A Defense of Mereological Nihilism

This dissertation is a defense of mereological nihilism, the view that composition never occurs. So, according to nihilism things with proper parts (including dogs, tables, and rocks) don't exist. I give two arguments in favor of nihilism, both of which are from the theoretical simplicity enjoyed by nihilism. The first argument is from nihilism's ideological simplicity, the fact that nihilism allows us to do without mereological primitives like 'part.' The second argument is from the theoretical unification conferred by nihilism. The remainder of the dissertation is directed toward defending nihilism against objections. Two of the objections I consider are deflationary, in the sense that they contend that the debate over the existence of composite objects is merely verbal, or trivially easy to settle via conceptual analysis in conjunction with basic empirical investigation. Other objections to nihilism which I address focus on claims which the nihilist endorses to the effect that, while there are no composite objects, there are 'simples arranged composite object-wise.' These objections contend that the 'simples arranged F-wise' locution is objectionable. I go on to consider whether science gives us compelling reasons to believe in composite objects. While scientific theories are frequently framed in terms which make reference to composite objects, I argue that these references to composite objects are eliminable. What's more, specific scientific contexts which have sometimes been thought to contain particularly intractable references to composition (quantum entanglement and natural selection) can all be interpreted in a nihilist friendly manner. Finally, I address the objection that nihilists are committed to the implausible view that we (you, me) don't exist. I note that substance dualism gets the nihilist out of the difficulty. While I am aware of no good arguments for substance dualism, I note that every popular argument against substance dualism has a parallel argument against composition. Accordingly, you should not reject nihilism because you reject substance dualism. I end with an appendix defending simplicity as a criterion of theory choice in metaphysics.