Kant's Argument for the Transcendental Ideality of Time

This dissertation presents a unified account of Kant's argument for the transcendental ideality of time as put forward in the Transcendental Aesthetic and the First Antinomy of the Critique of Pure Reason. Kant's transcendental ideality thesis for both space and time is that time and space are not fundamentally real entities but rather forms of intuition by which we are able to experience the world. In the secondary literature on Kant, the argument for the transcendental ideality of time is consistently and repeatedly ignored in favor of discussing the transcendental ideality of space. The ideality of time has its own distinctive issues that require special attention. My goal is to focus on these aspects of Kant's argument and to present my own unique interpretation of whether Kant's argument for the transcendental ideality of time is sound or not. Although, in the end, I argue that Kant's argument for the transcendental ideality of time is unsuccessful, it is by no means the case that all the arguments that led Kant to this conclusion are misguided. In fact, there are a number of Kant's arguments that are able to bear philosophical fruit. I discuss a number of these philosophically fruitful arguments and theses in the dissertation.