Prolegomena to a Kantian Theory of Moral Judgment

Doctoral Dissertation

Abstract

In this dissertation, I draw insight about what constitutes a good theory of moral judgment from Aristotle and, in particular, from John McDowell’s appropriation of him in “Virtue and Reason.” Articulating a set of desiderata for a theory of moral judgment, I consider whether Kant has the resources from which we could construct a similar theory of moral judgment while also retaining what I take to be advantageous aspects of his moral theory more generally. I turn to an examination of recent work in Kant’s theory of theoretical judgment–in particular, the work of Beatrice Longuenesse in Kant and the Capacity to Judge–in order to find out what, for Kant, guides and makes possible theoretical judgment. Finding that theoretical judgment has at its core a teleological impulse to judge, I then show how this insight both can and cannot be applied to the case of moral judgment.

Attributes

Attribute NameValues
URN
  • etd-04192011-205140

Author Angela Marie Schwenkler
Advisor Karl Ameriks
Contributor Paul Franks, Committee Member
Contributor David Solomon, Committee Member
Contributor Fred Rush, Committee Member
Contributor Karl Ameriks, Committee Chair
Degree Level Doctoral Dissertation
Degree Discipline Philosophy
Degree Name PhD
Defense Date
  • 2011-03-08

Submission Date 2011-04-19
Country
  • United States of America

Subject
  • moral judgment

  • Immanuel Kant

  • theoretical judgment

Publisher
  • University of Notre Dame

Language
  • English

Record Visibility Public
Content License
  • All rights reserved

Departments and Units

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