Meeting Anscombe's Demand: Toward a Moral Psychology of Character

MEETING ANSCOMBE'S DEMAND: TOWARD A MORAL PSYCHOLOGY OF CHARACTER Abstract by Liam Murphy Monahan Contemporary virtue theorists suggest a conception of moral perception, practical reasoning, and motivation radically different from that of their Enlightenment-inspired rivals. However, without a psychologically credible understanding of how it is possible for rationally limited creatures like human beings to be virtuous, virtue theory cannot be a genuine alternative. Many virtue theorists believe that being virtuous involves the possession of stable character traits that provide an agent with the capacity to consistently recognize objectively appropriate reasons for action as well as the ability to act reliably for, or because of, those reasons. What many virtue theorists fail to realize is that this description of being virtuous makes both normative and psychological assumptions that must be vindicated. I argue that no normative account of the existence of objectively appropriate reasons for action can be derived from an agent-based account of right action. An agent-based account of right action claims that evaluations of human action are derived from the motivation or behavior of a virtuous agent. I conclude that in order for virtue ethics to be a viable alternative moral theory, it must begin with a substantive account of the good. I also argue that a theory concerning the moral psychology of a virtuous agent can be constructed from Michael Bratman's descriptive account of his temporally extended planning theory of human agency. By identifying the primary functional roles played by the virtues in the psychology of a virtuous agent, I conclude that an agent's commitments can become embedded in her intentions, plans and policies in such a way that her commitments take on a central role in: (1) directing her attention to what is morally relevant, (2) framing her practical reasoning around the good, and (3) motivating her to pursue appropriate ends. When this account of the moral psychology of a virtuous agent is coupled with an adequate substantive account of the good, virtue theory stands a chance of becoming a genuine rival moral theory.