some were convenience samples. Samples have included secondary students, undergraduates and more than 4,500 non-student adults. (See Sidanius and Pratto 1999 for full details on samples.)

Average reliability across samples using the social dominance orientation scale was .89, and the scale has demonstrated stability across time including one study using a one-month time interval between administrations of the scale ($r=.86, p<.01$; Sidanius and

---

8 The questions for the gender prime were (a) Are you: male/female? (b) It feels natural to be in my gender group; (c) In general, society treats my gender group better than it treats the other gender group; (d) I am comfortable with my gender group and its position in society; (e) In general, my gender group is seen as having higher status than the other gender group; (f) I am satisfied with my gender group’s place in the world. After all the questions other than the initial gender question, respondents could either check ‘agree’ or ‘disagree’. The same questions were used in slightly modified form for the sexual orientation prime as well.
Pratto 1993). The scale has been shown to be predictive of racism/ethnic prejudice, nationalism, Protestant work ethic, political conservatism, and external attributions of poverty among other constructs. Likewise it is predictive of opposition to universal health care, lesbian and gay rights, women’s rights, social welfare programs and affirmative action. Sidanius and Pratto (1999) and others have demonstrated that the scale captures a construct that is distinct from political conservatism, authoritarianism, and a number of personality constructs including propensity for cruelty (Altemeyer 1998), neuroticism, conscientiousness, agreeableness, openness to experience and extroversion (Pratto et al. 1994). The social dominance orientation scale is listed in Appendix I.

Political orientation. Respondents were asked to place themselves on a continuum of political ideology, with the instructions, “On a scale of political ideology, individuals can be arranged from strongly liberal to strongly conservative. Which of the following best describes your views?” A seven-point Likert scale ranging from “Strongly Liberal” to “Strongly Conservative” was provided as the response set.

Belief that America provides equal opportunities. Respondents were asked to indicate their agreement on a seven-point Likert scale with a series of values and beliefs questions, among which were six questions regarding equal opportunity. These questions included (1) “Salaries are usually reflective of education, which in turn is reflective of intelligence and ambition”; (2) “Lower wages for women and ethnic minorities simply reflects lower skill and educational levels”; (3) “In America, every person has an equal chance to rise up and prosper”; (4) “Affirmative action prevents the more qualified from

---

9 Jost and Thompson (2000) measured political orientation by combining the strongly liberal-strongly conservative continuum scores with an additional 7-point Likert scale ranging from “A Strong Democrat” to “A Strong Republican.” The two measures were correlated at $r=.50 (p<.001)$. The political party question was unavailable in this survey.
attaining positions”; (5) “America is the ‘land of opportunity’”; and, (6) “Potential to do well should not be sufficient for admission to any program.” All responses were reverse coded so that higher responses indicate a stronger belief that America provides equal opportunities for everyone.

**Belief that the gender stratification system is fair.** To capture belief in the fairness of status differences between men and women, two questions were asked, to which respondents indicated their level of agreement on a seven-point Likert scale ranging from “Strongly Agree” to “Strongly Disagree.” They are: (1) “Differences in status between MEN and WOMEN are fair”; and, (2) “Differences in status between MEN and WOMEN are a result of injustice.” The second question was reverse coded and the items were combined. Higher scores on the combined variable indicate greater agreement with the unfairness of the gender stratification system.

**Prejudicial attitudes.** Prejudicial attitudes toward women, and lesbians and gay men were captured using a number of instruments. Both hostile and benevolent sexism are captured using Glick and Fiske’s (1996, 1997; Fiske and Glick 1995) Ambivalent Sexism Inventory. The Ambivalent Sexism Inventory is a 22-question self-report inventory that captures both on a Likert scale measuring agreement/disagreement with the statements. Both subdomains are used in this study.

Hostile sexism consists of three subcomponents: dominative paternalism, competitive gender differentiation, and heterosexual hostility. Dominative paternalism is a concept that captures attitudes where women are perceived to not be fully competent

---

10 Questions gauging belief in the fairness of the gender stratification system were taken from four questions used by Levin, Sidanius, Rabinowitz, and Federico (1998) to measure perceptions of system fairness regarding ethnic minorities.
adults. Competitive gender differentiation captures the cluster of attitudes that justify male dominance by associating the traits that are deemed necessary for governing social institutions as male only qualities. The final subcomponent of hostile sexism is heterosexual hostility which encompasses attitudes whereby sexual attraction and dominance are intertwined: women use their sexual allure to gain dominance over men. (For more on the specific subcomponents and the theoretical justification for inclusion as subcomponents of both hostile and benevolent sexism, see Glick and Fiske (1996)). The Ambivalent Sexism Inventory has demonstrated good reliability coefficients across six different samples used in initial testing of the psychometrics of the scale, ranging from .83 to .92. The hostile sexism subscale also performed well with reliabilities from .80 to .92 in these same samples.

Benevolent sexism, similarly, consists of three subcomponents: protective paternalism, complementary gender differentiation, and heterosexual intimacy. The protective paternalism subdomain captures attitudes whereby women are seen to have the need for a protector and frequently these attitudes are couched in terms of love. Complementary gender differentiation are beliefs that men and women are different and the characteristics assigned to women are frequently those of positive stereotypes. Finally, heterosexual intimacy is the desire for psychological closeness and is often accompanied by beliefs that an intimate heterosexual relationship is necessary for a complete life. The benevolent sexism subscale has demonstrated reliabilities from .73 to .85 in the above-mentioned studies exploring the psychometrics of the scale. As this study has a specific interest in the endorsement of positive stereotypes, the benevolent sexism subdomain will, at times, be decomposed into its three subcomponents as the
complementary gender differentiation subcomponent arguably captures positive stereotypes about women. (See Chapter 3 for a more detailed discussion on the specific subcomponents of benevolent sexism.)

Since its introduction in social psychology, the ASI has been used extensively in psychology and social psychology (see for example, Glick, Diebold, Bailey-Werner and Zhu 1997; Masser and Abrams 1999; Mladnic, Saiz, Diaz, Ortega, and Oyarce 1998; Russell and Trigg 2004) and has been shown to have good psychometric qualities in its Spanish (Expósito, Moya, and Glick 1998; Mladnic et al. 1998) and German (Eckes and Six-Materna 1999) language versions as well.

To capture hostile heterosexism\(^{11}\) Herek’s (1988) Attitudes Toward Lesbians and Gays – Short Form is utilized. This scale and its long form version are among the most widely used scales to measure attitudes about lesbians and gay men in the last twenty years. Recent examples include Ellis, Kitzinger and Wilkinson 2002; Smith and Gordon 1998; Span and Vidal 2003; Van de Meerendonk, Eisinga and Felling 2003; White and Kurpius 2002. The scale and its longer version have undergone extensive testing for\

\(^{11}\) Prejudice toward lesbians and gay men has been called a number of terms, including homophobia (Blumfield 1992; Smith 1971; Weinberg 1974), homoerotophobia (Churchill 1967), homosexism (Hansen 1982a, 1982b; Lehne 1976), heterosexism (Morin and Garfinkle 1978; Pharr 1988), homonegativism (Hudson and Ricketts 1980), homo-hatred (Appleby and Anastas 1998), hominegotor (Appleby and Anastas 1998), and sexual prejudice (Herek and Capitanio 1996). The term heterosexism will be adopted here to mean all forms of heterosexism for a number of reasons. First, it parallels the construction of other words used to denote types of individual and systemic prejudice and discrimination: racism, sexism, classism, etc. Second, it is one of the two most widely known ways of referring to anti-gay prejudice (Apphby and Anastas 1998). Third, heterosexism was chosen over the term homophobia as homophobia has been criticized as connoting an irrational psychological disorder – phobia. Finally, specific forms of heterosexism will be indicated when terms other than heterosexism are used: hostile heterosexism, aversive heterosexism, etc. See Chapter 4 for a discussion and definition of these specific subdomains of anti-lesbian/anti-gay attitudes.

The Multidimensional Heterosexism Inventory (MHI, Walls and Rodriguez 2002 for earlier versions) was developed to extend the scholarship on modern forms of racism and sexism into the realm of sexual orientation. It encapsulates four subdomains of modern heterosexism: aversive heterosexism, amnestic heterosexism, paternalistic heterosexism and positive stereotypic heterosexism. The reliability of the overall scale is reported at .82, while the reliability of the subdomain scales are .84, .64, .89 and .90 for hostile, apathetic, protective and positive heterosexism, respectively (see Chapter 4 for details on the development of the scale). The subscales have performed as hypothesized with constructs such as authoritarianism, hostile heterosexism, interpersonal contacts, political ideology, gender role discrepancy, and religiosity.

*Groups Thought About/Time Thinking About Each Group.* Immediately after completion of the social dominance orientation scale, respondents were asked to report the social groups that they were thinking about while completing the scale. They were instructed, “This question has two parts and as you answer it, please think about the answers you JUST gave to questions 1 through 16 above. In the left-hand column indicate what specific groups you were thinking about as you answered those questions. And, in the right-hand column indicate what percentage (1-100) of time you were thinking about that specific group. Your total should equal 100%. (The table will automatically add it for you!).” Respondents were then given seven lines in which to enter different social groups, and the corresponding percentage of time.
Public Policy Support/Opposition. Four different clusters of questions were included that tapped into opposition or support for public polices that seek to ameliorate inequality based on gender or sexual orientation. The first grouping were four items used to assess the degree of support for gendered affirmative action programs\(^{12}\) with agreement on a seven-point scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). They are: (1) “Affirmative action for women is unfair to men”; (2) “Affirmative action for women in education gives an opportunity to qualified women who might not have had a chance without it”; (3) “Affirmative action for women may force employers to hire unqualified people”; and (4) “Affirmative action for women in the workplace helps make sure the American work force and economy remain competitive” (Jost and Thompson 2000).

To assess support for equal rights for women, four questions regarding different aspects of rights for women were used. Questions were: (1) “Women should be guaranteed their job after returning from maternity leaves”; (2) “Women should receive equal pay to men for doing the same work”; (3) “Gender should be included in hate crime bills to deter violence against women”; (4) “The U.S. should ratify the Equal Rights Amendment to insure women are not discriminated against” (Pratto et al. 1994). Response sets for each statement was a 7-point scale indicating degree of agreement with the item.

\(^{12}\) Various terms are used to mean affirmative action policies that are directed toward gender. They include, “gendered affirmative action,” “affirmative action for women,” and “affirmative action policies targeting gender.” All terms are meant to mean the same thing.
Similarly, using a 7-point Likert scale indicating agreement/disagreement respondents were asked to answer five questions regarding reproductive rights\textsuperscript{13}. They are: (1) “Abortion should be legal under all circumstances”; (2) “State laws should require parental consent before a teenager under 18 can have an abortion”; (3) “Late-term abortions should be illegal in the U.S.”; (4) “The government should cover the medical costs of abortions for poor women who cannot afford the procedure”; and, (5) “Decisions to terminate a pregnancy should be a matter between a woman and her doctor.” (ABC News 1985; Miller, Kinder, Rosenstone, and National Election Studies 1990; Miller and National Election Study 1988)

Six questions were asked to determine respondent’s level of support for lesbians and gay rights. These questions include, (1) “Lesbians and gay men should not be allowed to serve in the U.S. Armed Forces”; (2) “I favor laws to protect lesbians and gay men against job discrimination” (Miller, Kinder, Rosenstone, and National Election Studies 1992; Rosenstone, Kinder, Miller, and National Election Studies 1996); (3) “Same-sex couples should have the right to marry one another” (General Social Survey 1998); “Private same-sex sexual behavior between consenting adults should be legal in the U.S.”; (4) “Lesbians and gay men should be allowed to adopt children if they meet all the other criteria required of adoptive parents”; and, (5) “It is necessary to pass laws to make sure that lesbians and gay men have equal rights” (CBS News 1993).

\textit{Control/Verification Variables}

In most cases, the statistical modeling used makes the assumption that sociodemographic variables are exogenous to social dominance orientation’s relationship

\textsuperscript{13} Reproductive rights and abortion rights are used interchangeably throughout the paper.
with prejudicial attitudes and social policy support. As such, control variables were not utilized in testing the relationships between the primary constructs of interest and the dependent variable(s) in the structural equation models. However, additional control variables were included in the survey. These variables were used in a number of ways. First they were used to verify the relationships between social group membership and social dominance orientation, as well as to verify that documented relationships in the literature hold with the study’s samples. When theory and empirical evidence suggested, they were used to test post-hoc hypotheses. Finally, parallel analyses were run using OLS regression controlling for gender, race, parental education, income, self-reported social class, age, religious tradition, and religiosity for structural equation models to provide additional information on the robustness of the relationships identified. In the few cases where OLS results deviated from structural equation modeling results, a footnote is included.\footnote{OLS results were considered similar as long as the sign of the coefficient was the same in both types of models, and results that were significant in one type of model was either significant or marginally significant ($p<.10$) in the other.}

2.5 Study Limitations

The most obvious limitation of the proposed project is its reliance on an undergraduate, convenience sample which has been one of the major criticisms of much of the social psychological research base (Higbee and Wells 1972; Myers 1983; Schultz 1969; Wintre, North and Sugar 2001). The critique inquires, “...given the unrepresentativeness of the sample, how can the findings of this type of study be generalized to the real world of everyday people?” (Sears 1986; Smart 1966). And,
because attending college is not even a universal phenomenon for young adults between the ages of 18 and 22, some have even argued that limiting generalization even just to this age group is also inappropriate (Munroe and Adams 1977; Schultz 1969; Wintre et al. 2001).

A second and related criticism regards the developmental phase in which college-aged students fall. They are neither adolescents nor are they typical adults, but are in a transitional phase to adulthood (Bronfenbrenner 1979; Lerner 1998; Wintre et al. 2001). Sears (1986) points out that undergraduates’ sense of self and identity are in flux, and Murphy and Gilligan (1980) suggest that the seclusion that comes with an academic atmosphere may actually negate the development of reasoning that results from real world adult experiences of moral conflict and choice. There is also evidence that intelligence (Norman and Daley 1959; Wechsler 1958), social behavior (Wintre, Yaffe and Crowley 1995; Youniss and Smollar 1985), and learning ability (Adams 1991; Wimer 1960) change as one ages.

All studies depart from the ideal research design in some ways with various trade-offs having to be negotiated by the researcher. The important question is, then, in what ways might this study’s departure from the ideal influence its findings and the ability to infer from the results? The above concerns seem to suggest that the generalizability of the study’s findings will be strongly restricted; however, other empirical evidence suggests that the concern may not be as troublesome as would initially seem.

*Empirical Considerations.* An examination of studies that have compared findings of undergraduate students and adults on the topics of sexism, heterosexism and social dominance orientation might shed some light upon the issue of generalizability for this
particular project. In a comparison of three undergraduate samples and two adult samples, Glick and Fiske (1996) found that the Ambivalent Sexism Inventory factor structure and the scale’s internal consistency were virtually the same in both type of samples, as was the rate of endorsement. They did however, find that the correlation between the two subscales (hostile sexism and benevolent sexism) was significantly positive in non-student male samples and independent among the male student samples.\textsuperscript{15} They raise the question of whether this is an indication of the increasing complexity of attitudes toward women that men develop as they gain more experience with women in romantic, sexual and competitive experiences. However, it also seems likely that the difference could be related to a cohort effect as overall attitudes toward women have seen positive changes (thus lowering hostile sexism) with younger generations.

Numerous components of social dominance theory have also been tested with both undergraduate samples and adult samples finding similar patterns between constructs. The invariance hypothesis that, all other things equal, men should score higher on social dominance orientation has been shown to hold true with a wide range of sample types and across different situational contexts (Sidanius et al. 1994; see also Altemeyer 1998; Pratto, Sidanius, and Stallworth 1993; Pratto et al. 1994; Sidanius and Liu 1992; Sidanius and Pratto 1993a; Sidanius, Pratto and Rabinowitz 1994). Research with both undergraduates and adult samples have found that members of various high-status social groups are also higher in social dominance orientation than are members of low-status social groups (Sidanius, Levin, Liu and Pratto 2000; Sidanius and Pratto 1999).

\textsuperscript{15}Differences were not found between non-student female samples and female student samples.
McFarland and Adelson (1996) used twenty different predictors of a composite measure of prejudice (against women, lesbians/gay men, and African Americans) with both a student sample and an adult sample. They found that only four of the twenty correlates significantly predicted prejudice and that the four predicted prejudice in both samples. In addition, an examination of their standardized coefficients reveals that they are very similar in strength across the samples. Table 2.1 lists the variables and their coefficients.

### TABLE 2.1

**REGRESSION OF COMPOSITE PREJUDICE MEASURE ON FOUR PREDICTORS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Correlate</th>
<th>Standardized coefficient $\beta$</th>
<th>Multiple correlation $R$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Adult sample (N=283)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>social dominance orientation$_5$</td>
<td>.29</td>
<td>.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Authoritarianism</td>
<td>.44</td>
<td>.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Universalism</td>
<td>-.19</td>
<td>.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>-.17</td>
<td>.73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Student sample (N=438)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>social dominance orientation$_5$</td>
<td>.29</td>
<td>.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Authoritarianism</td>
<td>.42</td>
<td>.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Universalism</td>
<td>-.21</td>
<td>.69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>-.10</td>
<td>.74</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Whitley and Lee (2000) in their meta-analysis of the relationships between authoritarianism, political conservatism, and heterosexism found similar patterns. Both right wing authoritarianism and political conservatism was associated more strongly with attitudes toward homosexuality in adult samples than in the college student samples. And,
although they were unable to examine the relationship between social dominance orientation and attitudes toward homosexuality in both types of samples, there is clear evidence that both right wing authoritarianism and conservatism are strongly correlated with social dominance orientation in numerous types of samples and across various cultural and situational contexts (see Duckitt 1992 for a comprehensive review).

While anti-gay/anti-lesbian prejudice has been found to be widespread in both samples of college students (e.g., Herek 1984; Kite 1994) and national survey samples (e.g. Herek and Capitanio 1996), a number of studies have indicated that younger people have lower rates of hostile heterosexism (Balanko 1998; Schellenberg, Hirt, and Sears 1999; Simon 1995; Simoni 1996; Waldo and Kemp 1997), greater support for lesbian/gay rights (Yang 1999), and greater support for same-sex marriage (Gallup 2004; L.A. Times 2004). Additionally, much of the work on the changing nature of heterosexism has specifically argued that the dynamics of modern prejudice are most clearly found within the academic setting where cultural socialization of anti-lesbian/anti-gay attitudes clashes with the values of egalitarianism (Norris 1991). In addition, it is logical to expect (and empirical evidence suggests (Balanko 1998; Schellenberg, Hirt, and Sears 1999; Simon 1995; Simoni 1996; Waldo and Kemp 1997)) that because the young adult generation has less negative and more positive attitudes toward homosexuality than older adults, we will find greater endorsement of positively-valenced prejudicial attitudes among members of this age group.

Alwin and Krosnick (1991) examined fifty sociopolitical attitudes in a longitudinal three-panel dataset comparing seven age groupings (18-25, 26-33, 34-41, 42-49, 50-57, 58-65, and 66-83) in terms of sociopolitical attitude stability. These attitudes
were least stable in the 18-25 age group which had a mean stability coefficient of .853 (.882, .939, .930 for 26-33, 34-41 and 42-49, respectively) however the mean stability coefficient was not statistically significant from the other age groups. Because these findings were based on the combination of fifty different sociopolitical attitudes, however, the researchers then examined attitude stability decomposing the general index into various categories based on how symbolic the attitudes were to the individual: policy, efficacy, social groups, race, party, candidate and ideology. While the two most symbolic categories – party and candidate – (Sears 1983) did come closest to reaching significance (p=.311 and .128, respectively) when comparing the 18-25 category to the other age categories, none of the seven categories were significantly different.

In a final test to disentangle the potential confound of age and cohort effects, they examined the stability of attitudes across different age groups within cohort and suggested that the 18-25 category did appear to be less stable than the remaining age groups. However, an examination of the table of results indicates that they have abandoned the .05 level of significance for the more liberal .10 level of significance without justifying the switch. And, even if the results were at the standard level of significance, the difference in attitude stability between the 18-25 age group is significant for the 1972 cohort on the three questions examined, but is not in two of three questions for the 1950 cohort. Their findings are mixed and only provide weak support for the idea that sociopolitical attitudes are less stable for young adults than for those held by other-aged adults.

These findings do not imply that the findings of this project will necessarily be generalizable to the U.S. population – that will be evident only if future replications of
the project are undertaken with different samples and find similar results. In general, however, these empirical findings suggest three things about the generalizability of the study. First, the idea that young adults have substantially less stability in sociopolitical attitudes than other age groups is weakly supported, at best. Second, in attempting to capture modern prejudice related to sexual orientation, a young adult cohort may actually be a better sample than older adults given the generational differences that have been documented related to the types of anti-gay/anti-lesbian attitudes. Finally, if anything the empirical results suggest that relationships between a number of attitudinal constructs used in this project and attitudes regarding homosexuality are likely to be *stronger* in the U.S. adult population than among college undergraduates in the U.S. Therefore, findings with college undergraduates are likely to be a conservative estimate of the relationships found in the adult population.

Finally, much scholarship in the social psychological tradition began – as a starting point – with the use of undergraduate research subjects. While not the best practice, it enables researchers a fairly inexpensive and timely way in which to test theory, examine predicted relationships and discover new ideas. If all research in social psychology ended there, then serious concerns should be raised regarding what is actually known within the field. However, this type of sample provides an excellent opportunity to fine tune and gain insight into theoretical relationships prior to being tested in the general population.
CHAPTER 3

CONCERNS ABOUT THE SOCIAL DOMINANCE ORIENTATION SCALE

3.1 Overview

Social dominance theory is not without its critics. Central among those critical of social dominance theory are social identity theorists (see, for example, Rubin and Hewstone 2004), and system justification theorists (see, for example, Jost, Banaji, and Nosak 2004). There is however, considerable overlap among these three theories, and social dominance theory has been very explicit in its incorporation of both social identity theory and research findings as well as system justification theory and research findings (Sidanius and Pratto 1999). Regardless, differences do exist, and researchers anticipate that the debate over the three theories is “far from over” (Rubin and Hewstone 2004, p. 839).

Since its inception in 1993 (Sidanius 1993), most critiques of social dominance theory have fallen into four broad categories: psychological reductionism, conceptual redundancy, biological determinism, and hierarchy justification (Sidanius, Pratto, van Laar, and Levin 2004). Sidanius and colleagues have persuasively argued that many of the concerns are misinterpretations of social dominance theory (Sidanius and Pratto 2003; Sidanius et al. 2004). While this chapter’s purpose is not to re-address these critiques of social dominance theory, it does examine two concerns raised in the literature related specifically to the social dominance orientation scale. The first issue raised by Schmitt
and colleagues (2003) concerns what exactly the social dominance orientation scale is measuring, and its empirical relationship to measures of prejudice. In relationship to the whole of this project, this first issue – while interesting in and of itself – is more of a methodological aside. The second critique, offered by Jost and Thompson (2000; Jost et al. 2004) suggests that the social dominance orientation scale – rather than being unidimensional – actually captures two distinct, but related constructs. Unlike the first critique, this second critique has more direct implications for this project as a whole. Each of these concerns will be discussed and empirical evidence will be brought to bear on the critique.

3.2 Social Dominance Orientation and Measures of Prejudice

The social dominance orientation scale purports to capture a general orientation toward social dominance and group hierarchy (Sidanius and Pratto 1999). Social dominance orientation is a “...general desire for unequal relations among social groups, regardless of whether this means in-group domination or in-group subordination” (Sidanius, Levin, and Federico 1998). Those who are high in social dominance orientation are more likely to justify stratification and the system of privileges and discrimination, while those who are low in social dominance orientation are more likely to support ideologies and values that seek to dismantle social stratification (Sidanius and Pratto 1999). Empirical research has supported social dominance theory’s hypothesized relationship between social dominance orientation and various forms of prejudice toward a variety of social groups and across a variety of cultures (Pratto et al. 1994).
Schmitt and colleagues (2003) argue from a social identity theoretical perspective that “…how people orient themselves toward inequality will be a function of what social categorizations come to mind when ‘general’ attitudes toward inequality are assessed” (p. 163). If, for example, people are thinking primarily of race, then the social dominance orientation scale really measures attitudes toward racial inequality, not general attitudes toward inequality. In this instance, it is not surprising they surmise, that the social dominance orientation scale is correlated with measures of racism since, in essence, the social dominance orientation scale has become another measure of attitudes toward racial inequality.

In their research, Schmitt and his team (2003, Study 1), found that the relationship between racism and social dominance orientation was dependent on the extent to which participants thought about race while completing the social dominance orientation measure. The relationship between racism and social dominance orientation was stronger for individuals who thought about race a lot while completing the social dominance orientation scale, and weaker for those who thought little about race while completing the scale. This finding is in conflict with social dominance theory’s expectation that individual differences in social dominance orientation will be correlated with measures of prejudice regardless of the amount of time spent thinking about the social group targeted for the prejudice.  

In their second study, they found that scores on the social dominance orientation scale were related to sexism, but not to racism when study participants had been primed to think of gender. They found the opposite effect when participants had been primed to

\[16\] This interpretation of what social dominance theory predicts in this situation is that of Schmitt and colleagues.
think of race: the social dominance orientation scale was predictive of racism, but not of sexism. This, they argued, was evidence that individuals bring to mind salient inequalities to refer to when completing the social dominance orientation scale since the scale does not refer to any specified group.17

In a response to Schmitt and colleagues, Sidanius and Pratto (2003) point out that the social dominance orientation scale was deliberately designed so that specific groups were not named, thus allowing respondents to reference social groups that were salient in their own cultural experience. They write:

> The groups most likely to be the targets of social dominance drives will be those groups which are both the most salient and define the sharpest power differential within any given society at any given time. (Sidanius and Pratto 1999, p.61).

They further give the example of the major role that social class has played in European history as compared to the major role that race has played in the American context.

Schmitt’s team’s (2003) findings underscored – according to Sidanius and Pratto (2003) – the contextual sensitivity of the social dominance orientation scale. They argued that SDT has never made the claim that social dominance orientation scale scores should be absolutely invariant. Rather, social dominance theory is in line with “…contemporary expertise on individual psychological differences, which suggests that individuals’ differences are indicated by systematic variability across situations, rather than absolute stability across situations (Mischel and Shoda 1995)” (Sidanius and Pratto 2003, p. 208).

To support this argument they point to Pratto and Shih’s (2000) findings that demonstrated that people high or low on social dominance orientation showed the same

17 Schmitt and colleagues’ (2003) experiments consisted of more than just the two studies described here. However, only the first two study’s findings are examined here.
level of discrimination in ordinary conditions, but significantly different levels when placed under the condition of group threat. While the absolute levels showed variation across contexts in the experiment, the relative levels of social dominance orientation were stable across the contexts.

One additional possible explanation for the finding is that their priming manipulation actually shifted the social dominance orientation scale from being a general dominance scale (as would be the case when respondents are not primed with a specific group), to a specific dominance scale. In other words when no priming occurs, it is possible that most people will complete the scale using a number of groups that are culturally-salient as reference groups. However, when primed for a specific group, the respondent may either use only the specific group for which they were primed as the sole reference group or rely more heavily on the primed social group than they would have in a non-primed condition. Because Schmitt and colleagues failed to include a control group in which no priming occurred, they were not able to compare primed and non-primed conditions.

3.3 Hypotheses

To test the concerns raised in their first two studies (Schmitt et al. 2003), and to test their findings with attitudes toward an additional population, this study proffers the following hypotheses. First, to demonstrate equivalence across experimental conditions, no significant differences should be found between respondents in each of three experimental conditions on social dominance orientation, levels of sexism, or levels of heterosexism.
Next, to establish similarity to the sample used in Schmitt et al. (2003), the ranking of the following social groups should be in the same general order in terms of percentage of time thought about while completing the social dominance orientation scale: race, class, gender, and then, sexual orientation.\(^\text{18}\) This similarity should occur as both samples were taken from university undergraduates at U.S. colleges, and should therefore be similar in terms of cultural salience of group and power differences.

To demonstrate the effectiveness of the prime, however, individuals in the gender prime condition should be, on average, significantly different from both those in the non-primed condition and the sexual orientation condition on the percentage of time spent thinking about gender while completing the social dominance orientation measure. Likewise, individuals in the sexual orientation prime condition should be significantly different from both those in the non-primed condition and the gender condition on the percentage of time spent thinking about sexual orientation while completing the social dominance orientation scale. In both cases, there should be a higher mean percentage of time spent thinking about gender or sexual orientation for the group of respondents in the primed conditions. There should, however, be no significant differences between the three experimental conditions in terms of time spent thinking about race or class while completing the social dominance orientation scale as there were no groups primed for either race or social class.

Contrary to Schmitt and colleagues (2003), it is anticipated that the relationship between sexism and social dominance orientation, and the relationship between

\(^{18}\) Schmitt and colleagues included more groups (e.g., nations, political, criminal) in their breakout of different groups thought about. For the sake of brevity, however, the relative ranking of the top two social groups plus the two social groups of interest to this study, gender and sexual orientation, are examined here.
heterosexism and social dominance orientation will not be dependent on the extent to which participants thought about either gender or sexual orientation, respectively. Rather, in line with social dominance theory, it is anticipated that individual differences in social dominance orientation will be significantly correlated with sexism and heterosexism regardless of the amount of time spent thinking about either gender or sexual orientation, respectively.19

In their second study, Schmitt’s group (2003) found that racism scores predicted social dominance orientation in the race prime condition, while controlling for sexism scores, but sexism scores were not significantly related to social dominance orientation. Additionally, they found that sexism scores best predicted social dominance orientation in the gender prime condition, while controlling for racism scores, and that racism scores – in this context – were not significantly related to social dominance orientation. As mentioned above, Schmitt and colleagues failed to include a control group in this experiment. If a control group had been included, would they have found that in a non-primed condition, both sexism and racism would significantly predict social dominance orientation both in the bivariate and multivariate contexts?

In an attempt to replicate their findings from Study 2 (Schmitt et al. 2003), it is anticipated that a similar pattern between social dominance orientation, sexism, and heterosexism in both the gender and sexual orientation primed conditions will emerge,

19 Schmitt and colleagues followed a different temporal ordering in their experiment. First, they had respondents complete measures of racism and sexism, then eight weeks later the same respondents were primed, completed the social dominance orientation scale, and then answered questions regarding the social groups thought about and the percentage of time thought about each group. As respondents in my study were exposed to the priming conditions prior to completing both the social dominance orientation and the sexism and heterosexism scales, I verified that there were not significant differences in the sexism or heterosexism scores based on priming conditions, confirming that the priming did not impact these two measures of prejudice.
however, in the non-primed condition, it is anticipated that both sexism and heterosexism will significantly predict social dominance orientation. In other words, in the gender-primed condition, the expectation is that (a) sexism will significantly predict social dominance orientation in the bivariate context, (b) sexism will significantly predict social dominance orientation in the multivariate context controlling for heterosexism, (c) heterosexism will predict social dominance orientation in the bivariate context, and (d) heterosexism will not significantly predict social dominance orientation in the multivariate context controlling for sexism. Likewise, in the sexual orientation prime condition, the expectation is that (a) heterosexism will significantly predict social dominance orientation in the bivariate context, (b) heterosexism will significantly predict social dominance orientation in the multivariate context controlling for sexism, (c) sexism will predict social dominance orientation in the bivariate context, and (d) sexism will not significantly predict social dominance orientation in the multivariate context controlling for heterosexism. If all of these conditions hold true, then Schmitt’s research group’s (2003) findings for attitudes using a different pair of social groups than the ones used for their experiment will have been replicated.

In addition, however, four additional hypotheses for the non-primed condition are suggested which were not tested in the original experiment. They are that (a) sexism will significantly predict social dominance orientation in the bivariate context, (b) heterosexism will significantly predict social dominance orientation in the bivariate context, (c/d) both sexism and heterosexism will significantly predict social dominance orientation in the multivariate context controlling for the other.
If the predictions turn out to be supported, what, then, might be happening in the primed conditions that is responsible for the effect identified in Schmitt et al. (2003)? Sidanius and Pratto (2003) suggest that although absolute levels of social dominance orientation may vary over different contexts, relative levels of social dominance orientation tend be stable over different situations and contexts. They suggest that “…one’s relative group status actually increases social dominance orientation levels” (Sidanius and Pratto 1999, p. 79). Levin (1996) demonstrated this, and found that making ethnicity salient among Ashkenazic Jews (high status), Sephardic Jews (low status), and mixed Jews (intermediate status), fostered social dominance orientation levels that were similar to the groups’ different statuses. Ashkenazic Jews demonstrated the highest social dominance orientation, Sephardic Jews the lowest, and mixed Jews in between the other two. However, when she manipulated the prime to make Palestinian – Jewish nationalities salient, where Jews have higher status than Palestinians, the levels of social dominance orientation among the three classifications of Jews were no longer significantly different from one another, and the levels for all three groups increased.

Pratto and Shih (2000) also demonstrated this effect using implicit prejudice measures. They increased salience of group membership by inducing threat to group identity and found that in the context of increased salience, the differences between the high social dominance orientation group and low social dominance orientation group became significant which was not the case when the groups were not under threat. Even though social dominance orientation scores varied across context (in this case, group identity threat), those with higher levels of implicit prejudice showed higher social dominance orientation scores than those with lower social dominance orientation scores.
in both contexts. Thus, the stronger relationships found by Schmitt et al. (2003) between racism and social dominance orientation when race is made salient, and between sexism and social dominance orientation when sexism is made salient is not surprising.

This would suggest that when gender is made salient, levels of social dominance orientation between men and women should be significantly different with males, as the higher status group, demonstrating higher levels of social dominance orientation than females. However, in the condition where there is no prime, significant differences in level of social dominance orientation between genders should no longer be significant. In addition, since race has been identified as the most salient social group difference in the U.S. (Hutchings and Valentino 2004; Sidanius and Pratto 1999), in the non-primed condition it is anticipated that differences should emerge between African Americans and other racial groups, but in the gender prime condition this difference should disappear as gender takes race’s place as the most salient group.

Sidanius and Pratto’s (2003) argument on the cause of difference in Schmittt and colleagues (2003) experiments would further be bolstered if there were indications that the interpretation of the social dominance orientation scale is actually shifting from being answered as a general dominance scale to being answered as a specific dominance scale because of the experimental manipulation. This could be evidenced in a number of ways. First, it could be that respondents in the non-primed condition will think about a significantly greater number of social groups while completing the social dominance orientation scale than will respondents in primed conditions. A second possibility is that the priming does not effect the number of groups thought about in an ordinal sense as implied by the first hypothesis, but rather that respondents in primed conditions are
significantly more likely to refer to only one group rather than to multiple groups as would be expected in the non-primed condition. A final possibility is that the priming process affects the relative weight given to different groups. If this were the case, it would be anticipated that those respondents who had been primed for a specific social group would rely more heavily on the primed social group than those in the unprimed condition. This would suggest that while priming doesn’t necessarily shift the social dominance orientation scale from being a general social dominance scale to a specific social dominance scale in terms of the actual number of groups thought about, it does foster the salience of the social group primed for – as Sidanius and Pratto (2003) suggest – making the social dominance orientation scale disproportionately reliant upon attitudes about the primed social group.

3.4 Results

Sample comparability. Using ANOVA with a Scheffe test, no differences in social dominance orientation, hostile sexism, or hostile heterosexism levels were found across experimental conditions. Respondents’ answers to what groups were thought about while completing the social dominance orientation scale and the percentage of time spent thinking about the various groups are listed in Table 3.1. Groups listed were classified as race, class, gender, sexual orientation, or other. Two answers listing “male” and “female”, for example, would be classified once under gender, and their corresponding percentages would be added together. Single answers that included more than one group were classified under both groups. For example, the answer “poor Whites” would be classified both under the race and the class categories. As it is impossible to separate the percentage of time thinking about a group with two or more identities, the decision was made to use the total percentage for both groups. While potentially interesting, social groups other than race, class, gender and sexual orientation were all categorized as other as they were not the primary focus of this study.
about social group with 73.80% of respondents indicating that racial groups were brought to mind while completing the social dominance orientation measure. Race was followed by class (54.26%), gender (19.69%), and sexual orientation (13.64%). This order of ranking was the same found by Schmitt et al. (2003) and further verifies the salience of race as an important social category within the U.S.

**TABLE 3.1**

PERCENTAGE OF PARTICIPANTS THINKING ABOUT EACH SOCIAL GROUP WHILE COMPLETING THE SOCIAL DOMINANCE ORIENTATION MEASURE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Social Group</th>
<th>Percent Mentioned</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Race</td>
<td>73.80%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class</td>
<td>54.26%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>19.69%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sexual Orientation</td>
<td>13.64%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>36.25%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

To verify the priming, the percentage of time spent thinking about the primed group was regressed on the primed condition. As predicted a greater percentage of time was spent thinking about gender while completing the social dominance orientation measure in the gender primed condition, and a greater percentage of time was spent thinking about sexual orientation in the sexual orientation primed condition. In the gender primed condition, respondents thought of gender almost 8 percentage points more than those in the other two experimental conditions ($\beta = 7.74$, $se = 1.223$, $p < .001$). In the sexual orientation primed condition, respondents thought of sexual orientation almost 10
percentage point more than respondents in the other two conditions ($\beta=9.93, \text{se}=1.172, p<.001$).

Percentage of time thinking about various social groups. The percentage of time reported in which the respondent thought of gender while completing the social dominance orientation measure ranged from 0% to 100%. The mean was 6.29% with a standard deviation of 15.05%. Regressing the social dominance orientation score on dummy variables for the sexual orientation prime and the non-primed conditions finds that those in the sexual orientation primed condition spent 8.20% less time thinking about gender than did those in the gender primed condition ($p<.001$). Likewise, those in the non-primed condition spent 7.27% less time ($p<.001$).

For the amount of time spent thinking of sexual orientation while completing the social dominance orientation instrument, the full range of percentages (0-100) were represented, with slightly more than 86% of respondents reporting that they did not think of sexual orientation at all. The mean time spent thinking of sexual orientation was 4.59% with a standard deviation of 14.82%. Regressing the social dominance orientation score on the dummy variables for the gender primed condition and the non-primed condition, it emerges that both the gender primed and non-primed condition spent 10% less time thinking about sexual orientation while completing the social dominance orientation measure ($p<.001$ for both).

Since there were no primed conditions for either race or social class, it had been predicted that there would not be a significant difference in percentage of times thinking of either social group while completing the social dominance orientation scale across the various conditions. This was the case. For race and social class the full range of
percentages was represented in the sample. The average time spent thinking about race was 48.54% with a standard deviation of 39.26% points. The average time thinking of social class was 31.25% with a standard deviation of 36.44% points. Table 3.2 lists the findings of the above analyses.

**TABLE 3.2**

REGRESSION ANALYSES PREDICTING PERCENTAGE OF TIME THINKING ABOUT SOCIAL GROUPS WHILE COMPLETING THE SOCIAL DOMINANCE ORIENTATION MEASURE ON EXPERIMENTAL CONDITION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Gender Prime Condition</th>
<th>Sexual Orientation Prime Condition</th>
<th>Race Condition</th>
<th>Social Class Condition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gender Prime</td>
<td>-9.96***</td>
<td>2.985</td>
<td>-6.452</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Condition</td>
<td>(1.358)</td>
<td>(3.799)</td>
<td>(3.517)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sexual Orientation</td>
<td>-8.20***</td>
<td>2.137</td>
<td>-5.798</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prime Condition</td>
<td>(1.410)</td>
<td>(3.782)</td>
<td>(3.505)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-primed Condition</td>
<td>-7.27***</td>
<td>-9.90***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.413)</td>
<td>(1.355)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>11.47***</td>
<td>11.175***</td>
<td>46.834***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.002)</td>
<td>(.956)</td>
<td>(2.680)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>35.326***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(2.481)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R²</td>
<td>.060</td>
<td>.100</td>
<td>.001</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>645</td>
<td>645</td>
<td>644</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NOTE: *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001 (two-tailed tests). Standard error in parentheses. The reference group is the group left blank.

Unlike Schmitt and colleague’s (2003) findings that social dominance orientation scores were dependent on the time spent thinking about race, in this study, as predicted,
the percentage of time spent thinking about gender is not statistically significant in either its bivariate relationship with the social dominance orientation score, or in the multivariate context where hostile sexism is being controlled for. Table 3.3 provides the information on these analyses.

This same pattern emerges when looking at sexual orientation. Percentage of time spent thinking about sexual orientation while completing the social dominance orientation measure is not a statistically significant predictor of the social dominance orientation score, regardless of whether or not hostile heterosexism is included in the regression analysis. To further test the relationship that Schmitt et al. (2003) identified, time spent thinking of gender was interacted with hostile sexism, and time spent thinking of sexual orientation was interacted with hostile heterosexism. Neither of the interaction terms were significant.

These findings fail to support Schmitt et al.’s (2003) results regarding social groups thought about while completing the social dominance orientation measure. It is possible that their results are a pattern that only applies to race, perhaps because of the centrality of race to the stratification system in the U.S. However, further studies would have to be conducted to determine if this is actually the case.

Social dominance orientation and measures of prejudice. Next, the relationship between various forms of prejudice and the social dominance orientation scale were examined under different priming conditions. Based on Sidanius and Pratto’s (2003) suggestion, it was anticipated that similar patterns to what Schmitt et al. (2003) found would emerge, regarding the relationship between hostile sexism, hostile heterosexism,
**TABLE 3.3**

**REGRESSION ANALYSES FOR SOCIAL DOMINANCE ORIENTATION ON HOSTILE PREJUDICE AND PERCENTAGE OF TIME THINKING ABOUT SOCIAL GROUPS, BY EXPERIMENTAL CONDITION**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>Sexual Orientation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Model 1a</td>
<td>Model 1b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hostile Sexism</td>
<td>5.496***</td>
<td>5.438***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.508)</td>
<td>(.515)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time Thinking</td>
<td>-.057</td>
<td>-.015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>About Gender</td>
<td>(.044)</td>
<td>(.041)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hostile Sexism X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time Thinking</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>About Sexual</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orientation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hostile Heterosexism</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time Thinking</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>About Sexual</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orientation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2.118)</td>
<td>(1.485)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R²</td>
<td>.156</td>
<td>.003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>634</td>
<td>639</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**NOTE:** *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001 (two-tailed tests). Standard errors in parentheses.
In the gender primed condition, as hypothesized, both hostile sexism \((p<.001)\) and hostile heterosexism \((p<.001)\) were significantly correlated with social dominance orientation in the bivariate context. Hostile sexism maintained significance \((p<.001)\) when hostile heterosexism was added to the model, but, controlling for hostile sexism, hostile heterosexism is no longer significant \((p<.208)\). This pattern matches the pattern found by Schmitt and colleagues (2003) when exploring attitudes about race and gender.

Examining the same pattern in the sexual orientation primed condition, however, yields different results. Like above, both hostile sexism \((p<.001)\) and hostile heterosexism \((p<.001)\) predict social dominance orientation in the bivariate relationships. However, unlike immediately above and in Schmitt’s study, both hostile sexism \((p<.001)\) and hostile heterosexism \((p<.01)\) maintain significance in the multivariate context. Given the interdependence of the relationship between hostile sexism and hostile heterosexism (see, for example, Pharr 1988), it seems reasonable to suggest that the relationship between hostile sexism and hostile heterosexism may be qualitatively different than the relationship between hostile sexism and hostile racism. This difference in the structural relationship between the two may be part of the explanation for the different pattern that emerges.

To shed additional light on what might be happening in this pattern, the same relationships were examined in the non-primed condition. Since respondents in this condition had not answered any previous questions, their responses to the social dominance orientation instrument should not be by survey effects making a
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Gender Prime Condition</th>
<th>Sexual Orientation Prime Condition</th>
<th>Non-primed Condition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Model 1a</td>
<td>Model 1b</td>
<td>Model 1c</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hostile Sexism</td>
<td>6.723***</td>
<td>6.178***</td>
<td>5.918***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( .813)</td>
<td>( .919)</td>
<td>( .922)</td>
<td>( .955)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hostile Heterosexism</td>
<td>.281***</td>
<td>.082</td>
<td>.280***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( .064)</td>
<td>( .065)</td>
<td>( .063)</td>
<td>( .062)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(3.371)</td>
<td>(2.610)</td>
<td>(3.934)</td>
<td>(3.704)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R²</td>
<td>.248</td>
<td>.085</td>
<td>.164</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>210</td>
<td>210</td>
<td>214</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NOTE: *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001 (two-tailed tests). Standard errors in parentheses.
certain identity more salient. Like above in both of the other two experimental conditions, both hostile sexism \((p<.001)\) and hostile heterosexism \((p<.001)\) are significantly correlated with social dominance orientation scores in the bivariate relationships. Again, contrary to Schmitt and his team’s (2003) finding and the findings above in the gender prime condition, I find that both hostile sexism \((p<.001)\) and hostile heterosexism \((p<.01)\) maintain their significant relationship with social dominance orientation controlling for the other.

**Stability of relative levels of social dominance orientation.** While the above empirical findings provide mixed support for the pattern that Schmitt et al. (2003) found, Sidanius and Pratto (2003) have made the argument that social dominance theory has been misunderstood by Schmitt and colleagues and, rather than social dominance orientation scale scores being absolutely invariant, social dominance orientation scale scores should show systematic variation based on contexts such as those introduced by making specific social groups salient. This fluctuation should be related to the social status of the group to which one belongs and which has been made salient.

Based on the notion that mean social dominance orientation levels will systematically vary across contexts, while relative levels will stay stable, a number of hypotheses were made. In the gender primed condition where gender is made salient, significant differences in the levels of social dominance orientation between men and women should emerge as their relative social group statuses have been made salient. However, this difference should disappear in the non-primed condition where gender has not been made salient. Using ANOVA, both of these hypotheses are supported. In the gender prime condition, males score slightly more than seven points higher than women
on social dominance orientation \((p<.001)\), while in the non-primed condition, no statistically significant difference in social dominance orientation emerges between males and females \((p<.13)\). In the non-primed condition, males continue to have higher social dominance orientation scores than females, just not significantly so.

Next, it was suggested that social dominance orientation levels between African Americans and other racial groups should differ in the non-primed condition, based on the notion that race is the default most salient group difference in contemporary U.S. society, and that these differences should disappear when gender is made the more salient of the two by priming. Again, using ANOVA, both of these hypotheses are supported. In the non-primed condition, African Americans score more than 11 points lower on the social dominance orientation measure than do non-African Americans \((p<.01)\). In the gender prime condition this difference is in the same direction, but is not statistically significant \((p<.16)\).

Overall these analyses suggest that while social dominance orientation mean scores change based on context (salience of different social groups), the relationship between those who are high status and those who are low status on the salient difference follows the pattern predicted and the explanation given by social dominance theory. These findings also suggest that rather than being a stable personality trait of individuals that explains prejudice as has been suggested by some researchers (see, for example, McFarland 1999; Whitley 1999), social dominance orientation might better be thought of as an individual level characteristic that shifts based on context. This conceptualization of

---

\(^{21}\) In both cases, the significance of either gender or race in predicting social dominance orientation in the gender-prime and non-prime conditions holds for both the opposition to equality and the group-based dominance subscales individually. However, in both cases, the relationship is stronger for the opposition to equality subscale than for the group-based dominance subscale.
social dominance orientation is what Guimond, Dambrun, Michinov, and Duarte (2003) call the group socialization model, to underscore the impact of salience of group identities as well as the influence of group norms and socialization on levels of social dominance orientation (Sinclair, Sidanius, and Levin 1998).

*Number of groups thought of.* This final section is an examination of whether or not priming actually shifts the number of groups referenced while completing the social dominance orientation scale. Three possibilities have been suggested. First, there may be a straightforward decrease in the number of groups thought about in conditions where a specific social group is made salient. Second, there may be an increased likelihood of referencing only one group when a specific social group is made salient. Finally, it is possible that priming for a social group makes the respondent give more relative weight to that particular social group.

Respondents could provide up to seven different social groups that they thought about while completing the social dominance orientation instrument. Almost 35% of the sample stated that they only thought of one group while completing the scale, 35% referenced two social groups, 22% thought of three groups, and the remaining 8% thought of 4 or more groups. The mean number of groups reported is 2.08 with a standard deviation of 1.02.

Using ANOVA with a Scheffe test to test for differences in number of groups referenced across the three experimental conditions, no significant difference in the number of groups thought about emerges. In addition, the three conditions were recoded into one dichotomous dummy variable representing whether or not the respondent was in
a primed experimental condition.\footnote{Additionally, I calculated the Index of Qualitative Variation (IQV, Bohrnstedt and Knoke 1982) for each of the three experimental conditions, and found that the indices were virtually no different across the three conditions. The IQVs were all within a 1% range of each other. The IQV for the gender primed condition was .1879. It was .1828 for the sexual orientation primed condition, and .1789 for the non-primed condition.} Again, ANOVA analysis indicates no significant differences between the two primed conditions (combined) and the non-primed condition.

The second possibility is that priming increases the likelihood of the respondent referring only to one group – the primed group – while completing the social dominance orientation measure. Slightly more than 65% of the sample reported thinking about more than one group. Using logistic regression with dummy codes for the two primed conditions, no significant difference in likelihood of using only one group as a reference category while answering the questions on the social dominance orientation instrument was found between the experimental conditions. Likewise, there were no significant differences in the likelihood of referring to only one group when comparing the primed groups combined with the non-primed group.

The final possibility is that the relative weight given to primed groups differs based on priming. A \textit{reliance} variable was constructed by using the number of groups referred to while completing the social dominance orientation scale as the denominator and either a 0 or a 1 as the numerator indicating whether or not the specific social group was referenced. This results in a variable with a range from 0 to 1 where 0 represents the respondent who did not think about the specific primed social group while completing the scale, and 1 represents the respondent who thought \textit{only} of the specific primed social group. Between those two values are the possibilities of .5 where the respondent thought of the specific social group and one additional social group, .33 where the respondent thought of the specific social group and two additional social groups, etc. Both a gender
reliance variable and a sexual orientation reliance variable were constructed, and ANOVA was used to determine if there were significant differences in the value of the reliance variable based on priming condition.

The gender reliance variable ranged from 0 to 1, had a mean of .079 and a standard deviation of .169. The results of the ANOVA indicate that respondents in both the sexual orientation primed condition and the non-primed condition gave significantly less relative weight to gender as a social group while completing the social dominance orientation scale than did respondents in the gender primed condition. Both are significant at the .001 level.

The sexual orientation reliance variable ranged from 0 to 1. It had a mean of .054 and a standard deviation of .152. As with the gender reliance variable, the results of the ANOVA indicate that those who were not primed with sexual orientation questions relied significantly less on sexual orientation as a social group than those who were primed. The p-level is .001 for both conditions again.

A second question arises given these findings. It appears that priming actually effects how much the respondent relies on the primed social group as a reference category relative to the total number of groups thought about while completing the instrument, but it is not clear whether or not those that relied more heavily on gender or sexual orientation relative to other groups had higher or lower social dominance orientation scores.

Regressing social dominance orientation scores on the gender reliance and sexual orientation reliance variables, I find that those who have higher gender reliance scores have significantly lower social dominance orientation scores ($p<.05$). To further test this
relationship, I examine the relationship based on whether or not the respondent was in a primed condition. These results suggest that for those who were not primed, their social dominance orientation score is not influenced by how much they relied on gender relative to other social groups. However, for those primed, the gender reliance score is marginally significant predicting lower levels of social dominance orientation ($p<.10$).

While the sexual orientation reliance variable does not predict social dominance scores in the full sample ($p<.21$), examining the relationship based on whether or not the respondent is in a primed condition, does find a significant relationship. For those in the non-primed condition, the relationship is not significant ($p<.24$), but for those in primed conditions, the relationship is again marginally significant whereby increased reliance on sexual orientation is associated with decreased levels of social dominance orientation ($p<.10$).

Together results – although not conclusive – suggest that priming shifts the way in which the respondent relies on groups that have been made salient and this shift is associated with decreased levels of social dominance orientation.

### 3.5 Discussion

Taken together the above empirical findings challenge a number of the outcomes found by Schmitt and colleagues (2003) raising questions about the generalizability of their findings across social groups other than race and gender. These include the relationship between percentage of time thinking about a group and its relationship to social dominance orientation, the relationship of prejudicial attitudes and social dominance orientation controlling for time thinking about the social group, and, the
influence of priming on the relationship between measures of different types of prejudice and social dominance orientation. Even with regard to the Schmitt et al. (2003) findings that were replicated, additional analyses seem to support Sidanius and Pratto’s interpretation of the relationships between the variables.

3.6 Two Distinct Constructs?

In a factor analysis of items on the social dominance orientation scale, Jost and Thompson (2000) found that the social dominance orientation scale actually captures two distinct, but related constructs: a) a system-justifying construct whereby there is the desire to maintain the existing system of hierarchical relations regardless of the impact for one’s own social group and b) a group-justifying construct whereby there is a desire to promote the interests, status and power of one’s own group. They further hypothesized that the system-justifying component of social dominance orientation (what they call the opposition to equality factor) should lead to preference for the high-status group regardless of whether one is in the high-status or low-status group. However the group-justifying component of the social dominance orientation scale (what they call the group-based dominance factor) should lead to favoritism for one’s own group for both the high-status and low-status groups. Jost and Thompson (2000) using the scale items loading on these different factors, tested and found support for this hypothesis. Building on their work, Foels and Pappas (2004) similarly found that the two different components of the social dominance orientation scale functioned differently in relationship to constructs such as masculinity, femininity, and feminist identity among women.
These competing motivations have different implications for high-status and low-status group members. For members of high-status groups, the motives are congruent. Support for the existing system maintains their privileges at the same time that it promotes their social group’s status and interests. For members of high-status groups, then, social dominance orientation should be related to in-group favoritism regardless of which motive is functional. For members of low-status groups, on the other hand, support for the system justifying motive of social dominance orientation is in direct conflict with the group justifying motive (Levin et al. 2002).

Two findings suggest that the perceived legitimacy of status differences may be the key to understanding which motives of social dominance orientation are operating. Asymmetry has been found both when status differences between the groups are perceived to be unstable (Federico 1999), and when members of social groups perceive that they and fellow members of their group are victims of oppression and discrimination (Rabinowitz 1999). Consistent with classical sociological perspectives on the integration of hierarchical social orders (e.g., Gramsci 1971; Marx and Engels [1846] 1970; Mosca [1896] 1936; Weber 1947) perceived legitimacy is significantly related to acceptance of group hierarchy, most particularly among low-status group members (Ellemers 1993; see also Hogg and Abrams 1990; Jost 1995; Jost, Burgess and Mosso 2001).

By incorporating a variable capturing perceived system legitimacy into their models, Levin et al. (2002) found a three-way interaction between social dominance orientation, group membership, and perceived legitimacy of the system in predicting high status group favoritism. As suggested by system justification theory, for individuals from higher status groups, a high social dominance orientation predicted greater in-group
favoritism regardless of how legitimate the system was perceived to be. For individuals from lower status groups, however, a high social dominance orientation predicted out-group favoritism only when the system was perceived to be legitimate. This was found to hold for both affective responses to social groups (Israeli Jews) and for opposition to social policies that guaranteed access to public accommodations for minorities (race in the U.S.).

These findings suggest that ideas advanced by system justification theory and social dominance theory work in tandem to explain differences in support for public policies and favorable ratings of high-status groups. When members of both high- and low-status groups perceive the existing hierarchy to be legitimate, they consensually favor the high-status group (Ellemers, et al. 1993; Jost et al. 2001; Sidanius and Pratto 1999: Taylor, Moghaddam, Gamble and Zellerer 1987; Turner 1975; Turner and Brown 1978). When this distinction between the groups is not seen as legitimate, the two groups no longer have consensual norms and tend to follow their own interests (see Jost et al. 2001; Levin et al. 2002; Turner and Brown 1978).

System justification theory and social dominance theory, however, diverge in their understanding of the social dominance orientation scale. System justification theory argues that the scale captures two related but distinct constructs, while social dominance theory suggests that the scale – even with two factors – is unidimensional in its functioning. That is, the two components of social dominance reflect two separate motivations underlying the unidimensional desire for social dominance, and that they emerge as separate factors due to question phrasing differences (Sidanius and Pratto 1999).
3.7 Hypotheses

Based on Jost and Thompson’s (2000, Study 1 and Study 2) factor analysis as well as analyses by social dominance theory researchers (Foels and Pappas 2004; Sidanius and Pratto 1999), it is anticipated that two subdomains will emerge on the social dominance orientation scale that will correspond to an anti-egalitarianism system-justifying motive, and a group-based dominance motive. Using structural equation modeling\(^\text{23}\), a two-factor structure model of the social dominance orientation scale will be compared to the one-factor structure to determine the best fit with the data.

Following that, a series of hypotheses used by Jost and Thompson (2000) to support their contention that the social dominance orientation scale captures two distinct constructs will be tested. The hypotheses will help determine if their findings – which focused on differences in the functioning of the two subdomains of the social dominance orientation scale between African Americans and European Americans – generalize to differences between men and women.

Based on social dominance theory’s “ideological symmetry effect” which suggests that social dominance orientation scores will tend to be more internally consistent for high-status group members than for low-status group members (Levin et al. 1998; Rabinowitz 1999), Jost and Thompson (2000) first predicted and found that correlations between the two subdomains were significantly more highly correlated for European Americans (higher status) than for African Americans (lower status). Therefore

\(^{23}\text{Completed with LISREL, version 8.71 statistical software (Jöreskog and Sörbom 2004).}\)
it is hypothesized that the correlations between the two subdomains will be significantly stronger for males, as the higher status group, than for females\textsuperscript{24}.

The central and recurring theme in Jost and Thompson’s (2000) critique of the social dominance orientation scale is that the two subdomains function differently in their relationship to other constructs, and that the two subdomains function differently for different social groups. In their series of studies they examine the subdomains’ relationships with self-esteem, ethnocentrism, neuroticism, political orientation, issue-based conservatism, attitudes toward affirmative action, and economic system justification. They find a number of differences in the relationship of each of the subdomains to these constructs, and find that two subdomains, at times, function differently for African Americans and European Americans. While not all variables examined in their studies are available in this study, some overlap does exist. The relationships between the subdomains and a number of constructs will be examined including relationships with political orientation, attitudes toward affirmative action for women, endorsement of equal opportunity, and belief that the gender stratification system is fair. In addition, differences in these relationships between men (as the higher status group) and women (as the lower status group) will be explored.

Jost and Thompson (2000, Study 4) found that opposition to equality was positively related to a conservative political orientation for both European Americans \(p<.01\) and African Americans \(p<.0001\), and that group-based dominance was not for either group. As such, it is predicted that the two subdomains will operate differently in

\textsuperscript{24} Jost and Thompson’s (2000) naming convention for the two subdomains, opposition to equality and group-based dominance will be utilized.
their relationship to political orientation, but that this pattern will be the same for both men and women.

With regard to affirmative action, African Americans were significantly more supportive than were European Americans ($p<.0001$) in Study 4 (Jost and Thompson 2000). They found that the opposition to equality subdomain was related to rejection of affirmative action, while the group-based dominance subdomain was not. This finding held for the whole sample ($p<.001$), as well as for African Americans ($p<.03$) and European Americans ($p<.0001$) as groups. Given that people frequently oppose affirmative action based on the reason that they are against unequal treatment (see, for example, Kravitz 1995), it is informative that opposition to equality is so strongly related to anti-affirmative action attitudes, suggesting that the actual reason that people oppose affirmative action is to justify the existing system of inequity. Based on these findings, it is anticipated that women will be more supportive of affirmative action policies for women than will be men, and second, that the opposition to equality subdomain score will be significantly related to rejection of affirmative action for both groups, while the group-based dominance subdomain score will not be a significant predictor for either group.

Jost and Thompson (2000, Study 4) also found that both subdomains were predictive of economic system justification. The opposition to equality subdomain had a strong positive relationship ($p<.0001$), while the group-based dominance subdomain had a marginally significant relationship ($p<.06$). While the current study does not ask the series of seventeen questions used in their study to measure economic system justification, it does contain a series of six questions gauging endorsement of the belief
that America provides equal opportunity for all, and has two questions gauging belief about the fairness of the gender stratification system. Many of the equal opportunity questions included in the survey have economic system justification implications. For example, one question asks the respondent to respond on a 7-point Likert scale indicating agreement with the statement, “Salaries are usually reflective of education, which in turn is reflective of intelligence and ambition,” and another with the statement, “Lower wages for women and ethnic minorities simply reflects lower skill and educational levels.” Based on Jost and Thompson’s (2000) findings, both subdomains should be significantly related (positively) to endorsement in the belief that equal opportunity for all exists in America. In addition, men should be more endorsing of this belief than will women.

Similarly, the belief in the fairness of the gender stratification system should be predicted by both the opposition to equality and the group-based dominance subdomains. Women, it is predicted, will be less inclined to believe that the system is fair.

3.8 Results

To test the hypothesis that a two-factor solution of the social dominance orientation scale would provide a better fit to the data than would a one-factor solution, structural equation modeling was used to model the two different solutions. First the one factor model of the scale – which is diagrammed in Figure 3.1 – was estimated. According to this model, all sixteen responses represent imperfectly measured indicators of a single latent variable, social dominance orientation. The sixteen indicator variables are represented by SDO$_1$ through SDO$_{16}$ in the diagram. The indicator coefficients are represented using LISREL’s notation by the Greek letter lambda (λ) with
subscripts from 1 to 16. The error component associated with each indicator is represented by the Greek letter delta (δ), again with subscripts from 1 to 16 corresponding with the sixteen indicator variables. Finally, the variance of the latent variable – social dominance orientation – is represented by the Greek letter phi (φ).

When evaluating model fit in structural equation models, there is no one standard way of determining goodness-of-fit. Fit measures typically examine the difference between the observed covariance matrix and the fitted covariance matrix from the model. Many authors recommend using a variety of fit measures (Baer 2004; Bollen 1989; Loehlin 1987), and in the best case scenario, the fit measures will be in agreement with one another. Following this recommendation, I will be reporting the model $\chi^2$, the discrepancy matrix, the root mean-square residual (RMR), the comparative fit index (CFI), and the Akaike information criterion (AIC). These fit measures are briefly discussed below.

Commonly reported in structural equation modeling reports is the model $\chi^2$, but because of its dependence on sample size in its calculation it is really just a starting place in the model evaluation process. Examining the residual matrix (discrepancy between the observed covariance and fitted covariance matrices) can provide a reader with information regarding the pattern of the discrepancies. Two models with very similar fit statistics may, for example, have very different discrepancy patterns. One may have residuals that are somewhat evenly distributed, while another model may have two or three covariances with very large residuals, and the remaining with very small residuals. The root mean-square residual (RMR, Jöreskog and Sörbom 1986) is the square root of

---

25 Using $\chi^2$ it is quite possible to have a very good-fitting model with a large sample, but still have a statistically significant $\chi^2$, and with a too small of a sample, a poorly fitting model may fail to be rejected.
Figure 3.1: One Factor Model of the Social Dominance Orientation Scale
the mean of the squared residuals from the difference between the two matrices, and gives one an idea about the “average” discrepancy between the two matrices. The RMR is formally defined as:

\[
\sqrt{\frac{2 \sum_{i=1}^{q} \sum_{j=1}^{l} (s_{ij} - \hat{\sigma}_{ij})^2}{q(q + 1)}}
\]

Given what the RMR measures, lower numbers tend to indicate a better overall fitting model.

Another family of fit indices is normed and non-normed fit indices and their extensions. Among these measures are Bentler and Bonett’s (1980) normed fit index (NFI) and their non-normed fit index (NNFI), as well as later extensions including the Comparative Fit Index (CFI, Bentler 1990). The NFI is a measure that compares the model under investigation with a baseline null model. This baseline model would be a highly constrained model with, for example, all the correlations set to zero. The comparison between the study’s model and the baseline model places the study model on a continuum from the baseline model to the full model, resulting in an NFI from 0 to 1. The closer the NFI is to 1, the closer the model is to a “perfect fit.”

The CFI was developed as some research with the NFI (Bentler 1990) found that the NFI tended to underestimate data-to-model fits, especially for small samples. The CFI results in a range from 0 to 1, with higher numbers representing a better fit. Bentler (1990) demonstrated that underestimation of fit happens less frequently with the CFI than with the NFI. The CFI is defined as:

\[
CFI = 1 - \frac{l_1}{l_2}
\]
where \( l_1 = \max(l_h,0), l_2 = \max(l_h,l_i,0), l_h = [(n-1)F_h - df_h], \) and \( l_i = [(n-1)F_i - df_i]. \) \( F \) represents the fitting function for the hypothesized model \((h)\) and the independence baseline model \((i)\), \( df \) is the degrees of freedom for each model, and \( n \) is the sample size.

Finally, there are a number of parsimonious fit measures which penalize the model for using additional degrees of freedom. Among these measures are the \textit{parsimony fit index} (PFT, James, Mulaik, and Brett 1982), the \textit{Akaike’s information criterion} (AIC, CITATION), and the \textit{parsimony normed fit index} (PNFI, Mulaik, James, Van Alstine, Bennett, Lind, and Stilwell 1989). The AIC which will be used here is formally defined as:

\[
AIC = \chi^2 + 2q
\]

where \( q \) represents the number of parameters. Lower values for AIC are more desirable.

The correlations and discrepancies for the one-factor model are listed in Table 3.5 (see McDonald and Ho 2002 for recommendations on reporting discrepancies for structural equation models.) The smallest fitted residual is -1.96, the median fitted residual if .46, and the largest is 2.58. The RMR for the one factor model of the social dominance orientation scale is .76.

The model has 104 degrees of freedom and results in a \( \chi^2 \) of 465.02 which is significant \((p<.001)\). The model Aikake Information Criterion (AIC) is 529.02. The one-factor model results in a Comparative Fit Index (CFI) of .73. Overall, this is not a particularly strong fit to the data.

Next a two-factor model is fit to the data. Like previous work on the social dominance orientation scale, eight questions load on what Jost and Thompson (2000) call
the opposition to equality construct, and the remaining eight questions load on the group-based dominance construct. This two-factor model is illustrated in Figure 3.2.

Discrepancies for the two-factor model are shown in Table 3.6. This model has an RMR of .61 which is lower than the RMR for the one-factor model. It has 103 degrees of freedom and a $\chi^2$ of 283.01 ($p<.001$), again this measure also indicates a better fit over the previous model. The difference in $\chi^2$ values between the models is 182.01 with 1 degree of freedom. This is also distributed $\chi^2$, and is clearly significant ($p<.001$). This indicates the two-factor model is a significant improvement over the one-factor model.

The model AIC is 349.01 and the CFI is .83. Likewise, both of these fit measures demonstrate that the two-factor model represents a better fitting model. As such, the two factor model of the social dominance orientation scale will be primarily utilized for the remainder of this paper.

*Ideological symmetry effect.* The next hypothesis tested examines the prediction from social dominance theory’s ideological symmetry effect which argues that social dominance orientation scores will tend to be more internally consistent for high-status group members than for low-status group members. Jost and Thompson (2000) found this was the case comparing correlations between the two subdomains for European Americans with those for African Americans. Foels and Pappas (2004) replicated this pattern comparing males and females in one study (Study 1), but found no significant differences in the internal consistency of the social dominance orientation scale in another study (Study 2). For this study, it was predicted that the correlations between the two factors would be statistically stronger for men (higher-status) than for women (lower-status).
### TABLE 3.5

**CORRELATIONS, VARIANCES AND DISCREPANCES OF THE ONE FACTOR SOLUTION OF THE SOCIAL DOMINANCE ORIENTATION SCALE**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>SDO1</th>
<th>SDO2</th>
<th>SDO3</th>
<th>SDO4</th>
<th>SDO5</th>
<th>SDO6</th>
<th>SDO7</th>
<th>SDO8</th>
<th>SDO9</th>
<th>SDO10</th>
<th>SDO11</th>
<th>SDO12</th>
<th>SDO13</th>
<th>SDO14</th>
<th>SDO15</th>
<th>SDO16</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SDO1</td>
<td>28.76</td>
<td>2.03</td>
<td>1.06</td>
<td>1.40</td>
<td>0.62</td>
<td>0.84</td>
<td>1.03</td>
<td>0.64</td>
<td>0.68</td>
<td>0.60</td>
<td>1.05</td>
<td>0.36</td>
<td>0.58</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>0.85</td>
<td>0.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDO2</td>
<td>.81***</td>
<td>8.39</td>
<td>1.09</td>
<td>1.21</td>
<td>0.59</td>
<td>1.91</td>
<td>1.53</td>
<td>1.35</td>
<td>0.52</td>
<td>0.45</td>
<td>0.27</td>
<td>0.83</td>
<td>0.51</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>0.55</td>
<td>0.85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDO3</td>
<td>.41***</td>
<td>.42***</td>
<td>10.82</td>
<td>0.66</td>
<td>0.57</td>
<td>2.58</td>
<td>1.08</td>
<td>0.66</td>
<td>0.55</td>
<td>0.33</td>
<td>0.40</td>
<td>1.09</td>
<td>0.48</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>0.16</td>
<td>0.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDO4</td>
<td>.51***</td>
<td>.60***</td>
<td>.61***</td>
<td>8.61</td>
<td>1.38</td>
<td>0.62</td>
<td>0.40</td>
<td>0.79</td>
<td>0.60</td>
<td>0.97</td>
<td>0.57</td>
<td>0.87</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>0.28</td>
<td>0.84</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDO5</td>
<td>.51***</td>
<td>.58***</td>
<td>.51***</td>
<td>.76***</td>
<td>8.59</td>
<td>1.21</td>
<td>0.66</td>
<td>0.67</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>1.20</td>
<td>0.45</td>
<td>0.87</td>
<td>0.36</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>1.15</td>
<td>0.79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDO6</td>
<td>.37***</td>
<td>.45***</td>
<td>.39***</td>
<td>.56***</td>
<td>.55***</td>
<td>14.36</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>0.58</td>
<td>-0.07</td>
<td>0.48</td>
<td>0.37</td>
<td>-0.17</td>
<td>0.45</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>-0.11</td>
<td>1.54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDO7</td>
<td>.37***</td>
<td>.45***</td>
<td>.31***</td>
<td>.48***</td>
<td>.45***</td>
<td>.46***</td>
<td>8.26</td>
<td>0.81</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>1.46</td>
<td>0.55</td>
<td>-1.18</td>
<td>0.27</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>-0.05</td>
<td>0.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDO8</td>
<td>.40***</td>
<td>.44***</td>
<td>.35***</td>
<td>.44***</td>
<td>.43***</td>
<td>.43***</td>
<td>.61***</td>
<td>9.71</td>
<td>0.16</td>
<td>1.23</td>
<td>0.53</td>
<td>-0.07</td>
<td>1.74</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.90</td>
<td>0.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDO9</td>
<td>.24***</td>
<td>.20***</td>
<td>.17***</td>
<td>.20***</td>
<td>.20***</td>
<td>.13**</td>
<td>.10*</td>
<td>.22***</td>
<td>7.35</td>
<td>0.75</td>
<td>0.31</td>
<td>-0.68</td>
<td>0.86</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.67</td>
<td>0.69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDO10</td>
<td>.28***</td>
<td>.31***</td>
<td>.19***</td>
<td>.30***</td>
<td>.28***</td>
<td>.23***</td>
<td>.26***</td>
<td>.26***</td>
<td>.40***</td>
<td>16.19</td>
<td>0.74</td>
<td>-0.74</td>
<td>0.49</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDO11</td>
<td>.29***</td>
<td>.32***</td>
<td>.36***</td>
<td>.41***</td>
<td>.37***</td>
<td>.37***</td>
<td>.26***</td>
<td>.33***</td>
<td>.34***</td>
<td>.39***</td>
<td>14.36</td>
<td>-0.75</td>
<td>-0.47</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
<td>0.36</td>
<td>0.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDO12</td>
<td>.27***</td>
<td>.27***</td>
<td>.23***</td>
<td>.31***</td>
<td>.29***</td>
<td>.23***</td>
<td>.17***</td>
<td>.28***</td>
<td>.32***</td>
<td>.58***</td>
<td>.49***</td>
<td>13.42</td>
<td>-1.96</td>
<td>-0.07</td>
<td>-1.35</td>
<td>0.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDO13</td>
<td>.18***</td>
<td>.21***</td>
<td>.30***</td>
<td>.30***</td>
<td>.29***</td>
<td>.22***</td>
<td>.10^</td>
<td>.20***</td>
<td>.42***</td>
<td>.36***</td>
<td>.43***</td>
<td>.46***</td>
<td>8.63</td>
<td>-0.03</td>
<td>-0.09</td>
<td>0.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDO14</td>
<td>.44***</td>
<td>.43***</td>
<td>.30***</td>
<td>.40***</td>
<td>.40***</td>
<td>.33***</td>
<td>.31***</td>
<td>.42***</td>
<td>.37***</td>
<td>.40***</td>
<td>.48***</td>
<td>.46***</td>
<td>.51***</td>
<td>4.73</td>
<td>-0.02</td>
<td>0.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDO15</td>
<td>.30***</td>
<td>.31***</td>
<td>.35***</td>
<td>.24***</td>
<td>.34***</td>
<td>.27***</td>
<td>.13**</td>
<td>.25***</td>
<td>.47***</td>
<td>.40***</td>
<td>.47***</td>
<td>.45***</td>
<td>.62***</td>
<td>.53***</td>
<td>36.66</td>
<td>0.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDO16</td>
<td>.28***</td>
<td>.26***</td>
<td>.25***</td>
<td>.37***</td>
<td>.27***</td>
<td>.20***</td>
<td>.14**</td>
<td>.21***</td>
<td>.41***</td>
<td>.47***</td>
<td>.39***</td>
<td>.47***</td>
<td>.58***</td>
<td>.57***</td>
<td>.66***</td>
<td>8.89</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note:** Sample correlations are in the lower triangle; variances are on the diagonal; and, fitted residuals are in upper triangle. Significance is indicated by *** (.0001), ** (.001), * (.01), ^ (.05). Adapted from McDonald 1999.
pattern comparing males and females in one study (Study 1), but found no significant
differences in the internal consistency of the social dominance orientation scale in
another study (Study 2). For this study, it was predicted that the correlations between the
two factors would be statistically stronger for men (higher-status) than for women (lower-
status).

For males, the mean score on the opposition to equality subdomain is 20.13 with a
standard deviation of 9.84, while for females the mean is 16.84 with a standard deviation
of 8.25. For the subdomain capturing group-based dominance, males have a mean of
24.07 with a standard deviation of 11.30, and women have a mean of 20.76 and a
standard deviation of 9.81. For both subdomain scores, men score significantly higher
than women (\( p < .001 \) in both cases) as would be predicted by social dominance theory.
Additionally, using the standard comparison of variance F-test and Levene’s (1960)
statistic which is more robust to violations of the normality assumption, the differences
between the two group’s variances in scores on the opposition to equality subdomain are
also found to be statistically significant (\( p < .01 \) in both cases). Likewise, the difference
between the variances of the men’s and women’s sample on the group-based dominance
subdomain are also statistically significant (\( p < .05 \) F-test; \( p < .01 \) Levene’s).

With regard to the hypothesis that the relationship between the subscales would
be more internally consistent for males than for females, no support is found. The
correlation between the two subscales is .42 for males and .51 for females which is the
opposite direction than was predicted. This difference is marginally significant (\( Z = -1.45, p < .08 \)). To better understand this pattern, the correlations between the two subscales in

\[^{26}\text{Brown and Forsythe (1974) recommend replacing the mean in Levene’s statistics with alternative location estimators, the median and the 10-percent trimmed mean. With both the opposition to equality and group-based dominance scores, these alternatives resulted in very similar p-values.}\]
Figure 3.2: Two Factor Model of the Social Dominance Orientation Scale
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>SDO1</th>
<th>SDO2</th>
<th>SDO3</th>
<th>SDO4</th>
<th>SDO5</th>
<th>SDO6</th>
<th>SDO7</th>
<th>SDO8</th>
<th>SDO9</th>
<th>SDO10</th>
<th>SDO11</th>
<th>SDO12</th>
<th>SDO13</th>
<th>SDO14</th>
<th>SDO15</th>
<th>SDO16</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SDO1</td>
<td>1.38</td>
<td>0.62</td>
<td>0.40</td>
<td>0.79</td>
<td>0.60</td>
<td>0.97</td>
<td>0.57</td>
<td>0.87</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>0.28</td>
<td>0.84</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDO2</td>
<td>1.21</td>
<td>0.66</td>
<td>0.67</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>1.20</td>
<td>0.45</td>
<td>0.87</td>
<td>0.36</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>1.15</td>
<td>0.79</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDO3</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>0.58</td>
<td>-0.07</td>
<td>0.48</td>
<td>0.37</td>
<td>-0.17</td>
<td>0.45</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>-0.11</td>
<td>1.54</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDO4</td>
<td>0.81</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>1.46</td>
<td>0.55</td>
<td>-1.18</td>
<td>0.27</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>-0.05</td>
<td>0.71</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDO5</td>
<td>0.16</td>
<td>1.23</td>
<td>0.53</td>
<td>-0.07</td>
<td>1.74</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.90</td>
<td>0.88</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDO6</td>
<td>0.75</td>
<td>0.31</td>
<td>-0.68</td>
<td>0.86</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.67</td>
<td>0.69</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDO7</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.74</td>
<td>-0.74</td>
<td>0.49</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.52</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDO8</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.75</td>
<td>-0.47</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
<td>0.36</td>
<td>0.21</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDO9</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDO10</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDO11</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDO12</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDO13</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDO14</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDO15</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDO16</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**NOTE:** Fitted residuals are in upper triangle.
each of the three experimental conditions were examined in an attempt to determine if the experimental priming might be influencing the correlational pattern.

Table 3.7 lists the correlations between the two subdomain scales by gender and by experimental condition. Across all three experimental conditions, females have a higher correlation between the two subscales than do males. However, the degree of difference fluctuates by experimental condition. The difference in the correlation between the two subscales is smallest in the sexual orientation prime ($\Delta=2.20$, $Z=-.19$, $p<.43$), and largest in the no prime condition ($\Delta=15.12$, $Z=-1.27$, $p<.11$), with the difference in the correlation in the gender prime condition falling between these two ($\Delta=9.56$, $Z=-.83$, $p<.21$). Only the difference in the no prime condition approaches marginal significance.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Experimental Condition</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Gender Prime</th>
<th>Sexual Orientation Prime</th>
<th>Control Group</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Males</td>
<td>.4167</td>
<td>.4066</td>
<td>.4078</td>
<td>.4471</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Females</td>
<td>.5148</td>
<td>.5022</td>
<td>.4308</td>
<td>.5983</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Foels and Pappas (2004) suggest that race potentially confounds the relationship between the two subscales between men and women, in that while all women fall into a social category with lower status, men may fall into higher or lower status categories
depending on their race/ethnicity.\textsuperscript{27} As such they restricted their analyses to white respondents in their sample.\textsuperscript{28} Examining the relationship between the two subscales for the white subsample, I find that the difference in the correlations between the two subscales does get smaller ($\Delta=4.03$, $Z=-.55$, $p<.30$) and is no longer marginally significant, indicating some support for their argument that race and gender become confounded.

Overall this pattern suggests that context influences the relationship between the two subscales. In the situation where there is no status difference for most of the sample based on the salient identity (i.e., sexual orientation for this sample), the correlation between the two subscales is similar for both groups. However, in the context where the difference between the two groups is salient (i.e., gender for this sample), the gap between the correlation between the two subscales becomes larger. Further research examining the factors that influence the relationship between the two subscales with a particular focus on social identity theory may illuminate the pattern that has emerged.

\textit{Political orientation.} Following the findings of Jost and Thompson (2000) and Foels and Pappas (2004), it was next predicted that the opposition to equality subscale and the group-based dominance subscale would function differently in their relationship to political orientation, and, further, that this relationship would follow the same pattern for both men and women. For the opposition to equality subscale it was suggested that greater opposition to equality would be related to greater political conservatism, but that

\textsuperscript{27} While this argument can easily be extended to all types of social categories (social class, religion, etc.), race has been identified as the most salient difference within the U.S. and, as such, their argument is restricted to racial differences.

\textsuperscript{28} There were not enough respondents of color in their sample to conduct separate analyses solely for people of color.
group-based dominance would be unrelated to political conservatism. The relationship between the two subscales was examined using OLS regression. Results for the analyses related to these hypotheses can be found in Tables 3.8 and 3.9.

In the bivariate regressions, both the opposition to equality subscale ($\beta = .059$, $\sigma = .0071$, $p < .000$) and the group-based dominance subscale ($\beta = .038$, $\sigma = .0062$, $p < .000$) significantly predict greater political conservatism, indicating that greater endorsement of the subscales is associated with higher levels of political conservatism. In the multivariate context both subscales maintain significance (opposition to equality, $\beta = .049$, $\sigma = .0081$, $p < .000$; group-based dominance, $\beta = .016$, $\sigma = .0070$, $p < .021$), however, the group-based dominance subscale’s relationship to political conservatism is attenuated. Opposition to equality works in the manner predicted, but group-based dominance does not.

For the male subsample this same pattern holds. In the bivariate context both subscales significantly predict greater political conservatism (opposition to equality: $\beta = .063$, $\sigma = .0120$, $p < .000$; group-based dominance: $\beta = .044$, $\sigma = .0109$, $p < .000$). Entering both subscales into the regression equation, the opposition to equality maintains its significance at the .001 level ($\beta = .051$, $\sigma = .0132$). The group-based dominance subscale also maintains its significance, but its effect is now significant at only the .05 level ($\beta = .024$, $\sigma = .0117$).

Regarding the female subsample, the opposition to equality subscale is significant in both the bivariate ($\beta = .056$, $\sigma = .0090$, $p < .000$), and the multivariate analysis ($\beta = .049$, $\sigma = .0106$, $p < .000$). The group-based dominance subscale, on the other hand, is a statistically significant predictor in the bivariate ($\beta = .033$, $\sigma = .0078$, $p < .000$), but not in the multivariate analysis ($\beta = .012$, $\sigma = .0089$, $p < .176$)
TABLE 3.8
REGRESSION ANALYSES OF POLITICAL CONSERVATISM ON OPPOSITION TO EQUALITY AND GROUP-BASED DOMINANCE SUBSCALES, FULL SAMPLE AND BY GENDER

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Full Sample</th>
<th>Female Sample</th>
<th>Male Sample</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Opposition to Equality</td>
<td>.059*** (.0071)</td>
<td>.049*** (.0081)</td>
<td>.056*** (.0090)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group-Based Dominance</td>
<td>.038*** (.0062)</td>
<td>.016* (.0070)</td>
<td>.033*** (.0078)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>3.023*** (.1683)</td>
<td>3.296*** (.1736)</td>
<td>2.850*** (.1842)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R2</td>
<td>.099</td>
<td>.054</td>
<td>.106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>642</td>
<td>642</td>
<td>642</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NOTE: All models were run controlling for experimental condition. Standard errors in parentheses. *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001 (two-tailed tests).
TABLE 3.9

REGRESSION ANALYSES OF POLITICAL CONSERVATISM ON OPPOSITION TO EQUALITY AND GROUP-BASED DOMINANCE SUBSCALES, MALE SAMPLE BY RACE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>White Male Sample</th>
<th>Men of Color Sample</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Opposition to Equality</td>
<td>0.073*** (.0138)</td>
<td>0.066*** (.0155)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group-Based Dominance</td>
<td>0.038** (.0124)</td>
<td>0.012 (.0132)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>2.944*** (.3819)</td>
<td>3.498*** (.4035)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>White Male Sample</th>
<th>Men of Color Sample</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Opposition to Equality</td>
<td>0.029 (.0247)</td>
<td>0.005 (.0243)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group-Based Dominance</td>
<td>0.069** (.0231)</td>
<td>0.067* (.0251)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>2.801*** (.4154)</td>
<td>3.187*** (.4154)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>White Male Sample</th>
<th>Men of Color Sample</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Opposition to Equality</td>
<td>2.219** (.6588)</td>
<td>2.153** (.7261)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group-Based Dominance</td>
<td>3.187*** (.6700)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>2.153** (.7261)</td>
<td>2.153** (.7261)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>White Male Sample</th>
<th>Men of Color Sample</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>R2</td>
<td>.163 .064 .167 .061</td>
<td>.229 .230</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>152 152 152 38</td>
<td>38 38 38</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NOTE: All models were run controlling for experimental condition. Standard errors in parentheses. *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001 (two-tailed tests).

The female subsample behaves in the manner predicted and follows the same pattern found by previous researchers with different samples. The male subsample, however, does not. For males in this sample, political conservatism appears to be driven by both the desire to maintain inequity as well as in-group favoritism. One possible explanation for this discrepancy in the pattern could be the race-gender confound discussed above that was suggested by Foels and Pappas (2004) in regard to the internal consistency of the two subscales.

If this were the case, it seems reasonable to predict that the pattern expected may emerge when examining only the white male subsample, that is, the desire to maintain inequity (and therefore privilege for the white male group) would be the primary force driving political conservatism. For men of color, this would suggest that opposition to equality should not be a significant factor in predicting political conservatism.
Examining the pattern for the 153 white males in the sample, this appears to be the case. Opposition to equality is statistically significant in predicting political conservatism ($\beta=.066$, $\sigma=.0155$, $p<.000$), while group-based dominance is not ($\beta=.012$, $\sigma=.0132$, $p<.390$). And, as predicted, opposition to equality is not significant in predicting political conservatism for men of color ($\beta=.005$, $\sigma=.0243$, $p<.822$). Interestingly, however, group-based dominance is a significant predictor of political conservatism for men of color ($\beta=.067$, $\sigma=.0251$, $p<.05$). Because of the sample size ($n=39$), however, the results for men of color should be viewed with caution.\(^{29}\) Table 3.9 above outlines these findings.

**Affirmative action policies for women.** Regarding support for affirmative action policies for women, a number of hypotheses were proffered. First, it was suggested that, in general, women would be more supportive of affirmative action policies for women than would be men. Second, it was predicted that opposition to equality would be significantly related to rejection of gendered affirmative action policies for both the male and female subsamples. Finally, it was predicted that group-based dominance would not be a significant predictor of support for affirmative action policies for women for neither males nor females. Results are shown in Table 3.10.

Again, using OLS regression, there is a significant difference in support for affirmative action policies for women, with males, on average, scoring almost .08 points.

\(^{29}\) A closer examination of the – granted small – sample of men of color suggests that the group-based dominance relationship to political conservatism may be driven by in-group favoritism related to sexual orientation. Neither opposition to equality, nor group-based dominance are statistically significant in either the gender prime or the non-primed conditions. However, in the sexual orientation primed condition, opposition to equality is not statistically significant, but group-based dominance reaches marginal significance ($p<.09$). Clearly, further research is needed to clarify if this is an artifact of the sample, or a more stable trend.
TABLE 3.10
REGRESSION ANALYSES OF SUPPORT OF GENDERED AFFIRMATIVE ACTION POLITICS ON GENDER, AND OPPOSITION TO EQUALITY AND GROUP-BASED DOMINANCE SUBSCALES, FULL SAMPLE AND BY GENDER

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Full Sample</th>
<th>Female Sample</th>
<th>Male Sample</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Males</td>
<td>Opposition to Equality</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(.0007)</td>
<td>(.0009)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-.077***</td>
<td>-.006***</td>
<td>-.005***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.0146)</td>
<td>(.0007)</td>
<td>(.001)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-006***</td>
<td>-005***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(.0006)</td>
<td>(.0008)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-.003***</td>
<td>-.003</td>
<td>-.002**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.0007)</td>
<td>(.0007)</td>
<td>(.0009)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-.0003</td>
<td></td>
<td>-.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(.0008)</td>
<td>(.0009)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-.001</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.0011)</td>
<td>(.0011)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-.003*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.0011)</td>
<td>(.0011)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-.0003</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.0011)</td>
<td>(.0011)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-.0001</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.0011)</td>
<td>(.0011)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-.0003</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.0011)</td>
<td>(.0011)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-.0001</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.0011)</td>
<td>(.0011)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-.0003</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.0011)</td>
<td>(.0011)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-.0001</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.0011)</td>
<td>(.0011)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-.0003</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.0011)</td>
<td>(.0011)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-.0001</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.0011)</td>
<td>(.0011)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-.0003</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.0011)</td>
<td>(.0011)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-.0001</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.0011)</td>
<td>(.0011)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-.0003</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.0011)</td>
<td>(.0011)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-.0001</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.0011)</td>
<td>(.0011)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-.0003</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.0011)</td>
<td>(.0011)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-.0001</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.0011)</td>
<td>(.0011)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-.0003</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.0011)</td>
<td>(.0011)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-.0001</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.0011)</td>
<td>(.0011)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-.0003</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.0011)</td>
<td>(.0011)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-.0001</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.0011)</td>
<td>(.0011)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-.0003</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.0011)</td>
<td>(.0011)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-.0001</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.0011)</td>
<td>(.0011)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-.0003</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.0011)</td>
<td>(.0011)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-.0001</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.0011)</td>
<td>(.0011)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-.0003</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.0011)</td>
<td>(.0011)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-.0001</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.0011)</td>
<td>(.0011)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-.0003</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.0011)</td>
<td>(.0011)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-.0001</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.0011)</td>
<td>(.0011)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-.0003</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.0011)</td>
<td>(.0011)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-.0001</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.0011)</td>
<td>(.0011)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-.0003</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.0011)</td>
<td>(.0011)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-.0001</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.0011)</td>
<td>(.0011)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
lower (on a scale of 0 to 1). The regression coefficient for males is -0.077 with a standard deviation of .0146.

Both opposition to equality and support of group-based dominance are negatively related to support for affirmative action policies for women when entered into the regression separately ($\beta=-.006, \sigma=.0007, p<.000; \beta=-.003, \sigma=.0006, p<.000$ respectively). Entering both subscales into the regression equation together, the opposition to equality remains significant ($\beta=-.006, \sigma=.0007, p<.000$), while group-based dominance does not ($\beta=-.0003, \sigma=.0007, p<.637$). These findings parallel the results of Jost and Thompson (2000) where they found that opposition to equality – not in-group favoritism – was the driving force behind opposition to affirmative action.

Also as predicted, this patterns holds for both males (opposition to equality: $\beta=-.006, \sigma=.0013, p<.000$; group-based dominance: $\beta=-.0003, \sigma=.0011, p<.767$) and females (opposition to equality: $\beta=-.005, \sigma=.0009, p<.000$; group-based dominance: $\beta=-.0001, \sigma=.0009, p<.875$), although the combination of the two subscales predicts 14.3% of the variance in opposition to affirmative action for males, and only 5.7% for females.

**Belief that American provides equal opportunities.** Shifting to economic values, Jost and Thompson (2000) demonstrated that both subscales worked in tandem when predicting justification of the economic stratification system. Related to beliefs about the U.S. economic system, are ideas about equal opportunity (Fine 1992; Kluegel and Smith 1986). Therefore, it was anticipated – in line with Jost and Thompson (2000) – that both subscales would positively predict the belief that America provides equal opportunities for everyone. In addition, it was suggested that men would embrace this belief more
strongly than would women. Table 3.11 provides information on the analyses for this section.

Combined opposition to equality and group-based dominance predict slightly more than 20% of the variance in belief that America provides equal opportunities for all. Opposition to equality has a coefficient of .002 and a standard error of .0007 ($p<.01$), while group-based dominance has a coefficient of .005 with a standard error of .0006 ($p<.000$). Likewise, males, on average score .06 points lower than do women ($p<.000$).

Breaking the sample into two subsamples based on gender, this pattern holds for men with opposition to equality being marginally significant, and group-based dominance maintaining significance. For females, however, opposition to equality is no longer significant, but group-based dominance continues to be so.

**Belief in the fairness of the gender stratification system.** Finally – and in a similar fashion to the pattern of relationship with belief in equal opportunity in the U.S. – it was predicted that belief in the fairness of the gender stratification system would be predicted by both the subdomains, and that women would be less inclined to believe that the system is fair. All three hypotheses are supported and results from the regression analyses can be found in Table 3.12.

Gender alone predicts almost 7% of the variance in belief that the gender stratification system is fair. Males score .11 points (on a 0 to 1 scale) higher than do females. Opposition to equality and group-based dominance combined in the regression model
# TABLE 3.11

REGRESSION ANALYSES OF BELIEF THAT THE U.S. PROVIDES EQUAL OPPORTUNITY TO ALL ON GENDER, AND OPPOSITION TO EQUALITY AND GROUP-BASED DOMINANCE SUBSCALES, FULL SAMPLE AND BY GENDER

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Full Sample</th>
<th>Female Sample</th>
<th>Male Sample</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Males</strong></td>
<td>.056***</td>
<td>.002**</td>
<td>.004***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opposition to Equality</td>
<td>.005*** (0.0006)</td>
<td>.005*** (0.0007)</td>
<td>.005*** (0.0008)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group-Based Dominance</td>
<td>.006*** (0.0005)</td>
<td>.005*** (0.0006)</td>
<td>.005*** (0.0007)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Constant</strong></td>
<td>.565***</td>
<td>.491***</td>
<td>.432***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.0099)</td>
<td>(.0144)</td>
<td>(.0148)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>R^2</strong></td>
<td>.033</td>
<td>.091</td>
<td>.193</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>N</strong></td>
<td>640</td>
<td>640</td>
<td>640</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NOTE: All models were run controlling for experimental condition. Standard errors in Parentheses.
^p<.10 *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001 (two-tailed tests).
TABLE 3.12

REGRESSION ANALYSES OF BELIEF THAT THE GENDER STRATIFICATION SYSTEM IS FAIR ON GENDER, AND
OPPOSITION TO EQUALITY AND GROUP-BASED DOMINANCE SUBSCALES, FULL SAMPLE AND BY GENDER

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Full Sample</th>
<th>Female Sample</th>
<th>Male Sample</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Males</td>
<td>Opposition to Equality</td>
<td>Group-Based Dominance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Full Sample</td>
<td>.113*** (.0168)</td>
<td>.008*** (.0008)</td>
<td>.006*** (.0009)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female Sample</td>
<td>.007*** (.0009)</td>
<td>.005*** (.0010)</td>
<td>.003*** (.0007)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male Sample</td>
<td></td>
<td>.006*** (.0009)</td>
<td>.001*** (.0008)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R^2</td>
<td>.067</td>
<td>.074</td>
<td>.294*** (.009)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>639</td>
<td>447</td>
<td>447</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NOTE: All models were run controlling for experimental condition. Standard errors in parentheses. ^p<.10, *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001 (two-tailed tests).
explains slightly more than 16% of the variance in belief that the gender stratification system is fair. As predicted both subscales work in a similar fashion with higher scores predicting greater belief that gender stratification is fair. For opposition to equality, the regression coefficient is .007, with a standard error of .0009. For group-based dominance, the regression coefficient of .003 and a standard error of .0008 is found.

Breaking the sample into gender groups, a similar pattern emerges for the male subsample; however, for the female subsample only the opposition to equality subscale maintains significance. The group-based dominance scale is no longer statistically significant. This gendered pattern follows the ideas forwarded by social dominance researchers that the two motivations work in concert for males as the high status group, but the two motivations are at odds for females as the low status group. Additionally, it supports that contention that when the system is viewed as just, the low status group is more likely to support the system. For females, then, opposition to equality supports the current gender stratification, but in-group favoritism does not. Males, on average, are more supportive of the gender stratification system than are females, on average, but the relationship between opposition to equality and belief that the system is fair is strong for women who view the system as legitimate.30

3.9 Discussion

Concern that the two subdomains of the social dominance orientation scale may be capturing two distinct concepts led Jost and Thompson (2000) to examine the

---

30 Additional analyses support this contention. Rerunning the analyses using only females scoring in the top 25% of the sample for believing the system is fair, results in opposition to equality as significant ($p<.05$), and group-based dominance not significant. For females in the lowest 25%, neither subscale reaches significance.
relationship between the subscales and the relationship of the subscales to various sociopolitical constructs. They found support for their idea that – although related – the subscales functioned in different ways in relationship with some constructs (e.g., political conservatism, support for affirmative action policies), while they functioned similarly in relationship with other constructs (e.g., economic system justification). Additionally, they found that the relationship between the subscales was different for groups and suggested that this difference was related to the social status of the group to which the individual belonged. In another study, Foels and Pappas (2004) found similar patterns in the subscales’ relationships with various other constructs, but found only mixed support on the internal consistency hypothesis suggested by Jost and Thompson (2000).

In this study, replication of Jost and Thompson’s (2000) findings were attempted using gender. In accordance with their results, the opposition to equality and group-based dominance subscales functioned differently in predicting political conservatism and support for affirmative action policies for women. Also in agreement with their findings, this study suggests that the subscales functioned similarly in predicting constructs with more of a general emphasis on economic justification.

However, like Foels and Pappas (2004), mixed results emerge for the idea that the two subscales would be more internally consistent for higher status groups than for lower status groups when examining the relationship using gender. The marginally significant difference that was found disappeared when examining the white-only subsample, a finding that supports Foels and Pappas (2004) idea that gender differences in the relationship between the two subscales may be confounded by racial differences.
Additionally, it was shown that the relationship between the two subscales may also fluctuate based on contextual influences. In making certain identities more salient, the correlation between the two subscales changed both between the two gender groups and within gender. The within gender pattern was much more striking for women than for men, raising the question of whether contextual influences may interact with status differences in driving some of the changes noted.

3.10 Conclusion

The social dominance orientation scale has shown a remarkable resilience and cross-cultural consistency that are frequently absent among psychometric instruments. As an instrument designed specifically to allow for cultural variation in salience of status differences, the instrument is purposefully engineered so as to avoid mentioning specific social groups. This flexibility is part of the scale’s strength, as well as a potentially problematic feature.

While numerous researchers have raised concerns about various aspects of the scale – including this lack of mention of specific social groups – empirical support for many of these contentions has been mixed. One concern that has been raised that appears to have some validity is whether or not the two subscales of the social dominance orientation scale are two different, but related constructs, as suggested by Jost and Thompson (2000), or two motivations underlying the same latent construct (Sidanius and Pratto 1999). While far from conclusive, this study seems to be in agreement with the “different, but related constructs” approach. Findings from this study also suggest that even the relationship between the two subscales may be subject to contextual effects.
Given these findings, researchers using the social dominance orientation scale should proceed with caution. Before assuming that the two components of the scale work in conjunction with one another, or even work in the same way with different social groups, the scale should be unpacked and the hypothesized relationships should be tested for each of the subdomains individually. Failure to do so could result in findings that are overly simplistic, or in certain cases, could result in non-significant findings when significant findings actually exist for either one or both of the subdomains.
CHAPTER 4
TOWARD A MULTIDIMENSIONAL UNDERSTANDING OF HETEROSEXISM:
THE MULTIDIMENSIONAL HETEROSEXISM INVENTORY

4.1 Overview

Since the 1970’s scholars began theorizing that racial attitudes in the U.S. were undergoing a shift whereby traditionally hostile forms of racism were being supplanted by more subtle and nuanced forms of attitudes that continued to support and maintain stratification based on race and ethnicity while appearing to be less “racist.” These various conceptualizations of modern racism have gone by numerous names including symbolic racism (Kinder and Sears 1981; Sears and McConahay 1973), aversive racism (Gaertner and Dovidio 1986), modern racism (McConahay and Hough 1976), and subtle racism (Pettigrew 1989; Pettigrew and Meertens 1995). Along with the various names were various understandings of what was driving this new manifestation of prejudice. Some envisioned it as a conflict between developing norms that made whites less comfortable expressing direct racism, and continuing anti-African American affect and beliefs. Others – building on a more general theory of stigma (Katz 1981) – suggested that it was ambivalence resulting from a belief that African Americans were deviant, while at the same time feeling that African Americans were disadvantaged and so, therefore, deserved help. Still others saw it as a conflict between truly held egalitarian
values and antipathy toward African Americans that gets played out at a more subconscious level such that traditional forms of racism cannot be expressed without challenging one’s egalitarian self-image. This, the theory argues, results in expression of racism when situations are ambiguous and the behaviors can be explained in non-race related justifications, combined with the suppression of racism when behavior cannot be explained away by non-race related factors (Gaertner and Dovidio 1986). These ideas were extended into the arena of attitudes toward women in the 1990s with the development of the Modern Sexism Scale (Swim, Aiken, Hall, and Hunter 1995), the Neo-Sexism Scale (Tougas, Brown, Beaton, and Joly 1995), and the Ambivalent Sexism Inventory (Glick and Fiske 1996).

Paralleling the scholarship of contemporary prejudice in the arenas of race and gender, this chapter extends this multidimensional understanding of prejudicial attitudes into the realm of sexual orientation. Specifically, it argues for a theoretical framework of modern heterosexism comprised of four specific subdomains: aversive heterosexism, amnestic heterosexism, paternalistic heterosexism and positive stereotypic heterosexism.\footnote{As a reminder to the reader, aversive heterosexism believes that lesbians and gay men get too much attention, that they are too militant and that they are pushing for too much too fast. Amnestic heterosexism denies that sexual orientation has an impact on life chances. Paternalistic heterosexism suggests that the holder of the attitude has nothing against lesbians and gay men, but they wouldn’t want their son or daughter to be gay/lesbian because of some concern about social consequences. Finally, positive stereotypic heterosexism is the endorsement of positive stereotypes of lesbians/gay men.}

### 4.2 Social Change

In the last few decades in the U.S. there has been increasing normative pressure on individuals not to appear prejudiced against social groups that have historically been
disenfranchised (Crocker, Major and Steele 1998; Fiske 1998; McConahay 1986; Smith 1985). There is also clear evidence that the overt expression of prejudice has decreased in this same time period (Bolzendahl and Myers 2004; Farley 1997; Loo and Thorpe 1998; McConahay 1986). However, there is considerable debate in the literature over whether this measured “reduction” indicates an actual reduction in prejudice or simply a shift in how prejudice is expressed.

On the side of the debate that claims that there is an actual reduction in prejudice, there is extensive empirical evidence that attitudes about race (Carmines and Champagne 1990; Farley 1997; Jones 1999; Warchal 1999), gender (Bachrach, Hindin and Thomson 2000; Badgett, Davidson, Folbre and Lim 2000; Diekman and Eagly 2000; Knodel, Saengtienchai, Vanlandingham and Lucas 1999; Morgan 1998), and sexual orientation (Beckham-Chasnoff 1997; Chevannes 1993; Herdt 2001; Lynxwiler and Gay 2000; Price and Hsu 1992; Scott 1998) are changing toward this less-prejudiced direction. In fact, some researchers argue that many individuals have internalized anti-prejudiced norms and monitor their behavior so as to act in accordance with these values (Devine, Monteith, Zuwerink and Elliot 1991; Gaertner and Dovidio 1986; Katz and Hass 1988).

The other side of the debate holds that as social change de-legitimizes previously “acceptable” overt manifestations of prejudicial attitudes and behaviors, new forms have evolved (Alder and Polk 1982; Benokraitis and Feagin 1995; Essed 1991; Gaertner and Dovidio 1986; Hecht and Baldwin 1998; Moya and Expósito 2001). Traditional social science measures of sexism and racism fail to capture these new forms, which explains what appears to be a reduction in prejudicial attitudes and behaviors. While the new forms may appear to be “kinder and gentler,” researchers argue that they maintain firm
boundaries between social groups and perform similar psychological and sociopolitical functions as the previous manifestations of overtly prejudiced attitudes and behavior.

Researchers studying these modern forms of prejudice point to the strong evidence that, for example, behaviors toward women and current structural inequalities are inconsistent with the more liberal attitudes toward women and women’s roles that are reported (Benokraitis and Feagin 1995; Rowe 1990). This, they argue, is evidence of the existence of modern sexism. For example, there still exists a strong preference for a male supervisor over a female supervisor in the workplace (Gallup 1990). Gendered segregation in the workplace (Glen and Feldberg 1984; Jacobs 1992; O’Steen 1993) and differential salary levels still exist for women (Stroh, Brett and Reilly 1993; Whitaker 1990). In the home, females disproportionately bear the responsibility for childcare and housework (Biernat and Wortman 1991); are disproportionately victims of domestic violence and rape (Benokraitis and Feagin 1995) and childhood sexual abuse (Bagley and Ramsay 1985-1986; Fromuth 1986).

Likewise, the literature documents the dissonance between behaviors toward people of color and continued structural inequalities. African Americans are more likely to live in areas with environmental hazards than are whites (Adeola 1994; Boer, Pastor, Sadd, and Snyder 1997; Stretesky 2003) and significant black-white income disparities continue to exist (Duncan 1994; Loury 2000). Within the criminal justice system, police are more likely to stop (Bricker 2003), and arrest (Chiricos and Crawford 1995; Cooney 1992) African American males than white males, and the courts are more likely to convict (Beaulieu and Messner 1999; Chiricos and Crawford 1995; Crawford, Chiricos and Kleck 1998) and give the death penalty when the victim is white (Keil and Vito
1995; Radelet and Vandiver 1986). Similarly, there are disparities between whites and Hispanics in health care service delivery (Aiken and Sloan 2001; Lasser, Himmelstein, Woolhandler, McCormick and Bor 2002), underemployment (Jensen, Findeis and Wang 2000), homeownership (Flippen 2001) and economic segregation (Jargowsky 1996).

4.3 Attitudes toward Lesbians and Gay Men

Exploring changes in attitudes toward homosexuality in the U.S. over the last three decades, Loftus (2001) finds that Americans have become more supportive of civil liberties for lesbians and gay men and Adam (1995) reports that there has been an overall significant improvement in general attitudes over the last decade. Recent research on attitudes towards lesbians and gay men among university students mirrors these recent national findings, which, like survey findings on attitudes towards race and gender, reports a rejection of the traditional, negative attitudes about homosexuality (Balanko 1998; Schellenberg, Hirt, and Sears 1999; Simon 1995; Simoni 1996; Waldo and Kemp 1997).

Looking at other trends, however, it becomes apparent that this improvement in attitudes is just part of the story. Concurrent with the increased support of civil liberties for lesbians and gay men is the continued belief that homosexuality is immoral (Loftus 2001). Findings of relatively high suicide rates and suicide attempts among lesbian and gay adolescents and adults in Canada and the U.S. continue to exist (Bagley and Tremblay 1997; Cochran and Mays 2000; Gibson 1989; Paul, Catania, Pollack, Moskowitz, Canchola, Binson, Mills and Stall 2002; Remafedi, French, Story, Resnick and Blum 1998). Lesbians and gay men continue to be one of the top social groups
targeted for hate crimes and harassment (Berrill 1992; Houser and Ham 2004; U.S. Department of Justice 2001; Whitley 2001) and there has been an increase in highly publicized violence against the population (Lacayo 1998). Gay men earn less real income than heterosexuals (Badgett 1995; Blanford 1999; Kenneavy 2003), and gay men who come out during adolescence have significantly lower levels of educational achievement than do heterosexual men (Barrett, Pollack, and Tilden 2002). At the institutional level, there have been a number of referenda and legislative battles that have resulted in negative outcomes for the community. Norris (1991) concludes in his study on attitudes about lesbians and gay men that a paradox exists in the liberal environment of academia between the widespread support for equal rights and heterosexual orthodoxy. His conclusion mirrors the tension between conflictual values that have been theorized to be central to the foundation of some understandings of modern racism (Katz and Hass 1988).

Morrison and Morrison (2002) offer three possible explanations for this apparent paradox. First, existing studies of attitudes toward homosexuality could be subject to social desirability. However, empirical studies testing social desirability influence have found no such relationship (Herek 1988; Khorrami 2002; Reinhardt 1995; Roderick, McCammon, Long and Allred 1998). A second explanation might be sampling bias: much of the research on attitudes toward homosexuality has relied on convenience samples that may be liberally biased. However, work based on nationally representative samples (Loftus 2001) has found similar patterns. Their final explanation – and one that seems most plausible – is that existing heterosexism measures capture only a subset of attitudes toward lesbians and gay men. Existing measures, while capturing more hostile
forms of attitudes toward lesbians and gay men, do not tap into the full range and changing nature of attitudes that justify and maintain social stratification based on sexual orientation.

4.4 Strategies for the Measurement of Heterosexism

Early Measurement Instruments. Attitudes about homosexuality and lesbians and gay men have been measured in a number of different ways in the literature, including the use of single (or few) question non-scale items (Bethke 2000; Irwin and Thompson 1977; Loftus 2001; Nyberg and Alston 1976 - 1977; Reynolds 2003). The use of single (or few) question non-scale items can be problematic for a number of reasons. First, scales achieve greater consistency than single item indicators of static concepts (Spector 1981). Second, many of the concepts – including the more contemporary conceptualization of prejudice – are multi-dimensional and complex. Single item indicators are not typically broad enough to capture this complexity. Finally, statistical methods are available that can enable researchers to evaluate how well scales capture the latent variables that they seek to measure. No such methods exist for single item indicators.

A second approach that was common in the 1970s and used by a number of researchers was to develop their own scales (Henley and Pincus 1978; Levitt and Klassen 1974; Millham, San Miguel and Kellogg 1976). These scales, however, were typically not evaluated for psychometric properties. Although this is a move toward multi-item measurement, there is little evidence other than face validity that these scales measure what they purport to measure.
Beginning in the late 1970s and early 1980s, researchers developed a number of psychometrically tested instruments to capture attitudes toward lesbians and gay people. The vast majority of these scales measure negative attitudes toward lesbians and gay people and, as such, do not consider the full spectrum of prejudicial and stereotypical attitudes as hypothesized by the modern prejudice scholarship. Primary among these instruments are Hudson and Rickett’s (1980) Index of Homophobia, the Heterosexual Attitudes Toward Homosexuality Scale (Larson, Reed, and Hoffman 1980) and the Attitudes Toward Lesbians and Gay Men scale (Herek 1988).\(^{32}\)

Perhaps, the mostly widely used scale to measure attitudes about lesbians and gay men in the last twenty years, is Herek’s (1988) ATLG and ATLG-S (short) scale (for recent examples, see Ellis, Kitzinger and Wilkinson 2002; Smith and Gordon 1998; Span and Vidal 2003; Van de Meerendonk et al. 2003; White and Kurpius 2002) The scale and its shorter version have undergone extensive testing for factor structure, item analysis, construct validity and reliability (Herek 1984, 1987a, 1987b, 1988).

*More recent measurement instruments.* More recent entries into the measurement of attitudes toward lesbians and gay men have included a number of new instruments that, like previous scales, capture only negative attitudes. Erickson (1995) administered her 28-item Attitudes Toward Gay and Lesbian People scale to 304 undergraduates. The scale demonstrated good reliability and validity, but has not been utilized to date in the literature. It has a primary aim is to capture both cognitive and affective dimensions of negative attitudes.

---

\(^{32}\) For a comprehensive review of strategies and scales used to capture attitudes toward lesbians and gay men through 1993, see Schwanberg (1993) and O’Donohue and Caselles (1993).
Eliason and Raheim’s (1996) Beliefs about Sexual Minorities scale adds the dimension of capturing attitudes and beliefs towards bisexuals (biphobia), which they demonstrate as a distinct construct. The Beliefs about Sexual Minorities scale demonstrated good content and concurrent validity and has been used in a number of studies to date (Eliason 1997; Eliason 2001). While the addition of the subdomain of attitudes regarding bisexuality is a needed contribution, the scale is, like most others, limited to negatively valenced attitudes and beliefs.

In an attempt to capture both personal and institutional components of heterosexism, Raja and Stokes (1998) developed the Modern Homophobia Scale. Even though three factors emerged – personal discomfort, institutional homophobia and deviance/changeability – the factors were highly correlated and showed little evidence of divergent validity, indicating that they were tapping into components of the same domain. In additional all three factors capture negative attitudes.

In 1999, Mohr and Rochlen published the Attitudes Regarding Bisexuality Scale which focuses on attitudes toward bisexual men and women, and incorporates not only heterosexuals’ attitudes, but also attitudes of lesbians and gay men toward bisexuality. The scale measures attitudes toward male bisexuals separately from attitudes toward female bisexuals, and subsequent research (Mohr, Israel, and Sedlacek 2001) suggests that attitudes toward bisexuality have explanatory value above and beyond attitudes toward lesbians and gay men.\(^{33}\)

Wright, Adams, and Bernat (1999) were among the first researchers to raise the concern that “…no scale currently in use assesses the full range of the domain of the

---

\(^{33}\) This study examined counselors’ responses to a case study of a bisexual woman.
construct [homophobia]” (p. 338), however, their concern – unlike the current one – does not argue for additional attitudinal constructs such as paternalism and positive stereotypes. Instead, they seek to address a concern raised by O’Donohue and Caselles (1993) who argue that existing measures of homophobia overlook the behavioral domain. If homophobia, they reason, is an anxiety response with a phobic component, then it should follow that there would exist a behavioral component which would be either avoidance or aggressiveness. In the two studies conducted to examine the scale, three factors emerged: a cognitive component, a negative affect and avoidant behavior component, and a negative affect and aggressive behavior component. The researchers’ originally hypothesized that a specific behavioral component would emerge, a hypothesis which was not supported. Avoidant behaviors clustered with a certain group of negative affects, and aggressive behaviors clustered with another. This indicates that the behavioral component of heterosexism is closely linked with the attitudinal component that reflects the likely behavioral manifestation of those attitudes. Other recent research supports this strong association between negative attitudes and negative behaviors toward lesbians and gay men (Patel, Long, McCammon and Wuensch 1995; Savin-Williams 1999).

Morrison and colleagues (Morrison, McLeod, Morrison, Anderson and O’Connor 1997) expressed concern about the comprehension level required to complete scales, especially for individuals who were less than college educated as researchers tested and validated many of the exiting scales using college samples. This seems particularly salient given theoretical linkages between adolescent male development and anti-gay attitudes (Plummer 2001). In response they developed a short 6-item scale, the
Homonegativity Scale, for use with respondents from adolescence into adulthood. The four studies examining the scale – including one with junior high students – have demonstrated adequate psychometric qualities and indicated that the Homonegativity Scale possesses a unidimensional factor structure (Morrison, Parriag and Morrison 1999). The brevity and understandability of the scale are indeed desirable qualities, however, the Homonegativity Scale – like those that have come before it – focuses solely on negative prejudicial attitudes.

Szczerba (1997), in an attempt to address the critique that existing measures (a) have failed to capture the full range of attitudes (from negative to positive) about lesbians and gay men and (b) do not capture the behavioral component of attitudes, developed the Gay and Lesbian Attitude Inventory. The inventory did expand the measurement of attitudes to include “homofriendliness” and demonstrated adequate content and concurrent validity. Szczerba’s (1997) study, however, studied only the attitudes of heterosexual men. To date, no further research has utilized the Gay and Lesbian Attitude Inventory.

Morrison and Morrison (2002), building on the theoretical foundation laid by modern racism and sexism researchers, developed the Modern Homonegativity Scale to capture negative attitudes toward lesbians and gay men that are not based on moral and religious objections (as they are in “old-fashioned” homonegativity). Like the current author, Morrison and Morrison argue that there has been a shift in how prejudice against lesbians and gay men gets expressed in certain contexts. They identify three abstract concerns that they suggest might drive the new attitudes. First, the belief that lesbians and gay men are making unnecessary and/or illegitimate demands for change such as same-
sex partner benefits, recognition of same-sex relationships, etc. Next is the belief that discrimination against lesbians and gay men is a historical artifact that is no longer true. And, finally, there is the belief that lesbians and gay men exaggerate the importance of sexual orientation which ultimately prevents them from assimilating into mainstream culture.\textsuperscript{34} The researchers undertook four studies to test the reliability and validity of the Modern Homonegativity Scale. Factor analysis identified one factor, suggesting that the scale is unidimensional as its developers theorized, capturing the domain of “modern homonegativity.” In addition, utilizing Herek’s Attitudes Toward Lesbians and Gays – Short Form, their studies suggest that modern homonegativity is a distinct domain from old-fashioned prejudice against lesbians and gay men. Further, they demonstrated that modern homonegativity predicts behavioral discrimination in certain conditions.

The most recent instrument capturing attitudes toward lesbians and gay men is the Lesbian, Gay, and Bisexual Knowledge and Attitudes Scale for Heterosexuals (LGB-KASH; Worthington, Dillon, and Becker-Schutte 2005). The authors have sought to develop a psychometrically sound instrument that captures both attitudes regard lesbians and gay men as well as knowledge about lesbian and gay culture. Based on findings which suggest that pro-lesbian/pro-gay attitudes are not simply the absence of homophobia (Worthington, Savoy, Dillon, and Vernaglia 2002), the LGB-KASH examines knowledge of lesbian and gay culture and “a recognition of heterosexual hegemony and privilege that extends beyond tolerance” (p. 105) as components of affirmativeness towards lesbians, gay men and bisexuals. Theoretically, the authors suggest that heterosexual attitudes toward lesbians, gay men and bisexuals reflect: “(a)

\textsuperscript{34} All of the concerns fall under the rubric of what the author originally conceptualized as apathetic heterosexism.
sexual self-awareness; (b) systematic homonegativity, sexual prejudice, and privilege; (c) knowledge of LGB history, symbols, and community; and (d) the potential for religious conflict” (p. 105). The LGB-KASH does move beyond traditional negative attitudes towards lesbians and gay men (most of which are incorporated into their “Hate” and “Religious Conflict” subdomains), and includes some vestiges of attitudes that fall under the rubric of modern prejudice (e.g., indifference, negatively ambivalent attitudes, and positively ambivalent attitudes).

The vast majority of existing scales have been limited by the conceptualization of prejudice toward lesbians and gay men as solely comprised of negatively valenced attitudes and behaviors. In addition, with the exception of the Modern Homonegativity Scale (Morrison and Morrison 2002), and some components of the LGB-KASH (Worthington, et al. 2004) no existing scale in the literature has utilized the theoretical foundation developed by the researchers of modern racism and sexism. The Modern Homonegativity Scale is limited to one specific theorized subdomain, neglecting three potential other subdomains that have been identified in this same literature.

4.5 The Current Measurement Instrument

The disparities between survey findings indicating that anti-gay attitudes on college campuses are at an all time low and the continued prevalence of anti-gay behavior create a conundrum for social science researchers. Models developed by researchers in the realms of modern sexism and racism, combined with Jackman’s (1994) insights into intergroup relations offer an intriguing possibility to understanding this paradox.
Synthesis of this literature, suggests that the manifestation of discriminatory attitudes towards lesbians and gay men is much more complex than has been captured in existing scales attempting to measure heterosexism, including that of Szczerba (1997), Morrison and Morrison (2002), and Worthington and his fellow researchers (2004). Within this theoretical framework, discriminatory attitudes towards lesbians and gay men consist of at least two distinct subdomains (in addition to hostile heterosexism) that work in conjunction to maintain stigmatization of non-heterosexual individuals, behavior and communities: *paternalistic heterosexism, and positive stereotypic heterosexism*.

The studies presented below develop and validate a measure of heterosexuals’ attitudes towards lesbians and gay men that: (a) is informed by the existing theoretical literature on prejudice and the measurement of social attitudes; (b) extends the conceptualization of modern forms of prejudice into the realm of attitudes about lesbians and gay men as a way of understanding paradoxical findings in the literature; and, (c) demonstrates its psychometric quality via its reliability with various samples, relationship to constructs hypothesized to be related to anti-lesbian and anti-gay attitudes, and ability to distinguish between groups hypothesized to differ on attitudes about lesbians and gay men.

### 4.6 Scale Preparation

*Defining the Concepts.* Following the classical process of scale development (DeVellis 1991; Spector 1992; Walsh and Betz 1995) the initial undertaking was to develop a definition of heterosexism. Numerous definitions abound for both the term homophobia and heterosexism (Appleby and Anastas 1998) and the concepts have been studied and debated in the literature (Neisen 1990; Young-Bruehl 1996). Weinberg’s
(1974) original definition of homophobia focused on society’s fear, dislike and/or hatred of lesbians and gay men, implying through its deliberate use of “phobia” that anti-gay prejudice is irrational and fear-driven. Research has shown that prejudice, in general, and anti-gay prejudice, in particular, are not necessarily irrational.\textsuperscript{35}

Herek (1992) argued for a shift in research to an analysis focusing on societal behaviors and their consequent attitudes and beliefs. His definition of heterosexism, “an ideological system that denies, denigrates and stigmatizes any nonheterosexual form of behavior, identity, relationship, or community” (p. 89.), is a useful definition, but seems to imply only negative or, possibly, apathetic components of the ideology. As positive stereotypes and other forms of modern heterosexism may play a role in the maintenance of social stratification based on sexual orientation, a definition that included these aspects of attitudes is needed. Making only a slight adjustment to Herek’s definition sufficed: \textit{an ideological system that denies, denigrates, stigmatizes [or segregates] any nonheterosexual form of behavior, identity, relationship, or community}. By adding “or segregates” to the definition, the original definition has been broadened to capture the primary manner in which theory suggests that both positive stereotypes and paternalistic heterosexism function to maintain stratification.

In determining the scope of attitudes and the resulting subdomains that the definition of heterosexism would cover, the literatures on intergroup relations, on contemporary forms of sexism and racism, on measurement and scale construction issues and on heterosexuals’ attitudes toward lesbians and gay men were consulted. In addition, scholars in the areas of prejudice, stereotypes and discrimination provided supplementary

\textsuperscript{35}See Fiske (1995) for a comprehensive coverage of the shifts in the academic literature regarding the function of stereotyping and prejudicial attitudes.
input. Initially, it was theorized that modern heterosexism consisted of two primary subdomains, in addition to the traditional “old-fashioned” heterosexism.

The term *hostile heterosexism*\(^{36}\) was adopted to denote the existing conceptualization of homophobia as negative myths, attitudes, and beliefs about lesbian and gay persons. Specifically, *hostile heterosexism* is defined as *negative attitudes, myths and beliefs that function by denying, denigrating, stigmatizing and/or segregating any nonheterosexual form of behavior, identity, relationship, or community*. By combining the scope and outcomes of Herek’s (1992) definition with the specificity of negative attitudes, myths and beliefs of previous definitions of homophobia (Fassinger 1991; Morin and Garfinkle 1978), this definition captures the traditional set of cognitive and affective components that are characterized by their aggressive, hostile nature.

Glick and Fiske (2001) use the term *benevolent sexism* to indicate discriminatory attitudes toward women that are justified with a chivalrous (protective) explanation. Specifically they define it as, “a subjectively favorable, chivalrous ideology that offers protection and affection to women who embrace conventional roles” (p. 109). In the Ambivalent Sexism Inventory (Glick and Fiske 1996), the authors further indicate that three sub-components exist under the rubric of benevolent sexism: heterosexual intimacy, protective paternalism and gender differentiation. The initial two subdomains of modern heterosexism arise from two of these three subcomponents: *paternalistic heterosexism* and *positive stereotypic heterosexism*\(^{37}\).

\(^{36}\) Using the term hostile heterosexism parallels Glick and Fiske’s (1996) use of the term hostile sexism which they define to mean “antipathy toward women who are viewed as usurping men’s power” (p. 109).

\(^{37}\) A subdomain corresponding to heterosexual intimacy was not theorized for the attitudes toward lesbians and gay men. Given that the nature of the relationship between the in-group (males) and out-groups (females) regarding gender is significantly more interdependent than that of heterosexuels and non-
Paternalistic heterosexism is defined as subjectively neutral or positive attitudes, myths and beliefs that express concern for the physical, emotional or cognitive well-being of nonheterosexual persons while concurrently denying, denigrating, stigmatizing and/or segregating any nonheterosexual form of behavior, identity, relationship, or community. Individuals may express this set of cognitive and affective components toward lesbians and gay men as a conceptual social group or as concern for specific lesbian or gay (or potentially lesbian or gay) individuals. In addition to concern, this conceptualization necessitates an indication of preference for heterosexuality. Paternalistic heterosexism should vary as a function of social distance (Bogardus 1927) with individuals expressing the highest levels for their own family members.

The second subdomain theorized to exist, positive stereotypic heterosexism is defined as subjectively positive attitudes, myths and beliefs that express appreciation of stereotypic characteristics often attributed to lesbians and gay men which function by denying, denigrating, stigmatizing and/or segregating any nonheterosexual form of behavior, identity, relationship, or community. Positive stereotypic heterosexism reinforces stereotypes, albeit with a focus on alleged or factual appreciation for the stereotypic characteristic(s). While the Ambivalent Sexism Inventory (ASI, Glick and Fiske 1996) uses the term gender differentiation to denote this subcomponent of benevolent sexism, examination of the questions formulated to tap into this attitudinal family indicates some type of positive evaluation of women as compared to men, not just differentiation between the sexes. For example, one question asks, “Women, as compared

heterosexuals, it is suggested that the heterosexual intimacy component may be a unique feature to prejudice based on gender. See Jackman (1994) for a thorough discussion of the role of interdependence between groups in shaping the dynamics of oppression between the groups.
to men, tend to have a more refined sense of culture and good taste” to which the respondent answers using a 6-point Likert scale. It seems that what Glick and Fiske label as *gender differentiation*, actually taps into positive stereotypes of women which, granted, may very well perform the function of differentiating genders in a traditional model of gender.

Positive stereotypes may also play a social identity role. They may function as identity consolidators – clearly defining in-groups and out-groups – in much the same manner as negative stereotypes. An individual with a non-prejudiced self-concept does not have negative stereotypes at their disposal (unless they want to risk cognitive and emotional dissonance) and therefore may endorse positive stereotypes as a way to meet their social psychological needs. These identities do not exist in a vacuum, but rather in a social context where they are tied to issues of power, privilege and status.

From a structural perspective, positive stereotypes also identify “approved of” social roles for marginalized groups and can serve as explicit and implicit justifications for limitations placed on career options, social roles and even geographic relationships. The positive stereotype of women as nurturing can be used, for example, as a justification to limit women to careers of education, childcare and nursing. This stereotype is dissonant with the image of women as trained soldiers marching into battle or cutthroat executives managing a hostile takeover. Even the man who considers himself non-sexist may still experience emotional reluctance to employ a qualified woman for “dirty work.”

---

38The remaining two questions for the gender differentiation subcomponent are “Women, compared to men, tend to have a superior moral sensibility” and “Many women have a quality of purity that few men possess.” Both are answered, like the previous example, on a 6-point Likert scale.
Developing the Question Pool. The next step in scale development was to generate a pool of potential questions believed to capture the subdomains previously identified and defined. In concert with a colleague in psychology, a pool of items was developed. The list was narrowed down to twenty-three items which were believed to adequately cover the two theorized modern subdomains. Two outside researchers with expertise in discriminatory attitudes research and scale development reviewed the index. Based on this preliminary review, six questions were re-worded to clarify meanings resulting in the Multidimensional Heterosexism Inventory (MHI, v. 1).

The original version of the MHI consisted of two types of questions. The first type of question was in the form of a statement to which the respondent would indicate agreement on a four-point Likert scale. These questions sought to capture the Positive Stereotypic Heterosexism subdomain and included questions such as, “Homosexual men have more sophisticated tastes than heterosexual men in art, music and literature.”

The second type of question was designed to tap into the paternalistic heterosexism subdomain. A number of question construction difficulties existed in attempting to capture this domain. First, questions needed to trigger a paternalistic response. Based on the theory that the level of paternalistic heterosexism might vary depending on the social distance of the target, it was assumed that asking about lesbians and gay men as an abstract social group might not trigger such a response. On the other hand, asking for opinions about one’s child might lead to little variability in the other direction as it might trigger a general parental protective response across the board. In the end, it was decided to hazard the potential of little variability and use one’s child (or potential child for those without children) as the target of paternalistic heterosexism.
Even though most parents are protective of their children and wish to avoid having their children experiencing a wide range of potential difficulties (e.g., I don’t want my child to have to wear glasses because other kids will make fun of her), it was reasoned that the shift to someone with more social distance, an aunt or friend, for example, would be much less likely to trigger a protective response at all. In addition, the most obvious parallel – which was in the area of race – are questions regarding the approval or disapproval of one’s child or family members dating or marrying someone of a different race. Researchers have used these types of questions in an attempt to understand racism (Bonilla-Silva and Hovespian 2000; Byrd 1991).

The second difficulty was whether to use a skip pattern or to make the assumption that all respondents would prefer that their children not be lesbian or gay. Incorporating a skip pattern in a self-administered survey makes the survey more difficult for the respondent to complete and increases the likelihood of errors (Sudman and Bradburn 1982). On the other hand assuming that all respondents would prefer heterosexual children might frustrate those who do not share that preference and leave those respondents without an appropriate response category (Neuman 2000). For the initial version of the scale, however, it was decided to make the assumption of heterosexual child preference, believing that even individuals who have progressive attitudes towards lesbians and gay men (and even many lesbians and gay men themselves) might have at least a slight hesitation about having a lesbian or gay child.39

The last dilemma in the paternalistic heterosexism question construction was that the attitudes must be justified by some (real or alleged) concern for the well-being of the

---

39 In later versions of the scale, different approaches to address this issue are explored.
lesbian or gay person. So questions must contain within their structure some reasoning as to why the individual holds the attitude. Unfortunately, this makes questions more complex and forces the respondent to agree with both parts of the question in order to be able to answer the question appropriately. In the MHI (v.1), questions to tap into paternalistic heterosexism were of the form, “I would prefer that my child NOT be homosexual because he/she would be unfairly discriminated against.” The response set was a four-point Likert response set indicating how much the respondent was in agreement with the statement.

4.7 Study One - Overview

The purpose of the initial study was to begin the development of a scale that would capture the complexity of heterosexuals’ attitudes toward lesbians and gay men. By extending the measurement of heterosexism beyond the traditional measure of hostile forms of prejudice, the instrument seeks to provide researchers with a tool in which to capture a broader range of attitudes toward lesbians and gay men, to assist in understanding existing paradoxes in the literature, and to build theory regarding the construction and function of attitudes toward lesbians and gay men for different social groups and in various social contexts.

4.8 Study One – Sample and Procedure

Three hundred and eighty-six undergraduates from introductory psychology courses at a medium-sized, private, Midwestern college participated. Along with the Multidimensional Heterosexism Inventory (v.1), participants answered a demographic
questionnaire and a number of unrelated scales not utilized in this study. Women comprised 51% of the sample and men made up 49%. Seventy-four percent of the sample were first year college students, 8% were sophomores, 9% were juniors, and seniors accounted for the remaining 9% of the sample. The majority of the respondents identified as Caucasian (81%), with small proportions identifying as Latino (5.6%), African American (4%), Asian or Asian American (3.3%), and other (combination of races, 6.1%).

4.9 Study One - Results

*Item Analysis.* The author and three scholars familiar with prejudice research reviewed the results from the study, and due to agreement about lack of question clarity, four items were discarded. This resulted in a 19-item scale. The item-total correlations were examined to determine if any items should be eliminated based on the threshold established by Betz (1996). All 19 items were maintained.

*Factor Structure.* Initially, exploratory factor analysis with an iterative factor process with oblique rotation was used to examine the factor structure of the 19-item scale. Retention of factors was based on the results of a scree test (Cattell 1966), examination of eigenvalues greater than 1.0 (Kaiser 1974; Kim and Mueller 1978), and exploration of alternative factor solutions (Floyd and Widaman 1995). All three methods indicated the retention of two factors.

In examining factor loading patterns, 4 of the 19 questions had low loadings and were thus eliminated.40 Out of the remaining 15 questions, only 13 had clearly-indicated

---

40 Tabachnik and Fidell (1989) recommend retaining only items with a factor loading of .50 or greater.
high loadings with two items loading ambiguously on two factors, resulting in their
elimination (see Gorsuch 1983). Factor 1 accounted for 71.8 % of the variance in the
measured variables, and factor 2 accounted for 18.8%. The two distinct factors
corresponded to questions developed to measure positive stereotypic heterosexism, and
paternalistic heterosexism, respectively.

*Descriptive Statistics and Reliability.* The range for the three-item Paternalistic
Heterosexism subscale ranges from 3 to 12, and has a mean of 6.2 ($SD = 1.89$). The
possible scores for the 10-item Positive Stereotypic Heterosexism subscale ranged from
10 to 40. This subscale mean was 31.0 ($SD = 5.42$).

The internal consistency of the overall scale was calculated at .84 (Cronbach’s
alpha.) For the subscales, the internal consistency estimates were .71 and .91 for the
Paternalistic Heterosexism and Positive Stereotypic Heterosexism subscales,
respectively.

*Discussion.* A sociological research group reviewed the results of Study One, and
based on the results suggested a number of improvements. Based on the results and the
recommendations, the following changes were made for the Multidimensional
Heterosexism Inventory (MHI v.2). First, additional questions were added to the scale in
an attempt to improve the internal consistency of the subscales. Next, wording was
changed on six questions to improve understandability. Finally, a skip pattern was added
to the scale so that only individuals who would prefer their child not be homosexual were
required to answer the Paternalistic Heterosexism subscale. Using this approach, scoring
of the Paternalistic Heterosexism subscale would assign the lowest scores to those who
indicate that they did not prefer their child’s sexual orientation to be heterosexual.
4.10 Study Two - Overview

Study Two further investigates the psychometric properties of the MHI (v.2). In addition to adding questions in an attempt to improve internal consistency of the scale, hypotheses were developed regarding the relationship of the subscales to Herek’s Attitudes toward Lesbians and Gay Men – Short Form (ATLG-S 1984) and included the ATLG-S as an initial test of criterion-related validity.

4.11 Study Two - Hypotheses

Given the theorized definitions of the subdomains and the structure of heterosexism as measured by the MHI (v.2), it was anticipated that the Paternalistic Heterosexism subscale would have a negative, significant relationship with the ATLG-S. This type of relationship is logical, as someone who believes that homosexuality is immoral, disgusting, etc. (hostile heterosexism) would not likely classify concerns about discrimination in career, adoption and other areas of life as unfair. Likewise, it was anticipated that a negative, statistically significant relationship would emerge between the Positive Stereotypic Heterosexism subscale and the ATLG-S, based on the same logic.

4.12 Sample and Procedure

Undergraduates from introductory sociology courses from a medium-sized, private, Midwestern university were recruited for Study Two. Two hundred and thirty students participated in the study. Along with the Multidimensional Heterosexism Inventory (v.2), participants answered a demographic questionnaire and the ATLG-S.
Women made up 54.2% of the sample and men made up 45.8%. All participants were first year college students. Caucasians made up the majority of the respondents (75.4%), with the remainder of the sample consisting of Latino (10.5%), African American (4.8%), Asian or Asian American (3.1%), and other (combination of races, 6.1%).

With regard to social class, 64.9% identified as middle class, 12.2% working class and 22.8% as upper class. Overwhelmingly the respondents identified as Christian (95.2%) with 2.2% identifying as agnostic/atheist and the remaining 2.6% as other religions. Of those who identified as Christian, 82.3% further identified themselves as Catholic.

4.13 Study Two - Results

*Factor Structure.* Again, initially exploratory factor analysis with an iterative factor process with oblique rotation was used to examine the factor structure of the 19-item scale. As before, two factors were retained as was indicated by examination of the scree plot, the eigenvalues and alternative factor structures.

In examining factor loading patterns, four of the 19 questions were eliminated due to low loadings. Out of the remaining 15 questions, only 12 had clearly-indicated high loadings with three items loading ambiguously on two factors, resulting in their elimination.

Factor 1 accounted for 57.0% of the variance in the measured variables, and factor 2 accounted for 26.8%. The two distinct factors again corresponded to questions developed to measure positive stereotypic heterosexism, and paternalistic heterosexism, respectively.
Descriptive Statistics and Reliability. The range for the four-item Paternalistic Heterosexism subscale was from 4 to 16, and has a mean of 11.7 (SD = 3.31). The possible scores for the 9-item Positive Stereotypic Heterosexism subscale range from 9 to 36. This subscale has a mean of 17.5 (SD = 4.58).

The internal consistency of the overall scale was calculated at .82 (Cronbach’s alpha.) For the subscales, the internal consistency estimates were .91 and .89 for the Paternalistic Heterosexism and Positive Stereotypic Heterosexism subscales, respectively. The addition of a question regarding the threat of violence to lesbian and gay individuals significantly improved the internal consistency of the Paternalistic Heterosexism subscale, and the Positive Stereotypic Heterosexism subscale, which lost one previously retained question due to low loadings saw a small decrease in its alpha value.

Relationship with ATLG-S. As predicted, the relationships between the various subscales of the Multidimensional Heterosexism Inventory (v.2) and ATLG-S emerged. Examining the relationship of each of the subscales while controlling for the other subscale both hypotheses were supported. The Paternalistic and Positive Stereotypic subscales had negative, significant relationships.

Discussion. An interdisciplinary sexuality research group reviewed the results of both Study one and Study Two. First, the group suggested that the 4-point Likert scale be replaced with an 11-point response set representing from 0% to 100% agreement with each of the statements to give respondents more variability in response categories.

The skip question reads, “I would prefer my child NOT be homosexual.” In MHI (v.2), anyone who indicated that they disagreed or strongly disagreed with this statement
was assigned the lowest scores on items from the Paternalistic Heterosexism subscale. In MHI (v.3), the research group recommended that only those who indicated the strongest disagreement with the skip statement on the 11-point scale (the 0% agreement response) be assigned the lowest scores on the Paternalistic Heterosexism subscale. This approach represents a more conservative approach and forces respondents who have any level of agreement with the skip question to answer the questions of the subscale.

Finally, based on recently published literature regarding attitudes toward lesbians and gay men, the group suggested that an additional subscale be explored that tapped into indifference to lesbian and gay issues. In response to this feedback, a number of changes to the scale were made.

Research regarding apathy and indifference as well as some approaches to measuring modern racism and sexism suggested potential approaches to capturing this third hypothesized subdomain. Based on this literature, the following definition for apathetic heterosexism was developed:

\[ \text{apathetic heterosexism}^{41} \text{ was developed: attitudes, myths and beliefs that dismiss or trivialize the importance of sexual orientation on life chances by denying, denigrating, stigmatizing and/or segregating any nonheterosexual form of behavior, identity, relationship, or community.} \]

To capture this subdomain, ten additional questions were developed and added to the potential scale items.

Finally, five additional questions focusing primarily on the Paternalistic Heterosexism subscale were also added. These additions resulted in a 28-item questionnaire.

---

41 Apathetic was chosen for its connotation of indifference, unresponsiveness, and little concern.
4.14 Study Three - Overview

Study Three further investigated the psychometric properties of the MHI (v.3), including the impact on the factor structure of the addition of the theorized Apathetic Heterosexism subscale. Hypotheses concerning the measure’s theorized relationships with several other variables were tested, and the scale’s ability to differentiate group membership was also explored.

4.15 Study Three – Hypotheses

*Apathetic Heterosexism.* Beliefs that homosexuals do not face discrimination, that the lesbian/gay rights movement is pushing “special rights” and the use of the language of “reverse discrimination” has been part of the political framing used by the conservative right in opposing political advances on behalf of lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender persons (Farhadian 1999; Lugg 1998). Much of this rhetoric has been disseminated through churches and organizations associated with the Religious Right (Apostolidis 2001; Gallagher and Bull 2001; Stein 2001). The Apathetic Heterosexism subscale attempts to capture this constellation of beliefs, and as such, a number of relationships between the subscale and political and religious variables are hypothesized.

Recent literature on political ideology has suggested a continued link between conservative political ideology and higher incidences of prejudice (Lieber, Woodrick and Roudebusch 1995; Meertens and Pettigrew 1997; Peck 2003; Stone 2000). Numerous studies have also shown that conservatism is a strong predictor of anti-gay prejudice in particular (Estrada and Weiss 1999; Mohr and Rochlen 1999; Victor 1996). Based on these findings and the political nature of the vehicle of dissemination for the ideas
captured in the conceptualization of apathetic heterosexism, it was predicted that higher levels of conservative ideology would be predictive of higher scores on the Apathetic Heterosexism subscale.

The link between religion and political attitudes has been well-studied and while not all Protestants, nor all Catholics were of the same mind concerning, for example, the Civil Rights Movement (Loveland, Walls, Myers, Sikkink and Radcliffe 2002), it has been documented that conservative Protestants were less supportive of the Civil Rights Movement than other denominational groups (Ammerman 1990; Fenton and Vines 1967; Wald 1997). In addition, Burnham, Connors and Leonard (1969) found that white Catholic students from four metropolitan Philadelphia colleges were less likely than students from other religious denominations to be in the ‘low prejudice’ category. Examining religion and support for African American activism among whites, Loveland, and colleagues (2002) find that only two groups stand out as overwhelmingly supportive of the Civil Rights Movement: Jews and those with no religious affiliation, a group which will be referred to as seculars.

Similar patterns have been found across religious traditions with regard to anti-gay attitudes (Kunkel and Temple 1992) with respondents from fundamentalist Protestant traditions frequently found to have some of the highest rates of homophobia (Hunsberger 1996; Laythe, Finkel, and Kirkpatrick 2001; Laythe, Finkel, Bringle, and Kirkpatrick 2002) and seculars and Jews found to be the most supportive of lesbian and gay rights (Fisher, Derison, Polley and Cadman 1994).

Based on the findings about religious traditions and prejudice, as well as the role that the Religious Right has played in the anti-gay political arena to foster belief in the
lack of discrimination against lesbian and gay persons, it was anticipated that seculars would score significantly lower on the Apathetic Heterosexism subscale than would conservative Protestants. In addition, based on the previous historical literature about the mixed support of civil rights for African Americans, it was anticipated that other religious faith traditions (Catholics, liberal/mainline Protestants) would not differ significantly than conservative Protestants.

*Paternalistic Heterosexism.* Given that paternalistic heterosexism has at its core a concern based on unfair constraints that one’s child would experience were s/he lesbian or gay, it was anticipated that the contact hypothesis – that exposure to minority group members decrease levels of prejudice against the group – would work in the opposite manner with scores on the Paternalistic Heterosexism subscale than would be expected from the literature on hostile heterosexism. As such individuals who have lesbian and/or gay friends would, it was predicted, have higher scores on the Paternalistic Heterosexism subscale than individuals who do not.

This expectation – that individuals with lesbian and gay friends would have higher rates of heterosexism on one of the subdomains than people who do not have such friends – may seem counterintuitive. While the expression and the experience of paternalistic heterosexism may indeed be subjectively positive because of its emphasis on the unfairness that lesbians and gay men (may) face, it maintains a preference for heterosexuality (albeit for ‘good’ reasons). And, while Allport’s (1954) strict definition of prejudice focused on antipathy, as Glick and Fiske (2001) point out, he does conclude

\[42\] One would also anticipate that like seculars, persons of the Jewish faith would also score significantly lower on the Apathetic Heterosexism subscale than would conservative Protestants. However, the sample consists of no persons of the Jewish faith, leaving this hypothesis untestable.
that the “net effect of prejudice…is to place the object of prejudice at some disadvantage” (p. 9). Expressing a preference for heterosexuality – regardless of the reason – is still a segregating preference.

However, unlike, the relationship between hostile heterosexism and casual interaction that is documented in the literature, it was additionally hypothesized that casual interaction alone would not have a statistically significant relationship with the Paternalistic Heterosexism subscale. In order for one to develop a concern that lesbians and gay men face discrimination, it was reasoned that a more personal relationship needs to be experienced. Knowing that the waiter at your favorite restaurant is gay might humanize lesbian and gay people somewhat, and potentially result in a lessening of hostile heterosexism, but it would do little, it seems, to increase one’s awareness of the barriers that lesbian and gay people experience in their daily lives. Therefore, controlling for having lesbian and gay friends, it was suggested that having casual interaction with lesbian and gay people would not impact the score on the Paternalistic Heterosexism subscale.

As the Paternalistic Heterosexism subscale captures concern about one’s child being lesbian or gay based on perceived unfairness of discrimination against lesbian and gay persons, it was also anticipated that political ideology would work in the opposite direction for paternalistic heterosexism than it does for apathetic heterosexism. As such, more politically conservative respondents should be lower on Paternalistic Heterosexism subscale scores than more politically liberal respondents.

Positive Stereotypic Heterosexism. One complicating factor with regard to positive stereotypic heterosexism is that the vast majority of the characteristics of positive
stereotypes, while subjectively positive qualities (e.g., compassion, creativity, athleticism), are typically gender-nonconforming as applied to lesbians and gay men. For example, in general women are typically perceived to be more compassionate than men, but one positive stereotype of gay men is that they are more compassionate and caring than heterosexual men. So, positive stereotypes could operate in ways that are positive based on the actual appreciation of the subjectively positive quality, or they could operate in ways that are negative based on negative reactions to gender nonconformity.

Basow and Johnson (2000) point out that the structure of attitudes toward lesbians and gay men are different for men and women and that they serve different social psychological functions. Herek (1986) argues that anti-gay attitudes are a result of fears about one’s masculinity for heterosexual men. Men, in a defensive attempt to shore up their maleness, distance themselves from gay men and express more anti-gay attitudes (Tucker 1996). Women do not need to assert their heterosexuality in the same way (Rich 1980). Heterosexual femininity is not as tied to possessing gender-appropriate traits as is heterosexual masculinity (Basow and Johnson 2000). Given that positive stereotypes are gender-nonconforming, it was hypothesized that males would endorse positive stereotypes more frequently than would females.

Higgins’ (1987) and Pelham and Swann’s (1989) work on self-discrepancy, found that self-discrepancy on important traits led to low self-esteem, anxiety and threat, which then resulted in defensive attitudes. Applying these findings to the arena of gender, Theodore and Basow (2000) find that self-discrepancy on masculinity for men is, at times, a reaction to a threat to one’s self. Given this, it was predicted that men who perceive themselves as having more feminine interests would endorse more positive
stereotypes. However, this relationship would not – it was predicted – occur for women, as women with more masculine interests are not as likely to be labeled homosexual as are men with more feminine interests.

4.16 Study 3 – Sample and Procedure

Study 3, utilizing MHI (v.3), was administered at a medium-sized public university in the Midwest. The sample consists of 277 undergraduates taking introductory sociology courses. The sample consisted of 63.9% females and 36.1% males. Racially, Caucasians made up the majority of the sample (82.7%), followed by African Americans (7.9%), Hispanics (3.61%) and the remaining proportion of the sample consisted of Asians/Asian Americans, Native Americans and multiracial individuals (5.79%). Most of the respondents were first year students (48.4%), 35.0% were sophomores, 13.0% were juniors, and the remaining 3.6% were seniors.

With regard to age, 78.34% were of traditional college ages (younger than 25 years) and 21.66% were 25 years old or older. Ages ranged from 18 to 51 with a mean age of 22.4 years for the sample ($SD = 5.91$). Most respondents self-identified as middle class (56.5%) followed by working class (37.3%), upper class (3.6%), and then lower class (2.5%). Protestants made up the highest percentage of the sample (46.9%), followed by Catholics (27.1%), agnostics/atheists (16.9%) and the remaining 9.2% classified themselves as “Other Christians” or as “Other Non-Christian.”

43 This relationship could evolve out of a number of processes. For males who believe that they should be masculine, yet who find themselves with more feminine interests, this relationship could arise out of threat. For males who are more comfortable with their feminine interests, this relationship still might hold and perform a differentiating function that is not necessarily based in threat.
4.17 Study Three - Results

Factor Structure. An exploratory iterative factor process with oblique rotation was used to examine the factor structure of the 28-item scale. All three factor retention methods indicated that three factors should be retained. Examination of the factor loading patterns indicated that eight of the 28 items had factor scores of less than .50 and were thus dropped from the scale resulting in a 20-item scale covering the three subdomains.44 As all of the remaining 20 items had clearly-indicated high loadings, they were maintained.

Factor 1 accounted for 40.4 % of the variance in the measured variables, factor 2 accounted for 27.4%, and the final factor for 8.7%. These correspond to the three subdomains of positive stereotypic, paternalistic, and apathetic heterosexism, respectively.

Descriptive Statistics and Reliability. The range for the six-item Paternalistic Heterosexism subscale goes from 0 to 600, and has a mean of 402.55 with a standard deviation of 165.11.45 The Positive Stereotypic Heterosexism subscale consists of eight items with a range from 0 to 800. It has a mean of 229.42 and a standard deviation of 183.62. The new subscale, the three-item Apathetic Heterosexism subscale has scores from 0 to 300, a mean of 96.29 and a standard deviation of 62.58.

The Cronbach’s alpha for the overall scale was calculated at .82, with internal consistency estimates of .89, .90, and .64 for the Paternalistic Heterosexism, Positive

---

44 Of the eight items dropped, seven were new items that had been included to capture the Apathetic Heterosexism subscale, leaving three items for that particular subscale. The last dropped item was an item capturing a positive stereotype.

45 The descriptive statistics are of a substantially different metric as the response scale was changed from a 4-point Likert scale to an 11-point percentage agreement scale.
Stereotypic Heterosexism, and Apathetic Heterosexism subscales, respectively. Both the Paternalistic and Positive Stereotypic Heterosexism subscale alphas were similar to version two of the scale. The Apathetic Heterosexism’s alpha was slightly lower than desired at .64.

4.18 Study Three – Hypotheses Testing

Apathetic heterosexism. The potential range of the Apathetic Heterosexism subscale is 0 to 300, with a score of 300 representing 100% endorsement of each of the three items on the subscale. The modal category is 0, capturing almost 10% of the sample respondents and indicating the lack of endorsement for any of the Apathetic Heterosexism subscale items. Table 4.1 shows the models testing the hypotheses related to this subscale.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE 4.1</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>REGRESSION ANALYSES FOR APATHETIC HETEROSEXISM (MHI, v.3) ON POLITICAL IDEOLOGY AND RELIGIOUS TRADITION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Model 1</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Political Ideology</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Catholic</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mainline/Liberal Protestant</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Other Non-Christian</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Secular</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NOTE: *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001 (two-tailed tests). Standard errors in parentheses.
Based on the conceptual definition of the Apathetic Heterosexism subscale and
the documented relationship between conservative politic views and the rhetoric
regarding lesbian and gay issues, it was predicted that higher levels of conservative
political ideology would be associated with higher levels of apathetic heterosexism. The
political ideology variable measures liberal-conservatism on a 7-point Likert scale
ranging from Extremely Liberal to Extremely Conservative. Higher scores indicate
higher levels of conservatism. Mean for the sample on the scale is 3.97, the median
indicates a moderate political orientation, and the standard deviation is 1.43. The full
range is represented in the sample with 31.2% indicating some level of a liberal
orientation, 39.6% self-reporting as moderate, and the remaining 29.2% indicating a
conservative orientation.

This predicted relationship was significant at the .001 level. Political ideology
explains 4.1% of the variation in the Apathetic Heterosexism subscale with each increase
of one category on scale representing approximately a 9-point increase in the subscale.
The typical difference between a respondent who answered Extremely Liberal and a
respondent who answered Extremely Conservative, then, is 54 points.

Examining religious tradition, it was suggested that seculars would score
significantly lower on the Apathetic Heterosexism subscale than would conservative
Protestants. Conservative Protestants, given their documented relationship with anti-gay
rhetoric that denies the significance of sexual orientation on social stratification, should
be more likely to embrace the denial of discrimination captured in the Apathetic
Heterosexism subscale.
Seventeen percent of the sample reports a secular orientation to religion, while approximately 25% report a conservative Protestant religious tradition.\textsuperscript{46} Conservative Protestants were designated as the reference group and dummy coded variables for Catholics, Mainline/Liberal Protestants, Seculars, and Other Non-Christians were included in the model. As predicted respondents falling into the secular category were significantly less endorsing of apathetic heterosexism. On average seculars were almost 23 points lower on the subscale than were conservative Protestants. Also as predicted, none of the other religious traditions were significantly different than conservative Protestants on the Apathetic Heterosexism subscale.

\textit{Paternalistic heterosexism}. The potential range of the Paternalistic Heterosexism subscale goes from 0 to 600. Like the previous subscale, the full range of the subscale is represented in the sample, with an average of 402.6 and a standard deviation of 165.1. Of the three subscales, the Paternalistic Heterosexism subscale is the only subscale where the mean for the sample is higher than 50\% of the possible subscale score indicating that it is the subscale with the highest endorsement rate in the sample. Table 4.2 illustrates the various models testing the Paternalistic Heterosexism subscale hypotheses.

Two testable relationships between the Paternalistic Heterosexism subscale and the contact thesis were predicted. First, it was anticipated that respondents who reported having higher percentages of lesbian and/or gay male friends would score higher on the subscale. This hypothesis is supported at the .05 level with percentage of lesbian and gay friends explaining slightly more than 3\% of the variation on the subscale. Each reported increase in 10\% lesbian/gay friends increases the score on the Paternalistic Heterosexism

\textsuperscript{46} All Protestants who are not classified as either mainline or liberal Protestants are included in the evangelical/conservative Protestant reference group.
### TABLE 4.2

REgression analyses for paternalistic heterosexism on having lesbian/gay friends or casual acquaintances and political ideology (MHI, v.3)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Percentage Friends who are Lesbian or Gay</td>
<td>1.38* (0.546)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Interaction with Lesbians or Gay Men</td>
<td>-7.20 (37.146)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Having Lesbian or Gay Male Friends</td>
<td>75.47** (24.918)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Ideology</td>
<td></td>
<td>-17.46* (8.018)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>381.38*** (14.265)</td>
<td>359.57*** (20.883)</td>
<td>470.81*** (33.595)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R²</td>
<td>.030</td>
<td>.054</td>
<td>.031</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>208</td>
<td>207</td>
<td>207</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**NOTE:** *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001 (two-tailed tests). Standard errors in parentheses.

...subscale by 1.4 points. While the relationship is statistically significant, it is substantively minor.

The second hypothesis related to the contact thesis was that no relationship between casual interaction and the Paternalistic Heterosexism subscale was expected to emerge. The reasoning was that while casual exposure to lesbians and gay men might decrease hostile heterosexism as indicated in the literature, only more personal and extended exposure to lesbians and gay men would increase awareness of the discrimination that non-heterosexuals experience and, therefore, impact the Paternalistic Heterosexism subscale score. Controlling for whether or not the respondent has lesbian or gay friends, respondents who believe that they have had no interaction with lesbians or gay men are not significantly different than respondents who have had only impersonal...
(casual) interaction with lesbians or gay men. One interesting side note to this hypothesis test is that the percentage lesbian/gay friends was recoded to be a dichotomous variable for this analysis where one indicates that the person has lesbian/gay friends and 0 means that the person does not. This, like the percentage lesbian/gay friends variable tested directly above, is statistically significant, but it is also substantively significant as having lesbian/gay friends increases one’s Paternalistic Heterosexism score by slightly more than 75 points on the subscale. This indicates that it is not the incremental progression to higher percentages of lesbian/gay friends (as was tested above), but rather a threshold effect whereby having any lesbian/gay friends has a strong effect on paternalistic heterosexism.

It was further predicted that higher levels of political conservatism would be related to lower scores on the Paternalistic Heterosexism subscale. This prediction is supported at the .05 level. Political ideology explains slightly more than 2% of the variation in subscale scores and, on average, there is a decrease of 17.5 points for each category shift toward the conservative end of the continuum. This would indicate the existence of about a 100-point spread on subscale scores between those who are extremely liberal and those who are extremely conservative.

*Positive stereotypic heterosexism.* The Positive Stereotypic Heterosexism subscale has a range from 0 to 800. The full range of the subscale is represented in the sample, with an average of 229.4 and a standard deviation of 183.6. Of the four subscales, the Positive Stereotypic Heterosexism subscale has the highest percentage of
respondents who did not endorse any of the statements at 18.4%. Table 4.3 illustrates the various models testing the Positive Stereotypic Heterosexism subscale hypotheses.

TABLE 4.3

REGRESSION ANALYSES FOR POSITIVE STEREOTYPIC HETEROSEXISM (MHI, v.3) ON GENDER AND GENDERED INTERESTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>67.35**</td>
<td>154.84**</td>
<td>39.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(24.053)</td>
<td>(72.769)</td>
<td>(45.447)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-report of Feminine Interests (males only)</td>
<td>205.98***</td>
<td>260.88***</td>
<td>201.88**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(14.189)</td>
<td>(20.641)</td>
<td>(14.677)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-report of Masculine Interests (females only)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>.031</td>
<td>.051</td>
<td>.005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>163</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NOTE: *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001 (two-tailed tests). Standard errors in parentheses.

First, it was hypothesized that males would have higher scores on the Positive Stereotypic Heterosexism subscale than would females based on the gendered function of heterosexism documented in the literature. Thirty-six percent of the sample is male, compared with 64% female. Gender is a statistically significant predictor of positive Stereotypic Heterosexism at the .01 level of significance, with men scoring, on average, 67.4 points higher than do women.

Based on the same body of literature, it was predicted that self-discrepancy along dimensions of masculinity in terms of masculine/feminine interests would be linked to higher scores on the Positive Stereotypic subscale for men, but not for women. For men, 47 The other two subscales have non-endorser rates of less than 10%.
only 7% of the sample self-identified as having feminine or very feminine interests while 11.5% of the women in the sample self-identified as having masculine or very masculine interests. For the men, the predicted relationship was found to be significant at the .05 level. Males who self-reported more feminine interests scored almost 155 points higher on the Positive Stereotypic Heterosexism subscale than other males, possibly lending support to Basow and Johnson’s (2000) idea that men who feel their masculinity is threatened may react defensively and, in this case, endorse more stereotypical views of lesbians and gay men. The final hypothesis was that this relationship would not hold for women. This prediction was also supported. Women who self-identified as having masculine interests were not significantly different from women who self-identified as having feminine, very feminine or gender neutral interests.

4.19 Relationships Between the Subscales

The next question of concern was the relationship between the subscales. To analyze this, the correlations between the subscales were examined. Table 4.4 and Figure 4.1 document the correlations between the subscales.

What emerges from examination of the data are two significant correlations at the .05 level. The Paternalistic Heterosexism subscale is positively correlated with the Positive Stereotypic Heterosexism subscale, but only weakly so \((r=.1982)\) at a .05 level of significance. This relationship is not surprising. Individuals most likely experience paternalistic heterosexism as neutral or positive and, as such, individuals who consider themselves as non-heterosexual might express attitudes in this cluster of sentiments.

\[48\text{ The question utilized for this test is: “My interests are mostly those of a person who is….Very Masculine, Masculine, Neither Masculine nor Feminine, Feminine, Very Feminine.”}\]
Similarly, positive stereotypic heterosexism is subjectively positive, and even individuals with many lesbian and gay friends might endorse these stereotypes.

Additionally, the Apathetic Heterosexism subscale is weakly correlated with the Paternalistic Heterosexism subscale in a negative direction ($r = -.1710$). Central to the concept of paternalistic heterosexism is the justification for not wanting one’s child to be lesbian or gay because they would unfairly experience various discriminatory behaviors toward them. On the other hand, apathetic heterosexists endorse ideas that lesbians and gay men are treated “as fairly” (emphasis added) as heterosexuals, so it is a denial of unfair treatment. This negative correlation reflects this divergence.

### 4.20 Discussion

The MHI (v.3) performed as expected on a number of tests of reliability and validity. Items developed to capture the distinct subdomains, including the additional subdomain of apathetic heterosexism, loaded as predicted. The emergent factor structure
Figure 4.1: Correlational Structure of the Subscales of the Multidimensional Heterosexism Inventory (v.3)

demonstrated theoretically sound relationships between the subdomains. However, one reasonable critique of the MHI (v.3) is its lack of differentiation between attitudes toward lesbians and attitudes toward gay men.

Recent research in attitudes toward lesbians and gay men has demonstrated differences in attitudes toward lesbians and attitudes toward gay men with greater hostility typically shown toward gay men than lesbians (Basow and Johnson 2000; Kite 1994). In addition, there have been some studies that have found differences in attitudes toward lesbians and attitudes toward gay men within gender groupings. That is, men demonstrate greater hostility toward gay men than toward lesbians, and women express greater hostility toward lesbians than gay men (CITE). Additional development of the Multidimensional Heterosexism Inventory should take into account these more recent developments in the understanding of attitudes toward lesbians and gay men.
4.21 Study Four - Overview

As MHI (v.3) does not differentiate attitudes toward lesbians from attitudes toward gay men with the exception of items capturing positive stereotypes, a fourth study was undertaken to incorporate this feature. Study Four also further investigates the factor structure and psychometric properties of the MHI (v.4) with a larger sample of undergraduate students. A total of forty questions were developed from the twenty questions included in MHI (v.3) by differentiating the gender of the target of the question and an additional four questions were added that were slight modifications of the questions to make the questions more applicable to the gender differences.49

4.22 Study Four - Sample and Procedure

Study Four is the primary study undertaken as part of this overall project. A thorough discussion of the sample, research protocol, measures used, and methodological limitations are included in Chapter 2 of this document.

4.23 Study Four - Hypotheses

Apathetic heterosexism. As was the case in Study 3, it is again hypothesized that a conservative political ideology would be associated with greater endorsement of the Apathetic Heterosexism subscale items. Likewise, it is anticipated that seculars would display significantly lower apathetic heterosexism than would conservative Protestants.

49 While attitudes toward lesbians may differ from attitudes toward gay men, the conceptualization of each of the subdomains of heterosexism captured by the MHI does not depend upon gender. However, inclusion of gender-specific items on the scale may improve the scale’s ability to capture the full range of the subdomain, and will allow flexibility in situations where researchers wish to examine these types of gendered differences in attitudes.
As an additional test of convergent validity for version four of the MHI, it is hypothesized that individuals with higher levels of hostile sexism will also show higher levels of apathetic heterosexism. The literature demonstrates that individuals who are hostilely prejudiced against one social group also tend to be hostilely prejudiced against other social groups (Bierly 1985; Ficarrotto 1990; Heineman 2003). Even though apathetic heterosexism differs conceptually from hostile heterosexism, it seems reasonable to predict that a similar relationship should exist between apathetic heterosexism and hostile sexism. This predicted relationship is based on the role that conservative religious organizations have played in disseminating the rhetoric associated with apathetic heterosexism, the relationship documented in the literature between religiosity and hostile heterosexism, and the relationship documented between conservative religious traditions and hostile heterosexism.

*Paternalistic heterosexism.* In addition to predicting apathetic heterosexism, conservative political ideology should also predict paternalistic heterosexism, although not as strongly and in the opposite direction given its concern about the unfairness of the discrimination that lesbians and gay men might face in life.

The predicted relationship between paternalistic heterosexism and hostile sexism is somewhat more difficult to anticipate. The most straightforward prediction would be that as hostile sexism increases paternalistic heterosexism decreases; individuals who are hostilely sexist are unlikely to express concern over the unfairness of discrimination towards lesbians and gay men.

*Positive stereotypic heterosexism.* As in Study 3, it is anticipated that males will endorse positive stereotypes more strongly than will females due to the gendered
functioning of heterosexism. It is also predicted that relationship between positive
stereotypic heterosexism and hostile sexism will emerge that is similar to the relationship
suggested above between paternalistic heterosexism and hostile sexism. Individuals who
are hostily sexist are unlikely to endorse stereotypes of lesbians and gay men that
attribute positive qualities to lesbians and gay men.

Unlike the other forms of heterosexism, positive stereotypes of gay men have not
played a significant role in the political rhetoric opposing legal advances for lesbians and
gay men. As such, it is anticipated that political orientation will not be predictive of
endorsement of positive stereotypes.

4.24 Study Four – Factor Analysis

Factor Structure. An exploratory iterative factor analysis with oblique rotation
was used to examine the factor structure of the 44-item scale. All three factor retention
methods indicated that four factors should be retained. The analysis was re-run restricting
the number of factors to four and the resulting factor loadings were examined.

Rather than the three factors anticipated (apathetic, paternalistic, and positive
stereotypic), four factors emerged. Items loaded as expected on both the paternalistic and
positive stereotypic subdomains, however, the items developed to capture the apathetic
heterosexism subdomain split into two distinct factors. Examination of the items
indicated that the two clusters represented a group of four items that denied the existence
of discrimination against lesbians and gay persons, and a second group of six items

50 While the stereotype that gay men are wealthy has been utilized in some anti-gay political
rhetoric, it has typically been used in a manner that resonates more with the denial of discrimination, rather
than as a positive stereotype. For example, it is often discussed as evidence that gay men are not
discriminated against and, therefore, need no legal protection against discrimination.
indicated belief that lesbians and gay men were too militant in their demands, were overly focused on their sexuality, or received too much attention.

This differentiation of themes in what had originally been termed *apathetic heterosexism* necessitated a teasing apart of the original definition of apathetic heterosexism into two definitions that better captured the nature of the two emergent clusters of items. The label *amnestic heterosexism*\(^{51}\) was used for the cluster of items that denies the existence of discrimination, and the cluster of items that perceived lesbians/gay men as too militant or receiving too much attention cluster was called *aversive heterosexism*.

For *aversive heterosexism*, the following definition was developed: *Attitudes, myths, and beliefs that dismiss, belittle, or disregard the impact of sexual orientation on life chances by denying, denigrating, stigmatizing and/or segregating any nonheterosexual form of behavior, identity, relationship, or community.*

Aversive heterosexism has a similar negative valence to hostile heterosexism, but rather than using rhetoric that relies on the traditional negative stereotypes of lesbians and gay men (mentally ill, perverse, pedophile, etc.), and concerns about morality, the aversive heterosexist is much more likely to couch their anti-gay arguments in less inflammatory language. They will argue that the lesbian and gay movement is wanting too much, too fast, an attitude similar to many in the 1960s who opposed the integration of African Americans in the U.S. South as being forced and not evolving “naturally.” Additionally, they may claim that too much attention is given to issues of lesbian and gay sexuality, or that lesbians and gay men are too focused on their sexuality.

---

\(^{51}\) Amnestic is the adjective form of the word amnesia and was chosen for its incorporation of both the idea of forgetfulness and the state of being oblivious.
*Amnestic heterosexism* is defined as attitudes, myths and beliefs that deny the impact of sexual orientation on life chances by denying, denigrating, stigmatizing and/or segregating any nonheterosexual form of behavior, identity, relationship, or community.

Amnestic heterosexism on the other hand is a move to a less hostilely valenced cluster of attitudes. The amnestic heterosexist suggests that discrimination is a thing of the past, and that lesbians and gay men are treated fairly in contemporary society. The amnestic heterosexist may be making these claims out of ignorance, out of refusal to acknowledge factual information, or even out of life experience where they see many successful lesbians and gay men.

Given the clustering of scale items for these two subdomains and the tone of the items, it is anticipated that aversive heterosexism would have a moderate to strong relationship with hostile heterosexism, while amnestic heterosexism would have only a weak to moderate relationship.

Of the 44 items tested, 20 items were dropped either due to factor loadings of less than .50 or due to ambiguous loadings onto two or more subdomains. This resulted in a 24-item scale covering the four subdomains: paternalistic heterosexism, positive stereotypic heterosexism, aversive heterosexism, and amnestic heterosexism.

Factor 1 accounted for 48.7% of the variance in the measured variables, factor 2 accounted for 30.2%, factor 3 accounted for 15.1%, and the final factor for 8.8%. These correspond to the four subdomains of paternalistic, positive stereotypic, aversive, and amnestic heterosexism, respectively. See Table 4.5 for the items of the MHI (v.4) and their factor loadings.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Factor</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Paternalistic Heterosexism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I would prefer my DAUGHTER NOT be homosexual because she would <em>unfairly</em> be stopped from adopting children. I would prefer my DAUGHTER NOT be a homosexual because she would face <em>unfair</em> discrimination. I would prefer my DAUGHTER NOT be homosexual because religious institutions <em>unfairly</em> reject lesbians. I would prefer my SON NOT be homosexual because most churches would <em>unfairly</em> reject him. I would prefer my SON NOT be homosexual because it would be <em>unfairly</em> harder for him to adopt or have children. I would prefer my SON NOT be a homosexual because he would <em>unfairly</em> be denied the right to marry the man he loved. I would prefer my SON NOT be homosexual because he would be <em>unfairly</em> discriminated against.</td>
<td>-0.86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Item</td>
<td>Factor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Paternalistic Heterosexism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Gay men should stop shoving their lifestyle down everyone's throat.</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Lesbianism is given too much attention in today's society.</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Lesbians make far too much noise about their sexuality.</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Lesbians have become too radical in their demands. Things would be better if lesbians quit trying to force their lifestyle on everyone else.</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. There is too much attention given to gay men on television and in the media.</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. Discrimination against lesbians is virtually non-existent in today's society.</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. Most people treat lesbians as fairly as they treat everyone else.</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15. Gay men are treated as fairly as everyone else in today's society.</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16. Gay men no longer face discrimination in the U.S.</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### TABLE 4.5 (continued)

ITEMS AND FACTOR LOADINGS OF THE MULTIDIMENSIONAL HETEROSEXISM INVENTORY (v.4)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Paternalistic Heterosexism</th>
<th>Aversive Heterosexism</th>
<th>Amnestic Heterosexism</th>
<th>Positive Stereotypic Heterosexism</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>18. Lesbians are better than heterosexual women at physically defending themselves.</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>.82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19. Lesbians excel at outdoor activities more than heterosexual women.</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>.79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20. Lesbians are better than heterosexual women at auto maintenance and repair.</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21. Gay men are more compassionate than heterosexual men.</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22. Gay men take better care of their bodies than heterosexual men.</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23. Lesbians are more independent than heterosexual women.</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>.65</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Descriptive Statistics and Reliability. In order to standardize the various subdomains which have different numbers of items, the sum of the subscale was divided by the number of items on the subscale to obtain an average score (from 1 to 7, with 7 being the highest endorsement of the items in the subdomain). The range for the 7-item Paternalistic Heterosexism subscale scores ranged from 0 to 7,\(^52\) and has a mean of 3.7 with a standard deviation of 2.25. The Positive Stereotypic Heterosexism subscale consists of six items with a range from 1.17 to 7 in the sample. It has a mean of 4.9 and a standard deviation of 1.27. The six-item Aversive Heterosexism subscale has scores in the sample ranging from 1 to 7, a mean of 4.1 and a standard deviation of 1.45. The last subscale, the four-item Amnestic Heterosexism subscale has a range from 1 to 6.5 in the sample, has the lowest mean at 2.5, and the smallest standard deviation at 1.10.

The Cronbach’s alpha for the scale was calculated at .80, with internal consistency estimates of .94, .87, .91, and .79 for the Paternalistic Heterosexism, Positive Stereotypic Heterosexism, Aversive Heterosexism, and Amnestic Heterosexism subscales, respectively. All the subscales and the scale as a whole demonstrate adequate internal consistency.

4.25 Study Four – Hypotheses Testing

Apathetic heterosexism. Since the theorized apathetic heterosexism subdomain emerged as the two distinct subdomains of aversive heterosexism and amnestic heterosexism instead of one subdomain, the hypotheses predicted for apathetic heterosexism will be utilized in testing the two new subdomains. Evidence of difference

\(^{52}\) The format of the Paternalistic Heterosexism subscale questions allow for someone to indicate that they are “okay with having a gay kid.” If they indicate that response on all 7 items then they are assigned a score of zero for the subscale.
in direction of relationship or in terms of strength will be further evidence of the distinctness of the two subdomains as well.

It was predicted that an increasingly conservative political orientation would be predictive of higher levels of apathetic heterosexism. Testing this hypothesis with the Aversive Heterosexism subscale, this hypothesis is supported. For each shift toward a more conservative political orientation, the endorsement of aversive heterosexism increases by almost a half of a point (.45) on the 7-point scale. On average, then, the difference between someone who classifies themselves as “strongly liberal” and someone who classifies themselves as “strongly conservative” will be 2.70 points which is almost 40% of the scale’s 7-point range.

Examining religious differences, it was found – as predicted – that seculars have significantly lower scores on the Aversive Heterosexism subscale than do conservative Protestants. However, it had not been anticipated that both liberal Protestants and Catholics would also significantly differentiate themselves from conservative Protestants on this subscale. This may be partially explained by the shift from apathetic heterosexism to aversive heterosexism. Aversive heterosexism is the most extreme component of apathetic heterosexism, while amnestic heterosexism is the less extreme component.

The third hypothesis related to apathetic heterosexism was a predicted positive relationship between it and hostile sexism. This hypothesis was supported with aversive heterosexism, with hostile sexism explaining 31.3% of the variability in the Aversive Heterosexism subscale. Clearly, hostile sexism has an overlap with aversive heterosexism. Table 4.6 displays all the hypotheses tests completed for aversive heterosexism.
Examine the same three hypotheses for amnestic heterosexism, similar results emerge. More conservative politics predicts greater endorsement of the Amnestic Heterosexism subscale items, seculars are significantly lower on the subscale than are conservative Protestants, and there is a significant, positive relationship between hostile sexism and amnestic heterosexism. While all three hypotheses are supported, they are weaker effects than were found with aversive heterosexism. In addition, liberal Protestants do not differ from conservative Protestants in their endorsement of amnestic heterosexism, although Catholics (along with seculars as already mentioned) are significantly lower than conservative Protestants. Results can be found displayed in Table 4.7.
### Table 4.7

Regression Analyses for Amnestic Heterosexism (MHI v.4) on Political Ideology, Religious Tradition and Hostile Sexism

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Political Ideology</td>
<td>.166***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catholic</td>
<td>-.278**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.0249)</td>
<td>(.1007)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mainline/Liberal Protestant</td>
<td>-.126</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.1447)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Non-Christian</td>
<td>.090</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.3344)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secular</td>
<td>-.433***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.1339)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hostile Sexism</td>
<td></td>
<td>.324***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(.0339)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>1.824***</td>
<td>2.683***</td>
<td>1.203***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.1097)</td>
<td>(.0730)</td>
<td>(.1415)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R²</td>
<td>.065</td>
<td>.022</td>
<td>.126</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>645</td>
<td>642</td>
<td>640</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001 (two-tailed tests). Standard errors in parentheses.

**Paternalistic heterosexism.** Two hypotheses were made regarding the Paternalistic Heterosexism subscale. First it was predicted that increases in political conservativism would be associated with lower levels of paternalistic heterosexism as paternalistic heterosexism is concerned with *unfair* discrimination against lesbians and gay men. However, this did not turn out to be the case. Rather greater levels of political conservativism predicted higher levels of paternalistic heterosexism. (See Table 4.8, Model 1). This is in contrast to the findings in Study 3 where the opposite pattern was found.

A number of possible explanations for the difference exist. The first is that the differences have emerged because Paternalistic Heterosexism subscale in MHI (v.3) did not differentiate attitudes toward gay men and attitudes toward lesbians, while MHI (v.4),...
TABLE 4.8

REGRESSION ANALYSES OF PATERNALISTIC HETEROSEXISM SUBSCALE (MHI, v.4) ON POLITICAL IDEOLOGY AND HOSTILE SEXISM

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model</th>
<th>Political Ideology</th>
<th>Hostile Sexism</th>
<th>Constant</th>
<th>R²</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Model 1</td>
<td>.133* (.0528)</td>
<td>.418*** (.0728)</td>
<td>3.158*** (.2323)</td>
<td>.010</td>
<td>642</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Model 1b</td>
<td>.088 (.0663)</td>
<td>-.162*** (.0437)</td>
<td>3.294*** (.2872)</td>
<td>.004</td>
<td>453</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Model 1c</td>
<td>.139* (.0685)</td>
<td>.418*** (.3037)</td>
<td>3.065*** (.2966)</td>
<td>.009</td>
<td>452</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Model 1d</td>
<td>.165* (.0912)</td>
<td>5.118*** (.4176)</td>
<td>3.176*** (.4176)</td>
<td>.017</td>
<td>452</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Model 1e</td>
<td>.193* (.0963)</td>
<td>5.118*** (.4411)</td>
<td>3.031*** (.4411)</td>
<td>.021</td>
<td>191</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Model 1f</td>
<td>-.162*** (.0437)</td>
<td>5.118*** (.2000)</td>
<td>5.118*** (.2000)</td>
<td>.025</td>
<td>191</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Model 2</td>
<td>.193* (.0963)</td>
<td>5.118*** (.2000)</td>
<td>5.118*** (.2000)</td>
<td>.025</td>
<td>537</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Model 2b</td>
<td>-.162*** (.0437)</td>
<td>5.118*** (.2000)</td>
<td>5.118*** (.2000)</td>
<td>.025</td>
<td>537</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NOTE: Note. ^ p<.10 *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001 (two-tailed tests). Standard errors in parentheses.

1Predicting paternalistic heterosexism toward gay men, female respondents only.
2Predicting paternalistic heterosexism toward lesbians, female respondents only.
3Predicting paternalistic heterosexism toward gay men, male respondents only.
4Predicting paternalistic heterosexism toward lesbians, male respondents only.
5Predicting paternalistic heterosexism, dropping respondents who report being okay with having a gay child.
which was used in study 4 does. Gender of the target for the attitude may be partially responsible for this pattern. Rerunning the analyses separating paternalistically heterosexist attitudes about lesbians from those about gay man, however, finds the same pattern maintained in predicting attitudes regardless of whether it was only for lesbians or only for gay men: increased political conservatism is associated with increased paternalistic heterosexism. (Analysis not included in Table 4.8).

The second possibility is that differences may exist based on the gender of the respondents, as well. First, examining the patterns for female respondents, the same pattern holds in predicting paternalistic attitudes toward lesbians, but not in predicting paternalistic attitudes toward gay men. Increasing levels of conservatism among women is associated with increased paternalistic attitudes toward lesbians, but is not a significant predictor of increased paternalistic attitudes toward men. (See Table 4.8, Models 1b and 1c.)

Likewise, this differentiated pattern evolved for the male respondents. Males who classified themselves as more conservative expressed greater levels of paternalistic heterosexism toward lesbians, while no significant differences emerged in paternalistic heterosexism toward gay men based on political conservatism. (See Table 4.8, Models 1c and 1d).

A third possible explanation for the differences between study 3 and study 4 regarding this empirical relationship is that the manner in which respondents who are okay with having a gay or lesbian child were handled in the survey administration changed. In MHI (v.3) a skip pattern was utilized so that those who expressed no preference in terms of the child’s sexual orientation did not answer the Paternalistic
Heterosexism subscale items. Those respondents were assigned a score of 0 on paternalistic heterosexism. However, in MHI (v.4) all respondents answered all the questions of the Paternalistic Heterosexism subscale, but were also given the opportunity to indicate that they were “Okay with a Gay Kid.” Only those who indicated that they were okay with having a gay child on every paternalistic heterosexism question received a zero as their score. (Approximately 16% of the sample indicated that they were okay having a gay or lesbian child on every paternalistic heterosexism question.)

To determine if this change in survey structure might be responsible for the difference between Study 3 and Study 4 findings, the analyses were rerun once again, but this time those who had a score of zero were eliminated from the analyses. This time the originally predicted pattern emerged and was significant at the .001 level. (See Table 4.8, Model 1f.) Those with a more conservative political ideology scored endorsed significantly lower levels of paternalistic heterosexism than those who were less conservative.

While it appears that both changes to the scale may have contributed to the difference between studies 3 and 4, examination of the strength of the effects indicates that the elimination of the skip pattern may have been the larger contributing factor of the two.

The second hypothesis regarding the Paternalistic Heterosexism subscale predicted that higher levels of hostile sexism would be associated with higher levels of paternalistic heterosexism. This hypothesis was supported with the full sample. (See Table 4.8, Model 2). To further test the relationship, respondents who indicated that they
were okay having a gay child were dropped from the sample and the analysis was rerun. The finding maintained significance at the .05 level. See Table 4.8, Model 2b.

*Positive stereotypic heterosexism.* Three hypotheses were proffered regarding positive stereotypic heterosexism. The prediction that those with higher levels of hostile sexism would have lower levels of endorsement of positive stereotypes of lesbians and gay men was supported (Table 4.9, Model 2), as was the prediction that political orientation should not be related to endorsement of positive stereotypes (Table 4.9, Model 3). The third hypothesis, that males would score higher on Positive Stereotypic Heterosexism, was not supported however. (See Table 4.9, Model 1.) In fact, the opposite pattern emerged. Males endorsed positive stereotypes significantly *less* than did females.

To better understand this finding, the analyses were rerun dividing the endorsement of positive stereotypes of gay men from those of lesbians. This closer examination of the relationship indicates that male and female respondents did not differ on their endorsement of positive stereotypes of gay men. (See Table 4.9, Model 1b). They were, however, significantly different in their endorsement of positive stereotypes of lesbians (Table 4.9, Model 1c). Male respondents reported higher levels of endorsement of positive stereotypes of lesbians than did female respondents.

4.26 Discussion.

The differentiation of attitudes toward lesbians from those toward gay men has improved the Multidimensional Heterosexism Inventory’s ability to discern important differences in levels of heterosexism depending on the target of the attitude, and, at times, the gender of the respondent combined with the gender of the target of the attitude. In
addition, a factor structure analysis with a larger sample identified two separate factors that had previously been combined into the subdomain of apathetic heterosexism. While not all hypotheses were supported, the majority were. Those that weren’t appear to be related to either structural changes in the survey instrument itself or to the differentiation of attitudes by gender of the target.

Further validation of the instrument, as well as, inquiry into the relationships around both paternalistic and positive stereotypic heterosexism is needed in order to better understand how these subdomains of modern prejudice function.

4.27 Conclusion.

The Multidimensional Heterosexism Inventory (v.4) builds on previous literature regarding attitudes towards lesbians and gay men and expands the conceptualization of
heterosexism to include four additional subdomains in addition to the one normally
captured by existing instruments. One of these additional subdomains, aversive
heterosexism, has been the subject of one other attitude scale, the Modern
Homonegativity Scale (Morrison and Morrison 2002), while the other three, paternalistic
heterosexism, positive stereotypic heterosexism, and amnestic heterosexism have not
been captured by scales in the existing literature.

This project extends the work of numerous scholars working in the arena of
modern racism and sexism into the realm of heterosexism and models two of the initial
subscales on the work of Glick and Fiske (1996) and their Ambivalent Sexism Inventory.
It also answers the call of a number of researchers (Morrison and Morrison 2002;
O’Donohue and Caselles 1993; Szczerba 1997; Wright, Adam and Bernat 1999) to
capture a wider range of attitudes about lesbians and gay men than is captured by existing
instruments.

The current scale is the first to attempt to capture positive stereotypes and to
examine their relationship to other subdomains of prejudicial attitudes toward lesbians
and gay men. It is unique in this manner, even among scales capturing modern racism
and modern sexism.\(^{53}\) While much work has been done on negative stereotypes – their
function, their content, and their relationship to other social psychological concepts –
little has been done on positive stereotypes and their role in the maintenance of
stratification. From differing perspectives, Jackman (1994) and Glick and Fiske (2001)
have laid a foundation on which this work can be undertaken. However, much work
needs to be done to fully understand the similarities and differences in positive and

\(^{53}\) Glick and Fiske’s (1996) Ambivalent Sexism Inventory does contain a component that they
term “gender differentiation” which it has been argued here actually does tap into positive stereotypes of
women.
negative stereotypes. The Multidimensional Heterosexism Inventory (v.4) offers an instrument that can be utilized in this endeavor when examining attitudes toward lesbians and gay men.

This chapter outlines the scale development process for the Multidimensional Heterosexism Inventory. The current version of the scale functions well in terms of reliability, construct validity, concurrent validity and divergent validity. It predicts group membership and its overall structure is supported by theoretical arguments that exist in the literature. Additional investigation of the scale will need to examine its properties when used in community settings rather than solely with undergraduates, and its ability to predict discriminatory behavior has yet to be explored.

While the scale has been designed to capture heterosexuals’ attitudes regarding lesbians and gay men, it seems logical that lesbians and gay men themselves may share as wide of a range of attitudes about their own social group as do heterosexuals. After all, lesbians and gay men grew up with the same socialization toward homosexuality as do heterosexuals. The scale’s applicability to lesbians and gay men has not been tested although it may be appropriate for use with this population given a few minor modifications.

Like attitudes regarding race and gender, the structure, content and function of attitudes toward sexual orientation are multidimensional and complex. The traditional perspective that prejudice is comprised solely of hostile attitudes is clearly called into question by recent studies on stereotype content and by theoretical developments in the understanding of intergroup relations and modern forms of prejudice. The current studies
extend this body of scholarship and offer further empirical evidence of this framework as applied to attitudes towards lesbians and gay men.

The existing literature on attitudes regarding homosexuality captures primarily only one specific subdomain, albeit probably the most common constellation of attitudes up until the last couple of decades. The force of social change has, however, remolded the manifestation of these attitudes into new forms that exist side-by-side with the traditional expression of hostile heterosexism. The narrow focus on hostile heterosexism is no longer broad enough to capture the intricacy of attitudes that maintain stratification based on sexual orientation and continued reliance on it will make the current understanding of attitudes towards homosexuality incomplete.

Finally, the conceptualization of positive stereotypes as a factor in maintaining stratification has implications beyond the current application to heterosexism. Their role has been hinted at in work done by Katz and Hass (1988) on the elicitation of polarized responses as a function of ambivalence and in the gender differentiation subcomponent of benevolent sexism (Glick and Fiske 1996). In addition the stereotype content model (Fiske, Cuddy, Glick and Xu 2002) incorporates the dimension of warmth which, for some social groups, can be closely related to positive stereotypes. Jackman (1994) – while not concerned specifically with positive stereotypes – has examined some aspects of the role that positive feelings can play in maintaining stratification based on class, gender and race. Her work, however, has not been sufficiently incorporated into the social psychological literature on prejudice and discrimination.

The recent call to examine stereotype content (Eckes 2002; Stangor and Schaller 1996; Zebrowitz 1996) is a timely one, and one that should not overlook the examination
of positively valenced attitudes toward various social groups and the role that these attitudes may play in fostering and maintaining stratification. Even so, as many of these scholars argue that the content of stereotypes matter and were it not for cultural consensus about the content, stereotypes would not be particularly problematic.
CHAPTER 5
SOCIAL DOMINANCE THEORY, SUBDOMAINS OF SEXISM, AND SUPPORT FOR GENDERED PUBLIC POLICIES

5.1 Overview

Social dominance theory (Sidanius and Pratto 1993, 1999) contends that societies have predominately been structured as group-based hierarchies where certain social groups command a greater share of resources and power, and other social groups experience a disproportionately smaller share of these same resources. These hierarchies are maintained through ideologies which justify and legitimize the stratification system, and are what social dominance theory terms *hierarchy-enhancing legitimizing myths*.

While hierarchy-enhancing legitimizing myths take many forms – such as belief in meritocracy, the Protestant work ethic, and belief in a just world (Pratto et al. 1994) to name a few – this chapter focuses on different subdomains of sexism as a system of hierarchy-enhancing legitimizing myths that work together to support and maintain gender stratification. It explores: (a) the relationship between social dominance orientation and various subdomains of sexism; (b) the relationship between various subdomains of sexism and support/opposition to gendered public policies; and, (c) the mediating effect of subdomains of sexism on the relationship between social dominance orientation and support/opposition to gendered public policies as predicted by social dominance theory.
5.2 Social Dominance Theory and Sexism

Social dominance orientation – the belief that societies should be hierarchically structured and that certain social groups deserve better treatment and a disproportionate share of resources – is one of the strongest social psychological predictors of negatively-valenced prejudice (Altemeyer 1998). Empirical studies have documented social dominance orientation as a significant predictor of anti-African American racism, sexism (Pratto et al. 1994; Sidanius 1993; Sidanius and Pratto 1993; Sidanius, Pratto and Bobo 1994, 1996), homophobia (Pratto, et al. 2000b; Whitley and Lee 2000), cultural elitism (Pratto et al. 1994), and negative attitudes towards Asians and aboriginals (Heaven and Quinton 2003). In addition, individuals with higher levels of social dominance orientation display higher levels of intergroup bias even in “minimal intergroup situations” based on arbitrary group assignments (Levin et al. 2002; Sidanius, Pratto and Mitchell 1994; Sidanius, Pratto and Rabinowitz 1994), as well as, discriminatory behavior towards the group to which they do not belong (Sidanius et al. 1994b). This relationship is robust and holds even when measures capture implicit attitudes (Pratto and Shih 2000).

Empirical work on how modern forms of prejudice function within a social dominance theory framework is a relatively new arena of research and much of what has been done has focused on issues of modern racism. Sidanius, Devereux and Pratto (1992) examined the theoretical relationships predicted by both symbolic racism and social dominance theories54. While they found some support for symbolic racism theory’s suggested relationship between variables, their examination of the data found that the relationships hypothesized by social dominance theory were more strongly supported,

54 The sample was a nationally representative, probability sample of white Americans.
and the social dominance model proved to be a better overall fit for the data. Finally, they tested both traditional and symbolic racism as hierarchy-enhancing legitimizing myths within the social dominance theoretical model.

Sear’s index of symbolic racism really functions as a legitimizing myth, and a very good one at that. [Social dominance] theory suggests, consistent with the results, that symbolic racism is driven not by traditional racism but by opposition to egalitarianism and a desire for superiority over negative reference groups (Sidanius et al. 2001, p. 391).

They further concluded that old-fashioned, traditional racism has lost its viability as an acceptable basis for public policy that fosters white group dominance.

One other study examining this relationship found similar results. Higher levels of social dominance orientation was predictive of increased levels of modern racism (Miller et al. 2004), and in an exploration of descriptions of affirmative action attitudes, Arriola and Cole (2001) found that certain affirmative action frames were related in similar fashion to both modern racism and social dominance orientation.

A number of studies have examined modern forms of sexism and social dominance orientation as covariates predicting variability in other constructs (Russell and Oswald 2001; Russell and Trigg 2004; Thomas and Esses 2004), while fewer have looked more directly at the relationship between the two. One study that did examine the direct relationship was conducted by Sibley and Wilson (2004) and found that social dominance motives combined with sociocognitive processes to undergird the gender stereotyping that results in the expression of ambivalent sexism.

Overall the existing literature consistently outlines the positive relationship between hostilely-valenced forms of prejudice and social dominance orientation. Further, it also seems to suggest that modern forms of prejudice do, indeed, function as hierarchy-
enhancing legitimizing myths, although the support for this component is much less well-established.

5.3 Sexism and Support/Opposition to Gendered Public Policies

The relationship between prejudicial attitudes toward various social groups and support or opposition to public policies that seek to ameliorate inequality has been and continues to be studied extensively within the social science literature around issues of race (Dovidio, Gaertner and Murrell 1994; Kinder and Sears 1981; Kravitz 1995; Murrell, Dietz-Uhler, Dovidio, Gaertner, and Drout 1994; Sears, Citrin, Sheleden and van Laar 1999), gender (Dietz-Uhler and Murrell 1993; Moya and Expósito 2001), and sexual orientation (Davies 2004; Herek 2000; Kite and Whitley 1996; Van der Meerendonk and Scheepers 2004). Depending on the type of prejudicial attitudes, and the specific type of public policies examined (e.g., affirmative action, civil rights, abortion rights), the scholarship has at times produced consistent findings (as is the case between modern forms of racism and affirmative action), while at other times findings are not as conclusive (as is the case with old-fashioned sexism and gender-based affirmative action).

In her examination of the applicability of predictors of opposition to race-based affirmative action into the realm of gender-based affirmative action, Baunach (2002) found that all three explanations she studied worked less well for understanding attitudes toward gender-based affirmative action than for race-based affirmative action. In fact, she found that even gender itself was not a strong predictor of support for gender-based affirmative action.
Research using measures of old-fashioned sexism as predictors of attitudes toward affirmative action policies for women has been mixed (Bailey 1993; Dietz-Uhler and Murrell 1993; Women in Higher Education 1995), while holding traditional attitudes toward women (Konrad and Hartmann 2001; Konrad and Spitz 2003) and modern forms of sexism have been shown to consistently act as significant predictors (Moya and Expósito 2001; Tougas et al. 1995; Tougas, Beaton and St. Pierre 1996; Tougas, Brown, Beaton and St. Pierre 1999).\(^{55}\)

With regard to abortion rights, attitudes toward women’s roles have consistently been found to predict attitudes toward abortion rights (Bailey 1993; Granberg 1978; Hout 1999) with those who support more traditional women’s roles or oppose women’s liberation indicating less support for a woman’s right to abortion. However, no research was identified that specifically examined the relationship between modern forms of sexism and attitudes toward abortion rights.

Like the conceptualization of racism in research in racial attitudes, the majority of the scholarship linking attitudes regarding women with attitudes toward gendered public policies has primarily relied upon the conceptualization of sexism as a hostile, prejudicial attitude. The few studies in this arena that have been completed using more contemporary conceptualizations of sexism (Moya and Expósito 2001; Tougas et al. 1995; Tougas et al. 1996; Tougas et al. 1999), have looked primarily at affirmative action policies, and have not examined attitudes toward other dimensions of gender equity policies. Likewise this scholarship has failed to decompose conceptualizations of modern sexism into the

\(^{55}\) The studies cited here used the Neosexism Inventory rather than the Ambivalent Sexism Inventory which is used in this study.
subcomponents theorized by Glick and Fiske (1996)\(^{56}\) as a way to better understand the specifics of these relationships.

### 5.4 Gendered Public Policies

While theoretically abortion rights, affirmative action for women, and women’s rights might all be classified under the rubric of “gender equity policies” as they disproportionately affect women, there is both historical evidence and empirical demonstration that attitudes regarding abortion rights do not necessarily strongly correlate with attitudes regarding other planks of the mainstream feminist political agenda (Bolzendahl and Myers 2004). Likewise support for affirmative action public policies has become increasingly contentious, and although affirmative action policies are perceived to be primarily racial policies, women are covered by affirmative action policies as well.

In her examination of gender equity policy support among U.S. political parties from 1972 through 1992, Wolbrecht (2002) demonstrates the realignment of gender equity policy issues from very similar positions held by both the Democratic and Republican Parties in 1972 to vastly different gender equity platforms in 1992. In 1972, both parties supported the Equal Rights Amendment (ERA), were silent on abortion rights, and supported some federally-funded or –assisted child care programs. By 1980, the Republican Party had embraced a pro-life plank within the party’s platform and had become fairly cold to the ERA, while Democrats maintained their support for the ERA and had adopted an abortion rights plank.

\(^{56}\) Glick and Fiske (1996) argue that benevolent sexism is comprised of three subcomponents: heterosexual intimacy, paternalism, and gender differentiation. The Ambivalent Sexism Scale combines questions from all three subdomains into its measurement of benevolent sexism.
By 1992, the Democrats supported all the major feminist agenda items – abortion rights, affirmative action, and economic and more general women’s rights (such as equal pay, comparable worth, federally-funded child care, etc.). Within the official Democratic camp, then, the full array of gender equity policies advocated by mainstream feminists and examined in the context of this study remain linked as a comprehensive package.

For Republicans, however, a different alignment emerged. While most Republicans may very well support some economic and general rights for women (equal pay, non-discrimination), other economic and general rights for women (Equal Rights Amendment, child-care subsidies, inclusion of gender in hate crimes legislation) are not supported, and, at times, are actively opposed. The Republican Party has incorporated an anti-abortion rights plank in their national platform since 19XX, and, by 1984, had also introduced opposition to quotas and “preferential treatment” (Wolbrect 2002), language often used to mean affirmative action (Chen and Tyler 2001).

Using nationally representative data, Bolzendahl and Myers (2004) examined individual level support for feminist attitudes and support for gender equality over a time period from 1974 through 1998. They found that while attitudes regarding sexuality, public roles for women, and family life have all liberalized over the time period of their study, attitudes regarding abortion have remained fairly stable. They suggest, “Abortion’s deviance from an otherwise liberalizing trajectory may indicate that it is decoupling from other issues of gender equity” (p. 781).

The evidence suggests – at both the political party platform level for Republicans and at the individual level – that abortion rights, affirmative action policies for women,
and women’s rights policies are not all viewed as an integral part of gender equity policies for women.

5.5 Social Dominance Theory and Public Policies

Social dominance orientation has been examined in the context of a wide range of public policies and sociopolitical attitudes. It is negatively related to endorsement of civil rights policies, social welfare programs, and environmentalism (Pratto et al. 1994). In the New Zealand context, Sibley and Liu (2004) found social dominance orientation to predict Pakeha (New Zealanders of European descent) attitudes toward biculturalism and attitudes toward affirmative action policies for the Maori, and Knight (2004) demonstrated similar results within an organizational context regarding affirmative action and organizational diversity policies. Examining immigration policies, Pratto and Lemieux (2001) demonstrated that manipulating framing of immigration policies to focus on dominance over immigrants or, conversely, integration of immigrants appealed to individuals who were high on social dominance and low on social dominance, respectively.

High scores on social dominance orientation are negatively correlated with being open to new experiences (Heaven and Bucci 2001), honesty, and support for international harmony and equality (Heaven and Connors 2001). More recently social dominance orientation has been shown to be negatively related to support for same sex civil unions (Saucier and Cawman 2004).

While in general, higher degrees of social dominance orientation predict support for discriminatory public policies (Pratto, Stallworth, and Conway-Lanz 1998), the vast
majority of research in this arena has either examined attitudes toward very general public policies, or specific policy attitudes regarding issues of race. Little work has been undertaken that examines social dominance orientation’s relationship with specific gendered public policies.

5.6 Hypotheses

*Women’s rights, affirmative action support, and abortion rights.* Based on the literature regarding the relationship between women’s rights, gendered affirmative action policies, and abortion rights at both the political party platform and individual attitude levels, it is anticipated that abortion rights will emerge as a separate factor from women’s rights and affirmative action policies for women. It is further possible that support for affirmative action policies for women may have also become another “stand-alone” set of policy items divorced from support for non-discrimination in employment, support for inclusion of gender in hate crimes legislations, and support for equal pay.

*Social dominance orientation and sexism.* One of the most consistent findings regarding social dominance orientation is its relationship to hostilely-valenced forms of prejudice. As such, increases in social dominance orientation should be associated with higher levels of old-fashioned sexism. However, Jost and Thompson (2000) have empirically demonstrated that the social dominance orientation scale actually consists of two different subdomains – opposition to equality, and group-based dominance – which they found functioned differently in relationships to different sociopolitical constructs.

Half of the sixteen social dominance orientation scale items refer to attitudes regarding group-based dominance, aggression and/or control, with a common theme of
the need to dominate other groups. Jost and Thompson (2000) call this subdomain, group-based dominance, and demonstrated that it is positively related to both ethnocentrism and in-group favoritism. Combining these findings with the overwhelming evidence of in-group favoritism in the social psychological literature (Branscombe and Wann 1994; Crocker and Luhtanen 1990), especially the role of in-group favoritism in prejudicial attitudes (Gaertner and McLaughlin 1983; Klinger and Bell 1992), it is predicted then, that group-based dominance will be significantly related to hostile sexism.

The remaining eight items of the scale focus on the generalized desire to maintain hierarchical relationships between social groups. This opposition to equality subdomain is similar to Jost and Banaji’s (1994) concept of system justification. Individuals who score high on the opposition to equality are more likely to justify existing social stratification and have public policy opinions that foster and maintain the existing hierarchical order, although they may not necessarily express strong in-group favoritism and ethnocentrism (Jost and Thompson 2000). Therefore, it is predicted that opposition to equality will not be a significant predictor of hostile sexism.

The theoretical understanding and the empirical evidence of the relationship between social dominance orientation and modern forms of racism and sexism suggests a parallel relationship to that between social dominance orientation and more traditional forms of prejudice. Combining these findings with Jost and Thompson’s (2000) bifurcated conceptualization of social dominance orientation, it is once again predicted, that group-based dominance will predict benevolent sexism, but opposition to equality will not.
Sexism and support for gendered public policies. According to social dominance theory prejudicial attitudes function as hierarchy-enhancing legitimizing myths to support and justify the unequal distribution of power and resources between various social groups. Based on this theoretical conceptualization of the role of prejudicial attitudes, a significant relationship between hostile sexism and gendered public policies should be found. Because this study examines three specific forms of public policies (abortion rights, women’s rights, and affirmative action policies), this prediction results in three different hypotheses. They are: (a) higher levels of hostile sexism will predict decreased support for women’s rights; (b) higher levels of hostile sexism will predict decreased support for gendered affirmative action policies; and, (c) higher levels of hostile sexism will predict decreased support for abortion rights.

Benevolent sexism – a form of sexism that rewards women for staying within the confines of traditional gender roles – should also perform as a hierarchy-enhancing legitimizing myth such that higher levels of benevolent sexism are related to decreased support for public policies of gender equity. While it may seem counterintuitive that more positively-valenced attitudes toward women play a role in maintaining gender inequality, it is important to think through the relationship between traditional gender roles and the set of public policies examined in this study. Given that motherhood, dependence on males, and staying at home, rather than entering the paid workforce are all more traditional roles for women, policies that are seen as counter to these roles or are perceived as undermining these roles should be negatively related to benevolent sexism. Abortion rights, for example, could very well be seen as counter to motherhood, while both women’s economic and general rights, and affirmative action policies could be
viewed as fostering women’s careers, and decreasing women’s economic reliance upon men. Therefore, it is anticipated that: (a) higher levels of benevolent sexism will predict decreased support for women’s rights; (b) higher levels of benevolent sexism will predict decreased support for gendered affirmative action policies; and, (c) higher levels of benevolent sexism will predict decreased support for abortion rights.

*Social dominance orientation and gendered public policies.* Social dominance orientation has emerged in the literature as a consistent predictor of hierarchy-enhancing and hierarchy-attenuating public policies with higher levels of social dominance orientation associated with higher levels of support for hierarchy-enhancing and lower levels of support for hierarchy-attenuating public policies. Decomposing social dominance into its subdomains, Jost and Thompson (2000) found that opposition to equality was consistently related to decreased support for hierarchy-attenuating public policies (affirmative action, economic equality), increased levels of issue-based political conservatism, and to self-reported political orientation. However, group-based dominance was only predictive of issue-based political conservatism and had no significant relationship with support for affirmative action or economic equality public policies, or with self-reported political orientation. Thus, it is expected that opposition to equality will predict decreased support for women’s rights, affirmative action policies for women, and abortion rights. For the group-based dominance subdomain, however, no significant relationship to any of the three gender equity policy domains is expected to exist.
5.7 Sample and Measures

Descriptions of the samples, the research protocol, and the various measures used in this chapter can be found in Chapter 2.

5.8 Factor Analysis

To test the hypotheses that support for women’s rights, gendered affirmative action, and abortion rights load on separate latent variables rather than on a general gender equity policy latent variable, two confirmatory factor analysis models were compared to determine which provided the best fit to the data.

The first represents the model where all three subdomains are permitted to load on a single gender equity policy factor. In this model, responses from all twelve observed variables represent imperfectly measured indicators of a single latent variable, gender equity policies. This model is shown in Figure 5.1. The four affirmative action policy variables are labeled affirm1 through affirm4. The five abortion rights variables are labeled abort1 through abort5, and the three women’s rights variables are labeled woman1 through women3. The coefficients are represented using LISREL’s notation by the Greek letter lambda (\( \lambda \)) with subscripts from 1 to 12. The error component associated with each indicator is represented by the Greek letter delta (\( \delta \)), again with subscripts from 1 to 12 corresponding with the twelve observed variables. Finally, the variance of the latent variable – gender equity policy support – is represented by the Greek letter phi (\( \phi \)).

This model results in a \( \chi^2 = 1213.90 \) with 54 degrees of freedom (\( p < .05 \)), and a CFI of .68. This is not a particularly good fit with the data.
Figure 5.1: One Factor Model of Gender Equity Policies
Figure 5.2: Three Factor Model of Gender Equity Policies
The second model allows the three subdomains to load on three separate factors representing women’s rights, support for gendered affirmative action policies, and abortion rights. This model is shown as Figure 5.2, and results in a \( \chi^2 = 206.42 \) with 51 degrees of freedom \((p<.05)\), and a CFI of .95. The difference between the models' \( \chi^2 \) is 1107.48 which is also distributed \( \chi^2 \) with 3 degrees of freedom. Clearly the three factor model is a significant improvement over the one factor model, lending further support to Bolzendahl and Myer’s (2005) contention that abortion rights does not load with the other issues of the feminist gender equity platform.57

5.9 Hypotheses Testing

*Social dominance orientation and sexism.* As predicted higher levels of the group-based dominance subscale of the social dominance orientation scale predicted greater endorsement of items measuring hostile sexism \( (t=6.57, \ p<.001) \), while a significant relationship did not emerge between the opposition to equality subscale and hostile sexism \( (t=1.66, \ ns) \). These findings echo the findings of the relationship between social dominance orientation and prejudicial attitudes found in existing literature, and the more specific relationships identified by Jost and Thompson (2000) on the relationship between the subscales and ethnocentrism. These findings suggest that hostile sexism is driven primarily by the desire to maintain group-based dominance, a concept closely related to in-group favoritism and ethnocentrism.

57 As Wolbrecht (2000) indicates, the three components of women’s rights that are included in this study are part of a unified platform within the Democratic party, but are not within the Republican Party. As such, it was anticipated that the three factor model should represent a significant improvement of fit over the one factor model for the conservative respondents in the sample, while it should not represent a significant improvement of fit over the one factor model for the liberal respondents in the sample. This did not, however, turn out to be the case. For both subsamples the three factor model represented a significant improvement over the one factor model.
Likewise, group-based dominance and opposition to equality worked in a similar fashion with benevolent sexism: higher levels of group-based dominance predicted greater endorsement of benevolent sexism ($t=8.01, p<.001$), while opposition to equality was not a significant predictor of benevolent sexism ($t=0.48, ns$). Benevolent sexism, too, seems driven primarily by the desire to maintain group-based dominance.

*Sexism and gendered public policies.* It was suggested that higher levels of both hostile and benevolent sexism would be associated with decreased support for all three subdomains of gender equity policies: women’s rights, affirmative action policy support, and abortion rights. First, the relationship between hostile sexism and the three types of gender equity policies will be examined, followed by an examination of the benevolent sexism and the policies.

As predicted increases in levels of hostile sexism significantly predict decreases in support for women’s rights, gendered affirmative action policies, and abortion rights. The relationship, while still statistically significant, is weakest for abortion rights with a t-value of -3.23 ($p<.001$), and strongest for support for affirmative action policies for women with a t-value of -6.87 ($p<.001$). The t-value for women’s rights falls between the other two at -5.18 ($p<.001$).

Given that gender equity policies could be viewed as undermining traditional roles for women, it was predicted that benevolent sexism would be negatively related to support for women’s rights, affirmative action policies for women, and abortion rights. This turned out to be the case for both abortion rights ($t=-3.61, p<.001$), and women’s rights ($t=-2.10, p<.05$). However, benevolent sexism was not a statistically significant

---

58 In OLS models controlling for the demographic variables, benevolent sexism did not predict support for women’s rights for the whole sample. This appears to be an effect primarily due to gender.
predictor of support for affirmative action policies for women ($t=-1.11, \text{ns}$) – a finding at odds with the literature using the Neosexism Scale to examine attitudes regarding affirmative action (Moya and Expósito 2001; Tougas et al. 1996; Tougas et al. 1999).

**Social dominance orientation and gender equity policies.** Social dominance orientation is a fairly consistent predictor of attitudes toward public policies that seek to foster greater equity between social groups. Jost and Thompson (2000), however, found that the opposition to equality subdomain of the social dominance orientation scale was predictive of a wide range of hierarchy-enhancing public policies, while the group-based dominance subdomain was related to issue-based conservatism, but not to economic policies. With regard to gender equity public policies, it was predicted that higher levels of opposition to equality would be significantly related to decreased support for women’s rights, affirmative action policies for women, and abortion rights. The group-based dominance subdomain, based on the same literature, was predicted to be unrelated to any of the three domains of gender equity policy.

As predicted, the opposition to equality subdomain significantly predicted all three areas of gender equity policies. Higher levels of opposition to equality were related to decreased support for women’s rights ($t=-5.17, p<.001$), gendered affirmative action policies ($t=-6.19, p<.001$), and abortion rights ($t=-2.44, p<.05$). Also as predicted, the group-based dominance subscale was not a significant predictor of women’s rights ($t=-0.82, \text{ns}$), affirmative action policies ($t=0.19, \text{ns}$), or abortion rights ($t=0.89, \text{ns}$).

Rerunning the analyses by gender, finds that benevolent sexism is not predictive of women’s rights support for men, but for women increases in benevolent sexism are associated with decreased support for women’s rights. This finding is in line with recent research that shows that women with higher levels of benevolent sexism tend to justify the gender stratification system more so than women with lower levels of benevolent sexism (see Jost and Kay 2005).
With the exception of the relationship between benevolent sexism and gendered affirmative action policies, social dominance theory’s anticipated relationship between the variables has been supported as clarified through Jost and Thompson’s (2000) findings on the differences between the opposition to equality and group-based dominance subdomains. Opposition to equality drives decreased support for women’s rights, affirmative action policies for women, and abortion rights, but is unrelated to either benevolent or hostile sexism. Group-based dominance does not appear to drive opinion regarding gender equity public policy, but does predict both benevolent and hostile sexism.

In turn, hostile sexism has a direct negative relationship with support for the three areas of gender equity policy, as does benevolent sexism with the exception of a non-significant relationship with support for affirmative action policies for women. Thus far, then, both hostile and benevolent sexism appear to be functioning as hierarchy-enhancing legitimizing myths. One final examination, however, is in order. Social dominance theory contends that legitimizing myths will have a mediating effect on the relationship between social dominance orientation and support for public policies. It is to this last question that our attention is now turned.

The mediating role of sexism. In order for the subdomains of sexism to be considered hierarchy-enhancing legitimizing myths within the context of social dominance theory, the subdomains must mediate the relationship between social dominance orientation and gendered public policies, resulting in both a direct and an indirect relationship between social dominance orientation and the public policy, as well as, a direct relationship between the legitimizing myth and the public policy. However,
since it appears that the opposition to equality subdomain is the main route through which social dominance theory is related to public policies, and the group-based dominance subdomain is the main route predicting the two subdomains of sexism, it is not anticipated that the theorized relationship will hold for the opposition to equality and group-based dominance subdomains when they are examined separately. As such, the relationship will first be examined using the one factor solution to the social dominance orientation scale. Then, the social dominance orientation scale will be decomposed into the opposition to equality and the group-based dominance subdomains to examine each of these domains separately. The anticipated relationships are illustrated in Figure 5.3.

The one-factor social dominance orientation scale performs as predicted with both women’s rights ($t=-5.03, p<.001$) and support for affirmative action policies ($t=-4.68, p<.001$), but does not function as social dominance theory suggests in predicting abortion rights ($t=-0.64, ns$). Hostile sexism, it seems, functions as a hierarchy-enhancing legitimizing myth when it comes to both women’s rights and affirmative action policies, a finding very much in line with the existing scholarship on both hostilely-valenced prejudicial attitudes in general, and hostile forms of sexism in particular. Greater levels of hostile sexism are associated with decreased support for these two gender equity policies. Figure 5.4 (A) and (B) illustrates the structural components of these relationships with their associated coefficients and standard errors.

Given the success of the pro-life movement in framing abortion as an issue of morality rather than the feminist frame of abortion rights as a gender equity policy, the finding that hostile sexism does not function as a mediator in the relationship between social dominance orientation and abortion rights is not particularly surprising. Much of
the rhetoric regarding the pro-life stance makes the argument that the pro-life stance is about guarding the “rights of the unborn,” complicating the classification of abortion rights as a hierarchy-attenuating public policy. From a pro-life stance, an argument could be made that abortion rights are actually a group of hierarchy-enhancing public policies with regard to the unborn.

While higher levels of social dominance orientation are related to decreased support for abortion rights in a bivariate relationship ($t=2.00, p<.05$), the addition of
Figure 5.4: The Role of Hostile Sexism as a Mediating Factor in the Relationship between the One Factor Model of Social Dominance Orientation and Support for (A) Women’s Rights, (B) Affirmative Action, and (C) Abortion Rights
hostile sexism eliminates this relationship suggesting that it might actually be hostile sexism and not social dominance orientation that is driving the opposition to abortion rights. Another possibility, however, is that the opposition to equality and group-based dominance subdomains have differing relationships with abortion rights, as such, the decomposition of the social dominance orientation scale into the two subdomains may shed some additional light on this issue. Figure 5.4 (C) illustrates the one-factor relationship.

Bisecting the social dominance orientation scale into its two subdomains uncovers an interesting pattern of relationships whereby the opposition to equality component is significantly related to opposition to all three gender equity policies, but does not predict hostile sexism in any of the three models. Conversely, a significant relationship emerges between group-based dominance and hostile sexism across the models, but group-based dominance is not significant in predicting opposition to any of the three gender equity policy clusters.

This pattern seems to suggest that group-based dominance – which some scholars have argued is similar to in-group favoritism – underlies prejudicial attitudes, while opposition to equality – which has been interpreted as a justification of stratification (Jost and Thompson 2000) – underlies support for or opposition to hierarchical-enhancing or hierarchical attenuating public policy. Given the evidence that in-group favoritism is a stronger predictor of prejudicial attitudes than is out-group derogation, the group-based dominance effect fits well with existing social psychological evidence. Likewise, the opposition to equality effect falls into line with research from system justification theory.
and the role that fear of equality plays in shaping political attitudes (Jost and Thompson 2000; Lane 1962, 2004).

Figure 5.5 (A), (B), and (C) illustrates the relationships between the two factor model of the social dominance orientation scale, hostile sexism, and the gender equity policy attitudes. While the models for both (A) women’s rights and (B) affirmative action policies do not offer additional information from the one factor model of the social dominance scale with the exception of the observation mentioned above that the opposition to equality and group-based dominance subgroups appear to be motivating different aspects of the relationship with hostile sexism and attitudes toward gendered public policies, the (C) abortion rights model does.

In the one factor model, it appeared as if hostile sexism did not perform as a hierarchy-enhancing legitimizing myth in the context of abortion rights. It was suggested that this might be a result of the ambiguity of whether or not abortion rights could be considered a hierarchy-attenuating public policy (for women) or hierarchy-enhancing public policy (for the unborn). Or, it was suggested that hostile sexism might be a stronger driving force behind opposition to abortion rights, than is social dominance orientation. Lastly, there was a question of whether or not the lack of relationship as predicted by social dominance theory could be the artifact of the two subdomains of the social dominance orientation scale having differing relationships with the hostile sexism and/or abortion rights. The two factor model suggests that it is this latter supposition that is the case.

The two factor model demonstrates that the same pattern that exists between the two subdomains of social dominance orientation, hostile sexism, and either women’s rights or affirmative action support is the same as that which emerges with abortion
Figure 5.5: The Role of Hostile Sexism as a Mediating Factor in the Relationship between the Two Factor Model of Social Dominance Orientation and Support for (A) Women’s Rights, (B) Affirmative Action, and (C) Abortion Rights
rights. This only becomes apparent when the social dominance orientation scale is decomposed into its two subcomponents. Because the relationship between the opposition to equality subdomain and abortion rights is weaker than the relationships between the opposition to equality subdomain and either women’s rights or affirmative action support, the non-significant relationship between the group-based dominance subdomain and abortion rights obscures the relationship, which it does not do with the other two gender equity policy clusters.

Turning our attention now to benevolent sexism as a mediator between social dominance orientation and gender equity policies, a somewhat more complicated picture emerges. Using the one factor model of social dominance orientation two patterns emerge, neither of which fit the relationship predicted by social dominance theory. First, the pattern for women’s rights and affirmative action support will be discussed, and then our attention will focus on abortion rights.

For both women’s rights and affirmative action support, social dominance orientation has a significant relationship with both benevolent sexism and the two gender equity policy variables. However, in both cases in the full models benevolent sexism is not significant in predicting the gender equity policy. For affirmative action this matches the bivariate relationship between benevolent sexism and support for gendered affirmative action. For women’s rights however, a significant relationship existed in the

59 This comparison is between the model in Figure 5.4 (C) and the model in Figure 5.5 (C). In 5.4 (C) the relationship between social dominance orientation and support for abortion rights is not significant, but in 5.5 (C) the relationship between the opposition to equality subdomain of the social dominance orientation scale and support for abortion rights is significant while the relationship between the group-based dominance subdomain and support for abortion rights is not significant.

60 In the OLS model with the demographic controls included, the opposition to equality subdomain does not quite reach a marginal level of significance ($p<.107$). Additional exploration in the OLS context demonstrates that the primary factor responsible for the difference in the two models is the inclusion of religiosity variables in the OLS model.
bivariate context, but the addition of social dominance orientation reduces the relationship to the level of non-significance. Figure 5.6 (A) and (B) illustrates these relationships.

Decomposing the social dominance orientation scale into the two subcomponents, the same pattern emerges between the subdomains and benevolent sexism, and between the subdomains and gender equity policies that emerged with hostile sexism. That is, the group-based dominance subdomain predicts benevolent sexism, and is not a significant predictor of either gender equity policy, while opposition to equality is not a significant predictor of benevolent sexism, but is of both gender equity policies. Even so, the pattern differs from that with hostile sexism in that hostile sexism still had a direct relationship with the gender equity policies, while benevolent sexism does not. See Figure 5.7 (A) and (B). This raises the question of why benevolent sexism is not a significant predictor of these two types of gender equity policies?

Like the social dominance orientation scale, the benevolent sexism is also comprised of subcomponents. One possibility for this lack of significance is that the subcomponents of the benevolent sexism scale have different individual relationships with the gender equity policies so that when the relationships are clustered together as the singular construct of benevolent sexism, these significant relationships get obscured. Additional analysis of the relationships through decomposition of benevolent sexism into its three subcomponents reveals that none of the subcomponents – heterosexual intimacy, gender differentiation, or protective paternalism – has a significant relationship with women’s rights. However, both gender differentiation and protective paternalism do demonstrate significant relationships with affirmative action support, but
Figure 5.6: The Role of Benevolent Sexism as a Mediating Factor in the Relationship between the One Factor Model of Social Dominance Orientation and Support for (A) Women’s Rights, (B) Affirmative Action, and (C) Abortion Rights
Figure 5.7: The Role of Benevolent Sexism as a Mediating Factor in the Relationship between the Two Factor Model of Social Dominance Orientation and Support for (A) Women’s Rights, (B) Affirmative Action, and (C) Abortion Rights
heterosexual intimacy does not. Figure 5.8 (A) and (B) illustrates this configuration of relationships.

Higher levels of endorsing the items on the gender differentiation scale – that women have a sense of purity that men don’t have or that they are more refined, for example – is associated with increased support of affirmative action policies for women. In other words, endorsement of positive stereotypes is associated with increased support of affirmative action policies for women. Could it be that this relationship represents a form of condescension toward women? The more that one believes that men and women are different – and that the difference is that women are endowed with these “noble” characteristics, the more one believes that women need help in order to succeed in the workplace? Or is it driven by the need for cognitive consistency? That is, individuals who see women as more refined do not see themselves as “sexist” and are likely to see themselves as non-sexist. And to maintain consistency, they endorse affirmative action policies for women, since the opposition to affirmative action policies is seen, at least in progressive circles, as sexist. The data available here, unfortunately, cannot answer this question, but this relationship raises some intriguing notions of the way in which endorsement of positive stereotypes of women may actually function.

Conversely higher levels of endorsing items on the protective paternalism subscale – that women should be protected from the harsh side of life – is related to decreased support for affirmative action policies for women. Given that affirmative

---

61 This notion is different than support for affirmative action because women have historically been denied access to employment and promotion opportunities because of the unequal distribution of power. One utilizes a structural understanding of the need for affirmative action while the other is more of an essentialistic view of women.
Figure 5.8: The Role of the Three Subcomponents of Benevolent Sexism as Mediating Factors in the Relationship between the Two Factor Model of Social Dominance Orientation and Support for (A) Women’s Rights, and (B) Affirmative Action
action policies seek to support women entering the work world – a place that is inherently competitive – it is not surprising that respondents who believe women should be protected would be less supportive of policies that promote women’s involvement in activities they may consider “harsh”. This relationship seems more straightforward.

So overall what do these findings suggest? First, it appears that the relationship between social dominance orientation and benevolent sexism parallels the relationship between social dominance orientation and hostile sexism – higher rates of social dominance orientation are associated with higher rates of benevolent sexism, and that this is primarily driven by the group-based dominance subdomain. Second, and again paralleling the corresponding relationship with hostile sexism models, social dominance orientation continues to have a significant relationship with gender equity policies in the presence of benevolent sexism – higher rates of social dominance orientation are associated with decreased support for gender equity policies. Likewise, this relationship is primarily the result of the relationship between opposition to equality and the gender equity policies. Third, neither benevolent sexism nor any of its three subcomponents individually appear to be a motivating factor in opposition to women’s rights, but protective paternalism and gender differentiation do seem to play a role in attitudes toward affirmative action policies for women.

Now turning our attention to support for abortion rights, social dominance orientation does not appear -- in the presence of benevolent sexism in the model – to be a significant predictor of support for abortion rights. (See Figure 5.6 (C) above.) However, closer examination of the two subdomains of social dominance orientation shows that both group-based equality and opposition to equality have significant relationships to
support for abortion rights, but in opposite directions. (See Figure 5.7 (C) above.) As with the rest of findings in this study, higher levels of opposition to equality are associated with decreased support for a woman’s right to a legal abortion. But, in the first instance of the group-based dominance subdomain having a relationship with one of the gender equity variables, higher levels of group-based dominance are associated with greater support of abortion rights. To help understand what might be underpinning this finding, benevolent sexism is again unpacked into its three subcomponents to see if the various subcomponents have different relationships with support for abortion rights. Figure 5.9 illustrates this relationship.\(^6^2\)

What surfaces in this more complex model suggests that group-based dominance’s relationship with support for abortion rights is actually an influence through protective paternalism. Of the three subcomponents of benevolent sexism, only protective paternalism displays a significant relationship with support for abortion rights. The relationships with both heterosexual intimacy and gender differentiation and abortion rights are non-significant. In addition, the direct relationship between group-based dominance and abortion rights becomes insignificant. As group-based dominance increases so does protective paternalism (women should be protected), and as protective paternalism increases, support for abortion rights decreases.

\(^6^2\) In the OLS models with the demographic controls included, the group-based dominance subdomain is not significance \((p<.634)\). Additional exploration indicates that the religiosity and religious tradition variables are responsible for the differences between the two types of models. Removal of the these variables results in marginal significance \((p<.071)\) for the the group-based dominance subdomain \((p<.161)\). Given the relationship between religion and support/opposition to abortion rights, these findings are not surprising.
Because of the intricacies of these findings, two summary tables have been developed to assist the reader in synthesizing the results. Table 5.1 contains the summary information for the subdomain of hostile sexism, and Table 5.2 contains the summary information for the subcomponents of the subdomain of benevolent sexism.

5.10 Conclusion

While the relationship of hostile sexism performs as a hierarchy-enhancing legitimizing myth as predicted by social dominance theory, the relationship between social dominance orientation, benevolent sexism and gender equity policies is not as straightforward as suggested by the theory. First, in agreement with Jost and Thompson’s (2000) findings, the social dominance orientation scale appears to capture two distinct, but correlated constructs that sometimes perform differently based on context. The.
opposition to equality subdomain appears to be the motivating force behind attitudes toward gender equity policies, while the group-based dominance subdomain demonstrates the strongest relationship with both hostiley valenced and positively valenced prejudicial attitudes toward women. Group-based dominance appears to function similarly to in-group bias as outlined in the social psychological scholarship, whereas opposition to equality seems to perform as a way to justify or legitimize social stratification.

Second, the subcomponents of the benevolent sexism subdomain of the Ambivalent Sexism Inventory also seem to work in different ways based on context. There was at least one situation where using the benevolent sexism subscale as a single combined scale obscured the relationship of two of its subcomponents with public policy attitudes, that of protective paternalism and gender differentiation with support for
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Social Dominance</th>
<th>Heterosexual Intimacy</th>
<th>Benevolent Sexism</th>
<th>Gender Equity Policies</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Abortion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opposition to Equality</td>
<td>ns</td>
<td>ns</td>
<td>ns</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group-based Dominance</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heterosexual Intimacy</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benevolent Sexism</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protective paternalism</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
affirmative action policies for women. While theoretically and empirically the benevolent sexism subscale of the Ambivalent Sexism Inventory might seem to function best as a consolidated scale of its three subcomponents, researchers may want to unpack the subscale into its subcomponents as a matter of standard operating procedure to insure that important relationships are not being obscured.

Third, benevolent sexism does not consistently perform as a hierarchy-enhancing legitimizing myth as outlined by social dominance theory. Using the one factor structure suggested by Sidanius and Pratto (1999), social dominance orientation does not maintain a direct relationship with abortion rights when benevolent sexism is added to the model. Even putting aside this finding regarding abortion rights, benevolent sexism does not predict either support for women’s rights or affirmative action once social dominance orientation is added to the model.63

These findings raise a number of questions. Is it possible that benevolent sexism does not function as predicted by social dominance theory, while other forms of modern prejudice do, especially given initial work on modern racism that seems to support the legitimizing myths component of social dominance theory? Would, for example, Morrison and Morrison’s (2002) Modern Homonegativity function as predicted? Or perhaps other forms of modern sexism such as neosexism would do so, while benevolent sexism does not? Or could it be that modern forms of prejudice do not function as predicted by social dominance theory, and the initial findings regarding modern racism are, in fact, an anomaly?

63 Decomposition of the benevolent sexism factor into its subcomponents, however, does uncover a relationship between both the gender differentiation and chivalrous paternalism subscales and support for affirmative action.
It could also be possible that certain specific subcomponents of modern prejudice do indeed function as hierarchy-legitimating myths, while other subcomponents do not. For example, the heterosexual intimacy subcomponent of benevolent sexism did not function as predicted, while the gender differentiation and protective paternalism subcomponents came closer to functioning in the manner predicted by social dominance theory.

If modern forms of prejudice do not function in the manner suggested by social dominance theory, what other ways might they function? For example, a recent study by Kay, Jost, and Young (2005) found support for a convergence between system threat and stereotype activation that appears to at least partially explain how “victim-enhancing stereotypes” may play a role in maintaining systems of stratification.

Finally, positively valenced stereotypes may actually function in conjunction with more traditional hostile forms of prejudice. Some scholars have suggested that some positively-valenced attitudes toward traditionally disenfranchised groups might function as a more “liberal” form of prejudice (Cooper 2001; Vieux 1997). If this were the case we would anticipate that more modern forms of prejudice might display a relationship with public policies seeking to ameliorate inequality, but perhaps only for those low in traditional forms of prejudice.

While quite a bit of work has been done documenting the change in prejudicial attitudes and the relationship of these new attitudes to certain psychological constructs and sociopolitical attitudes, little has been undertaken that attempts to help us understand how these new prejudicial attitudes might function to support and maintain different forms of stratification. There is clearly much left to be done as we grapple with
understanding the complexity of how modern forms of prejudice function differently than do more traditional forms of prejudice.
CHAPTER 6
SOCIAL DOMINANCE THEORY, SUBDOMAINS OF HETEROSEXISM, AND SUPPORT FOR LESBIAN AND GAY RIGHTS

6.1 Overview

This chapter extends the examination of the subdomains of modern forms of prejudice in the social dominance theoretical framework that was started in Chapter 5 using the arena of gender and sexism, into the realm of sexual orientation and heterosexism. By examining the same relationships using a different social group and different form of prejudicial attitudes, the previous chapter’s findings may be strengthened, challenged or qualified. Because the relationship between men and women as social groups differs from the relationship between lesbians and gay men, and heterosexuals as social groups, similar findings may suggest that the underlying processes are more about dynamics between high-status and low-status groups rather than dynamics specific to the realm of either gender or sexual orientation. Different findings, on the other hand, may indicate that the processes differ based on the form of intergroup relations that exist between the high-status and low-status group.

A review of the literature will outline, first, what is known of the relationship between social dominance theory and both hostile and modern forms of heterosexism, followed by findings relating attitudes toward lesbians and gay men to support
for/opposition to lesbian and gay rights. And, finally, the relationship between social dominance theory and public policies regard lesbians and gay men.

6.2 Social Dominance Theory and Heterosexism

As mentioned in previous chapters, social dominance orientation is the belief that societies should be hierarchically structured and that certain social groups deserve better treatment and a disproportionate share of resources, and is one of the strongest predictors of negatively-valenced prejudice (Altemeyer 1998). Using various measures of hostile heterosexism (e.g., Attitudes Toward Lesbians and Gays (Herek 1988), Heterosexual Attitudes Toward Homosexuals (1980)), a few studies have demonstrated that higher levels of social dominance orientation are associated with increased levels of traditional, anti-gay prejudice (Killianski 2003; Pratto et al. 2000; Whitley and Ægisdottir 2000; Whitley and Lee 2000).

While anti-egalitarianism and social dominance orientation are not the same theoretical concept, they are closely related, and attitudes toward egalitarianism have occasionally been used as a proxy for social dominance orientation (Sidanius and Pratto 1999). In line with the findings on social dominance orientation and hostile heterosexism, the empirical scholarship has consistently found that anti-lesbian/anti-gay attitudes are associated with anti-egalitarian attitudes and values, or conversely that pro-gay attitudes are associated with egalitarian attitudes (Biernat, Vescio, Theno, and Crandall 1996; Brewer 2003; Wilcox and Wolpert 1996 2000). Hegarty, Pratto, and Lemieux (2004) have argued – much in line with the symbolic racism literature – that a tension exists between the norm of egalitarianism and anti-gay affect resulting in what they call
heterosexist ambivalence. Likewise Ellis (2002) found high levels of endorsement of egalitarianism, but a lack of commitment when it clashes with one’s ideological beliefs regarding lesbians and gay men among a sample of undergraduate students.

Only one study has been conducted that examines subdomains other than hostile heterosexism and social dominance orientation. Worthington and colleagues (2004) examined five subdomains of heterosexuals’ attitudes toward lesbians and gay men based on their conceptualization of a multidimensional structure of current attitudes. Two of those subdomains – “Hate” and “Religious Conflict” – mirror traditional forms of hostile heterosexism, and in line with previous findings using more established hostile heterosexism measurement instruments, higher levels of social dominance orientation were significantly correlated with both subdomains. One subdomain, “Knowledge of LGB History, Symbols, and Community”, captured the respondent’s awareness of lesbian and gay culture and was – as expected – negatively related to social dominance orientation. Those with increased awareness tended to be more knowledgeable about lesbian and gay culture and tended to have lower levels of social dominance orientation. Likewise the two remaining subdomains were also negatively related to social dominance orientation. They captured support for lesbian and gay civil rights, and what the authors termed “Internalized Affirmation.” Internalized Affirmation is a five-item factor which reflects “a personalized affirmativeness and a willingness to engage in proactive social activism” (p. 108).

While there is not extensive research on modern forms of prejudice within a social dominance theoretical framework what has been done has examined symbolic racism (Miller et al. 2004; Sidanius et al. 1992; see relatedly, Arriola and Cole 2001) or
modern sexism (Sibley and Wilson 2004). These studies have tended to support social dominance theory’s understanding of prejudicial attitudes as hierarchy-enhancing legitimizing myths. And, while Worthington’s team’s (2004) study found relationships in the expected directions between subdomains of modern heterosexism and social dominance orientation, their study did not examine the full theoretical relationship postulated by social dominance orientation’s definition of legitimizing myths (e.g., the mediating effect of modern prejudice on the relationship between social dominance orientation and public policy support). Additionally, Worthington and colleague’s (2004) conceptualization of the multidimensionality of modern heterosexism fails to examine subdomains of attitudes toward lesbians and gay men that have been suggested as integral components of modern heterosexism by either Morrison and Morrison (2002) or Walls and Rodriguez (2002).

6.3 Heterosexism and Support/Opposition to Lesbian and Gay Rights

The relationship between attitudes regarding lesbians and gay men, and the opposition or support of lesbian and gay rights has been more extensively studied than the relationship between social dominance orientation and heterosexism. Higher levels of hostile heterosexism, not surprisingly, have been found to be predictive of opposition to lesbian and gay rights (Wood and Bartkowski 2004; Yang 1997), civil unions (Burridge 2004; Saucier and Cawman 2004), equalizing age of consent laws for heterosexuals and homosexuals (Moran 2001; Waites 2000 2001), and restrictive policies regarding HIV and AIDS (Dunlap 1989; Jelen and Wilcox 1992; Price and Hsu 1992), as have higher levels of endorsement of negative stereotypes of lesbians and gay men (Wood and
Bartkowski 2004). Saucier and Cawman (2004) further linked higher levels of hostile heterosexism with voting patterns, and Burridge (2004) with opposition to Howard Dean’s candidacy for governor of Vermont, and increased support for Take Back Vermont, an organization seeking to abolish same sex civil unions in that state.

In his analysis of the arguments offered by those supporting discrimination against lesbians and gay men, Burridge (2004) found a consistent claim that their opposition to same sex civil unions (or Howard Dean’s candidacy, or support of Take Back Vermont) was not based in homophobia, but rather was attributed to other factors. Similarly, in examinations of the rhetoric used against repeal of Section 28 in Great Britain – a repeal that would have equalized age of consent for sex for both opposite sex and same sex partners – Waites (2001) suggests that the arguments for anti-lesbian/anti-gay discrimination have undergone “refinement” such as discussion of the repeal of Section 28 as “lowering the age of consent” versus “equalizing the age of consent”.

Moran (2001) noted that opponents of the repeal spoke carefully to avoid condemnation of homosexuality – instead of talking of sin, they talked of the “lack of moral equivalence” between heterosexuality and homosexuality. And, looking at the aggregate level, Wetzel (2001) has linked international levels of heterosexism with violations of lesbian and gay rights.

Like most of the scholarship on heterosexism, the empirical work on the relationship between attitudes regarding lesbians and gay men and public policies impacting lesbian and gay lives has focused predominately on hostile heterosexism. While it is clear that rhetoric used to legitimize support for the continuance of discriminatory policies based on sexual orientation is shifting away from traditional
hostile heterosexist justification, little is known about the relationship between more modern forms of heterosexism and lesbian- and gay-related public policies.

6.4 Social Dominance Theory and Ameliorative Public Policies

While in general, higher degrees of social dominance orientation predict support for discriminatory public policies and opposition to values of harmony, openness and equality (Heaven and Bucci 2001; Heaven and Connors 2001; Knight 2004; Pratto et al. 1998; Sibley and Liu 2004), the vast majority of this research has not examined policies seeking to ameliorate inequities based on sexual orientation. The small amount of research that has been undertaken suggests that respondents higher in social dominance orientation are less likely to support lesbian and gay rights (Pratto et al. 1994), same-sex marriage (Cercedes 2003), and same-sex civil unions (Burridge 2004).

6.5 Hypotheses

Social dominance orientation and heterosexism. Based on the existing literature and the theoretical conceptualization of prejudicial ideologies as cultural scripts that act as hierarchy-enhancing legitimizing myths, it is anticipated that higher levels of social dominance orientation will be associated with higher levels of hostile heterosexism. This relationship, if found, would mirror previous findings. However, because Jost and Thompson (2000) have demonstrated that the social dominance orientation scale actually consists of two different subdomains – opposition to equality, and group-based dominance – which they found functioned differently in relationships to different sociopolitical constructs, it is further anticipated that the opposition to equality and
group-based dominance subdomains will function differently with regards to hostile heterosexism.

Given the overwhelming evidence of in-group favoritism in the social psychological literature and the more specific empirical support of the role of in-group favoritism in prejudicial attitudes, it is hypothesized that group-based dominance will be significantly related to hostile heterosexism. Similarly, because out-group derogation has not consistently been found to predict prejudicial attitudes, and the literature has consistently found that Americans like to perceive themselves as egalitarian, it is hypothesized that the opposition to equality subdomain of the social dominance orientation scale will not be predictive of hostile heterosexism.

While Worthington and his fellow researchers (2004) found that higher levels of social dominance orientation was associated with higher levels of some subdomains of attitudes toward lesbians and gay men, they also found a negative relationship between social dominance orientation and other subdomains of these attitudes. However, their conceptualization of heterosexual’s attitudes toward lesbians and gay men extends beyond prejudicial attitudes regarding lesbians and gay men, and includes lesbian- and gay-affirmative attitudes and beliefs. They include what might be considered negatively-valenced prejudicial attitudes (“Hate”), ambivalently-valenced prejudicial attitudes (“Religious Conflict”), positively-valenced non-prejudicial attitudes (“Internal Affirmation”), attitudes toward public policies (“LGB Civil Rights”), and knowledge of lesbian and gay culture (“Knowledge of LGB History, Symbols and Community”). Within the context of this paper, only negatively- and positively-valenced prejudicial attitudes are being examined. This conceptualization does not, by definition, include the
constellation of attitudes captured in Worthington and colleague’s (2004) last three subdomains.

Given the theoretical understanding and the empirical evidence of the relationship between social dominance orientation and modern forms of racism and sexism which suggest a parallel relationship to that between social dominance orientation and hostile forms of prejudice, it is anticipated – again – that group-based dominance will predict the four subdomains of modern heterosexism -- *aversive heterosexism, amnestic heterosexism, paternalistic heterosexism*, and *positive stereotypic heterosexism*. Following the same pattern identified above, it is also expected that the opposition to equality subdomain will not be predictive of the four subdomains.

*Heterosexism and support for lesbian and gay rights.* Hostile heterosexism has consistently been shown to predict opposition to lesbian and gay rights when measured by a number of different instruments capturing homophobic attitudes. Therefore, hostile heterosexism should be negatively related to support for lesbian and gay rights.

While no research has been identified that examines the relationship between modern forms of heterosexism and support for lesbian and gay rights, a number of studies have demonstrated that opposition to public policies promoting equity for lesbians and gay men has frequently been justified through rhetoric that moves away from condemnation of homosexuality as immoral (as would be expected in hostile heterosexism), toward justifications that appear less hostile. This type of shift in political rhetoric supports the argument from the modern prejudice literature that suggests that when expression of prejudicial attitudes becomes stigmatized, new rhetoric and ideologies evolves that justify the continuation of social stratification based on rationale
that may appear “less” prejudicial. It could reasonably be argued that three of the four forms of modern heterosexism examined in this study – aversive heterosexism, amnestic heterosexism, and paternalistic heterosexism – fall under this rubric. Therefore, it is anticipated that higher levels of social dominance orientation will be predictive of greater endorsement of all three of these subtypes of heterosexism. Only one additional subtype of heterosexism then remains, positive stereotypic heterosexism.

There is little in the way of empirical research to guide the hypothesis regarding the relationship of positive stereotypic heterosexism and support for lesbian and gay rights. On one hand positive stereotypic heterosexism is positively-valenced and it seems reasonable to expect that many of the respondents who endorse positive stereotypes of lesbians and gay men, might very well consider themselves non-homophobic. As such these respondents may very well be supportive of lesbian and gay rights. This rationale would lead us to the hypothesis that those with higher levels of positive stereotypic heterosexism would be more supportive of lesbian and gay rights. However, another argument suggests the opposite relationship.

As social dominance theory argues that prejudicial attitudes are hierarchy-enhancing legitimizing myths, an idea that some research on modern racism and modern sexism seems to support, it seems logical that prejudicial attitudes – regardless of their emotional valence – should act in this manner. Recent work by Jost and Kay (2005) seems to suggest that positive stereotypes function as cultural scripts that justify and legitimize existing social stratification. In an interesting experiment, they found that while endorsement of positive stereotypes of women significantly predicted increased justification of both gender stratification and stratification more generally, endorsement
of positive attributes that are not part of the cultural scripts of positive stereotypes (resourcefulness, for example) for women, did not have the same effect. They argue that positive stereotypes perform a complementary function for different social groups: as long as each social group is perceived to be good at some general area, then the system is perceived as fair. For that reason, we might anticipate that higher levels of endorsement of positive stereotypes of lesbians and gay men would be associated with higher levels of opposition to lesbian and gay rights. If this were the case across the board, then it would suggest that positive stereotypic heterosexism does act as a hierarchy-enhancing legitimizing myth, at least in the sense that it justifies and legitimizes the existing stratification system.

Given that this study is testing various components of social dominance theory, it is hypothesized, in accordance with social dominance theory, that positive stereotypic heterosexism does work in the manner predicted by the theory. Higher levels of endorsement of positive stereotypes of lesbians and gay men should be associated with higher levels of opposition to lesbian and gay rights.

Social dominance orientation and lesbian and gay rights. Here a fairly straightforward relationship is expected. Social dominance orientation has consistently been negatively correlated with support for policies that seek to decrease levels of social stratification. Therefore, it is anticipated that higher levels of social dominance orientation will be associated with lower levels of support for lesbian and gay rights.

The mediating role of heterosexism. The final set of relationships to be tested will be the mediating relationship predicted by social dominance theory which suggests that prejudicial attitudes should mediate the relationship between social dominance
orientation and hierarchy-attenuating public policies. In line with this theoretical understanding, it is predicted that all five subdomains of heterosexism will function in this manner.

6.6 Sample, Measures and Research Protocol

Information regarding the sample, the procedures followed to gather the data, and the manner in which the concepts were operationalized is covered in detail in Chapter 2 of this document.

6.7 Results

Social dominance orientation and heterosexism. As predicted the group-based dominance subdomain of the social dominance orientation scale was predictive of hostile heterosexism and all four subdomains of modern heterosexism. Interestingly the t-values for the relationships between social dominance orientation and aversive heterosexism ($t=6.26$) and positive stereotypic heterosexism ($t=5.96$) were the strongest relationships, while the relationship between social dominance orientation and hostile heterosexism ($t=3.52$), although still statistically significant, was the weakest of the five subdomains tested. Paternalistic heterosexism and amnestic heterosexism fell in between with t-values of 4.86 and 4.24, respectively. This suggests that individuals who are high in social dominance orientation prescribe to the cultural scripts of the various subtypes of heterosexism to greater degrees than do those individuals who are low in social dominance orientation. The relative strength of those relationships also hints at the changing nature of heterosexism.
The opposition to equality subdomain of the social dominance orientation scale was not a significant predictor of aversive heterosexism, paternalistic heterosexism, or positive stereotypic heterosexism as was hypothesized. However, it was significant in its relationship with hostile heterosexism ($t=3.68$), and amnestic heterosexism ($t=2.43$). Unlike the case with the various subdomains of sexism, both components of the social dominance orientation scale appear to motivate hostile prejudice and the denial of discrimination against lesbians and gay men.

**Heterosexism and lesbian and gay rights.** It was predicted that higher levels of all five subtypes of heterosexism would be related to decreased support for lesbian and gay rights. These hypotheses were supported. While hostile heterosexism had the strongest predictive relationship with lesbian and gay rights ($t=-26.76$), three of the remaining four subdomains of modern heterosexism also had strong relationships. Aversive heterosexism had a $t$-value of -18.37, amnestic a $t$-value of -9.25, and paternalistic a $t$-value of -5.21. Positive stereotypic heterosexism had the weakest relationship with support for lesbian and gay rights ($t=-2.64$), although it too did reach the level of significance.

**Social dominance orientation and lesbian and gay rights.** Were the relationship between social dominance orientation and lesbian and gay rights to follow the relationship uncovered between social dominance orientation and various gender equity policies, we should find that the group-based dominance subdomain of the social dominance orientation scale is not a significant predictor of lesbian and gay rights, while the opposition to equality subdomain is significant. This, however, did not turn out to be the case.
Both subdomains of social dominance orientation were significantly and negatively related to support for gay rights. This is similar to the findings for the influence of the two subdomains on both hostile heterosexism and amnestic heterosexism where both subdomains also were predictors of greater endorsement of that specific type of prejudicial attitudes toward lesbians and gay men. While group-based dominance does not appear to play a role in predicting gender equity policies, it does seem to in predicting policies regarding denial of equal treatment of sexual minorities.

*The mediating role of heterosexism.* In this final section of the analyses, the various components of the overall relationships between the variables are combined to determine if the various subdomains of heterosexism work in the fashion predicted by social dominance theory. If so, we should find that the differing subdomains of heterosexism mediate the relationship between social dominance orientation and lesbian and gay rights, resulting in both a direct and indirect relationship between social dominance orientation and support for sexual orientation equity policies.

Hostile heterosexism works – for the most part – as predicted. Figure 6.1 illustrates the structural relationship using Sidanius and Pratto’s (1999) one-factor model of the social dominance orientation scale. Here, social dominance orientation is positively related to hostile heterosexism, and negatively related to support for lesbian and gay rights. Additionally, hostile heterosexism functions as a mediating factor between the relationship, reducing social dominance orientation’s relationship with support for lesbian and gay rights from a t-value of -8.43 to a t-value of -3.47.

Next, the social dominance orientation scale was decomposed into the two factors identified by Jost and Thompson (2000) to examine whether or not hostile heterosexism
mediates the relationship between each of the two subdomains of the social dominance orientation scale individually, as it does with the social dominance orientation scale as a one-factor composite. The two factor model of social dominance orientation is illustrated in Figure 6.2.

In the complete model, the group-based dominance subdomain is predictive of hostile heterosexism \( t=3.48 \), similar to its bivariate relationship with hostile heterosexism \( t=3.52 \). However, the relationship between group-based dominance and lesbian and gay rights moves from a significant relationship \( t=-3.70 \) to one of insignificance \( t=-0.84 \), indicating that the primary relationship between group-based dominance and support for lesbian and gay rights is due to hostile heterosexism. This is a pattern similar to that found with an equivalent model using sexism and gender equity policies.
Turning now to the opposition to equality subdomain, previously it was found that the opposition to equality subdomain was predictive of opposition to support for lesbian and gay rights ($t=-4.56$) in its bivariate relationship, and as predicted, it maintains significance in the full model ($t=-2.39$). The drop in the t-value suggests that only part of the relationship between opposition to equality and support for lesbian and gay rights is due to levels of hostile heterosexism. Contrary to what was expected, however, opposition to equality was also predictive of hostile heterosexism ($t=3.52$) in the full model. This pattern is somewhat different than that found for hostile sexism.

Similar to the full model predicted by social dominance theory regarding issues of gender and hostile sexism, the full model examining hostile heterosexism seems to further support the contention that the relationship between social dominance orientation and support for public policies that seek to ameliorate conditions of inequality is driven primarily by the opposition to equality subdomain of social dominance orientation.
Likewise the group-based dominance subdomain is a significant predictor of the level of hostile prejudice in both arenas of prejudicial attitudes, but hostile anti-lesbian/anti-gay attitudes seem to be further driven somewhat by opposition to equality as well.

Shifting now to the modern forms of heterosexism, the full relationship of each subdomain will be examined in turn, and this section will conclude with a summary of the findings for all the modern subdomains of heterosexism. First, aversive heterosexism will be discussed, followed by amnestic heterosexism, paternalistic heterosexism, and finally positive stereotypic heterosexism.

Aversive heterosexism works in the manner predicted by social dominance theory. Figure 6.3 illustrates this relationship. Higher levels of social dominance orientation are associated with higher levels of aversive heterosexism, and lower levels of support for lesbian and gay rights. As suggested by social dominance theory’s conceptualization of the way in which hierarchy-enhancing legitimizing myths function, aversive heterosexism also mediates the relationship between social dominance orientation and lesbian and gay rights, resulting in a reduction from a t-value of -8.43 in the bivariate relationship between social dominance orientation and support for lesbian and gay rights to that of a -3.10.

Unlike the relationships found in the full model with hostile heterosexism, the relationship pattern that emerges upon decomposition of the social dominance orientation scale into a two factor model mirrors the pattern found examining sexism and gender equity policies. That is, the opposition to equality subdomain significantly predicts opposition to lesbian and gay rights ($t=-4.51$), but not aversive heterosexism ($t=1.58$), while group-based dominance works in the opposite manner predicting aversive
heterosexism ($t=6.29$), but not opposition to lesbian and gay rights ($t=1.87$). This relationship is shown in Figure 6.4.

As with the previous two subdomains of heterosexism, the relationships predicted by social dominance theory emerge utilizing the one-factor model of social dominance orientation when examining amnestic heterosexism. Social dominance orientation is positively related to amnestic heterosexism, negatively related to support for lesbian and gay rights, and amnestic heterosexism is negatively related to support for lesbian and gay rights. And, amnestic heterosexism appears to function as a hierarchy-enhancing legitimizing myth as it mediates the relationship between social dominance orientation and support for lesbian and gay rights which drops from a t-value of -8.43 to a t-value of -5.90. This model is illustrated in Figure 6.5.
Figure 6.4: The Role of the Aversive Heterosexism as a Mediating Factor in the Relationship between the Two Factor Model of Social Dominance Orientation and Support for Lesbian and Gay Rights

Turning now to the two factor model which is shown in Figure 6.6, opposition to equality significantly predicts opposition to lesbian and gay rights ($t=-3.76$), and group-based dominance likewise predicts amnestic heterosexism ($t=4.27$) as hypothesized. However, contrary to what was hypothesized opposition to equality also predicts amnestic heterosexism ($t=2.45$), and group-based dominance predicts opposition to lesbian and gay rights ($t=-2.02$). Underlying the belief that lesbians and gay men no longer face discrimination, then, is both the personality characteristic whereby one opposes equality, and the in-group favoritism expressed through group-based dominance. Amnestic heterosexism also mediates the relationship between each of the subdomains of social dominance orientation and support for lesbian and gay rights. In the bivariate relationship, a t-value of -4.56 was found for the relationship between opposition to equality and support for lesbian and gay rights which is reduced to a t-value of -3.76 once amnestic heterosexism is added as a potential mediator to the model. Similarly, group-based dominance drops in t-value from -3.70 to -2.02.
Figure 6.5: The Role of the Amnestic Heterosexism as a Mediating Factor in the Relationship between the One Factor Model of Social Dominance Orientation and Support for Lesbian and Gay Rights

The subdomain of paternalistic heterosexism functions as hypothesized using the one-factor solution of the social dominance orientation scale. Figure 6.7 shows the results of this model. Social dominance orientation significantly predicts paternalistic heterosexism ($t=3.74$), and support for lesbian and gay rights ($t=-7.96$), while paternalistic heterosexism predicts support for lesbian and gay rights ($t=-4.02$). Likewise the relationship between social dominance orientation and support for lesbian and gay rights is somewhat mediated by the addition of paternalistic heterosexism to the model represented by a drop in t-value from -8.43 to -7.96. The directions of the relationships in the full model are all in the expected direction.

Opposition to equality’s relationship with support for lesbian and gay rights stays about the same in the bivariate model ($t=-4.56$) as it is in the full model ($t=-4.79$), as does its relationship with paternalistic heterosexism ($t=-1.29$ in both models). However, the strength of the relationship between group-based dominance and lesbian and gay rights is decreased from a t-value of -3.70 to a t-value of -2.86 with the addition of
paternalistic heterosexism to the model indicating that at least a portion of the relationship is driven by this form of anti-lesbian/anti-gay attitudes. It had not been anticipated that the relationship between group-based dominance and support for lesbian and gay rights would be significant in either the bivariate or the full model. The relationship between group-based dominance and paternalistic heterosexism remains virtually unchanged ($t=4.87$ and $t=4.86$ in the full and bivariate models, respectively). Higher levels of paternalism maintains its significant and negative relationship with support for lesbian and gay rights ($t=-3.96$). Figure 6.8 illustrates the model using the two-factor solution to the social dominance orientation scale.

Comparing the results of the models examining the relationships with paternalistic heterosexism, it appears that the mediation of the relationship between the one-factor model of social dominance orientation and gay rights is due primarily to the mediating effect of the group-based dominance subcomponent of social dominance orientation.
The last subdomain to be examined is positive stereotypic heterosexism. Using the one-factor model of social dominance orientation, the hypotheses that increased levels of social dominance orientation continue to be associated with increased levels of positive stereotypic heterosexism ($t=4.53$), and with decreased support for lesbian and gay rights ($t=-8.12$) is supported. See Figure 6.9. Contrary to what was predicted, however, positive stereotypic heterosexism moves from a significant negative relationship with support for lesbian and gay rights ($t=-2.64$) to a level of non-significance ($t=-0.92$).

Breaking the social dominance orientation scale into its two subcomponents, opposition to equality follows the pattern most typically found in this study. It demonstrates a negative and significant relationship with support for lesbian and gay rights ($t=-4.60$), and a non-significant relationship with positive stereotypic heterosexism ($t=-1.72$). Higher levels of group-based dominance are related to increased endorsement of positive stereotypes of lesbians and gay men ($t=5.97$), and to decreased support for
lesbian and gay rights \( (t=-3.31) \). However, positive stereotypic heterosexism – although negatively related – does not reach a level of significance in predicting lesbian and gay rights \( (t=-0.78) \). Figure 6.10 shows these relationships.

Table 6.1 below summarizes the numerous relationships that have been examined in each of the separate models (by type of heterosexism) for the full models predicted by social dominance theory, using the two-factor model of social dominance orientation suggested by Jost and Thompson (2000). Overall the findings seem to validate some of the findings found regarding prejudice against women and gender equity policies.

First, with regard to the social dominance orientation scale, the opposition to equality subdomain appears to be the primary force behind opposition to ameliorative public policies and does not appear to be consistently related to prejudicial attitudes. Opposition to equality did predict both hostile and aversive heterosexism, indicating that these types of prejudicial attitudes against lesbians and gay men have a component of
general desire to maintain stratification in addition to the in-group favoritism of group-based dominance.

Second, while the group-based dominance subdomain appears to be the primary force behind prejudicial attitudes, it does not appear to be consistently related to support for equity policies. As with the general pattern just mentioned, a couple of exceptions to this pattern did emerge in the examination of heterosexism. Group-based dominance was correlated with opposition to lesbian and gay rights in the models for hostile and aversive heterosexism.

Lastly, in addition to their meditating role between social dominance orientation and support for ameliorative public policies, hostile and modern forms of prejudicial attitudes have a direct explanatory value in support/opposition to public policies seeking to address structural inequality, with the exception of the positively-valenced positive stereotypic heterosexism.
6.8 A System of Heterosexisms

Not surprisingly, the various subdomains of heterosexism are correlated with one another, and, as such, it is logical to wonder how the full system of heterosexisms might work together? Do the various subdomains of heterosexism function similarly when all subdomains are included in one comprehensive model? Do the subcomponents of social dominance orientation, likewise, function as they do when one considers the subdomains of heterosexism separately? To provide some initial answers to these questions, a comprehensive model was constructed whereby hostile heterosexism plus all four subdomains of modern heterosexism were included along with the two subcomponents of social dominance orientation separately. The structural components of this full model are represented in Figure 6.11.

Figure 6.10: The Role of the Positive Stereotypic Heterosexism as a Mediating Factor in the Relationship between the Two Factor Model of Social Dominance Orientation and Support for Lesbian and Gay Rights
TABLE 6.1
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS REGARDING RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN SOCIAL DOMINANCE ORIENTATION, SUBDOMAINS OF HETEROSEXISM, AND SUPPORT FOR LESBIAN AND GAY RIGHTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subdomains of Heterosexism</th>
<th>Hostile</th>
<th>Aversive</th>
<th>Amnestic</th>
<th>Paternalistic</th>
<th>Positive Stereotypic</th>
<th>Lesbian/Gay Rights</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>OE</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>ns</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>ns</td>
<td>Ns</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GBD</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>ns*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hostile</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aversive</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amnestic</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paternalistic</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Positive Stereotypic</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>ns</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*GBD is not significant in models with hostile and aversive heterosexism, but is significant and negative with the remaining three subdomains.
Figure 6.11: The Role of the All Subdomains Of Heterosexism as Mediating Factors in the Relationship between the Two Factor Model of Social Dominance Orientation and Support for Lesbian and Gay Rights
By allowing opposition to equality and group-based dominance to work through paths through all the different subdomains of heterosexism in one model, a clearer picture emerges. Opposition to equality works similarly to how it did above in that it is predictive opposition to lesbian and gay rights, but not to any of the subdomains of modern forms of heterosexism. It does, however, continue to be significant in predicting hostile heterosexism.

Here we also find – similar to what we did above – that group-based dominance underlies both the hostile and modern forms of prejudice, but not opposition to public policies seeking to foster more equality. In this comprehensive model, group-based dominance is no longer a significant predictor of opposition to lesbian and gay rights as it was in the separate models examining hostile heterosexism and aversive heterosexism.

Finally, we see that hostile, aversive and amnestic heterosexisms are all predictive of opposition to lesbian and gay rights, but neither paternalistic, nor positive stereotypic heterosexism is. Both paternalistic and positive stereotypic heterosexism have more of a positive valence than do the other three subdomains of heterosexism. This suggests that positively-valenced forms of prejudicial attitudes may not function as hierarchy-enhancing legitimizing myths in the manner in which social dominance theory suggests, leaving open the question of their relationship to the structure of stratification based on sexual orientation.\(^{64}\) The summary of the findings from this comprehensive model are listed in Table 6.2.

\(^{64}\) In the OLS analysis controlling for the demographic variables, positive stereotypic heterosexism is significant and positive. That is, increased endorsement of positive stereotypes is associated with increased support for lesbian and gay rights. However, additional analyses indicate that there is a significant interaction effect between positive stereotypic heterosexism and hostile heterosexism.
TABLE 6.2
FINDINGS REGARDING RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN SOCIAL DOMINANCE ORIENTATION, SUBDOMAINS OF HETEROSEXISM, AND SUPPORT FOR LESBIAN AND GAY RIGHTS, AS A SYSTEM OF HETEROSEXISMS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Social Dominance</th>
<th>Subdomains of Heterosexism</th>
<th>Lesbian/Gay Rights</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Hostile</td>
<td>Aversive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OE</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>ns</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GBD</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Subdomains of Heterosexism

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subdomains of Heterosexism</th>
<th>Hostile</th>
<th>Aversive</th>
<th>Paternalistic</th>
<th>-</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aversive</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amnestic</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paternalistic</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Positive Stereotypic</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>ns</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Positive Stereotypic</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>ns</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
6.9 Conclusion

In this paper, the functioning of hostile and modern forms of heterosexism has been examined within a social dominance theoretical framework. Analyses have further supported Jost and Thompson’s (2000) contention that the social dominance orientation scale consists of two separate, but related constructs. It extends this finding by testing the mediating relationship of hierarchy-enhancing legitimizing myths suggested by social dominance theory. Emerging from these tests is the pattern whereby opposition to public policies seeking equity appears to be driven primarily by the opposition to equality subdomain, while prejudicial attitudes tend to be driven by the group-based dominance subdomain.

Contrary to what occurred in the previous examination of sexism – opposition to equality does play a role in hostile heterosexism. Like the findings with sexism, opposition to equality does not appear to play a role in any of the modern forms of heterosexism. And, finally, while the negatively- and neutrally-valenced clusters of prejudicial attitudes toward lesbians and gay men are predictive of support for lesbian and gay rights, the more positively-valenced clusters are not. This raises further questions on how the more positively-valenced clusters of attitudes might be related to social stratification.
CHAPTER 7
CONCLUSION

This dissertation began as an attempt to understand how modern forms of prejudice might work to support and maintain systems of stratification. While its sole focus was not an exploration of neutrally and positively valenced prejudicial attitudes, these were of particular interest, especially given the scarcity of empirical research on their relationships with other constructs, and their relationships with support of public policies meant to lessen specific forms of inequality.

7.1 Social Dominance Orientation

One manner in which these modern forms of prejudicial attitudes might function is postulated by social dominance theory. It argues that clusters of prejudicial attitudes legitimize stratification and have very specific relationships with both social dominance orientation and ameliorative public policies. They function, in social dominance theory terms, as hierarchy-enhancing legitimizing myths. And, while many theories propose relationships and leave the researcher to struggle with creating testable hypotheses, social dominance theory – fortunately – specifies very explicit, testable relationships.

Like virtually all social science theories, social dominance theory is not wholly embraced by the academic community and has received a number of challenges to certain components of the theory. It is with two of these criticisms that this dissertation began,
finding little support for one, but finding strong support for the other. This finding, perhaps, is the first contribution to the literature made by this work: the social dominance orientation scale appears to captures two distinct, but related constructs which each drive different components of the primary relationship that social dominance theory forwards.

Jost and Thompson (2000) identified the two constructs as (a) a general opposition to equality, and (b) support for group-based dominance. Additionally, they demonstrated that the constructs functioned differently for different social groups in different contexts. The opposition to equality construct is basically a system justification component. People who are high on the opposition to equality construct appear to have a need to legitimize existing social stratification. People who endorse the group-based dominance construct, on the other hand, hold more prejudicial attitudes toward traditionally disenfranchised social groups. Not surprisingly people who are high on one construct are also frequently high on the other.

This study, however, not only replicates these findings, but extends the idea of a two-factored social dominance orientation by using the two constructs in its test of a series of hierarchy-enhancing legitimizing myths. What emerges is a general pattern whereby the opposition to equality construct predicts attitudes toward public policies seeking to decrease in equity, but is unrelated to the prejudicial attitudes. And, conversely, the group-based dominance construct predicts prejudicial attitudes, but is unrelated to public policies. In social dominance theory vernacular, opposition to equality appears to be the primary driving force behind attitudes regarding hierarchy-enhancing public policies, while group-based dominance appears to be the primary driving force behind hierarchy-enhancing legitimizing myths. Given these findings, researchers using
the social dominance orientation scale, may want to decompose the scale into its two subcomponents to insure that a hypothesized relationship is not being obscured by, for example, the group of respondents who are high on group-based dominance, but not on opposition to equality.

7.2 Modern Heterosexism

Whereas research on modern forms of racism and modern forms of sexism has been undertaken fairly consistently for the last twenty years or so, there is virtually nothing regarding modern forms of heterosexism. Given the rapidly changing attitudes regarding lesbians and gay men in the U.S., this is somewhat surprising. The second contribution of the current research is in the conceptual development of and measurement of modern heterosexism.

Four studies have been undertaken exploring contemporary attitudes toward lesbians and gay men, and what has materialized from these research endeavors is a multidimensional configuration of four forms of prejudicial attitudes other than what has traditionally been called homophobia. While a number of the subdomains were theorized from a straightforward extension of the ideas of modern prejudice into this realm (i.e., apathetic heterosexism, paternalistic heterosexism, positive stereotypic heterosexism), two of the “modern” subdomains emerged where one had been envisioned (i.e., apathetic heterosexism split into aversive heterosexism and amnestic heterosexism). Whether this split of the apathetic heterosexism construct is robust is yet to be seen.

The next contribution of this work is also related to the measurement and conceptualization of modern forms of prejudice as well: the inclusion of positive
stereotypes as a specific domain of prejudicial attitudes. While numerous scholars have made the argument that positively-valenced attitudes play a role in the maintenance of inequitable stratification systems, to date positive stereotypes have not been included in instruments that seek to measure modern forms of prejudice with the possible exception of the Ambivalent Sexism Inventory (Glick and Fiske 1996) which conceives of positive stereotypes of women as a way to maintain gender differentiation. Even so, gender differentiation becomes subsumed under the construct of benevolent sexism and is not examined in its own right. As Mary Jackman (1994) so eloquently reminds us, the most effective way to maintain a system of stratification is through the use of ideologies that actually feel good to the holder of those attitudes.

7.3 Modern Prejudice as Hierarchy-enhancing Legitimizing Myths

The final contribution emerging from this project brings us back to the research question that is the primary motivator of the dissertation. That is, do modern forms of prejudice function as hierarchy-enhancing legitimizing myths as social dominance theory suggests? The answer, not surprisingly, is, “It depends.”

It appears that paternalistic sexism, aversive heterosexism, and amnestic heterosexism follow the general pattern outlined by social dominance theory, while gender differentiation, the belief in the necessity of heterosexual intimacy, paternalistic heterosexism and positive stereotypic heterosexism do not. As attitudes that support social stratification, then, increases in ideas such as the belief that women need to be protected; or that lesbians and gay men are too militant; or that discrimination against lesbians and gay men is a thing of the past, function as modern forms of prejudicial
attitudes that are associated with decreased support for some gender equity policies and an array of lesbian and gay rights. These kinder and gentler ideologies appear to function in the same way as hostile sexism and hostile heterosexism, except they are wearing – in Jackman’s (1994) term – “velvet gloves.”

But what of the subdomains of modern prejudice that did not function as social dominance theory projected? Does this mean that these subdomains do not play a role in maintaining systems of stratification? Not necessarily. Numerous possibilities still have been unexplored by this project which provide direction for future research.

7.4 Future Research

Staying within the realm of social dominance theory, for example, Glick and Fiske’s (1996, 1999) ideas about and work on ambivalent sexism lead to a number of intriguing research questions. Might high endorsement of positive stereotypes function differently for people who score low in hostile forms of prejudice, than they do for people who score high in hostile forms of prejudice? In line with current social psychological findings, could endorsement of positive stereotypes function differently based on subtypes within the oppressed social group? This seems quite plausible given findings that hostile sexism punishes certain social roles (career women), while rewarding other social roles (homemakers). Concerning measurement of positive stereotypes of women, should Glick and Fiske’s gender differentiation subcomponent of benevolent sexism be expanded in scope to include a broader range of positive stereotypes of women, especially given that it was never meant to be a measure of endorsement of positive stereotypes of women.
Another line of thinking to pursue could examine the question, “How positive are positive stereotypes?” The characteristics that are assumed here to be positive – creativity, nurturing, cooperation, etc. – may not be perceived to be that positive at all. Given the individualistic, competitive nature of contemporary American culture, these characteristics may be seen negatively? Or, as some sociological research has argued, it could be that the characteristics that are deemed here as positive are indeed held in regard – but only when they are in their proper place. So nurturing women are seen positively, but nurturing men are seen negatively. This would be in line with Asch’s (1946) work where he argued that the same characteristic (intelligence) was perceived very differently in different contexts. In persons that were seen as “warm” intelligence was perceived as wisdom, but in a “cold” person, it was seen as slyness.

Another area that offers potential for additional work is in the area of mental representations of social groups. Regardless of the manner in which one believes representations of social groups are stored in memory (see Smith 1995 for thorough discussion of mental representations), most social psychological work has suggested that closely related representations also get stimulated when exposure to a prime occurs. In fact, Charles, Reed, and Derryberry (1994) found that cognitive judgments were faster for direct antonyms than for direct synonyms underscoring the importance of opposites in the learning process (see, for example, Williams and Lilly 1985). What related mental representations are being activated when one endorses a positive stereotype? Could it be that the explicit component is that person from the targeted group is perceived to have the positive characteristic, but what is left unsaid is that they are also perceived as not having a characteristic that is seen as opposite? Consider for example, the common opposite in
subtypes that one either has brains or brawn. When the stereotype of African Americans being good athletes is activated, what also might get activated is the belief that African Americans are not intelligent. This “unsaid” component does not need to be in the respondent’s conscious awareness to affect behavior and other judgments as has been demonstrated with the growing empirical literature on implicit attitudes.

Finally, to address methodological limitations, future research should endeavor to do a number of things. First, the Multidimensional Heterosexism Inventory’s performance and factor structured should be examined with different types of samples, preferably a representative, random sample. Given that the empirical evidence suggests that the relationship between heterosexism and other constructs is actually stronger among non-student populations than among U.S. undergraduate populations, the examination of heterosexisms within this project has most likely been a conservative one. In a similar fashion results from this study that have indicated a non-significant relationship between constructs are – because of this issue – a conservative test of these relationships and, thus, relationships may actually emerge in a representative sample where results from this project have indicated they do not exist. Similarly, the remaining findings regarding the functioning of the two subdomains of social dominance orientation, and the functioning of the various forms of modern sexism and heterosexism as hierarchy-enhancing legitimizing myths should also be examined with a more representative, random sample.
7.5 In Closing

The empirical and anecdotal evidence consistently indicates that the face of prejudice has changed – and is continuing to change. The shift from the more traditional hostile attitudes toward traditionally disenfranchised social groups to an ideology that may appear to be less harsh and prejudicial is embedded within a context where the open, direct expression of prejudice is increasingly stigmatized. This shifting decrease in the expression of hostile prejudice may be an attempt to avoid stigmatization, a protection of self- or group-esteem, a protection of a non-prejudiced self-identity, a desire to justify an inequitable social structure, or some combination thereof. What is evident, however, is that it is no longer adequate to talk of racism or sexism or heterosexism to indicate only hostile forms of prejudice. Doing so will likely miss a large part of the landscape of prejudice as it is experienced and expressed today.

Its changing nature also implies another caveat. The instruments used here to capture modern prejudice against women, and against lesbians and gay men will – at some point in the future – be outdated and in need of revision. Using these instruments however will create a public record of the shifts in prejudice so that we can not only understand what prejudice looks like in a certain sociohistorical context with a certain population, but we can also begin to study the factors that foster the shifts in the specific manifestations of prejudice.

Finally, the effects, dynamics, processes and content of positive stereotypes are an area of research within which little has been undertaken. Pioneers in this area like Mary Jackman have convincingly argued that positively-valenced attitudes may be more functional in the long run at maintaining the oppression of certain groups than attitudes
that are outright hostile. As we grapple with the increasing multicultural nature of our world, we must not categorically dismiss positive stereotypes, nor underestimate the role that they may play in reinforcing social stratification.
REFERENCES


Bonilla-Silva, Eduardo, and Hovespian, M. 2000. If Two People are in Love: Deconstructing Whites’ Views on Interracial Marriage with Blacks.” Presented at the meeting of the Southern Sociological Society, April, New Orleans, LA.


Foels, Rob, and Christopher J. Pappas. 2004. “Learning and Unlearning the Myths We are Taught: Gender and Social Dominance Orientation.” *Sex Roles*, 50: 743-757.


Jost, John T., and Aaron Kay. 2005. “Exposure to Benevolent Sexism and Complementary Gender Stereotypes: Consequences for Specific and Diffuse


258


Reynolds, A. C. 2003. “Religiosity as a Predictor of Attitudes toward Homosexuality.” Presented at the meeting of the Southern Sociological Society, April, New Orleans, LA.


APPENDIX I

SOCIAL DOMINANCE ORIENTATION SCALE

1. It’s probably a good thing that certain groups are at the top and other groups are at the bottom.
2. All groups should be given equal chances in life.
3. We need increased social equality.
4. Inferior groups should stay in their place.
5. Group equality should be our ideal.
6. Sometimes other groups must be kept in their place.
7. We should strive to make incomes equal as possible.
8. No one group should dominate society.
9. Some groups of people are simply inferior to other groups.
10. It would be good if all groups could be equal.
11. In getting what you want, it is sometimes necessary to use force against other groups.
12. It’s OK if some groups have more of a chance in life than others.
13. All groups should be given an equal chance in life.
14. To get ahead in life, it is sometimes necessary to step on other groups.
15. If certain groups stayed in their place, we would have fewer problems.
16. We would have fewer problems if we treated people more equally.