In this dissertation, I draw insight about what constitutes a good theory of moral judgment from Aristotle and, in particular, from John McDowell’s appropriation of him in “Virtue and Reason.” Articulating a set of desiderata for a theory of moral judgment, I consider whether Kant has the resources from which we could construct a similar theory of moral judgment while also retaining what I take to be advantageous aspects of his moral theory more generally. I turn to an examination of recent work in Kant’s theory of theoretical judgment–in particular, the work of Beatrice Longuenesse in Kant and the Capacity to Judge–in order to find out what, for Kant, guides and makes possible theoretical judgment. Finding that theoretical judgment has at its core a teleological impulse to judge, I then show how this insight both can and cannot be applied to the case of moral judgment.
|Author||Angela Marie Schwenkler|
|Contributor||Paul Franks, Committee Member|
|Contributor||David Solomon, Committee Member|
|Contributor||Fred Rush, Committee Member|
|Contributor||Karl Ameriks, Committee Chair|
|Degree Level||Doctoral Dissertation|
|Departments and Units|