Self-Knowledge in Plato’s Apology and Charmides

In this dissertation, I argue that to understand Plato’s Socrates—who he is, what he knows, what he does, and so forth—we ought to attend to his particular focus on self-knowledge. I examine Socrates’ theory of self-knowledge through the Apology and Charmides. In Chapter 1, I use the Apology to sketch an outline of Socratic philosophy, and argue that Socrates’ so-called “human wisdom”—what is therein portrayed as something at the center of the sort of examined life Socrates evangelizes throughout the dialogues—is a complex form of self-knowledge. That self-knowledge, I contend, is a knowledge not only of the condition of his soul but also a knowledge of what is valuable, and a knowledge of how to practice certain activities that are conducive to moral improvement. In Chapter 2, I explore how Socrates’ method induces this self-knowledge in others—specifically, I argue that his portrait of it in the first half of the Charmides, wherein Socrates compares himself to a therapist or doctor of the whole soul, indicates that Socrates conceives of his practice as having the power to generate in his interlocutors positive progress with respect to self-knowledge. Finally, in Chapter 3, I look at a series of arguments in the second half of the Charmides that are widely regarded as problematic for Socratic self-knowledge, as there a theory of sôphrosunê that bears some resemblance to Socrates’ self-portrait in the Apology appears to be struck down as either impossible or lacking in benefit. I outline a variety of interpretations of the dialogue, and argue that negative readings of the Charmides are due, on the one hand, to faulty interpretations of the nature and purpose of the arguments therein, as well as, on the other, misconceptions about Socrates himself (what he knows, the purpose and aims of his method, and so forth). I conclude that Socratic self-knowledge, as I understand it, escapes unscathed.