Aristotle on Pleasure and Prudence in the Nicomachean Ethics

This project strives to understand the significance of pleasure and pain in Aristotle’s presentation of moral virtue and prudence in his Nicomachean Ethics. The central question of my analysis pertains to the manner in which pleasure and pain operate in moral virtue and how this is essential for the operation of prudence, the intellectual virtue that pertains to the legislative art and political science. Proceeding in this manner not only deepens our understanding of the content of Aristotle’s teaching, but also illuminates an often-overlooked aspect of the account of prudence, namely, its dependence on moral virtue and the correct disposition toward pleasures and pains.

The question of prudence has been an object of much dispute in the long history of commentary and in the contemporary scholarship on Aristotle. This project departs from prior treatments by focusing more directly than is usual on the relationship of pleasure and pain to practical intellect (nous) and moral perception (aisthēsis). I argue that Aristotle’s account of prudence suggests that the nous that grasps the end in action is inseparable from the desiderative part of the soul that feels pleasure and pain. Prudence depends on moderation because the human desire for pleasure and the aversion to pain are persistent and can alter one’s perception of the “end” in action if one is not armed, by habit, to endure them.

This aspect of the account of moral virtue and prudence is missed by those who elevate reason and forget the role of pleasure and pain in human affairs. By investigating the role of pleasure and pain in moral education, the manner in which each virtue from courage to justice interacts with pleasure and pain, as well as the role of pleasure and pain in the operation of prudence, this study serves to remind the reader of the intransigent role of pleasure and pain in human affairs and the extent to which this common-sense insight informs Aristotle’s entire approach to virtue