Reevaluating Legal Liberty of Conscience

This dissertation examines and defends American federal law’s special protections for religion and conscience by engaging prominent, particular challenges to that legal regime. First, the dissertation analyzes the effect of the United States Supreme Court’s landmark decision in Bostock v. Clayton County, arguing that its interpretation of employment discrimination law does not eliminate protections for employers’ religious and conscientious action. Second, it argues that special legal protections for religion, including when they exceed special legal protections for conscience, are defensible as promoting an intrinsic aspect of human flourishing that is cognizable to human reason and human government. Third, the dissertation defines and defends conscience as a sound ground for special legal protection, particularly in the medical profession. In all, this project seeks to show unsoundness in categorical objections to protections for religion and conscience, suggesting that debate on such protections is best undertaken on a case-by-case basis, weighing empirical effects of such protections against the presumptive reasonableness of promoting these basic human goods.