What Propositions Correspond To and How They Do It

My overall project is to develop a metaphysical framework in which a correspondence theory of truth can be adequately developed. I offer a theory of the correspondence relation and of the relata that it relates. I view this project as part of a more general investigation into the nature of facts, propositions, and truth.

In Chapter 1, I discuss what I take to be three of the most challenging metaphysical criticisms of correspondence theories of truth. One is the Problem of Funny Facts, which is the problem of seeing how certain propositions, such as ones that report the non-existence of things, could correspond to a fact. Second, there is the famous Slingshot Argument for thinking that if there were facts, then there could only be one fact. Third, there is the problem of understanding how abstract propositions could correspond to concrete facts. I argue that the standard versions of the correspondence theory are susceptible to these problems because they require that all the objects of correspondence (the things to which true propositions correspond) be concrete or else that they all be abstract (as in abstract states of affairs). I argue that if true propositions correspond to anything, then some correspond to abstract things and others to concrete things.

In Chapter 2, I develop a theory of the objects of correspondence (facts). The gist of the theory is that the objects of correspondence are arrangements of entities. I offer a formal definition of an arrangement and various identity and existence conditions. The theory allows some arrangements to be wholly abstract and others to be concrete.

In Chapter 3, I develop a theory of propositions and of the correspondence relation. I begin by offering three reasons to think that propositions are not concrete. I then put forward the hypothesis that a proposition is an arrangement of individual essences. The theory of propositions allows me to offer an account of the correspondence relation in terms of the 'parts' of a proposition being exemplified by the parts of an arrangement in the right order. (I define what 'in the right order' means.)

In Chapter 4, I defend the correspondence theory of truth against the metaphysical objections discussed in the first chapter. I attempt to show that each of those objections can be adequately answered if the metaphysical theories in Chapters 2 and 3 are true. For example, to address the Problem of Funny Facts, I identify an abstract arrangement to which negative existential propositions may correspond, and I deal with many other difficult cases, such as counterfactuals, modal claims, universal quantification, and so on.