A Foundational Theory for Neo-Aristotelian Virtue Ethics

With the work of philosophers such as Elizabeth Anscombe and Philippa Foot, the 20^th Century saw a revival in the use of virtue ethics as a model for assessing moral problems. Within this revival, those holding close to a particularly Neo-Aristotelian interpretation of virtue ethics have often emphasized the claim morality is based in the pursuit of natural flourishing (“eudaimonia”). Alongside this claim, some have argued that moral philosophy should also require a regard for absolute moral prohibitions.

In this dissertation, I seek to develop the existing work on Neo-Aristotelian ethics to better address the reconciliation of a eudaimonistic account of morality with certain absolute moral prohibitions. My main strategy is to incorporate arguments from consistency in action, mostly developed by deontological (“rule-based”) ethicists, into a Neo-Aristotelian framework. After discussing what role norms about consistency might play in a eudaimonistic moral theory, I show how my approach can help ease certain difficulties around two especially contested moral absolutes, namely, the prohibition of torture and the prohibition of lying. By doing so, I indicate how future work in a Neo-Aristotelian vein might proceed in addressing similar moral problems.